INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS OF EURASIA
Higor Uchoa
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South Ossetia
❑ Officially the Republic of South Ossetia is an autonomous region within the borders of Georgia

❑ The surface area is 3900 square kilometers.

❑ Population is almost 70 thousand.

❑ About 68% of the population is Oset. Besides the Ossetians, Russians, Georgians, Armenians and

Jews live.

❑ The Republic has rich underground and surface resources.

❑ Two languages are spoken: iron and Digor.

❑ The Orthodox Christian Of The Iranian Ossetians. The other Ossetians are Muslims
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Abkhazia
❑ 45% Georgians, Abkhaz made 17.8%, 14% were Russians and 14% Armenians.

❑ Abkhazian language is different from Georgian, it belong to the North-Caucasian

linguistic family and is akin to Chechen-Dagestan group.

❑ You can find both Orthodox and Muslim believers among Abkhazians.

❑ Abkhazia was one of the wealthiest regions of the Soviet Union and enjoyed a far

higher standard of living than the rest of Georgia.

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Background to Russian-Georgia Conflict

❑ South Ossetia was an autonomous oblast of the Georgian SSR from 1936 until 1991;

❑ Abkhazia, following a period in which it held the status of a SSR and was united with

Georgia by treaty, was an ASSR inside the Georgian SSR from 1931 until 1991;

❑ Stalin-era federal structures - artificially divided Ossetia into North (within the

RSFSR) and South (within Georgia)

❑ Language differences (Eastern Iranian language that was dominant among Ossetians)
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Background to Russian-Georgia Conflict (cont…)

❑ Nationalism tensions (Georgianization policy against the Ossetian identity )

❑ The separatist administrations in South Ossetia and Abkhazia have been

trying to gain formal independence since breaking away in the early 1990s;

❑ These are regions that are technically part of Georgia, but have gained some

independence over the years;

❑ Their de Facto independence included an internationally unrecognized

government that was largely support by Russia.

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Background to Russian-Georgia Conflict (cont…)

❑ Public Referendum - South Ossetia prioritized independence, and then

unification with North Ossetia;

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Background to Russian-Georgia Conflict (cont…)

❑ President Mikheil Saakashvili came to power in Georgia in 2003, and was re-
elected in 2008 ;
❑ Anti-corruption and democratization reforms stood atop his priorities;
❑ Tried to restore the Georgia’s territorial integrity by promising “broader
autonomy” for both Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the form of guaranteed
language and education rights and representation quotas in government
structures
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Socio-Political Development
❑ Since the time that the two breakaway regions had begun to exist as a de facto
states, in 1992 and 1994 respectively, during Georgia’s critical juncture period,
three elements had crystallized:

1. Their political preference for independence should no other political solution

that would allow for co-existence within Georgia was feasible;

2. Their aversion to the Georgian polity;

3. Their acceptance of the Russian presence, mostly in security terms (JPKF)

rather than as a political preference.

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Prior conflicts and Russian financial aid

❑ First major eruption of the Georgian–South Ossetian conflict, (1991-1992)

❑ A brief war occurred between Georgia and South Ossetia in 2004 over the

placement of Georgian troops

❑ Russia, which supplied 2/3 of South Ossetia’s funds, become alarmed at this

conflict, and began stepping up support of South Ossetia and Abkhazia under

the premise of trying to maintain stability in the region

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Tensions Rising (cont.)

❑ Georgia disapproved of what they called Russian interference in domestic

affairs;

❑ After Saakashvili’s re-election in 2008, he stepped efforts to fully integrate

South Ossetia and Abkhazia into Georgia;

❑ Russia responded by officially recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia as

independent countries, further enraging Georgia.
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Further Escalation

❑ Both Russia and Georgia began military built up, placing troops near the
borders of South Ossetia and Abkhazia

❑ Russians shot down a Georgian reconnaissance drone that was flying over
Abkhazia

❑ On June 14, 2008, first fighting occurred between Georgia and South Ossetia
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Russian Response
❑ Soon after, Russian troops entered South Ossetia and Abkhazia, noting that
since their peacekeepers had been killed in the conflict, they had a stake as
well;

❑ Full fledge war broke out between Georgia v. Russia, South Ossetia, and
Abkhazia on August 7, 2008.
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Major Events of the War

❑ August 7- Georgian armor begins attacking south Ossetian lines

❑ August 8- The Battle of Tskhinvali- Georgia captured several South Ossetia

cities

❑ August 9- Abkhazian Front- Naval skirmish between Georgia and Russia

❑ August 14- Occupation of Poti - Russia moved into Poti and sunk several
Georgian naval vessels
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Aftermath
❑ The war lasted a total of 5 days

❑ Predictably, Georgia was badly beaten, forced out of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, and back into their own territory despite the international
community’s condemnation of Russia’s over aggressive actions;

❑ Georgia’s homeland was badly damaged in the war;

❑ Treaty negotiation began on August 12 with Russia having more leverage

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Six Point Peace Plan
❑ French President Nicolas Sarkozy drafted, on August 12, a succinct, six-point
ceasefire document: This was used to help end the war, all countries signed it

1. No recourse to the use of force.;

2. Definitive cessation of hostilities;

3. Free access to humanitarian aid (addition rejected: and to allow the return of

refugees);

4. The Armed Forces of Georgia must withdraw to their permanent positions.

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Six Point Peace Plan
❑ French President Nicolas Sarkozy drafted, on August 12, a succinct, six-point
ceasefire document: This was used to help end the war, all countries signed it

5. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation must withdraw to the line where they were
stationed prior to the beginning of hostilities. Prior to the establishment of international
mechanisms the Russian peacekeeping forces will take additional security measures. (addition
rejected: six months)

6. An international debate on the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and ways to ensure
their lasting security will take place. (addition rejected: based on the decisions of the UN and the
OSCE).
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Points of contention
❑ Complete withdrawal of Georgian troops outside contended borders:

• Georgia: Although they wanted to keep troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, they were much more concerned
with recovering and getting Russian troops out of Georgia and the contended regions.

• Russia: Were strongly opposed to Georgian troops in the region, part of their reason for entering conflict in the
first place

❑ End to hostilities and removal of 9000 Russian troops in Georgia and regions of
conflict:
• Georgia: Having suffered heavy casualties and defeats, this was the key point for the Georgians as they tried to
recover.

• Russia: Were willing and able to continue the conflict, but felt they had made their point and were facing
international pressure to withdraw
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Points of contention (cont…)
❑ Russian peacekeepers will take additions measures to ensure attacks from their side
stop:

• Georgia: Georgians wanted some extra assurance that the attacks would stop so they could recover
• Russia: Saw this as a nuisance, but were planning on stopping attacks anyway

❑ Free access to humanitarian aid in Georgia

• Georgia: Georgia needed and wanted all the help they could get as they recovered
• Russia: Russia had no interest in whether or not Georgia got aid, only used this a negotiating ploy

• A U.N. led debate of the future statuses of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
• Georgia: Supported this idea, but again, their biggest concern was their own well-being

• Russia: Was vehemently opposed to a U.N. led debate, knowing they would support Georgia’s position, and they
had a great interest on the statuses of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
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After war results

❑ Russian can keep 2/13 of their troops (or 1385 troops) in Georgia and
contended regions (Russian still has around 3700 troops in/near the South
Ossetian and Abkhazia border);
❑ Withdrawal of Georgian troops outside contended borders;
❑ Free access to humanitarian aid in Georgia ;
❑ Russian peacekeepers will take additions measures to ensure attacks from
their side stop;
❑ NO U.N. led debate of the future status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Status
quo disagreements between Russia and Western World/Georgia remained
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General overview of the Crisis in South Ossetia and
Abkhazia: Substantiating Causality
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Conclusions

❑ The main difference between the period right after the war and reality today it

is the extra Russian troops in the contended regions;

❑ Georgia was inevitably going to get a weak deal because of their heavy losses;

❑ Georgia put most of its emphasis on healing its own country;

❑ In the UN Security Council, the United States was heavily critical of Russian

support of the secessionist governments, accusing the government of violating

Georgia's territorial integrity.

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Conclusions

❑ Got an overall “fair” deal thanks to heavy international support;

❑ Russia was satisfied with the results (two states became Russian protectorate)

❑ Both Abkhazia and South Ossetia are partially recognized as independent

states by Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru and Syria.

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Conclusions (cont.)

❑ Russian president Medvedev stated that:

"Western countries rushed to recognize Kosovo's illegal declaration of

independence from Serbia. We argued consistently that it would be impossible,
after that, to tell the Abkhazians and Ossetians (and dozens of other groups
around the world) that what was good for the Kosovo Albanians was not good for
them. In international relations, you cannot have one rule for some and another
rule for others."
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Comparison with Transdniestria
❑ President of Transdniestria, Igor Smirnov said:

“"the Russian leadership, in recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South

Ossetia, has underlined the priority of the expression of the will of the people for

solution of such problems."

❑ On 25 August, the day before Russia's recognition, Dmitry Medvedev met

with President of Moldova Vladimir Voronin, where the Russian leader made
it clear that Moscow was ready to solve the Transdniestria problem within the
framework of the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova with the maximum
effort. Relations between Moldova and Russia worsened after Moldova
refused to support the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
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Questions to consider
a) Why did the UN not intervene in this crisis enough?

b) Why did the United States refrain from intervening in the crisis despite

being a world power ?

c) What was NATO's perspective on Georgia without a NATO member ?,

d) Despite being outside the EU region, Why did EU play a key role in solving

the crisis ?

e) What does South Ossetia mean for Russia?

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From the perspective of the United Nations
❑ During the Russian-Georgian War, the UN was undoubtedly at the top of the

international mechanisms that had the responsibility to intervene in the crisis

and to solve the problem.

❑ But the UN failed to follow a very effective policy during and after the war.

❑ The most important reason why the UN could not be effective in the face of

the problem was, without a doubt, Russia's veto card at the Security Council,

as in many cases so far. Of course, it was not possible to make a decision in the

Security Council that Russia would not accept despite its veto.
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From the perspective of the United Nations
❑ If the UN had been able to reach a solution to the problem since 1992, perhaps there

would have been no war. The lack of significant progress in the problems of South

Ossetia and Abkhazia in the 1992-2008 period was largely due to the failure of the UN

to remain passive. After 1992, a United Nations Observer mission in Georgia was

established to ensure that the agreements signed between Georgia and South Ossetia

and Abkhazia were complied with and sent to the region to serve.

❑ As a result of the joint efforts of the not UN and the EU and the OSCE, a cease-fire

was established between the two sides.

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From the perspective of NATO
❑ Russia's war against Georgia in 2008 is no secret that it has a purpose to prevent its
membership in NATO.
❑ The 2006 gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine and the independence referendum in
South Ossetia were Russia's warning against their NATO membership. Clearly Russia
has given the West the message that NATO enlargement in the region will not be
riskless
❑ Russia'S NATO representative Dmitry Rogozin said NATO encouraged Georgia to
attack South Ossetia, which declared its unilateral independence. After that, he sent an
official letter to all NATO members in Brussels asking them not to support
Saakashvili. Russia's maneuver was, of course, to show NATO that Saakashvili was
causing the war. However, he also stressed that NATO would not consider the attempt
to stop itself.
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From the perspective of the European Union
❑ The policies pursued by the EU in the face of the Russian-Georgian war are more active than the
other international actors. The fact that the United Nations has been locked up due to Russia's
veto, that NATO is not authorized to intervene directly, and that the United States is not alone in
conflict with Russia has made the EU the first actor in the face of the crisis.
❑ The cost of this war was very high for Europe. Since the war risked Europe's energy security, the
EU was obliged to take responsibility for eliminating this risk. It was also important that the EU
had close relations with Russia and Georgia, among the reasons that forced the EU to deal with
the problem.
❑ At the end of the war in a short period of time, the International Crisis Group and the EU had
an important role in the rapid movement. The French Foreign Minister and also the EU Council
President Bernard Koucher initiated a shuttle diplomacy with the OSCE President Alexandr
Stubb to stop the war.
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From the perspective of the United States of America
❑ Georgia geopolitics was extremely important for the USA. On the one hand, Central Asia energy sources are a
country on the route of transition, on the other hand Russia and Iran are at the point of control and the Black
Sea coast is one of the most important reasons for the U.S. to care about this country.
❑ Georgia was among the countries that supported the US and NATO's Afghan operations.
❑ There is a widespread belief that this rapprochement between the United States and Georgia encouraged
Saakashvili to conduct operations in South Ossetia in August 2008. In particular, at NATO'S Bucharest Summit
in April 2008, US President George W. Bush's voice over Georgia's NATO membership has been understood by
Saakashvili as a US guarantee.
❑ There were important reasons why the United States could not develop policy in the face of war. Among them is
the first possibility that the Bush administration would avoid taking the United States on a new adventure after
the failure of Afghanistan and Iraq. The upcoming presidential elections, the reluctance of institutions such as
NATO and the EU to intervene in the event as well as the restrictions imposed by the Montreal Convention on
intervention may be viewed as other obstacles.
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From the perspective of Russia
❑ When we look at the issue from the Russian front, we can say that Russia is not the winning side
of the war. Apparently Russia achieved a military success. Georgia, which has close relations with
the West, has been given a very strong eye to other countries in the same situation. It has shown
that the USA will strongly oppose Regional Policy and NATO's enlargement efforts in the
Caucasus. The United States, which has good relations with Georgia, has given the message it
wants to Turkey and Azerbaijan.

❑ Russia, which uses energy as a means of foreign policy, has made it feel that the energy and
transportation lines in the region are in danger at all times.

❑ All of this can be written into Russia's gain. However, even if they all put Russia into the
psychology of the victorious country in the short term, Russia's losses will be greater in the long
term.
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