TITLE III CASES

G.R. Nos. 172070-72             June 1, 2007 – nature of rebellion; membership in CPP

VICENTE P. LADLAD, NATHANAEL S. SANTIAGO, RANDALL B. ECHANIS, and REY CLARO
C. CASAMBRE, Petitioners,
vs.
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR
JOSELITA C. MENDOZA, SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AILEEN MARIE S. GUTIERREZ,
STATE PROSECUTOR IRWIN A. MARAYA, and STATE PROSECUTOR MERBA A. WAGA, in
their capacity as members of the Department of Justice panel of prosecutors investigating
I.S. Nos. 2006-225, 2006-226 and 2006-234, JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL M. GONZALEZ,
DIRECTOR GENERAL ARTURO C. LOMIBAO, in his capacity as Chief, Philippine National
Police, P/CSUPT. RODOLFO B. MENDOZA, JR., and P/SUPT. YOLANDA G.
TANIGUE, Respondents.
Thus, by its nature, rebellion is a crime of the masses or multitudes involving crowd action done in
furtherance of a political end.24
The evidence before the panel of prosecutors who conducted the inquest of Beltran for Rebellion
consisted of the affidavits and other documents25 attached to the CIDG letters. We have gone over
these documents and find merit in Beltran’s contention that the same are insufficient to show
probable cause to indict him for Rebellion. The bulk of the documents consists of affidavits, some of
which were sworn before a notary public, executed by members of the military and some civilians.
Except for two affidavits, executed by a certain Ruel Escala (Escala), dated 20 Febuary 2006,26 and
Raul Cachuela (Cachuela), dated 23 February 2006,27 none of the affidavits mentions Beltran.28 In
his affidavit, Escala recounted that in the afternoon of 20 February 2006, he saw Beltran, Ocampo,
Casiño, Maza, Mariano, Virador, and other individuals on board a vehicle which entered a chicken
farm in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas and that after the passengers alighted, they were met by
another individual who looked like San Juan. For his part, Cachuela stated that he was a former
member of the CPP and that (1) he attended the CPP’s "10th Plenum" in 1992 where he saw Beltran;
(2) he took part in criminal activities; and (3) the arms he and the other CPP members used were
purchased partly from contributions by Congressional members, like Beltran, who represent party-list
groups affiliated with the CPP.
The allegations in these affidavits are far from the proof needed to indict Beltran for taking part in an
armed public uprising against the government. What these documents prove, at best, is that Beltran
was in Bucal, Padre Garcia, Batangas on 20 February 2006 and that 14 years earlier, he was
present during the 1992 CPP Plenum. None of the affidavits stated that Beltran committed specific
acts of promoting, maintaining, or heading a rebellion as found in the DOJ Resolution of 27 February
2006. None of the affidavits alleged that Beltran is a leader of a rebellion. Beltran’s alleged presence
during the 1992 CPP Plenum does not automatically make him a leader of a rebellion.
In fact, Cachuela’s affidavit stated that Beltran attended the 1992 CPP Plenum as "Chairman,
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU)." Assuming that Beltran is a member of the CPP, which Beltran does not
acknowledge, mere membership in the CPP does not constitute rebellion.29 As for the alleged
funding of the CPP’s military equipment from Beltran’s congressional funds, Cachuela’s affidavit
merely contained a general conclusion without any specific act showing such funding. Cachuela
merely alleged that "ang mga ibang mga pondo namin ay galing sa mga party list na naihalal sa
Kongreso tulad ng BAYAN MUNA – pimumunuan nila SATUR OCAMPO at CRISPIN BELTRAN, x x
x."30 Such a general conclusion does not establish probable cause.

People vs Lovedioro, GR No. 112235, 29 November 1995 – nature of rebellion; absorption

1. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ESSENTIALLY A CRIME OF MASSES INVOLVING CROWD
ACTION. — The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against
the government. By its very nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or
multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be confined a priori within
predetermined bounds. One aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is that
other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself because
they acquire a political character.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CRIMES COMMITTED IN FURTHERANCE OF POLITICAL END,

ABSORBED. — Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act, however
grave, assumes a different color by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion, which
carries a lighter penalty than the crime of murder. In deciding if the crime committed is
rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or not
the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political motive of the act should
be conclusively demonstrated. It is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly
proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential components of the crime. With either
of these elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist. In fact, even in
cases where the act complained of were committed simultaneously with or in the course
of the rebellion, if the killing, robbing, or etc., were accomplished for private purposes
or profit, without any political motivation, it has been held that the crime would be
separately punishable as a common crime and would not be absorbed by the crime
rebellion. If no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be
convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive
relates to the act, and mere membership in an organization dedicated to the
furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.

3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF; BURDEN IN PROVING POLITICAL

MOTIVE IN CRIMES COMMITTED IN FURTHERANCE OF REBELLION LIES WITH THE
ACCUSED. — The burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, motive,
being a state of mind which the accused, better than any individual knows. As stated
hereinabove, the burden of proof that the act committed was impelled by a political
motive lies on the accused. Political motive must be alleged in the information. It must
be established by clear and satisfactory evidence.

4. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; NOT ESTABLISHED WHERE KILLING WAS NOT

POLITICALLY MOTIVATED. — It bears emphasis that nowhere in his entire extrajudicial
confession did appellant ever mention that he was a member of the New People’s Army.
A thorough reading of the same reveals nothing which would suggest that the killing in
which he was a participant was motivated by a political purpose. Moreover, the
information filed against appellant, based on sworn statements, did not contain any
mention or allusion as to the involvement of the NPA in the death of SPO3 Lucilo. Even
prosecution eyewitness Nestor Armenta did not mention the NPA in his sworn statement
of October 19, 1992. In any case, appellant’s claim regarding the political color
attending the commission of the crime being a matter of defense, its viability depends
on his sole and unsupported testimony. Against appellant’s attempts to shade his
participation in the killing with a political color, the evidence on record leaves the
impression that appellant’s bare allegations of membership in the NPA was conveniently
infused to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him. It is of judicial notice that in many
NPA infested areas, crimes have been all-too-quickly attributed to the furtherance of an
ideology or under the cloak of political color for the purpose of mitigating the imposable
penalty when in fact they are no more than ordinary crimes perpetrated by common
criminals. In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a political
motive for the killing of SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, we are satisfied that the trial court correctly
convicted appellant of the crime of murder.

Prov Prosecutor vs CA, GR No 125796, 27 December 2000 – rebellion, membership in CPP, theory of
absorption

Nowhere is the political motivation for the commission of the crime indicated in the
foregoing affidavit. Merely because it is alleged that private respondents were members
of the CPP/NPA who engaged government troops in a firefight resulting in the death of
a government trooper and the wounding of four others does not necessarily mean that
the killing and wounding of the victims was made in furtherance of a rebellion. The
political motivation for the crime must be shown in order to justify finding the crime
committed to be rebellion. Otherwise, as in People v. Ompad, 10 although it was shown
that the accused was an NPA commander, he was nonetheless convicted of murder for
the killing of a person suspected of being a government informer. At all events, as this
Court said in Baylosis v. Chavez: 11 chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

. . . Certainly, the public prosecutors should have the option to ascertain which
prosecutions should be initiated on the basis of the evidence at hand. That a criminal
act may have elements common to more than one offense does not rob the prosecutor
of that option (or discretion) and mandatorily require him to charge the lesser offense
although the evidence before him may warrant prosecution of the more serious one. 12

In Baylosis v. Chavez, the accused, who were NPA members, assailed the
constitutionality of P.D. No. 1866 under which they were charged with illegal possession
of firearm and ammunition on the ground that it gave prosecutors the discretion to
charge an accused either with rebellion or with other crimes committed in furtherance
thereof. In rejecting their contention, this Court said: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . The argument is not tenable. The fact is that the Revised Penal Code treats
rebellion or insurrection as a crime distinct from murder, homicide, arson, or other
felonies that might conceivably be committed in the course of rebellion. It is the Code,
therefore, in relation to the evidence in the hands of the public prosecutor, and not the
latter’s whim or caprice, which gives the choice. The Code allows for example, separate
prosecutions for either murder or rebellion, although not for both where the indictment
alleges that the former has been committed in furtherance of or in connection with the
latter. 13

The burden of proving that the motivation for the crime is political and not private is on
the defense. This is the teaching of another case, 14 in which it was held: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . In deciding if the crime is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our
courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end.
The political motive of the act should be conclusively demonstrated.

In such cases the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, motive,
being a state of mind which the accused, better than any individual, knows . . .

x          x           x
[I]t is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and
overt acts are essential components of the crime. With either of these elements
wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist . . . .

Third. The Court of Appeals says it is a common practice of the military and the police
to charge captured members of the NPA with capital offenses like murder, robbery with
homicide, or illegal possession of firearms rather than rebellion. The alleged purpose is
to deny them bail since murder is a capital offense and private respondents will have a
right to bail only if it can be shown that the evidence against them is not strong,
whereas if the charge is rebellion, private respondents would have an absolute right to
bail.

As already stated, however, given the Joint Affidavit of the prosecution witnesses alone,
it is not possible to determine at this stage of the criminal proceeding that in engaging
the government troops in a "firefight," private respondents were acting in pursuance of
rebellion. It could be that the "firefight" was more of an ambush staged by the NPA, as
shown by the fact that while the government troop suffered one dead and four
wounded, the CPP/NPA suffered only one wounded.

The charge that it is "common practice" for the military and the police to charge
suspected rebels with murder in order to prevent them from going out on bail can be
laid equally at the door of the accused. As noted in Enrile v. Salazar: 16

It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that
quintessentially quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is
regarded and punished by law, that present-day rebels are less impelled by love of
country than by lust for power and have become no better than mere terrorists to
whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of
their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly
senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news
these days, as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but
by and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an
ongoing rebellion. 17

What the real crime is must await the presentation of evidence at the trial or at the
hearing on the application for bail. Those accused of common crimes can then show
proof that the crime with which they were charged is really rebellion. They are thus not
without any remedy. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated July 24, 1996, is REVERSED
insofar as it orders petitioner to file a substitute information for rebellion in Criminal
Case No. 6427. In other respects, it is AFFIRMED.
Gonzales vs Abaya, GR No 164007, 10 August 2006 – coup d’etat, absorption
The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is ‘absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of
coup d’etat.’ Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to criminal law and generally
applies to crimes punished by the same statute, 25 unlike here where different statutes are involved.
Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section
1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article
96 of the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.