Defence Studies

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The ‘Clash of Civilisations’ Thesis as a Tool for

Explaining Conflicts in the Contemporary World

Major Alex Osborn British Army

To cite this article: Major Alex Osborn British Army (2005) The ‘Clash of Civilisations’ Thesis as
a Tool for Explaining Conflicts in the Contemporary World, Defence Studies, 5:3, 394-400, DOI:
10.1080/14702430500492849

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14702430500492849

Published online: 17 Jul 2006.

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 VIEWPOINT

The ‘Clash of Civilisations’ Thesis as a

Tool for Explaining Conflicts in the
Contemporary World
M A J O R ALE X O S B OR N, B RIT ISH ARMY

The Clash of Civilisations thesis contends that the fundamental source of

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conflict in the post-Cold War world will be cultural rather than ideological
or economic.1 The key features of this thesis will be identified and exam-
ined in order to assess its validity.2
The American Professor Samuel P. Huntington argues3 that while
nation states remain the key players in global relations, conflicts will now
occur between nations and groups of different civilisations. A civilisation is
defined as ‘the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of
cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes them from
other species’.4 Huntington identifies seven or eight civilisations based on
factors including history, language, custom and religion. His civilisations
are: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin
American and possibly African.
Civilisations will clash principally because the differences between them
are fundamental and often irreconcilable, such as ‘views on the relations
between God and man, individual and state, parents and children, man and
wife as well as…rights and responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality
and hierarchy’.5 This basic cause is bolstered, in Huntington’s analysis, by
factors arising in the modern world. The increasing interaction between the
people of different civilisations is heightening awareness of their differences
while social and economic change is breaking down traditional focuses for
identity such as the nation-state. As a result people are increasingly defining
themselves in ethnic and religious terms, often taken to extreme lengths in
the form of fundamentalism.
With the failure and collapse of Communism, Western economic and
cultural dominance is increasingly seen as a threat by those in other

Major Alex Osborn, British Army, ICSC (L) 1.

Defence Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Summer 2005), pp. 394–400

ISSN 1470-2436
DOI: 10.1080/14702430500492849 © 2005 Taylor & Francis
T HE ‘ CLASH O F C I V I L I S A T I ON S ’ EXP L A N A T I O N 395

cultures, causing them to re-emphasise and even re-invent their own iden-
tities, giving rise to phenomena such as ‘Islamification’. The rise of
economic unions such as the European Union and the North American
Free Trade Area in the West and the East Asian economic bloc centred on
China, deriving their success from shared values and mutual understand-
ing, is seen as proof of this as well as representing another influence tending
to reinforce the differences between civilisations. Unlike theorists such as
Francis Fukuyama,6 Huntington does not regard Western ideals either as
universal or as a prerequisite for modernisation. Echoing the early twenti-
eth century writings of the German Oswald Spengler,7the American’s
thinking contemplates the possibility of Western decline and the rise of
other civilisations instead.
Huntington suggests that clashes will occur both at the macro level
between nations, and at the micro level between groups within states. In
both cases, the parties to conflict will be differentiated by the civilisation to
which they belong.
It is quite possible to interpret today’s world in terms of a clash of
civilisations. The ethnic struggles in the former Yugoslavia and in many
successor states to the Soviet Union pit Orthodox Christian against
Muslim, while the frequent stand-offs over Kashmir see Hindu India
confronting Muslim Pakistan. In Israel, Afghanistan and Iraq the West
confronts Islam, a struggle given a new dimension by the terrorist attacks of
11 September 2001.
The basis of Huntington’s thinking lies in the characterisation and defi-
nition of his civilisations and an acceptance that the underlying causes of
conflict arise from the differences between these civilisations. It is therefore
necessary to examine these areas in detail as a means of validating the thesis.
Huntington’s civilisations are defined in a very simplistic manner. The
main criterion for deciding to which civilisation a country belongs seems to
be religion, although it is clear that geographical location plays a significant
role in the definition, especially in cases such as Latin America and Africa.8
Furthermore, the rich diversity of the civilisations is not explored in by
Huntington.9 Is it really meaningful to include in a single Islamic civilisa-
tion the ‘theocracies of Iran and Sudan, the politically opportunistic inter-
pretation of Islam in Saddam’s Iraq (pre-2003), open repression in Syria,
enlightened absolutism in Jordan and a typical post-modern, post-colonial
state in Egypt’.10
Furthermore, this assumption of an essential homogeneity within, in
this case, Islam fails to account for the numerous conflicts between
Muslims and the extensive differences in foreign policy exhibited by
Islamic states.11 Even within nation-states there are infinite differences in
396 D E F E NC E S TUD IE S

the attitudes of people and civilisation can be seen as specific to each indi-
vidual, born out of upbringing, education etc.12 Indeed, how does one
measure the influence of immigration into Western societies?
Huntington’s contention that differences between civilisations cause
conflict because they are fundamental suggests that there must be an inher-
ent inflexibility: an inability to contemplate compromise or change. It is
widely observed that in reality cultural norms change with time, even on
such elemental issues as individual versus community values.13 Some
commentators even argue that Western values emphasising individual
freedom are universal and the natural consequence of adopting modern
economic reform, and that all civilisations will eventually modernise and
adopt these values for themselves.14 Whether this alternative vision can be
justified or not, it is certainly true that many in the Islamic world share what
Huntington would identify as Western liberal values and vice versa.
Problems with the practical application of Huntington’s thesis can be
seen in real world examples. The clash of civilisations approach suggests
that groups will come together in support, yet the coalition to defeat Iraq in
1991 included numerous Arab nations and Iran supported Christian
Armenia in its conflict with Muslim Azerbaijan. Conversely, the genocide
of Tutsis by Hutus in Rwanda took place within a single civilisation, and
wars within Western civilisation have been the most numerous and bloody
in history.15 Perhaps the flaw is in seeing some change in the nature of
conflict: ‘what was the East-West clash if not one rooted in civilisations?
Two opposing and incompatible visions of society with different
approaches to quite fundamental questions of the order of the state and
individual.’16
Looking next at the causes of conflict, Russet and others conducted a
statistical analysis of conflict between pairs of states in the period 1950 to
1992 in an attempt to establish whether there was any evidence supporting
Huntington’s key assertions. Despite the effects of the Cold War ideologi-
cal clash, one would still expect to see some corroboration of the thesis in
reality. They concluded that differences in civilisation had no statistically
significant effect on the probability that a pair of states would go to war.17
They also investigated whether the incidence of conflict between civilisa-
tions would increase as the Cold War progressed towards its end, or
during periods where it was less intense. Using two different measures of
intensity they concluded that the reverse was the case: the Cold War
inflamed civilisation conflict.18 The data also indicated that states within
civilisations had fought much more frequently among themselves than
with others, and that inter-civilisation conflict decreased overall in the
period examined.19
THE ‘ CLASH O F C I V I L I S A T I ON S ’ EXP L A N A T I O N 397

Commentators agree that most recent conflicts have started within

states, usually between rival ethnic or communal groups for a variety of
reasons 20 The first identifiable cause of war is to achieve political objec-
tives. Although revolutionary ideology is no longer a major factor, there
is evidence that many sub-state conflicts are prosecuted by parties
competing for political power. This appears to have been the case in the
recent civil wars in Liberia and Somalia, in which the aim of the warring
parties was essentially to seize or hold on to political control of the
country.21
A second major cause of conflict is competition for scarce resources. In
the next 50 years the world’s population will pass nine billion and scarcities
of renewable resources will increase.22 Areas of shortage include the
degradation of farmland and forests, the depletion of freshwater sources
and fisheries, and it is expected that long-term environmental effects such
as global warming may exacerbate these existing problems in the future.23 It
is widely asserted that competition for scarce resources lies at the heart of
most conflicts, and that the subsequent polarisation of competing parties
along ethnic or religious lines is merely a product of the significance of
those social divisions within a society.24
In other words, although the resulting conflict may be between groups
which appear to come from different cultures, the real underlying cause of
it is resource scarcity. The single resource most likely to cause conflict in
the future is water, especially where rivers run through the territory of
several countries so that those downstream are distrustful of those higher
up.25 This relationship will tend to cause conflict completely independently
of civilisation boundaries.
Analysts agree that sub-state conflict will occur mainly within weak or
failed states.26 A common reason for this type of conflict in recent years has
been post-colonial collapse. Successor governments often struggle to estab-
lish their legitimacy or indeed maintain security without the backing of the
colonial power. Groups within the state begin to struggle for power and the
state institutions cannot prevent them from doing so, leading to civil war of
the type seen in the former Yugoslavia. The situation there was exacerbated
because the different ethnic groups were split up, a common tactic of
colonial powers to reduce their cohesion, causing a subsequent struggle to
reunite in the civil war.27 This cause of conflict has been very common in
recent years following the breakup of the Soviet Union, but is likely to
reduce in significance as this effect is gradually resolved.
There are various other reasons why a state might weaken or fail.
During the Cold War both superpowers sponsored Third World regimes in
an attempt to further their political and ideological aims at the expense of
398 D E F E NC E S TUD IE S

the other. The end of this sponsorship has resulted in the weakening of
many regimes to the point of failure such as that seen in Zaire in the mid-
1990s.28
A more general reason for state weakening throughout the world today
is the loss of legitimacy leading to pressure for reform. Governments the
world over are increasingly required to legitimise their status by meeting
the needs of their populations. This does not necessarily mean democratic
freedoms, as some more fundamentalist regimes will claim to meet other
needs more effectively, but it does mean that states which fail to maintain
legitimacy will weaken and become vulnerable.29
Weak states are unable to guarantee the security of groups within
society, and these groups will then prepare for and engage in violence to
maintain or enhance their position.30 In such situations, the people will
align themselves to groups based on underlying identities within that
society. In the contemporary world these group identities are likely to be
formed along ethnic, religious or otherwise cultural lines.31 Governments
faced with internal discontent can attempt to democratise or clamp down
via a return to oppressive control. The first approach, in a fundamentally
weak state, generally promotes the division of people into opposing groups
and makes protest easier, while the second will not halt the tide of conflict
in the long run.32
It is important to note that in these circumstances the underlying causes
of the conflict are not cultural in nature. Historically, the allegiances into
which society divides are just as likely to be political as ethnic or religious,
although it is easy after the event to ascribe cultural causes.33 Even where
society is divided by religion or ethnicity before conflict breaks out, perhaps
where one group holds the political power and has disproportionate access
to resources, it can still be argued that it is these social and economic issues
which are at the heart of the conflict rather than strictly cultural ones. In the
vast majority of observed cases of ethnic or religious conflict, whereas reli-
gion remained a constant prior to the outbreak it was preceded by intense
political or economic tensions.34
The reaction of other civilisations to Western dominance requires some
investigation. Huntington contests that other civilisations, especially Islam,
are in conflict with the West because they fundamentally oppose values of
individual freedom and secularity. This can be seen as a reaction against the
relative success of Western societies evidenced by the disparity in standards
of living. Alternatively, conflict and violence can be ascribed to frustration
at the failure of indigenous societies to translate Western systems into
positive benefits, namely Islamic anti-Western feeling stemming from the
failure of Arab nationalism and socialism.35
T HE ‘ CLASH O F C I V I L I S A T I ON S ’ EXP L A N A T I O N 399

The 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center represented a new form of
terrorism in which terror represents an end in itself and there is no desire
to further tangible political aims or to negotiate.36 Taken at face value the
rhetoric employed by Al-Qaeda indicates an irreconcilable clash between
Western and Islamic values, yet closer examination suggests more prag-
matic socio-economic reasons. Gross social and economic inequalities
prevail in the states from which the terrorist leadership is drawn, and these
are becoming starker as populations rapidly grow.37 Terrorist action is thus
the product of frustrations with no alternative outlet.
Taking the evidence together it must be concluded that contemporary
conflict has many causes; individual conflicts and wars result from a combi-
nation of many interlinked reasons. There is no doubt that cultural factors
play a role in most conflict, and in the post-Communist era societies in
discord invariably fragment along ethnic or religious lines. Thus, on super-
ficial inspection, Huntington’s thesis seems a valid explanation for the
evidence. Its flaws are brought into focus by the simplistically defined
civilisations which fail to withstand rigorous examination. It is clear that
conflict does not represent a clash of civilisations but rather stems from the
same causes as always. As Gray notes, ‘The change in current circumstances
is the worldwide spread of industrial production leading to the end of
western global hegemony. What is not new is the traditional conflict
between and within states over territory, religion, resources and commer-
cial advantage.’38
Huntington’s thesis should not be dismissed lightly. There are many
who subscribe to the Clash of Civilisations and commentators have noted
that viewing the world through Huntington’s filter could cause his ideas to
become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Conflicts could be started or intensified
by the actions of statesmen informed by ideas of a clash of civilisations. It is
for this reason that Huntington’s thesis is not only limited but potentially
dangerous.

NOTES
1 The analysis, opinions and conclusions expressed or implied in this viewpoint are those of
the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the UK MOD or any other govern-
ment agency.
2 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?, Foreign Affairs 72/3 (1993) p.22 of
pp.22–49.
3 This summary is drawn from Huntington (note 2) and Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash
of Civilisations’, The Sunday Times, 14 Oct. 2001.
4 Huntington (note 2) p.24.
5 Huntington (note 3).
6 John Gray, ‘Global Utopias and Clashing Civilisations: Misunderstanding the Present’,
International Affairs 74/1(1998) pp.3–4 of pp.149–64.
400 D E F E NC E S TUD I E S

7 Robert W. Cox, ‘Thinking about Civilisations’, Review of International Studies 26/5

(Dec. 2000) p.218 of pp.217–34.
8 Bruce M. Russett, John R. O’Neal and Michaelene Cox, ‘Clash of Civilisations, or Realism
and Liberalism Déjà vu? Some Evidence’, Journal of Peace Research 37/5 (2000) p.592 of
pp.583–608.
9 Dieter Senghaas, The Clash within Civilisations (London: Routledge 1998) p.74.
10 Ibid. p.89.
11 Saqeb Mueen, ‘Fallout from the War in Iraq: Domestic Echoes in Foreign Policy?’, RUSI
Journal 148/3 (June 2003) p.31 of pp.26–32.
12 Cox (note 7) p.220.
13 Ibid. p.221.
14 Senghaas (note 9) p.75.
15 Gray (note 6) p.9.
16 Senghaas (note 9) p.82.
17 Russett et al. (note 8) p.595.
18 Ibid. pp.599–600.
19 Ibid. p.602.
20 Charles J. Dick, ‘Conflict Spills into the 21st Century’, Jane’s Intelligence Review 11/12
(Dec. 2000) p.48 of pp.5–40.
21 Isabelle Duyvesteyn, ‘Contemporary War: Ethnic Conflict, Resource Conflict or Some-
thing Else?’, Civil Wars 3/1 (Spring 2000) p.111 of pp.92–116.
22 Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, ‘Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict, Evidence from
Cases’, International Security 19/1 ( Summer 1994) pp.5–40.
23 Ibid. pp.17–18.
24 David A. Lake and Donald Rothschild, ‘Containing Fear, The Origins and Management of
Ethnic Conflict’, International Security 21/2 ( Fall 1996) p.44 of pp.41–75.
25 Homer-Dixon (note 22) pp.19–20.
26 Dick (note 20) p.48.
27 Daniel Byman and Stephen van Evera, ‘Why They Fight: Hypotheses on the Causes of
Contemporary Deadly Conflict’, Security Studies 7/3 ( Spring 1998) pp.25–7 of pp.1–50.
28 Duyvesteyn (note 21) p.97.
29 Gray (note 6) p.6.
30 Byman and van Evera (note 27) p.37.
31 Senghaas (note 9) p.75.
32 Byman and van Evera (note 27) pp.33–5.
33 James Kurth, ‘Religion and Ethnic Conflict – in Theory’, Orbis 45/1 (Spring 2001) p.283 of
pp.281–94.
34 Ibid. p.293.
35 Ibid. p.290.
36 Matthew J. Morgan, ‘The Origins of the New Terrorism’, Parameters 33/1 (Spring 2004)
pp.29–30 of pp.29–43.
37 Ibid. p.36.
38 Gray (note 6) p.10.