Human Nature, Virtue and Contingency:

The Metaphysical Framework surrounding the Thomistic account of Natural Virtue

Arielle Harms
Ave Maria University

5050 Ave Maria Blvd., Ave Maria, FL 34142 • arielle.harms@my.avemaria.edu • 316-516-7708

Human Nature, Virtue and Contingency

Probably on account of its resonances with our common experience, different sections of

St. Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae have been synthesized with various other philosophical

and theological ideas and methods in the hope of solving a difficulty or resolving a tension that

arises in the other account. For just such a tension, appeal is made to St. Thomas’ account of the

virtue of courage in the Secunda Secundae to resolve the conflict between the ordinary manner

of speaking in assigning praise and blame for personal action and Richard Rorty’s theory of

contingency, where human action is not even considered voluntary. By moving beyond the

traditional categories of moral agency, Rorty eliminates culpability and with it a person’s ability

to be praised or blamed for his own actions, putting his theory at odds with common parlance in

regard to agency.i For Rorty, the only exception to the normal state of human affairs, that is,

being trapped in inherited moral language and subject to an all-encompassing contingency, is for

those who are able to will their own description of themselves, though even in this they do not

escape the contingency that renders their action meaningless on the level of culpability.ii

In an attempt to reconcile Rorty’s account of contingency with the common manner of

speaking of human action John Bowlin proposes a synthesis of St. Thomas Aquinas' discussion

of the virtue of courage and Rorty's account of contingency.iii Accepting most of Rorty’s

premises in regard to the contingency of human action, Bowlin agrees that most men are

detained from birth within the moral language they inherit from their surroundings, while only a

few are able to create their own self-descriptive language, necessary in Rorty’s account for

actually willing anything at all.iv Even with the presence of self-description, Rorty’s account is

still, at best, ambiguous as to whether or not a person can be held accountable for his own

actions,v but Bowlin seizes upon this ambiguity, determined to conclude that the common

practice of assigning praise and blame is relevant to at least some forms of human action.vi

Through Bowlin’s lens, Thomas virtue of courage, in contrast to the other virtues and other

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actions from habit, is especially helpful because it entails the overcoming of extraordinary

dangers and difficulties which present a challenge to our inherited moral language, thus

providing an opening for the voluntary within the contingent.vii In the reflection proper to

courage, Bowlin finds the necessary self-creative element.viii The consideration of moral values

and the making of choices based on that consideration allows logical space for assigning praise

and blame to actions.

Bowlin's proposed synthesis, however, hangs on an explicit supposition concerning

Aquinas' account of virtue, specifically the virtue of courage, namely that it rests only

superficially on a metaphysical structure and particular account of human nature, thus enabling it

to be adaptable enough to move between Thomas' rigorous and specifically Christian account of

human action and a more general description of human action found within Rorty's account of

contingency.ix As it turns out, the context of Thomas's account of the virtue of courage has much

more to teach about human nature than Bowlin is able to see, in the end presenting a robust

metaphysical structure, including a particular account of human nature, that is at odds with

Rorty's contingency and linguistic self-creation. By removing St. Thomas’ account of the virtue

of courage from its context in the larger discussion of the moral life given in the Secundae Pars

of the Summa Theologiae, Bowlin misses the connection of courage to the other virtues,

especially the virtue of prudence, the relationship of the virtues to the human person, and the

larger view of the whole which St. Thomas presents.

While conceding St. Thomas’ greater theological framework ultimately directs the courage

of those inspired by grace to act not just on account of the habit of courage, which has been

recognized as a good, but also for the sake of eternal life with God, Bowlin notes that not all

courage needs to be directed this far to be worthy of the designation, nor to make action

voluntary. Rather all that is needed is to reflect on the known ends of action. In the case of the

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courage untouched by grace, this can be simply the end of the habit of courage and the good that

is being protected. St. Thomas would agree with Bowlin that not all courage must be directed to

man’s supernatural end in order to bear the name of courage,x but he would disagree that this

lower species of courage is without a significant metaphysical framework. Instead, in Thomas’

account, reason and human nature connect this natural species of courage to the metaphysical

whole.

All of the virtues perfect man’s natural powers in relation to the perfection of his nature or

to his supernatural end, guided by the appropriate species of prudence in the particulars of their

acts. While natural prudence takes its bearing from the natural human good indicated by the

moral virtues, supernatural prudence, which directs man ultimately to God, receives its direction

from the virtue of charity, which is capable of directing man to a supernatural end.xi In both

orders, prudence, in guiding the particular virtuous actions receives direction ultimately from the

end, one a natural end, given by the type of being that man is, and the other a supernatural end,

given by the supernatural call man has received.

Courage is the virtue that moderates fear so the good discerned by reason but found

difficult to achieve might be pursued.xii The difficulty of its object indicates that this virtue is the

habit directed to the perfection of the irascible power of the human soul.xiii Most proper to

courage is right action in the face of the danger of death, as Thomas explains, “it behooves one to

hold firmly to the good of reason against every evil whatsoever, since no bodily good is

equivalent to the good of reason. Hence courage of soul must be that which binds the will firmly

to the good of reason in the face of greatest evils, because he that stands firm against the greatest

will in consequence stand firm against the lesser, but not conversely.”xiv In this explanation of

courage, the good of reason comes to sight as the highest good to be achieved. It is the good of

reason that is sought above and beyond any other good of the person.

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The good of reason is not a good other than a good of the person, as Thomas explains:

“Human virtue, of which we are speaking, is that which makes a man good and renders his work

good. The good of man, however, is to be according to reason…and therefore it belongs to

human virtue to make man and his work to be according to reason.”xv Reason, man’s highest

faculty, sets him apart from all other creatures and thus gives him a distinct purpose in the

created order, a purpose he must work toward and, once achieved, allows him to be called

good.xvi While many human goods are recognizable by reason, these must also be ordered

properly by reason to the final end. Thus, while man’s bodily good is a good of reason, there are

goods reason recognizes that are higher than it, and which are to be preferred to it because they

are more closely related to his end as identified and reached by reason.xvii

For Thomas the whole of the created world is ordered to its fitting end, through the very

natures given by God. That which is good for each created thing is what is most in accord with

its ordering to its end. This ordering is recognizable by reason, and shared in by man through his

own nature.xviii Thus man, who is naturally ordered to life, is also further ordered by his nature

to procreation and education of his offspring. But his highest ordering, to live in community

and to seek the truth especially about God, relates most closely to the rational powers of his

nature, and it is to this end that the other ends of man are subordinated.xix

The task of virtue is to assist man in living according to the good dictated to him through

the ordering of his nature and recognized by reason. The practice of the virtues orders and

perfects the appetites, moderating the passions and appetites so that they are able to act in accord

with reason.xx It must be noted that Thomas’ account of virtue always considers the act

proceeding from the virtuous habit to be a freely chosen and thus voluntary act.xxi The

distinction for Thomas does not have to do with choosing circumstances or ends by which the act

is measured virtuous. Rather, all truly human actions proceed from reason and as such are

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voluntary. They are done for a purpose, directed toward a goal set by the individual as a means

to attaining his final end or goal of happiness, fixed by his nature.xxii As a habit, virtue assists

man in acting consistently and with ease according to reason and in a manner conforming to true

happiness, rather than removing the voluntary character from his action.

Reason’s navigation of these goods and of the means of attaining the final good requires its

own special virtue: prudence. Prudence is “right reason about things to be done.”xxiii The act of

prudence terminates in the guidance of the acts of the other moral virtues.xxiv Considering

principles and experience, it directs its possessor’s action properly and virtuously, allowing for

the judgment of practical matters.xxv It does not set the end for the moral virtues, as this is set by

human nature, but uses knowledge of the end to direct action, as Thomas explains:

In the practical reason, certain things pre-exist as naturally known principles and such are
the ends of moral virtues, since the end is in practical matters what principles are in
speculative matters…while certain things are in the practical reason by way of conclusions
and such are the means which we gather from the ends themselves. About these is
prudence, which applies universal principles to the particular conclusions of practical
matters. Consequently, it does not belong to prudence to appoint the end to moral virtues,
but only to regulate the means.xxvi

Because the already determined end is the starting point for all human action, the job of prudence

is to discern the proper manner of reaching that end through the action of moral virtue in light of

the particular circumstances. Prudence assists the moral virtues by showing them the means to

the end to which they are already directed.xxvii In his discussion of the connection of the moral

virtues, Thomas explains:

No moral virtue can be without prudence; since it is proper to moral virtue to make a
right choice, for it is an elective habit. Now right choice requires not only the inclination
to a due end, which inclination is the direct outcome of moral virtue, but also the correct
choice of things conducive to that end, which choice is made by prudence, that counsels,
judges, and commands in those things that are directed to the end. In like manner one
cannot have prudence unless one has the moral virtues: since prudence is right reason
about things to be done and the starting point of reason is the end of the thing to be done
to which end man is rightly disposed by moral virtue.xxviii

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Thus for Thomas the choice that prudence makes in commanding moral virtue concerns the

means to the end to which the moral virtue itself is already determined. Prudence takes its

direction and its standard from the principles relating to the virtue whose action it is guiding.

Contrary to Bowlin’s premise, Thomas’ account of courage and, in fact, of all moral virtue,

is deeply rooted in a much larger metaphysical framework. Courage for its very operation needs

the direction of prudence to select the means by which courageous action is to be accomplished.

Prudence, however in selecting the means has not only knowledge of singulars and particulars,

but also knows the end of human action, the specifically human good or perfection. This end is

fixed in human nature and recognized by reason. For an act to be truly courageous, it must take

into account not only the overcoming of fear in reaching a good but, more importantly, this good

must be in accord with the specifically human good as ascertained by reason and set by human

nature.

The fixed nature of the human good in Thomas’ framework leaves no room for Rorty’s

linguistic self-creation in the account of courage, necessary as it is to Bowlin’s entire thesis.

Rather than each willing his own life, Thomas sees that human nature gives a fixed measure for

human action. Bowlin only partially recognizes this. He considers Thomas’ theological context,

but, quite rightly, notes that one can be said to have courage even without directing this virtue

ultimately to a supernatural goal. While Aquinas would agree to a natural species of virtue not

necessarily ordered further to a supernatural goal, he would not allow this natural virtue to be

wrenched out of the framework provided by nature, which can then be ordered by grace to the

supernatural.xxix In Thomas’ account, nature itself is ordered to an ultimate end that is normative

of human actions. In both species of virtue, the natural and the supernatural, the end directs and

guides, setting parameters for virtuous action. Rather than courage being coerced reflection and

perhaps even redefinition to fit the end given by right reason and derived from the inherited

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moral language, Thomas shows prudence to give the means of action in accord with the set end

of courage.xxx

Prudence’s grasp of the fixed end of human nature does not exclude a relation to

contingent particulars. In fact, this is the facet of Thomas’ account that Bowlin is able to place in

a larger context. Prudence is concerned with navigating circumstances as Thomas explains more

fully:

To prudence belongs not only the consideration of the reason, but also the application to
action, which is the end of the practical reason. Now no man can conveniently apply one
thing to another unless he knows both the thing to be applied and the thing to which it has
to be applied. Now actions are singular in matter and so it is necessary for the prudent
man to know both the universal principles of reason and the singulars about which
actions are concerned.xxxi

For Thomas, then, prudence is the virtue that examines the circumstances in light of the

appropriate standards and thus determines the proper course of action in a very definite situation.

This explanation of prudence lends credence to Bowlin’s concern for the proper objects,

circumstances and degree in the proper context for determining the proper action of courage.

Indeed, Thomas affirms that on account of the variety of circumstances pertaining to human

action prudence usually requires discernment and experience of something to which the present

can be compared.xxxii

Contrary to Thomas, however, Bowlin’s account shows right reason as determining the

good to be achieved: “Courage allays fear, strengthens us to endure difficulties and dangers, and

enables us to pursue the good that right reason dictates.”xxxiii He explains the case of someone

whose natural tendency is to excessive daring, rather than fear: “Here courage does not allay

fear but rather elicits it, enabling the fearless and the daring to fear the right objects, in the right

circumstances, and to the right degree, and to withhold aggression in the right contexts. In short,

it enables them to respond to difficulties and dangers with passion that tracks the judgments of

right reason.”xxxiv According to Bowlin, right reason must navigate the circumstances to

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establish what is good in the situation and guide courage. The point of departure for prudence is

the inherited moral language, which is then revised if the circumstances change drastically or the

action proposed proves to be too difficult.xxxv

For Bowlin, the relation to particular and changing circumstances affords him the place

for self-description, which on his account is necessary for voluntary action. The original

intention of his synthesis was merely to provide logical space for voluntary action within an

account of historical contingency in order to lay a foundation for judgments of praise and

blame.xxxvi He secures the voluntary character of action by showing prudence to be a comparison

of the relative merits of goods within a particular situation. These goods, given by the inherited

moral language are revised or acted upon according to the dictate of right reason and after

suitable reflection. The change in circumstances leads to reflection on the inherited moral

language which renders any resulting action voluntary. The result of this description is a

constantly changing inherited moral language, subject to revision and re-description as goods

come into conflict.

Even as he articulates the necessity of a flexible moral inheritance, Bowlin

simultaneously tries to give it the task of the standard which Thomas shows is requisite for

prudence to function. For Thomas, the known end provides the moral standard against which

human action is measured.xxxvii That is, the standard points to what is good. Bowlin argues that

propositions of moral value ultimately come from a person’s inherited moral language, setting

the standard for virtue and virtue’s end.xxxviii This standard of action, though, is nothing like

Thomas’ standard. Dependent on the history and background of the person inheriting it, the

contingent moral inheritance which comprises Bowlin’s standard of action is not universal or

standard in any sense. Varied cultural norms can change the moral inheritance from country to

country, from community to community while varied experiences will modify the moral

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language enough to supply differences even among close family members. Circumstances and

particulars necessarily are mixed in with those norms as the inherited moral language develops.

On account of its contingency, inherited moral language is not equal to the task to which

Bowlin appoints it: it cannot supply a real standard for human action, as Rorty himself explains:

Our insistence on contingency, and our consequent opposition to ideas like ‘essence,’
‘nature,’ and ‘foundation,’ makes it impossible for us to retain the notion that some
actions and attitudes are naturally ‘inhuman.’ For this insistence implies that what counts
as being a decent human being is relative to historical circumstance, a matter of transient
consensus about what attitudes are normal and what practices are just or unjust.xxxix

A commitment to contingency makes the moral judgment of other times and even other persons

impossible, because there is no set standard with which to assess them. There can be nothing

that is always good or always bad because of the variety and constant change in attitudes and

opinions. Assigning praise or blame for actions requires a true norm against which to consider

them, a contingent standard is not really a standard at all.

Bowlin gives witness to this weakness, even though he does not recognize it explicitly.

At the crucial moment in his own test case, he finds himself in search of some other standard and

thus does not ultimately approach the question of how right reason determines what is the proper

good to be pursued. While his entire article rests on the premise that during the holocaust it was

virtuous for the Danes to assist their Jewish neighbors and vicious for the Belgians to neglect

theirs, Bowlin’s only standard for offering this judgment comes from outside the inherited moral

language of the Danes and Belgians. Instead it is the perceived natural desire to offer praise and

blame in these circumstances and the observation that all language discussing these events

cannot help but be couched in moral terms and judgments.xl His acceptance of Rorty’s

contingency allows him nothing more as guidance. In contrast, Aquinas’ notion of the virtues

and the relation of prudence or right reason to courage is connected, not to an inherited moral

language, but to objective norms, which, while still requiring deliberation and choice, offer

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prudence something more stable than a contingent inherited moral language and experiential

observations by which to render judgment.

In contrast to the variable inherited moral language, in Thomas’ account of the moral

virtues, prudence has a dependable and fixed standard to be applied to the concrete particulars,

thus giving definite guidance in determining a course of action. The moral virtues ultimately

direct man to the good of his nature, disposing his actions to assist him in perfecting the different

powers of his soul.xli Human nature sets a fixed standard and offers a specification of the

perfection and good from which moral virtue and prudence take their bearings. For Thomas,

virtue is how man forms his passions and appetites according to reason, how he comes to attain

his final end or perfection.xlii Simply put virtue’s purpose is to make man and his work good.

The work of prudence in directing the other moral virtues is to determine what actions are in

accord with the already established end of the human person by examining the principles and the

circumstances.xliii In the end, Bowlin’s attempt at a synthesis fails, because Thomas’ account of

courage requires the direction of prudence which relies on a fixed, universal, normative end. No

matter how Bowlin tries to cast it, Rorty’s inherited moral language cannot supply the stability

and universality required for the moral virtue of courage.

The attempt to rescue virtuous action out of the meaninglessness of contingency is

thwarted in the failure of the synthesis between a Thomistic account of courage and Rorty’s

account of contingency. In the end, the Thomistic account of courage is unable to be extricated

out of his larger metaphysical framework without losing its points of reference and standards of

judgment, in short, without losing that which determines courageous action. This is because, for

Thomas, it is ultimately impossible to judge actions that truly characterize courage without

reference to the proper and fixed end of human life. Despite his careful attention to these details

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of Thomas’ account, Bowlin is unable to recognize the parts of the account that serve as anchors

and point to St. Thomas’ larger framework.

The weakness of Bowlin’s account was not his explanation of courage, but his discussion

of the guidance courage receives from prudence and its relation to the whole. While his

description of prudence did take due note of singulars, Bowlin’s association of prudence to the

universals by which it judges is much more tenuous. He mistakes the role of prudence and

deliberation in Aquinas’ account for the Rortian concept of self-description, thus failing to see

the larger metaphysical framework which renders Aquinas’ account intelligible. In the proposed

synthesis, Rorty’s inherited moral language is forced to take on more than one role. Through

reflection and subsequent action or revision, the inherited moral language provides an

opportunity for characterizing human actions as voluntary even within the boundaries of

contingency. But Bowlin also wishes to assign to the inherited moral language a more stable

position, allowing it to supply the standards for action against which prudence judges particulars.

In this role, a difficulty emerges as Bowlin wishes to hold the Danes and the Belgians to the

same moral standard, despite the disparity in inherited moral language, the standard to which

they are held. Thus Bowlin is forced to choose between consistency in his argument and his

desire to assign praise and blame. His decision for the latter compels him to move the line of the

voluntary back to the unreflective reception of the moral language, rather than leaving it with

courageous action, which is where he originally proved it.

Whether he wishes to acknowledge it or not, Bowlin’s inconsistency demonstrates that

the visceral desire to judge human actions in different circumstances and to assign praise or

blame needs something more stable and fundamental, something underlying the historical

contingency. This underlying norm is provided in Thomas’ account, where human actions are

measured according to the standard of the prior ordering of human nature. While still subject to

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and dependent on changing circumstances and situations, the idea of things having an essence or

nature, an essential metaphysical component rejected by Rorty, sets objective and fixed standards

by which to judge human action. Rorty’s postmodernist revision of human life to exclude moral

categories and moral judgments because of his rejection of both categories and judgments can in

no way be reconciled with Thomas’ account of the moral life and human nature. The two

vocabularies, to use Rorty’s terminology, are at odds with each other and are incapable of being

united.xliv

Though the two cannot be reconciled, the instinctive challenge Bowlin presents to

Rorty’s description of human life and action deserves further reflection. The failure of this

synthesis does not automatically close the questions and objections. Human action will still be

described in terms of moral agency. Some actions do not require any reflection to be

characterized as virtuous or vicious, and, because it resonates human experience, this usage will

be difficult to eradicate. Something within human beings seems to be resistant to such a facile

dismissal of moral agency. Thomas’ more complete account of virtue, prudence and the

goodness of the human person agrees with this basic human experience.

i cf. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 44.
ii Rorty, 28-29.
iii John Bowlin, "Rorty and Aquinas on Courage and Contingency" The Journal of Religion 77.3 (July, 1997) pp.

402-420.
iv Cf. Rorty, 28; 38; Bowlin, “Rorty and Aquinas, “ 404; Allan Hutchison, “The Three ‘Rs’:

Reading/Rorty/Radically” Harvard Law Review, 103.2 (Dec. 1989), 557.

v Rorty, 28-30.
vi Bowlin, “Rorty and Aquinas,” 404.
vii Bowlin, “Rorty and Aquinas”, 406.
viii Bowlin, “Rorty and Aquinas”, 406.
ix cf. Bowlin, "Rorty and Aquinas", 420.
x cf. Summa Theologiae, I-II, 63; 65.2.
xi Summa Theologiae, I-II, 65.2
xii Summa Theologiae, I-II, 61.2; cf. Bowlin, “Rorty and Aquinas” 406.
xiii Summa Theologiae, I-II, 40.1; 55.1
xiv Summa Theologiae, II-II, 123.4: modified translation.
xv Summa Theologiae, 123.1: Bonum autem hominis est secundum rationem esse…et ideo ad virtutem humanam

pertinet ut faciat hominem et opus eius secundum rationem esse.

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xvi Summa Theologiae, I-II, 1; 91.2
xvii Cf. Summa Theologiae, I-II, 94.2, which gives the very basic ordering of human goods in Thomas’ discussion of
natural law, and I-II, 1-5, which discusses in more detail the end of man simply.
xviii Summa Theologiae, I-II, 91. 1-2.
xix Summa Theologiae, I-II, 94.2. cf. Maria Carl, “Law, Virtue and Happiness in Aquinas’s Moral Theory”, The

Thomist, 61. (1997) 425-448. Carl’s essay focus’s on the relation between the objective standard that natural law
gives and the way man follows it through virtue in Aquinas’ thought. Her argument, though much longer, is similar
to mine.
xx Summa Theologiae, I-II, 59.5; 24.3, ad 1; cf. Carl, 439; 431
xxi cf. Renee Mirkes, “Aquinas on the Unity of Perfect Moral Virtue” American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly,

71.4 (1998), 593.

xxii Summa Theologiae, I-II, 1.1
xxiii Summa Theologiae, I-II, 57.4. cf. II-II, 47.2, 9.
xxiv Summa Theologiae, II-II, 47.9, cf. I-II, 65.2.
xxv Summa Theologiae, II-II, 47.3; cf. Thomas S. Hibbs, “Principles and Prudence: The Aristotelianism of Thomas’

Account of Moral Knowledge”, The New Scholasticism, 61.3 (1987), 280.

xxvi Summa Theologiae, II-II, 47.6.
xxvii Summa Theologiae, II-II, 47.6 ad 3.
xxviii Summa Theologiae, I-II, 65.1.
xxix Summa Theologiae, II-II 23.7.
xxx Summa Theologiae, II-II, 47.7.
xxxi Summa Theologiae, II-II, 47.3.
xxxii Summa Theologiae, II-II, 49.1.
xxxiii Bowlin, “Rorty and Aquinas” 407, referencing Summa Theologiae, I-II, 61.2; II-II, 123.3, 6.
xxxiv Bowlin, “Rorty and Aquinas” 407, referencing Summa Theologiae, II-II, 127.
xxxv Bowlin, “Rorty and Aquinas” 410-411.
xxxvi Cf. Bowlin, “Rorty and Aquinas,” 420.
xxxvii Summa Theologiae, II-II, 47.6.
xxxviiiCf. Bowlin, “Aquinas on the Goods of Fortune,” 545-546. Bowlin shows here that he is not completely ignorant

of the importance of ends in Thomas’ account, but he does fail to recognize something higher than a particular
virtuous act.
xxxix Rorty, 189.
xl Bowlin, “Rorty and Aquinas” 402-403.
xli cf. Summa Theologiae, I-II, 49.4; 50; II-II, 47.6.
xlii cf. Summa Theologiae, I-II, 50; 55.1
xliii Summa Theologiae, II-II, 47.7.
xliv cf. Rorty, 9-12

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