Professional Documents
Culture Documents
L-45685 65 Phil 56 November 16, 1937 Among other things in the allegation of the petition, it is
asserted that "Act No. 3155 of the Philippine Legislature was
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI enacted for the sole purpose of preventing the introduction of
BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners, cattle diseases into the Philippine Islands from foreign
countries, as shown by an explanatory note and text of Senate
vs. Bill No. 328 as introduced in the Philippine Legislature, ... ."
The Act in question reads as follows:
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO
CU UNJIENG, respondents. SECTION 1. After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and
twenty-five existing contracts for the importation of cattle into
Facts:Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed
this country to the contrary notwithstanding, it shall be strictly
for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He prohibited to import, bring or introduce into the Philippine
then elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the Islands any cattle from foreign countries: Provided, however,
appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he That at any time after said date, the Governor-General, with the
appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was concurrence of the presiding officers of both Houses, may raise
convicted of. The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular such prohibition entirely or in part if the conditions of the
Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon country make this advisable or if decease among foreign cattle
another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and live stock of
City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu the lands.
Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221
which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the SEC. 2. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this Act are
power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the hereby repealed.
law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is
covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Approved, March 8, 1924.
Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides
absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it
delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The
encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because demurrer was based on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No.
providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon. 3155 were declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner
would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No.
Issues: 3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit
the respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that
Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative Act No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid.
power
The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was
Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws dismissed by reason of the failure of the petitioner to file
another complaint. From that order of dismissal, the petitioner
Discussions: appealed to this court.
An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay The appellee contends that even if Act No. 3155 be declared
down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or unconstitutional by the fact alleged by the petitioner in his
board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to complaint, still the petitioner can not be allowed to import cattle
it. The probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and from Australia for the reason that, while Act No. 3155 were
impose upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of declared unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 would automatically
their discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo become effective. Act No. 3052 reads as follows:
in the recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which enables
the provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, SECTION 1. Section seventeen hundred and sixty-two of Act
the legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven, known as the
of the Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter Administrative Code, is hereby amended to read as follows:
for the various provincial boards to determine.
"SEC. 1762. Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries
The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The into the Philippine Islands. — It shall be unlawful for any person
classification of equal protection, to be reasonable, must be based on or corporation to import, bring or introduce live cattle into the
substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to Philippine Islands from any foreign country. The Director of
the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, Agriculture may, with the approval of the head of the
department first had, authorize the importation, bringing or
and must apply equally to each member of the class.
introduction of various classes of thoroughbred cattle from
Republic of the Philippines foreign countries for breeding the same to the native cattle of
SUPREME COURT these Islands, and such as may be necessary for the
Manila improvement of the breed, not to exceed five hundred head per
annum: Provided, however, That the Director of Agriculture
EN BANC shall in all cases permit the importation, bringing or
introduction of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the
G.R. No. L-34674 October 26, 1931 manufacture of serum: Provided, further, That all live cattle
from foreign countries the importation, bringing or introduction
MAURICIO CRUZ, petitioner-appellant,
of which into the Islands is authorized by this Act, shall be
vs.
submitted to regulations issued by the Director of Agriculture,
STANTON YOUNGBERG, Director of the Bureau of Animal
with the approval of the head of the department, prior to
Industry, respondent-appellee.
authorizing its transfer to other provinces.
Jose Yulo for appellant.
"At the time of the approval of this Act, the Governor-General
Office of the Solicitor-General Reyes for appellee.
shall issue regulations and others to provide against a raising of
the price of both fresh and refrigerated meat. The Governor-
OSTRAND, J.: General also may, by executive order, suspend, this prohibition
for a fixed period in case local conditions require it."
This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First
Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect six months after approval.
injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as
Approved, March 14, 1922.
Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, requiring him to
issue a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the The petitioner does not present any allegations in regard to Act
petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner attacked No. 3052 to show its nullity or unconstitutionality though it
the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits appears clearly that in the absence of Act No. 3155 the former
the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the act would make it impossible for the Director of the Bureau of
Philippine Islands. Animal Industry to grant the petitioner a permit for the
importation of the cattle without the approval of the head of the WILLIAM C. DAGAN, CARLOS H. REYES, NARCISO MORALES,
corresponding department. BONIFACIO MANTILLA, CESAR AZURIN, WEITONG LIM, MA.
TERESA TRINIDAD, MA. CARMELITA FLORENTINO, Petitioners,
An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former vs.
laws or parts of laws by implication, since, being void, it is not PHILIPPINE RACING COMMISSION, MANILA JOCKEY CLUB,
inconsistent with such former laws. (I Lewis Sutherland, INC., and PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB, INC.,Respondents.
Statutory Construction 2nd ed., p. 458, citing McAllister vs.
Hamlin, 83 Cal., 361; 23 Pac., 357; Orange Country vs. Harris, DECISION
97 Cal., 600; 32 Pac., 594; Carr vs. State, 127 Ind., 204; 11
TINGA, J.:
L.R.A., 370, etc.)
The subject of this petition for certiorari is the decision1 of the Court of
This court has several times declared that it will not pass upon
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 95212, affirming in toto the judgment 2 of the
the constitutionality of statutes unless it is necessary to do so
Regional Trial Court of Makati in Civil Case No. 04-1228.
(McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563, 568; Walter E.
Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil., 259) but in The controversy stemmed from the 11 August 2004 directive 3 issued by the
this case it is not necessary to pass upon the validity of the Philippine Racing Commission (Philracom) directing the Manila Jockey Club,
statute attacked by the petitioner because even if it were Inc. (MJCI) and Philippine Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI) to immediately come up
declared unconstitutional, the petitioner would not be entitled with their respective Clubs’ House Rule to address Equine Infectious Anemia
to relief inasmuch as Act No. 3052 is not in issue. (EIA)4 problem and to rid their facilities of horses infected with EIA. Said
directive was issued pursuant to Administrative Order No. 5 5 dated 28 March
But aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, we are of the 1994 by the Department of Agriculture declaring it unlawful for any person,
opinion that Act No. 3155 is entirely valid. As shown in firm or corporation to ship, drive, or transport horses from any locality or
paragraph 8 of the amended petition, the Legislature passed Act place except when accompanied by a certificate issued by the authority of the
No. 3155 to protect the cattle industry of the country and to Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI).6
prevent the introduction of cattle diseases through importation
of foreign cattle. It is now generally recognized that the In compliance with the directive, MJCI and PRCI ordered the owners of
promotion of industries affecting the public welfare and the racehorses stable in their establishments to submit the horses to blood
development of the resources of the country are objects within sampling and administration of the Coggins Test to determine whether they
the scope of the police power (12 C.J., 927; 6 R.C.L., 203-206 are afflicted with the EIA virus. Subsequently, on 17 September 2004,
and decisions cited therein; Reid vs. Colorado, 187 U.S., 137, Philracom issued copies of the guidelines for the monitoring and eradication
147, 152; Yeazel vs. Alexander, 58 Ill., 254). In this connection of EIA.7
it is said in the case of Punzalan vs. Ferriols and Provincial
Board of Batangas (19 Phil., 214), that the provisions of the Act Petitioners and racehorse owners William Dagan (Dagan), Carlos Reyes,
of Congress of July 1, 1902, did not have the effect of denying to Narciso Morales, Bonifacio Montilla, Cezar Azurin, Weitong Lim, Ma. Teresa
the Government of the Philippine Islands the right to the Trinidad and Ma. Carmelita Florentino refused to comply with the directive.
exercise of the sovereign police power in the promotion of the First, they alleged that there had been no prior consultation with horse owners.
Second, they claimed that neither official guidelines nor regulations had been
general welfare and the public interest. The facts recited in
issued relative to the taking of blood samples. And third, they asserted that no
paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the time the
documented case of EIA had been presented to justify the undertaking.8
Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was reasonable necessity
therefor and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its Despite resistance from petitioners, the blood testing proceeded. The horses,
power in passing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court whose owners refused to comply were banned from the races, were removed
to avoid or vacate the Act upon constitutional grounds nor will from the actual day of race, prohibited from renewing their licenses or evicted
it assume to determine whether the measures are wise or the from their stables.
best that might have been adopted. (6 R.C.L., 243 and decisions
cited therein.)1awphil.net When their complaint went unheeded, the racehorse owners lodged a
complaint before the Office of the President (OP) which in turn issued a
In his third assignment of error the petitioner claims that "The directive instructing Philracom to investigate the matter.
lower court erred in not holding that the power given by Act No.
3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or not, at his For failure of Philracom to act upon the directive of the OP, petitioners filed a
discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an petition for injunction with application for the issuance of a temporary
unlawful delegation of the legislative powers." We do not think restraining order (TRO). In an order9 dated 11 November 2004, the trial court
that such is the case; as Judge Ranney of the Ohio Supreme issued a TRO.
Court in Cincinnati, Wilmington and Zanesville Railroad Co. vs.
Commissioners of Clinton County (1 Ohio St., 77, 88) said in Dagan refused to comply with the directives because, according to him, the
same are unfair as there are no implementing rules on the banning of sick
such case:
horses from races. Consequently, his horses were evicted from the stables and
The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of transferred to an isolation area. He also admitted that three of his horses had
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion been found positive for EIA.10
as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion
Confronted with two issues, namely: whether there were valid grounds for the
as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of
issuance of a writ of injunction and whether respondents had acted with whim
the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection
and caprice in the implementation of the contested guideline, the trial court
can be made.
resolved both queries in the negative.
Under his fourth assignment of error the appellant argues that The trial court found that most racehorse owners, except for Dagan, had
Act No. 3155 amends section 3 of the Tariff Law, but it will be already subjected their racehorses to EIA testing. Their act constituted
noted that Act No. 3155 is not an absolute prohibition of the demonstrated compliance with the contested guidelines, according to the trial
importation of cattle and it does not add any provision to court. Hence, the acts sought to be enjoined had been rendered moot and
section 3 of the Tariff Law. As stated in the brief of the Attorney- academic.
General: "It is a complete statute in itself. It does not make any
reference to the Tariff Law. It does not permit the importation of With respect to the subject guidelines, the trial court upheld their validity as
articles, whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is an exercise of police power, thus:
not a tariff measure but a quarantine measure, a statute
adopted under the police power of the Philippine Government. It The Petitioner’s submission that the subject guidelines are oppressive and
is at most a `supplement' or an `addition' to the Tariff Law. (See hence confiscatory of proprietary rights is likewise viewed by this Court to be
MacLeary vs. Babcock, 82 N.E., 453, 455; 169 Ind., 228 for barren of factual and legal support. The horseracing industry, needless to state,
distinction between `supplemental' and `amendatory' and is imbued with public interest deserving of utmost concern if not constant
O'Pry vs. U.S., 249 U.S., 323; 63 Law. ed., 626, for distinction vigilance. The Petitioners do not dispute this. It is because of this basic fact
between `addition' and `amendment.')" that respondents are expected to police the concerned individuals and adopt
measures that will promote and protect the interests of all the stakeholders
The decision appealed from is affirmed with the costs against starting from the moneyed horse-owners, gawking bettors down to the lowly
the appellant. So ordered. maintainers of the stables. This is a clear and valid exercise of police power
with the respondents acting for the State. Participation in the business of
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Romualdez, horseracing is but a privilege; it is not a right. And no clear acquiescence to
Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concur. this postulation can there be than the Petitioners' own undertaking to abide by
the rules and conditions issued and imposed by the respondents as specifically
G.R. No. 175220 February 12, 2009 shown by their contracts of lease with MCJI.111avvphi1
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated 27 October recognized exceptions30 such as the grant of rule-making power to
2006, the appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. administrative agencies. They have been granted by Congress with the
authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to
The appellate court upheld the authority of Philracom to formulate guidelines them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern
since it is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over and control of the horse- governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions.31
racing industry per Section 8 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 8. The
appellate court further pointed out that P.D. No. 420 also endows Philracom However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing
with the power to prescribe additional rules and regulations not otherwise that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in
inconsistent with the said presidential decree12 and to perform such duties and itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
exercise all powers incidental or necessary to the accomplishment of its aims implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard—the limits of which are
and objectives.13 It similarly concluded that the petition for prohibition should sufficiently determinate and determinable—to which the delegate must
be dismissed on the ground of mootness in light of evidence indicating that conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one
petitioners had already reconsidered their refusal to have their horses tested which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
and had, in fact, subsequently requested the administration of the test to the specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under
horses.14 which the legislative command is to be effected.32
Aggrieved by the appellate court’s decision, petitioners filed the instant P.D. No. 420 hurdles the tests of completeness and standards sufficiency.
certiorari petition15 imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondents in compelling petitioners to subject their racehorses to blood Philracom was created for the purpose of carrying out the declared policy in
testing. Section 1 which is "to promote and direct the accelerated development and
continued growth of horse racing not only in pursuance of the sports
In their amended petition,16 petitioners allege that Philracom’s unsigned and development program but also in order to insure the full exploitation of the
undated implementing guidelines suffer from several infirmities. They sport as a source of revenue and employment." Furthermore, Philracom was
maintain that the assailed guidelines do not comply with due process granted exclusive jurisdiction and control over every aspect of the conduct of
requirements. Petitioners insist that racehorses already in the MJCI stables horse racing, including the framing and scheduling of races, the construction
were allowed to be so quartered because the individual horse owners had and safety of race tracks, and the security of racing. P.D. No. 420 is already
already complied with the Philracom regulation that horses should not bear complete in itself.
any disease. There was neither a directive nor a rule that racehorses already
lodged in the stables of the racing clubs should again be subjected to the Section 9 of the law fixes the standards and limitations to which Philracom
collection of blood samples preparatory to the conduct of the EIA must conform in the performance of its functions, to wit:
tests,17petitioners note. Thus, it came as a surprise to horse owners when told
about the administration of a new Coggins Tests on old horses since the Section 9. Specific Powers. Specifically, the Commission shall have the
matter had not been taken up with them.18 No investigation or at least a power:
summary proceeding was conducted affording petitioners an opportunity to be
a. To enforce all laws, decrees and executive orders relating to horse-racing
heard.19 Petitioners also aver that the assailed guidelines are ultra vires in that
that are not expressly or implied repealed or modified by this Decree,
the sanctions imposed for refusing to submit to medical examination are
including all such existing rules and regulations until otherwise modified or
summary eviction from the stables or arbitrary banning of participation in the
amended by the Commission;
races, notwithstanding the penalties prescribed in the contract of lease.20
b. To prescribe additional rules and regulations not otherwise inconsistent
In its Comment,21 the PRCI emphasizes that it merely obeyed the terms of its
with this Decree;
franchise and abided by the rules enacted by Philracom. 22 For its part,
Philracom, through the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG), stresses that the c. To register race horses, horse owners or associations or federations thereof,
case has become moot and academic since most of petitioners had complied and to regulate the construction of race tracks and to grant permit for the
with the guidelines by subjecting their race horses to EIA testing. The horses holding of races;
found unafflicted with the disease were eventually allowed to join the
races.23 Philracom also justified its right under the law to regulate horse d. To issue, suspend or revoke permits and licenses and to impose or collect
racing.24 MJCI adds that Philracom need fees for the issuance of such licenses and permits to persons required to obtain
the same;
not delegate its rule-making power to the former since MJCI’s right to
formulate its internal rules is subsumed under the franchise granted to it by e. To review, modify, approve or disapprove the rules and regulations issued
Congress.25 by any person or entity concerning the conduct of horse races held by them;
In their Reply,26 petitioners raise for the first time the issue that Philracom had f. To supervise all such race meeting to assure integrity at all times. It can
unconstitutionally delegated its rule-making power to PRCI and MJCI in order the suspension of any racing event in case of violation of any law,
issuing the directive for them to come up with club rules. In response to the ordinance or rules and regulations;
claim that respondents had merely complied with their duties under their
franchises, petitioners counter that the power granted to PRCI and MJCI under g. To prohibit the use of improper devices, drugs, stimulants or other means to
their respective franchises is limited to: (1) the construction, operation and enhance or diminish the speed of horse or materially harm their condition;
maintenance of racetracks; (2) the establishment of branches for booking
purposes; and (3) the conduct of horse races. h. To approve the annual budget of the omission and such supplemental
budgets as may be necessary;
It appears on record that only Dagan had refused to comply with the orders of
respondents. Therefore, the case subsists as regards Dagan. i. To appoint all personnel, including an Executive Director of the
Commission, as it may be deem necessary in the exercise and performance of
Petitioners essentially assail two issuances of Philracom; namely: the its powers and duties; and
Philracom directive27 and the subsequent guidelines addressed to MJCI and
PRCI. j. To enter into contracts involving obligations chargeable to or against the
funds of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
The validity of an administrative issuance, such as the assailed guidelines,
hinges on compliance with the following requisites: Clearly, there is a proper legislative delegation of rule-making power to
Philracom. Clearly too, for its part Philracom has exercised its rule-making
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature; power in a proper and reasonable manner. More specifically, its discretion to
rid the facilities of MJCI and PRCI of horses afflicted with EIA is aimed at
2. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; preserving the security and integrity of horse races.
3. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; Petitioners also question the supposed delegation by Philracom of its rule-
making powers to MJCI and PRCI.
4. It must be reasonable.28
There is no delegation of power to speak of between Philracom, as the
All the prescribed requisites are met as regards the questioned issuances. delegator and MJCI and PRCI as delegates. The Philracom directive is merely
Philracom’s authority is drawn from P.D. No. 420. The delegation made in the instructive in character. Philracom had instructed PRCI and MJCI to
presidential decree is valid. Philracom did not exceed its authority. And the "immediately come up with Club’s House Rule to address the problem and rid
issuances are fair and reasonable. their facilities of horses infected with EIA." PRCI and MJCI followed-up
when they ordered the racehorse owners to submit blood samples and subject
The rule is that what has been delegated cannot be delegated, or as expressed
their race horses to blood testing. Compliance with the Philracom’s directive
in the Latin maxim: potestas delegate non delegare potest. This rule is based
is part of the mandate of PRCI and MJCI under Sections 133 of R.A. No.
upon the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a
795334 and Sections 135 and 236 of 8407.37
right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his
own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not
through the intervening mind of another.29 This rule however admits of
As correctly proferred by MJCI, its duty is not derived from the delegated Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators
authority of Philracom but arises from the franchise granted to them by which contained measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of
Congress allowing MJCI "to do and carry out all such acts, deeds and things stealing of cellular phone units. This was followed by another Memorandum
as may be necessary to give effect to the foregoing." 38 As justified by PRCI, dated October 6, 2000 addressed to all public telecommunications entities,
"obeying the terms of the franchise and abiding by whatever rules enacted by which reads:
Philracom is its duty."39
This is to remind you that the validity of all prepaid cards sold on 07 October
More on the second, third and fourth requisites. 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least two (2) years from date of first use
pursuant to MC 13-6-2000.
As to the second requisite, petitioners raise some infirmities relating to
Philracom’s guidelines. They question the supposed belated issuance of the In addition, all CMTS operators are reminded that all SIM packs used by
guidelines, that is, only after the collection of blood samples for the Coggins subscribers of prepaid cards sold on 07 October 2000 and beyond shall be
Test was ordered. While it is conceded that the guidelines were issued a valid for at least two (2) years from date of first use. Also, the billing unit
month after Philracom’s directive, this circumstance does not render the shall be on a six (6) seconds pulse effective 07 October 2000. For strict
directive nor the guidelines void. The directive’s validity and effectivity are compliance.
not dependent on any supplemental guidelines. Philracom has every right to
issue directives to MJCI and PRCI with respect to the conduct of horse racing, On October 20, 2000, petitioners ISLACOM and PILTEL filed against the
with or without implementing guidelines. NTC, Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M.
Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for
Petitioners also argue that Philracom’s guidelines have no force and effect for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the
lack of publication and failure to file copies with the University of the Billing Circular) and the NTC Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with
Philippines (UP) Law Center as required by law. prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77.
As a rule, the issuance of rules and regulations in the exercise of an
administrative agency of its quasi-legislative power does not require notice Petitioners Islacom and Piltel alleged, that the NTC has no jurisdiction to
7and hearing.40 In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission,41 this Court had regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such
the occasion to rule that prior notice and hearing are not essential to the jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the
validity of rules or regulations issued in the exercise of quasi-legislative Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive,
powers since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation
established or ascertained.42 of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the
impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly
The third requisite for the validity of an administrative issuance is that it must prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and
be within the limits of the powers granted to it. The administrative body may that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance
not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular
the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or be declared null and void ab initio. Globe Telecom and Smart filed a joint
which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a Motion for Leave to Intervene which was granted by the trial court. On
statute.43 October 27, 2000, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the NTC from implementing Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000
The assailed guidelines prescribe the procedure for monitoring and eradicating and the Memorandum dated October 6, 2000.
EIA. These guidelines are in accord with Philracom’s mandate under the law
to regulate the conduct of horse racing in the country. In the meantime, respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the case on the ground of petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative
Anent the fourth requisite, the assailed guidelines do not appear to be remedies. Subsequently, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to
unreasonable or discriminatory. In fact, all horses stabled at the MJCI and dismiss. Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in
PRCI’s premises underwent the same procedure. The guidelines implemented an Order dated February 1, 2001.
were undoubtedly reasonable as they bear a reasonable relation to the purpose
sought to be accomplished, i.e., the complete riddance of horses infected with Respondent NTC thus filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
EIA. with the Court of Appeals, which was granted and annulled the injunction
issued by the lower court.
It also appears from the records that MJCI properly notified the racehorse
owners before the test was conducted.44Those who failed to comply were
repeatedly warned of certain consequences and sanctions.
Petitioners' motions for reconsideration were denied in a Resolution dated
Furthermore, extant from the records are circumstances which allow January 10, 2002 for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition for review filed
respondents to determine from time to time the eligibility of horses as race by Smart and Piltel.
entries. The lease contract executed between petitioner and MJC contains a
proviso reserving the right of the lessor, MJCI in this case, the right to
determine whether a particular horse is a qualified horse. In addition,
Philracom’s rules and regulations on horse racing provide that horses must be ISSUES:
free from any contagious disease or illness in order to be eligible as race
entries. WON Respondent court erred in holding respondents failed to exhaust
administrative remedy.
All told, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Philracom in
issuing the contested guidelines and on the part MJCI and PRCI in complying WON NTC has Jurisdiction over the case.
with Philracom’s directive.
WON the Billing Circular issued by NTC is unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner William
Dagan.
RULE:
SO ORDERED.
1ST ISSSUE – Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-
SMART VS. NTC; G.R. No. 151908
making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers.
Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and
regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of
PARTIES: the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of
powers.
SMART & PILTEL – petitioners,
GLOBE & ISLACOM – petitioners, The rules and regulations should be within the scope of the statutory authority
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC) granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the
– respondent. regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by
law.17 They must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the
enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. The
PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative
FACTS:Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued Memorandum Circular No. necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty
13-6-2000, promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of entrusted to it.
telecommunications services. On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by (4) Subscribers shall be updated of the remaining value of their cards before
an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies the start of every call using the cards.
before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial (5) The unit of billing for the cellular mobile telephone service whether
function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi- postpaid or prepaid shall be reduced from 1 minute per pulse to 6 seconds per
legislative power. pulse. The authorized rates per minute shall thus be divided by 10.[1]
Even assuming that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies The Memorandum Circular provided that it shall take effect 15 days after its
apply in this case, the records reveal that petitioners sufficiently complied publication in a newspaper of general circulation and three certified true
with this requirement. Petitioners were able to register their protests to the copies thereof furnished the UP Law Center. It was published in the
proposed billing guidelines. They submitted their respective position papers newspaper, The Philippine Star, on June 22, 2000.[2] Meanwhile, the
setting forth their objections and submitting proposed schemes for the billing provisions of the Memorandum Circular pertaining to the sale and use of
circular. After the same was issued, petitioners wrote successive letters dated prepaid cards and the unit of billing for cellular mobile telephone service took
July 3, 2000 and July 5, 2000, asking for the suspension and reconsideration effect 90 days from the effectivity of the Memorandum Circular.
of the so-called Billing Circular. This was taken by petitioners as a clear
denial of the requests contained in their previous letters, thus prompting them On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile
to seek judicial relief. telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained measures to minimize if
not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. The
2ND ISSSUE – In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies Memorandum directed CMTS operators to:
only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory function. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is a. strictly comply with Section B(1) of MC 13-6-2000 requiring the
to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its presentation and verification of the identity and addresses of prepaid SIM card
jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question customers;
or some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court.
b. require all your respective prepaid SIM cards dealers to comply with
However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or Section B(1) of MC 13-6-2000;
regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-
c. deny acceptance to your respective networks prepaid and/or postpaid
legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.
customers using stolen cellphone units or cellphone units registered to
The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an
somebody other than the applicant when properly informed of all information
administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the
relative to the stolen cellphone units;
jurisdiction of the regular courts.
d. share all necessary information of stolen cellphone units to all other CMTS
3RD ISSSUE – In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum
operators in order to prevent the use of stolen cellphone units; and
Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was
pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners e. require all your existing prepaid SIM card customers to register and present
were justified in invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to valid identification cards.[3]
assail the constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. Hence, the
Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. The Court of This was followed by another Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 addressed
Appeals erred in setting aside the orders of the trial court and in dismissing to all public telecommunications entities, which reads:
the case.
This is to remind you that the validity of all prepaid cards sold on 07 October
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the consolidated petitions are 2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least two (2) years from date of first use
GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET pursuant to MC 13-6-2000.
ASIDE.
In addition, all CMTS operators are reminded that all SIM packs used by
PRINCIPLE INVOLVED: Doctrine of Administrative Exhaustion. subscribers of prepaid cards sold on 07 October 2000 and beyond shall be
valid for at least two (2) years from date of first use. Also, the billing unit
[G.R. No. 151908. August 12, 2003] shall be on a six (6) seconds pulse effective 07 October 2000.
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (SMART) and PILIPINO For strict compliance.[4]
TELEPHONE CORPORATION (PILTEL), petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), respondent. On October 20, 2000, petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino
Telephone Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications
[G.R. No. 152063. August 12, 2003] Commission, Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner
Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action
GLOBE TELECOM, INC. (GLOBE) and ISLA COMMUNICATIONS
for declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the
CO., INC. (ISLACOM), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (The
Billing Circular) and the NTC Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with
Former 6th Division) and the NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary
COMMISSION, respondents.
restraining order. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-42221
DECISION at the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77.[5]
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Petitioners Islacom and Piltel alleged, inter alia, that the NTC has no
jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call
Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000 under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is
Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and regulations on oppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against
the billing of telecommunications services. Among its pertinent provisions are deprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circular will
the following: result in the impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by
unduly prolonging the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call
(1) The billing statements shall be received by the subscriber of the telephone cards; and that the requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and
service not later than 30 days from the end of each billing cycle. In case the call balance announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the
statement is received beyond this period, the subscriber shall have a specified Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio.
grace period within which to pay the bill and the public telecommunications
entity (PTEs) shall not be allowed to disconnect the service within the grace Soon thereafter, petitioners Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications,
period. Inc. filed a joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-
Intervention.[6]This was granted by the trial court.
(2) There shall be no charge for calls that are diverted to a voice mailbox,
voice prompt, recorded message or similar facility excluding the customers On October 27, 2000, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order
own equipment. enjoining the NTC from implementing Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000
and the Memorandum dated October 6, 2000.[7]
(3) PTEs shall verify the identification and address of each purchaser of
prepaid SIM cards. Prepaid call cards and SIM cards shall be valid for at least In the meantime, respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to
2 years from the date of first use.Holders of prepaid SIM cards shall be given dismiss the case on the ground of petitioners failure to exhaust administrative
45 days from the date the prepaid SIM card is fully consumed but not beyond remedies.
2 years and 45 days from date of first use to replenish the SIM card, otherwise
the SIM card shall be rendered invalid. The validity of an invalid SIM card, Subsequently, after hearing petitioners application for preliminary injunction
however, shall be installed upon request of the customer at no additional as well as respondents motion to dismiss, the trial court issued on November
charge except the presentation of a valid prepaid call card. 20, 2000 an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the defendants motion to dismiss is 5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SO GRAVELY ERRED IN
hereby denied for lack of merit. The plaintiffs application for the issuance of a ISSUING ITS QUESTIONED RULINGS IN THIS CASE BECAUSE
writ of preliminary injunction is hereby granted. Accordingly, the defendants GLOBE AND ISLA HAVE A CLEAR RIGHT TO AN INJUNCTION.[13]
are hereby enjoined from implementing NTC Memorandum Circular 13-6-
2000 and the NTC Memorandum, dated October 6, 2000, pending the The two petitions were consolidated in a Resolution dated February 17, 2003.
[14]
issuance and finality of the decision in this case. The plaintiffs and intervenors
are, however, required to file a bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00), Philippine currency. On March 24, 2003, the petitions were given due course and the parties were
required to submit their respective memoranda.[15]
SO ORDERED.[8]
We find merit in the petitions.
Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in an Order
dated February 1, 2001.[9] Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and
quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-
Respondent NTC thus filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in
with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the
64274. On October 9, 2001, a decision was rendered, the decretal portion of doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.[16]
which reads:
The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari and the product of a delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal
prohibition is GRANTED, in that, the order of the court a quo denying the provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the
petitioners motion to dismiss as well as the order of the court a quo granting statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is
the private respondents prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, and the required that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law,
writ of preliminary injunction issued thereby, are hereby ANNULLED and and be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed
SET ASIDE. The private respondents complaint and complaint-in- by law.[17] They must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the
intervention below are hereby DISMISSED, without prejudice to the referral enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional
of the private respondents grievances and disputes on the assailed issuances of and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations
the NTC with the said agency. may be promulgated by an administrative body, as well as with respect to
what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and
SO ORDERED.[10] regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a
statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which created it, or which
Petitioners motions for reconsideration were denied in a Resolution dated are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute. In case of conflict
January 10, 2002 for lack of merit.[11] between a statute and an administrative order, the former must prevail.[18]
Hence, the instant petition for review filed by Smart and Piltel, which was Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an
docketed as G.R. No. 151908, anchored on the following grounds: administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
power. This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
A. legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards
laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
HOLDING THAT THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative
COMMISSION (NTC) AND NOT THE REGULAR COURTS HAS
nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty
B. entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative
officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO GRAVELY ERRED IN facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis
HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.[19]
EXHAUST AN AVAILABLE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by
C. an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies
before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial
THAT THE BILLING CIRCULAR ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT NTC function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND PUBLIC legislative power. In Association of Philippine Coconut Dessicators v.
POLICY. Philippine Coconut Authority,[20] it was held:
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SO GRAVELY ERRED In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the
BECAUSE THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
REMEDIES DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE ADMINISTRATIVE function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been
ACTION IS COMPLETE AND EFFECTIVE, WHEN THERE IS NO to refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant
OTHER REMEDY, AND THE PETITIONER STANDS TO SUFFER to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.The courts will not determine a
GRAVE AND IRREPARABLE INJURY. controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the
4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SO GRAVELY ERRED administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound
BECAUSE PETITIONERS IN FACT EXHAUSTED ALL administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THEM. services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the The foregoing question is addressed by this Court in resolving the instant
premises of the regulatory statute administered. The objective of the doctrine petition for certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside Decision No. 94-
of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining whether it should 126[1]dated March 15, 1994 of respondent Commission on Audit, which
refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has denied petitioners request for reconsideration of its adverse ruling
determined some question or some aspect of some question arising in the disapproving claims for financial assistance under SSS Resolution No. 56.
proceeding before the court. It applies where the claim is originally cognizable
in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires The Facts
the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed
within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the Petitioners Avelina B. Conte and Leticia Boiser-Palma were former
judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the employees of the Social Security System (SSS) who retired from government
administrative body for its view.[24] service on May 9, 1990 and September 13, 1992, respectively. They availed of
compulsory retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 660.[2]
However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi- In addition to retirement benefits provided under R.A. 660, petitioners also
legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the claimed SSS financial assistance benefits granted under SSS Resolution No.
same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an 56, series of 1971.
administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the
A brief historical backgrounder is in order. SSS Resolution No. 56,
jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of [3]
approved on January 21, 1971, provides financial incentive and inducement
judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive
to SSS employees qualified to retire to avail of retirement benefits under RA
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in
660 as amended, rather than the retirement benefits under RA 1616 as
the courts, including the regional trial courts. [25] This is within the scope of
amended, by giving them financial assistance equivalent in amount to the
judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an
difference between what a retiree would have received under RA 1616, less
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments.
[26]
what he was entitled to under RA 660. The said SSS Resolution No. 56 states:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, RESOLUTION NO. 56
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or WHEREAS, the retirement benefits of SSS employees are provided for under
instrumentality of the Government.[27] Republic Acts 660 and 1616 as amended;
In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13- WHEREAS, SSS employees who are qualified for compulsory retirement at
6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi- age 65 or for optional retirement at a lower age are entitled to either the life
legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in annuity under R.A. 660, as amended, or the gratuity under R.A. 1616, as
invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the amended;
constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. In Drilon v. Lim,[28] it was
held: WHEREAS, a retirement benefit to be effective must be a periodic income as
close as possible to the monthly income that would have been due to the
We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the retiree during the remaining years of his life were he still employed;
constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general
definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding WHEREAS, the life annuity under R.A. 660, as amended, being closer to the
laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, monthly income that was lost on account of old age than the gratuity under
B.P. 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in R.A. 1616, as amended, would best serve the interest of the retiree;
which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, even
as the accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the WHEREAS, it is the policy of the Social Security Commission to promote
constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings and to protect the interest of all SSS employees, with a view to providing for
taken against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of their well-being during both their working and retirement years;
Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the
WHEREAS, the availment of life annuities built up by premiums paid on
Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower
behalf of SSS employees during their working years would mean more
courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
savings to the SSS;
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.[29] WHEREAS, it is a duty of the Social Security Commission to effect savings
in every possible way for economical and efficient operations;
In their complaint before the Regional Trial Court, petitioners averred that the
Circular contravened Civil Code provisions on sales and violated the WHEREAS, it is the right of every SSS employee to choose freely and
constitutional prohibition against the deprivation of property without due voluntarily the benefit he is entitled to solely for his own benefit and for the
process of law. These are within the competence of the trial judge. Contrary to benefit of his family;
the finding of the Court of Appeals, the issues raised in the complaint do not
entail highly technical matters. Rather, what is required of the judge who will NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That all the SSS employees who
resolve this issue is a basic familiarity with the workings of the cellular are simultaneously qualified for compulsory retirement at age 65 or for
telephone service, including prepaid SIM and call cards and this is judicially optional retirement at a lower age be encouraged to avail for themselves the
known to be within the knowledge of a good percentage of our population and life annuity under R.A. 660, as amended;
expertise in fundamental principles of civil law and the Constitution.
RESOLVED, FURTHER, That SSS employees who availed themselves of the
Hence, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case said life annuity, in appreciation and recognition of their long and faithful
No. Q-00-42221. The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the orders of the service, be granted financial assistance equivalent to the gratuity plus return of
trial court and in dismissing the case. contributions under R.A. 1616, as amended, less the five year guaranteed
annuity under R.A. 660, as amended;
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the consolidated petitions
are GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. RESOLVED, FINALLY, That the Administrator be authorized to act on all
64274 dated October 9, 2001 and its Resolution dated January 10, 2002 are applications for retirement submitted by SSS employees and subject to
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated November 20, 2000 of the availability of funds, pay the corresponding benefits in addition to the money
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. Q-00- value of all accumulated leaves. (underscoring supplied)
42221 is REINSTATED. This case is REMANDED to the court a quo for
continuation of the proceedings. Long after the promulgation of SSS Resolution No. 56, respondent
Commission on Audit (COA) issued a ruling, captioned as 3rd Indorsement
SO ORDERED. dated July 10, 1989,[4]disallowing in audit all such claims for financial
assistance under SSS Resolution No. 56, for the reason that: --
[G.R. No. 116422. November 4, 1996]
x x x the scheme of financial assistance authorized by the SSS is similar to
AVELINA B. CONTE and LETICIA BOISER-PALMA, petitioners, vs. those separate retirement plan or incentive/separation pay plans adopted by
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), respondent. other government corporate agencies which results in the increase of benefits
beyond what is allowed under existing retirement laws. In this regard,
DECISION
attention x x x is invited to the view expressed by the Secretary of Budget and
PANGANIBAN, J.: Management dated February 17, 1988 to the COA General Counsel against
the proliferation of retirement plans which, in COA Decision No. 591 dated
Are the benefits provided for under Social Security System Resolution No. 56 August 31, 1988, was concurred in by this Commission. x x x.
to be considered simply as financial assistance for retiring employees, or does
such scheme constitute a supplementary retirement plan proscribed by
Republic Act No. 4968?
Accordingly, all such claims for financial assistance under SSS Resolution said life annuity (under RA 660), in appreciation and recognition of their long
No. 56 dated January 21, 1971 should be disallowed in audit. (underscoring and faithful service, be granted financial assistance x x x can only be
supplied) interpreted to mean that the benefit being granted is none other than a kind of
amelioration to enable the retiring employee to enjoy (or survive) his
Despite the aforequoted ruling of respondent COA, then SSS Administrator retirement years and a reward for his loyalty and service. Moreover, it is plain
Jose L. Cuisia, Jr. nevertheless wrote [5] on February 12, 1990 then Executive to see that the grant of said financial assistance is inextricably linked with and
Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., seeking presidential authority for SSS to inseparable from the application for and approval of retirement benefits under
continue implementing its Resolution No. 56 dated January 21, 1971 granting RA 660, i.e., that availment of said financial assistance under Res. 56 may not
financial assistance to its qualified retiring employees. be done independently of but only in conjunction with the availment of
retirement benefits under RA 660, and that the former is in augmentation or
However, in a letter-reply dated May 28, 1990,[6] then Executive Secretary supplementation of the latter benefits.
Macaraig advised Administrator Cuisia that the Office of the President is not
inclined to favorably act on the herein request, let alone overrule the Likewise, then SSS Administrator Cuisias historical overview of the origins
disallowance by COA of such claims, because, aside from the fact that and purpose of Res. 56 is very instructive and sheds much light on the
decisions, order or actions of the COA in the exercise of its audit functions are controversy:[12]
appealable to the Supreme Court[7] pursuant to Sec. 50 of PD 1445, the
benefits under said Res. 56, though referred to as financial assistance, Resolution No. 56, x x x, applies where a retiring SSS employee is qualified
constituted additional retirement benefits, and the scheme partook of the to claim under either RA 660 (pension benefit, that is, 5 year lump sum
nature of a supplementary pension/retirement plan proscribed by law. pension and after 5 years, life time pension), or RA 1616 (gratuity benefit plus
return of contribution), at his option. The benefits under RA 660 are entirely
The law referred to above is RA 4968 (The Teves Retirement Law), which payable by GSIS while those under RA 1616 are entirely shouldered by SSS
took effect June 17, 1967 and amended CA 186 (otherwise known as the except the return of contribution by GSIS.
Government Service Insurance Act, or the GSIS Charter), making Sec. 28 (b)
of the latter act read as follows: Resolution No. 56 came about upon observation that qualified SSS employees
have invariably opted to retire under RA 1616 instead of RA 660 because the
(b) Hereafter, no insurance or retirement plan for officers or employees shall total benefit under the former is much greater than the 5-year lump sum
be created by employer. All supplementary retirement or pension plans under the latter. As a consequence, the SSS usually ended up virtually paying
heretofore in force in any government office, agency or instrumentality or the entire retirement benefit, instead of GSIS which is the main insurance
corporation owned or controlled by the government, are hereby declared carrier for government employees. Hence, the situation has become so
inoperative or abolished; Provided, That the rights of those who are already expensive for SSS that a study of the problem became inevitable.
eligible to retire thereunder shall not be affected. (underscoring supplied)
As a result of the study and upon the recommendation of its Actuary, the SSS
On January 12, 1993, herein petitioners filed with respondent COA their Management recommended to the Social Security Commission that retiring
letter-appeal/protest[8] seeking reconsideration of COAs ruling of July 10, employees who are qualified to claim under either RA 660 or 1616 should be
1989 disallowing claims for financial assistance under Res. 56. encouraged to avail for themselves the life annuity under RA 660, as
amended, with the SSS providing a financial assistance equivalent to
On November 15, 1993, petitioner Conte sought payment from SSS of the the difference between the benefit under RA 1616 (gratuity plus return of
benefits under Res. 56. On December 9, 1993, SSS Administrator Renato C. contribution) and the 5-year lump sum pension under RA 660.
Valencia denied[9] the request in consonance with the previous disallowance
by respondent COA, but assured petitioner that should the COA change its The Social Security Commission, as the policy-making body of the SSS
position, the SSS will resume the grant of benefits under said Res. 56. approved the recommendation in line with its mandate to insure
the efficient, honest and economical administration of the provisions and
On March 15, 1994, respondent COA rendered its COA Decision No. 94-126 purposes of this Act. (Section 3 (c) of the Social Security Law).
denying petitioners request for reconsideration.
Necessarily, the situation was reversed with qualified SSS employees opting
Thus this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. to retire under RA No. 660 or RA 1146 instead of RA 1616, resulting in
substantial savings for the SSS despite its having to pay financial assistance.
The Issues
Until Resolution No. 56 was questioned by COA. (underscoring part of
The issues[10] submitted by petitioners may be simplified and re-stated thus:
original text; italics ours)
Did public respondent abuse its discretion when it disallowed in audit
petitioners claims for benefits under SSS Res. 56? Although such financial assistance package may have been instituted for
noble, altruistic purposes as well as from self-interest and a desire to cut costs
Petitioners argue that the financial assistance under Res. 56 is not a retirement
on the part of the SSS, nevertheless, it is beyond any dispute that such
plan prohibited by RA 4968, and that Res. 56 provides benefits different from
package effectively constitutes a supplementary retirement plan. The fact that
and aside from what a retiring SSS employee would be entitled to under RA
it was designed to equalize the benefits receivable from RA 1616 with those
660. Petitioners contend that it is a social amelioration and economic
payable under RA 660 and make the latter program more attractive, merely
upliftment measure undertaken not only for the benefit of the SSS but more so
confirms the foregoing finding.
for the welfare of its qualified retiring employees. As such, it should be
interpreted in a manner that would give the x x x most advantage to the That the Res. 56 package is labelled financial assistance does not change its
recipient -- the retiring employees whose dedicated, loyal, lengthy and faithful essential nature. Retirement benefits are, after all, a form of reward for an
service to the agency of government is recognized and amply rewarded -- the employees loyalty and service to the employer, and are intended to help the
rationale for the financial assistance plan. Petitioners reiterate the argument in employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, lessening the burden of
their letter dated January 12, 1993 to COA that: worrying about his financial support or upkeep.[13] On the other hand, a
pension partakes of the nature of retained wages of the retiree for a dual
Motivation can be in the form of financial assistance, during their stay in the
purpose: to entice competent people to enter the government service, and to
service or upon retirement, as in the SSS Financial Assistance Plan. This is so,
permit them to retire from the service with relative security, not only for those
because Government has to have some attractive remuneration programs to
who have retained their vigor, but more so for those who have been
encourage well-qualified personnel to pursue a career in the government
incapacitated by illness or accident.[14]
service, rather than in the private sector or in foreign countries ...
Is SSS Resolution No. 56 then within the ambit of and thus proscribed by Sec.
A more developmental view of the financial institutions grant of certain forms
28 (b) of CA 186 as amended by RA 4968?
of financial assistance to its personnel, we believe, would enable government
administrators to see these financial forms of remuneration as contributory to We answer in the affirmative. Said Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no
the national developmental efforts for effective and efficient administration of uncertain terms bars the creation of any insurance or retirement plan -- other
the personnel programs in different institutions.[11] than the GSIS -- for government officers and employees, in order to prevent
the undue and inequitous proliferation of such plans. It is beyond cavil that
The Courts Ruling
Res. 56 contravenes the said provision of law and is therefore invalid, void
Petitioners contentions are not supported by law. We hold that Res. 56 and of no effect. To ignore this and rule otherwise would be tantamount to
constitutes a supplementary retirement plan. permitting every other government office or agency to put up its own
supplementary retirement benefit plan under the guise of such financial
A cursory examination of the preambular clauses and provisions of Res. 56 assistance.
provides a number of clear indications that its financial assistance plan
constitutes a supplemental retirement/pension benefits plan. In particular, the We are not unmindful of the laudable purposes for promulgating Res. 56, and
fifth preambular clause which provides that it is the policy of the Social the positive results it must have had, not only in reducing costs and expenses
Security Commission to promote and to protect the interest of all SSS on the part of the SSS in connection with the pay-out of retirement benefits
employees, with a view to providing for their well-being during both their and gratuities, but also in improving the quality of life for scores of
working and retirement years, and the wording of the resolution itself which retirees. But it is simply beyond dispute that the SSS had no authority to
states Resolved, further, that SSS employees who availed themselves of the maintain and implement such retirement plan, particularly in the face of the
statutory prohibition. The SSS cannot, in the guise of rule-making, legislate or to enjoy their remaining years, face a financially dismal if not distressed
amend laws or worse, render them nugatory. future, deprived of what should have been due them by way of additional
retirement benefits, on account of a bureaucratic boo-boo improvidently
It is doctrinal that in case of conflict between a statute and an administrative hatched by their higher-ups. It is clear to our mind that petitioners applied for
order, the former must prevail.[15] A rule or regulation must conform to and be benefits under RA 660 only because of the incentives offered by Res. 56, and
consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or that absent such incentives, they would have without fail availed of RA 1616
regulation to be valid.[16] The rule-making power of a public administrative instead. We likewise have no doubt that petitioners are simply innocent
body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge bystanders in this whole bureaucratic rule-making/financial scheme-making
the authority given it by the Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its drama, and that therefore, to the extent possible, petitioners ought not be
power beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions penalized or made to suffer as a result of the subsequently determined
control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by invalidity of Res. 56, the promulgation and implementation of which they had
such a body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by nothing to do with.
it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the
provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is And here is where equity may properly be invoked: since SSS employees who
administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the are qualified for compulsory retirement at age 65 or for optional retirement at
purpose of a statute.[17] Though well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are a lower age are entitled to either the life annuity under R.A. 660, as amended,
liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree,[18] nevertheless, there is really or the gratuity under R.A. 1616, as amended,[22] it appears that petitioners,
nothing to interpret in either RA 4968 or Res. 56, and correspondingly, the being qualified to avail of benefits under RA 660, may also readily qualify
absence of any doubt as to the ultra-vires nature and illegality of the disputed under RA 1616. It would therefore not be misplaced to enjoin the SSS to
resolution constrains us to rule against petitioners. render all possible assistance to petitioners for the prompt processing and
approval of their applications under RA 1616, and in the meantime, unless
As a necessary consequence of the invalidity of Res. 56, we can hardly impute barred by existing regulations, to advance to petitioners the difference
abuse of discretion of any sort to respondent Commission for denying between the amounts due under RA 1616, and the amounts they already
petitioners request for reconsideration of the 3rd Indorsement of July 10, obtained, if any, under RA 660.
1989. On the contrary, we hold that public respondent in its assailed Decision
acted with circumspection in denying petitioners claim. It reasoned thus: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, there
having been no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
After a careful evaluation of the facts herein obtaining, this Commission finds Commission. The assailed Decision of public respondent is AFFIRMED, and
the instant request to be devoid of merit. It bears stress that the financial SSS Resolution No. 56 is hereby declared ILLEGAL, VOID AND OF NO
assistance contemplated under SSS Resolution No. 56 is granted to SSS EFFECT. The SSS is hereby urged to assist petitioners and facilitate their
employees who opt to retire under R.A. No. 660. In fact, by the aggrieved applications under RA 1616, and to advance to them, unless barred by existing
parties own admission (page 2 of the request for reconsideration dated January regulations, the corresponding amounts representing the difference between
12, 1993), it is a financial assistance granted by the SSS management to its the two benefits programs. No costs.
employees, in addition to the retirement benefits under Republic Act No.
660. (underscoring supplied for emphasis) There is therefore no question, that SO ORDERED.
the said financial assistance partakes of the nature of a retirement benefit that
has the effect of modifying existing retirement laws particularly R.A. No. 660. G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977
Petitioners also asseverate that the scheme of financial assistance under Res. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
56 may be likened to the monetary benefits of government officials and vs.
employees who are paid, over and above their salaries and allowances as HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN CFI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, JOSE
provided by statute, an additional honorarium in varying amounts. We find BUENAVENTURA, GODOFREDO REYES, BENJAMIN REYES,
this comparison baseless and misplaced. As clarified by the Solicitor General: NAZARIO AQUINO and CARLO DEL ROSARIO, accused-appellees.
[19]
Office of the Solicitor General for appellant.
Petitioners comparison of SSS Resolution No. 56 with the honoraria given to
government officials and employees of the National Prosecution Service of Rustics F. de los Reyes, Jr. for appellees.
the Department of Justice, Office of the Government Corporate Counsel and
even in the Office of the Solicitor General is devoid of any basis. The
monetary benefits or honoraria given to these officials or employees are AQUINO, J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£
categorized as travelling and/or representation expenses which are incurred by
them in the course of handling cases, attending court/administrative hearings, This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro
or performing other field work. These monetary benefits are given upon fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture
rendition of service while the financial benefits under SSS Resolution No. 56 and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old
are given upon retirement from service. Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission.
In a last-ditch attempt to convince this Court that their position is tenable, On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes,
petitioners invoke equity. They believe that they are deserving of justice and Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary
equity in their quest for financial assistance under SSS Resolution No. 56, not investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated
so much because the SSS is one of the very few stable agencies of government Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.
where no doubt this recognition and reputation is earned x x x but more so due
to the miserable scale of compensation granted to employees in various It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March
agencies to include those obtaining in the SSS.[20] 1, 1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte,
Sta. Cruz by "using their own motor banca, equipped with motor; with a
We must admit we sympathize with petitioners in their financial predicament generator colored green with attached dynamo colored gray or somewhat
as a result of their misplaced decision to avail of retirement benefits under RA white; and electrocuting device locally known as sensored with a somewhat
660, with the false expectation that financial assistance under the disputed webbed copper wire on the tip or other end of a bamboo pole with electric
Res. 56 will also materialize. Nevertheless, this Court has always held that wire attachment which was attached to the dynamo direct and with the use of
equity, which has been aptly described as justice outside legality, is applied these devices or equipments catches fish thru electric current, which destroy
only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of any aquatic animals within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and prejudice of
procedure.[21] In this case, equity cannot be applied to give validity and effect the populace" (Criminal Case No. 5429).
to Res. 56, which directly contravenes the clear mandate of the provisions of
RA 4968. Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The
prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the
Likewise, we cannot but be aware that the clear imbalance between the order of dismissal (Civil Case No. SC-36). The case is now before this Court
benefits available under RA 660 and those under RA 1616 has created an on appeal by the prosecution under Republic Act No. 5440.
unfair situation for it has shifted the burden of paying such benefits from the
GSIS (the main insurance carrier of government employees) to the The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric
SSS. Without the corrective effects of Res. 56, all retiring SSS employees current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section
without exception will be impelled to avail of benefits under RA 1616. The I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of
cumulative effect of such availments on the financial standing and stability of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held
the SSS is better left to actuarians. But the solution or remedy for such that, since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and
situation can be provided only by Congress. Judicial hands cannot, on the judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.
pretext of showing concern for the welfare of government employees, bestow
equity contrary to the clear provisions of law. As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law
prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing.
Nevertheless, insofar as herein petitioners are concerned, this Court cannot
just sit back and watch as these two erstwhile government employees, who Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or
after spending the best parts of their lives in public service have retired hoping poisonous substance in fishing with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos
nor more than five thousand, and by imprisonment for not less than six Court of First instance (People vs. Nazareno, L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70
months nor more than five years. SCRA 531 and the cases cited therein).
It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro And since the instant case was filed in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz,
fishing." Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture Laguna, a provincial capital, the order of d rendered by that municipal court
and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of was directly appealable to the Court, not to the Court of First Instance of
Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), Laguna (Sec. 45 and last par. of section 87 of the Judiciary Law; Esperat vs.
prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters. The order is quoted Avila, L-25992, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 596).
below: ñé+.£ªwph!1
It results that the Court of First Instance of Laguna had no appellate
SUBJECT: PROHIBITING ELECTRO FISHING IN ALL WATERS ñé+. jurisdiction over the case. Its order affirming the municipal court's order of
£ªwph!1 dismissal is void for lack of motion. This appeal shall be treated as a direct
appeal from the municipal court to this Court. (See People vs. Del Rosario, 97
OF THE PHILIPPINES. Phil. 67).
Pursuant to Section 4 of Act No. 4003, as amended, and Section 4 of R.A. No. In this appeal, the prosecution argues that Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and
3512, the following rules and regulations regarding the prohibition of electro 84-1 were not issued under section 11 of the Fisheries Law which, as
fishing in all waters of the Philippines are promulgated for the information indicated above, punishes fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous
and guidance of all concerned.ñé+.£ªwph!1 substance. This contention is not well-taken because, as already stated, the
Penal provision of Administrative Order No. 84 implies that electro fishing is
SECTION 1. — Definition. — Words and terms used in this Order 11 penalized as a form of fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous
construed as follows: substance under section 11.
(a) Philippine waters or territorial waters of the Philippines' includes all waters The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro
of the Philippine Archipelago, as defined in the t between the United States fishing in fresh water fisheries (1) the rule-making power of the Department
and Spain, dated respectively the tenth of December, eighteen hundred ninety Secretary under section 4 of the Fisheries Law; (2) the function of the
eight and the seventh of November, nineteen hundred. For the purpose of this Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the Fisheries Law and
order, rivers, lakes and other bodies of fresh waters are included. the regulations Promulgated thereunder and to execute the rules and
regulations consistent with the purpose for the creation of the Fisheries
(b) Electro Fishing. — Electro fishing is the catching of fish with the use of
Commission and for the development of fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h] Republic
electric current. The equipment used are of many electrical devices which may
Act No. 3512; (3) the declared national policy to encourage, Promote and
be battery or generator-operated and from and available source of electric
conserve our fishing resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 3512), and (4)
current.
section 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that "any other violation of"
(c) 'Persons' includes firm, corporation, association, agent or employee. the Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder
"shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or
(d) 'Fish' includes other aquatic products. imprisonment for not more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the
court."
SEC. 2. — Prohibition. — It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in
electro fishing or to catch fish by the use of electric current in any portion of As already pointed out above, the prosecution's reference to section 83 is out
the Philippine waters except for research, educational and scientific purposes of place because the penalty for electro fishing under Administrative order
which must be covered by a permit issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and No. 84 is not the same as the penalty fixed in section 83.
Natural Resources which shall be carried at all times.
We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
SEC. 3. — Penalty. — Any violation of the provisions of this Administrative and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing
Order shall subject the offender to a fine of not exceeding five hundred pesos Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are
(P500.00) or imprisonment of not extending six (6) months or both at the not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.
discretion of the Court.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro
SEC. 4. — Repealing Provisions. — All administrative orders or parts thereof fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of
inconsistent with the provisions of this Administrative Order are hereby Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are
revoked. powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and
84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
SEC. 5. — Effectivity. — This Administrative Order shall take effect six (60)
days after its publication in the Office Gazette. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision
to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.
On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon
the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or
Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful
No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed
fisheries (63 O.G. 9963). fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other
violations.
Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2,
was changed by the amendatory order to read as follows: "in fresh water Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative
fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation Order No. 84, in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an
canals and other bodies of fresh water." offense fails within the category of "other violations" because, as already
shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty
The Court of First Instance and the prosecution (p. 11 of brief) assumed that for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section
electro fishing is punishable under section 83 of the Fisheries Law (not under 76, and is not the same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and
section 76 thereof), which provides that any other violation of that law "or of regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law.
any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall subject the offender to
a fine of not more than two hundred pesos (P200), or in t for not more than six The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to
months, or both, in the discretion of the court." declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of
regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself.
That assumption is incorrect because 3 of the aforequoted Administrative (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur. 965 on p. 11 32).
Order No. 84 imposes a fm of not exceeding P500 on a person engaged in
electro fishing, which amount the 83. It seems that the Department of Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro fishing in all waters.
Fisheries prescribed their own penalty for swift fishing which penalty is less Later, the ban against electro fishing was confined to fresh water fisheries.
than the severe penalty imposed in section 76 and which is not Identified to The amendment created the impression that electro fishing is not condemnable
the at penalty imposed in section 83. per se. It could be tolerated in marine waters. That circumstances strengthens
the view that the old law does not eschew all forms of electro fishing.
Had Administrative Order No. 84 adopted the fighter penalty prescribed in on
83, then the crime of electro fishing would be within the exclusive original However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable
jurisdiction of the inferior court (Sec. 44 [f], Judiciary Law; People vs. under the Fisheries Law and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive
Ragasi, L-28663, September 22, revolution because Presidential Decree No. 704, which is a revision and
consolidation of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which
We have discussed this pre point, not raised in the briefs, because it is obvious was promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269), expressly punishes electro
that the crime of electro fishing which is punishable with a sum up to P500, fishing in fresh water and salt water areas.
falls within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the inferior courts and the
That decree provides: ñé+.£ªwph!1
SEC. 33. — Illegal fishing, dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic fit do so, all rules, regulates, orders, memorandums, and other
products. — It shall he unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or instructions, not contrary to law, to regulate the proper working and
cause to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in harmonious and efficient administration of each and all of the offices and
Philippine waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous dependencies of his Department, and for the strict enforcement and proper
substance, or by the use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and execution of the laws relative to matters under the jurisdiction of said
(d), respectively, of Section 3 hereof: ... Department; but none of said rules or orders shall prescribe penalties for the
violation thereof, except as expressly authorized by law."
The decree Act No. 4003, as amended, Republic Acts Nos. 428, 3048, 3512
and 3586, Presidential Decrees Nos. 43, 534 and 553, and all , Acts, Executive Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity with
Orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with it (Sec. 49, P. law have the force of law (Valerie vs. Secretary of culture and Natural
D. No. 704). Resources, 117 Phil. 729, 733; Antique Sawmills, Inc. vs. Zayco, L- 20051,
May 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 316). As he exercises the rule-making power by
The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing electro delegation of the lawmaking body, it is a requisite that he should not transcend
fishing is a clear recognition of the deficiency or silence on that point of the the bound demarcated by the statute for the exercise of that power; otherwise,
old Fisheries Law. It is an admission that a mere executive regulation is not he would be improperly exercising legislative power in his own right and not
legally adequate to penalize electro fishing. as a surrogate of the lawmaking body.
Note that the definition of electro fishing, which is found in section 1 (c) of Article 7 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle that administrative or
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 and which is not provided for the old executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
Fisheries Law, is now found in section 3(d) of the decree. Note further that the contrary to the laws or the Constitution."
decree penalty electro fishing by "imprisonment from two (2) to four (4)
years", a punishment which is more severe than the penalty of a time of not As noted by Justice Fernando, "except for constitutional officials who can
excluding P500 or imprisonment of not more than six months or both fixed in trace their competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a public office
section 3 of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84. must be in the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it."
"department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by
An examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and statute." (Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Santiago, L-
administrative agencies and, in particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and 29236, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 493, 496-8).
Natural Resources (now Secretary of Natural Resources) under the Fisheries
Law sustains the view that he ex his authority in penalizing electro fishing by "Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or
means of an administrative order. authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the
nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal
Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched
lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and in general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies
provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered and sanctions intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of
in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be carrying out the law are oftentimes left to the administrative agency entrusted
germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations
the standards that the law prescribes (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125; are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal
Director of Forestry vs. Muñ;oz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, provisions that have the effect of law." The rule or regulation should be within
1198; Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712). the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the
administrative agency. (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in
The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the Victories Milling Co., Inc. vs. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555,
enforcement of a particular statute (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125, 558).
citing U.S. vs. Grimaud 220 U.S. 506; Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. vs.
Coll. of Internal Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6). In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to
implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People vs. Lim,
of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the 108 Phil. 1091).
nondeleption of legislative, powers. Administrative regulations or
"subordinate legislation calculated to promote the public interest are necessary This Court in its decision in the Lim case, supra, promulgated on July 26,
because of "the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the 1960, called the attention of technical men in the executive departments, who
subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of draft rules and regulations, to the importance and necessity of closely
administering the law" Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726; People vs. following the legal provisions which they intend to implement so as to avoid
Rosenthal and Osmeñ;a, 68 Phil. 328). any possible misunderstanding or confusion.
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular The rule is that the violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be of the government in conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing
for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such such regulation constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to
regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi punishment in accordance with the provisions of the law (U.S. vs. Tupasi
Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 124).
(Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the d of
Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General In other words, a violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly
Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. issued can constitute a crime punishable as provided in the authorizing statute
Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350). and by virtue of the latter (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125, 1132).
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or It has been held that "to declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall
proceeding to carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power be punished is a power vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may not be
cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to delegated to any other body or agency" (1 Am. Jur. 2nd, sec. 127, p. 938;
embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute Texas Co. vs. Montgomery, 73 F. Supp. 527).
cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax A 93 Phil.
376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see of Internal In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in
Revenue vs. Villaflor 69 Phil. 319, Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; accordance with the Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was
Del March vs. Phil. Veterans Administrative, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 issued, because the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing.
SCRA 340, 349).
The instant case is similar to People vs. Santos, 63 Phil. 300. The Santos case
There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources involves section 28 of Fish and Game Administrative Order No. 2 issued by
has rule-making powers. Section 4 of the Fisheries law provides that the the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the
Secretary "shall from time to time issue instructions, orders, and regulations aforementioned section 4 of the Fisheries Law.
consistent" with that law, "as may be and proper to carry into effect the
provisions thereof." That power is now vested in the Secretary of Natural Section 28 contains the proviso that a fishing boat not licensed under the
Resources by on 7 of the Revised Fisheries law, Presidential December No. Fisheries Law and under the said administrative order may fish within three
704. kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction
is exercised by naval and military reservations authorities of the United States
Section 4(h) of Republic Act No. 3512 empower the Co of Fisheries "to only upon receiving written permission therefor, which permission may be
prepare and execute upon the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and granted by the Secretary upon recommendation of the military or naval
Natural Resources, forms instructions, rules and regulations consistent with authorities concerned. A violation of the proviso may be proceeded against
the purpose" of that enactment "and for the development of fisheries." under section 45 of the Federal Penal Code.
Section 79(B) of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "the Augusto A. Santos was prosecuted under that provision in the Court of First
Department Head shall have the power to promulgate, whenever he may see Instance of Cavite for having caused his two fishing boats to fish, loiter and
anchor without permission from the Secretary within three kilometers from Petitioner Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. is
the shoreline of Corrigidor Island. a domestic corporation whose members, individually or
collectively, are engaged in the buying and selling of copra in
This Court held that the Fisheries Law does not prohibit boats not subject to Misamis Oriental. The petitioner alleges that prior to the
license from fishing within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and issuance of Revenue Memorandum Circular 47-91 on June 11,
reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military 1991, which implemented VAT Ruling 190-90, copra was
authorities of the United States, without permission from the Secretary of classified as agricultural food product under $ 103(b) of the
Agriculture and Natural Resources upon recommendation of the military and National Internal Revenue Code and, therefore, exempt from
naval authorities concerned. VAT at all stages of production or distribution.
As the said law does not penalize the act mentioned in section 28 of the
Respondents represent departments of the executive branch of
administrative order, the promulgation of that provision by the Secretary "is
government charged with the generation of funds and the
equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power which has not been and cannot
assessment, levy and collection of taxes and other imposts.
be delegated to him, it being expressly reserved" to the lawmaking body.
"Such an act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory power conferred The pertinent provision of the NIRC states:
upon the Secretary but also an exercise of a legislative power which he does
not have, and therefore" the said provision "is null and void and without Sec. 103. Exempt Transactions. — The following shall be exempt
effect". Hence, the charge against Santos was dismiss. from the value-added tax:
A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the (a) Sale of nonfood agricultural, marine and forest products in
right to make ranks and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, their original state by the primary producer or the owner of the
that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. land where the same are produced;
An administrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers
expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it. (Glustrom vs. State, (b) Sale or importation in their original state of agricultural and
206 Ga. 734, 58 Second 2d 534; See 2 Am. Jr. 2nd 129-130). marine food products, livestock and poultry of a kind generally
used as, or yielding or producing foods for human consumption,
Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and and breeding stock and genetic material therefor;
boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative
purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect Under §103(a), as above quoted, the sale of agricultural non-
of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not food products in their original state is exempt from VAT only if
represent a valid precise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by the sale is made by the primary producer or owner of the land
an administrative body to legislate (State vs. Miles, Wash. 2nd 322, 105 Pac. from which the same are produced. The sale made by any other
2nd 51). person or entity, like a trader or dealer, is not exempt from the
tax. On the other hand, under §103(b) the sale of agricultural
In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly
food products in their original state is exempt from VAT at all
appear that the order is one which falls within the scope of the authority
stages of production or distribution regardless of who the seller
conferred upon the administrative body, and the order will be scrutinized with
is.
special care. (State vs. Miles supra).
The question is whether copra is an agricultural food or non-
The Miles case involved a statute which authorized the State Game
Commission "to adopt, promulgate, amend and/or repeal, and enforce food product for purposes of this provision of the NIRC. On
reasonable rules and regulations governing and/or prohibiting the taking of June 11, 1991, respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue
the various classes of game. issued the circular in question, classifying copra as an
agricultural non-food product and declaring it "exempt from
Under that statute, the Game Commission promulgated a rule that "it shall be VAT only if the sale is made by the primary producer pursuant
unlawful to offer, pay or receive any reward, prize or compensation for the to Section 103(a) of the Tax Code, as amended." 2
hunting, pursuing, taking, killing or displaying of any game animal, game bird
or game fish or any part thereof." The reclassification had the effect of denying to the petitioner
the exemption it previously enjoyed when copra was classified
Beryl S. Miles, the owner of a sporting goods store, regularly offered a ten- as an agricultural food product under §103(b) of the NIRC.
down cash prize to the person displaying the largest deer in his store during Petitioner challenges RMC No. 47-91 on various grounds, which
the open for hunting such game animals. For that act, he was charged with a will be presently discussed although not in the order raised in
violation of the rule Promulgated by the State Game Commission. the petition for prohibition.
It was held that there was no statute penalizing the display of game. What the First. Petitioner contends that the Bureau of Food and Drug of
statute penalized was the taking of game. If the lawmaking body desired to the Department of Health and not the BIR is the competent
prohibit the display of game, it could have readily said so. It was not lawful government agency to determine the proper classification of
for the administrative board to extend or modify the statute. Hence, the food products. Petitioner cites the opinion of Dr. Quintin
indictment against Miles was quashed. The Miles case is similar to this case. Kintanar of the Bureau of Food and Drug to the effect that
copra should be considered "food" because it is produced from
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision of June 9, 1970 is set aside for lack
coconut which is food and 80% of coconut products are edible.
of appellate jurisdiction and the order of dismissal rendered by the municipal
court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Criminal Case No. 5429 is affirmed. Costs de On the other hand, the respondents argue that the opinion of
oficio. the BIR, as the government agency charged with the
implementation and interpretation of the tax laws, is entitled to
SO ORDERED.
great respect.
We agree with respondents. In interpreting §103(a) and (b) of
G.R. No. 108524 November 10, 1994 the NIRC, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue gave it a strict
construction consistent with the rule that tax exemptions must
MISAMIS ORIENTAL ASSOCIATION OF COCO TRADERS, be strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor
INC., petitioner, of the state. Indeed, even Dr. Kintanar said that his
vs. classification of copra as food was based on "the broader
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY, COMMISSIONER definition of food which includes agricultural commodities and
OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR), AND other components used in the manufacture/processing of food."
REVENUE DISTRICT OFFICER, BIR MISAMIS The full text of his letter reads:
ORIENTAL, respondents.
10 April 1991
Damasing Law Office for petitioner.
Mr. VICTOR A. DEOFERIO, JR.
Chairman VAT Review Committee
Bureau of Internal Revenue
MENDOZA, J.: Diliman, Quezon City
This is a petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to Dear Mr. Deoferio:
nullify Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 47-91 and enjoin
the collection by respondent revenue officials of the Value This is to clarify a previous communication made by this Office
Added Tax (VAT) on the sale of copra by members of petitioner about copra in a letter dated 05 December 1990 stating that
organization. 1 copra is not classified as food. The statement was made in the
context of BFAD's regulatory responsibilities which focus mainly Third. Petitioner likewise claims that RMC No. 47-91 is
on foods that are processed and packaged, and thereby copra is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause of the
not covered. Constitution because while coconut farmers and copra
producers are exempt, traders and dealers are not, although
However, in the broader definition of food which include both sell copra in its original state. Petitioners add that oil
agricultural commodities and other components used in the millers do not enjoy tax credit out of the VAT payment of traders
manufacture/ processing of food, it is our opinion that copra and dealers.
should be classified as an agricultural food product since copra
is produced from coconut meat which is food and based on The argument has no merit. There is a material or substantial
available information, more than 80% of products derived from difference between coconut farmers and copra producers, on
copra are edible products. the one hand, and copra traders and dealers, on the other. The
former produce and sell copra, the latter merely sell copra.
Very truly yours, The Constitution does not forbid the differential treatment of
persons so long as there is a reasonable basis for classifying
QUINTIN L. KINTANAR, M.D., Ph.D.
them differently. 8
Director
Assistant Secretary of Health for Standards and Regulations It is not true that oil millers are exempt from VAT. Pursuant to §
102 of the NIRC, they are subject to 10% VAT on the sale of
Moreover, as the government agency charged with the
services. Under § 104 of the Tax Code, they are allowed to credit
enforcement of the law, the opinion of the Commissioner of
the input tax on the sale of copra by traders and dealers, but
Internal Revenue, in the absence of any showing that it is
there is no tax credit if the sale is made directly by the copra
plainly wrong, is entitled to great weight. Indeed, the ruling was
producer as the sale is VAT exempt. In the same manner, copra
made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the exercise
traders and dealers are allowed to credit the input tax on the
of his power under § 245 of the NIRC to "make rulings or
sale of copra by other traders and dealers, but there is no tax
opinions in connection with the implementation of the
credit if the sale is made by the producer.
provisions of internal revenue laws, including rulings on the
classification of articles for sales tax and similar purposes." Fourth. It is finally argued that RMC No. 47-91 is
counterproductive because traders and dealers would be forced
Second. Petitioner complains that it was denied due process
to buy copra from coconut farmers who are exempt from the
because it was not heard before the ruling was made. There is a
VAT and that to the extent that prices are reduced the
distinction in administrative law between legislative rules and
government would lose revenues as the 10% tax base is
interpretative rules. 3 There would be force in petitioner's
correspondingly diminished.
argument if the circular in question were in the nature of a
legislative rule. But it is not. It is a mere interpretative rule. This is not so. The sale of agricultural non-food products is
exempt from VAT only when made by the primary producer or
The reason for this distinction is that a legislative rule is in the
owner of the land from which the same is produced, but in the
nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a
case of agricultural food products their sale in their original
primary legislation by providing the details thereof. In the same
state is exempt at all stages of production or distribution. At
way that laws must have the benefit of public hearing, it is
any rate, the argument that the classification of copra as
generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there
agricultural non-food product is counterproductive is a question
must be hearing. In this connection, the Administrative Code of
of wisdom or policy which should be addressed to respondent
1987 provides:
officials and to Congress.
Public Participation. — If not otherwise required by law, an
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices
of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity SO ORDERED.
to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
G.R. No. 95832 August 10, 1992
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid
unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a MAYNARD R. PERALTA, petitioner,
newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before
the first hearing thereon. vs.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
observed. 4
Tranquilino F. Meris Law Office for petitioner.
In addition such rule must be published. 5 On the other hand,
PADILLA, J.:
interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to the law
which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing. Petitioner was appointed Trade-Specialist II on 25 September
1989 in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). His
Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to
appointment was classified as "Reinstatement/Permanent".
make three inquiries: (i) whether the rule is within the delegated
Before said appointment, he was working at the Philippine
authority of the administrative agency; (ii) whether it is
Cotton Corporation, a government-owned and controlled
reasonable; and (iii) whether it was issued pursuant to proper
corporation under the Department of Agriculture.
procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its judgment
as to the desirability or wisdom of the rule for the legislative On 8 December 1989, petitioner received his initial salary,
body, by its delegation of administrative judgment, has covering the period from 25 September to 31 October 1989.
committed those questions to administrative judgments and not Since he had no accumulated leave credits, DTI deducted from
to judicial judgments. In the case of an interpretative rule, the his salary the amount corresponding to his absences during the
inquiry is not into the validity but into the correctness or covered period, namely, 29 September 1989 and 20 October
propriety of the rule. As a matter of power a court, when 1989, inclusive of Saturdays and Sundays. More specifically,
confronted with an interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force the dates of said absences for which salary deductions were
of law to the rule; (ii) go to the opposite extreme and substitute made, are as follows:
its judgment; or (iii) give some intermediate degree of
authoritative weight to the interpretative rule. 6
In the case at bar, we find no reason for holding that 1. 29 September 1989 — Friday
respondent Commissioner erred in not considering copra as an
"agricultural food product" within the meaning of § 103(b) of the 2. 30 September 1989 — Saturday
NIRC. As the Solicitor General contends, "copra per se is not
food, that is, it is not intended for human consumption. Simply 3. 01 October 1989 — Sunday
stated, nobody eats copra for food." That previous
4. 20 October 1989 — Friday
Commissioners considered it so, is not reason for holding that
the present interpretation is wrong. The Commissioner of 5. 21 October 1989 — Saturday
Internal Revenue is not bound by the ruling of his
predecessors. 7 To the contrary, the overruling of decisions is 6. 22 October 1989 — Sunday
inherent in the interpretation of laws.
payment of his salaries corresponding to Saturdays and
Sundays when he was in fact on leave of absence without pay
Petitioner sent a memorandum to Amando T. Alvis (Chief, on a Friday prior to the said days. A reading of Republic Act No.
General Administrative Service) on 15 December 1989 inquiring 2260 (sic) does not show that a government employee who is on
as to the law on salary deductions, if the employee has no leave leave of absence without pay on a day before or immediately
credits. preceding Saturdays, Sunday or legal holiday is entitled to
payment of his salary for said days. Further, a reading of
Amando T. Alvis answered petitioner's query in a memorandum
Senate Journal No. 67 dated May 4, 1960 of House Bill No. 41
dated 30 January 1990 citing Chapter 5.49 of the Handbook of
(Republic Act No. 2625) reveals that while the law excludes
Information on the Philippine Civil Service which states that
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays in the computation of leave
"when an employee is on leave without pay on a day before or
credits, it does not, however, include a case where the leave of
on a day immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday,
absence is without pay. Hence, applying the principle of inclusio
such Saturday, Sunday, or Holiday shall also be without pay
unius est exclusio alterius, the claim of Peralta has no merit.
(CSC, 2nd Ind., February 12, 1965)."
Moreover, to take a different posture would be in effect giving
Petitioner then sent a latter dated 20 February 1990 addressed more premium to employees who are frequently on leave of
to Civil Service Commission (CSC) Chairman Patricia A. Sto. absence without pay, instead of discouraging them from
Tomas raising the following question: incurring further absence without
As the questioned CSC policy is here declared invalid, we are AZUCENA T. REYES, G.R. No. 163581
next confronted with the question of what effect such invalidity
will have. Will all government employees on a monthly salary Petitioner,
basis, deprived of their salaries corresponding to Saturdays,
Sundays or legal holidays (as herein petitioner was so deprived) - versus -
since 12 February 1965, be entitled to recover the amounts
corresponding to such non-working days? COMMISSIONER OF Promulgated:
INTERNAL REVENUE,
The general rule vis-a-vis legislation is that an unconstitutional Respondent. January 27, 2006
act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal
contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been
passed. 13
DECISION
But, as held in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter State
Bank:14
PANGANIBAN, CJ.:
. . . . It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to
the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be
taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such determination is an operative fact and may have U nder the present provisions of the Tax Code and pursuant
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot to elementary due process, taxpayers must be informed in
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the writing of the law and the facts upon which a tax
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in assessment is based; otherwise, the assessment is void. Being
various aspects — with respect to particular relations, invalid, the assessment cannot in turn be used as a basis for
individual and corporate; and particular conduct, private and the perfection of a tax compromise.
official.
The Case
To allow all the affected government employees, similarly
situated as petitioner herein, to claim their deducted salaries
resulting from the past enforcement of the herein invalidated
Before us are two consolidated[1] Petitions for Review[2] filed
CSC policy, would cause quite a heavy financial burden on the
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the August 8,
national and local governments considering the length of time
2003 Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No.
that such policy has been effective. Also, administrative and
71392. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as
practical considerations must be taken into account if this
follows:
ruling will have a strict restrospective application. The Court, in
this connection, calls upon the respondent Commission and the
Congress of the Philippines, if necessary, to handle this problem
with justice and equity to all affected government employees. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision
of the Court of Tax Appeals is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE without prejudice to the action of the National
Evaluation Board on the proposed compromise settlement of the
It must be pointed out, however, that after CSC Memorandum
Maria C. Tancinco estates tax liability.[4]
Circular No. 16 Series of 1991 — amending the herein
invalidated policy — was promulgated on 26 April 1991,
deductions from salaries made after said date in contravention
of the new CSC policy must be restored to the government
employees concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, CSC Resolutions No.
90-497 and 90-797 are declared NULL and VOID. The The Facts
respondent Commission is directed to take the appropriate
action so that petitioner shall be paid the amounts previously
but unlawfully deducted from his monthly salary as above The CA narrated the facts as follows:
indicated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
On July 8, 1993, Maria C. Tancinco (or decedent) died, leaving
COMMISSIONER OF G.R. No. 159694
a 1,292 square-meter residential lot and an old house thereon
(or subject property) located
INTERNAL REVENUE,
at 4931 Pasay Road, Dasmarias Village, Makati City.
Petitioner, Present:
Panganiban, CJ,
On the basis of a sworn information-for-reward filed on
- versus - Chairman, February 17, 1997 by a certain Raymond Abad (or Abad),
Revenue District Office No. 50 (South Makati) conducted an
Ynares-Santiago, investigation on the decedents estate (or estate). Subsequently,
it issued a Return Verification Order. But without the required On July 17, 2000, [Reyes] filed a Motion for the Issuance of a
preliminary findings being submitted, it issued Letter of Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Status Quo Order, which was
Authority No. 132963 for the regular investigation of the estate granted by the CTA on July 26, 2000. Upon [Reyess] filing of a
tax case.Azucena T. Reyes (or [Reyes]), one of the decedents surety bond in the amount of P27,000,000.00, the CTA issued a
heirs, received the Letter of Authority on March 14, 1997. [R]esolution dated August 16, 2000 ordering [the CIR] to desist
and refrain from proceeding with the auction sale of the subject
property or from issuing a [W]arrant of [D]istraint or
[G]arnishment of [B]ank [A]ccount[,] pending determination of
On February 12, 1998, the Chief, Assessment Division, Bureau
the case and/or unless a contrary order is issued.
of Internal Revenue (or BIR), issued a preliminary assessment
notice against the estate in the amount of P14,580,618.67. On
May 10, 1998, the heirs of the decedent (or heirs) received a
final estate tax assessment notice and a demand letter, both [The CIR] filed a [M]otion to [D]ismiss the petition on the
dated April 22, 1998, for the amount of P14,912,205.47, grounds (i) that the CTA no longer has jurisdiction over the
inclusive of surcharge and interest. case[,] because the assessment against the estate is already
final and executory; and (ii) that the petition was filed out of
time. In a [R]esolution dated November 23, 2000, the CTA
denied [the CIRs] motion.
On June 1, 1998, a certain Felix M. Sumbillo (or Sumbillo)
protested the assessment [o]n behalf of the heirs on the ground
that the subject property had already been sold by the decedent
sometime in 1990. During the pendency of the [P]etition for [R]eview with the CTA,
however, the BIR issued Revenue Regulation (or RR) No. 6-2000
and Revenue Memorandum Order (or RMO) No. 42-2000
offering certain taxpayers with delinquent accounts and
On November 12, 1998, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
disputed assessments an opportunity to compromise their tax
(or [CIR]) issued a preliminary collection letter to [Reyes],
liability.
followed by a Final Notice Before Seizure dated December 4,
1998.
On June 14, 2001, [Reyes] filed a Motion for Judgment on the Hence, this Petition.[10]
Pleadings; the motion was granted on July 11, 2001. After
submission of memoranda, the case was submitted for
[D]ecision.
A tax regulation is promulgated by the finance secretary to Tax laws are civil in nature. [22] Under our Civil Code, acts
implement the provisions of the Tax Code. [15] While it is executed against the mandatory provisions of law are void,
desirable for the government authority or administrative agency except when the law itself authorizes the validity of those acts.
[23]
to have one immediately issued after a law is passed, the Failure to comply with Section 228 does not only render the
absence of the regulation does not automatically mean that the assessment void, but also finds no validation in any provision in
law itself would become inoperative. the Tax Code. We cannot condone errant or enterprising tax
officials, as they are expected to be vigilant and law-abiding.
At the time the pre-assessment notice was issued to Reyes, RA
8424 already stated that the taxpayer must be informed of both Second Issue:
the law and facts on which the assessment was based. Thus,
Validity of Compromise
the CIR should have required the assessment officers of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to follow the clear mandate of It would be premature for this Court to declare that the
the new law. The old regulation governing the issuance of estate compromise on the estate tax liability has been perfected and
tax assessment notices ran afoul of the rule that tax regulations consummated, considering the earlier determination that the
-- old as they were -- should be in harmony with, and not assessment against the estate was void. Nothing has been
supplant or modify, the law. [16] settled or finalized. Under Section 204(A) of the Tax Code, where
the basic tax involved exceeds one million pesos or the
It may be argued that the Tax Code provisions are not self-
settlement offered is less than the prescribed minimum rates,
executory. It would be too wide a stretch of the imagination,
the compromise shall be subject to the approval of
though, to still issue a regulation that would simply require tax
the NEB composed of the petitioner and four deputy
officials to inform the taxpayer, in any manner, of the law and
commissioners.
the facts on which an assessment was based. That requirement
is neither difficult to make nor its desired results hard to Finally, as correctly held by the appellate court, this provision
achieve. applies to all compromises, whether government-initiated or
not. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos. W
Moreover, an administrative rule interpretive of a statute, and
here the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
not declarative of certain rights and corresponding obligations,
is given retroactive effect as of the date of the effectivity of the WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
statute.[17] RR 12-99 is one such rule. Being interpretive of the Decision AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
provisions of the Tax Code, even if it was issued only
on September 6, 1999, this regulation was to retroact SO ORDERED.
to January 1, 1998 -- a date prior to the issuance of the
preliminary assessment notice and demand letter. G.R. Nos. 94878-94881 May 15, 1991
Third, neither Section 229 nor RR 12-85 can prevail over NORBERTO A. ROMUALDEZ III, petitioner,
Section 228 of the Tax Code. vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION* and THE PHILIPPINE
No doubt, Section 228 has replaced Section 229. The provision COCONUT AUTHORITY, respondents.
on protesting an assessment has been amended. Furthermore,
in case of discrepancy between the law as amended and its Fernando T. Collantes for petitioner.
implementing but old regulation, the former necessarily
GANCAYCO, J.:
By this petition the intervention of public respondent Civil directive of Section 8, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on
Service Commission (SCS) is sought to compel public Personnel Actions and Policies.5
respondent Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to reinstate and
extend a permanent appointment to petitioner as Deputy The petition is devoid of merit.
Administrator for Industrial Research and Market Development.
No doubt the appointment extended to petitioner by respondent
Petitioner was appointed and served as a Commercial Attache of PCA as PCA Deputy Administrator for Industrial Research and
the Department of Trade continuously for twelve years from Market Development was temporary. Although petitioner was
September, 1975 to August 30, 1987. His civil service formerly holding a permanent appointment as a commercial
eligibilities are: Patrolman of the City of Manila (1963 CS Exam) attache, he sought and accepted this temporary appointment to
and a Commercial Attache (1973 CS Exam). respondent PCA.
On September 1, 1987, he was transferred to the respondent His temporary appointment was for a definite period and when
PCA whereby he was extended an appointment as Deputy it lapsed and was not renewed on February 28, 1987, he
Administrator for Industrial Research and Market complains that there was a denial of due process. This is not a
Development.1 The nature of his appointment was case of removal from office. Indeed, when he accepted this
"reinstatement" and his employment status was "temporary," for temporary appointment he was thereby effectively divested of
the period covering September 1, 1987 to August 30, 1988. His security of tenure.6 A temporary appointment does not give the
appointment was renewed for another six months from appointee any definite tenure of office but makes it dependent
September 1, 1988 to February 28, 1989 also on a "temporary" upon the pleasure of the appointing power.7 Thus, the matter of
status and subject to certain conditions to which petitioner converting such a temporary appointment to a permanent one
agreed. is addressed to the sound discretion of the appointing
authority. Respondent CSC cannot direct the appointing
When his appointment expired on February 28, 1989, the authority to make such an appointment if it is not so disposed. 8
Governing Board did not renew the same so he was promptly
informed thereof by the Acting Chairman of the Board of the The duty of respondent CSC is to approve or disapprove an
PCA, Apolonio V. Bautista.2 appointment.1âwphi1 Its attestation is limited to the
determination whether the appointee possesses the required
On February 6, 1990, petitioner appealed to respondent CSC He qualifications for the position as the appropriate civil service
requested reinstatement to his previous position in PCA and in eligibility.9
support of the request, he invoked the provisions of (CSC)
Memorandum Circular No. 29 dated July 19, 1989. 3 Petitioner invokes CSC Memorandum Circular No, 29, S. 1989,
dated July 19, 1989 which provides—
Respondent CSC denied petitioner's request for reinstatement
on May 2, 1990 by way of its Resolution No. 90-407, holding (a) A permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who
that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29 was not applicable to meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being
petitioner's case because it took effect on July 19, 1989 when appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in
petitioner had long been out of the government service since accordance with the provisions of law, rules and standards
February 28, 1989 and that his reappointment was essentially promulgated in pursuance thereof. (Section 25 (a), P.D. 807).
discretionary on the part of the proper appointing authority.
(b) While the appointing authority is given a wide latitude of
On May 11, 1990, respondent PCA appointed Mr. Roman discretion in the selection of personnel for his department or
Santos to the contested position. agency, in the exercise of this discretion he shall be guided by
and subject to the Civil Service Law and Rules. 10
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of Resolution No. 90-407
but it was denied by respondent CSC in Resolution No. 90-693 As aptly observed by respondent CSC said circular cannot be
dated July 31, 1990.4 given retrospective effect as to apply to the case of petitioner
who was separated from the service on February 28, 1989. And
Hence, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition even if the said circular may apply to petitioner's situation,
and mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of under said circular it is recognized that "the appointing
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, authority is given a wide latitude of discretion in the selection of
raising the following issues— personnel of his department or agency." Respondent PCA
exercised its discretion and opted not to extend the
l. Public Respondent Civil Service Commission committed grave appointment of petitioner. It cannot be compelled to extend
abuse of discretion amounting to capricious, whimsical, and petitioner's appointment, much less can it be directed to extend
despotic refusal to perform a legal/constitutional duty to a permanent appointment to petitioner. A discretionary duty
enforce the Civil Service Law and/or constituting non- cannot be compelled by mandamus.11 More so when as in this
feasance/mis-feasance in office in issuing Resolution Nos. 90- case petitioner has not shown a lawful right to the position. If
407 and 90-693; the legal rights of the petitioner are not well-defined, clear and
certain, the petition must be dismissed. 12
2. The legal issue of the applicability of Civil Service
Commission Circular No. 29, Series 1989 on the appointment of WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
petitioner as PCA Deputy Administrator for Industrial Research
and Market Development; SO ORDERED.
4. Public respondent Civil Service Commission committed grave FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or ON ELECTIONS and CANUTO SENEN A.
non-feasance/misfeasance of official functions in not exercising ORETA, respondents.
its authority to enforce/implement the Civil Service Law and in
DECISION
not affording petitioner who belongs to the career service in the
government the protective security of tenure and due process PUNO, J.:
clause of the Philippine 1987 Constitution as well as the Civil
Service Law under P.D. 807; The petition at bar assails the order of the Commission on
Elections , (COMELEC) en banc dated June 2, 1998 nullifying
5. Public respondent Philippine Coconut Authority unlawfully and setting aside the proclamation of petitioner Federico S.
and maliciously deliberately failed/refused to strictly comply Sandoval as congressman-elect for the Malabon-Navotas
with the provision of par. a, Section 25 of P.D. 807 in the matter legislative district.
of extending permanent appointment to petitioner constituting
likewise grave abuse of discretion on the part of public The facts are as follows:
respondent Civil Service Commission amounting to gross
ignorance of the law in not correcting/rectifying such malicious Petitioner Federico S. Sandoval and private respondent
and deliberate non-compliance, in view of the mandatory Canuto Senen Greta, together with Pedro Domingo, Mariano
Santiago, Symaco Benito and Warren Serna, vied for the
congressional seat for the Malabon-Navotas legislative district canvassers, complete the canvassing of the municipal
during the election held on May 11, 1998. certificate of canvass and supporting statement of votes per
municipality , and proclaim the winning candidate for the
On election day, after the votes have been cast and counted congressional seat of the Malabon-Navotas legislative district.
in the various precincts in the two municipalities, their [9]
"5. Respondent Oreta's recourse lies with the House of Considering the arguments raised by the parties, the issues
Representatives Electoral Tribunal which is not precluded that need to be resolved in this case are:
from passing upon the allegedly uncanvassed election returns
1. whether the COMELEC has the power to take cognizance of
in Malabon."[18]
SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, both alleging the
On June 9, 1998, we required the respondents to comment on existence 'of manifest error in the certificate of canvass
the petition. We also issued a temporary restraining order issued by the Malabon municipal board of canvassers and
mandating the COMELEC to cease and desist from seeking to reconvene said board of canvassers to allow it to
implementing and enforcing the questioned order. [19] correct the alleged error; and
The COMELEC nonetheless conducted a hearing on June 9, 2. whether the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's
1998 , concerning SPC No.98-143 and SPC No.98-206. proclamation was valid.
Private respondent filed his comment [20] on June 22, 1998. He On the first issue, we uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
argued: over the petitions filed by private respondent. As
a general rule, candidates and registered political parties error in the Statement of Votes, like SPC 95-198 is a pre-
involved in an election are allowed to file pre-proclamation proclamation ; controversy -- in none of the cases cited to
cases before the COMELEC. Pre-proclamation cases refer to support this proposition was the issue the correction of a
any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the manifest error in the Statement of Votes under Sec. 231 of the
board of canvassers which may be raised by, any candidate or Omnibus Election Code (BP. Blg. 881) or Sec. 15 of R.A.
by any registered political party or coalition of political parties No.7166. On the other hand, Rule 27, Sec. 5 of the 1993 Rules
before the board or directly with the Commission, or any of the COMELEC expressly provides that pre - proclamation
matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in controversies involving, inter alia, manifest errors in the
relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and tabulation or tallying of the results may be filed directly with
appreciation of election returns.[24] The COMELEC has the COMELEC en banc x x x." [34]
exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies.
[25]
As an exception, however, to the general rule, Section 15 Petitioner nonetheless contends that SPC No. 98-143 and SPC
of Republic Act (RA) 7166[26]. prohibits candidates in the No. 98-206 must be dismissed because private respondent
presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial and congressional failed to raise the issue of manifest error before the
elections from filing pre-proclamation cases.[27] It states: appropriate board of canvassers in accordance with the
second sentence of Section 15 of RA 7166.
"Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in
Elections for President, Vice-President, Senator, and We disagree.
Members of the House of
The issue of manifest error in the certificate of canvass for
Representatives.-- For purposes of the elections for
Malabon has been raised before the district board of
President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House
canvassers before petitioner could be proclaimed and said
of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be
board has in fact ruled on the issue. [35] We find this as
allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission,
sufficient compliance with the law. The facts show that it was
receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or the
impossible for private respondent to raise the issue before the
certificates of canvass, as the case may be. However, this
Malabon municipal board of canvassers as it still did not have
does not preclude the authority of the appropriate
a copy of the statement of votes and the precinct list at the
canvassing body motu propio or upon written
time of the canvassing in the municipal level. At that time,
complaint of an interested person to correct manifest
private respondent still had no knowledge of the alleged
errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns
manifest error. He, however, lost no time in notifying the
before it." Rtc spped
COMELEC Chairman and the district board of the alleged error
The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the upon discovery thereof. We find petitioner's argument,
winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum therefore, to be devoid of merit.
in these sensitive posts. [28] The law, nonetheless, provides
We now go to the second issue. Although the COMELEC is
an exception to the exception. The second sentence of
clothed with jurisdiction over the subject matter and issue of
Section 15 allows the filing of petitions for correction
SPC No.98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, we find the exercise of
of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election
its jurisdiction tainted with illegality. We hold that its
returns even in elections for president, vice- president and
order to set aside the proclamation of petitioner is invalid for
members of the House of Representatives for
having been rendered without due process of law. Procedural
the simple reason that the correction of manifest error will
due process demands prior notice and hearing. Then after the
not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the
hearing, it is also necessary that the tribunal show substantial
proclamation of the winner in the election. This rule is
evidence to support its ruling.[36] In other words, due process
consistent with and complements the authority of the
requires that a party be given an opportunity to adduce his
COMELEC under the Constitution to, "enforce and administer
evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an, election,
should be considered in the adjudication of the case. [37] The
plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall"[29] and its power
facts show that COMELEC set aside the proclamation of
to "decide, except those involving the right to vote, all
petitioner , without the benefit of prior notice and hearing and
questions affecting elections."[30]
it rendered the questioned order based solely on private
Applying the foregoing rule, we hold that the Commission respondent's allegations. We held in Bince, Jr. vs.
has jurisdiction over SPC No. 98- 143 and SPC No.98-206, COMELEC:[38] x law
both filed by private respondent seeking to correct the alleged
"Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due
manifest error in the certificate of canvass issued by the
process of law. Although public office is not property under
Malabon municipal board of canvassers. These petitions
Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, and one
essentially allege that there exists a manifest error in said
cannot acquire a vested right to public office, it is,
certificate of canvass as the board failed to include several
nevertheless, a protected right. Due process in proceedings
election returns in the canvassing. Private respondent prays
before the COMELEC, exercising its quasi-judicial functions,
that the board be reconvened to correct said error. Section
requires due notice and hearing, among others. Thus,
15 of RA 7166 vests the COMELEC with jurisdiction over
although the COMELEC possesses, in appropriate cases, the
cases of this nature. We reiterate the long-standing
power to annul or suspend the proclamation of any candidate,
rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law and is
We had ruled in Farinas vs. Commission on Elections, Reyes
determined by the allegations in the petition
vs. Commission on Elections and Gallardo vs. Commission on
regardless of whether or not the petitioner is entitled
Elections that the COMELEC is without power to partially or
to the relief sought.[31]
totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a
The authority to rule on petitions for correction of manifest proclamation without notice and hearing."[39]
error is vested in the COMELEC en banc. Section 7 of Rule
Citing Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code, private
27 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure [32] provides that if
respondent argues that the COMELEC is authorized to annul
the error is discovered before proclamation, the board of
an illegal proclamation even without notice and hearing
canvassers may motu proprio, or upon verified petition by any
because the law states that it may motu proprio order a
candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political
partial or total suspension of the proclamation of any
parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the errors
candidate-elect or annul partially or totally any proclamation,
committed. The aggrieved party may appeal the decision of
if one has been made. We reject the argument. Section 242 of
the board to the Commission and said appeal shall be heard
the Omnibus Election Code reads:
and decided by the Commission en banc. Section 5, however
of the same rule states that a petition for correction of "Sec. 242. Commission's exclusive jurisdiction of all
manifest error may be filed directly with the Commission en pre-proclamation controversies.-- The Commission shall
banc provided that such errors could not have been have exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation
discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of due controversies. It may motu proprio or upon written petition,
diligence and proclamation of , the winning candidate had and after due notice and hearing, order the partial or total
already been made. Thus, we held in Ramirez vs. COMELEC: suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or
[33]
Korte annul partially or totally any proclamation, if one has been
made, as the evidence shall warrant in accordance with the
"Although in Ong, Jr. v. COMELEC it was said that 'By now it is
succeeding sections."
settled that election cases which include pre-proclamation
controversies must first be heard and decided by a division of The phrase "motu proprio" does not refer to the annulment of
the Commission' -- and a petition for correction of manifest proclamation but to the manner of initiating the proceedings
to annul a proclamation made by the board of canvassers. IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF INSOLVENCY OF [A]
The law provides two ways by which annulment proceedings FILAND MANUFACTURING AND ESTATE DEVELOPMENT
may be initiated. It may be at the own initiative of the COMPANY; [B] TOP CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES, INC. AND
COMELEC (motu proprio) or by written petition. In either case, [C] SPOUSES EMILIO CHING AND INAI TEH; EMILIO CHING,
notice and hearing is required. This is clear from the language petitioner, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor. LAND
of the law. Scmis BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
We likewise reject private respondent's assertion that the HON. DIONISIO N. CAPISTRANO, JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
hearing held on June 9, 1998 substantially satisfies the due TRIAL COURT OF PASAY CITY, EMILIO CHING AND FILAND
process requirement. The law requires that the hearing be MANUFACTURING AND ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CO.,
held beforethe COMELEC rules on the petition. Here, the INC., respondents.
public respondent first issued an order annulling the
proclamation of petitioner and then set the date of the Lily K. Gruba and Florencio S. Jimenez for Land Bank of the
hearing. We explained in Farinasvs. COMELEC[40] the Philippines.
pernicious effect of such procedure:
"As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, 'to sanction the FERNAN, C.J.:
immediate annulment or even the suspension of the effects of
a proclamation before the petition seeking such annulment or Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the jurisdiction of the
suspension of its effects shall have been heard would open Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City over a petition for declaration
the floodgates of unsubstantiated petitions after the results of insolvency of two (2) private corporations.
are known, considering the propensity of the losing
The antecedent facts are undisputed:
candidates to put up all sorts of obstacles in an open display
of unwillingness to accept defeat, or would encourage the On September 19, 1980, private respondents Filand Manufacturing
filing of baseless petitions not only to the damage and and Estate Development Co., Inc. (hereafter, Filand Manufacturing)
prejudice of winning candidates but also to the frustration of and Emilio Ching obtained from petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines
the sovereign will of the electorate.'" (citations omitted) a loan in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). Private
respondents having failed to pay the loan on its due date, petitioner
Public respondent submits that procedural due process need instituted before the RTC of Manila a complaint for recovery thereof,
not be observed in this case because it was merely exercising docketed as Civil Case No. 0184-P.
its administrative power to review, revise and reverse the
actions of the board of canvassers. It set aside the During the pendency of the collection suit on December 29, 1984,
proclamation made by the district board of canvassers for the private respondents Filand Manufacturing, Emilio Ching and his
position of congressman upon finding that it was tainted with spouse Inai Teh and Top Construction Enterprises, Inc., thru Emilio
illegality. Ching, filed before the respondent RTC of Pasay City a petition
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 3232P for declaration of
We cannot accept public respondent's argument. insolvency. Cited as ground therefor was their inability to pay the
various debts and liabilities incurred by them, either jointly or solidarily
Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for
or guaranteed by one for the other, in the course of their businesses,
annulment of petitioner's proclamation, COMELEC was not
such inability being due to business reserves brought about by the fire
merely performing an administrative function. The
on January 2, 1984 which gutted the old Holiday Plaza Building then
administrative powers of the COMELEC include the power to
owned and operated by Filand Manufacturing, as well as the economic
determine the number and location of polling places, appoint
crisis which gripped the country following the assassination of former
election officials and inspectors, conduct registration of
Senator Benigno S. Aquino in 1983.1
voters, deputize law enforcement agencies and government
instrumentalities to ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and Acting on said petition, respondent court on January 29, 1985 issued
credible elections, register political parties, organizations or an Order of Adjudication declaring private respondents insolvent
coalitions, accredit citizens' arms of the Commission, pursuant to Section 18 of the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956). The
prosecute election offenses, and recommend to the President Sheriff of Pasay City was "directed to take possession of, and safely
the removal of or imposition of any other disciplinary action keep, until the appointment of a receiver or assignee, all the deeds,
upon any officer or employee it has deputized for violation or vouchers, books of account, papers, notes, bonds, bills and securities
disregard of its directive, order or decision. In addition, the of (therein) petitioners, and all the real and personal properties, estates
Commission also has direct control and supervision over all and effects of the same petitioners, except such as may, by law, be
personnel involved in the conduct of election. However , the exempt from execution." Respondent court set "March 25, 1985 at 9:00
resolution of the adverse claims of private respondent and A.M. in its premises ... as the date of the meeting of the creditors of the
petitioner as regards the existence of a manifest error in petitioners for them to choose an assignee/assignees of the estates of
the questioned certificate of canvass requires the the petitioners."2
COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the Commission
to hear both parties to determine the veracity of their Petitioner bank moved for a reconsideration of the Order of
allegations and to decide whether the alleged error is a Adjudication on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) that the court has no
manifest error. Hence, the resolution of this issue calls for jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition insofar as petitioning
the exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi- judicial power. It corporations are concerned; and (2) the petition is defective in form
has been said that where a power rests in judgment or and substance.3 After an exchange of pleadings between petitioner
discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does and private respondents, respondent court issued on July 19, 1985 an
not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred Order upholding its jurisdiction over the petition and appointing
upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi- petitioner bank as the assignee for and in behalf of all the creditors
without bond, thus:
judicial.[41] The COMELEC therefore, acting as quasi-judicial
tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of procedural due WHEREFORE, all motions seeking to have this Court make a
process in resolving the petitions filed by private declaration that it has no jurisdiction over the above-entitled
respondent.Mis sc proceeding are hereby DENIED, and the Land Bank of the Philippines
is appointed as the assignee for and in behalf of all the creditors of the
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the COMELEC order dated June 2, 1998
petitioners, without bond, to which assignee the Clerk of Court, thru the
in SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206 is ANNULLED. This
Branch Sheriff, shall deliver any and all real and personal properties,
case is REMANDED to the COMELEC and the Commission is
estates and effects, as well as the pertinent papers and all deeds,
hereby ordered to hold a hearing on the issues presented in vouchers, books of accounts, papers, notes, bonds, bills and securities
SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, and thereafter render a taken by him pursuant to the order of this Court of January 29, 1985.
decision based on the evidence adduced and the applicable
laws. The incident of whether or not petitioner may continue The assignee is hereby ordered to comply with the time limit provided
discharging the functions of the office of congressman pending for in Sec. 43 of Act 1956, and for this purpose, hereby sets his report
resolution of the case on its merit shall be addressed by the for hearing on October 29, 1985, at 9:00 A.M.
COMELEC in the exercise of its reasonable discretion.
SO ORDERED.4
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner bank declined the appointment and the City Treasurer of
G.R. No. 73123 September 2, 1991 Pasay City, being the second biggest creditor of private respondents,
was appointed in its stead Petitioner bank then filed a Notice of Appeal
and a Record on Appeal on August 19, 1985, on the basis of which the
respondent court forwarded the records of the case directly to this morning. A senior and knowledgeable officer of the SEC was
Court. requested to "appear and inform the Court of the law and practice
actually applied and followed by the SEC in respect of suspension of
By resolution dated September 23, 1985, the Court resolved to payments by, and voluntary and involuntary insolvencies of Philippine
"REQUIRE the Branch Clerk of Court of the (respondent court) to corporations . ..." Former SEC Chairman Julito Sulit, Jr. was
EXPLAIN why he forwarded to this Court the aforesaid records when appointed amicus curiae and was requested to appear at the hearing
the mode of seeking review by this Court of a lower court's judgment in that capacity.11
under R.A. 5440 is by petition for review on certiorari; and the
Presiding Judge of said trial court is also directed to EXPLAIN why he Before addressing the principal issue in the instant petition, the Court
accepted and approved the forwarding to this Court of the aforesaid notes with dismay that the petitioner and the lower court appear to be
records, both within ten (10) days from notice hereof." Petitioner bank still in the dark as to the proper mode of appeal to this Court. Hence,
and/or counsel were also "REQUIRED to EXPLAIN within ten (10) for their elucidation as well as the others similarly misinformed, we
days from notice ..., since they failed to pay timely the docket and legal deem it proper to quote the following resolution dated March 1, 1990 of
research fund fees and to file timely a petition for review on certiorari the Court en banc in UDK 9748, "Murillo v. Consul":
under R.A. 5440 why the judgment sought to be reviewed should not
be now deemed final and executory and the records returned for R.A. No. 5440 changed the mode of appeal from courts of first
execution of judgment".5 Upon submission of the required instance (now Regional Trial Courts) to the Supreme Court in cases
explanations, the Court on December 4, 1985 resolved to require the involving only questions of law, or the constitutionality or validity of any
petitioner bank to file a petition for review on certiorari and to pay the treaty, law, ordinance, etc. or the legality of any tax, impost,
docket and legal research fund fees, both within a non-extendible assessment or toll, etc., or the jurisdiction of any inferior court, from
period of ten (10) days from notice.6 This Order was seasonably ordinary appeal — i.e., by notice of appeal, record on appeal and
complied with. appeal bond, under Rule 41— to appeal by certiorari, under Rule 45.
TINGA, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the the purpose of determining the propriety of issuing a
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of preliminary/permanent injunction.
the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66710
granting herein respondents petition for prohibition and On September 20, 2001, Josefina Lubrica, the successor-in-
its Resolution[2] denying herein petitioners motion for interest of Suntay, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
reconsideration. Prohibition,[18] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66710. The petition,
impleading DARAB and Land Bank as respondents, sought to
This Court adopts the appellate courts narration of facts. enjoin DARAB from further proceeding with DSCA No. 0252,
mainly on the theory that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, which
On August 4, 2000, Federico Suntay, now deceased, filed a confers adjudicatory functions upon the DAR, does not grant
petition for fixing and payment of just compensation under DAR jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari. On the
Presidential Decree No. 27 against the Department of Agrarian same day, the Court of Appeals granted Lubricas prayer for a
Reform (DAR), the DAR Regional Director for Region IV and the temporary restraining order.[19] This notwithstanding, DARAB
Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank).[3] Docketed as issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction [20] on October 3, 2001,
DARAB Case No. V-0405-0001-00, the case was filed before the directing RARAD not to implement its January 24,
Office of the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) and 2001 Decision and the other orders in relation thereto,
raffled to Adjudicator Conchita Mias. Subject of the case was including the Writ of Execution.
Suntays landholdings covering a total area of 948.1911
hectares situated in Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro and On October 8, 2001, DARAB filed a Comment[21] in CA-G.R. SP
embraced under Transfer Certificate of Title T-31. The DAR and No. 66710, arguing that the writ of certiorari/injunction was
Land Bank determined its value at Four Million Two Hundred issued under its power of supervision over its
Fifty-One Thousand One Hundred Forty-One Pesos and 68/100 subordinates/delegates like the PARADs and RARADs to
(P4,251,141.68) or Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Seven restrain the execution of a decision which had not yet attained
Pesos and 50/100 (P4,497.50) per hectare, which valuation finality. In an omnibus motion filed on October 10, 2001,
according to Suntay, was unconscionably low and tantamount Lubrica sought to nullify the Writ of Preliminary
to taking of property without due process of law. [4] Injunction issued by DARAB in DSCA No. 0252 and to cite the
DARAB for contempt.[22] Land Bank also filed its Comment[23] on
After summary administrative proceedings, the RARAD October 15, 2001, raising the prematurity of Lubricas petition
rendered a Decision[5] on January 24, 2001 in favor of Suntay, for prohibition. It contended that the issue of whether or not
ordering Land Bank to pay the former the amount of One DARAB can take cognizance of Land Banks petition for
Hundred Fifty-Seven Million Five Hundred Forty-One Thousand certiorari may be elevated to the Office of the DAR Secretary, in
Nine Hundred Fifty-One Pesos & 30/100 (P157,541,951.30) as accordance with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
just compensation for the taking of a total of 948.1911 hectares remedies. Land Bank also questioned Lubricas personality to
of Suntays properties. Land Bank sought reconsideration of the file the petition for prohibition considering that she never
RARAD decision for not being supported by clear and intervened in the proceedings before the RARAD.
convincing evidence and for its conclusions which are contrary
to law. However, in an Order[6] dated March 14, 2001, the The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision[24] on
RARAD denied Land Banks motion. Land Bank received a copy August 22, 2002. The appellate court ruled that petitioner
of the order of denial on March 26, 2001. [7] DARAB had no personality to file a comment on Lubricas
petition for prohibition filed with the Court of Appeals because
On April 20, 2001, Land Bank filed a petition for just DARAB was a mere formal party and could file a comment only
compensation[8] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, when specifically and expressly directed to do so. The appellate
Occidental Mindoro against Suntay, DAR, and RARAD. The court also ruled that DARABs exercise of jurisdiction over the
petition, docketed as Agrarian Case No. R-1241, prayed that petition for certiorari had no constitutional or statutory basis. It
just compensation for the taking of Suntays landholdings be rejected DARABs contention that the issuance of the writ of
declared in the amount of Four Million Two Hundred Fifty One certiorari arose from its power of direct and functional
Thousand, One Hundred Forty-One Pesos (P4,251,141.00). supervision over the RARAD. In sum, the Court of Appeals
Suntay moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of declared that DARAB was without jurisdiction to take
capacity to sue, lack of cause of action, and res judicata. After cognizance of DSCA No. 0252 and issued a Writ of
Land Bank filed its comment on Suntays motion to dismiss, the Prohibition, perpetually enjoining DARAB from proceeding with
RTC, sitting as a special agrarian court, dismissed on August 6, DSCA No. 0252 and ordering its dismissal.
2001 Land Banks petition for failure to pay the docket fees
within the reglementary period.[9] The special agrarian court also Hence, the instant petition, in which DARAB assigns the
denied Land Banks Motion for Reconsideration for being pro- following errors to the Court of Appeals:
forma.[10] Thereafter, Land Bank appealed the order of dismissal
to the Court of Appeals by filing a Notice of Appeal with the The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it ruled:
special agrarian court. [11]
1. THAT THE PETITIONER (DARAB), BEING A FORMAL PARTY,
While the petition for just compensation was pending with the SHOULD NOT HAVE FILED COMMENT TO THE PETITION AND
special agrarian court, upon motion of Suntay, the RARAD INSTEAD, IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CO-RESPONDENT LAND
issued an Order[12] on May 22, 2001, declaring its January 24, BANK, THE FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY OF CARP;
2001 Decision as final and executory after noting that Land
2. THAT PETITIONER HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER DSCA
Banks petition for just compensation with the special agrarian
0252 WHICH IS A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI; AND
court was filed beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period in
violation of Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules of 3. THAT WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ISSUED BY
Procedure.[13] In its July 10, 2001 Order,[14] the RARAD denied DARAB IN DSCA 0252 WAS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING
LBPs motion for reconsideration of the order of finality. On July BEEN ISSUED IN VIOLATION OF THE TEMPORARY
18, 2001, the RARAD issued a Writ of Execution,[15] directing the RESTRAINING ORDER IT ISSUED.[25]
Regional Sheriff of DARAB-Region IV to implement its January
24, 2001 Decision. This Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the
DARAB does not have jurisdiction over Land Banks petition for
Thus, Land Bank filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the certiorari.
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary
Injunction[16] before the DARAB on September 12, 2001 against Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and determine a cause
Suntay and RARAD. The petition, docketed as DSCA No. 0252, or causes of action, must exist as a matter of law. [26] It is settled
prayed for the nullification of the following issuances of the that the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
RARAD: [1] the January 24, 2001 Decision directing Land Bank and mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction
to pay Suntay just compensation in the amount which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by
of P157,541,951.30; [2] the Order dated May 22, 2001 declaring law.[27] It is never derived by implication. Indeed, while the
the finality of the aforesaid Decision; [3] the July 10, power to issue the writ of certiorari is in some instance
2001 Order denying Land Banks motion for reconsideration; conferred on all courts by constitutional or statutory provisions,
and [4] the Writ of Execution dated July 18, 2001. On ordinarily, the particular courts which have such power are
September 12, 2001, the DARAB issued an Order[17] enjoining expressly designated.[28]
the RARAD from momentarily implementing its January 24,
2001 Decision and directing the parties to attend the hearing for Pursuant to Section 17 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 229 and
Section 13 of E.O. No. 129-A, the DARAB was created to act as
the quasi-judicial arm of the DAR. With the passage of R.A. No. officials/entities contemplated to be subject thereof are not
6657, the adjudicatory powers and functions of the DAR were within the administrative power/competence, or in any manner
further delineated when, under Section 50 thereof, it was vested under the control or supervision, of the issuing authority.
with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over This Court is not persuaded. The function of a writ
all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform of certiorari is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse
Department of Agriculture, Department of Environment and of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. [33] In the
Natural Resources and the Special Agrarian Courts. The same instant case, the RARAD issued the order of finality and the writ
provision granted the DAR the power to summon witnesses, of execution upon the belief that its decision had become final
administer oaths, take testimony, require submission of and executory, as authorized under Section 1, Rule XII of the
reports, compel the production of books and documents and DARAB Rules of Procedure. It is worth noting that in its
answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena and petition, DARAB maintains that in preventing the RARAD from
subpoena duces tecum, and enforce its writs through sheriffs or implementing its decision, it merely exercised its residual power
other duly deputized officers, and the broad power to adopt a of supervision, to insure that the RARAD acted within the
uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and bounds of delegated authority and/or prevent/avoid her from
inexpensive determination of cases before it. [29] Section 13 of committing grave and serious disservice to the Program.
[34]
E.O. No. 129-A also authorized the DAR to delegate its DARABs action, therefore, is a rectification of what it
adjudicatory powers and functions to its regional offices. perceived as an abuse of the RARADs jurisdiction. By its own
admission, DARAB took upon itself the power to correct errors
To this end, the DARAB adopted its Rules of Procedure, where it of jurisdiction which is ordinarily lodged with the regular courts
delegated to the RARADs and PARADs the authority to hear, by virtue of express constitutional grant or legislative
determine and adjudicate all agrarian cases and disputes, and enactments.
incidents in connection therewith, arising within their assigned
territorial jurisdiction.[30] In the absence of a specific statutory This Court recognizes the supervisory authority of the DARAB
grant of jurisdiction to issue the said extraordinary writ of over its delegates, namely, the RARADs and PARADs, but the
certiorari, the DARAB, as a quasi-judicial body with only limited same should be exercised within the context of administrative
jurisdiction, cannot exercise jurisdiction over Land Banks supervision and/or control. In the event that the RARADs or
petition for certiorari. Neither the quasi-judicial authority of the PARADs act beyond its adjudicatory functions, nothing prevents
DARAB nor its rule-making power justifies such self-conferment the aggrieved party from availing of the extraordinary remedy of
of authority. certiorari, which is ordinarily within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts.
In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers
which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the That the statutes allowed the DARAB to adopt its own rules of
enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which procedure does not permit it with unbridled discretion to grant
an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends itself jurisdiction ordinarily conferred only by the Constitution
largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or or by law. Procedure, as distinguished from jurisdiction, is the
empowering such agency.[31] The grant of original jurisdiction on means by which the power or authority of a court to hear and
a quasi-judicial agency is not implied. There is no question that decide a class of cases is put into action. Rules of procedure are
the legislative grant of adjudicatory powers upon the DAR, as in remedial in nature and not substantive. They cover only rules
all other quasi-judicial agencies, bodies and tribunals, is in the on pleadings and practice.[35]
nature of a limited and special jurisdiction, that is, the
While the Court of Appeals held that the DARAB should not
authority to hear and determine a class of cases within the
have participated in the proceedings before said court by filing a
DARs competence and field of expertise. In conferring
comment in CA-G.R. SP No. 66710, this Court considers
adjudicatory powers and functions on the DAR, the legislature
satisfactory the explanation of the DARAB that it has a peculiar
could not have intended to create a regular court of justice out
interest in the final outcome of this case. As DARAB pointed
of the DARAB, equipped with all the vast powers inherent in the
out, while it is only an adjunct of, it is at the same time not
exercise of its jurisdiction. The DARAB is only a quasi-judicial
totally independent from it. The DARAB is composed of the
body, whose limited jurisdiction does not include authority over
senior officials of the DAR, who are guided by the States main
petitions for certiorari, in the absence of an express grant in
policy in agrarian reform when resolving disputes before the
R.A. No. 6657, E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A.
DARAB. The DARABs interest in the case is not purely legal but
In addition, Rule XIII, 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure also a matter of governance; thus, it cannot be strictly
allows a party who does not agree with the RARADs preliminary considered as a nominal party which must refrain from taking
valuation in land compensation cases fifteen (15) days from an active part in the proceedings.
receipt of notice to bring the matter to the proper special
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. No costs.
agrarian court, thus:
SO ORDERED.
SECTION 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination
and Payment of Just Compensation. The decision of the [G.R. No. 78163. December 10, 1990.]
Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination
and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to
the Board but shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial
Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) ANGELINA P. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, v. The Honorable
days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and HI-CEMENT
entitled to only one motion for reconsideration. CORPORATION, Respondents.
"Sec. 27.Annual Work Obligations. — The claim-owner shall It is significant to note that the then Minister of Natural
submit proof of compliance with the annual work obligations Resources Ernesto Maceda reiterated the Ministry’s previous
by filing an affidavit therefor and the statement of ruling in his decision dated April 10, 1986, in MNR Case No.
expenditures and technical report in the prescribed form in 6300, entitled "RE PLACER LEASE APPLICATION NO. V-3895 OF
support thereof with the Mines Regional Officer concerned CONTINENTAL MARBLE CORPORATION." To
within one hundred twenty days from the end of the year in quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
which the work obligation is required: Provided, That failure of
the claim-owner to comply therewith for two (2) consecutive
years shall constitute automatic abandonment of the mining
claim: Provided, further, That, if it is found upon field "This office has been consistent on its ruling that it is the
verification that no such work was actually done on the continued failure to undertake the work obligation that causes
mining claim, the claim owner/lessee shall automatically lose a mining claim to lapse. The affidavit (of annual work
all his right thereto notwithstanding submission of the obligation) is merely a prima facie proof of performance of
aforesaid documents: Provided, finally, That the Director, in said work obligations, and the omission to submit said
cases of unstable peace and order conditions and/or affidavit raised only a disputable presumption that no work
involvement in mining conflicts may grant further had been done and shift upon the claim owner the burden of
extensions."cralaw virtua1aw library proof to show otherwise. The claim-owner is not precluded
from making proof of performance in some other way.
The argument is untenable.chanrobles.com : virtual law (Malayan Integrated Industries v. Apo Cement Corporation, Et.
library Al. MNR Case No. 5036, July 6, 1982, Republic Glass
Corporation, MNR Case 4336 and Sto. Rosario Fertilizer
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, there is no rule of automatic Corporation, MNR Case No. 4369). These decided cases fall
abandonment with respect to mining claims for failure to file squarely with the facts of the instant case." (Rollo, p. 195)
AAWO. Under the Consolidated Mines Administrative Order
(CMAO), implementing PD 463, as amended, the rule that has
been consistently applied is that it is the failure to perform the
required assessment work, not the failure to file the AAWO The aforesaid decision was penned after the then Minister
that gives rise to abandonment. Interpreted within the context Ernesto Maceda overturned the decision of the BMGS in the
of PD 1902, the last amending decree of PD 463, it is case of Hi-Cement v. Angelina Santiago. As can be seen
intended, among others, to accelerate the development of our therefore, it has always been an administrative policy that the
natural resources and to accelerate mineral productions, requirement to file AAWO is a matter of convenience rather
abandonment under the aforequoted Sec. 27 refers to the than substance as it is not related to the essence of the acts
failure to perform work obligations which in turn is one of the performed. These administrative policies enacted by
grounds for the cancellation of the lease contract (Sec. 43 (a), administrative bodies to interpret the law have the force and
Consolidated Mines Administrative Order, implementing PD effect of law and entitled to great respect (Tayug v. Central
463). Bank, G.R. 46158, Nov. 28, 1986; Warren Manufacturing
Workers Union v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 159 SCRA 387
[1988]). It is the general policy of this Court to sustain the
decision of administrative authorities not only on the basis of
The question of whether or not the failure to submit AAWO for the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their
more than two (2) consecutive years constitutes presumed knowledge ability and even expertise in the laws
abandonment as ground for cancellation of a mining lease they are entrusted to enforce (Cuerdo v. COA, 166 SCRA 657
contract has been the subject matter of many cases in the [1988]).chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
Ministry of Natural Resources (now Department of
Environment and Natural Resources). Public respondent had
made the following significant findings, to
quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Consequently, Hi-Cement has never abandoned its mining
claim. It may not have filed the AAWO but it has actually
performed the annual work obligations as found by the BMGS.
Administrative findings of facts are sufficient if supported by
"In a number of cases, the MNR answered the question in the substantial evidence on record and as a general rule, actions
negative. (Sec. 1, Malayan Integrated industries Corporation of administrative agencies need not be disturbed by the
v. Apo Cement Corporation; 2. "In the matter of the denial by judicial department (Manahan v. People, G.R. 37010, Nov. 7,
the Director of Mines Temporary Permit Application No. V- 1988; Gordon v. Veridiano, 167 SCRA 51[1938]; Mapa v.
2780 of the Republic Glass Corporation" and 3. "In Re: Denial Arroyo G.R. 78585, July 5, 1989; Neddle Queen Corporation v.
of Mines Temporary Permit Application No. V-2340, Bonanza Nicolas, Et. Al. G.R. 60741-45, Dec. 22, 1989). This court finds
Consolidated Mines, Inc., Appellant", docketed as MNR Case no reason to disturb such findings.
Nos. 5036, 4386, 4459, respectively). As there explained, it is
the continued failure to perform the annual work obligations, II Petitioner insists that her Quarry License No. 37 is a valid
NOT the failure to file AAWO, that gives rise to abandonment intervening right that prevails over the mining claims of Hi-
as ground for cancellation of a mining lease contract; that Cement as its claims were automatically abandoned without
compliance with AAWO requirements, not being related to the need for any proceeding or declaration for cancellation.
essence of the acts to be performed, is a matter of
convenience rather than substance; and that non-submission
of AAWO does not preclude the lessee from proving
performance of such working obligation in some other way." Given the fact that Hi-Cement Mining Lease Contract has
(Rollo, p. 106; Decision, O.P., p. 6) never been cancelled not its mining claim abandoned, this
Court rules that Santiago can not have any valid intervening
Moreover, before any mining lease contract is cancelled, right over the mining claims of the respondent for the
Consolidated Mines Administrative Order, Section 44 thereof, following reasons: First, the license of the respondent covers
requires notice and healing. Said BMGS OIC Director an area which is closed to mining location under Sec. 13, PD
Gonzales:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph 463, as amended.
"Sec. 13.Areas Closed to Mining Location. — No prospecting previously passed upon not only by the Director of Mines but
and exploration shall be allowed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw also by the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources
library based on the applicable law. Besides, as the public
respondent said, "the more important consideration is that
x x x the decision correctly disposes of the controversy" (Rollo, p.
110).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Third, both the BMGS and the public respondent found the
The Solicitor General for respondents.
petitioner guilty of misrepresentation. Said the public
respondent:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional
. . . Santiago misrepresented in her application for a quarry Regulation Commission so that it cannot pass upon the validity of the
license that the area applied for was a public land when, in administrative acts of the latter? Can this Commission lawfully prohibit
reality, it is covered by TCT No. T-62628 in the name of Hi- the examiness from attending review classes, receiving handout
Cement. In this regard, the provisions of PD 512 require the materials, tips, or the like three (3) days before the date of the
locator or prospector before entering a private land to give examination? Theses are the issues presented to the court by this
prior notification to the landowner who is thereby entitled to petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulagated on January 13, 1987, in CA-G.R. SP No.
compensation and royalty." (Rollo, p. 110).
10598, * declaring null and void the other dated Ocober 21, 1986
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32 in Civil Case
Such finding is binding on this Court. Findings of the
No. 86-37950 entitled " Lupo L. Lupangco, et al. vs. Professional
administrative agency on matters falling within its
Regulation Commission."
competence will not be disturbed by the courts, especially
with respect to factual findings, they are accorded respect if
not finality, because of the special knowledge and expertise The records shows the following undisputed facts:
gained by the tribunals from handling specific matters falling
under their jurisdiction (Mapa v. Arroyo, G.R. 78585, July 5, On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional
1989; Needle Queen Corp. v. Nicolas, Et Al., supra).chanrobles Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of
law library its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for
admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The
Section 43 of the Consolidated Mines Administrative Order has resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions:
provided a ground for cancellation of a Mining Lease Contract,
among others, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph No examinee shall attend any review class,
briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or
shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any
tip from any school, college or university, or any
"1.) Any falsehood in the statements in the application or review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer,
support thereof, which may alter, change or affect instructor official or employee of any of the
substantially the facts set in said statements."cralaw aforementioned or similars institutions during the
virtua1aw library three days immediately proceeding every
examination day including examination day.
Petitioner’s QL No. 37, therefore, cannot be a valid Any examinee violating this instruction shall be
intervening right over the mining claims of Hi-Cement. subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art.
III of the Rules and Regulations of the
Commission. 1
III Petitioner assails the decision rendered by OIC Benjamin A. On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to
Gonzales of the BGMS. She claims that under Special Order take the licensure examinations in accountancy schedule on October
No. 86 dated March 19, 1985 which 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch XXXII, a complaint for injuction with a prayer with the
"Except appointments and matters involving policy, the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC
Assistant director or the Officer-in-charge of his office shall to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution
sign on official papers; . . ." (p. 18, Rollo). and to declare the same unconstitution.
the jurisdiction to exercise quasi-judicial authority to resolve Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the
mining controversies lies solely with the Director of BGMS. ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin
Hence, she alleges that the decision of May 17, 1985 is null the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the
and void for want of authority (Rollo, pp. 228-230). lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined
the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to
The argument is untenable. Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional.
The cases cited by respondent court are not in point. It is glaringly Republic vs. Presiding Judge, CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. II, 11 is
apparent that the reason why this Court ruled that the Court of First another case in point. Here, "the Executive Office"' of the Department
Instance could not interfere with the orders of the Securities and of Education and Culture issued Memorandum Order No. 93 under the
Exchange Commission was that this was so provided for by the law. authority of then Secretary of Education Juan Manuel. As in this case,
In Pineda vs. Lantin, We explained that whenever a party is aggrieved a complaint for injunction was filed with the Court of First Instance of
by or disagree with an order or ruling of the Securities and Exchange Lanao del Norte because, allegedly, the enforcement of the circular
Commission, he cannot seek relief from courts of general jurisdiction would impair some contracts already entered into by public school
since under the Rules of Court and Commonwealth Act No. 83, as teachers. It was the contention of petitioner therein that "the Court of
amended by Republic Act No. 635, creating and setting forth the First Instance is not empowered to amend, reverse and modify what is
powers and functions of the old Securities and Exchange Commission, otherwise the clear and explicit provision of the memorandum circular
his remedy is to go the Supreme Court on a petition for review. issued by the Executive Office which has the force and effect of law."
Likewise, in Philippine Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. vs. Luna,it was stressed In resolving the issue, We held:
that if an order of the Securities and Exchange Commission is
erroneous, the appropriate remedy take is first, within the Commission
itself, then, to the Supreme Court as mandated in Presidential Decree ... We definitely state that respondent Court
No. 902-A, the law creating the new Securities and Exchange lawfully acquired jurisdiction in Civil Case No. II-
Commission. Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a Court of 240 (8) because the plaintiff therein asked the
First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other government agencies. lower court for relief, in the form of injunction, in
On the contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the Securities and defense of a legal right (freedom to enter into
Exchange Commission. contracts) . . . . .
The respondent court erred when it place the Securities and Exchange Hence there is a clear infringement of private
Commission and the Professional Regulation Commsision in the same respondent's constitutional right to enter into
category. As alraedy mentioned, with respect to the Securities and agreements not contrary to law, which might run
Exchange Commission, the laws cited explicitly provide with the the risk of being violated by the threatened
procedure that need be taken when one is aggrieved by its order or implementation of Executive Office Memorandum
ruling. Upon the other hand, there is no law providing for the next Circular No. 93, dated February 5, 1968, which
course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of prohibits, with certain exceptions, cashiers and
the Professional Regulation Commission. Unlike Commonwealth Act disbursing officers from honoring special powers
No. 83 and Presidential Decree No. 902-A, there is no provision in of attorney executed by the payee
Presidential Decree No. 223, creating the Professional Regulation employees. The respondent Court is not only right
Commission, that orders or resolutions of the Commission are but duty bound to take cognizance of cases of this
appealable either to the Court of Appeals or to theSupreme Court. nature wherein a constitutional and statutory right
Consequently, Civil Case No. 86-37950, which was filed in order to is allegedly infringed by the administrative action
enjoin the enforcement of a resolution of the respondent Professional of a government office. Courts of first Instance
Regulation Commission alleged to be unconstitutional, should fall have original jurisdiction over all civil actions in
within the general jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, now the which the subject of the litigation is not capable of
Regional Trial Court. 7 pecuniary estimation (Sec. 44, Republic Act 296,
as amended). 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional
Regulation Commission is attached to the Office of the President for In San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, 13 We ruled that a judge of the
general direction and coordination. 8 Well settled in our jurisprudence is Court of First Instance has the authority to decide on the validity of a
the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed city tax ordinance even after its validity had been contested before the
by the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court). Secretary of Justice and an opinion thereon had been rendered.
In Medalla vs. Sayo, 9 this rule was thoroughly propounded on, to wit:
In view of the foregoing, We find no cogent reason why Resolution No.
In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to 105, issued by the respondent Professional Regulation Commission,
review by certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of should be exempted from the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
the Civil Service Commission and of the Court.
residential Executive Asssistant is concerned,
there should be no question but that the power of
judicial review should be upheld. The following
rulings buttress this conclusion:
Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that under Section 9, be deemed as a "final order reviewable by
paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, it is the Court of Appeals which has certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial
jurisdiction over the case. The said law provides: in character, no contempt order may be imposed
by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct
and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Intermediate
lie from such order. Any question arising from said
Appellate Court shall exercise:
order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action
before the trial courts. (Emphasis supplied.) 17
xxx xxx xxx
One other case that should be mentioned in this regard is Salud vs.
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final Central Bank of the Philippines. 18 Here, petitioner Central Bank, like
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or respondent in this case, argued that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi- B.P. Blg. 129, orders of the Monetary Board are appealable only to the
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or Intermediate Appellate Court. Thus:
commissions, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
The Central Bank and its Liquidator also postulate,
accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of
for the very first time, that the Monetary Board is
this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
among the "quasi-judicial ... boards" whose
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
judgments are within the exclusive appellate
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
jurisdiction of the IAC; hence, it is only said Court,
1948.
"to the exclusion of the Regional Trial Courts," that
may review the Monetary Board's resolutions. 19
The contention is devoid of merit.
Anent the posture of the Central Bank, We made the following
In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of pronouncement:
Appeals as provided for in Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129,
there has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from proceedings
The contention is utterly devoid of merit. The IAC
wherein the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-
has no appellate jurisdiction over resolution or
judicial functions. In Black's Law Dictionary, quasi-judicial is defined as
orders of the Monetary Board. No law prescribes
a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative
any mode of appeal from the Monetary Board to
officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
the IAC. 20
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as
a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature. To expound thereon, quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a In view of the foregoing, We hold that the Regional Trial Court has
determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a decision or jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 86-37950 and enjoin the
order which applies to a specific situation . 14This does not cover rules respondent PRC from enforcing its resolution.
and regulations of general applicability issued by the administrative
body to implement its purely administrative policies and functions like
Although We have finally settled the issue of jurisdiction, We find it
Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a
imperative to decide once and for all the validity of Resolution No. 105
measure to preserve the integrity of licensure examinations.
so as to provide the much awaited relief to those who are and will be
affected by it.
The above rule was adhered to in Filipinas Engineering and Machine
Shop vs. Ferrer. 15 In this case, the issue presented was whether or not
Of course, We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a
the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over a case involving an
commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of
order of the Commission on Elections awarding a contract to a private
the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak
party which originated from an invitation to bid. The said issue came
to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily
about because under the laws then in force, final awards, judgments,
seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend
decisions or orders of the Commission on Elections fall within the
any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-
exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by way of certiorari. Hence,
out, review material, or any tip from any school, collge or university, or
it has been consistently held that "it is the Supreme Court, not the
any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor,
Court of First Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on
official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar
certiorari final decisions, orders, or rulings of the Commission on
institutions . ... 21
Elections relative to the conduct of elections and the enforcement of
election laws." 16
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught
committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be
As to whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in
barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent
saidcase, We said:
PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can
manage to have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during
We are however, far from convinced that an order the three days before the examination period.
of the COMELEC awarding a contract to a private
party, as a result of its choice among various
It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities
proposals submitted in response to its invitation to
should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and
bid comes within the purview of a "final order"
regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be
which is exclusively and directly appealable to this
reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no
court on certiorari. What is contemplated by the
reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be
term "final orders, rulings and decisions, of the
issued, then they must be held to be invalid. 22
COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the
Supreme Court as provided by law are those
rendered in actions or proceedings before the Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also
COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the
body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi- Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the
judicial powers. (Emphasis supplied.) reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure
examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful
steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become
xxx xxx xxx
public accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties
in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to
We agree with petitioner's contention that the enjoy their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their
order of the Commission granting the award to a personal growth. As defined in a decision of the United States
bidder is not an order rendered in a legal Supreme Court:
controversy before it wherein the parties filed their
respective pleadings and presented evidence after
The term "liberty" means more than mere freedom
which the questioned order was issued; and that
from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It
this order of the commission was issued pursuant
means freedom to go where one may choose and
to its authority to enter into contracts in relation to
to act in such a manner not inconsistent with the
election purposes. In short, the COMELEC
equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate
resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme
for the promotion of his happiness, to pursue such
was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial
callings and vocations as may be most suitable to
functions but merely as an incident of its inherent
develop his capacities, and giv to them their
administrative functions over the conduct of
highest enjoyment. 23
elections, and hence, the said resolution may not
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the 2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR
academic freedom of the schools concerned. Respondent PRC cannot complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on
interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the
believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days
required before becoming a full fledged public accountant. Unless the "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced
means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation
impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in
not be stopped from helping out their students. At this juncture, We call accordance with P.D. 807. 5
attention to Our pronouncement in Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 24 regarding academic freedom
3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-
to wit:
082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran,
Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others, named
... It would follow then that the school or college respondents, 6 the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal
itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the administrative
itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their
them. It is free from outside coercion or application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining
interference save possibly when the overriding order." But when their motion for suspension was denied by Order
public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later
wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to also denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing
the choice of students. This constitutional of November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a
provision is not to be construed in a niggardly walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The
manner or in a grudging fashion. case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cariño dated
December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well
as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the
G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991
respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber
and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del
HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department Castillo. 8
of Education, Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her
capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila, petitioners,
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cariño),
vs. which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the
MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to
nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as
JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the
GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in
ESBER, respondents. this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named
individuals, and "other teacher-members so numerous similarly
The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too
at bar, instituted by the Solicitor General, may be formulated as numerous to be impleaded."
follows: where the relief sought from the Commission on Human Rights
by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or modification 5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted
of a decision or order issued by a court of justice or government sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on
agency or official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in
Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as
otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons
jurisdiction of a court or other government agency or official for completely unknown to them. 10
purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the Commission on Human
Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same
purposes of hearing and adjudication?
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the 7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cariño
eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon sought and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His
Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the non- motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as
political demands of the MPSTA. 4
grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty
the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case." 14 of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This
in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.:
function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it (8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose
does not feel bound by this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is
and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its intention "to hear and necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the conducted by it or under its authority;
merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear and
determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues:
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
agency in the performance of its functions;
1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due
process, and just cause exists for the imposition of administrative
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law;
disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and
and
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as
power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not
court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical
take over the functions of the latter. sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore,
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official
and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of
even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain
evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling,
deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions.
by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service Commission
and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it
concludes that Secretary Cariño was in error, is to refer the matter to
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow
the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that
up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to
would be the Civil Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto
search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find
itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal
inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being
in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29,
ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission
an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof are
concerning a certain matter or matters." 29 prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC
Case No. 90-775) on the merits."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge,
arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The SO ORDERED.
dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of
the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass
G.R. No. 188056 January 8, 2013
judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "adjudge"
means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-
judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R.
. . . ." 31 DACUDAO, Petitioners,
vs.
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE
judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondent.
strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to
decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a DECISION
judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32
BERSAMIN, J.:
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the
power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the
merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Petitioners - residents of Bacaca Road, Davao City - were among
Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his
so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary associates in the Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Group)
proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group's "buy back
by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been agreement" that earned them check payments that were
transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to dishonored. After their written demands for the return of their
"resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of charges
concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the
prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City on February 6, 2009.
carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the Three of the cases were docketed as NPS Docket No. XI-02-INV.-
teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes 09-A-00356, Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-C-00752, and Docket
despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute No. XI-02-INV.-09-C-00753.1
infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative
disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of
On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department
by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each
of Justice (DOJ) Order No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all
individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed
for said acts or omissions. Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City
Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos
Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original Manila for appropriate action.
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the
disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and
also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission. DO No. 182 reads:2
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already All cases against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr., et al. under Legacy
taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33 and it appears Group of Companies, may be filed with the docket section of the
that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to National Prosecution Service, Department of Justice, Padre
the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had Faura, Manila and shall be forwarded to the Secretariat of the
occasion to pass upon said issues. 34 Special Panel for assignment and distribution to panel
members, per Department Order No. 84 dated February 13,
2009.
In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights Petitioners also challenge as unconstitutional the issuance of
would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 exempting from the
conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary Cariño, it would
coverage of DO No. No. 182 all the cases for syndicated estafa x x x. This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of
already filed and pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
Cagayan de Oro City. They aver that DOJ Memorandum dated habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by
March 2, 2009 violated their right to equal protection under the this Court with Regional Trial Courts x x x, which may issue the
Constitution. writ, enforceable in any part of their respective regions. It is also
shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the
Court of Appeals x x x, although prior to the effectivity of Batas
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing
Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's
respondent Secretary of Justice, maintains the validity of DO
competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted to
No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, and
those "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." This concurrence of
prays that the petition be dismissed for its utter lack of merit.
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
Issues choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as
The following issues are now to be resolved, to wit:
a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for
the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial
1. Did petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari, hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
prohibition and mandamus directly to the Court? issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior")
courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those
against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation
2. Did respondent Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of
of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs
discretion in issuing DO No. 182?
should be allowed only when there are special and important
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
3. Did DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to
violate petitioners’ constitutionally guaranteed rights? prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of
Ruling
the Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra—
The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, being resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its
bereft of substance and merit, is dismissed. appellate jurisdiction" — was evidently intended precisely to
relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with
Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of applications for the extraordinary writs which, but for the
courts by coming directly to the Court with their petition for expansion of the Appellate Court corresponding jurisdiction,
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without tendering therein would have had to be filed with it.1âwphi1
any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct
filing of the petition. xxxx
We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration for
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts the information and evidence of all concerned, that it will not
to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo only continue to enforce the policy, but will require a more strict
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners observance thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. 4 An undue
disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will
Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not
cause the dismissal of the recourse. In Bañez, Jr. v.
the only judicial forum from which to seek and obtain effective
Concepcion,5 we explained why, to wit:
redress of their grievances. As a rule, the Court is a court of last
resort, not a court of the first instance. Hence, every litigant
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the who brings the petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy
ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the on the hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is explicitly
policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with defined and enjoined in Section 4 of Rule 65, Rules of Court,
causes that are also well within the competence of the lower viz:
courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more
fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has
Section 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall be
assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the
filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new
only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important
trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy. This was why
sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial
the Court stressed in Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto:
of the said motion.