1.

Director of Lands vs CA

Facts: The private respondent Teodoro Abistado petitioned to have his 648 square meters of
land be given an original registration of his title. This was under the PD No. 1529. While the
petition was still pending, the petitioner however died and so his heirs were all represented
by their aunt, Josefa Abistado. The land registration court dismissed the petition for want of
jurisdiction. The trial court explained that the applicants was not able to follow the stated
provision of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529. It provides that applicants must publish the notice of
initial hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The applicant,
however, only published in the Official Gazette. As such, for failure to comply with the
mandatory provision, it has was not able to acquire its jurisdiction for the matter.One
purpose of the requirement is to maintain a proper due process. Not satisfied, they appealed
to the Court of Appeals who finally decided in their favor, thereby allowing the registration of
the lind in the name of Teodoro Abistado. This is because failure to comply the requirement
was only a mere procedural defect. Thus, still dispensable. Because motion of
reconsideration for the decision made by the Court of Appeals was denied, the Director of
Lands then elevated the case to the Supreme Court. The petitioner alleged that Court of
Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in failing to apply the required publication.
Private, on the other hand, respondents contend that f

Issue: Whether or Not the Director of Land is correct that the publication of Notice of Initial
hearing in a Land Registration Case is mandatory.

Held: Yes. Under the rule of statutory construction, where the law speaks in clear and
categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation, or equivocation, there
is room only for application. In case above, section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 expresses a
mandatory and indispensable provision that must be followed by the applicant. Such
publication requires to be made both in the Official Gazette and newspaper of general
circulation. Since the Land Registration Case is an in Rem proceeding, it needs that all
persons who are concerned be informed on why such applicant should be the one to be
given the title. Moreover, such provision uses the term "shall" which shows its mandatory
nature.Hence, the Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed and set aside the
decision of the Court of Appeals. It also dismissed the application of the private respondent.

PEOPLE VS MAPA

Facts:
        Mario Mapa was accused was accused of possessing a pistol cal. 22 revolver on August
13, 1962 in the City of Manila. The firearm was without any license for its use. He admitted
the accusations but was confident that he has the right for its possession thereby exhibiting
a document showing that he is was appointed as a secret agent of the Governor of
Batangas. He defended that such title would grant him the exemption from the requirement
of securing a licensed firearm. The evidences were admitted by the Court for review. On
November 27, 1963, the trial court then decided on convicting the accused of the crime of
illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty. As such, this
prompted Mapa to appeal to the Supreme Court. He relied on People v. Macarandang case
where the secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the basis that the secret agent was to
assist in the maintenance of peace and order, thereby categorized him under the “peace
offer”.

Issue: Whether or not the holding of secret agent of a provincial governor would exempt him
from the crime of illegal possession of firearm.

nHeld: No. Under the rule in statutory construction, the first and fundamental duty of the
Courts is to apply the law. In the case of Mapa, the provision was explicit in enumerating
instance from which the requirement of a licensed firearm can be dispensed. The law
stipulates that, “it shall be unlawful for any person to possess any firearm, detached parts of
firearms or ammunition.” Also, it further provides that, “firearms and ammunition regularly
and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines, the Philippine Constabulary,
guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors,
lieutenant governors, provincial treasurer, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and
guards of provincial prisoners and jails,” are not covered “when such firearms are in
possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official
duties.” There was no provision being made to apply for secret agents. Therefore, as plain
and simple as it is, he cannot be granted for such exemption. There is no room for
interpretation in this case. Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment appealed.

Patricio Amigo vs People

Facts:

On December 29, 1989 in Davao City around 1:00 P.M, Benito Ng Suy was driving back
home, together with his daughters, Jocelyn Ng Suy and another younger daughter together
with his two year old son, while a five year old boy was also seated at the back. As they
reached the National Highway of Bajada, a car driven by Virgilio Abogada made a left turn
which cause an accidental collision between the parties. Immediately after the incident,
Benito came out of the driver sear and approached Virgilio. A confrontation occurred which
caused Patricio, who was a passenger of Virgilio, to also came out of the car and went to
Benito. He told him to just let the matter pass as it was only a minor incident. Benito was
irritated and fused out that Patricio should not interfere with them. Likewise, Patricio was
irked by Benito’s remark which made him to address him by first asking about his nationality
and left but came back immediately with a five inch knife and simultaneously stabbed him.
This has caused him to a critical condition. Because of the information made, Patricio was
initially charged with frustrated murder. While ay the hospital, the operations made were not
able to help him recover his critical condition due to a multiple stabbed wounds. After three
weeks of confinement, Benito died because of sepsis which is an overwhelming infection. As
such, due to the death of Benito, the accused was now charged with the crime of murder. As
a punishment, he was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. This made the
accused to sought to reversal of the said decision alleging that the trial court erred in
imposing the penalty despite the fact that Sec. 19 Art. III of the 1987 Constitution was
already in effect. This Constitution abolished the death penalty and stipulated that the crime
of murder should be reclusion temporal, which is a penalty lower than what was imposed.
Issue: Whether or Not the penalty imposed upon the accused "Reclusion Perpetua" be
modified or reduced by virtue of Section 19 (1) of Article III of the Constitution.

Held: No. Under the statutory construction, the duty of the Courts is to apply the law
disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for the accused. In the case at bar, it does not
matter whether the penalty is too harsh because as the golden rule states, the law may be
harsh but it is the law. The will of the Constitution and subsequently the duty of the court is
to just apply them. As a matter of fact, the allegation of the accused has no bearing since
the contended provision of Article III, Section 19 (1) does not change the penalty periods
prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. It merely explains the prohibition of
imposing the death penalty, and thus the range of penalties are still the same. As judges, it
is their responsibility not to modify nor revise what the legislature has provided. As a
mandate in separation of powers, the court should not encroach on the powers of the
lawmaking body. Thus, it is their duty to only interpret and apply them as what is stated.
Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court.

Socor Ramirez vs CA and Ester Garcia

FACTS:

The petitioner Socorro Ramirez recorded a secret conversation with the private respondent
Ester Garcia. In the said conversation, a confrontation was made where the petitioner
alleges that the private respondent insulted and humiliated her in a manner offensive to her
dignity and personality. The private respondent, on the other hand, filed a criminal case
against the petitioner for violating the Republic Act 4200 which penalizes wire tapping and
other related violation of private communication. Upon arraignment, the petitioner filed a
motion to quash the information on the ground that what she did was not a violation
specifically provided by RA 4200. The trial court then granted the motion because of the
technicalities of the case which is not in conformity with the RA. The private respondent was
not convinced with the trial court’s decision and thus filed a petition for review on certiorari
with the Supreme Court. The said court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals and
consequently declared the decision of the trial court null and void for the reason that the
accusations constitute an offense which is punishable under the RA. The petitioner then filed
motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hence, Ramirez elevated the case to the
Supreme Court contending that the provision applies only to an accused who was other than
those involved in the communication.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of
a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation.

HELD:
NO. Under the rule of Statutory Construction, the legislative intent is determined principally
from the language of the statute. The said provision in issue is clear and free from
ambiguity. It has expressly made unlawful for any person, not authorize, to record any
communication in secret. This makes no reference as to whether the accused is a party in
the conversation or not. It is the intent of the statute to penalize such action. In the case at
bar, therefore, even if she was a party to the conversation, she still violated the statute. The
Court of Appeals then correctly concluded that, “even a privy to a communication who
records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter qualify as
a violator.” Hence, the Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals.

Manuel de guia vs Comelec

FACTS:

On November 26, 1991, the Congress passed RA 7166 which authorized COMELEC to adopt
rules and guidelines in the apportionment during elections. The petitioner Manuel De Guia,
an incumbent member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Paranaque, prays for
the reversal of the ruling since it affects their municipality and others as well. He claims,
among others, that the second paragraph, Section 3 of the RA 7166 was unclear as to when
the members will be start to be elected by district. As such, he chose to follow the next
paragraph of the same provision which indicated that the members will continue to be
elected at large in the May 11, 1992 elections. Such particular paragraph expressly stated
that the members will be elected by district beginning 1995. Hence, petitioner put his
confidence that the members fall currently in this ruling, thereby still recognizing that they
shall continue to be elected at large. The Court considered the suit filed despite lacking the
locus standi of the petitioner because the issue at hand involves an important case involving
the political exercise of qualified voters who are affected by the apportionment. On February
20, 1992, the petitioner filed with COMELEC a Motion for Clarification. On March 10, 1992,
the COMELEC resolved the issue and explained that the members should already start to be
elected by district in the May 11, 1992 election. He was not, however, convinced and so filed
a petition to the Supreme Court imputing that the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of
discretion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s interpretation of Sec.3 of R.A. 7166 is correct in assailing the
aforementioned COMELEC Resolutions.

HELD:
 
NO. A statutory construction that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that
does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted should be reject. In this
case, the interpretation of the petition is erroneous. It is the purpose of the statute is to
reduce the number of positions to be voted or in the May 11, 1992 elections and ensure the
efficiency of the electoral process. If the interpretation of the petitioner is to be followed,
then the spirit of the statute would not be accomplished and consequently result to an
absurdity in the implementation of the statute. Although it is true that the statute was
unclear and contradictory, but a construction which gives the purpose of the law should be
taken and not otherwise. This is so because of a presumption that no law is enacted to be
meaningless. Since the statute was vaguely expressed, the statute should be construed in
the light of its purpose. Hence, the Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the respondent and thereby dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
JMM Promotions & Management Inc. vs NLRC

Facts: The petitioner JMM Promotions & Management Inc. appealed to the respondent
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) the decision of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA). This appeal was however dismissed on the ground of
failure to post the appeal bond required by Art. 223 of the Labor Code as amended and Rule
VI, Sec. 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended. The petitioner contends
that the respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion as it insisted that they no longer
need to post the appeal bond. This is so because as licensed recruiters for overseas
employment, they were already required by another provision to pay a license fee, post a
cash bond and surety bond. These bonds were already made to answer all claims for any
violations. The Solicitor General sustained the appeal bond and commented that appeals
from decisions of the POEA were governed by Section 5 and 6, Rule V, Book VII of the POEA
Rules and not the rules cited by the NLRC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is still required to post an appeal bond to perfect its appeal
from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC?

HELD:
YES. Under the rule of Statutory Construction, in interpreting a statute, care should be taken
that every part be given effect. Following this, the petitioner is not only required to comply
with rules cited by the NLRC but more particularly those of the POEA since they are
appealing to the decision made by them. It is clear that the POEA rules mentioned about the
required appeal fee and other bonds in order for the perfection of appeal or prosper. Absent
this, it will have the effect of stopping the running of the period. It is therefore erroneous for
the petitioner to interpret that by merely complying with the bonds and escrow money, it
will now disregard the POEA Rule. Statutes should then be read as a whole. If this will not be
observed, Sec. 6 of the POEA Rule will be useless because of nullifying its effect. It is to be
noted that this should not be the case as there was no even such redundancy that took
place. As a matter of fact, they complement each other. Hence, in addition to the
requirements as an overseas recruiter under Sec. 4 and the escrow agreement under Sec.
17, it is also necessary for the petitioner to comply Sec. 6 of the same Rules. The Supreme
Court then dismissed the petition.

Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation vs National Labor Relations

Facts: The private respondent Imelda Salazar was the general systems analyst of Globe-
Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. (GMRC). Delfin Saldivar, a close friend of hers, was the
technical operations support manager. In 1984, the GMRC was receiving reports that
equipments and spare parts were missing. This objects were under the custody of Saldivar.
As such, an investigation was already being made. One of the findings indicated that
Saldivar entered into a partnership with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Eledon
Engineering Services (Elecon). Additionally, company regulations were also violated by
Salazar by being part of the partnership entered by the Saldivar and Yambao. As a witness
to their articles of partnership, she was fully aware of the situation but did not take action on
reporting it to GMRC. Because of this, the company placed Salazar under 1 month
preventive suspension, allowing her 30 days within which to explain her side. Instead of
explaining, she filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, which was later
modified to illegal dismissal. The Labor arbiter ruled in favor of Salazar and ordered the
company to reinstate her to her former position plus full backwages, benefits, and moral
damages. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the decision except
that it deleted the award for moral damages.

Issue: Whether or Not the action of dismissal would constitute a violation of Art. 279 of the
Labor Code, which protects the security of tenure of an employee.

Held: YES. Under the principle to be applied in statutory construction, if a statute is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity. It must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. This still holds true even if the court be convinced that some other
meaning wa really intended by the law-making assembly. In the case above, there was also
lack of evidence to show that Salazar was directly involved and had full knowledge of the
malicious activities of Saldivar. Being a witness to the articles of partnership is not a
conclusive evidence that she is involved. Also, The GMRC only relied to the audit findings. As
stated by the Labor Code, "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement and full back wages." Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the
resolution of NLRC and ordered the GMCR to reinstate Salazar and to pay her backwages.

Felicito Basbacio vs. Office of the Secretary

FACTS: The petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law Wilfredo Balderrama were
convicted of frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder. The motive was a
land dispute between the Boyons and petitioner. As punishment for the crime committed,
they were sentenced to imprisonment. Both of them appealed but only the petitioner’s
appeal was proceeded to judgment. The appeal of his son-in-law was dismissed because of
his failure to file his brief. The Court of Appeals acquitted the petitioner on the ground that
the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. According to the
appellate court, the petitioner did nothing more in the scene of the crime and such inaction
was insufficient to show conspiracy. It was Balderamma who started the shooting. Because
he believed that he was wrongfully accused, he filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, Sec.
3(a), which provides for the payment of compensation to “any person who was unjustly
accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of
acquittal.” This was, however, denied since the provision does not apply to his case because
he was not at all innocent but only acquitted because of insufficiency to find him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the fact that there was a dispute between the parties
and the convicted murderer was his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he was
“probably guilty.” Petitioner then elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled of the claim under R.A. No. 7309.

HELD: NO. Under the rule of Statutory Construction, verbal legis non est recedendum. This
means, from the words of a statute, there should be no departure. The contention of the
petitioner has no merit. The statute does not apply to all cases where the accused was
acquitted, but those where there is an unjust accusation and conviction. Meaning, from the
start of the case, he was brought to the court in an unjust manner of conviction. It has
nothing to do with the innocence of the accused but with the manner of his conviction. It is
considered unjust when, for example, the judgment was contrary to law or is not supported
by the evidence, and was made with deliberate intent to do an injustice. Thus, the statute
was made to compensate the person who was being subjected to an unjust manner of
conviction. In the case under consideration, however, such was not the case. There was no
evidence to show that his conviction was wrongful or a product of malice or gross ignorance
or gross negligence. Hence, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition.

Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas vs. Court of Appeals

Facts: The spouses Enciso owned a property issued by virtue of Free Patent Application No.
192765 which was given by the state as a reward for his labor in clearing and cultivating the
land. The patentees sold the property to their daughter Elena Salenillas and her husband
Bernardino Salenillas for P900. They used the property as a mortgage in favor of the
Philippine National Bank as security for their P2,500 loan. The petitioners failed to pay their
loan, and as a result of which, an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding was instituted and on
February 27, 1981, the property was sold at a public auction. The highest bidder in the said
auction was William Guerra, and consequently, a certificate of sale was issued to him. On
August 17, 1983 the Philippine National Bank filed a motion for a writ of possession but the
petitioners refused to vacate and instead offered to repurchase the property by virtue of
Section 119 of the Public Land Act. Despite the offer, the trial court issued the writ of
possession in favor of the private respondent. The spouses Salenillas then appealed to the
Court of Appeals but was later dismissed for lack of merit. According to the Court of Appeals,
the transfer from the parent to the child for a nominal sum was not the conveyance
contemplated by law.

Issue: Whether or Not the petitioners have the right to repurchase the contested property
under Section 119 of the Public Land Act.

Held: YES. As a rule in the statutory construction, between two statutory interpretations,
that which better serves the purpose of the law shall prevail. In this case, the provision
under Sec. 119 of Public Land Act provides that ”Every conveyance of land acquired under
the free patent of homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the
applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of 5 years from the date of re
conveyance." As such, the petitioners are given the right to repurchase the property. Such
interpretation is one that better serves the purpose of the law because the intention of the
stated provision is to preserve the land that the State gratuitously gave to the patentee.
Moreover, the contention that the prescription period of five years already expired is wrong.
The starting point of five-year period is the day the property was sold at a public auction
which was held on February 27, 1981. The offer to repurchase was made on August 31,
1984, in which case, still within the prescribed five-year period. Based on the foregoing
statutory applications, the more the law favors the petitioners in repurchasing the contested
property. Hence, the Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed the decisions of the
Court of Appeals and Regional Trial Court.
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINE, INC., vs. HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ

Facts: Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of toilet

preparations and household remedies. In order to accomplish its purpose, it frequently imports from
abroad its raw materials for use as stabilizers and flavoring such as sodium benzoate and dicalcium
phosphate. As required by the Exchange Tax Law, every importation is subject to a 17% special excise
tax on the foreign exchange used. On March 14, 1956, the petitioner filed a claim for refund of the
excise tax paid amounting to P113,343.99 on the basis of Section 2 of Republic Act 601. It provides that
foreign exchange used for the payment of cost, transportation and incidental charges to the importation
of stabilizers and flavors shall be refunded to any importer upon satisfactory proof of actual
importations. Of the total amount claimed for refund, the officer-in-charge of the Exchange Tax
Administration of Central Bank approved the amount of P23,958.13. Despite this approval, the auditor
of the Central Bank refused to pass on the reason that stabilizers and flavoring are not exempt under
Sec. 2 of the Exchange Tax Law. The petitioner then appealed to the Auditor General who had the same
judgment as the auditor of the Central Bank. Hence, he elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the stabilizers and flavors are exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by
the Exchange Tax Law, so as to entitle it to a refund.

Held: Yes. The Auditor General wrongly applied the rule on Statutory Construction of “general terms
may be restricted by specific words” It is to be emphasized that such principle is applicable only to cases
wherein, except for one general term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one
specific class. In the case under consideration, however, this was not the case. Not all the items
enumerated in the provision belong to one specific class, and therefore a conclusion that it only pertains
to food or food products is erroneous. Notable, other classes are also listed like fertilizers, which does
hardly qualify as food products. As such, when the law not distinguish, neither should the court
authorized to do so. The words should therefore be construed in their general sense and not be limited
by terms included therein. Hence, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower courts and
ordered the respondents to audit petitioners applications for refund.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES

FACTS: On October 25, 1977 the fiscal filed with the lower court a case of squatting as penalized by
Presidential Decree No. 772. The separate informations were against sixteen persons. One of them was
Mario Aparici whereby he was accused of the crime mentioned because of the act of entering,
occupying, and cultivating a portion of a grazing land claimed by Atty. Vicente De la Serna, Jr. The other
five informations were assigned to Judge Vicente B. Echaves. He dismissed all the five on the ground
that it does not meet the provision mentioned in the PD No. 772. This decree took effect on August 20,
1975 which provides that “Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking
advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the
property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be
punished…”. In the informations filed by the fiscal, it was alleged that the accused entered through
“stealth and strategy” which is not the same as “force, intimation or threat, or taking advantage of the
absence or tolerance of the landowner” mentioned in the decree. Because of the dismissal, the fiscal
amended the informations by using the wordings of the provision itself but the action for
reconsideration was denied. The lower court further explains that the phrase “and for other purposes”
does not include those of agricultural lands because there was no mention of the Secretary of
Agriculture in the preamble and even makes reference to the affluent class. By reason of this, the fiscal
appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decree also includes agricultural lands.

HELD: NO. Under the rule of ejusdem generis, the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing
land which is an agricultural land. The preamble clearly shows that the decree was intended for urban
communities, and not rural areas which was the case at bar. Additionally, it mentions squatting made by
well-to-do individuals. The informations filed did not meet the circumstances provided by the decree,
and such clear and express provision does not need any construction since the intent of the decree is
unmistakable. Hence, the rule of ejusdem generis does not apply to this case. The Supreme Court,
therefore, held that the lower court correctly ruled the case.

MANOLO FULE VS THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Manolo Fule was an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation. On January 21, 1981, he issued
a check no. 26741 in the amount of P2,541.05. This check was for the purpose of paying the complaining
witness Roy Nadera. However, the said check was dishonored on January 24, 1981 because of closed
checking account. As such, Manolo Fule has been accused for violating the Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. On
August 8, 1985 the pre-trial was held. During the hearing on August 23, 1985, only the prosecution
presented its evidence. On the next hearing, the petitioner waived his right to present evidence and
instead submitted a Memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. The trial court convicted the
accused for violating BP Blg. 22. He then appealed to the Court of Appeals which in turn upheld the
Stipulation of Facts and affirmed the lower court’s decision. Hence, he elevated the case to the Supreme
Court. He contended that the Court of Appeals erred because the basis of such conviction was only
based on the stipulation of facts without his signature nor of his counsel. His argument was based on the
1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure effective January 1, 1985. Such provision provides that no agreement
entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used unless it be signed by the accused and his counsel.

ISSUE: Whether or not the signature of the accused and his counsel in the pre-trial agreement
mandatory in order to be used as evidence.

HELD: YES. As a rule in statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as
mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. In the case at bar, the particular rule on
criminal procedure used the words “No” and “shall”. In this case, it shall be applied strictly because
these terms essentially highlights its mandatory nature. Being so, non-compliance with the provision will
render it inadmissible. This being so, the omission of the signature of Manolo Fule and his counsel
cannot be used by the Court as evidence. The mere confirmation of the lawyer of the accused during the
subsequent hearing does not cleanse the error. What the prosecution should do is submit other
substantial evidence instead of relying solely in the Stipulation of Facts. Hence, the Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, ordered the case to be re-opened, and remanded it back
to the trial court for further reception of evidence.

BERSABAL VS. HON. JUDGE SERAFIN SALVADOR

FACTS: The private respondents Tan That and Ong Pin Tee filed an ejectment suit against the petitioner
Purita Bersabal. The decision of the City Court of Caloocan City was appealed to the Court of First
Instance of Caloocan City. While the appeal was still pending, the court issued an order stating that the
parties are given 15 days from receipt to transmit the transcripts of stenographic notes and 30 days
within which to file their memoranda. This order was received by the petitioner on April 17, 1971. No
transcript was transmitted yet so on May 5, 1971 the petitioner filed a motion ex-parte. This was
granted but before the petitioner could receive any the notice, another order was issued by the court on
August 4, 1971 stating that the appeal is dismissed for failure to prosecute her appeal. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but was denied. She then petitioned to the Supreme Court. The petitioner
seeks to annul the orders of the respondent Judge Salvador of the Court of First Instance of Caloocan
City and compel him to decide the petitioner’s perfected appeal on the basis of the evidence and
records submitted, plus the memorandum subsequently submitted. The petitioner’s request is backed
by the second paragraph of Section 45 of R.A. No. 296 which provides that, “Courts of First
Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the
city or municipal courts: Provided, That the parties may submit memoranda and/or brief with oral
argument if so requested.”

Issue: Whether or not the mere failure to submit the memorandum on time would empower the trial
court to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute.

HELD: NO. As a rule followed by Statutory Construction, the word “may” is permissive which constitutes
a discretion while the word “shall” is imperative which imposes a duty.  The provision stated by RA No.
296 used the term “may” in the second sentence which necessarily implies that the submission of
memorandum only connotes an option on the part of the parties. This being so, they can choose
whether to follow it or not. More so, the grant of option will not be determinative of whether the court
can dismiss the appeal just on the basis of failure of its submission. It is emphasized, with the use of
term “shall” that the Court is mandatorily required to decide the case on the basis of the evidences and
records submitted. Being a mandatory duty, they are left with no alternative choice but to comply with
it, regardless of whether the parties has submitted the memorandum or not. Hence, the Supreme Court
set aside as null and void the orders of the respondent judge and directed the respondent court to
decide the civil case.

LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS HOMEOWNERS (SOUTH) ASSOCIATION, INC. VS HON. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association, Inc. (LGVHAI) was organized as the association of
homeowners and residents of the Loyola Grand Villas. As a requirement by the Corporation Code to file
by-laws, the LGVHAI was not able to comply with such. The Corporation Code Sec. 46. Provides that,
““Ever corporation formed under this code MUST within 1 month after receipt of official notice of the
issuance of its certificate of incorporation by SEC, adopt a code of by-laws for its government not
inconsistent with this Code.” Victorio V. Soliven, its first president, then inquired about the status of the
association and to his surprise, Atty. Joaquin A. Bautista, the head of the legal department of the Home
Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) informed him that the said association was already
automatically dissolved for failure to submit its by-laws and non-user of its corporate charter. Such
grounds paved the way for the registration of South Association. This has prompted LGVHAI to file a
complaint and the decision was in favor of LGVHAI, thereby revoking the revoking the certificate of
registration of North and South Associations. Thus, the LGVHAI was now recognized as the duly
registered and existing homeowners association for Loyola Grand Villas homeowners. The South
Association then appealed to the Appeals Board of the HIGC but was later dismissed. They again
appealed but this time to the Court of Appeals but the court likewise affirmed the decision of HIGC
Appeals Board. Not contented, the petitioner still elevated the case to the Supreme Court contending
that the failure to file by-laws would result to automatic dissolution.

Issue: Whether or not LGVHAI’s failure to file by-laws as prescribed the Sec. 46 of the Corporation Code
result to automatic dissolution of the corporation.

Held: No. Under the rule of statutory construction, the word “must” in a statute like “shall” is not always
imperative and may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. As such, it is the intention of the
legislature in making this provision that the terms used to be directory only, and not compulsory. In the
case at bar, it is true that by-laws are indispensable to corporations, however, the failture to comply
them within the period prescribed does not necessarily mean an automatic dissolution. This is backed up
by the fact that the Corporation Code does not expressly provided that its non-compliance to be one of
those specific grounds for automatic dissolution. Notably, the Corporation Code only provides that such
non-filing amount to a ground for suspension or revocation of its registration but not automatic
dissolution. Hence, the Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and EPIFANIO DE LA CRUZ, respondents.

Facts: The private respondent mortgages two parcels of land to secure payment of their loan to the petitioner
Philippine National Bank. The parties failed to pay their loan and so the petitioner foreclosed the property. In the
auction sale, PNB won as the highest bidder. As such, a deed of sale and a certificate of sale was issued. The
notices of sale were published on March 28 (Friday), April 11 (Friday) and April 12 (Saturday) in a newspaper. This
is in compliance with the rule which requires that the notice of auction sale shall be published once a week for at
least three consecutive weeks. The respondent afterwards sought for reconveyance of the properties due to an
unlawful foreclosure made by the petitioner. The court of first instance decided in favor of the petitioner. Because
the respondent was not convinced, he appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that the lower court erred in
concluding that there was a valid compliance to the provision under Sec. 3 of Art. 3135. Thus, the Court of Appeals
reversed the judgment of the lower court and declared the auction sale, deed of sale, and the consolidation of
ownership as void. Hence, the petitioner elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner complied with the requirement of weekly publication of notice of extra-
judicial foreclosure

HELD: NO. Under the rule, a “week” means a period of seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the
week on which it begins. Following this, the petitioner has failed to follow the definition of a week since the second
week publication on April 11 was already the first day of the third week. There was no second consecutive
publication evidently made thereby not being able to comply with the legal requirement. Even a slight deviation
will invalidate the notice and render the sale void since a strict compliance should be made. If it will follow the first
day of the week as the definition of a week, it will have an effect of extending the first week by another day.
Hence, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitions for certiorari and affirmed the decision of Court of Appeals.dd