CAYETANO v MONSOD

G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991

FACTS:

In 1991, Christian Monsod was appointed by President Corazon Aquino as the

Chairman of the Commission on Elections. His appointment was affirmed by the
Commission on Appointments. Monsod’s appointment was opposed by Renato
Cayetano on the ground that he does not qualify for he failed to meet the Constitutional
requirement which provides that the chairman of the COMELEC should have been
engaged in the practice law for at least ten years.

Monsod’s track record as a lawyer:

1. Passed the bar in 1960 with a rating of 86.55%.

2. Immediately after passing, worked in his father’s law firm for one year.
3. Thereafter, until 1970, he went abroad where he had a degree in economics and
held various positions in various foreign corporations.
4. In 1970, he returned to the Philippines and held executive jobs for various local
corporations until 1986.
5. In 1986, he became a member of the Constitutional Commission.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Monsod qualifies as chairman of the COMELEC.

2. What constitutes practice of law?

HELD:

1. Yes. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-

manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings
on Monsod’s confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the
exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only
upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission’s judgment. In

1
the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court’s corrective power,
since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been
clearly shown.

2. Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of
law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.

As noted by various authorities, the practice of law is not limited to court appearances.
The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen,
know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted
in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation
and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending
more time doing what is loosely described as business counseling than in trying cases.
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number
of legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal
institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of
lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside
their specialty. By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is
one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion
of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client counseling, advice-giving, document drafting, and
negotiation.
DECISION:

The petition is DISMISSED.

2
 RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO vs. ATT Y. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO
A.C. No. 6705 March 31, 2006

FACTS:

Ruthie Lim-Santiago filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio

for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the
prohibition against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor.
The complainant is the daughter of one of the stockholder and former President of
Taggat Industries Inc where the respondent worked as a Personnel Manager and
Retained Counsel before his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.

Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat filed a criminal complaint. They

alleged that complainant, who took over the management and control of Taggat after
the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid
cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997.
Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the
preliminary investigation. He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing
of 651 Informations for violation of Article 288 in relation to Article 116 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines.

Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests.
Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat,
knew the operations of Taggat very well and should have inhibited himself from hearing,
investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees.

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government

prosecutor

Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice
of law while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to
prove that respondent received retainer's fee.

On the other hand, respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, he is
no longer part of Taggat. He contends that complainant failed to establish lack of
impartiality when he performed his duty. He points out that complainant did not file a
motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the criminal complaint but instead complainant
voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation.
Respondent asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not representing

3
Taggat employees or the complainant and he was merely performing his official duty as
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, after their investigation found that respondent is
guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former client’s interest, and violating
the prohibition against the private practice of law while being a government prosecutor.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor in deciding the labor case filed against the complainant.
2. Whether or not respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as
a government prosecutor

HELD:

1. The court found no conflict of interests when respondent handled the preliminary
investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in
the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages. Clearly, respondent was no
longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992.

In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be

presented to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any
confidential information acquired through his previous employment. The only
established participation respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he
was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. The fact alone that
respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat and
the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor related is not a sufficient
basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests.

A lawyer’s immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred
beyond the lawyer’s employment with the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon
the lawyer the duty to protect the client’s interests only on matters that he previously
handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client
relationship has terminated. Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of
evidence to prove her allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03
of the Code.

2. The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill. Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to
Taggat intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as

4
alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish between
consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed
acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the
same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of law."
Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to complainant
while working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed stated that the
payments by Taggat were for "Retainer’s fee." Thus, as correctly pointed out by
complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.

Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of

Canon 1, which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat
fees for legal services while serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct,
which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.

Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in
unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one day to
one year. The court finds this penalty appropriate for respondent’s violation in this case
of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

DECISION:

WHEREFORE, the court finds that respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

5
 aIN RE: VICENTE CHING
BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

FACTS:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and
Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April
1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines. In 1998, Vicente Ching
finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City. He eventually
passed the bar but he was advised that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino
citizen before he be allowed to take his oath.

Apparently, Ching’s father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen.
His parents were married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a
legitimate child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the
foreign parent.  Ching maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino;
that he is a certified public accountant – a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even
served as a councilor in a municipality in La Union.

The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a legitimate child of a

Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority. Ching did elect Filipino citizenship, but he only did so when he was
preparing for the bar in 1998 or 14 years after reaching the age of majority.

In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine
citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time"
allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances
surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on
the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ching should be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

HELD:

No. In the present case, Ching was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied
with the requirements of CA No. 625 or fourteen years after he had reached the age of
majority. The age of majority commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. The
Supreme Court noted that the period is originally 3 years but it was extended to 7 years.
(It seems it can’t be extended any further). Ching’s special circumstances can’t be
considered. It is not enough that he considered all his life that he is a Filipino; that he is
a professional and a public officer (was) serving this country. The rules for citizenship
are in place.

6
Further, Ching didn’t give any explanation why he belatedly chose to elect Filipino
citizenship (but I guess it’s simply because he never thought he’s Chinese not until he
applied to take the bar). The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is
certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to
execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same
with the nearest civil registry. Ching’s unreasonable and unexplained delay in making
his election cannot be simply glossed over.

DECISION:

The Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the
Philippine Bar.

7
 IN RE: JUDGE QUITAIN
JBC No. 013, August 22, 2007

FACTS:

Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City. Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) received confidential information that administrative and criminal
charges were filed against Judge Quitain in his capacity as then Assistant Regional
Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and as a result of which he was
dismissed from the service. The Deputy of Court Administrator (DCA) required Judge
Quitain to explain the alleged misrepresentation and deception he committed before the
JBC.

Judge Quitain denied having committed any misrepresentation before the JBC.
Respondent explained that during the investigation of his administrative case by the
NAPOLCOM Ad Hoc Committee, one of its members suggested to him that if he resigns
from the government service, he will no longer be prosecuted; that following such
suggestion, he tendered his irrevocable resignation from NAPOLCOM; that he did not
disclose the case in his PDS because he was of the honest belief that he had no more
pending administrative case by reason of his resignation; that his resignation amounted
to an automatic dismissal of his administrative case considering that the issues raised
therein became moot and academic; and that had he known that he would be dismissed
from the service, he should not have applied for the position of a judge since he knew
he would never be appointed.

The court contends that Judge Quitain deliberately did not disclose the fact that
he was dismissed from the government service. At the time he filled up and submitted
his Personal Data Sheet with the Judicial and Bar Council, he had full knowledge of the
subject administrative case, as well as Administrative Order No. 183 dismissing him
from the government service.

ISSUES:

1. WON the resignation of the judge renders the administrative proceedings against him
moot and academic.

2. WON the judge be excused of his omission in the PDS.

HELD:

1. No. Respondents contentions utterly lack merit. As a member of the Bar, he should
know that his resignation from the NAPOLCOM would not obliterate any administrative
liability he may have incurred, much less, would it result to the automatic dismissal of
the administrative case filed against him. The acceptance of his resignation is definitely

8
without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative case filed against him. If such
would be the case, anyone charged administratively could easily escape from
administrative sanctions by the simple expedient of resigning from the service.

Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by the Court without
prejudice does not render moot and academic the instant administrative case. The
jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint is
not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge by his resignation and its
consequent acceptance without prejudice by this Court, has ceased to be in office
during the pendency of this case. The Court retains its authority to
pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges against him.

2. No. Respondent is guilty of dishonesty. Dishonesty means disposition to lie, cheat or

defraud; unworthiness; lack of integrity. The court cannot overemphasize the need for
honesty and integrity on the part of all those who are in the service of the Judiciary.
They have often stressed that the conduct required of court personnel, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk of court, must always be beyond reproach and
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free from any
suspicion that may taint the Judiciary. The court condemns, and will never countenance
any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of
justice, which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just
tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.

DECISION:

WHEREFORE, in view of our finding that JUDGE JAIME V. QUITAIN is guilty of grave
misconduct which would have warranted his dismissal from the service had he not
resigned during the pendency of this case, he is hereby meted the penalty of a fine of
P40,000.00. It appearing that he has yet to apply for his retirement benefits and other
privileges, if any, the Court likewise ORDERS the FORFEITURE of all benefits, except
earned leave credits which Judge Quitain may be entitled to, and he is PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement and appointment to any branch,
instrumentality or agency of the government, including government-owned and/or
controlled corporations.

9
 FATHER RANHILIO AQUINO et al v ATTY EDWIN PASCUA
A.C. No. 5095, November 28, 2007

FACTS:

Father Ranhilio Aquino, as the Academic head of the Philippine Judiciary Academy,
together with other complainants filed a letter-complaint against Attorney Edwin Pascua,
a Notary Public for violation of the Notarial Practice Law.

In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two notarized
documents in which he filed with the Civil Service Commission. Atty. Pascua admitted
having notarized the two documents, but they were not entered in his Notarial Register
due to the oversight of his legal secretary.

The case was referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and
recommendation. The Office of the Bar Confidant found that Fr. Ranhilio and the other
complainants are, therefore, correct in maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely assigned
fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on his part
not only as a Notary Public, but also as a member of the Bar.

ISSUE:

WON Atty. Pascua is guilty of Misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to
register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints.

HELD:

Yes. After a close review of the records of this case, the court resolved to adopt the
findings of facts and conclusion of law by the Office of the Bar Confidant. They found
that Atty. Pascua guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to
register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and
Remigio B. Domingo. Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful
conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose.

Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due to oversight of his
staff. Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot escape liability. His failure to enter
into his notarial register the documents that he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of
duty on his part as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his staff.

Under the notarial law, the notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological
order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him,
the person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument. Failure of the
notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial
acts in the manner required by law is a ground for revocation of his commission.

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In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua’s first offense, court believed
that the imposition of a three-month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in
order. Likewise, since his offense is a ground for revocation of notarial commission, the
same should also be imposed upon him.

DECISION:

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of misconduct and is

SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial
commission, if still existing, is ordered REVOKED.

11
 RODOLFO M. BERNARDO v ATTY. ISMAEL F. MEJIA
Adm. Case No. 2984. August 31, 2007

FACTS:

Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia of

several administrative offenses such as misappropriating and converting to his personal
use the money entrusted to him for payment of real estate taxes on Bernardo’s
property; falsification of documents such as the Special Power of Attorney, Deed of Sale
and Deed of Assignment and lastly, issuing a check knowing that he was without funds
in the bank, in payment of a loan obtained from the former in the amount of P50,000.00,
and thereafter, replacing said check with others known also to be insufficiently funded.
The Supreme Court En Banc rendered a Decision Per Curiam which found the
respondent Atty. Mejia guilty of all the charges against him and imposed on him the
penalty of Disbarment. Respondent files a Petition praying that he be allowed to
reengage in the practice of law however, the Supreme Court En Banc denied his
petition for reinstatement.
The respondent filed again this present petition for review of his Administrative
case with a plea for reinstatement in the practice of law. In the petition, Mejia
acknowledged his indiscretions in the law profession. At the age of seventy-one, he is
begging for forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement. According to him, he has long
repented and he has suffered enough. Through his reinstatement, he wants to leave a
legacy to his children and redeem the indignity that they have suffered due to his
disbarment.

ISSUE:
WON the respondent shall be reinstated.

HELD:
The Court granted the respondent’s petition. Fifteen years has passed since he
was punished with the severe penalty of disbarment. Although the Court does not lightly
take the bases for Mejias disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia
is already of advanced years. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has
been attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Thus, while the Court is ever
mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion
when the penalty imposed has already served its purpose. After all, penalties, such as
disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. However, the petitioner
is reminded that practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to
the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and
faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the continuing requirements
for enjoying the privilege to practice law.

DECISION:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for reinstatement in the Roll of
Attorneys by Ismael F. Mejia is hereby GRANTED.

12
 VELEZ V ATTY DE VERA
A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006

FACTS:

This case involves three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de
Vera. The first pertains to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de Veras moral fitness to
remain as a member of the Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Veras letter-
request to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President, and the third case
concerns the validity of his removal as Governor and EVP of the IBP by the IBP Board.

The complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the suspension and/or
disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following grounds:

1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered

against him by the State Bar of California; and

2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule with the purpose of
becoming the next IBP National President

Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit
funds due his client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by
the State Bar of California. He also alleged that the respondent was then forced to
resign or surrender his license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the
recommended three (3) year suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent
lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the country’s most noble profession.
Complainant prayed that the respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP
National President.

Respondent, in his comment, stated that the issues raised in Complaint were the
very issues raised in an earlier administrative case filed by the same complainant
against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were already extensively
discussed and categorically ruled upon by this Court. Respondent prayed that the
instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res judicata.
On the other hand, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply
in the case at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case filed against the
respondent was one for his disqualification.

During the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote,
resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP
Executive Vice President for having committed acts which were inimical to the IBP
Board and the IBP. On the other hand, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court
by writing the then Hon. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter. In the said letter, he
strongly and categorically denied having committed acts inimical to the IBP and its
Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter complaint filed by IBP

13
Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him posthaste, without just cause and in
complete disregard of even the minimum standards of due process.

On their response, the IBP Board explained to the Court that their decision to remove
Atty. de Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect itself from a
recalcitrant member. Atty. de Vera maintained that there was absolutely no factual or
legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the IBP Board because he violated
no law. He argued that if the basis for his removal as EVP was based on the same
grounds as his removal from the IBP Board, then his removal as EVP was likewise
executed without due notice and without the least compliance with the minimum
standards of due process of law.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not respondent Attorney Leonard S. Devera commited malpractice which

amounted to moral turpitude in the State Bar of California and in the Philippines, in the
course of his practice of law.
2. Whether or not the oath of office as lawyer is attached to the person of Attorney
Leonard S. Devera wherever he may go and not necessarily bound by the territorial
jurisdiction of the
Philippines.
3. Whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove the moral turpitude, as basis for
disbarment of respondent in an administrative proceeding.
4. Whether or not res judicata applies in this case.

HELD:

1. The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing
alone, is not proof of malpractice. There’s no final judgment for suspension or
disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension
of three years as he surrendered his license to practice law before his case could be
taken up by the Supreme Court of California. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino
lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the
basis of the foreign courts action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension in this jurisdiction. In herein case, considering that there is technically no
foreign judgment to speak of, the recommendation by the hearing officer of the State
Bar of California does not constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty.
de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the
recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must
then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law.

2. Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is
not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Paranaque and he was
originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter
membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post,

14
which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership,
respondent De Vera violated the domicile
rule. The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II,
a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the
particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice.

3. The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was
resolved on the basis of the parties rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We
held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional
Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions the
disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed that the
petition had no firm ground to stand on.

The Courts statement, therefore, that Atty. De Vera cannot be disqualified on the
ground that he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum.
Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings;
hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings of
a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him from the practice of law
for three years.

There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be
morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the
determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment of the
members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member's standard of
morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses
the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a
candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or
suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an
offense which involves moral turpitude.

4. In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the
complainant had already been resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative case.
The complainant’s contention that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the
case at bar as the first administrative case was one for disqualification while the instant
administrative complaint is one for suspension and/or disbarment should be given least
credence. It is worthy to note that while the instant administrative complaint is
denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed neither the suspension
nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought to enjoin the
respondent from assuming office as IBP National President. Although the parties in the
present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their capacities in
these cases and the issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the
application of res judicata.

In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential
conditions must concur, namely:

15
(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final;
(2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties;
(3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or order on the
merits, and
(4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity
of subject matter, and identity of causes of action.

In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res judicata in
his favor. Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first
case, the complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP
Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in his
Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. De Vera’s suspension or
disbarment.

DECISION:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:

1. SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO
(2) YEARS,
effective from the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to
the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts;

2. DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M.
No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of
the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing him from his
posts as Governor and Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines,
the said Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse of discretion;

3. AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar as
Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for the remainder of the term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in accordance
with its By-Laws and absent any showing of grave abuse of
discretion; and

4. DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and
assume the Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with the automatic succession rule in Article VII,
Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.

16
 JOSELANO GUEVARRA v ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA
A.C. No. 7136. August 1, 2007

FACTS

Joselano Guevarra filed case for disbarment against Atty. Jose Emmanuel “Noli” Eala
(6th PBA Commissioner) for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the
lawyer’s oath. In the Complaint, Guevarra first met the respondent in January 2000
when his then fiancée Irene Moje introduced respondent to him as her friend who was
married with whom he had three children.

Joselano and Irene got married on October 7, 2000 and soon after, complainant, from
January to March 2001, saw that Irene had been receiving calls from Noli, as well as
messages some of which read “I love you,” “I miss you,” or “Meet you at Megamall.” He
also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of
the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. Her excuse was that she
slept at her parents’ house or she was busy with work. Joselano also saw Irene and Noli
together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them after which
Irene abandoned the family house.

In April 2001, Joselano went uninvited to Irene’s birthday celebration at which he saw
her and Noli celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and
humiliation, he left immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the family house
and hauled off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the
household appliances. Complainant later found a handwritten letter dated October 7,
2007, the day of his wedding to Irene, containing sweet words and vows from the
respondent.

On his complaint, petitioner contends that:

1. Respondent and Irene were FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as

they attended social functions together and that adulterous conduct with his wife and his
apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral
depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar.

2. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a “piece of paper.”

Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant’s bride on the very
day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her.

3. Respondents grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he,
as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the
complainant’s wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family,
broke up the complainant’s marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the
legal profession.

17
On the other hand, respondent denied the allegations that the complainant is accusing
him. He denied that:

1. they had ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene, the truth of the matter
being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate members
of their respective families. And his relationship with Irene was not under scandalous
circumstances

2. he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the institution of
marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference to the marriage between
Complainant and Irene
as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality of the marriage contract.

Meanwhile, respondent admitted The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the
Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable
social institution and is the foundation of the family.

ISSUE

WON an illicit affair between a married lawyer and a married woman constitute gross
immoral conduct.

HELD

Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of
marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the
surrounding circumstances." The case at bar involves a relationship between a married
lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was
carried out discreetly.

Sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests

deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws.

Respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly
immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of
his profession. This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving
of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon him.  Respondent
in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law.

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the

Constitution reading: Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. In this connection, the
Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision,
obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support."

18
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a
lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law."

DECISION

WHEREFORE, Petition is GRANTED. Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is

DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

19
 In re: Atty. Marcial Edillon
A.C. No. 1928. August 3, 1978

FACTS:

The respondent Martial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the

Philippines. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution recommending to the Court the removal of the name
of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues” to the IBP since the latter’s constitution notwithstanding due notice. The Court
required the respondent to comment on the resolution; he submitted his comment
reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.

The core of the respondent’s arguments is that the above provisions constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a
precondition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of
the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally
antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him
by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the provisions of the Court Rule
and of the IBP By- Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from
the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases
triable by the Court but is rather of an “administrative nature pertaining to an
administrative body.”

ISSUES

Whether the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Whether the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void.

Whether the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of

property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.

Whether the power of SC to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys is
valid.

20
HELD:

1.     To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of

Edillon’s constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer
to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme
Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the
lawyers.

But, assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police
power of the State.

2.      Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the Court, to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X,
Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — from requiring members of a privileged class,
such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is
indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the
objectives and purposes of integration.

3.      Whether the practice of law is a property right, the respondent’s right to practice
law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But it must be emphasized that the practice of law is not a property right but a    mere  
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities.

4.     Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike
the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation
and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial
functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion.

DECISION

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the
respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is
hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court. Respondent disbarred.

21
 DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE v EDWIN L. RANA
Bar Matter No. 1036. June 10, 2003

FACTS

Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
One day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as
members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against the
respondent. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar. However, the
Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution
of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled
date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers
(“MBEC”) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with
the MBEC a pleading wherein the respondent represented himself as counsel for and in
be Vice Mayoralty Candidate and signed the pleading as counsel for him. Complainant
claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the
winning vice mayoralty candidate. Complainant questioned his appearance on two
grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an
employee of the government.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his “specific assistance” to
represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that “he decided to assist and
advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law.” Respondent admits
signing the pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He
explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself
as an “attorney” in the pleading. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for
lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

ISSUE

WON respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not
deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

HELD

The records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan and has also
retained by a mayoralty candidate as her counsel. All these happened even before
respondent took the

22
lawyer’s oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a
member of the Philippine Bar.

In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or
out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually
performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render
any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the
proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so.
Evidence
clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself
“counsel” knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held himself
out as “counsel” knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has
shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who
has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law
without a license. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-
law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still
had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his
signature in the Roll of Attorneys

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan
indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and
similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no
authority to practice law.

DECISION

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

23
 FERDINAND A. CRUZ v ALBERTO MINA
G.R. No. 154207. April 27, 2007

FACTS

Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner), a third-year law student, filed before the MeTC a formal
Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, in Criminal Case for Grave Threats, where
his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness. The petitioner furthermore avers
that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a written
authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said
criminal case.

However, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on
the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction
with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take
precedence over the ruling of the Court and set the case for continuation of trial.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MeTC and RTC) seeking to reverse the
Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the
effect of superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the
source itself of the rule, which is the Supreme Court alone.

The petitioner argues that nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave
Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar Matter No. 730 dated June 10,
1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the inferior
courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a
member of the bar.

The petitioner directly filed to the Supreme Court the petition and contended that the
court[s] are clearly ignoring the law when they patently refused to heed to the clear
mandate of the Laput, Cantimbuhan and Bulacan cases, as well as bar matter no. 730,
providing for the appearance of non-lawyers before the lower courts (MTC’s).

ISSUE

Whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent
or friend of a party litigant.

HELD

The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-
A of the Rules of Court, prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his

24
appearance in behalf of his father, the private complainant in the criminal case without
the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.

However, in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified: The rule, however, is
different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer: Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted.—In the court of a justice of the peace, a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
without the supervision of a member of the bar.

There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-
A. In the former, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party
litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule provides for conditions when a law
student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the courts.

Rule 138-A should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission
to act as private prosecutor against petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is
not the basis for the petitioner’s appearance. Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that
appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of
whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by
virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a
party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.

DECISION

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of
Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private prosecutor under
the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor.

25
 IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534, MARCH 18, 1954

FACTS

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952.
Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to
have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling
below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the
different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded,
this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in
1947, 70 per cent in 1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and

passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See
Explanatory Note to R. A. No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of
a few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and
secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the
passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946.

The President requested the views of the court on the bill. Complying with that request,
seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse
thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the
veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371 which is an Act to fix the passing marks
for bar examinations from nineteen hundred and forty-six up to and including nineteen
Hundred and fifty-five, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill.

Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094
law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the practice of law profession, as
evidenced by their failure in the exams.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for
admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision
of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an
additional ground for admission. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first
reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had
invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise
their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act
No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether
they have filed petitions or not.

ISSUE

26
Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

HELD

RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparation.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and
their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have
said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission,
suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession is concededly judicial.

On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial
and legislative departments of the government.

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law
belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum
conditions for the license.

Reasons for Unconstitutionality:

1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the
Supreme Court.
2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may
revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution.
3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on
admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession,
and those rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.)
4. It is a class legislation
5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is
void.

Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.

27
IN RE: PETITION OF ARTURO EFREN GARCIA for admission to the Philippine Bar
without taking the examination. (August 15, 1961)

FACTS
Arturo E. Garcia has applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines
without submitting to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers:

1. that he is a Filipino citizen born in Bacolor City,Province of Negros Occidental, of

Filipino parentage;
2.that he had taken and finished in Spain, the course of "Bachillerato Superior";
3. that he was approved, selected and qualified by the "Instituto de Cervantes" for
admission to the Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law
course graduating there as "Licenciado En Derecho";
4.that thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain;
5. and that under the provision of the Treaty of Academic Degrees and the Exercise of
Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state, he is
entitled to practice the law profession in the Philippines without submitting to the
required bar examinations.

After due consideration, the Court resolved to deny the petition.

ISSUE
Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar.

HELD
The Court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the Treaty on Academic
Degrees and the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and
the Spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. Said Treaty was intended to
govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice the legal in Spain, and the citizens of Spain
desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen
desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He is therefore subject to the
laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to Spanish
nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the Treaty
invoked by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the
contracting state in whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession.

The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Spanish state could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations
governing admission to the practice of law in the Philippines, for reason that the
Executive Department may not enroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the
Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law in the
Philippines, and the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only
to the Congress of the Philippines.

IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE

28
 Adm. Case No. 533. September 12, 1974

FACTS

Florencio Mallare was admitted to the Philippine Bar however the court ordered an
investigation regarding his citizenship and for the purpose of determining whether his
name should be stricken from the roll of persons authorized to practice law in the
Philippines. After the investigation, a decision was rendered by the Court, holding that
by preponderance of evidence, it appeared that respondent Mallare’s father, Esteban
Mallare, was a Chinese up to his death; and his mother admittedly being a Chinese,
respondent is likewise a Chinese national. Consequently, respondent Florencio Mallare
was declared excluded from the practice of law; his admission to the bar was revoked,
and he was ordered to return to this Court, the lawyer’s diploma previously issued to
him.

Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision, which was denied by the Court.
On February 4, 1969, respondent petitioned the Court for the reopening of the case and
for new trial on the ground, inter alia, of newly discovered evidence, the introduction of
which could alter the decision previously promulgated. The evidence proposed to be
presented consisted of :
(1) an entry in the registry of baptism of the Immaculate Concepcion Church at
Macalelon, Quezon, purporting to show that Estaben Mallare (respondent’s father) is
the natural son of Ana Mallare, a Filipina; and
(2) testimonies of certain persons who had a known Esteban Mallare and his mother
during their lifetime.

The Court Resolved to set aside the decision of their prior decision and granted the re-
opening and new trial prayed for. Respondent’s petition to set aside the decision of this
Court of April 29,1968, as well as the resolution of January 10, 1969, is premised upon
three basic arguments, to wit:

(a) Respondent’s father, Esteban Mallare, being the natural son of Ana Mallare, a
Filipino, was a Filipino citizen;
(b) Esteben Mallare, the son of a Filipino mother, by his own overt acts, had chosen
Philippine citizenship; and
(c) respondent, a legitimate son of Esteban Mallare, is a Filipino citizen.

ISSUE

WON the respondent’s father is Filipino citizen.

HELD

The Court finds sufficient grounds to warrant a definite setting aside of its decision
and a definitive declaration that respondent Florencio Mallare is a Filipino citizen and
therefore with qualification and right to continue the practice of law in the Philippines.

29
With the additional evidence submitted by respondent pursuant to the authority granted
by this Court, the aforementioned void in the proof of respondent’s citizenship has been
duly filled.

The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of the person,
birth and residency of both Ana Mallare and her son Esteban, were one in their
declaration that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog who had continuously resided in the place,
and that Esteban, her son, was reputedly born out of wedlock. Such declarations
constitute admissible evidence of the birth and illegitimacy of Esteban Mallare.

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino,
and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges
attached to Philippine citizenship.

DECISION

Upon the foregoing considerations, and on the basis of the original and additional
evidence herein adduced the decision of this Court dated April 29, 1968, is hereby
definitely set aside, and the complaint in this case is DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs.

TELESFORO A. DIAO, vs. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ

A.C. No. 244. March 29, 1963.

30
FACTS

After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A.

Diao was admitted to the Bar. About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him
with having falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had
the requisite academic qualifications. He prayed that Diao’s name be erased from the
roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination, he
(Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal
education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the following
particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma
therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his
application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the
“required pre-legal education”.
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the
first charge: but he claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he
entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given
therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his
return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the
equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.

ISSUE
Whether or not Telesforo A. Diao should be disbarred from practice of law

HELD
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but
due to his false representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was
thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false
pretenses must be and is hereby revoked.

The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations
is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses
of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.

DECISION

The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of
Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer’s diploma within thirty
days.

In re Luis B. TAGORDA
March 23, 1929

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FACTS

In 1928, Luis Tagorda was a provincial board member of Isabela. He admits that during
his campaign, he made use of a card written in Spanish and Ilocano which, in
translation means that he is a lawyer and a notary public; and that as a notary public he
can do notarial acts such as execution of deeds of sale, can renew lost documents, and
etc.; that as a lawyer, he can help clients collect debts; that he offers free consultation;
and that he is willing to serve the poor.

The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter addressed to a lieutenant
of barrio in his home municipality advising the latter that even though he was elected as
a provincial board member, he can still practice law; that he wants the lieutenant to tell
the same to his people; that he is willing to receive works regarding preparations of
sales contracts and affidavits etc.; that he is willing to receive land registration cases for
a charge of three pesos.

He requested the barrio lieutenant to transmit this information in any of your meetings or
social gatherings so that the people will be informed of his desire to live and to serve
them in his capacity as lawyer and notary public.

ISSUE

Whether or not Tagorda is guilty of malpractice.

HELD

Yes. Tagorda admitted doing the foregoing acts. The practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice.

The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and
especially with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well- merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the
outcome of character and conduct. Solicitation of business by circulars or
advertisements, or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal
relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to procure business by
indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust
companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in
exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect
advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning
the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of
the lawyer’s position, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the
tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.

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It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare
cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so.

Tagorda’s liability is however mitigated by the fact that he is a young inexperienced

lawyer and that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts. So instead of being
disbarred, he was suspended from the practice of law for a month.

DECISION

Respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended from the practice as

an attorney-at-law for the period of one month from April 1, 1929.

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 CIU v CIU
No. L-18727. August 31, 1964

FACTS:
Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and
DoñaBenigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent
invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by
legislation and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a series
of donations, principally the deed of donation.-Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the
initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death,
to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them."-
Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the
Hospicio until her death in 1929. Thereupon the administration passed to Mauricio Cui
and Dionisio Jakosalem who both died. Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui,
became the administrator.-Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma.
Cui are brothers, being the sons of  Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the
spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then
incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant
to a "convenio" entered into between them and embodied in a notarial document. The
next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however,
had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the
position.-Dr. Teodoro Cui died on August 27, 1960; on Sept 5, 1960 the
plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant demanding that the office be turned over to
him; and the demand not having been complied with the plaintiff filed the complaint in
this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office, being a
grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the
Hospicio in their deed of donation.
-As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective
qualifications to the position of administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and
therefore under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to section 2 of the
deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives
preference to the one, among thel egitimate descendants of the nephews therein
named, "que posea titulo de abogado, omedico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a
falta de estos titulos el que pague al estadomayor impuesto o contribucion."-The
specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma.Cui
holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class1926)
but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify him as
one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred
by this Court, he was reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February1960, about
two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospiciode Barili.
C o u r t a quo- decided in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de
abogado,"taken alone, means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed

34
of donation and considering the function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be
given astrict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or
diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant
and by the intervenor.

ISSUE:
WON the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of administrator.
(YES)

RATIO:
Whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not mere
possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar
after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor's degree
alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements,
does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent of
"abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification,
and has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers of the courts,
empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. In this jurisdiction
admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme
Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations,
taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this
certificate being his license to practice the profession.
The academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the
Bar, except as evidence of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the
examinations has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a law school or
university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this purpose, however,
possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed
courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly
under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone through
any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Bar examinations and to
qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the necessary
qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such
persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree
of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university. The founders of the Hospicio
de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test advisely, and provided in
the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or a civil
engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who pays
the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified.

35
A lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the
Hospicio shall "make regulations for the government of said institution; shall "prescribe
the conditions subject to which invalids and incapacitated and destitute persons may be
admitted to the institute"; shall see to it that the rules and conditions promulgated for
admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall administer
properties of considerable value — for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a working
knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.
Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the
defendant, to the office of administrator.
As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking
reinstatement to the office of attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in
paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in this
case. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and
disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out. For the claim of
intervener and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandson of Vicente
Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed
of donation. He is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui,
who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. Besides being a nearer
descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and therefore is
preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal.
The interven or contends that the intention of the founders was to confer the
administration by line and successively to the descendants of the nephews named in
the deed, in the order they are named. Thus, he argues, since the last administrator
was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cuiline, the next administrator must
come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the interven or belongs. This interpretation,
however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation.
DECISION
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is
reversed and set aside, and the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are
dismissed, with costs equally against plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.

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 ALAWI V ALAUYA
A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997.*
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 96-1-SDC(P)

FACTS

Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao
City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive
clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City, They were classmates,
and used to be friends.

Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by
Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co.
advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his
consent was vitiated because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit,
fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice
President of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.

On learning of Alauya’s letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. One
of her grounds was Alauya’s  usurpation of the title of “attorney,” which only regular
members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

Alauya justified his use of the title, “attorney,” by the assertion that it is “lexically
synonymous” with “Counsellors-at-law.” a title to which Shari’a lawyers have a rightful
claim, adding that he prefers the title of “attorney” because “counsellor” is often
mistaken for “councilor,” “konsehal” or the Maranao term “consial,” connoting a local
legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer. 

ISSUE

Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use the title of Attorney

HELD

He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar.As
regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,” this Court has already had occasion to
declare that persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has
been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar,
may both be considered “counsellors,” in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney.” The title of “attorney” is reserved to
those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully
taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

37
and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction.

DECISION

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashary M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of

excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a
judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or
other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

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 PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION V CELEDONIO AGRAVA
No. L-12426. February 16, 1959

FACTS
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had
scheduled an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice
as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office. According to the circular,
members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific
and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. The petitioner contends
that one who has passed the bar examination sand is licensed by the Supreme Court to
practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing is duly qualified to practice
before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent Director’s holding an
examination for the purpose is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the
law.The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution of patent cases “ does not
involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and
technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual practice so as to include
engineers and other individuals who passed the examination can practice before the
Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this is
the first time that his right has been questioned formally.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the
prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law. 

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before the
Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the
prosecution of their applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement
of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves
the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the
existence of facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and
procedure. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court
but also embraces all other matters connected with the law and any work involving the
determination by the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore,
the law provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or
decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent Office
involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and training, then
logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board
of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.

DECISION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent
Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to
an examination or tests and pass the same before ore being permitted to appear and
practice before the Patent Office.

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