NAVAL

POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

ME 4751 Survivability of LPD 17 class ships

by

Davis, Justin
Palao Rondon, Jonathan
Roussopoulos, Kyriakos

March 2017
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. LPD 17 OVERVIEW...........................................................................................04
A. BACKGROUND......................................................................................04
B. DESIGN....................................................................................................05

II. SURVIVABILITY ANALYSIS APPROACH..................................................07

A. THREAT ANALYSIS.............................................................................07
1. Threat Environment....................................................................12
2. Treat Summary............................................................................13

III. SURVIVABILITY ASSESSMENT....................................................................13

A. CRITICAL COMPONENTS-KILL MODE..........................................13
B. SUSCEPTIBILITY ANALYSIS.............................................................14
1. Radar Signature...........................................................................14
2. Infrared Signature.......................................................................16
3. Electromagnetic Signature..........................................................18
4. Threat Warning...........................................................................19
5. Threat Suppression......................................................................22
6. Expendables..................................................................................25

IV. LIST OF REFERENCES....................................................................................27

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Concept of LPD-17....................................................................................05

Figure 2. Advanced enclosed mast/sensor (AEM/S).................................................05

Figure 3. Schematic diagram of LPD-17...................................................................07

Figure 4. Potential operating environment................................................................08

Figure 5. Karman Class Silhouette............................................................................09

Figure 6. Layout of Oto Melara 76 mm Compact.....................................................11

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Figure 7. Sketch of threat laydown with respect to mission.....................................13

Figure 8. Example of Advanced Enclosed Mast.......................................................15

Figure 9. IR Signature...............................................................................................16

Figure 10. Ejector/Diffuser assembly..........................................................................17

Figure 11. Susceptibility reduction due to IR reduction.............................................17

Figure 12. Active shaft grounding system...................................................................18

Figure 13. Noor/Ghader SSM.....................................................................................19

Figure 14. Oto Melara 76mm......................................................................................19

Figure 15. Brenda Bofors 40mm.................................................................................19

Figure 16. SPS-73(V)..................................................................................................20

Figure 17. ITT SPS-48E..............................................................................................20

Figure 18. AN/SLQ-32................................................................................................21

Figure 19. JTIDS Link 16............................................................................................21

Figure 20. Raytheon RAM RIM-116..........................................................................22

Figure 21. Mk 46 30mm Gun......................................................................................23

Figure 22. Machine Guns of 9-12.7 mm.....................................................................23

Figure 23. Sikorsky CH-53E Sea Stallion...................................................................24

Figure 24. BELI AH-1W Super Cobra........................................................................24

Figure 25. Phalanx CIWS............................................................................................25

Figure 26. Mk-53 Decoy Launch system (NULKA)..................................................26

Figure 27. Mk-36 SRBOC...........................................................................................27

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 LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. FAC/FIAC threat types……………………………………………………09

Table 2. Karman (Combattante II) class characteristics adapted from…………….10

Jane’s fighting ships

Table 3. Oto Melara gun characteristics …………………………………………...11

Table 4. Ghader missile characteristics …………………………………………....12

Table 5. Critical components and kill modes………………………………………14

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 LPD 17 Overview

Amphibious transport dock ships are warships that embark, transport and land elements of a
landing force for a variety of expeditionary warfare missions. LPDs are used to transport and
land Marines, their equipment and supplies by embarked Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) or
conventional landing craft and amphibious assault vehicles (AAV) augmented by helicopters or
vertical take-off and landing aircraft (MV 22). These ships support amphibious assault, special
operations or expeditionary warfare missions and can serve as secondary aviation platforms for
amphibious ready groups.

Background
The LPD-17 San Antonio class is the functional replacement of over 41 ships from the
following:
- LPD 4 Austin class,
- LSD 36 Anchorage class,
- LKA 113 Charleston class and
- LST 1179 Newport class amphibious ships.

The San Antonio class provides the Navy and Marine Corps with modern, sea-based platforms
that are networked, survivable and built from the keel up, to execute Operational Maneuver from
the Sea, and Ship to Objective Maneuver.

Design
The LPD-17 variant of the San Antonio class amphibious ships is a drastic change in design with
a renewed focus on survivability. Major strides were incorporated to reduce susceptibility as
well as vulnerability reduction in the event of a hit.

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 Figure 1: Concept of LPD-17

The ship is built from steel and designed in a manner, which minimizes radar cross section
(RCS). In particular, the ship’s advanced enclosed mast/sensor (AEM/S) system consists of two
large eight-sided structures, which provide a protection and mounting for radar and
communications antennas.

Figure 2: Advanced enclosed mast/sensor (AEM/S)

Cargo capacity on the LPD-17 class ships can accommodate two Landing Craft Air-Cushion
(LCAC), 700 troops and 14 AAAVs. The ship aircraft carrying capability and weapons systems
allow for up to two Sikorsky CH-53E Sea Stallion helicopters, six Bell AH-1W Super Cobras, 4
Boeing CH-46 Sea Knight helos or 2 Boeing Bell MV-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft. Each of
which can be stored inside of a large hanger protected by 18,000kg blast-resistant doors. This
added aircraft capability enhances the possibility of threat suppression.

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Weaponry selection for the LPD-17 is robust enough to provide self-defense capabilities from a
variety of asymmetric threats. The ship is equipped with the latest Ships Self Defense System
(SSDS), which provides command capabilities with higher echelon commands. The SSDS
system incorporates multi-function radar systems, advanced integrated electronic warfare system
as well as an infrared search-and-track system. Sensors include the AN/SPS-48E 3D air search
radar, which operates in both C/D bands. A trio of I band surface radars round out the sensor
selection for the San Antonio class, they include the AN/SPQ-9B, AN/SPS-64(V)9 and AN/SPS-
73 radars.

There are two mk31 launchers capable of firing the rolling airframe missile (RAM) which
provides surface to air capabilities and incorporates dual-mode radio frequency and infrared
guidance technologies. Additionally, space is allocated for incorporating a vertical launch
system capable of housing the evolved sea sparrow missile (ESSM) if required.

LPD 17 class ships are equipped with automated gun systems such as the 2 mk46 mod 2 30mm
guns for close-in surface self-defense. This gun can fire at a rate of 250 rounds per minute and
includes a thermal imager, low-light TV camera as well as laser rangefinder and closed-loop
tracking system capabilities. There are also crew served weapons systems such as 25mm
machine guns as .50 caliber machine guns for close in self-defense capabilities.

Countermeasure technologies for the LPD 17 class ships seek to identify and defeat attacks
above as well as below the water. The ship is equipped with an AN/SLQ-25A Nixie towed
decoy system to aid in torpedo defense. Counter missile defense is handled in part by hard kill
systems described above as well as soft kill systems such as the mk53 Nulka decoy launching
system and AN/SLQ-32A (V) 2 ESM (electronic support measures) system which provides
detection and jamming capabilities as well as surveillance, warning and electronic
countermeasures.

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 Figure 3: Schematic diagram of LPD-17

Survivability Analysis Approach

Survivability analysis is approached by first conducting a threat analysis to determine potential

adversarial systems that may be encountered in the area of operation. The analysis will identify
key threats to specific operations for the LPD 17. The threat environment that will be examined
with regards to a ship to shore amphibious operations mission based in the Straits of Hormuz.
Upon completion of threat analysis, ship susceptibility is investigated.

Susceptibility analysis will consist of fault tree analysis, signature analysis to include
radar/IR/visual, and signature reduction.

Threat Analysis

Purpose: Threat analysis of the LPD 17 class ship will seek to answer three key questions. First,
what are the LPD 17 primary missions, second, where is the primary theater of operation and
finally, describe and identify a typical mission profile.

The primary missions of the LPD-17 class ship is to support embarking, transporting and landing
elements of a Marine landing force in an assault by helicopters, landing craft, amphibious
vehicles, and by a combination of these methods to conduct primary amphibious warfare
missions. The theater of operations that the San Antonio class LPD will most frequently
encounter are littoral environments near high traffic congested coastlines.

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 Figure 4: Potential operating environment.

The Expected Threats

The vicinity of host nation coastline will present unique challenges to forces conducting
maritime operations. Threats range from various moored, floating and bottom laid mines as
well as organized host nation naval forces. Threats projectors such as naval guns, missiles and
rockets can be brought to bare of forces from land based sites as well as maritime platforms.
There exists the potential for air-to-surface attacks as well by enemy aircraft and missiles. The
unique challenge this document will focus on it the threat from and organized Fast Attack Craft
(FAC) or Fast Inshore Attack Craft (FIAC) attack.

In 2005 the UK’s Defense Science and Technology Laboratory presented a report in which they
classified the FIAC threat into three subtypes: Type 1 includes jet-ski or Boston Whaler craft
carrying rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), Type 2 are Boghammar or similar fast craft, fitted
with unguided multiple launch bombardment rockets or larger anti-tank guided weapons, while
Type 3 were conventional fast attack craft (Scott, 2014). FAC tend to be equipped with small
anti-ship missiles or torpedoes as well as have some organic sensor and a degree of command
and control.

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Type Number Definition/weapons Range
Type 1 Jetski or Boston Whaler with RPG or large blast bomb. 3-500 meters
Type 2 Boghammer class boat with unguided multiple launch Up to 8 km
bombardment or larger anti-tank guided weapon.
Type 3 Fast attack craft: small anti-ship missiles or torpedoes as well 4 km (torpedo)
as have some organic sensor and a degree of command and 15 km (ASM)
control
Table 1: FAC/FIAC threat types.

The large number of threats even from just the FAC/FIAC threat requires an even further refined
scope for discussion. Type three threats will likely present the greatest range of challenges and
therefore will be selected. In particular, the Iranian Karman (Combattante II) class fast attack
craft will be used to aid in assessing the susceptibility of the LPD 17 class ships.

Figure 5: Karman Class Silhouette

Jane’s fighting ships identifies a service fleet of 13 ships currently in use and an additional five
in production. These missile boats are an important part of Iranian Naval forces and provide fast
reaction capabilities to protect territorial waters. A modest size ship displacing just 279 tons
fully loaded the vessel is equipped with missiles, radars and command and control equipment.
Ships characteristics are listed below in table xx below.

Dimensions and weights

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Displacement
standard: 253 tons
full load: 279 tons
Length 47 m (154.2 ft)
Beam 7.1 m (23.3 ft)
Performance
Top speed: 37.5 kt (69.4 km/h) (43.2 mph)
Range 2000 n miles (3704.0 km) (2301.6 miles) at 15 kt (27.8 km/h) (17.3
mph)
700 n miles (1296.4 km) (805.5 miles) at 33.7 kt (62.4 km/h) (38.8
mph)
Machinery: 4 MTU 16V 538 TB91 diesels; 12,280 hp(m) (9.03 MW) sustained; 4
shafts
Firepower
Missiles: SSM: 2 or 4 Noor/Ghader (C-802 derivative) (1 or 2 twin); active
radar homing to 180 km (97.2 n miles) (Noor); 200 km (108 n miles)
(Ghader) at 0.9 Mach; warhead 165 kg; sea-skimmer or 4 McDonnell
Douglas Harpoon (2 twin); active radar homing to 40 km (22 n miles)
at 0.9 Mach; warhead 165 kg; sea-skimmer or Standard SM1-MR box
launchers (Gorz) .
Guns: 1 Oto Melara 3 in (76 mm) /62 compact; 85 rds/min to 16 km (8.7 n
miles) anti-surface; 12 km (6.6 n miles) anti-aircraft; weight of shell
6 kg; 320 rounds. 1 Breda Bofors 40 mm/70; 300 rds/min to 12 km
(6.6 n miles) ; weight of shell 0.96 kg; 900 rounds. Some have a 23
mm or 20 mm gun in place of the 40 mm. 2-12.7 mm MGs.
Electronic ESM: Thomson-CSF TMV 433 Dalia; radar intercept.
countermeasures: ECM: Thomson-CSF Alligator; jammer.
Radars: Surface search/fire control: Signaal WM28; I/J-band.
Navigation: Racal Decca 1226; I-band.
IFF: UPZ-27N/APX-72.
Table 2: Karman (Combattante II) class characteristics adapted from Jane’s fighting ships

Threat mechanisms:
Contact-fuzzed: Oto Melara 3 76mm cannon

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 Figure 6: Layout of Oto Melara 76 mm Compact

Oto Melara 76 mm Compact

Dimensions and weight

Elevation -15 to +85°

Training speed 70°/s

Elevation speed 35°/s

Weight (unloaded) 7.5 t

Performance

Muzzle velocity 925 m/s

Rate of fire 10-85 rds/min

Gun Range 8.6 n miles (16 km) (standard ammunition)

10.8 n miles (20 km)(extended range

ammunition)

Fire Control WM 28 I-/J-band (8 to 20 GHz) fire-control

radar

Radar range 46km

Table 3: Oto Melara gun characteristics
The Ghader missile is powered by a small turbojet engine, which uses a paraffin-based fuel. The
missile uses a DM-3b active radar seeker and guidance uses inertial navigation for midcourse
guidance and active radar for terminal homing. The Ghader missile is programmed to hit the
target below the waterline while maintaining a cruising altitude of between 20 m, 30 m while on

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route to the target, and terminal maneuver allows for a decent to between 5 m and 7 m for the
terminal phase. The warhead uses the same warhead system as the C-801, which has an armor
piercing high-explosive warhead fitted with an electromechanical contact/delay fuze.

Ghader (C-802 derivative)

Dimensions and weights
Length 6.381 m (20 ft 11¼ in) (with booster)
overall: 5.15 m (16 ft 10¾ in) (without booster)
Diameter: 18-20 inch
Flight control surfaces
Span: 1.22 m (4 ft 0 in) (wing)
Weight 800 kg (1,763 lb)
Performance
Speed 0.9 max Mach number
Range 200 km (max)
Ordnance components
Warhead: 1 × 190 kg (418 lb)
Guidance: INS, active, radar, data-link (possible)
Table 4: Ghader missile characteristics

Threat Environment

Encounter conditions between the ship and the threat will occur while the San Antonio class ship
is conducting ship-to-shore movement of troops. The ship will be within ten miles of hostile
territory and will be approached by two host nation Karman Class fast attack craft launched from
a nearby military sea port.

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 Figure 7: Sketch of threat laydown with respect to mission.

Threat Summary

The condition described above will create a realistic state of susceptibility that will provide a
solid backdrop for identifying the key issues of susceptibility related to complex near coast
operations against a Karman Class fast attack craft.

Survivability Assessment

Purpose: Determine the critical components on the ship and show their associated kill modes.

Critical Component Kill Mode(s)

Missiles:  SAM 2 Raytheon RAM RIM-116  Damage in launcher due to missile or

                21 cell Mk-31 Launchers             projectile hit
 Fire
 Explosion
 Overheat
 Damage in Missile launching system
 Crew death or injury
 Damage of cooling system
 Lost of control
 Electrical failure

Guns:  Damage in Guns due to missile or

 2 Mk-46 30 mm projectile hit
 Machine Guns 9-12.7 mm  Fire
 Explosion
 Overheat
 Crew death or injury
 Damage of cooling system
 Lost of control
 Electrical failure

Physical Countermeasures-Decoys:  Damage  due  to missile or projectile hit

 4 Nulka and chaff launchers  Fire
 6 Mk-53  Crew death or injury
 SLQ-25A Nixie  Lost of control
 Combat information system failure

Electronic Countermeasures:  Damage due to missile or projectile hit

 ESM/ECM: SLQ-32A(V)  Fire

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  Combat information system failure
 Crew death or injury
 Damage of cooling system
 Lost of control
 Electrical failure

Radars:  Damage due to missile or projectile hit

 Air Search: ITT SPS-48E, E/F Band  Fire
 Surface Search: Raytheon SPS  Overheat
73(V)13, I Band  Crew death or injury
 Fire Control: Lockheed SPQ-98B, I  Damage of cooling system
Band  Lost of control
 Electrical/High frequency converter
failure
 Jamming from hostile systems

Combat Data Systems:  Damage due to missile or projectile hit

 JTIDS (Link 16)  Fire
 SSDs Mk-2  Overheat
 GCCS (M)  Crew death or injury
 AADS  Lost of control
 Electrical/High frequency converter
failure
 Jamming from hostile systems

Table 5: Critical components and kill modes

Susceptibility Analysis

LPD 17 Signature Analysis

1. Radar Signature
The navy had an initial design for this ship, but after reconsideration, decided to add some
features to create an improved version, they decided to rearrange all the communication antennae
and radar into the new "advanced enclosed mast sensor system" (AEM/S). An important concept
taken into consideration for the design of this ship was to add stealth characteristics, including
the following:

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 - The hull of the ship has a streamlined topside design
- Incorporates a boat valley instead of boat deck
- It has removable coverings in several stations, and
- The ladders can be folded into the ship’s hull.
Advanced Enclosed Mast/Sensor (AEM/S) System
It is a 93 foot high hexagonal structure with a 35 foot diameter made of composite material
which provides a smooth silhouette to reduce its radar cross section. Is constructed of a multi-
layer, frequency-selective composite material designed to allow passage of own-ship sensor
frequencies with very low loss while reflecting other frequencies.

Figure 8: Example of Advanced Enclosed Mast

The incorporation of (AEM/S) System allows for:

Enable New Technologies:
- Embedded Sensors.
- Enclosed Sensors.
- Planar Arrays.
- Low Observable ship signature.
Solve old problems:
- Sensors performance: Blockage, false targets, sensor downtime.
- Life cycle costs.

2. Infrared Signature

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IR self-protection is essential to the survivability of modern warships. Ship IR signature
reduction decreases the range at which IR seekers lock on to the ship, making a missile hit less
probable and providing the crew with more time to launch decoys.
The IR signature of a ship originates from both internal and external sources. Internal sources
include the hot engine uptake metal and exhaust, and heated interior compartments. External
sources include skin heating, reflections, and contrast with the background. Internal and external
sources must be addressed in a balanced manner during the design of the ship.

Figure 9: IR Signature

Above are the differences among levels of protection, level one has only 8 seconds after missile
detection to react against the threat. Level one corresponds to the level where there are no IR
reduction measures.
In level 4, the ship has 70 seconds at most to react and apply threat countermeasures like decoys.
Therefore, we see here some serious advantages and a clear susceptibility reduction when the IR
signature is reduced, especially when the main threats are mostly IR guided missiles.
The single greatest source of IR energy emitting from a ship is the hot exhaust uptakes from the
gas turbine and/or diesel engines where they exit the ship. LPD-17 employs film cooling
technology in an entraining diffuser to cool the uptake metal close to ambient temperature.
Ejector/Diffuser
Provides IR signature suppression of the exhaust gas and uptake metal for the diesel engines and
diesel generators of the LPD-17. The device is mounted directly to the uptake and is normally
fully enclosed within the exhaust funnel.

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The educator/diffuser typically draws in 100% additional air to mix with the hot exhaust,
dramatically reducing the temperature of the exhaust plume and it consists of three main
components:
- The multi-ring entraining diffuser
- The mixing tube
- The ejector nozzle

Figure 10:
Ejector/Diffuser assembly

Figure 11: Susceptibility reduction due to IR reduction

The IR reduction increases the time to react against a threat and deploy countermeasures, in red
the susceptibility is displayed and in blue the available time to launch IRCM, depending on the
ship’s level of signature reduction.

3. Electromagnetic Signature
Another improvement of this ship is related to the reduction of its underwater electromagnetic

signature. It is produced as a result of the current flow between the cathodic protection system

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and the ship propellers, this electromagnetic field can be detected by different kinds of mines and

trigger their detonation causing serious damage to the ship. That is why is so important to

consider, particularly because of the type of missions that this kind of ship performs.

The magnitude of this field is proportional to the level of current flowing between the electrodes

and their relative distance and the passage frequency of the field is modulated by the turning of

the propeller.

LPD-17 has an integrated ASG (Active Shaft Grounding) unit which, when activated, provides a

low resistance path for the current which leads to a significant reduction of the electromagnetic

field generated.

The most important advantage of this system is the capability of avoiding detection by

underwater mine sensors that could be present in our theater of operation. Figure 10 below

provides a visual indication of how this system works.

Current path due the interaction of the System Activated – field reduced to
cathodic protection and the propellers an almost null value

Figure 12:
Active shaft
grounding system.
4. Threat Warning

The threat warning is based on the LPD 17 current capabilities and system detection equipment.
This susceptibility reduction method is in accordance with the specific features of the main
threat, which LPD 17 faces in this scenario. This threat is the Iranian Karman (combattante II)
class fast attack craft. The LPD 17 threat warning has as main objective the early detection of the
fast craft itself as well as the threats launched by this craft against the LPD. More specifically the

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threat warning has to deal with the high speed of the fast attack craft (Top Speed: 37.5 knots) and
the offensive capabilities of it, which basically are 2 or 4 Noor/Ghader SSM, 1 Oto Melara 76
mm Gun and 1 Brenda Bofors 40mm Gun.

Figure 13: Noor/Ghader SSM

Figure 14: Oto Melara 76mm Figure15: Brenda Bofors 40mm

In order to detect the fast attack craft presence in the operational area, LPD deploys the Raytheon
SPS-73(V). This is a short-range two dimensional search/navigation radar system, which
provides contact range and bearing information. It also provides for signal processing and
automatic target detection capability. Its surface function provides short-range detection and
surveillance of surface units, hence is suitable for the detection of the adversary fast attack craft
in this operational environment. Furthermore, this radar can track up to 200 targets with speeds
up to 210 knots, so is capable to provide multiple threats detection in case of a swarm of fast
attack craft that conduct attacks from multiple axes.

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 Figure 16: SPS-73(V)
In order to detect the potential launched missiles or Gun projectiles the LPD utilizes the ITT
SPS-48E, which is an electronically scanned array, three-dimensional radar. This is used for air
defense systems and is very useful tool for the air threats detection. Its frequency band is about 2
and 4 GHz, the range is 460 Km, the altitude is 30 Km and the elevation is 0-65 o. This system
can provide target range and altitude information using a frequency scanning antenna in the
frequencies of E and L Band.

Figure 17: ITT SPS-48E

Another Threat warning method deployed by LPD is the AN/SLQ-32 Electronic Warfare. This is
a threat-warning receiver, which is capable of receiving surveillance and targeting radar as well
as high band radar signals from missiles and aircrafts. In this case this method can be used in
order to provide warning, identification, and direction finding of incoming anti-ships missiles
launched by the fast attack craft. Furthermore, it can be interfaced with the Mk 36 Decoy system
(NULKA) and can control the chaff launching.

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 Figure 18: AN/SLQ-32
For this specific scenario and this particular operational environment, we suggest that those
detection systems should be implemented by a local network between the LPD and its
helicopters. More specifically LPD can use the combination of the existing JTIDS (Joint Tactical
Information Distribution System) and its aircraft. The development of this network requires the
helicopters to have been taken off and explore a wider operation area. Then the LPD uses the
JTIDS in order to support data communication between the helicopters and the ship. JTIDS is
designed to provide reliable situational awareness in the modern combat environments. The
system is implemented by the equipment Link 16 which is an encrypted, jam-resistant, node-less
tactical digital data link network, which transmits and receives data messages with compatible
communication terminals. In the operational scenario, the helicopters are deployed to gather
information and coordinate to the local network supported by the JTIDS in order to share those
information with the LPD. As a result, LPD is capable to “see” the composite operational image
from different positioned helicopters and hence to form a more accurate assessment associated
with the existing targets in the operational environment. Consequently, the almost real time
exchange of data among the tactical data systems and units can provide the LPD with an
effective threat detection method.

Figure 19: JTIDS Link 16

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 5. Threat Suppression

The threat suppression should be primary based on the existing firepower of the LPD, which are
the SAM missiles Raytheon RAM RIM-116, the guns Mk-46 30mm and the machine guns MGs
9-12.7 mm. Additionally, for this purpose it can utilize the offensive helicopters that it carries.

The SAM Raytheon RAM RIM-116 is a small is an effective low-cost lightweight surface to air
missile and is used as a point self-defense system against hostile units. They provide an
improved capability to engage and defeat incoming anti-ship cruise missiles. These missiles are
installed in the two Mk 31 guided launch platforms and are launched by the Mk49 guided
launching system. The launch platform stores 21 missiles and the entire system is integrated with
the LPD combat system in order to utilize the ship’s sensors system. Each missile has blast
fragmentation warhead and operational range 9 km. In our scenario once the threat of a hostile
fast attack craft is detected the LPD is better be ready to open fire against the threat at the
maximum useful missile range, the 9 km distance between the LPD and the target. This is
because we take the worst-case scenario that the fast craft attack fires its missiles against LPD
once it detects it. The early detection of the threat in order to start launching the SAM missiles is
very critical and provides a significant gain to the operation. As it is clearly understood, this gain
can be delivered by the local network benefits as described above. According to those benefits,
the LPD obtains earlier a more accurate operational picture and can optimum utilize these
missiles against the fast attack craft.

Figure 20: Raytheon RAM RIM-116

The other medium for threat suppression is the two available Mk 46 30mm Guns. This Gun is a
remotely operated naval gun system, which is designed as ship self-defense weapon against
small high-speed surface crafts. The system uses a high velocity 30 mm cannon and is guided by

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a forward-looking infrared sensor, a laser rangefinder and a low television camera. The magazine
capacity of the system is 400 rounds with a fire rate of 200 round per minute hence is capable of
facing multiple targets in the case of a swarm fast crafts attacking to the LPD. This Gun can fire
either locally or remotely from the combat information system and therefore take the advantage
of the achieved operational picture. The effective range of the Mk 46 Gun is 4 Km. This feature
combined with the high fire rate makes the usage of this gun an appropriate threat suppression
method in the case of multiple fast craft given that they have survived the other threat
suppression methods and has achieved to approach close to the LPD.

Figure 21: Mk 46 30mm Gun

Additionally, the Machine Guns of 9-12.7 mm can support a self-defense action against the
incoming threats. These guns are effective against armed fast crafts and typically have a cyclic
fighting rate about 450-600 rounds per minute. Their maximum effective range is 2 Km and
therefore are suitable for the closest threats of the LPD. The fact that these guns are portable
increases their effectiveness in the case of multiple threats in a relatively small distance from the
LPD. Although these guns are appropriate for high speed surface targets, their benefits would not
help LPD in all cases of the battle against the fast attack craft. However, they can support the last
line of defense, given that fast attack craft has not effectively fired against the LPD.

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 Figure 22: Machine Guns of 9-12.7 mm
The LPD can also use its aircraft carrying capability as a threat suppression method, by utilizing
the offensive capabilities of the helicopters. LPD can carry two Sikorsky CH-53E Sea Stallion
helicopters which are equipped with a pair of 7,62x51mm M60 Machine guns each and can fire
against surface targets. It also can carry six BELI AH-1W Super Cobras which have firepower of
2 three barrel 20 mm x M197 cannons, 2 six barrel M61 Vulcan cannons, 2 AIM-9 Sidewinder
Missiles and 8 anti-armor AGM-114 Hellfire missiles. The offensive capabilities of these
helicopters can be implemented by the addition of the UAV in order not only to fire against the
fast attack craft but also to keep the battle away from the LPD. We consider that the usage of a
combining air-force consisted of helicopters and UAVs can be beneficially applied in the case of
the fast attack craft as the main threat against LPD in this particular operational environment.
The helicopters and UAV force can provide either ISR or ID information about the target and
due to the fact that the UAV will also be armed they can be used in order to restrain the incoming
fast attack craft raid. The success of that action relies on the effective networking between the
LPD and the helicopter because UAV are not crewed autonomous crafts and hence there is a
need of accurate operational information for the effective utilization of the UAVs.

Figure 23: Sikorsky CH-53E Sea Stallion

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 Figure 24: BELI AH-1W Super Cobra

In the above section of the threat suppression, we mostly discussed methods and techniques
against the fast attack craft, given that this hostile unit has not fire the LPD. We recommend a
very significant implementation for the LPD for the case in which the fast attack craft is capable
of launching its SSM missiles against the LPD. This implementation is the installment of the
Phalanx CIWS system in the LPD. This is a self-defense system against anti-ship missiles. The
system is automated and its operation is based on the 20 mm M 61 Vulcan Gatling gun auto
cannon, which is linked to a Ku-band radar system for acquiring and tracing targets. The system
is capable of automatically search for, detect, track engage and confirm kills. It also
demonstrates fast elevation and reverse speed in order to track the incoming missiles. Its rate of
fire is 4,500 rounds per minute and the maximum firing range is 3.5 Km. According to those
features that incorporates, this system is suitable for the examined scenario and could be the last
line of defense for the LPD because covers the case of launched missiles by the hostile units.
Furthermore, its high firing rate can make it an excellent solution for the multiple threats
scenario.

Figure 25: Phalanx CIWS

6. Expendables

Another critical method for susceptibility reduction is the use of expendables deployed by the
LPD. The ship has primary two physical countermeasure systems, the Mk-53 Decoy Launch
system (NULKA) and the SLQ-25A Nixie.

The Mk-53 Decoy system is a rapid response active expendable decoy system. It has six chaff
launchers and provides defense against anti-ship missiles. Therefore can contribute to the
susceptibility reduction in case the hostile fast attack crafts launch SSM missiles against the LPD

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and Phalanx system has failed to kill them (we assume that the suggested installation in the LPD
have been done). The system is effective over a full 360 degrees around the LPD and is
independent of the ship maneuvers even in extreme environmental conditions. The system is
highly effective against current and next generation anti-ship missiles, hence is a necessary
expendable solution for the susceptibility reduction problem in this particular scenario. More
specifically, it can provide a false target to the SSM missiles launched by the fast attack craft and
therefore can decrease the susceptibility of the LPD. The system is integrated and controlled by
the combat information center of the ship.

Figure 26: Mk-53 Decoy Launch system (NULKA)

The other existing expendable system of the LPD is the SLQ-25A Nixie, which is torpedo decoy
and therefore is not useful in this operational scenario. Besides that, we consider that the
expendable systems of the LPD should be implemented by the Mk-36 SRBOC system, which is
very effective in that scenario. This system is a cheap and easy method for susceptibility
reduction as it provides protection against anti-ship missiles. It has three-tube set at 45 degree
and three-tube set at 60 degree and each launcher has 30 rounds. The system capable of
launching and spread the decoys and defeat radio emitting missiles. This system can also be
interfaced with the existing AN/SLQ-32 Electronic Warfare, which can control the launching of
the chaff.

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 Figure 27: Mk-36 SRBOC

References

Adams, Christopher. 2017. ME 4751 Survivability Term Project. Resident. Monterey, CA:
Naval Postgraduate School.

Ball, R. (2003). The Fundamentals of ship Combat Survivability Analysis and Design, 2nd. Ed.
Reston: AIAA.

Harney, R. (2013). Combat Systems Engineering, Volume 6. Systems Engineering &

Integration, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School.

Scott, Richard. 2014. Surviving the swarm: navies eye new counters to the FIAC threat,
Retrieved March 6th 2017.
http://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Janes/Display/1701595, Jane’s Navy International

Janes’s Fighting Ships. 2017. Kaman (Combattante II) class. Retrieved March 6th 2017.
http://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Janes/Display/1353411

Jane’s Weapons: Naval. 2017. Oto Melara 76/62 mm (MMI; Compact; 76 mm Super Rapid; 76
mm Mk 75; 76 mm Mk 75 Mod.2; 76 mm AD; 76 mm IROF; 76 mm STRALES; Fajr 27);
DART Ammunition 3AP fuze. Retrieved March 6th 2017.
https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/NavalWeapons/Display/1499799

Jane’s Weapons: Air-launched. 2017. Noor (C-802) and Ghader/Qader. Retrieved March 6th
2017.

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https://janes.ihs.com.libproxy.nps.edu/Janes/Display/1307808

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