he questions the individualist anthropology of the Enlightenment and develops a more social

and historical conception of human nature, one that will reappear constantly in the nineteenth
century.

È a antropologia pragmática de Kant!!!

Fourth and finally, he begins the historical study of language, helping to bring language, the
very medium of human thought, into the historical worldview.

Linguagem

Compreender a natureza humana a partir da história:

This would be a completely new kind of history, an anthropological history, whose subject
would be not so much the particular deeds, people or works of humanity but human nature
itself. The same conception emerges even more forcefully several years later in the
Reisejournal, when Herder imagines writing a book on the history of humanity, its origins and
development. 129

Parei na página 10 da sonia sikka

A noção de desenvolvimento histórico é da antropologia, contudo a noção de

individualidade vem da estética:

Although Herder's anthropology is fundamental to his historicism, it still does not provide a
sufficient account of its origin or meaning. It does explain one basic principle of his historicism:
the principle of development, i.e., the thesis that everything in the human world, like
everything in the natural world, is changing. But there is another no less fundamental principle
of Herder's historicism that is not explained by his anthropology: the principle of individuality.
According to this principle, everything within the human world is unique, incomparable,
irretrievable, having a determinate identity entirely unlike anything else. If Herder's principle
of development came from his anthropology, his principle of individuality derived from
another, even more novel, discipline: aesthetics. P.130

Ode e a expressão de sentimentos:

The ode attempts to express our most subtle and delicate feelings; but such feelings, because
they are embedded in a particular language and culture, are completely individual (79)

Linguagem e intradutibilidade:
that the genius and character of a people lies in the genius and character of its language; and
that the meaning and beauty of literature are untranslatable because they reside in the
peculiarities of its language p.131

It is very unclear from the Fragmente how far Herder wishes to push his principle of
individuality. He thinks that his thesis of the identity of thought and expression holds especially
for poetry and the language of ordinary life; but he is sometimes unwilling to extend it to the
language of philosophy or science. P.132

Relativismo:

He now explicitly says that he would be setting too great limits to the affinity of thought and
expression if it were confined to literature alone (556). Since we cannot think without words,
and since we learn to think through them, language sets the limits of all human knowledge
(557). Hence Herder draws the bold and troubling conclusion that all thinking is national: “Each
nation speaks according to how it thinks, and thinks according to how it speaks” (558). P.132

The phenomena of cultural diversity and historical change present us with a dilemma: if we
endorse only the values of our own culture, we commit ethnocentrism; but if we accept the
values of all cultures, we have to deal with the contradiction between them because these
values not only differ but conflict with one another. Referring to Hume, Montaigne and La
Motte de Vayer, Herder admits that the inevitable result of these phenomena appears to be
skepticism (151); p.133

Critério para a crítica:

Rather than judging an author from some presumed universal standard, he demands that the
critic should examine him from within, according to the goals and standards the author sets for
himself: “As long as one does not know how to trace ideas back to their source in the intention
of the author, one writes at best against him; one arouses—if he does not know how to place
himself in his position—contradiction rather than conviction.” (172). P.133

Hermeneutica:

s, for Herder, proper criticism is essentially internalcriticism; or, as he puts it: “The best
manner to judge an author is according to his own plan…” (230). As we shall soon see, this
method of literary criticism will play a crucial role in Herder's hermeneutics.

Hermeneutica e bliblia:

The Archäologie is essentially a radical reading of Genesis according to the new critical
methods of the historical school. Herder attempts to interpret Genesis in its original historical
context and treats it as a cultural document expressing the values and ways of life of the
ancient Jews, p.135
Kant busca os valores na bíblia?

Clearly, such an argument has disturbing implications for the Christian faith. In defending
Genesis because of its poetic qualities, Herder seems to undermine its claim to moral and
metaphysical truth. P.136

Ou o a priori de Kant

Against this creeping Spinozism, Hamann had proclaimed his own version of the belief in
revelation: the Bible is a translation of the divine word into the human through the inspiration
of the poet.39,p. 137

Hamman Lembra a noção de gênio de Kant.

A história como arte: fio condutor –

Herder distinguishes three levels of theorizing in history, classifying them according to their
greater degree of subjectivity: that of the annalist, who simply reports what happens; that of
the reasoner, who attempts to determine causes; and that of the artist, who orders all events
according to a single plan (14–15), p. 142

Herder pós-moderno:

Given his skepticism about a scientific history and his preference for the artistic dimension of
history, it might seem that Herder comes close to the post‐modern doctrine that everything in
history is a matter of interpretation or rhetoric. Some scholars have indeed pressed this kind of
interpretation on Herder, p.142

Since myths and legends are fiction, one might think their loss is insignificant; but, Herder
insists, myths and legends tell us much about the values, customs and beliefs of a people,
p.143

A antropologia de Herder:

Herder's treatise was his first major attempt to realize the grand ideal of his anthropology: a
natural history of the human mind, p. 145

O naturalism de Herder é como Rousseau:

Although born weak, with few natural defenses, and lacking instincts and acute senses,
humans still have something to compensate for these deficiencies: reason and freedom. It is
reason and freedom that allow human beings to transcend the limits of their immediate
environment, to work in many different climates and in many different ways, p. 147

A linguagem substitui os instintos no estado natural, ao compararmos com Rousseau.

Here, then, was Herder's answer to Rousseau's thesis that man in the state of nature did not
need language and could survive happily from instinct alone. Man's instincts were simply too
few to guide him in all the different spheres of activity to which he had to adapt himself.
Without language to guide him, each generation would have to learn the hard way the lessons
of its parents, p.151…. a linguagem é produto da natureza humana… e não é convenção.

Teodicécia de Herder:

: that the meaning of history comes from providence whose ends are not accessible to
reason. It is astonishing to find Herder going back to theology after his original plans for a,
p.155

A razão não tem acesso aos objetivos da história.

Como Herder lida com o relativismo:

The worst problem was relativism, i.e., how there could be universal standards if all values are
cultural and historical. While Herder clearly sees this problem and struggles to avoid it, he
offers nothing toward its solution but religious faith, an appeal to providence. It was a
desperate strategy; but also the precedent for Humboldt, Ranke and Droysen, p.156

Herder crítica do iluminismo:

The Enlightenment critique of past history fails by its own standards, Herder argues, because
its judgments are based upon not universal and necessary principles but the values and beliefs
of the present age illegitimately generalized as if they held for all mankind, p.157

Teoria da história do iluminismo que Herder crítica:

Despite their differences, most of these authors share a general theory of history, which was
the main target of Herder's polemic. This theory consists in four basic assumptions. First, that
the present age, the age of Enlightenment, is the highest stage in the development of
humanity, because mankind has finally reclaimed its power to direct its own fate according to
the guidance of reason. Second, that the growth of the arts and sciences, the result ofthe
rehabilitation of reason during the Renaissance, has improved morals and the condition of
mankind. Third, the Middle Ages was an epoch of darkness, where the use of reason was
trampled by ecclesiastical authority, and where belief in revelation spread fanaticism,
superstition and prejudice. Fourth, the inspiration for the age of reason is classical antiquity,
more specifically, the culture of the Roman republic and fifth century Athens; civilization must
return to and imitate this source, which had been cast into darkness since the decline of the
Roman Empire. Such a theory of history gave rise to a specific historical practice, a specific way
of doing history, which bore the brunt of Herder's wrath. Namely, if our present culture is the
highest stage of human development, we can judge other ages and cultures according to the
extent to which they have contributed toward our age and culture, p. 157-158
Princípio do desenvolvimento de Herder:

The organic metaphor, or the principle of development behind it, was very strategic for
Herder. It was his middle path between two extreme views about the meaning of history. One
extreme affirms that there is purpose in history but measures progress toward it according to
an ethnocentric standard; the other extreme denies that there is purpose in history because it
sees epochs come and go with no coherent or cumulative result, as if history were the work of
Penelope, who weaved her shroud during the day only to unravel it at night (40), p.161…
lembra kant de 1784.

Entwined with Herder's principle of development is another central theme of his 1774 tract, a
theme that came straight out of his religious sensibility in Bückeburg: the idea of providence.
So important is this idea for Herder that he heralds it as “mein großes Thema!” He introduces
it by saying that, despite all the changes of history, there is still “a plan” behind it (40), what he
calls “progress and development in a higher sense” (41). The “higher sense” turns out to be
nothing less than providence. Amid all the chaos and confusion of history there is still “a
greater plan of God in the whole” (82), p. 161 como 1784.

Motive das ações:

hat its faith in reason makes it ignore the role of the passions, the real motives of human
action; that its radical criticism dismisses as “prejudices” beliefs necessary for action, p.165

Objeção de Herder a segunda proposição de Kant 1784:

In the strongest terms he protested that the Kantian thesis distorted the ends of providence,
which are that each generation has an intrinsic value, that each is an end in itself having its
center of happiness within itself (335, 341–2), p.182

Continuação:

The second objection is how can there be a single process of education, a history of humanity
as a whole, if each culture and epoch has its own conception of happiness and perfection?
Herder uses his relativistic doctrine as a stick to beat Kant for assuming that the creation of a
republication constitution is the goal of world history, p.182

O cárater formal da noção de humanidade:

The basic norms by which we should govern our life are those that ensure, as their minimal
precondition, that we can live autonomously and rationally. Hence, for Herder, the two
fundamental characteristics of humanity are the use of reason and freedom. It is important to
see that these are essentially formal characteristics for Herder, i.e., they do not determine
what should be rational, or what we should choose as a free being; in other words, they leave
open the specific contentof rational and free actions, which will vary greatly according to
circumstances and climate. Freedom and rationality are simply necessary conditions for all
actions to be successful and for all beliefs to be true. Freedom prescribes only that we choose
effective means to ends, whatever these ends might be; and reason prescribes only that we
find sufficient evidence for our beliefs, whatever these beliefs might be The formality of these
requirements, Herder assumes, make the standpoint of humanity compatible with historical
change and cultural diversity. All cultures have different ways of acting according to their
reason and freedom; but they all presuppose them if they are to hold justifiable beliefs and if
they are to choose and achieve their ends. Such was Herder's ultimate solution to the problem
of the one‐in‐many in history, of how there could be a single rational standard amid
incommensurable national ones p.186

Muito parecido com o Kant tardio:

Hence there is no higher law for humanity than humanity itself (631). The standards of good
and evil are relative to human beings. Whatever good happens in history is for the sake of
humanity, and whatever evil happens is contrary to the ends of humanity. The chief natural
law that governs history is this: “Man should be man! He forms himself according to what he
thinks best in his circumstances.” (632). God has given man sufficient freedom to realize his
nature according to how he sees fit; he has created him so that he becomes a God on Earth,
p.187

The various peoples of the earth, each in its own way, have realized their humanity according
to their different climates and circumstances. History only seems meaningless if we measure it
by false standards, viz., religious standards that place the highest values beyond this world, or
ethnocentric standards applicable only to one time and place, p.188

Ou padrões transcendentes

História como empreendimento humano:

We can avoid such skepticism if we only drop such standards and measure it according to what
people can achieve, and indeed have achieved, in the very different climates and
circumstances in which they find themselves. History has meaning as long as we view it, in
different ways and under different circumstances, as a striving to realize our humanity, p.188

Sikka -artigo

A limited, culture-specifi c horizon of wishes is thereby constructed, within which defi nite
forms of happiness are possible, p. 11

This thesis forms the basis for Herder=s claim that ‘every nation has its centre of happiness
within itself, as every ball its centre of gravity’ (APG, 39), p.11

the European has no concept of the boiling passions and phantoms that glow in the breast of a
Negro, and the Indian has no concept of the restless longings that drive the European from
one end of the world to another

Desejos são construídos históricamente numa cultura em Herder.

Crítica de Kant a concepção histórica de felicidade de Herder:

In Herder=s view, while it is true that individuals have different ideas of happiness, the general
shapes of these are constructed by the combination of natural and social factors that make up
a specifi c culture. That is why the section on happiness in the Ideas which Kant criticizes
claims, in its title, that happiness is ‘climatic and organic, a child of practice, tradition and
custom’ (Ideen, 327), p. 12

Definição de felicidade em Herder:

If happiness consisted in the sum of satisfaction of a potentially infi nite set of inclinations, it
would indeed be fair to say that no one is ever happy. But the wants of particular individuals in
particular societies take shape against a limited horizon, and to be happy, Herder thinks, is to
experience the joys envisioned as possible within this horizon, p.13

Kant 1784:

In the ‘Universal History’ essay, Kant had suggested that, in the case of human beings, nature
appears to have aimed not at happiness but at the development of these capacities. P.13

Kant pensa a história a partir de um princípio transcendente. A história não resultado da

escolha dos indivíduos, mas de um princípio mecânico. Isto é pensar a história a partir de
valores transcendentes (metafísicos e universais, a realização de um Bem transcendente)

Diferença de Herder e Kant acerca da felicidade e razão:

ies are ‘rewarded of themselves with happiness and joy’ (Ideen, 329). Thus when Herder
equates happiness with the ‘simple, deep, irreplaceable feeling of existence,’ he conceives of
this feeling as including the sensation of force and activity proper to each kind of living being.
In the case of human beings, that includes the healthy exercise of reason, but whereas Kant
draws a sharp distinction between the rational and the natural, and, correspondingly, between
the human and the animal, Herder does not see these as belonging to separate spheres of
existence, p.14

Na antropologia pragmática é diferente?

O status biológico de ser humano não garante a sua dignidade (povos do taiti), não são fins em
si mesmos:

It is not, after all, the biological species ‘human being’ that possesses, for Kant, the status of
being an end in itself. This status belongs to ‘rational natures,’ and happy Tahitians, as Kant
imagines them, do not realize this nature until they meet other human beings who do —
namely, Europeans, p.18

a Pragmatic Point of View, that ‘life itself and all the enjoyment of it, so far as it depends upon
circumstances, has no value of its own; what alone has value is the use to which life is put and
the end to which it is directed’(APPV, 141/239), p.19

nas lições de antropologia Kant coloca o valor na noção de eu:

While Kant rejects the intrinsic value of the life of Tahitians, he also says, in his Lectures on
Anthropology (and here there is perhaps a tension in his position), that ‘any being that can say
‘‘I,’’ and therefore make itself into an object of its consideration, has an unmediated worth’
(AA 25.1:10), p.22

A questão é que Kant retira a noção de valor das coisas e coloca nas máximas...

Contraste de Herder e Kant (Religião, passagem sobre os impulsos naturais):

As Herder sees it, on the other hand, the will to live, sexual love, care for children, sociability —
these are indeed natural drives, with analogues in the animal world, but they are expressed in
a special way among human beings (Ideen, 109). It is not, therefore, a matter of regulating the
‘animal’ in ourselves through the use of reason, conceived as a distinct and non-natural
capacity, p. 23

No entanto, esses impulsos são expresso em máximas, o que o torna humanos.

Passagem completamente equivocada da autora:

Kant sees emotions as merely natural, which means that they belong to the realm of
sensibility, are ultimately self-seeking, and are determined by causal laws. Actions motivated
by emotions have no moral worth, for they are not the result of free selflegislation according
to the autonomous laws of pure practical reason, p. 23.

Livro Sikka:

As a culturalist, Herder is thought to have held the relativistic thesis that the value systems of
different societies are incommensurable and equally valid, because there is no common
human nature and therefore no basis for postulating universal ethical principles, p.15

Diferenças culturais são baseadas na:

He nevertheless does think that cultures have distinct characters in a weaker sense, resulting
from identifiably real differences among histories, languages, geographies, forms of life, and
beliefs, p.21

Bildung: formação da cultura e educação -

For Herder, cultures are the product of Bildung, of processes of education and cultivation
involving the active exercise of specifically human, reflective faculties. Individuals become
members of cultures by participating in these processes, which they begin to do as soon as
they are born into a human society, p.21

Cultura e natureza humana:

An individual may dislike something, or many things, or even almost everything about the
society in which she is raised; she is nonetheless deeply affected by the character of that
society simply in virtue of the fact that she took shape as a human being within it, p.23
recognition of the significance of the specific cultural environment within which individuals
realize the various aspects of their humanity: their emotions, reason, and habits of thought;
their values and modes of social interaction; their practical, aesthetic, and spiritual responses
to the world. And while it is important to be critical of relations to identity that engender
violence, one should be equally wary these days of what Linda Alcoff has described as the
“pathologizing of identity”, p.23

noções transcendentais são incoerentes para herder:

With respect to cultural identity, Herder’s analyses help to show why the goal of transcending
the shaping forces of culture is incoherent, and why cultural attachments are profoundly
meaningful and important to individuals, needing to be appropriately qualified and balanced,
not eliminated, p.23