Computers in Human Behavior 48 (2015) 473–480

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Computers in Human Behavior

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/comphumbeh

The brain in your pocket: Evidence that Smartphones

are used to supplant thinking q
Nathaniel Barr 1, Gordon Pennycook ⇑,1, Jennifer A. Stolz, Jonathan A. Fugelsang
Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo, Canada

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: With the advent of Smartphone technology, access to the internet and its associated knowledge base is at
one’s fingertips. What consequences does this have for human cognition? We frame Smartphone use as
an instantiation of the extended mind—the notion that our cognition goes beyond our brains—and in so
Keywords: doing, characterize a modern form of cognitive miserliness. Specifically, that people typically forego
Smartphone use effortful analytic thinking in lieu of fast and easy intuition suggests that individuals may allow their
Internet use Smartphones to do their thinking for them. Our account predicts that individuals who are relatively less
Cognitive miserliness
willing and/or able to engage effortful reasoning processes may compensate by relying on the internet
Dual-process theories
Extended mind
through their Smartphones. Across three studies, we find that those who think more intuitively and less
Situated cognition analytically when given reasoning problems were more likely to rely on their Smartphones (i.e., extended
mind) for information in their everyday lives. There was no such association with the amount of time
using the Smartphone for social media and entertainment purposes, nor did boredom proneness qualify
any of our results. These findings demonstrate that people may offload thinking to technology, which in
turn demands that psychological science understand the meshing of mind and media to adequately char-
acterize human experience and cognition in the modern era.
Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

‘‘...the medium is the message... the personal and social conse-
quences of any medium - that is, of any extension of ourselves -
result from the new scale that is introduced into our affairs by each
extension of ourselves, or by any new technology.’’
[McLuhan (1964), p. 8]
1. Introduction
McLuhan (1964) turned the attention of the world to the impact
that technological change can impart by famously proclaiming
‘‘the medium is the message.’’ The internet, although now ubiqui-
tous, is a recent addition to our society that has afforded unprece-
dented access to information of nearly every possible kind. This
easily accessible online knowledge base has largely supplanted
other media in terms of acquiring knowledge for daily life. As such,
few, if any, media have been as monumental as the internet. First
q
Funding for this study was provided by the Natural Sciences and Engineering
Research Council of Canada.
⇑ Corresponding author at: Department of Psychology, University of Waterloo,
200 University Avenue West, Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1, Canada.
E-mail address: gpennyco@uwaterloo.ca (G. Pennycook).
1
These authors contributed equally to this work.
bounded by wires, next by proximity to a router, the advent and
rise of the Smartphone means that the internet and the massive
knowledge base it contains now knows no bounds for billions.
Soon the number of Smartphones in use will be in the billions
and the anticipated power of such devices is expected to continue
to grow at a rate reminiscent of science fiction rather than science
fact (Miller, 2012). Smartphones have undeniably become a medi-
um with a very important message – a message that has yet to be
deciphered.
1.1. The extended mind
The extended mind – the notion that the mind goes beyond
grey matter – is an idea that allows an understanding of human
cognition as acting in a coupled system with the environment
(Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Clark, 2008). In the seminal work on this
topic, Clark and Chalmers (1998) define an extended cognitive sys-
tem as an external object that serves to accomplish a function that
would otherwise be attained via the action of internal cognitive
processes. A simple example is the jotting down of a number on
paper, rather than maintaining that same information in memory.
The technological properties of Smartphones provide an exciting
and interesting new means of externalization. Such devices go

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2015.02.029
0747-5632/Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
474 N. Barr et al. / Computers in Human Behavior 48 (2015) 473–480
beyond assisting memory through simple maintenance, as has long
been done with various media, and in fact accomplish much in the
way of the storage and retrieval of memory as well.
Given the significance of the central tenet of this idea, as well as
the staggering efficiency with which ‘cognitive’ functions can now
operate externally, it is surprising how little work has directly
explored Smartphones within such a framework. Empirical support
for the notion that the internet, an integral component of the
Smartphone’s utility, acts as an extension of the mind comes from
research demonstrating that people think of, and use, the internet
as a transactive, or external, memory source (Sparrow, Liu, &
Wegner, 2011). One can easily probe the depths of the internet,
as opposed to one’s own mind to retrieve information, thus limit-
ing the use of effortful cognitive processes.
1.2. Cognitive miserliness and dual-process theories
Parallel to this work, a long tradition of reasoning research has
demonstrated that humans are ‘‘cognitive misers’’ (Kahneman,
2011; Stanovich, 2004), a term adopted from early information
processing frameworks (Dawes, 1976; Taylor, 1981). Empirical evi-
dence shows that people tend to eschew costly analytic thought in
favor of comparatively effortless intuitive processing (for reviews,
see Baron, 1998; Evans, 1989; Evans & Over, 1996; Kahneman,
2003; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Shafir & Tversky,
1995; Stanovich & West, 2000). Consider the following example
from the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005):
A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more
than the ball. How much does the ball cost? _____ cents.
The bat and ball problem cues an intuitive response (i.e., 10
cents) that can be shown to be obviously incorrect using a very
simple mathematical operation (.10 + 1.00 + .10 = 1.20). However,
college students and participants recruited online nonetheless tend
to have a great deal of difficulty correctly solving the problem –
with typical scores falling around 33% correct (Campitelli &
Gerrans, 2014; Frederick, 2005).
The difficulty that people have with problems like the above
example is easily understood under a dual-process perspective of
cognitive functioning (e.g., Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Dual-process
theories distinguish between autonomously cued intuitive or
‘‘Type 1’’ processes that require few cognitive resources on the
one hand and more deliberative ‘‘Type 2’’ processes that require
working memory capacity on the other (Evans & Stanovich,
2013; see also Evans, 2009; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 2009;
Thompson, Prowse Turner, & Pennycook, 2011). Under this expla-
nation, performance on the bat and ball problem is relatively low
because the features of the problem cause Type 1 processing to
rapidly output a response that requires resource demanding Type
2 processes to override. Thus, in other words, the miserly nature
of human cognition lends itself to an overreliance on simple
heuristics and mental shortcuts (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman
et al., 1982).
1.3. Hypothesis
One potential consequence of the accessibility of Smartphone
technology is that the general disinclination and/or inability to
engage analytic thinking may now be applicable not only to reli-
ance on intuitive and heuristic thinking, but also to no thinking
at all. A straightforward prediction follows from this line of reason-
ing: There should be a relation between these two forms of cogni-
tive miserliness, such that those more prone to rely on intuitive
cognitive heuristics should be more prone to heavy Smartphones
use. We tested this prediction in three studies.
2. Study 1
As an initial test of the proposed association between Smart-
phone (SP) use and heuristic thinking, we gave participants a set
of ‘‘heuristics and biases’’ problems that have been used extensive-
ly in previous research. Each problem is designed to cue an incor-
rect intuitive response that is difficult to override and is therefore
considered at least partially reflective of analytic cognitive style
(otherwise referred to as thinking disposition, see Stanovich,
2009). Participants were also asked to indicate if they own a Smart-
phone and, if so, how much time they spend on it generally and
using search engines in particular.
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants
Participants in Study 1 were Americans recruited through
Mechanical Turk™, an online marketplace where ‘workers’ can sign
up for paid studies (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Par-
ticipants who failed an attention check question were excluded
from analysis. For this, participants were shown a list of activities
and asked to write ‘‘I read the instructions’’ in the ‘‘other’’ box if
they were, in fact, reading the instructions. The final sample
included 190 individuals (94 females, Mage = 35).
2.1.2. Measures
These data were collected as part of a larger set of studies on
political ideology, religious beliefs, and moral values. As such, addi-
tional measures were included in the study session that are not of
interest here, and are thus not reported.
2.1.2.1. Cognitive. Cognitive measures for Study 1 included 4 syllo-
gisms (De Neys & Franssens, 2009), 4 base-rate problems (De Neys
& Glumicic, 2008), and a 14 item ‘‘heuristics and biases’’ battery
(Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011). Individual items for the cogni-
tive measures can be found in Supplementary materials. An overall
cognitive style score was computed by taking the mean of the
three measures.
2.1.2.2. Smartphone use. After answering a set of demographic
questions, participants were asked to indicate whether they own
a Smartphone (SP). Those who responded affirmatively were asked
to indicate roughly how many minutes they spend per day (a) on
their SP and (b) on their SP specifically using search engines.
2.2. Results
Performance did not significantly differ between SP owners
(N = 131) and non-owners (N = 47) on any of the cognitive mea-
sures, t’s < 1.5, p’s > .18. To assess the predicted association
between performance and SP use, SP owners were broken up into
three roughly equivalent usage groups (low, medium, and high).
This approach was taken in lieu of correlational analyses because
it is not influenced by outliers and as a consequence does not
require case exclusion. We computed an overall performance score
on the cognitive style measures and compared the three usage
groups using one-way ANOVA’s (see Table 1). There were main
effects of SP usage group, F(2, 128) = 9.61, MSE = .03, p < .001,
gp2 = .13, and SP search engine usage group, F(2, 128) = 10.76,
MSE = .03, p < .001, gp2 = .14 (see Table 1). Follow-up t-tests
revealed that there was no difference between low and medium
usage groups for general SP use, t < 1. However, all three search
engine use groups differed, all t’s > 2.68, p’s < .01.
The main effect of SP usage group held for each of the individual
cognitive style measures: Syllogisms, F(2, 128) = 3.65, MSE = .134,
 N. Barr et al. / Computers in Human Behavior 48 (2015) 473–480
Table 1
Mean accuracy on cognitive style measures as a function of number of minutes using
Smartphone.
Low Medium High ANOVA
Overall .54 .51 .39 F = 9.61***
Search engine .57 .47 .41 F = 10.76***
***
p 6 .001.
p = .029, Base-rate problems, F(2, 128) = 4.52, MSE = .141, p = .013,
and the Heuristics and biases battery, F(2, 128) = 7.62, MSE = .03,
p = .001. The main effect of SP search engine usage group also held
for each of the individual cognitive style measures: Syllogisms,
F(2, 128) = 3.26, MSE = .135, p = .042, Base-rate problems,
F(2, 128) = 3.94, MSE = .142, p = .022, and the Heuristics and biases
battery, F(2, 128) = 10.31, MSE = .03, p < .001.
2.3. Discussion
In Study 1 we found that participants who reported a relatively
high level of SP usage scored lower on each of the cognitive style
measures employed. In contrast, there were no differences
between SP owners and non-owners. This null result supports
the causal explanation that we have hypothesized. Namely, if SP
use over time leads to an increase in cognitive miserliness (as
opposed to the converse), one would expect SP owners to score
lower than non-owners. Thus, our results supported the hypothesis
that cognitive misers offload analytic thinking to their SP.
3. Study 2
A simple alternative explanation for the association between SP
usage and reasoning performance would be that the participants
who fell in the high SP usage group are simply worse at estimating
how much time they spend on things, leading to overestimation
much of the time. Presumably, if this were the case, the relatively
more heuristic thinkers in the sample would be more prone to
overestimation. To rule out this possibility, we asked participants
to estimate how much time they spend on computers, both online
and specifically using search engines. For the participants who
have a SP, there should be no relation between computer usage
and heuristic thinking because, presumably, access to a SP would
undermine the potential function of the computer as an extended
mind source. Certainly, a lack of association for computer usage
would suggest that the lower accuracy on the heuristics and biased
measures for the high SP usage group is not simply due to
overestimation.
A second alternative explanation relates to the multiple poten-
tial online uses of the SP. We have hypothesized a direct link
between cognitive miserliness and use of the SP as an information
source. However, in Study 1 we found that use of search engines on
the SP and general SP use were both associated with lower perfor-
mance on the reasoning tasks. Thus, to investigate the possible
association between cognitive miserliness and alternative online
uses of the SP, we also asked participants to estimate how much
time per day they spend using their SP for general entertainment
purposes (e.g., YouTube, reddit, tumblr) and on social media (e.g.,
Facebook, Twitter). These questions were also extended to com-
puter use.
Finally, we also extended our battery of cognitive tasks to
include cognitive ability measures. In contrast to cognitive style
measures, cognitive ability measures do not cue an intuitive
response and therefore primarily assess the participants’ ability
to apply analytic thinking to a problem. As a consequence, cogni-
tive style and ability assess different dimensions of cognitive
475
miserliness. Cognitive style refers to the disposition to engage
analytic thinking whereas cognitive ability refers to the computa-
tional power and knowledge that is available for use. Both factors
undermine elaborative Type 2 processing and, as a consequence,
they both could theoretically contribute to a ‘‘Smartphone heuris-
tic’’. This more encompassing approach to rationality was pio-
neered by Stanovich and West (e.g., Stanovich & West, 1997,
1998, 2000) is becoming more common in the literature (e.g.,
Barr, Pennycook, Stolz, & Fugelsang, 2014; Pennycook, Cheyne,
Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2014; Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli,
Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012; Toplak et al., 2011). It is important
to keep in mind, however, that using performance-based measures
to assess cognitive style means that all cognitive style and ability
measures necessarily require some degree of ability and cognitive
motivation. The measures should therefore be viewed as more
reflective of one over the other, but not as purely one or the other
(for a similar discussion, see Pennycook et al. (2014)).
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Participants were Americans recruited through Mechanical
Turk™. As in Study 1, participants who failed an attention check
question were excluded from analysis. The final sample consisted
of 208 participants (84 females, Mage = 34.5).
3.1.2. Measures
As with Study 1, these data were collected as part of a larger set
of studies on political ideology, religious beliefs, and moral values.
3.1.2.1. Cognitive. Cognitive style measures included 3 base-rate
problems (as above) and the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT;
Frederick, 2005). Cognitive ability measures included a 3 item
numeracy test (Schwartz, Woloshin, Black, & Welch, 1997) and
the Wordsum verbal intelligence test (Huang & Hauser, 1998).
Individual items for the cognitive measures can be found in Sup-
plementary materials.
3.1.2.2. Smartphone and computer use. Participants who reported
owning a SP were asked to estimate how much time they spent
online and specifically using search engines on their SP. We also
included two additional questions asking participants to estimate
the amount of time they spent on their SPs using social media
and for general entertainment. Finally, participants were asked to
indicate how many minutes per day they spent online using a com-
puter (generally and specifically using search engines, social
media, and for general entertainment).
3.2. Results
Performance did not significantly differ between SP owners
(N = 98) and non-owners (N = 106) on any set of cognitive mea-
sures, t’s < 1.1, p’s > .25. As in Study 1, participants were broken
up into three roughly equivalent usage groups for each SP and
computer use item (low, medium, and high; see Table 2). There
were main effects of SP online usage group for both cognitive style,
F(2, 92) = 3.75, MSE = .07, p = .027, gp2 = .08, and ability, F(2, 92) =
8.23, MSE = .04, p = .001, gp2 = .15 (see Table 2) composite scores.
There were also main effects of SP search engine usage group for
both cognitive style, F(2, 92) = 3.87, MSE = .07, p = .024, gp2 = .08,
and ability, F(2, 92) = 6.14, MSE = .04, p = .003, gp2 = .12 (see
Table 2). There were no differences between low and medium
usage groups for both general and specifically search engine relat-
ed SP use on either measure, t’s < 1.
The main effect of SP usage group held for each of the individual
cognitive style and ability measures, with the exception of base-
476 N. Barr et al. / Computers in Human Behavior 48 (2015) 473–480

Table 2
Mean accuracy on cognitive style and ability measures as a function of number of minutes spend online using Smartphones (SP) and computers.

Cognitive Style Cognitive Ability

Low Medium High ANOVA Low Medium High ANOVA
Smartphone Overall .44 .38 .25 F = 3.75* .69 .75 .53 F = 8.23***
Search engine .43 .40 .25 F = 3.87* .69 .74 .56 F = 6.14**
Social media .42 .30 .36 F = 1.43 .73 .62 .64 F = 2.20
Entertainment .38 .45 .30 F = 1.79 .69 .75 .61 F = 2.42
Computer (SP owners) Overall .38 .37 .37 F = .02 .65 .71 .69 F = .64
Search engine .41 .40 .30 F = 1.62 .71 .69 .64 F = .85
Social media .37 .43 .33 F = 1.08 .71 .67 .67 F = .31
Entertainment .36 .38 .38 F = .04 .67 .67 .75 F = 1.17
Computer (SP non-owners) Overall .35 .41 .34 F = .69 .69 .75 .71 F = .71
Search engine .44 .38 .19 F = 6.10** .71 .75 .66 F = 1.83
Social media .36 .37 .36 F = .01 .78 .68 .66 F = 4.41*
Entertainment .31 .40 .41 F = 1.24 .70 .72 .75 F = .45
*
p 6 .05.
**
p 6 .01.
***
p 6 .001.

rate problems: Cognitive Reflection Test, F(2, 92) = 5.39, MSE =
.139, p = .006, Base-rate problems, F(2, 92) = 1.16, MSE = .09,
p = .318, Numeracy, F(2, 92) = 8.07, MSE = .097, p = .001, and Word-
sum, F(2, 92) = 3.26, MSE = .03, p = .043. The same pattern of results
occurred for SP search engine usage: Cognitive Reflection Test,
F(2, 92) = 4.84, MSE = .141, p = .010, Base-rate problems, F(2, 92) =
1.50, MSE = .09, p = .230, Numeracy, F(2, 92) = 3.99, MSE = .105,
p = .022, and Wordsum, F(2, 92) = 5.59, MSE = .02, p = .005.
In contrast, there were no main effects of SP social media use for
the overall cognitive style or ability scores (see Table 2) or any
individual measure. There was a small trend for the numeracy
measure, F(2, 92) = 2.29, MSE = .108, p = .108, but none of the other
measures approached significance, all other F’s < 1.3, p’s > .29. Use
of the SP for entertainment purposes was also not associated with
the overall cognitive style or ability scores (see Table 2), although
there were small trends among all individual measures except for
the CRT: Cognitive Reflection Test, F(2,92) = .85, MSE = .153,
p = .431, Base-rate problems, F(2, 92) = 1.88, MSE = .09, p = .159,
Numeracy, F(2, 92) = 1.73, MSE = .110, p = .184, and Wordsum,
F(2, 92) = 2.28, MSE = .03, p = .108.
Further, there were no main effects in terms of online com-
puter usage for any cognitive style or ability measure when
the analysis was isolated to SP owners, all F’s < 1. The same pat-
tern held for search engine use, all F’s < 1.71, all p’s > .18, social
media use, all F’s < 1.36, all p’s > .26, and entertainment, all
F’s < 1.76, all p’s > .17. For SP non-owners, there was no main
effect of general online computer usage for any cognitive style
or ability measure, all F’s < 1.32, all p’s > .27. However, cognitive
style performance did differ as a function of computer search
engine use for SP non-owners (albeit marginally for the CRT):
Overall, F(2, 103) = 6.10, MSE = .07, p = .003, gp2 = .11, Cognitive
Reflection Test, F(2, 103) = 2.78, MSE = .149, p = .066, and Base-
rate problems, F(2, 92) = 4.60, MSE = .10, p = .012. This pattern
did not hold for cognitive ability measures, all F’s < 1.91, all
p’s > .15. There was also a main effect of cognitive ability for
social media use on the computer among SP non-owners: Over-
all, F(2, 103) = 4.41, MSE = .04, p = .015, gp2 = .08. This difference
was marginal for Numeracy, F(2, 103) = 2.69, MSE = .09, p = .073,
and significant for Wordsum, F(2, 103) = 4.74, MSE = .03,
p = .011. However, there were no significant differences for the
cognitive style measures, all F’s < 1. Finally, the amount of time
using the computer for entertainment online among SP
non-owners was not associated with any cognitive ability or
style measures, although there was a trend for the Cognitive
Reflection Test, F(2, 103) = 2.26, MSE = .15, p = .109, all other
F’s < 1.
3.3. Discussion
Study 2 replicated and extended the results of Study 1. As in
Study 1, participants who reported relatively high levels of general
online SP use and SP search engine use scored lower on measures
of analytic cognitive style. This finding was extended to cognitive
ability measures as well, indicating a role for both dispositional
and computational sources of cognitive miserliness in SP use.
A number of informative null results also emerged from Study
2. The amount of estimated time using computers for SP owners
did not differ for either general use or any of the specific computer
use items. This indicates that the association between reasoning
performance and SP use cannot be explained by a mere overesti-
mation error among high users. Rather, the evidence suggests that
high SP users are genuinely lower in cognitive ability and have a
more intuitive cognitive style. In addition, there was limited evi-
dence for an association between cognitive miserliness and com-
puter use among the participants who did not own a SP. Those
who used search engines on computers (and who did not own a
SP) scored lower on the cognitive style, but not ability measures.
Thus, although it appears that – as predicted – the use of SPs as
informational sources has much to do with proximity and ease of
use, offloading thinking by relying on external information sources
may extend past SPs as well. This is an important question for
future research.
Finally, the use of SPs and computers for entertainment and
social media did not strongly associate with our cognitive style
and ability measures. The only exception was lower performance
on cognitive ability measures among SP non-owners who frequent
social media sites on the computer. Future research is required to
further probe this observation to determine if this is a stable and
replicable observation or an anomaly. Regardless, this exception
does not undermine the hypothesis that cognitive misers use SPs
as an external mind.
4. Study 3
Recent research on cell phone use that is relevant to our
hypothesis has come from a rather different perspective from that
offered here. Specifically, research demonstrating a negative asso-
ciation between cell phone use and academic performance (e.g.,
Hong, Chiu, & Hong, 2012; Jacobsen & Forste, 2011; Lepp,
Barkley, & Karpinski, 2014; Sanchez-Martinez & Otero, 2009; Yen
et al., 2009) has focused on the cell phone as a source of distraction
in educational settings. For example, Lepp et al. (2014) found a
negative correlation between grade point average (GPA) and both
 N. Barr et al. / Computers in Human Behavior 48 (2015) 473–480
overall cell phone use (i.e., including all uses apart from listening to
music) and text messaging among university students. Lepp et al.’s
explanation for this association was that cell phone use – at least at
high levels – distracts students from school work (see also
Jacobsen & Forste, 2011). This hypothesis was supported by anec-
dotal evidence from students who report feeling obligated to con-
stantly be in touch via texting and/or social media (Lepp et al.,
2014). Moreover, Jacobsen and Forste (2011) found that more than
two-thirds of their sample of university students reported multi-
tasking with electronic media (including but not limited to cell
phone use) while in class, studying, or doing homework (see also
Junco & Cotton, 2011, 2012).
These studies differ from our own in two important respects.
First, we are interested in a very specific form of cell phone use.
Clearly, those who spend a lot of time online on their SPs will also
spend more time on their cell phones in general. However, at least
in the case of search engine use, this likely only represents a frac-
tion of the time spent using cell phones. Second, although aca-
demic performance is surely facilitated by cognitive
reflectiveness and ability, there are obviously multiple additional
factors that determine success. Thus, it is quite possible that (a)
academic performance is decreased by general cell phone use
(including internet use in particular) and (b) those who use their
cell phone as an extended mind (during class and otherwise) are
less analytic in disposition and computational power and, as a con-
sequence, have lower academic success. In Study 3, we investigat-
ed this possibility by including a measure of self-report GPA in a
university sample. This also had the added benefit of allowing us
to replicate our findings with a different sample.
The research discussed above focuses on the cell phone as an
ultimate source of distraction: students who might normally do
well in an academic setting feel obligated or compelled to use their
SP while in class or studying. However, it is possible that, in addi-
tion to this mechanism, there are ultimate psychological factors
that lead to compulsive cell phone use. For example, boredom
proneness is associated with lower academic performance in uni-
versity samples (Mann & Robinson, 2009) and internet addiction
in a non-clinical sample (Nichols & Nicki, 2004). Moreover, high
cell phone users may be susceptible to boredom during leisure
time (Lepp, Li, Barkley, & Salehi-Esfahani, 2015). Thus, it may be
that boredom proneness mediates the association between SP
use and reasoning performance. Specifically, boredom proneness
may lead people to (a) do poorly on reasoning tasks due to a lack
of attention and (b) compulsively use their SP. These same people
would presumably also do poorly in educational settings. To inves-
tigate this possibility we also assessed boredom proneness.
4.1. Method
4.1.1. Participants
For Study 3, participants were Canadian undergraduate stu-
dents. As above, participants who failed an attention check ques-
tion were excluded from analysis. The final sample included 262
participants (193 females, Mage = 20.3).
4.1.2. Measures
These data were collected as part of a larger set of studies on
political ideology, religious beliefs, and moral values. As such, addi-
tional measures were included that are not of interest here, and are
thus not reported.
4.1.2.1. Cognitive. Cognitive style measures included the Cognitive
Reflection Test and the heuristics and biases battery. Cognitive
ability measures included the numeracy test and the Wordsum
verbal intelligence test.
477
4.1.2.2. Smartphone use. The SP use items were identical to Study 1.
4.1.2.3. Boredom proneness. Participants completed a self-report
boredom proneness measure in an earlier session as part of depart-
mental mass testing. The Boredom Proneness Scale (Farmer &
Sundberg, 1986) includes 28 items such as ‘‘I am not good at wait-
ing patiently’’ and ‘‘time always seems to pass slowly’’. Participants
responded on a 7-point likert scale from strongly disagree to
strongly agree. Responses were summed to create the overall bore-
dom proneness score. The scale had good internal consistency
(Cronbach’s Alpha = .92).
4.1.2.4. Grade point average. A self-report estimate of GPA was
included in a prescreen study at the beginning of the semester. Par-
ticipants selected from the following options: (1) below 60%, (2)
60–64.9%, (3) 65–69.9%, (4) 70–74.9%, (5) 75–79.9%, (6) 80–
84.9%, (7) 85–89.9%, (8) 90–94.9%, (9) 95–100%.
4.2. Results
Overall cognitive style or ability performance, GPA, and bore-
dom proneness did not significantly differ between SP owners
(N = 227) and non-owners (N = 35), t’s < 1.5, p’s > .14. There were,
however, two marginal differences among the individual measures
reflecting better reasoning performance for SP non-owners:
Heuristics and biases battery, t(42.2) = 1.84, SE = .04, p = .0742,
and Wordsum, t(260) = 2.01, MSE = .03, p = .045. The other two mea-
sures did not differ: Cognitive Reflection Test, t(260) = .95, MSE = .07,
p = .342, and Numeracy, t(260) = .47, MSE = .05, p = .637.
As in Study 1 and 2, SP owners were broken up into three
roughly equivalent usage groups (low, medium, and high; see
Table 3). There were main effects of general SP usage group for
both cognitive style, F(2, 224) = 7.34, MSE = .05, p = .001, gp2 = .06,
and ability, F(2, 224) = 9.44, MSE = .03, p < .001, gp2 = .08, compos-
ite scores (see Table 3). There were also main effects of SP search
engine usage group for cognitive style, F(2, 224) = 4.96, MSE = .05,
p = .008, gp2 = .04, and, marginally, ability, F(2, 224) = 2.95,
MSE = .04, p = .054, gp2 = .03 (see Table 3). There were no differ-
ences between low and medium usage groups for both general
and specifically search engine related SP use, t’s < 1.5, p’s > .13.
While the main effect of search engine use for cognitive ability
was moderate (p = .054), the high usage group differed from the
combined low and medium usage groups, t(225) = 2.37, SE = .03,
p = .019.
The main effect of SP usage group held for each of the individual
cognitive style and ability measures: Cognitive Reflection Test,
F(2, 224) = 7.51, MSE = .12, p = .001, Heuristics and biases battery,
F(2, 224) = 3.06, MSE = .03, p = .049, Numeracy, F(2, 224) = 6.75,
MSE = .08, p = .001, and Wordsum, F(2, 224) = 5.75, MSE = .03,
p = .004. The main effect of SP search engine usage group held for
both of the individual cognitive style measures: Cognitive Reflec-
tion Test, F(2, 224) = 4.37, MSE = .12, p = .014, and the Heuristics
and biases battery, F(2, 224) = 3.07, MSE = .03, p = .048. Perfor-
mance on the individual cognitive ability measures did not differ
despite the overall main effect: Numeracy, F(2, 224) = 2.55,
MSE = .08, p = .080, and Wordsum, F(2, 224) = 1.39, MSE = .03,
p = .251.
In contrast to previous work (e.g., Lepp et al., 2014), GPA did not
differ as a function of either general SP use or SP search engine use,
both F’s < 1. Further, boredom proneness also did not differ as a
function of either general SP use or SP search engine use, both
F’s < 1.
2
Equal variances not assumed due to significant Levene’s test, F = 6.2, p = .013.
478 N. Barr et al. / Computers in Human Behavior 48 (2015) 473–480
Table 3
Mean accuracy on cognitive style, ability, and boredom proneness measures as a function of number of minutes using Smartphone.
Cognitive Style
Low Medium High ANOVA
Overall .49 .45 .35 F = 7.34***
Search engine .49 .44 .36 F = 4.96**
⁄
p 6 .05.
**
p 6 .01.
***
p 6 .001.
p = .054.
4.3. Discussion
In Study 3, we replicated the association between high levels of
SP use and cognitive miserliness in a sample of Canadian university
students. However, in contrast to what would be predicted based
on prior research (e.g., Jacobsen & Forste, 2011; Lepp et al.,
2014), there were no associations between SP use and either GPA
or boredom proneness. Although this may be because our GPA
measure was obtained via self-report, it is likely that more direct
questions about SP use during class-time and studying would
reveal differences. Moreover, Jacobsen and Forste (2011) linked a
wide range of electronic media, not just SP use, with diminished
academic performance. Thus, the lack of association between
GPA and SP use does not necessarily undermine these earlier stud-
ies. Rather, this null result serves as a strong contrast to the robust
associations between SP use and our cognitive style and ability
measures.
Boredom proneness did not relate to either online SP use or
search engine use despite previous evidence that it is associated
with internet addiction in a non-clinical sample (Nichols & Nicki,
2004). This null result suggests that boredom proneness may not
play a strong role in general internet use. More importantly for
present purposes, this excludes boredom proneness as a potential
mediator between cognitive miserliness and SP use.
5. General discussion
We provide evidence that the tendency to rely on intuitive
rather than analytic thinking is related to a modern form of cogni-
tive miserliness whereby information is sought from an external
source (i.e., one’s Smartphone). This pattern was replicated and
qualified across three studies and among both Mechanical Turk™
workers in the United States and Canadian undergraduate stu-
dents. Moreover, in Study 2, performance on cognitive style mea-
sures was associated with search engine use on computers, but
only among those who did not own a Smartphone. In addition,
boredom proneness was ruled out as a potential moderator. These
data suggest that those prone to cognitive miserliness in particular
can supplant potentially biased and irrational intuitive thinking
(Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich, 2004) with outsourced information
sources via the Smartphone (Sparrow et al., 2011).
A number of informative null results also emerged from our
analysis. First, across all three studies, there were generally no dif-
ferences between Smartphone owners and non-owners for the
cognitive measures. The two exceptions in Study 3 were relatively
small differences that were not consistent across cognitive style
and ability measures. This general lack of a difference suggests that
owning and (presumably) using a Smartphone is not sufficient to
strongly alter analytic thinking skill or disposition. However, it is
important to note that the strongest effects of Smartphone usage
emerged for those who fell into the highest usage group. Thus, it
is possible that a high level of Smartphone use is required for the
Smartphone to have negative effects on analytic thinking. We note,
Cognitive Ability Boredom Proneness
Low Medium High ANOVA Low Medium High ANOVA
.70 .68 .58 F = 9.44*** 84.7 85.3 83.3 F = .14
.66 .68 .61 F = 2.95  83.7 85.8 83.2 F = .26
however, that higher order reasoning is difficult to alter even given
direct interventions (for a short review see, Lilienfeld, Ammirati, &
Landfield, 2009). While it seems unlikely that Smartphone use
would be so influential, future research is required. We advocate
for longitudinal approaches to this issue (i.e., an analysis of cogni-
tive changes that accompany adoption or changes in Smartphone
use). However, given the rising ubiquity of use, there seems to be
a shrinking temporal window in which to find people who are
not already reliant to some degree upon such technologies.
Reasoning performance also did not generally relate to comput-
er use of any type or Smartphone use that was specific to social
media (e.g., Facebook) and online entertainment (e.g., YouTube).
This suggests that the correlation between cognitive sophistication
and Smartphone usage cannot be explained by a mere usage
reporting bias among the least analytic participants. In other
words, there was no evidence that cognitive misers were simply
more likely to overestimate time spent doing a given task. More-
over, the specificity of the associations between cognitive miserli-
ness and Smartphone use (i.e., search engine use, but not social
media and online entertainment use) supports the hypothesis that
the association between cognitive miserliness and the extended
mind is specific to a reliance on outside informational sources.
5.1. Cognitive style and Smartphone use
That those less willing to think analytically are more prone to
heavy Smartphone search engine use suggests that people may
be prone to look up information that they actually know or could
easily learn, but are unwilling to invest the cognitive cost associat-
ed with encoding and retrieval. Recall that a common characteris-
tic across our cognitive style measures was the presence of an
intuitive response that must be overridden to obtain the correct
answer. Translating this to searching for information on one’s
phone, it would seem that a feeling of uncertainty could prompt
one to reach for their Smartphone, rather than engage in more
analytic thought. This supposition is consistent with recent
research implicating metacognitive feelings of rightness as sources
of analytic engagement (Thompson et al., 2011, 2013). Similarly,
one might choose not to engage in costly elaborative encoding,
as they know that knowledge can be procured externally.
5.2. Cognitive ability and Smartphone use
Although the tendency to seek knowledge and information is
often equated with intelligence, cognitive ability was associated
with less Smartphone use and less time spend using online search
engines. This connection between cognitive ability and Smart-
phone use may be reflective of the possibility that more knowl-
edgeable individuals are less likely to require online information
search when confronted with a problem in everyday life. Our abil-
ity measures included numerical and vocabulary related problems,
and these seem likely types of information that one might search
for, such as calculating a tip online, or looking up the meaning of
 N. Barr et al. / Computers in Human Behavior 48 (2015) 473–480
a word. The ability to search for information online, on the go, has
presumably equated the facts and knowledge available for use,
although differences in online search efficiency are likely (Ford,
Miller, & Moss, 2005). While our findings support the idea that
highly intelligent individuals are less likely to require this external
knowledge, further examination of the association between every-
day information search and cognitive ability is necessary to come
to any definitive conclusions.
5.3. Limitations
Our data indicate a robust and replicable relation between rea-
soning performance and high levels of Smartphone use. However,
the causal explanation of this finding that we have hypothesized
– that cognitive miserliness leads individuals to rely on their
Smartphone as an external mind – requires further experimental
work. While this seems to be the most plausible account of our
data (as discussed above), the results reported herein should be
considered preliminary. Outside of experimental work, it is also
possible that the association between cognitive miserliness and
Smartphone use is explained by some third variable that has not
been assessed here. We have ruled out boredom proneness and
have illustrated the specificity of the association, but, again, further
work is necessary.
In line with previous work (e.g., Barr et al., 2014; Pennycook
et al., 2014), we have labeled the cognitive tasks that cue incorrect
intuitive responses ‘‘cognitive style’’ measures and those that more
directly assess specific abilities (i.e., numeracy and verbal intelli-
gence) ‘‘cognitive ability’’ measures. Although we used six different
cognitive measures (four cognitive style and two cognitive ability)
across our three studies, all six measures were relatively short and,
as a consequence, should not be considered full and extensive mea-
sures of ability and style. We contend that the measures employed
here are sufficient to evidence a basic association between cogni-
tive miserliness in both forms; however, future research with more
extensive measures – including full intelligence measures and
thinking disposition questionnaires – is necessary to determine
whether cognitive ability or style are differentially influential fac-
tors in determining the use of Smartphones as an extended mind.
5.4. Conclusions and future directions
Technological advances have long figured prominently in the
history of psychological science. Smartphones seem to represent
another technology that can fundamentally change psychology,
though unlike neuroimaging or computational technology that
afforded new ways of answering old questions, this advance inter-
acts with, and might also change, the very thing which we aim to
understand. Acknowledging the impending integration of man and
machine will result in a broader understanding of human experi-
ence and cognition, though the work has only just begun. Given
the frenetic pace of such technological advances, we believe it
imperative that more researchers consider reliance on Smart-
phones as a new kind of thinking, as our collective psychology
may change alongside the technological advances. In light of our
data, construing Smartphone use as a form of cognitive miserliness
is a potentially fruitful means of framing the way in which we off-
load cognitive effort within an ecologically valid framework.
In his short story, Harrison Bergeron, Vonnegut Jr. (1961) fore-
cast a future in which personal technological devices are used to
suppress the abilities of the most able, to be more commensurate
with the level of their less capable societal counterparts. It seems
that the opposite has become reality, whereby the Smartphone
operates to provide information to those less willing and able to
think analytically, thus acting to diminish disadvantage. However,
it is also worth considering that the ability to rely on the external
479
mind might have detrimental consequences to cognition (see Carr,
2010). While the lack of overall difference between Smartphone
owners and non-owners is counter to this possibility, further
research is required before any concrete conclusions can be made.
An important issue for future research is to attempt to understand
the complex interplay between personality factors (Lane &
Manner, 2011) and cognitive factors such as those measured here
that determine the use of Smartphones.
The long-term ramifications of the expanding externalization of
our cognitive functions to device remain unseen. Rather than adju-
dicate between those hopeful of the benefits afforded by such
advances and those fearful of the costs, we hope that our data will
serve as a call to search out both the positive and negative cogni-
tive consequences such media will impart, as there is a demonstra-
ble, replicable relation between cognitive factors and the use of
Smartphones that raises many questions that cannot be ‘Googled’
for an answer. In the face of increasing accessibility to increasingly
powerful personal technological devices (e.g., smart watches, Goo-
gle Glass), it is time for more psychologists to accept and embrace
that our cognition has transcended skull and skin (Clark &
Chalmers, 1998). It remains unclear as to whether such meshing
of mind and media is a first step toward a new era of postbiological
intelligence (Dick, 2003) or if such changes will have negative con-
sequences for our cognition (Carr, 2010). Time is of the essence, for
we ‘‘rapidly. . . approach the final phases of the extensions of man—
the technological simulation of consciousness, when the creative
process of knowing will be collectively and corporately extended
to the whole of human society.’’ (McLuhan, 1964, p. 19).
Appendix A. Supplementary material
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2015.02.029.
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