CR Pe eS Re ted Se ee acc) eee ae international security. Offering broad Tete emus auc ieee one ie Pesca ae Pee an) ere Ra Cassese ne eae ene) sorutiny of the political, economic, ee Up ek Sgn Ruts Search So! PEARSON centro STO} evita mie ert international relatio theory available, orindeed Frere eN seen it DUS g Fomceteit OCR Tae ncit Gia autS Teron F —Charles Call Bg De ii 2009 C66 2013 RNC RicHARD K. BETTSTf you‘re wondering why you should buy this new edition of Conflict After _ the Cold War, here are 5 good reasons! 1, A.selection from Fareed Zakatia’s The Post-American World offers a new look at forces shaping Intemational developments and supplements the three visions offered by Fukuyama, Mearshelmer, and Huntington in Part I 2. Robert Jervis'“War and Misperception” adds a perspective ‘emphasizing cognition to supplement the psychoanalytically-orlented ‘explanations in Part 1V. 3. A discussion of emotional and spiritual motives for war drawn from Ned Lebow’s Why Nations Fight explores important dimensions of the problem unaccounted for in the materialist approach of realist and liberal theories. 4. Three new readings examine the challenge of unconventional war: Selections from David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare analyze the problem through the experience ‘of the Cold War competition; an article by Eliot Cohen and others summarizes recent ideas that drove the official U.S. military revision ‘of doctrine on the subject; and a critique by U.S. Army Colonel Gian Gentile argues that counterinsurgency Is a vain endeavor 5. An analysis by Indra de Soysa of the causes of violence aver ecological ‘and resource issues offers a contrast with the prominent argument by Thomas Homer-Dixon, PEARSON manne untnanN. oR) Conflict After the Cold War Arguments on Causes of War and Peace Fourth Edition RICHARD K. BETTS Columbia University The Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies Em. Boston Columbus Indianapolis New York San Francico Upper Saddle River Anserdam CapeTown Dubai London Madd Milan Matich Pars Monica Toronto Delhi Mexico City Sio Palo. Sydney HongKong Seoul Singapore “Taipei TokyoSenior Acquisitions Editor Vikram Mubija Edril Assistant: eal Schwab, Beverly Fong Excutive Marketing Manager: Wendy Gordon Senior Digital Editor Paul Del.nea Production Manager: Savoula Aranatiis Projet Coordination, Text Design and Flecwonic Page Makevp: PreMediaGlobal Cover Desgnet/Manages: Wendy Ann Fredesicks Cover Photo: Copyright © Brendan Salowsk Senior Manufacturing Buyer: Dennis. Pars Printer and Binder! Courier Corporaion-Westford (Cover Printer: Courier Cozporation-Westford ibrar of Congress Cataloging in-Pblication Da Confit after the Cold War arguments on eauses of war and peace [odie by] Richard K,Beus, —th ed. prem. Inclides bibliographical eterences ISBN-13:978-0-205-85175-1 ISBN-10: 0205-85175-4 1. Worl poles 1989-2. Was, 3, Peace, 1, Bets, Raed K, 1947 1)2009.066 2012 305.66 de23 2012001266 ‘Copyright © 2013, 2008, and 2005 by Peatson Eduction, In [ll ghts reserved, Manactred inthe United States of Amica. This plication is protected by Copyright, and permission should be obesined from the publsher prior to any prohibited reproduction storage in aretieval system, o transmission in any form ar by any means, tlecttonc, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or likewise, To obtain permissions 0 se Inacerial from this work, please submic a written request fo Pearson Education, Inc, Permissions Department, One Lake Stet, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey 07458, or You may fx your equest to 201-236-3290. 1098765452 1I-CRW45 14 13:12 Is8N-10:0.205-85175.4 ISBN-13: 978-0.205.85175-1 CONTENTS Preface vii PARTI Visions of War and Peace 1 18 The End of History? 6 Francis Fueuvana 1» Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War 18 ova J, MeagsveIMer 1 The Clash of Civilizations? 35 Saul P. Huxrinsron 1 Economics Trumps Politics 54 Fareeo ZaKania PARTII International Realisi Anarchy and Power 66 = The Melian Dialogue 69 THucyoives 1 Doing Evil in Order to Do Good 74 Miceoé Macmaverti 1 The State of Nature and the State of War 78 Twomas Hosees 1 Realism and Idealism 82 Epwano Hatters Care 1 The Origins of War in Neorealist Theary 200 KeNwerw Nl. Wacrz Hegemonic War and International Change 107 Roser Grew = Power, Culprits, and Arms 120 GeorrRey Buaney PARTI International Liberalism: In ns and Cooperation 133 1 Perpetual Peace 136 Tuawanuee Kan 1 Peace Through Arbitration 143 Ricnaeo Cosoen WwWw | contents Contents = Community of Power vs, Balance of Power 146 Wooorow Wiesou 1 Liberalism and World Politics 149 ‘Micnage W. Dovee 1» Power and Interdependence 164 RoserT O. Keowane ano JoseeH S. NYE PARTIV Psychology: The Human Mind and International Conflict 172 = Why War? 175 ‘Stemuwo FREUD How Good People Do Bad Things 183 STANLEY Miean = Why Hawks Win 190 Dantes Kaitwewan ano JONATHAN REWSHON = War and Misperceation 194 RoveRr Jervis, PARTV — Culture: Customs, Norms, and Learning 211 1 Anarchy Is What States Make of It 214 ALEXANDER WenDr 1 Spirit, Standing, and Honor 236 Ricwaro Neo LeBow ‘= Warfare Is Only an Invention—Not a Blolagical Necessity 244 ‘MaRoaREr MeaD 1» The Obsolescence of Major War 249 Jon Mue.ceR ™ Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention 262 MagsHAa Finnenone = Men, Women, and War 280 J. ANN Trexwer PART VI Economics: Interests and Interdependence 294 = Money Is Not the Sinews of War, Although It Is Generally So Considered 297 Niccavé Maciiavertr 1 The Great Ilusion 299 Noriean ANGELL = Paradise Isa Bazaar 301 GeoreRey Buainey 1 Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism 309 Val. Lens 1 Imperialism and Capitalism 317 JOSEPH ScHumPeTER War as Policy 326 Auaw 8. Micwaro 1 Structural Causes and Economic Effects 339 Kenwerw Nl, Wactz Trade and Power:-349 RicHaro Rasecrance PART VII Politics: Ideology and Identity 364 ‘= Nations and Nationalism 368 Enuesr GELLNER = Democratization and War 380 Eowano D, MANSFIELO AnD JACK SHYOER 1 Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars 394 Charm Kauemann 1» The Troubled History of Partition 422 Raowa Kumar PART VIII Military Technology, Strategy, and Stability 421 = Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma 425 Rosear JeRvis 1» The Offensive/Defensive Balance of Military Technology 442 Jack 8. Levy 1 Arms Control: Historical Experience 454 CHARLES H. FAIRBANKS JR. AND ABRAM N, SHULSKY 1 The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better 465 Kenuera N. Wavrz PARTIX Revolution, Unconventional Warfare, and Terrorism 477 w= The Strategic Logic of Terrorism 481 MarTHa CRENSHAW 1 Religious Radicalism and Political ‘Mane JUERSENSMEVER 495wi | contents 1 Speech to the American People 512 Osa arn Lavin 1 Jihadi Networks of Terror 516 Maa Saceman Science of Guerrilla Warfare 530 T. E. Lawrence = On Guerrilla Warfare 539 Mao Tse-Tune 1» Patterns of Violence in World Politics 550 Saver P. Huninston w= Insurgency and Counterinsurgeney 575 Davio Gacuca 1 Principles, Imperatives, and Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency 591 Euior Conen, Coweao Crane, Jan HoRvATd, ano Jown Nast = A Strategy of Tactics: The Folly of Counterinsurgency 598 Guam P. Gen7ice PART X — New Threats and Strategies for Peace 611 ‘= Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict 614 Tuowas F. HomeR-Dixow 1 Ecoviolence 629 TnoRA 0E Sovsa = AWorld of Liberty Under Law 641 G. Jown IKENBERRY Ano Anne-MaRie SLAUGHTER ‘an the Next Superpower Rise Without War? 646 RicwARO K. BETTS AND THOMAS J. CHRISTENSEN 1 Peace Among Civilizations? 659 SamueL P, HunTricTon scl PREFACE transition from the conflict-ridden ewentieth century to the new world of international polities, and to confront the question of how much or how little the fature willbe like the past. The “century of total war"— two world wars and a long Cold War—had given way to amity among major powers, economic globalization, and a surge of democratization. For a little while many assumed that nothing would ever be the same, and the world ‘was hurtling toward permanent peace. Others cautioned that this calmer new world was temporary, bound to fall back into age-old cycles of conflict and instability. ‘We are now long past the Cold War. Optimism of the early 1990s has bbeen tempered by new outbreaks of politcal violence atound the world, but they are smaller in scale than many wars of the past century, and peace re- ‘mains robust among the only powers that have the capacity to repeat the huge catastrophic clashes of earlier times, The contentious issues of how much progress toward peace is possible, the issues that animated earlier editions of this book, are yet to be resolved: What concepts best explain the odds of con flict or cooperation between governments or groups? What causes war, and what causes peace? Can war be made obsolete? Thus many readings from earlier editions remain in this one, since the questions they address are as rel- evant as ever. Indeed, some of what seems new in the world is actually, in a sense, old, For example, in recent years Iraq and Afghanistan have brought the problem of irregular warfare back to the front burner ofthe national security agenda for the world’s sole superpower, after it had been studiously forgotten in the decades after the Vietnam War. Although the adversasies and particular circumstances are different in crucial ways, the nature of the problem of un- conventional or guerrilla war, and ideas for dealing with it, are in many ways similar to what they were in earlier times. T: original motive for this book was to help students make sense of the NEW TO THIS EDITION While this edition preserves much of previous ones, it focuses on evolving is- sues by including seven new items: 1» Fareed Zakaria’s assessment, drawn from his book The Post-American World, of how economic development in non-Western countries is shap- ing international incentives and constraints in unprecedented ways. This supplements the three basic visions (Fukuyama, Mearsheimer, and Hun- tington) that have been featured as the perspectives for organizing ideas about future developments, 7vill | Pretace Petace | ix 1» Robert Jervis's discussion of “War and Misperception,” which adds a perspective emphasizing cognition to supplement the psychoanalytically oriented explanations in Part IV. 1 A discussion of emotional and spiritual motives for war, by Ned Lebow, drawn from his book Why Nations Fight. This explores important di- mensions of the problem unaccounted for in the materialist approach of realist and liberal thcories emphasized elsewhere in the book 1 Three new readings on the challenge of unconventional war: selections from David Galula’s classic book, Counterinsurgency Warfare, which an- alyzed the problem through the experience of the Cold War competitions an article by Eliot Cohen and others summarizing recent ideas that drove the official U.S. military revision of doctrine on the subject; and a critique by U.S. Army colonel Gian Gentile, arguing that counterinsurgeney is more or less a foo!’s errand. 1 Indra de Soysa’s analysis of the causes of violence over ecological and resource issues, which contrasts with the prominent argument by Thomas Homer-Dixon. FEATURES The main point of this book has been to expose students to the timeless questions and recurrent debates about what causes war and peace, to show them that most current ideas are actually variations on old themes and that classic disagreements by thoughtful theorists about what either logic or his- tory should tell us still have much relevance. As much as possible, ceadings vwere selected that argue with each other, to make students realize that what seems self-evident or obvious to many people can be challenged in serious ways. Pedagogically, my purpose is to make students step back from certainty, to question what seems ro be common sense, and to think about what more they need to know to have informed opinions on the subject. ‘To do this, Part I presents contrasting basic arguments about what the driving forces in world politics are, and how they affect the odds of conflict or cooperation. Parts Il and Ill outline the main competing traditions in theory of international politics—ealism and liberalism, Statements by both historic theorists and contemporary analysts in both parts demonstrate the durability of contrasting convictions, however much the particular elements of argumen- tation evolve. Parts IV and V add perspectives on psychological and cultural ‘causes, more subjective sources of decisions about war that may sometimes override the materialist and conscious motives that dominate explanations of the realist and liberal sorts Getting into more theoretical detail, Part VI presents contrasting. argu- ments variously grounded in the basic realist and liberal traditions about why the logic of free economics and international interdependence naturally en- ‘courages peace (Angell, Schumpeter, Rosecrance), or how economic eauses, ef fects, and interests can leave ample motives for conquest (Machiavelli, Blainey, Lenin, Milward, Waltz). Pare VII suggests how political development and ideological change create frictions that foster violence. Ideas about national identity and self-determination ean put groups at each others’ throats (Gellnr, Mansfield, and Snyder), raising questions about which is the lesser evil: delib- erate separation of antagonistic ethnic groups or forced national integration. Kaufmann and Kumar argue on opposite sides of the latter question, ‘The next two sections are about the workings of war itself, and how they channel other causes and constraints. In Part VIll, on conventional and supra- conventional warfare, Jervis and Levy present different assessments about how judgments ofthe difference ineffectiveness of offensive or defensive modes of combat affect decisions about war. Waltz and Fairbanks and Shulsky offer counterintuitive views about how the most destructive weapons, or negotiated efforts to ban them, may have effects quite opposite from what conventional wisdom assumes. art IX, on subconventional war and terrorism, has the greatest number of readings of any section because it covers the topics that have dominated the recent national security agenda in the world's most powerful states, especially the United States: terrorism and guerrilla warfare, Is terrorism simply a nibil- istic and nonsensical atrocity, or is ita strategically rational instrement, how ‘ever objectionable? Crenshaw, Juergensmeyer, bin Ladin, and Sageman offer a varity of perspectives, Lawrence, Mao, Huntington, and Galula then analyze the classic interaction of objectives, strategy, and tacties in revolutionary ot guerilla warfare, and the other authors in this section engage the question as itis now presenting itself in the twenty-first century. ‘The last section, Part X, frst illustrates the emergence of new sources of potential political violence with contrasting assessments by Homer-Dixon and de Soysa about environmental degradation and competition for natural re- sources. It concludes with three essays chat link speculation about the future to the overarching visions and theories featured at the beginning of the book, SUPPLEMENTS Pearson is pleased to offer several resources to qualified adopters of Conflict After the Cold War and their students that will make teaching and learning, from this book even more effective and enjoyable. MySearchLab For over 10 years, instructors and students have reported achieving bet- ter results and better grades when a Pearson MyLab has been integrated inco the course. MySearchLab provides engaging experiences that personal- ize learning, and comes from 2 trusted partner with educational expertise and a deep commitment to helping students and instructors achieve theit goals. A wide range of writing, grammar, and research tools and access to a variety of academic journals, census data, Associated Press newsfeeds, andx| Pretace Prete | xl discipline-specific readings help you hone your writing and research skills To order MySearchLab with the print text, use ISBN 0-205-84447-2. Passport Choose the resources you want from MyPoliSciLab and put links to them into your course management system. If there is assessment associated with those resources, it also can be uploaded, allowing the results to feed directly into your course management system’s gradebook. 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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Many things in my intellectual carcer have fed indirectly into this collection, but for more immediate help in putting the book together I am most grate. ful to the staff of Columbia's Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, which I have been honored to direct, and the students and teaching assistants in my lecture course, “War, Peace, and Strategy,” who have served as guinea pigs for the pedagogical utility of the volume, I would also like to thank the reviewers of the last edition, including Ron Krebs, University of ‘Minnesota; Christopher Marcoux, College of William and Mary Eric Shitaev, George Mason University; Krista Wiegand, Georgia Southern University; and Joe Young, Southern Illinois University. As always, my family gets the most thanks: my wife Adela and children Elena, Michael, and Diego, babies at the time of the first edition, now full grown. I wish the world had been able to solve the problem in the interim, Richar K, BerrsVisions of War and Peace he Cold War is now more than two decades in the past, and the world ‘wars of the twentieth century that shaped the modern world are even more a matter of history than of current consciousness, Violent con- flict has remained an important part of international life, though on a smaller scale. How much do we still have to learn from the past about the prospects for war and peace? The scale of conflict in the twentieth century, the episodic but regular recurrence of war throughout earlier history, and evolving ideo- logical and institutional efforts to overcome the causes of political violence remain the standards against which current and emerging threats to interna~ tional stability, and potential progress toward peace, have to be assessed. International conflict in the past century was unusually intense. The first half was an unparalleled catastrophe: two world wars killed well over 60 million people and ruined the lives of countless others—hundseds of mile lions maimed, traumatized, displaced, or impoverished. The second half ofthe century witnessed the Cold War, a global struggle between two superpowers and two transnational ideologies. The Cold War kept conflice within bounds, not least because the nuclear revolution meant that a World War Ill would dwarf the earlier world wars in destructiveness. Nevertheless, the Cold War was punctuated by “proxy” wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, and ‘numerous revolts and other outbreaks of political violence. In terms of to- tal destruction and constant levels of military mobilization, the past century ranks as one of the bloodiest in history. To some, this dismal record closed decisively in the last decade of the century. Optimism bloomed as the Cold War ended, Western liberalism found new security as the only remaining world-spanning ideology, and growing ‘rade and modern communications brought nations closer together than everARTI Visions of War and Peace before, To others, however, the good news of the early 1990s was only a tem porary respite from an eternal cycle of conflict and calm. Afterall, the ni teenth century had witnessed relatively little large-scale international violence. And while global competition between great powers ended with the Cold ‘War, innumerable local disputes burst out and horrific small wars spread in the wake of communists collapse and Third World states’ disintegration, ‘Then on September 11th, 2001, terrorist attacks that appeared to declare war on the whole global ide of Westernization raised the specter of «future fright- ceningly violent but different in political and military dynamics from the main wars ofthe past. Will the refreshing new wave of international civility that rose when the Berlin Wall opened be limited to the developed “core” of western Europe, Japan, and North America, while the poor countries of the “periphery” con tinue to wallow in force and fury? Or is the prospect even worse? Some worry that the durability of peace is doubtful in Europe too, despite the demise of the old Soviet threat. The Cold War standoff between the superpowers had imposed a cautionary discipline on the traditional self-assertion of nations and forced them to cooperate in the interests of alliance security. Removal of the threat reduces the incentives for caution and cooperation, making it easier for states of the continent to rediscover old frictions and ambitions. Will the ond of the standoff bring the “end of history” and a world of un- precedented peace? or the return of history and old patterns of violence? or a new chapter in history in which social identity, conflicts between cultures, and unconventional threats from transnational or religious groups replace interstate combat as the main danger? or the final triumph of economic in- terests in cooperation over parochial political antagonisms? To figure out ‘whether international relations in the new millennium will be fundamentally different from such relations in the past, we need to understand what forces ‘made for wat or peace in the past, which of those forces are more important in the new world and which less, and what novel forces may push events in uncharted directions, Excessive optimism overlooks the fact that some current explanations of why international relations have become naturally and permanently peaceful are actually similar to old explanations, ones that were jolted, if not discred- sd, by the catastrophes of the first half of the past century (the two world wars) or by the reinvigoration of the Cold War after the detente of the early 1970s, More than once, analysts discovered decisive shifts in the world, ony to find that less had changed than meets the eye, Pessimists, on the other hand, overlook how much has changed. The de- ‘ise of Marxism-Leninism everywhere but in a few puny enclaves is an even ‘more significant elimination of ideological conflict than the destruction of fascism in 1945, No cohesive transnational ideological challenge to Western democratic capitalism has emerged to rival the challenges of the past century. ‘fora comprehensive survey see Jack S. Ley and Willam R, Thompson, Canses of War (Chichester, UK Wiley: Blackwell, 2010), PARTI Visions of War and Peace Even traditional dictatorships have been declining as an alternative to the slobal primacy of Western liberal norms, Can political and cconomic change ‘this scale be intelevant to the prospects for peace or war? ‘The readings in this volume explore competing ideas about present trends in the light of historic debates about the causes of war and peace. Part I pres- ents four arguments, two generally optimistic, two more pessimistic. The sub- sequent two sections sample the main arguments that have animated debate about whether the threat of war is inevitable or can be made obsolete, The two overarching theoretical craditions that subsume most of the arguments are realism (see Part Il) and liberalism (sec Part If), both of which cover a wide variety of ideas. Not long ago, Marxism would have been considered a competing para- digin on a level with the other two, but except to the degree that it shares some assumptions with realism, ie has fallen by the wayside intellectually as well as politically. (Lenin’s explanation for imperialism, in Part VI, represents that once potent idea.} Part V, on cultural sources of eonflice and cooperation, touches on a third school of thought about international relations that has been prominent recently—“constructivism.”" Some of the causes and concerns that figure in constructivist challenges to realism and liberalism can also be seen in the Huntington entries in Parts I and XI, and underlie some interpreta- tions of global terrorism. ‘Whereas Parts Il and III focus on dynamics in the relations among govern- ‘ments, Parts IV and V illustrate arguments about how human nature or social differences affect tendencies toward war or peace. Parts VI to IX present con- tending views of how economic, political, and military factors may encourage, suppress, or channel decisions to resort to force. Most of these entries reflect variations of the realist and liberal perspectives. (As editor I have tried to keep some balance between the two strands of argument, and I personally do not have complete faith in cither one, Honesty, however, requires that ladmit a tilt in favor of realism.) Part X notes a debate about environmental change and political conflict as an example of issues that may come to drive war or peace in ways different from the causes of the past, and then turns to reflee- tions about the future that apply the visions featured at the beginning of the volume, “af we substitute classes for states a the essential units in competition for owes, Marxish has much of che materials and decisis logic of realism, Both ser, in contcast to liberals, thar confi eather than harmony i he aaturalconltion of haman eations n opposition to realism, classical Maxim ses the state as only the superstractre of clas inter, so tan atonal socal allnees should have proved to emote sgificat than confit betwee ste “This idea was thoroughly knocked out by World War |, When Lenni came to dominate “Maeaise and marie it 19 Russian and Chinese navonalsm, communist sarsmanship became einen reals, For more in this win ee Alexander Wen, Scil Theory of Iteration Politics (Cambridge, ‘UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999)Peter Kateenstein ed, The Culture of Nationl Secwity (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), and Richard Ned Lebow A altura Theory of. International Relations (New York: Cambie University Pres, 2008).