CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
COR JESU COLLEGE OF LAW 36) Lastimosa vs. Vasquez, 243 SCRA 497 [1997]
Civil Procedure
Atty. Victoriano D. Alabastro
I. General Principles
Concept of Remedial Law; Substantive Law Distinguished
from Remedial Law; Power of the Supreme Court; Nature
of Philippine Courts; Principle of Hierarchy of Courts;
Doctrine of Judicial Courtesy; Jurisdiction; Doctrine of
Primary Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction of Courts
II. Rule 1 to 5
1) Bustos vs. Lucero, GR N o. L-2068, 08/20/1948;
2) First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. CA, GR No.
110571, 03/10/1994;
3) Albert vs. University Publishing, GR N o. L-19118,
01/30/1965
4) Ateneo vs. De La Rosa, G.R. No. L-286,
03/28/1946
5) Jose vs. Javellana, GR No. 158239, 01/25/2012,
citing De Los Santos vs. Vda. de Mangubat
6) CIR v. Migrant Pagbilao Corp., GR No. 159593,
10/12/2006
7) Sarmiento v. Zaratan, GR 167471, 02/05/2007)
8) Cu-Unjieng v. CA, 479 SCRA 594
9) Mindanao Savings Loan Asso. vs. Vicenta Vda.
De Flores, 469 SCRA 416
10) Pinga vs. Heirs of Santiago, GR 170354,
07/30/2006
11) Phil. Economic Zone Authority vs. Carates, GR
 No. 181274, 07/23/2010
12) Mapagay vs. people, GR No. 178984, 08/19/2009
13) US v. Tamparong, 31 Phil. 321
14) Miaque vs. Patag, GR Nos. 1790609-13,
01/30/2009
15) Aquino v. Municipality of Malay, Aklan, GR No.
211356, 09/29/2014
16) PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp. vs. CA, 358
Phil. 38, 62 [1998]
17) Do-All Metals Industries vs. Security Bank Corp.,
GR No. 176339, 01/10/2011
18) Lhuillier vs. British Airways, GR No. 171092,
03/15/2010
19) UCPB vs. Ongpin, GR No. 146593, 10/26/2001
20) Go vs. Cordero, GR No. 164703, 05/04/2010
21) Kukan International Corp. v. Reyes, GR No.
182729, 09/29/2010
22) Monsanto v. Lim and De Guzman, GR No.
178911, 09/17/2014
23) Omictin vs. CA, GR 148004, January 22, 2007
24) Sps. Fajardo vs. Flores, GR No. 167891,
01/15/2010
25) Abad vs. RTC Manila, 10/12/1987
26) Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, 301 SCRA 96
27) Banco Español Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 291
28) Office of the Ombudsman vs. Heirs of Vda. De
Ventura, GR No. 151800, 1105/2009).
29) Lanting vs. Ombudsman, GR No. 141426,
05/06/2005
30) Fabian vs. Desierto, GR No. 129742, 0916/1998
31) Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, 282 SCRA 328 [1988]
32) Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 90529,
08/16/1991
33) Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 16160,
07/13/2010
34) Office of the Ombudsman vs. Enoc, 374 SCRA
691 [2002
35) ii. Garcia vs. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207
37) Layno vs. Sandiganbayan, 136 Scra 536 [1985]
38) Bernardo vs. Heirs of Villegas, GR No. 183357,
03/15/2010
39) BF Citiland Corp. vs. Otake, GR No. 173351,
07/29/2010
40) Villagracia v. Fifth Shari‘a District Court and
Mala, GR No. 188832, April 23, 2014
41) Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corp., GR No. 138822,
01/23/2001; Bayer Phil., Inc. vs. CA, GR No.
109269, 09/15/2000
1) Marcos-Araneta vs. CA, GR No. 154096,
08/22/2008
2) Fortune Motors, Inc. vs. CA, GR No. 76431,
10/16/1989
3) Biaco vs. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank, GR
161417, February 8, 2007:
4) Lucas vs. Lucas, GR No. 190710, 06/06/2011
5) Dial Corp. vs. Soriano, GR No. 82330, 05/31/1988
6) Chua vs. Metrobank, GR No. 182311, 08/19/2009
7) Ma-ao Sugar Central v. Barrios, 76 Phil. 666
8) Vda. De Manalo vs. CA, 402 Phil. 152, 161 [2001]
9) Montañer vs. Shari‘a District Court, GR No.
174975, 01/20/2009
10) Marquez v. Varela, 92 Phil. 373
11) Misamis Occidental II Cooperative, Inc. vs. David,
468 SCRA 63
12) Santos v. de Leon, 470 SCRA 455
13) Zepeda v. China Banking Corp., GR 172175, Oct.
9, 2006
14) Blossom Co. vs. Manila Gas Corp., GR No. 32958,
11/08/1930
15) Bachrach vs. Icaringal, 68 SCRA 287
16) Quadra vs. CA, GR 147593, 07/31/2006
17) Bacolod City vs. San Miguel, Inc., L-2513,
10/30/1969
18) Arreza vs. Diaz, 364 SCRA 88 [2001]
19) Fortich vs. Corona, 289 SCRA 624
20) Samaniego vs. Aguila, 334 SCRA 438
21) De Castro vs. CA, 384 SCRA 607
22) Frias v. Judge Sorongon and First Asia Realty
Development Corp., GR No. 184827, 02/11/2015
23)  National Power Corporation v. Provincial
Government of Bataan, GR No. 180654,
04/212014
24) Clidorio v. Almanzar, GR No. 176598, 07/09/2014
25) Flores vs. Mallare-Phillips, 144 SCRA 377 [1988]
26) Republic vs. Herbieto, 459 SCRA 183
27) Lim Tan Hu vs. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425
28) Divinagracia v. Parilla, et al, GR No. 196750,
03/11/2015
29) Asset Privatization Trust v. CA, GR No. 121171,
12/29/1998
30) Cabresos v. Tiro, 166 SCRA 400 [1988]
31) Lim v. Lim-Yu, 352 SCRA 216 [2001]
32) Lapanday vs. Estita, 449 SCRA 240
33) Laviña vs. CA, 171 SCRA 691
34) Lawas vs. CA, 146 SCRA 173
35) ii. Aguas vs. Llamas, 5 SCRA 959
36) Manila Railroad Company vs. Attorney General,
20 Phil. 523
Page 1 of 93

37) United Overseas Bank Philippines v. Roosemore
Mining & Development Corp., GR Nos. 159669
and 163521, 03/12/2007
38) Bank of America v. American Realty Corp., GR
 No. 133876, 12/29/1999
39) Spouses Lantin vs. Lantin, GR 160053, August 28,
2006
III. Rule 6 to 13
1) Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 1512154, July
15, 2003
2) Financial Building Corp. vs. Forbes Park Assn.
Inc., 338 SCRA 811
3) Aurello v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 674
[1994]
4) Carpio v. Rural Bank of Sto. Tomas Batangas,
Inc., GR No. 153171, 05/04/2006
5) Pinga v. Heirs of Santiago, GR No. 170354,
06/30/206
6) Dio and H.S. Equities, Ltd. V. Subic Bay Marine
Exploration, Inc., GR No. 189532, 09/11/2014
7) Padilla v. Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings
Corporation, GR No. 207376, 08/06/2014
8) Robert Development Corp. vs. Quitain, 315 SCRA
150
9) Huibonhoa vs. Concepcion, GR 153785, Aug. 3,
2006
10) Montes vs. CA, GR 143797, May 4, 2006
11) Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs. CA, 297 SCRA 30
12) Subic Telecommunications Company, Inc. v.
SBMA, GR No. 185159, 10/12/2009
13) Brown-Araneta v. Araneta, GR No. 190814,
10/09/2013
14) Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc. v. Chiongbian, GR
 No. 197530, 07/09/2014
15) Garcia v. Ferro Chemicals, Inc., GR No. 172505,
10/01/2014
16) Great Southern Maritime Services Corp. v. Acuna,
GR No. 140189, 02/28/2005
17)  National Steel Corp.
Corp. vs. CA, 388 SCRA 85
18) Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. CA, 297 SCRA
30
19) Go vs. Rico, GR 140682, April 25, 2006
20) Gaza vs Lim, GR No. 126863, 01/16/2003
21) Aquintey vs. Tibong, GR No. 166704, 12/20/2006
22) Republic vs. Sarabia, GR 157847, Aug. 25, 2005
23) Citibank vs. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 679
[1999]
24)  Nasser vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 783
[1992]
25) Capuz vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 471
[1994]
26) Mago vs. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 600 [1999]
27) Matute vs. CS, 26 SCRA 798; Akut vs. CA, 116
SCRA 216)
28) Gajudo vs. Traders Royal Bank, GR 151098,
March 31, 2006
29) Proton Pilipinas Corp. vs. Banque National de
Paris, 460 SCRA 260
30) Manchester Development Corp. vs. CA, GR
75919, May 7, 1987
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
31) PAGCOR vs. Lopez, 474 SCRA 76; Sun Insurance
Office vs. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 272
32) Rivera vs. Del Rosario, GR 144934, Jan. 15, 2004
33) Regalado vs. Go, GR 167988, Feb. 6, 2007
34) MA Santander Construction vs. Villanueva, GR
136477, Nov. 10, 2004
35) Villamor vs. CA, GR 136858, 01//21/2004
36) Gipa, et al. v. Southern Luzon Institute, GR No.
177425, 06/18/2014
37) Bracero v. Arcelo and Heirs of Monisit, GR No.
212496, 03/18/2015
38) Sps. Manuel v. Ong, GR No. 205249, 10/15/2014
39) De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation,
GR No. 194751, 11/26/2014)
40) Yuk Ling Ong v. Co, Gr No. 206653, 02/25/2015
41)  Navarro Vda. De Taroma,
Taroma, 478 SCRA 336
42) Calo and San Jose vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445
43) Buenaventura vs. Buenaventura,
Buenaventura, 94 Phil. 193
44) Siasoco vs.CA, 303 SCRA 186
45) Sps. Caoili vs. CA, GR 128325, Sept. 14, 1999
46) Versoza v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 100
[1998]
47) RCPI v. CA, GR No. 121397, 04/17/1997)
48) Swagman Hotels & Travel, Inc. v. CA, GR No.
161135, 04/08/32005
49) Magaspi vs. Remolete, 115 SCRA 193
IV. Rule 14
1) Echevarria vs. Parsons Hardware, 51 Phil. 980
2) Umandap vs. Sabio, Jr., 339 SCRA 243
3) Gomez vs. CA, 420 SCRA 98
4) Toyota Cubao vs. CA, GR 126321, Oct. 23, 1997
5) Flores vs. Zurbito, 37 Phil. 746
6) Carballo vs. Encarnacion, 92 Phil. 974
7) Busuego vs. CA, L-48955, June 30, 1987
8) La Naval Drug Corp. vs. CA, 54 SCAD 917
9) Punzalan vs. Papica, Feb. 29, 1960
10)  Navale vs. CA, GR 109957, Feb. 20, 1996
11) Mapa v. CA, 214 SCRA 417 [1992
12) Manotoc v. CA, GR No. 130974, 08/16/2006
13) Alaban vs. CA, GR 156021, 09/23/2005
14) Pantaleon vs. Asuncion, 105 Phil. 761
15) Consolidated Plyware Industries vs. Breva, 166
SCRA 516
16) Citizen Surety v. Melencio-Herrera, 38 SCRA 369
[1971]
17) Valmonte v. CA, 252 SCRA 92 [1996
18) Kawasaki Port Services vs. Amores, 199 SCRA
230 [1991]
19) Dial Corporation vs. Soriano, 161 SCRA 737
[1988]
20) Montalban vs. Maximo, 22 SCRA 1070
21) Banco Do Brasil vs. CA, 333 SCRA 545
Page 2 of 93

37) United Overseas Bank Philippines v. Roosemore
Mining & Development Corp., GR Nos. 159669
and 163521, 03/12/2007
38) Bank of America v. American Realty Corp., GR
 No. 133876, 12/29/1999
39) Spouses Lantin vs. Lantin, GR 160053, August 28,
2006
III. Rule 6 to 13
1) Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 1512154, July
15, 2003
2) Financial Building Corp. vs. Forbes Park Assn.
Inc., 338 SCRA 811
3) Aurello v. Court of Appeals, 196 SCRA 674
[1994]
4) Carpio v. Rural Bank of Sto. Tomas Batangas,
Inc., GR No. 153171, 05/04/2006
5) Pinga v. Heirs of Santiago, GR No. 170354,
06/30/206
6) Dio and H.S. Equities, Ltd. V. Subic Bay Marine
Exploration, Inc., GR No. 189532, 09/11/2014
7) Padilla v. Globe Asiatique Realty Holdings
Corporation, GR No. 207376, 08/06/2014
8) Robert Development Corp. vs. Quitain, 315 SCRA
150
9) Huibonhoa vs. Concepcion, GR 153785, Aug. 3,
2006
10) Montes vs. CA, GR 143797, May 4, 2006
11) Far Eastern Shipping Co. vs. CA, 297 SCRA 30
12) Subic Telecommunications Company, Inc. v.
SBMA, GR No. 185159, 10/12/2009
13) Brown-Araneta v. Araneta, GR No. 190814,
10/09/2013
14) Aboitiz Equity Ventures, Inc. v. Chiongbian, GR
 No. 197530, 07/09/2014
15) Garcia v. Ferro Chemicals, Inc., GR No. 172505,
10/01/2014
16) Great Southern Maritime Services Corp. v. Acuna,
GR No. 140189, 02/28/2005
17)  National Steel Corp.
Corp. vs. CA, 388 SCRA 85
18) Far Eastern Shipping Company vs. CA, 297 SCRA
30
19) Go vs. Rico, GR 140682, April 25, 2006
20) Gaza vs Lim, GR No. 126863, 01/16/2003
21) Aquintey vs. Tibong, GR No. 166704, 12/20/2006
22) Republic vs. Sarabia, GR 157847, Aug. 25, 2005
23) Citibank vs. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 679
[1999]
24)  Nasser vs. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 783
[1992]
25) Capuz vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 471
[1994]
26) Mago vs. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 600 [1999]
27) Matute vs. CS, 26 SCRA 798; Akut vs. CA, 116
SCRA 216)
28) Gajudo vs. Traders Royal Bank, GR 151098,
March 31, 2006
29) Proton Pilipinas Corp. vs. Banque National de
Paris, 460 SCRA 260
30) Manchester Development Corp. vs. CA, GR
75919, May 7, 1987
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
31) PAGCOR vs. Lopez, 474 SCRA 76; Sun Insurance
Office vs. Asuncion, 170 SCRA 272
32) Rivera vs. Del Rosario, GR 144934, Jan. 15, 2004
33) Regalado vs. Go, GR 167988, Feb. 6, 2007
34) MA Santander Construction vs. Villanueva, GR
136477, Nov. 10, 2004
35) Villamor vs. CA, GR 136858, 01//21/2004
36) Gipa, et al. v. Southern Luzon Institute, GR No.
177425, 06/18/2014
37) Bracero v. Arcelo and Heirs of Monisit, GR No.
212496, 03/18/2015
38) Sps. Manuel v. Ong, GR No. 205249, 10/15/2014
39) De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation,
GR No. 194751, 11/26/2014)
40) Yuk Ling Ong v. Co, Gr No. 206653, 02/25/2015
41)  Navarro Vda. De Taroma,
Taroma, 478 SCRA 336
42) Calo and San Jose vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445
43) Buenaventura vs. Buenaventura,
Buenaventura, 94 Phil. 193
44) Siasoco vs.CA, 303 SCRA 186
45) Sps. Caoili vs. CA, GR 128325, Sept. 14, 1999
46) Versoza v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 100
[1998]
47) RCPI v. CA, GR No. 121397, 04/17/1997)
48) Swagman Hotels & Travel, Inc. v. CA, GR No.
161135, 04/08/32005
49) Magaspi vs. Remolete, 115 SCRA 193
IV. Rule 14
1) Echevarria vs. Parsons Hardware, 51 Phil. 980
2) Umandap vs. Sabio, Jr., 339 SCRA 243
3) Gomez vs. CA, 420 SCRA 98
4) Toyota Cubao vs. CA, GR 126321, Oct. 23, 1997
5) Flores vs. Zurbito, 37 Phil. 746
6) Carballo vs. Encarnacion, 92 Phil. 974
7) Busuego vs. CA, L-48955, June 30, 1987
8) La Naval Drug Corp. vs. CA, 54 SCAD 917
9) Punzalan vs. Papica, Feb. 29, 1960
10)  Navale vs. CA, GR 109957, Feb. 20, 1996
11) Mapa v. CA, 214 SCRA 417 [1992
12) Manotoc v. CA, GR No. 130974, 08/16/2006
13) Alaban vs. CA, GR 156021, 09/23/2005
14) Pantaleon vs. Asuncion, 105 Phil. 761
15) Consolidated Plyware Industries vs. Breva, 166
SCRA 516
16) Citizen Surety v. Melencio-Herrera, 38 SCRA 369
[1971]
17) Valmonte v. CA, 252 SCRA 92 [1996
18) Kawasaki Port Services vs. Amores, 199 SCRA
230 [1991]
19) Dial Corporation vs. Soriano, 161 SCRA 737
[1988]
20) Montalban vs. Maximo, 22 SCRA 1070
21) Banco Do Brasil vs. CA, 333 SCRA 545
Page 2 of 93

DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO
FACTS: The petitioner herein, an accused in a
criminal case, filed a motion with the CFI of
Pampanga after he had been bound over to that
court for trial, praying that the record of the case
be remanded to the justice of the peace court of
Masantol, the court of origin, in order that the
petitioner might cross-examine the complainant
and her witnesses in connection with their
testimony, on the strength of which warrant was
issued for the arrest of the accused. The accused,
assisted by counsel, appeared at the preliminary
investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the
peace informed him of the charges and asked him
if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he
entered the plea of not guilty.
Then his counsel moved that the complainant
present her evidence so that she and her witnesses
could be examined and cross-examined in the
manner and form provided by law. The fiscal and
the private prosecutor objected, invoking section
11 of rule 108, and the objection was sustained. In
view thereof, the accused's counsel announced his
intention to renounce his right to present evidence,
and the justice of the peace forwarded the case to
the court of first instance.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Justice of the Peace court
of Masantol committed grave abuse of discretion in
refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the
record.
HELD: Evidence is the mode and manner of proving
competent facts and circumstances on which a
party relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial
proceedings. It is fundamentally a procedural law.
The Supreme Court that section 11 of Rule 108 does
not curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the
peace on the matter. Said section defines the
bounds of the defendant's right in the preliminary
investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law
restricting the authority, inherent in a court of
 justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably
calculated to bring out the truth.
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided
court. The minority went farther than the majority
and denied even any discretion on the part of the
 justice of the peace or judge holding the
preliminary investigation to compel the
complainant and his witnesses to testify anew.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the present
petition is dismissed with costs against the petitioner.
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMIC V MARIWASA AND CA
FACTS: Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions
of B.P. 129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
issued by the Supreme Court which deals with the
 jurisdiction of courts for appeal of cases decided by
quasi-judicial agencies such as the Board of
Investments (BOI).
BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s
application to amend its BOI certificate of
registration by changing the scope of its registered
product from "glazed floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles."
Oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said BOI decision while
oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move
to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom.
Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration,
Mariwasa filed a petition for review with CA.
CA temporarily restrained the BOI from
implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its
own terms twenty (20) days after its issuance,
without respondent court issuing any preliminary
injunction.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the
restraining order contending that CA does not have
 jurisdiction over the BOI case, since the same is
exclusively vested with the Supreme Court pursuant
to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code of
1987.
Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980 or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91,
"Prescribing the Rules Governing Appeals to the
Court of Appeals from a Final Order or Decision of
the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial
Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's
appeal to respondent court because the
procedure for appeal laid down therein runs
contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides
that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI
shall be filed directly with the Supreme Court.
While Mariwasa maintains that whatever
inconsistency there may have been between
B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the
question of venue for appeal, has already been
resolved by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court,
which was promulgated on February 27, 1991 or
four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.
ISSUE:  Whether or not the Court of Appeals has
 jurisdiction over the case
RULING: YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or
superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the
manner and method of enforcing the right to
appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned.
Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute
was previously allowed to be filed directly with the
Supreme Court, should now be brought to the
Court of Appeals.
Page 3 of 93

MARIANO ALBER V UNIVERSITY PUBLISHING CO., INC.
BENGZON, J.P. J. | 1965
FACTS: “No less than three times have the parties
here appealed to this Court.”
In 1949, Albert sued University Publishing Co. (UPC).
He alleged that UPC was organized and existing
under PH laws and that thru its president Jose
Aruego (Aruego), they entered into a contract
where UPC would pay him 30 thousand pesos for
the exclusive right to publish his revised
Commentaries on the RPC and for his share in
previous sales of the book ’s 1st  edition; that UPC
undertook to pay in 8 instalments of 3.5k and failure
to pay one instalment would render the rest due.
Albert said UPC failed to pay the 2nd instalment but
the latter countered that it was the former who
violated their contract by his failure to deliver the
manuscript.
Later, Albert died and Justo Albert (his
administrator) substituted him. The CFI then
favoured Justo and ordered UPC to pay him 23
thousand. The cases went to SC which reduced it to
15 thousand pesos.
The CFI then ordered for the execution against UPC
but at some point, Justo petitioned for a writ of
execution against Aruego (its president) because
he and the sheriff discovered that UPC wasn ’t
registered in the SEC. UPC countered by saying that
Aruego was not a party to the case so the petition
should be denied.
SC notes that UPC doesn’t want Aruego to be a
party to the case because if he’s not a party, a
separate action will have to be filed by Justo which
will result in him dealing with the statute of
limitations.
The CFI denied the petition so Justo appealed.
ISSUE: W/N Aruego considered a party in the case.
RULING: Yes, Aruego is a party in the case. Non-
registration of UPC is undisputed. Hence, on
account of the non-registration it cannot be
considered a corporation, not even a corporation
de facto;  UPC then has no personality separate
from Aruego, thus cannot be sued independently;
Corporation-by-estoppel not invoked by UPC. Even
if invoked, it’s not applicable;
Aruego represented a non-existent entity and
induced not only Justo but also the court to believe
such representation; (he signed the contract as
president and stated the UPC was registered);
One who has induced another to act upon his wilful
misrepresentation that a corporation was duly
organized and existing under the law, cannot
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
thereafter set up against his victim the principle of
corporation by estoppel (Salvatiera vs. Garlitos, 56
O.G. 3069);
Aruego is the real defendant because it is UPC who
came to the court, but as said, it does not have
independent personaility; it is just a name;
In reality, it was Aruego, in reality, the one who
answered and litigated, through his own law firm as
counsel;
On Agency, a person acting or purporting to act on
behalf of a corporation which has no valid
existence assumes such privileges and obligations
and becomes personally liable  for contracts
entered into or for other acts performed as such
agent;
On the issue of due process (since Aruego wasn ’t
named in the case), Aruego was given his day in
court;
Parties to a suit are "persons who have a right to
control the proceedings, to make defense, to
adduce and cross-examine witnesses, and to
appeal from a decision; in reality, it was Aruego
who exercised these rights;
By due process of law we mean a law which hears
before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry,
and renders judgment only after trial;
Summary: The evidence is patently clear that Jose
M. Aruego, acting as representative of a non-
existent principal, was the real party to the contract
sued upon; that he was the one who reaped the
benefits resulting from it, so much so that partial
payments of the consideration were made by him;
that he violated its terms, thereby precipitating the
suit in question; and that in the litigation he was the
real defendant.
CASE REMANDED: Lower court to hold
supplementary proceedings for the purpose of
carrying the judgment into effect against University
Publishing Co., Inc. and/or Jose M. Aruego
(because others might be liable to him for
reimbursement or contribution.)
ALVERO V. DELA ROSA
FACTS: On June 25, 1945, respondent Jose R.
Victoriano had filed a complaint, in the Court of First
Instance of the City of Manila, against petitioner
Fredesvindo S. Alvero and one Margarita Villarica,
alleging two causes of action:
(1) to declare in force the contract of sale,
between said Jose R. Victoriano and Margarita
Villarica, of two parcels of land in the Manotoc
Page 4 of 93

subdivision, Balintawak, in the barrio of Calaanan,
municipality of Caloocan, Province of Rizal, which
land was subsequently sold by said Villarica, in favor
of petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero, on December
31, 1944, for the sum of P100,000 in Japanese
military notes; and
(2) to declare said subsequent sale null and void.
On July 7, 1945, Margarita Villarica filed an answer
to said complaint, expressly admitting having sold
said land to Fresdesvindo S. Alvero, for P100,000, in
December, 1944, due to the necessity of raising
funds with which to provide for herself and family,
and that she did not remember the previous sale; at
the same time, offering to repurchase said land
from Fredesvindo S. Alvero in the sum of P5,000, but
that the latter refused to accept the offer.
Jose R. Victoriano filed an answer to said
counterclaim, denying Fredesvindo S. Alvero's
alleged ownership over said land, and the other
allegations contained in Alvero's answer.
On July 13, 1945, Fredesvindo S. Alvero, in answering
said complaint, denied the allegations a nd claimed
exclusive ownership of the land in question.
Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of the City of Manila, one of the
respondents in this case, rendered his decision, in
which it was declared that the two parcels of land
in question had been sold by Margarita Villarica to
Jose R. Victoriano and that Victoriano continued
making monthly payments until December, 1941,
but that owing to the war-time conditions then
existing, Margarita Villarica agreed verbally to
suspend such payments until the restoration of
peace and that Margarita Villarica, having
forgotten the sale of said land to Jose R. Victoriano,
sold the same for P100,000 in Japanese military
notes, on December 31, 1944, to Fredesvindo S.
Alvero, but afterwards offered to repurchase said
property from him, for the sum of P8,000 in genuine
Philippine currency, after liberation.
Jose R. Victoriano had presented the deed of sale
which was older than that of Fredesvindo S. Alvero,
the respondent judge rendered his decision in favor
of Jose R. Victoriano, adjudging to him the title over
the property in question, including all the
improvements existing thereon, and dismissed the
counterclaim.
On November 28, 1945, Fredesvindo S. Alvero was
notified of said decision; and on December 27,
1945, he filed a petition for reconsideration and
new trial, which was denied on January 3, 1946. On
January 8, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed his
notice of appeal and record on appeal
simultaneously in the lower court, without filing the
P60-appeal bond.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
Jose R. Victoriano filed a petition to dismiss the
appeal, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed an opposition to
said motion to dismiss, alleging that on the very
same day, January 15, 1946, said appeal bond for
P60 had been actually filed, and allege as an
excuse, for not filing the said appeal bond, in due
time, the illness of his lawyer's wife. The respondent
 judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, ordered the
dismissal of the appeal, declaring that, although
the notice of appeal and record on appeal had
been filed in due time, the P60-appeal bond was
filed too late.
ISSUE: Is the petition defective in form as well as in
substance?
HELD: Yes, the period for perfecting herein
petitioner's appeal commenced from November
28, 1945, when he was notified of the judgment
rendered in the case, and expired on December
28, 1945; and, therefore, his notice of appeal and
record on appeal filed on January 8, 1946, were
filed out of time, and much more so his appeal
bond, which was only filed on Januar y 15, 1946.
Counsel for the petitioner Fredesvindo Alvero
alleges as an excuse, for his failure to perfect and
file his appeal, in due time, the illness of his wife. It is
not difficult to understand the state of mind of the
attorney, and his intense devotion and ardent
affection towards his dying wife.
Unfortunately, counsel for petitioner has created a
difficult situation. In his motion for reconsideration
and new trial, dated December 27, 1945, he did not
point out specifically the findings or conclusions in
the judgment, are not supported by the evidence
or which are contrary to law, making express
reference to the pertinent evidence or legal
provisions, as expressly required by Rule 37, section
2, paragraph (c) of the Rules of Court. Motions of
that kind have been considered as motions pro
forma intended merely to delay the proceeding,
and, as such, they cannot and will not interrupt or
suspend the period of time for the perfection of the
appeal. He could have asked for an extension of
time, within which to file and perfect his appeal, in
the court below; but he had failed to do so, and he
must bear the consequences of his act.
A strict observance of the rules of court, which have
been considered indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays and to the orderly and speedy
dispatch of judicial business, is an imperative
necessity. Human laws are inflexible and no
personal consideration should stand in the way of
performing a legal duty.
Page 5 of 93

PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE vs. RAMON C. JAVELLANA, ET
AL.
FACTS: Margarita Marquez Alma Jose (Margarita)
sold for consideration of P160,000.00 to respondent
Ramon Javellana by deed of conditional sale two
parcels of land with areas of 3,675 and 20,936
square meters located in Barangay Mallis,
Guiguinto, Bulacan. They agreed that Javellana
would pay P80,000.00 upon the execution of the
deed and the balance of P80,000.00 upon the
registration of the parcels of land under the Torrens
System (the registration being undertaken by
Margarita within a reasonable period of time); and
that should Margarita become incapacitated, her
son and attorney-in-fact, Juvenal M. Alma Jose
(Juvenal), and her daughter, petitioner Priscilla M.
Alma Jose, would receive the payment of the
balance and proceed with the application for
registration.
After Margarita died and with Juvenal having
predeceased Margarita without issue, the vendor ’s
undertaking fell on the shoulders of Priscilla, being
Margarita’s sole surviving heir. However, Priscilla did
not comply with the undertaking to cause the
registration of the properties under the Torrens
System, and, instead, began to improve the
properties by dumping filling materials therein with
the intention of converting the parcels of land into
a residential or industrial subdivision. Faced with
Priscilla’s refusal to comply, Javellana commenced
an action for specific performance, injunction, and
damages against her in the Regional Trial Court in
Malolos, Bulacan (RTC).
Javellana prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain Priscilla from dumping filling materials in the
parcels of land; and that Priscilla be ordered to
institute registration proceedings and then to
execute a final deed of sale in his favor. Priscilla
filed a motion to dismiss, stating that the complaint
was already barred by prescription; and that the
complaint did not state a cause of action.
The RTC initially denied Priscilla ’s motion to dismiss.
However, upon her motion for reconsideration, the
RTC reversed itself and granted the motion to
dismiss.
Javellana moved for reconsideration. The RTC
denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of
any reason to disturb its order. Accordingly,
Javellana filed a notice of appeal. Priscilla
countered that the RTC order was not appealable;
that the appeal was not perfected on time; and
that Javellana was guilty of forum shopping. It
appears that pending the appeal, Javellana also
filed a petition for certiorari in the CA to assail the
June 24, 1999 and June 21, 2000 orders dismissing his
complaint. The CA dismissed the petition for
certiorari.
As to the notice on appeal, the CA reversed and
set aside the RTC decision and remanded the
records to the RTC "for further proceedings in
accordance with law." The CA denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by Priscilla.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the RTC’s decision denying
of the motion for reconsideration of the
order of dismissal a final order and
appealable;
2. Javellana was guilty of forum shopping for
filing in the CA a petition for certiorari to
assail the orders of the RTC that were the
subject matter of his appeal pending in the
CA.
HELD:
1. Yes.
First of all, the denial of Javellana ’s motion for
reconsideration left nothing more to be done by
the RTC because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an
interlocutory one. The distinction between a final
order and an interlocutory order is well known. The
first disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action,
leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce
by execution what the court has determined, but
the latter does not completely dispose of the case
but leaves something else to be decided upon. An
interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters
and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the
 judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether
or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final
is: does the order or judgment leave something to
be done in the trial court with respect to the merits
of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is
interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.
And, secondly, whether an order is final or
interlocutory determines whether appeal is the
correct remedy or not. A final order is appealable,
to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated
in Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the
effect that "appeal may be taken from a judgment
or final order that completely disposes of the case,
or of a particular matter therein when declared by
these Rules to be appealable;" but the remedy from
an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special
civil action for certiorari.
2. No. No forum shopping was committed.
Priscilla claims that Javellana engaged in forum
shopping by filing a notice of appeal and a petition
for certiorari against the same orders. As earlier
noted, he denies that his doing so violated the
policy against forum shopping.
The Court expounded on the nature and purpose
of forum shopping in In Re: Reconstitution of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. 303168 and 303169 and
Issuance of Owner ’s Duplicate Certificates of Title In
Lieu of Those Lost, Rolando Edward G. Lim,
Petitioner:
Forum shopping is the act of a party litigant against
whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in
one forum seeking and possibly getting a favorable
opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or
the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution
Page 6 of 93

of two or more actions or proceedings grounded
on the same cause or supposition that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition.
Forum shopping happens when, in the two or more
pending cases, there is identity of parties, identity of
rights or causes of action, and identity of reliefs
sought. Where the elements of litis pendentia are
present, and where a final judgment in one case
will amount to res judicata in the other, there is
forum shopping. For litis pendentia to be a ground
for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a)
identity of the parties or at least such as to
represent the same interest in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same acts; and (c) the
identity in the two cases should be such that the
 judgment which may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to
res judicata in the other.
For forum shopping to exist, both actions must
involve the same transaction, same essential facts
and circumstances and must raise identical causes
of action, subject matter and issues. Clearly, it does
not exist where different orders were questioned,
two distinct causes of action and issues were raised,
and two objectives were sought.
Should Javellana ’s present appeal now be held
barred by his filing of the petition for certiorari in the
CA when his appeal in that court was yet pending?
We are aware that in Young v. Sy, in which the
petitioner filed a notice of appeal to elevate the
orders concerning the dismissal of her case due to
non-suit to the CA and a petition for certiorari in the
CA assailing the same orders four months later, the
Court ruled that the successive filings of the notice
of appeal and the petition for certiorari to attain
the same objective of nullifying the trial court ’s
dismissal orders constituted forum shopping that
warranted the dismissal of both cases. The Court
said:
Ineluctably, the petitioner, by filing an ordinary
appeal and a petition for certiorari with the CA,
engaged in forum shopping. When the
petitioner commenced the appeal, only four
months had elapsed prior to her filing with the CA
the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 and which
eventually came up to this Court by way of the
instant Petition (re: Non-Suit).
The elements of litis pendentia are present between
the two suits. As the CA, through its Thirteenth
Division, correctly noted, both suits are founded on
exactly the same facts and refer to the same
subject matter  — the RTC Orders which dismissed
Civil Case No. SP-5703 (2000) for failure to
prosecute. In both cases, the petitioner is seeking
the reversal of the RTC orders. The parties, the rights
asserted, the issues professed, and the reliefs
prayed for, are all the same. It is evident that the
 judgment of one forum may amount to res judicata
in the other.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
The remedies of appeal and certiorari under Rule 65
are mutually exclusive and not alternative or
cumulative. This is a firm judicial policy. The
petitioner cannot hedge her case by wagering two
or more appeals, and, in the event that the
ordinary appeal lags significantly behind the others,
she cannot post facto validate this circumstance as
a demonstration that the ordinary appeal had not
been speedy or adequate enough, in order to
 justify the recourse to Rule 65. This practice, if
adopted, would sanction the filing of multiple suits
in multiple fora, where each one, as the petitioner
couches it, becomes a “precautionary measure”
for the rest, thereby increasing the chances of a
favorable decision. This is the very evil that the
proscription on forum shopping seeks to put right.
In Guaranteed Hotels, Inc. v. Baltao, the Court
stated that the grave evil sought to be avoided by
the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by
two competent tribunals of two separate and
contradictory decisions. Unscrupulous party
litigants, taking advantage of a variety of
competent tribunals, may repeatedly try their luck
in several different fora until a favorable result is
reached. To avoid the resultant confusion, the
Court adheres strictly to the rules against forum
shopping, and any violation of these rules results in
the dismissal of the case.
CIR vs MIRANT PAGBILAO CORP
FACTS: [MPC] is a domestic corporation duly
organized and existing under and by virtue of the
laws of the Philippines.
For the period April 1, 1996 to December 31, 1996,
[MPC] seasonably filed its Quarterly VAT Returns
reflecting an accumulated input taxes in the
amount of P39,330,500.85. These input taxes were
allegedly paid by [MPC] to the suppliers of capital
goods and services for the construction and
development of the power generating plant and
other related facilities in Pagbilao, Quezon.
Pursuant to the procedures prescribed under
Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, as amended, [MPC]
filed on June 30, 1998, an application for tax credit
or refund of the aforementioned unutilized VAT paid
on capital goods.
In answer to the Petition, [the BIR Commissioner]
advanced as special and affirmative defenses that
"[MPC]'s claim for refund is still pending investigation
and consideration before the office of [the BIR
Commissioner] accordingly, the filing of the present
petition is premature; well-settled is the doctrine
that provisions in tax refund and credit are
construed strictly against the taxpayer as they are in
the nature of a tax exemption; in an action for
Page 7 of 93

refund or tax credit, the taxpayer has the burden to
show that the taxes paid were erroneously or
illegally paid and failure to sustain the said burden is
fatal to the action for refund; it is incumbent upon
[MPC] to show that the claim for tax credit has
been filed within the prescriptive period under the
Tax Code; and the taxes allegedly paid by [MPC]
are presumed to have been collected and
received in accordance with law and revenue
regulations.
The CTA ruled in favor of MPC and the refund was
granted.
Aggrieved, the BIR Commissioner filed with the CA a
Petition for Review of the foregoing Decision.
Notably, the BIR Commissioner identified and
discussed as grounds for its Petition arguments that
were totally new and were never raised before the
CTA, to wit -
1. RESPONDENT BEING AN ELECTRIC UTILITY, IT IS
SUBJECT TO FRANCHISE TAX UNDER THEN
SECTION 117 (NOW SECTION 119) OF THE TAX
CODE AND NOT TO VALUE ADDED TAX
(VAT).
2. SINCE RESPONDENT IS EXEMPT FROM VAT, IT
IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE REFUND OF INPUT
VAT PURSUANT TO SECTION 4.103-1 OF
REVENUE REGULATIONS NO. 7-95.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in the BIR
Commissioner's Petition, and in its Decision, dated
30 July 2003, it pronounced that:
(1) The BIR Commissioner cannot validly change his
theory of the case on appeal;
CA affirmed in toto.
Hence, this petition. The BIR Commissioner argues
that (1) The observance of procedural rules may be
relaxed considering that technicalities are not ends
in themselves but exist to protect and promote the
substantive rights of the parties;
ISSUE: WON the contention of the BIR commissioner
is correct.
RULING: No. The general rule is that a party
cannot change his theory of
the case on appeal.
It is already well-settled in this jurisdiction that a
party may not change his theory of the case on
appeal. Such a rule has been expressly adopted in
Rule 44, Section 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which provides -
SEC. 15. Questions that may be raised on appeal. -
Whether or not the appellant has filed a motion for
new trial in the court below, he may include in his
assignment of errors any question of law or fact that
has been raised in the court below and which is
within the issues framed by the parties.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
Thus, in Carantes v. Court of Appeals,
Appeals, this Court
emphasized that – 
The settled rule is that defenses not pleaded in the
answer may not be raised for the first time on
appeal. A party cannot, on appeal, change
fundamentally the nature of the issue in the case.
When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory
and the case is decided upon that theory in the
court below, he will not be permitted to change the
same on appeal, because to permit him to do so
would be unfair to the adverse party.
In the more recent case of  Mon v. Court of
 Appeals,
 Appeals, this Court again pronounced that, in this
 jurisdiction, the settled rule is that a party cannot
change his theory of the case or his cause of action
on appeal. It affirms that "courts of justice
justice have no
 jurisdiction or power to decide a question not in
issue." Thus, a judgment that goes beyond the
issues and purports to adjudicate something on
which the court did not hear the parties, is not only
irregular but also extrajudicial and invalid.
invalid. The rule
rests on the fundamental tenets of fair play.
The BIR Commissioner pleads with this Court not to
apply the foregoing rule to the instant case, for a
rule on technicality should not defeat substantive
 justice. The BIR Commissioner apparently forgets
that there are specific reasons why technical or
procedural rules are imposed upon the courts, and
that compliance with these rules, should still be the
general course of action. Hence, this Court has
expounded that -
Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated
with utmost respect and due regard since they are
designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to
remedy the worsening problem of delay in the
resolution of rival claims and in the administration of
 justice. The requirement is in pursuance to the bill of
rights inscribed in the Constitution which guarantees
that "all persons shall have a right to the speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
 judicial and administrative bodies."
bodies." The
adjudicatory bodies and the parties to a case are
thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While it is
true that a litigation is not a game of technicalities,
it is equally true that every case must be
prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. There have been some
instances wherein this Court allowed a relaxation in
the application of the rules, but this flexibility was
"never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants
to violate the rules with impunity." A liberal
interpretation and application of the rules of
procedure can be resorted to only in proper cases
and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
The courts have the power to relax or suspend
technical or procedural rules or to except a case
from their operation when compelling reasons so
warrant or when the purpose of justice requires it.
Page 8 of 93

What constitutes good and sufficient cause that
would merit suspension of the rules is discretionary
upon the courts.
In his Petition and Memorandum before this Court,
the BIR Commissioner made no attempt to provide
reasonable explanation for his failure to raise before
the CTA the issue of MPC being a public utility
subject to franchise tax rather than VAT. VAT. The BIR
Commissioner argues, in a singular paragraph in his
Petition, subsequently reproduced in his
Memorandum, that the Court of Appeals should
have taken cognizance of the said issue, although
it was raised for the first time on appeal, entirely on
the basis of this Court's ruling in Sy v. Court of
 Appeals.
 Appeals. He contends that -
The submission fails to take into account that
although this Honorable Court has repeatedly ruled
that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time
on appeal, as this would contravene the basic rules
of justice and fair play, the observance of
procedural rules may be relaxed, noting that
technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to
protect and promote the substantive rights of the
litigants (Sy v. Court of Appeals , 330 SCRA 570
[2000]).
This Court is unconvinced. There is no sufficient
sufficient
cause to warrant the relaxation of technical or
procedural rules in the instant
instant case. The general
rules of procedure still apply and the BIR
Commissioner cannot be allowed to raise an issue
for the first time on appeal.
SARMIENTO V. ZARATAN
FACTS:  Petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an
ejectment case against respondent Emerita
Zaratan, in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Quezon City.
On 31 March 2003, the MeTC rendered a decision in
favor of petitioner. (MeTC ordered the defendant
to pay plaintiff monthly rentals and to vacate the
premises.)
Respondent filed her notice of appeal. Thereafter,
the case was raffled to the RTC of Quezon City. In
the Notice of Appealed Case, the RTC directed
respondent to submit her memorandum in
accordance with the provisions of Section 7(b) of
Rule 40of the Rules of Court and petitioner to file a
reply memorandum within 15days from receipt.
Respondent’s counsel having received the notice
on 19 May 2003, he had until 3 June 2003 within
which to file the requisite memorandum. But on
3June 2003, he filed a Motion for Extension of Time
of five days due to his failure to finish the draft of the
said Memorandum. He cited as reasons for the
delay of filing his illness for one week, lack of staff to
do the work due to storm and flood compounded
by the grounding of the computers because the
wirings got wet. But the motion remained unacted.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
On 9 June 2003, respondent filed her
Memorandum. On 19 June 2003, the RTC dismissed
the appeal as follows:
Record shows that defendant-appellant
received the Notice of Appealed Case,
through counsel, on May 19, 2003 (Registry
Return Receipt dated May 12, 2003, Record,
back of p. 298).
Thus, under Section 7(b), Rule 40of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, she had fifteen (15)
days or until June3, 2003 within which to
submit a memorandum on appeal. As
further appears on record, however, the
required Memorandum was filed by
defendant-appellant only on June 9, 2003,
or six (6) daysbeyond the expiration of the
aforesaid fifteen day period.
Aggrieved, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari
in the Court of Appeals, which was granted the
petition of respondent. The appellate court nullified
and set aside Orders of the RTC and ordered the
reinstatement of respondent’s appeal.
Consequently, respondent ’s appeal memorandum
was admitted and the case remanded to the RTC
for further proceedings. Hence, this appeal by
petitioner.
ISSUE:  Whether the lack of notice of hearing in the
Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on
Appeal is fatal, such that the filing of the motion is a
worthless piece of paper.
RULING: NO. Petitioner avers that, because of the
failure of respondent to include a Notice of Hearing
in her Motion for Extension of Time to file
Memorandum on Appeal in the RTC, the latter ’s
motion is a worthless piece of paper with no legal
effect. It is not disputed that respondent perfected
her appeal on 4 April 2003 with the filing of her
Notice of Appeal and payment of the required
docket fees. However, before the expiration of time
to file the Memorandum, she filed a Motion for
Extension of Time seeking an additional period of
five days within which to file her Memorandum,
which motion lacked the Notice of Hearing
required by Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of
Court which provides:
SEC. 4. Hearing of Motion. - Except for
motions which the court may act upon
without prejudicing the rights of the adverse
party, every written motion shall be set for
hearing by the applicant. Every written
motion required to be heard and the notice
of the hearing thereof shall be served in
such a manner as to ensure its receipt by
the other party at least three (3) days before
the date of hearing, unless the court for
good cause sets the hearing on shorter
notice.
As may be gleaned above and as held time and
again, the notice requirement in a motion is
mandatory. As a rule, a motion without a Notice of
Page 9 of 93

Hearing is considered pro forma and does not
affect the reglementary period for the appeal or
the filing of the requisite pleading.
As a general rule, notice of motion is required
where a party has a right to resist the relief sought
by the motion and principles of natural justice
demand that his right be not affected without an
opportunity to be heard. The three-day notice
required by law is intended not for the benefit of
the movant but to avoid surprises upon the adverse
party and to give the latter time to study and meet
the arguments of the motion. Principles of natural
 justice demand that the right of a party should not
be affected without giving it an opportunity to be
heard.
The test is the presence of the opportunity to be
heard, as well as to have time to study the motion
and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds
upon which it is based. Considering the
circumstances of the present case, we believe that
procedural due process was substantially complied
with.
There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the
suspension of the Rules:
(a) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances,
(b) the merits of the case,
(c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or
negligence of the party favored by the suspension
of rules,
(d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is
merely frivolous and dilatory, and
(e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced
thereby.
Elements or circumstances (c), (d) and (e) exist in
the present case. The suspension of the Rules is
warranted in this case. The motion in question does
not affect the substantive rights of petitioner as it
merely seeks to extend the period to file
Memorandum. The required extension was due to
respondent’s counsel’s illness, lack of staff to do the
work due to storm and flood, compounded by the
grounding of the computers. There is no claim
likewise that said motion was interposed to delay
the appeal. As it appears, respondent sought
extension prior to the expiration of the time to do so
and the memorandum was subsequently filed
within the requested extended period.
CHARLES CU-UNJIENG  vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and UNI0N BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS: Respondent Union Bank of the Philippines
(UBP) is the owner of a parcel of agricultural land
situated in Barangay Sta. Maria, San Miguel,
Bulacan and registered in its name.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
Petitioner offered to buy the subject property and
issued checks in consideration thereof. UBP then
acknowledged receipt of the checks.
On August 30, 1994, petitioner wrote a follow-up
letter to UBP inquiring on the status of his offer to
buy the subject premises.
Via a reply-letter dated August 31, 1994, the
manager of UBP’s Acquired Assets Department
advised petitioner that his offer to purchase is yet to
be acted upon because the bank was still awaiting
the opinion of its legal division regarding the sale of
"CARPable" agricultural assets acquired by the
bank.
As it turned out, UBP rejected petitioner’s offer upon
on account of the legal division’s opinion that sales
of lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law without prior Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) approval are considered null and
void. Accordingly, UBP advised petitioner to pick up
the refund of his "earnest money"
money" at the bank ’s
disbursing unit.
On February 6, 1997, the petitioner filed his
complaint in RTC at Malolos, Bulacan, for Specific
Performance and Damages 
Damages  against UBP. RTC
dismissed the case for lack of cause of action
because there was no perfected contract of sale.
Petitioner filed with the trial court a Notice of
 Appeal therein making known that he is taking an
appeal from the adverse decision to the CA. Acting
thereon, the trial court issued an Order directing the
elevation of the records of the case to the CA.
As things would have it, in the herein first assailed
Resolution dated May 10, 1999 , the CA dismissed
petitioner’s appeal for nonpayment of the required
docket and other lawful appeal fees, to wit:
For failure of the appellant [petitioner] to pay the
docket and other lawful fees (Sec. 4, Rule 41, 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure), the CA Resolved to
DISMISS the appeal pursuant to Sec. 1(c), Rule 50 of
the same Rule.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON petitioner’s contention is correct.
RULING: Doctrinally entrenched is the
pronouncement that the right to appeal is merely
statutory and a party seeking to avail of that right
must comply with the statute or rules.
Rule 41, Section 4, of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
SEC. 4.  Appellate court docket and other lawful
fees.
fees.  –   Within the period for taking an appeal, the
appellant shall pay to the clerk of the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from, the full amount of the appellate court docket
and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees
shall be transmitted to the appellate court together
with the original record or the record on appeal.
Page 10 of 93

Well-settled is the rule that payment of the docket
and other legal fees within the prescribed period is
both mandatory and jurisdictional, noncompliance
with which is fatal to an appeal. For, to stress,
appeal is not a matter of right, but a mere statutory
privilege.
An ordinary appeal from a decision or final order of
the RTC to the CA must be made within fifteen (15)
days from notice. And within this period, the full
amount of the appellate court docket and other
lawful fees must be paid to the clerk of the court
which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from.
Time and again, this Court has consistently held that
full payment of docket fees within the prescribed
period is mandatory for the perfection of an
appeal. Without such payment, the appeal is not
perfected and the appellate court does not
acquire jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, thereby
rendering the decision sought to be appealed final
and executory.
For sure, nonpayment of the appellate court
docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period as provided under Section 4,
Rule 41,  supra,  is a ground for the dismissal of an
appeal under Section 1(c) of Rule 50, to wit:
SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal.- An
appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals,
on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the
following grounds:
 xxx xxx xxx
c. Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and
other lawful fees as provided in section 4 of Rule 41;
 xxx
This Court has invariably sustained the CA’ s dismissal
on technical grounds under the aforequoted
provision unless considerations of equity and
substantial justice present cogent reasons to hold
otherwise. True, the rules may be relaxed but only
for persuasive and weighty reasons, to relieve a
litigant of an injustice commensurate with his failure
to comply with the prescribed procedure.
The SC emphasizes that invocation of substantial
 justice is not a magical incantation that will
automatically compel this Court to suspend
procedural rules. Rules of procedure are not to be
belittled or dismissed simply because their non-
observance may have resulted in prejudice to a
party’s substantive r ights. Like all rules, they are
required to be followed.
G.R. No. 142022 September 7, 2005
MINDANAO SAVINGS ANDD LOAN ASSOCIATION,
INC., Petitioners, vs. VICENTA VDA. DE FLORES, and
HEIRS OF FLORENCIO FLORES, SR., namely, EDNA
FLORES EISEIDEL, BELINDA FLORES, FLORENCIO T.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
FLORES, JR., ROBERTO T. FLORES, SYLVIA FLORES
SICAT and LORNA FLORES FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
Facts:  Florencio Flores, Sr., husband of respondent
Vicenta Vda. De Flores and predecessor-in-interest
of the other respondents, entered into a JVA with
DS Homes, Inc. (DSHI) for the development of the
Flores spouses’ 2 adjoining lots located at the
center of Malaybalay, Bukidnon. Pursuant to
the JVA, Flores, Sr. secured a loan of ₱1.5M from
petitioner MSLAI using as collaterals the 2
aforementioned lots. Thereafter, a commercial
building known as the Flores Building was
constructed on the lots in question.
In 1986, the joint venture suffered severe business
reversals on account of which DSHI discontinued
the management of the Flores Building, prompting
respondents to take over its operations.
Meanwhile, MSLAI, then operating under the name
"Davao Savings and Loan Association", was placed
by the Monetary Board of the Central Bank under
receivership of the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation (PDIC) which was later designated by
the Monetary Board as liquidator of the already
insolvent MSLAI.
Respondents received from PDIC a demand letter
for the payment of an outstanding obligation in the
staggering amount of ₱23,756,477.61. Unable to
believe that the original loan of ₱1.5M obtained by
their predecessor could have reached that much,
respondents then filed with the a complaint
for Accounting and Liquidation of Joint Venture,
 Annulment of Loan & Mortgages and
Damages thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 2138.
In a decision dated January 26, 1998, the trial court
rendered judgment for the respondents.
On February 4, 1998, petitioner MSLAI filed with the
trial court a Notice of Appeal  by reason of which
the records of the case were elevated to the Court
of Appeals.
On February 29, 1999, the appellate court issued a
notice to the parties requiring them to file their
respective briefs within 45 days from receipt thereof.
On June 21, 1999, the office of the Chief Legal
Counsel of the PDIC, as counsel for petitioner MSLAI,
entered its appearance in the appellate court and
filed a motion for a 45-day extension of time to file
appellant’s brief.
In its Resolution of August 11, 1999, the appellate
court favorably acted on petitioner’s motion and
accordingly granted petitioner forty-five (45)
days from June 21 or until August 5, 1999, within
which to file its appellant’s b rief.
Come August 5, 1999, but no appellant’s brief was
filed by petitioner. Instead, on August 25, 1999, or
way beyond the period given by the appellate
court, petitioner filed a Motion to Admit, therein
praying that the appellant’s brief thereto attache d
be admitted.
Page 11 of 93

In its challenged Resolution dated October 27,
1999, the appellate court denied admission of the
proffered Appellant’s Brief for being filed twenty
(20) days late, and consequently dismissed
petitioner’s appeal.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied
by the appellate court in its subsequent Resolution
of February 15, 2000, petitioner is now with us via the
instant recourse on the following assigned errors,
which perplexingly, are actually an assault against
the decision of the trial court and not the
challenged resolutions of the Court of Appeals.
At the outset, let it be made clear that in petitions
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the "errors" which are reviewable by this
Court are only those committed by the Court of
Appeals and not directly those of the trial court. It is
thus unfortunate that the Office of the Chief Legal
Counsel of the PDIC, as petitioner’s counsel in this
case, is evidently unaware of how appellate
proceedings before this Court go.
Issue: Whether or not the appellate court’s
resolution dismissing petitioner’s appeal was correct
on account of petitioner’s failure to file its
appellant’s brief on time.
Ruling: Yes. We must emphasize that review is not a
matter of right. Accordingly, there should be strict
adherence to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Section
6 of which delineates the grounds for the
allowance of review to avoid delays in the
enforcement of final judgments and orders of lower
courts, to wit:
SEC. 6. Review discretionary. - A review is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, and
will be granted only when there are special and
important reasons therefor. The following, while
neither controlling nor fully measuring the court’s
discretion, indicate the character of the reasons
which will be considered:
(a) When the court a quo has decided a question
of substance, not theretofore determined by the
Supreme Court, or has decided it in a way probably
not in accord with law or with the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court; or
(b) When the court a quo has so far departed from
the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure
by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of the
power of supervision.
Petitioner attempts to justify its tardiness by claiming
that its handling counsel who resigned from PDIC
on July 30, 1999 failed to turn over the subject case
to another lawyer for re-assignment.
This excuse is not only flimsy but utterly lame.
It bears emphasizing that petitioner is represented
by no less than the Office of the Chief Legal
Counsel of the PDIC which has, at its helm and
command, a battery of lawyers. As pointed out by
respondents, on July 7, 1999, the handling counsel
tendered his resignation from PDIC effective on July
30, 1999. Petitioner, therefore, had 29 days from July
7, 1999, or until August 5, 1999, the last day for filing
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
the subject brief. During those 29 days, petitioner
had the luxury of time to file its appellant’s brief, or,
at the very least, ask for another extension from the
appellate court. It did not.
Petitioner ought to be reminded that procedural
rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply
because their non-observance may have resulted
in prejudice to the parties’ subst antive rights. Like all
rules, they are required to be followed except only
for the most persuasive of reasons as when
"transcendental matters" of life, liberty or state
security are involved.
True, litigation is not a game of technicalities. It is
equally true, however, that every case must be
presented in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.
Doubtless, and judging from the very nature of
petitioner’s assigned errors, the instant petition wa s
resorted to as a substitute for the lost remedy of
appeal. This cannot be allowed, more so when, as
here, such loss is occasioned by petitioner’s own
neglect. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
G.R. No. 170354 June 30, 2006
EDGARDO PINGA, Petitioner, vs. THE HEIRS OF
GERMAN, SANTIAGO represented by FERNANDO
SANTIAGO, Respondents.
Facts: The Heirs of Santiago filed an injunction
against Pinga alleging that Pinga had been
unlawfully entering the coco lands of the
respondent cutting wood and bamboos and
harvesting the fruits of the coconut trees. As a
counterclaim, Pinga contests the ownership of the
lands to which Pinga was harvesting the fruits.
However, due to failures of Heirs of Santiago to
attend the hearings, the court ordered the dismissal
of said case.
Respondents thus filed an MR not to reinstate the
case but to ask for the entire action to be dismissed
and not to allow petitioner to present evidence ex
parte.
RTC granted the MR, hence the counterclaim was
dismissed. RTC ruled that compulsory counterclaims
cannot be adjudicated independently of plaintiff’s
cause of action vis a vis the dismissal of the
complaint carries with the dismissal of the
counterclaim.
Petitioner then elevates it to the SC by way of Rule
45 on pure questions of law. (Santiago’s motive:
They just asked for the dismissal of their entire case
so that their ownership wouldn’t be put in
controversy in the counterclaim)
Issue: Whether or not dismissal of original complaint
affects that of the compulsory counter claims?
Ruling: No. The counterclaims, in this case, can
stand on its own.
Page 12 of 93

Rule 17 Sec 3 provides: ´If for any cause, the plaintiff
fails to appear on the date of his presentation of his
evidence x x x the complaint may be dismissed
upon motion of the defendant or upon the court’s
own motion, without prejudice to the right of the
defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the
same or in a separate action.”
The dismissal of the complaint does not carry with
the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or
otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is
without prejudice to the right of defendants to
prosecute his counterclaim. Section 3 contemplates
a dismissal not procured by plaintiff, albeit justified
by causes imputable to him and which, in the
present case, was petitioner's failure to appear at
the pre-trial.
This situation is also covered by Section 3, as
extended by judicial interpretation, and is ordered
upon motion of defendant or motu proprio by the
court. Here, the issue of whether defendant has a
pending counterclaim, permissive or compulsory, is
not of determinative significance. The dismissal of
plaintiff's complaint is evidently a confirmation of
the failure of evidence to prove his cause of action
outlined therein, hence the dismissal is considered,
as a matter of evidence, an adjudication on the
merits.
This does not, however, mean that there is likewise
such absence of evidence to prove defendant's
counterclaim although the same arises out of the
subject matter of the complaint which was merely
terminated for lack of proof. To hold otherwise
would not only work injustice to defendant but
would be reading a further provision into Section 3
and wresting a meaning therefrom although neither
exists even by mere implication.
Thus understood, the complaint can accordingly be
dismissed, but relief can nevertheless be granted as
a matter of course to defendant on his
counterclaim as alleged and proved, with or
without any reservation therefor on his part, unless
from his conduct, express or implied, he has virtually
consented to the concomitant dismissal of his
counterclaim. The present rule embodied in
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more
equitable disposition of the counterclaims by
ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the
merit of the counterclaim itself and not on the
survival of the main complaint.
Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without
merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand
independent of the complaint, the trial court is not
precluded from dismissing it under the amended
rules, provided that the judgment or order
dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those
defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is
 justified, the amended rules now unequivocally
protect such counterclaim from peremptory
dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the complaint.
Petition granted.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
G.R. No. 181274 June 23, 2010
PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY,
represented herein by DIRECTOR GENERAL LILIA B.
DE LIMA, Petitioner, vs. JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES,
ROSE CARANTES, and all the other HEIRS OF
MAXIMINO CARANTES, Respondents.
Facts: Respondents Joseph Jude Carantes, Rose
Carantes and the heirs of Maximino Carantes are in
possession of a 30,368-square meter parcel of land
located in Loakan Road, Baguio City. They
obtained Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim
(CALC) over the land from the DENR. On the
strength of said CALC, respondents secured a
building permit and a fencing permit from the
Building Official of Baguio City, Teodoro G. Barrozo.
They fenced the premises and began constructing
a residential building thereon.
Respondents received a letter from Digna D. Torres,
the Zone Administrator of the Philippine Economic
Zone Authority (PEZA), informing them that the
house they built had overlapped PEZA’s terri torial
boundary. Torres advised respondents to demolish
the same within 60 days from notice. Otherwise,
PEZA would undertake its demolition at
respondents’ expense.
Without answering PEZA’s letter, respondents filed a
petition for injunction, with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of
preliminary injunction before the RTC of Baguio City.
By Order dated April 8, 1999, the RTC of Baguio City
issued a TRO, which enjoined PEZA to cease and
desist from threatening respondents with the
demolition of their house before respondents’
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction can be
heard. On September 19, 2001, the RTC likewise
issued an Order, which directed the parties to
maintain the status quo pending resolution of the
case.
On October 2, 2001, the RTC granted respondents’
petition and ordered the issuance of a writ of
injunction against PEZA. The trial court ruled that
respondents are entitled to possess, occupy and
cultivate the subject lots on the basis of their CALC.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling.
The OSG explains the delay in appealing the CA
decision. It attributes the delay to the inadvertence
of Senior State Solicitor Rodolfo Geronimo M.
Pineda, the temporarily-designated officer-in-
charge, who took over the case when State
Solicitor Maricar S.A. Prudon-Sison went on
maternity leave. Pineda allegedly merely noted
receipt of the CA decision without noticing that it
was adverse to PEZA. The OSG adds that the sparse
complement of three (3) lawyers left at the time
could not tackle at once the horde of cases
assigned to the division.
Respondents likewise assail the petition for being
filed late, stressing that it was filed only after almost
three (3) months from petitioner’s receipt of the CA
decision.
Page 13 of 93

Issue: Whether or not the appeal was perfected
outside the reglementary period provided by law,
hence, the decision already became final and
executory.
Ruling: No. The Court is inclined to overlook this
procedural lapse in the interest of substantial
 justice.
It is settled that an appeal must be perfected within
the reglementary period provided by law;
otherwise, the decision becomes final and
executory. Before the Supreme Court, a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, must be filed within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or
final order or resolution appealed from, or of the
denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or
reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the
 judgment. Even then, review is not a matter of right,
but of sound judicial discretion, and may be
granted only when there are special and important
reasons therefor.
In the case at bar, the Docket Division of the OSG
received a copy of the CA decision on November
7, 2007. It was not until February 1, 2008 or almost
three (3) months however, that the OSG, for
petitioner, filed a petition for review on certiorari
with this Court. The OSG pleads for understanding
considering the scarcity of its lawyers and the
inadvertence of the temporarily-designated OIC of
Division XV in overlooking that the CA decision was
adverse to PEZA.
While the Court realizes the OSG’s difficulty in
having only three (3) lawyers working full time on its
cases, the OSG could have easily asked for an
extension of time within which to file the petition.
More importantly, as the government agency
tasked to represent the government in litigations,
the OSG should perform its duty with promptness
and utmost diligence.
However, upon careful consideration of the merits
of this case, the Court is inclined to overlook this
procedural lapse in the interest of substantial
 justice. Although a party is bound by the acts of its
counsel, including the latter’s mistakes and
negligence, a departure from this rule is warranted
where such mistake or neglect would result in
serious injustice to the client. Indeed, procedural
rules may be relaxed for persuasive reasons to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate
with his failure to comply with the prescribed
procedure. More so, when to allow the assailed
decision to go unchecked would set a precedent
that will sanction a violation of substantive law.
Such is the situation in this case.
G.R. No. 178984 August 19, 2009
ERLINDA MAPAGAY, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
The rule is that when a party is represented by
counsel, notices of all kinds. including motions,
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
pleadings and orders, must be serve on the
counsel. Notice to counsel of records is binding to
the client. and the neglect or failure of counsel to
inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the
 Joss of his right to appeal is not ground for setting
aside a judgment, valid and regular on its face.
Facts: Erinda Mapagay (Mapagay) borrowed
money from Relindia dela Cruz in November 1996.
Mapagay gave her a signed check tor the loan
and promised to replace the check with cash.
Upon failure of Mapagay to give her cash despite
repeated demands, she presented the check to
the drawee bank. The check was dishonored for
the reason of “Account Closed". Her lawyer, after
consultation, sent a demand letter to Mapagay but
the latter refused to receive it.
Dela cruz told Mapagay to pay the loan or the
former will sue her in court. Mapagay promised to
pay, but failed to do so. Thus, she filed a case for
the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against
Mapagay.
On June 1999. the Metropolitan Trial Curt (MeTC)
provisionally dismissed the case on the basis of
amicable settlement betv1een the parties.
Hov1ever the case was revived because Mapagay
failed to comply with the terms of their agreement.
The MeTC rendered a Decision finding Mapagay
guilty of the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) affirmed in toto the
MeTC Decision. Mapagay filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but this was denied by the RTC for
being filed outside the the reglementary period.
Mapagay alleges that she learned of the RTC
Decision only on 20 October 2004 When she asked
a friend to check on the status of the case and that
her lav1yer did not inform her of the RTC Decision.
The Court of Appeal(CA) held that the RTC's
Decision had become final and unalterable for
filing the motion for reconsideration out of time.
Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition
maintaining that the Court of Appeals erred in
denying due course to her appeal.
Issue: Whether or not the omission or negligence of
Mapagay’s counsel binds her.
Ruling: Yes. Under the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of the
 judgment of conviction may be filed within 15 days
from the promulgation of the judgment or from
notice of the final order appealed from. Failure to
file a motion for reconsideration within the
reglementary period renders the subject decision
final and executory.
Once a judgment attains finality, it becomes
immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be
modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless
of whether the modification is attempted to be
made by the court rendering it or by this Court.
Page 14 of 93

Decisions that have long become final and
executory cannot be annulled by courts, and the
appellate court is deprived of jurisdiction to alter
the trial court’s final judgment. This doctrine is
founded on considerations of public policy and
sound practice that, at the risk of occasional errors,
 judgments must become final at some point in time.
Evidence on record shows that petitioner’s counsel
of record, Atty. Antonio J. Ballena (Atty. Ballena),
received on 21 September 2004 a copy of the RTC
Decision dated 14 September 2004, which affirms
petitioner’s conviction for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. Hence, petitioner may file a
motion for reconsideration within 15 days from such
date of receipt, which must be on or before 6
October 2004. However, petitioner filed her motion
for reconsideration only on 3 November 2004, or on
the 43rd day, which was obviously way beyond the
15-day reglementary period. Consequently, the RTC
Decision dated has become final and executory.
Petitioner alleges that she learned of the RTC
Decision only on 20 October 2004 when she asked
a friend to check on the status of the case and that
Atty. Ballena did not inform her of the RTC Decision.
The rule is that when a party is represented by
counsel, notices of all kinds, including motions,
pleadings and orders, must be served on the
counsel. Notice to counsel of record is binding on
the client, and the neglect or failure of counsel to
inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the
loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting
aside a judgment, valid and regular on its face.
It is indeed settled that the omission or negligence
of counsel binds the client. This is more true if the
client did not make a periodic check on the
progress of her case. Otherwise, there would be no
end to a suit, so long as a new counsel could be
employed who would allege and show that the
prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent,
experienced, or learned.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that
petitioner had constantly followed up her case with
Atty. Ballena. Petitioner did not even bother to call
or personally go to the RTC to verify the progress of
her case. Clearly, petitioner did not exercise
diligence in pursuing her case.
Petitioner argues that the technical rules of
procedure should be relaxed in the interest of
substantial justice, so as to afford her opportunity to
present her case.
We have invariably pronounced that the bare
invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" is
not a magic wand that will automatically compel
this Court to suspend procedural rules. Rules of
Procedure are tools designed to promote efficiency
and orderliness, as well as to facilitate the
attainment of justice, such that strict adherence
thereto is required. Procedural rules are not to be
belittled or dismissed, simply because their non-
observance may have resulted in prejudice to a
party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
required to be followed except only for the most
persuasive reasons, when they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate
with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not
complying with the procedure prescribed. Rules of
Procedure, especially those prescribing the time
within which certain acts must be done, are
absolutely indispensable to the prevention of
needless delays and to the orderly and speedy
discharge of justice. We have held that the rules
may be relaxed only in "exceptionally meritorious
cases."
In the instant case, we find no persuasive or
exceptionally meritorious reasons to justify the
relaxation of the rules. The circumstances obtaining
in the instant case show that petitioner was
accorded opportunity to settle her liability to
private complainant and to present her case during
the proceedings. As earlier recounted, the MTC,
upon motion of petitioner, provisionally dismissed
the case on the basis of an amicable settlement
between her and private complainant. However,
the case was revived, because petitioner failed to
comply with the settlement. Petitioner was given
several opportunities during the trial to present
evidence in her defense. Nonetheless, despite
being duly notified and subpoenaed, she did not
appear during the trial proper and promulgation of
 judgment.
It should be noted that private complainant has not
been fully or partially paid the amount stated in the
check. The time-honored principle is "Justice is for
all. Litigants have equal footing in a court of law.
Rules are laid down for the benefit of all and should
not be made dependent upon a suitor’s sweet time
and own bidding."
Given the foregoing, we find no error in the
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
denying petitioner’s appeal.
G.R. No. 9527. August 23, 1915
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSE
TAMPARONG ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.
SYLLABUS (Basaha nalang ninyo ang syllabus. Ruling
was taken from a digest online. Dili nako masabtan
ang case.)
1. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE; APPEALS IN THIRD
INSTANCE; EXTENT OF REVIEW.  —   Under the Spanish
criminal procedure, appeals from justices’ courts
were allowed only to Courts of First Instance. By
 section 43 of General Orders No. 58, this procedure
has been so amended that appeals can be taken
to the Supreme Court in such cases when the
validity or constitutionality of a statute is involved.
This amendment of the procedure does not carry
with it the right of review of the facts, but is
confined to the purpose stated  —   that is, of
determining the validity or constitutionality of the
 statute or ordinance upon which the judgment was
predicated. Former cases reviewed, showing that
Page 15 of 93

 such has uniformly been the interpretation of
 section 43 by this court.
Facts: The defendants were convicted by the
 justice of the peace of Baguio for having played
the game of chance called "monte" in violation of
Ordinance No. 35. They appealed to the Court of
First Instance, where they were again tried and
convicted upon the same charge. An appeal was
allowed to this court because the validity of
Ordinance No, 35 was drawn in question during the
trial of the cause in the court below.
Issues: Whether or not the court is required under
the law to examine the evidence for the purpose of
determining the guilt or innocence of the
defendants?
Ruling: No. Although the SC wrote that Act No.
1627 does not explicitly limit their powers from
examining issues of facts, it likewise does not
expressly authorize them to do so. The SC,
nevertheless, interpreted that the law was not
framed to confer them the said power.
The SC has revisited prior laws to ascertain the
intention of the 'framers' of the amended section of
Act No. 1627; the latter being ambiguous in the
sense that it did not explicitly allow nor prohibit SC
to examine issues of facts on appeals. The SC
found, in light of former practices and from further
understanding the circumstances in which the
framers of the amended law were subject to, that
the amendment was not meant to confer in them
the jurisdiction of reviewing questions of fact.
The SC further distinguished their holding from Loeb
vs Columbia Township Trustees, and Boise Artesian
Hot and Cold Water Co., Ltd. vs. Boise City. These
two latter cases were taken to the US SC directly
from the circuit courts as writs of error, (not as
appeals) where the US SC does not only have
 jurisdiction to review constitutional questions but
also every other question properly arising.
In at least fourteen other cases, the SC has showed
that the ruling for this issue in the last 10 years has
remained uniform. And that the court, since its
organization, never held that it had the power to
review facts touching guilt of an accused person,
ONLY as to when the appeal involved the validity or
constitutionality of a statute or the constitutionality
of a municipal or township ordinance.
G.R. Nos. 170609-13 January 30, 2009
BERNIE G. MIAQUE, Petitioner vs. HON. VIRGILIO M.
PATAG, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, VICENTE
C. ARAGONA, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
Facts: 5 informations for libel were filed in the RTC
against petitioner Miaque and 3 others. Said
informations were quashed for lack of jurisdiction of
the offense charged. Specifically, said Informations
failed to allege either that private respondent
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
Vicente Aragona actually held office in Iloilo City at
the time of the commission of the offenses or that
the alleged libelous remarks were printed or first
published in Iloilo City.
5 new informations for libel were filed against
petitioner in the RTC as recommended by Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Maranon. The new
Informations were similarly worded as those
previously quashed but with these added
allegations: (1) Aragona, Regional State Prosecutor
VI of the Department of Justice, held office at the
Hall of Justice, Iloilo City or (2) the alleged libelous
remarks were written, printed and published in Iloilo
City.
Petitioner filed his motions not to issue warrants of
arrest and, if already issued, to recall them. The
motions were denied on the ground that petitioner
was beyond the court's jurisdiction as he was not
under the custody of the court.
Petitioner contends that the Informations were filed
without the mandatory preliminary investigation.
Moreover, the new Informations were filed by one
who had no authority to do so because these were
filed by the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor's Office and
not the Iloilo City Prosecutor's Office. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter supposedly belonged to
the latter. Petitioner likewise assails the refusal of
respondent judge to recall the warrants of arrest
issued against him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
representing the People of the Philippines, contends
that the quashed Informations were merely
amended to include the allegations that Aragona
actually held office in Iloilo City at the time of the
commission of the offenses or that the libelous
remarks were printed and first published in Iloilo City.
A new preliminary investigation was therefore
unnecessary. On the warrant of arrest, the OSG
alleges that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over
petitioner in view of the filing of his August 8, 2005
motions. The filing of the motions supposedly was
tantamount to voluntarily submitting to the
 jurisdiction of the court.
Issues: 1. Whether or not a direct resort to the
Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari is correct.
2. Whether or not the Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s
Office has the authority to file and sign the new
Informations against petitioner.
Ruling: 1. Generally, a direct resort to us in a petition
for certiorari is incorrect for it violates the hierarchy
of courts. A regard for judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level courts should be
filed in the RTC and those against the latter should
be filed in the Court of Appeals. This rule, however,
may be relaxed when pure questions of law are
raised as in this case.
2. No. It is undisputed that the alleged acts of libel
were committed in Iloilo City. The Charter of the
City of Iloilo provides:
Page 16 of 93

[The City Fiscal, now City Prosecutor] shall also have
charge of the prosecution of all crimes,
misdemeanors and violations of city ordinances, in
the Court of First Instance (now RTC) and in the
Municipal Trial Court of the city, and shall discharge
all the duties in respect to criminal prosecutions
enjoined by law upon provincial fiscals.
The city fiscal shall cause to be investigated all
charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of
ordinances, and have the necessary informations or
complaints prepared against the persons accused.
The authority to sign and file the new Informations is
properly lodged with the Iloilo City Prosecutor’s
Office. The Iloilo Provincial Prosecutor’s Office was
clearly bereft of authority to file the new
Informations against petitioner. An Information,
when required by law to be filed by a public
prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. The
court does not acquire jurisdiction over the case
because there is a defect in the Information. We
held in People v. Hon. Garfin:
It is a valid information signed by a competent
officer which, among other requisites, confers
 jurisdiction on the court over the person of the
accused and the subject matter thereof. xxx
Questions relating to lack of jurisdiction may be
 raised at any stage of the proceeding. An infirmity
in the information, such as lack of authority of the
officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence,
acquiescence, or even by express consent.
The foregoing considered, the Informations were
fatally defective. The common infirmity in the
Informations constituted a jurisdictional defect that
could not be cured. There was no point in
proceeding under a defective Information that
could never be the basis of a valid conviction.
G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014
CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO, Petitioner, v.
MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN, REPRESENTED BY
HON. MAYOR JOHN P. YAP, SANGGUNIANG BAYAN
OF MALAY, AKLAN, REPRESENTED BY HON. EZEL
FLORES, DANTE PASUGUIRON, ROWEN AGUIRRE,
WILBEC GELITO, JUPITER GALLENERO, OFFICE OF THE
MUNICIPAL ENGINEER, OFFICE OF THE MUNICIPAL
TREASURER, BORACAY PNP CHIEF, BORACAY
FOUNDATION, INC., REPRESENTED BY NENETTE GRAF,
MUNICIPAL AUXILIARY POLICE, AND JOHN AND
JANE DOES, Respondents.
DOCTRINE: Based on law and jurisprudence, the
office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to
order the closing and demolition of establishments.
This power granted by the LGC, as earlier
explained, is not the same power devolved in favor
of the LGU under Sec. 17 (b)(2)(ii), as above-
quoted, which is subject to review by the DENR. The
fact that the building to be demolished is located
within a forestland under the administration of the
DENR is of no moment, for what is involved herein,
strictly speaking, is not an issue on environmental
protection, conservation of natural resources, and
the maintenance of ecological balance, but the
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
legality or illegality of the structure. Rather than
treating this as an environmental issue then, focus
should not be diverted from the root cause of this
debacle compliance.
Facts: Petitioner is the president and chief executive
officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management
Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove). On January
7, 2010, the company applied for a zoning
compliance with the municipal government of
Malay, Aklan. While the company was already
operating a resort in the area, and the application
sought the issuance of a building permit covering
the construction of a three-storey hotel over a
parcel of land measuring 998 sqm. located in Sitio
Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island, Malay,
Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land Use
Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by
the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) in favor of Boracay West Cove.
Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20,
2010, the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied
petitioner’s application on the ground that the
proposed construction site was within the “no build
zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-
131 (Ordinance).
Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office
of the Mayor but despite follow up, no action was
ever taken by the respondent mayor. A Cease and
Desist Order was issued by the municipal
government, enjoining the expansion of the resort,
and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of
Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the
closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s
hotel.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for
injunctive relief with the CA Alleging that the order
was issued and executed with grave abuse of
discretion.
Issue: Whether or not judicial proceedings should be
conducted first before the LGU can order the
closure and demolition of the property in question.
Ruling: Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a
particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is
a nuisance per se.
Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per
accidens, however, we still find in this case that the
LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s
demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police
power and the general welfare clause, property
rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints
and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the
government. Otherwise stated, the government
may enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and
occupations to promote the general welfare.
Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are
concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the
requirement of due notice and hearing, order their
closure and demolition.
Page 17 of 93

One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which
authorizes city and municipal governments, acting
through their local chief executives, to issue
demolition orders. Under existing laws, the office of
the mayor is given powers not only relative to its
function as the executive official of the town; it has
also been endowed with authority to hear issues
involving property rights of individuals and to come
out with an effective order or resolution thereon.20
Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b) (3) (vi) of the LGC,
which empowered the mayor to order the closure
and removal of illegally constructed establishments
for failing to secure the necessary permits.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION:
The DENR does not have primary jurisdiction over
the controversy
In alleging that the case concerns the
development and the proper use of the country’s
environment and natural resources, petitioner is
skirting the principal issue, which is Boracay West
Cove’s non-compliance with the permit, clearance,
and zoning requirements for building constructions
under national and municipal laws. He downplays
Boracay West Cove’s omission in a bid to justify
ousting the LGU of jurisdiction over the case and
transferring the same to the DENR. He attempts to
blow the issue out of proportion when it all boils
down to whether or not the construction of the
three-storey hotel was supported by the necessary
documentary requirements.
Based on law and jurisprudence, the office of the
mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the closing
and demolition of establishments. This power
granted by the LGC, as earlier explained, We
believe, is not the same power devolved in favor of
the LGU under Sec. 17 (b)(2)(ii), as above-quoted,
which is subject to review by the DENR. The fact
that the building to be demolished is located within
a forestland under the administration of the DENR is
of no moment, for what is involved herein, strictly
speaking, is not an issue on environmental
protection, conservation of natural resources, and
the maintenance of ecological balance, but the
legality or illegality of the structure. Rather than
treating this as an environmental issue then, focus
should not be diverted from the root cause of this
debacle –– compliance.
Ultimately, the purported power of review by a
regional office of the DENR over respondents’
actions exercised through an instrumentality of an
ex-parte opinion, in this case, finds no sufficient
basis. At best, the legal opinion rendered, though
perhaps informative, is not conclusive on the courts
and should be taken with a grain of salt.
G.R. No. 107518 October 8, 1998
PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING
CORPORATION, respondents.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
Doctrine: A party is entitled to adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss actually
suffered and duly proved. Indeed, basic is the rule
that to recover actual damages, the amount of loss
must not only be capable of proof but must
actually be proven with a reasonable degree of
certainty, premised upon competent proof or best
evidence obtainable of the actual amount
thereof. The claimant is duty-bound to point out
specific facts that afford a basis for measuring
whatever compensatory damages are borne. A
court cannot merely rely on speculations,
conjectures, or guesswork as to the fact and
amount of damages as well as hearsay or
uncorroborated testimony whose truth is
suspect. Such are the jurisprudential precepts that
the Court now applies in resolving the instant
petition.
Facts: In the early morning of September 21, 1977,
the M/V Maria Efigenia XV, owned by private
respondent Maria Efigenia Fishing Corporation, was
navigating the waters near Fortune Island in
Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to Navotas, Metro
Manila when it collided with the
vessel Petroparcel which at the time was owned by
the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC).
After investigation was conducted by the Board of
Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard
Commandant Simeon N. Alejandro rendered a
decision finding the Petroparcel  at fault. Based on
this finding by the Board and after unsuccessful
demands on petitioner, private respondent sued
the LSC and the Petroparcel captain, Edgardo
Doruelo, before the then Court of First Instance of
Caloocan City paying thereto the docket fee of
one thousand two hundred fifty-two pesos
(P1,252.00) and the legal research fee of two pesos
(P2.00). In particular, private respondent prayed for
an award of P692,680.00.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case,
petitioner PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation sought to be substituted in place of
LSC as it had already acquired ownership of
the Petroparcel.
RTC rendered a decision against the defendant
PNOC Shipping & Transport Corporation, to pay the
plaintiff P6,438,048 value of the fishing boat with
interest plus P50K attorney's fees and cost of suit.
Likewise, the case against defendant Edgardo
Doruelo is hereby DISMISSED, for lack of jurisdiction.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the lower court's decision
contending that: (1) the lower court erred in
holding it liable for damages; that the lower court
did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by paying
only P1,252.00 as docket fee; (2) assuming that
plaintiff was entitled to damages, the lower court
erred in awarding an amount greater than that
prayed for in the second amended complaint; and
(3) the lower court erred when it failed to resolve
the issues it had raised in its memorandum. 16
Petitioner likewise filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration expounding on whether the lower
Page 18 of 93

court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case despite therein plaintiff's failure to pay
the prescribed docket fee.
On January 25, 1990, the lower court declined
reconsideration for lack of merit. Apparently not
having received the order denying its motion for
reconsideration, petitioner still filed a motion for
leave to file a reply to private respondent's
opposition to said motion. Hence, the lower court
denied said motion for leave to file a reply on the
ground that by the issuance of the order of January
25, 1990, said motion had become moot and
academic.
Unsatisfied with the lower court's decision, petitioner
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which,
however, affirmed the same in toto. Hence, the
instant recourse.
Issue: Whether or not the lower court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the amended complaint
increasing the amount of damages claimed to
P600,000.00
Held: Yes. With respect to petitioner's contention
that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the amended complaint increasing the amount of
damages claimed to P600,000.00, we agree with
the Court of Appeals that the lower court acquired
 jurisdiction over the case when private respondent
paid the docket fee corresponding to its claim in its
original complaint. Its failure to pay the docket fee
corresponding to its increased claim for damages
under the amended complaint should not be
considered as having curtailed the lower court's
 jurisdiction. Pursuant to the ruling in Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, 55 the unpaid docket
fee should be considered as a lien on the judgment
even though private respondent specified the
amount of P600,000.00 as its claim for damages in
its amended complaint.
Moreover, we note that petitioner did not question
at all the jurisdiction of the lower court on the
ground of insufficient docket fees in its answers to
both the amended complaint and the second
amended complaint. It did so only in its motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the lower court
after it had received an adverse decision. As this
Court held in Pantranco North Express, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, participation in all stages of the case
before the trial court, that included invoking its
authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively
barred petitioner by estoppel from challenging the
court's jurisdiction. Notably, from the time it filed its
answer to the second amended complaint on April
16, 1985, petitioner did not question the lower
court's jurisdiction. It was only on December 29,
1989 when it filed its motion for reconsideration of
the lower court's decision that petitioner raised the
question of the lower court's lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner thus foreclosed its right to raise the issue of
 jurisdiction by its own inaction.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
G.R. No. 176339 January 10, 2011
DO-ALL METALS INDUSTRIES, INC., SPS. DOMINGO
LIM and LELY KUNG LIM,   Petitioners, vs.
SECURITY BANK CORP., TITOLAIDO E.
PAYONGAYONG, EVYLENE C. SISON, PHIL.
INDUSTRIAL SECURITY AGENCY CORP. and GIL SILOS,
Respondents.
Facts:
From 1996 to 1997, Dragon Lady Industries, Inc.,
owned by petitioner spouses Domingo Lim and Lely
Kung Lim (the Lims) took out loans from respondent
Security Bank Corporation (the Bank) that totaled
₱92,454,776.45. Unable to pay the loans on time,
the Lims assigned some of their real properties to
the Bank to secure the same, including a building
and the lot on which it stands (the property),
located at M. de Leon St., Santolan, Pasig City.1
In 1998 the Bank offered to lease the property to
the Lims through petitioner Do-All Metals Industries,
Inc. (DMI) primarily for business although the Lims
were to use part of the property as their residence.
DMI and the Bank executed a two-year lease
contract from October 1, 1998 to September 30,
2000 but the Bank retained the right to pre-
terminate the lease. The contract also provided
that, should the Bank decide to sell the property,
DMI shall have the right of first refusal.
On December 3, 1999, before the lease was up, the
Bank gave notice to DMI that it was pre-terminating
the lease on December 31, 1999. Wanting to
exercise its right of first refusal, DMI tried to
negotiate with the Bank the terms of its purchase.
DMI offered to pay the Bank ₱8 million for the
property but the latter rejected the offer,
suggesting ₱15 million instead. DMI made a second
offer of ₱10 million but the Bank declined the same.
While the negotiations were on going, the Lims
claimed that they continued to use the property in
their business. But the Bank posted at the place
private security guards from Philippine Industrial
Security Agency (PISA). The Lims also claimed that
on several occasions in 2000, the guards, on
instructions of the Bank representatives Titolaido
Payongayong and Evylene Sison, padlocked the
entrances to the place and barred the Lims as well
as DMI’s employees from entering the property.
One of the guards even pointed his gun at one
employee and shots were fired. Because of this,
DMI was unable to close several projects and
contracts with prospective clients. Further, the Lims
alleged that they were unable to retrieve assorted
furniture, equipment, and personal items left at the
property.
Lim- filed a complaint with RTC for damages
RTC- On September 30, 2004 the RTC rendered a
decision in favor of DMI and the Lims. It ordered the
Bank to pay the plaintiffs ₱27,974,564.00 as actual
damages, ₱500,000.00 as moral damages, ₱500,000
as exemplary damages, and ₱100,000.00 as
Page 19 of 93

attorney’s fees. But the court absolved defendants
Payongayong, Sison, Silos and PISA of any liability.
CA- found for the Bank
Issue:
1. Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction to
hear and adjudicate plaintiff’s supplemental
complaint against the Bank considering their failure
to pay the filing fees on the amounts of damages
they claim in it;
2. Whether or not the Bank is liable to DMI and the
Lims for the machineries, equipment, and other
properties they allegedly lost after they were barred
from the property.
Ruling:
1. On the issue of jurisdiction, respondent Bank
argues that plaintiffs’ failure to pay the filing fees
on their supplemental complaint is fatal to their
action.
But what the plaintiffs failed to pay was merely the
filing fees for their Supplemental Complaint. The RTC
acquired jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ action from the
moment they filed their original complaint
accompanied by the payment of the filing fees
due on the same. The plaintiffs’ non-payment of the
additional filing fees due on their additional claims
did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already
had over the case.6
2. Here, the supplemental complaint specified from
the beginning the actual damages that the
plaintiffs sought against the Bank. Still plaintiffs paid
no filing fees on the same. And, while petitioners
claim that they were willing to pay the additional
fees, they gave no reason for their omission nor
offered to pay the same. They merely said that they
did not yet pay the fees because the RTC had not
assessed them for it. But a supplemental complaint
is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing
fees due on a complaint need to be paid upon its
filing.9  The rules do not require the court to make
special assessments in cases of supplemental
complaints.
To aggravate plaintiffs’ omission, although the Bank
brought up the question of their failure to pay
additional filing fees in its motion for
reconsideration, plaintiffs made no effort to make
at least a late payment before the case could be
submitted for decision, assuming of course that the
prescription of their action had not then set it in.
Clearly, plaintiffs have no excuse for their
continuous failure to pay the fees they owed the
court. Consequently, the trial court should have
treated their Supplemental Complaint as not filed.
Plaintiffs of course point out that the Bank itself
raised the issue of non-payment of additional filing
fees only after the RTC had rendered its decision in
the case. The implication is that the Bank should be
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
deemed to have waived its objection to such
omission. But it is not for a party to the case or even
for the trial court to waive the payment of the
additional filing fees due on the supplemental
complaint. Only the Supreme Court can grant
exemptions to the payment of the fees due the
courts and these exemptions are embodied in its
rules.
G.R. No. 171092 March 15, 2010
EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER,   Petitioner, vs. BRITISH
AIRWAYS, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Jurisdictio est potestas de publico introducta cum
necessitate juris dicendi. Jurisdiction is a power
introduced for the public good, on account of the
necessity of dispensing justice. 1
Facts:
On April 28, 2005, petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier
filed a Complaint2 for damages against respondent
British Airways before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Makati City. She alleged that on February 28,
2005, she took respondent’s flight 548 from London,
United Kingdom to Rome, Italy. Once on board, she
allegedly requested Julian Halliday (Halliday), one
of the respondent’s flight attendants, to assist her in
placing her hand-carried luggage in the overhead
bin. However, Halliday allegedly refused to help
and assist her, and even sarcastically remarked that
"If I were to help all 300 passengers in this flight, I
would have a broken back!"
Petitioner further alleged that when the plane was
about to land in Rome, Italy, another flight
attendant, Nickolas Kerrigan (Kerrigan), singled her
out from among all the passengers in the business
class section to lecture on plane safety. Allegedly,
Kerrigan made her appear to the other passengers
to be ignorant, uneducated, stupid, and in need of
lecturing on the safety rules and regulations of the
plane. Affronted, petitioner assured Kerrigan that
she knew the plane’s safety regulations being a
frequent traveler. Thereupon, Kerrigan allegedly
thrust his face a mere few centimeters away from
that of the petitioner and menacingly told her that
"We don’t like your attitude."
Upon arrival in Rome, petitioner complained to
respondent’s ground manager and demanded an
apology. However, the latter declared that the
flight stewards were "only doing their job."
Thus, petitioner filed the complaint for damages.
On May 30, 2005, respondent, by way of special
appearance through counsel, filed a Motion to
Dismiss4  on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the
Page 20 of 93

case and over the person of the respondent.
Respondent alleged that only the courts of London,
United Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction
over the complaint for damages pursuant to the
Warsaw Convention,5  Article 28(1) of which
provides:
An action for damages must be brought at the
option of the plaintiff, either before the court of
domicile of the carrier or his principal place of
business, or where he has a place of business
through which the contract has been made, or
before the court of the place of destination.
Thus, since a) respondent is domiciled in London; b)
respondent’s principal place of business is in
London; c) petitioner bought her ticket in Italy
(through Jeepney Travel S.A.S, in Rome); 6  and d)
Rome, Italy is petitioner’s place of destination, then
it follows that the complaint should only be filed in
the proper courts of London, United Kingdom or
Rome, Italy.
Likewise, it was alleged that the case must be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the respondent because the summons was
erroneously served on Euro-Philippine Airline
Services, Inc. which is not its resident agent in the
Philippines.
RTC- On October 14, 2005, the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 132, issued an Order 10 granting respondent’s
Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that:
 xxxxxSince the Philippines is not the place of
domicile of the defendant nor is it the principal
place of business, our courts are thus divested of
 jurisdiction over cases for damages. Neither was
plaintiff’s ticket issued in this country nor   was her
destination Manila but Rome in Italy. It bears
stressing however, that referral to the court of
proper jurisdiction does not constitute constructive
denial of plaintiff’s right to have access to our
courts since the Warsaw Convention itself provided
for jurisdiction over cases arising from international
transportation. Said treaty stipulations must be
complied with in good faith following the time
honored principle of pacta sunt servanda.
MFR- denied
Petitioner now comes directly before us on a
Petition for Review on Certiorari  on pure questions
of law, raising the following issues:
Issue:
1. WON RTC has jurisdiction? NO
2. WON respondent air carrier of passengers, in
filing its motion to dismiss based on lack of
 jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
and over its person may be deemed as having
in fact and in law submitted itself to the
 jurisdiction of the lower court, especially so,
when the very lawyer arguing for it is himself the
resident agent of the carrier? NO
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
Ruling:
1. The Warsaw Convention has the force and
effect of law in this country.
Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
1. This Convention applies to all international
carriage of persons, luggage or goods
performed by aircraft for reward. It applies
equally to gratuitous carriage by aircraft
performed by an air transport undertaking.
2. For the purposes of this Convention the
expression "international carriage" means
any carriage in which, according to the
contract made by the parties, the place of
departure and the place of destination,
whether or not there be a break in the
carriage or a transhipment, are situated
either within the territories of two High
Contracting Parties, or within the territory of
a single High Contracting Party, if there is an
agreed stopping place within a territory
subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty,
mandate or authority of another Power,
even though that Power is not a party to this
Convention. A carriage without such an
agreed stopping place between territories
subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty,
mandate or authority of the same High
Contracting Party is not deemed to be
international for the purposes of this
Convention. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, when the place of departure and the place
of destination in a contract of carriage are situated
within the territories of two High Contracting Parties,
said carriage is deemed an "international carriage".
The High Contracting Parties referred to herein were
the signatories to the Warsaw Convention and
those which subsequently adhered to it. 14
In the case at bench, petitioner’s place of
departure was London, United Kingdom while her
place of destination was Rome, Italy.15  Both the
United Kingdom16 and Italy17 signed and ratified the
Warsaw Convention. As such, the transport of the
petitioner is deemed to be an "international
carriage" within the contemplation of the Warsaw
Convention.
Since the Warsaw Convention applies in the instant
case, then the jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the action is governed by the provisions of the
Warsaw Convention.
Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, the
plaintiff may bring the action for damages before – 
1. the court where the carrier is domiciled;
2. the court where the carrier has its
principal place of business;
Page 21 of 93

3. the court where the carrier has an
establishment by which the contract has
been made; or
4. the court of the place of destination.
In this case, it is not disputed that respondent is a
British corporation domiciled in London, United
Kingdom with London as its principal place of
business. Hence, under the first and second
 jurisdictional rules, the petitioner may bring her case
before the courts of London in the United Kingdom.
In the passenger ticket and baggage check
presented by both the petitioner and respondent, it
appears that the ticket was issued in Rome, Italy.
Consequently, under the third jurisdictional rule, the
petitioner has the option to bring her case before
the courts of Rome in Italy. Finally, both the
petitioner and respondent aver that the place of
destination is Rome, Italy, which is properly
designated given the routing presented in the said
passenger ticket and baggage check.
Accordingly, petitioner may bring her action before
the courts of Rome, Italy. We thus find that the RTC
of Makati correctly ruled that it does not have
 jurisdiction over the case filed by the petitioner.
2. Special Appearance to Question a Court’s
Jurisdiction Is NotVoluntary Appearance
The second sentence of Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure clearly provides:
Sec. 20. Voluntary appearance.  –  The defendant’s
voluntary appearance in the action shall be
equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a
motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall
not be deemed a voluntary appearance.
Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss,
assailing the jurisdiction of the court over his person,
together with other grounds raised therein, is not
deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the
court. What the rule on voluntary appearance –  the
first sentence of the above-quoted rule  –   means is
that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in
court is without qualification, in which case he is
deemed to have waived his defense of lack of
 jurisdiction over his person due to improper service
of summons.
The pleadings filed by petitioner in the subject
forfeiture cases, however, do not show that she
voluntarily appeared without qualification.
Petitioner filed the following pleadings in Forfeiture I:
(a) motion to dismiss; (b) motion for reconsideration
and/or to admit answer; (c) second motion for
reconsideration; (d) motion to consolidate forfeiture
case with plunder case; and (e) motion to dismiss
and/or to quash Forfeiture I. And in Forfeiture II: (a)
motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture II; and
(b) motion for partial reconsideration.
The foregoing pleadings, particularly the motions to
dismiss, were filed by petitioner solely for special
appearance with the purpose of challenging the
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
 jurisdiction of the SB over her person and that of her
three children. Petitioner asserts therein that SB did
not acquire jurisdiction over her person and of her
three children for lack of valid service of summons
through improvident substituted service of summons
in both Forfeiture I and Forfeiture II. This stance the
petitioner never abandoned when she filed her
motions for reconsideration, even with a prayer to
admit their attached Answer Ex Abundante Ad
Cautelam dated January 22, 2005 setting forth
affirmative defenses with a claim for damages. And
the other subsequent pleadings, likewise, did not
abandon her stance and defense of lack of
 jurisdiction due to improper substituted services of
summons in the forfeiture cases. Evidently, from the
foregoing Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules
on Civil Procedure, petitioner and her sons did not
voluntarily appear before the SB constitutive of or
equivalent to service of summons.
In this case, the special appearance of the counsel
of respondent in filing the Motion to Dismiss and
other pleadings before the trial court cannot be
deemed to be voluntary submission to the
 jurisdiction of the said trial court. We hence
disagree with the contention of the petitioner and
rule that there was no voluntary appearance
before the trial court that could constitute estoppel
or a waiver of respondent’s objection to jurisdiction
over its person.
G.R. No. 146593 October 26, 2001
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK,  petitioner, vs.
ROBERTO V. ONGPIN,  respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
Facts:
On November 17, 1994, Philippine Apparel, Inc.
(PAI) entered into a credit agreement with
petitioner United Coconut Planters Bank for a case-
to-case credit line in the amount of US$500,000.00.
Respondent Roberto V. Ongpin, then controlling
stockholder of PAI, signed as surety, binding himself
 jointly and severally liable with PAI for the same
amount. PAI availed of the credit line by drawing
on short-term loans and opening letters of credit for
the importation of goods, which amounted to
US$650,986.34 or P16,526,653.00.2
As PAI failed to pay its obligations, petitioner filed a
complaint against respondent Ongpin with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati to enforce
his obligation as surety of PAI. Petitioner sought the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment on the
following grounds: (1) respondent, in fraud of
creditors, had transferred residence to Hongkong;
(2) his obligation was not covered by any collateral;
and (3) PAI and its officers, including respondent,
with intent to defraud, did not disclose the fact that
the Bureau of Customs had claims against PAI for
unpaid customs duties and taxes in the amount of
Page 22 of 93

P284,010,387.00, which fact could have affected
petitioner's decision whether to grant the loan to
PAI.
On November 10, 1995, the trial court issued an
order granting petitioner's prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary attachment. On November 16,
1995, a writ of attachment and a notice of
garnishment were issued by the trial court,
addressed to the president and corporate
secretary of the Dominion Asian Equities garnishing
8,315,600 shares of stock belonging to respondent.3
On November 21, 1995, respondent, making a
special appearance through counsel, moved to
dismiss the complaint and to quash the writ of
attachment and garnishment on the ground that
the trial court had no jurisdiction over the person of
respondent, the summons prepared on October 30,
1995 having been unserved as of November 17,
1995. The trial court denied the urgent motion as
well as respondent's subsequent motion for
reconsideration.4
On May 24, 1996, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals assailing the orders
of the trial court. During the pendency of the
petition, on May 27, 1996, petitioner filed with the
trial court a Motion for Leave to Serve Summons
Through Publication. Its motion was granted, but the
publication was held in abeyance on October 2,
1996. On the same date, petitioner entered into an
agreement with TODAY for the publication of the
summons on October 4, 11, and 18, 1996. Petitioner
received the trial court's order at the close of office
hours on October 3, 1996. Attempts to prevent the
publication by requesting the trial court through
telephone to inform the newspaper publisher of its
order and informing the newspaper itself of the
same proved futile, as nobody in the court was
contacted by petitioner while the telephone lines of
the newspaper were busy. As a result, TODAY
published the summons on October 4, 1996. It was
only on October 8, 1996 that petitioner was able to
inform the newspaper of the October 2, 1996 order
and to request the latter to hold in abeyance
further publication of the summons. 5
CA- the issuance of a Writ of Attachment together
with the Notice of Garnishment is hereby validated:
but the implementation of the Writ of
Attachment/Garnishment is prohibited until after
the Court shall have acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner, either through voluntary
appearance or service of summons.
CA-MFR-denied
On August 1, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari (denied in aug 27, ‘97) with this Court.
Again, during the pendency of the case, petitioner
filed with the trial court on August 15, 1997 another
Motion to Serve Summons through Publication with
Leave of Court.
On November 27, 1997, Deputy Sheriff Glenn B.
Parra, together with Atty. Rodulfo Baculi, Jr.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
representative of petitioner, went to the PILTEL
office at the Banker's Center Building, Ayala
Avenue, Makati City to serve summons on
respondent, who was then the chairman of the
board of PILTEL.
There, he met for the first time Anne V. Morallo,
who told him that she was authorized to receive
court processes for and on behalf of respondent
even though the latter was not holding office in the
building. Morallo was so advised by Atty. Joseph
Santiago, Chief of the Legal Department of PILTEL.
Thus, Sheriff Parra served the summons on Morallo
who received it accordingly. However, when
Morallo tried to forward the court process to
respondent, the latter's lawyer, Atty. David S.
Narvasa, refused to receive it.8
On December 4, 1997, respondent filed with the trial
court an Urgent Omnibus Motion: (a) to Dismiss; (b)
for Prohibition of the Implementation of the Writ of
Attachment dated 16 November 1995; (c) for
Quashal of the Notice of Garnishment dated 27
November 1997; and (d) for Release of Properties
attached thereby. On April 19, 1999, the trial court
denied respondent's motion for lack of merit.
Respondent's motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied on October 13, 1999.
Consequently, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari with application for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
promulgated its decision on December 27, 2000,
annulling and setting aside the orders of the trial
court, dated April 19, 1999 and October 13, 1999,
on the ground that PILTEL was not the regular place
of business of respondent and that, even if it was,
Morallo could not be considered a competent
person in charge of respondent's office, as she was
the executive secretary of the president of PILTEL
and not of respondent. Hence, this petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure.10
Issues:
(1) whether or not respondent Ongpin's continuous
"special appearances" before the court for five
years may be deemed voluntary appearance as
contemplated by the Revised Rules on Civil
Procedure on acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of defendant; and
(2) whether or not the substituted service of
summons on Anne V. Morallo, executive secretary
of the president of PILTEL, was valid.
Ruling:
1. Petitioner maintains that the trial court had
already acquired jurisdiction over the person of
respondent Ongpin by virtue of the numerous
appearances by his counsel and respondent's
undeniable knowledge of the complaint
against him.
Page 23 of 93

This contention has no merit. A party who makes a
special appearance in court challenging the
 jurisdiction of said court based on the ground, e. g.,
invalidity of the service of summons, cannot be
considered to have submitted himself to the
 jurisdiction of the court.11  In fact, in La Naval Drug
Corp. vs. Court of Appeals,12  this Court ruled that
even the assertion of affirmative defenses aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant cannot be considered a waiver of the
defense of lack of jurisdiction over such person.
In the present case, although respondent had
indeed filed numerous pleadings, these pleadings
were precisely for the purpose of contesting the
 jurisdiction of the court over the person of
respondent on the ground that there was no valid
service of summons on him. It would be absurd to
hold that respondent, by making such
appearance, thereby submitted himself to the
 jurisdiction of the court.
Petitioner cites the ruling in  Macapagal v. Court of
 Appeals13  for its contention that the "feigned
unawareness" of a defendant is equivalent to
voluntary appearance. The facts of  Macapagal
are, however, different from the facts of this case. In
that case, this Court considered the petitioner to
have been validly served summons based on its
findings that summons was served on the legal
counsel of the two corporations and its officers and
directors. Petitioner's defense that at the time of the
service of summons he was no longer connected
with both corporations, having resigned from them
before such service, was dismissed by this Court as
flimsy. The finding of this Court on the feigned
unawareness of petitioner was based on the fact
that Philfinance's woes were widely publicized. This,
together with counsel's authority to receive service
of summons on behalf of petitioner, was the basis
for this Court's ruling that jurisdiction over the person
of the latter had already been acquired by the trial
court.
In contrast, summons in this case was served on the
executive secretary of the president of PILTEL, a
company which is not a party to the present action.
Respondent Ongpin, through counsel, entered
"numerous special appearances" in court precisely
to question the court's jurisdiction over his person
either due to failure to serve summons or to an
invalid service of summons on him. Jurisdiction
cannot be acquired over the person of respondent
even if he knows of the case against him unless he is
validly served with summons. 14
(2) Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals
erred in ruling that (1) substituted service of
summons at the PILTEL office where respondent sits
as chairman of the board is invalid as the PILTEL
office is not his regular place of business; and (2)
Anne V. Morallo, the executive secretary of PILTEL's
president, was not authorized to receive the
summons on behalf of respondent Ongpin as she
was not his executive secretary but that of the
president's.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
We think no error was incurred by the Court of
Appeals in this ruling. Rule 14, §7 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if, for
 justifiable causes, personal service cannot be
effected on defendant, service may be effected
(a) by leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant's residence with some person of suitable
age and discretion residing therein, or (b) by
leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular
place of business with some competent person in
charge thereof.15  The word "office" or the phrase
"regular place of business" refers to the office or
place of business of the defendant at the time of
service. The rule specifically designates the persons
to whom copies of the process should be left. In
 Mapa vs. Court of Appeals,16  substituted service of
summons in a person claiming to be authorized to
receive service of summons in behalf of the
corporation was held to be invalid as far as
 jurisdiction over the person of the chairman of the
board was concerned inasmuch as he was not
holding office in the corporation but in his
residence. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that
the regular place of business of a chairman of the
board of directors is the same as the address of the
corporation as it is possible for him to hold office
elsewhere.
In the case at bar, the corporation (PILTEL), where
substituted summons was served and of which
respondent was the chairman of the board, was
not even a party to the present suit. Respondent
was sued in his personal capacity as surety for PAI.
Even from the initial inquiries made by the sheriff
and petitioner's representative in the office of
PILTEL, it was evident that respondent was not
holding office there. Indeed, Morallo, executive
secretary of the PILTEL, had to call respondent's
secretary at the BA Lepanto Building, Paseo de
Roxas, to find out whether he was attending the
board meeting to be held on that day. Thus, the
process server already knew that respondent was
not holding office at the PILTEL office but
somewhere else.
As the PILTEL office is not respondent's regular place
of business, it cannot therefore be said that Anne V.
Morallo, the person who received the service of
summons in behalf of respondent, was authorized
to receive service of process on behalf of
respondent.
(3)  It is not clear whether respondent could be
personally served with summons because he had
transferred residence to Hongkong. Thus in its
complaint, petitioner alleged that respondent's
address was either at ATA Capital Corporation,
3404 1 Exchange Square, #8 Connaught Place,
Central Hongkong or South China Morning, Post
Center #22 Tai Fat Street, Taipo Industrial Estate,
Taipo, New Territories, Hongkong. But later, it tried to
personally serve summons on respondent at the
PILTEL office, where he served as chairman of the
board of directors. When respondent failed to
attend the meeting, the process server proceeded
to the BA Lepanto Building, Paseo de Roxas, Makati
Page 24 of 93

City, where, as the process server learned from
Morallo, respondent was allegedly holding office.
Under the Rules, if a defendant is a non-resident
and his property in the Philippines had been
attached, service may, by leave of court, be
effected outside the Philippines or by publication in
a newspaper of general circulation.17In the same
manner, if the whereabouts of the defendant is
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent
inquiry, service may, by leave of court, likewise be
effected by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.18 In this case, the plaintiff must show that
the address of defendant is unknown and cannot
be ascertained by diligent inquiry. 19
It is clear that petitioner is not without remedy under
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure to enforce the
writ of attachment through a valid service of
summons. If, indeed, respondent is no longer a
resident of the Philippines, petitioner still can, by
leave of court, serve summons by publication, as it
in fact tried to do. The records show that petitioner
attempted to serve summons by publication, but
later abandoned its effort and for some reason
attempted personal service instead.
If, on the other hand, respondent is a resident and
petitioner cannot determine the correct address of
respondent, petitioner only needs to show that
respondent's address is unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry. Upon compliance
with this requirement, it can validly serve summons
by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation.
Petitioner cannot fall back on allegations of
knowledge of respondent to avoid complying with
the standards and guidelines set by the Rules. What
we said in Oñate v. Abrogar 20  bears repeating in
this case:
. . . More important than the need for
insuring success in the enforcement of the
writ is the need for affirming a principle on
that "most fundamental of all requisites  —  misrepresentations committed by Go in connivance
the jurisdiction of the court issuing
attachment over the person of the
defendant." It may be that the same result
would follow from requiring that a new writ
be served all over again. The symbolic
significance of such an act, however, is that
it would affirm our commitment to the rule of
law.
G.R. No. 164703 May 4, 2010
ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and
style "ACG Express Liner,"   Petitioner, vs.
MORTIMER F. CORDERO,  Respondent.
 x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 164747
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
MORTIMER F. CORDERO,   Petitioner, vs.
ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and
style "ACG Express Liner," FELIPE M. LANDICHO and
VINCENT D. TECSON, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Facts:
Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-
President of Pamana Marketing Corporation
(Pamana), ventured into the business of marketing
inter-island passenger vessels. After contacting
various overseas fast ferry manufacturers from all
over the world, he came to meet Tony Robinson, an
Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who
is the Managing Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries
Australia (AFFA).
Between June and August 1997, Robinson signed
documents appointing Cordero as the exclusive
distributor of AFFA catamaran and other fast ferry
vessels in the Philippines. As such exclusive
distributor, Cordero offered for sale to prospective
buyers the 25-meter Aluminium Passenger
catamaran known as the SEACAT 25. 4
However, Cordero later discovered that Go was
dealing directly with Robinson when he was
informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines
that Go was canvassing for a second catamaran
engine from their company which provided the ship
engine for the first SEACAT 25.
In a handwritten letter dated June 24, 1998,
Cordero informed Go that such act of dealing
directly with Robinson violated his exclusive
distributorship and demanded that they respect the
same, without prejudice to legal action against him
and Robinson should they fail to heed the same. 8
Cordero’s lawyer, Atty. Ernesto A. Tabujara, Jr. of
ACCRA law firm, also wrote ACG Express Liner
assailing the fraudulent actuations and
with his lawyers (Landicho and Tecson) in breach of
Cordero’s exclusive distributorship appointment. 9
Cordero then filed a complaint with the Bureau of
Customs (BOC) to prohibit the entry of SEACAT 25
from Australia based on misdeclaration and
undervaluation. Consequently, an Alert Order was
issued by Acting BOC Commissioner Nelson Tan for
the vessel which in fact arrived on July 17, 1998.
Cordero claimed that Go and Robinson had
conspired to undervalue the vessel by around
US$500,000.00.11
On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case
No. 98-35332 seeking to hold Robinson, Go, Tecson
and Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for
conniving and conspiring together in violating his
exclusive distributorship in bad faith and wanton
disregard of his rights, thus depriving him of his due
commissions (balance of unpaid commission from
the sale of the first vessel in the amount of
Page 25 of 93

US$31,522.01 and unpaid commission for the sale of
the second vessel in the amount of US$328,742.00)
and causing him actual, moral and exemplary
damages, including ₱800,000.00 representing
expenses for airplane travel to Australia,
telecommunications bills and entertainment, on
account of AFFA’s untimely cancellation of the
exclusive distributorship agreement. Cordero also
prayed for the award of moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses.12
RTC- Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded
on lack of jurisdiction over his person and failure to
state a cause of action, asserting that there was no
act committed in violation of the distributorship
agreement.
Cordero no longer had cause of action for his
commission for the sale of the second vessel under
the memorandum of agreement dated August 7,
1997 considering the termination of his authority by
AFFA’s lawyers on June 26, 1998.15
On May 31, 2000, the trial court rendered its
decision in favor of Plaintiff and against defendants
Allan C. Go, Tony Robinson, Felipe Landicho, and
Vincent Tecson.
CA- affirmed the trial court (1) in allowing Cordero
to present his evidence ex-parte after the unjustified
failure of appellants (Go, Tecson and Landicho) to
appear at the pre-trial conference despite due
notice; (2) in finding that it was Cordero and not
Pamana who was appointed by AFFA as the
exclusive distributor in the Philippines of its SEACAT
25 and other fast ferry vessels, which is not limited to
the sale of one (1) such catamaran to Go on
August 7, 1997; and (3) in finding that Cordero is
entitled to a commission per vessel sold for AFFA
through his efforts in the amount equivalent to
22.43% of the price of each vessel or US$328,742.00,
and with payments of US$297,219.91 having been
made to Cordero, there remained a balance of
US$31,522.09 still due to him. The CA sustained the
trial court in ruling that Cordero is entitled to
damages for the breach of his exclusive
distributorship agreement with AFFA. However, it
held that Cordero is entitled only to commission for
the sale of the first catamaran obtained through his
efforts with the remaining unpaid sum of
US$31,522.09 or ₱1,355,449.90 (on the basis of
US$1.00=₱43.00 rate) with interest at 6% per annum
from the time of the filing of the complaint until the
same is fully paid. As to the ₱800,000.00
representing expenses incurred by Cordero for
transportation, phone bills, entertainment, food and
lodging, the CA declared there was no basis for
such award, the same being the logical and
necessary consequences of the exclusive
distributorship agreement which are normal in the
field of sales and distribution, and the expenditures
having redounded to the benefit of the distributor
(Cordero).
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
Issue:
1. whether petitioner cordero has the legal
personality to sue the respondents for
breach of contract? (did the court have
 jurisdiction? YES)
Ruling:
I. Real Party-in-Interest
First, on the issue of whether the case had been
filed by the real party-in-interest as required by
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which defines
such party as the one (1) to be benefited or injured
by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit. The purposes of this provision
are: 1) to prevent the prosecution of actions by
persons without any right, title or interest in the case;
2) to require that the actual party entitled to legal
relief be the one to prosecute the action; 3) to
avoid a multiplicity of suits; and 4) to discourage
litigation and keep it within certain bounds,
pursuant to sound public policy.31  A case is
dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof
that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest,
hence grounded on failure to state a cause of
action.32
On this issue, we agree with the CA in ruling that it
was Cordero and not Pamana who is the exclusive
distributor of AFFA in the Philippines. For all intents
and purposes, Robinson and AFFA dealt only with
Cordero who alone made decisions in the
performance of the exclusive distributorship, as with
other clients to whom he had similarly offered
AFFA’s fast ferry vessels. Moreover, the stipulated
commissions from each progress payments made
by Go were directly paid by Robinson to Cordero. 37
Respondents Landicho and Tecson were only too
aware of Cordero’s authority as the person who
was appointed and acted as exclusive distributor of
AFFA, which can be gleaned from their act of
immediately furnishing him with copies of bank
transmittals everytime Go remits payment to
Robinson, who in turn transfers a portion of funds
received to the bank account of Cordero in the
Philippines as his commission. Out of these partial
payments of his commission, Cordero would still
give Landicho and Tecson their respective
"commission," or "cuts" from his own commission.
Respondents Landicho and Tecson failed to refute
the evidence submitted by Cordero consisting of
receipts signed by them. Said amounts were apart
from the earlier expenses shouldered by Cordero for
Landicho’s airline tickets, transportation, food   and
hotel accommodations for the trip to Australia.38
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon
the filing of the complaint, while jurisdiction over the
defendants in a civil case is acquired either through
the service of summons upon them in the manner
required by law or through their voluntary
appearance in court and their submission to its
authority.42  A party who makes a special
appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of
said court based on the ground of invalid service of
Page 26 of 93

summons is not deemed to have submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court. 43
In this case, however, although the Motion to
Dismiss filed by Robinson specifically stated as one
(1) of the grounds the lack of "personal jurisdiction,"
it must be noted that he had earlier filed a Motion
for Time to file an appropriate responsive pleading
even beyond the time provided in the summons by
publication.44 Such motion did not state that it was
a conditional appearance entered to question the
regularity of the service of summons, but an
appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the
court by acknowledging the summons by
publication issued by the court and praying for
additional time to file a responsive pleading.
Consequently, Robinson having acknowledged the
summons by publication and also having invoked
the jurisdiction of the trial court to secure affirmative
relief in his motion for additional time, he effectively
submitted voluntarily to the trial court’s jurisdiction.
He is now estopped from asserting otherwise, even
before this Court.45
G.R. No. 182729 September 29, 2010
KUKAN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION,   Petitioner,
vs.
HON. AMOR REYES, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
21, and ROMEO M. MORALES, doing business under
the name and style "RM Morales Trophies and
Plaques,"Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Facts
Sometime in March 1998, Kukan, Inc. conducted a
bidding for the supply and installation of signages in
a building being constructed in Makati City.
Morales tendered the winning bid and was
awarded the PhP 5 million contract. Some of the
items in the project award were later excluded
resulting in the corresponding reduction of the
contract price to PhP 3,388,502. Despite his
compliance with his contractual undertakings,
Morales was only paid the amount of PhP
1,976,371.07, leaving a balance of PhP 1,412,130.93,
which Kukan, Inc. refused to pay despite demands.
Shortchanged, Morales filed a Complaint6  with the
RTC against Kukan, Inc. for a sum of money, the
case docketed as Civil Case No. 99-93173 and
eventually raffled to Branch 17 of the court.
Following the joinder of issues after Kukan, Inc. filed
an answer with counterclaim, trial ensued.
However, starting November 2000, Kukan, Inc. no
longer appeared and participated in the
proceedings before the trial court, prompting the
RTC to declare Kukan, Inc. in default and paving
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
the way for Morales to present his evidence ex
parte.
On November 28, 2002, the RTC rendered a
Decision finding for Morales and against Kukan.
After the above decision became final and
executory, Morales moved for and secured a writ of
execution8  against Kukan, Inc. The sheriff then
levied upon various personal properties. Kukan
International Corporation (KIC) filed an Affidavit of
Third-Party Claim. Notably, KIC was incorporated in
August 2000, or shortly after Kukan, Inc. had
stopped participating in Civil Case No. 99-93173.
In reaction to the third party claim, Morales
interposed an Omnibus Motion dated April 30, 2003.
In it, Morales prayed, applying the principle of
piercing the veil of corporate fiction, that an order
be issued for the satisfaction of the judgment debt
of Kukan, Inc. with the properties under the name or
in the possession of KIC, it being alleged that both
corporations are but one and the same entity. KIC
opposed Morales’ motion. By Order of May 29,
20039as reiterated in a subsequent order, the court
denied the omnibus motion.
Morales then sought the inhibition of the presiding
 judge, Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr., who eventually
granted the motion. The case was re-raffled to
Branch 21, presided by public respondent Judge
Amor Reyes.
Before the Manila RTC, Branch 21, Morales filed a
Motion to Pierce the Veil of Corporate Fiction to
declare KIC as having no existence separate from
Kukan, Inc. This time around, the RTC, by Order
dated March 12, 2007, granted the motion.
CA- affirmed
Issue:
Issue: WON it was proper for RTC to assume
 jurisdiction over KIC?
Ruling:
Propriety of the RTC Assuming Jurisdiction over KIC
Orion Security Corporation v. Kalfam Enterprises,
Inc.23  explains how courts acquire jurisdiction over
the parties in a civil case:
Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon
the filing of the complaint. On the other hand,
 jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case is
acquired either through the service of summons
upon them or through their voluntary appearance
in court and their submission to its authority.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the fairly recent Palma v. Galvez,24  the Court
reiterated its holding in Orion Security Corporation,
stating: "[I]n civil cases, the trial court acquires
 jurisdiction over the person of the defendant either
Page 27 of 93

by the service of summons or by the latter’s
voluntary appearance and submission to the
authority of the former."
The court’s jurisdiction over a party -defendant
resulting from his voluntary submission to its authority
is provided under Sec. 20, Rule 14 of the Rules,
which states:
Section 20. Voluntary appearance.  –   The
defendant’s voluntary appearance in the actions
shall be equivalent to service of summons. The
inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds
aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary
appearance.
To be sure, the CA’s ruling that any form of
appearance by the party or its counsel is deemed
as voluntary appearance finds support in the
kindred Republic v. Ker & Co., Ltd. 25  and De
Midgely v. Ferandos. 26
Republic and De Midgely, however, have already
been modified if not altogether superseded 27 by La
Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals,28
wherein the Court essentially ruled and elucidated
on the current view in our jurisdiction, to wit: "[A]
special appearance before the court –– challenging
its jurisdiction over the person through a motion to
dismiss even if the movant invokes other grounds –– is
not tantamount to estoppel or a waiver by the
movant of his objection to jurisdiction over his
person; and such is not constitutive of a voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court." 29
In the instant case, KIC was not made a party-
defendant in Civil Case No. 99-93173. Even if it is
conceded that it raised affirmative defenses
through its aforementioned pleadings, KIC never
abandoned its challenge, however implicit, to the
RTC’s jurisdiction over its person. The challe nge was
subsumed in KIC’s primary assertion that it was not
the same entity as Kukan, Inc. Pertinently, in its
Comment and Opposition to Plaintiff’s Omnibus
Motion dated May 20, 2003, KIC entered its " special
but not voluntary appearance " alleging therein that
it was a different entity and has a separate legal
personality from Kukan, Inc. And KIC would
consistently reiterate this assertion in all its pleadings,
thus effectively resisting all along the RTC’s
 jurisdiction of its person. It cannot
overemphasized that KIC could not file before the
RTC a motion to dismiss and its attachments in Civil
Case No. 99-93173, precisely because KIC was
neither impleaded nor served with summons.
Consequently, KIC could only assert and claim
through its affidavits, comments, and motions filed
by special appearance before the RTC that it is
separate and distinct from Kukan, Inc.
Following  La Naval Drug Corporation,30  KIC cannot
be deemed to have waived its objection to the
court’s lack of jurisdic tion over its person. It would
defy logic to say that KIC unequivocally submitted
itself to the jurisdiction of the RTC when it strongly
asserted that it and Kukan, Inc. are different entities.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
In the scheme of things obtaining, KIC had no other
option but to insist on its separate identity and
plead for relief consistent with that position.
G.R. No. 178911 September 17, 2014
EDUARDO D. MONSANTO, DECOROSO D.
MONSANTO, SR., and REV. FR. PASCUAL D.
MONSANTO, JR.,Petitioners, vs. LEONCIO LIM and
LORENZO DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
"Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the
payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter." 1
Facts:
In a letter 6  dated February 18, 2004, Flordelis B.
Menzon, Regional Director of the Home
Development Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG), requested
the intervention of Executive Judge Sinforiano A.
Monsanto (Executive Judge Monsanto) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Catbalogan, Samar on
the alleged anomalous auction sale conducted by
Sheriff IVLorenzo De Guzman (De Guzman).
According to Pag-IBIG, De Guzman previously
acceded to its request to move the date of the
auction sale to January 20, 2004; however, to its
surprise, the sale proceeded as originally scheduled
on January 15, 2004. Pag-IBIG also claimed that the
winning bid of Leoncio Lim (Leoncio) in the amount
of ₱500,000.00 was grossly disadvantageous to the
government considering that the outstanding loan
obligations of the mortgagor, Eduardo Monsanto
(Eduardo), was more than the bid amount. Pag-
IBIG thus manifested that – 
It is for this reason that we are making this protest.
Sheriff de Guzman failed to comply with our request
for deferment despitehis [acquiescence]. We are
requesting for your intervention to nullify the results
of the auction sale conducted last January 15,
2004. This will give our office a chance to be able to
participate and recoup our investment.
be
We trust that you will give thismatter preferential
attention.7
Executive Judge Monsantorefrained from acting on
the letter considering that Eduardo is his relative;
instead he re-assigned the same to Judge Sibanah
E. Usman (Judge Usman) 8 of Branch 28.
Judge Usman noted that no formal petition
orcomplaint was actually filed which presents a
 judicial issue; moreover, the acts complained of
partake of administrative matter. Consequently,
Judge Usman referred the matter to the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) for further action.
Page 28 of 93

Subsequently, Pascual filed with the OCA, copy
furnished the RTCCatbalogan, Samar, Branches 27
and 28, a Motion to Lift Writ of Execution and Notice
to Vac ate10 dated March 13, 2004.
In a Manifestation15  dated June 7, 2005 and filed
before Branch 28, PagIBIG informed the trial court
that the loan of Eduardo had been restructured
and that Eduardo had commenced paying
monthly amortizations; that as a result of the
restructuring, Pag-IBIG is withdrawing its Petition for
Extra-judicial Foreclosure; and that it is no longer
interested in pursuing an administrative action
against De Guzman.
RTC-
After careful and judicious scrutiny of the records of
thiscase, this Court is highly convinced that the
public auction sale conducted by Mr. De Guzman
and Atty. Ma. Luz Lampasa-Pabilona, Clerk of Court
whereby Mr. Leoncio Lim emerged as the highest
bidder and purchaser of the subject property in
good faith, and also given a Certificate of Sale
issued by the Sheriff and the same was registered
with the Registry of Deeds on March 5, 2004 are in
order. The impugned Sheriff De Guzman had
accordingly performed his functions. Accordingly,
there is no showing that hehas abuse[d] his
authority during the conduct of the public auction.
Such being the case, this Court is further convinced
that the motion filed by Leoncio Lim through
counsel Atty. Labid being meritorious should be
given due course. On the other hand, the motion to
lift writ of execution and notice to vacatefiled by
Rev. Fr. Pascual D. Monsanto, Jr. being devoid of
merit should be denied.
CA- affirmed
Issue: WON the trial court acquired jurisdiction?
Ruling:
"Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the
payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter." 28
Section 5, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court specifically
providesthat "[a] civil action is commenced by the
filing of the original complaint in court." Moreover,
"[e]very ordinary civil action must bebased on a
cause of action."29
No proper initiatory pleading was filed before the
trial court.
In this case, records show that no formal complaint
or petition was filed in court. The case was
supposedly "commenced" through a letter of Pag-
IBIG asking the intervention of Executive Judge
Monsanto on the alleged anomalous foreclosure
sale conducted by De Guzman. However, saidletter
could not in any way be considered as a pleading.
Section 1, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court defines
pleadings as "written statements of the respective
claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the
court for appropriate judgment." To stress, Pag-
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
IBIG’s letter could not be considered as a formal
complaint or petition. First, the parties to the case
were not identified pursuant to Section 1, 30  Rule 3
and Section 1,31 Rule 7. Second, the so-called claim
or cause of action was not properly mentioned or
specified. Third, the letter miserably failed to comply
with the requirements of Rule 7, Rules of Court. The
letter bore no caption; it was not even assigned a
docket number; the parties were not properly
identified;the allegations were not properly set
forth; no particular relief issought; in fact, only the
intervention of Executive Judge Monsanto is
requested; it was notsigned by a counsel; and most
of all, there is no verification orcertification against
forum-shopping.
In addition, it is quite unfortunate that Judge Usman
proceeded to take cognizance of the case
notwithstanding his prior observation as stated in
the May 3, 2004 Order that no formal petition or
complaint was actually filed and which presents a
 judicial issue.In fact, Judge Usman even opined
that the acts complained of partake of
administrative matter and thus referred the same to
the OCA for further action. The May 9, 2005 letter of
OCA directing Judge Usman to take action on the
Motion to Lift Writ of Execution and Notice to
Vacatecould not be interpreted as vesting Judge
Usman with the authority and jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the matter. Nothing to that effect
could be inferred from the tenor of the May 9, 2005
letter ofOCA. Jurisdiction is vested by law. When
OCA directed Judge Usman to take action on the
Motion to Lift Writ of Execution and Notice to
Vacate, it did not deprive the latter ofhis discretion
to dismiss the matter/case for lack of jurisdiction, if
the matter/case so warrants.
In fine, there being no proper initiatory pleading
filed, then the RTC Branch 28 did not acquire
 jurisdiction over the matter/case.
No payment of docket fees.
We have also noted that no docket feeswere paid
before the trial court. Section 1, Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court mandates that "[u]pon the filing of
the pleading or other application which initiates an
action or proceeding, the fees prescribed therefor
shall be paid in full." "It is hornbook law that courts
acquire jurisdiction over a case only upon payment
of the prescribed docket fee." 32
In Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Shemberg
Marketing Corporation,33  we ruled thus: A court
acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the
payment of the prescribed fees. The importance of
filing fees cannot be gainsaid for these are
intended to take care of court expenses inthe
handling of cases in terms of costs of supplies, use
of equipment, salaries and fringe benefits of
personnel, and others, computed as to man-hours
used in the handling of each case. Hence, the non-
payment or insufficient payment of docket fees
can entail tremendous losses to government in
general and to the judiciary in particular.
Page 29 of 93

In fine, since no docket or filing feeswere paid, then
the RTC Branch 28 did not acquire jurisdiction over
the matter/case.1âwphi1 It therefore erred in taking
cognizance of the same. Consequently, all the
proceedings undertaken by the trial court are null
and void,and without force and effect. In,
particular, the July 1, 2005 and August 30, 2005
Orders of the RTC are null and void.
It is settled jurisprudence that "[a]ny decision
rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and
may be struck down at any time, even on appeal
before this Court."34 Prescinding from the foregoing,
we hold that the RTC-Branch 28 did not acquire
 jurisdiction over the instant matter/case there being
no formal initiatory pleading filed as well asnon-
payment of docket fees. Consequently, all
proceedings had before the RTC Branch 28 were
null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
G.R. No.148004 January 22, 2007
VINCENT E. OMICTIN, Petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS (Special Twelfth Division) and GEORGE I.
LAGOS, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Vincent E. Omictin, Operations Manager
Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., filed a complaint for
two counts of estafa with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Makati against private respondent
George I. Lagos. He alleged that private
respondent, despite repeated demands, refused to
return the two company vehicles entrusted to him
when he was still the president of Saag Phils., Inc..
On February 26, 1999, public prosecutor Alex G.
Bagaoisan recommended the indictment of private
respondent, and on the same day, respondent was
charged with the crime of estafa under Article 315,
par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 57 of Makati City.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-
633, entitled "People of the Philippines v. George I.
Lagos."
On June 4, 1999, private respondent filed a motion
to recuse praying that Presiding Judge Reinato G.
Quilala inhibit himself from hearing the case based
on the following grounds:
a) In an order, dated May 28, 1999, the
presiding judge summarily denied
respondent’s motion: 1) to defer issuance of
the warrant of arrest; and 2) to order
reinvestigation.
b) Immediately before the issuance of the
above-mentioned order, the presiding
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
 judge and Atty. Alex Y. Tan, SAAG
Philippines, Inc.’s Ad Interim President, were
seen together.2
On June 24, 1999, private respondent filed a motion
to suspend proceedings on the basis of a
prejudicial question because of a pending petition
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
involving the same parties.
It appears that on January 7, 1999, private
respondent filed SEC Case No. 01-99-6185 for the
declaration of nullity of the respective
appointments of Alex Y. Tan and petitioner as
President Ad Interim and Operations Manager Ad
Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., declaration of dividends,
recovery of share in the profits, involuntary
dissolution and the appointment of a receiver,
recovery of damages and an application for a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and injunction
against Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., Nicholas Ng, Janifer Yeo,
Tan and petitioner. 3
In the action before the SEC, private respondent
averred that Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. is a foreign
corporation organized and existing under the laws
of Singapore, and is fully owned by Saag
Corporation (Bhd). On July 1, 1994, he was
appointed as Area Sales Manager in the Philippines
by Thiang Shiang Hiang, Manager of Saag (S) Pte.
Ltd. Pursuant to his appointment, respondent was
authorized to organize a local joint venture
corporation to be known as Saag Philippines, Inc.
for the wholesale trade and service of industrial
products for oil, gas and power industries in the
Philippines.
Barely three months after, or on June 23, 1998,
private respondent resigned his post as president of
Saag Phils., Inc. while still retaining his position as a
director of the company.4
Citing as a reason the absence of a board
resolution authorizing the continued operations of
Saag Phils., Inc., private respondent retained his
possession of the office equipment of the company
in a fiduciary capacity as director of the
corporation pending its dissolution and/or the
resolution of the intra-corporate dispute. He likewise
changed the locks of the offices of the company
allegedly to prevent Tan and petitioner from seizing
company property.
Private respondent stressed that Tan’s appointment
was invalid because it was in derogation of the
company by-laws requiring that the president must
be chosen from among the directors, and elected
by the affirmative vote of a majority of all the
members of the board of directors.5 As Tan’s
appointment did not have the acquiescence of the
board of directors, petitioner’s appointment by the
former is likewise allegedly invalid. Thus, neither has
the power or the authority to represent or act for
Saag Phils., Inc. in any transaction or action before
the SEC or any court of justice.
Page 30 of 93

RTC- The trial court, in an order dated September 8,
1999, denied respondent’s motion t o suspend
proceedings and motion to recuse.
CA- it is clear that a prejudicial question exists which
calls for the suspension of the criminal proceedings
before the lower court.
Issue: whether or not a prejudicial question exists to
warrant the suspension of the criminal proceedings
pending the resolution of the intra-corporate
controversy that was originally filed with the SEC.
NB: PLEASE READ DISCUSSION ON DOCTRINE OF
PRIMARY JURISDICTION BELOW
Ruling:
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises
in a case, the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.14
Here, the case which was lodged originally before
the SEC and which is now pending before the RTC
of Mandaluyong City by virtue of Republic Act No.
8799 involves facts that are intimately related to
those upon which the criminal prosecution is based.
Ultimately, the resolution of the issues raised in the
intra-corporate dispute will determine the guilt or
innocence of private respondent in the crime of
estafa filed against him by petitioner before the RTC
of Makati. As correctly stated by the CA, one of the
elements of the crime of estafa with abuse of
confidence under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the
Revised Penal Code is a demand made by the
offended party to the offender:
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence
under subdivision No. 1, par. (b) of Art. 315 are as
follows:
1. That money, goods, or other personal
property be received by the offender in
trust, or on commission, or for administration,
or under any other obligation involving the
duty to make delivery of, or to return the
same;
2. That there be misrepresentation or
conversion of such money or property by
the offender, or denial on his part of such
receipt;
3. That such misappropriation or conversion
or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
4. That there is a demand made by the
offended party to the offender.15
Logically, under the circumstances, since the
alleged offended party is Saag Phils., Inc., the
validity of the demand for the delivery of the
subject vehicles rests upon the authority of the
person making such a demand on the company’s
behalf. Private respondent is challenging
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
petitioner’s authority to act for Saag Phils., Inc. in
the corporate case pending before the RTC of
Mandaluyong, Branch 214. Taken in this light, if the
supposed authority of petitioner is found to be
defective, it is as if no demand was ever made,
hence, the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.
Moreover, the mere failure to return the thing
received for safekeeping or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to deliver or to return the same or
deliver the value thereof to the owner could only
give rise to a civil action and does not constitute
the crime of estafa. This is because the crime is
committed by misappropriating or converting
money or goods received by the offender under a
lawful transaction. As stated in the case of United
States v. Bleibel:16
The crime of estafa is not committed by the failure
to return the things received for sale on commission,
or to deliver their value, but, as this class of crime is
defined by law, by misappropriating or converting
the money or goods received on commission.
Delay in the fulfillment of a commission or in the
delivery of the sum on such account received only
involves civil liability. So long as the money that a
person is under obligation to deliver is not
demanded of him, and he fails to deliver it for
having wrongfully disposed of it, there is no estafa,
whatever be the cause of the debt.
Likewise, by analogy, the doctrine of primary
 jurisdiction may be applied in this case. The issues
raised by petitioner particularly the status of Saag
Phils., Inc. vis-à-vis Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., as well as the
question regarding the supposed authority of the
latter to make a demand on behalf of the
company, are proper subjects for the determination
of the tribunal hearing the intra-corporate case
which in this case is the RTC of Mandaluyong,
Branch 214. These issues would have been referred
to the expertise of the SEC in accordance with the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction had the case not
been transferred to the RTC of Mandaluyong.
Strictly speaking, the objective of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction is to guide a court in determining
whether it should refrain from exercising its
 jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has
determined some question or some aspect of some
question arising in the proceeding before the
court.17  The court cannot or will not determine a
controversy involving a question which is within the
 jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to
resolving the same, where the question demands
the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring special knowledge, experience and
services in determining technical and intricate
matters of fact.18
While the above doctrine refers specifically to an
administrative tribunal, the Court believes that the
circumstances in the instant case do not proscribe
the application of the doctrine, as the role of an
administrative tribunal such as the SEC in
determining technical and intricate matters of
special competence has been taken on by
Page 31 of 93

specially designated RTCs by virtue of Republic Act
No. 8799.19 Hence, the RTC of Mandaluyong where
the intra-corporate case is pending has the primary
 jurisdiction to determine the issues under contention
relating to the status of the domestic corporation,
Saag Phils., Inc., vis-à-vis Saag Pte. Ltd.; and the
authority of petitioner to act on behalf of the
domestic corporation, the determination of which
will have a direct bearing on the criminal case. The
law recognizes that, in place of the SEC, the regular
courts now have the legal competence to decide
intra-corporate disputes.20
G.R. No. 167891 January 15, 2010
SPOUSES JESUS FAJARDO and EMER FAJARDO,
Petitioners, vs. ANITA R. FLORES, assisted by her
husband, BIENVENIDO FLORES,  Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Facts:
Leopoldo delos Reyes owned a parcel of land,
denominated as Lot No. 2351 (Cad. 320-D), with an
area of 25,513 square meters (sq m), located in
Barangay Sumandig in Hacienda Buenavista, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan. In 1963, he allowed petitioner
Jesus Fajardo to cultivate said land. The net
harvests were divided equally between the two
until 1975 when the relationship was converted to
leasehold tenancy. Per Order 2 from the Department
of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Regional Office, Region
III, San Fernando, Pampanga, rent was provisionally
fixed at 27.42 cavans per year, which Jesus Fajardo
religiously complied with. From the time petitioner
cultivated the land, he was allowed by Leopoldo
delos Reyes to erect a house for his family on the
stony part of the land, which is the subject of
controversy.
On January 26, 1988, Leopoldo delos Reyes died.
His daughter and sole heir, herein respondent Anita
Flores, inherited the property. On June 28, 1991,
Anita Flores and Jesus Fajardo executed an
agreement, denominated as "KASUNDUAN NG
PAGHAHATI NG LUPA AT PAGTATALAGA NG DAAN
UKOL SA MAGKABILANG PANIG." 3 This was followed
by another agreement, "KASUNDUAN SA HATIAN SA
LUPA," executed on July 10, 1991, wherein the
parties agreed to deduct from Lot No. 2351 an area
of 10,923 sq m, allotting the same to petitioner.
Apparently, there was a conflict of claims in the
interpretation of the Kasunduan between Anita
Flores and Jesus Fajardo, which was referred to the
DAR, Provincial Agrarian Reform Office, Baliuag,
Bulacan.4  In the Report and Recommendation
dated May 3, 2000, the Legal Officer advised the
parties to ventilate their claims and counterclaims
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), Malolos, Bulacan. 5
On December 22, 2000, a complaint for ejectment
was filed by herein respondent Anita Flores, assisted
by her husband Bienvenido Flores, against
petitioners with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), San
Ildefonso, Bulacan.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that Lot
No. 2351, with an area of 25,513 sq m, was
agricultural land; that they had been continuously,
uninterruptedly, and personally cultivating the same
since 1960 up to the present; that the MTC had no
 jurisdiction over the case, considering that the
dispute between the parties, regarding the
Kasunduan, was referred to the DARAB; and that
the assumption by the DARAB of jurisdiction over
the controversy involving the lot in question
therefore precluded the MTC from exercising
 jurisdiction over the case.
MTC- in favor of respondent
RTC- affirmed the MTC Decision in toto
On motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC
issued an Order on December 10, 2002, reversing its
decision dated August 29, 2002. The RTC found that
the issue involved appeared to be an agrarian
dispute, which fell within the contemplation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,
and thus ordered the dismissal of the case for lack
of jurisdiction.
A petition for review was then filed by respondents
with the CA to annul the Order of the RTC dated
December 10, 2002.
On October 28, 2004, the CA rendered the assailed
decision, which reinstated the MTC decision. It
disagreed with the findings of the RTC and ruled
that the part of Lot No. 2351 where petitioners’
house stood was stony and residential in nature,
one that may not be made to fall within the ambit
of the operation of Philippine agrarian laws, owing
to its non-agriculture character. The CA explained
that, on the strength of the two instruments, the
parties made a partition and divided the
agricultural portion of Lot No. 2351 equally among
themselves. By virtue of said division, the parties
effectively severed and terminated the agricultural
leasehold/tenancy relationship between them;
thus, there was no longer any agrarian dispute to
speak of.
Issue: whether it is MTC or the DARAB which has
 jurisdiction over the case.
Page 32 of 93

Ruling:
There is no dispute that, on June 28, 1991, the
parties executed an agreement, denominated as
"KASUNDUAN NG PAGHAHATI NG LUPA AT
PAGTATALAGA NG DAAN UKOL SA MAGKABILANG
PANIG." Therein, it was admitted that Jesus Fajardo
was the tiller of the land. This Kasunduan was
subsequently followed by another agreement,
"KASUNDUAN SA HATIAN SA LUPA," whereby an
area of 10,923 sq m of Lot No. 2351 was given to
petitioners. The portion of the land where
petitioners’ house is erected is the subject of the
instant case for unlawful detainer. Respondent
argues that this portion is not included in the deed
of partition, while petitioners insist that it is.
We agree with the RTC when it clearly pointed out
in its Order dated December 10, 2002 that the
resolution of this case hinges on the correct
interpretation of the contracts executed by the
parties. The issue of who has a better right of
possession over the subject land cannot be
determined without resolving first the matter as to
whom the subject property was allotted. Thus, this is
not simply a case for unlawful detainer, but one
that is incapable of pecuniary estimation, definitely
beyond the competence of the MTC.11
More importantly, the controversy involves an
agricultural land, which petitioners have
continuously and personally cultivated since the
1960s. In the Kasunduan, it was admitted that Jesus
Fajardo was the tiller of the land. Being agricultural
lessees, petitioners have a right to a home lot and a
right to exclusive possession thereof by virtue of
Section 24, R.A. No. 3844 of the Agricultural Land
Reform Code.12  Logically, therefore, the case
involves an agrarian dispute, which falls within the
contemplation of R.A. No. 6657, or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
An agrarian dispute13  refers to any controversy
relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise, over
lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers’ associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms
or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It
includes any controversy relating to compensation
of lands acquired under this Act and other terms
and conditions of transfer of ownership from
landowner to farmworkers, tenants, and other
agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant,
or lessor and lessee. It relates to any controversy
relating to, inter alia, tenancy over lands devoted
to agriculture.14
Undeniably, the instant case involves a controversy
regarding tenurial arrangements. The contention
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
that the Kasunduans, which allegedly terminated
the tenancy relationship between the parties and,
therefore, removed the case from the ambit of R.A.
No. 6657, is untenable. There still exists an agrarian
dispute because the controversy involves the home
lot of petitioners, an incident arising from the
landlord-tenant relationship.
In the case at bar, petitioners’ claim that the
tenancy relationship has been terminated by the
Kasulatan is of no moment. As long as the subject
matter of the dispute is the legality of the
termination of the relationship, or if the dispute
originates from such relationship, the case is
cognizable by the DAR, through the DARAB. The
severance of the tenurial arrangement will not
render the action beyond the ambit of an agrarian
dispute.15
Furthermore, the records disclose that the dispute
between the parties, regarding the interpretation of
the Kasunduan, was, in fact, raised and referred to
the DAR, which in turn referred the case to the
DARAB.16  In view of the foregoing, we reiterate
Hilario v. Prudente,17 that:
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the
courts from resolving a controversy over which
 jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an
administrative body of special competence. For
agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more
specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Y. G.R. No. L-65505 October 12, 1987
GABRIEL ABAD, PIO AGANON, MARIO ALARCIO,
JOSE AQUINO, CESAR AURELIO, SOTERO BERNARDO,
AURELIO CABRAL, JESUS CARREON, ABELARDO
CARILLO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH LII-
HON. DAVID G. NITAFAN and THE PHILIPPINE
AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.,
respondents.
PARAS, J.:
FACTS:
Abad et al., filed on August 18, 1978 against
Philippine American General Insurance Company,
Inc. (PHILAMGEN, for brevity) for the enforcement of
contract and recovery of loss of money basically
praying for payment of the money value of the
respective accumulated sick leave with pay of the
separated employees of PHILAGEM either thru
retirement, retrenchment or resignation.
Page 33 of 93

Instead of filing an answer, PHILAMGEN moved to
dismiss the complaint, which the trial court granted
(Feb. 16, 1979). After a denial of their motion to
reconsider, Abad et al filed before the Supermen
Court a petition for Certiorari. A decision was
rendered setting aside the aforesaid orders and the
dismissed complaint was reinstated. The case was
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
A fire destroyed the sala wherein the entire records
of Civil case No. 117708 were kept. However, the
records of the case were reconstituted on January
21, 1982 and the case was renumbered as Civil
Case No. 82-1324.Thereafter, Philamgen filed its
Answer to the complaint.
On January, 1983, judicial reorganization took
place by the passage of Executive Order No. 864
and the case at bar was re-raffled to Regional Trial
Court of Manila. RTC Manila motu proprio, dismissed
the complaint in Civil Case No. 82-1324 declaring
that it lacked jurisdiction over the subject made
being money claims arising from employer-
employee relations.
ISSUES:
1. WON RTC Manila erred in reversing motu
proprio the Supreme Court's decision in G.R.
No. L-50563 by dismissing once again Abad
et al’s action on the erroneous ground of
lack of jurisdiction. - NEGATIVE
2. WON RTC Manila erred in holding itself a
totally different court from the Court of First
Instance whose cases were merely taken
over by RTC Manila - NEGATIVE
RULING:
RTC Manila's allegations do not deserve merit.
One of the important features in the Judiciary
Reorganization effected through B.P. 129 is the
addition of paragraph (6, . Sec. 19, in defining the
 jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts (which took the
place of the abolished Courts of First Instance),
which reading as follows:
In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of
any court, tribunal, person or body exercising
 judicial or quasi-judicial functions. (emphasis
supplied).
A provision not found in Sec. 44 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948. It was the intention of the legislative body
to uncluttered the courts of cases which may be
adjudicated, in the first instance, by officials or
bodies exercising quasi-judicial adjudicatory powers
like the Labor Arbiters or the National Labor
Relations Commission a specialized body or bodies
on labor related provisions and are not restricted by
the technical rules of pleading and evidence.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
The Regional Trial Courts of today are actually the
 same  courts that functioned as Courts of First
Instance before the Judiciary Reorganization Act
(Batas Pambansa Bilang 129). There might have
been a change in the name and in some incidental
features but essentially, they are the same.
However, whereas before jurisdiction over money
claims of laborers and employees appertained to
Courts of First Instance, the same are now to be
taken cognizance of by proper entities in the
Department of Labor and Employment.
The rule of adherence of jurisdiction until a cause is
finally resolved or adjudicated does not apply
when the change in jurisdiction is curative in
character. Thus in the instant case, there is nothing
wrong in holding that Courts of First Instance
/Regional Trial Courts no longer have jurisdiction
over aforesaid monetary claims of labor .
Z. G.R. No. 132601 January 19, 1999
LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.
Facts: Leo Echegaray was convicted and was to
be executed by lethal injection (RA 8177) The
Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order
restraining the execution of said party. Said
execution was set for Jan. 4, 1999 but the petitioner
filed his Very Urgent Motion for Issuance of TRO on
Dec. 28, 1998. The Court wasin recess at the time
but a Special Session was called to deliberate
onsaid matters. Furthermore, Congress was a new
one with about 130new members whose views on
capital punishment were still unexpressed. The
suspension was temporary (until June 15, 1999,
unless it sooner becomes certain that no repeal or
modification of the law is going to be made). It was
alleged that sine it is already final and executory,
the Supreme Court has lost its jurisdiction with the
case.
Issue: Whether or not in issuing the temporary
restraining order, the Supreme Court has gone
beyond its jurisdiction since the case is already final.
Ruling: It is not beyond the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court. What the SC could not do is alter
the decision. In the case at hand, the SC did
nothing of the sort. Jurisprudence tells us “the finality
of a judgment does not mean that the Court has
lost all its powers nor the case. By the finality of the
 judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to
amend, modify or alter the same. Even after the
 judgment has become final, the court retains its
 jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a
difference between the jurisdiction of the court to
execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend,
modify or alter the same. The former continues even
after the judgment has become final for the
purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter
Page 34 of 93

terminates when the judgment becomes final. For
after the judgment has become final, facts and
circumstances may transpire which can render the
execution unjust or impossible.
AA. G.R. No. L-11390 March 26, 1918
EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO,  plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VICENTE PALANCA, administrator of the estate of
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng,   defendant-
appellant.
STREET, J.:
JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED: Jurisdiction over the
property which is the subject of the litigation may
result either from a seizure of the property under
legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual
custody of the law, or it may result from the
institution of legal proceedings wherein, under
special provisions of law, the power of the court
over the property is recognized and made
effective.
The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a
proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the
idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in
rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially
such.
DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS:
Property is always assumed to be in the possession
of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be
safely held, under certain conditions, to be
affected with knowledge that proceedings have
been instituted for its condemnation and sale.
FACTS:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco
mortgaged various parcels of real property in
Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino.
Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there
he died on January 29, 1810 without returning again
to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted
foreclosure proceeding but since defendant is a
non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by
publication.
The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy
of the summons to the defendant’s last known
address, which is in Amoy, China. It is not shown
whether the Clerk complied with this requirement.
Nevertheless, after publication in a newspaper of
the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and
 judgment by default was rendered. The decision
was likewise published and afterwards sale by
public auction was held with the bank as the
highest bidder.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the
court. However, about seven years after the
confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by
Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of
the original defendant, wherein the applicant
requested the court to set aside the order of default
and the judgment, and to vacate all the
proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this
application was that the order of default and the
 judgment rendered thereon were void because the
court had never acquired jurisdiction over the
defendant or over the subject of the action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction
over the defendant and the subject matter of the
action
Whether or not due process of law was observed
RULING:
On Jurisdiction
The word “jurisdiction” is used in several different,
though related, senses since it may have reference
(1) to the authority of the court to entertain a
particular kind of action or to administer a particular
kind of relief, or it may refer to the power of the
court over the parties, or (2) over the property
which is the subject to the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court
determines the nature and extent of its powers in
general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction
with reference to the actions which it may entertain
and the relief it may grant.
How Jurisdiction is Acquired
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the
voluntary appearance of a party in court and his
submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the
coercive power of legal process exerted over the
person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of
the litigation may result either from a seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought
into the actual custody of the law, or it may result
from the institution of legal proceedings wherein,
under special provisions of law, the power of the
court over the property is recognized and made
effective. In the latter case the property, though at
all times within the potential power of the court,
may never be taken into actual custody at all. An
illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual
seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where
the property is seized at the beginning of the
action, or some subsequent stage of its progress,
and held to abide the final event of the litigation.
An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction
Page 35 of 93

over the res, is found in the proceeding to register
the title of land under our system for the registration
of land. Here the court, without taking actual
physical control over the property assumes, at the
instance of some person claiming to be owner, to
exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and
to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner
against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the action to
foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding
quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that
while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it
partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The
expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow
application, used only with reference to certain
proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the
property alone is treated as responsible for the
claim or obligation upon which the proceedings
are based. The action quasi rem differs from the
true action in rem in the circumstance that in the
former an individual is named as defendant, and
the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening
the property. All proceedings having for their sole
object the sale or other disposition of the property
of the defendant, whether by attachment,
foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a
general way thus designated. The judgment
entered in these proceedings is conclusive only
between the parties.
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the
defendant for whom publication is made appears,
the action becomes as to him a personal action
and is conducted as such. This, however, does not
affect the proposition that where the defendant
fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it
should therefore be considered with reference to
the principles governing actions in rem.
BB. G.R. No. 151800 November 5, 2009
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, represented by HON.
ANIANO A. DESIERTO,  Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARGARITA VDA. DE VENTURA,
represented by PACITA V. PASCUAL, EMILIANO
EUSEBIO, JR., and CARLOS RUSTIA,  Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Heirs of Margarita Vda. De Ventura (the Heirs) filed
with the Office of the Ombudsman a complaint for
Falsification of Public Documents and violation of
Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 against Zenaida Palacio and
spouses Edilberto and Celerina Darang.
Palacio being the OIC of DAR designated Celerina
to investigate the claims of the Heirs against her
former husband Edilberto. Celerina supported the
report with public documents which she falsified
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
and Palacio issued a recommendation based on
that report to award the landholding in dispute to
Edilberto.
The DARAB recommended that the charged
against the respondents be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
The CA then took cognizance of the case and
granted the provisional dismissal of the complaint
against respondent for violation of Sec 3 (e) of
RA3019 but denied the dismissal of the complaint
for falsification of public documents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA has jurisdiction over
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman.
RULING:
The CA has jurisdiction over orders, directives and
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot,
therefore, review the orders, directives or decisions
of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-
administrative cases.
This issue has been directly addressed in Kuizon v.
Desierto and reiterated in the more recent
Golangco v. Fung,wherein the Court declared,
thus: “The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over
orders, directives and decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases
only. It cannot, therefore, review the orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative
cases.”
The question that arises next is what remedy should
an aggrieved party should avail of to assail the
Ombudsman’s finding of the existence or lack of
probable cause in criminal cases or non-
administrative cases. In Estrada v. Desierto, the
Court emphasized that parties seeking to question
the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
criminal cases or non-administrative cases, may file
an original action for certiorari with this Court, not
with the CA, when it is believed that the
Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion.
CC. G.R. No. 141426 May 6, 2005
ZENAIDA F. LANTING, petitioner, vs.
HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, ANTI-GRAFT
INVESTIGATOR OSCAR RAMOS, MAYOR LITO
ATIENZA, EMMANUEL SISON, VIRGILIO FORBES,
CHARITO RUMBO, DIRECTOR ERLINDA MAGALONG
and ERNESTO SAW, JR., respondents.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Page 36 of 93

FACTS:
Lanting is an Administrative Officer of the City
Council of Manila. She filed with the Ombudsman
a complaint charging then Manila Vice-Mayor
Atienza (now City Mayor); Secretary to the City
Council; and a Human Resource Management
Officer with violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and Falsification of Public documents.
Lanting also questions the appointment in the City
Government of several individuals which are
relatives of the respondents.
The Graft Investigator Officer issued a Resolution
recommending that Lansing’s complaint be
dismissed. It stated that: (1) the evidence does not
warrant the filing of graft charges and (2) the
appointments are governed by the Civil Service
Commission.
Lanting filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution on the ground that the Investigator
“conveniently and intentionally skirted the issue of
falsification of public documents which are crystal
clear in my complaint.” Lanting then prayed for a
re-investigation of her complaint by a Special
Prosecutor. The Ombudsman denied the motion.
Dissatisfied, Lanting filed with the Court of Appeals
a petition for certiorari and mandamus. Aside from
several procedural errors, the petition was dismissed
on the ground that the CA has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the assailed Ombudsman’s
resolution. The CA held that Section 14 of The
Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides that “No court
 shall hear any appeal or application for remedy
against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman,
except the Supreme Court on pure question of
law.”
Lanting filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was
again denied. The CA held that the Congress
through The Ombudsman Act of 1989 designated
only the Supreme Court as the appellate authority
in Ombudsman decisions in criminal cases.
Lanting’s position: Her complaint be fore the
Ombudsman was not limited to violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, but likewise
includes “acts constituting ground for administrative
complaint hence cognizable by the Court of
 Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred
in dismissing Lanting’s petition for certiorari on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on the basis of The
Ombudsman Act.
RULING:
NO. The complaint is for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Acts. It is not an
administrative complaint. Nowhere in her complaint
did she allege administrative offenses, such as
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
dishonesty or misconduct on the part of
respondents. The allegations describe the acts
complained of as “willful, felonious, unlawful, odious
and despicable criminal activities .”
In her motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman’s Resolution, Lanting claimed that the
Investigator “skirted the issue of falsification of
public documents which is crystal clear in my
complaint.” Considering that the complaint is
criminal in nature, the Supreme Court, not the Court
of Appeals, has the sole authority to review the
Ombudsman’s Resolutions on pure question of law
as expressly mandated in The Ombudsman Act of
1989.
In Fabian vs. Desierto, it was held that only “appeals
from the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken
to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule
43.” Therefore, the CA did not commit grave abuse
of discretion. Clearly, it has no jurisdiction over
Lanting’s criminal action.
DD. G.R. No. 129742 September 16, 1998
TERESITA G. FABIAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as
Ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his
capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon; and
NESTOR V. AGUSTIN, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
Teresita Fabian was the major stockholder and
president of PROMAT Construction Development
Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the
construction business with a certain Nestor Agustin.
Agustin was the incumbent District Engineer of the
First Metro Manila Engineering District (FMED).
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents
developed between Fabian and Agustin. Fabian
tried to terminate their relationship, but Agustin
refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the
extent of employing acts of harassment,
intimidation and threats. She eventually filed an
administrative case against Agustin which
eventually led an appeal to the Ombudsman but
the Ombudsman, Aniano Desierto, inhibited himself.
But the case was later referred to the deputy
Ombudsman, Jesus Guerrero.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the
decision is final and executory. Fabian appealed
the case to the Supreme Court. She averred that
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman
Act of 1989) pertinently provides that:
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the
Page 37 of 93

Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme
Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10)
days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is
valid.
RULING:
No. It is invalid for it illegally expanded the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Section
27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to
the SC from decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Section 30,
Article VI of the Constitution against a law which
increases the Appellate jurisdiction of the SC. No
countervailing argument has been cogently
presented to justify such disregard of the
constitutional prohibition. That constitutional
provision was intended to give the SC a measure of
control over cases placed under its appellate
 jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate
enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
 jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the SC.
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution is clear
when it states that the appellate jurisdiction of the
SC contemplated therein is to be exercised over
“final judgments and orders of lower courts,” that is,
the courts composing the integrated judicial
system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies
or agencies.
But what is the proper remedy?
Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-
 judicial agencies are now required to be b rought to
the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for
review, under the requirements and conditions in
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court which was precisely
formulated and adopted to provide for a uniform
rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial
agencies.
EE. G.R. No. 124067 March 27, 1998
PERLA A. SEGOVIA, REYNALDO C. SANTIAGO, and
WINIFREDO SM. PANGILINAN, petitioners,
vs.
The SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
and the PRESIDENT of the NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, respondents.
NARVASA, C.J.:
DOCTRINE: Under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Law, the suspension of a public
officer is mandatory after a determination has been
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
made of the validity of the information in a pre-
suspension hearing conducted for that purpose.
(Socrates vs. Sandiganbayan, and Luciano, et al vs.
Mariano)
Segovia, et al were designated as members of the
Contracts Committee of NPC for the Mindanao
Grid Projects. A bidding was held . The lowest and
second lowest bidders were the  Joint Venture of
INPHASE and T & D, and Urban Consolidated
Constructors, Inc.,  respectively. Joint Venture was
disqualified but instead of awarding the project to
Urban it was also disqualified and a failure of
bidding was declared. Subsequently, the project
was cancelled.
Urban charged Segovia, et al with violation of the
Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
After a preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman
recommended the filing of a case thus a case was
filed with the Sandiganbayan. Sandiganbayan
issued a resolution placing Segovia, et al, under
preventive suspension of 90 days.
Segovia, et al questioned it claiming that
preventive suspension is not mandatory but is
subject to the sound discretion of the court. Also,
their suspension is no longer necessary because the
project was already cancelled, they are no longer
involved in the awarding of bids, and that all
documents necessary for the investigation were
already submitted.
ISSUE:
Whether it is mandatory or discretionary  for the
Sandiganbayan to place under preventive
suspension public officers who stand accused
before it, pursuant to Section 13 of RA 3019 (Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)?
RULING:
It is mandatory. The firmly entrenched doctrine is
that under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Law, the suspension of a public officer is
mandatory after a determination has been made
of the validity of the information in a pre-suspension
hearing conducted for that purpose. (Socrates vs.
Sandiganbayan, and Luciano, et al vs. Mariano)
There is no grave abuse of discretion. In ordering
the preventive suspension, the Sandiganbayan did
but adhere to the clear command of the law and
what it calls a “mass of jurispudence” emanating
from this Court, sustaining its authority to decree
suspension of public officials and employees
indicted before it. Indeed, that the theory of
“discretionary suspension” should still be advocated
to this late date, despite the “mass of
 jurisprudence” relevant to the issue, it little short of
amazing, bordering on contumacious disregard of
the solemn magisterial pronouncements of the
Highest court of the land.
Page 38 of 93
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended -- the reason that "it is the Ombudsman  —   not the
treating of the suspension pendente lite  of an Office of the Solicitor  —   General that has the
accused public officer -- may no longer be put at authority to file the petition."
issue, having been repeatedly upheld by this Court .
On April 28, 1989, the Solicitor General, pursuant to
Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan: Preventive suspension the aforesaid recommendation of the
was not penal in character but merely a preventive Ombudsman, filed a Petition for Forfeiture before
measure before final judgement. The purpose of the Sandiganbayan.
suspension is to prevent the accused public officer
from frustrating or hampering his prosecution by A Motion to Dismiss was filed by respondent Asistio,
intimidating or influencing witnesses or tampering through counsel, on the ground that:
with documentary evidence, or from committing
further acts of malfeasance while in office; 1. The Sandigan bayan has no jurisdiction over the
case;
Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan : Preventive suspension
is not violative of the Constitution as the person In an Opposition to Respondent's Motion to
suspended remains entitled to the constitutional Dismiss,6 the Solicitor General averred that:
presumption of innocence since his culpability must
still be established.
1. The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the
case;
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act implicitly
recognizes that the power of preventive suspension
In dismissing the petition for forfeiture and in ruling
lies in the court in which the criminal charge is filed;
that it is the Ombudsman who has the authority to
once a case is filed in court, all other acts
file the same before the court, the
connected with the discharge of court functions --
SANDIGANBAYAN held that:
including preventive suspension -- should be
acknowledged as within the competence of the
Other statutory provisions pertinent to the incident
court that has taken cognizance thereof, no
at bar read:
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers
being perceivable in that acknowledgment.
The Office of the Tanodbayan shall have the
The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to
exclusive authority to conduct preliminary
all persons indicated upon a valid information
investigation of all cases cognizable by the
under Act, whether they be appointive or elective
Sandiganbayan; to file information therefor and to
officials; or permanent or temporary employees, or
direct and control the prosecution of the said cases.
(Sec. .77, PD 1630.)
pertaining to the career or non-career service. The
term “office” in Section 13 of the law applies to any
office in relation to which he is charged. The provisions of the Decree notwithstanding, the
Office of the Tanodbayan shall continue to have
the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary
It is mandatory for the court to place under
investigation, file the necessary information, and
preventive suspension a public officer accused
direct and control the prosecution of all cases
before it.
enumerated in Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.
1606, whether such cases be within the exclusive
Once a proper determination of the validity of the
original/appellate jurisdiction of the
Information has been made, it becomes the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts in
ministerial duty of the court to forthwith issue the
accordance with the provisions of Presidential
order of preventive suspension of the accused
Decree No. 1630. (Sec. 3, PD 1861, attending PD
official.
1606.)

Since violations of Republic Act 1379 are

cognizable exclusively by the Sandiganbayan
FF. G.R. No. 90529 August 16, 1991 pursuant to Section 4 of PD 1606, abrogating
thereby the jurisdiction over forfeiture cases
theretofore vested in the Regional Trial Court of the
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,  petitioner,
city or province where the public officer or
vs.
employee complained of resides or holds office
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and MACARIO
under Section 2 of Republic Act 1379, the other
ASISTIO, JR., respondents.
provision of said section 2 insofar as it lodged in the
City or Provincial Fiscal the power to conduct the
REGALADO, J.: previous inquiry/preliminary investigation must be
deemed similarly modified by PD 1630, Section 17,
The Republic, through the Solicitor General, filed the and PD 1861, Section 3 abovequoted, in the sense
instant petition for review on certiorari seeking to that such authority of the City or Provincial Fiscal
annul and set aside the resolution2 of respondent has been transferred to the Office of the
Sandiganbayan, promulgated on October 10, 1989, Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman). Considering,
dismissing the petition for forfeiture filed by the further, that PDs 1630 and 1861, Sections 17 and 3,
Republic against respondent Macario Asistio, Jr., for
Page 39 of 93

respectively, also provide that the Office of the
Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) shall also have the
exclusive authority to file the necessary information
and direct and control the prosecution of all cases
falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, it is the Ombudsman-not the
Office of the Solicitor General-that has the authority
to file the petition in this case.
In effect, the dismissal of the petition for forfeiture by
the Sandiganbayan is premised on the supposition
that since violations of Republic Act No. 1379 now
fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, and considering further that the
exclusive authority to file the necessary informations
and to direct and control the prosecution of all
cases falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan is vested in the Office of the
Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman), it follows that it is
the Ombudsman, and not the Solicitor General, who
has the authority to file the petition for forfeiture.
SOLGEN Contention:
It is the submission of the Solicitor General that his
authority to file the petition for forfeiture under
Republic Act No. 1379 should be retained,
notwithstanding the amendments introduced by
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1630 and 1861 vesting in
the Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman) the exclusive
authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of
all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
(specifically those enumerated in Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as last amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1861), to file the
informations therefor and to direct and control the
prosecution of said cases.
Several reasons are advanced by the Solicitor
General for his aforesaid postulation, viz :
1. The exclusive authority vested in the Tanodbayan
by Section 17 of Presidential Decree No. 1630 and
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1861 is
confined only to the filing of the information and
directing and controlling the prosecution of the
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, but does
not include the authority to file a petition for
forfeiture. An information, as defined under Section
4, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court, is different from a
petition, in that an information necessarily refers to
a criminal proceeding while a petition does not.
2. It is the intention of the legislature to delineate
forfeiture proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379
from the rest of the violations of Republic Act No.
3019, as may be implied from a reading of Section 9
of Republic Act No. 3019 (penalties for violations of
Sections 3, 4, 5, and 6 thereof), which does not
include Section 8 (forfeiture judgments) of the same
law within the punishments usually associated with
criminal proceedings, such as imprisonment and/or
perpetual disqualification from public office.
3. The provision of Republic Act No. 1379 authorizing
the Solicitor General to file the petition for forfeiture
being a special and specific provision, should
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
prevail over Presidential Decrees Nos. 1630 and
1861 which contain general provisions involving
violations not only of Republic Act No. 1379 but also
of Republic Act No. 3019.
ISSUE:
WHETHER it is the Office of the Ombudsman or the
Office of the Solicitor General which has the
authority to file a petition for forfeiture of unlawfully
acquired wealth as provided for in Republic Act No.
1379.1
RULING:
SOLICITOR GENERAL
The authority thereafter restored to the then
Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) to file informations for
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan does not
include the filing of a petition for forfeiture.
An information is an accusation in writing charging
a person with an offense and requires a criminal
proceeding; a petition for forfeiture involves a civil
action in rem.
The Solicitor General was, therefore, acting within
the scope of his authority when he filed the petition
for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan.
Besides, such authority of the Solicitor General is not
an entirely new concept if we are to consider that
under Executive Order No. 14, the Solicitor General
is empowered to assist in the filing and prosecution
of cases for a violation thereof, including forfeiture
proceedings under Republic Act No. 1379 in
connection with Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2.
RATIO:
Before the creation of the Sandiganbayan, it was
the Solicitor General who was authorized to initiate
forfeiture proceedings before the then court of first
instance of the city or province where the public
officer or employee resides or holds office, pursuant
to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 13798 which reads:
See. 2. Filing of petition. — Whenever any public
officer or employee has acquired during his
incumbency an amount of property which is
manifestly out of proportion to s salary as such
public officer or employee and to his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired
property, said property shall be presumed prima
facie to have been unlawfully acquired. The
Solicitor General, upon complaint by any taxpayer
to the city or provincial fiscal who shall conduct a
previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations
in criminal cases and shall certify to the Solicitor
General that there is reasonable ground to believe
that there has been committed a violation of this
Act and the respondent is probably guilty thereof,
shall file, in the name and on behalf of the Republic
of the Philippines, in the Court of First Instance of the
city or province where said public officer or
Page 40 of 93

employee resides or holds office, a petition for a
writ commanding said officer or employee to show
cause why the property aforesaid, or any part
thereof, should not be declared property of the
State: ... .
Thereafter, Presidential Decree No. 1486 was
promulgated on June 11, 1978 providing for the
creation of the Sandiganbayan and vesting it,
under Section 4 thereof, with original and exclusive
 jurisdiction to try and decide, among others:
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act and Republic Act No. 1379;
(b) Crimes committed by public officers or
employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations,
embraced in Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public
officers or employees including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations in
relation to their office; Provided, that in case private
individuals are accused as principals, accomplices
or accessories in the commission of the crimes
hereinabove mentioned, they shall be tried jointly
with the public officers or employees concerned.
 x x x xxx xx
(d) Civil suits brought in connection with the
aforementioned crimes for restitution or reparation
of damages, recovery of the instruments and
effects of the crimes, or forfeiture proceedings
provided for under Republic Act No. 1379;
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public
officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision correcional
or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of
P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or
felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the
penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision
correcional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine
of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial
Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
(b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction:
(1) On appeal, from the final judgments, resolutions
or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in cases
originally decided by them in their respective
territorial jurisdiction.
(2) By petition for review, from the final judgments,
resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts, in
the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over
cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction.

(e) Civil actions brought under Articles 32 and 34 of
the Civil Code.
 x x x xxx xxx
Subsequently, Presidential Decree No. 1606 was
issued on December 10, 1978 expressly repealing
Presidential Decree No. 1486 and revising in the
process the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
removing therefrom the civil cases stated in Section
4(d) and (e) of Presidential Decree No. 1486 which
included forfeiture proceedings provided for under
Republic Act No. 1379.
Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 expanded
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over the offenses enumerated in
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 to
embrace all such offenses irrespective of the
imposable penalty, but Presidential Decree No.
1606 was subsequently amended, first by
Presidential Decree No. 1860 and eventually by
Presidential Decree No. 1861, establishing the
 jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. — 
 — The
The Sandiganbayan
exercise:
On the foregoing considerations, there is no issue
that jurisdiction over violations of Republic Acts Nos.
3019 and 1379 now rests with the Sandiganbayan.
Concomitant with this transfer of jurisdiction,
however, is the question of whether such transfer
necessarily involves a transfer of the authority to file
a petition for forfeiture from the Solicitor General to
the Ombudsman. The Sandiganbayan holds in the
affirmative; the Solicitor General opines otherwise.
The resolution of the main substantive issue posed in
the present petition renders imperative a review of
the powers of the present Special Prosecutor
(formerly called the Tanodbayan) and of the
Ombudsman (who is now the Tanodbayan).
Presidential Decree No. 1487, which was enacted
on June 11, 1978 at the same time that Presidential
Decree No. 1486 was passed, is the primary law
creating the Office of the Ombudsman, then
known as the Tanodbayan. The powers of the then
Tanodbayan were as follows:
SEC. 10. Powers. — 
 — The
The Tanodbayan shall have the
following powers:
shall
(a) He may investigate, on complaint, any
administrative act of any administrative agency

Page 41 of 93

including any government-owned or controlled
corporation;
 x x x xxx xxx
SEC. 17. Prosecution of public personnel. —   — If
If the
Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public
official, employee or other person has acted in a
manner resulting in a failure of justice, he shall file
and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil, or
administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or
the proper court or body.
It is important to note that when the Tanodbayan
was created, it initially had no authority to
prosecute cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as provided for under Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1486 hereinbefore
mentioned. It was the Chief Special Prosecutor who
was vested with such authority pursuant to Section
12 of said decree, thus:
SEC. 12. Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor. — 
 —  before the proper administrative agency. ...
The provisions of any law or rule to the contrary
notwithstanding, the direction and control of the
prosecution of cases mentioned in Section 4
thereof, shall be exercised by a Chief Special
Prosecutor ... .
The Chief Special Prosecutor ... shall have exclusive
authority to conduct preliminary investigations of all
complaints filed with the Sandiganbayan, to file
informations and conduct the prosecution of all
cases ... .
A perusal of Sections 4(d) and 12 of Presidential
Decree No. 1486, in conjunction with Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 1379, readily reveals that
Presidential Decree No. 1486 had impliedly
repealed Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379 by
transferring both the jurisdiction of the former courts
of first instance over and the authority of the
Solicitor General to file a petition for forfeiture under
Republic Act No. 1379 to the Sandiganbayan and
the then Chief Special Prosecutor, respectively.
Then, Presidential Decree No. 1607 was enacted on
December 10, 1978, amending the power of the
former Tanodbayan to investigate administrative
complaints and providing for the creation of the
Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor whose
powers were substantially retained by the later law,
in this wise:
SEC. 10. Powers. — 
 — The
The Tanodbayan shall have the
following powers:
(a) He may investigate, on complaint by any
person or on his own motion or initiative, any
administrative act whether amounting to any
criminal offense or not of any administrative agency
including any government-owned or controlled
corporation;
 x x x xxx xxx
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
SEC. 17. Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor. — 
 — 
 x x x xxx xxx
The Chief Special Prosecutor, ... shall have the
exclusive authority to conduct preliminary
investigation of all cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan; to file informations therefor and to
direct and control the prosecution of d cases
therein; ... .
 x x x xxx xxx
SEC. 19. Prosecution of Public Personnel or Other
Person. — 
 — If
If the Tanodbayan has reason to believe
that any public official, employee, or other person
has acted in a manner warranting criminal or
disciplinary action or proceedings, he shall cause
him to be investigated by the Office of the Chief
Special Prosecutor who shall file and prosecute the
corresponding criminal or administrative case
before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or
The scope of the then Tanodbayan's authority was
broadened on July 18, 1979 by a subsequent law,
Presidential Decree No. 1630, to include, aside from
the power to investigate any administrative act
whether amounting to any criminal offense or not of
any administrative agency, the following powers: to
file the necessary information or complaint with the
Sandiganbayan or any proper court or
administrative agency and prosecute the same if,
after preliminary investigation, he finds a prima
facie case; and to file and prosecute civil and
administrative cases involving graft and corrupt
practices and such other offenses committed by
public officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in
relation to their office.9 The exclusive authority to
conduct preliminary investigation of all cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, to file
informations therefor and to direct and control the
prosecution of said cases was also specifically
restored by said decree to the Tanodbayan.10 In
addition, the power to conduct the necessary
investigation and to file and prosecute the
corresponding criminal and administrative cases
before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or
before the proper administrative agency against
any public personnel who has acted in a manner
warranting criminal or disciplinary action or
proceedings was likewise transferred from the Chief
Special Prosecutor to the Tanodbayan.11
Thereafter, when Presidential Decree No. 1606 was
amended by Presidential Decrees Nos. 1860 and
1861 on January 14, 1983 and March 23, 1983,
respectively, both amendatory decrees contained
a virtually identical Section 3 granting him the same
authority, to wit:
SEC. 3. The provisions of this decree
notwithstanding, the Office of the Tanodbayan shall
continue to have the exclusive authority to conduct
preliminary investigation, file the necessary
information, and direct and control the prosecution
Page 42 of 93

of all cases enumerated in Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 1606, whether such cases be within the
exclusive original/appellate jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts in
accordance with the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1630.
With the ratification of the present Constitution, the
existing Tanodbayan became known as the Office
of the Special Prosecutor which continued to
exercise its powers except those conferred on the
Office of the Ombudsman to be known as the
Tanodbayan created under the said Constitution.12
The Office of the Ombudsman, and the Office of
the Special Prosecutor were officially and
respectively created under Republic Act No. 6770,
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
and Executive Order No. 244.
At present, the powers of the Ombudsman, as
defined by Republic Act No. 6770 corollary to
Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
include, inter alia, the authority to: (1) investigate
and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the
exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over,
at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases;13 and
(2) investigate and initiate the proper action for the
recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth
amassed after February 25, 1986 and the
prosecution of the parties involved there.14
It follows that these powers vested in the
Ombudsman by the Constitution and the law have
been removed from the erstwhile Tanodbayan
(now called the Special Prosecutor) and may no
longer be exercised by the latter. The powers of the
previous Tanodbayan is now limited, under the
supervision and control and upon the authority of
the Ombudsman, to the following: (1) to conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan;
(2) to enter into plea bargaining agreements; and
(3) to perform such other duties assigned to it by the
Ombudsman.15
In Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, et al.,16 the powers
of the former Tanodbayan were explained as
follows:
Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman (as
distinguished from the incumbent Tanodbayan) is
charged with the duty to:
Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. (See. 13, par. 1)
The Constitution likewise provides that:
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known
as the Office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall
continue to function and exercise its powers as now
or hereafter may be provided by law, except those
conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman
created under this Constitution. (Art. XI, Section 7)
Now then, inasmuch as the aforementioned duty is
given to the Ombudsman, the incumbent
Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the
1987 Constitution and who is supposed to retain
powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman)
is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary
investigations and to direct the filing of criminal
cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders
of the Ombudsman . This right to do so was lost
effective February 2, 1987. From that time, he has
been divested of such authority.
Under the present Constitution, the Special
Prosecutor (Raul Gonzales) is a mere subordinate of
the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) and can
investigate and prosecute cases only upon the
latter's authority or orders. The Special Prosecutor
cannot initiate the prosecution of cases but can
only conduct the same if instructed to do so by the
Ombudsman. Even his original power to issue
subpoena, which he still claims under Section 10(d)
of PD 1630, is now deemed transferred to the
Ombudsman, who may however, retain it in the
Special Prosecutor in connection with the cases he
is ordered to investigate.
In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, there
is no doubt that the power of the present Special
Prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation and
to prosecute is subject to the following limitations:
(a) it extends only to criminal cases within the
 jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; and (b) the
same may be exercised only by authority of the
Ombudsman.
The rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are
actions in rem17 and therefore, civil in nature.
Parenthetically, considering the limited authority of
the present Special Prosecutor, he is not allowed to
file and prosecute forfeiture cases provided for
under Republic Act No. 1379 even if the same falls
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. On the
premise that the incumbent Special Prosecutor
cannot file the petition, is the Ombudsman
empowered to initiate and prosecute the same?
A perusal of the law originally creating the Office of
the Ombudsman then (to be known as the
Tanodbayan), and the amendatory laws issued
subsequent thereto will show that, at its inception,
the Office of the Ombudsman was already vested
with the power to investigate and prosecute civil
and criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan and
even the regular courts. In resume Presidential
Decree No. 1487 provided:
SEC. 17. Prosecution of public personnel. —   — If
If the
Tanodbayan has reason to believe that any public
official, employee, or other person has acted in a
manner resulting in a failure of justice, he shall file
Page 43 of 93
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil, or It is our considered opinion, therefore, that in cases
administrative case before the Sandiganbayan or of unlawfully acquired wealth amassed before
the proper court of body. February 25, 1986, as is the situation obtaining in the
case at bar, it is the Solicitor General who should file
and Presidential Decree No. 1630, on its part, had the petition for forfeiture. The reason is manifestly
this more detailed provision: supplied by an analysis of the interplay of
antecedent legislation.
SEC. 10. Powers. — The Tanodbayan shall have the
following powers: It will be recalled that when Presidential Decree No.
1486 was issued on June 11, 19781 it vested in the
 x x x xxx xxx Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over forfeiture
proceedings provided for under Republic Act No.
1379, Section 12 of the same decree gave the
(e) If after preliminary investigation he finds a prima
Chief Special Prosecutor the authority to prosecute
facie case, he may file the necessary information or
forfeiture cases. This should be taken as merely an
complaint with the Sandiganbayan or any proper
implied repeal by Presidential Decree No. 1486 of
court or administrative agency and prosecute the
the jurisdiction of the former courts of first instance
same;
and the authority of the Solicitor General to file a
petition for forfeiture under Section 2 of Republic
(f) He may file and prosecute civil and
Act No. 1379 by transferring said jurisdiction and
administrative cases involving graft and corrupt
authority to the Sandiganbayan and the Chief
practices and such other offenses committed by
Special Prosecutor, respectively.
public officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in
However, on December 10, 1978, Presidential
relation to their office.
Decree No. 1606 was enacted expressly repealing
Presidential Decree No. 1486.1âwphi1 Issued on the
Presidential Decree No. 1630 was the existing law
same date was Presidential Decree No. 1607 which
governing the then Tanodbayan when Republic
declared the official creation of the Office of the
Act No. 6770 was enacted providing for the
Chief Special Prosecutor, with Section 17 thereof
functional and structural organization of the present
providing for its exclusive authority to conduct
Office of the Ombudsman. This later law retained in
preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by
the Ombudsman the power of the former
the Sandiganbayan, file informations therefor, and
Tanodbayan to investigate and prosecute on its
direct and control the prosecution of said cases
own or on complaint by any person, any act or
therein. Still and all, it now bears stressing that,
omission of any public officer or employee, office or
under the state of the law at that juncture, the
agency, when such act or omission appears to be
authority of the Chief Special Prosecutor no longer
illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. In addition, the
included the right to file actions for forfeiture under
Ombudsman is now vested with primary jurisdiction
Republic Act No. 1379, nor was such authority
over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. It
vested in any other office or agency.
would appear, therefore, that, as declared by
respondent Sandiganbayan, it is the Ombudsman
It is a respected rule of statutory construction that
who should file the petition for forfeiture involved in
"where a law which repeals a prior law, not
this case.
expressly but by implication, is itself repealed, ... the
repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law,
Nonetheless, while we do not discount the authority
unless the language of the repealing statute
of the Ombudsman, we believe and so hold that
provides otherwise.19 Hence, the repeal of
the exercise of his correlative powers to both
Presidential Decree No. 1486 necessarily revived the
investigate and initiate the proper action for the
authority of the Solicitor General to file a petition for
recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth is
forfeiture under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379,
restricted only to cases for the recovery of ill-gotten
but not the jurisdiction of the quondam courts of
and/or unexplained wealth which were amassed
first instance over the case nor the authority of the
after February 25, 1986.18 Prior to said date, the
provincial or city fiscals to conduct the preliminary
Ombudsman is without authority to initiate such
investigation therefor, since said powers at that time
forfeiture proceedings. We, however, uphold his
remained in the Sandiganbayan and the Chief
authority to investigate cases for the forfeiture or
Special Prosecutor. That such was the intendment
recovery of such ill-gotten and/or unexplained
of the law can be irresistibly deduced from a
wealth amassed even before the aforementioned
reading of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606
date, pursuant to his general investigatory power
retaining in the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over
under Section 15(l) of Republic Act No. 6770.
violations of Republic Act No. 1379, and of Section
17 of Presidential Decree No. 1607 which vested in
In the case at bar, the alleged unexplained wealth the Chief Special Prosecutor the right to conduct a
of respondent Macario Asistio, Jr. was supposed to preliminary investigation and to file only
have been acquired from 1981 to 1983. Verily, the informations for cases cognizable by the
Ombudsman, like the Special Prosecutor, is without Sandiganbayan.
authority to initiate and file the petition for forfeiture
against respondent Asistio.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the
authority thereafter restored to the then

Page 44 of 93
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
Tanodbayan to file informations for cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan does not On August 13, 2003 the Sandiganbayan
include the filing of a petition for forfeiture. As earlier issued a resolution, denying the Romualdezes
mentioned, an information is an accusation in March 31, 2003 motion. It also denied by resolution
writing charging a person with an offense and on December 3, 2003 their subsequent motion for
requires a criminal proceeding; a petition for reconsideration. Thus, the Romualdezes filed the
forfeiture involves a civil action in rem. The Solicitor
present petition for certiorari  and prohibition,
General was, therefore, acting within the scope of
seeking to annul the Sandiganbayans rulings and
his authority when he filed the petition for forfeiture
before the Sandiganbayan. Besides, such authority prevent it from further proceeding with Civil Case
of the Solicitor General is not an entirely new 0167 until another preliminary investigation is
concept if we are to consider that under Executive conducted in their case.
Order No. 14, the Solicitor General is empowered to
assist in the filing and prosecution of cases for a ISSUE
violation thereof, including forfeiture proceedings Whether or not the preliminary
under Republic Act No. 1379 in connection with investigation that the Ombudsman conducted in
Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 2. OMB-0-91-0820 in 1991 satisfied the requirement of
the law in forfeiture cases.
RULING
The Supreme Court held that there is no
reason which exists for suspending or interrupting
ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, G.R. No. 161602
the conduct of the forfeiture proceedings before
Vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
the Sandiganbayan. It stated that it cannot
(THIRD DIVISION) and THE Promulgated:
subscribe to the Romualdezes’ claim that they are
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
entitled to a new preliminary investigation since
Respondents. July 13, 2010
they had no opportunity to take part in the one
held in 1991, in OMB-0-91-0820. The High Court aptly
FACTS
pointed out that:
On March 6, 1996 respondent Republic of
Respondents admit that the subpoena for
the Philippines (Republic) filed an action for the
that investigation had been sent to their last known
forfeiture of alleged unlawfully acquired property
residence at the time it was conducted. The
with the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case 0167 against
Republic also categorically insists that the
petitioner Alfredo T. Romualdez and his wife Agnes
appropriate subpoena had been served on the
Sison Romualdez as well as against Romson Realty,
Romualdezes. Accordingly, the Ombudsman could
Inc., R & S Transport, Inc., Fidelity Management, Inc.,
not be faulted for proceeding with the investigation
and Dio Island Resort, Inc. (collectively, the
of the Romualdezes’ cases when they did not show
Romualdezes) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) 1379.
up despite notice being sent to them at their last
known residence.
On January 16, 2000 the Romualdezes filed
The New Rules on Criminal Procedure "does
a motion to dismiss the action on grounds of a)
not require as a condition sine qua non to the
violation of their right to a speedy disposition of their
validity of the proceedings [in the preliminary
case; b) lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
investigation] the presence of the accused for as
over the action; c) prematurity; d) prescription; and
long as efforts to reach him were made, and an
e) litis pendentia. On September 11, 2002 the
opportunity to controvert the evidence of the
Sandiganbayan denied the motion. It also denied
complainant is accorded him.
on March 10, 2003 their subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
The obvious purpose of the rule is to block
attempts of unscrupulous respondents to thwart the
On March 31, 2003 the Romualdezes next
prosecution of offenses by hiding themselves or by
filed a motion for preliminary investigation and to
employing dilatory tactics" (Mercado v. Court of
suspend proceedings. They claim that since Civil
Appeals, 315 Phil. 657, 662 (1995). In sum, there is no
Case 0167 was a forfeiture proceeding filed under
reason for suspending or interrupting the conduct of
R.A. 1379, the Ombudsman should have first
the forfeiture proceedings before the
conducted a previous inquiry similar to preliminary
Sandiganbayan.
investigations in criminal cases before the filing of
the case pursuant to Section 2 of the law.

In its Comment [4] on the motion, the

Republic pointed out that the Office of the
Ombudsman in fact conducted such a preliminary
investigation in 1991 in OMB-0-91-0820 and issued
on January 22, 1992 a resolution, recommending
the endorsement of the matter to the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) for the filing of the forfeiture
case.
Office of the Ombudsman vs. ENOC
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
order dated 100700 of the RTC Branch 19 of Digos,
Davao del Sur dismissing criminal cases against
respondents. Respondents were charged with 11
Page 45 of 93

counts of malversation through falsification, based
on alleged purchases of medicine and food
assistance for cultural community members, and
one count of violation of R.A. No. 3019 in
connection with the purchases of supplies for the
OSCC without bidding/canvass.
As none of the respondents has the "rank"
required under R.A. No. 8249 to be tried for the said
crimes in the Sandiganbayan, the information were
filed by the Ombudsman in the RTC. Invoking the
ruling in Uy vs. Sandiganbayan, respondents move
to quash arguing Ombudsman has no authority to
prosecute graft cases falling within the jurisdiction of
regular courts.
RTC granted such motion. The office of the
Ombudsman filed a petition contending the trial
court erred invoking Uy vs. Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has
authority to prosecute graft cases falling within the
 jurisdiction of regular courts
RULING: YES. The Ombudsman has powers to
prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by
the regular courts. [ruling from here same with Uy vs.
Sandiganbayan] The Ombudsman is clothed with
authority to conduct preliminary investigation and
to prosecute all criminal cases involving public
officers and employees, not only those within the
 jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, but those within
the jurisdiction of the regular courts as well. The
authority of the Ombudsman to investigate and
prosecute offenses committed by public officers
and employees is founded in Section 15 and
Section 11 of RA 6770.
a. Section 15 vests the Ombudsman with the power
to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
 jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
 jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the
investigation of such cases.
b. Section 11 grants the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, an organic component of the Office of
the Ombudsman under the latter's supervision and
control, the power to conduct preliminary
investigation and prosecute criminal cases within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted
by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any
public officer or employee when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. The law does not make a distinction
between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
and those cognizable by regular courts. 8. It has
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
been held that the clause "any illegal act or
omission of any public official" is broad enough to
embrace any crime committed by a public officer
or employee.
The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply
the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases involving
public officers and employees cognizable by other
courts. The exercise by the Ombudsman of his
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan is not incompatible with the
discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute
other offenses committed by public officers and
employees.
Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted
by the legislature to the Ombudsman are very
broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance and non-feasance committed by
public officers and employees during their tenure of
office.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in
Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary
 jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, and Section 11 (4) granting the
Special Prosecutor the power to conduct
preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
should not be construed as confining the scope of
the investigatory and prosecutory power of the
Ombudsman to such cases.
The jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman
should not be equated with the limited authority of
the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely a
component of the Office of the Ombudsman and
may only act under the supervision and control and
upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to
conduct preliminary investigation and to prosecute
is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did
not intend to confine the investigatory and
prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these
types of cases.
The Ombudsman is mandated by law to act on all
complaints against officers and employees of the
government and to enforce their administrative,
civil and criminal liability in every case where the
evidence warrants
a. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize
the personnel of his office and/or designate any
fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government
service to act as special investigator or prosecutor
to assist in the investigation and prosecution of
certain cases.
b. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special
Page 46 of 93

Prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction in accordance with
Section 11 (4c) of RA 6770, i.e. to perform such
duties assigned to it by the Ombudsman.
Garcia vs Mojica
[G.R. No. 139043. September 10, 1999]
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS: On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as
Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig
for the supply of asphalt to the city. The contract
covers the period 1998-2001, which period was to
commence on September 1998 when the first
delivery should have been made by F.E. Zuellig.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
conclusive determining factor” as regards the
people’s thinking on the matter is an election. On
this point, we agree with petitioner. That the
people voted for an official with knowledge of his
character is presumed, precisely to eliminate the
need to determine, in factual terms, the extent of
this knowledge. Such an undertaking will obviously
be impossible. Our rulings on the matter do not
distinguish the precise timing or period when the
misconduct was committed, reckoned from the
date of the official’s reelection, except that it must
be prior to said date.”
The above ruling in Salalima  applies to this
case. Petitioner cannot anymore be held
administratively liable for an act done during his
previous term, that is, his signing of the contract with
F.E. Zuellig.

Sometime in March 1999, news reports came

The agreement between petitioner
out regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of
(representing Cebu City) and F.E. Zuellig was
asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract signed
perfected on the date the contract was signed,
by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the
during petitioner’s prior term. At that moment,
Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into
petitioner already acceded to the terms of the
the matter.[1]
contract, including stipulations now alleged to be
prejudicial to the city government. Thus, any
Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special
culpability petitioner may have in signing the
prosecution officer of the Office of the
contract already became extant on the day the
Ombudsman, was assigned to conduct the inquiry,
contract was signed. It hardly matters that the
docketed as INQ-VIS-99-0132. After his
deliveries under the contract are supposed to have
investigation, he recommended that the said
been made months later.
inquiry be upgraded to criminal and administrative
cases against petitioner and the other city officials
While petitioner can no longer be held
involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy
administratively liable for signing the contract with
Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this
F. E. Zuellig, however, this should not prejudice the
recommendation.
filing of any case other than administrative against
petitioner. Our ruling in this case, may not be taken
ISSUES:
to mean the total exoneration of petitioner for
WON Garcia may be held administratively whatever wrongdoing, if any, might have been
liable. committed in signing the subject contract. The
ruling now is limited to the question of whether or
HELD: NO. “In a number of cases, we have
not he may be held administratively liable therefor,
repeatedly held that a reelected local official may
and it is our considered view that he may not.
not be held administratively accountable for
misconduct committed during his prior term of
ISSUE: WON the Ombudsman was stripped of its
office.[24]  The rationale for this holding is that when
powers by virtue of the LGC.
the electorate put him back into office, it is
presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life
HELD: No.  Indeed, there is nothing in the Local
and character, including his past misconduct. If,
Government Code to indicate that it has repealed,
armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him,
whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent
then such reelection is considered a condonation
provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes
of his past misdeeds.
on the specific matter in question are not so
inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel
However, in the present case, respondents
us to only uphold one and strike down the other.
point out that the contract entered into by
The decision of the Ombudsman (6 month
petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed just four days
suspension) will prevail over the LGC (60day
before the date of the elections. It was not made
suspension) if the evidence of guilt is strong.
an issue during the election, and so the electorate
could not be said to have voted for petitioner with
* The power to preventively suspend is available not
knowledge of this particular aspect of his life and
only to the Ombudsman but also to the Deputy
character.
Ombudsman.

For his part, petitioner contends that “the only

“SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension.  –   The
Page 47 of 93

Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively
suspend any officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation, if in his judgment the
evidence of guilt is strong ,”
Lastimosa v. Vasquez
Provision: Section 31 of the Ombudsman Act of
1989 (R.A. No. 6770):
Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors.  —   The
Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office
and/or designate of deputize any fiscal, state
prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to
act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in
the investigation and prosecution of certain cases.
Those designated or deputized to assist him as
herein provided shall be under his supervision and
control. (Emphasis added)
Doctrine: When a prosecutor is deputized by the
ombudsman, he becomes under the supervision
and control of the latter.
Facts: On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos
Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, filed
a criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an
administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of
authority and grave misconduct against the
Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo.
Intially, the deputy ombudsman found no prima
facie evidence. After review, Omb. Vasquez
reversed and directed that the mayor be charged
with a criminal case in the RTC.
The case was referred to provincial prosecutor
Lastimosa. She conducted her own preliminary
investigation and found that only acts of
lasciviousness had been committed. She filed a
case for acts of lasciviousness with the MCTC.
As no case for attempted rape had been filed
by the Prosecutor's Office, Deputy Ombudsman
Mojica ordered on July 27, 1994 Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Lastimosa to
show cause why they should not be punished for
contempt for "refusing and failing to obey the lawful
directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner contends, the Office of the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case
against the mayor because the crime involved
(rape) was not committed in relation to a public
office. For this reason it is argued that the Office of
the Ombudsman has no authority to place her and
Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive
suspension for refusing to follow his orders and to
cite them for indirect contempt for such refusal.
Issues:
Whether or not the Office of the
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
Ombudsman has the power to call on the
Provincial Prosecutor to assist it in the
prosecution of the case for attempted rape
against Mayor Ilustrisimo.
Whether or not the Office of the
Ombudsman has the power to suspend the
prosecutor.
RULING
Issue 1: YES. The office of the Ombudsman has the
power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or
on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public officer or employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient." This power has been
held to include the investigation and prosecution of
any crime committed by a public official regardless
of whether the acts or omissions complained of are
related to, or connected with, or arise from, the
performance of his official duty.
It does not matter that the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor had already conducted the
preliminary investigation and all that remained to
be done was for the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor to file the corresponding case in court.
Even if the preliminary investigation had been given
over to the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his
determination of the nature of the offense to be
charged would still be subject to the approval of
the Office of the Ombudsman. This is because
under §31 of the Ombudsman's Act, when a
prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the
"supervision and control" of the Ombudsman which
means that he is subject to the power of the
Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or
modify his (prosecutor's) decision. Petitioner cannot
legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and
file the information as directed by the Ombudsman.
Issue 2: YES. Section 15(g) of the Ombudsman Act
gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to
"punish for contempt, in accordance with the Rules
of Court and under the same procedure and with
the same penalties provided therein." There is no
merit in the argument that petitioner and Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable for
contempt because their refusal arose out of an
administrative, rather than judicial, proceeding
before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Whether petitioner's refusal to follow the
Ombudsman's orders constitutes a defiance,
disobedience or resistance of a lawful process,
order or command of the Ombudsman thus making
her liable for indirect contempt under Rule 71,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court is for respondents to
determine after appropriate hearing.
Layno vs Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 65848, May 24, 1985
Page 48 of 93

Facts: Layno was charged with violating paragraph
(e), Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 as
amended. was then arraigned on October 3, 1983,
and was suspended pendente lite, by respondent
Sandiganbayan on October 26, 1983.
The validity of the mandatory provision of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, suspending from
office any public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under such
statute, is assailed in this certiorari  and prohibition
proceeding on the ground that it is violative of the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
Issue: Whether or not the provision is violative of the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
Held: Yes.
It is a basic assumption of the electoral process
implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are
entitled to the services of elective officials of their
choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of
them could, of course, be proceeded against
administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In
either case, his culpability must be established.
Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is
entitled to the constitutional presumption of
innocence. A preventive suspension may be
 justified. Its continuance, however, for an
unreasonable length of time raises a due process
question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted,
in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been
nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an
injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim.
There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of
Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the
man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that
sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the
protracted continuance of this preventive
suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and
resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due
process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an
unconstitutional application that the order of
suspension should be lifted.
HONORIO BERNARDO, Petitioner,
- Versus  –  value of the property, it cannot readily be
HEIRS OF EUSEBIO VILLEGAS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 183357, March 15, 2010
Justice Perez, Ponente
FACTS: A complaint dated 14 November 2000 for
accion publiciana was filed by respondent Heirs of
Eusebio Villegas against petitioner Honorio
Bernardo, Romeo Gaza and Monina Francisco.
Respondents had earlier filed an ejectment case
against the trio, with the Municipal Trial Court of
Binangonan, Rizal, which case was dismissed on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction for having been filed
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
beyond the one-year prescriptive period for filing a
forcible entry case.
Respondents alleged in the Complaint that
their father, Eusebio Villegas, is the registered owner
of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 46891 with an area of 18,369
square meters and situated in Barangay Pag-asa,
Binangonan, Rizal; that petitioner, by stealth and in
the guise of merely grazing his cattle, surreptitiously
entered into possession of a portion of respondents’
land; that petitioner conspired and confederated
with Gaza and Francisco by illegally constructing
their own houses on the subject land; that the issue
of possession was brought to the barangay for
conciliation but no settlement was reached by the
parties; and that petitioner, Gaza and Francisco
had forcibly, unlawfully and unjustly possessed and
continue to possess the subject property and had
refused to vacate the same.
Petitioner denied that taking possession of
any portion of the property of respondents. He
argued that the cause of action is barred by the
 judgment in the ejectment case. He claimed that
he had been in possession of his land since the early
1950s. As he did before the MTC, petitioner also
alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not estoppel bars petitioner from
raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction
Ruling: YES. Petitioner is estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the RTC. Under Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129, the plenary action of accion publiciana
must be brought before the regional trial courts.
With the modifications introduced by Republic Act
No. 7691 in 1994, the jurisdiction of the regional trial
courts was limited to real actions where the
assessed value exceeds P20,000.00, and P50,000.00
where the action is filed in Metro Manila. Under the
law as modified, jurisdiction is determined by the
assessed value of the property.
In the instant case, nowhere in the
complaint was the assessed value of the subject
property ever mentioned. There is no showing on
the face of the complaint that the RTC has
 jurisdiction exclusive of the MTC. Indeed, absent
any allegation in the complaint of the assessed
determined which of the two trial courts had
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
However, estoppel sets in when a party participates
in all stages of a case before challenging the
 jurisdiction of the lower court. One cannot
belatedly reject or repudiate its decision after
voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure
affirmative relief against one's opponent or after
failing to obtain such relief.
Clearly, petitioner failed to point out the
omission of the assessed value in the complaint.
Page 49 of 93

Petitioner actively participated during the trial by
adducing evidence and filing numerous pleadings,
none of which mentioned any defect in the
 jurisdiction of the RTC. It was only on appeal before
the Court of Appeals, after he obtained an adverse
 judgment in the trial court, that petitioner, for the
first time, came up with the argument that the
decision is void because there was no allegation in
the complaint about the value of the property.
BF CITILAND CORPORATION V. MARILYN B. OTAKE
NATURE: Petition for review of the Resolutions of
CA under RULE 45
FACTS: BF Citiland Corporation is the registered
owner of a lot in Parañaque City, with an assessed
value of P48,000 (based on Tax Declaration).
On 24 February 1987, respondent Merlinda B.
Bodullo bought the adjoining lot. However,
records show respondent occupied not just the lot
she purchased. She also encroached upon
petitioner's lot.
On 13 October 2000, petitioner filed in the
Metropolitan Trial Court a complaint for accion
publiciana praying: that judgment be rendered
ordering respondent to vacate the subject lot;
that respondent be ordered to pay P15,000.00 per
month by way of reasonable compensation for the
use of the lot.
The MeTC ruled in favor of BF Citiland (except rent
was P10K/month), even ordering Bodullo to pay
P20,000 as atty’s fees & costs of the suit.
The MeTC also issued writ of execution & granted
the motion for special order of demolition.
Merlinda Bodulla filed in the RTC a petition for
certiorari under RULE 65, seeking dismissal of the
case in the MeTC for lack of jurisdiction.
RTC reversed the MeTC  –  case dismissed, for lack of
 jurisdiction; alleging that a suit for accion
publiciana fell under the exclusive original
 jurisdiction of the RTC.
BF Citiland claimed Bodullo was estopped for
participating in all the proceedings of the MeTC.
Bodullon countered that the issue on lack of
 jurisdiction can be raised any time.
BF Citiland filed a petition for review under RULE 42:
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
TO THE COURT OF APPEALS.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
Court of Appeals dismissed case saying the proper
appeal from the RTC decision is by way of notice of
appeal.
Hence, BF Citiland filed this Petition for Review in the
SC.
ISSUES:
1) What is the proper mode of appeal from the
decision of the RTC?
2) Who has jurisdiction on the accion
publiciana case?
HELD:
1.) Notice of Appeal  –  because the RTC decided
the case in the exercise of its Original Jurisdiction.
i.e. The case filed in the RTC was an Original
Action for Petition for Review on Certiorari under
RULE 65.
RULES OF COURT:
RULE 41: APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
SECTION 2. MODES OF APPEAL -
ORDINARY APPEAL. -   The appeal to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction   shall
be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court
which rendered the judgment or final order
appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon
the adverse party. x x x
PETITION FOR REVIEW.   - The appeal to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction  shall
be by petition for review in accordance with Rule
42. (Emphasis supplied) x x x
However, in numerous cases, this Court has allowed
liberal construction of the rules when to do so would
serve the demands of substantial justice.
Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon.
Thus, notwithstanding petitioner's wrong mode of
appeal, the Court of Appeals should not have so
easily dismissed the petition.
2.) Metropolitan Trial Court  –   Under BP 129, as
amended, jurisdiction even in accion publiciana
cases is determined by the assessed value of the
property.
With the modifications introduced by REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 7691, the jurisdiction of regional trial courts has
been limited to real actions where the assessed
value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 if the action
Page 50 of 93

is filed in Metro Manila.
If the assessed value is below the said amounts, the
action must be brought before first level courts.
SEC. 33. JURISDICTION OF METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, AND MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS IN CIVIL CASES. -
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
 x x x
Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any
interest therein where the assessed value of the
property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in
Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)   exclusive
of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's
fees, litigation expenses, and costs:
Provided, That in cases of land not declared
for taxation purposes, the value of such
property shall be determined by the
assessed value of the adjacent lots.
(Emphasis supplied)
The subject lot, with an assessed value below the
 jurisdictional limit of P50,000.00 for Metro Manila,
comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
MeTC under BP 129, as amended.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE , the Supreme Court
GRANT the petition.
VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA, Petitioner, vs. FIFTH (5th)
SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT and ROLDAN E. MALA,
represented by his father Hadji Kalam T. Mala,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 188832 / April 23, 2014
Nature: petition for certiorari with application for
issuance of TRO and/or preliminary injunction to set
aside the Shari'a District Court's decision.
Doctrine: Shari' a District Courts have no jurisdiction
over real actions where one of the parties is not a
Muslim.
FACTS: Roldan E. Mala purchased a parcel of land
located in Maguindanao, from one Ceres Cañete.
Transfer Certificate of Title covering the parcel of
land was issued in Roldan’s name. At the time of
the purchase, Vivencio B. Villagracia occupied the
parcel of land.
Vivencio secured a Katibayan ng Orihinal na
Titulo issued by the Land Registration Authority
allegedly covering the same parcel of land. Roldan
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
had the parcel of land surveyed. In a report,
Geodetic Engineer found that Vivencio occupied
the parcel of land covered by Roldan’s cer tificate
of title.
To settle his conflicting claim with Vivencio,
Roldan initiated barangay conciliation proceedings
before the Office of the Barangay Chairman.
Failing to settle with Vivencio at the barangay level,
Roldan filed an action to recover the possession of
the parcel of land with respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court.
Roldan alleged that he is a Filipino Muslim; that
he is the registered owner of the lot covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15633; and that
Vivencio occupied his property, depriving him of
the right to use, possess, and enjoy it.
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court ruled that
Roldan, as registered owner, had the better right to
possess the parcel of land. It ordered Vivencio to
vacate the property, turn it over to Roldan,
Vivencio filed a petition for relief from judgment
with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction. Vivencio cited Article 155, paragraph (2)
of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines and argued that Shari’a District Courts
may only hear civil actions and proceedings if both
parties are Muslims. Considering that he is a
Christian, Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of Roldan’s action for recovery of
possession of a parcel of land.
According to respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court, Vivencio cited the wrong provision of law.
Article 155, paragraph (2) of the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws of the Philippines refers to the
 jurisdiction of Shari’a Circuit Courts, not of Shari’a
District Courts. It ruled that it had jurisdiction over
Roldan’s action for recovery of possession.
Regardless of Vivencio being a non-Muslim, his
rights were not prejudiced since respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court decided the case a pplying the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court denied
Vivencio’s petition for relief from judgment for lack
of merit. Vivencio filed the petition for certiorari with
prayer for issuance of temporary restraining order
with the SC.
Vivencio argued that respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court acted without jurisdiction in rendering
the decision. Under Article 143, paragraph (2)(b) of
the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines,
Shari’a District Courts may only take cognizance of
real actions where the parties involved are Muslims.
Reiterating that he is not a Muslim, Vivencio argued
that respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no
 jurisdiction over the subject matter of Roldan’s
action.
The Supreme Court subsequently issued a
TRO enjoining the implementation of the writ of
execution against Vivencio.
Page 51 of 93

Issue: Whether or not a Shari’a District Court may
validly hear, try, and decide a real action where
one of the parties is a non-Muslim if the District Court
decides the action applying the provisions of the
Civil Code of the Philippines
Held: NO. Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court
had no jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide Roldan’s
action for recovery of possession
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to
hear and determine cases of the general class to
which the proceedings in question belong." This
power is conferred by law, which may either be the
Constitution or a statute. Since subject matter
 jurisdiction is a matter of law, parties cannot
choose, consent to, or agree as to what court or
tribunal should decide their disputes. If a court
hears, tries, and decides an action in which it has
no jurisdiction, all its proceedings, including the
 judgment rendered, are void.
To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action, the material
allegations of the complaint and the character of
the relief sought are examined.
The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District
Courts is the Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines. Under Article 143 of the Muslim
Code, Shari’a District Courts have concurrent
original jurisdiction with "existing civil courts" over
real actions not arising from customary contracts
wherein the parties involved are Muslims:
ART 143. Original jurisdiction.  –  x x x x
(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari’a
District Court shall have original jurisdiction over:
 x x x x
(b) All other personal and real actions not
mentioned in paragraph 1(d)42  wherein the parties
involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry
and unlawful detainer, which shall fall under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit
Court; and
 x x x x
When ownership is acquired over a particular
property, the owner has the right to possess and
enjoy it.43  If the owner is dispossessed of his or her
property, he or she has a right of action to recover
its possession from the dispossessor. 44  When the
property involved is real,45 such as land, the action
to recover it is a real action;46otherwise, the action
is a personal action.47  In such actions, the parties
involved must be Muslims for Shari’a District Courts
to validly take cognizance of them.
In this case, the allegations in Roldan’s petition for
recovery of possession did not state that Vivencio is
a Muslim. When Vivencio stated in his petition for
relief from judgment that he is not a Muslim, Roldan
did not dispute this claim.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
When it became apparent that Vivencio is not a
Muslim, respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court should
have motu proprio dismissed the case. Under Rule
9, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, if it appears that
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action based on the pleadings or the
evidence on record, the court shall dismiss the
claim:
Section 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded.  – 
Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived. However, when it appears from the
pleadings or the evidence on record that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that
there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause, or that the action is
barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no
authority under the law to decide Roldan’s   action
because not all of the parties involved in the action
are Muslims. Thus, it had no jurisdiction over Roldan’s
action for recovery of possession. All its proceedings
in SDC Special Proceedings Case No. 07-200 are
void.
Roldan chose to file his acti on with the Shari’a
District Court, instead of filing the action with the
regular courts, to obtain "a more speedy disposition
of the case."48  This would have been a valid
argument had all the parties involved in this case
been Muslims. Under Article 143 of the Muslim
Code, the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts over
real actions not arising from customary contracts is
concurrent with that of existing civil courts.
However, this concurrent jurisdiction over real
actions "is applicable solely when both parties are
Muslims"49  as this court ruled in Tomawis v. Hon.
Balindong.50  When one of the parties is not a
Muslim, the action must be filed before the regular
courts.
The application of the provisions of the Civil Code
of the Philippines by respondent Fifth Shari’a District
Court does not validate the proceedings before the
court. Under Article 175 of the Muslim Code,
customary contracts are construed in accordance
with Muslim law.51 Hence, Shari’a District Courts
apply Muslim law when resolving real actions arising
from customary contracts.
In real actions not arising from contracts customary
to Muslims, there is no reason for Shari’a District
Courts to apply Muslim law. In such real actions,
Shari’a District Courts will necessarily apply the laws
of general application, which in this case is the Civil
Code of the Philippines, regardless of the court
taking cognizance of the action. This is the reason
why the original jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts
over real actions not arising from customary
contracts is concurrent with that of regular courts.
However, as discussed, this concurrent jurisdiction
arises only if the parties involved are Muslims.
Considering that Vivencio is not a Muslim,
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court had no
Page 52 of 93

 jurisdiction over Roldan’s action for recovery of
possession of real property. The proceedings before
it are void, regardless of the fact that it applied the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines in
resolving the action.
True, no provision in the Code of Muslim Personal
Laws of the Philippines expressly prohibits non-
Muslims from participating in Shari’a court
proceedings. In fact, there are instances when
provisions in the Muslim Code apply to non-Muslims.
Under Article 13 of the Muslim Code,52 provisions of
the Code on marriage and divorce apply to the
female party in a marriage solemnized according
to Muslim law, even if the female is non-Muslim. 53
Under Article 93, paragraph (c) of the Muslim
Code,54  a person of a different religion is
disqualified from inheriting from a Muslim
decedent.55  However, by operation of law and
regardless of Muslim law to the contrary, the
decedent’s parent or spouse who is a non-Muslim
"shall be entitled to one-third of what he or she
would have received without such
disqualification."56  In these instances, non-Muslims
may participate in Shari’a court proceedings.57
Nonetheless, this case does not involve any of the
previously cited instances. This case involves an
action for recovery of possession of real property.
As a matter of law, Shari’a District Courts may only
take cognizance of a real action "wherein the
parties involved are Muslims."58  Considering that
one of the parties involved in this case is not a
Muslim, respondent Fif th Shari’a District Court had
no jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the action
for recovery of possession of real property. The
 judgment against Vivencio is void for respondent
Fifth Shari’a District Court’s lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action.
That Vivencio raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter only after respondent Fifth
Shari’a District Court had rendered judgment is
immaterial. A party may assail the jurisdiction of a
court or tribunal over a subject matter at any stage
of the proceedings, even on appeal. 59 The reason is
that "jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it
affects the very authority of the court to take
cognizance of and to render judgment on the
action."60
In Figueroa v. People of the Philippines,61 Venancio
Figueroa was charged with reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide before the Regional Trial Court
of Bulacan. The trial court convicted Figueroa as
charged. On appeal with the Court of Appeals,
Figueroa raised for the first time the issue of
 jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court to decide the
case. Ruling that the Regional Trial Court had no
 jurisdiction over the crime charged, this court
dismissed the criminal case despite the fact that
Figueroa objected to the trial court’s jurisdiction
only on appeal.
In Metromedia Times Corporation v. Pastorin, 62
Johnny Pastorin filed a complaint for constructive
dismissal against Metromedia Times Corporation.
Metromedia Times Corporation actively
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
participated in the proceedings before the Labor
Arbiter. When the Labor Arbiter ruled against
Metromedia Times, it appealed to the National
Labor Relations Commission, arguing for the first
time that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over
the complaint. According to Metromedia Times, the
case involved a grievance issue "properly
cognizable by the voluntary arbitrator."63  This court
set aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter despite the fact that the issue of jurisdiction
was raised only on appeal.
There are exceptional circumstances when a party
may be barred from assailing the jurisdiction of the
court to decide a case. In the 1968 case of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy,64 the Spouses Tijam sued the Spouses
Sibonghanoy on July 19, 1948 before the Court of
First Instance of Cebu to recover P1,908.00. At that
time, the court with exclusive original jurisdiction to
hear civil actions in which the amount demanded
does not exceed P2,000.00 was the court of justices
of the peace and municipal courts in chartered
cities under Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
As prayed for by the Spouses Tijam in their
complaint, the Court of First Instance issued a writ of
attachment against the Spouses Sibonghanoy.
However, the latter filed a counter-bond issued by
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. Thus, the Court
of First Instance dissolved the writ of attachment.
After trial, the Court of First Instance decided in
favor of the Spouses Tijam. When the writ of
execution returned unsatisfied, the Spouses Tijam
moved for the issuance of a writ of execution
against Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.’s bond.
The Court of First Instance granted the motion.
Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. moved to quash
the writ of execution, which motion the Court of First
Instance denied. Thus, the surety company
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals sustained the Court of First
Instance’s decision. Five days after receiving the
Court of Appeals’ decision, Manila Surety and
Fidelity Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss, arguing for
the first time that the Court of First Instance had no
 jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The
Court of Appeals forwarded the case to this court
for resolution.
This court ruled that the surety company could no
longer assail the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance on the ground of estoppel by laches.
Parties may be barred from assailing the jurisdiction
of the court over the subject matter of the action if
it took them an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time to object to the court’s jurisdiction.65
This is to discourage the deliberate practice of
parties in invoking the jurisdiction of a court to seek
affirmative relief, only to repudiate the court’s
 jurisdiction after failing to obtain the relief sought.66
In such cases, the court’s lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter is overlooked in favor of the
public policy of discouraging such inequitable and
unfair conduct.67
Page 53 of 93

In Tijam, it took Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc.
15 years before assailing the jurisdiction of the Court
of First Instance. As early as 1948, the surety
company became a party to the case when it
issued the counter-bond to the writ of attachment.
During trial, it invoked the jurisdiction of the Court of
First Instance by seeking several affirmative reliefs,
including a motion to quash the writ of execution.
The surety company only assailed the jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance in 1963 when the Court of
Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision. This
court said:
 x x x x Were we to sanction such conduct on
[Manila Surety and Fidelity, Co. Inc.’s] part, We
would in effect be declaring as useless all the
proceedings had in the present case since it was
commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel [the
spouses Tijam] to go up their Calvary once more.
The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent
but revolting.68
After this court had rendered the decision in Tijam,
this court observed that the "non-waivability of
objection to jurisdiction"69  has been ignored, and
the Tijam doctrine has become more the general
rule than the exception.
In Calimlim v. Ramirez,70 this court said:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned
acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous
to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the
subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and
may not be conferred by consent or agreement of
the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on
appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from
the ruling in the cited case of [Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy]. It is to be regretted, however, that
the holding in said case had been applied to
situations which were obviously not contemplated
therein. x x x.71
Thus, the court reiterated the "unquestionably
accepted"72 rule that objections to a court’s
 jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This
is because jurisdiction over the subject matter is a
"matter of law"73  and "may not be conferred by
consent or agreement of the parties."74
In Figueroa,75 this court ruled that the Tijam doctrine
"must be applied with great care;"76  otherwise, the
doctrine "may be a most effective weapon for the
accomplishment of injustice":77
 x x x estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is
not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely  —   only
from necessity, and only in extraordinary
circumstances. The doctrine must be applied with
great care and the equity must be strong in its
favor. When misapplied, the doctrine of estoppel
may be a most effective weapon for the
accomplishment of injustice. x x x a judgment
rendered without jurisdiction over the subject
matter is void. x x x. No laches will even attach
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
when the judgment is null and void for want of
 jurisdiction x x x.78
In this case, the exceptional circumstances similar
to Tijam do not exist. Vivencio never invoked
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court’s jurisdiction to
seek affirmative relief. He filed the petition for relief
from judgment precisely to assail the jurisdiction of
respondent Fifth Shari’a District Court over Roldan’s
petition for recovery of possession.
Thus, the general rule holds. Vivencio validly
assailed the jurisdict ion of respondent Fifth Shari’a
District Court over the action for recovery of
possession for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of Roldan’s action.
oo.) EVANGELINE ALDAY,  petitioner , vs. FGU
INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondent .
Facts: FGU Insurance Corporation filed a complaint
with the RTC of Makati alleging that Alday owed it
P114,650.76, representing unliquidated cash
advances, unremitted costs of premiums and other
charges incurred as an insurance agent.
Respondent also prayed for exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, and costs of suit. Petitioner filed her
answer and by way of counterclaim, asserted her
right for the payment of P104,893.45, representing
direct commissions, profit commissions and
contingent bonuses and for accumulated premium
reserves amounting to P500,000.00. In addition,
petitioner prayed for attorneys fees, litigation
expenses, moral damages and exemplary
damages for the allegedly unfounded action filed
by respondent.
Respondent filed a Motion to Strike Out Answer With
Compulsory Counterclaim And To Declare
Defendant In Default because petitioners answer
was allegedly filed out of time. However, the trial
court denied the motion. A few weeks later,
respondent filed a motion to dismiss petitioners
counterclaim, contending that the trial court never
acquired jurisdiction over the same because of the
non-payment of docket fees by petitioner. In
response, petitioner asked the trial court to declare
her counterclaim as exempt from payment of
docket fees since it is compulsory and that
respondent be declared in default for having failed
to answer such counterclaim.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The
court found petitioners counterclaim to be merely
permissive and held that petitioners failure to pay
docket fees prevented the court from acquiring
 jurisdiction over the same. The Court of Appeals
sustained the trial court.
Issues:
Page 54 of 93

1) Whether or not the respondent is estopped
from questioning her non-payment of
docket fees because it did not raise this
particular issue when it filed its first motion.
2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals had
 jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of the
petitioner.
3) Whether or not the counterclaim was
permissive or compulsory
Held:
Estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to
assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert
it. In the case at bar, respondent cannot be
considered as estopped from assailing the trial
court’s jurisdiction over petitioners counterclaim
since this issue was raised by respondent with the
trial court itself the body where the action is
pending - even before the presentation of any
evidence by the parties and definitely, way before
any judgment could be rendered by the t rial court.
This objection to the CA’s jurisdiction is raised for the
first time before this Court. Although the lack of
 jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of
the action, a party may be estopped from raising
such questions if he has actively taken part in the
very proceedings which he questions, belatedly
objecting to the court’s jurisdiction in the event that
that the judgment or order subsequently rendered is
adverse to him. In this case, respondent actively
took part in the proceedings before the CA by filing
its appellees brief with the same. Its participation,
when taken together with its failure to object to the
 jurisdiction during the entire duration of the
proceedings before such court, demonstrates a
willingness to abide by the resolution of the case by
such tribunal and accordingly, respondent is now
most decidedly estopped.
BOTH. A compulsory counterclaim is one which,
being cognizable by the regular courts of justice,
arises out of or is connected with the transaction or
occurrence constituting the subject matter of the
opposing parties’ claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. In Valencia v.
Court of Appeals, this Court set the criteria to
determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or
permissive,
Are the issues of fact and law  raised by the claim
and counterclaim largely the same?
Would  res judicata  bar a subsequent suit on
defendants claim absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule?
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
Will  substantially the same evidence  support or
refute plaintiffs claim as well as defendants
counterclaim?chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Is there any logical relation between the claim and
the counterclaim?
Another test, applied in Quintanilla v. Court of
 Appeals, is the compelling test of compulsoriness
which requires a logical relationship between the
claim and counterclaim, that is, where conducting
separate trials of the respective claims of the parties
would entail a substantial duplication of effort and
time by the parties and the court.
Petitioner’s counterclaim for commissions, bonuses,
and accumulated premium reserves is merely
permissive. The evidence required to prove
petitioners claims differs from that needed to
establish respondent’s demands for the recovery of
cash accountabilities from petitioner, such as cash
advances and costs of premiums. This conclusion is
further reinforced by petitioners own admissions
since she declared in her answer that respondents
cause of action, unlike her own, was not based
upon the Special Agents Contract.
However, petitioners claims for damages, allegedly
suffered as a result of the filing by respondent of its
complaint, are compulsory.
The rule on the payment of filing fees has been laid
down by the Court in the case of Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of
the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court
with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of
the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading
is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee,
the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims,
third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall
not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee
prescribed therefor is paid. The court may allow
payment of said fee within a reasonable time but
also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a
claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same
has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien
on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the
Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
Page 55 of 93

enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.
In Suson v. Court of Appeals, the Court
explained that although the payment of the
prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional
requirement, its non-payment does not result
in the automatic dismissal of the case
provided the docket fees are paid within
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period. Coming now to the case at bar, it
has not been alleged by respondent and
there is nothing in the records to show that
petitioner has attempted to evade the
payment of the proper docket fees for her
permissive counterclaim. As a matter of
fact, after respondent filed its motion to
dismiss petitioners counterclaim based on
her failure to pay docket fees, petitioner
immediately filed a motion with the trial
court, asking it to declare her counterclaim
as compulsory in nature and therefore
exempt from docket fees and, in addition,
to declare that respondent was in default
for its failure to answer her counterclaim. The
trial court should have instead given
petitioner a reasonable time, but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period, to pay the filing fees
for her permissive counterclaim.
a) MARCOS-ARANETA vs CA G.R. No. 154096,
August 22, 2008
Facts: Ambassador Roberto S. Benedicto, now
deceased, and his business associates (Benedicto
Group) organized Far East Managers and Investors,
Inc. (FEMII) and Universal Equity Corporation (UEC),
respectively. As petitioner Irene Marcos-Araneta
would later allege, both corporations were
organized pursuant to a contract or arrangement
whereby Benedicto, as trustor, placed in his name
and in the name of his associates, as trustees, the
shares of stocks of FEMII and UEC with the obligation
to hold those shares and their fruits in trust and for
the benefit of Irene to the extent of 65% of such
shares. Several years after, Irene, through her
trustee-husband, Gregorio Ma. Araneta III,
demanded the reconveyance of said 65%
stockholdings, but the Benedicto Group refused to
oblige.
In March 2000, Irene thereupon instituted before the
RTC two similar complaints for conveyance of
shares of stock, accounting and receivership
against the Benedicto Group with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO). The
second sought the recovery to the extent of 65% of
FEMII shares held by Benedicto and the other
defendants named therein. Respondent Francisca
Benedicto-Paulino, Benedicto's daughter, filed a
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 3341-17, followed
later by an Amended Motion to Dismiss. Benedicto,
on the other hand, moved to dismiss the case filed,
adopting in toto the five (5) grounds raised by
Francisca in her amended motion to dismiss.
Among these were:
(1) the cases involved an intra-corporate dispute
over which the Securities and Exchange
Commission, not the RTC, has jurisdiction;
(2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) the
complaint failed to state a cause of action, as there
was no allegation therein that plaintiff, as
beneficiary of the purported trust, has accepted
the trust created in her favor.
Upon Benedicto's motion, both cases were
consolidated. During the preliminary proceedings
on their motions to dismiss, Benedicto and
Francisca, by way of bolstering their contentions on
improper venue, presented the Joint Affidavit of
Gilmia B. Valdez, Catalino A. Bactat, and Conchita
R. Rasco who all attested being employed as
household staff at the Marcos' Mansion in Brgy.
Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte and that Irene did not
maintain residence in said place as she in fact only
visited the mansion twice in 1999; that she did not
vote in Batac in the 1998 national elections; and
that she was staying at her husband's house in
Makati City.
Against the aforesaid unrebutted joint affidavit,
Irene presented her PhP 5 community tax certificate
(CTC) issued on "11/07/99" in Curimao, Ilocos Norte
to support her claimed residency in Batac, Ilocos
Norte. In the meantime, on May 15, 2000, Benedicto
died and was substituted by his wife, Julita C.
Benedicto, and Francisca.
RTC dismissed both complaints, stating that these
partly constituted "real action," and that Irene did
not actually reside in Ilocos Norte, and, therefore,
venue was improperly laid. Pending resolution of
her motion for reconsideration, Irene filed a Motion
(to Admit Amended Complaint), attaching Case
Digest:
RULE 4 - Venue CIVIL PROCEDURE
Therewith a copy of the Amended Complaint in
which the names of Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin,
and Jose G. Reslin appeared as additional plaintiffs.
As stated in the amended complaint, the added
plaintiffs, all from Ilocos Norte, were Irene's new
trustees. Parenthetically, the amended complaint
stated practically the same cause of action but, as
couched, sought the reconveyance of the FEMII
shares only. RTC admitted such amended
complaint. Later developments saw the CA issuing
a TRO and then a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining the RTC from conducting further
proceedings on the subject civil cases. It further
rendered a Decision, setting aside the assailed RTC
order and the amended complaint.
Page 56 of 93

Issue:  Whether or not the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the case on the ground of improper venue.
Held:  It is the posture of Julita and Francisca that
the venue was in this case improperly laid since the
suit in question partakes of a real action involving
real properties located outside the territorial
 jurisdiction of the RTC in Batac. This contention is not
well-taken. In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks
the recovery of personal property, the enforcement
of a contract, or the recovery of damag.eRseal
actions, on the other hand, are those affecting title
to or possession of real property, or interest therein.
In accordance with the wordings of Sec. 1 of Rule 4,
the venue of real actions shall be the proper court
which has territorial jurisdiction over the area
wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, is situated. The venue of personal actions is
the court where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of
the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a
non-resident defendant where he may be found, at
the election of the plaint.iff In this case, Irene seeks
to compel recognition of the trust arrangement she
has with the Benedicto Group. The fact that FEMII's
assets include real properties does not materially
change the nature of the action, for the ownership
interest of a stockholder over corporate assets is
only inchoate as the corporation, as a juridical
person, solely owns such assets. It is only upon the
liquidation of the corporation that the stockholders,
depending on the type and nature of their
stockownership, may have a real inchoate right
over the corporate assets, but then only to the
extent of their stockownership. The amended
complaint is an actioinn personam, it being a suit
against Francisca and the late Benedicto (now
represented by Julita and Francisca), on the basis
of their alleged personal liability to Irene upon an
alleged trust constituted in 1968 and/or 1972. They
are not actions in rem where the actions are
against the real properties instead of against
persons. We point out at the outset that Irene, as
categorically and peremptorily found by the RTC
after a hearing, is not a resident of Batac, Ilocos
Norte, as she claimed. The Court perceives no
compelling reason to disturb, in the confines of this
case, the factual determination of the trial court
and the premises holding it together. Accordingly,
Irene cannot, in a personal action, contextually opt
for Batac as venue of her reconveyance complaint.
As to her, Batac, Ilocos Norte is not what Sec. 2,
Rule 4 of the Rules of Court adverts to as the place
"where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides" at the time she filed her amended
complaint. That Irene holds CTC No. 17019451
issued sometime in June 2000 in Batac, Ilocos Norte
and in which she indicated her address as Brgy.
Lacub, Batac, Ilocos is really of no moment. Let
alone the fact that one can easily secure a basic
residence certificate practically anytime in any
Bureau of Internal Revenue or treasurer's office and
dictate whatever relevant data one desires
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
entered, Irene procured CTC No. 17019451 and
appended the same to her motion for
reconsideration following the RTC's pronouncement
against her being a resident of Batac. There can be
no serious dispute that the real party-ininterest
plaintiff is Irene. As self-styled beneficiary of the
disputed trust, she stands to be benefited or entitled
to the avails of the present suit. It is undisputed too
that petitioners Daniel Rubio, Orlando G. Reslin, and
Jose G. Reslin, all from Ilocos Norte, were included
as co-plaintiffs in the amended complaint as Irene's
new designated trustees. As trustees, they can only
serve as mere representatives of Irene. Sec. 2 of
Rule 4 indicates quite clearly that when there is
more than one plaintiff in a personal action case,
the residences of the principal parties should be the
basis for determining proper venue.
Before the RTC in Batac, in Civil Case Nos. 3341-17
and 3342- 17, Irene stands undisputedly as the
principal plaintiff, the real party-in-interest. Following
Sec. 2 of Rule 4, the subject civil cases ought to be
commenced and prosecuted at the place where
Irene resides. Irene was a resident during the period
material of Forbes Park, Makati City. She was not a
resident of Brgy. Lacub, Batac, Ilocos Norte,
although jurisprudence has it that one can have
several residences, if such were the established
fact.
b) Fortune Motors, Inc. v. CA, Metropolitan
Bank and Trust Company
Facts: Private respondent extended various loans to
petitioner for a total sum of P32,500,000.00;Due to
financial difficulties, and economic recession, the
petitioner was not able to pay the loan which
became due; The respondent bank initiated
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, the
mortgaged property was sold at public auction
where respondent was the highest bidder;
3 days before the expiration of the redemption
period, petitioner filed a complaint for the
annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale at
the RTC of Manila, alleging that:
(a) the foreclosure was premature because its
(b) obligation to the Bank was not yet due, he
publication of the notice of sale was
incomplete, there was no public auction,
(c) the price for which was “shockingly low”;
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the venue of the
action wasimproperly laid in Manila for the
realty covered by the real estate mortgages is
situated in Makati, therefore the action to annul
the foreclosure sale should be filed in the RTC of
Makati;
Page 57 of 93

Petitioner argued that its action is a personal action
and that the issue is the validity of the extrajudicial
foreclosure proceedings so that it may have a new
one year period to redeem the same.
Lower court rulings:
RTC: reserved the resolution of the Bank’s motion to
dismiss until after the trial on the merits
CA: on petition for certiorari and prohibition,
granted the petitions and dismissed the case
without prejudice to the filing of the case before
the proper courts
*Reconsideration was denied, hence the petition
before the SC
Issue : WON petitioner’s action for annulment of the
real estate mortgage extrajudicial foreclosure sale
of Fortune Building is personal action or a real
action for venue purposes
Ruling: Yes, the action is a real action which should
have been filed before the RTC of Makati.
Real actions or actions affecting title to, or for the
recovery of possession, or for the partition or
condemnation of or foreclosure of mortgage on
real property, must be instituted in the CFI of the
province where the property or any part thereof
lies.
Personal actions upon the other hand, may be
instituted in the CFI where the defendant resides or
may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the
plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
An action for the annulment or rescission of
contract does not operate to efface the true
objectives and nature of action which is to recover
real property.
An action for annulment or rescission of sale of real
property is a real action; its prime objective is to
recover said real property.
An action to annul a real estate mortgage
foreclosure is no different from an action to annul a
private sale of real property.
Hence, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The
decision of CA is affirmed.
c) Biaco vs. Philippine Countryside Rural Bank,
GR 161417, February 8, 2007
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
Ernesto Biaco, husband of Teresa Biaco, acquired
several loans from Philippine Countryside Rural Bank
(PCRB) from 1996 to 1998. To secure the loans, he
mortgaged certain property in favor of the bank.
He was able to pay loans from 1996 to 1997 but he
defaulted in loans obtained in 1998 which
amounted to more than a million pesos.
Eventually, PCRB filed a complaint for foreclosure
against the spouses Biaco. Summons were issued
by the trial judge. The Sherriff served the summons
to Ernesto at the latter’s office. No summons was
served to Teresa.
Ernesto did not file a responsive pleading (so did
Teresa because she was not aware sans the
summons being served her). The case was heard
ex-parte and the spouses were ordered to satisfy
the debt and failure to do so will authorize the
Sheriff to auction the mortgaged the property.
Eventually, the mortgaged property was auctioned
for P150k which is not sufficient to cover the P1 M+
debt. Upon motion by PCRB, a notice of levy was
issued against the personal properties of Teresa to
satisfy the deficiency.
It was only at this point that Teresa learned of the
previous ex parte proceedings. She then sought to
have the judgment annulled as she now claims that
she was deprived of due process when she did not
receive summons; that it was only her husband who
received the summons; that there was extrinsic
fraud because her husband deliberately hid the
fact of the foreclosure proceeding.
PRCB argued that the foreclosure proceeding is an
action quasi in rem, hence Teresa’s participation is
not required so long as the court acquires
 jurisdiction over the res which is what happened in
the case at bar; that Teresa cannot invoke extrinsic
fraud because such situation cannot occur in her
case because she is a co-defendant of Ernesto.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of the trial court
should be annulled.
HELD: Yes. It is admitted that the proceeding is a
quasi in rem proceeding and that the presence of
Teresa is not required because the trial court was
able to acquire jurisdiction over the res (mortgaged
property).
HOWEVER, her constitutional right to due process is
superior over the procedural matters mentioned.
Her right to due process was violated when she did
not receive summons. Teresa, as a resident
defendant, who does not voluntary appear in court
must be  personally  served with summons as
provided under Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court. Even if the action is quasi in rem, personal
service of summons is essential in order to afford her
due process. The substituted service made by the
sheriff at her husband’s office cannot be deemed
proper service absent any explanation that efforts
had been made to personally serve summons upon
her but that such efforts failed. Further, the order of
the trial court compelling Teresa to pay off the debt
using her personal property is a judgment in
personam which the court cannot do because it
only acquired jurisdiction over the res and not over
the person of Teresa.
Page 58 of 93

On the issue of extrinsic fraud, the Court of Appeals,
agreeing with PCRB, is correct that there is none in
the case at bar. Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a
fraudulent act committed by the prevailing party
outside of the trial of the case, whereby the
defeated party was prevented from presenting fully
his side of the case by fraud or deception
practiced on him by the prevailing party. Extrinsic
fraud is present where the unsuccessful party had
been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by
fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a
false promise of a compromise; or where the
defendant never had knowledge of the suit, being
kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or
where an attorney fraudulently or without authority
assumes to represent a party and connives at his
defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed
corruptly sells out his client’s interest to the other
side. The above is not applicable in the case of
Teresa. It was not PCRB which made any fraud. It
should be noted that spouses Biaco were co-
defendants in the case and shared the same
interest.
d) JESSE U. LUCAS V. JESUS S. LUCAS G.R. No.
190710, [June 6, 2011]
FACTS:  Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to
Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of
Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional  Trial
Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that he is the son of his
mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent,
Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted
documents which include (a) petitioner’s certificate
of live birth; (b) petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c)
petitioner’s college diploma, showing that he
graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City
with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of
Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of
Recognition from the University of the Philippines,
College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles
from different newspapers about petitioner, as a
musical prodigy.
Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special
Appearance and Comment manifesting that the
petition was adversarial in nature and therefore
summons should be served on him. Meanwhile,
Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the
Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form
and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a
Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA
testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere
allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the
RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to
establish compliance  with the four procedural
aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the
case of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima faciecase,
affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy,
and physical resemblance between the putative
father and the child.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
This prompted Jesse to file  a Motion for
Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new
hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that
ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing
the instant petition is premature considering that a
full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by
the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of
Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four
significant aspects of a traditional paternity action
had been met and held that DNA testing should
not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to
establish a prima facie case.
ISSUE:  Whether aprima facie showing is necessary
before a court can issue a DNA testing order
HELD:  Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack
ofa prima facie  case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA
testing since no evidence has, as yet, been
presented by petitioner.
RATIO:  Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. The
statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four
significant procedural aspects in a traditional
paternity case which parties have to face has been
widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A
party is confronted by these so-called procedural
aspects during trial, when the parties have
presented their respective evidence. They are
matters of evidence that cannot be determined at
this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the
petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CA’s
observation that petitioner failed to establish a
prima facie case is herefore misplaced. A prima
facie case is built by a party’s evidence and not by
mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely
provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard
the accuracy and integrity of the DNA testing. It
states that the appropriate court may, at any time,
either motu proprio or on application of any person,
who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation,
order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due
hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing
of the following: (a) A biological sample exists that is
relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i)
was not previously subjected to the type of DNA
testing now requested; or (ii) was previously
subjected to DNA testing, but the results may
require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA
testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The
DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce
new information that is relevant to the proper
resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of
other factors, if any, which the court may consider
as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of
the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA
testing, without need of a prior court order, at the
behest of any party, including law enforcement
agencies, before a suit or proceeding is
commenced. This does not mean, however, that a
DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right
Page 59 of 93

if, during the hearing, the said conditions are
established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA
testing order, there must be a show cause hearing
wherein the applicant  must first present sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case or a
reasonable possibility of paternity or “good cause”
for the holding of the test. In these states, a court
order for blood testing is considered a “search,”
which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be
preceded by a finding of probable cause in order
to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima
facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in
civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of
probable cause. Courts in various jurisdictions have
differed regarding the kind of procedures which are
required, but those jurisdictions have almost
universally found that a preliminary showing must
be made before a court can constitutionally  order
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We
agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter,
before the court may issue an order for compulsory
blood testing, the moving party must show that
there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As
explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is
contested and a party to the action refuses to
voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause
hearing must be held in which the court can
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to
establish a prima facie case which warrants
issuance of a court order for blood testing The same
condition precedent should be applied in our
 jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere
harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the
motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present
prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable
possibility of paternity.”
e) Dial Corp. v Judge Soriano, Imperial
Vegetable Oil Co.
Facts: Petitioners are foreign corporations organize
and existing under the laws of US, UK, Malaysia, and
are NOT domiciled in the Philippines, NOR do they
have officers or agents, place of business, or
property in the Phil., they are not licensed to
engaged, and ARE not engaged in business here.
Respondent (IVO) is a Philippine corporation;The
petitioners and respondent entered into a contract
for delivery of coconut oil to the petitioners. Those
contracts stipulate that any dispute shall be
resolved through arbitration, either in FOSFA or
NIOP. Because IVO failed to deliver, petitioners and
15 others, initiated arbitration proceedings and
some have already obtained arbitration awards
against respondent. IVO filed a complaint for
injunction against 19 foreign coconut oil buyers
including petitioner, with whom its president
Dominador Monteverde, entered into contract
with. IVO repudiated Monteverde’s contracts oon
the ground that they were mere “paper trading in
futures” as no actual delivery of the coconut oil was
allegedly intended by the parties. IVO replaced
Dominador Monteverde and named Rodrigo
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
Monteverde in his stead and disowned the former’s
allegedly unauthorized acts. Petitioners allegedly
“harassed” IVO to recognize the contract entered
into by Dominador and to come into settlement
with them, which is why IVO applied for TRO and
WPI; IVO also prayed for Moral Damages, Actual
Damages, Exemplary Damages, and Counsel
Appearances. On motion of IVO, respondent judge
authorized to effect EXTRATERRITORIAL SERVICE OF
SUMMONS to all the defendants through DHL
Philippines; Pursuant to such order, petitioners were
served with summons and copy of the complaint by
DHL courier service. Without submitting to court’s
 jurisdiction, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on
the ground that the extraterritorial service of
summons to them was improper and that hence
the court did not acquire jurisdiction over them. The
respondent court denied the motion on the ground
that “the present action relates to property rights
which lie in contracts within the Philippines, or which
defendant claim liens or interests, actual or
inchoate, legal or equitable. And one of the reliefs
demanded consists, wholly or in part, in excluding
the defendants from interest in such property for the
reason that their transactions with plaintiffs former
president are ultra vires. Furthermore, as “foreign
corporations doing business in the Philippines
without a license, they opened themselves to suit
before Philippine courts”, pursuant to Sec. 133 of
the Corporation Code of the Philippines. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was also denied, hence
this petition for certiorari with TRO, which the court
granted;
*Directly went up to the SC
Issue: WON the extraterritorial service of summons
was proper to notify petitioners and will
consequently result to the court having jurisdiction;
Ruling: No, the extraterritorial service of summons
was is not proper and therefore, null and void.
Only in 4 instances is extraterritorial service of
summons proper:
(1) When the action affects personal status of the
plaintiffs;
(2) When the action relates to, or the subject of
which is, property within the Philippines, in which
defendant has claims or lien or interest, actual or
contingent;
(3) When relief demanded in such action consists in
excluding defendant from any interest in property
located in the Philippines; and
(4) When defendant non-resident’s property has
been attached within the Philippines;
The complaint in this case does not involve personal
status of the plaintiff, nor any property in the
Philippines in which defendants have or claim an
interest, or which the plaintiff has attached.
Page 60 of 93

The action is purely an action for injunction to
restrain the defendants from enforcing against IVO
(“abusing and harassing”) its contracts for the
delivery of coconut oil to the defendants, and to
recover from the defendants P21 million in
damages for such “harassment”.
It is clearly a PERSONAL ACTION as well as an
ACTION IN PERSONAM, not an action in rem or
quasi in rem.
“An action in personam is an action against a
person on the basis of his personal liability, while an
action in remedies (action in rem) is an action
against the thing itself, instead of the person.”
(Hernandez case)
A personal action is one brought for the recovery of
personal property, for the enforcement of some
contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or
for the recovery of damages for the commission of
an injury to the person or property. (Hernandez
case also)
This case is a personal action, personal or
substituted service of summons on the defendants,
NOT extraterritorial service, is necessary to confer
 jurisdiction on the court.
General rule: when defendant is not residing in the
Philippines, the Philippine courts cannot try any
case against him because of the impossibility of
acquiring jurisdiction over his person.
Exception:
(1) Voluntary appearance;
(2) Affects personal status of plaintiffs;
(3) Or intended to seize or dispose of any property,
real or personal, of the defendant located in the
Philippines
All of the above is because they already have
 jurisdiction over the res.
F) Chua vs. Metropolitan bank
Facts:
- Chua and Filiden (the company where
Chua is president) obtained P4 million peso
loan from Metroank
- This loan is secured by a a real estate
mortgage
- Since the value of the collateral was more
than the loan, Chua was given an open
credit line for future loans
- Chua/Filiden obtained other loans from
respondent Metrobank, and the real estate
mortgages were repeatedly amended in
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
accordance with the increase in
Chua/Filiden’s liabilities.
- Having failed to fully pay their obligations,
petitioners entered into a Debt Settlement
Agreement with respondent Metrobank,
whereby the loan was restructured.
- Eventually, the lawyers of Metrobank
demanded that Chua/Filiden fully pay and
settle their liabilities, including interest and
penalties, in the total amount
ofP103,450,391, as well as the stipulated
attorney’s fees, within three days from
receipt of said letter.
- When petitioners still failed to pay their
loans, Metrobank sought to extra-judicially
foreclose the REM constituted on the subject
properties. Upon a verified Petition for
Foreclosure filed by respondent Metrobank
- Chua, in his personal capacity and acting
on behalf of petitioner Filiden, filed before
Branch 257, a Complaint for Injunction with
Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO), Preliminary Injunction and
Damages (from this point on shall be called
Injunction Complaint).
- RTC-Branch 257 issued a TRO enjoining
respondents Metrobank and Atty. Celestra
from conducting the auction sale of the
mortgaged properties on 31 May 2001.
- After the expiration of the TRO on 18 June
2001, and no injunction having been issued
by RTC-Branch 257, respondent Atty.
Celestra reset the auction sale on 8
November 2001.
- On 8 November 2001, the rescheduled
date of the auction sale, RTC-Branch 257
issued an Order directing that the said sale
be reset anew after 8 November 2001 .
- Order was served on 8 November 2001, on
respondent Atty. Celestra’s daughter,
Arlene Celestra,
- The auction sale, however, proceeded on 8
November 2001, and a Certificate of Sale
was accordingly issued to respondent
Metrobank as the highest bidder of the
foreclosed properties.
- Chua amended the Injunction Complaint
o alleged that the Certificate of Sale
was a falsified document since there
was no actual sale that took place
on 8 November 2001.
o And, even if an auction sale was
conducted, the Certificate of Sale
would still be void because the
auction sale was done in
disobedience to a lawful order of
RTC-Branch 257.
- Chua additionally prayed in their Amended
Complaint for the award of damages
Page 61 of 93

- RTC-Branch 257 denied Chua’s  application
for injunction on the ground that the sale of
the foreclosed properties rendered the
same moot and academic.
o Ruled that the Nov 8 2001 auction
sale was valid
- Chua filed a Motion for Reconsideration
- When RTC-Branch 257 failed to take any
action on said Motion, petitioners filed with
the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari
- CA reversed RTC-Branch 257, remanded the
case for further proceedings
- The Supreme Court dismissed Metrobank’s
appeal with finality
- RTC-Branch 257 set the hearing for the
presentation of evidence by respondent
Metrobank for the application for
preliminary injunction on November 9, 2005.
- On 28 October 2005, Chua filed with Branch
195 of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque
(RTC-Branch 195) a Verified Complaint for
Damages  against respondents Metrobank,
Atty. Celestra, and three Metrobank
lawyers.
o Chua sought in their Complaint the
award of actual, moral, and
exemplary damages against
Metrobank for making it appear that
an auction sale of the subject
properties took place, as a result of
which, the prospective buyers of the
said properties lost their interest and
petitioner Chua was prevented from
realizing a profit of P70,000,000.00
from the intended sale.
Chua sought the inhibition of Executive
-
Judge of RTC-Branch 257
- Chua’s motion was granted and the case
was re-raffled to RTC-Branch 258
- Petitioners filed with RTC-Branch 195 a
Motion to Consolidate the Injunction
complaint (which was docketed in RTC-
Branch 257) and the Damages complaint
(which was docketed in RTC-Branch 195).
Metrobank filed with RTC-Branch 195 an
-
Opposition to Motion to Consolidate with
Prayer for Sanctions, praying for the dismissal
of the Complaint for Damages, on the
ground of forum shopping.
- RTC-Branch 195 granted the Motion to
Consolidate, and ordered that the
Injunction case be transferred to RTC-Branch
258
- Metrobank filed before RTC-Branch 258.
o Motion for Reconsideration of RTC-
Branch 195’s order granting to
consolidate
o Manifestation and Motion raising the
ground of forum shopping
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
- RTC-Branch 258 dismissed the Damages
Complaint on the ground of forum shopping
o RTC-Branch 258 declared that the
facts or claims submitted by
petitioners, the rights asserted, and
the principal parties in the two cases
were the same.
- Chua filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari
with the Court of Appeals
- Court of Appeals affirmed Order of RTC-
Branch 258. The appellate court observed
that although the defendants in the two
cases were not identical, they represented
a community of interest. It also declared
that the cause of action of the two cases,
upon which the recovery of damages was
based, was the same
- The Court of Appeals additionally noted
that petitioners admitted in their Motion for
Consolidation that the Injunction Complaint
and the Damages Complaint involved the
same parties, central issue, and subject
properties.
Additional facts to note:
- Chua/Filiden failed to state in the Certificate
of Non-Forum Shopping,   attached to their
Verified Complaint for Damages before
RTC-Branch 195, the existence of the
Injunction Case pending before RTC-Branch
258.
-
- In the Injunction Case, the damages
purportedly arose from the bad faith of
respondents in offering the subject
properties at the auction sale at a price
much lower than the assessed fair market
value of the said properties, said to be
P176,117,000.00. On the other hand, the
Damages Complaint, allegedly resulted
from the backing out of prospective buyers,
who had initially offered to buy the subject
properties for “not less than
P175,000,000.00,” because respondents
made it appear that the said properties
were already sold at the auction sale.
Applicable Law:
The proscription against forum shopping is
found in Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
which provides that:
SEC. 5. Certification against
forum shopping. — The plaintiff or
principal party shall certify under oath
Page 62 of 93

in the complaint or other initiatory
pleading asserting a claim for relief, or
in a sworn certification annexed
thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not
theretofore commenced any action or
filed any claim involving the same
issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-
 judicial agency and, to the best of his
knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is
such other pending action or claim, a
complete statement of the present
status thereof; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or
similar action or claim has been filed or
is pending, he shall report that fact
within five (5) days therefrom to the
court wherein his aforesaid complaint
or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the
foregoing requirements shall not be
curable by mere amendment of the
complaint or other initiatory pleading
but shall be cause for the dismissal of
the case without prejudice, unless
otherwise provided, upon motion and
after hearing . The submission of a false
certification or non-compliance with
any of the undertakings therein shall
constitute indirect contempt of court,
without prejudice to the corresponding
administrative and criminal actions. If
the acts of the party or his counsel
clearly constitutes willful and
deliberate forum shopping, the same
shall be ground for summary dismissal
with prejudice and shall constitute
direct contempt, as well as a cause for
administrative sanctions.
First Issue: WON the two complaints of Chua had a
single cause of action.
Held:
YES. In the present case, there is no dispute that
petitioners failed to state in the Certificate of Non-
Forum Shopping,  attached to their Verified
Complaint for Damages before RTC-Branch 195, the
existence of the Injunction Case pending before
RTC-Branch 258.
Nevertheless, petitioners insist that they are not
guilty of forum shopping, since
(1) the two cases do not have the same ultimate
objective  –   Injunction Complaint seeks
annulment of the 8 November 2001 public auction
and certificate of sale issued therein, while the
Damages Complaint prays for the award of actual
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
and compensatory damages for respondents’
tortuous act of making it appear that an auction
sale actually took place on 8 November 2001; and
(2) the judgment in the Injunction Case, on the
annulment of the foreclosure sale, would not affect
the outcome of the Damages Case, on the
entitlement of petitioners to damages.
The Court, however, finds these arguments refuted
by the allegations made by petitioners themselves
in their Complaints in both cases.
Petitioners committed forum shopping by filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action,
although with different prayers.
There is a splitting of cause of action. Petitioners
would like to make it appear that the Injunction
Case was solely concerned with the nullification of
the auction sale and certification of sale, while the
Damages Complaint was a totally separate claim
for damages. Yet, a review of the records reveals
that petitioners also included an explicit claim for
damages in their Amended Complaint
Petitioners averred in their Amended Complaint in
the Injunction Case that the assessed fair market
value of the subject properties was
P176,117,000.00.[39]
The Court observes that the damages being
claimed by petitioners in their Damages Complaint
were also occasioned by the supposedly fictitious 8
November 2001foreclosure sale,
There is no question that the claims of petitioners for
damages in Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 and Civil
Case No. CV-05-0402 are premised on the same
cause of action, i.e., the purportedly wrongful
conduct of respondents in connection with the
foreclosure sale of the subject properties.
the
At first glance, said claims for damages may
appear different. In the Injunction Case, the
damages purportedly arose from the bad faith of
Page 63 of 93

respondents in offering the subject properties at the
auction sale at a price much lower than the
assessed fair market value of the said properties,
said to be P176,117,000.00. On the other hand, the
Damages Complaint, allegedly resulted from the
backing out of prospective buyers, who had initially
offered to buy the subject properties for “not less
than P175,000,000.00,” because respondents made
it appear that the said properties were already sold
at the auction sale. Yet, it is worthy to note that
petitioners quoted closely similar values for the
subject properties in both cases, against which they
measured the damages they supposedly suffered .
Evidently, this is due to the fact that petitioners
actually based the said values on the single
appraisal report of the Philippine Appraisal
Company on the subject properties. Even though
petitioners did not specify in their Amended
Complaint in the Injunction Case the exact amount
of damages they were seeking to recover, leaving
the same to the determination of the trial court,
and petitioners expressly prayed that they be
awarded damages of not less than P70,000,000.00
in their Damages complaint, petitioners cannot
deny that all their claims for damages arose from
what they averred was a fictitious public auction
sale of the subject properties.
Moreover, petitioners admitted in their Motion to
Consolidate before]RTC-Branch 195 that both cases
shared the same parties, the same central issue,
and the same subject property.
Second Issue:
WON the forum shopping was willful and deliberate,
and the Damages Case should be dismissed with
prejudice to the Injunction Case
Held:
NO
If the forum shopping is not considered willful and
deliberate, the subsequent case shall be dismissed
without prejudice,  on the ground of either litis
pendentia or  res judicata. However, if the forum
shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if
there are more than two) actions shall be dismissed
with prejudice ..[43] In this case, petitioners did not
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
deliberately file the Damages Case for the purpose
of seeking a favorable decision in another forum.
Otherwise, they would not have moved for the
consolidation of both cases. Thus, only the
Damages Case is dismissed and the hearing of the
Injunction Case before RTC-Branch 258 will be
continued.
G) MA-AO SUGAR CENTRAL CO. vs. BARRIOS
G.R. No. L-1539, 03 December 1947
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the
order of the respondent judge denying the motion
to dismiss the complaint of the other respondents
which seek to recover amounts of money due then
from the petitioner before the outbreak of the war,
on the ground that the respondent judge acted
without or in excess of the court's jurisdiction in
rendering said order; and for prohibition to forbid
the respondent judge from taking cognizance of
the case on the ground that the respondent judge
had no jurisdiction to try and decide it. The ground
for the motion to dismiss filed by the petitioner is
that the complaint of the respondents does not
state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action,
because the plaintiffs have no right to demand the
payment of the defendants' alleged debts until
after the termination or legal cessation of the
moratorium provided No. 32, the pertinent part of
which reads as follows: III. DEBT MORATORIUM1.
Enforcement of payment of all debts and other
monetary obligations payable within the Philippines,
except debts and other monetary obligations,
entered into in any area after declaration by
Presidential Proclamation that such area has been
freed from enemy occupation and control, is
temporarily suspended pending action by the
Commonwealth Government.
Issue:
Whether or not the complaint of the plaintiffs-
respondents states no cause of action and the
petition for certiorari and prohibition filed in the
present case do not entitle the petitioner to said
reliefs. Yes!
Held:
It is plain and Supreme Court (SC) is of the opinion
that the complaint filed by the plaintiff respondent
in the court below does not state facts sufficient to
constitute a cause of action. A cause of action is
an act or omission of one party in violation of the
legal right or rights of the other; and its essential
elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of
the defendant in violation of said legal right. In the
Page 64 of 93

present case the complaint alleges the legal right
of the plaintiffs to be paid the amount due them
from the defendant, as well as the correlative
obligation of the defendant to pay said debts to
the plaintiffs when it becomes due and payable;
but not the omission on the part of the defendant
to pay in violation of the legal rights of the plaintiffs
to be paid, because according to the above
quoted provision of Executive Order No. 32, said
debts are not yet payable or their payment cannot
be enforced until the legal cessation of the
moratorium, which is still in force. As the defendant
herein petitioner is not yet in default, plaintiffs have
no cause of action against him. While the debt
moratorium is in force the defendant-petitioner has
no obligation yet to pay the plaintiffs, and the latter
cannot file a suit against him in the courts of justice
requiring him to recognize his debts to the plaintiffs
and to pay them (after the moratorium) not only
the amount of the indebtedness, but the legal
interest thereon from the filling of the complaint, the
attorney's fees of ten per centum of the amounts
due, and the costs of the suits. There is no such
action to compel a defendant to acknowledge or
recognize his debt which is not yet payable, distinct
and different from the action for recovery or
payment of a debt already due and payable,
against the debtor who refuses to pay it. To allow
the plaintiffs' action and grant the relief demanded
in the complaint, would be to compel the
defendant to pay legal interest of the amount
claimed from filing of the said complaint, as well as
the attorney’s fees of 10 per cent of the sum due
thereon as stipulated, and the costs of the suit, as if
the defendants' obligations to the plaintiffs were
already payable and he had failed or refused to
pay them. Why should the defendant be required
to bear the expenses incidental to a suit before he
has violated the plaintiffs' right? How could plaintiffs
assume that the defendant will not pay his debts
when they become payable, and for that reason
they have filed this action against defendant? Why
should not the contrary be presumed, that is, that
the debtor will pay his obligation at the proper time,
in order to prevent a suit, preserve its credit, and
avoid the expenses incident to a suit, and the
payment of legal interest on the amount due and
attorney's fees? After stating SC’s opinion that the
complaint of the plaintiff’s respondent’s states no
cause of action, SC has to hold that the facts
stated in the petition for certiorari and prohibition
filed in the present case do not entitle the petitioner
to said reliefs. It requires no argument to show that
the respondent judge had jurisdiction and did not
exceed it or act with grave abuse of discretion in
denying the petitioner’s motion to dismiss, and
therefore we have to dismiss the present petition.
This Court, in special civil actions of certiorari and
prohibition, can only determine the question
whether or not the court acted without or in excess
of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of its discretion
in doing the act complained of. SC can not correct
errors committed by the lower courts in their
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
 judgments, decrees or orders rendered in the
exercise of their jurisdiction.
G.R. NO. 129242 January 16, 2001
PILAR S. VDA. DE MANALO, ANTONIO S. MANALO,
ORLANDO S. MANALO, and ISABELITA MANALO
,petitioners, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MANILA (BRANCH 35), PURITA S. JAYME,
MILAGROS M. TERRE, BELEN M. ORILLANO, ROSALINA
M. ACUIN, ROMEO S. MANALO, ROBERTO S.
MANALO, AMALIA MANALO and IMELDA MANALO,
respondents.
FACTS: Troadio Manalo, a resident of 1996 Maria
Clara Street, Sampaloc, Manila died intestate on
February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar
S. Manalo, and his eleven (11) children, namely:
Purita M. Jayme, Antonio Manalo, Milagros M. Terre,
Belen M. Orillano, Isabelita Manalo, Rosalina M.
Acuin, Romeo Manalo, Roberto Manalo, Amalia
Manalo, Orlando Manalo and Imelda Manalo, who
are all of legal age.1âwphi1.nêt
At the time of his death, Troadio Manalo left
several real properties located in Manila and in the
province of Tarlac including a business under the
name and style Manalo's Machine Shop.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents,
who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the
late Troadio Manalo, namely; Purita, Milagros, Belen
Rocalina, Romeo, Roberto, Amalia, and Imelda
filed a petition with the respondent Regional Trial
Court of Manila of the judicial settlement of the
estate of their late father, Troadio Manalo, and for
the appointment of their brother, Romeo Manalo,
as administrator thereof.
On February 11, 1993, the date set for
hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an
order 'declaring the whole world in default, except
the government. However, the trial court upon
motion of the petitioners set the order of general
default aside and granted herein petitioners
(oppositors therein) namely: Pilar S. Vda. De
Manalo, Antonio, Isabelita and Orlando who (10)
days within which to file their opposition to the
petition.
On July 30, 1993, the trial court issued an
order a.) Admitting the opposition of the petitioners
only for the purpose of considering the merits
thereof and b.) denying the prayer of the
petitioners for a preliminary hearing of their
affirmative defenses as ground for the dismissal of
this proceeding, said affirmative defenses being
irrelevant and immaterial to the purpose and issue
of the present proceeding
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of
Page 65 of 93

Appeals, contending that there was absence of
earnest efforts toward compromise among
members of the same family. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition for certiorari and the motion
for reconsideration of the said resolution was
likewise dismissed.
The petitioners alleged that the CA erred in
upholding the orders of the RTC which denied their
motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for
 judicial settlement of estate despite the failure of
the petitioners therein to aver that earnest efforts
toward a compromise involving members of the
same family have been made prior to the filling of
the petition but that the same have failed.
Petitioners claimed that the petition in SP.
PROC. No. 92-63626 is actually an ordinary civil
action involving members of the same family. They
point out that it contains certain averments, which,
according to them, are indicative of its adversarial
nature, to wit:
X X X left by the deceased which are sought to be settled
Par. 7. One of the surviving sons, ANTONIO
MANALO, since the death of his father,
TROADIO MANALO, had not made any
settlement, judicial or extra-judicial of the
properties of the deceased father TROADIO
MANALO.
Par. 8. xxx the said surviving son continued to
manage and control the properties
aforementioned, without proper
accounting, to his own benefit and
advantage xxx.
X X X
Par. 12. That said ANTONIO MANALO is
managing and controlling the estate of the
deceased TROADIO MANALO to his own
advantage and to the damage and
prejudice of the herein petitioners and their
co-heirs xxx.
X X X may not validly take refuge under the provisions of
Thus, according to the petitioners, the
petition should be dismissed under Rule 16, Section
1(j) of the Revised Rules of Court which provides
that a motion to dismiss a complaint may be filed
on the ground that a condition precedent for filling
the claim has not been complied with, that is, that
the petitioners therein failed to aver in the petition
in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626, that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made involving
members of the same family prior to the filling of the
petition pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
ISSUE: What is the nature of the action/petition?  –  IT
IS A SPECIAL PROCEEDING
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
RULING: It is a fundamental rule that in the
determination of the nature of an action or
proceeding, the averments and the character of
the relief sought in the complaint, or petition, as in
the case at bar, shall be controlling. A careful
scrutiny of the Petition for Issuance of Letters of
Administration, Settlement and Distribution of Estate
in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 belies herein petitioners'
claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary
civil action.
The said petition contains sufficient
 jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person, such as
the fact of death of the late Troadio Manalo on
February 14, 1992, as well as his residence in the City
of Manila at the time of his said death. The fact of
death of the decedent and of his residence within
the country are foundation facts upon which all the
subsequent proceedings in the administration of the
estate rest. The petition in SP.PROC No. 92-63626
also contains an enumeration of the names of his
legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties
in the probate proceedings. In addition, the relief's
prayed for in the said petition leave no room for
doubt as regard the intention of the petitioners
therein (private respondents herein) to seek judicial
settlement of the estate of their deceased father,
Troadio Manalo.
Petitioners argue that even if the petition in
SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 were to be considered as a
special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a
deceased person, Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules
of Court vis-à-visArticle 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines would nevertheless apply as a ground
for the dismissal of the same by virtue of Rule 1,
Section 2 of the Rules of Court which provides that
the 'rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceedings.'
Petitioners contend that the term "proceeding" is so
broad that it must necessarily include special
proceedings.
The argument is misplaced. Herein petitioners
Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the
invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for
settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio
Manalo inasmuch as the latter provision is clear
enough. Article 222 of the Civil Code is applicable
only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the
term 'suit' that it refers to an action by one person or
persons against another or other in a court of justice
in which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the
law affords him for the redress of an injury or the
enforcement of a right, whether at law or in equity.
A civil action is thus an action filed in a court of
 justice, whereby a party sues another for the
enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress
of a wrong.
Page 66 of 93

It must be emphasized that the oppositors
(herein petitioners) are not being sued in SP. PROC.
No. 92-63626 for any cause of action as in fact no
defendant was imploded therein. The Petition for
issuance of letters of Administration, Settlement and
Distribution of Estate in SP. PROC. No. 92-63626 is a
special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy
whereby the petitioners therein seek to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact. The respondents
merely seek to establish the fact of death of their
father and subsequently to be duly recognized as
among the heirs of the said deceased so that they
can validly exercise their right to participate in the
settlement and liquidation of the estate of the
decedent consistent with the limited and special
 jurisdiction of the probate court.
Concededly, the petition in SP. PROC. No. 92-
63626 contains certain averments which may be
typical of an ordinary civil action. Herein petitioners,
as oppositors therein, took advantage of the said
defect in the petition and filed their so-called
Opposition thereto which, as observed by the trial
court, is actually an Answer containing admissions
and denials, special and affirmative defenses and
compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and
exemplary damages, plus attorney's fees and costs
in an apparent effort to make out a case of an
ordinary civil action and ultimately seek its dismissal
under Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the Rules of Court vis-
à-vis, Article 222 of civil of the Civil Code.
It is our view that herein petitioners may not be
allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially
valid petition for the settlement of the estate of the
late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that as
irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. It must
be emphasized that the trial court, siting as a
probate court, has limited and special jurisdiction
and cannot hear and dispose of collateral matters
and issues which may be properly threshed out only
in an ordinary civil action. In addition, the rule has
always been to the effect that the jurisdiction of a
court, as well as the concomitant nature of an
action, is determined by the averments in the
complaint and not by the defenses contained in
the answer. If it were otherwise, it would not be too
difficult to have a case either thrown out of court or
its proceedings unduly delayed by simple
strategem. So it should be in the instant petition for
settlement of estate.
G.R. No. 174975 January 20, 2009
LUISA KHO MONTAÑER, ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, JR.,
LILLIBETH MONTAÑER-BARRIOS, AND RHODORA
ELEANOR MONTAÑER-DALUPAN,  Petitioners,
vs. SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING
DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S.
MONTAÑER, Respondents.
FACTS: On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho
Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
Montañer, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish
in Cubao, Quezon City. Petitioners Alejandro
Montañer, Jr., Lillibeth Montañer-Barrios, and
Rhodora Eleanor Montañer-Dalupan are their
children. On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr.
died.
On August 19, 2005, respondents Liling
Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S.
Montañer, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the
 judicial partition of properties before the Shari’a
District Court. In the said complaint, respondents
made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995,
Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died; (2) the late Alejandro
Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first
family of the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is
the widow of the decedent; (5) Almahleen Liling S.
Montañer is the daughter of the decedent; and (6)
the estimated value of and a list of the properties
comprising the estate of the decedent.
On the other hand, Petitioners filed a motion
to dismiss contending that the Shari’a District Court
has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late
Alejandro Montañer, Sr., because he was a Roman
Catholic and that private respondents’ complaint is
barred by prescription.
On November 22, 2005, the Shari’a District
Court dismissed the private respondents’ complaint.
The district court held that Alejandro Montañer, Sr.
was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to
the settlement and distribution of the estate of
deceased Muslims. On August 22, 2006, the Shari’a
District Court granted the motion for
reconsideration filed by respomdents.
Petitioners seek recourse before this Court
alleging that respondent Shari’a District Court -
Marawi City lacks jurisdiction over petitioners who
are Roman Catholics and non-Muslims.
ISSUE: 1. What is the nature of the complaint filed
by respondents before the Shari’a Court? - IT IS A
SPECIAL PROCEEDING
2. WON the Shari’a Court has jurisdiction
over the compliant?  – YES, it has authority to receive
evidences to determine whether the deceased is a
Muslim or not.
3. WON the motion for reconsideration is
defective for lack of notice of hearing. – NO
4. WON the action has prescribed. - NO
RULING: 1. The determination of the nature of an
action or proceeding is controlled by the
averments and character of the relief sought in the
complaint or petition. The designation given by
parties to their own pleadings does not necessarily
bind the courts to treat it according to the said
designation. Rather than rely on "a falsa descriptio
or defective caption," courts are "guided by the
substantive averments of the pleadings."
Page 67 of 93
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
Although private respondents designated 2. Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083,
the pleading filed before the Shari’a District Court otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal
as a "Complaint" for judicial partition of properties, it Laws of the Philippines, provides that the Shari’a
is a petition for the issuance of letters of District Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction
administration, settlement, and distribution of the over the settlement of the estate of deceased
estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient Muslims:
 jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased Muslim, such as the fact of ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction.  — 
Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death as well as the (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have
allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition also exclusive original jurisdiction over:
contains an enumeration of the names of his legal
heirs, so far as known to the private respondents,  x x x x
and a probable list of the properties left by the
decedent, which are the very properties sought to
(b) All cases involving disposition,
be settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the
distribution and settlement of the estate of
reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the
deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance
private respondents to seek judicial settlement of
of letters of administration or appointment of
the estate of the decedent.
administrators or executors regardless of the
nature or the aggregate value of the
We reiterate that the proceedings before property.
the court a quo  are for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the
We cannot agree with the contention of the
estate of the deceased, which is a special
petitioners that the district court does not have
proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court
 jurisdiction over the case because of an allegation
(Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a remedy
in their answer with a motion to dismiss that
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right,
Montañer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court
or a particular fact." This Court has applied the
over the nature of the action and its subject matter
Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings,
does not depend upon the defenses set forth in an
for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction
Muslim. In a petition for the issuance of letters of
would depend almost entirely on the defendant or
administration, settlement, and distribution of
result in having "a case either thrown out of court or
estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of
its proceedings unduly delayed by simple
death of the decedent and later to be duly
stratagem. Indeed, the "defense of lack of
recognized as among the decedent’s heirs, which
 jurisdiction which is dependent on a question of
would allow them to exercise their right to
fact does not render the court to lose or be
participate in the settlement and liquidation of the
deprived of its jurisdiction." In the case at bar, the
estate of the decedent. Here, the respondents seek
Shari’a District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction
to establish the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s
simply because petitioners raised as a defense the
death and, subsequently, for private respondent
allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The
Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as
Shari’a District Court has the authority to hear and
among his heirs, if such is the case in fact. The
receive evidence to determine whether it has
erroneous understanding of the proceeding by the
 jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination
petitioners is attributable to the fact that the parties
that the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the
were designated either as plaintiffs or defendants
Shari’a District Court determines that the deceased
and the case was denominated as a special civil
was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should
action.
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

Unlike a civil action which has definite

3. The Rules require every written motion to be set
adverse parties, a special proceeding has no
for hearing by the applicant and to address the
definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil
notice of hearing to all parties concerned. The Rules
action and a special proceeding, respectively, in
also provide that "no written motion set for hearing
the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in
shall be acted upon by the court without proof of
which "a party sues another for the enforcement or
service thereof." However, the Rules allow a liberal
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of
construction of its provisions "in order to promote
a wrong" necessarily has definite adverse parties,
the objective of securing a just, speedy, and
who are either the plaintiff or defendant. On the
inexpensive disposition of every action and
other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a
proceeding." Moreover, this Court has upheld a
party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular
liberal construction specifically of the rules of notice
fact," has one definite party, who petitions or
of hearing in cases where "a rigid application will
applies for a declaration of a status, right, or
result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice
particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the
especially if a party successfully shows that the
case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the
alleged defect in the questioned final and
decedent is not being sued for any cause of action.
executory judgment is not apparent on its face or
As a special proceeding, the purpose of the
from the recitals contained therein." In these
settlement of the estate of the decedent is to
exceptional cases, the Court considers that "no
determine all the assets of the estate, pay its
party can even claim a vested right in
liabilities, and to distribute the residual to those
technicalities," and for this reason, cases should, as
entitled to the same.
Page 68 of 93

much as possible, be decided on the merits rather
than on technicalities.
The case at bar falls under this exception. To
deny the Shari’a District Court of an opportunity to
determine whether it has jurisdiction over a petition
for the settlement of the estate of a decedent
alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent
power as a court to control its process to ensure
conformity with the law and justice. To sanction
such a situation simply because of a lapse in
fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a
miscarriage of justice. In addition, the present case
calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice
of hearing, because the rights of the petitioners
were not affected.
4. Petitioners’ argument that the action has
prescribed is premature. Again, the Shari’a District
Court has not yet determined whether it has
 jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent. In
the event that a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending,
questions regarding heirship, including prescription
in relation to recognition and filiation, should be
raised and settled in the said proceeding. The
court, in its capacity as a probate court, has
 jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the
decedent. In the case at bar, the determination of
the heirs of the decedent depends on an
affirmative answer to the question of whether the
Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over the estate
of the decedent.
G.R. No. L-4845. December 24, 1952
L. G. MARQUEZ and Z. GUTIERREZ LORA, plaintiffs. L.
G. Marquez, Plaintiff-Appellant , v. FRANCISCO
VARELA and CARMEN VARELA, Defendants-
 Appellees.
FACTS: Gutierrez Lora was authorized by
respondents Valera to negotiate the sale of their
share or interest in a parcel of land on Plaza Goiti,
Manila. Lora and L. G. Marquez (herein petitioners),
a real estate broker, agreed to work together for
the sale of respondents’ property. Petitioners found
a ready, willing, and able buyer, which accepted
respondents’ price and terms, but that thereafter
respondents, without any justifiable reason, refused
to carry out the sale and to execute the necessary
deed therefor; and that as a consequence
petitioners failed to receive the commission which
they were entitled to receive.
The respondents filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint as to L. G. Marquez on the ground that
he has no cause of action against respondents.
Such motion having been granted, plaintiff L. G.
Marquez has prosecuted this appeal.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
The respondents contended that Marquez
cannot join in this action and enforce therein his
rights directly against them, evidently because
respondents never dealt with Marquez, directly or
indirectly, or, in other words, that both Marquez and
his services were not known to them.
ISSUES: 1. WON there is a valid cause of action in
favor of Marquez against the respondents. – YES
2. WON Marquez is a real party in interest
over the subject action considering that he is not a
party of the contract between Lora and the
Varelas. –  YES
RULING: 1. It is not denied that Lora, if he rendered
the service alleged in the complaint, would have a
right to be paid compensation for the service he
rendered jointly with Marquez. He acted as a
broker, and a broker is entitled to a commission for
his services. There is no prohibition in law against the
employment of a companion to look for a buyer;
neither is it against public policy. Neither was there
even any implied understanding between Lora and
the respondents that no part of the compensation
to which Lora would be entitled to receive could
be paid to any companion or helper of Lora. From
the facts alleged in the complaint, it is clear that
there is a primary right in favor of Marquez (to be
paid for his services even through Lora only) and a
corresponding duty devolving upon the
respondents (to pay for said services). Since (as
alleged respondents refused to comply with their
duty, Marquez now is entitled to enforce his legal
right by an action in court. The complaint in the
case at bar, therefore, contains both the primary
right and duty and the delict or wrong combined
which constitute the cause of action in the legal
sense as used in Code Pleading, and the cause of
action is full and complete.
2. The principle underlying respondents’ objection
is one of procedure recognized under the common
law, where no one could sue for the breach of a
contract who was not a party thereto, and the
action allowed to be brought only in the name of
the one holding the legal title or interest therein and
not of substantive law. The requirement was based
upon the doctrine of privity of contract.
Under the common law, in order that two or more
persons may join in an action upon a contract,
there must be community of interest between them;
that is, they must be parties to the contract and
 jointly interested therein. Persons subsequently
admitted to the benefit of a contract, without the
privity or assent of the promisor, cannot join in a suit
on the contract.
But we did not import into this jurisdiction the
common law procedure. Our original Code of Civil
Procedure (Act 190) was taken mainly from the
Code of Civil Procedure of California, and this in
turn was based upon the Code of Civil Procedure
of New York adopted in that stated in 1948. Our
system of pleading is based on the Code Pleading,
that system used in the states of the Union that had
Page 69 of 93

adopted codes of procedure. Such code system of
pleading adopted in substance the rules of equity
practice as to parties, under which "all persons
having an interest in the subject of the action, and
in obtaining the relief demanded, may be joined as
plaintiffs." In New York and California interest in the
subject matter, or in any relief growing out of the
same transaction or series of transactions is
sufficient to allow joinder.
The principle underlying the rule is that all
persons having a material interest under the
substantive law should be made parties, as
distinguished from that of the common law which
allowed only a two-sided controversy, each party
to be opposed to the other.
The above principles have not been
changed by the reforms in the rules in 1940 and
1941. The action is still to be prosecuted in the name
of the real party in interest. Under section 6 of Rule
3, "All persons in whom . . . any right to relief in
respect to or arising out of the same transaction . . .
is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the
alternative, may, . . . join as plaintiffs . . ., where any
question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs
. . . may arise in the action; . . ."
Marquez, in the case at bar, clearly falls
under the above rule. He is entitled to be paid his
commission out of the very contract of agency
between Lora and the respondents; Lora and he
acted jointly in rendering services to respondents
under Lora’s contract, and the same questions of
law and fact govern their claims. The rules do not
require the existence of privity of contract between
Marquez and the respondents as required under
the common law; all that they demand is that
Marquez has a material interest in the subject of the
action, the right t o share in the broker’s commission
to be paid Lora under the latter’s contract, which
right Lora does not deny. This is sufficient to justify
the joinder of Marquez as a party plaintiff, even in
the absence of privity of contract between him and
the respondents.
CAUSE OF ACTION DISTINGUISHED FROM RIGHT OF
ACTION. The term "cause of action" has been held
to be synonymous with "right of action" ; but in
Code Pleading one is distinguished from the other in
that a right of action is a remedial right belonging
to some person, while a cause of action is a formal
statement of the operative facts that give rise to
such remedial right. The right of action is a matter of
right and depends on the substantive law, while the
cause of action is a matter of statement and is
governed by the law of procedure.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
G.R. No. 129928 August 25, 2005
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL II COOPERATIVE, INC.,
Petitioners, vs. VIRGILIO S. DAVID,  Respondent.
FACTS: Private respondent Virgilio S. David
(hereinafter, David), a supplier of electrical
hardware, filed a case for specific performance
and damages against MOELCI II, a rural electric
cooperative in Misamis Occidental. The said case,
which was essentially a collection suit, was
predicated on a document attached to the
complaint as Annex ‘’a’’  which according to David
is the contract pursuant to which he sold to MOELCI
II one (1) unit of 10 MVA Transformer.
MOELCI II filed a  Motion (For Preliminary
Hearing of Affirmative Defenses and Deferment of
Pre-Trial Conference)  on the ground of lack of
cause of action, there being allegedly no
enforceable contract between David and MOELCI
II. MOELCI II argued that the document referred to
by David was only a quotation letter and not a
contract. Thus, it contends that David’s  Amended
Complaint is dismissible for failure to state a cause
of action.
David contended that because a motion to
dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action is required to be based only on the
allegations of the complaint, the "quotation letter,"
being merely an attachment to the complaint and
not part of its allegations, cannot be inquired into.
MOELCI II filed a rejoinder to the opposition
in which it asserted that a complaint cannot be
separated from its annexes; hence, the trial court in
resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action must consider the
complaint’s annexes.
RTC issued an order denying MOELCI II’s
motion. Thus, MOELCI II elevated the case to the
CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of Judge of the RTC for denying its motion. The CA
dismissed MOELCI II’s petition holding that the
allegations in David’s complaint constitute a cause
of action. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: 1. WON the complaint states a cause of
action. – YES
2. WON the denial of the motion for
preliminary hearing is erroneous. -NO
RULING: 1. Citing the case of The Heirs of Juliana
Clavano v. Genato, the Supreme Court ruled that it
is a well-settled rule that in a motion to dismiss
based on the ground that the complaint fails to
state a cause of action, the question submitted to
the court for determination is the sufficiency of the
allegations in the complaint itself. Whether those
allegations are true or not is beside the point, for
their truth is hypothetically admitted by the motion.
The issue rather is: admitting them to be true, may
the court render a valid judgment in accordance
with the prayer of the complaint? Stated otherwise,
Page 70 of 93

the sufficiency of the cause of action must appear
on the face of the complaint in order to sustain a
dismissal on this ground. No extraneous matter may
be considered nor facts not alleged, which would
require evidence and therefore must be raised as
defenses and await the trial. In other words, to
determine the sufficiency of the cause of action,
only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no
other should be considered. The respondent Judge
of the above cited case departed from this rule in
conducting a hearing and in receiving evidence in
support of the private respondent’s affirmative
defense, that is, lack of cause of action.
To determine the existence of a cause of
action, only the statements in the complaint may
be properly considered. It is error for the court to
take cognizance of external facts or hold
preliminary hearings to determine their existence. If
the allegations in a complaint furnish sufficient basis
by which the complaint can be maintained, the
same should not be dismissed regardless of the
defenses that may be averred by the defendants.
The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting a cause of action is
whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the
court could render a valid verdict in accordance
with the prayer of said complaint.
In the case at bar, it has been
hypothetically admitted that the parties had
entered into a contract sale David bound himself to
supply MOELCI II (1) unit 10 MVA Power transformer
with accessories for a total price of ₱5,200,000.00
plus 69 KV Line Accessories for a total price of
₱2,169,500.00; that despite written and verbal
demands, MOELCI II has failed to pay the price
thereof plus the custom duties and incidental
expenses of ₱272,722.27; and that apart from the
previously stated contract of sale, David regularly
delivered various electrical hardware to MOELCI II
which, despite demands, has an outstanding
balance of ₱281,939.76.
We believe all the foregoing sufficiently lay
out a cause of action. Even extending our scrutiny
to Annex "A," which is after all deemed a part of the
 Amended Complaint, will not result to a change in
our conclusion.
Contrary to MOELCI II’s assertion, Annex "A"
is not an "undisguised quotation letter." While Annex
"A" is captioned as such, the presence of the
signatures of both the General Manager and the
Chairman of the Committee of Management
immediately below the word "CONFORME"
appearing on the document’s last page lends
credulity to David’s contention that there was, or
might have been, a meeting of minds on the terms
embodied therein. Thus, the appendage of Annex
"A" does not entirely serve to extinguish David’s
claims.
In fact, the ambiguity of the import and
nature of Annex "A" which necessitates a resort to its
proper interpretation, strengthens the propriety of
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
the trial court’s denial of MOELCI II’s  Motion. The
interpretation of a document requires introduction
of evidence which is precisely disallowed in
determining whether or not a complaint states a
cause of action. The Court of Appeals therefore
correctly dismissed MOE LCI II’s petition and upheld
the trial court’s ruling.
Now, whether in truth Annex "A" is, as
entitled, a mere quotation letter is a matter that
could best be proven during a full-blown hearing
rather than through a preliminary hearing as this
may involve extensive proof. Verily, where a
preliminary hearing will not suffice, it is incumbent
upon the trial court to deny a motion for preliminary
hearing and go on to trial. The veracity of the
assertions of the parties can be ascertained at the
trial of the case on the merits.
2. In  Municipality of Biñan, Laguna v. Court
of Appeals, decided under the old Rules of Court,
we held that a preliminary hearing permitted under
Section 5, Rule 16, is not mandatory even when the
same is prayed for. It rests largely on the sound
discretion of the court, thus:
SEC. 5. Pleading grounds as
affirmative defenses.- Any of the grounds for
dismissal provided for in this rule, except
improper venue, may be pleaded as an
affirmative defense, and a preliminary
hearing may be had thereon as if a motion
to dismiss had been filed.
The use of the word "may" in the
aforequoted provision shows that such a hearing is
not mandatory but discretionary. It is an auxiliary
verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission and
possibility.
Such interpretation is now specifically
expressed in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Section 6, Rule 16 provides that a grant of
preliminary hearing rests on the sound discretion of
the court, to wit-
SEC. 6. Pleading grounds as
affirmative defenses.- If no motion to dismiss
has been filed, any of the grounds for
dismissal provided for in this Rule may be
pleaded as an affirmative defense in the
answer and, in the discretion of the court, a
preliminary hearing may be had thereon as
if a motion to dismiss had been filed. …
Based on the foregoing, a preliminary
hearing undeniably is subject to the discretion of
the trial court. Absent any showing that the trial
court had acted without jurisdiction or in excess
thereof or with such grave abuse of discretion as
would amount to lack of jurisdiction, as in the
present case, the trial court’s order granting or
dispensing with the need for a preliminary hearing
may not be corrected by certiorari.
Page 71 of 93

G.R. No. 140892. September 21, 2005
Dr. Ibarra S. Santos and Josefina M. Rivera,
Petitioners,
vs. Spouses Pablo and Nieves de Leon and Virginia
Enales, Respondent.
FACTS: Records show that on September 25, 1995,
respondent spouses Pablo and Nieves de Leon filed
with the MTC of Parañaque City a complaint for
forcible entry against Josefina Rivera, petitioner.
Petitioner Rivera claimed that the real owner of the
subject property is Dr. Ibarra Santos, also a
petitioner.
The MTC rendered a Decision in favor of
respondent spouses de Leon. Upon appeal, the RTC
affirmed the MTC Decision. Petitioners filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for review, but it was
denied.
Subsequently, or on July 3, 1996, petitioners
Dr. Ibarra Santos and Josefina Rivera filed with the
RTC, Branch 260, Parañaque City, Civil Case No. 96-
0285 for declaration of nullity of a Deed of Sale  with
prayer for a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction. Impleaded as defendants
were spouses Pablo and Nieves de Leon (herein
respondents), Virginia Enales and Pericles Telan,
deputy sheriff IV of the said MTC.
The complaint alleges that petitioner, Dr.
Ibarra Santos, is the registered owner of the subject
parcel of land and its improvements covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 69150 of the Registry
of Deeds; that Virginia Enales and Rosendo Rivera
(deceased husband of petitioner Josefina Rivera)
sold Dr. Santos’ property to respondent spouses de
Leon; and that in Civil Case No. 9500 for forcible
entry filed by said respondent spouses with the MTC
of Parañaque City involving the same property, a
writ of execution was issued evicting from the
premises petitioner Josefina Rivera, the lessee of Dr.
Santos. Petitioners Dr. Santos and Rivera thus
prayed that the Deed of Sale between Virginia
Enales and Rosendo Rivera, as vendors, and
respondent spouses de Leon, as vendees, be
declared void; and that a temporary restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction be issued
enjoining the sheriff from implementing the Decision
of the MTC in Civil Case No. 9500.
On August 1, 1996, respondent spouses de
Leon filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that it states no cause of action. The motion
was granted.
Hence, both petitioners filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for review. The CA
subsequently denied the petition holding that the
complaint does not state a cause of action
considering that while it alleges that the Deed of
Sale is null and void, however, petitioner Dr. Santos
failed to specify the grounds why the said
document is a nullity and should, therefore, be
annulled. Petitioners filed a motion for
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate
Court. Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioners Dr. Santos and Rivera contend
that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
complaint states no cause of action. They insist that
the allegations therein "are sufficient for rendering a
valid judgment in accordance with their prayer."
Their complaint states only the ultimate facts since
the details can be proven during the trial.
ISSUE: WON the allegations in the complaint are
sufficient to constitute a cause of action. - YES
RULING: The general rule is that the allegations in a
complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of
action against the defendants if, admitting the
facts alleged, the court can render a valid
 judgment upon the same in accordance with the
prayer therein.
A cause of action exists if the following
elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of
the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation
on the part of the named defendant to respect or
not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission
on the part of such defendant violative of the right
of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which
the latter may maintain an action for recovery of
damages.
The above allegations quoted above
sufficiently establish a cause of action. They specify
that petitioners Dr. Ibarra Santos is the absolute
owner of the disputed parcel of land and the
improvements thereon. His claim of ownership is
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
4569216 of the Registry of Deeds for Parañaque
City. Definitely, as the registered owner of the
subject property, he has a cause of action against
spouses de Leon who claim to have purchased the
same from Virginia Enales and Rosendo Rivera who
are not the true owners thereof.
On the part of petitioner Josefina Rivera, she
alleged in the same complaint that she has been in
possession, as a lessee, of the same property since
1983 as shown by a Contract of Lease between her
and Dr. Ibarra Santos; and that her right as a lessee
has been prejudiced when the property, belonging
to Dr. Santos, was sold by persons who are not its
real owners to spouses de Leon.
In determining whether the allegations of
the complaint are sufficient to support a cause of
action, the complaint does not have to establish or
allege the facts proving the existence of a cause at
the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on
the merits of the case. A complaint is sufficient if it
contains sufficient notice of the cause of action
even though the allegations may be vague and
indefinite. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of
cause of action, the complaint must show that the
claim for relief does not exist rather than that a
claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous,
Page 72 of 93

indefinite or uncertain. The determination of the
issue of ownership of a property requires proofs
which can be threshed out, not in a motion to
dismiss, but in a full-blown trial on the merits.
G.R. No. 172175 October 9, 2006
SPS. EXPEDITO ZEPEDA AND ALICE D. ZEPEDA,
petitioners,
vs. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION,  respondent.
FACTS: On February 18, 2003, spouses Expedito
and Alice Zepeda filed a complaint for nullification
of foreclosure proceedings and loan documents
with damages against respondent Chinabank
before the Regional Trial Court. They alleged that
on June 28, 1995, they obtained a loan in the
amount of P5,800,000.00 from respondent secured
by a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
23136.
Petitioners subsequently encountered
difficulties in paying their loan obligations hence
they requested for restructuring which was
allegedly granted by Chinabank. Hence, they were
surprised when respondent bank extrajudicially
foreclosed the subject property on October 9, 2001
where it emerged as the highest bidder.
Respondent bank was issued a Provisional
Certificate of Sale and upon petitioners’ failure to
redeem the property, ownership was consolidated
in its favor.
According to petitioners, the foreclosure
proceedings should be annulled for failure to
comply with the posting and publication
requirements. They also claimed that they signed
the Real Estate Mortgage and Promissory Note in
blank and were not given a copy and the interest
rates thereon were unilaterally fixed by the
respondent.
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. The CA
ruled that the complaint states no cause of action
because petitioners admitted that they failed to
redeem the property and that ownership of the
same was consolidated in the name of Chinabank.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON the complaint states a cause of
action-YES
RULING: A cause of action is a formal statement of
the operative facts that give rise to a remedial right.
The question of whether the complaint states a
cause of action is determined by its averments
regarding the acts committed by the defendant.
Thus it "must contain a concise statement of the
ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s
cause of action." Failure to make a sufficient
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
allegation of a cause of action in the complaint
"warrants its dismissal."
As defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court, a cause of action is the act or omission by
which a party violates the right of another. Its
essential elements are as follows:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is
created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such
right; and
3. Act or omission on the part of such
defendant in violation of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the
obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff
for which the latter may maintain an action
for recovery of damages or other
appropriate relief.
It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the
last element that a cause of action arises, giving
the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court
for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
In determining whether an initiatory pleading states
a cause of action, "the test is as follows: admitting
the truth of the facts alleged, can the court render
a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer?"
To be taken into account are only the material
allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and
circumstances or other matters aliunde are not
considered. The court may consider in addition to
the complaint the appended annexes or
documents, other pleadings of the plaintiff, or
admissions in the records.
In the instant case, petitioners specifically
alleged that respondent bank acted in bad faith
when it extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged
property notwithstanding the approval of the
restructuring of their loan obligation. They claimed
that with such approval, respondent bank made
them believe that foreclosure would be held in
abeyance. They also alleged that the proceeding
was conducted without complying with the posting
and publication requirements.
Assuming these allegations to be true,
petitioners can validly seek the nullification of the
foreclosure since the alleged restructuring of their
debt would effectively modify the terms of the
original loan obligations and accordingly supersede
the original mortgage thus making the subsequent
foreclosure void. Similarly, the allegation of lack of
notice if subsequently proven renders the
foreclosure a nullity in line with prevailing
 jurisprudence.
Page 73 of 93

We find the allegations in the complaint
sufficient to establish a cause of action for nullifying
the foreclosure of the mortgaged property. The fact
that petitioners admitted that they failed to redeem
the property and that the title was consolidated in
respondent bank’s name did not preclude them
from seeking to nullify the extrajudicial foreclosure.
Precisely, petitioners seek to nullify the proceedings
based on circumstances obtaining prior to and
during the foreclosure which render it void.
G.R. No. L-32958 November 8, 1930
BLOSSOM AND COMPANY, INC.,  plaintiff-appellant,
vs. MANILA GAS CORPORATION,  defendant-
appellee.
"As a general rule a contract to do several
things at several times is divisible in its nature, so as
to authorize successive actions; and a judgment
 recovered for a single breach of a continuing
contract or covenant is no bar to a suit for a
 subsequent breach thereof. But where the
covenant or contract is entire, and the breach
total, there can be only one action, and plaintiff
must therein recover all his damages."
FACTS: On March 3, 1927, the plaintiff filed a
complaint against the defendant contending that
on September 10, 1918, it entered into a contract
with the defendant in which the plaintiff promised
and undertook to purchase and receive from the
defendant and the defendant agreed to sell and
deliver to the plaintiff, for a period of four years,
three tons of water gas tar per month from
September to January 1, 1919 and twenty tons per
month after January 1, 1919, for the remaining
period of the contract; one-half ton of coal gas tar
a month from September to January 1, 1919, and six
tons per month after January 1, 1919, for the
remainder of the contract. (old contract)
On January 31, 1919, this contract was
amended so that it should continue to remain in
force for a period of ten years from January 1, 1919,
and it was agreed that the plaintiff should not be
obliged to take the qualities of the tars required
during the year 1919, but that it might purchase tars
in such quantities as it could use to its advantage at
the stipulated price. That after the year 1919 the
plaintiff would take at least the quantities specified
in the contract of September 10, 1918, to be taken
from and after January 1, 1919, and that at its
option it would have the right to take any quantity
of water gas tar in excess of the minimum quantity
specified in that contract and up to the total
amount of output of that tar of defendant's plant
and also to take any quantity of coal gas tar in
excess of the minimum quantity specified in that
contract and up to 50 per cent of defendant's
entire output of coal gas tar, and that by giving the
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
defendant ninety days' notice, it would have the
right at its option to take the entire output of
defendant's coal gas tar, except such as it might
need for its own use in and about its plant. That in
consideration of this modification of the contract,
plaintiff agreed to purchase from the defendant of
certain piece of land to which the plaintiff in turn
executed a mortgage thereon to the defendant for
P17,140.20, to secure the payment of the balance
of the purchase price. (10-year contract)
That about the last part of July, 1920 the
defendant herein, the Manila Gas Corporation
willfully, and deliberately breached its said contract
with the plaintiff by ceasing to deliver any coal and
water gas tar to it thereunder solely because of the
increased price of its tar products and its desire to
secure better prices therefor than plaintiff was
obliged to pay to it, notwithstanding the frequent
and urgent demands made by the plaintiff upon it
to comply with its aforesaid contract by continuing
to deliver the coal and water gas tar to the plaintiff
thereunder, but the said defendant flatly refused to
make any deliveries under said contract.
On November 23, 1923, the plaintiff was
forced to commence an action against the
defendant before the Court of First Instance of
Manila to recover the damages which it had up to
that time suffered by reason of such flagrant
violation of said contract on the part of the
defendant herein, and to obtain the specific
performance of the said contract.
Judgment was rendered by RTC in favor of
the plaintiff herein and against the said defendant,
the Manila Gas Corporation, for the sum of
P26,119.08, as the damages suffered by this plaintiff
by the defendant's breach of said contract from
July, 1920, up to and including September, 1923,
but the court refused to order the said defendant to
resume the delivery of the coal and water gas tar
to the plaintiff under said contract, but left the
plaintiff with its remedy for damages against said
defendant for the subsequent breaches of said
contract, which said decision was affirmed by our
Supreme Court on March 3, 1926.
The defendant made no deliveries under its
contract, from July, 1920 to March 26, 1926, or until
after the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of
the lower court for damages.
On January 31, 1926, Plaintiff notified
defendant in writing that it desired to take the
delivery of 50 per cent of defendant's coal tar
production for that month and that on November 1,
1926, it desired to take the entire output of
defendant's coal gas tar. But still defendant refused
to make either of such deliveries unless plaintiff
would take all of its water gas tar production with
the desired quantity of coal gas tar which refusal
was a plain violation of the contract. Plaintiff further
Page 74 of 93

notified defendant that in February, 1927, it would
require 50 per cent of its total water gas tar
production and that in April 1927, it would require
the total output of the defendant of both coal and
water gas tars, and that it refused to make either of
such deliveries. Thus, plaintiff filed an action for
rescission of the contract and damages amounting
to 300,000.00
The defendant contended that the
complaint has the same cause of action as the
action brought on or about the 16th day of June,
1925, wherein said plaintiff recovered judgment
upon the merits thereof, against said defendant
decreeing a breach of the contract sued upon
herein, and awarding damages therefor in the sum
of P26,119.08.
The RTC rendered judgment awarding
damages to plaintiff only amounting to 2, 219.60.
The plaintiff appealed the case seeking to recover
damages from the defendant which it claims to
have sustained after September, 1923, arising from,
and growing out of, its original contract of
September 10, 1918, as modified on January 1,
1919, to continue for a period of ten years from that
date.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff, in a former action, having
recovered judgment for the damages which it
sustained by reason of a breach of its contract by
the defendant up to September, 1923, can now in
this action recover damages it may have sustained
after September, 1923, arising from, and growing
out of, a breach of the same contract, upon and
for which it recovered its judgment in the former
action. – NO
RULING: Plaintiff’s original cause of action, in
which it recovered judgment for damages, was
founded on the ten-year contract, and that the
damages which it then recovered were recovered
for a breach of that contract. Both actions are
founded on one and the same contract. In the
instant case the plaintiff alleges and relies upon the
ten year contract on January 11, 1920, which in
bad faith was broken by the defendant.
As a general rule a contract to do several
things at several times in its nature, so as to
authorize successive actions; and a judgment
recovered for a single breach of a continuing
contract or covenant is no bar to a suit for a
subsequent breach thereof. But where the
covenant or contract is entire, and the breach
total, there can be only one action, and plaintiff
must therein recover all his damages.
The counsel for the plaintiff contends that
the former judgment did not constitute a bar to the
present action but that the plaintiff had the right to
elect to waive or disregard the breach, keep the
contract in force, and maintain successive actions
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
for time to time as the installments of goods were to
be delivered, how numerous these actions might
be.
As there was a total breach of the contract
by the defendant's refusal to deliver, the plaintiff
cannot split up his demand and maintain
successive actions, but must either recover all his
damages in the first suit or wait until the contract
matured or the time for the delivery of all the goods
had arrived. In other words, there can be but one
action for damages for a total breach of an entire
contract to deliver goods, and the fact that they
were to be delivered in installment from time to
time does not change the general rule.
It will thus be seen that, where there is a
complete and total breach of a continuous
contract for a term of years, the recovery of a
 judgment for damages by reason of the breach is a
bar to another action on the same contract for and
on account of the continuous breach.
Plaintiff contends that such deliveries were
made under and in continuation of the old
contract. The record tends to show that tars which
the defendant delivered after April 7, 1926, were
not delivered under the old contract of January 1,
1920, and that at all times since July 1920, the
defendant has consistently refused to make any
deliveries of any tars under that contract.
G.R. No. L-45350 May 29, 1939
BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC.,   plaintiff-appellant,
vs. ESTEBAN ICARAÑGAL and ORIENTAL
COMMERCIAL CO., INC., defendants-appellees.
FACTS: On June 11 , 1930, defendant herein,
Esteban Icarañgal, with one Jacinto Figueroa,
executed in favor of the plaintiff, Bachrach Motor
Co., Inc., a promissory note for one thousand six
hundred fourteen pesos (P1,614), and in security for
its payment, Esteban Icarañgal executed a real
estate mortgage on a parcel of land in Pañgil,
Laguna, which was duly registered on August 5,
1931, in the registry of deeds of the Province of
Laguna. Thereafter, promissors defaulted in the
payment of the agreed monthly installments;
wherefore, plaintiff instituted in the CFI an action for
the collection of the amount due on the note.
Judgment was there rendered for the plaintiff. A
writ of execution was subsequently issued and, in
pursuance thereof, the provincial sheriff of Laguna,
at the indication of the plaintiff, levied on the
properties of the defendants, including that which
has been mortgaged by Esteban Icarañgal in favor
of the plaintiff.
The other defendant herein, Oriental
Commercial Co., Inc., interposed a third-party
claim, alleging that by virtue of a writ of execution
Page 75 of 93

issued by the municipal court of the City of Manila,
the property which was the subject of the
mortgage and which has been levied upon by the
sheriff, had already been acquired by it at the
public auction on May 12, 1933.
By reason of this third-party claim, the sheriff
desisted from the sale of the property and, in
consequence thereof, the judgment rendered in
favor of the plaintiff remained unsatisfied.
Whereupon, plaintiff instituted an action to
foreclose the mortgage. The trial court dismissed
the action thus the plaintiff took the present
appeal.
ISSUE: WON plaintiff is barred from foreclosing the
real estate mortgage after it has elected to sue and
obtain a personal judgment against the defendant-
appellee on the promissory note for the payment of
which the mortgage was constituted as a security. -
YES
RULING: "The rule is well established that the
creditor may waive whatever security he has and
maintain a personal action, in the absence of
statutory provisions to the contrary."
Most of the provisions of our Code of Civil
Procedure are taken from that of California, and in
that jurisdiction the rule has always been, and still is,
that a party who sues and obtains a personal
 judgment against a defendant upon a note, waives
thereby his right to foreclose the mortgage securing
it.
We have the rule against splitting a single
cause of action. This rule, though not contained in
any statutory provision, has been applied by this
court in all appropriate cases. The rule against
splitting a single cause of action is intended "to
prevent repeated litigation between the same
parties in regard to the same subject of controversy;
to protect defendant from unnecessary vexation;
and to avoid the costs and expenses incident to
numerous suits." It comes from that old maxim nemo
bedet bis vexare pro una et eadem cause (no man
shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause).
And it developed, certainly not as an original legal
right of the defendant, but as an interposition of
courts upon principles of public policy to prevent
inconvenience and hardship incident to a
repeated and unnecessary litigations.
For non-payment of a note secured by
mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action
against the debtor. This single cause of action
consists in the recovery of the credit with execution
of the security. In other words, the creditor in his
action may make two demands, the payment of
the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But
both demands arise from the same cause, the non-
payment of the debt, and, for that reason, they
constitute a single cause of action. Though the
debt and the mortgage constitute separate
agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former,
and both refer to one and the same obligation.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
Consequently, there exists only one cause of action
for a single breach of that obligation.
In the case at bar, Plaintiff, then, by
applying the rule above stated, cannot split up his
single cause of action by filing a complaint for
payment of the debt, and thereafter another
complaint for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he
does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the
subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to
file two separate complaints simultaneously or
successively, one to recover his credit and another
to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be
authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of
contract at so much cost to the courts and with so
much vexation and oppression to the debtor.
We hold, therefore, that, in the absence of
express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor
may institute against the mortgage debtor either a
personal action for debt or real action to foreclose
the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either
of the two remedies, but not both. By such election,
his cause of action can by no means be impaired,
for each of the two remedies is complete in itself.
Thus, an election to bring personal action will leave
open to him all the properties of the debtor for
attachment and execution, even including the
mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such
personal action and pursues his remedy against the
mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment
thereon would still give him the right to sue for a
deficiency judgment, in which case, all the
properties of the defendant, other than the
mortgaged property, are again open to him for the
satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his
remedy is complete, his cause of action
undiminished, and any advantages attendant to
the pursuit of one or the other remedy are purely
accidental and are all under his right of election.
On the other hand, a rule that would authorize the
plaintiff to bring a personal action against the
debtor and simultaneously or successively another
action against the mortgaged property, would
result not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to
 justice and obnoxious to law and equity, but also in
subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being
sued in the place of his residence of the plaintiff,
and then again in the place where the property
lies.
G.R. No. 147593 July 31, 2006
GERONIMO Q. QUADRA,  petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PHILIPPINE CHARITY
SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE, respondents.
FACTS:  Petitioner was the Chief Legal Officer of
respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
(PCSO) when he organized and actively
participated in the activities of CUGCO, an
organization composed of the rank and file
employees of PCSO, and then later, the Association
Page 76 of 93
 CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
of Sweepstakes Staff Personnel and Supervisors
(CUGCO) (ASSPS [CUGCO]). In April 1964, he was
administratively charged before the Civil Service G.R. No. L-25134 October 30, 1969
Commission with violation of Civil Service Law and
Rules for neglect of duty and misconduct and/or THE CITY OF BACOLOD,  plaintiff-appellee,
conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service. vs.
On July 14, 1965, the Civil Service Commission SAN MIGUEL BREWERY, INC., defendant-appellant.
rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the
charges and recommending the penalty of FACTS: On February 17, 1949, the City Council of
dismissal. The following day, on July 15, 1965, the
Bacolod passed Ordinance No. 66, series of 1949
General Manager of PCSO, sent petitioner a letter
imposing upon "any person, firm or corporation
of dismissal, in accordance with the decision of the
engaged in the manufacturer bottling of coca-
Civil Service Commission. Petitioner filed a motion
cola, pepsi cola, tru orange, lemonade, and other
for reconsideration of the decision of the Civil
soft drinks within the jurisdiction of the City of
Service Commission on August 10, 1965. At the
Bacolod, ... a fee of ONE TWENTY-FOURTH (1/24) of
same time, petitioner, together with ASSPS
a centavo for every bottle thereof," plus "a
(CUGCO), filed with the Court of Industrial Relations
surcharge of 2% every month, but in no case to
(CIR) a complaint for unfair labor practice against
exceed 24% for one whole year," upon "such local
respondent PCSO and its officers. On November 19,
manufacturers or bottler above-mentioned who will
1966, the CIR issued its decision finding respondent
be delinquent on any amount of fees due" under
PCSO guilty of unfair labor practice for having
the ordinance. In 1959, this ordinance was
committed discrimination against the union and for
amended by Ordinance No. 150, series of 1959, by
having dismissed petitioner due to his union
increasing the fee to "one-eighth (1/8) of a centavo
activities. It ordered the reinstatement of petitioner
for every bottle thereof." In other words, the fee was
to his former position with full backwages and with
increased from P0.01 to P0.03 per case of soft drinks.
all the rights and privileges pertaining to said
Appellant refused to pay the additional fee and
position. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the
challenged the validity of the whole ordinance.
Labor Arbiter,5 prompting respondent PCSO to file a
petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA reversed
Under date of March 23, 1960, appellee sued
the decision of the NLRC.
appellant in Civil Case No. 5693 of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, with the
ISSUE:  W/N the claims for moral and exemplary corresponding Complaint alleging, inter alia:
damages of the petitioner is allegedly "tantamount
to splitting of cause of action under Sec. 4, Rule 2 of
3.  —   That the defendant, Manager of the
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure" is contrary to la w.
San Miguel Brewery, Bacolod Coca Cola
Plant, Bacolod Branch since the approval of
RULING: NO. The filing of a petition for damages Ordinance No. 66, Series of 1949 as
before the CIR did not constitute splitting of cause
amended by Ordinance No. 150, Series of
of action under the Revised Rules of Court. The
1959, which took effect on July 1, 1959, only
Revised Rules of Court prohibits parties from
paid to the plaintiff herein the P0.01 bottling
instituting more than one suit for a single cause of
tax per case of soft drinks thereby refusing to
action. Splitting a cause of action is the act of
pay the P0.03 bottling tax per case of soft
dividing a single cause of action, claim or demand
drinks which amounted to P26,306.54 at
into two or more parts, and bringing suit for one of
P0.02 per case of soft drinks such as coca
such parts only, intending to reserve the rest for
cola and tru orange manufactured or
another separate action. The purpose of the rule is
bottled by said company as per statement
to avoid harassment and vexation to the
submitted by the Assistant City Treasurer of
defendant and avoid multiplicity of suits. The
Bacolod City herewith attached as Annex
prevailing rule at the time that the action for unfair
"C" of this complaint;
labor practice and illegal dismissal was filed and
tried before the CIR was that said court had no
Failing thus in its attempt to collect the surcharge
 jurisdiction over claims for damages. Hence,
provided for in the ordinances in question, appellee
petitioner, at that time, could not raise the issue of
filed a second action (Civil Case No. 7355) to
damages in the proceedings. However, on January
collect the said surcharges. Under date of July 10,
27, 1967, the Supreme Court rendered its ruling in
1964, it filed the corresponding complaint before
Rheem of the Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Ferrer, et al.
the same Court of First Instance of Negros
upholding the jurisdiction of the CIR over claims for
Occidental alleging
damages incidental to an employee's illegal
dismissal. Petitioner properly filed his claim for
damages after the declaration by the Court and ISSUE:  W/N appellee may institute more than one
before the ruling on their case became final. Such suit for a single cause of action.
filing could not be considered as splitting of cause
of action. RULING: We find appellant's position essentially
correct. There is no question that appellee split up
its cause of action when it filed the first complaint
on March 23, 1960, seeking the recovery of only the
bottling taxes or charges plus legal interest, without
mentioning in any manner the surcharges. The rule
Page 77 of 93

on the matter is clear. Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 2 of
the Rules of Court of 1940 which were still in force
then provided:
SEC. 3. Splitting a cause of action,
forbidden.  —   A single cause of action
cannot be split up into two or more parts so
as to be made the subject of different
complaints. .
SEC. 4. Effect of splitting.  —   If separate
complaints were brought for different parts
of a single cause of action, the filing of the
first may be pleaded in abatement of the
others, and a judgment upon the merits in
either is available as a bar in the others.
In the case at bar, when appellant failed and
refused to pay the difference in bottling charges
from July 1, 1959, such act of appellant in violation
of the right of appellee to be paid said charges in
full under the Ordinance, was one single cause of
action, but under the Ordinance, appellee
became entitled, as a result of such non-payment,
to two reliefs, namely: (1) the recovery of the
balance of the basic charges; and (2) the payment
of the corresponding surcharges, the latter being
merely a consequence of the failure to pay the
former. Stated differently, the obligation of
appellant to pay the surcharges arose from the
violation by said appellant of the same right of
appellee from which the obligation to pay the
basic charges also arose.
Upon these facts, it is obvious that appellee has
filed separate complaints for each of two reliefs
related to the same single cause of action, thereby
splitting up the said cause of action. The rule
against splitting a single cause of action is intended
"to prevent repeated litigation between the same
parties in regard to the same subject of controversy;
to protect defendant from unnecessary vexation;
and to avoid the costs and expenses incident to
numerous suits." Section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rule of
Court is unmistakably clear as to the effect of the
splitting up of a cause of action. It says, "if separate
complaints are brought for different parts (reliefs) of
a single cause of action, the filing of the first
(complaint) may be pleaded in abatement of the
others, and a judgment upon the merits in either is
available as a bar in the others." In other words,
whenever a plaintiff has filed more than one
complaint for the same violation of a right, the filing
of the first complaint on any of the reliefs born of
the said violation constitutes a bar to any action on
any of the other possible reliefs arising from the
same violation, whether the first action is still
pending, in which event, the defense to the
subsequent complaint would be litis pendentia, or it
has already been finally terminated, in which case,
the defense would be  res adjudicata.2  Indeed,  litis
pendentia and  res adjudicata, on the one hand,
and splitting up a cause of action on the other, are
not separate and distinct defenses, since either of
the former is by law only the result or effect of the
latter, or, better said, the sanction for or behind it.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
G.R. No. 133113 August 30, 2001
EDGAR H. ARREZA, petitioner,
vs.
MONTANO M. DIAZ, JR., respondent.
FACTS:  Bliss Development Corporation is the owner
of a housing complex located in Quezon City. It
instituted before RTC Makati an interpleader case
against Arreza and Diaz who were conflicting
claimants of the property (Civil Case No. 94-2086).
The RTC ruled in favor of Arreza. In view of said
decision, Bliss executed a contract to sell the
property to Arreza and Diaz was constrained to
transfer possession together with all improvements
to Arreza.
Thereafter, Diaz filed a case against Arreza and Bliss
for the reimbursement of the cost of his acquisition
and improvements on the property (Civil Case No.
96-1372). Arreza filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of res judicata and lack of cause of action.
RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. Arreza appealed
to CA which dismissed the petition saying that res
 judicata does not apply because the interpleader
case only settled the issue on who had a better
right. It did not determine the parties‘ respective
rights and obligations. The action filed by Diaz seeks
principally the collection of damages in the form of
the payments Diaz made to Bliss and the value of
the improvements he introduced on the property
matters that were not adjudicated upon in the
previous case for interpleader.
ISSUE:  Are Diaz's claims for reimbursement against
Arreza barred by res adjudicata?
RULING:  YES. The court in a complaint for
interpleader shall determine the rights and
obligations of the parties and adjudicate their
respective claims. Such rights, obligations and
claims could only be adjudicated if put forward by
the aggrieved party in assertion of his rights. That
party in this case referred to respondent Diaz. The
second paragraph of Section 5 of Rule 62 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the
parties in an interpleader action may file
counterclaims, cross-claims, third party complaints
and responsive pleadings thereto, as provided by
these Rules. The second paragraph was added to
Section 5 to expressly authorize the additional
pleadings and claims enumerated therein, in the
interest of a complete adjudication of the
controversy and its incidents. Pursuant to said Rules,
respondent should have filed his claims against
petitioner Arreza in the interpleader action. Having
asserted his rights as a buyer in good faith in his
answer, and praying relief therefor, respondent Diaz
should have crystallized his demand into specific
claims for reimbursement by petitioner Arreza. This
he failed to do. Having failed to set up his claim for
Page 78 of 93

reimbursement, said claim of respondent Diaz b eing
in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim is now
barred.
The elements of res adjudicata are: (a) that the
former judgment must be final; (b) the court which
rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties
and the subject matter; (c) it must be a judgment
on the merits; and (d) there must be between the
first and second causes of action identity of parties,
subject matter, and cause of action. In the present
case, we find there is an identity of causes of action
between Civil Case No. 94-2086 and Civil Case No.
96-1372. Respondent Diaz's cause of action in the
prior case, now the crux of his present complaint
against petitioner, was in the nature of an
unpleaded compulsory counterclaim, which is now
barred. There being a former final judgment on the
merits in the prior case, rendered in Civil Case No.
94-2086 by Branch 146 of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, which acquired jurisdiction over the same
parties, the same subject property, and the same
cause of action, the present complaint of
respondent herein (Diaz) against petitioner Arreza
docketed as Civil Case No. 96-1372 before the
Regional Trial of Makati, Branch 59 should be
dismissed on the ground of res adjudicata.
G.R. No. 131457 April 24, 1998
FORTICH vs. CORONA
FACTS: On March 29, 1996, strikers went on protest
concerning the decision of the Office of the
President issued through the executive secretary
Ruben Torres which approved the conversion of a
144 hectare of agricultural land to an agro-industrial
(institutional) area. That event led to the issuance of
the so-called “win-win” resolution made by the
Office of the President on November 7, 1997
through then Deputy Executive Secretary, Renato
Corona, which substantially modified its earlier
decision after it had become final and executory.
The said resolution modified the approval of the
land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the
extent of 44 hectares and has ordered that the
remainder of 100 hectares to be distributed to the
qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
On August 12, 1997, the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the RTC was challenged by some farmers
before the CA (Court of Appeals) through a petition
(for certiorari and prohibition) praying for the lifting
of the injunction and for issuance of writ of
prohibition from further trying the RTC case. Some
alleged farmer-beneficiaries went on a hunger
strike on October 9, 1997 in front of the DAR
compound in Quezon City protesting about the
decision made by the Office of the President on
March 29, 1996. The Office of the President resolved
the strikers’ protest by issuing the so-called “win-win”
resolution, which was drafted by then deputy
executive secretary Renato Corona, on November
7, 1997. Governor Fortich and NQSRMDC received
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
a copy of the said “win-win” resolution and filed
the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and
injunction with urgent prayer of TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction against then deputy secretary
Renato Corona and DAR secretary Ernesto Garilao.
A motion for leave to intervene was filed by alleged
farmer-beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that
they are real parties in interest. In seeking the
annulment of the “win-win” resolution, the
petitioners claim that the OP came up with a purely
political decision to appease the farmers by
reviving and modifying the decision (made on
March 29, 1996) which has been declared final and
executory in an order issued on June 23, 1997. They
(petitioners) also allege that the respondent (then
deputy secretary) committed grave abuse of
discretion and acted beyond his jurisdiction when
he drafted the questioned resolution on November
7, 1997.
ISSUE:  W/N the doctrine of Res Judicata applies in
the case at bar
RULING: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that the acts
of the petitioner does not constitute forum
shopping, “that there is forum-shopping whenever,
as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a
party seeks a favorable opinion other than by
appeal or certiorari in another”. The principle
applies not only with respect to suits filed in the
courts but also in connection with litigation
commenced in the courts while administrative
proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to
defeat administrative processes in anticipation of
an favorable administrative ruling and a favorable
court ruling. This specially so, as in this case, where
the court in which the second suit was brought, has
no jurisdiction. Furthermore, the court has explained
that the test for determining whether a party
violated the rule against forum shopping is where
the elements of litis pendentia are present or where
a final judgement in one case will amount to  res
 judicata in the other, which are absent in the case
at bar.
A cursory examination of the cases filed by the
petitioners does not show that the said cases are
similar with each other. The petition for certiorari in
the Court of Appeals sought the nullification of the
DAR Secretary's order to proceed with the
compulsory acquisition and distribution of the
subject property. On the other hand, the civil case
in RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment
and cancellation of title issued in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was
based on the following grounds: (1) the DAR, in
applying for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDC's
title, used documents which were earlier declared
null and void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of
NQSRMDC's title was made without payment of just
compensation; and (3) without notice to NQSRMDC
for the surrender of its title. The present petition is
entirely different from the said two cases as it seeks
the nullification of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution
Page 79 of 93

of the Office of the President dated November 7,
1997, which resolution was issued long after the
previous two cases were instituted.
The fourth and final preliminary issue to be resolved
is the motion for intervention filed by alleged
farmer-beneficiaries, which we have to deny for
lack of merit. In their motion, movants contend that
they are the farmer-beneficiaries of the land in
question, hence, are real parties in interest. To
prove this, they attached as Annex "I" in their motion
a Master List of Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently,
the alleged master list was made pursuant to the
directive in the dispositive portion of the assailed
"Win-Win" Resolution which directs the DAR "to
carefully and meticulously determine who among
the claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries."
However, a perusal of the said document reveals
that movants are those purportedly "Found
Qualified and Recommended for Approval." In
other words, movants are merely  recommendee
farmer-beneficiaries. The rule in this jurisdiction is
that a real party in interest is a party who would be
benefited or injured by the judgment or is the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interest means
a  present substantial  interest, as distinguished from
a mere expectancy or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest. 59
Undoubtedly, movants' interest over the land in
question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not
real parties in interest.
t. SAMANIEGO vs AGUILA 334 SCRA 438 (2000)
Facts: Private respondents Vic Alvarez Aguila and
Josephine Taguinod filed for exemption from the
Operation Land Transfer Program of the DAR for the
land owned by their father Salud Aguila. The
tenants Samaniego, et. al, opposed the petition for
exemption. The Office of the President granted the
exemption. The petitioners appealed to the CA but
the CA dismissed the appeal for failure to implead
the Office of the President, as they should be
considered as indispensable parties. Petitioners
moved for a reconsideration, contending that
under Administrative Circular No. 1-95, the Office of
the President need not be impleaded. However,
their motion was denied.
Issue: Whether the Office of the President should be
considered as an indispensable party and must
therefore be impleaded pursuant to the Rules. - NO
Held: No. An indispensable party is a party in
interest without whom no final determination can
be had of an action without that party being
impleaded. Indispensable parties are those with
such an interest in the controversy that a final
decree would necessarily affect their rights, or that
the court cannot proceed without their presence.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
"Interests" within the meaning of this rule, should be
material, directly in issue and to be affected by the
decree as distinguished from a mere incidental
interest in the question involved. On the other hand,
a nominal or pro forma party is one who is joined as
a plaintiff or defendant, not because such party
has any real interest on the subject matter or
because any relief is demanded, but merely
because the technical rules of pleadings require
the presence of such party on the record. In the
case at bar, the failure to implead the Office of the
President does not warrant the dismissal of the case
as such is considered as a pro forma party.
u. De Castro vs. CA, 384 SCRA 607
Facts: Private respondent Artigo sued petitioners
Constante and Amor de Castro to collect the
unpaid balance of his broker’s commission from the
De Castros.
The appellants, De Castros, were co-owners
of 4 lots in Cubao, Quezon City. The appellee,
Artigo, was authorized by appellants to act as real
estate broker in the sale of these properties for the
amount of Php 23,000,000.00, 5% of which will be
given to the agent as commission. Appellee first
found the Times Transit Corporation and 2 lot were
sold. In return, he received Php 48,893.76 as
commission.
Appellee apparently fell short changed
because according to him, his total commission
should be Php 352,500.00 which is 5% of the agreed
price of Php 7,050,000.00 paid by Times Transit
Corporation to appellants for the 2 lots that it was
he who introduced the buyer to appellants and
unceasingly facilitated the negotiation which
ultimately led to the consummation of the sale.
Hence, he sued to collect the balance of Php
303,606.24 after having received Php 48,893.76 in
advance.
Appelants argued that appellee is selfishly
asking for more than what he truly deserved as
commission to the prejudice of other agents who
were more instrumental to the consummation of the
sale and that there were more or less 18 others who
took active efforts.
The de Castros argued that Artigo’s
complaint should have been dismissed for failure to
implead all the co-owners of the 2 lots. The de
Castros contend that failure to implead such
indispensable parties is fatal to the complaint since
Artigo, as agent of all the four co-owners, would be
paid with funds co-owned by the four co-owners.
It was shown also that Constante Amor de
Castro signed the authorization of Artigo as owner
and representative of the co-owners.
Page 80 of 93

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint merits dismissal
or failure to implead other co-owners as
indispensable parties.
HELD: No. The de Castros’ contentions are devoid of
legal basis. The CA explained that it is not necessary
to implead the co-owners since the action is
exclusively based on a contract of agency
between Artigo and Constante. The rule on
mandatory joinder of indispensable parties is not
applicable to the instant case.
Constante signed the note as owner and as
representative of the other co-owners. Under this
note, a contract of agency was clearly constituted
between Constante and Artigo. Whether
Constatnte appointed Artigo as agent, in
Constatnte’s individual or representative capacity,
or both, the de Castros cannot seek the dismissal of
the case for failure to implead the other co-owners
as indispensable parties. The de Castros admit that
the other co-owners are solidarily liable under the
contract of agency, citing Article 1915 of the Civil
Code, the solidary liability of the four co-owners,
however, militates against their theory that the
other co-owners should be impleaded as
indispensable parties. When the law expressly
provides for solidarity of the obligation, as in the
liability of co-principals in a contract of agency,
each obligor may be compelled to pay the entire
obligation. The agent may recover the whole
compensation from any one of the co-principals, as
in this case.
Indeed, Article 1216 of the Civil Code provides that
a creditor may sue any of the solidary debtors. This
article reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art. 1216. The creditor may proceed against any
one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them
simultaneously. The demand made against one of
them shall not be an obstacle to those which may
subsequently be directed against the others, so
long as the debt has not been fully collected.
v. Frias v. Judge Sorongon and First Asia Realty
Development Corp., GR No. 184827, 02/11/2015
Facts:  The RTC issued an order denying the
petitioners’ motion for leave to litigate as indigents.
Petitioners argue that respondent judge did not
conduct the proper hearing as prescribed under
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. They claim
that private respondents neither submitted
evidence nor were they required by respondent
 judge to submit evidence in support of their motions
on the issue of indigency of petitioners.
Issue: Whether the petitioners should be exempted
from payment of docket fees and other lawful fees
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
as provided under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court. - YES
Held:  The Supreme Court ruled that the hearing
requirement, contrary to petitioners’ claim, was
complied with during the hearings on the motions
to dismiss filed by respondents. In said hearings,
petitioners counsel was present and they were
given the opportunity to prove their indigency.
Clearly, their non-payment of docket fees is one of
the grounds raised by respondents in their motions
to dismiss and the hearings on the motions were
indeed the perfect opportunity for petitioners to
prove that they are entitled to be treated as
indigent litigants and thus exempted from the
payment of docket fees as initially found by the
Executive Judge.
w. National Power Corporation v. Provincial
Government of Bataan, GR No. 180654, 04/212014
Facts: On March 28, 2003 petitioner National Power
Corporation (NPC) received a notice of franchise
tax delinquency from the respondent Provincial
Government of Bataan (the Province) for P45.9
million covering the years 2001, 2002, and 2003. The
Province based its assessment on the NPC's sale of
electricity that it generated from two power plants
in Bataan. Rather than pay the tax or reject it, the
NPC chose to reserve its right to contest the
computation pending the decision of the Supreme
Court in National Power Corporation v. City of
Cabanatuan,[1] a case where the issue of the
NPC's exemption from the payment of local
franchise tax was then pending.
Province again sent notices of tax due to the NPC,
calling its attention to the Court's Decision in
National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan
that held the NPC liable for the payment of local
franchise tax. The NPC replied, however, that it had
ceased to be liable for the payment of that tax
after Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 9136,
also known as the Electric Power Industry Reform
Act. By operation of the EPIRA in 2001, the NPC had
ceased to engage in power transmission, given that
all its facilities for this function, including its
nationwide franchise, had been transferred to the
National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO).
The new law relieved the NPC of the function of
generating and supplying electricity beginning that
year. Consequently, the Province has no right to
further assess it for the 2001, 2002, and 2003 local
franchise tax.
NPC received a copy of the Certificate of Sale of
Real Property covering the auctioned properties for
P60,477,285.22, the amount of its franchise tax
delinquency.
On July 7, 2004 the NPC filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Mariveles, Bataan, a petition for
Page 81 of 93

declaration of nullity of the foreclosure sale with
prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction against
the Province, the provincial treasurer, and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
The NPC alleged that the foreclosure had no legal
basis since R.A. 7160 which authorized the
collection of local franchise tax had been modified
by the EPIRA.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the CA erred in failing to rule
that the NPC no longer owned or operated
the business subject to local franchise tax ;
(2) Whether or not the Province cannot
execute on former NPC properties that had
been taken from it and transferred to other
government corporations; and
(3) Whether or not PSALM and TRANSCO are
indispensable parties to the case.
Ruling:
NPC failed to present evidence that it no longer
owned or operated the business subject to local
franchise tax and that the properties the Province
levied on did not belong to it. But proving these
things did not require the presentation of evidence
in this case since these events took place by
operation of law. Within six (6) months from the
effectivity of this Act, the transmission and
subtransmission facilities of NPC and all other assets
related to transmission operations, including the
nationwide franchise of NPC for the operation of
the transmission system and the grid, shall be...
transferred to the TRANSCO.
The above created the TRANSCO and transferred
to it the NPC's electrical transmission function with
effect on June 26, 2001. The NPC, therefore, ceased
to operate that business in Bataan by operation of
law. Since the local franchise tax is imposed on the
privilege of operating a franchise, not a tax on the
ownership of the transmission facilities, it is clear that
such tax is not a liability of the NPC.
An indispensable party is one who has an interest in
the controversy or subject matter and in whose
absence there cannot be a determination between
the parties already before the court which is
effective, complete or equitable.[2] Here, since the
subject properties belong to PSALM Corp. and
TRANSCO, they are certainly indispensable parties
to the case that must be necessarily included
before it may properly go forward. For this reason,
the proceedings below that held the NPC liable for
the local franchise tax is a nullity.
G.R. No. 176598 July 9, 2014
PETRONIO CLIDORO, DIONISIO CLIDORO, LOLITA
CLIDORO, CALIXTO CARD ANO, JR., LOURDES
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
CLIDORO-LARIN, MATEO CLIDORO and MARLIZA
CLIDORO-DE UNA, Petitioners,
vs.
AUGUSTO JALMANZAR, GREGORIO CLIDORO, JR.,
SENECA CLIDORO-CIOCSON, MONSERAT CLIDORO-
QUIDAY, CELESTIAL CLIDORO-BINASA, APOLLO
CLIDORO, ROSALIE CLIDORO-CATOLICO, SOPHIE
CLIDORO, and JOSE CLIDORO, JR., Respondents.
FACTS:
The instant appeal stemmed from a complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. T-2275 for revival of
 judgment filed by Rizalina Clidoro, et al. against
Onofre Clidoro, et al., praying that the
Decisiondated November 13, 1995 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 19831, which
affirmed with modification the RTC Decision dated
March 10, 1988 in Civil Case No. T-98 for partition,
berevived and that the corresponding writ of
execution be issued.On September 3, 2003,
defendants-appellees except Gregoria Clidoro-
Palanca, moved to dismiss the said complaint on
the following grounds: "
1.) The petition, not being brought up against the
real partiesin-interest, is dismissible for lack of cause
of action;
2.) The substitution of the parties defendant is
improper and is not in accordance with the rules;
3.) Even if the decision is ordered revived, the same
cannot be executed since the legal requirements
of Rule 69, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure has not been complied with; and
4.) The Judgment of the Honorable Court ordering
partition is merely interlocutory as it leaves
something more to be done to complete the
disposition of the case."
After the filing of plaintiffs-appellants'
Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss,
defendants-appellees' Reply, plaintiffs-appellants'
Rejoinder and defendants-interestedparties' Sur-
Rejoinder, the RTC issued the assailed Order dated
December 8, 2003 dismissing the instant complaint
for lack of cause of action, the complaint shows
that most of the parties-plaintiffs, partiesdefendants
and interested parties are already deceased and
have no more natural or material existence.
This is contrary to the provision of the Rules (Sec. 1,
Rule 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). They could no
longer be considered as the real parties-in-interest.
Besides, pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 3 (1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure), where the action is allowed to be
prosecuted or defended by a representative or
someone acting in fiduciary capacity, the
beneficiary shall be included in the title of the case.
In the instant case the beneficiaries are already
deceased persons. Also, the Complaint states that
they were the original parties in Civil Case No. T-98
for Partition, but this is not so (paragraph 2).
Page 82 of 93

Some of the parties are actually not parties to the
original case, but representing the original parties
who are indicated as deceased. From the
foregoing, the Court finds the instant complaint to
be flawed in form and substance. The suit is not
brought by the real parties-ininterest, thus a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states
no cause of action is proper (Section 1(g), Rule 16).
Issue:
Whether the complaint for revival of judgment may
be dismissed for lack of cause of action as it was
not brought by or against the real parties-in-interest.
Ruling:
No. The Court emphasizes that lack of cause of
action is not enumerated under Rule 16 of the Rules
of Court as one of the grounds for the dismissal of a
complaint. As explained in Vitangcol v. New Vista
Properties, Inc.,5 to wit:
Lack of cause of action is, however, not a ground
for a dismissal of the complaint through a motion to
dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, for the
determination of a lack of cause of action can only
be made during and/or after trial. What is
dismissible via that mode is failure of the complaint
to state a cause of action. Sec. 1(g) of Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court provides that a motion may be
made on the ground "that the pleading asserting
the claim states no cause of action."
The rule is that in a motion to dismiss, a defendant
hypothetically admits the truth ofthe material
allegations of the ultimate facts contained in the
plaintiff's complaint. When a motion to dismiss is
grounded on the failure tostate a cause of action,
a ruling thereon should, as rule, be based only on
the facts alleged in the complaint.
In a motion to dismiss for failureto state a cause of
action, the focus is on the sufficiency, not the
veracity, of the material allegations. The test of
sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint
constituting a cause of action lies on whether or not
the court, admitting the facts alleged, could render
a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint.
In this case, it was alleged in the complaint for
revival of judgment that the parties therein were
also the parties inthe action for partition. Applying
the foregoing test of hypothetically admitting this
allegation in the complaint, and not looking into the
veracity of the same, it would then appear that the
complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action as
the plaintiffs in the complaint for revival of judgment
(hereinafter respondents), as the prevailing parties
in the action for partition, had a right to seek
enforcement of the decision in the partition case.
It should be borne in mind that the action for revival
of judgment is a totally separate and distinct case
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
from the original Civil Case No. T-98 for Partition. As
explained in Saligumba v. Palanog,9 to wit:
An action for revival of judgment is no more than a
procedural means of securing the execution of a
previous judgment which has become dormant
after the passage of five years without it being
executed upon motion of the prevailing party. It
isnot intended to re-open any issue affecting the
merits of the judgment debtor's case nor the
propriety or correctness of the first judgment. An
action for revival of judgment is a new and
independent action, different and distinct
fromeither the recovery of property case or the
reconstitution case [in this case, the original action
for partition], wherein the cause of action is the
decision itself and not the merits of the action upon
which the judgment sought to be enforced is
rendered. x x x10
With the foregoing in mind, it is understandable that
there would be instances where the parties in the
original case and in the subsequent action for
revival of judgment would not be exactly the same.
The mere fact that the names appearing as parties
in the the complaint for revival of judgment are
different from the names of the parties in the
original case would not necessarily mean that
theyare not the real parties-in-interest. What is
important is that, as provided in Section 1, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, they are "the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit."
Definitely, as the prevailing parties in the previous
case for partition, the plaintiffs in the case for revival
of judgment would be benefited by the
enforcement of the decision in the partition case.
G.R. No. L-66620 September 24, 1986
REMEDIO V. FLORES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE HEILIA S. MALLARE-PHILLIPPS, IGNACIO
BINONGCAL & FERNANDO CALION, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner has appealed by certiorari from the order
of Judge Heilia S. Mallare-Phillipps of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio City and Benguet Province
which dismissed his complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner did not attach to his petition a copy of his
complaint in the erroneous belief that the entire
original record of the case shall be transmitted to
this Court pursuant to the second paragraph of
Section 39 of BP129.
However, the order appealed from states that the
first cause of action alleged in the complaint was
against respondent Ignacio Binongcal for refusing
to pay the amount of P11,643.00 representing cost
of truck tires which he purchased on credit from
Page 83 of 93

petitioner on various occasions from August to
October, 1981; and the second cause of action
was against respondent Fernando Calion for
allegedly refusing to pay the amount of P10,212.00
representing cost of truck tires which he purchased
on credit from petitioner on several occasions.
Counsel for respondent Binongcal filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the
amount of the demand against said respondent
was only P11,643.00, and under Section 19(8) of
BP129 the regional trial court shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction if the amount of the demand is
more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). It
was further averred in said motion that although
another person, Fernando Calion, was allegedly
indebted to petitioner in the amount of P10,212.00,
his obligation was separate and distinct from that of
the other respondent. At the hearing of said Motion
to Dismiss, counsel for respondent Calion joined in
moving for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner maintains that the lower court has
 jurisdiction over the case following the "novel"
totality rule introduced in Section 33(l) of BP129 and
Section 11 of the Interim Rules.
The pertinent portion of Section 33(l) of BP129 reads
as follows:
... Provided,That where there are several claims or
causes of action between the same or different
parties, embodied in the same complaint, the
amount of the demand shall be the totality of the
claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of
whether the causes of action arose out of the same
or different transactions. ...
Section 11 of the Interim Rules provides thus:
Application of the totality rule.-In actions where the
 jurisdiction of the court is dependent on the amount
involved, the test of jurisdiction shall be the
aggregate sum of all the money demands,
exclusive only of interest and costs, irrespective of
whether or not the separate claims are owned by
or due to different parties. If any demand is for
damages in a civil action, the amount thereof must
be specifically alleged.
Petitioner compares the above-quoted provisions
with the pertinent portion of the former rule under
Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended
which reads as follows:
... Where there are several claims or causes of
action between the same parties embodied in the
same complaint, the amount of the demand shall
be the totality of the demand in all the causes of
action, irrespective of whether the causes of action
arose out of the same or different transactions; but
where the claims or causes of action joined in a
single complaint are separately owned by or due to
different parties, each separate claim shall furnish
the jurisdictional test. ...
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court correctly ruled on the
application joinder of the permissive joinder of the
parties
RULING:
Yes. In cases of permissive joinder of parties,
whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, under
Section 6 of Rule 3, the total of all the claims shall
now furnish the jurisdictional test. Needless to state
also, if instead of joining or being joined in one
complaint separate actions are filed by or against
the parties, the amount demanded in each
complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
In the case at bar, the lower court correctly held
that the jurisdictional test is subject to the rules on
 joinder of parties pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 2 and
Section 6 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and that,
after a careful scrutiny of the complaint, it appears
that there is a misjoinder of parties for the reason
that the claims against respondents Binongcal and
Calion are separate and distinct and neither of
which falls within its jurisdiction.
There is no difference between the former and
present rules in cases where a plaintiff sues a
defendant on two or more separate causes of
action. In such cases, the amount of the demand
shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of
action irrespective of whether the causes of action
arose out of the same or different transactions. If
the total demand exceeds twenty thousand pesos,
then the regional trial court has jurisdiction.
Needless to state, if the causes of action are
separate and independent, their joinder in one
complaint is permissive and not mandatory, and
any cause of action where the amount of the
demand is twenty thousand pesos or less may be
the subject of a separate complaint filed with a
metropolitan or municipal trial court.
On the other hand, there is a difference between
the former and present rules in cases where two or
more plaintiffs having separate causes of action
against a defendant join in a single complaint.
Under the former rule, "where the claims or causes
of action joined in a single complaint are separately
owned by or due to different parties, each
separate claim shall furnish the jurisdictional te st"
The difference between the former and present
rules in cases of permissive joinder of parties may be
illustrated by the two cases which were cited in the
case of Vda. de Rosario vs. Justice of the Peace
( supra) as exceptions to the totality rule. In the case
of Soriano y Cia vs. Jose (86 Phil. 523), where
twenty-nine dismissed employees joined in a
complaint against the defendant to collect their
respective claims, each of which was within the
 jurisdiction of the municipal court although the total
exceeded the jurisdictional amount, this Court held
that under the law then the municipal court had
 jurisdiction. In said case, although the plaintiffs'
Page 84 of 93

demands were separate, distinct and independent
of one another, their joint suit was authorized under
Section 6 of Rule 3 and each separate claim
furnished the jurisdictional test. In the case of
International Colleges, Inc. vs. Argonza (90 Phil.
470), where twenty-five dismissed teachers jointly
sued the defendant for unpaid salaries, this Court
also held that the municipal court had jurisdiction
because the amount of each claim was within,
although the total exceeded, its jurisdiction and it
was a case of permissive joinder of parties plaintiff
under Section 6 of Rule 3.
G.R. No. 156117 May 26, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO, respondents
FACTS:
Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto
brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed with the
MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single application for
registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422
and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion,
Cebu (Subject Lots). They claimed to be owners in
fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they
purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio
Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976.3
Together with their application for registration. The
petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed
an Opposition to the respondents' application for
registration of the Subject Lots arguing that: (1)
Respondents failed to comply with the period of
adverse possession of the Subject Lots required by
law; (2) Respondents' muniments of title were not
genuine and did not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of bona fide  acquisition of the
Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of
the public domain belonging to the Republic and
were not subject to private appropriation. , the MTC
promulgated its Judgment ordering the registration
and confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias
over Lot No. 8422 and of respondent David over Lot
No. 8423.
ISSUE:
Whether the MTC has jurisdiction to proceed and
hear the application for registration filed by
respondent
RULING:
No. Court finds that the MTC had no jurisdiction to
proceed with and hear the application for
registration filed by the respondents but for reasons
different from those presented by petitioner
Republic.
The Property Registration Decree 23  recognizes and
expressly allows the following situations: (1) the filing
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
of a single application by several applicants for as
long as they are co-owners of the parcel of land
sought to be registered; 24and (2) the filing of a
single application for registration of several parcels
of land provided that the same are located within
the same province.25  The Property Registration
Decree is silent, however, as to the present situation
wherein two applicants filed a single application for
two parcels of land, but are seeking the separate
and individual registration of the parcels of land in
their respective names.
Since the Property Registration Decree failed to
provide for such a situation, then this Court refers to
the Rules of Court to determine the proper course
of action. Section 34 of the Property Registration
Decree itself provides that, "[t]he Rules of Court
shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions of
this Decree, be applicable to land registration and
cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and
convenient."
Considering every application for land registration
filed in strict accordance with the Property
Registration Decree as a single cause of action,
then the defect in the joint application for
registration filed by the respondents with the MTC
constitutes a misjoinder of causes of action and
parties. Instead of a single or joint application for
registration, respondents Jeremias and David, more
appropriately, should have filed separate
applications for registration of Lots No. 8422 and
8423, respectively.
Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not
involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear
and proceed with the case.26  They are not even
accepted grounds for dismissal thereof. 27  Instead,
under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of
action and parties involve an implied admission of
the court's jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power
of the court, acting upon the motion of a party to
the case or on its own initiative, to order the
severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be
proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of
causes of action); and/or the dropping of a party
and the severance of any claim against said
misjoined party, also to be proceeded with
separately (in case of misjoinder of parties).
The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the
present Petition may have been corrected by the
MTC motu propio  or on motion of the petitioner
Republic. It is regrettable, however, that the MTC
failed to detect the misjoinder when the
application for registration was still pending before
it; and more regrettable that the petitioner Republic
did not call the attention of the MTC to the fact by
filing a motion for severance of the causes of action
and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only
before this Court.
Page 85 of 93

G.R. No. L-40098 August 29, 1975
ANTONIO LIM TANHU, DY OCHAY, ALFONSO
LEONARDO NG SUA and CO OYO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE R. RAMOLETE as Presiding Judge, Branch
III, CFI, Cebu and TAN PUT, respondents.
(TAAS KAYO NGA CASE)
FACTS:
The case was elevated to the SC by way of petition
for certiorari to annul and set aside certain
actuations of the CFI; specifically, its granting of the
motion to drop the two non-defaulted defendants
and proceeding to hear to hear the r est of Tan Put’s
(plaintiff’s) evidence ex-parte, and subsequently
rendering judgment by default against the
defaulted defendants.
Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, Alfonso Ng Sua and
Antonio Lim Tanhu were partners in the commercial
partnership of Glory Commercial Company with
Tee Hoon as the manager. When Tee Hoon died,
Tan Put, claiming to be the widow, filed a
complaint against spouses Antonio Lim Tanhu and
Dy Ochay. Later, the complaint included Lim
Tanhu’s son Lim Teck Chuan, as well as the spouses
Alfonso Ng Sua and Co Oyo, and their son Eng
Chong Leonardo. Tan Put claims in her complaint
that after Tee Hoon died, there was no liquidation
of the company assets made and that she owns
one third of the company shares. However, Lim
Tanhu, Ng Sua, Lim Teck Chuan, and Eng Chong
Leonardo continued to manage the company and
used the company funds to acquire lands and
buildings in several areas. Allegedly, the
defendants also used the company assets to
organize another corporation known as Glory
Commercial, Inc.
Subsequently, Tan Put amended her
complaint and added other averments. According
to Tan Put, she had asked the defendants to
liquidate the business of the defunct partnership
including real estate investments in Hong Kong. The
defendants did not make good in their promise to
liquidate the said properties, and instead, induced
her to execute a quitclaim of all her rights and
interests in the same. After the quitclaim was
executed, Lim Tanhu allegedly offered to pay her
P65,000 and issued a receipt to her bearing the said
amount. She signed the receipt but was not given a
copy of it and had not received the said money.
When she eventually made a formal demand for
the accounting and liquidation of the partnership
company’s assets, the defendants refus ed and
stated that they will not give her share.
Lim Tanhu, et. al.: The amended complaint (2nd
paragraph) should not be admitted as there were
material modifications of the causes of action
previously alleged.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
CFI: The judge allowed the amendment and said
that the present action is for accounting of real and
personal properties as well as for the recovery of
the same with damages. The amended complaint
only alleged facts that merely amplified the
material averments constituting the cause of action
in the original complaint. It likewise include
necessary and indispensable defendants without
whom no final determination can be had in the
action and in order that complete relief is to be
accorded as between those already parties. Thus,
the amendments were allowed because they did
not change the main causes of action in the
original complaint.
---Trial continued
The defendants filed a single answer with
counterclaim. They assert that Tan Put was not Tee
Hoon’s legitimate wife as the real Mrs. Tee Hoon,
Ang Siok Tin, is in Hong Kong. They also denied the
allegations of fraud and claimed that proper
liquidation had been regularly made of the business
of the partnership and Tee Hoon regularly received
his share until his death. After which, the partnership
was dissolved and his supposed share were all
given to Ang Siok and their children.
Lim Tanhu, et.al.: (By way of COUNTERCLAIM) The
case should be dismissed since Tan Put is not the
legitimate wife, and thus, lacks the legal capacity
to sue them. Further, even before the death of Tee
Hoon, Tan Put was no longer the decedent’s
common law wife and the ‘quitclaim’ was only
offered to her by Lim Tanhu out of the latter’s
kindness and generosity. Thus, in the event that Tan
Put is filing the case under Art. 144 of the Civil Code
(this part was already removed in the present Civil
Code and was replaced by the Family Code), then,
her acceptance of the ‘quitclaim’ constitutes a
waiver for her claims.
The newly acquired properties of the
defendants were bought out of their own personal
funds and not from the funds belonging to the
partnership. Further, since Tee Hoon and Tan Put did
not have a child together, there was no one who is
lawfully entitled to succeed to the properties left by
Tee Hoon together with the widow and the
legitimate children.
Tan Put: The said counterclaim should be dismissed
as it is merely permissive and the corresponding
filing fee was not paid.
CFI: (Ruling on the motion of Tan Put to dismiss the
counterclaim of the defendants) Overruled. The
counterclaim was accepted by the court and
declared to be a compulsory counterclaim.
Tan Put: Denied all the allegations in the
defendants counterclaim.
--- However, on the date set for the pre-trial, the
spouses Lim Tanhus and Ng Suas did not appear, it
being their belief that they were all compulsory
Page 86 of 93

parties and that the defense of one is the defense
of all of them. Thus, they were all “declared in
DEFAULT”. The said spouses tried to lift the order thru
a motion for reconsideration, but the court denied
such. During the trial, while her allegedly adopted
son Antonio Nuñez was testifying and was up for re-
cross-examination, Tan Put suddenly filed a motion
to drop Lim Teck Chuan and Eng Chong Leonardo
as defendants to the case without justifications,
which was granted by the court.
CFI: With the granting of the motion to drop Lim
Teck Chuan and Eng Chong Leonardo as
defendants, the case against the two was dismissed
upon order. However, since the spouses Lim Tanhus
and Ng Suas were declared to be in default for
their non-appearance in the pretrial, they remain to
be defendants in the complaint. Aside from giving
the said order, the court proceeded to hear ex-
parte the rest of Tan Put’s evidence.
--- The dropped defendants separately filed a
motion for reconsideration over the said orders of
the RTC, but were all denied. However, the denial
of their motions was received after the RTC’s
 judgment was promulgated.
Thus, all the defendants filed a motion to
quash the order dropping the 2 defendants, but
was later declared to be abandoned by the
defendants. Hence this present petition for certiorari
to annul the decision and actuations of the CFI.
Lim Tanhu, et.al. : There was a compulsory
counterclaim in the common answer of the
defendants and it is the nature of such that it
cannot be decided in an independent action.
Under Sec.4 Rule 18, the CFI has no authority to
divide the case before it by dismissing the case
against the non-defaulted defendants, and
thereafter proceeded to hear the case ex-parte
and subsequently rendering judgment against the
defaulted defendants. Further, under the said rule,
when a common cause of action is alleged against
several defendants, the default of any of them is a
mere formality by which those defaulted are not
allowed to take part in the proceedings. But
otherwise, all the defendants, defaulted and not
defaulted, are supposed to have but a common
fate, win or lose. Thus, there shall only be one
common judgment for or against all the
defendants, whether defaulted or non-defaulted.
Following such argument, either the CFI dismiss the
case against all the defendants or resume the
proceedings and allow the non-defendants to
defend the case for all the defendants.
Tan Put: The spouses Lim Tanhu and the spouses Ng
Suas were properly declared in default. Thus, they
have no personality or interest to question the
dismissal of the case as against their non-defaulted
co-defendants and should suffer the consequences
of their own default.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
ISSUE:
Whether or not, by virtue of the nature of the
counterclaim of the defendants, either the dismissal
of the complaint be applied to all the defendants
or the proceedings be resumed and the non-
defaulted defendants be allowed to present
defense on behalf of all of them.
RULING:
Yes. The defendants’ counterclaim is a compulsory
one because the same evidence to sustain it will
also refute the cause or causes of action alleged in
plaintiff's complaint. Moreover, it is compulsory
because it is obvious that the same cannot "remain
pending for independent adjudication by the
court."
Further, under the rules, "(i)f a counterclaim has
been pleaded by a defendant prior to the service
upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the
action shall not be dismissed against the
defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can
remain pending for independent adjudication by
the court." In the instant case, it was evident that
the judgment against the defaulted defendants
was rendered before the non-defaulted
defendants’ motion for reconsideration of the order
dropping them as defendants in the case was
received by them.
It should be noted that when Tan Put earlier
questioned the defendants’ counterclaim, the CFI
ruled that the same was permissive, and yet,
contrary to the nature of compulsory counterclaim,
it granted the dropping of the non-defaulted
defendants and proceeded in hearing Tan Put’s
evidence ex-parte.
Moreover, it is clear that all the defendants are
indispensable parties and under the rules of court
and according to jurisprudence, “when an
indispensable party is not before the court (that)
the action should be dismissed."
Additionally, the order dropping the non-defaulted
defendants “was not predicated on Section 2 of
Rule 17 but more on Section 11 of Rule 3. But the
truth is that nothing can be more incorrect.” To start
with, the latter rule does not comprehend whimsical
and irrational dropping or adding of parties in a
complaint. What it really contemplates is erroneous
or mistaken non-joinder and misjoinder of parties.
No one is free to join anybody in a complaint in
court only to drop him unceremoniously later at the
pleasure of the plaintiff. The rule presupposes that
the original inclusion had been made in the honest
conviction that it was proper and the subsequent
dropping is requested because it has turned out
that such inclusion was a mistake. And this is the
reason why the rule ordains that the dropping be
"on such terms as are just"  —   just to all the other
parties.
Page 87 of 93

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the record to
legally justify the dropping of the non-defaulted
defendants, Lim and Leonardo. Even Tan Put’s
motion dropping them as defendants did not
provide any justification. From all appearances, Tan
Put just decided to ask for it, without any relevant
explanation at all. Usually, the court in granting
such a motion inquires for the reasons and in the
appropriate instances directs the granting of some
form of compensation for the trouble undergone by
the defendant in answering the complaint,
preparing for or proceeding partially to trial, hiring
counsel and making corresponding expenses in the
premises. Nothing of these, appears in the order in
question. Most importantly, the judge ought to have
considered that the outright dropping of the non-
defaulted defendants Lim and Leonardo, over their
objection at that, would certainly be unjust not only
to the petitioners, their own parents, who would in
consequence be entirely defenseless, but also to
Lim and Leonardo themselves who would naturally
correspondingly suffer from the eventual judgment
against their parents. Respondent court paid no
heed at all to the mandate that such dropping
must be on such terms as are just"  —   meaning to all
concerned with its legal and factual effects.
Thus, it is quite plain that respondent court erred in
issuing its order of dismissal of the order dropping
the non-defaulted defendants in the complaint as
well as its order denying reconsideration of such
dismissal. Though Lim and Leonardo are not parties
to the herein petition, such consideration is
inconsequential. The fate of the case of petitioners
is inseparably tied up with said order of dismissal, if
only because the order of ex-parte  hearing of the
case which directly affects and prejudices said
petitioners is predicated thereon.
Hence, PETITION GRANTED. All proceedings held by
the respondent CFI particularly the ex-parte
proceedings against the defendants are annulled
and set aside. Further, “[r]espodent court is hereby
ordered to enter an order extending the effects of
its order of dismissal of the action dated October
21, 1974 to herein petitioners Antonio Lim Tanhu, Dy
Ochay, Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua and Co Oyo. And
respondent court is hereby permanently enjoined
from taking any further action in said civil case
gave and except as herein indicated.”
G.R. No. 196750
MA. ELENA R. DIVINAGRACIA, as Administratrix of
the ESTATE OF THE LATE SANTIAGO C.
DIVINAGRACIA,  Petitioner,
vs.
CORONACION PARILLA, CELESTIAL NOBLEZA,
CECILIA LELINA, CELEDONIO NOBLEZA, MAUDE
NOBLEZA, Respondents.
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
FACTS:
Conrado Nobleza, Sr. (Conrado, Sr.) owned a 313-
square meter parcel of land located at Cor.
Fuentes-Delgado Streets, Iloilo City denominated as
Lot 133-B-1-A and covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T- 12255 (subject land).6  During his
lifetime, he contracted two marriages: (a) the first
was with Lolita Palermo with whom he had two (2)
childrenand (b) the second was with Eusela
Niangar with whom he had seven (7) children.
According to Santiago, upon Conrado, Sr.’s death,
Cresencio, Conrado, Jr., Felcon (in representation
of his father, Mateo, Sr., and his siblings),
Coronacion, Celestial, Cecilia, Rogelio, Eduardo,
and Ricardo sold their respective interests over the
subject land to Santiago for a consideration of
447,695.66, as embodied in a Deed of Extrajudicial
Settlement or Adjudication with Deed of Sale 10
dated November 22, 1989 (subject document),11
which was, however, not signed by the other heirs
who did not sell their respective shares, namely,
Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude (in representation
of his husband, Cebeleo, Sr., and their children). 12
On December 22, 1989, the same parties executed
a Supplemental Contract13  whereby the vendors-
heirs and Santiago agreed that out of the aforesaid
consideration, only 109,807.93 will be paid up front,
and that Santiago will only pay the remaining
balance of 337,887.73 upon the partition of the
subject land.14  However, Santiago was not able to
have TCT No. T-12255 cancelled and the subject
document registered because of Ceruleo,
Celedonio, and Maude’s refusal to surrender the
said title. This fact, coupled with Ceruleo,
Celedonio, and Maude’s failure to partition the
subject land, prompted Santiago to file a
Complaint15  dated January 3, 1990 for judicial
partition and for receivership.16
For their part, Ceruleo, Celedonio, and Maude(Heirs
of second wife) maintained that Santiago had no
legal right to file an action for judicial partition nor
compel them to surrender TCT No. T-12255 because,
inter alia: (a) Santiago did not pay the full purchase
price of the shares sold to him; and (b) the subject
land is a conjugal asset of Conrado Sr. and Eusela
Niangar and, thus, only their legitimate issues may
validly inherit the same. 17
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA correctly ruled that Felcon’s
siblings and Cebeleo, Sr. and Maude’s children are
indispensable parties to Santiago’s complaint for
 judicial partition
RULING:
YES. An indispensable party is one whose interest will
be affected by the court’s action in the litigation,
and without whom no final determination of the
case can be had. The party’s interest in the subject
matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so
inextricably intertwined with the other parties’ that
his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is
an absolute necessity. In his absence, there cannot
be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before
Page 88 of 93

the court which is effective, complete, or
equitable.30  Thus, the absence of an indispensable
party renders all subsequent actions of the court
null and void, for want of authority to act, not only
as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.31
With regard to actions for partition, Section 1, Rule
69 of the Rules of Court requires that all persons
interested in the property shall be joined as
defendants, viz.:
SEC. 1. Complaint in action for partition of real
estate.  –   A person having the right to compel the
partition of real estate may do so as provided in this
Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and
extent of his title and an adequate description of
the real estate of which partition is demanded and
 joining as defendants all other persons interested in
the property. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest
in the property are indispensable parties; as such,
an action for partition will not lie without the joinder
of the said parties.32
In the instant case, records reveal that Conrado, Sr.
has the following heirs, legitimate and illegitimate,
who are entitled to a pro-indiviso share in the
subject land, namely: Conrado, Jr., Cresencio,
Mateo, Sr., Coronacion, Cecilia, Celestial,
Celedonio, Ceruleo, Cebeleo, Sr., Eduardo, Rogelio,
and Ricardo. However, both Mateo, Sr. and
Cebeleo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and, thus,
pursuant to the rules on representation under the
Civil Code,33  their respective interests shall be
represented by their children, namely: (a) for
Mateo, Sr.: Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni,
Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord; and (b) for Cebeleo,
Sr.: Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel.34
The aforementioned heirs  –   whether in their own
capacity or in representation of their direct
ascendant  –   have vested rights over the subject
land and, as such, should be impleaded as
indispensable parties in an action for partition
thereof. However, a reading of Santiago’s
complaint shows that as r egards Mateo, Sr.’s
interest, only Felcon was impleaded, excluding
therefrom his siblings and co-representatives.
Similarly, with regard to Cebeleo, Sr.’s interest over
the subject land, the complaint impleaded his wife,
Maude, when pursuant to Article 972 35  of the Civil
Code, the proper representatives to his interest
should have been his children, Cebeleo, Jr. and
Neobel. Verily, Santiago’s omission of the aforesaid
heirs renders his complaint for partition defective.
G.R. No. 121171 December 29, 1998
ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, JESUS S. CABARRUS, SR., JESUS
S. CABARRUS, JR., JAIME T. CABARRUS, JOSE MIGUEL
CABARRUS, ALEJANDRO S. PASTOR, JR., ANTONIO U.
MIRANDA, and MIGUEL M. ANTONIO, as Minority
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
Stock-Holders of Marinduque Mining and Industrial
Corporation, respondents.
FACTS:
The development, exploration and utilization of the
mineral deposits in the Surigao Mineral Reservation
have been authorized by the Republic Act No.
1528, as amended by Republic Act No. 2077 and
Republic Act No. 4167, by virtue of which laws, a
memorandum of agreement was drawn on July 3,
1968, whereby the Republic of the Philippines thru
the Surigao Mineral Reservation Board, granted
MMIC the exclusive right to explore, develop and
exploit nickel, cobalt, and other minerals in the
Surigao Mineral Reservation.
MMIC is a domestic corporation engaged in mining
with respondent Jesus S. Cabarrus Sr. as president
and among its original stockholders. The Philippine
government undertook to support the financing of
MMIC by purchase of MMIC debenture bonds and
extension of guarantees. Further, from the DBP
and/or the government financing institutions to
subscribe in MMIC and issue guarantee/s of foreign
loans or deferred payment arrangements secured
from the US Eximbank, Asian Development Bank
(ADB), Kobe steel of amount not exceeding US$100
million.
On July 13, 1981, MMIC, PNB, and DBP executed a
mortgage trust agreement whereby MMIC as
mortgagor, agreed to constitute a mortgage in
favor of PNB and DBP as mortgages, over all MMIC
assets; subject of real estate and chattel mortgage
executed by the mortgagor, and additional assets
described and identified, including assets of
whatever kind, nature or description, which the
mortgagor may acquire whether in substitution of,
in replenishment or in addition thereto. Due to the
unsettled obligations, a financial restructuring plan
(FRP) was suggested, however not finalized. The
obligations matured and the mortgage was
foreclosed.
The foreclosed assets were sold to PNB as the lone
bidder and were assigned to the newly formed
corporations namely Nonoc Mining Corporation,
Maricalum Mining and Industrial Corporation and
Island Cement Corporation. In 1986, these assets
were transferred to the asset privatization trust. On
February 28, 1985, Jesus S. Cabarrus Sr. together
with the other stockholders of MMIC, filed a
derivative suit against DBP and PNB before the RTC
of Makati branch 62, for annulment of foreclosures,
specific performance and damages.
The suit docketed as civil case no. 9900, prayed
that the court:
1.) Annul the foreclosures, restore the foreclosed
assets to MMIC, and require the banks to account
for their use and operation in the interim;
Page 89 of 93

2.) Direct the banks to honor and perform their
commitments under the alleged FRP;
3.) Pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses and costs. A compromise
and arbitration agreement was entered by the
parties to which committee awarded damages in
favor of Cabarrus.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the court of appeals erred in not
holding that the makati regional trial court,
branch 62 which has previously dismissed civil
case no. 9900 had lost jurisdiction to confirm
the arbitral award under the same civil case
and not ruling that the application for
confirmation should have been filed as a new
case to be raffled off among the different
branches of the rtc.
2. Whether the court of appeals likewise erred in
holding that petitioner was estopped from
questioning the arbitration award, when
petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the rtc-
makati, branch 62 and at the same time
moved to vacate the arbitral award.
RULING:
1. The RTC of Makati, Branch 62, did not have
 jurisdiction to confirm the arbitral award.
The use of the term "dismissed" is not "a mere
semantic imperfection". The dispositive portion of
the Order of the trial court dated October 14, 1992
stated in no uncertain terms:
4. The Complaint is hereby DISMISSED. 22
The term "dismiss" has a precise definition in
law. "To dispose of an action, suit, or motion
without trial on the issues involved. Conclude,
discontinue, terminate, quash." 23
Admittedly, the correct procedure was for the
parties to go back to the court where the case was
pending to have the award confirmed by said
court. However, Branch 62 made the  fatal  mistake
of issuing a final order dismissing the case. While
Branch 62 should have merely suspended the case
and not dismissed it, 24neither of the parties
questioned said dismissal. Thus, both parties as well
as said court are bound by such error.
It is erroneous then to argue, as private respondents
do, that petitioner APT was charged with the
knowledge that the "case was merely stayed until
arbitration finished," as again, the order of Branch
62 in very clear terms stated that the "complaint
was dismissed." By its own action, Branch 62 had lost
 jurisdiction over the case. It could not have validly
reacquired jurisdiction over the said case on mere
motion of one of the parties. The Rules of Court is
specific on how a new case may be initiated and
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
such is not done by mere motion in a particular
branch of the RTC. Consequently, as there was no
"pending action" to speak of, the petition to confirm
the arbitral award should have been filed as a new
case and raffled accordingly to one of the
branches of the Regional Trial Court.
2. Petitioner was not estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of  Branch 62 of the RTC of
 Makati.
The Court of Appeals ruled that APT was already
estopped to question the jurisdiction of the RTC to
confirm the arbitral award because it sought
affirmative relief in said court by asking that the
arbitral award be vacated.
The rule is that "Where the court itself clearly has no
 jurisdiction over the subject matter or the nature of
the action, the invocation of this defense may be
done at any time. It is neither for the courts nor for
the parties to violate or disregard that rule, let alone
to confer that jurisdiction this matter being
legislative in character." 25  As a rule then, neither
waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction
upon a courtbarring highly meritorious and
exceptional circumstances. 26  One such exception
was enunciated in  Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 27  where
it was held that "after voluntarily submitting a cause
and encountering an adverse decision on the
merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
 jurisdiction or power of the court."
Petitioner's situation is different because from the
outset, it has consistently held the position that the
RTC, Branch 62 had no jurisdiction to confirm the
arbitral award; consequently, it cannot be said that
it was estopped from questioning the RTC's
 jurisdiction. Petitioner's prayer for the setting aside of
the arbitral award was not inconsistent with its
disavowal of the court's jurisdiction.
G.R. No. L-46843 October 18, 1988
VIRGILIA CABRESOS, WELDELINO CABRESOS,
RUBYLIN CABRESOS, LUZVIMINDA CABRESOS,
MARILOU CABRESOS, ROQUELITO CABRESOS and
SYLVIA LUNA CABRESOS, petitioners,
vs.
MEYNARDO A. TIRO in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch VIII Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental, DAMASO B. DAHINO in his
capacity as Provincial Deputy Sheriff of Misamis
Oriental, RAMON QUIZ and GENEROSA ENRIQUEZ,
respondents.
FACTS:
On September 17, 1968, the private respondents
filed against spouses Galicano and Florentina
Page 90 of 93

Cabresos a case for recovery of ownership and
possession of a portion of a residential — commercial
parcel of land situated in the Poblacion of
Balingoan Misamis Oriental. They alleged that since
February 24, 1961, the spouses Cabresos have
illegally occupied the premises in question and
have refused to vacate it despite repeated
demands to do so. The piece of land under
litigation is the southern portion of a parcel of
residential-commercial land owned by the private
respondents. The private respondents averred that
they are the real owners and actual possessors of
the lot in dispute. As an affirmative defense, they
alleged prescription.
After trial on the merits, the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Oriental, 15th Judicial District, Branch VIII
through then District Judge Bernardo Teves
rendered judgment in favor of the private
respondents. On June 26, 1976, the private
respondents filed a motion for execution.
Consequently, on July 1, 1976, Judge Teves issued a
writ of execution. On September 7, 1977, this
petition was filed praying for a restraining order on
the allegations that the respondent judge had
threatened to issue the writ of demolition on
September 12, 1977 despite the variance in the
decision and the writ of execution and that the
respondent sheriff notified the petitioners of his
intention to demolish their house on the same date.
In support of their claim, the petitioners invoke
section 17, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court
which partly provides that:
SEC. 17. Proceedings where property claimed by
third person. — If property levied on be claimed
by any other person than the judgment debtor
or his agent, and such person make an affidavit
of his title thereto or right to the possession
thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title,
and serve the same upon the officer making the
levy, and a copy thereof upon the judgment
creditor, the officer shall not be bound to keep
the property, unless such judgment creditor or his
agent, on demand of the officer, indemnify the
officer against such claim by a bond in a sum
not greater than the value of the property levied
on. In case of disagreement as to such value, the
same shall be determined by the court issuing
the writ of execution.
The officer is not liable for damages, for the
taking or keeping of the property, to any third-
party claimant unless a claim is made by the
latter and unless an action for damages is
brought by him against the officer within one
hundred twenty (1 20) days from the date of the
filing of the bond. But nothing herein contained
shall prevent such claimant or any third person
from vindicating his claim to the property by any
proper action. (Rule 39, Sec. 17)
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are considered third party
within the definition of the said rule
RULING:
YES. It is important to determine whether the above
rule applies to the petitioners. The key word in the
said rule is "third party." By "third party" is meant a
person who is not a party to the action under
consideration. We agree with the private
respondents that the petitioners are privies to the
case for recovery of ownership and possession filed
by the former against the latter's predecessors-in-
interest, the latter being the daughter-in-law and
grandchildren of the losing party in Civil Case No.
3150. By the term "privies" is meant those between
whom an action is deemed binding although they
are not literally parties to the said action. There is no
doubt that the assailed decision is binding on the
petitioners. The house they constructed while the
case was pending started out only as a "camarin"
which was converted into a house.
With respect to the contention of the petitioners
that there exists a variance between the dispositive
portion of the questioned decision and the writ of
execution subject of this petition, the said
contention is untenable. The order to vacate the
litigated premises extends to those considered as
privies to the action for recovery of ownership and
possession. The fact that the petitioners' house is not
strictly speaking the same structure referred to in
the dispositive portion of the said civil action does
not bring them outside the ambit of the order to
vacate.
What the rule prohibits is for the writ of execution to
be different from or to exceed the terms of the
 judgment. (see Rule 39, Section 8, Revised Rules of
Court; Mutual Security Insurance Corporation v.
Court of Appeals 153 SCRA 678; Villoria v. Piccio, 95
Phil. 802). The judgment in Civil Case No. 3150
accords recovery of ownership and possession to
the private respondents. There can be no recovery
if the ejected tenants keep on building a new
house alongside the old one everytime they sense
a judgment against them.
Notwithstanding the inclusion of the second house
in the writ of execution issued to enforce it, that
 judgment remains unaltered or unmodified
considering that the alleged owners of said house
are the successors-in-interest of the petitioners.
Page 91 of 93

G.R. No. 138343 February 19, 2001
GILDA C. LIM, WILHELMINA V. JOVEN and DITAS A.
LERIOS, petitioners,
vs.
PATRICIA LIM-YU, in her capacity as a minority
stockholder of LIMPAN INVESTMENT
CORPORATION,respondent.
FACTS:
The Board of Directors of Limpan Corporation issued
a resolution authorizing the partial payment for the
legal services rendered by petitioner Lim to be in
form of shares of stock there being no available
funds to pay the same. As a result, the unsubscribed
shares of LIMPAN were issued and all of its
authorized capital stock became fully subscribed
with petitioner Lim ending up controlling 62.5% of
the shares. Respondent Yu filed a complaint against
the members who approved the resolution.
Petitioners moved to dismiss alleging Yu had no
legal capacity to sue on the basis of a TRO issued
by the SC on her guardianship case and thus
incapacitated from filing a derivative suit. The SEC
Hearing Officer held in abeyance the motion but
the SEC En Banc ordered the case to proceed. CA
affirmed the SEC En Banc.
ISSUE:
Whether the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
sustaining the respondent's legal capacity to sue
the petitioners by relying solely on the first half of this
Honorable Court's TRO and without considering the
second half of said TRO
RULING:
Petitioners point out that both the SEC and the
Court of Appeals considered only the first part of
the Supreme Court TRO and completely ignored
the second part. Supposedly, the latter part barred
respondent from entering into agreements that
would affect her family and the corporation.
Hence, they claim that the TRO, taken as a whole,
proscribed respondent's "derivative suit," which
sought to "enjoin herein [P]etitioner Gilda C. Lim
from further voting or exercising any and all rights
arising from the issuance to her of 15,515 shares of
stock of the corporation."9
We do not agree. The pertinent portion of the TRO
issued by this Court reads as follows:
"(b) to ISSUE the TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
prayed for, limited however, to the 'Writ of
Preliminary Injunction' dated 22 August 1994 and
the Order dated 14 July 1994 both issued in SP
Proceeding No. 94-71010 which in the opinion of
the Court are all too encompassing and should be
limited in scope and subject to the conditions set
forth in the Resolution of September 28, 1994 that,
'(D)uring the effectivity of the Temporary Restraining
Order, petitioner Patricia C. Lim, her attorneys,
CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS - 1
representatives, agents and any other persons
assisting petitioner Patricia C. Lim will be able to
act, enter into or sign contracts or documents solely
for and on behalf of Patricia C. Lim; said actions,
contracts or documents should not in any way bind
or affect the interests of her parents, Isabelo P. Lim
and Purificacion C. Lim, her brothers and sisters and
any family owned or controlled corporation in
particular, the Limpan Investment Corporation."
Simply put, the TRO allows Respondent Patricia Lim-
Yu to act for herself and to enter into any contract
on her own behalf. However, she cannot transact in
representation of or for the benefit of her parents,
brothers or sisters, or the Limpan Investment
Corporation. Contrary to what petitioners suggest,
all that is prohibited is any action that will bind
them. In short, she can act only on and in her own
behalf, not that of petitioners or the Corporation.
There appears to be a confusion on the nature of
the suit initiated before the SEC. Petitioners describe
it as a derivative suit, which has been defined as
"an action brought by minority shareholders in the
name of the corporation to redress wrongs
committed against it, for which the directors refuse
to sue. It is a remedy designed by equity and has
been the principal defense of the minority
shareholders against abuses by the majority."10  In a
derivative action, the real party in interest is the
corporation itself, I not the shareholder(s) who
actually instituted it.
"If the suit filed by respondent was indeed derivative
in character, then respondent may not have the
capacity to sue. The reason is that she would be
acting in representation of the corporation, an act
which the TRO enjoins her from doing.
We hold, however, that the suit of respondent
cannot be characterized as derivative, because
she was complaining only of the violation of her
preemptive right under Section 39 of the
Corporation Code.11  She was merely praying that
she be allowed to subscribe to the additional
issuances of stocks in proportion to her
shareholdings to enable her to preserve her
percentage of ownership in the corporation. She
was therefore not acting for the benefit of the
corporation. Quite the contrary, she was suing on
her own behalf, out of a desire to protect and
preserve her preemptive rights. Unquestionably, the
TRO did not prevent her from pursuing that action.
To repeat, the TRO issued by this Court had two
components: (1) it allowed respondent to enter into
agreements on her own behalf; and (2) it clarified
that respondent's acts could not bind or affect the
interests of her parents, brothers or sisters, or Limpan.
In other words, respondent was, as a rule, allowed
to act; but, as an exception, was prohibited from
doing anything that would bind the corporation or
any of the above-named persons.
Page 92 of 93