Adam Smith

Against the masters

selected passages from The Wealth of Nations

(1776)

Note

These selected passages, taken from Adam Smith's masterpiece, The Wealth of Nations, should destroy, once for all, the
conventional and conveniently false image of a Smith as acritical champion of the businessmen (merchants and
manufacturers). Smith was for the freedom of doing business (trade and industry) and he saw it put at risk all the
time by the collusion between economic masters (merchants and manufacturers) and political masters (the state
rulers). He called this practice Mercantilism. However, it must be stressed that the so-called Capitalism has followed
in the footsteps of Mercantilism and is only Mercantilism on a larger scale, based on lobbying state rulers on a way
and size unparalleled in human history

The masters grabbing the land

As soon as the land of any country has all become private property, the landlords, like
all other men, love to reap where they never sowed, and demand a rent even for its
natural produce. The wood of the forest, the grass of the field, and all the natural fruits
of the earth, which, when land was in common, cost the labourer only the trouble of
gathering them, come, even to him, to have an additional price fixed upon them. He
must then pay for the licence to gather them; and must give up to the landlord a portion
of what his labour either collects or produces. This portion, or, what comes to the same
thing, the price of this portion, constitutes the rent of land, and in the price of the
greater part of commodities makes a third component part.
(Book I, Chapter VI)

 
 

The interest of the masters generally prevailing upon that of the workers

What are the common wages of labour, depends every where upon the contract usually
made between those two parties, whose interests are by no means the same. The
workmen desire to get as much, the masters to give as little as possible. The former are
disposed to combine in order to raise, the latter in order to lower the wages of labour.
It is not, however, difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, upon all ordinary
occasions, have the advantage in the dispute, and force the other into a compliance with
their terms. The masters, being fewer in number, can combine much more easily; and
the law, besides, authorises, or at least does not prohibit their combinations, while it
prohibits those of the workmen.

We have no acts of parliament against combining to lower the price of work; but many
against combining to raise it. In all such disputes the masters can hold out much longer.
A landlord, a farmer, a master manufacturer, or merchant, though they did not employ
a single workman, could generally live a year or two upon the stocks which they have
already acquired. Many workmen could not subsist a week, few could subsist a month,
and scarce any a year without employment. In the long-run the workman may be as
necessary to his master as his master is to him, but the necessity is not so immediate.
We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters, though frequently of
those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that masters rarely
combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the subject. Masters are always and every
where in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to raise the wages of
labour above their actual rate. To violate this combination is every where a most
unpopular action, and a sort of reproach to a master among his neighbours and equals.
We seldom, indeed, hear of this combination, because it is the usual, and one may say,
the natural state of things which nobody ever hears of. Masters too sometimes enter into
particular combinations to sink the wages of labour even below this rate. These are
always conducted with the utmost silence and secrecy, till the moment of execution,
and when the workmen yield, as they sometimes do, without resistance, though
severely felt by them, they are never heard of by other people.
Such combinations, however, are frequently resisted by a contrary defensive
combination of the workmen; who sometimes too, without any provocation of this kind,
combine of their own accord to raise the price of their labour. Their usual pretences are,
sometimes the high price of provisions; sometimes the great profit which their masters
make by their work. But whether their combinations be offensive or defensive, they are
always abundantly heard of. In order to bring the point to a speedy decision, they have
always recourse to the loudest clamour, and sometimes to the most shocking violence
and outrage. They are desperate, and act with the folly and extravagance of desperate
men, who must either starve, or frighten their masters into an immediate compliance
with their demands. The masters upon these occasions are just as clamorous upon the
other side, and never cease to call aloud for the assistance of the civil magistrate, and
the rigorous execution of those laws which have been enacted with so much severity
against the combinations of servants, labourers, and journeymen. The workmen,
accordingly, very seldom derive any advantage from the violence of those tumultuous
combinations, which, partly from the interposition of the civil magistrate, partly from
the superior steadiness of the masters, partly from the necessity which the greater part
of the workmen are under of submitting for the sake of present subsistence, generally
end in nothing, but the punishment or ruin of the ringleaders.
(Book I, Chapter VIII)

Justice and well-being as signs of a flourishing society

Servants, labourers and workmen of different kinds, make up the far greater part of
every great political society. But what improves the circumstances of the greater part
can never be regarded as an inconveniency to the whole. No society can surely be
flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and
miserable. It is but equity, besides, that they who feed, cloath and lodge the whole body
of the people, should have such a share of the produce of their own labour as to be
themselves tolerably well fed, cloathed and lodged.
(Book I, Chapter VIII)

High salaries bring about high quality and productivity of work

The wages of labour are the encouragement of industry, which, like every other human
quality, improves in proportion to the encouragement it receives. A plentiful
subsistence increases the bodily strength of the labourer, and the comfortable hope of
bettering his condition, and of ending his days perhaps in ease and plenty, animates
him to exert that strength to the utmost. Where wages are high, accordingly, we shall
always find the workmen more active, diligent, and expeditious, than where they are
low.
(Book I, Chapter VIII)

The economic ideal is the independent worker

Nothing can be more absurd, however, than to imagine that men in general should
work less when they work for themselves, than when they work for other people. A
poor independent workman will generally be more industrious than even a journeyman
who works by the piece. The one enjoys the whole produce of his own industry; the
other shares it with his master. The one, in his separate independent state, is less liable
to the temptations of bad company, which in large manufactories so frequently ruin the
morals of the other. The superiority of the independent workman over those servants
who are hired by the month or by the year, and whose wages and maintenance are the
same whether they do much or do little, is likely to be still greater. Cheap years tend to
increase the proportion of independent workmen to journeymen and servants of all
kinds, and dear years to diminish it.
(Book I, Chapter VIII)

The lowering of profits as sign of general prosperity

When profit diminishes, merchants are very apt to complain that trade decays; though
the diminution of profit is the natural effect of its prosperity, or of a greater stock being
employed in it than before.
(Book I, Chapter IX)

But the rate of profit does not, like rent and wages, rise with the prosperity, and fall
with the declension of the society. On the contrary, it is naturally low in rich, and high
in poor countries, and it is always highest in the countries which are going fastest to
ruin. The interest of this third order, therefore, has not the same connection with the
general interest of the society as that of the other two. Merchants and master
manufacturers are, in this order, the two classes of people who commonly employ the
largest capitals, and who by their wealth draw to themselves the greatest share of the
public consideration. As during their whole lives they are engaged in plans and
projects, they have frequently more acuteness of understanding than the greater part of
country gentlemen. As their thoughts, however, are commonly exercised rather about
the interest of their own particular branch of business, than about that of the society,
their judgment, even when given with the greatest candour (which it has not been upon
every occasion) is much more to be depended upon with regard to the former of those
two objects, than with regard to the latter.
(Book I, Chapter XI)

Equality as consequence of freedom

The whole of the advantages and disadvantages of the different employments of labour
and stock must, in the same neighbourhood, be either perfectly equal or continually
tending to equality. If in the same neighbourhood, there was any employment evidently
either more or less advantageous than the rest, so many people would crowd into it in
the one case, and so many would desert it in the other, that its advantages would soon
return to the level of other employments. This at least would be the case in a society
where things were left to follow their natural course, where there was perfect liberty,
and where every man was perfectly free both to chuse what occupation he thought
proper, and to change it as often as he thought proper. Every man's interest would
prompt him to seek the advantageous, and to shun the disadvantageous employment.
Pecuniary wages and profit, indeed, are every-where in Europe extremely different
according to the different employments of labour and stock. But this difference arises
partly from certain circumstances in the employments themselves, which, either really,
or at least in the imaginations of men, make up for a small pecuniary gain in some, and
counter-balance a great one in others; and partly from the policy of Europe, which no-
where leaves things at perfect liberty.
(Book I, Chapter X, Part I)

But the policy of Europe, by not leaving things at perfect liberty, occasions other
inequalities of much greater importance.
It does this chiefly in the three following ways. First, by restraining the competition in
some employments to a smaller number than would otherwise be disposed to enter into
them; secondly, by increasing it in others beyond what it naturally would be; and,
thirdly, by obstructing the free circulation of labour and stock, both from employment
to employment and from place to place.
(Book I, Chapter X, Part II)

Acts of Parliament are sometimes necessary to grant freedom of employment

The silk weavers in London had scarce been incorporated a year when they enacted a
bye-law, restraining any master from having more than two apprentices at a time. It
required a particular act of parliament to rescind this bye-law.
(Book I, Chapter X, Part II)

The masters and the state rulers against the property of the workers

The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the original foundation of
all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of a poor man
lies in the strength and dexterity of his hands; and to hinder him from employing this
strength and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper without injury to his
neighbour, is a plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a manifest
encroachment upon the just liberty both of the workman, and of those who might be
disposed to employ him. As it hinders the one from working at what he thinks proper,
so it hinders the others from employing whom they think proper. To judge whether he
is fit to be employed, may surely be trusted to the discretion of the employers whose
interest it so much concerns. The affected anxiety of the law-giver lest they should
employ an improper person, is evidently as impertinent as it is oppressive.
(Book I, Chapter X, Part II)

Freedom of trade benefits the public

The same increase of competition would reduce the profits of the masters as well as the
wages of the workmen. The trades, the crafts, the mysteries, would all be losers. But the
public would be a gainer, the work of all artificers coming in this way much cheaper to
market.
It is to prevent this reduction of price, and consequently of wages and profit, by
restraining that free competition which would most certainly occasion it, that all
corporations, and the greater part of corporation laws, have been established. In order
to erect a corporation, no other authority in ancient times was requisite in many parts of
Europe, but that of the town corporate in which it was established. In England, indeed,
a charter from the king was likewise necessary. But this prerogative of the crown seems
to have been reserved rather for extorting money from the subject, than for the defence
of the common liberty against such oppressive monopolies.
(Book I, Chapter X, Part II)

Urban masters and workers prevailing over rural people

Whatever regulations, therefore, tend to increase those wages and profits beyond what
they otherwise would be, tend to enable the town to purchase, with a smaller quantity
of its labour, the produce of a greater quantity of the labour of the country. They give
the traders and artificers in the town an advantage over the landlords, farmers, and
labourers in the country, and break down that natural equality which would otherwise
take place in the commerce which is carried on between them. The whole annual
produce of the labour of the society is annually divided between those two different
sets of people. By means of those regulations a greater share of it is given to the
inhabitants of the town than would otherwise fall to them; and a less to those of the
country.
(Book I, Chapter X, Part II)

The inhabitants of a town, being collected into one place, can easily combine together.
The most insignificant trades carried on in towns have accordingly, in some place or
other, been incorporated; and even where they have never been incorporated, yet the
corporation spirit, the jealousy of strangers, the aversion to take apprentices, or to
communicate the secret of their trade, generally prevail in them, and often teach them,
by voluntary associations and agreements, to prevent that free competition which they
cannot prohibit by bye-laws. The trades which employ but a small number of hands,
run most easily into such combinations. Half a dozen wool-combers, perhaps, are
necessary to keep a thousand spinners and weavers at work. By combining not to take
apprentices they can not only engross the employment, but reduce the whole
manufacture into a sort of slavery to themselves, and raise the price of their labour
much above what is due to the nature of their work.
The inhabitants of the country, dispersed in distant places, cannot easily combine
together. They have not only never been incorporated, but the corporation spirit never
has prevailed among them.
(Book I, Chapter X, Part II)

The masters congregating to exploit the public (with the aid of the state)

People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but
the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise
prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could
be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot
hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do
nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary.
A regulation which obliges all those of the same trade in a particular town to enter their
names and places of abode in a public register, facilitates such assemblies. It connects
individuals who might never otherwise be known to one another, and gives every man
of the trade a direction where to find every other man of it.
A regulation which enables those of the same trade to tax themselves in order to
provide for their poor, their sick, their widows and orphans, by giving them a common
interest to manage, renders such assemblies necessary.
(Book I, Chapter X, Part II)

The laws generally unfavourable to the workers

Whenever the law has attempted to regulate the wages of workmen, it has always been
rather to lower them than to raise them.
(Book I, Chapter X, Part II)

The policy of Europe, by obstructing the free circulation of labour and stock both from
employment to employment, and from place to place, occasions in some cases a very
inconvenient inequality in the whole of the advantages and disadvantages of their
different employments.
(Book I, Chapter X, Part II)

It is every-where much easier for a wealthy merchant to obtain the privilege of trading
in a town corporate, than for a poor artificer to obtain that of working in it.
(Book I, Chapter X, Part II)

The obstruction which corporation laws give to the free circulation of labour is
common, I believe, to every part of Europe. That which is given to it by the poor laws is,
so far as I know, peculiar to England. It consists in the difficulty which a poor man finds
in obtaining a settlement, or even in being allowed to exercise his industry in any parish
but that to which he belongs. It is the labour of artificers and manufacturers only of
which the free circulation is obstructed by corporation laws. The difficulty of obtaining
settlements obstructs even that of common labour. It may be worth while to give some
account of the rise, progress, and present state of this disorder, the greatest perhaps of
any in the police of England.
(Book I, Chapter X, Part II)
The very unequal price of labour which we frequently find in England in places at no
great distance from one another, is probably owing to the obstruction which the law of
settlements gives to a poor man who would carry his industry from one parish to
another without a certificate. A single man, indeed, who is healthy and industrious,
may sometimes reside by sufferance without one; but a man with a wife and family
who should attempt to do so, would in most parishes be sure of being removed, and if
the single man should afterwards marry, he would generally be removed likewise.

To remove a man who has committed no misdemeanour from the parish where he
chuses to reside, is an evident violation of natural liberty and justice.

There is scarce a poor man in England of forty years of age, I will venture to say, who
has not in some part of his life felt himself most cruelly oppressed by this ill-contrived
law of settlements.
(Book I, Chapter X, Part II)

The proprietors of land were anciently the legislators of every part of Europe. The laws
relating to land, therefore, were all calculated for what they supposed the interest of the
proprietor. It was for his interest, they had imagined, that no lease granted by any of his
predecessors should hinder him from enjoying, during a long term of years, the full
value of his land. Avarice and injustice are always short-sighted, and they did not
foresee how much this regulation must obstruct improvement, and thereby hurt in the
long-run the real interest of the landlord.
The farmers too, besides paying the rent, were anciently, it was supposed, bound to
perform a great number of services to the landlord, which were seldom either specified
in the lease, or regulated by any precise rule, but by the use and wont of the manor or
barony. These services, therefore, being almost entirely arbitrary, subjected the tenant to
many vexations.
(Book III, Chapter II)

The masters lobbying the state rulers for their own narrow interest

Whenever the legislature attempts to regulate the differences between masters and their
workmen, its counsellors are always the masters. When the regulation, therefore, is in
favour of the workmen, it is always just and equitable; but it is sometimes otherwise
when in favour of the masters. Thus the law which obliges the masters in several
different trades to pay their workmen in money and not in goods, is quite just and
equitable. It imposes no real hardship upon the masters. It only obliges them to pay that
value in money, which they pretended to pay, but did not always really pay, in goods.
This law is in favour of the workmen; but the 8th of George III. is in favour of the
masters. When masters combine together in order to reduce the wages of their
workmen, they commonly enter into a private bond or agreement, not to give more
than a certain wage under a certain penalty. Were the workmen to enter into a contrary
combination of the same kind, not to accept of a certain wage under a certain penalty,
the law would punish them very severely.
(Book I, Chapter X, Part II)

To widen the market and to narrow the competition, is always the interest of the
dealers. To widen the market may frequently be agreeable enough to the interest of the
public; but to narrow the competition must always be against it, and can serve only to
enable the dealers, by raising their profits above what they naturally would be, to levy,
for their own benefit, an absurd tax upon the rest of their fellow-citizens. The proposal
of any new law or regulation of commerce which comes from this order, ought always
to be listened to with great precaution, and ought never to be adopted till after having
been long and carefully examined, not only with the most scrupulous, but with the
most suspicious attention. It comes from an order of men, whose interest is never
exactly the same with that of the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and
even to oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon many occasions, both
deceived and oppressed it.
(Book I, Chapter XI)

The selfishness and avarice of the masters

All for ourselves and nothing for other people, seems, in every age of the world, to have
been the vile maxim of the masters of mankind. As soon, therefore, as they could find a
method of consuming the whole value of their rents themselves, they had no
disposition to share them with any other persons.
(Book III, Chapter IV)
Our woollen manufacturers have been more successful than any other class of
workmen in persuading the legislature that the prosperity of the nation depended upon
the success and extension of their particular business. They have not only obtained a
monopoly against the consumers by an absolute prohibition of importing woollen
cloths from any foreign country, but they have likewise obtained another monopoly
against the sheep farmers and growers of wool by a similar prohibition of the
exportation of live sheep and wool. The severity of many of the laws which have been
enacted for the security of the revenue is very justly complained of, as imposing heavy
penalties upon actions which, antecedent to the statutes that declared them to be
crimes, had always been understood to be innocent. But the cruellest of our revenue
laws, I will venture to affirm, are mild and gentle in comparison of some of those which
the clamour of our merchants and manufacturers has extorted from the legislature for
the support of their own absurd and oppressive monopolies. Like the laws of Draco,
these laws may be said to be all written in blood.
(Book IV, Chapter VIII)

It is unnecessary, I imagine, to observe how contrary such regulations are to the boasted
liberty of the subject, of which we affect to be so very jealous; but which, in this case, is
so plainly sacrificed to the futile interests of our merchants and manufacturers.
The laudable motive of all these regulations is to extend our own manufactures, not by
their own improvement, but by the depression of those of all our neighbours, and by
putting an end, as much as possible, to the troublesome competition of such odious and
disagreeable rivals. Our master manufacturers think it reasonable that they themselves
should have the monopoly of the ingenuity of all their countrymen. Though by
restraining, in some trades, the number of apprentices which can be employed at one
time, and by imposing the necessity of a long apprenticeship in all trades, they
endeavour, all of them, to confine the knowledge of their respective employments to as
small a number as possible; they are unwilling, however, that any part of this small
number should go abroad to instruct foreigners.
Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; and the interest of the
producer ought to be attended to only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that
of the consumer. The maxim is so perfectly self-evident that it would be absurd to
attempt to prove it. But in the mercantile system the interest of the consumer is almost
constantly sacrificed to that of the producer; and it seems to consider production, and
not consumption, as the ultimate end and object of all industry and commerce.
(Book IV, Chapter VIII)

 
 

The manufacturers can prosper during a war

The manufacturers, during the war, will have a double demand upon them, and be
called upon, first, to work up goods to be sent abroad, for paying the bills drawn upon
foreign countries for the pay and provisions of the army; and, secondly, to work up
such as are necessary for purchasing the common returns that had usually been
consumed in the country. In the midst of the most destructive foreign war, therefore,
the greater part of manufactures may frequently flourish greatly; and, on the contrary,
they may decline on the return of the peace. They may flourish amidst the ruin of their
country, and begin to decay upon the return of its prosperity. The different state of
many different branches of the British manufactures during the late war, and for some
time after the peace, may serve as an illustration of what has been just now said.
(Book IV, Chapter I)

The monopoly of the home market

Merchants and manufacturers are the people who derive the greatest advantage from
this monopoly of the home-market.
(Book IV, Chapter II)

Merchants and manufacturers are not contented with the monopoly of the home
market, but desire likewise the most extensive foreign sale for their goods. Their
country has no jurisdiction in foreign nations, and therefore can seldom procure them
any monopoly there. They are generally obliged, therefore, to content themselves with
petitioning for certain encouragements to exportation.
(Book IV, Chapter IV)

Some goods, the particular objects of the jealousy of our own manufacturers, are
prohibited to be imported for home consumption.
(Book IV, Chapter IV)

Country gentlemen and farmers, dispersed in different parts of the country, cannot so
easily combine as merchants and manufacturers, who, being collected into towns, and
accustomed to that exclusive corporation spirit which prevails in them, naturally
endeavour to obtain against all their countrymen the same exclusive privilege which
they generally possess against the inhabitants of their respective towns. They
accordingly seem to have been the original inventors of those restraints upon the
importation of foreign goods which secure to them the monopoly of the home-market.
It was probably in imitation of them, and to put themselves upon a level with those
who, they found, were disposed to oppress them, that the country gentlemen and
farmers of Great Britain in so far forgot the generosity which is natural to their station
as to demand the exclusive privilege of supplying their countrymen with corn and
butcher's-meat. They did not perhaps take time to consider how much less their interest
could be affected by the freedom of trade than that of the people whose example they
followed.
(Book IV, Chapter II)

The French have been particularly forward to favour their own manufactures by
restraining the importation of such foreign goods as could come into competition with
them. In this consisted a great part of the policy of Mr. Colbert, who, notwithstanding
his great abilities, seems in this case to have been imposed upon by the sophistry of
merchants and manufacturers, who are always demanding a monopoly against their
countrymen.
(Book IV, Chapter II)

We are unwilling even to be the carriers of French goods, and choose rather to forego a
profit to ourselves than to suffer those, whom we consider as our enemies, to make any
profit by our means.
(Book IV, Chapter IV)

Let the same natural liberty of exercising what species of industry they please, be
restored to all his Majesty's subjects, in the same manner as to soldiers and seamen; that
is, break down the exclusive privileges of corporations, and repeal the statute of
apprenticeship, both which are real encroachments upon natural liberty, and add to
these the repeal of the law of settlements, so that a poor workman, when thrown out of
employment either in one trade or in one place, may seek for it in another trade or in
another place without the fear either of a prosecution or of a removal, and neither the
public nor the individuals will suffer much more from the occasional disbanding some
particular classes of manufacturers than from that of soldiers. Our manufacturers have
no doubt great merit with their country, but they cannot have more than those who
defend it with their blood, nor deserve to be treated with more delicacy.
To expect, indeed, that the freedom of trade should ever be entirely restored in Great
Britain is as absurd as to expect that an Oceana or Utopia should ever be established in
it. Not only the prejudices of the public, but what is much more unconquerable, the
private interests of many individuals, irresistibly oppose it. Were the officers of the
army to oppose with the same zeal and unanimity any reduction in the numbers of
forces with which master manufacturers set themselves against every law that is likely
to increase the number of their rivals in the home-market; were the former to animate
their soldiers in the same manner as the latter enflame their workmen to attack with
violence and outrage the proposers of any such regulation, to attempt to reduce the
army would be as dangerous as it has now become to attempt to diminish in any
respect the monopoly which our manufacturers have obtained against us. This
monopoly has so much increased the number of some particular tribes of them that, like
an overgrown standing army, they have become formidable to the government, and
upon many occasions intimidate the legislature. The Member of Parliament who
supports every proposal for strengthening this monopoly is sure to acquire not only the
reputation of understanding trade, but great popularity and influence with an order of
men whose numbers and wealth render them of great importance. If he opposes them,
on the contrary, and still more if he has authority enough to be able to thwart them,
neither the most acknowledged probity, nor the highest rank, nor the greatest public
services can protect him from the most infamous abuse and detraction, from personal
insults, nor sometimes from real danger, arising from the insolent outrage of furious
and disappointed monopolists.
(Book IV, Chapter II)

Restrictions to commerce

By such maxims as these, however, nations have been taught that their interest
consisted in beggaring all their neighbours. Each nation has been made to look with an
invidious eye upon the prosperity of all the nations with which it trades, and to
consider their gain as its own loss. Commerce, which ought naturally to be, among
nations, as among individuals, a bond of union and friendship, has become the most
fertile source of discord and animosity. The capricious ambition of kings and ministers
has not, during the present and the preceding century, been more fatal to the repose of
Europe than the impertinent jealousy of merchants and manufacturers. The violence
and injustice of the rulers of mankind is an ancient evil, for which, I am afraid, the
nature of human affairs can scarce admit of a remedy. But the mean rapacity, the
monopolizing spirit of merchants and manufacturers, who neither are, nor ought to be,
the rulers of mankind, though it cannot perhaps be corrected may very easily be
prevented from disturbing the tranquillity of anybody but themselves.

That it was the spirit of monopoly which originally both invented and propagated this
doctrine cannot be doubted; and they who first taught it were by no means such fools as
they who believed it. In every country it always is and must be the interest of the great
body of the people to buy whatever they want of those who sell it cheapest. The
proposition is so very manifest that it seems ridiculous to take any pains to prove it; nor
could it ever have been called in question had not the interested sophistry of merchants
and manufacturers confounded the common sense of mankind. Their interest is, in this
respect, directly opposite to that of the great body of the people. As it is the interest of
the freemen of a corporation to hinder the rest of the inhabitants from employing any
workmen but themselves, so it is the interest of the merchants and manufacturers of
every country to secure to themselves the monopoly of the home market.
(Book IV, Chapter III, Part II)

The object, besides, of the greater part of the bye-laws of all regulated companies, as
well as of all other corporations, is not so much to oppress those who are already
members, as to discourage others from becoming so; which may be done, not only by a
high fine, but by many other contrivances. The constant view of such companies is
always to raise the rate of their own profit as high as they can; to keep the market, both
for the goods which they export, and for those which they import, as much
understocked as they can: which can be done only by restraining the competition, or by
discouraging new adventurers from entering into the trade.
(Book V, Chapter I, Part III)

Egoism and nationalism of the masters

But the very same circumstances which would have rendered an open and free
commerce between the two countries so advantageous to both, have occasioned the
principal obstructions to that commerce. Being neighbours, they are necessarily
enemies, and the wealth and power of each becomes, upon that account, more
formidable to the other; and what would increase the advantage of national friendship
serves only to inflame the violence of national animosity. They are both rich and
industrious nations; and the merchants and manufacturers of each dread the
competition of the skill and activity of those of the other.
(Book IV, Chapter III, Part II)

Great Britain ... imposes an absolute prohibition upon the erection of steel furnaces and
slitmills in any of her American plantations. She will not suffer her colonists to work in
those more refined manufactures even for their own consumption; but insists upon
their purchasing of her merchants and manufacturers all goods of this kind which they
have occasion for.
She prohibits the exportation from one province to another by water, and even the
carriage by land upon horseback or in a cart, of hats, of wools and woollen goods, of the
produce of America; a regulation which effectually prevents the establishment of any
manufacture of such commodities for distant sale, and confines the industry of her
colonists in this way to such coarse and household manufactures as a private family
commonly makes for its own use or for that of some of its neighbours in the same
province.
To prohibit a great people, however, from making all that they can of every part of their
own produce, or from employing their stock and industry in the way that they judge
most advantageous to themselves, is a manifest violation of the most sacred rights of
mankind.
(Book IV, Chapter VII)

In their exclusive privilege of supplying the colonies with all the goods which they
wanted from Europe, and of purchasing all such parts of their surplus produce as could
not interfere with any of the trades which they themselves carried on at home, the
interest of the colonies was sacrificed to the interest of those merchants.
(Book IV, Chapter VII)

The masters increase the price of their goods and lower the wages of their workers

Were it possible, indeed, for one great company of merchants to possess themselves of
the whole crop of an extensive country, it might, perhaps, be their interest to deal with
it as the Dutch are said to do with the spiceries of the Moluccas, to destroy or throw
away a considerable part of it in order to keep up the price of the rest.
(Book IV, Chapter V)
By extorting from the legislature bounties upon the exportation of their own linen, high
duties upon the importation of all foreign linen, and a total prohibition of the home
consumption of some sorts of French linen, they endeavour to sell their own goods as
dear as possible. By encouraging the importation of foreign linen yarn, and thereby
bringing it into competition with that which is made by our own people, they
endeavour to buy the work of the poor spinners as cheap as possible. They are as intent
to keep down the wages of their own weavers as the earnings of the poor spinners, and
it is by no means for the benefit of the workman that they endeavour either to raise the
price of the complete work or to lower that of the rude materials. It is the industry
which is carried on for the benefit of the rich and the powerful that is principally
encouraged by our mercantile system. That which is carried on for the benefit of the
poor and the indigent is too often either neglected or oppressed.
(Book IV, Chapter VIII)

The worst government: that of the exclusive companies

The government of an exclusive company of merchants is, perhaps, the worst of all
governments for any country whatever.

Of all the expedients that can well be contrived to stunt the natural growth of a new
colony, that of an exclusive company is undoubtedly the most effectual.

But as all the different merchants, who joined their stocks in order to fit out those
licensed vessels, would find it for their interest to act in concert, the trade which was
carried on in this manner would necessarily be conducted very nearly upon the same
principles as that of an exclusive company. The profit of those merchants would be
almost equally exorbitant and oppressive.
(Book IV, Chapter VI)

 
The exploitation of colonies

Folly and injustice seem to have been the principles which presided over and directed
the first project of establishing those colonies; the folly of hunting after gold and silver
mines, and the injustice of coveting the possession of a country whose harmless natives,
far from having ever injured the people of Europe, had received the first adventurers
with every mark of kindness and hospitality.
(Book IV, Chapter VII, Part II)

The absurd complaints of the British capitalists

Our merchants frequently complain of the high wages of British labour as the cause of
their manufactures being undersold in foreign markets, but they are silent about the
high profits of stock. They complain of the extravagant gain of other people, but they
say nothing of their own. The high profits of British stock, however, may contribute
towards raising the price of British manufactures in many cases as much, and in some
perhaps more, than the high wages of British labour.
(Book IV, Chapter VII, Part III)

Unnatural gigantism

The monopoly of the colony trade besides, by forcing towards it a much greater
proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what would naturally have gone to it,
seems to have broken altogether that natural balance which would otherwise have
taken place among all the different branches of British industry. The industry of Great
Britain, instead of being accommodated to a great number of small markets, has been
principally suited to one great market. Her commerce, instead of running in a great
number of small channels, has been taught to run principally in one great channel. But
the whole system of her industry and commerce has thereby been rendered less secure,
the whole state of her body politic less healthful than it otherwise would have been. In
her present condition, Great Britain resembles one of those unwholesome bodies in
which some of the vital parts are overgrown, and which, upon that account, are liable to
many dangerous disorders scarce incident to those in which all the parts are more
properly proportioned. A small stop in that great blood-vessel, which has been
artificially swelled beyond its natural dimensions, and through which an unnatural
proportion of the industry and commerce of the country has been forced to circulate, is
very likely to bring on the most dangerous disorders upon the whole body politic.
(Book IV, Chapter VII, Part III)

Monopoly

The monopoly raises the rate of profit, but it hinders the sum of profit from rising so
high as it otherwise would do.
All the original sources of revenue, the wages of labour, the rent of land, and the profits
of stock, the monopoly renders much less abundant than they otherwise would be. To
promote the little interest of one little order of men in one country, it hurts the interest
of all other orders of men in that country, and of all men in all other countries.
(Book IV, Chapter VII, Part III)

It is thus that the single advantage which the monopoly procures to a single order of
men is in many different ways hurtful to the general interest of the country.
To found a great empire for the sole purpose of raising up a people of customers may at
first sight appear a project fit only for a nation of shopkeepers. It is, however, a project
altogether unfit for a nation of shopkeepers; but extremely fit for a nation whose
government is influenced by shopkeepers.
(Book IV, Chapter VII, Part III)

All the different regulations of the mercantile system necessarily derange more or less
this natural and most advantageous distribution of stock. But those which concern the
trade to America and the East Indies derange it perhaps more than any other, because
the trade to those two great continents absorbs a greater quantity of stock than any two
other branches of trade. The regulations, however, by which this derangement is
effected in those two different branches of trade are not altogether the same. Monopoly
is the great engine of both; but it is a different sort of monopoly. Monopoly of one kind
or another, indeed, seems to be the sole engine of the mercantile system.
(Book IV, Chapter VII, Part III)

Great properties require the establishment of the government

Men may live together in society with some tolerable degree of security, though there is
no civil magistrate to protect them from the injustice of those passions. But avarice and
ambition in the rich, in the poor the hatred of labour and the love of present ease and
enjoyment, are the passions which prompt to invade property, passions much more
steady in their operation, and much more universal in their influence. Wherever there is
great property there is great inequality. For one very rich man there must be at least five
hundred poor, and the affluence of the few supposes the indigence of the many. The
affluence of the rich excites the indignation of the poor, who are often both driven by
want, and prompted by envy, to invade his possessions. It is only under the shelter of
the civil magistrate that the owner of that valuable property, which is acquired by the
labour of many years, or perhaps of many successive generations, can sleep a single
night in security. He is at all times surrounded by unknown enemies, whom, though he
never provoked, he can never appease, and from whose injustice he can be protected
only by the powerful arm of the civil magistrate continually held up to chastise it. The
acquisition of valuable and extensive property, therefore, necessarily requires the
establishment of civil government.
(Book V, Chapter I, Part II)

The rich, in particular, are necessarily interested to support that order of things which
can alone secure them in the possession of their own advantages.
(Book V, Chapter I, Part II)

The monied people increase their wealth lending to the government

The merchant or monied man makes money by lending money to government, and
instead of diminishing, increases his trading capital. He generally considers it as a
favour, therefore, when the administration admits him to a share in the first
subscription for a new loan. Hence the inclination or willingness in the subjects of a
commercial state to lend.
The government of such a state is very apt to repose itself upon this ability and
willingness of its subjects to lend it their money on extraordinary occasions. It foresees
the facility of borrowing, and therefore dispenses itself from the duty of saving.
(Book V, Chapter III)