Borja's liability alone. In this regard, the propriety of the SB's granting of respondent De Borja’s Demurrer to Evidence, which is the subject matter of this case, is separate and distinct from the subject matter of the appeal in G.R. No. 199523, ie., liability of Velasco, et al. ‘Thus, respondent De Borja's claim in his Motion to Dismiss that "the complaint against [him] was dismissed not only once but twice" is inaccurate and legally flawed. Perforce, it is of no ‘moment that the SB dismissed Civil Case No. 0003 as the same was merely with respect to the respondents other than respondent De Borja who, by then, was already confronted with the instant appeal brought by petitioner Republic. (Republic v. de Borja, G.R. No. 187448, January 9, 2017) ‘A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. Couzts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness. With the issuance of RMO No. 44-2016, a supervening event has transpired that rendered this petition moot and academic, and subject to denial. The CIR, in her petition, assails the RTC Decision finding RMO No. 20-2013 unconstitutional because it violated the non-stock, non- profit educational institutions’ tax exemption privilege under the Constitution. However, subsequently, RMO No. 44-2016 clatified that non-stock, non-profit educational institutions are excluded from the coverage of RMO No. 20-2013. Consequently, the RTC Decision no longer stands, and there is no longer any practical value in resolving the issues raised in this petition. (lacinto-Henares v. St. Paul College of Makati, G.R. No. 215383, March 8, 2017) Locus Standi Hence, for failing to show that it is a juridical entity, endowed by law with the capacity to bring suits in its own name, PISTON is devoid of any legal capacity to institute this action. With respect to petitioner-in-intervention AAP, Stradcom claims that it does not have the requisite legal personality to intervene, as it does not allege any injury to the organization, Rather, the injury, if any, would be to its members who would be required to pay the REID fee. Stradcom claims that absent any allegation that it is AAP that will shoulder the costs of the REID for the latter’s members, AAP cannot institute the present suit. ‘The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, ie., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. However, despite its lack of interest, an association has the legal personality to file a suit and represent its members if the outcome of the case will affect their vital interests. Similarly, an organization has the standing to assert the concem of its constituents. In view thereof, we rule that AAP has the standing to file the instant suit. (Bayan Muna v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 190431, January 31, 2017) 40Petitioners in the Cullamat Petition claim to be "suing in their capacities as citizens of the Republic;" similarly, petitioners in the Mohamad Petition all claim to be "Filipino citizens, all women, all of [agel, and residents of Marawi City". 20x. In any case, the Court can take judicial cognizance of the fact that petitioners in the Lagman Petition are all citizens of the Philippines since Philippine citizenship is a requirement for them to be elected as representatives. We will therefore consider them as suing in their own behalf as citizens of this country. Besides, respondent did not question petitioners’ legal standing. (Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 251658, July 4, 2017) In Zamora, the Court categorically ruled that the Integrated Bar of the Philippines had failed to sufficiently comply with the requisites of locus standi, as it was not able to show any specific injury which it had suffered or could suffer by virtue of President Joseph Estrada's order deploying the Philippine Marines to join the PNP in visibility patrols around the metropolis. ‘This locus standi requirement, however, need not be complied with in so far as the Court's jurisdiction to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the President's declaration of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is concerned. In fact, by constitutional design, such review may be instituted by any citizen before the Court, without the need to prove that he or she stands to sustain a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned Presidential act/s. (Lagmuan v, Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017) Citing Section i, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases (RPEC), respondents argue that the petitioners failed to show that they have the requisite standing to file the petition, being representatives of a rather amorphous sector of society and without a concrete interest or injury. Petitioners counter that they filed the suit as citizens, taxpayers, and representatives; that the rules on standing had been relaxed following the decision in Opesa v. Factoran; and that, in any event, legal standing is a procedural technicality which the Court may set aside in its discretion ‘The Court agrees with the petitioners’ position. The RPEC did liberalize the requirements on standing, allowing the filing of citizen's suit for the enforcement of rights and obligations under environmental laws. This has been confirmed by this Court's rulings in Arigo v. Swift, and International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-BioTech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southenst Asia (Philippines). However, it bears noting that there is a difference between a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikasan, wherein it is sufficient that the person filing represents the inhabitants prejudiced by the environmental damage subject of the writ; and a petition for the issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus, which is only available to one who is personally aggrieved by the unlawful act or omission. (Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017) Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts As expressly provided in the Constitution, this Court has original jurisdiction "over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus." However, this Court has emphasized in People v. Cuaresma that the power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus does not exclusively pertain to this Court. Rather, it is shared with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts. Nevertheless, "this concurrence of jurisdiction" does not agive parties unfettered discretion as to the choice of forum. The doctrine on hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate venue where petitions for extraordinary writs should be filed. Parties cannot randomly select the court or forum to which their actions will be directed. ‘There is another reason why this Court enjoins strict adherence to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. As explained in Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, "t]he doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner." Thus: ‘Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent io determine issues of law which ‘may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach within those tertitorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring th facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the ‘actual case’ that makes ripe a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course, would be rational in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial courts, It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court, But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a hationwide scope. Itis competent tc determine facts and, ideally, should act on constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine. ‘This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating - in the light of new circumstances or in the light of some confusions of bench or bar - existing precedents. Rather than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role. (Citation omitted) Consequently, this Court will not entertain direct resort to it when relief can be obtained in the lower courts. This holds especially true when questions of fact are raised. Unlike this Court, trial courts and the Court of Appeals are better equipped to resolve questions of fact. They are in the best position to deal with causes in the first instance. However, the doctrine on hierarchy of courts is not an inflexible rule. In Spouses Chua v. Ang, this Court held that "[a] strict application of this rule may be excused when the reason behind the rule is not present in a case[.]"This Court has recognized that a direct invocation of its original jurisdiction may be warranted in exceptional cases as when there are compelling reasons clearly set forth in the petition, or when what is raised is a pure question of law. In a fairly recent case, we summarized other well-defined exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. Inmediate resort to this Court may be allowed when any of the following grounds are present: (1) when genuine issues of constitutionality are raised that must be 42addressed immediately; (2) when the case involves transcendental importance; (3) when the case is novel; (4) when the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this Court; (5) when time is of the essence; (6) when the subject of review involves acts of a constitutional organ; (7) when there is no other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; (8) when the petition includes questions that may affect public welfare, public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice; (9) when the order complained of was a patent nullity; and (10) when the appeal was considered as an inappropriate remedy. None of the exceptions to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts are present in this case. Significantly, although petitioners raise questions of law, other interrelated factual issues have emerged from the parties’ arguments, which this Court deems indispensable for the proper disposition of this case. (Aala v. Uy, G.R. No. 202781, January 10, 2017) Respondents also seck the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the petitioners failed to adhere to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, reasoning that since a petition for the issuance of a writ of kalikesat must be filed with the Supreme Court or with any of the stations of the Court of Appeals, then the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is applicable. Petitioners, on the other hand, cite the same provision and argue that direct recourse to this Court is available, and that the provision shows that the remedy to environmental damage should not be limited to the territorial jurisdiction of the lower courts. The respondents’ argument does not persuade. Under the RPEC, the writ of kalikasan is an extraordinary remedy covering environmental damage of such magnitude that will prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces. It is designed for a narrow but special purpose: to accord a stronger protection for environmental rights, aiming, among others, to provide a speedy and effective resolution of a case involving the violation of one's constitutional right to a healthful and balanced ecology that transcends political and territorial boundaries, and to address the potentially exponential nature of large-scale ecological threats. At the very least, the magnitude of the ecological problems contemplated under the RPEC satisfies at least one of the exceptions to the rule on hierarchy of courts, as when direct resort is allowed where it is dictated by public welfare. Given that the RPEC allows direct resort to this Court, it is ultimately within the Court's discretion whether or not to accept petitions brought directly before it. (Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 211010, March 7, 2017) In the same manner, the supposed violation of the principle of the hierarchy of courts does not pose any hindrance to the full deliberation of the issues at hand. Itis well to remember that "the judicial hierarchy of courts is 1 not an iron-clad rule. It generally applies to cases involving warring factual allegations. For this reason, litigants are required to [refer] to the trial courts at the first instance to determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of the evidence of the parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision cannot be brought immediately before appellate courts as they are not triers of facts. Therefore, a strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not necessary when the cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve factual but legal questions. Moreover, the principle of hierarchy of courts may be set aside for special and important reasons, such as when dictated by, public welfare and 'the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice. Thus, when based on the good judgment of the 43court, the urgency and significance of the issues presented calls for its intervention, it should not hesitate to exercise its duty to resolve. ‘The instant petition presents an exception to the principle as it basically raises a legal question on the constitutionality of the mandatory discount and the breadth of its rightful beneficiaries. (Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. The Department of Social Welfare and Development, G.R. No. 199669, April 25, 2017) Writ of Amparo The writ of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to adldress specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, Liberty or security. Section 1 of AM. No, 07-9-12-SC specifically delimits the coverage of the writ of amtparo to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, i: Sec. 1, Petition. - The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose rights to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. “The wrt shall cover extralegal Kilings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, ie, without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearance hasbeen defined by the Court as the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting, with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of Liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law. In an amparo action, the parties must establish their respective claims by substantial evidence: ‘Substantial evidence is that amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of liability against the person charged. After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court affirms the factual findings of the CA, which is largely based on the respondent's evidence. Verily, the totality of the evidence presented by the respondent meets the requisite evidentiary threshold. To corroborate his Allegations, the respondent presented the testimony of Haber who, during the hearing conducted by the CA on October 6, 2009, averred that on June 15, 2009, he was brought to Mayor Mamba's house where he and the respondent were tortured. Haber testified that hot wax was dripped onto their bodies while they were handcuffed; that they were kicked and beaten with a cue stick and an alcohol container. Thereafter, Haber testified that he and the respondent were brought to the guardhouse where they were suffocated by placing plastic bags on their heads. He also testified that a wire was inserted inside their penises. (Mayor Mamba v. Bueno, G.R.No. 191416, February 7, 2017)act one way or the other. The duty being enjoined in mandamus must be one according to the terms provided in the law itself. Thus, the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by ‘mandamus to act, but not to act one way or the other. (Segovia v. Climate Change Commission, G.R. No. 2111010, March 7, 2017) Rules of Court In Magsino v. De Ocampo, the Court instructs that: Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide sirictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. ‘The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases an4 under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most ‘persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. ‘The rules were instituted to be faithfully complied with, and allowing them to be ignored or lightly dismissed to suit the convenionce of a party like the petitioner was impermissible. Such rules, often derided as merely technical, are to be relaxed only in the furtherance of justice and to benefit the deserving, Their liberal construction in ‘exceptional situations should then rest on a showing of justifiable reasons and of at least 1 reasonable attempt at compliance with them. xxx. In the case at bar, the CA aptly pointed out that the Spouses Louh filed their Answer with the RIC only on July 20, 2012 or more than three months after the prescribed period, which expired on March 4, 2012. When they were thereafter declared in default, they filed no motion to set aside the RTC's order, a remedy which is allowed under Rule 9, Section 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Spouses Louh failed to show that they exerted due diligence in timely pursuing their cause so as to entitle them to a liberal construction of the rules, which can only be made in exceptional cases. (Louh v. Bank of the Philippine islands, G.R. No. 225562, March 8, 2017) ‘Administrative Supervision We would like to further stress that all directives coming from the Court Administrator and his deputies are issted in the exercise of this Court's administrative supervision of trial courts and their personnel, hence, should be respected. These directives are not mere requests, but should be complied with promptly and completely. Clearly, Judge Demot-Marifias' unexplained disregard of the orders of the OCA for her to comment on the complaint shows her disrespect for and contempt, not just for the OCA, but also for the Court, which exercises direct administrative supervision over trial court officers and employees through the OCA. Her 48indifference to, and disregard of, the directives issued to her clearly constituted insubordination which this Court will not tolerate. (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Demot-Marinas, A.M. No. RTJ-16-2446, March 7, 2017) Judicial and Bar Council ‘The JBC avers that it has no duty to increase the chances of appointment of every candidate it has adjudged to have met the minimum qualifications for a judicial post. The Court does not impose upon the JBC such duty, it only requires that the JBC gives all qualified nominees fair and equal opportunity to be appointed. The clustering by the JBC of nominees for simultaneous or closely successive vacancies in collegiate courts can actually be a device to favor or prejudice a particular nominee. A favored nominee can be included in a cluster with no other strong contender to ensure his/her appointment; or conversely, a nominee can be placed in a cluster with many strong contenders to minimize his/her chances of appointment, (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, Resolution on the MR, February 21, 2017) ‘The Court emphasizes that the requirements and qualifications, as well as the powers, duties, and responsibilities are the same for all vacant posts in a collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan; and if an individual is found to be qualified for one vacancy, then he/she is found to be qualified for all the other vacancies - there are no distinctions among the vacant posts, It is improbable that the nominees expressed their desire to be appointed to only a specific vacant position and not the other vacant positions in the same collegiate court, when neither the Constitution nor the law provides a specific designation or distinctive description for each vacant position in the collegiate court. The JBC did not cite any cogent reason in its Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention for assigning a nominee to a particular dluster/ vacancy. The Court highlights that without objective criteria, standards, or guidelines in determining which nominees are to be included in which cluster, the clustering of nominees for specific vacant posts seems to be at the very least, totally arbitrary. The lack of such criteria, standards, or guidelines may open the clustering to manipulation to favor or prejudice a qualified nominee. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, Resolution on the MR, February 21, 2017) Inits Decision dated November 29, 2016, the Court already adjudged that: Evidently, based on law, rules, and jurisprudence, the numerical order of the Sandiganbayan ‘Associate Justices cannot be determined until their actual appointment by the President, It also bears to point out that part of the President's power to appoint members of a collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan, is the power to determine the seniority or order of preference of such newly appointed members by controlling the date and order of issuance of said members’ appointment or commission papers. By already designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC would be establishing the seniority or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan ‘Associate Justices even before their appointment by the President and, thus, unduly arrogating unto itself a vital part ofthe President's power of appointment. Its also not clear to the Court how, as the JBC avowed in its Motion for Reconsideration, the lustering of nominees for simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts into separate short lists can rid the appointment process to the Judiciary of political pressure; or conversely, how the 49previous practice of submitting a single list of nominees to the President for simultaneous vacancies in collegiate courts, requiring the same qualifications, made the appointment process more susceptible to political pressure. The 1987 Constitution itself, by creating the JBC and requiring that the President can only appoint judges and Justices from the nominees submitted by the JBC, already sets in place the mechanism to protect the appointment process from political pressure. By arbitrarily clustering the nominees for appointment to the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into separate short lists, the JBC influenced the appointment process and encroached on the President's power to appoint members of the Judiciary and determine seniority in the said court, beyond its mandate under the 1987 Constitution. As the Court pronounced in its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the President's power to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment is valid, and he, not the JBC, determines the seniority of appointees to a collegiate court. Finally, the JBC maintains that it is not bound by the Decision dated November 29, 2016 of the Court in this case on the ground that it is not a party herein. The JBC prays in its Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, among other reliefs and remedies, for the Court to reverse its ruling in the Decision dated November 29, 2016 denying the Motion for Intervention of the JBC in the present case. However, the Court has now practically allowed the intervention of the JBC in this case, by taking into consideration the issues raised and arguments adduced in its Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention, but which the Court found to be unmeritorious. ‘To recapitulate, the Petition at bar challenged President Aquino's appointment of respondents Econg and Musngi as Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, which disregarded the clustering by the JBC of the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies in said collegiate court into six separate short lists. The Court ultimately decreed in its Decision dated Novemiber 29, 2016 that: President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint members of the Judiciary when he disregarded the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists for the vacancies for the 16, 17%, 18, 19%, 20%, and 21" Sandiganbayan Associate Justices President Aquino merely maintained the well-established practice, consistent with the paramount Presidential constitutional prerogative, to appoint the six new Sandiganbayan ‘Associate Justices from the 37 qualified nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list. This does not violate Article Vfll, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution which requires the President to appoint from a list of atleast three nominees submitted by the JBC for every vacancy. To meet the minimum requirement under said constitutional provision of three nominees per vacancy, there should at least be 18 nominees from the JBC for the six vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; but the minimum requirement was even exceeded herein because the JBC submitted for the President's consideration a total of 37 qualified nominees, All the six newly appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices met the requirement of nomination by the JBC under Article VII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the appointments of respondents Musngi and Econg, as well as the other four new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, are valid and do not suffer from any constitutional infirmity. 50‘The declaration of the Court that the clustering of nominees by the JBC for the simultaneous vacancies that occurred by the creation of six new positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan is unconstitutional was only incidental to its ruling that President Aquino is not bound by such clustering in making his appointments to the vacant Sandiganbayan Associate Justice posts. Other than said declaration, the Court did not require the JBC to do or to refrain from doing something insofar as the issue of clustering of the nominees to the then six vacant posts of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice was concerned. [As for the other new rules and practices adopted by the JBC which the Court has taken cognizance of and docketed as a separate administrative matter (oiz,, Item No.2: the deletion or nom-inclusion in JBC No. 2016-1, or the Revised Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, of Rule 8, Section 1 of JBC-009; and Item No. 3: the removal of incumbent Senior Associate Justices of the Supreme Court as consultants of the Judicial and Bar Council, referred to in pages 45 to 51 of the Decision dated November 29, 2016), the JBC is actually being given the opportunity to submit its comment and be heard on the same. The administrative matter was already raffled to another ponente, thus, any incident concerning the same should be consolidated in the said administrative matter. Regarding the Separate Opinion of Associate Justice Caguioa, it must be pointed out that he has conceded that the President did not commit an unconstitutional act in "disregarding the clustering done by the JBC” when he chose Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan "outside" of the "clustered" lists provided by the JBC. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, Resolution on the MR, February 21, 2017) Disciplinary Authority The Court disagrees with the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. The IBP has no jurisdiction over the disbarment complaint. The administrative complaint must be filed with the Office of the Ombudsrnan. Republic Act No. 6770 (R.A. No. 6770), otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989,” prescribes the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. Section 15, paragraph 1 of R.A. No. 670 provides: Section 15. Powers, Function and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties: (Q) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer ar employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of his primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases. ‘The 1987 Constitution clothes the Office of the Ombudsman with the administrative disciplinary authority to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any government official when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. The Office of the Ombudsman is the government agency responsible for enforcing administrative, 81civil, and criminal liability of government officials "in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people." In Samson v. Restrivera, the Court ruled that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance committed by any public officer or employee during his or her tenure, Consequently, acts or missions of public officials relating to the performance of their function as government officials are within the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. In Spouses Buffe v. Secretary Gonzales, the Court held that the IBP has no jurisdiction over government lawyers who are charged with administrative offenses involving their official duties. in the present case, the allegations in Alicias' complaint against Atty. Macatangay, Atty. Zerna, Atty. Ronquillo, and Atty. Buenaflor, which include their (1) failure to evaluate CSC records; (2) failure to evaluate documentary evidence presented to the CSC; and (3) non-service of CSC Orders and Resolutions, all relate to their misconduct in the discharge of their official duties as government lawyers working in the CSC. Hence, the IBP has no jurisdiction over Alicias' complaint. These are acts or omissions connected with their duties as government lawyers exercising official functions in the CSC and within the administrative discipiinary jurisdiction of their superior or the Office of the Ombudsman. (Alicias v. Macatangay, A.C. No. 7478, January 11,2017) Petitioner assails two acts as violating the confidentiality rule: first, respondents’ supposed public threats of filing a disbarment case against him, and second, respondents’ public statement that they had filed a disbarment complaint. Where there are yet no proceedings against a lawyer, there is nothing to keep private and confidential. Respondents’ threats were made before November 4, 2014, and there was no proceeding to keep private. As for the Press Statement made on November 4, 2014, a close examination reveals that it does not divulge anything that merits punishment for contempt. ‘The Press Statement declared only three (3) things: first, respondent AEP filed a disbarment complaint against petitioner; second, petitioner is a lawyer, and thus, must conduct himself according to the standards of the legal profession; and third, petitioner's "unlawful conduct” is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility. As regards the disbarment, the Press Statement only said: ‘At about 2 p.m. today, the AFP has filed a verified disbarment complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Harry Roque for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ‘The Press Statement’s coverage of the disbarment complaint was a brief, unembellished report that a complaint had been filed. Such an announcement does not, in and of itself, violate the confidentiality rule, particularly considering that it did not discuss the disbarment complaint itself. In any case, the Press Statement does not divulge any acts or character traits on the part of 82petitioner that would damage his personal and professional reputation. Although the Press Statement mentioned that a disbarment complaint had been filed against petitioner, no particulars were given about the content of the complaint or the actual charges filed. Furthermore, prior to the filing of the complaint, petitioner even made his own public statement regarding respondents! possible filing of a disbarment complaint. Even before any case against him had been filed, media reported that petitioner tweeted publicly that he looked forward to answering the complaint before the AFP. In the articles cited by petitioner as evidence of respondents! violation of the confidentiality rule, he, too, is quoted, saying "the case is a chance for him to ‘clarify a lawyer's role in pushing victims rights and sovereignty." It is unlikely that petitioner's reputation could be further damaged by a factual report that a complaint had actnally been filed. Petitioner has made it even more public by filing the instant case against the entire Armed Forces of the Philippines, instead of targeting only the individuals who participated in the disclosure. Even the events that led to the filing of the disbarment case transpired in front of media. As alleged by petitioner, the question of custody over Pemberton was the subject of public discussion. In relation to that issue, petitioner accompanied his clients when they demanded to see Pemberton, when they were refused, and when they forced themselves into Pemberton's detention facility, in a serious breach of security of a military zone. Thus, this Court agrees with respondents, that they should not be faulted for releasing a subsequent press statement regarding the disbarment complaint they filed against petitioner. The statements were official statements made in the performance of respondents’ official functions to address a matter of public concern. It was the publication of an institutional action in response to a serious breach of security. Respondents, in the exercise of their public functions, should not be punished for responding publicly to such public actions. (Roque v. AFP Chief of Staff, G.R. No. 214986, February 15, 2017) With regard to the imputation of falsification of public document, the Court shall not inquire into the merits of the said criminal case pending adjudication before the MTCC and make a ruling on the matter. Commissioner Esquivel correctly declined to resolve the falsification case pending resolution before the regular court to which jurisdiction properly pertains. Though disbarment proceedings are sui generis as they belong to a class of their own and are distinct from that of civil or criminal actions, itis judicious for an administrative body like IBP-CBD not to pre-empt the course of action of the regular courts in order to avert contradictory findings. (Matvar v, Baleros, A.C. No. 11346, March 8, 2017) ‘The respondent's accountability did not end with her removal from the Judiciary. In the decision of November 22, 2016, we declared that her misdemeanor as a member of the Bench could also cause her expulsion from the Legal Profession through disbarment. 20%. Accordingly, gross misconduct, violation of the Lawyer's Oath, and willful disobedience of any lawful order by the Court constitute grounds to disbar an attorney. In the respondent's case, she ‘was herein found to have committed all of these grounds for disbarment, warranting her immediate disbarment as a consequence. 53We deem it worthwhile to remind that the penalty of disbarment being hereby imposed does not equate to stripping the respondent of the source of her livelihood. Disbarment is intended to protect the administration of justice by ensuring that those taking part in it as attorneys should be competent, honorable and reliable to enable the courts and the clients they serve to rightly repose their confidence in them. Once again, we express our disdain for judges and attorneys who undeservedly think too highly of themselves, their personal and professional qualifications and qualities at the expense of the nobility of the Law Profession. It is well to remind the respondent that membership in the Law Profession is not like that in any ordinary trade. The Law is a noble calling, and only the individuals who are competent and fit according to the canons and standards set by this Court, the law and the Rules of Court may be bestowed the privilege to practice it. Lastly, every lawyer must pursue only the highest standards in the practice of his calling. The practice of law is @ privilege, and only those adjudged qualified are permitted to do so. The respondent has fallen short of this standard thus meriting her expulsion from the profession. (Office of the Court Administrator v. judge Eliza B. Yu, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1813. March 14, 2017) Generally, this Court defers from taking cognizance of disbarment complaints against lawyers in government service arising from their administrative duties, and refers the complaint first either to the proper administrative body that has disciplinary authority over the erring public official or employee or the Ombudsman. For instance, in Spouses Buffe v. Gonzales, this Court dismissed the disbarment complaint against former Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez, former Undersecretary of Justice Fidel J. Exconde, Jr., and former Congressman Eleandro Jesus F. Madrona, holding that the respondents were public officials being charged for actions involving their official functions during their tenure, which should be resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman. In that case, one (1) of the respondents sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of forum-shopping because he allegedly received an order from the Office of the Ombudsman directing him to file a counter-affidavit based on the same administrative ‘complaint filed before the Office of the Bar Confidant. Again, in the fairly recent case of Alicias, Jr. v. Macatangay, the Court dismissed the complaint against respondents - government lawyers in the Civil Service Commission. The Court held that the acts or omissions alleged in the complaint were "connected with their . . . official functions in the [Civil Service Commission] and within the administrative disciplinary jurisdiction of their superior or the Office of the Ombudsman." It would seem that the complainant directly instituted a disbarment complaint with this Court instead of filing an administrative complaint before the proper administrative body. ‘This case is an exception. Unlike the circumstances in Spouses Buffe and Alicias, Jr., the records here show that the Office of the Ombudsman had previously dismissed Fuji's administrative complaint due to the pendency of his Verified Petition and Administrative Complaint before the Bureau of Immigration, and considered the case closed. ‘The Bureau of Immigration subsequently granted Fuj's petition to reopen his case and ordered his release. However, it was silent as to the culpability of respondent on the charges levelled by Fuji, 54.Thus, with the termination of the administrative proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman and the apparent inaction of the Bureau of Immigration on complainant's administrative complaint, this Court considers it proper to take cognizance of this case, and to determine whether there is sufficient ground to discipline respondent under its "plenary disciplinary authority" over members of the legal profession. (Fuji v. de Ia Cruz, A.C. No. 11043, March 8, 2017) cathe "practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure[,] and calls for legal knowledge, training[,] and experience.” During the suspension period and before the suspension is lifted, a lawyer must desist from practicing law. It must be stressed, however, that a lawyer's suspension is not automatically lifted upon the lapse of the suspension period. The lawyer must submit the required documents and wait for an order from the Court lifting the suspension before he or she resumes the practice of law. (Paras v. Paras, A.C. No. 5333, March 12, 2027) Failing to comply with the mandate to decide cases within the period prescribed by the Constitution, the laws, the Rules of Court and the administrative circulars and guidelines constitutes gross inefficiency and incompetence, for which the judge may be held to account. Retirement from the Bench does not exempt the judge from liability for disobeying or ignoring the mandate. (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Aventurado, A.M. No. RTJ-09-2212, April 18, 2017) Decisions Section 15, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires the lower courts to decide or resolve cases or matters for decision or final resolution within three (3) months from date of submission. In complaints for forcible entry and unlawful detainer as in this case, Section 10 of the Rules on Summary Procedure specifically requires that the complaint be resolved within thirty (80) days from receipt of the last affidavits and position papers. Without any order of extension granted by this Court, failure to decide even a single case within the required period constitutes gross inefficiency. (Gamboa-Roces v. Judge Perez, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1887 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 15-2814-MTJ], January 9, 2017) ‘Article VIIL, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that lower courts have three months within which to decide cases or resolve matters submitted to them for resolution. Moreover, Canon 3, Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to dispose of their business promptly and decide cases within the required period. In addition, this Court laid down the guidelines in SC Administrative Circular No. 13which provides, énter alia, that "[jJudges shall observe scrupulously the periods prescribed by Article VIII, Section 15, of the Constitution for the adjudication and resolution of all cases or matters submitted in their courts. Thus, all cases or matters must be decided or resolved within twelve months from date of submission by all lower collegiate courts, while all other lower courts are given a period of three months to do so." ‘The Court has reiterated this admonition in SC Administrative Circular No, 3-99which requires all judges to scrupulously observe the periods prescribed in the Constitution for deciding cases and the failure to comply therewith is considered a serious violation of the constitutional right of the parties to speedy disposition of their cases. 55‘This Court has consistently held that failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanction against the erring magistrate. Respondent judge failed to live up to the exacting standards of duty and responsibility that her position required. As a trial judge, Judge Demot- Marifias is a frontline official of the judiciary and should have at all times acted with efficiency and with probity. (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Demot-Marinas, A.M. No. RT}-16- 2446, March 7, 2017) Article IX-B CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION Jurisdiction ‘The Administrative Code of 1987 is the law that provided for the Civil Service Commission's appellate jurisdiction in administrative disciplinary cases: Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. - (1) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' saiary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission) by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the investigation. ‘The resuits of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other artion to be taken. (2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be fina! in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be ‘executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned. @) An investigation may be entrusted to regional director or similar officials who shall make the necessary report and recommendation to the chief of bureau or office or department within the period specified in Paragraph (4) of the following Section. (6) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal Section 49. Appeals. - (1) Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for reconsideration is seasonably filed, which petition shall be decided within fifteen days. Notice of the appeal shall be filed with the disciplining office, which shall forward the records of the case, together with the notice of appeal, to the appellate authority within fifteen days from filing of the notice of appeal, with its comment, if any. The 56notice of appeal shall specifically state the date of the decision appealed from and the date of receipt thereof. It shall also specifically set forth clearly the grounds relied upon for excepting from the decision. (2) A petition for reconsideration shall be based only on any of the following grounds: (a) new evidence has been discovered which materially affects the decision rendered; (b) the decision is not supported by the evidence on record; or (c) error of law or irregularit have been committed which are prejudicial to the interest of the respondent: Provided, ‘That only one petition for reconsideration shall be entertained. The Administrative Code of 1987 also gave the Civil Service Commission the power to “[pjrescribe, amend and enforce regulations and rules for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service Law and other pertinent laws." Sections 61 and 45 of the 2012 Revised Rules on ‘Administrative Cases in the Civil Service echo the Administrative Code of 1987, and read: Section 6i. Filing. - Subject to Section 45 of this Rule, decisions of heals of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty ‘exceeding thirty (30) days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty (80) days salary, may be appealed to the Commission within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. In cases the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department head and then finally to the Commission. [All decisions of heads of agencies are immediately executory pending appeal before the ‘Commission, The decision imposing the penalty of dismissal by disciplining authorities in departments is not immediately executory unless confirmed by the Secretary concerned. However, the Commission may take cognizance of the appeal pending confirmation of its execution by the Secretary. Section 45. Finality of Decisions. - A decision rendered by the disciplining authority ‘whereby a penalty of suspension for not more than thirty (90) days or a fine in an amount not exceeding thirty (30) days' salary is imposed, shall be final, executory and not appealable unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. However, the respondent may file an appeal when the issue raised is violation of due process. If the penalty imposed is suspension exceeding thirty (30) days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days' salary, the same shall be final and executory after the lapse of the reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal and no such pleading has been filed. (Galindo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 210788, January 10, 2017) ‘The COA promulgated rules of procedure for its agency, which include rules for disciplinary and administrative cases involving officers and employees of COA. Sections 1 and 10 of Ruie XIV on Administrative Cases of the 2009 Revised Rules of Procedure of the Commission on ‘Audit state: Section 1. Applicability of Cioil Service Law and Other Rules. - The procedures set forth in the pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law, The Omnibus Rules Implementing Executive Order No. 292 and COA Memorandum No. 76-48 dated s7April 27, 1976, in administrative cases against officers and employees of the ‘Commission, are hereby adopted and read into these rules. Section 10. Appeal. - Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision in accordance with the rules prescribed under existing Civil Service rules and regulations. In the present petition, Galindo and Pinto failed to explain why they filed a petition for certiorari before this Court instead of an appeal before the Civil Service Commission. Galindo and Pinto also failed to allege and show that the COA acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A petition for certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal. The supposed petition for certiorari imputed errors in the COA's appreciation of facts and evidence presented, which are proper subjects of an appeal. (Galindo v. Commission on Audit, G.R, No. 210788, January 10, 2017) There is no question that the case that Galindo and Pinto sought to be reviewed is an administrative disciplinary case. We previously ruled in Saligumba v. Commission on Audit that our power to review is limited to legal issues in administrative matters, thus: “The petition has to be dismissed for the following reasons: 1. Our power to review COA decisions refers to money matters and not to administrative cases involving the discipline of its personnel. 2. Even assuming that We have jurisdiction to review decisions on administrative matters as mentioned above, We cannot do s0 on factual issues; Our power to review is limited to Tegal issues. (Emphasis supplied) (Galindo v. Commission on Ault, GI. No. 210788, January 10, 2017) Assuming arguendo that Galindo and Pinto availed of certiorari under Rule 64 as the proper remedy, the present petition was filed beyond the reglementary period for filing. Egargo Puertollano Gervacio Law Offices, Galindo and Pinto's previous counsel, received a copy of the COA’s Resolution on 8 October 2013. The same lawyers withdrew their appearance in a notice dated 21 October 2013. As notice to counsel is notice to the client, Galindo and Pinto had only ‘until 7 November 2013 to file a petition for certiorari. When Galindo and Pinto filed their present petition for certiorari on 30 January 2014, the petition was already 84 days late. Thus, the ruling of the COA in the cases of Galindo and Pinto became final and exectory as of 8 November 2013. Even if the present petition properly raised this Court's certiorari jurisdiction and was filed within the reglementary period, we find no grave abuse of discretion in the decision of the COA. There is no capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, The COA constituted a team from the FAIO-LSS, which in turn found prima facie evidence of petitioners’ misconduct, Petitioners were charged and hearings were conducted. The pieces of evidence presented against petitioners were substantial enough to justify the finding of their administrative liability. (Galindo v. Commission on Audit, GR. No. 210788, January 10, 2017) 58Galindo and Pinto question the quantum of evidence that established their administrative liability. However, they conveniently forgot that mere substantial evidence, or "that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion," is sufficient. The pieces of evidence presented before the COA, such as the cash advances of Ms. Mendoza accompanied by the testimony of Ms. Mendoza herself, as well as the Indices of Payments and the car loan contracts, establish Galindo's and Pinto's receipt of the disallowed amounts. "Recipients of unauthorized sums would, after all, ordinarily evade traces of their receipt of such amounts. Resort to other documents from which such fact could be deduced was then appropriate.” In the case of Nacion v. Commission on Audit, an offshoot of the FAIO-LSS investigation involving the set of COA-MWSS officers that included Galindo and Pinto, this Court dismissed Atty. Janet D. Nacion’s petition for certiorari for lack of merit, The COA assigned Atty. Nacion to MWSS as State Auditor V from 16 October 2001 to 15 September 2003. The COA initiated motte proprio administrative proceedings against Atty. Nacion after it found unauthorized receipt of bonuses and benefits from MWSS by COA-MWSS officers in the period immediately following Atty. Nacion's term. Atty. Nacion alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of COA, and invoked violation of her right to due process. She argued that the records during her tenure with the MIWSS should not have been included by the FAIO-LSS in its investigations because the COA Chairperson did not issue an office order specifically for her case. We found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of COA finding Atty. Nacion guilty of Grave Misconduct and Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations. We ruled that there was no need for a separate office order for the FAIO-LSS team's investigation of Atty. Nacion's case. The COA accorded Atty. Nacion a reasonable opportunity to present her defenses through her answer to the formal charge issued by the COA Chairperson and her motion for reconsideration of the COA's decision. (Galindo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 210788, January 10, 2017) ‘The dispute in this case concerns the classification of certain positions in the Public Attorney's Office (PAQ).The Court is asked to determine, in particular, whether these positions are properly inchuded in the Career Executive Service (CES); and whether the occupants of these positions must obtain ihird-level eligibility to qualify for permanent appointment. To resolve these questions, the Court must also delineate the respective jurisdictions ‘granted by Ino to the competing authorities involved in this case ~ the Civil Service Conamsission (CSC) and the Career Executive Service Board (CESB). ‘Although the specific powers of the CSC are not enumerated in the final version of 1987 Constitution, it is evident from the deliberations of the framers that the concept of a "central personnel agency" was considered all-encompassing. The concept was understood to be sufficiently broad as to include the authority to promulgate and enforce policies on personnel actions, to classify positions, and to exercise all powers and functions inherent in and incidental to human resources management xxx. (Career Executive Service Board v. Civil Service Commission, GR. No. 197762, March 7, 2017) ... the mandate of the CSC should therefore be read as the comprehensive authority to perform all functions necessary to ensure the efficient administration of the entire civil service, including the CES. 59‘The Administrative Code of 1987 further reinforces this view. Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12 thereof enumerates the specific powers and functions of the CSC while recognizing its comprehensive authority over all civil service matters. [See Section 12, Items (1) to @) (11), (14), and (19)] o0«. It is evident from the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions that the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, has been granted the broad authority and the specific powers to pass upon all civil service matters. (Career Executive Service Board v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 197762, March 7, 2017) The specific powers of the CESB nuust be narrowly interpreted as exceptions to the comprehensive authority granted to the CSC by the Constitution and relevant statutes. In this case, the specific powers of the CESB over members of the CES must be interpreted in a ‘manner that takes into account the comprehensive mandate of the CSC under the Constitution and other statutes. The present case involves the classification of positions belonging to the CES and the qualifications for these posts. These are matiers clearly within the scope of the powers granted to the CESB under the Administrative Code and the Integrated Reorganization Plan. However, this fact alone does not push the matter beyond the reach of the CSC. ‘As previously discussed, the CSC, as the central personnel agency of the government, is given the comprehensive mandate to administer the civil service under Article DCB, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution; and Section 12, Items (4), (5), and (14) of the Administrative Code. It has also been expressly granted the power to promulgate policies, standards, and guidelines for the civil service; and to render opinions and rulings on all personnel and other civil service matters. Here, the question of whether the subject PAO positions belong to the CES is clearly a civil service matter falling within the comprehensive jurisdiction of the CSC. Further, considering the repercussions of the issue concerning the appointments of those occupying the posts in question, the jurisdiction of the CSC over personnel actions is implicated. (Career Executive Service Board v, Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 197762, March 7, 2017) Section 38(a) of Presidential Decree No. 807 has drawn a definite distinction between subordinate officers or employees who were presidential appointees, on the one hand, and subordinate officers or employees who were non-presidential appointees, on the other. Without a doubt, substantial distinctions that set apart presidential appointees from nonpresidential appointees truly existed. or one, presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the President pursuant to the well-settled principle that, in the absence of a contrary law, the power to remove or to discipline is lodged in the same authority in whom the power to appoint is vested. Having the power to remove or to discipline presidential appointees, therefore, the President has the corollary authority to investigate them and look into their conduct in office. 60Thus, Baculi, as a presidential appointee, came under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President in line with the principle that the "power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint." As such, the DAR Secretary held no disciplinary jurisdiction over him. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 807 has expressly specified the procedure for disciplinary actions involving presidential appointees. (Baculi v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 188681, March 8, 2017) First of all, DAR General Memorandum Order No. 5, Series of 1990, whose pertinent text expressly vested in the DAR's Office of Legal Affairs the authority to investigate administrative complaints against presidential appointees, presupposed the actual existence of the administrative complaints. In respect of Baculi, however, there was yet no administrative ‘complaint when the DAR-RIC conducted its investigation. Such administrative complaint came to exist only when Secretary Garilao brought the formal charge for gross dishonesty, abuse of authority, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Such formal charge became the administrative complaint contemplated by law. As a consequence, the DAR-RIC's investigation was separate and apart from the investigation that the DAR Office of Legal Affairs could have conducted once a formal charge had beer initiated. In the absence of a law or administrative issuance barring the DARRIC from conducting its own investigation of Baculi even when there was no complaint being first filed against him, the eventual report rendered after investigation was valid. ‘And, secondly, it was of no moment to the validity and efficacy of the dismissal that only ‘Acting Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Gaite had signed and issued the order of dismissal. In so doing, Acting Deputy Executive Secretary Gaite neither exceeded his authority, nor usurped the power of the President. Although the powers and functions of the Chief Executive have been expressly reposed by the Constitution in one person, the President of the Philippines, it would be unnatural to expect the President to personally exercise and discharge all such powers and functions. Somehow, the exercise and discharge of most of these powers and functions have been delegated to others, particularly to the members of the Cabinet, conformably to the doctrine of qualified political agency. Accordingly, we have expressly recognized the extensive range of authority vested in the Executive Secretary or the Deputy Executive Secretary as an official who ordinarily acts for and in behalf of the President. As such, the decisions or orders emanating from the Office of the Executive Secretary are attributable to the Executive Secretary even if they have been signed only by any of the Deputy Executive Secretaries. Given the foregoing, the dismissal of Baculi through the order of June 25, 2003, being by authority of the President, was entitled to full faith and credit as an act of the President herself. (Baculi v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 188681, March 8, 2017) Appeals Since the CESB is an attached agency of the CSC, the former's decisions are expressly subject to the CSC's review on appeal. 61‘Against the express mandate given to the CSC in the foregoing provision, the contention of the CESB that its decisions may only be appealed tc the Office of the President must fail. »00. In our view, the foregoing rule on appeals to the Office of the President only covers disciplinary cases involving members of the CES, It is evident that this special rule was created for that particular type of case, because members of the CES arc all presidential appointees. Given that the power to appoint generally carries with it the power to discipline, it is only reasonable for the president to be given the ultimate authority to discipline presidential appointees. But this special rule cannot apply to the matter at hand, because CESB Resolution No. 918 did not involve a disciplinary case. Since it was clearly outside the scope of the foregoing provision, the Resolution did not come within the jurisdiction of the Office of the President. It was therefore correctly appealed to the CSC. From the above discussion, it is evident that the CSC acted within its jurisdiction when it resolved the PAO’s appeal. The arguments of the CESB on this point anust perforce be rejected. (Career Executive Service Board v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 197762, March 7, 2017) Itis settled that a resort to the extraordinary remedies of certiorari and prohibition is proper only in cases where (a) a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions hhas acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (b) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires the concurrence of both these requisites »0x. In this case, the second requirement is plainly absent. ‘As respondents correctly observed, there was an appeal available to the CESB in the form of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. »0cx. Here, the CESB could have appealed the CSC Decision and Resolution to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43. Hence, the filing of the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is improper regardless of the grounds invoked therein. (Career Executive Service Board v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 19762, March 7, 2017) Apparently, Dacoycoy broadened the scope of "party adversely affected’ so as to include the disciplining authority whose ruling is in question within its definition. However, this development introduced in Dacoycoy would be short-lived. In the same year that Decoycoy was decided, the Court En Banc would render judgment in Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals (Mathay) in the following wise: We are aware of our pronouncements in the recent case of Civil Service Commission ». Pedro Dacoycoy which overturned our rulings in Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, ‘Mendez vs. Civil Service Commission and Magpale vs. Civil Service Commission. In Dacoycoy, we affirmed the right of the Civil Service Commission to bring an appeal as the aggrieved party affected by a ruling which may seriously prejudice the civil service system. The aforementioned case, however, is different from the case at bar. Dacoycoy was an administrative case involving nepotism whose deleterious effect on government cannot bbe overemphasized. The subject of the present case, on the other hand, is reinstatement, 62We fail to sce how the present petition, involving as it does the reinstatement or non- reinstatement of one obviously reluctant to litigate, can impair the effectiveness of government. Accordingly, the ruling in Dacoycoy does not apply. It would then appear that in not all administrative cases would the doctrine in Dacoyeoy find application. On the other hand, Mathay, one of the cases relied upon by respondents, would pave the way for the Court's rulings in National Police Commission v. Mamauag (Mamauag) and Pleyio v. Philippine National Police Crintinal Investigation and Detection Group (Pleyto) that would clarify the Dacoycoy doctrine, specifying that the government party appealing must not be the i judicial body that meted out the administrative sanction, but the prosecuting body in the Later, in the 2008 case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego (Samaniego), the Court En Banc rendered judgment covering the decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases that is in tune with both Dacoycoy and Mathay. The Court rativcinated in Samaniego that aside from the Ombudsman being the disciplining authority whose decision is being assailed, its mandate under the Constitution also bestows it wide disciplinary authority that includes prosecutorial powers. Hence, it has the legai interest to appeal a decision reversing its ruling, satisfying both the requirements of Dacoycoy and Mathay. xx. ‘Thus, as things currently stand, Samaniego remains to be the prevailing doctrine. The Ombudsman has legal interest in appeals from its rulings in administrative cases. Petitioner could not then be faulted for filing its Omnibus Motion before the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 107551. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 189100, June 21, 2017) Eligibility .. To require the occupants of the subject PAO positions to possess third-level eligibility would be to amend the law and defeat its spirit and intent. 20%. ‘The authority to prescribe qualifications for poslt10ns in the government is lodged in Congress as part of its plenary legislative power to create, abolish and modify public offices to meet societal demands. From this authority emanates the right to change the qualifications for existing statutory offices. It was in the exercise of this power that the legislature enacted Section 5 of R.A. 9406, which provides for the qualifications for the Chief Public Attorney, Deputy Chief Public Attorneys, Regional Public Attorneys and Assistant Regional Public Attorneys 2%. ..it is clear that occupants of the subject PAO positions are only mandated to comply with requirements as to age, citizenship, education, and experience. Since third-level eligibility is not at ali mentioned in the law, it would be improper for the CESB to impose this additional qualification as a prerequisite to permanent appointments. To do so would be to amend the law and to overrule Congress. While the CESB has been granted the power to prescribe entrance requirements for the third- level of the civil service, this power cannot be construed as the authority to modify the 63qualifications specifically set by law for certain positions. Hence, even granting that the occupants of the subject positions indeed exercise managerial and executive functions as incidents of their primary roles, the CESB has no power to impose additional qualifications for them. It cannot use the authority granted to it by Congress itself to defeat the express provisions of statutes enacted by the latter. It is also beyond the power of the CESB to question or overrule the specific qualifications imposed by Congress for the subject positions. The legislature must be deemed to have considered the entirety of the functions attendant to these posts when it enacted RA. 9406 and prescribed the relevant qualifications for each position. The choice not to require third level Aigiblity in this instance must be respected - not only by the CESB but also by this Court as a matter that goes into the wisdom and the policy of a statute. (Career Executive Service Board v, Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 197762, March 7, 2017) cit is evident that the OSC acted within its jurisdiction and authority as the central personnel agency of the government when it passed upon the appeal filed vy the PAO from CESB Resolution No. 918, Further, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC when it reversed the said resolution, which refused to declassify the subject PAO positions. As the CSC noted, the third-level eligibility required by the CESB as an additional qualification for these posts contravened not only the express terms, but also the clear intent of R.A. 9406, (Career Executive Service Board v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 197762, March 7, 2017) However, the fact that respondent Roque was still a probationer when he applied for the position of Utility Worker and accomplished his Personal Data Sheet did not disqualify him from applying for the position. In Moreno 2. Commission on Elections (680 Phil. 279 (2006)), the Court clarified that the grant of probation suspends the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. (Re: Anonymous Letter-Complaint versus judge Divina T. Samson, A.M. No. MT- 16-1870, June 6, 2017) uv itis clear that when respondent Roque was granted probation, not only was the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment suspended, but the accessory penalty of suspension from the right to follow a profession or calling was also suspended. Hence, respondent Roque retained the right to seek employment and was, therefore, not disqualified to apply for the position of utility worker in the court when he was still a probationer. However, respondent Roque had the obligation to disclose the fact that he had been formally charged and convicted of an offense in his Personal Data Sheet and cannot justify his non-disclosure of such fact by invoking the confidentiality of his records under the Probation Law. (Re: Anonymous Letter- Complaint versus Judge Divina T. Sarason, A.M. No. MTJ-16-1870, June 6,2017) Investigation In this case, records show that the Formal Charge against Gutierrez was issued following the LTO's issuance of a Show Cause Memorandum. Under Section 16 of the Revised Rules on “Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), a Show Cause Memorandum emanating 6afrom the disciplining authority or its authorized representative is sufficient to institute preliminary investigation proceedings, x00. A reading of the Show Cause Memorandum issued by the LTO shows that Gutierrez was directed to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against her. The latter then duly complied therewith by submitting her letter-reply pursuant thereto. Evidently, Gutierrez was accorded her right to procedural due process when she was given an opportunity to be heard before the LTO found a prima facie case against her, which thus, necessitated the issuance of the Formal Charge. In fact, even after the issuance of a Formal Charge, the LTO continued to respect Gutierrez's right to procedural due process as it allowed her to file an Answer to refute the charges of Gross Insubordination, Refusal to Perform Official Duties, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service against her. (Disciplinary Board, Land Transportation Office v. Gutierrez, G.R. No, 224395, July 3, 2017) Preventive Suspension ‘The law abhors the indefinite preventive suspension of public officials and employees, whether they are presidential appointees or not. For presidential appointees, the suspension should last only within a reasonable time, For non-presidential appointees, the maximum period of preventive suspension is 90 days. Once the allowable period of preventive suspension had been served, the public officials and employees must be automatically reinstated. (Baculi v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 188681, March 8, 2017) By law, Baculi should have been automatically reinstated at the end of the 90-day period of his preventive suspension because his case was not finally decided within the said period. We have to point out that preventive suspension is of two kinds. The first is the preventive suspension pending investigation, and the second is the preventive suspension pending appeal where the penalty imposed by the disciplining authority is either suspension or dismissal but after review the respondent official or employee is exonerated. ‘The nature of preventive suspension pending investigation has been explained in the following manner: xxx Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any wey influencing witnesses against him. Ifthe investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated. If after investigation, respondent is found innocent of the charges and is exonerated, he should be reinstated. Preventive suspension pending investigation is not violative of the Constitution because it is not a penalty. It is authorized by law whenever the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or whenever there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges that would warrant removal from the service. If the proper disciplinary authority does not finally decide the administrative case within a period of 90 days from the start of preventive suspension pending investigation, and the respondent is not a presidential appointee, the preventive. suspension is lifted and the respondent is "automatically reinstated in the service." In the case of presidential appointees, the preventive suspension 65pending investigation shall be “for a reasonable time as the circumstances of the case may warrant." Nonetheless, there shall be no indefinite suspension pending investigation, whether the respondent officials are presidential or nonpresidential appointees, The law abhors indefinite preventive suspension because the indefiniteness violates the constitutional guarantees under the due process and equal protection clauses, as well as the right of public officers and ‘employees to security of tenure, The abhorrence of indefinite suspensions impelled the Court in Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan to delineate rules on preventive suspensions pending investigation, viz To the extent that there may be cases of indefinite suspension imposed either under Section 13 of Rep. Act 3019, or Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807, itis best for the guidance of all concerned that this Court set forth the rales on the period of preventive suspension ‘under the aforementioned laws, as follows: 11, Preventive suspension under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019 as amended shall be limited to ‘a maximum period of ninety (90) days, from issuance thereof, and this applies to all public officers, (as defined in Section 2(b) of Rep. Act 3019) who are validly charged sunder said Act. 2. Preventive suspension under Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807 shall apply to all officers or employees whose positions are embraced in the Civil Service, as provided under Sections 3and 4 of said Pres. Decree 807; and shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days from issuance, except where there is delay in the disposition of the case, which is ‘due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of ‘delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein stated; provided that if the person suspended is a presidential appointee, the continuance of his ‘suspension shall be for a reasonable time as the circumstances of the case may warrant. It cannot be validly argued that in the case of presidential appointees the preventive suspension pending investigation can be indefinite. The Court discredited such argument in Garcia v. The Executive Secretary, and directed the immediate reinstatement of a presidential appointee whose preventive suspension had lasted for nearly seven months, declaring: ‘To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President, facing administrative charges, can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service law. This, it is believed, is not conducive to the maintenance of a robust, effective and efficient civil service, the integrity of which has, in this jurisdiction, received constitutional guarantee, as it places in the hands of the Chief Executive a weapon that could be wielded to undermine the security of tenure of public officers. Of course, this is not so in the case of those officers holding office at the pleasure of the President. But where the tenure of office is fixed, as in the case of herein Petitioner, which according to the law he could hold "for 6 years and shall not be removed therefrom except for cause", to sanction the stand of respondents would be to nullify and render useless such specific condition imposed by the law itself If he could be preventively suspended indefinitely, until the final determination of the ‘administrative charges against him (and under the circumstances, it would be the 86President himself who would decide the same at a time only he can determine) then the provisions of the law both as to the fixity of his tenure and the limitation of his removal to only for cause would be meaningless. In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he could, in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution. This would set at naught the !audible (sic) purpose of Congress to surround the tenure of office of the Chairman of the National Science Development Board, which is longer than that of the President himself, with all the safeguards compatible with the purpose of maintaining the office of such officer, considering its highly scientific and technological nature, beyond extraneous influences, and of insuring continuity of research and development activities in an atmosphere of stability and detachment so necessary for the fulfillment of its mission, uninterrupted by factors other than removal for cause-22 (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis) In Layzo, Sr. ». Sandiganbayan, the Court has further reminded that preventive suspension pending investigation for an indefinite period of time, like one that would last until the case against the incumbent official would have been finally terminated, would "outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression," and would be a denial of due process. Conformably with the foregoing disquisitions, we hold that the CA correctly decreed that Baculi should be paid his back salaries and other benefits for the entire time that he should have been automatically reinstated at the rate owing to his position that he last received prior to his preventive suspension on September 4, 1992. Such time corresponded to the period from December 4, 1992 until June 25, 2003, but excluding the interval from March 12, 2001 until December 31, 2001 when he was briefly reinstated. (Baculi v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 188681, March 8, 2017) Dropping from the Rolls ‘There is no question that a public officer or employee who is AWOL may be separated from service or dropped from the rolls of employees without prior notice. (Civil Service Commission v. Plopino, G.R. No. 197571, April 3, 2017) Based on current rules, a public officer or employee may be dropped from the rolls for AWOL without prior notice, under any of the following circumstances: (1) the public officer or employee was continuously absent without approved leave for at least 30 working days; or (2) the public officer or employee had established a scheme to circumvent the rule by incurring, substantial absences, though less than 30 working days, three times in a semester, such that a pattern was readily apparent. Dropping from the rolls is not disciplinary in nature. It shall not result in the forfeiture of any benefit of the public official or employee concerned nor in said public official or employee's disqualification from reemployment in the government. Thus, the concerned public official or employee need not be notified or be heard. (Civil Service Commission v. Plopino, G.R. No. 197571, April 3, 2017) 67Article KC (COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Enforcement and Administration of Election Laws Under Section 2 (1), Article IX (C) of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC has the duty to "[elnforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election 20%" ‘The Court had previously ruled that the COMELEC has the legal duty to cancel the CoC of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office, albeit, arising from a criminal conviction. Considering, however, that Section 52 (a), Rule 10 of the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service similarly imposes the penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal from service, the Court sees no reason why the ratiocination enunciated in such earlier criminal case should not apply here, xxx. (Dimapilis v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227158, April 18, 2017) In Romeo G. Jalosjos v. COMELEC (Jalosjos), the Court had illumined that while the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of, one's CoC generally necessitates the exercise of the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions commenced through a petition based on either Sections 12 or 78 of the OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC, when the grounds therefor are rendered conclusive on account of final and executory judgments, as in this case, such exercise falls within the COMELEC's administrative functions. (Dimapilis v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227158, April 18, 2017) ‘As petitioner's disqualification to run for public office pursuant to the final and executory OMB rulings dismissing him from service now stands beyond dispute, it is incumbent upon the COMELEC to cancel petitioner's CoC as a matter of course, else it be remiss in fulfilling its Constitutional duty to enforce and administer all laws and regulation relative to the conduct of an election. (Dimapilis v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227158, April 18, 2017) Certificates of Candidacy ‘A CoC is a formal requirement for eligibility to public office. Section 74 of the OEC provides that the CoC of the person filing it shall state, among others, that he is eligible for the office he seeks to run, and that the facts stated therein are true to the best of his knowledge. To be "eligible" relates to the capacity of holding, as well as that of being elected to an office. Conversely, "ineligibility" has been defined as a "disqualification or legal incapacity to be elected to an office or appointed to a particular position." In this relation, a person intending to run for public office must not only possess the required qualifications for the position for which he or she intends to run, but must also possess none of the grounds for disqualification under the law. (Dimapilis v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227158, April 18, 2017) In this case, petitioner had been found guilty of Grave Misconduct by a final judgment, and punished with dismissal from service with all its accessory penalties, including perpetual disqualification from holding public office. Verily, perpetual disqualification to hold public office is a material fact involving eligibility which rendered petitioner's CoC void from the start 68,since he was not eligible to run for any public office at the time he filed the same. (Dimapilis v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227158, April 18, 2017) A person whose CoC had been cancelled is deemed to have not been a candidate at all because his CoC is considered void ab initio, and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily to valid votes. The cancellation of the CoC essentially renders the votes cast for him or her as stray votes, and are not considered in determining the winner of an election. This would necessarily invalidate his proclamation and entitle the qualified candidate receiving the highest number of votes to the position. (Dimapilis v. Conimission on Elections, G.R, No. 227158, April 18, 2017) Itis likewise imperative for the eligible candidate who gamered the highest number of votes to assume the office. In Svetlana P. Jalosjos v. COMELEC, the Court explained: ‘There is another more compelling reason why the eligible candidate who gamered the highest number of votes must assume the office. The ineligible candidate who was proclaimed and who already assumed office is a de facto officer by virtue of the ineligibility. The rule on succession in Section 44 of the Local Government Code cannot apply in instances when a de facto officer is ousted from office and the de jure officer takes over. The ouster of a de facto officer cannot create a permanent vacancy as contemplated in the Locel Government Code. There is no vacancy to speak of as the de Jure officer, the rightful winner in the elections, has the legal right to assume the position. (Dimapitis v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No, 227158, April 18, 2017) Petitioner filed the petition for disqualification of respondent on the grounds that he allegedly violated the three-term limit rule provided under the Constitution and the LGC; and that he was suspended from office as a result of an administrative case. Notably, however, a reading of the grounds enumerated under the above-quoted provisions for a candidate's disqualification does not include the two grounds relied upon by petitioner. Thus, the COMELEC Second Division was correct when it found that the petition was not based on any of the grounds for disqualification as enumerated in the foregoing statutory provisions. 30%. While the alleged violation of the three-term limit rule is not a ground for a petition for disqualification, however, the COMELEC Second Division found that it is an ineligibility which is a proper ground for a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a Certificate of Candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC, hence considered the petition as such. »0% Since the petition filed was a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy, such petition must be filed within 25 days from the time of filing of the COC, as, provided under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. However, as the COMELEC found, the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period, and dismissed the petition for being filed out time. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed such dismissal. We agree. (Albania v, Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 226792, june 7, 2017) 69We, likewise, find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC En Bane when it found that the petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC will not also prosper as there was no violation of the three-term limit rule. Petitioner alleges that since respondent had already been elected and had served as Governor of Camarines Norte for three consecutive terms, ie., 2007, 2010, and 2013, he is proscribed from running for the same position in the 2016 elections as it would already be his fourth consecutive term. Weare not convinced. We heid that two conditions must concur for the application of the disqualification of a candidate based on violation of the three-term limit rule, which are: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. xxx. In this case, while respondent ran as Governor of Camarines Norte in the 2007 elections, he did not win as such. Jt was only after he filed a petition for correction of manifest error that he was proclaimed as the duly-elected Govemor. He assumed the post and served the unexpired term of his opponent from March 22, 2010 until June 30, 2010. Consequently, he did not hold the office for the full term of three years to which he was supposedly entitled to. Thus, such period of time that respondent served as Governor did not constitute a complete and full service of his term. The period when he was out of office involuntarily interrupted the continuity of his service as Governor. As he had not fully served the 2007-2010 term, and had not been elected for three consecutive terms as Governor, there was no violation of the three-term limit rule when he ran again in the 2016 elections. (Albania v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 226792, June 7, 2017) Canvassing of Votes In Nasser Immam v. COMELEC, the Court ruled that a complete canvass of votes is necessary in order to reflect the true desire of the electorate, and that a proclamation of winning candidates on the basis of incomplete canvass is illegal and of no effect, viz.: Jurisprudence provides that all yotes cast in an election must be considered, otherwise Yoters shall be disenfranchised. A canvass cannot be reflective of the true vote of the clectorate unless and until all returns aze considered and none is omitted. In this case, fourteen (14) precincts were omitted in the canvassing, 20% ‘An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent proclamation. A canvass cannot be reflective of the true vote of the electorate unless all Tetums are considered and none is omitted. This is true when the clection returns missing or not counted will affect the results ofthe election. We note that the votes of petitioner totaled one thousand nine hundred and sixty-one (1,961) while private respondent garnered a total of one thousand nine hundred thirty (11930) votes. The difference was only thirty-one (31) votes. There were fourteen (14) precincts unaccounted for whose total number of registered voters are two thousand three hundred 70and forty-eight (2,348). Surely, these votes will affect the result of the election. Consequently, the non-inclusion of the 14 precincts in the counting disenfranchised the voters. In the case at bar, the COMELEC En Banc correctly pointed out that the uncanvassed election returns can still drastically affect the outcome of the elections, since "at the time of Sinsuat's proclamation, he garnered only [1,230] votes, with the exclusion of the [12] election returns and. [4] election returns that have yet to be canvassed. These [4] election returns amount to [3,049] votes, or equivalent to 42.91% of the total registered voters of South Upi, Maguindanao." Notably, Mamalinta's defense of duress - which was upheld in her other two (2) acts of double proclamation and unauthorized transfer of the place for canvassing - is untenable in this instance as there was no showing that the MBOC was intimidated or coerced into proclaiming Sinsuat as the winning candidate for the position of Mayor of South Upi, Maguindano. The allegations of Mamalinta that force and threats were exerted on her to make said premature proclamation are self-serving and not supported by any other evidence, hence, cannot be relied upon. Therefore, Mamalinta's afore-described act of premature proclamation may still be considered as Grave Misconduct, Gross Neglect of Duty, and/or Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service, and thus, she should be held administratively liable therefor. (Commission or: Elections v. Mamalinta, G.R. No. 226622, Match 14, 2017) ‘The penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office may be properly imposed on a candidate for public office who repeatedly fails to submit his Statement of Contributions and Expenditures (SOCE) pursuant to Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166. The penalty does not amount to the cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment proscribed by the Bill of Rights. (Maturan v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227155, March 28, 2017) Nonetheless, the petitioner submits that he only failed to submit his SOCE once, in 2010. He pleads good faith because he thought that he was no longer required to submit his SOCE for the 2013 elections because of his having withdrawn from the mayoral race in that year. His plea of good faith is undeserving of consideration. ‘The petitioner should have paid heed to the 1995 ruling in Pilar v. Conarsission of Elections, which the COMELEC properly cited in its assailed resolution. Based on Pilar, every candidate, including one who meanwhile withdraws his candidacy, is required to file his SOCE by Section 1d of R.A. No. 7166. Accordingly, the petitioner could not invoke good faith on the basis of his having withdrawn his candidacy a day before the 2013 elections. (Maturan , Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227155, March 28, 2017) Cardino innmediately filed a petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC, which sought to nullify the candidacy of Jalosjos on the ground of ineligibility. Said petition was docketed as EPC No. 2013-06 before the COMELEC Second Division. Cardino alleged that Jalosjos was a former natural-born Filipino citizen who subsequently became a naturalized Citizen of the United States of America (USA). Jalosjos later applied for the reacquisition of her Filipino citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in Los Angeles, California, USA. On ‘August 2, 2009, Jalosjos took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and an Order of Approval of Citizenship retention and reacquisition was issued in her favor. However, when Jalosjs filed her Certificate of nmCandidacy (COC) for Mayor of Dapitan City on October 1, 2012, she atfached therein an AMfidavit of Renunciation of her American citizenship that was subscribed and sworn to on July 16, 2012 before Judge Veronica C. De Gueman-Laput of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte. Cantino averred that based on the certification from the Bureau of Inmigration,Jalosos left the Philippines for the USA on May 30, 2012 and she presented her US passport to the immigration authorities. Jalosjos then arrived back in he Philippines via Delia Airlines Flight No. 173 on July 17, 2012 at around 10:45 pam. using her US passport Carino, therefore, argued that it was physically impossible for Jalosjos to have personally appeared in Manukam, Zamboanga del Norte before Judge De Gurman-Laput on July 16, 2012 to execute, sign and swear to her Affidavit of Renunciation. Cardino alleged that Jalosios' Affidavit of Remunciation was a falsified document that had no legal effect. As such, when Jalosjos filed her COC for Mayor of Dapitan City, she still possessed both Philippine and American titizenships and was therefore disqualified from running for any elective local position. Given that Jalojos' COC twas void ab initio, she was never a candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City. Cardino, thus, prayed for Jalosjos to be declared ineligible fo run for Mayor of Dapitan: City, that her proclamation be set aside, and that he be proclaimed as the duly-elected Mayor of Dapitan City. Jjlosjos ansioered that the date of "16th day of July, 2012" was mistakenty indicated in the Affidavit of Renunciation instead of ts actual execution date of July 19, 2012. Jalosos claimed that it was on the later date tat she appeared before Judge De Guzman-Laput to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship. Jalosjs further contended that Cardino failed to show that Judge De Guzman-Laput denied having ‘tdministered the oath that Jalosjos took as she renounced said citizenship, Jalosjos averred that she had no reason to inake if appear that she renounced her American citizenship on July 16, 2012. The actual date of Jlosjos' renunciation of her American citizenship on July 19, 2012 allegedly complied with the requirements under Republic ‘Act No. 9225 such that she remained eligible for the position of Mayor of Dapitan City. (Cardino v. Commission. on Elections, G.R. No. 216637, March 7, 2017) In this case, the crux of the controversy involves the validity of Jalosjos' Affidavit of Renunciation. Cardino asserts the spuriousness of the affidavit based on the date of its supposed execution on July 16, 2012; whereas Jalosjos claims otherwise, insisting that while the affidavit was so dated, the same was merely an error as the affidavit was executed and subscribed to on July 19, 2012. The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the ruling of the Second Division that the date of July 16, 2012 in the Affidavit of Renunciation was indeed a clerical error. The COMELEC Second Division gave greater weight to the evidence offered by Jalosjos, particularly the testimony of Judge De Guzman-Laput, who unequivocally stated that Jalosjos personally appeared before her sala "on July 19, 2012 to subscribe to the Affidavit of Renunciation. The COMELEC Second Division found that Cardino failed to disprove Judge De Guzman-Laput's testimony. After carefully reviewing the evidence on hand, the Court finds no proper reason to disturb the factual findings of the COMELEC. (Cardin v. Commission on Elections, G.R, No. 216637, March 7, 2017) All things considered, the Court affirms the findings of the COMELEC Second Division that Jalosjos' Affidavit of Renunciation ig not a falsified document. As such, Jalosjos complied with the provisions of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. By virtue thereof, Jalosjos was able to fully divest herself of her American citizenship, thus making her eligible to run for the 72mayorship of Dapitan City, Zamboanga dei Norte. (Cardino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 216637, March 7, 2017) In Sobejana-Condon v. Commission on Elections, the Court explained in detail the requirements that must be complied with under Republic Act No. 9225 before a person with dual citizenship can be qualified to run for any elective public office, to wit: [Republic Act] No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic, thus: Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign “ountry are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: “1, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal ordezs promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that [recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.” Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after th effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath, ‘The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5, viz: Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: (1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws; (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing Iaws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath; xx B‘The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v, COMELEC, we declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied. (Cardino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 216637, March 7, 2017) Article X-D COMMISSION ON AUDIT Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that "[ulnless otherwise provided by this Constitution, or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari vy the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." (Galindo v. Commission on Autit, G.R. No. 210788, January 10, 2017) In administrative disciplinary cases decided by the COA, the proper remedy in case of an adverse decision is an appeal to the Civil Service Commission and not a petition for certiorari before this Court under Rule 64. (Galindo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 210788, January 10, 2017) Rule 64 governs the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on. Audit and the Commission on Elections. It refers to Rule 65 for the mode of review of the judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Audit and the Commission on Elections. A petition filed under Rule 65 requires that the "tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law 2x." (Galindo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 210788, January 10, 2017) Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution governs the review of the COA, in that the COA 's decisions, final orders or rulings may be brought to the Supreme Coul1 on certiomri by the aggrieved paily within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. To differentiate this review from the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, the Court incorporated a new rule (Rule 64) in the 1997 revision of the Rules of Court under the title Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit. Except for the period for bringing the petition for review, Rule 64 is a replication of the provisions of Rule 65 on the special civil action for certiorari. (Birttudan v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 211937, March 21, 2017) ‘The Constitution vests enough latitude in the COA, as the guardian of public funds, to determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government fund. The COA is thus accorded the complete discretion to exercise its constitutional duty. To accord with such constitutional empowerment, the Court generally sustains the COA's decisions in recognition of its expertise in the 74implementation of the laws it has been entrusted to enforce. Only if the COA acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may the Court intervene and correct the COA's actions. For this purpose, grave ‘abuse of discretion means that there is on the part of the COA an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law, such as when the assailed decision or resolution rendered is not based on law and the evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism. (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R No. 216588; Antonio v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 216954, April 18, 2017) Without any evidence being presented by the COA to show that the individual beneficiaries and the approving officers had acted in bad faith and with gross negligence in the performance of their duties in relation to the MVLPP, the persons identified by the COA to be liable for the {disallowances should not be ordered to refund the amounts or restitute the benefits disallowed by the COA. Nonetheless, the Court needs to clarify that the claim of good faith is being favorably ‘considered herein only because the Notice of Disallowance issued long after the disallowed availments were made, and because no evidence showed those who had availed themselves of the benefits had not fully returned the funds in question. Verily, there would be no way of appreciating good faith in their favor had the availments been made after the disallowance issued. (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R, No. 216538; Antonio v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 216954, April 18, 2017) By jurisprudence, the patent disregard of several case laws and COA directives, as in this case, amounts to gross negligence; hence, petitioners cannot be presumed in good faith. (Tetangeo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 215061, June 6, 2017) ‘As the records bear out, the petitioners who approved the EMEs (Extraordinary and ‘Miscellaneous Expenses) failed to observe the following: first, there is already a law, the GAA, that limits the grant of EMEs; second; COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997 is a directive issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executing prohibition imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution on the President and his official family, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives from holding multiple offices and receiving double compensation; and third, the irregularity of giving additional compensation or allowances to ex officio members was already settled by jurisprudence, during the time that the subject allowances were authorized by the BSP. Indeed, the petitioners-approving officers! disregard of the aforementioned case laws, COA issuances, and the Constitution, cannot be deemed as a mere lapse consistent with the presumption of good faith. (Tetangco v. Comission on Audit, G.R, No. 215061, June 6, 2017) Clearly, therefore, public officials who are directly responsible for, or participated in making the illegal expenditures, as well as those who actually received the amounts therefrom shall be solidarily liable for their reimbursement. However, in cases involving the disallowance of salaries, emoluments, benefits, and allowances due to government employees, jurisprudence has settled that recipients or payees in good faith 7s‘The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the cettificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship. (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied. (Cardino v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 216637, March 7, 2017) Article HCD COMMISSION ON AUDIT Section 7, Article DCA of the Constitution provides that "[ujnless otherwise provided by this Constitution, or by Jaw, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari vy the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." (Galindo v. Commission on Audit, GR. No. 210788, January 10,2017) In administrative disciplinary cases decided by the COA, the proper remedy in case of an adverse decision is an appeal to the Civil Service Commission and not a petition for certiorari before this Court under Rule 64. (Galindo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 210788, January 10, 2017) Rule 64 governs the review of judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on ‘Audit and the Commission on Elections. It refers to Rule 65 for the mode of review of the judgment or final order or resolution of the Commission on Audit and the Commission on Elections. A petition filed under Rule 65 requires that the "tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law 200%." (Galindo v. Commission on Audit, GR. No. 210788, January 10, 2017) Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution governs the review of the COA, in that the COA 's decisions, final orders or rulings may be brought to the Supreme Coul1 on certiorari by the aggrieved paily within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. To differentiate this review from the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, the Court incorporated a new rule (Rule 64) in the 1997 revision of the Rules of Court under the title Review of Judgments and Final Orders or Resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit. Except for the period for bringing the petition for review, Rule 64 is a replication of the provisions of Rule 65 on the special civil action for certiorari. (Bintudan v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 211937, March 21, 2017) ‘The Constitution vests enough latitude in the COA, as the guardian of public funds, to determine, prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government fund. The COA is thus accorded the complete discretion to exercise its constitutional duty. To accord with such constitutional empowerment, the Court generally sustains the COA's decisions in recognition of its expertise in the 74implementation of the laws it has been entrusted to enforce. Only if the COA acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with graye abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may the Court intervene and correct the COA's actions. For this purpose, grave abuse of discretion means that there is on the part of the COA an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act in contemplation of law, such as when the assailed decision or resolution rendered is not based on law and the evidence but on caprice, whim and despotism. (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, GR. No. 216538; Antonio v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 216954, April 18, 2017) Without any evidence being presented by the COA to show that the individual beneficiaries and the approving officers had acted in bad faith and with gross negligence in the performance of their duties in relation to the MVLPP, the persons identified by the COA to be liable for the disallowances should not be ordered to refund the amounts or restitute the benefits disallowed by the COA. Nonetheless, the Court needs to clarify that the claim of good faith is being favorably considered herein only because the Notice of Disallowance issued long after the disallowed availments were made, and because no evidence showed those who had availed themselves of the benefits had not fully returned the funds in question. Verily, there would be no way of appreciating good faith in their favor had the availments been made after the disallowance issued. (Development Bank of the Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R, No. 216538; Antonio 2. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 216954, April 18, 2017) Ry jurisprudence, the patent disregard of several case laws and COA directives, as in this case, amounts to gross negligence; hence, petitioners cannot be presumed in good faith. (Tetangeo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 215061, June 6, 2017) ‘As the records bear out, the petitioners who approved the EMEs (Extraordinary and “Miscellaneous Expenses) failed to observe the following: first, there is already a law, the GAA, that limits the grant of EMEs; second; COA Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September 19, 1997 is a directive issued by the COA to its auditors to enforce the self-executing prohibition imposed by Section 13, Article VII of the Constitution on the President and his official family, their deputies and assistants, or their representatives from holding multiple offices and receiving double compensation; and third, the irregularity of giving additional compensation or allowances to ex officio members was already settled by jurisprudence, during the time that the subject allowances were authorized by the BSP. Indeed, the petitioners-approving officers' disregard of the aforementioned case laws, COA issuances, and the Constitution, cannot be deemed as a mere lapse consistent with the presumption of good faith. (Tetangco v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No, 215061, June 6, 2017) Clearly, therefore, public officials who are directly responsible for, or participated in making the illegal expenditures, as well as those who actually received the amounts therefrom shall be solidarily liable for their reimbursement. “However, in cases involving the disallowance of salaries, emoluments, benefits, and allowances due to government employees, jurisprudence has settled that recipients or payees in good faith 7s‘ced not refund these disallowed amounts. For as long as there is no showing of ill intent and the disbursement was made in good faith, public officers and employees who receive subsequently disallowed benefits or allowances may keep the amounts disbursed to them. On the part of the approving officers, they shall only be required to refund if they are found to have acted in bad faith or were grossly negligent amounting to bad faith. In common usage, the term "good faith" is ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting "honesty of intention, and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or benefit or belief of facts which render transaction unconscientious." (Sambo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 223244, June 20, 2017) Petitioners failed to faithfully discharge their respective duties and to exercise the required diligence which resulted in the irregular disbursements paid to the employees whose appointments have not been approved by the CSC. Being a GOCC, QUEDANCOR is bound by civil service laws. Under the Constitution, the CSC is the central personnel agency of the government, including GOCCs. It primarily deals with matters affecting the career development, rights and welfare of government employees. In this light, the ruling of the COA Commission Proper in not appreciating good faith on the part of the petitioners must perforce be upheld. (Sambo v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 223244, June 20, 2017) Article X LOCAL GOVERNMENT Under Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991, aggrieved taxpayers who question the validity or legality of a tax ordinance are requited to file an appeal before the Secretary of Justice before they seek intervention from the regular courts. Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991 provid SECTION 187, Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Oniinances and Revenue “Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. - ‘The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shail be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, ‘That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provited, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raiged on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thercof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of ‘competent jurisdiction. (Aala v. Uy, G.R. No. 202781, January 10, 2017) In this case, respondent has no clear legal right to the performance of the legal act to be compelled. To recount, respondent filed a mandamus petition before the RTC, seeking that petitioner, as city government, release the funds appropriated for Brgy. 76-A, together with the funds for the compensation of barangay employees, and all funds that in the future may accrue 16to Brgy. 76-A, including legal interests until full payment. As it appears, respondent anchors his legal interest to claim such relief on his ostensible authority as Punong, Barangay of Brgy. 76-A. ocx. However, records clearly show that respondent's proclamation as Punong Barangay was overturned by the COMELEC upon the successful election protest of Tizon, who was later declared the duly-elected Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A. x. Thus, considering that respondent had no right to the office of Punong Barangay at the time he filed his mandamus petition on July 26, 2005, during which the SQAO had already been recalled, he had no valid legal interest to the reliefs prayed for. .ocx. In addition, petitioner could not have been compelled by mandams to release the funds prayed for by respondent in view of the attending circumstances. It is well-settled that "[ m Jandamus only lies to enforce the performance of a ministerial act or duty and not to control the performance of a discretionary power. Purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts. Discretion, as thus intended, means the power or right conferred upon the office by law of acting officially under certain circumstances according to the dictates of his own judgment and conscience and not controlled by the judgment or conscience of others." In this case, petitioner, as city government, had to exercise its discretion not to release the funds to respondent considering the COMELEC's declaration of Tizon as the duly-elected Punong Barangay of Brgy. 76-A. Surely, it was part of petitioner's fiscal responsibility to ensure that the barangay funds would not be released to a person without proper authority. (City of Dano v. Olanolan, G.R. No. 181149, April 17, 2017) ‘The main purpose of zoning is the protection of public safety, health, convenience, and welfare. ‘There is no indication that the Torre de Manila project brings any harm, or hazard to the people in the surrounding areas except that the building allegedly poses an unsightly view on the taking of photos or the visual appreciation of the Rizal Monument by locals and tourists. In fact, the Court must take the approval of the MZBAA, and its subsequent ratification by the City ‘Council of Manila, as the duly authorized exercise of discretion by the city officials. Great care must be taken that the Court does not unduly tread upon the local government's performance of its duties. It is not for this Court to dictate upon the other branches of the government how their discretion must be exercised so long as these branches do not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., GR. ‘No. 213948, April 25, 2017) In this case, while respondent ran as Governor of Camarines Norte in the 2007 elections, he did. not win as such, It was only after he filed a petition for correction of manifest error that he was proclaimed as the duly-elected Governor. He assumed the post and served the unexpired term of his opponent from March 22, 2010 until June 30, 2010. Consequently, he did not hold the office for the full term of three years to which he was supposedly entitled to. Thus, such period of time that respondent served as Governor did not constitute a complete and full service of his term. The period when he was out of office involuntarily interrupted the continuity of his service as Governor. As he had not fully served the 2007-2010 term, and had not been elected for three consecutive terms as Governor, there was no violation of the three-term limit rule when he ran again in the 2016 elections. (Albania v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 226792, June 7, 2017) 7Article XI ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS Public Officers Munoz's DILG authorization prohibited him from utilizing government time for his private practice, As correctly observed by Commissioner Aguila, Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws (Omnibus Rules), requires government officers and employees of all departments and agencies, except those covered by special laws, to render not less than eight (8) hours of work a day for five (6) days a week, or a tolal of forty (40) hours a week. The number of required weekly working hours may not be reduced, even in cases where the department or agency adopts @ flexible work schedule, Notably, Munoz did not deny Monares' allegation that he made at least eighty-six (86) court appearances in connection with at least thirty (90) cases from April 11, 1996 to August 1, 2001. He merely alleged that his private practice did not prejudice the functions of his office. Court appearances are necessarily made within regular government working, hours, from 8:00 in the morning to 12:00 noon, and 1:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon. Additional time is likewise required to study each case, draft pleadings and prepare for trial. The sheer volume of cases handled by Mufioz clearly indicates that government time was necessarily utilized in pursuit of hie private practice, in clear violation of the DILG authorization and Rule 6.02 of the CPR. (Monares v. Munoz, A.C. No. 5582, January 24, 2017) In Philippine National Railtoays &. Kanlaon Construction Enterprises Co., Inc. this Court has held that contracts that do not comply with the foregoing requirements are void: ‘Thus, the Administrative Code of 1987 expressly prohibits the entering into contracts involving the expenditure of public funds unless two prior requirements are satisfied. First, there must be an appropriation law authorizing the expenditure required in the contract, Second, there must be attached to the contract a certification by the proper ‘accounting official and auditor that funds have been appropriated by law and such funds are available. Failure to comply with any of these two requirements renders the contract void. In several cases, the Court had the occasion to apply these provisions of the “Administrative Code of 1987 and the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. In these cases, the Court clearly ruled that the two requirements-the existence of appropriation and the attachment of the certification-are "conditions sine qua nom for the ‘execution of government contracts.” In COMELEC v. Quijano-Padilla, we stated: It fs quite evident from the tenor of the language of the law that the existence of appropriations and the availability of funds are indispensable pre-requisites to or ‘Conditions sine qua non for the execution of government contracts. The obvious intent is to impose such conditions as a priori requisites to the validity ofthe proposed contract. 78Condonation Doctrine In Carpio Morales, the Court abandoned the "condonation doctrine," explaining that "[eJlection is, not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different termis fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term." ‘Although Carpio Morales clarified that such abandonment should be prospectively applied (tus, treating the condonation doctrine as "good law" when the COMELEC's petition was commenced on October 29, 2013, and when petitioner filed his Verified Answer cum ‘Memorandum invoking the same), the parameters for the operation of such doctrine simply do not obtain in petitioner's favor. (Dimapilis v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227158, April 18, 2017) In this case, the OMB rulings dismissing petitioner for Grave Misconduct had already attained finality on May 28, 2010, which date was even prior to his first election as Punong Barangay of Brgy. Pulung Maragul in the October 2010 Barangay Elections. As above-stated, "[t]he penalty of dismissal [from service] shali carry with it that of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for re-employment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision." Although the principal penalty of dismissal appears to have not been effectively implemented (since petitioner was even able to run and win for two [2] consecutive elections), the corresponding accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office had already rendered him ineligible to run for any elective local position. Bearing the same sense as its criminal law counterpart, the term perpetual in this administrative penalty should likewise connote a lifetime restriction and is not dependent on the term of any principal penalty. It is undisputable that this accessory penalty sprung from the same final OMB rulings, and therefore had already attached and consequently, remained effective at the time petitioner filed his CoC on October 11, 2013 and his later re~ election in 2013. Therefore, petitioner could not have been validly re-elected so as to avail of the condonation doctrine, unlike in other cases where the condonation doctrine was successfully invoked by virtue of re-clections which overtook and thus, rendered moot and academic pending administrative cases. (Dimuapilis v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 227158, April 18, 2017) Retirement Retirement benefits are given to government employees to reward them for giving the best years of their lives to the service of their country. This is especially true with those in government service occupying positions of leadership or positions requiring management skills because the years they devote to government service could be spent more profitably elsewhere, such as in lucrative appointments in the private sector. Hence, in exchange for their selfless dedication to government service, they should enjoy security of tenure and be ensured of a reasonable amount of support after they leave the government. Pauig insists that retirement laws must be liberally construed in favor of the retirees because the intention is to provide for their sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when they no longer a1have the stamina to continue earning their livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life to public service, Pautig asserts that he deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best concretely expressed in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the value and length of his services. That generosity, he argues, is the least he chould expect now that his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach ofthe lengthening shadows, he should be able to savor the fruits of his toil. However, the doctrine of liberal construction cannot be applied in this case, where the law. invoked i clear, unequivocal and leaves no room for interpretation or construction. To uphold Pauig's position will contravene the very words of the law, and will defeat the ends which it seeks to atiain. (Government Service Insurance System v. Pauig, G-R. No. 210328, January 30, 2017) Pauig cited the case of GSIS v. CSC, where the Court ruled that the basis for the provision of retiremer:: benefits is service to the government. Indeed, while a government insurance system rationalizes the management of funds necessary to keep this system of retirement support afloat and is partly dependent on contributions made by the thousands of members of the system, the fact that these contributions are minimal when compared to ‘the amount of retirement benefits actually received shows that such contributions, while necessary, are not absolutely determinative in drawing up criteria for those who would qualify as recipients of the retirement benefit system. Unfortunately, Pautig's reliance on the aforecited case is misplaced. True, in GSIS 2. CSC, the Court allowed the claimants to avail of their retirement benefits although no deductions were made from their salaries during the disputed periods when they were paid on a per diem basis. However, unlike in the case at bar, deductions were actually made from claimant's fixed salary before and after the short controversial period. She assumed in all good faith that she continued to be covered by the GSIS insurance benefits considering that, in fact and in practice, the deductions are virtually mandatorily made from all government employees on an essentially involuntary basis. More importantly, neither of the claimants in this case of GSIS 9. CSC was 2 casual or temporary employee like Pauig, both of them being elective officials. Here, the primordial reason why there were ng deductions during those fourteen (14) years was because Pauig was not yet a GSIS member at that time. There was thus no legal obligation to pay the premium as no basis for the remittance of the same existed. And since only periods of service where premium payments were actually made and duly remitted to the GSIS shall be included in the computation of retirement benefits, said disputed period of fourteen (14) years must corollarily be removed from Pauig's creditable service, ‘The Court must deny Pauig's appeal to liberal construction since the applicable law is clear and unambiguous. The primary modality of addressing the present case is to look into the provisions of the retirement law itself. Guided by the rules of statutory construction in this Consideration, the Court finds that the language of the retirement law is clear and unequivocal; no room for construction of interpretation exists, only the application of the letter of the law. ‘Therefore, Pauig's casual and temporary service in the government from February 12, 1964 to July 18, 1977 must necessarily be excluded from the creditable period of service for retirement purposes. (Government Service Insurance System v. Pauig, GR. No. 210828, January 30, 2017) 82Ombudsman ‘The issue presented in these consolidated petitions is not novel. In fact, it has long been settled in a number of cases, to wit: Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego, Villasenor, et al. v. Ombudsman, et al., and The Office of the Ombudsman v. Valencerina, stating that the OMB's decision, even if the penalty imposed is dismissal from the service, is immediately executory despite the pendency of a motion for reconsideration or an appeal and cannot be stayed by mere filing of them. (Cobarde-Gamallo 0. Escandor, G.R. No. 184464, June 21, 2017) It can be gleaned from the afore-quoted provision that the OMB's decisions in administrative cases may either be unappealable of appealable. The unappealable decisions are final and executory, to wit: (1) respondent is absolved of the charge; (2) the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand; (3) suspension of not more than one month; and (4) a fine equivalent to one month's salary. The appealable decisions, on the other hand, are those falling outside the aforesaid enumeration, and may be appealed to the CA under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within 15 days from receipt of the writien notice of the decision or order denying the motion for reconsideration. Section 7 (of Rule IIL, of the OMB Rules of Procedure, as amended by AO No. 17) is categorical in providing that an appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and that such shali be executed as a matter of course. (Cobirde-Gamallo v. Escandor, G.R. No. 184464, June 21, 2017) Here, Escandor was ordered dismissed from the service. Undoubtedly, such decision against him is appealable via Rule 43 to the CA. Nonetheless, the same is immediately executory even pending appeal or in his case even pending his motion for reconsideration before the OMB as that is the clear mandate of Section 7, Rule III of the OMB Rules of Procedure, as amended, as well as the OMB's MC No. 01, Series of 2006. As such, Escandor's filing of a motion for reconsideration does not stay the inumediate implementation of the OMB's order of dismissal since "a decision of the [OMB] in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course" under the afore-quoted Section 7. (Cobmtrde-Gamallo v. Escandor, G.R. No. 184464, June 21, 2017) Further, in applying Section 7, there is no vested right that is violated as the respondent in the administrative case is considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal and, in the event he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal. To note, there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office. Except for constitutional offices that provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office. Hence, no vested right of Escandor would be violated as he would be considered under preventive suspension and entitled to the salary and emoluments that he did not receive, by reason of his dismissal from the service, in the event that his Motion for Reconsideration will be granted or that he wins in his eventual appeal. (Cobarde-Gamallo v. Escandor, G.R. No. 184464, June 21, 2017) ‘The OMB is authorized to promulgate its own rules of procedure by none other than the Constitution, which is fleshed out in Sections 18 and 27 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989" empowering the OMB to "promulgate its rrules of procediure for the effective exercise or performance of its powers, functions, and dluties* and to accordingly amend or modify its rules as the interest of justice may require. With that, 83the CA cannot just stay the execution of decisions rendered by the OMB when its rules categorically and specifically warrant their enforcement, else the OMB's rule-making authority be unduly encroached and the constitutional and statutory provisions providing the same be disregarded. (Cobarde-Gamallo v. Escandor, G.R. No. 184464, June 21, 2017) ‘Thus, as things currently stand, Samaniego remains to be the prevailing doctrine. The ‘Ombudsman has legal interest in appeals from its rulings in administrative cases. Petitioner could not then be faulted for filing its Omnibus Motion before the appellate court in CA-G.R. SP No. 107551. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 189100, June 21, 2017) ‘Thus, in the three cases that seemingly strayed from Samaniego, it can be said that under the circumstances obtaining therein, the appellate court had a valid reason for disallowing the Ombudsman to participate in those cases because the latter only moved for intervention after the CA already rendered judgment. By that time, intervention is no longer warranted. (Office of the Ontbudsman 0, Gutierrez, G.R. No. 189100, June 21, 2017) SALNs It must be emphasized that the filing of SALNs is obligatory on the part of all officials and employees of the government. A SALN is a pro forma document which must be completed and submitted under oath by the declarant attesting to his/her total assets and liabilities, including businesses and financial interests that make up his/her net worth. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conductand _Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, mandates all officials and employees in the government service to accomplish and submit, under oath, declarations of their assets, liabilities, net worth and business interests including those of their spouse and unmarried children below eighteen (18) years of age. 200. ‘Thus, upon assumption of office and every year thereafter, it is mandatory for all public officials and employees, whether regular or co-terminous, to file their SALNs. In completing the SALN, particularly the portion requiring the declaration of real properties, it is compulsory for the declarant to disclose the kind, location, year, and mode of acquisition, the assessed value, current fair market value and the acquisition cost of the property including the improvements thereon. Before 2011, public officers and employees accomplished their SALNs by accompiishing the pro forma form drawn up by the Civil Service Commission (CSC). During the time, a general statement of one's assets and liabilities would suffice, as the declarant had no obligation to enumerate in detail his assets and liabilities. In order to make the SALN a more effective tool for transparency and accountability, the CSC created a technical working group for the revision and amendments on the use of SALN. On July 8, 2011, the CSC issued Resolution No. 1100902 prescribing the guidelines in accomplishing the revised SALN. The implementation of the revised SALN was, however, deferred due to several requests from the private sectors, the House Committee on Civil Service and Professional Regulation, and the Senate Committee on Civil Service and Government Reorganization, citing that government workers had not fully comprehended the requirements in the filling out of the new SALN form and for lack of sufficient knowledge on how to accomplish it. 34‘Thereafter, CSC Resolution No. 1300174, dated January 24, 2013, was circulated prescribing the new SALN Form and Guidelines in the Filling Out of the SALN Form. This was, however, revised again thru CSC Resolution No, 1500088, dated January 23, 2015. CSC Resolution No. 1500088 is the current SALN that must be accomplished by all government officials and ‘employees. Unlike the old form, the new SALN form is more restrictive as it requires a more detailed and sworn statement of the declarant's assets, liabilities and net worth, disclosure of business interests, financial connections, relatives in the government service, and amount and ‘sources of income for the preceding calendar year. With respect to real property, the declarant is mandated to disclose the description and the exact location of the property involved. (In re: ‘Alleged Immorality and Unexplained Wealth of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Roland B. jurado, A.M. OCA IPINo. 10-21-SB-}. April 4, 2017) Indeed, the failure to file a truthful SALN puts in doubt the integrity of the public officer or employee, and would normally amount to dishonesty. {¢ should be emphasized, however, that mere non-declaration of the required data in the SALN does not automatically amount to such ‘an offense. Dishonesty requires malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. In addition, a public officer or employee becomes susceptible to dishonesty only when such non-declaration results in the accumulated wealth becoming manifestly disproportionate to his/her income, and income from other sources, and he/she fails to properly account or explain ‘these sources of income and acquisitions. Here, the Court finds that there is no substantial evidence of intent to commit a wrong, or to deceive the authorities, and conceal the other properties in petitioner's and her husband's names. Petitioner's failure to disclose in her 1997 SALN her business interest in KEI is not a sufficient badge of dishonesty in the absence of bad faith, or any malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill-will for ulterior purposes. 3%x. It should be emphasized that the laws on SALN aim to curtail the acquisition of unexplained wealth. Thus, in several cases where the source of the undisclosed wealth was properly accounted for, the Court deemed the same an "explained wealth’ which the law does not penalize. Consequently, absent any intent to commit a wrong, and having accounted for the source of the "undisclosed wealth,” as in this case, petitioner cannot be adjudged guilty of the charge of Dishonesty; but at the most, of mere negligence for having failed to accomplish her SALN properly and accurately. (Daplas v. Department of Finance, G.R, No, 221153, April 17, 2017) Article XIL NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY Reversion is the remedy where the State, pursuant to the Regalian doctrine, seeks to revert land back to the mass of the public domain. It is proper when public land is fraudulently awarded and disposed of to private individuals or corporations. There are also instances when we granted reversion on grounds other than fraud, such as when a "person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight, lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system, or when the Director of Lands did not have jurisdiction over the same because itis of the public domain." asIn this case, the State, through the Solicitor General, alleges neither fraud nor misrepresentation in the cadastral proceedings and in the issuance of the title in Espinosa’s favor. The argument for the State is merely that the property was unlawfully included in the certificate of title because it is of the public domain. Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land registration, the burden is on the State to ‘prove that the property was classified as timberland or forest land at the time it was decreed to Espinosa, To reiterate, there is no burden on Caliston to prove that the property in question is, alienable and disposable land. At this stage, it is reasonable to presume that Espinosa, from whom Caliston derived her title, had already established that the property is alienable and disposable land considering that she succeeded in obtaining the OCT over it. In this reversion proceeding, the State must prove that there was an oversight or mistake in the inclusion of the property in Espinosa's title because it was of public dominion. This is consistent with the rule that the burden of proof rests on the arty who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the affirmative of an issue. (Republic v. Espinosa, G.R. No, 186603, April 5, 2017) ‘The Gamboa Decision already held, in no uncertain terms, that what the Constitution requires is “[fJull [and legal] beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights xox must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals xxx." And, precisely that is what SEC-MC No, 8 provides, viz: "xox For purposes of determining compliance [with the constitutional or statutory ownership], the required percentage of Filipino ownership shall be applied to BOTH (a) the total number of outstanding shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors; AND {b) the total number of outstanding shares of stock, whether or not entitled to vote 200! xx. (Roy v. Herbosa, Resolution on the MR, GR. No. 207246, April 18, 2017) .. the definition of "beneficial owner or beneficial ownership" in the SRC-IRR. which is in consonance with the concept of "full beneficial ownership" in the FIA-IRR, is, as stressed in the Decision, relevant in resolving only the question of who is the beneficial owner or has beneficial ‘ownership of each "specific stock" of the public utility company whose stocks are under review. If the Filipino has the voting power af the "specific stock," i.e., he can vote the stock or direct another to vote for him, or the Filipino has the investment power over the "specific stock", ie., he can dispose of the stock or direct another to dispose of it for him, or both, ic., he can vote and dispose of that "specific stock" or direct another to vote or dispose it for him, then such Filipino is the "beneficial owner" of that "specific stock." Being considered Filipino, that "specific stock" is then to be counted as part of the 60% Filipino ownership requirement under the Constitution. ‘The right to the dividends, jus fruendi-a right emanating from ownership of that "specific stock" necessarily accrues to its Filipino beneficial owner." (Roy v. Herbosa, Resolution on the MR, G-R. ‘No. 207246, April 18, 2017) Article XI SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law generally covers all public and private agricultural lands. (Heirs of Augusto Salas Kr. V. Cabungeal, G.R. No. 191545, March 29, 2017) 86‘The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law covers all public and private agricultural lands, as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the Public domain suitable for agriculture, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, However, a maximum of five (5) hectares of the Iandowner's compact or contiguous andholdings may not be distributed to qualified beneficiaries, as itis within the landowners rights to zetain this area. ‘The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program covers the following lands: (i) all alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture; (2) all lands of the public domain exceeding the total area of five hectares and below to be retained by the Jandowner; (3) all government-owned lands that are devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and (@) all private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture, regardless of the agricultural products raised or can be raised on these lands. (Heirs of Augusto Salas Kr. V. Cabunged, GR. No. 191545, March 29, 2017) ‘The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law covers all agricultural lands, save for those not used or suitable for agricultural activities. ‘The law defines agricultural land as "land devoted to agricultural activity ... and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.* For agricultural land to be considered devoted to an agricultural activity, there must be "cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing, of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of Such farm products, and other faim activities and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.” (Heirs of Augusto Salas Kr. V. Cabungeal, G.R. No. 191545, March 29, 2017) ‘Aside from being devoted to an agricultural activity, the land must, likewise, not have been Classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial, or industrial land. (Heirs of Augusto Salas Kr. V. Cabungcal, G.R. No. 191545, March 29, 2017) ‘As a general rule, agricultural lands that were reclassified as commercial, residential, or industrial by the local government, as approved by the HLURB, before June 15, 1986 are excluded from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. 'A farmlot is not included in any of these categories. (Heirs of Augusto Salas Kr. V. Cabungeal, G.R. No. 191545, March 29, 2017) ‘The reclassification of Salas’ landholding into a farmlot subdivision, although effected before Republic Act No. 6657, has not changed the nature of these agricultural lands, the legal relationships existing over such lands, or the agricultural usability of the lands, Thus; these lots were properly subjected to compulsory coverage under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. (Heirs of Augusto Salas Kr. V. Cabungcal, G.R. No. 191545, March 29, 2017) However, We emphasize that the constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers. The commitment of this Court to the cause of labor ‘oes not prevent us from sustaining the employer when it isin the right. We should always be ‘mindful that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed with in the light of 87established facts, the applicable law, and existing jurisprudence. (C. F, Sharp Crew Management »- Castillo, G.R. No. 208215, April 19, 2017) Article XIV. EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, ete. Section 15, Article XIV of the Constitution, which deals with the subject of arts and culture, provides that "[t]he State shall conserve, promote and the ‘nation’s historical and cultural Feritage and resources x« .” Since this provision is not self-executory, Congress Passed laws dealing with the preservation and conservation of our cultural heritage. (Knights of Rizal DMCI Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April 25, 2017) CARLO L. CRUZ