1. CASE: Bennet Coleman & Co. v.

Union of India
CITATION: AIR 1973 SC 106
STATUE/RULE/executive decision : Import Policy for Newsprint for 1972-73 along
with Newsprint Control Order, 1962 issued under Section 3 of Essential
Commodities Act.

22. The rights of shareholders with regard to Article 19(1)(a) are projected and
manifested by the newspapers owned and controlled by the shareholders through the
medium of the corporation.In the present case, the individual rights of freedom of speech
and expression of editors, Directors and shareholders are all exercised through their
newspapers through which they speak. The press reaches the public through the
Newspapers. The shareholders speak through their editors. The fact that the companies
are the petitioners does not prevent this Court from giving relief to the shareholders,
editors, printers who have asked for protection of their fundamental rights by reason of
the effect of the law and of the action upon their rights.

26.Executive action which is unconstitutional is not immune during the proclamation of

emergency. During the proclamation of emergency Article 19 is suspended. But it would
not authorise the taking of detrimental executive action during the emergency affecting
the fundamental rights in Article 19 without any legislative authority or in purported
exercise of power conferred by any pre-emergency law which was invalid when enacted.

A law dealing directly with the Defence of India or defamation may yet have a direct
effect on the freedom of speech. Article 19(2) could not have such law if the restriction is
unreasonable even if at is related to matters mentioned therein. Therefore, the word
"direct" would go to the quality or character of the effect and not to the subject matter.
The object of the law or executive action is irrelevant when it establishes the petitioner's
contention about fundamental right. In the present case, the object, of the newspaper
restrictions has nothing to do with the availability of; newsprint or foreign exchange
because these restrictions come into operation after the grant of quota. Therefore the
restrictions are to control the number of pages or circulation of dailies or newspapers.
These restrictions are clearly outside the ambit of Article 19(2) of the Constitution. It,
therefore, confirms that the right of freedom of speech and expression is abridged by
these restrictions.
45.It is indisputable that by freedom of the press is meant the right of all citizens to speak,
publish and express their views. The freedom of the press embodies the right of the
people to read. The freedom of the press is not antithetical to the right of the people to
speak and express.

46. The First Amendment of the American Constitution enacts that the Congress shall
make no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. The American First
Amendment contains no exceptions like our Article 19(2) of the Constitution. Therefore,
American decisions have evolved their own, exceptions. Our Article. 19(2) speaks of
reasonable restrictions. Our Article 13 states that the State shall not make laws which
abridge or take away fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution.

A claim to enlarge the volume of speech by diminishing the circulation raises the problem
of reconciling the citizens' right to unfettered exercise of speech in volume with the
community's right to undiminished circulation. Both rights fall within the ambit of the
concept of freedom of speech.

160.The extent of permissible limitations on freedom of expression-is also indicated by

our Constitution which contains the fundamental law of the land. To that law all
Governmental policies rules and regulations, orders and directions, must conform so that
there is "a Government of laws and not of men" or in other words, a Government whose
policies are based on democratic principles and not on human caprice or arbitrariness.
Article 19(2) of the Constitution requires that Governmental action which affects freedom
of speech and expression of Indian citizens should be founded on some "law" and also
that such "law" should restrict freedom of expression and opinion reasonably only "in the
interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India the security of the State friendly
relations with foreign states public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt
of court, defamation or incitement to an offence." Although, the ambit of restrictions
which can be imposed by "law" on freedom to carry on any occupation, trade or business,
guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution is wider than that of restrictions on
freedom of speech and expression, yet, these restrictions have also to be limited to those
which are reasonably necessary "in the interest of the general public" as contemplated by
Article 19(6) of the Constitution.
2. CASE: Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Private Ltd. and Ors. vs. Union of
India (UOI) and Ors.
CITATION: AIR 1986 SC 515
STATUE/RULE/executive decision: sections 12, 14, 25 of Customs Act. 1962 Delhi
Muncipal Corporation Act. 1957, section 2 of Customs Tariff Act, 1975

The freedom of press, as one of the members of the Constituent Assembly said, is one of
the items around which the greatest and the bitterest of constitutional struggles have been
waged in all countries where liberal constitutions prevail. The said freedom is attained at
considerable sacrifice and suffering and ultimately it has come to be incorporated in the
various written constitutions.
It has selected the fact or thing which is an essential and basic attribute of the conception
of the freedom of speech viz.. the right to circulate one's views to all whom one can reach
or care to reach for the imposition of a restriction.

Newspaper industry enjoys two of the fundamental rights namely the freedom of speech
and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) and the freedom to engage in any
profession, occupation, trade, industry or business guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of
the Constitution, the first because it is concerned with the field of expression and
communication and the second because communication has become an occupation or
profession and because there is an invasion of trade, business and industry into that field
where freedom of expression is being exercised.

In other words, the Government must at all material times be conscious of the fact that it
is dealing with an activity protected by Article 19 (1)(a) of the Constitution which is vital
to our democratic existence. In deciding the reasonableness of restrictions imposed on
any fundamental right the Court should take into consideration the nature of the right
alleged to have been infringed, the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the
disproportion of the imposition and the prevailing conditions at the relevant time
including the social values whose needs are sought to be satisfied by means of the
restrictions.

It cannot be said, therefore, that every advertisement is a matter dealing with freedom of
speech nor can it be said that it is an expression of ideas. In every case one has to see
 what is the nature of the advertisement and what activity falling under Article 19(1) it
seeks to further. The advertisements in the instant case relate to commerce or trade and
not to propagating of ideas; and advertising of prohibited drugs or commodities of which
the sale is not in the interest of the general public cannot be speech within the meaning of
freedom of speech and would not fall within Article 19(1)(a).

3. CASE: Tata Press Ltd. vs. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Limited and Ors.
CITATION: 1995 AIR 2438
STATUE/RULE/executive decision: Newspaper (price And Page) Act, 1956
[repealed] - Section 3(1)

It cannot be said therefore that every advertisement is a matter dealing with freedom of
speech nor can it he said that it is an expression of ideas. In every case one has to see
what is the nature of the advertisement and what activity falling under Article 19(1) it
seeks to further.

At the outset, it must be determined whether the advertising is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision it must concern lawful
activity and not misleading. Next it is seen whether the asserted government interest is
substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers then it must be determined whether
the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted and whether it is more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.

For a democratic press the advertising "subsidy is crucial. Without advertising, the
resources available for expenditure on the "news" would decline, which may lead to an
erosion of quality and quantity. The cost of the "news" to the public would increase,
thereby restricting its "democratic" availability.

On the other hand, the space for advertisement is reduced the earnings of a newspaper
would go down and it would either have to run at a toss or close down or raise its price.
The object of the Act in regulating the space for advertisements is stated to be to prevent
'unfair' competition, it is thus directed against circulation of a newspaper. When a law is
intended to bring about this result there would be a direct interference with the right of
freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a).
 In a democratic economy tree How of commercial information is indispensable. There
cannot he honest and economical marketing by the public at large without being educated
by the information disseminated through advertisements. The economic system in a
democracy would be handicapped without there being freedom of "commercial speech",
in rotation to the publication and circulation of newspapers.

The public at large has a right to receive the "commercial speech". Article 19(1)(a) not
only guarantees freedom of speech and expression, it also protects the rights of an
individual to listen, read and receive the said speech. So far as the economic needs of a
citizen are concerned, their fulfilment has to be guided by the 'information disseminated
through the advertisements. The protection of Article 19(1)(a) is available to the speaker
as well as to the recipient of the speech.

Right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution can only be restricted under Article 19(2). The said right cannot be denied by
creating a monopoly in favour of the government or any other authority. "Publication of
advertisements" which is a "commercial speech" and protected under Article 19(1)(a)

4. CASE: :In Re: Noise Pollution - Implementation of the Laws for restricting use of
loudspeakers and high volume producing sound systems
CITATION: AIR 2005 SC 3136
STATUE/RULE/executive decision: laws on noise pollution in C.A. No. 3735 of 2005

Those who make noise often take shelter behind Article 19 (1)A pleading freedom of
speech and right to expression. Undoubtedly, the freedom of speech and right to
expression are fundamental rights but the rights are not absolute. Nobody can claim a
fundamental right to create noise by amplifying the sound of his speech with the help of
loudspeakers. While one has a right to speech, others have a right to listen or decline to
listen. Nobody can be compelled to listen and nobody can claim that he has a right to
make his voice trespass into the ears or mind of others. Nobody can indulge into aural
aggression. If anyone increases his volume of speech and that too with the assistance of
artificial devices so as to compulsorily expose unwilling persons to hear a noise raised to
unpleasant or obnoxious levels then the person speaking is violating the right of others to
 a peaceful, comfortable and pollution-free life guaranteed by Article 21. Article 19 (1)A
cannot be pressed into service for defeating the fundamental right guaranteed by Article
21. Free speech is not to be treated as a promise to everyone with opinions and beliefs, to
gather at any place and at any time and express their views in any manner. The right is
subordinate to peace and order.

He could be forced to hear what, he wishes not, to hear. That will be an invasion of his
right to be let alone, to hear what he wants to hear, or not to hear, what he does not wish
to hear. One may put his mind or hearing to his own uses, but not that of another. No one
has a right to trespass on the mind or ear of another and commit auricular or visual
aggression. A loudspeaker is mechanical device, and it has no mind or thought process in
it.

5. CASE: Radhey Shyam Sharma vs. The Post Master General Central Circle Nagpur
CITATION: 1965 AIR 311
STATUE/RULE/executive decision: Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Essential Services
Maintenance Ordinance, 1960

We are of opinion that there is no force in the contention that these provisions of the
Ordinance violate the fundamental rights enshrined in sub-cls. (a) and (b) of Art. 19(1). A
perusal of Art. 19(1) shows that there is no fundamental right to strike, and all that the
Ordinance provides is with respect to any illegal strike as provided in the Ordinance.

This Court held in that case that R. 4-A insofar as it prohibited any form of
demonstration, be it however innocent or however incapable of causing a breach of public
tranquility was violative of Arts. 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution. This Court
also held that insofar as that rule prohibited a strike it was good, since there was no
fundamental right to resort to strike.

The punishment given to the petitioner cannot therefore be set aside on the ground that
the charge was in violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed under sub-cls. (a) and (b)
of Art. 19(1), which deal with freedom of speech and expression and the right to assemble
peaceably and without arms.
6. CASE: Odyssey Communications Pvt. Ltd. vs. Lokvidayan Sanghatana and Ors.
CITATION: 1988 AIR 1642
STATUE/RULE/executive decision:

the right of a citizen to exhibit films on the Doordarshan subject to the terms and
conditions to be imposed by the Doordarshan is a part of the fundamental right of
freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India
which can be curtailed only under circumstances which are set out sin Clause (2) of
Article 19 of the Constitution of India.

7. CASE: Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India and

Ors. vs. Cricket Association of Bengal and Ors
CITATION: 1995 AIR 1236
STATUE/RULE/executive decision: Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 - Section 3,4.

In our country, since the organisation of an event is an aspect of the fundamental right to
freedom of speech and expression protected by Article 19(1)(a), the law can be made to
control the organisation of such events only for the purposes of imposing reasonable
restrictions in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of the country, the security of
the State, friendly relations with foreign State, public order, decency or morality or in
relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence as laid down under
Article 19(2) of the Constitution. Although, therefore, it is not possible to make law for
prohibiting the recording of spontaneous, accidental or natural events, it is possible for
the reasons mentioned in Article 19(2), to restrict their telecasting. There cannot,
however, be restrictions on producing and recording the event on grounds not permitted
by Article 19(2)

The freedom of speech and expression includes right to acquire information and to
disseminate it. Freedom of speech and expression is necessary, for self expression which
is an important means of free conscience and self fulfilment.
The right to communicate, therefore, includes right to communicate through any media
that is available whether print of electronic or audio-visual such as advertisement, movie,
article, speech etc. That is why freedom of speech and expression includes freedom of the
press. The freedom of the press in terms includes right to circulate and also to determine
the volume of such circulation. This freedom includes the freedom to communicate or
circulate one's opinion without interference to as large a population in country as well as
abroad as is possible to reach.

BCCI/CAB have the fundamental right to televise the game of cricket organised and
conducted by them for the benefit of public at large and in particular citizens of India who
are either interested in cricket or desire to be educated and/or entertained.
there is a right of the viewers and also the right of the producer to telecast the event and in
view of these two rights, there is an obligation on the part of the Department of
Telecommunication to allow the telecasting.
The right to impart and receive information is a species of the right of freedom of speech
and expression guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. A citizen has a
fundamental right to use the best means of imparting and receiving information and as
such to have an access to telecasting for the purpose.

The game of cricket provides entertainment to public. It is a form of expression and is,
therefore, included within the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article
19(1)(a) of the Constitution. This right includes the right to telecast and broadcast the
matches.

The right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(a) is not limited to organisers of such sports events.
The said right is guaranteed equally to the broadcaster and the viewers. Among them, the
right of the viewers is the more important one.

The game of cricket provides entertainment to public at large. The entertainment is

organised and provided by the petitioners. Providing entertainment is a form of
expression and, therefore, covered by Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
The words "freedom of speech and expression" must, therefore, be broadly construed to
include the freedom to circulate one's views by words of mouth or in writing or through
audio-visual instrumentalities. It, therefore, includes the right to propagate one's views
through the print media or through any other communication channel e.g. the radio and
 the television. This freedom must, however, be exercised with circumspection and care
must be taken not to trench on the rights of other citizens or to jeopardise public interest.

8. CASE: Raja Kulkarni and Ors. vs. The State of Bombay

CITATION: AIR 1954 SC 73
STATUE/RULE/executive decision: Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 - Section
23, Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946 - Section 42

The right to freedom of speech and expression is not denied to the appellants, nor are they
prohibited from forming associations or unions. The Act makes no discrimination
between textile workers as a class but lays down a reasonable classification to the effect
that a certain percentage of membership possessed by a union will be allowed to represent
the workers as a class to the exclusion of others, but there is nothing to present the other
unions or other workers from forming a fresh union and enrolling a higher percentage so
as to acquire the sole right of representation.

9. CASE: N.B. Khare vs. The State of Delhi

CITATION: AIR 1950 SC 211
STATUE/RULE/executive decision: East Punjab Public Safety Act, 1949 - Section
4(1), Section 4(3) , Section 4(6).

The law providing reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by article
19 may contain substantive provisions as well as procedural provisions. While the
reasonableness of the restrictions has to be considered with regard to the exercise of the
right, it does not necessarily exclude from the consideration of the Court the question of
reasonableness of the procedural part of the law.

10. CASE: State of Bihar vs. Kamla Kant Misra and Ors.
CITATION: AIR 1971 SC 1667
STATUE/RULE/executive decision: Sections 134, 144, 435 and 439 of Criminal
Procedure Code, 1898
 Reasonableness of a statutory provision cannot be determined by the application of a set
formula: it must be determined on a review of the procedural and substantive provisions
of the statute keeping in mind the nature of the right intended to be infringed, underlying
purpose of the restriction contemplated to be imposed, gravity of the evil intended to be
remedied thereby, object intended to be achieved by the imposition of restriction, and
other relevant circumstances.

Any restriction which is opposed to the fundamental principles of liberty and justice
cannot be considered reasonable. No person can be deprived of his liberty without being
afforded an opportunity to be heard in defence and that opportunity must be adequate, fair
and reasonable. Further the courts have to see whether the restriction is in excess of the
requirement or whether it is imposed in an arbitrary manner.

11. CASE: Hari Khemu Gawali vs. The Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bombay and
Ors.
CITATION: 1956 AIR 559
STATUE/RULE/executive decision: Bombay Police Act, 1951 - Section 57

Article 19 of the Constitution has guaranteed the several rights enumerated under that
article to all citizens of India. After laying down the different rights to freedom in clause
(1), clauses (2) to (6) of that article recognise the right of the State to make laws putting
reasonable restrictions on those rights in the interest of the general public, security of the
State, public order, decency or morality and for other reasons set out in those sub-clauses,
so that there has to be a balance between individual rights guaranteed under article 19(1)
and the exigencies of the State which is the custodian of the interests of the general
public, public order, decency or morality and all other public interests which may
compendiously be described as social welfare.

It appears to me that the constitutional validity of laws of preventive restriction, as

opposed to the laws of preventive detention, have to be judged with reference to standards
which this Court has generally accepted as regards the validity of restriction on the other
fundamental rights under article 19(1) of the Constitution. As repeatedly held by this
 Court, a proper balance must be struck between the fundamental right of the citizen and
the social control by the State in order to evolve the permissible restriction of the
fundamental right under the Constitution.

12. CASE: Union of India (UOI) vs. Naveen Jindal and Ors
CITATION: AIR 2004 SC 1559
STATUE/RULE/executive decision: Emblems and Names Prevention of Improper
Use Act 1950 – Section 1 & 3

The rights specified in Article 19 operate against the State actions. The rights granted to a
citizen of India under Article 19 of the Constitution of India, it is trite, is not to be
considered in isolation as Part III constitutes an amalgam of rights and, thus, a law falling
under Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India has yet to satisfy the requirements of
other Articles in Part III of the Constitution, such as Articles 14 and 19 of the
Constitution of India.

The right to fly the National Flag is not an absolute right. The freedom of expression for
the purpose of giving a feeling or nationalism and for that purpose all that is required to
be done is that the duty to respect the Flag must be strictly obeyed. The pride of a person
involved in flying the Flag is the pride to be an Indian and that, thus, in all respects to it
must be shown. The State may not tolerate even the slightest disrespect.
The recent amendments made in the Flag Code by the Union of India and the stand taken
by the learned solicitor general that the Central government is not against the flying of the
Flag by an individual is itself indicative of the fact that a liberal construction so far as
Article 19(1)(a) is concerned may be adopted. The extreme proposition of law taken in
the American decisions that burning of the Flag is an expression of anger cannot be
accepted in India as it would amount to disrespect of the National Flag.

13. CASE: Life Insurance Corporation of India and Union of India (UOI) and Ors. vs.
Manubhai D. Shah and Cinemart Foundation
CITATION: AIR 1993 SC 171
STATUE/RULE/executive decision: Cinematograph Act, 1952- section 3, 4 , 5, 5A,
5B, 5C, 5D,6,7,8, AND 9
 The words `freedom of speech and expression ' must be broadly construed to include the
freedom to circulate one's views by words of mouth or in writing or through audio-visual
instrumentalities. therefore, includes it the right propagate one's the views through the
print media or through any other communication channel e.g. the radio and the television.
The print media, the radio and the tiny screen play the role of public educators, so vital to
the growth of a healthy democracy. Every citizen of this free country, therefore, has the
right to air his or her views through the printing and/or the electronic media subject of
course to permissible restrictions imposed under Article 19(2) of the Constitution. The
right extends to the citizen being permitted to use the media to answer the criticism
levelled against the view propagated by him.
Article 19(1)(a) includes the freedom to communicate one's ideas or thoughts through a
newspaper, a magazine or a movie. Although movie enjoys that freedom it must be
remembered that movie is a powerful mode of communication and has the capacity to
make a profound impact on the minds of the viewers and it is, therefore, essential to
ensure that the message it conveys is not harmful to the society or even a section of the,
society. Censorship by prior restraint, therefore seems justified for the protection of the
society from the ill-effects that a motion picture may produce if unrestricted exhibition is
allowed. Censorship is thus permitted to protect social interests enumerated in Article
19(2) and Section 58 of the Act. But such censorship must be reasonable and must answer
the test of Article 14 of the Constitution.

14. CASE: People's Union for civil Liberties (PUCL) and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI)
and Ors.
CITATION: AIR 2003 SC 2363
STATUE/RULE/executive decision: Representation of the People Act, 1951

The voters' right to know the antecedents of the candidates is based on interpretation of
Article 19(1)(a) which provides that all citizens of this country would have fundamental
right to "freedom of speech and expression" and this phrase is construed to include
fundamental right to know relevant antecedents of the candidate contesting the elections.
as has been laid down by various decisions of this Court that for survival of true
democracy, the voter must be aware of the antecedents of his candidate. Voter has to
caste intelligent and rational vote according to his own criteria. A well informed voter is
the foundation of democratic structure. That information to a voter, who is the citizen of
this country, is one facet of the fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a).

Freedom of speech and expression, just as equality clause and the guarantee of life and
liberty has been very broadly construed by this Court right from 1950s. It has been
variously described as a 'basic human right', 'a natural right' and the like. It embraces
within its scope the freedom of propagation and inter-change of ideas, dissemination of
information which would help formation of one's opinion and viewpoint and debates on
matters of public concern. The importance which our Constitution- makers wanted to
attach to this freedom is evident from the fact that reasonable restrictions on that right
could be placed by law only on the limited grounds specified in Article 19(2), not to
speak of inherent limitations of the right.

Here, a distinction has to be drawn between the conferment of the right to vote on
fulfillment of requisite criteria and the culmination of that right in the final act of
expressing choice towards a particular candidate by means of ballot.
Though the initial right cannot be placed on the pedestal of a fundamental right, but, at
the stage when the voter goes to the polling booth and casts his vote, his freedom to
express arises. The casting of vote in favour of one or the other candidate tantamounts to
expression of his opinion and preference and that final stage in the exercise of voting
right marks the accomplishment of freedom of expression of the voter. That is where
Article 19(1)(a) is attracted. Freedom of voting as distinct from right to vote is thus a
species of freedom of expression and therefore carries with it the auxiliary and
complementary rights such as right to secure information about the candidate which are
conducive to the freedom.

The right to vote at the elections to the House of people or Legislative Assembly is a
constitutional right but not merely a statutory right; freedom of voting as distinct from
right to vote is a facet of the fundamental right enshrined in Article 19(1)(a). The casting
of vote in favour of one or the other candidate marks the accomplishment of freedom of
expression of the voter.