58 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012

THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The history of the Caucasus confirms that the ethnic diversity of the region does not relate to the
level of its explosiveness. People used to live together in peace and harmony for centuries here. As the
analysis shows, ethnic hatred is supposedly associated with Soviet rule. Basically, it is based on ter-
ritorial arguments between peoples. Stability was undermined by the Kremlin, which changed the
existing borders of the republics in order to divide and rule.
The situation has changed now. Russia’s rule is mainly based on regular money transfers and
military force, but Moscow has already lost its credit and role of arbiter for most of the North Cauca-
sian people in terms of peacekeeping and just division of wealth and revenue. Frequent reference to
the armed forces has created a vicious circle. The arbitrariness of the local and federal government
(siloviks) fuels resistance, while Moscow’s efforts to justify its military activity and atrocities in the
Northern Caucasus have led to radicalization and self-deception.
The Chechen national liberation movement continues to be the main engine of resistance in the
Northern Caucasus. Even radicalized, it still determines the possibilities of conflict resolution and
appeasement of the region. Thus resurgence is likely to continue until the real target is addressed.
Even if Russia succeeds in slowing it down, there is a great chance that violence will reemerge in the
Northern Caucasus sooner or later, unless the real reasons for conflict are finally recognized and ad-
dressed.

Israpil SAMPIEV

D.Sc. (Political Science), Professor,

Head of the Chair of Sociology and Political Science
at Ingush State University
(Nazran, the Russian Federation).

THE CONFLICT
IN THE PRIGORODNY DISTRICT AND
THE CITY OF VLADIKAVKAZ:
THE CRUX OF THE MATTER,
THE STATE’S ROLE,
AND WAYS TO RESOLVE IT

Abstract

A
n analysis of the documentary sourc-
es, including of the information
gleaned by a joint investigatory team
of the Russian Federation Prosecutor Gen-
eral’s Office, shows that based on the en-
tities involved and the main determinant,
the October-November 1992 conflict can-
not be called ethnic, but must be defined
as ethnic cleansing sanctioned by the
state. The Russian government bodies, as
one of the parties concerned, were not ob-
jective peacekeepers and mediators in the
Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 59
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

so-called Ossetian-Ingush conflict, which the region is to ensure immediate and un-
is proven by the 20-year settlement expe- conditional execution of the Federal Law
rience predominated by coercion. The only on Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peo-
legal and moral way to restore order in ples.

Introduction
The fair resolution of any conflict presupposes taking comprehensive account of the legal inter-
ests of the sides, being objective, and excluding actors as mediators who are directly or indirectly
party to the conflict. This is a necessary prerequisite for civilized conflict settlement, and this is what
determines the prospects for its resolution. Applying this precept in the case-study of the so-called
Ossetian-Ingush conflict appears to be heuristic both with respect to understanding and resolving it,
since practice has shown the ineptitude of the existing approaches.
It has been almost twenty years since the events officially called the Ossetian-Ingush conflict
came to pass, but the level of tension is still high. In short, the conflict has been frozen by the armed
forces of the Federal Center1 and continues to play a significant role in the ethnopolitical situation in
the Caucasus.2 After the Russian-Georgian armed conflict in August 2008 and Russia’s recognition
of the “independence” of South Ossetia, it stands to reason that the so-called Ossetian-Ingush conflict
will continue to be a key bone of contention in the region in the future.3 In this respect, new approach-
es must be found to the crux of the matter and ways to resolve it.

Origin of the Conflict and

Its Basic Determinant:
Common Sense versus
Vicious Perpetuity
The official version calls this conflict a dispute between two ethnic groups over who has rightful
claim to the Prigorodny District, the city of Vladikavkaz, and part of the Mozdok District, that is, an
ethnoterritorial conflict. However, we think that the Ossetian-Ingush dispute is a separate independ-
ent topic, although it derives from the state national policy pursued by all the regimes in the Caucasus.
Essentially the open conflict that erupted in the fall of 1992 was not simply a squabble over territory
between two ethnicities, but over the territory of a national-state formation, the boundaries of which
could not be changed without their consent (a national referendum) either under the Constitutions of
the U.S.S.R., R.S.F.S.R., and Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. in effect in 1944 or under the current Consti-
tutions of the Russian Federation and Republic of Ingushetia. All of the anti-constitutional repressive
acts of the Stalinist regime to eliminate the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. and transfer its territory have
been cancelled and North Ossetia has no legal grounds for jurisdiction over this territory.4 Conse-
quently, the conflict is based on a political dispute, i.e. the contradiction between the national-state

1
See: I.M. Sampiev, “Repressirovannye narody: sostoianie reabilitatsii,” Kavkazsky ekspert, No. 4 (8), 2006.
2
See: S.M. Markedonov, “Osetino-ingushsky dialog,” Politkom.ru, 4 May, 2007.
3
This is shown by the fact that 300 Ingush policemen dutifully resigned in August 2008 (see: “Ponuzhdenie vayna-
khov,” Novaia gazeta, No. 62 (1380), 25 June-27 August, 2008).
4
See: A.I. Kovalenko, Pravovaia ekspertiza documentalnykh materialov, otnosiashchikhsia k territorialno-po-
liticheskomu razvitiiu ingushskogo naroda, Nazran, 2001.
60 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

status of this territory as a constituent part of the Republic of Ingushetia and its possession de facto by
another entity.
By defining the entities in the conflict as ethnicities, the sides, in their striving to justify the
ethnic affiliation of the Prigorodny District, go back to historical times5 that are not directly related to
the conflict. In fact, the 1992 armed conflict goes back to the 1920s, that is, to the time the national-
territorial formations and their boundaries emerged. The Ossetians had little to do with the confron-
tation between the ethnic Ingush and the Russian Empire over the territory of the Prigorodny District
in the 19th century—the czarist authorities recruited Russians and Cossacks to carry out expansion.
The Ingush, like several other mountain peoples, found themselves victims of the colonial policy that
was expressed by territorial rearrangement, the expulsion of entire groups of the population to the
Ottoman Empire, confiscation of the mountain peoples’ lands, and their resettlement by the Cossacks.
As A. Zdravomyslov notes, “in the 1930s, a new line of fortifications began to be erected—fortresses
and Cossack settlements—called the Sunzha Line. This line passed through the territory traditionally
occupied by ethnic Ingush… Consequently, at the very initial stage of colonization of this region, the
interests of the Ingush were infringed upon.”6
The Soviet Union, already on a new ideological platform, revived the imperial principles of its
national and geopolitical strategy (and these principles were always indivisible, since the empire was
totally comprised of conquered peoples and territories). This policy culminated during Stalin’s rule,
but after the 1917 revolution it could no longer rely on the Cossacks as a privileged class. The Soviets
put the stakes in the region on the Ossetians—an important role in this being played by Stalin’s Osse-
tian origin.7 The repression and deportation of 13 “untrustworthy,” from the Stalinist regime’s per-
spective, peoples from their historical territory was chosen as way to resolve the geopolitical prob-
lems. The Ingush were among them: on 23 February, 1944, Stalin deported each and every Ingush and
Chechen to Kazakhstan and Kirghizia, including 710 officers, 1,696 sergeants, and 6,488 rank-and-
file soldiers who had been recalled from the front in 1944. The conditions the repressed peoples found
themselves in were intolerable. In Kazakhstan alone, 125,564 people died of starvation between April
1944 and July 1949.8
In the wake of this deportation, the territory of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. was divided
among Georgia, North Ossetia, Daghestan, and the Grozny Region. The Prigorodny, Nazran, and
Achaluki districts of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. and the city of Malgobek were joined to the North
Ossetian A.S.S.R. on 7 March, 1944 and settled with Ossetians. The report of First Secretary of the
North Ossetian Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party(Bolsheviks) K.D. Kulov at
the 13th regional party conference noted that “thanks to the constant concern of the Communist Party
and Comrade Stalin personally, in February 1944, new districts were joined to North Ossetia, among
them Malgobek, the city of oil workers, and the Mozdok and Kurp districts. These measures enlarged
the territory of our republic by 50%, and its population also increased.”9 The Ossetians were not the
only ones to assimilate other people’s land, but in contrast to the Georgians and Daghestanis, they did
not return the time-honored land to their neighbors and thus paved the way to ethnic discord.
After the personality cult was exposed at the 20th congress of the Communist Party in 1956, the
decades-long rehabilitation of the repressed peoples began and has still not been completed.10 All of

5
For a review of the approaches, see: V.A. Shnirelman, Byt alanami. Intelledtualy i politika na Severnom Kavkaze
v XX veke, Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, Moscow, 2006, Part 2, Chap. 8, 9; Part 3, Chap. 9.
6
A.G. Zdravomyslov, Osetino-ingushsky konflikt: perspektivy vykhoda iz tupikovoy situatsii, Moscow, 1998, p. 30.
7
[http://stalinism.ru/zhivoy-stalin/dzhugashvili-proishozhdenie-familii.html; http://www.rso-kprf.ru/index.php/
info-otdel/2230-2011-03-10-12-16-08.html].
8
Central State Archive of the October Revolution, rec. gr. 9479, inv. 1, f. 182, sheet 5.
9
K.D. Kulov, “Doklad na 13-y oblastnoy partiynoy konferentsii VKP(b) SOASSR,” Sotsialisticheskaia Osetia,
No. 30, 12 February, 1949.
10
For more detail, see: Problemy reabilitatsii repressirovannykh narodov v sovremennoy Rossii, Collection of arti-
cles, ed. by I. M. Sampiev, Piligrim, Nazran, 2009.
Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 61
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

this occurred on the basis of by-laws in violation of the Constitutions of the U.S.S.R., R.S.F.S.R., and
Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R., thus tilling the ground for an ethnic dispute over the Prigorodny District
and the city of Vladikavkaz.
It was the discriminatory policy of the U.S.S.R. and R.S.F.S.R. leadership pandering to the
territorial claims of North Ossetia that set the slow-action bomb in this part of the Caucasus. The
government bodies of the U.S.S.R., R.S.F.S.R., and North Ossetian A.S.S.R. adopted anti-constitu-
tional acts that restricted the rights of ethnic Ingush to choice of place to stay, residence, and free-
dom of movement,11 repressing all those who protested against the tyranny.12 At the same time,
people from the South Ossetian Autonomous Region of the Georgian S.S.R. were settled in the
Prigorodny District. “Assuming mass proportions, migration from the villages of the region be-
tween 1956 and 1959 reduced the population by 22,000 people. The main flow of migrants went to
North Ossetia, where they settled in the suburbs of the republic’s capital, on land they were given
by collective and state-owned farms.”13 Before 1944, more than 34,000 people lived in the Prigor-
odny District of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R., 31,000 of whom were Ingush. By 1990, a total of
40,000 people lived in the same territory, 17,500 of whom were Ingush.14 The most backward dis-
tricts in Chechen-Ingushetia were Ingush areas—Nazran, Sunzha, and Malgobek districts, as well
as the Prigorodny District in North Ossetia.15 This kind of “equality” could not suit the Ingush, and
even in the most difficult years, the Ingush people fought actively for their rights.16 The demands
the Ingush made on Moscow were set forth in the address of the Second Congress of the Ingush
Peoples (held on 9-10 September, 1989 in Grozny) to the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. and
U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet: to adopt a Law on Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples with Resto-
ration of Territorial Integrity, as well as resolve the question of restoring the autonomy of the In-
gush peoples in their time-honored historical boundaries.17
On 19 November, 1989, under pressure from the repressed peoples, the U.S.S.R. Supreme So-
viet adopted the Declaration on Recognizing the Repressive Acts against Peoples Subjected to Depor-
tation Illegal and Criminal and Guaranteeing Their Rights, which deemed deportation an extremely
grave crime contradicting the fundamental principles of international law. In furtherance of this
Declaration, the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet cancelled the repressive legislative acts with its Resolu-
tion No. 2013-1 of 7 March, 1991, while on 6 June, 1991 the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers adopted
Resolution No. 336 On Cancellation of the Resolutions of the Former State Defense Committee of the
U.S.S.R. and Decisions of the U.S.S.R. Government Regarding Soviet Peoples Subjected to Repres-
sion and Deportation.18
On 26 April, 1991, in a tough political struggle, U.S.S.R. and R.S.F.S.R. deputies for the re-
pressed peoples succeeded in pushing through the R.S.F.S.R. Law on Rehabilitation of the Repressed
Peoples, in spite of opposition to its adoption by the authorities of North Ossetia and their support by

11
See: Confidential letter of the Council of Ministers of the North Ossetian A.S.S.R. No. 063 of 17 October, 1956,
Resolution of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers No. 183 of 5 March, 1982 On Restricting Registration of Citizens in the
Prigorodny District of the North Ossetian A.S.S.R., and so on, which directly violated Art 123 of the U.S.S.R. Constitu-
tion and Art 127 of the R.S.F.S.R. Constitution.
12
See, for example: A. Nekrich, Nakazannye narody, Khronika, New York, 1978, pp. 131-132 (A. Nekrich, The
Punished Peoples. The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War, Norton and Com-
pany, New York, 1978); Resolution of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. of 13 March, 1973 on Antisocial and Na-
tionalist Manifestations in Grozny.
13
D.G. Kabisov, Rost blagosostoianiia i demograficheskie protsessy v Iuzhnoy Osetii, Tskhinvali, 1987.
14
See: T.Kh. Mutaliev, Kh.A. Fargiev, A.A. Pliev, Ternistyy put naroda, Moscow, 1992, p. 52.
15
See: Ibid., p. 53.
16
See: “Politicheskoe samoopredelenie ingushskogo naroda v postsovetsky period: istoricheskie, politicheskie i
sotsialno-ekonomicheskie faktory,” in: Aktualnye sotsialno-politicheskie i etnokulturnye problemy Ingushetii, Collection
of Scientific Articles, ISI IngGU, Magas, 2007, pp. 4-37.
17
See: Vtoroy s’ezd ingushskogo naroda, Kniga, Grozny, 1989, pp. 209, 213.
18
[http://www.bestpravo.ru/sssr/gn-instrukcii/q0g.htm].
62 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

the Ossetian lobby, still powerful since Stalin’s time, in the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.19
Unable to achieve its goals, the Supreme Soviet of the North Ossetian S.S.R. adopted a Resolution on
17 May, 1991 On the R.S.F.S.R. Law on Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples, which reserved
itself the right to suspend Arts 3, 4, and 6 of the indicated Law in the territory of the North Ossetian
S.S.R. The central authorities and Prosecutor General’s office, which could have prevented further
escalation of violence in the region, failed to respond in the appropriate way.
The Ossetian authorities were left with one alternative—preventing the territorial rehabilitation
of the Ingush people by force. On 14 April, 1991, the Supreme Soviet of the North Ossetian S.S.R.
entrusted itself with the right to introduce a state of emergency, which was a gross violation of the
Union Law on a State of Emergency. The same day, a state of emergency was introduced in the Prig-
orodny District and the city of Vladikavkaz, the motivation for which was a family fight provoked by
the authorities in the village of Kurtat. In their repeated appeals to all the government bodies of the
U.S.S.R. and R.S.F.S.R., representatives of the Ingush population expressed their indignation over
the tyranny of the Ossetian defense and security employees performing acts of terror under the sem-
blance of a state of emergency, and demanded that measures be taken. Overt arming of the guards,
militia, and other illegal armed formations,20 attacks on military warehouses, and theft of firearms
became customary practice in North Ossetia.21 However, the Center encouraged the illegal actions of
the leadership of the North Ossetian A.S.S.R.: under the pretext of rendering military aid to South
Ossetia, the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Defense supplied North Ossetia with
a large amount of weapons.22
At the same time, at talks with members of the Organizing Committee for Restoration of the
Autonomy of Ingushetia, the Ossetian leaders made a statement characteristic of the Ossetian side:
“We did not deprive the Ingush of their Homeland—the Prigorodny District and part of the Malgo-
bek District. Russia gave them to us, and if Russia adopts the Law on Rehabilitation of the Ingush
Peoples, the Ossetians will do their part in a dignified fashion—we will return your land. It should
have been returned back in 1957. Then we would not be having such a hard time today.”23 Howev-
er, this was no more than maneuvers aimed at postponing execution of the Law on Rehabilitation of
the Repressed Peoples, since the leadership of North Ossetia, which was closely associated with
reactionary circles in the party upper crust, army, and special services, had information that prep-
arations were being made for the August coup, and so delayed the talks while intensively arming
themselves. Professor V. Shnirelman comes to the same conclusion: “The attempted coup that oc-
curred in the next few days threw a spanner in the works, and the radically changed situation in the
country allowed the North Ossetian leaders to delay resolution of the issue.”24 Participants in the
talks also testify to this.25

19
See: V.A. Shnirelman, op. cit., p. 309.
20
See: The Tenth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the North Ossetian S.S.R. (twelfth convocation), Verbatim re-
port, Vladikavkaz, 1992, pp. 282-287.
21
See, for example: the newspaper Severnaia Osetia of 21 December, 1991: “The day before yesterday, a meeting
was held at the headquarters of the national militia between representatives of the media and leaders of the self-defense
forces;” the newspaper Severnyy Kavkaz of 16 May, 1991: “In many districts of Vladikavkaz, funds were collected from
residents for purchasing weapons for the self-defense contingents. A sum of between 200 and 1,000 rubles;” the newspa-
per Severnaia Osetia of 12 October, 1992: “…over the past two years, 1,655 guns have been stolen from military units of
North Ossetia, including 735 machineguns, 720 pistols, 236 missiles, and 10,000 pieces of ammunition,” to quote just a
few of dozens of similar publications.
22
See: “Spravka ob obstoiatelstvakh vozniknoveniia osetino-ingushskogo vooruzhennogo konflikta, ego razvitiia i
roli v nem federalnykh organov vlasti i upravleniia,” in: Doklad o massovykh narusheniiakh prav grazhdan ingushskoy
nationalnosti v Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 1992-1995 godakh, Moscow, Nazran, 1996, pp. 376-377; “Istoriia odnoy ot-
stavki,” Dosh, Special Issue, No. 4 (12), 2006.
23
B.U. Kostoev, Kavkazsky meridian. K voprosu russko-osetino-ingushskikh otnosheny i chechenskogo uregulirov-
aniia, Humanitarian Foundation of Ingushetia, Moscow, 2003, p. 73.
24
V.A. Shnirelman, op. cit., p. 311.
25
See: F.P. Bokov, Iad kriminala, Insan, Moscow, 1994, pp. 22-23.
Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 63
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

After failure of the August coup, on 6 September, 1991, the militants of the All-National Con-
gress of the Chechen People (NCChP) dispersed the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingushetian
Republic and power went to the Executive Committee of the NCChP. Execution of the Declaration on
Sovereignty of the Chechen Republic demanded legitimization of power in the Ingush districts. The
referendum held on 30 November, 1991 among the Ingush population became that legitimate act of
declaration of the people’s will. The referendum asked one question: “Are you in favor of establishing
the Ingush Republic within the R.S.F.S.R. with return of the illegally confiscated Ingush land and
with its capital in the city of Vladikavkaz?” Ninety-seven percent of the electorate of the Ingush dis-
tricts took part in the voting, 92.5% of whom answered “Yes.”26 Despite all the hindrances and
provocations both from North Ossetia and from self-proclaimed Ichkeria, the Ingush leaders were
able to pass the Law 0n the Formation of the Ingush Republic within the Russian Federation on 4 June,
1992. Adoption of the Law required that the Federal Center create temporary bodies of power. To this
end, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R. appointed deputy V. Ermakov as its rep-
resentative in the Ingush Republic and I. Kostoev was appointed as representative of the Russian
President for Ingushetia. Noting their role in the social life of the republic being established, Profes-
sor V. Tishkov wrote the following: “Some circumstances have been limiting their activity and pre-
venting them from fulfilling the mission of representatives of the supreme power. First, the Center has
not been effectively supporting Ermakov and Kostoev: they do not have real financial resources at
their disposal and there has been no assistance from the federal ministries…”27 It is obvious that the
Center was stalling for time in the hope of restoring Chechen-Ingushetia, so one candidate after an-
other for head of administration of the republic was nominated for approval of the Russian President
and rejected by him, which aggravated the struggle among the political parties. The leaders of North
Ossetia made successful use of this.28 As V. Tishkov notes, “North Ossetia could not help but be
aware of the position and action of the Ingush side. In response to them, a strategy of rejecting any
compromises and of building up force positions was chosen, accompanied by anti-Ingush propagan-
da… The North Ossetian leaders felt fairly confident, enjoying their financial and force advantages,
as well as close contacts with the Center…”29

The Crux of the Conflict:

Official Version and Facts
Due to its policy on the eve of the open phase of the conflict, the Kremlin essentially provoked
the Ingush to engage in an unorganized uprising against the repressions in the Prigorodny District and
the city of Vladikavkaz in order, in this way, to resolve the problem of sovereign Chechnia which
many powers in the Center wanted to return by force to Russia by playing the Ingush card.30 Resolu-
tion of the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office on Termination of Criminal Case No. 18192642-9231
contains a large number of factual documents (an analysis of dozens of volumes) that reveal the role
of the Federal Center in planning and preparing the conflict. However, for political reasons, these

26
T. Muzaev, Etnichesky separatizm v Rossii, Panorama, Moscow, 1999, p. 100.
27
V. Tishkov, “Osetino-ingushsky konflikt,” Serdalo, No. 35, 21 August, 1996.
28
See: I.M. Sampiev, Institutsializatsiia samoopredeleniia narodov v politicheskikh protsessakh na postsovetskom
Severnom Kavkaze, Piligrim, Nazran, 2010, pp. 230-231.
29
V. Tishkov, op. cit.
30
For more on this process, see: I. Dementieva, “Ingushskaia tragediia,” Izvestia, 30 November, 1992; I. Kostoev,
“Eta tragediia byla sprovotsirovana umyshlenno,” Dosh, Special Issue, No. 4 (12), 2006, pp. 20-21.
31
See: Resolution on Termination of Criminal Case No. 18192642-92 of Assistant of the Russian Prosecutor Gen-
eral G. E. Chuglazov, Moscow, 8 February, 1995.
64 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

documents are ignored when evaluating the events of the fall of 1992 in the Prigorodny District and
the city of Vladikavkaz, which had a direct effect on settlement of the conflict. The resolution
shows that the federal structures, represented by the Russian Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Se-
curity, and Ministry of Internal Affairs, helped to establish and arm illegal armed formations of the
North Ossetian S.S.R.—national militia and guards (from mid-1991)—and notes Moscow’s target-
ed efforts to militarize North Ossetia, as well as numerous imaginary “seizures” of armaments, in-
cluding heavy, by Ossetian armed gangs. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Defense
transferred weapons and armored vehicles under the pretext of supporting the so-called peacekeep-
ing battalion in South Ossetia and the patrol-guard service regiments in the North Ossetian S.S.R.32
that took active part in the genocide. It is no accident that the first to show up in the conflict zone
were former commander of this battalion Major General Sergey Shoygu and his deputy Gennady
Filatov.
An analysis of the numerous testimonies of high-ranking Russian officials makes it possible to
conclude that the Federal Center, represented by the defense and security structures, drew up the plan
for the armed act in the Prigorodny District intended to resolve the problem of independent Chechnia.
The Ossetian leadership had already taken advantage of the situation to hinder territorial rehabilita-
tion of the Ingush by means of an act of force, since it had undergone a fiasco in the political and legal
sphere. President Boris Yeltsin and the defense and security ministers were well informed about the
situation in the region, including from their representatives there.33 On 31 October, armed clashes
began, and as early as 2 November an extensive army operation began with the use of armored vehi-
cles, helicopters, and heavy artillery to drive the Ingush from their villages in the Prigorodny District.
During the conflict itself, the Russian government vice premiers who came to execute the state of
emergency, Georgy Khizha and Sergey Shoygu, issued an order with the consent of First Vice Pre-
mier Egor Gaidar and Defense Minister Pavel Grachev on supplying the Ossetian armed gangs with
642 automatic weapons, 18 BMP-2 (infantry combat vehicles), and 57 T-72 tanks.34
According to independent military experts from the Shchit and Soiuz ofitserov servicemen or-
ganizations, “the steps taken by the leadership led to aggravation of the Ossetian-Ingush conflict and,
as a result, to deterioration of the situation in the North Caucasian Region since a method was chosen
not for separating the sides (as happened in South Ossetia and Transnistria), but for suppressing one
of the sides.”35
It is characteristic that the draft of “The Political Evaluation of the Russian Security Council of
the Armed Conflict in the North Ossetian S.S.R. and Ingush Republic in October-November 1992,”
which was never approved, did not say a word about the role of the Union and Federal Center, the
army, or the internal troops in the armed conflict among the factors and reasons for the conflict.36
However, the information gleaned by the joint investigatory team gives direct indication of their spe-
cial role. The fact sheet provided on 14 June, 1993 by senior investigator for particularly important
cases of the Russian Prosecutor General’s Office V.E. Kostyrev indicated that “… the nature of and
way the state of emergency was instituted at the beginning of the armed conflict did not meet the in-
tended purposes and tasks. Independent armed formations continued to operate in the state of emer-
gency zone, including those from another state—Georgia.”37

32
See: Doklad o massovykh narusheniiakh prav grazhdan ingushskoy natsionalnosti v Rossiyskoy Federatsii v
1992-1995 godakh, Moscow, Nazran, 1996, p. 343.
33
See: R. Albagachiev, A. Gazgireev, Genotsid, Nazran, 1994, p. 9.
34
See: Doklad o massovykh narusheniiakh prav cheloveka lits ingushskoy natsionalnosti v 1992-1995 godakh, Me-
morial, Moscow, 1995, pp. 260-261.
35
Ibid., p. 343.
36
See: Nezavisimaia gazeta, No. 54 (730), 23 March, 1994.
37
“Spravka ob obstoiatelstvakh vozniknoveniia osetino-ingushskogo vooruzhennogo konflikta, ego razvitiia i roli
v nem federalnykh organov vlasti i upravleniia,” in: Doklad o massovykh narusheniiakh prav grazhdan ingushskoy nat-
sionalnosti v Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 1992-1995 godakh, 1996, pp. 378-379.
Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 65
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

As a result of the “peacekeeping” intervention of the Armed Forces and internal troops, ethnic
Ingush were forced to leave their homes when their peaceful villages were subjected to artillery and
helicopter fire, while the rest were killed or taken hostage by the Ossetian armed gangs that arrived in
the wake of the paratroopers. Around 3,200 Ingush households were plundered and razed to the
ground. Thirteen of the sixteen population settlements of compact Ingush residence were destroyed to
one extent or another.38 In November, the Ingush were given the opportunity to bury their dead. It
turned out that many were missing their hearts, kidneys, and other organs, possibly the result of the
Agreement between France and Ossetia on the Procurement of Organs entered in October 1992, re-
vealed by English journalist Armora Zeynon,39 which shows the major preparations made for the
planned conflict.
Furthermore, the Federal Center did not restrict itself to connivance, but took direct part in the
conflict. Ethnic cleansing of the Prigorodny District and the city of Vladikavkaz from the Ingush
population, which was cynically called “the expulsion of armed gangs,” would essentially have
been impossible without the help of army artillery, helicopters, and tanks. As Akhsarbek Galazov
stated in the Report on Perfidious Aggression of the Ingush National Extremists and Measures to
Ensure Security, Legality, and Law and Order in the Republic, “…we had no doubt that Russia
would assist the republic at this difficult time. And this assistance was forthcoming. At our request,
the Russian President introduced a state of emergency throughout North Ossetia … today I have no
reservations in expressing my gratitude to the Russian generals, officers, and soldiers for their help.
I want to draw special attention to our old and true friends who have brought peace to South Osse-
tia: Chairman of the State Committee Sergey Shoygu, his deputy, Colonel General Gennady Fila-
tov, and Deputy Minister of Security Alexander Safonov.”40 Only later was it realized that the ac-
tivity of the joint group of internal troops of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry
of Defense should have been described as peacekeeping, whereas at the time the press made no
bones about it: “The teams of joint armed forces of Ministry of Internal Affairs troops, OMON,
national militia, republic guards, paratroopers, and Russian internal troops are augmenting the
force grouping in the conflict zone for the purpose of destroying hotbeds of resistance and stabiliz-
ing the situation as a whole.”41 As follows from the testimony of Minister of Internal Affairs of
North Ossetia Georgy Kantemirov, “the entire guards and some of the militia have joined the ranks
of the peacekeeping forces.”42
Valery Tishkov has the following to say about the role of the Federal Center in the events of the
fall of 1992: “Here we concede to a scenario which nevertheless needs confirming—to provoke
Chechnia by means of an ‘armed act’ in this region and in so doing resolve the ‘problem of Dudaev…’
I. Dementieva’s journalistic investigation has shown essentially beyond a doubt that the federal au-
thorities, including President Boris Yeltsin himself, were motivated by the Chechen question, which
is confirmed by the subsequent course of events. Later Egor Gaidar also admitted this.”43 In addition
to active participation in the ethnic cleansing, the Federal Center created advantages for one of the
sides with its law-making. The state of emergency introduced on 2 November by law required subor-
dination of all the government and administrative bodies of both republics to the Interim Administra-
tion established, but President Yeltsin’s subsequent decree of 4 November, 1992 determined that only

38
See: R.Sh. Albagachiev, M.A. Akhilgov, Znat i pomnit, Moscow, 1997.
39
See: S. Bartnikas, L. Krutakov, “Khochesh pochku? Tolko cherez moi trup. Na voyne, kak na voyne,” Komso-
molskaia pravda, 3 November, 1993.
40
Documents of the 5th Sitting of the 18th Session of the Supreme Soviet of the North Ossetian S.S.R. of the 12th
Convocation (10 November, 1992), Vladikavkaz, 1992.
41
Severnaia Osetia, 4 November, 1992.
42
“Spravka ob obstoiatelstvakh vozniknoveniia osetino-ingushskogo vooruzhennogo konflikta, ego razvitiia i roli
v nem federalnykh organov vlasti i upravleniia,” p. 15.
43
V.A. Tishkov, “Osetino-ingushsky konflikt (Antropologiia etnicheskoy chistki),” in: Ocherki teorii i politiki et-
nichnosti v Rossii, Russky Mir, Moscow, 1997, p. 388.
66 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

the executive power bodies were subordinate to the Interim Administration in North Ossetia, which in
fact subordinated the Interim Administration in the conflict zone to the Supreme Soviet of the North
Ossetian S.S.R.
As was mentioned above, the investigation notes that “independent armed formations contin-
ued to operate in the state of emergency zone, including those from another state—Georgia (mean-
ing the South Ossetian battalion armed by the Russian Ministry of Defense—I.S.).” “The joint forc-
es of the Russian Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs,” senior investigator for
particularly important cases of the Russian Prosecutor General’s office V.E. Kostyrev continues,
“did not separate the opposing sides, did not ensure eradication or localization of the armed forma-
tions, and did not destroy them, nor was the task solved of ensuring the vital activity and security
of the district’s population and releasing hostages. In some cases, with the direct involvement of
the joint armed forces of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the North Ossetian Ministry
of Internal Affairs, armed formations carried out violence against citizens, plundering, looting,
setting fire to and bombing homes, and taking up illegal residence in the houses and apartments
abandoned by the refugees.”44
The conclusion of the National Assembly, the Parliament of the Republic of Ingushetia, On the
Political and Legal Assessment of the Events of October-November 1992 in the Prigorodny District
and the City of Vladikavkaz of the Republic of North Ossetia of 21 September, 1994 on the basis of
the investigation documents of the parliamentary commission states: “The events of October-Novem-
ber 1992 cannot be called an ‘Ossetian-Ingush conflict’ since violence was exercised by well-armed
Ossetian formations and Russian troops against the peaceful, unarmed, and unprotected Ingush pop-
ulation of the Prigorodny District.”45 In this way, the Russian leadership not only acted as an initiator,
but also as a direct participant in the conflict. As Professor Tishkov notes, “from that moment (the
transfer of weapons and armored vehicles.—I.S.), the Center unequivocally identified itself with one
of the conflicting sides and effectively sanctioned and financially supported the armed acts and mass
violence against the civilian Ingush population… I am increasingly inclined to think that the final
tragic stage of the conflict was made possible when the Russian supreme leadership exchanged in-
dulging in ethnic cleansing for the opportunity to use the situation to resolve the problem of restoring
power over Chechnia.”46

Post-Conflict Settlement
The further steps taken by the Federal Center and its Interim Administration exposed the organ-
izers’ intention of genocide: the state of emergency was executed in Ossetia by the Ossetian author-
ities and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and in Ingushetia by the commandants of the Russian Min-
istry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Interim Administration began taking steps to
block the formation of legitimate government bodies of the Ingush Republic, replacing them with the
appointed and powerless Interim Administration of the Ingush Republic. In these difficult conditions
in Ingushetia, an Emergency Congress of the Ingush People gathered on 20 December, 1992, which
contrary to the Kremlin’s will, instituted the post of President of the Ingush Republic, approved the

44
“Spravka po resultatam izucheniia ugolovnogo dela o massovykh bezporiadkakh v Respublike Severnaia Osetia
k zasedaniiu Kollegii Generalnoy prokuratury Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 01.09.04 g.,” in: Doklad o massovykh narusheni-
iakh prav grazhdan ingushskoy natsionalnosti v Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 1992-1995 gg.
45
Conclusion on the Political and Legal Assessment of the Events of October-November 1992 in the Prigorodny
District and the City of Vladikavkaz of the Republic of North Ossetia; Resolution of the National Assembly, the Parlia-
ment of the Republic of Ingushetia, Ingushetia, No. 47, 21 September, 1994.
46
V.A. Tishkov, “Osetino-ingushsky konflikt (Antropologiia etnicheskoy chistki),” pp. 392-394.
Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 67
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Provisions on the President and on the Central Elections Committee, as well as Temporary Provisions
on the Election of the President of the Ingush Republic, and scheduled a presidential election. It also
nominated on its behalf Major General Ruslan Aushev as candidate for president of the Ingush Re-
public.47 Under public pressure, the Presidium of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet adopted a
resolution on 20 January, 1992 On Election of the President—Head of Executive Power of the Ingush
Republic in accordance with the Russian Law of 4 June, 1992 On the Formation of the Ingush Repub-
lic within the Russian Federation and with the resolution of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the
Russian Federation of 10 December, 1992 On the Russian Federation Law on the Formation of the
Ingush Republic within the Russian Federation, as well as taking into account the declaration of will
of the Ingush people.
The Federal Center continued to pursue a unilateral policy in the following years. Beginning
in November 1992, 131 regulatory legal acts were issued by the federal state power bodies aimed at
eliminating the consequences of the events that occurred in Vladikavkaz and the Prigorodny Dis-
trict. They included 47 decrees and orders of the Russian President, 10 assignments and addresses
of the Russian President, 49 resolutions and orders of the Russian Government, 23 resolutions of
the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, and 2 rulings of the Constitutional Court of the
Russian Federation. The presidents and governments of the Republic of North Ossetia and the
Republic of Ingushetia signed more than 20 treaties, agreements, and work plans and programs
aimed at resolving the problem.48 However, these regulatory acts bore no fruit; on the contrary,
they hindered refugees from returning to their homes. Even the Russian Federation Security Coun-
cil stated as early as January 1999 that not one of the regulatory legal acts designed to return the
forced migrants to their places of former residence had been executed.49 And not until thirteen
years later did the Federal Center admit that this way was ineffective and led to endless delays in
dealing with the consequences of the conflict.50
The strategy of the Federal Center, which ensured a forceful and political cover for not allowing
the Ingush into the Prigorodny District and the city of Vladikavkaz both by means of coercive acts and
by adopting anti-constitutional regulatory acts, consisted of replacing the question of territorial reha-
bilitation with the problem of returning the Ingush to the Prigorodny District. But this process is also
being deliberately delayed and return of the internally displaced persons to their former places of res-
idence is not taking place.51 Well aware of the Kremlin’s true intentions, the Ossetian side noted with
satisfaction that “the problems of returning the internally displaced Ingush and setting them up in
their former places of residence in North Ossetia, in spite of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s in-
structions to the leaders of North Ossetia and Ingushetia and authorized representative of the Russian
President in the Southern Federal District Dmitry Kozak to complete this process in 2007, will not be
resolved this year either.”52
In the so-called post-conflict period between 1992 and 2011 alone, more than 150 ethnic Ingush
were killed, more than 90 injured, 39 taken hostage, 450 Ingush households destroyed, and 238 units
of temporary housing burned down during the state of emergency in the region carried out by subdi-
visions of the army, internal troops, and Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation and
North Ossetia forces.
Carrying out the counterterrorist operation in the Northern Caucasus gave the Ossetian author-
ities the opportunity to correlate execution of the Federal Law on Rehabilitation of the Repressed

47
See: Documents from the Emergency Congress of the Ingush People. The author’s archives.
48
See: Informatsionnyy vestnik, No. 2, January 2002.
49
See: Ibidem.
50
See: M. Targimov, “U ingushskikh bezhentsev poiavilas nadezhda,” Iuzhnyy Federalnyy, No. 14 (237), 19-25 April,
2006.
51
See: Fantazii i realnost, Vladikavaz, 2001, p. 16.
52
A. Dzadziev, “Itogi pervogo polugodiia,” Biulleten Seti etnologicheskogo monitoringa i rannego preduprezhde-
niia konfliktov, No. 74, July-August 2007, p. 61.
68 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Peoples with the notorious struggle with extremism. This became particularly noticeable after seizure
of the school in Beslan in 2004.53 The Authorized Representation Office of the Russian President in
the Southern Federal District was compelled to admit this: “The law-enforcement agencies do not
exclude the existence in the region of an organized group that has been kidnapping Ingush people and
in so doing supposedly taking revenge for the deaths of the children in Beslan.”54 The protests regard-
ing the numerous kidnappings, attacks, and nationalist escapades55 were simply ignored. During the
investigation, it transpired that between the summer of 2005 and July 2007, 21 people were kid-
napped in North Ossetia, whereby in most cases witnesses pointed to police employees. According to
Kommersant, the investigators came to the following conclusion: groups operate in North Ossetia that
are helped by police employees. The presumed motives vary: revenge for Beslan and efforts to pre-
vent the Ingush from returning to the Prigorodny District.56 The repeated addresses of the parlia-
ment,57 public organizations, and citizens of the Republic of Ingushetia to the Federal Center—“the
desperate appeal to the Kremlin to stop sticking its head in the sand and begin performing its direct
obligations”58 —are simply ignored or the local authorities are turned loose on the authors of the ad-
dresses. On the other hand, the federal and district bodies have rendered substantial support to the
authorities of North Ossetia in creating a new population settlement for internally displaced persons
directly on the border with the Republic of Ingushetia where a ghetto was essentially set up in order
to stop them from reaching their homes.
For all intents and purposes, the Federal Center has as good as blocked all attempts to resolve
the conflict using legal methods, relying on violence. And even the rulings of the judicial bodies are
either ignored or illegally cancelled. For example, the Federal Judge for the Nazran District issued
a decision on 14 December, 2004 on an appeal from the Akhki-Yurt public movement, deeming the
actions of officials of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. to co-
ordinate the borders of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. and North Ossetian A.S.S.R. to be drawn on
maps illegal. The Parliament of the Republic of North Ossetia did not lodge a complaint against this
judicial decision in accordance with legal procedure and so the decision came into legal force.
However, six months later it was cancelled … by the federal city court (that is, of the same level!)
of Rostov (?!).
The approaches to settlement of the so-called Ossetian-Ingush conflict by the Federal Center as
its main organizer and actor are also clearly illustrated by the so-called Kozak Plan drawn up on the
instructions of Vladimir Putin with the aim of ultimately resolving the conflict before the beginning
of 2007.59 This plan was set forth in the Minutes of the Meeting between Authorized Representative
of the President of the Russian Federation in the Southern Federal District Dmitry Kozak and Leaders
of the Federal Executive Power Bodies and Executive Power Bodies of the Constituents of the Repub-
lic of North Ossetia and the Republic of Ingushetia on Settlement of the Consequences of the Osse-
tian-Ingush Conflict of October-November 1992 of 8 February, 2006.60 The reaction of the Ossetian
side to the decisions made was in general positive, since the objective content of the Minutes as a
whole and their individual provisions correspond to the official position of North Ossetia, which has
not changed since November 1992. Its basic principles were set forth on 10 November, 1992 in
Akhsarbek Galazov’s Report on the Perfidious Aggression of the Ingush National Extremists against

53
See: V. Salugardanov, “Ostenisky kukluksklan,” available at [www/gazet.gzt/ru], 12 October, 2004.
54
Severnaia Osetiia, No. 128 (24929), 19 July, 2007, p. 1.
55
See: “Ingushi v Severnoy Osetii vyshli na miting s trebovaniem prekratit pokhishcheniia liudey,” Regnum.ru,
29 March, 2006.
56
[kavkaz.memo.ru], 24 September, 2007.
57
See, for example: “Parlament Ingushetii schitaet situatsiiu v zone osetino-ingushskogo konflikta kriticheskoy,”
available at [www.regnum.ru], 27 March, 2006.
58
S. Markedonov, op. cit.
59
See: Assignment of the President of the Russian Federation of 14 November, 2003, No. MK-1871.
60
[http://www.magas.ru/news_detail.php?id=638].
Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 69
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

North Ossetia at the 5th sitting of the 18th session of the Supreme Soviet of the North Ossetian
S.S.R.,61 as well as in the Kislovodsk agreements signed by Akhsarbek Galazov and Ruslan Aushev
in March 1993, where provisions that violate the rights of citizens on ethnic grounds were registered
and included in all the subsequent agreements and documents.
The inherent integrity of these documents is shown by provisions of the Kislovodsk agreement
of 1993 and the Minutes which are identical in meaning.
1. “Comprehensive resolution of the refugee problem” in the Kislovodsk agreements, which
implied correlating the problem of accommodating the South Ossetian refugees in the Prig-
orodny District and the city of Vladikavkaz with the problem of returning the Ingush depor-
tees, and “housing accommodation of other categories of refugees and forced migrants”
(Para 5.8 of the Report), where refugees means South Ossetians (for North Ossetia), and oth-
er categories of forced migrants means those from the Chechen Republic (for the Republic of
Ingushetia).
2. “On the impossibility of coexistence”—a thesis from Resolution No. 84 of the Supreme
Soviet of the North Ossetian S.S.R. of 6 March, 1993, which essentially “legitimized” the
policy of apartheid and discrimination on ethnic grounds62 and which was recognized by
Resolution No. 17-P of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court of 17 September, 1993
as not complying with the Russian Federation Constitution63; whereby parts of it were dis-
owned in 1998. However, it continues to be implemented to this day, cloaked verbally in
less extremist formulations. One such formulation can be considered the thesis “on com-
pact living accommodation” (paragraphs 3.4. and 3.5. and similar formulations in para-
graphs 5.1. and 5.5.).
3. “On the perfidious aggression of the Ingush national extremists.” Although there was no po-
litical or legal evaluation of the so-called Ossetian-Ingush conflict by the federal authorities,
Moscow de facto proceeds in the documents adopted and measures carried out from the Os-
setian thesis on “the Ingush being to blame.” This was precisely why the Interregional De-
partment of the Russian Federal Immigration Service was instructed “…to send the docu-
ments on 581 records of forced migrants to the Commission of the Government of the Repub-
lic of North Ossetia-Alania created by order No. 8-rg of the Head of the Republic of North
Ossetia-Alania of 1 February, 2006 in order for written motivated conclusions to be drawn up
by the local administration heads of the corresponding population settlements on the possi-
bility of or hindrance to providing specified families of forced migrants with housing accom-
modation in their chosen places of residence” (Para. 4.2.).
The indicated provisions show the attitude of the plan’s authors toward the Ingush formed by
Galazov’s ideologeme on the “Ingush aggressors,” which it is difficult to describe as anything other
than illegal and insulting, since the federal authorities, the main culprit of the ethnic cleansing, places
the question of restoring the Ingush constitutional rights at the discretion of those who directly violat-
ed these rights.
In our view, such an ambiguous document as the Minutes of the Meeting … on Settlement of
the Consequences of the Ossetian-Ingush Conflict of October-November 1992 appeared as the re-
sult of the following circumstances: pressure from the Ossetian leadership and nationalist public on

61
“On the Perfidious Aggression of the Ingush National Extremists against North Ossetia,” in: Documents of the
5th Sitting of the 18th Session of the Supreme Soviet of the North Ossetian S.S.R. of the 12th Convocation (10 November,
1992), p. 20.
62
See: Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the North Ossetian S.S.R. on the Program for Comprehensive Resolu-
tion of the Problem of Refugees, Forced Migrants, and Persons Who Have Left North Ossetia No. 84 of 6 March, 1993.
63
See: Resolution No. 17-P of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court of 17 September, 1993, available at
[http://www.eurolawco.ru/publ/ccrf12.html].
70 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Moscow after the Beslan events; Dmitry Kozak’s striving at all costs to “close” the Ossetian-In-
gush conflict before the end of 2006 as instructed by the Russian President; and another failure by
the Ossetian side to juridically cancel Arts 3 and 6 of the R.S.F.S.R. Law on Rehabilitation of the
Repressed Peoples.64

The Crux and

Prime Cause of the Conflict:
Several Conclusions
The above makes it possible to confirm that the conflict being analyzed cannot be classified as
ethnic (ethnoterritorial). Its interpretation as the Ossetian-Ingush conflict is incorrect in the purely
ethnic respect. Although the ethnic factor is clearly manifested in the conflict, and as such it is active-
ly hypostatized, in actual fact ethnicity is a secondary factor. All the clashes occurred only in settle-
ments of the Prigorodny District where Ingush lived. There were no clashes in any villages beyond the
district or in villages of the district where only Ossetians lived, so there can be no talk of an ethnic
war. Moreover, identifying one of the sides in ethnic categories implies that all the other sides in the
conflict should be identified in the same way. If the conflict or its open phase is evaluated in ethnic
categories, it should be described as Russian-Ossetian-Ingush. This follows at least from the fact that
Russian servicemen participated en masse in the conflict, whereby their participation determined the
course and nature of the conflict. Nor can we ignore the participation of armed Cossack contingents
who were later rewarded with Ingush homes in Terk and the Popov hamlet.
The entities and initiators of the conflict are the Federal Center and the government and admin-
istrative bodies of the North Ossetian S.S.R. Government bodies did not participate in the conflict on
the Ingush side, since they simply did not exist, but if they had, they would have been the entities of
the events. The deciding participation of the Federal Center, represented by its power bodies, army,
and other defense and security structures, defies describing the conflict as ethnic. The dominating
reason for the conflict, like its genesis, lies in the state’s national policy—first the Russian Empire’s,
then the Soviet Union’s and the Russian Federation’s. So the ethnic standoff is only a consequence
and not the main reason for the conflict, which is the state’s national policy applied to various ethnic
entities. It is precisely the state, represented by the Federal Center, that was the main actor in the
events of 1944, 1957, 1973, 1981, and 1992. So Professor Iu. Karpov is right when he says that “…in
today’s reality, it (the Ossetian-Ingush conflict.—I.S.) is exacerbated by the presence of a third entity
that at one time created grounds for the conflict and now is trying to perform the function of an arbi-
trator. Whereby the third entity, having its own interests, has the greatest power, which defines its
active position as well as the striving of each of the sides to secure its support. The Ossetian side,
looking for support from the federal authorities, refers, among other things, to the fact that the Osse-
tian people are carrying out a special mission in the region.”65
Another important aspect of the problem is international. By describing the conflict in the fall of
1992 as ethnic “Ossetian-Ingush,” Moscow deliberately presented it as a conflict of values and con-
sequently as essentially irresolvable.66 Designating it as purely ethnic or even civilizational was
prompted by the latent desire to convince the West, which is always very wary about any kind of eth-

64
See: Definition of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation No. 365 of 1 December, 2005 on the in-
quiry of the Parliament of North Ossetia “On Checking Compliance of the Provisions of Arts 3 and 6 of the R.S.F.S.R.
Law on Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples to the Constitution of the Russian Federation.”
65
Iu. Karpov, “Obrazy nasiliia v novoy i noveyshey istorii Severnogo Kavkaza,” in: Antropologiia nasiliia, St. Pe-
tersburg, 2001, p. 244.
66
For more on the conflict of values, see: V.A. Avksentiev, Etnicheskaia konfliktologiia, Stavropol, 1997, pp. 52-58.
Volume 6 Issue 3 2012 71
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

nic conflict, of the need for tough measures in the Caucasus where “wild tribes have the tendency to
slaughter each other.” However, the definition of the entities of the conflict and their role in it, as
discussed above, gives no grounds for concluding that it is an ethnic conflict. Moreover, this follows
from an analysis of the crux of the conflict being examined.
The prime cause of the conflict is the Kremlin’s recidivist policy aimed at divestiture of Ingush
national territory in favor of ethnic groups which in the Kremlin’s opinion correspond more to the
great power’s ethnic geopolitics. All other manifestations of the conflict in the form of ethnic incom-
patibility and fighting barbarism, banditry, and extremism are consequences of this policy. If this fact
is not taken into account, the model of the conflict turns out to be a priori ineffective in terms of its
political and practical resolution. The state’s coercive resources make it possible to replace fair reso-
lution of the conflict with its “regulation,” which is effectively nothing other than illegal group vio-
lence. The incidental products of this policy are mass discrimination on national and religious
grounds, stirring up ethnic discord, segregation, and other negative phenomena.
The subject of the conflict is clearer—the territory the Stalinist regime illegally took from the
Ingush people in 1944 and gave to North Ossetia. But if the question is asked, who took away this
territory, gave it to another ethnicity, held onto it by force, and for what purpose, the problem appears
in an entirely different light. Of course, the ethnic tension between the Ossetians and Ingush is related
to the subject of the conflict, but this tension is a consequence of the state’s political actions, and not
the reason for them. All the arguments about the eternal antagonism or civilizational incompatibility
between the Ingush and the Ossetians are trivial and smack of fascism. To be fair, it must be confessed
that the Ingush authorities too have taken the position of “political pragmatism” imposed on them. In
other words, an evaluation of the conflict and attempts to settle it proceed from only one factor—
force. The theoretical weakness of this position lies in the fact that force is not a constant argument,
but transitional in the historical respect. This is why this conflict and others like it cannot essentially
be resolved given the existing approaches.

Conclusion
The conflict around the Prigorodny District and the city of Vladikavkaz is acquiring new devel-
opment in the light of South Ossetian “independence.” The twenty-year epic of its “settlement,” first
by the Interim Administration in part of the territory of North Ossetia and the Ingush Republic (1992-
1995) and the Russian Federation State Committee (1995-1996), then by the authorized representa-
tive of the Russian President in the Republic of North Ossetia and the Republic of Ingushetia (1996-
2000), the special representative of the Russian President for settlement of the Ossetian-Ingush con-
flict (2000-2002) and, finally, the authorized representative of the Russian President in the Southern
Federal District (since 2002), has effectively brought the situation to an impasse. We need to rid our-
selves of approaches to the conflict and to resolution of the problems it has created that have discredit-
ed themselves, critically re-examine the principles and practice of national policy on which they are
based, and draw up new approaches to a systemic resolution of the problems of ethnic interaction in
the region. Resolving the problem of the return of the Ingush deportees to their homes is a secondary
problem that can be resolved by executing Arts 3 and 6 of the Federal Law on Rehabilitation of the
Repressed Peoples. In fact the problem itself was created to distract attention away from territorial
rehabilitation, whereas execution of the law will automatically remove the problem of returning the
deportees to their homes and restore equality and peace in ethnic relations.
To sum up, the entities of the conflict of October-November 1992 are the Federal Center, the
power bodies of North Ossetia, and the ethnic Ingush population of the Prigorodny District and the
city of Vladikavkaz. Based on the main reason for its emergence and its entity-initiators, the conflict
cannot be described as ethnic Ossetian-Ingush, but is defined as an ethnic geopolitical act of the Fed-
72 Volume 6 Issue 3 2012
THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

eral Center in the form of ethnic cleansing sanctioned by the state, responsibility for which is held by
the leadership of the Russian Federation and North Ossetia. In this respect, the power bodies of the
Russian Federation cannot from either the moral or legal viewpoint claim the role of peacekeeper and
mediator in settlement of the so-called Ossetian-Ingush conflict. Force and the threat of force should
be excluded as a factor of settlement; otherwise the decisions being made cannot be recognized as
legitimate and binding when changing the balance and breakdown in forces of the sides. The only
legal and moral way to restore order in the region is to ensure immediate and unconditional execution
of the Federal Law on Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples. Precisely how realistic this is in con-
ditions of sovereign democracy and how settlement can be carried out in practice is another matter,
but it is just as idealistic to think that the conflict can be resolved in any other way.

Sofia MELIKOVA

Licentiate in International Relations, North-West Academy of

Public Administration (St. Petersburg, Russia),
M.A. in European Studies
(Flensburg, Germany).

THE FIRST RUSSO-CHECHEN CAMPAIGN

(1994-1996):
CAUSES AND FACTORS OF
ETHNIC MOBILIZATION

Abstract

T his article attempts to examine the deep

historical roots and causes of the first
Russo-Chechen conflict (1994-1996)
and the role it has played in influencing
overall Russian policy-making in the North-
ern Caucasus. Furthermore, the author an-
alyzes the link with Islam as an instrument
of political mobilization. The level of involve-
ment of international actors in the first Rus-
so-Chechen campaign is also analyzed.

Introduction
The first Russo-Chechen war, which lasted from 1994 until 1996, is believed to be one of the
most severe conflicts in the Northern Caucasus in terms of the number of deaths and scope of material
devastation. On the one hand, it involved one of world’s greatest military powers—the Russian Fed-
eration, while on the other, like no other conflict, it displayed the rebelling minority’s fight for life or
death. In addition, the war was fueled by international actors, which made the discord relevant in re-