WASSMER V VELEZ G.R. No.

L-20089 December 26, 1964

FACTS: Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love,
decided to get married and set Sept. 4, 1954 as the big day. On Sept. 2, 1954, Velez left
a note for his bride-to-be saying that he wants to postpone the marriage as his mother
opposes it and that he is leaving. But the next day, Sept. 3, he sent her a telegram and
told her that nothing has changed, that he is returning and he apologizes. Thereafter,
Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again. Wassmer sued him for damages. Velez
filed no answer and was declared in default.
ISSUE: Is the case at bar a mere breach of promise to marry?
RULING: Surely, this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and
go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is
about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to
good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Art. 21 of the NCC which provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
DECISION: Affirmed.

Hermosisima vs Court of Appeals 103 Phil 629 Breach of Promise to Marry

FACTS:An appeal by certiorari, on October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred

to as complainant, filed with the said CFI a complaint for the acknowledgment of her
child, Chris Hermosisima, as a natural child of said petitioner, as well as for support of
said child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise to marry. Petitioner admitted
the paternity of the child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied
having ever promised to marry complainant. Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July
1917, since 1950, Soledad then a teacher and petitioner who was almost ten years younger
than her used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he made no
promise of marriage thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance
underwriter where intimacy developed between her and petitioner, since one evening in 1953
when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board MV
Escano to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad
advised petitioner that she was pregnant, whereupon he promised to marry her. However,
subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez.
ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise
to marry.
HELD:  It appearing that because of the defendant-appellant’s seductive prowess,
plaintiff-appellee overwhelmed by her love for him yielded to his sexual desires in spite
of her age and self-control. In the present case, the court is unable to say that
petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten years
younger but also because the CFI found that complainant surrendered herself to the
petitioner because overwhelmed by her love for him she wanted to bind him by having a
fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

Article 15: Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons re binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958.
Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta
from joining her husband. ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon
courts of the Philippines. HELD: Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts
cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would
be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can
afford divorce in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is
enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez
and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to
recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the
desertion and securing of an invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows: (1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant
Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño; (2) Sentencing
defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for
damages and attorneys' fees; (3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto
Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys'
fees.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo 139 SCRA 139

FACTS: Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was
married in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They
were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit
against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioner’s business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon
Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an accounting
of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property. ISSUE: Whether or not the
foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines
where petitioner is a Filipino citizen. HELD: Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his
own representation before the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
Furthermore, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to
respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if
the end of justice is to be served.

Tenchavez vs. Escano 15 SCRA 355

FACTS: 27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got
married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before
Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and
was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-
between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student
where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a
church as suggested by Vicenta’s parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicenta’s dad, he
disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back
to work in Manila. Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved
she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved
and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her
marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo

BARRETO GONZALES vs GONZALES 58 Phil 238 March 7, 1933

FACTS: • The plaintiff & defendant were both citizens of the Philippines, married & lived together from
January 1919 until Spring of 1926. After which they voluntary separated & have not lived together as man
& wife, they had 4 minor children together. • After negotiations, both parties mutually agreed to allow
Manuela Barreto (plaintiff) for her & her children’s support of P500 (five hundred pesos) monthly which to
be increased in cases of necessity & illness, and that the title of certain properties be put in her name. •
Shortly after the agreement, Augusto Gonzales (defendant), when to Reno, Nevada & secured in that
jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of desertion dated November 28, 1927. On that same date
he went through the forms of marriage with another Filipino citizen as well & had 3 children with her. •
When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the support
of Manuela Barreto & her children & has not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony.

• Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August 1928 and shortly after, Barreto brought an action at the
CFI-Manila requesting to confirm & ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts of Nevada & invoked
sec 9 of Act 2710. Such is requested to be enforced, and deliver to the Guardian ad litem the equivalent of
what would have been due to their children as their legal portion from respective estates had their parents
died intestate on November 28, 1927, they also prayed that the marriage existing between Barreto &
Gonzales be declared dissolved & Gonzales be ordered to pay Barreto P500 per month, counsel fees of
P5000 & all the expenses incurred in educating the 3 minor sons. The guardians of the children also filed
as intervenors in the case. • After the hearing, the CFI-Manila granted the judgement in favor of the
plaintiff & intervenors, but reduced the attorney’s fees to P3000 instead & also granted the costs of the
action against the defendant, Hence, this appeal by Gonzales saying that the lower court erred in their
decision. ISSUE: WON any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be recognized in
this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and under conditions for which the courts of the Philippine Islands
would grant a divorce. HELD: NO. The lower court erred in granting the relief as prayed for on granting the
divorce, because: • The court said that securing the jurisdiction of the courts to recognize & approve the
divorce done in Reno, Nevada cannot be done according to the public policy in this jurisdiction on the
question of divorce. • It’s clear in Act No. 2710 & court decisions on cases such as Goitia VS. Campos
Rueda that the entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case was submitted
praying the ratification of the Reno Divorce was clearly a circumvention of the law regarding divorce & will
be done under conditions not authorized by our laws. • The matrimonial domicile of the couple had always
been the Philippines & the residence acquired by the husband in Reno, Nevada was a bona fide residence
& did not confer jurisdiction upon the court of that state to dissolve the matrimonial bonds in which he had
entered in 1919. • Art 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Law of the Philippines does not allow such
to be done, the effect of foreign divorce in the Philippines says that litigants cannot compel the courts to
approve of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens of the Philippines to be
affected by decrees of divorce of foreign courts in manner which out government believes is contrary to
public order & good morals. SC RULING: The decision of CFI-Manila was REVERSED & Defendant is
absolved from the demands made against him in this action.

CONNECTION TO PERSONS, FAMILY RELATION / CIVIL CODE: • Article 9 of the Old Civil Code, now in Art 15
says that “Laws relating to family rights & duties or to status, condition, and legal capacity of persons, are
binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a foreign country” • The last part of Art 11 of the Old
Civil Code, now in Art 17 also states “...the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts & their property,
and those intended to promote public order & good morals, shall not be rendered without effect by any
foreign laws or judgements or by anything done or any agreements entered into in a foreign country.”
Divorce Laws of the Philippines—The hardships of existing divorce laws of the Philippine Islands are well
known to the members of the Legislature. It is the duty of the courts to enforce the laws of divorce as
written by the Legislature if they constitutional. Courts have no right to say such laws are too strict or too
liberal. • At the time this decision was rendered there was still absolute divorce in the Philippines on the
ground of Adultery on the part of the wife, and Concubinage on the part of the husband; the divorce,
however, could be granted only upon showing that the defendant had been convicted by final judgement
for the adultery or concubinage as the case maybe. The new Civil Code has abolished absolute divorce,
leaving only legal separation, which is equivalent to relative divorce

Bellis vs Bellis 20 scra 358

FACTS: Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife whom he
divorced he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate
children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas
properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not
given anything. The illegitimate children

opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they should be
entitled, if Philippine law were to be applied. ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased
should determine the successional rights of the illegitimate children. HELD: The Supreme Court held that
the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law, being the national law of the
deceased, there are no legitimes. The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the
State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights
are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis. Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the
decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession;
(b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed. Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found

Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera
TITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera
CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653

FACTS:

Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German
national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of
Germany.  They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling.   Conjugal
disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in
Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal
separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses.  The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter “had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and
another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”. 
ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they
are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally
file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else.  Though in this case, it appeared that
private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
effects may be recognized in the
Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal
Philippines in so far as he is concerned.  Thus, under the same
consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that
he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. 
EMETRIO CUI vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY
2 SCRA 205
May 30, 1961
 Facts:
            Cui was a law scholar at the Arellano University; he paid the tuition fees but it was returned to him at the end
of every semester. Before Arellano awarded the scholarship grant, Cui was made to sign a contract covenant and
agreement saying that he waives his right to transfer to another school in consideration of the scholarship grant and if
he transfers, he shall pay the tuition fees awarded to him while being a scholar. He transferred to another school to
finish his last term in law school. When he was about to take the Bar, his TOR at Arellano was not issued unless he pays
the amount of the tuition fees that were returned to him when he was still their scholar. He paid under protest.

Issue:
            Whether or not the provision of the contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former waived
his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarship grants in cash, is
valid or not.

Held:
            The waiver signed by Cui was void as it was contrary to public policy; it was null and void.
            Scholarship grants, as pointed out by the Director of the Bureau of Private Schools in Memorandum No. 38, are
awarded in recognition of merit and not to attract and keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda value. To
look at such grants as a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an educational institution is not
only inconsistent with sound public policy but also good morals. Consequently, the waiver signed by the student,
waiving his right to transfer to another school unless he refunds to the university the equivalent of his scholarship
grants, is null and void.
            WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reverse and another one shall be entered sentencing the
defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954,
date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and dismissing defendant’s counterclaim. It is so ordered.

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA,
Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.
G.R. No. 142820
June 20, 2003

Facts:
                Petitioner Wolfgang, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen, a
Filipina, on 11 December 1980 in Hamburg, Gemany.  Early 1981, the marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros
Oriental. They had two daughters, Carolyne and Alexandria Kristine.
                Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati on 28 August 1996. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by trial court. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by private respondent but was again denied by the trial court.
                In 1997, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese and
granting the custody of the children to the father.
                It was June 14, 1999 when public respondent issued an order granting the petitioner’s motion to dismiss, but
was partially set aside on September 1999 for the purpose of tackling issues regarding property relations of the spouses
as well as support and custody of their children. Petitioner assailed for the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction, and grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge.

Issue:
                Whether or not the Philippine courts can determine the legal effects of a decree of divorce from a foreign
country.

Held:
                Yes. Our courts can determine the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such as those
concerning with support and custody of the children.
                In this case, the decree did not touch as to who the offending spouse was. The trial court was correct in
setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education of the best
interests of the children. After all, the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions
concerning his care and custody.
                WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on September 30, 1999 and
March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue
between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely
Carolyne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for
continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
                SO ORDERED.

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. “AMAY BISAYA”, respondent
G.R. No. 154259
February 28, 2005

Facts:
                        This is a petition for review on certiorari regarding the reversing decision of the Court of Appeals in the
decision of the Trial Court and thus, making the petitioners liable for damages through the abusive conduct of
petitioner Lim, imposing upon them P200,000 as exemplary damages, P200,000 as moral damages, and P10,000 as
attorney’s fees.
                        Plaintiff Roberto Reyes (Amay Bisaya) was having coffee at the Nikko Hotel lobby on October 13, 1994
at around six in the morning when Dr. Violeta Filart, a long-time friend, approached him and invited him to a party at
the penthouse where the hotel’s former manager’s birthday was being celebrated. He consented and carried the
latter’s present. At the party, when he was helping himself at the buffet table, Ruby Lim, one of the petitioners,
approached him and asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by those around the buffet table. Then, a
Makati policeman accompanied the embarrassed Amay Bisaya in leaving the penthouse.
                        Ruby Lim accepted the fact that she asked Mr. Reyes to leave but not in the manner he claimed. She
said she politely asked Mr. Reyes to finish his food and leave the party as the celebrant wants the party to be intimate,
and that he was not invited. On the other hand, Dr. Filart denied Amay Bisaya’s claim that she invited him to the
party.

Issue:
                        Whether or not petitioner Lim’s conduct was abusive enough to make the petitioners liable for
damages caused to plaintiff.

Held:
                        No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s
exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
                        The plaintiff failed in proving the ill-motive of the petitioners. It was from his confession that when Ms.
Lim approached him, they were very close that they nearly kissed each other. Considering the closeness of defendant
Lim to plaintiff when she requested the latter to leave the party, it is apparent that the request was meant to be
heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause him embarrassment. It was plaintiff’s
reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. Had plaintiff
simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out. Therefore, we find the petitioners
not guilty of violating Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
                        WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April
1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
                        SO ORDERED