R
Rabbinic Hebrew
▶ Language and Literature, Hebrew
Rabbinic Tradition
▶ Judaic Studies
Radical Orthodoxy
Mattias Martinson
Department of Theology, Faculty of Theology,
Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
Radical orthodoxy (RO) is a highly influential
contemporary British academic theological move-
ment originally set up in the late 1990s – May 1,
1997, is the official date – as a group of scholars
in Cambridge mainly (but not exclusively)
represented by high Church Anglicans. It devel-
oped out of a theological study group – Theory
Group – related to Peterhouse College. Little St.
Mary’s Church, with an explicit Anglo-Catholic
profile (located very close to Peterhouse in
Cambridge) also played a practical role in the
formation of the ecclesiological reflection of RO.
The two most important defining documents are
John Milbank’s Theology and Social Theory.
Beyond Secular Reason (1990 from now on TST)
A. Runehov, L. Oviedo (eds.), Encyclopedia of Sciences and Religions,
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4020-8265-8, # Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013
and the anthology Radical Orthodoxy. A New
Theology (1999), edited by John Milbank,
Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward who
generally are held to be the central scholars of RO.
General Characterization
During more than a decade, RO has influenced
the debate on postmodern Christian theology,
especially in the English-speaking world. The
reason for the success of its “sensibility” is not
so much a common theology in terms of sub-
stance. It is rather the movement’s general
approach to theology and Christianity – its criti-
cal theoretical perspective – that has been widely
appreciated and much debated. RO is often
counted among the most challenging and serious
expressions of postmodern theology. It is charac-
teristic of RO scholarship to be very ambitious,
learned, difficult, and deeply aware both of tradi-
tional Christian sources and the most recent
debates in postmodern theory. The voice of RO
scholarship is usually highly unapologetic and
without any ingratiating tenor. It is interesting to
notice how important works of RO, such as
Milbank’s TST or Graham Ward’s more recent
work Christ and Culture, not only make this
obvious in terms of theoretical content, they
also use very significant stylistic and rhetorical
means in order to make the reader fully aware of
the fact that they have entered a theological space
where no preliminary arguments or excuses for
the Christian vision have to be made. Ward,
R 1944
for instance, begins his work in medias res
by a quotation from Aquinas followed by the
solemn statement that “Taking our cue from this
statement by Aquinas, the Christological ques-
tion begins not with who is the Christ or what is
the Christ; it begins with where is the Christ”
(Ward 2005b). This example of how RO starts
in the midst of a Christian problematic, taking the
Christian discourse as the natural point of depar-
ture, illustrates perfectly how the unapologetic
logic operates at every level of the RO discourse –
Theology stands on its own; it does not have to
lean on secular reason.
In this respect, RO and its representatives are
guided by a truly proud, synthesizing Christian
ambition, reminiscent of the great theologians
they tend to admire most, such as Augustine and
Aquinas. One could also argue that RO has
become the new primary point of reference for
that kind of unapologetic reflection on theology
that earlier was associated with postliberal theol-
ogy (a movement that originally emanated from
Yale Divinity School during the 1980s followed
by heated debates among the most prominent
theologians in the English-speaking world). At
a first glance, RO has very little to do with the
so-called Yale school, but it has undoubtedly
developed and differentiated the kind of
reorientation of theological imagination that was
initiated by Yale postliberals such as George A.
Lindbeck, Hans Frei, and – somewhat later and
somewhat differently – Stanley Hauerwas.
The basic assumption of RO is that the
supposedly neutral and disinterested Western
▶ secular rationality has a hidden theological
core. As John Milbank tries to show in TST,
modernity (and the movement in modern society
from a basically religious to a basically secular
worldview) can be interpreted fundamentally
as a development within theology. Through
a genealogical account of modern secular sociol-
ogy and philosophy, Milbank attempts to
show how the modern exclusion of theology actu-
ally presupposes a theological perspective. From
the orthodox Christian point of view, this
“hidden” theological development within moder-
nity can be understood both as pagan and
Radical Orthodoxy
heretic. As such, it has no room within an authen-
tic Christian vision. “It follows that if Christianity
seeks to ‘find a place for’ secular reason, it may
be perversely compromising with what, on its
own terms, is either deviancy or falsehood”
(TST, p. 23). Against this background, RO rejects
the idea of dialogue as long as it works from
the assumption of a neutral ground or an
unproblematic meeting place for the dialogue.
All these basic features throw light on the aspect
of the notions “orthodoxy” and “radicalism” in
the vision of RO.
Radicalism and Orthodoxy
There are at least two dimensions of the
radicalism in RO. First and foremost, radical is
related to orthodoxy in the sense that RO
connects the radical directly to radix (root). The
radical is someone who is “at root” or “more in
tune with the sources” rather than someone who
wants a clean break or a wholly new direction.
However, RO is also radical in the political sense
of making a clean break with the present order
of things. It moves back to the sources as
a possibility to challenge what they understand
to be the nihilist ideology of modernity and post-
modernity. As D. Stephen Long rightly has noted,
RO is radical because it makes explicit the
unavoidable interconnections between theology
and politics, which becomes a way to “question
modern politics, culture, art, science, and philos-
ophy” (Long 2003). Christian Orthodoxy, then,
becomes the source for a radical vision of a new
society beyond the liberal and individualistic soci-
ety of our days. As such, the radicalism of RO can
be classified as a Christian socialism, although this
socialism has nothing to do with the modern state
solutions of communism and social democracy.
If the radicalism of RO can be deduced partly
from its orthodoxy in this way, then it should be
equally fair to claim that the orthodoxy of RO can
be deduced partly from the notion of radicalism. As
an orthodox theological movement, RO wants to
make the authentic Christian tradition operative in
a critical conception and challenge of the present
Radical Orthodoxy
social and political reality. It is only a truly
Christian theology – in contrast to the heretic the-
ology that Milbank and others detect in the modern
and postmodern visions of society – that can sup-
port a vision that breaks with the heretic nihilist
celebration of death and violence that lurks under
the surface of the secular society. It is very impor-
tant to underline that this kind of orthodox judg-
ments claims no neutrality. It is meaningless to
criticize it for being biased or fideist in any general
sense since the very idea of RO is to provide
a comprehensive Christian perspective. According
to RO, the very idea of a neutral secular realm is
one of the most problematic and violent expres-
sions of the hidden theology of liberal society.
Through the ideal of a neutral knowledge or
a neutrally established social order, the heretic
theological vision of the secular becomes all the
more influential. The orthodox Christian vision
thus becomes the determinate alternative to this
violent neutrality, and it is characterized by an
▶ ontology of love and peace.
More concretely speaking, for RO orthodox
Christianity means the development from patris-
tic times on the high Middle Ages. The idea is not
to take side with any particular orthodoxy in the
present, such as one form of Eastern Orthodoxy
or one form of Roman Catholicism. RO under-
stands its own orthodoxy as ecumenical in the
broadest sense, although it is obvious that
the characteristic emphasis on Augustine and
Thomas links it closely to Roman Catholicism.
The point of being orthodox in the RO sense,
however, is not to be restricted by traditional-
ism but rather to be aware of the Augustinian
possibility of a distinct Christian alternative to
the worldly life, and more exactly, the possi-
bility of an alternative to the worldly life such
as it expresses itself in the contemporary
situation.
This explains why RO, rather than being
a regular orthodoxy, is deeply involved in the
most progressive debates about the postmodern.
The interlocutors of RO – although their dialogue
is very often diachronic and in tune with the
Bible, the fathers, and various other ancient theo-
logians – are very often contemporary secular
1945 R
critics of modern life who have put their fingers
right on the problems of secular nihilism
even though RO rejects their “still-nihilistic”
solutions.
Works and Developments
As was stated above, RO does not represent
a single theology in terms of substance or content.
If Milbank’s seminal works has laid out the basic
perspective of RO, Graham Ward’s and Catherine
Pickstock’s works have developed this perspective
in somewhat different ways. In After Writing,
Pickstock developed Milbank’s reflection on the
Christian vision in terms of liturgical praxis.
The first lines of the book are telling: “This essay
completes and surpasses philosophy in the direc-
tion, not of nihilism but of doxology. It shows how
philosophy itself, in its Platonic guise, did not
assume, as have been thought, a primacy of meta-
physical presence, but rather a primacy of liturgi-
cal theory and practice” (Pickstock 1997).
Instead of being an operation against
philosophy, Pickstock here understands the criti-
cal task of theology as an operation within phi-
losophy, reinterpreting its Greek foundations in
a way that opens up for a reflection on later
deviations from the authentic Platonic-Christian
worldview. Both Milbank and Pickstock locate
this deviation, the moment of heresy, in Johannes
Duns Scotus, who replaced the Thomistic idea of
analogia entis with the idea of univocity, which R
paved the way for a “metaphysics of presence.”
“Duns Scotus, unlike Thomas Aquinas, already
distinguished metaphysics as a philosophical sci-
ence concerning Being from theology as
a science concerning God” (TST, p. 302.). For
Pickstock, liturgy in its Platonic-Christian
modus becomes the doxological correction of
this flaw.
Graham Ward, but also Gerhard Loughlin and
others, has developed a somewhat different
aspect of RO. They are taking their point of
departure not so much in the idea of nihilism as
heresy, but rather in an unapologetic Christian
reflection on postmodern life. A quote from the
R 1946
introduction of Ward’s book Cities of God is
enlightening:
This book was conceived in New Orleans and
brought to birth in Manchester. In between there
were flirtations with Sidney, Bonn, Amsterdam,
Cape Town, San Francisco, and Jerusalem. If it is
only movie legend that the German film-maker
Fritz Lang was inspired by the New York skyline,
seen from an ocean liner, to direct Metropolis, it is
a recordable fact that my first glance of New
Orleans, coming over the freeway from the airport,
opened my eyes to the excitement of the city. Rising
from the plain, as so many American cities do, its
towers of polished glass and steel shimmering with
the associations of jazz, voodoo and the New Jeru-
salem, New Orleans posed a question I could not at
that time articulate. Returning to Manchester,
a city in which I grew up and which I then rejected
in a teenage flight to Oxbride, the question began to
take on form: what kind of theological statement
does the city make today? This book is an attempt
to answer that question (Ward 2000).
On the one hand, this introductory remark
underlines the general hallmark of RO, namely,
that the task is to draw everything into the theolog-
ical sphere, being explicit about how Christian
theology can alter the vision of the secular and
expose its theological presuppositions. On the
other hand, it shows a somewhat more generous
attitude toward the secular. Although it is
not generous in the sense of welcoming secular
theology as such, it is so in the sense of dwelling
within the aporetic sphere of secular life. Ward’s
form of RO can thus be said to underline that
aspect of the Augustinian theology that puts
emphasis on interpretation and analogical vision
as a fundamental dimension of the Christian pil-
grimage in this world. This emphasis explains why
Ward’s texts are full of interpretations and engaged
reflections on postmodern theory, postmodern art,
films, etc. Against this background, it is also quite
natural that Ward is the representative of RO that
has moved farthest in the direction of a renewed
concept of apologetic theology developed in terms
of a standpoint epistemology (Ward 2005a).
Critical Assessment
RO is a deeply controversial movement in
today’s theology. Making the division between
Radical Orthodoxy
the genuinely Christian and the non-Christian
into the fundamental paradigm, there is a risk of
a nostalgia that becomes idealistic and blind to
the ambiguities and varieties not only of the
secular realm but within the Christian as well.
One has to admire RO for being so explicit in
all of its operations but also for being so thor-
ough and solid in scholarship. However, there is
also a risk that the programmatic tenor and the
solidity might stifle less self-certain attempts
and establish an orthodoxy of a much less
constructive kind than the one RO seems to
opt for. Being focused on the need for a strong
and self-confident theology is not without risks
when it comes to the question of which
theology.
RO is quite exclusively focused on the secu-
lar in terms of philosophy, social and economic
theory, politics, and culture. Given these fields,
the present state of RO scholarship is a quite
remarkable example of how theology and
science can interact and make meaningful crit-
ical conversation on a very advanced level.
However, the decided point of departure in
a Christian rejection of the secular makes
this critical “dialogue” with other disciplines
a radically different and less synthetic than
other attempts to relate religion and science.
When it comes to natural science, and the phil-
osophical debate on the relationship with sci-
ence and religion, RO has not contributed
much. The reason for this is not difficult to
understand, although it is a clear weakness
that such a comprehensive perspective has little
room for the debates on science as a potential
ally to theology. In an unpublished paper, James
K. Smith has brought up the question of the
relationship between RO and the science/reli-
gion debate. He argues that RO’s critique of the
secular could be extended successfully also to
the framework of the “hard sciences.” Smith
claims that RO’s “participatory ontology,”
according to which liturgical and bodily prac-
tices are primary to abstract reflection, is the
most promising entry for such a movement
toward science. He might very well be right,
although very little has been done in this
direction so far.
Rationality (Philosophical) 1947 R
Cross-References offer greater confidence that differences in out-
come can be causally attributed to the differing
▶ Ecclesiology conditions or treatments.
▶ Systematic Theology

References Rate of Entropy Production

Long, D. S. (2003). In Vanhoozer ed. (2003). Radical ▶ Chemical Thermodynamics
orthodoxy.
Milbank, J. (1990). Theology and social theory. Beyond
secular reason. Oxford: Blackwell.
Milbank, et al. eds. (1999). Radical orthodoxy. A new
theology. London/New York: Routledge. Rational Theology
Pickstock, C. (1997). After writing. The liturgical
consummation of philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell.
Smith, J. K. Introducing radical orthodoxy to the science/ ▶ Natural Theology
religion conversation. http://www.metanexus.net/
conference2006/papers.asp#S. Accessed Dec 2008
Vanhoozer, K. J. ed. (2003). Cambridge companion to
postmodern theology. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press. Rational Thinking in Islam
Ward, G. (2000). Cities of God. London/New York:
Routledge. ▶ Logic in Islam
Ward, G. (2005a). Cultural tranformation and religious
praxis. Cambridge: Cambridge university press.
Ward, G. (2005b). Christ and culture. Oxford: Blackwell.

Rationalism

€elian Movement
Ra ▶ Deism

▶ UFO Cults

Rationality (Philosophical)

Randomized Controlled Trial Charles Taliaferro R

Department of Philosophy, St. Olaf College,
Kevin S. Masters Northfield, MN, USA
Department of Psychology, University of
Colorado Denver, Denver, CO, USA
Related Terms

A type of research design considered the most Logical

powerful test of the efficacy of a proposed treat-
ment by investigators in the fields of medicine
and behavioral medicine. In these studies, partic-
ipants are randomly assigned to the treatment or
control conditions thus all factors, known and
unknown, are presumed to be balanced across
groups. Because randomization attenuates the
threat for bias, randomized controlled trials
Description
The concept of rationality is in dispute today,
with philosophers taking up two camps. In one,
for a person to be rational involves instrumental
reason relative to his desires. If a subject desires
R 1948
to go fishing, it may be rational for him to buy
fishing equipment. This view is sometimes called
internalism. According to externalism, a person’s
desires may themselves be rational or irrational to
the extent that the person is responsive to the
reasons he has for acting, thinking, and feeling.
On this view, a person may lack a desire to be
healthy, but he still has a reason to live in
a healthy manner. Why? On most accounts of
externalism, this is because it is good for him to
be healthy. Sometimes philosophers will use the
word “rational” to refer to instrumental reason
(internalism) and use the term “reasonable” to
refer to this alternative approach in which
a person is responsive to reasons. Philosophers
in both camps assume that, minimally, to be
rational is to be logical at least in the minimal
sense of not violating the law of identity (A is A)
and noncontradiction (A is not non-A), though
there may be thought to be some exceptions for
internalism. Both positions have advantages and
disadvantages, reviewed below.
Internalism Versus Externalism
Forms of internalism today are often traced back
to Hume who, famously, once wrote that “reason
alone can never be a motive to any action of
the will” (Hume 1737, Treatise, 1.3.3). For
Humeans, rationality only makes sense relative
to desire. One apparent advantage of this account
is that it does not leave open the question of why
someone should be rational. Rationality is only
operative given a person who already has the
requisite desires. A person has a reason to be
compassionate if and only if she has a desire to
do so. One disadvantage of this account, how-
ever, is that it seems to leave one with a very
counter-intuitive position with respect to the
wicked. To take an extreme example, internalists
seem compelled to accept the unhappy thesis that
Hitler had a reason to exterminate European Jews
and that he had no reason not go (given his
desires). Internalists seem to have no reason
why some desire would be better than another.
Derek Parfit has recently argued that internalism
seems to lead one to a form of nihilism for,
given any kind of crazy desire, it seems that
anything goes.
Rationality (Philosophical)
Externalists tend to be moral realists; that is,
they believe that there are truths about what per-
sons ought to do, and these are not subject to or
wholly constituted by what subjects happen to
desire. If the entire world desired to practice
slavery, an externalist could coherently claim
that slavery is still wrong, and everyone has
a reason not to practice slavery. Internalists
claim that externalists leave us with too much
mystery. What are these objective reasons for
doing one thing (seeking liberty) rather than
another (pursuing slavery)? Are these nonnatural
properties? Platonic forms? Some philosophers
have concluded that recognizing such forms is
incompatible with secular, scientific naturalism,
while others have proposed that moral realism is
best defended on the grounds of some form of
theism. It seems evident, though, that if one
refuses to recognize moral reasons on metaphys-
ical grounds, then one might be led to deny the
existence of epistemic reasons (a normative view
of evidence). The later seems extreme and may
even be self-defeating, for this would put
a philosopher in the position of arguing that we
ought to reject the view that we ought to accept
beliefs only when supported by good reasons.
Normativity in both ethics and in epistemology
seem inextricably bound together (normative
evidence appears to concern what a person
ought to believe) and so it is problematic to
extract one while leaving the other in place
(Parfet 2011; Gewirth 1991).
Rationality and Impartiality
Philosophers have disagreed over the extent to
which impartiality is an essential condition for
rationality. What might be called epistemic
impartiality seems like a secure position –
the idea that one should be impartial in
assessing the evidence for and against
a given belief or thesis – but it is not unassail-
able. Some feminists have contended that
rationality should be seen as something
embedded in social, including gendered, con-
texts. The idea of rationality from some ideal,
disinterested point of view (as in the ideal
observer theory) has been seen as revealing
a male bias (Anderson 1998).
Rationality (Philosophical)
There has also been dispute over whether
a form of ethical egoism is rational. In ethical
egoism, an agent may be compelled to act in
favor of his or her perceived self-interest when
this could be at grave expense to other persons.
Moral realists who view ethical egoism as wrong
would claim that a person could not have a reason
to do an immoral act which would greatly
improve the good of the person while violating
the rights or good of others.
Rationality and Rationalism Versus
Empiricism
In the history of philosophy, Descartes, Leibniz,
Spinoza, and others have been identified as ratio-
nalists on the grounds that they used rationality as
their key philosophical method, in contrast to
those classified as empiricists such as Locke,
Berkeley, Hume, and others who used sensory
experience as their key philosophical method.
To some extent, this distinction is overdrawn, as
some empiricists seem to claim to grasp neces-
sary truths using their reason or rationality and
virtually all so-called rationalists appeal to
experience (see Taliaferro 2005, Chap. 3 for
detailed discussion).
Rationality and History
Some philosophers have held that what counts as
rationality varies depending on culture and his-
tory. This is more common among internalists
than externalists, but it is important to appreciate
that most philosophers hold that what will be
judged the rational course of action or belief
depends upon the evidence and assumptions
available. It may have been rational for us at
one time to believe that light is instantaneous;
there is no speed of light. But this is not
rational today.
Rationality and Faith
A great deal of philosophical work has been
done on the role of rationality in the formation
and assessment of religious belief. There is
a position called evidentialism, according to
which for a person to believe that something
is the case, it is essential (if the belief is to be
legitimate) for her to have some evidence
1949 R
sufficient to justify the belief. In modern phi-
losophy, two of the more well-known propo-
nents of evidentialism (though they did not use
that term) are Locke and Hume. There is no
consensus today on how much evidence is
required for philosophical convictions to be
deemed legitimate or justified. Some philoso-
phers oppose evidentialism on the grounds of
some form of reliabilism, according to which
a belief is justified for a person if it is produced
in a way that is likely to produce a true belief,
irrespective of whether the person has evidence
for the belief. A movement called Reformed
Epistemology also opposes evidentialism on
the grounds that we may possess a warranted
belief that God exists if that belief is produced
in a reliable way (perhaps due to a sense of the
divine) and God exists (see Taliaferro 2005,
Chaps. 8, 9).
Rationality and Machines
Some philosophers wonder whether machines
can reason or exercise rationality. This is best
addressed in the context of questioning whether
machines can be conscious. The idea that a
machine might simulate or be used to do
computational functions is only philosophically
interesting when it is thought that this might be
done consciously or with thoughts (Hoyningen-
Huene 1993).
Rationality and Emotions
Some philosophers juxtapose rationality or rea- R
son with emotion. This is more common among
externalists than internalists. There is currently
strong support for a cognitive theory of emotion,
according to which emotions involve rational or
irrational judgments. See the entry ▶ Passion and
Emotion, Theories of (Sibley 1953).
Rationality and Responsibility
In American law, it is assumed that for
a person to be properly held responsible for
their action and thus held to be a proper
object of praise or blame, the action must
have been done through the exercise of ratio-
nality. Imagine that a person believes (irra-
tionally) that saying the word “bat” backward
R 1950 Rationality of Theistic Belief

would kill an enemy; he says the word “Tab”

in front of the enemy. Saying the word trig- Reafference Principle
gers such a deep anxiety (the enemy’s best
friend who just died was nicknamed “Tab”) Jörg-Peter Ewert
that the enemy has a heart attack and dies. Faculty of Natural Sciences, University of
From an ethical point of view, we might Kassel, Schauenburg, Germany
think of the person as murderous and worthy
of blame, but legally the “killer” would not
be held accountable because no rational per- The reafference principle offers an explanation
son would believe that such an act would kill for the fact that stimuli caused by self-initiated
(Brown 1988, 1989). motions (e.g., voluntary eye movements) are not
perceived and thus do not interfere with con-
stancy. The theory suggests that, for example,
Cross-References with the signal sm of the eye movement
command, an efference copy sm’ is stored. This
▶ Emotion copy is subtracted from the retinal signal sr
▶ Ethics resulting from the self-induced motion, so that
▶ Experience its perception is
▶ Faith and Belief
;
▶ Imagination p ¼ jSr  Sm j ¼ 0:
▶ Learning
▶ Phenomenology The reafference principle serves different
tasks. For example, in the common toad’s retina,
the off/on units are activated by brisk darkening
References or illuminating the surroundings; these units do
not respond if the toad itself darkens its retina by
Anderson, P. (1998). A feminist philosophy of religion. closing the eyelid.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Brown, H. (1988). Rationality. London: Routledge.
Brown, J. R. (1989). The rational and the social. London:
Routledge.
Gewirth, A. (1991). The rationality of reasonableness. Realism
Synthese, 57, 225–247.
Hoyningen-Huene, P. (1993). Reconstructing scientific
revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn’s philosophy of science ▶ Classical and Quantum Realism
(trans: Levine, A.). Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Hume, D. (1737). Treatise of human nature. London:
Clarendon.
Parfet, D. (2011). On what matters (2 vols.). Oxford: Realisms in Philosophy of Religion
Oxford University Press.
Sibley, W. M. (1953). The rational versus the reasonable. Eberhard Herrmann
Philosophical Review, 62, 554–560.
Department of Theology, Faculty of Theology,
Taliaferro, C. (2005). Evidence and faith; philosophy and
religion since the seventeenth century. Cambridge: Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
Cambridge University Press.

Introduction

Rationality of Theistic Belief In order to survive and live a good life, we need to
know what is dangerous and what is good for us.
▶ Epistemology, Reformed We take certain things for granted, for instance,
Realisms in Philosophy of Religion
the existence of an outer reality and other people.
That there is a reality is both the practical and the
logical presupposition of our conceptualizations,
interactions, and reactions to what we conceive of
as reality. Realism is, in a sense, presupposed in
our actions even when we do not call ourselves
realists. Why are we not content with that but
have all these philosophical ideas on realism
such as metaphysical realism, antirealism,
nonmetaphysical realism, nonrealism, internal
realism, and pragmatic realism? As reflecting
beings, we cannot help asking what conclusions
we can reasonably draw from the dual fact that
although reality is always reality conceptualized
by us, our conceptualizations are nevertheless
conceptualizations of reality.
This entry will not be a general survey of all
philosophical debates on realism. Instead, it will
focus on the debate on the relation between real-
ism and metaphysical realism and its implica-
tions for discussions on the relation between
science and religion. With this focus, this entry
will itself be part of the philosophical debate on
realism. After tracing the origin of the labels
“realism” and “metaphysical realism,” this entry
will outline various themes in the debates on
realism, followed by a discussion of some key
points of the different perspectives and conse-
quently some points that need to be questioned
or defended. On the basis of this critical evalua-
tion, I will present a proposal of my own.
The Issue of Terminology
In the actual debates on realism, the pair of
contraries is realism and antirealism, introduced
by Michael Dummett in some of his essays
reprinted in Truth and Other Enigmas (1978).
When discussing what is real, we often do so in
terms of what kinds of entity exist. Either God
exists or God does not exist; either the proposition
that God exists is true or it is false. However, the
issue of God’s existence and the issue of the truth
of the proposition that God exists are not identical.
This is because the logical law of the excluded
middle is one thing and the semantic bivalence
principle is another. The first claims that something
1951 R
either is the case or is not the case, the latter that
a proposition is either true or false. The question is
whether a proposition is always either true or false
irrespective of our knowledge of evidence or
whether we have to rely on evidence in virtue of
which we are justified in ascribing truth values.
According to Dummett, realism is not about
objects but about the applicability of the bivalence
principle to certain classes of propositions: propo-
sitions of the past, empirical propositions, or math-
ematical propositions. Realism means that every
proposition in a certain class is determinately either
true or false, irrespective of whether it is possible
for us to achieve knowledge of it. A person who
denies the validity of the bivalence principle for
a certain class of propositions is an antirealist as
far as those propositions are concerned, according
to Dummett.
Dummett’s view implies that the status of
propositions can differ and that what looks like
a proposition may not always be one. First, there
are propositions that are true and propositions
that are false because we know how to check,
and can actually determine, their truth value.
Many propositions in everyday life and in the
sciences are of this kind. Second, there are prop-
ositions that are truth apt, such as “The Roman
emperor Caesar woke up on his right side on his
first birthday.” The proposition has the property
of being either true or false. We know in principle
how to proceed, but because our possibilities of
checking it are limited, there is no chance of
determining whether the proposition actually is R
true. Finally, we have putative propositions,
such as “My neighbor’s dog is looking forward
to midsummer.” In this case, we cannot even
understand what it would be like to determine
the truth conditions of the putative proposition
in question.
Realism in Philosophy of Religion
One topic in philosophy of religion has been
whether or not religious utterances can express
propositions and, if they can, whether these
belong to the first or second group of proposi-
tions. The so-called metaphysical realists place
R 1952
religious propositions in the first group, which
means that the relation between science and reli-
gion becomes important. Nonmetaphysical real-
ists, like Karin Johannesson in God « Pro Nobis »
(2007), place religious propositions in the second
group. It cannot be determined whether they are
true or false, but we can identify the justification
conditions under which the truth value of reli-
gious propositions can be determined. This is
done, however, in relation to our conceptions of
what these justification conditions are, and these
conceptions can differ. For example, both the
mystic and the atheist claim that God does not
exist but they do so for different reasons, i.e., they
point out different yet mutually intelligible justi-
fication conditions. According to the mystic, the
truth claim concerning God’s nonexistence can
be justified by referring to the fact that the mys-
tic’s encounter with God or the divine is not an
encounter with somebody or something which
exists in the same sense as things or persons
exist. According to the atheist, the truth claim
concerning God’s nonexistence can be justified
by referring to the huge amount of suffering in the
world, for instance. Nevertheless, in both cases,
the reference to what is conceived of as justifica-
tion conditions of one’s truth claim is about real-
ity and not only about our conceptualizations.
Those who deny the existence of a divine reality
usually characterize religious utterances either as
false propositions or as neither true nor false.
According to internal realism (here understood
as a kind of modified Dummettian antirealism,
approaching pragmatic realism), the bivalence
principle can be applied to religious propositions,
but the ways in which the justification conditions of
religious propositions are identified differ from the
ways in which other domains and practices identify
their justification conditions. The sciences, for
instance, provide us with conceptualizations and
knowledge of the resistance reality offers in empir-
ical regards, whereas religions and ideologies pro-
vide us with insights into the resistance reality
offers in existential regards. Here, the issue of the
relation between science and religion does not per-
tain to their relation on the propositional level but to
how we must relate to them in human life. Such an
approach is rejected by the metaphysical realist.
Realisms in Philosophy of Religion
Metaphysical Realism
The label “metaphysical realism” was introduced
by Hilary Putnam in Reason, Truth and History
(1981) as he questioned a certain idea of what
realism means. He summarizes what he calls
metaphysical realism in the following three theses:
(1) Reality is mind and language independent with
properties irrespective of how we conceptualize
them. (2) These properties, irrespective of how
we conceptualize them, make propositions true
or false. (3) There is only one true description of
reality. According to Putnam, these three theses
imply a correspondence theory of truth according
to which truth is defined as a correspondence rela-
tion between a certain conceptualization and real-
ity as it is, irrespective of how we conceptualize it.
Realists falling under this description value
truth and objectivity very highly, irrespective
of whether they call themselves metaphysical
realists. Without truth, we cannot distinguish
between what we think is true and what actually
is true. Objectivity is the result of neither opinion
nor consensus. What is objectively true is deter-
mined by mind- and language-independent real-
ity. Truth and reality as they are, irrespective of
how we conceptualize them, are two sides of the
same coin. In that sense, truth means the same
irrespective of whether we are dealing with
science or religion.
Every idea that is not in accordance with meta-
physical realism is rejected as relativism, subjec-
tivism, or antirealism. In relativism, “true”
amounts ultimately to “true-for-me,” excluding
the possibility of distinguishing between what
I think is true and what is true. Everything circles
round what I think is true. It is no longer about
truth and reality, and the result is the denial of
a mind- and language-independent reality, which
is the main thesis of metaphysical antirealism.
But this does not allow for the possibility of
determining what propositions of reality are true.
Obviously, there are important philosophical
insights in metaphysical realism but also philo-
sophically problematic ideas. Metaphysical real-
ism is right in claiming that if truth is not
objective, we are talking of something other
than truth and that we therefore have to
Realisms in Philosophy of Religion
distinguish between what I think is true and what
is true. However, there are serious problems with
metaphysical realism.
Objections to Metaphysical Realism
There are mainly three objections to metaphysi-
cal realism: It is incoherent, it implies skepticism,
and there is a risk of fundamentalism (1).
According to the metaphysically realist concep-
tion of truth, it is reality as such, irrespective of
how we conceptualize it, which makes our prop-
ositions true or false. This means that in order to
determine whether a proposition corresponds
with reality as it is, irrespective of how we con-
ceptualize it, we would need to know what this
real reality is like. Conceiving of truth as
a correspondence relation between propositions
and mind- and language-independent reality
therefore amounts to conceiving of reality as it
is, irrespective of how we conceptualize it. Such
a conception of reality, however, is incoherent
since we cannot even understand what talk of
such a reality could be like.
(2) Since reality, for us humans, is conceptu-
alized reality, we have no access to reality as
such; thus, we can never know whether we have
made the right truth claims. Metaphysical realism
therefore implies skepticism. However, skepti-
cism is not an option for us humans to live by.
Although there are things we do not know and
gray zones of uncertainty, there are also clear
examples of what we do know.
Despite the implication of skepticism, meta-
physical realism has not been abandoned – what
is the reason for this? I think part of the answer
lies in the fact that our thinking is based on
a fundamentally realist conception of truth. In
a prereflective way, we take many things for
granted. We claim that a proposition is true only
if there is something in the world, according to
Dummett’s terminology, in virtue of which it is
true. The metaphysical realist would say that
a proposition is true only if there is something
in the world which makes it true, independently
of how we conceptualize it. Dummett’s phrase
does not exclude the relation to the world, but
1953 R
when we talk of something in virtue of which
a proposition is true, we do so in relation to
what we conceptualize as that in virtue of which
a proposition is true. The metaphysical realist
rejects this relation to our epistemic abilities in
order to preserve the objectivity of truth. The
price, however, is skepticism.
(3) Since metaphysical realism implies skep-
ticism, there is a risk of fundamentalism. The fact
that we as individuals cannot determine what
truth claims actually correspond to reality does
not exclude the possibility that there is only one
true description of it, some metaphysical realists
may argue. Skepticism concerns only our human
epistemic abilities, which does not exclude the
possibility that the one and only true description
of reality is revealed in some political or religious
way. Some metaphysical realists may be tempted
to claim to be in the possession of the truth,
a possession other people are denied.
The most radical proposal aimed to rid us
of the problems with metaphysical realism
has been the denial of the existence of a mind-
and language-independent reality. This is
metaphysical antirealism.
Different Kinds of Antirealism
The reason why metaphysical realism and meta-
physical antirealism can contradict each other is
that they both presuppose the same thing, namely,
that the idea of reality, irrespective of how we R
conceptualize it, is a conceptually meaningful
one. If it were not conceptually meaningful, it
would not be possible to maintain or deny the
existence of what the idea is about.
Responsibility for what conceptualizations we
use is something which the metaphysical antirealist
values highly. A religious antirealist, such as Don
Cupitt, denies that the existence of an independent
reality is a guarantee of truth since it can be shown
that what was claimed to be the truth is actually
the expression of power claims or prejudices.
Therefore, since there is no independent reality
and consequently no independent divine reality,
religious believers should not refer to religious
documents or God’s will as the truth. Instead, they
R 1954
should take responsibility for the ideas of
their traditions by critically assessing them in
relation to whether they are compatible with
human autonomy.
(1) Denying the existence of mind- and lan-
guage-independent reality is one thing.
(2) Denying the meaningfulness of the concep-
tion of reality as it is, with no relation to how
we conceptualize it, is another. So, for instance,
feminist philosophers of religion, such as
Pamela Sue Anderson in A Feminist Philosophy
of Religion (1998), attack the idea that there is
neutral truth independent of the interests of
those who raise the truth claims. Traditional
descriptions of the differences between women
and men are not descriptions of mind- and
language-independent reality. Instead, the
putative differences are social constructs based
on formal accounts of our world. Nevertheless,
she wants to retain a form of realism which still
makes possible nonrelativist claims about truth
and justice.
The idea of reality as a social construct must
be seen in relation to the fear that truth claims
may become tools for subordination and oppres-
sion. Thus, if it is claimed that the subject of
knowledge is a detached subject, for instance,
a subject not disturbed by emotions, then those
who make such a claim are, by definition,
incapable of realizing that they, too, are situated
subjects and that their truth claims may become
oppressive.
One of the important philosophical insights
stemming from this critical approach to meta-
physical realism is that there is something
wrong with the idea of an independent reality
irrespective of how we conceptualize it. As soon
as we talk of reality, reality is conceptualized
reality and we who do the talking are histori-
cally, socially, and culturally situated beings.
However, the metaphysical antirealist draws
the wrong conclusion by denying the existence
of mind- and language-independent reality. If
reality was nothing other than our conceptions
of it, then we who have these conceptions would
also be nothing other than conceptions. We can-
not live by such an idea, and since we are part of
the reality with which we interact, it is also
Realisms in Philosophy of Religion
unreasonable to deny its existence. So,
a reasonable alternative to metaphysical realism
has to be some form of realism.
Nonmetaphysical Realism
Nonmetaphysical realism, as outlined by
Johannesson (2007), deals with the issue of real-
ism in relation to religious propositions. If reli-
gious propositions were only expressions of
wishful thinking or expressions of how we cope
with life emotionally, then not only would they
cease to be propositions, but they would also
cease to be religious. Without realism, there can
be no religion.
Nonmetaphysical realism is realist in the sense
that it maintains the applicability of the bivalence
principle in religion. Although it cannot be deter-
mined whether a religious proposition such as
“God is beyond comprehension” is true or false,
it is nevertheless possible to spell out the
conditions under which one is prepared to believe
it to be true. One example of justification condi-
tions for such a proposition, taken from
Dewi Z. Phillips’ The Concept of Prayer (1965),
could be the reference to one’s experience of not
understanding life and one’s lack of control over
everything in life when confessing one’s inability
before someone or something that is also incom-
prehensible. By means of such justification con-
ditions, religious propositions can be shown to be
either true or false, although we cannot determi-
nately decide which. However, it enables us to
discuss what justification conditions make it rea-
sonable to believe that a proposition is true.
Nonmetaphysical realism rejects metaphysi-
cal realism since this kind of realism, with its
conception of truth as a correspondence relation
between our propositions and reality as it is,
irrespective of how we conceptualize it, does
not take into account the importance of justifica-
tion conditions. However, seen from our human
perspective, we need access to justification con-
ditions to be able to decide what propositions can
at least be said to be truth apt. Without justifica-
tion conditions, we cannot determine the mean-
ing of propositions, and therefore we cannot
Realisms in Philosophy of Religion
examine truth claims, something we certainly
need to do in order to survive and live a good life.
Nonmetaphysical realism emphasizes the idea
that truth and realism are two sides of the same
coin. If they were not, it would be impossible to
maintain the idea that truth is objective. But
nonmetaphysical realism does not sufficiently dis-
tinguish between different ways in which truth
manifests itself in different domains and practices.
Although nonmetaphysical realism, unlike meta-
physical realism, defends the relevance of justifica-
tion conditions, it still shares with it the idea that the
combination of truth and realism, i.e., alethic real-
ism, is one and the same everywhere.
Alethic Realism
The label “alethic realism” comes from William
Alston, who discusses it in A Realist Conception
of Truth (1996) and other works. According to
Alston, debates on realism are not so much about
independent reality as about truth. Conceiving of
truth realistically means primarily that what is
true is so independently of our ideas of whether
it is true. Alston maintains that alethic realism is
minimal and does not involve any specific
theories about truth or about the relation of
language to reality. However, in Alston’s version,
alethic realism is actually an example of
metaphysical realism.
Advocates of alethic realism present different
ideas about what the realist element consists of
in alethic realism. Nevertheless, they all relate
to Alfred Tarski’s definition of truth for formal
languages. Tarski argues that sentences are truth-
bearers, while Alston argues that propositions are
truth-bearers. In Tarski’s view, the variables in the
truth schema “The sentence ‘p’ is true if and only if
p” stand for different things. In the complete phrase
of the metalanguage “‘Snow is white’ is true if and
only if snow is white,” it is spelled out under what
conditions the sentence in the object-language
“Snow is white” is true. In Alston’s view, the
variable in “The proposition p is true if and only
if p” stands for the same thing.
In the Tarski case, the focus is on the conditions
under which the sentence in the object-language is
1955 R
true, not on what kind of conditions they are. Noth-
ing is said about reality. In the Alston case, the
focus is on what makes the proposition true and
what it refers to, namely, reality.
Nonrealism
This idea of reference is questioned in
nonrealism, for instance, by Erica Appelros in
God in the Act of Reference (2002). Her point is
that a focus on metaphysical realism and its meta-
physical opposite prevents one from dealing with
the issue of reference in a reasonable way. In
metaphysical realism, reference means that, for
instance, the term “God” either refers to an inde-
pendently existing being or has no reference at
all. However, this conception of reference pre-
supposes that the meanings of words are perma-
nent. This conception of reference does not
sufficiently take into account the fact that there
is a difference between referring to something in
the sense of pointing it out by whatever means are
suitable and referring to something in the sense of
conceptually identifying it. In metaphysical real-
ism, a word is said to have meaning if it refers to
something real and to have its meaning only
on the basis of what reality is like, irrespective
of how we conceptualize it. Questioning this
conception of reference is a main objective of
Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion as well.
In Religion and Friendly Fire (2004) and other
works, Phillips criticizes the separation in philoso- R
phy of a belief and its meaning from the practices
in which the belief is made. The relation between
a belief and its meaning, on the one hand, and the
practices in which the belief is made, on the other,
is an internal one. By “practice,” he means concep-
tually distinct ways of acting and judging. How-
ever, the belief cannot be reduced to the practice in
which it is appropriate, nor is it caused by it.
Phillips does not deny that we have contact with
reality, but he shows how metaphysics distorts
what that contact amounts to. The central issue in
the dispute between Wittgensteinian and analytical
philosophers of religion like Nicholas Wolterstorff,
Alvin Plantinga, and Richard Swinburne concerns
the assumption that realism is metaphysical
R 1956
realism. Whereas the former denies it, the latter
take it for granted.
According to Phillips, concepts are whatever it
is we have when we have learned to use language
correctly in a certain practice. This implies diver-
sity, which the universalizing tendency of meta-
physical realism cannot take into account. If there
is one and only one reality which determines
what propositions of it are true, then there is
only one true description of reality. However,
we know from the sciences that the same empir-
ical evidence can support different theories.
There is a kind of indeterminacy, which opens
up for different descriptions. The possibilities
multiply if we consider not only one but several
various domains and practices. For instance,
a physical description of a causal connection is
different from a description of human relations.
They cannot be transferred to a foreign domain or
practice.
Furthermore, this actualizes the role of the
subject as a situated subject. Reality is not over
there. Instead, we are part of reality, with which
we interact and to which we relate as the beings
we are. We interact with and relate to reality
together with others and we do it in different
ways depending on domain and practice. How-
ever, this insight would have unreasonable impli-
cations if it were not combined with realism in the
sense that we do have contact with reality,
although it is by and through our conceptualiza-
tions of it that we have this contact. Internal
realism is an endeavor to establish such
a connection.
Internal Realism
The fundamental idea of internal realism is that
reality is reality conceptualized by us. According
to Putnam, it is not only about internal coherence.
There are experiential inputs concerning knowl-
edge. However, internal realism denies that there
are inputs which are not, to some extent, shaped
by our concepts. It denies, furthermore, that there
are inputs which admit of only one description.
But it is not the case that just any description is as
good as any other. Whether a conceptual choice is
Realisms in Philosophy of Religion
rationally acceptable depends largely on its
coherence and appropriateness. In that sense,
our conceptions of coherence and acceptability
are deeply interwoven with our biology, psychol-
ogy, and culture. They are not value free because
we relate to reality’s impact on us from the per-
spective of what is both possible and important to
us as the beings we are. Nevertheless, our con-
ceptions of coherence and rationality are concep-
tions of something real. They guarantee
objectivity, although the objectivity in question
is not the metaphysical objectivity of an external
God’s eye view.
The rejection of this metaphysical, external
perspective, however, does not amount to the iden-
tification of truth with rational acceptability. Truth
is a property that cannot be lost, whereas justifica-
tion can. Although in earlier times people had
reasons to believe, for instance, that the earth is
flat, this belief is nevertheless false. The metaphys-
ical realist is right when claiming that truth cannot
be defined in terms of rational acceptability but
wrong when denying the connection between the
concepts of truth and rational acceptability. Seen
from our perspective, we cannot grasp either of
them without also grasping the other.
For the internal realist, it is important to have
a conception of truth we can live by. The meta-
physically realist conception of truth as
a correspondence relation between propositions
of reality and reality as it is, irrespective of how
we conceptualize it, does not meet this require-
ment. It actually presupposes that we have
already conceptualized reality, which means
that it is no longer a correspondence relation
with reality irrespective of how we conceptualize
it. This shows that the concepts of truth, rational-
ity, and objectivity must be related to each other.
The main insight of internal realism is its
support of a philosophy in which the concepts
of truth, rationality, and objectivity are not
detached from the ways in which we learn and
use them in different practices. Nevertheless,
despite the insight that more than one true
description of reality is possible, there is no fur-
ther discussion of the relation between realism
and pluralism in the sense that truth can manifest
itself in different ways depending on whether we
Realisms in Philosophy of Religion
have to do with different domains and practices
such as science, morality, or religion. This short-
coming is amended in pragmatic realism.
Pragmatic Realism
Pragmatic realism, as developed by, for instance,
Eberhard Herrmann in Religion, Reality and
a Good Life (2004), is based on three ideas:
first, that reality for us humans is always concep-
tualized reality; second, that there is one concept
of truth but different manifestations of truth in
our different life practices; and third, that truth is
part as well as a condition of a good life. The first
idea is taken from internal realism, whereas the
second and third ideas are inspired by Michael
Lynch’s notion of truth as one and many, for
instance, in Truth in Context (1998), though he
himself does not use the label “pragmatic real-
ism” but talks instead of alethic realism and
pluralism.
There is only one concept of truth in the min-
imal sense that a judgment is true if and only if
reality corresponds to that judgment. This does
not tell us what judgments are true. For that, we
need criteria. However, these criteria differ
because truth manifests itself differently in dif-
ferent practices, for instance, in religions and
secular ideologies compared to the sciences. Sci-
entific theories are conceptualizations of how
reality offers us resistance in empirical regards.
Theories are neither true nor false but provide us
with rules for what general concepts can be
ascribed to what objects in order to generate
empirically testable hypotheses. Theories that
are not prosperous in this regard are empirically
inadequate and therefore say nothing about
reality.
In religions and ideologies, conceptualizations
in the form of images and narratives are concep-
tualizations of how reality offers us resistance in
existential regards, i.e., they are conceptualiza-
tions of the experienced tension between life at its
best and the life that is lived. If the conceptuali-
zations are existentially adequate, we can say
something true about what it means to live with
the inevitabilities of life such as love, happiness,
1957 R
and joy as well as suffering, guilt, and death.
Although we experience these in different ways,
there is some common ground, namely, the fact
that we do not understand them but must never-
theless relate to them. The main difference
between empirical and existential conceptualiza-
tions is not appearance but function.
Although science provides us with knowledge
of how reality works and thus of the practical
conditions of and hindrances to a good life, sci-
ence is not sufficient when it comes to the mys-
teries of life. Scientifically, we know a lot about
fertilization, but when we hold a newborn baby in
our arms, we face a mystery we cannot explain.
Similarly, we know a lot about the bodily pro-
cesses connected with the end of life, but the very
fact that a certain person is not there anymore is
incomprehensible to us. Religions and ideologies
provide us with rituals, images, and narratives for
conceptualizing the inexplicable.
In both empirical and existential regards, we
need to be able to distinguish between what we
think is true and what actually is true. Otherwise,
we would not be able to survive or live a good
life. There is no consensus about what constitutes
the good life, but we all know that a life in
poverty, misery, violence, marginalization, and
oppression is definitely not a good life.
Truth is both part of a good life and a condition
of it. We can get rid of the hindrances to a good
life only if our claims, for instance, concerning
causal connections, are empirically true and our
claims concerning the inevitabilities of life are R
true to life. In the former case, we can give
arguments for why something is true. In the latter
case – the manifestation of truth in our actual
decisions in life – we can only give arguments
for why a certain image or narrative is existen-
tially inadequate by referring to what is definitely
not a good life. In both these regards, truth is
a condition of a good life. It is also part of
a good life in the sense that, as far as empirical
truth is concerned, we have to seek truth for its
own sake; otherwise, we cannot know what hin-
ders or harmonizes with a good life. Being exis-
tentially true to life is also something which
cannot be defined in terms of consensus or what
is useful to us. Truth is here part of a good life in
R 1958
the sense that we can sometimes actually tell
when life is definitely not a good life.
As every philosophical view, pragmatic real-
ism also has its limitations. It is the expression of
a certain philosophical attitude wherein philo-
sophical issues are not detached from human
life. Therefore, philosophical issues, such as
what conceptions of reality, truth, and objectivity
are reasonable, cannot be conceived of as being
settled once and for all. The advantage, however,
is that pragmatic realism opens up to a critical
discussion of all phenomena in human life,
including science and religion. It opens up to
a critical discussion of what functions they have
in human life, in what sense their truth claims
make sense, and, when understood, by means of
what criteria these truth claims can reasonably be
justified.
Cross-References
▶ Concept of God in Contemporary Philosophy
of Religion
▶ Emotion
▶ Happiness
▶ Meaning, the Concept of
▶ Philosophy of Religion
▶ Philosophy of Science
▶ Pragmatism on Religion and Science
▶ Truth
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Alston, W. P. (1996). A realist conception of truth. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
Anderson, P. S. (1998). A feminist philosophy of religion.
The rationality and myths of religious belief. Oxford:
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Appelros, E. (2002). God in the act of reference. Debating
religious realism and non-realism. Aldershot:
Ashgate.
Dummett, M. (1978). Truth and other enigmas. London:
Duckworth.
Herrmann, E. (2004). Religion, reality, and a good life.
A philosophical approach to religion. T€ ubingen: Mohr
Siebeck.
Johannesson, K. (2007). God Pro Nobis. On non-
metaphysical realism and the philosophy of religion.
Leuven: Peeters.
Reality in Buddhism
Lynch, M. P. (1998). Truth in context. An essay on
pluralism and objectivity. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Phillips, D. Z. (1965). The concept of prayer. London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Phillips, D. Z. (2004). Religion and friendly fire.
Examining assumptions in contemporary philosophy
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Putnam, H. (1981). Reason, truth and history. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Reality in Buddhism
Klaus-Dieter Mathes
Department of South Asian, Tibetan and
Buddhist Studies, University of Vienna
The concept of reality or rather the “ultimate
reality” experienced by a Buddha – as opposed
to the conventional reality commonly experi-
enced by the world – looks back upon a long
history in Buddhism. A little more than two and
a half thousand years ago, Siddhārtha Gautama is
said to have fully awakened to this true reality
and spent the remainder of his life as a Buddha
(lit. “awakened one”) pointing this reality out to
others. According to tradition, the Buddha ini-
tially doubted whether the reality he realized
was too subtle to be conveyed in words. Thus,
in the “Detailed Account on the Natural Acts [of
the Buddha]” (“Lalitavistarasūtra,” Vaidya 1958,
286), we are told that the Buddha said to himself
(my own translation from the Sanskrit), “I found
a Dharma, profound, peaceful, pure, luminous,
nectar-like, and not conditioned. Even if
I taught it, nobody would understand it. I better
remain silent and go to the forest.” Tradition
relates that it was only through the intervention
of the Hindu gods Brahmā and Indra that he was
persuaded not to keep what he had learned to
himself. His long career as a spiritual teacher
and the posthumous attribution of large bodies
of discourses, such as the “Discourses of the
Great Way” (“Mahāyāna Sūtras”), resulted in
vast sacred canons (the Tibetan Buddhist canon
consists of more than a hundred huge volumes).
Going by the early scriptures, the Buddha
rejected philosophical questions which he did
Reality in Buddhism
not consider soteriologically relevant. In his
“Shorter Instructions to Mālunkyāputta,” he thus
refrained from making statements about whether
or not the cosmos is eternal and infinite, the self
or rather the soul and the body are the same, or the
Buddha exists after death (Chalmers 1926,
304–07).
The Buddhist idea of reality is used with ref-
erence not only to states of affairs but also to
propositions. Thus, Buddhists are in general
agreement that “reality” (in the first sense) is
best described (in the second sense) in terms of
the four noble truths that were summarized in the
Buddha’s first discourse in Deer Park in Sarnath
near Benares, the “Discourse of Setting the
Wheel of the Buddha’s Doctrine in Motion”
(“Dharmacakrapravartanasūtra”). The first of
these four is the truth of suffering which is char-
acterized by birth, old age, sickness, and death.
This does not deny life’s temporary experiences
of happiness but brings to attention the fact that
eventually one has to part from what is pleasant
or unite with what is unpleasant. Next comes the
noble truth of the origin of suffering. In the same
proclamation at Sarnath, this is specified as the
thirst for desire and becoming, which is, in turn,
identified as the source of rebirth in cyclic exis-
tence. In the Buddha’s “Account of Enlighten-
ment” (“Bodhikathā”), the dynamic process
underlying continued rebirth is then specified in
its well-known form of the 12 links of dependent
origination: (1) ignorance, (2) intentional deeds,
(3) consciousness, (4) name and form (i.e., the five
“groups” (“skandha”) of psychophysical exis-
tence), (5) the sixfold sphere of consciousness,
(6) contact, (7) sensation, (8) thirst, (9) grasping,
(10) becoming, (11) birth, and (12) old age and
death. In its fully developed form, the entire
personality is taken as a stream of momentary
psychophysical factors of existence, that continues
into future rebirths forever, if one continues to
accumulate the mental imprints of “deeds”
(“karman”) under the influence of ignorance
(Frauwallner 2010, 34–52).
The third and fourth noble truths consist in the
cessation of suffering and the eightfold path lead-
ing to it. The latter comprises right view, thought,
speech, conduct, livelihood, striving, mindfulness,
1959 R
and concentration. Cultivating the right view and
the rest help to uproot ignorance and, thereby, the
remaining links of dependent origination: in the
absence of ignorance there will be no intentional
deeds, and the same follows for the remaining
links in the chain. It should be noted that in
its early form, like in the “Discourse to
Kaccāyanagotta” (“Kaccāyanagotta Sutta”), the
links of dependent origination are not reified as
something really existing in themselves nor is
there any metaphysical speculation about their
genesis or causal relations. The Buddha is reported
to have simply said, with x as condition there is y.
From the termination of x, there is the termination
of y. All this is beyond the extreme notions of
existence and nonexistence. The extreme of non-
existence is avoided by seeing the arising of the
world as it really is and the extreme of existence by
seeing the world’s cessation (Bikkhu Bodhi 2000,
544).
In the various systems of Abhidharma (besides
its original meaning “[teaching] concerning the
factors of existence,” the word abhidharma came
to be understood as “higher teaching”) that devel-
oped after the Buddha had passed away, momen-
tary factors of existence are taken as truly
existing in terms of their “specific characteristic”
(“svalaksana”). Apart from a few unconditioned
˙ ˙
categories, such as space and the soteriologically
relevant forms of cessation, the entire world
consists of material or mental conditioned factors
of existence, which arise and instantly pass out of
existence with new ones continuously emerging. R
Strictly speaking, the conditioned factors of
existence consist of four categories: “matter”
(“rūpa”), “mind” (“citta”), “mental factors”
(“caitta”), and “factors dissociated from mind”
(“cittaviprayukta”) (Cox 1995, 12). Although
momentary, these building blocks of the universe
are held to possess an “own being” (“svabhāva”)
and to exist as “real entities” (“dravya”), as
opposed to aggregations of these real entities,
which exist only as something “designated”
(“prajñapti”) (Cox 1995, 148). This can be best
illustrated by the example of a flame, which
appears to be a permanent phenomenon, at least
within a given time frame. It exists only as some-
thing designated on the basis of a series of what
R 1960
each moment is an entirely new flame, or rather,
to describe it in modern way, a series of reactions
of ever new wax and oxygen molecules. It is only
the latter that really exist.
The goal of this analysis is to realize that one’s
psychophysical existence consists entirely of
momentary factors of existence, and there is no
such thing as a permanent “self” or “soul”
(“ātman”) that anchors them. Frauwallner (2010,
21) observes, however, that the Buddha rejected
philosophical questions about the existence of
a soul. All the factors of existence that make up
a sentient being can be included in the five
psychophysical aggregates of “matter” (“rūpa”),
“sensation” (“vedanā”), “ideation” (“samjñā”),
˙
“formations” (“samskāra”), and “consciousness”
˙
(“vijñāna”). All the Buddha’s statements
concerning a permanent self were assigned provi-
sional meaning to be interpreted in the light of the
definitive meaning of momentariness. To illustrate
the underlying hermeneutics with an example, on
a conventional level of discourse it must be still
possible to say “I am going to town” instead of “the
five psychophysical aggregates which I self-
identify as ‘mine’ are moving toward a set of
factors of existence labeled town.”
Of particular interest for the study of Buddhist
models of reality is the influential Abhidharma
school known as Sarvāstivāda (lit. “maintaining
the existence of everything”) that included
among the existent factors the future and the
past. While the own being of a conditioned factor
already exists in the future and continues to exist
in the past, Cox speaks of the “atemporal issue
of the existence of factors in the abstract,”
its momentary nature can still be upheld by
distinguishing different “modes of existence”
(“bhāva”). How this change of modes precisely
worked remained controversial among the fol-
lowers of Sarvāstivāda themselves, but the pre-
ferred view was to maintain that it is only the
present factor’s mode that unfolds “activity”
(“kāritra”). To be sure, when the present activity
of a conditioned factor stops, it ceases, but con-
tinues to exist in terms of its own being
(Cox 1995, 137–41). In his “Treasury of Higher
Teaching” (“Abhidharmakośa”), which became
the standard work on Abhidharma, Vasubandhu
Reality in Buddhism
(ca. 400–ca. 480 CE) criticizes the existence of
a conditioned factor’s own being in the three
times on the ground that its changing modes are
not taken to be different from the own being
(La Vallée Poussin 1991, vol. 3, 811–20).
Even though the way “external” reality is
presented in the Abhidharma systems is strik-
ingly similar to modern atom theory, one should
not underestimate the importance of mind and its
mental factors in this system. According to
Vasubandhu’s “Treasury of Higher Teaching,”
it is the traces of one’s deeds left in the mind
(not a creator God or big bang) that brings forth
the entire world and that includes external matter
(La Vallée Poussin 1991, vol. 2, 551f.). It is not
clear whether an idealist position is upheld
here, but in his “Proof in Twenty [Verses] that
[Everything] is Only Mental Representation”
(“Vimśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi”), Vasubandhu
˙
the older (ca. 320–ca. 380 CE, Frauwallner 1951)
replies to a follower of Sarvāstivāda that if he
accepts that material factors of existence arise
through deeds, why he does not then accept that
these factors are, like their causes, consciousness
as well, the latter only appearing in the form of
material factors (Frauwallner 2010, 397). To be
sure, not a single Buddhist model of reality has
attempted to reduce mind to matter. Of particular
interest here is Dharmakı̄rti’s (seventh century CE)
argument that only like causes like, which means
that material elements cannot cause mental events.
Cognitive objects and the senses can support cog-
nition as auxiliary causes, but they are not needed
for mental processes such as thoughts or the expe-
rience of pleasure. The main cause for a mental
event is rather the immediately preceding similar
event (Steinkellner 2012, 364–66). Directly related
to this observation is also Dharmakı̄rti’s argument
for the possibility of rebirth and an infinite number
of previous lives. This is most clearly stated in the
second chapter of his “Commentary on Valid
Cognitions” (“Pramānavārttika” II.34–119, Franco
˙
1997).
Other currents in Buddhist thought have iden-
tified a general causal nexus of the world from the
internal 12 links of dependent origination. In an
early Mahāyāna discourse, the “Rice Seedling
Discourse” (“Śālistambasūtra”), for example,
Reality in Buddhism
the Buddha is said to have distinguished the
causes and conditions of an outer and an inner
dependent origination. The causes of the outer
one are illustrated by the different stages of
a growing rice seedling. The seed is the cause of
the sprout, the latter the cause of the leaf, etc. As
conditions in this process, six elements are listed:
earth, fire, water, wind, space, and the season.
The causes of the inner causal nexus are the
well-known 12 links starting with ignorance.
The conditions are again the six elements but
“consciousness” replaces “season.” Any teleo-
logical intentional or volitional act on the side
of the causes and conditions is excluded. The
seed, for example, does not think, “I bring forth
the sprout,” and the sprout does not think, “I have
been brought forth by the seed” (Reat 1993, 35).
The way dependent origination is presented is
strikingly similar to our modern understanding
of the world in terms of natural laws.
From around 200 CE onwards, the proponents
of Madhyamaka took issue with the combination
of what were in their eyes, two contradictory
predications (1) that factors of existence possess
an own being or specific characteristics and
(2) that these factors nonetheless arise every
moment anew. Such momentariness, or any other
form of dependent arising for that matter, contra-
dicts the concept of independent existence, which
follows in Madhyamaka if the factors of existence
are ascribed their own specific characteristics.
Taking their lead from the “Discourses on the
Perfection of Wisdom” (“Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras”),
Madhyamaka philosophers claim that everything
must be empty of such an independent existence.
The most eminent Buddhist philosopher of
Madhyamaka, Nāgārjuna (fl. 200 CE), argues that
if things (such as mind and matter) really exist
independently in their own right, they cannot influ-
ence each other, which would contradict the Bud-
dhist axiom of dependent origination. Here it is
important to note that for a traditional adherent of
Mahāyāna Buddhism the discourses on the perfec-
tion of wisdom and for that matter also the much
later discourses endorsing the Yogācāra doctrine,
such as the “Discourse Revealing the True Inten-
tion” (“Samdhinirmocanasūtra”), were taught by
˙
the historical Buddha. Critical philological and
1961 R
historical research suggests, however, that these
discourses were only composed during the period
when the doctrines they endorse were formulated.
Nāgārjuna’s observation suggests the viability
of a model of reality that equally accepts both
mental and material factors of existence under
the condition that they are correctly understood
to be empty of an independent existence and thus
capable of mutual interaction. In other words,
dependent origination is inseparably linked to
emptiness, that is, the universal absence of locally
determined entities. Any “own being” of anything
must be viewed as reified constructions of the
mind that “simplify” phenomena at the cost of
misrepresenting their irreducibly complex inter-
connectedness. It should be noted that the nature
and purpose of Nāgārjuna’s philosophy have
remained controversial over the centuries and
are still disputed among modern Madhyamaka
scholars. Two main issues have been whether
knowledge about the true nature of things, such
that everything lacks an own being, is possible,
and whether Nāgārjuna refutes all linguistic and
conceptual attempts to grasp true reality (for
a good overview of various interpretations see
Huntington 1989 and Burton 1999).
The denial of an own being directly
confronted the old Abhidharma ontology by
claiming that the new teaching of emptiness has
“definitive meaning” (“nı̄tārtha”). As a doctrinal
support for this, the “Discourse on the King of
Meditative Absorption” (“Samādhirājasūtra,”
Vaidya 1961, 36) is adduced. The old definition R
of definitive meaning has been extended by
the Prajñāpāramitā concept of the three doors
to liberation (i.e., emptiness, signlessness, and
wishlessness). Accordingly, the momentary fac-
tors of existence, which possess a specific char-
acteristic and represent the ultimate in the old
Abhidharma ontology, are assigned the status of
provisional meaning and included under conven-
tional truth. It should be noted that the various
Buddhist models of reality operate with two
levels of truths, the conventional and ultimate
truth. The conventional truth is the phenomenal
world which is generally accepted when not fur-
ther analyzed, while the ultimate truth withstands
careful analysis. In Madhyamaka, it is only the
R 1962
emptiness of the factors of existence from an own
being or specific characteristic that meets the
requirements of definitive meaning and thus
the new ultimate (Lopez 1988, 61–62). This
move was not only justified by a new group of
discourses which included the above quoted
statements but also a number of treatises which
took issue with the old ontology of truly existing
momentary factors of existence. Something
which arises and passes out of existence in
every moment cannot be the ultimate truth or
exist ultimately.
The traditional explanation of such inconsis-
tencies is that the Buddha taught his disciples
different things according to their varying intel-
lectual capacities, inclinations, and convictions.
According to Buddhist hermeneutics, a number
of discourses were given with the hidden inten-
tion to further certain disciples and therefore had
only “provisional meaning” (“neyārtha”), that is,
were in need of further interpretation. Such dis-
courses must be understood in juxtaposition to
discourses in which the Buddha revealed the
“definitive meaning” (“nı̄tārtha”) of the reality
he had awakened to. Such a division into
neyārtha and nı̄tārtha can be already found in
early Buddhism where it was used to explain
contradictory statements. The Vaibhāsikas, for
˙
example, explained the inconsistency that the
body of the Buddha is at times described as
defiled and not defiled, by taking recourse to the
distinction into neyārtha and nı̄tārtha statements.
While the definitive meaning is that the body of
the Buddha is impure like all other bodies, the
contrary statements is neyārtha in the sense that
it is not the physical body of the Buddha
which is pure but the “body of his teaching”
(“dharmakāya”) (Honjō 1989, 405–10). Later
on, this distinction between neyārtha and
nı̄tārtha proved helpful to justify new models of
reality that developed out of, and sometimes in
contrast to, the older ones (for a good introduc-
tion to these exegetical principles, see the contri-
butions in Lopez 1988).
About a century later, the proponents of
Yogācāra, an idealist current of Buddhist thought
that reduces matter to mind on the presupposition
that “mind alone” (“cittamātra”) exists,
Reality in Buddhism
formulated their own interpretation of the
discourses on the perfection of wisdom.
According to Nakamura (1989, 210), the
discourse which endorses the Madhyamaka herme-
neutics that the emptiness of an own-being has
definitive meaning, that is, the “Discourse of
Instructions for Aksayamati” (“Aksayamatinir-
˙ ˙
deśasūtra”), already existed at the time of
Nāgārjuna, and the “Discourse Revealing the
True Intention” was written down around 300 CE
(Schmithausen 1969, 819).
For the Yogācāras, true reality is the perfect
nature of mind, directly realized by the
“nonconceptual wisdom” (“nirvikalpajñāna”) of
the Buddhas and very advanced practitioners and
not the reality of our common sense material
world. The perceived object and the related per-
ceiving subject are nothing but a product of false
imagination and thus called imagined nature. The
process of dependently arising mental factors of
existence (i.e., the dependent nature), however,
which underlies the falsely imagined world is
admitted a higher degree of reality than the one of
the imagined nature. To which degree this depen-
dent nature partakes of ultimate reality is a disputed
issue. These imagined (parikalpita), dependent
(paratantra), and “perfect” (parinispanna) natures
˙
constitute the Yogācāra model of reality. It is the
second major doctrinal development of Mahāyāna
Buddhism, the first one being the Madhyamaka
notion that all factors of existence are empty of
an own being (Mathes 2007, 232–39).
In the seventh chapter of the “Discourse
Revealing the True Intention,” this latest develop-
ment is summarized as the third “Wheel of
the Buddha’s doctrine” (“dharmacakra”), the two
older layers of doctrine (reflecting Abhidharma and
Prajñāpāramitā views, respectively) correspond to
the first two dharmacakras. Only the final
dharmacakra is declared to have definitive mean-
ing, while the first two are taken to be provisional.
At the beginning of this seventh chapter, the Bodhi-
sattva Paramārthasamudgata addresses the doc-
trinal differences between the Abhidharma and
Prajñāpāramitā and directly asks the Buddha
about his hidden intention in teaching the
latter. The answer is “the three types of
‘essencelessness’” etc. (“nihsvabhāvatā”), namely,
˙
Reality in Buddhism
the imagined, dependent, and perfect natures,
which sets the stage for the above-mentioned
Yogācāra interpretation of the Prajñāpāramitā.
The essencelessness of defining characteristic is
the imagined nature, the essencelessness in terms
of arising is the dependent nature, and the ultimate
essencelessness the perfect nature (Mathes 1996,
161). In other words, the Buddha was thinking of
the nonexisting imagined nature when he taught
that all factors of existence lack an own being or
specific characteristic. From a Yogācāra point of
view, such an exegesis not only protects the prac-
titioner from nihilism, but also explains the differ-
ence of definitive meaning between the first and
second dharmacakras: a threefold division of the
lack of essence allows the old Abhidharma ontol-
ogy to be accommodated within the dependent
nature and thus retain a distinction between the
entirely unreal imagined and the mentally real fac-
tors of existence on a relative or conventional level.
The Madhyamaka reaction to this interpretation is
that the Buddha occasionally even denied the mate-
rial world in order to help those who have an
inordinate attachment to matter. From a historical
perspective, it is doubtful, however, whether the
Buddha had ever maintained such a view. The
respective texts, such as the “Discourse Revealing
the True Intention,” were written down around
300 A.D. (see above).
In the “Handbook of Hermeneutics”
(“Vyākhyāyukti”) written by Vasubandhu the
younger (Schmithausen 1987, part 2, 262), it
becomes clear that the proponents of Yogācāra
follow the same strategy as the followers of
Madhyamaka. In addition to adducing discourses
which define definitive meaning in accordance
with their own tradition, they point out
a problem to which the old ontology leads:
while the introduction of Madhyamaka was jus-
tified by finding fault with the old doctrine of
momentariness, the followers Yogācāra take
issue with a nihilistic interpretation of the dis-
courses on the perfection of wisdom. Given the
latter’s emptiness of all factors of existence,
the existence of real mental events, such as inten-
tional deeds and their retribution, can only be
accepted on the level of conventional truth, but
then there can no longer be any distinction
1963 R
between the real mental factors and a purely
imagined personal subject (or self), both of
which must be accepted on the level of conven-
tional truth. In the eyes of Vasubandhu, it is
precisely this lack of distinction which makes
the discourses on the perfection of wisdom vul-
nerable to the charge of nihilism on the side of
some opponents from the older Abhidharma
schools. At this point, the theory of three natures
is presented in order to draw a distinction
between existence and nonexistence on the level
of conventional truth. Intentional deeds and their
retribution constitute the dependent nature. As
such they are not absolute, but still more real
than the purely imagined self, which does
not exist even on the level of apparent truth
(Mathes 2007:332–37).
The way the three natures are presented here
comes close to Sponberg’s (1981, 97–119) pro-
gressive exegetical model of the three natures.
The relationship between the dependent and
perfect natures can be variously defined along
the lines of two models of the three natures.
The central focus of the first, which Sponberg
calls the “pivotal model,” is on a dependent
nature which at times is even taken to exist
ultimately, the imagined and perfect natures
being respectively just the way the dependent
nature appears to be and really is. The depen-
dent is thus a framework for understanding
the perfect, which is construed as something
abstract, like the state of suffering or imper-
manence. The “progressive model,” by con- R
trast, focuses more on an emptiness which
pervades or transcends all phenomena of the
dependent nature. This all-pervading emptiness
is sometimes described as possessing positive
qualities such as natural luminosity and can
exist, contrary to the first model, in its own
right (Mathes 2004, 318–22).
Drawing on strands that take the dependent
nature as conventional truth, the eighth century
scholar Śāntaraksita (725–788) and his disciple
˙
Kamalaśı̄la started to combine Yogācāra and
Madhyamaka views. In his “Lamp of the Middle
Way” (“Madhyamakāloka”), Kamalaśı̄la finds no
contradiction between Madhyamaka emptiness
and the three nature theory, reconciling the
R 1964
hermeneutics of the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra.
The teaching of non-arising in the discourses on
the perfection of wisdom (i.e., the emptiness of
the second wheel of the Buddha’s doctrine) refers
exclusively to the ultimate, while the clarification
of this emptiness on the basis of the three nature
theory in the “Discourse Unveiling the True
Intention” helps to avoid the two extremes of
wrong denial and superimposition on the
Madhyamaka path. The second wheel of the Bud-
dha’s doctrine would then only have provisional
meaning in the sense that it lacks the fine distinc-
tion into different degrees of reality on the level
of conventional truth. In his “Lamp of the Middle
Way,” Kamalaśı̄la (1957, 162a7–b6) thus writes
(my own translation from the Tibetan) “Non-
arising and so forth have been taught as having
definitive meaning in the ‘Noble [Discourse of]
Instructions for Aksayamati’. Therefore it is cer-
˙
tain that precisely such [statements] as that there
is no arising and so forth [define] the ultimate. If
this is the case, how could then the Buddha teach
in the “Noble [Discourse] Unveiling the True
Intention” the lack of essence of all phenomena,
having in mind as the underlying intention the
three natures, that is, the three types of
essencelessness? There is no fault in this. [. . .]
Since an intellect which has succumbed to either
of the two extremes of superimposition and
wrong denial does not enter the very profound
ocean of the ultimate, which is free from [these]
two extremes, the Buddha, for that reason, pro-
nounced the teaching of non-arising and so forth
exclusively with respect to the ultimate and hav-
ing taught [its] underlying intention, that is, the
three types of essencelessness, he established
a textual [tradition], one of exclusively definitive
meaning, in order to teach a Madhyamaka path
free from the two extremes. It is not the case that
Mādhyamikas do not accept the presentation
of three natures”.
However, Candrakı̄rti (ca. 600–ca. 650 CE)
was more critical of Yogācāra. In his
autocommentary on the “Introduction to the Mid-
dle Path” (“Madhyamakāvatāra,” VI.36), he
points out that factors of existence with specific
characteristics do not arise even on the level of
conventional truth and, on this basis, he rejects
Reality in Buddhism
the Yogācāra interpretation that Nāgārjuna only
refuted the imagined and not the dependent
(La Vallée Poussin 1992, 123). Since nothing
arises in terms of an own being, there can be no
passing out of existence in terms of an own being
either. Following this line of thought, Candrakı̄rti
explains that the future result of intentional
deeds can be maintained even without the
Yogācāra notion of a ground consciousness, that
is, the dependent nature of the Yogācāras
(Madhyamkāvatāra, VI.39, La Vallée Poussin
1992, 123). In his “Introduction to the Middle
Path,” Candrakı̄rti thus claims (my own transla-
tion from the Tibetan) “Since there is no passing
out of existence in terms of an own-being you
should know that the fruit [of deeds] will
definitely occur even if the termination of the
deed sometimes lies back a long time. This
works even without a ground [consciousness as
a carrier of] its (i.e., the deed’s) power.”
To conclude, Buddhist models of reality are
strikingly heterogeneous, ranging from the realist
ontology of the Abhidharma at one end of the
spectrum to the idealist position at the other. In
a sense, the followers of Madhyamaka stand out
by avoiding any model that involves locally
determined factors of existence. This allows one
to understand dependent origination as a dynamic
system of interrelatedness which precludes any
clean separation between any individual compo-
nent of the system – or any subsystem that is
singled out for observation – and all the rest. It
is this absence of own being and other being from
the standpoint of dependent origination that is
called emptiness.
Cross-References
▶ Buddha (Historical)
▶ Buddhist Canonical Literature
▶ Consciousness (Buddhist)
▶ Dependent Arising
▶ Impermanence (Buddhist)
▶ Karma (Buddhist)
▶ Physics in Buddhism
▶ Science in Buddhism
▶ Truths, four Noble
Recovery 1965 R
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Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, 38(1), 405–410. Reciprocity
Huntington, C. W. (1989). The emptiness of emptiness: An
introduction to early Indian Madhyamaka. Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press. ▶ Altruism
Kamalaśı̄la (1957). Madhyamakāloka (Tibetan trans).
Peking bsTan ´gyur, no. 5287.
La Vallée Poussin, L. (1991). Abhidharmakos´abhāsyam
(English trans: Pruden, L. M.) (Vol. 2 and˙ 3). Reckoning
Berkeley: Asian Humanity Press.
La Vallée Poussin, L. (1992). Madhyamakāvatāra of ▶ Arithmetic in Islam
Candrakı̄rti (Tibetan trans). (Bibliotheca Buddhica,
Vol. 9). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Lopez, D. S. (1988). Buddhist hermeneutics. In
D. S. Lopez (Ed.), Studies in East Asian Buddhism
(Vol. 6). Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Reconstructionist Judaism
Mathes, K. D. (1996). Unterscheidung der Gegebenheiten R
von ihrem wahren Wesen (Dharmadharmatāvibhāga) ▶ Progressive Judaism
(Vol. 26). Indica et Tibetica: Swisttal-Odendorf.
Mathes, K. D. (2004). Tāranātha’s ‘twenty-one differences
with regard to the profound meaning’: Comparing the
views of the two gźan stoṅ masters Dol po pa and Śākya Recovery
mchog ldan. Journal of the International Association of
Buddhist Studies, 27(2), 278–322.
Steven Cramer
Mathes, K. D. (2007). The ontological status of the depen-
dent (paratantra) in the Sandhinirmocanasūtra and the Department of Neurology, University of
Vyākhyāyukti. In Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und California Irvine Medical Center, Orange,
Buddhismuskunde (Vol. 66, pp. 323–339). Vienna: CA, USA
Arbeitskreis f€ur tibetische und buddhistische Studien.
Nakamura, H. (1989). Indian Buddhism. Motilal
Banarsidass: Delhi. Description
Reat, R. (1993). The s´ālistambhasūtra. Delhi: Motilal
Banarsidass.
Schmithausen, L. (1969). Zur Literaturgeschichte der Recovery is the study of improvement after an
€alteren Yogācāra-Schule. Zeitschrift der deutschen injury or insult. This can occur in any organ
R 1966
throughout the body. This chapter considers
recovery in the brain, particularly after the occur-
rence of a sudden event such as stroke or trauma
or spinal cord injury. Recovery can be spontane-
ous or treatment-induced. It can be partial or
complete. Recovery can be measured in terms
of brain events: Do cells grow back? Does elec-
trical activity normalize? Do brain regions fire
when it is time to move the leg? Recovery can
also be measured in terms of behavior: can the
person move better than before? Recovery can be
considered in many different domains, such as
movement, sensation, thinking, feelings, eating,
speaking, and more. Recovery can also be mea-
sured in different dimensions, such as activity or
participation. Recent developments include an
increasing number of studies focused on bringing
new treatments to patients in order to promote
a degree of recovery beyond that which occurs
spontaneously.
Self-identification
Science
Recovery is a science at many levels. One can
speak of recovery in molecular, cellular, and
genetic terms – reductionist and appealing to the
benchtop scientist. In this way, we learn about the
molecular underpinnings of a patient’s recovery.
Recovery can be examined at the systems level,
seeing how regions of an organ, such as different
cortical zones around the brain, interact. Much of
modern functional neuroimaging focuses on this
level. Recovery can be viewed at the behavioral
level, such as by clinicians, psychologists, or
sociologists. This is perhaps the most important
focus of all, as recovery of function is paramount;
getting patients back home to loved ones is the
ultimate goal of this branch of science.
Characteristics
Recovery is distinct from other clinical scientific
disciplines in several ways. First, when discussing
stroke therapeutics in particular, recovery is distin-
guished by the broad time window. Many acute
Recovery
stroke therapies focus on the first few hours after
stroke, but recovery-based therapies under evalua-
tion often are initiated days/weeks after onset of
stroke injury. This permits attention to a broad
range of psychosocial issues that often cannot be
addressed with acute therapies. Also, recovery has
many analogies with normal function. That is, the
process of recovery is similar to normal develop-
ment, to learning, and to learning a new skill. These
points of analogy might have therapeutic implica-
tions, for example, perhaps the best pathway to
repair the brain is to mimic the normal pattern of
brain development.
Relevance to Science and Religion
Recovery is a biological process influenced by
psychosocial functions. As such, religious issues
can influence a person’s outlook, mood, motiva-
tion, and social satisfaction, and therefore can
impact recovery.
Sources of Authority
The most important person with control over
recovery is the patient, who sets goals and
motivation levels. Second, the family and close
social circle have a major influence, as these per-
sons are of great influence at many levels. In some
settings, persons who dispense rehabilitation ther-
apy can have an enormous influence on recovery.
Ethical Principles
On the one hand, the standard ethical principles
of medical practice apply. On the other hand,
recovery can be so influenced by psychological
and social state, and one must be particularly
mindful of these issues.
Key Values
The key values in the field of recovery are to
restore function. In the spirit of the World Health
Recovery
Organization, recovery aims to repair the affected
organ in order to improve body function, increase
the patient’s activity level, and increase patient
participation in social activities.
Conceptualization
Nature/World
Nature and the world is the arena in which the
subject exists and recovers. Nature/world is
a source of many influences on recovery.
Human Being
A human being is a person, an individual.
A human being is the one undergoing recovery.
Life and Death
Life is the state of being animate, of being living.
Death is its absence. Recovery can only occur in
the living.
Reality
Reality is the world around us, the real world.
Knowledge
Knowledge is what we know, what information
and experiences that are available to us.
Truth
Truth is that which is reality.
Perception
Perception is how reality is described by the
individual.
Time
Time is the fourth dimension.
Consciousness
Consciousness is the state of being aware and
awake, of interacting with one’s environment.
Rationality/Reason
I have no response for this Q.
Mystery
A mystery is a problem that still needs to be solved.
1967 R
Relevant Themes
Much of recovery is influenced by individual
personality features, such as motivation, hope,
and satisfaction.
Cross-References
▶ Body
▶ Brains, Artificial and Computational
▶ Depression
▶ Limbic System
▶ Neuroimaging
▶ Neuropathology
▶ Neurophysiology
▶ Neuropsychology
▶ Neuroradiology
▶ Neuroscience
▶ Neurosurgery
▶ Robot Societies
References
Cramer, S. C. (2008a). Repairing the human brain after
stroke: I. Mechanisms of spontaneous recovery.
Annals of Neurology, 63, 272–287.
Cramer, S. C. (2008b). Repairing the human brain after
stroke. I. Restorative therapies. Annals of Neurology,
63, 549–560.
Cramer, S. C., Sur, M., Dobkin, B. H., O’Brien, C.,
Sanger, T. D., Trojanowski, J. Q., et al. (2011).
Harnessing neuroplasticity for clinical applications.
Brain: A Journal of Neurology, 134, 1591–1609. R
Dimyan, M. A., & Cohen, L. G. (2011). Neuroplasticity in
the context of motor rehabilitation after stroke. Nature
Reviews Neurology, 7, 76–85.
Grefkes, C., & Fink, G. R. (2011). Reorganization of
cerebral networks after stroke: New insights from
neuroimaging with connectivity approaches. Brain.
Murphy, T. H., & Corbett, D. (2009). Plasticity during
stroke recovery: From synapse to behaviour. Nature
Reviews Neuroscience, 10, 861–872.
Nudo, R. J. (2011). Neural bases of recovery after brain
injury. Journal of Communication Disorders, 44,
515–520.
Pearson-Fuhrhop, K. M., & Cramer, S. C. (2010). Genetic
influences on neural plasticity. PM R, 2, S227–240.
Savitz, S. I., Chopp, M., Deans, R., Carmichael, S.T.,
Phinney, D., & Wechsler, L. (2011). Stem cell therapy
as an emerging paradigm for stroke (steps) ii. Stroke,
42, 825–829.
R 1968
Volpe, B. T., Huerta, P. T., Zipse, J. L., Rykman, A.,
Edwards, D., Dipietro, L., et al. (2009).
Robotic devices as therapeutic and diagnostic
tools for stroke recovery. Arch Neurology, 66,
1086–1090.
Zhang, Z. G., & Chopp, M. (2009). Neurorestorative
therapies for stroke: Underlying mechanisms
and translation to the clinic. Lancet Neurology, 8,
491–500.
Recursion
Linda Sherrell
Department of Computer Science, The
University of Memphis, Memphis, TN, USA
Recursion is a tool that every programmer
should master. Recursion is very similar
to induction in mathematics. For example,
a recursive algorithm must have at least one
base case (to end the recursion) and a case to
represent the looping.
For many problems, there are multiple algo-
rithms that can produce a correct solution. Often-
times, the recursive algorithm is the shortest and
easiest for other programmers to understand;
however, the recursive algorithm may not be the
most efficient.
An example of a recursive algorithm for com-
puting the factorial of a number is given below.
Note that the algorithm is written in Java-like
pseudo-code. The reserved word public means
that this method is visible throughout the
program.
public factorial (n)
if (n = 0 or n = 1)
then return 1
else
return (n * factorial (n - 1))
Red Blood Cells
▶ Transfusion Medicine
Recursion
Redemption in Judaism
Norbert M. Samuelson
School of Historical, Philosophical, and
Religious Studies, Arizona State University,
Tempe, AZ, USA
Related Terms
Redemption and Science in Judaism; Science
and redemption in Jewish religion; Views of
redemption in Jewish science
According to classical rabbinic theology, redemp-
tion (geulah in Hebrew) is one of the three unique
actions of God, together with creation and revela-
tion. In medieval philosophical theology, these
three become identified with the single timeless
act of the radically unified single deity of the
universe who in fact is the God of Israel. What
differentiates the theme is not the action itself but
its object. God’s single action directed toward the
cosmos both originates and ends it. The logical
consequence of this line of thought is that time
does not exist, for the beginning (creation) and the
end (redemption) are one and the same. Yet, it is
quite clear, to the rabbis no less than the church
fathers, that this world is far from redeemed. “This
world” (ha-‘olam ha’zeh) is the domain of time,
where time is what is after creation and before
redemption. Yet, when seen from an absolute
rather than a human perspective, redemption and
creation are both conditions of every present
moment. Creation is not in the past and redemp-
tion is not in the future. These terms are aspects, in
fact limit aspects, of life in the present.
Prophetic texts can be found in the Hebrew
Scriptures that allude both to a messianic age
(yemot ha-moshiach) and to an end of days.
On the messianic age, see (for example) Ez
11:13–15, where the prophet speaks of
a “remnant” (she-erit) of Israel that will survive
the first Babylonian exile and reestablish the
Jewish theocracy, and he alludes in passages to
predictions of what the rabbis will interpret to
mean the resurrection of the dead. (The most
Redemption in Judaism
famous allusion is Ezekiel’s vision of the valley
of dry bones reassembling into living beings at
God’s command. (Ez 37:1–28)).
We are told that this resurrected “nation” will
bring about “peace” (shalom). The prediction
seems to be clear, but it is not. What is the
“nation” that is resurrected? Is it some members
(viz., a “remnant”) of the nation Israel or the
entire nation? Is it Israel or is it also other nations
as well? Again is it all or some within all the
nations who will be resurrected? In other words,
is this the “old Israel” (on which rabbinic Judaism
will insist) or is this a “new Israel” (on which
Christianity will insist)?
But “nation” is not the only ambiguous term.
“Peace” (shalom) also has many meanings. In its
most simple sense, it means that the messianic
age will be a time period in which there will be no
wars between nations. But the term’s meaning
need not be restricted to national wars. It can
refer to any kind of conflict – conflict between
neighbors, between friends, between families,
and (most important of all) conflicts within
ourselves between our different human inclina-
tions, some good and some bad and some better
than others. In other words, the “shalom” spoken
of here is a peace of perfection, of physical and
psychic completeness. Hence, on this interpreta-
tion, the messianic age will last just as long as it
takes (however long that is) for the world to
become perfect. Then it will be transcended by
a radically different kind of reality.
This prophetic anticipation of a realm of
universal perfection that will succeed the age of
becoming perfect is how the rabbis interpreted
some of Isaiah’s prophesies about the future, espe-
cially Isa 9:1–2 and 45:3–7. In these texts, the
prophet envisions a time when there will no longer
be darkness and everything will be light. Here the
prophet says little more than this, but it is not hard
to visualize what this means. If there is no dark-
ness, then there are no shadows; if there are no
shadows, then there are no distinguishable shapes.
And if there are no shapes, then there are no dis-
tinct entities. Many of the rabbis (and certainly
many of the medieval Jewish philosophers and
Kabbalists) shared this prophetic vision and
drew out its consequences.
1969 R
Before the beginning of the world
(creation), there was only the light of God,
and God made room for the world by making
room for the dark. This world is the story of
the interplay (in the language of the medieval
Jewish natural philosophers) between the dark-
ness of mundane matter and the intelligible
light of the divine form. In the end, we are
here told, the form will again dominate over
the matter, the light over the dark, and once
again, all will be light, which means that all
will be God. It is a vision of what from
a human perspective is universal death.
But what expires is the material aspects of
reality, including the human, and what persists
universally is the divine.
What I have presented so far as early rabbinic
inferences from the words of the Hebrew Scrip-
tures became formalized as rabbinic dogma by
Moses Maimonides (1135–1204) in his
Commentary on the Mishna. There we are told
that “all of Israel has a share in the World to
Come” (chpt 10 of tractate Sanhedrin of the
Mishna), and that the list of Jews excluded from
this share are anyone who denies the resurrection,
who teaches that the Torah is not of divine origin
(literally, that it is “not from the heavens”), and
someone called an “epicurean” (“apikoros” in
Hebrew). An epicurean, Maimonides tells us, is
someone who denies 13 “foundations of the
Torah,” including (12) there will be a messianic
age, and (13) there will be a resurrection of the
dead. However, this is explicitly only a reference R
to the messianic age. Subsequent commentaries
will extend Maimonides’ statements either to say
that the messianic age is the end of days or that the
end of days will follow the messianic age.
There are comparable voices within the
culture of modern science that raise comparable
kinds of predictions about a final stage of human
historical evolution that is evocative of Judaism’s
dogmas of a messianic age and an end of days.
Michio Kaku, for example, predicts a day when
through humanity’s combined knowledge from
quantum mechanics in physics, the biomolecular
revolution in the life sciences, and the informa-
tion revolution in the cognitive science, we will
know virtually “everything” that there is to know
R 1970
and the Age of Enlightenment will come to an
end, not because it has been overthrown, but
because it has been fulfilled.
There are many other apparent points of at least
coincidence if not identity between what Judaism
proclaims about the final redemption and what at
least some modern scientists say about the not-
too-distant future. First, the rabbis predict that the
messianic age will be so radically different from
this world, that there is no comparison between
the two. Notably the laws of nature will them-
selves be new, so new that (for example) lions
can lie with lambs rather than killing them, and
(in general) sin will disappear from the world.
Similarly Ray Kurzweil predicts that in the very
near future, the rate of development of technology
will increase exponentially to a point in which
change will be temporally continuous, a state so
inconceivable from a present human perspective
that Kurzweil identifies this future stage of the
world as “the singularity.”
Second, the rabbis predict that in the
messianic age, there will be an end to death.
Similarly, cultural historians such as David Nye
foresee a time when our biological and medical
knowledge is sufficiently advanced that entities
living and dying will be a matter of human
choice and not natural accident or necessity.
Third, the conquest of death will necessitate
major changes in moral judgments. From the
perspective of secular philosophy, philosophers
like Peter Singer point to many examples where
rethinking of values is required. For example,
the more we know about them, the more life
and death become arbitrary, so that coming into
life and passing into death requires human
intentionality. In this vein of thought, lines
become at least fuzzy between not just life and
death but between what is human and what is
not human, so that it becomes increasingly
necessary to move ethics outside of its tradi-
tional anthropocentric focus. Similarly, as Rabbi
Elliot Dorff and other scholars of Jewish bio-
ethics demonstrate, Jewish law no less than
ethics in general needs to be rethought and
reconstructed in new ways as a consequence of
new technology, especially in medical ethics.
(See “▶ Bioethics in Judaism”).
Redemption in Judaism
The above are only examples of the extensive
degree to which the claims and problems of prog-
nostications about the future ends of humanity
and the cosmos are parallel in both Judaism and
modern science. But there are critical differences
as well. The most obvious discordance in this
case is that the prophets of the end in science
are scientists and engineers armed with the
power of collective human scientific research
and experimentation. None of them claim to
be prophets whose source of insight is divine
revelation. Furthermore, not every prediction is
as humanly affirmative as the prophecies of
Kaku. On the contrary, the cosmological physi-
cist Steve Weinberg (1977, p. 154) soberly
states, “The more the universe seems compre-
hensible, the more it seems pointless.” And
pointless it is from a human perspective. On
this prophecy, the universe will continue to
expand endlessly toward infinity, and as it
expands, it will become endlessly less dense
and endlessly colder, to a point sometime in
the very distant future where nothing that we
could recognize as an entity would exist. The
temperatures will be too low for any form of
life to exist, and distances between particles
will be so enormous, that no force could
hold any two particles together to constitute
a compound entity. However, it should be
noted, this end of days in universal death is
not unlike Isaiah’s prediction of universal light
conquering all darkness. What is judged from
a human perspective as “pointless” can be
affirmed (for better or for worse) as “fulfill-
ment” from a divine perspective.
Cross-References
▶ Historical Theology
▶ Judaism: An Overview
▶ Kabbalah in Judaism
▶ Natural Sciences in Judaism
▶ Philosophy in Judaism
▶ Physics in Judaism
▶ Psychology in Judaism
▶ Theology in Judaism
▶ Time
Reductionism
References
Diamond, J. (1992). Third Chimpanzee, the: The evolution
and future of the human animal. New York:
HarperCollins.
Dorff, E. (2003). Matters of life and death: A Jewish
approach to modern medical ethics. Philadelphia:
Jewish Publication Society of America.
Fukayama, F. (2002). Our posthuman future: The conse-
quences of the biotechnology revolution. New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Kaku, M. (1997). Visions: How science will revolutionize
the 21st century. New York/London: Doubleday.
Kurzweil, R. (2005). The singularity is near: When
humans transcend biology. New York: Viking.
Nye, D. E. (1994). American technological sublime.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Samuelson, N. M. (2009). Jewish faith and modern sci-
ence: On the death and rebirth of Jewish philosophy.
Lanham/Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield.
Singer, P. (1994). Rethinking life and death: The collapse of
our traditional ethics. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin.
Weinberg, S. (1977). The first three minutes. New York:
Basic Books.
Redemption and Science in Judaism
▶ Redemption in Judaism
Reductionism
John R. Albright1,2,3 and Anne L. C. Runehov4
1
Lutheran School of Theology, Chicago, IL, USA
2
Purdue University Calumet, IN, USA
3 R
Florida State University, FL, USA
4
Department of Systematic Theology, Copenhagen
University, Copenhagen, Denmark
Related Terms
Top Down
Reductionism is a view of areas of knowledge as
capable of being arranged in hierarchical fashion,
and then claiming that a lower level entails the one
just above it. Consider the following short list of
areas of study, from top to bottom: humanities,
history, sociology, psychology, biology, chemistry,
1971 R
and physics. Reductionism claims that complete
knowledge and understanding at a lower level
will enable you to deduce results at the next higher
level. A reductionism program is any attempt to
implement such a claim for any pair of levels.
Science and technology have been able to
produce impressive results by using reductionis-
tic thinking. A complicated system, such as an
automobile, is best understood by conceptualiz-
ing it as an assembly of subsystems. If there is
a malfunction, one should isolate the subsystem
where the problem resides and test its compo-
nents; if a headlight does not work, you do not
begin by checking the level of the oil in the
engine.
Most scientists and engineers would agree
(Barbour 1990, 165; Peacocke 1993, 217) that
a hierarchy of studies exists. They would not
necessarily agree that (1) the hierarchy is simple:
There may be interconnections that skip one level
or more; (2) a specific order or place in it con-
notes any particular value (ethical, societal, eco-
nomic, etc.), or (3) the reductionist program is
valid. There is, however, a tendency for some
biologists to favor reductionism because they
want to oppose vitalism, the notion that living
beings have some kind of vital essence that sep-
arates them from nonliving matter.
The list of areas in the hierarchy is certainly of
interest (Barbour, Peacocke, loc. cit). Ian Barbour
distinguishes three types of reductionism:
(1) methodological, (2) epistemological, and
(3) ontological. Methodology guides research
programs; epistemology concerns relations
between adjacent levels; ontology claims to
speak about reality. As Barbour states, the three
types of reductionism do not make equivalent
claims, but writers often do not distinguish care-
fully among them. Methodological reductionism
is seen as quite proper in science.
However, according to some philosophers,
there are six established types of reductionism:
(1) ontological reductionism, (2) reductive mate-
rialism, (3) eliminating materialism, (4) scientific
reductionism, (5) causal reductionism, and
(6) methodological reductionism. Nevertheless,
by showing how these are related to one another,
Anne L.C. Runehov suggests that these can be
R 1972
reduced to two types of reductionism, namely,
ontological reductionism and methodological
reductionism (Runehov 2007: 204–206).
Ontological reductionism has the purpose of
rendering an exhaustive explanation of some phe-
nomenon, process or event (the explanandum) in
terms of another phenomenon, process, or event
(the explanans). Accordingly, something x is
explained in terms of nothing but y. A variant,
for example, is to maintain that everything that
exists is made up of a small number of basic
substances that behave in regular ways like
atoms, quarks, or energy. Then one has applied
ontological reductionism. Nancey Murphy
understands ontological reductionism as “no
new kinds of metaphysical ‘ingredients’ need to
be added to produce higher-level entities from
lower level ones” (Murphy 1998: 65). Her defi-
nition rejects the existence of vital forces or
entelechy in the life sciences, as well as mind or
soul as the basis of consciousness. She also des-
ignates a type of reductionism that has even
stronger claims than ontological reductionism,
namely, reductive materialism which dictates
that all higher-level explananda can be exhaus-
tively explained in terms of lower level
explanantia with the addition that only the lower
level explanantia are really real while the higher-
level explananda are only composite structures
made of atoms (Murphy 1998). The latter type of
reductionism makes the ontological reductive
argument, that religious experiences are nothing
but experiences caused by God, impossible,
because God is apprehended as a higher-level
explanans, which cannot be reduced to composite
structures made of atoms. Still, in my view,
reductive materialism is a form of ontological
reductionism, even the strongest form.
Yet another type of ontological reductionism,
and which is gaining ground, is known as elimi-
nating materialism, which dictates that mental
states such as religiosity and love are simply mis-
nomers. One day all such concepts will be seen as
inadequate and it will become clear that what is
at stake is pure neural-chemistry. Eliminating
materialism projects the success of science in
explaining misnomers in the past onto the future
(Churchland 2002). The exhaustiveness hence
Reductionism
lies in the future. Which form of ontological
reductionism is applied depends on how the
explanans is defined.
When the explanans is a scientific explanation,
we are dealing with scientific reductionism,
which is a form of ontological reductionism
when it is argued that phenomena, processes,
and events can exhaustively be explained by
science. It is the same causal reductionism
when it is intended that the explanandum can be
exhaustively explained by what caused it
(Stenmark 2001, 21–22). Causal reductionism is
actually understood as a bottom-up hierarchy
from, which if true, it would follow that the
laws of the sciences ranked higher up in the
hierarchy should be reducible to the laws of
physics.
Thus, reductive materialism is an extreme
form of ontological reductionism while scientific
reductionism and causal reductionism may be
forms of ontological reductionism if the claim is
that the explanans exhaustively explains the
explanandum. What all types of ontological
explanations have in common is that it is the
explanans that exhaustively explains the
explanandum or at least will be able to do so in
the future.
A different type of reductionism is known as
methodological reductionism, which can also be
understood in different ways. Firstly, it can be
understood as every explanation ought to be con-
tinually reduced to the very simplest possible
explanation. Secondly, it may be apprehended
as a research strategy for analyzing things to
study, such as cells, in terms of their parts, such
as macromolecules, as well as for applying suc-
cessful theories in one area, such as Darwinian
evolution, to other areas, such as sociology or
religion. Thirdly, methodological reductionism
may aim to reduce a whole into a specific set of
parts for a scientific purpose without claiming
that this is all there is to that whole. An illustra-
tion of such reductionism would be to explain
pain in terms of its neurological correlations.
For instance, such a neurological explanation
would be an example of a scientifically reductionist
explanation that is not a form of ontological reduc-
tionism, because the scientific explanans is not
Reductionism
meant to exhaustively explain the explanandum
(pain is not maintained to be nothing but neural
activity).
Runehov suggests there are two main types of
reductionism: ontological reductionism and meth-
odological reductionism. The difference between
these two types of reductionism is that ontological
reductionism signifies that phenomena, processes,
or events can be exhaustively explained by other
phenomena, processes, or events. Methodological
reductionism, on the other hand, means that
a whole is reduced to a specific set of parts for
a scientific purpose without claiming that this is
all there is to that whole. Hence, there is no claim
for exhaustiveness. Hence, one can have causal
ontological reductionism or causal methodologi-
cal reductionism – likewise, it is with scientific
reductionism.
Controversies Regarding Reductionism
Scientists often make overt claims for reduction-
ism of all kinds.I cite twoexamples:
Thus eventually one may hope to have the whole of
biology ‘explained’in terms of the level below it,
and so on right down to the atomic level.... (Francis
Crick,quoted in Barbour 1990, 165).
“The underlying physical laws necessary for
the mathematical theory of a large part of physics
and the whole of chemistry are thus completely
known, and the difficulty is only that the exact
application of these laws leads to equations much
too complicated to be soluble.” (Dirac 1929,
714).
These examples epitomize the bottom-up
approach. Opposition to reductionism is evident
among many of those who deal with the
upper levels of the hierarchy. They often use
“reductionist” as an insult hurled at a scientist –
sometimes justly, sometimes not. Antireduction-
ists tend to deal with rather complex systems that
they describe holistically. If they allow for
a hierarchy, they emphasize the need for top-
down causation, as when a thinking brain
(psychology) brings about the motion of a body
part (biology). The reductionist claim – that both
happenings are the result of electrochemical
1973 R
activities in the body – is not seen as useful by
a holist, who would favor explanations involving
bodily processes, brain processes, and conscious
processes acting in concert.
The case against reduction is strengthened by
emergence, defined as a phenomenon that occurs
at a particular level in the hierarchy, completely
and qualitatively unexpected from all we know
about the next lower level. A simple example
might be the schooling behavior of some species
of fish; the behavior of one animal does not pre-
pare you for the collective behavior when large
numbers are present. Other examples of emer-
gence are numerous (Johnson 2001).
The difference between living and nonliving
matter is again an example of emergence, perhaps
the most important of all. Life could be consid-
ered as an emergent phenomenon, arising from
chemistry. Vitalism was formerly widely
maintained as a way of sanctifying life by setting
it apart from other things. In chemistry, organic
compound were seen as distinct – made only by
living beings. Inorganic matter was considered
lifeless. In 1828, Friedrich Wöhler synthesized
urea, an organic substance, from totally inorganic
ingredients. This discovery struck a damaging
blow to vitalism. Finally, on May 20, 2010, the
geneticist Craig Venter announced in the journal
Science that he and his team had created synthetic
DNA from the four chemical buildings blocks
that ordinarily form DNA, and inserted it into
a bacterium from which the natural DNA had
been removed. The newly created bacterium R
reproduced normally, with instructions from the
new DNA. Venter’s team had created a life form
that had never lived before and opened a new era
of synthetic life (Gibson et al. 2010).
This is certainly a noteworthy feat in methodo-
logical reductionism, but it does not necessary
establish ontological reductionism. The future
of synthetic biology will be a holistic process
involving science, ethics, economics, and politics.
Cross-References
▶ Divine Action
▶ Epistemology
R 1974 Reflective Judgment and Moderate Living

▶ Evolution
▶ Holism Reformation
▶ Religiosity
▶ Religious Experience ▶ Physics in Protestantism
▶ Scientism

References Regulation
Barbour, I. (1990). Religion in an age of science (The ▶ Control Theory (Cybernetics)
Gifford Lectures 1989–1991),Vol 1. San Francisco:
Harper.
Churchland, P. S. (2002). Brain-wise, neurophilosophy.
Massachusetts: The Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. Relational Buddhism
Dirac, P. A. M. (1929). Quantum mechanics of many-
electron systems. Proceedings of the Royal Society of
London, 123(792), 714–733. ▶ Psychology in Buddhism
Gibson, D. G. et al. (2010). Creation of a bacterial cell
controlled by a chemically synthesized genome.
Science 329(5987), 52–56. First reported in Science
Express on 20 May 2010.
Johnson, S. (2001). Emergence: The connected lives of Relational Dharma
ants, brains, cities, and software. New York: Simon &
Schuster. ▶ Psychology in Buddhism
Murphy, N. (1998). Supervenience and the
nonreducibility of ethics to biology. In R. J. Russell,
R. William, S. J. Stoeger, & F. J. Ayala (Eds.),
Evolutionary and molecular biology: Scientific per-
spectives on divine action (pp. 463–489). California, Relational Ontology
USA: Vatican Observatory.
Peacocke, A. (1993). Theology for a scientific age: Being
and becoming – natural, divine, and human. Minneap- Gloria L. Schaab
olis: Fortress Press. Department of Theology and Philosophy,
Runehov, A. L. C. (2007). Sacred or neural? Barry University, Miami Shores, FL, USA
The potential of neuroscience to explain religious
experience. Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck &
Ruprecht.
Stenmark, M. (2001). Scientism: Science, ethics Relational ontology is the philosophical position
and religion. Aldershot, UK/Burlington, USA: that what distinguishes subject from subject,
Ashgate.
subject from object, or object from object is
mutual relation rather than substance. Ontologi-
cally, substance refers to the essence or nature of
a being. The substance of God is immaterial, self-
Reflective Judgment and Moderate existent, immutable, and eternal. Conversely, the
Living substance of the universe is material, contingent,
mutable, and temporal. While distinction of
▶ Wisdom (Philosophically) substances clearly differentiates God from the
cosmos, it implies that union of God and the
cosmos is impossible since ontologically distinct
substances cannot interpenetrate. Hence, true
Reform Judaism God cannot remain true God and be truly imma-
nent in the cosmos. Conversely, true cosmos
▶ Progressive Judaism cannot remain true cosmos and be conceived
Relations in Buddhism 1975 R
within the being of God. Substance ontology relationship between God and creation while
thus precludes the possibility of conceiving the upholding the ontological distinction between
self-creativity of the cosmos as the immanent Creator and creation.
creativity of God-qua-Creator and suggests
a “God of the gaps” divine-world relation in
which God’s creativity in the cosmos is intrusive Cross-References
rather than intrinsic.
In contrast, a relational ontology upholds the ▶ Divine Action
distinction between Creator and the created ▶ Divine Creativity
without insisting on radical separation. A basis ▶ Evolutionary Theology
for this ontology can be traced to Thomas ▶ God of the Gaps
Aquinas as he reflects on whether the term “per- ▶ Ontology
son” signifies “relation” in the Trinity. According ▶ Panentheism
to Aquinas, “a divine person signifies a relation as ▶ Transcendence and Immanence
subsisting. And this is to signify relation by way
of substance, and such a relation is a hypostasis
subsisting in the divine nature, although in truth References
that which subsists in the divine nature is the
divine nature itself (1989: Ia.29.4).” Conse- Aquinas, T. (1989). The summa theologica a concise
translation. Notre Dame: Christian Classics.
quently, triune Persons share the same divine
LaCugna, C. M. (1991). God for us: The trinity and
nature but are distinguished by their relation one Christian life. San Francisco: Harper Collins.
to another. Nonetheless, this relation is not dis-
tinct from nature but in fact subsists within it and
is the divine nature itself. Hence, in God For Us:
The Trinity and Christian Life, Catherine La Relationality
Cugna could claim, “A relational ontology under-
stands both God and the creature to exist and ▶ Externalism and Internalism
meet as persons in communion. In other words,
the meaning of to-be is to-be-a-person-in-com-
munion. God’s To-Be is To-Be-in-relationship,
and God’s being-in-relationship-to-us is what Relations
God is. A relational ontology focuses on person-
hood, relationship, and communion as the modal- ▶ Relations in Buddhism R
ity of all existence.” In addition to LaCugna
(1991: 250), other contemporary scholars have
taken up Aquinas’ understanding of nature as
relation. Relational ontology has been particu- Relations in Buddhism
larly useful to many in the theology-science
dialogue like Arthur R. Peacocke who utilize Ven. Agganyani
a panentheistic model of God-world relation- German Vinaya Sangha Association (DBO) and
ship to express divine action in the creative Centre for Buddhist Studies (CBS), Myanmar,
processes of the cosmos. Countering the Bruckmuehl, Germany
critique that in panentheism there is no distinc-
tion between God and creation, relational
ontology contends that the ontological distinc- Related Terms
tion between Creator and created is relational,
a distinction of “subjects” rather than “sub- Buddhist causality; Conditional relations;
stances.” Hence, one can maintain the panentheistic Conditionality; Relations
R 1976 Relations in Buddhism

Description

Patthāna belongs to the “higher teachings” of

˙˙
the Buddha, the Abhidhamma of Theravāda
Buddhism (http://www.abhidhamma.com/). The
term “Patthāna” (Pāḷi) is composed of the prefix
˙˙
“pa,” various, and “thāna,” cause or condition;
˙
thus, Patthāna means “various causes or condi-
˙˙
tions,” or “a system of relations.” Patthāna is
˙˙
usually translated as “conditional relations.”
Causality or conditionality plays an important
role in Buddhism. Already in his first sermon, the
Buddha taught about cause and effect: the
first noble truth, suffering (dukkha), as effect,
and the second noble truth, craving (tanhā), as
˙
the cause for suffering. (See entry “▶ Dukkha”).
Then, in his doctrine of dependent origination
(paticcasamuppāda), the conditionality within Relations in Buddhism, Fig. 1 The universal symbol of
˙ Patthāna: the wheel of life
the cycle of rebirth (samsāra) is explained ˙˙
˙
with 12 factors which are themselves conditioned
and condition the next factor. (See a short
explanation of dependent origination under the mostly referred to as relations or conditions
entry “▶ Truth”). But Patthāna treats condition- (paccaya). In the terms of ultimate reality,
˙˙
ality completely and in the deepest and exactest Patthāna is the science of relations between
˙˙
way possible (Fig. 1). the conditioning states (paccaya-dhamma), the
Patthāna is laid down in the seventh conditioned states (paccayuppanna-dhamma),
˙˙
book of the Abhidhamma Pitaka (http://www. and the conditioning forces (paccayasatti), which
˙
abhidhamma.com/; Ko Lay 1986; Nyanatiloka have the power to link each cause to its effect by its
2008), the third part of the Pāli canon or specific function of production (janaka), support
“Tipitaka.” Fundamental knowledge of (upatthambhaka), or maintenance (anupālana)
˙
Abhidhamma is necessary to understand (Fig. 2).
Patthāna. For instance, in the text, it is said: “The visible
˙˙
This last, large book of the Abhidhamma is object-base is related to eye-consciousness ele-
decidedly the most profound, subtle and abstruse ment and its associated states by the force of
of the seven. Therefore, it is also called “the object condition ((Nārada Mūla Patthāna
˙˙
great book” (mahāpakarana), or “a complete Sayadaw) Vol. I, Chap. II, 2 (i)).” Here, the
˙
book with infinite methods” (anantanaya samanta visible object-base (rūpāyatana) refers to the
patthāna). Whereas the previous six Abhidhamma actual cause, i.e., the conditioning state, and
˙˙
books analyze all ultimate realities (paramattha the eye consciousness (cakkhuviññāna), and its
˙
dhammas), i.e., one’s direct experiences, in minute mental factors (cetasika) refer to the actual
detail according to various aspects; Patthāna effects, i.e., the conditioned states, while the
˙˙
relates them again to each other and describes the force of the object-condition (ārammana-
˙
causes or conditions, the effects, and the condition- paccaya), i.e., the conditioning force, makes the
ing forces. (The ultimate realities according to cause relate with its effects by production and
Abhidhamma are consciousness (citta), mental support. However, the complete picture, why
factors (cetasika), matter (rūpa), and Nibbāna. eye consciousness and its mental factors arise, is
Altogether, 24 conditioning forces are enumerated, more complicated and includes other conditions
Relations in Buddhism 1977 R
Cause or conditioning state Effect or conditioned state
(paccaya) (paccayuppanna)

1. Consciousness (citta) 1. Consciousness (citta)

Ultimate realities 2. Mental factors (cetasika) 2. Mental factors (cetasika)

(paramattha dhammas) 3. Matter (rupa) 3. Matter (rupa)
4. Nibbana
5. Concepts (pannatti)

Relations in Buddhism, Fig. 2 Cause and effect in Abhidhamma terms

such as prenascence, presence, nondisappearance, classifies them into a complete system for
and association. Indeed, it is a huge, multiple- understanding the mechanics of the universe of
dimensional network of causes and effects Dhamma.” (Ko Lay 1986, Chap. X, VII., p. 157)
which Patthāna explains step by step in its vol- (Fig. 3)
˙˙
umes (Five volumes in Pāḷi (Cattha Saṅgāyana
˙˙ The 24 conditions (paccaya) and sub-conditions
edition), six large volumes in the Burmese and
Siamese Pāḷi edition, two volumes of about 1. Hetu-paccaya Root-condition
2. Ārammana-paccaya Object-condition
500–600 pages in the English translation of ˙
3. Adhipati-paccaya Predominance-condition
a part of Patthāna only, Pali Text Society (PTS)).
˙˙ Āramman’ādhipati Object-predominance
The complex system of relations is complicated ˙
Sahajāt’ādhipati Conascence-
yet logical and reasonable. The whole universe predominance
can be explained with it. As it is common in the 4. Anantara-paccaya Proximity-condition
teachings of the Buddha, the emphasis is put on 5. Samanantara-paccaya Contiguity-condition
human beings and their liberation from suffering 6. Sahajāta-paccaya Conascence-condition
(dukkha) and the round of rebirth (samsāra). 7. Aññamañña-paccaya Mutuality-condition
˙
Patthāna is the last, huge step to completely 8. Nissaya-paccaya Support-condition
˙˙
understand and penetrate mind (nāma) and matter Sahajāta-nissaya Conascence-support
(rūpa), their conditioned arising, decay, ceasing, Purejāta-nissaya Prenascence-support
and their nature of nonself (anatta). (See entry Vatthu- Base-
“▶ Anatta”). One will clearly see the dependences Vatthārammana- Base-object-
˙
and the conditionality of all things, so that 9. Upanissaya-paccaya Decisive support-
condition R
one might be ready to finally give up and let go
Āramman’ūpanissaya Object decisive
all hankering after, clinging and identifying, ˙ support
which is the way to liberation, the path leading Anantar’ūpanissaya Proximity decisive
to the realization of Nibbāna, the final goal support
in Buddhism. Pakat’ūpanissaya Natural decisive
U Ko Lay, a renown Burmese Buddhist writer support
and translator, wrote in “An outline of the 10. Purejāta-paccaya Prenascence -condition
Patthāna system of relations” in his “Guide to Vatthu-purejāta Base-prenascence
˙˙ Ārammana-purejāta Object-prenascence
Tipitaka” ((Ko Lay 1986)): “The Great Treatise ˙
˙ 11. Pacchājāta-paccaya Postnascence-condition
of Patthāna arranges all conditioned things,
˙˙ 12. Āsevana-paccaya Repetition-condition
(22 Tikas and 100 Dukas of the Mātikā),
13. Kamma-paccaya Kamma-condition
(These matrixes (mātikā) are taught in the
Sahajāta-kamma Conascent kamma
Dhammasaṅganı̄, the first Abhidhamma book.) Nānakkhanika-kamma Asynchronous kamma
˙ ˙
under 24 kinds of relations, describes and
(continued)
R 1978 Relations in Buddhism

The 24 conditions (paccaya) and sub-conditions mutuality, result, dissociation, and associa-
14. Vipāka-paccaya Result-condition tion; and occasionally some out of root, pre-
15. Āhāra-paccaya Nutriment-condition dominance, nutriment, kamma, faculty, jhāna,
Rūpāhāra material nutriment and path) (See Patthāna – Conditional
˙˙
Nāmāhāra mental nutriment Relations, Sahajāta group, by Agganyani
16. Indriya-paccaya Faculty-condition (download: http://www.abhidhamma.com/txt_
Purejāta-indriya Prenascence faculty Patthana_Sahajata_group.pdf)).
Jı̄vit’indriya Material life faculty 3. Proximity (anantara) group: seven conditions
Sahājāta-indriya Conascence faculty (proximity, contiguity, decisive support, repeti-
17. Jhāna-paccaya Jhāna-condition tion, kamma, nonpresence, and disappearance).
18. Magga-paccaya Path-condition 4. Prenascence (purejāta) group: six conditions
19. Sampayutta-paccaya Association-condition (prenascence, support, faculty, dissociation,
20. Vippayutta-paccaya Dissociation-condition
presence, and nondisappearance).
Sahajāta-vippayutta Conascence
dissociation
5. Postnascence (pacchājāta) group: four condi-
Purejāta-vippayutta Prenascence tions (postnascence, dissociation, presence,
dissociation and nondisappearance).
Pacchājāta-vippayutta Postnascence 6. Nutriment (āhāra) group: three conditions
dissociation (nutriment, presence, and nondisappearance).
21. Atthi-paccaya Presence-condition 7. Faculty (indriya) group: three conditions
Sahajāta-atthi Conascence presence (faculty, presence, and nondisappearance).
Purejāta-atthi Prenascence presence 8. Natural decisive support (pakatūpanissaya)
Pacchājāta-atthi Postnascence presence group: two conditions (decisive support and
Āhāra-atthi Nutriment presence
kamma).
Indriya-atthi Faculty presence
9. Kamma: one condition (kamma).
22. Natthi-paccaya Absence-condition
The conditioning phenomena mostly do not
23. Vigata-paccaya Disappearance-condition
(same as no. 22) “produce” the effect but are one of the various
24. Avigata-paccaya Non-disappearance- necessary conditions for the effect, or they support
condition (same as no. 21) or just influence the effect in one or another way.
Important to understand is that the effect must not
These 24 conditions do not work separately but necessarily arise later than the cause. They can
collectively in groups; they join together consti- occur at the same time or the effect might even
tuting nine groups (with overlaps, i.e., some con- arise earlier than the cause. The Patthāna explains
˙˙
ditions participate in several groups) (According in great detail how or why the cause conditions its
to Dr. Nandamālābhivamsa, chapter “Patthāna” in effect, which dhammas can be related – or not – by
˙ ˙˙
“Fundamental Abhidhamma” (download: http:// what conditioning force.
www.abhidhamma.com/txt_Patthana.pdf) and The conditions (paccayas) also can be grouped
Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha (Bodhi 2007)): according to mental (nāma) or physical (rūpa)
1. Object (ārammana) group: eight conditions nature of the conditioning and conditioned states:
˙
(object, predominance, support, decisive 1. Mind is related to mind by the force of six
support, prenascence, dissociation, presence, conditions: Proximity, contiguity, absence,
and nondisappearance) (For a detailed disappearance, repetition, and association.
explanation, see Patthāna – Conditional 2. Mind is related to mind and matter by the force
˙˙
Relations by Agganyani (download: http:// of five conditions: root, kamma, result, jhāna,
www.abhidhamma.com/txt_Patthana_conditio- and path.
nal_relations.pdf)). 3. Mind is related to matter alone by the force of
2. Conascence (sahajāta) group: 15 conditions one condition: postnascence.
(conascence, support, presence, and nondisap- 4. Matter is related to matter by one condition:
pearance always; usually several out of faculty (physical life faculty).
Relations in Buddhism 1979 R
Relations in Buddhism,

(Non-d
Fig. 3 Patthāna: the

Hetu-paccayo
Avigata
˙˙ (Pāḷi and

Ad (Object ccayo
Vig
24 conditions

(D is

(Root)
ata-
English) (Figure from

isappe
app

nc o
Na (Abs

a- pa

na ay
)
Mehm Hla Aung Gyi

-pacca

e)
pac nce)
tth e n

mi c c
eara
1998b)

i-p ce

man

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cay
arance
At o

ac )

re ti-
t
(P hi-p ay

yo

(P ipa
cc

ca

Aram
o
re ac a
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yo

h
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)
nc yo ta xim
Vip e) n
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(Di utta-p An (P - p acc
sso 23 24 1 2 ra y)
cia accay nta it
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22 3
m ana ontigu
) 21 4 Sa (C
cayo
Sampayutta-pac 20 5 ta-pac
(Association)
cayo Sahaja scence)
19 24 6 (Cona
CONDITIONS 7 Aññamaññ
accayo 18 a-paccayo
Magga--p (Mutuality)
(P )
a th 17 8
16 9 Nis
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5. Matter is related to mind by the force of one
condition: prenascence.
6. Mind, matter, Nibbāna, and concepts
(paññatti) are related to mind by the forces
of two conditions: object and decisive support.
7. Mind and matter are related to mind and
matter by the forces of nine conditions: pre-
dominance, conascence, mutuality, support,
nutriment, faculty, dissociation, presence,
and nondisappearance.
Structure of Patthāna
˙˙
Patthāna is made up of two main chapters (vāra):
˙˙
the “brief chapter” and the “great chapter.”
(According to Mehm Hla Aung Gyi 1998a,
pp. 7–13) (Fig. 4).
The brief chapter consists of two parts: the
“Enumeration of the conditions” (paccayuddesa)
and the “Analytical exposition of the conditions”
(paccayaniddesa). The latter gives a brief
account of the conditioning and conditioned
states of each of the 24 conditions.
The great chapter is divided into four great
divisions which are applied to all 24 conditions:
1. Positive: Anuloma Patthāna – Both the condi-
˙˙
tioning and the conditioned state are positive,
i.e., both arise.
2. Negative: Paccanı̄ya Patthāna – Both the con-
˙˙
ditioning and the conditioned state are nega- R
tive, i.e., both do not arise.
3. Positive–negative: Anuloma Paccanı̄ya
Patthāna – The conditioning state is positive,
˙˙
but the conditioned state is negative.
4. Negative–positive: Paccanı̄ya Anuloma
Patthāna – The conditioning state is negative,
˙˙
but the conditioned state is positive.
Each of these four “Great Patthāna Divisions”
˙˙
consists of “Six Patthānas” or ways of application:
˙˙
1. Triplet: Tika Patthāna – application of the 24
˙˙
conditions (paccayas) to the phenomena in
their 22 triplets (tika).
2. Couplet: Duka Patthāna – application of the
˙˙
24 conditions (paccayas) to the phenomena in
their 100 couplets (duka).
R 1980
Relations in Buddhism, Fig. 4 Structure of Patthāna
˙˙
3. Couplet-triplet: Duka-Tika Patthāna – appli-
˙˙
cation of the 24 conditions (paccayas) to the
phenomena in their 100 couplets (duka) as
reference and the three sections of the 22
triplets (tika).
4. Triplet-couplet: Tika-Duka Patthāna – appli-
˙˙
cation of the 24 conditions (paccayas) to the
phenomena in their 22 triplets (tika) as reference
and the two sections of the 100 couplets (duka).
5. Triplet-triplet: Tika-Tika Patthāna – applica-
˙˙
tion of the 24 conditions (paccayas) to the
phenomena in each triplet (tika) as reference
and the three sections of the remaining 21
triplets (tika).
6. Couplet-couplet: Duka-Duka Patthāna –
˙˙
application of the 24 conditions (paccayas) to
the phenomena in each couplet and the two
sections of the remaining 99 couplets (duka).
Furthermore, all points are detailed in seven
chapters:
1. Dependent chapter (paticca-vāra)
˙
2. Conascent chapter (sahajāta-vāra)
3. Conditioned chapter (paccaya-vāra)
4. Supported chapter (nissaya-vāra)
5. Conjoined chapter (samsatha-vāra)
˙ ˙
6. Associated chapter (sampayutta-vāra)
7. Investigation chapter (pañhā-vāra)
Relations in Buddhism
While the ancient Patthāna books (Nārada
˙˙
Mūla Patthāna Sayadaw) and the commentaries
˙˙
in Abhidhammattha Saṅgaha ((Bodhi 2007)) and
Visuddhimagga ((Buddhaghosa 2011, 1975)) are
very dry and scholastic, some well-educated
modern Abhidhamma teachers have the ability
to instruct Patthāna in connection with the men-
˙˙
tal process (vı̄thi) or with the doctrine of depen-
dent origination (paticcasamuppāda) and to
˙
explain the practical application in daily life,
which can be very fascinating and eye opening
(http://www.abhidhamma.com/; van Gorkom
2010; Ledi 1986; Nandamālābhivamsa 2007;
˙
Naing 2005).
For example, in the mental process (vı̄thi),
for each consciousness (citta) taking part in
the process (at least), four points or groups of
conditions (paccaya) have to be considered:
1. The object with which the consciousness
works, i.e., the object group
2. The base on which the consciousness arises,
i.e., the prenascence group
3. The previous consciousness, i.e., the proximity
group
4. The mental factors (cetasika) associated
with the respected consciousness, i.e., the
conascence group (Fig. 5).
Relations in Buddhism
object
1
previous
consciousness
3 conascence
mental process C C
proximity
group
2 group
base
Relations in Buddhism, Fig. 5 The four conditioning groups for one consciousness in the mental process
Self-identification
Science
As seen from the above figure, Patthāna is most
˙˙
scientific and goes beyond what is commonly
called science. Explaining completely the condi-
tionality of life and the animate universe by all
possible relations and subatomic forces between
mind, matter, concepts, and even Nibbāna in fact
can only be understood as scientific approach.
Nevertheless the purpose of Patthāna is not to
˙˙
be an abstract science but to apply and fully
penetrate reality in order to attain liberation,
meaning, to realize Nibbāna.
Religion
Even if Buddhism is regarded as a religion,
Patthāna, belonging to the Abhidhamma, which
˙˙
is a part of the Pāli canon of Theravāda
Buddhism, cannot be called a religion or part of
a religious teaching, because it is a mere detailed
explanation of cause and effect. In particular, it is
not a religion in the sense that one blindly has
to believe and follow any laws, instructions, or
commandments. Furthermore, as the Patthāna
˙˙
system of relations covers the complete
explanation of conditionality, there is space
1981 R
object
group
4 mental process
group
prenascence C = consciousness (citta)
surrounded by its
associated mental
factors (cetasika)
neither for a creator god nor for the concept of
an individual soul.
However, the legend around the Buddha’s
realization of the Patthāna belongs to the area
˙˙
of ancient religious belief.
In the Introduction of the “Atthasālinı̄,”
(“The Expositor,” the commentary to the
Dhammasaṅganı̄, the first book of the
˙
Abhidhamma) it is stated that the Buddha, during
the fourth week after his enlightenment, sat in the
“Jewel House,” in the northwest direction, and
contemplated the Abhidhamma. (The “Jewel R
House” is said to be the place where
the seven books of the Abhidhamma have been
contemplated). Then:“And while he contem-
plated the contents of the ‘Dhammasaṅganı̄,’ his
˙
body did not emit rays; and similarly with
the contemplation of the next five books.
But when coming to the ‘Great Book,’
(Mahāpakarana ¼ Patthāna) he began to
˙ ˙˙
contemplate the 24 universal causal relations of
condition, of presentation, and so on, his omni-
science certainly found its opportunity therein.
For as the great fish Timiratipiṅgala finds room
only in the great ocean 84,000 yojanas in depth,
so his omniscience truly finds room only in the
Great Book. Rays of six colours- indigo, golden,
R 1982
red, white, tawny, and dazzling- issued from
the Teacher’s body, as he was contemplating the
subtle and abstruse Dhamma by his omniscience
which had found such opportunity (. . .)
(Part I (Ganthārambhakathā), 2.4, }13).”
Another sign of religiosity might be the
common practice of its chanting, especially in
Myanmar. It is believed, that in the time of
decline and decay of the Buddha’s teachings,
the Abhidhamma will be the first pitaka to disap-
˙
pear, and out of it, Patthāna will be lost at first.
˙˙
Therefore, pious Buddhists especially care for
the maintenance of Patthāna, and there is
˙˙
a widespread custom to chant the whole Patthāna
˙˙
at the end of the rainy season (vassa) in
monasteries and nunneries, which takes about
5 days and nights continuously – nowadays
through loudspeakers, trusting it is a great
blessing for everybody to hear it.
Characteristics
It is the abstract, scientific completeness, which
is the uniqueness of Patthāna. Without having to
˙˙
rely on a mysterious “first cause,” which in
religions usually is assigned to a creator god,
Patthāna can explain the conditionality of life,
˙˙
the whole samsāra. The nonself or nonsoul
˙
(anatta) (See entry “▶ Anatta”) doctrine typical
of the Buddha’s teaching becomes fully evident
through Patthāna.
˙˙
Relevance to Science and Religion
The teaching of conditional relations in Patthāna
˙˙
has its own scientific logic, which at first seems
unusual, eccentric, and odd to Western students.
Because of the difference in approach, compari-
son and scientific exchange are very difficult.
Nevertheless, some basics might be interesting
for psychologists, psychotherapists, physicians,
physicists, and others. In the field of application
of Patthāna, almost nothing has been or is done.
˙˙
The majority of religious-oriented people and
representatives of the various religious convic-
tions might be hesitant to reflect on the Patthāna,
˙˙
Relations in Buddhism
because they fear to lose faith in their religion.
The greatest hindrance for an exchange between
the traditional teaching and Western-oriented
students is the profundity of Patthāna,
˙˙
which requires pre-knowledge of the entire
Abhidhamma. To this day, there are few Western
students and teachers who have studied and are
well versed in the Abhidhamma and Patthāna.
˙˙
Asian Abhidhamma and Patthāna scholars,
˙˙
however, are occupied and engaged in teaching
mainly at monasteries or Buddhist universities
and have little interest in or opportunity for
scientific exchange with Western scholars.
Sources of Authority
Patthāna as a part of the Abhidhammapitaka was
˙˙ ˙
reexamined and confirmed in all six Buddhist
councils. (The first Buddhist council was held
3 months after the Buddha’s demise, and only
Enlightened Ones (Arahats) were allowed to
participate. The latest council was held from
1954 to 1956 in Yangon, Myanmar, to which
a great number of Buddhist scholars of various
countries were invited and participated). It was
included on the oldest palm leaves found in
the Aloka cave near Matale, Sri Lanka, when
the Pāḷi canon was written down for the first
time during the fourth Buddhist council in
the first century B.C.E. The version of the fifth
Buddhist council of 1871 is engraved on the
famous marble slabs of Kuthodaw Pagoda in
Mandalay, Myanmar. (The 729 marble slabs
comprising the entire Pāḷi canon are dubbed the
biggest book of the world).
Advanced Vipassanā meditators are able
to experience and observe at least parts of the
relations and conditionality, which confirms
what the Buddha himself had realized and laid
down in the Patthāna. (Insight meditation. See
˙˙
“▶ Vipassanā” in the entry).
Ethical Principles
Ethical principles are important in the entire Bud-
dhist teaching and serve as a necessary
Relations in Buddhism
foundation for the development of knowledge
and wisdom (paññā). The system of relations in
the Patthāna is classified according to whole-
˙˙
some, unwholesome, and neutral states every-
where. Wholesome (kusala) is always moral and
ethical and conducive for liberation. Unwhole-
some (akusala) is mostly immoral or unethical
and definitely not conducive for one’s own liber-
ation. Neutral or kammically variable (abyākata)
is a state which is neither wholesome nor
unwholesome in itself but can take over the qual-
ity of the other associated states.
Key Values
Key values of Patthāna are analytical, discrimi-
˙˙
native knowledge and wisdom (paññā), not as an
end in itself but for the purpose of seeing things as
they really are, especially their nature of nonself
(anatta), which leads to “liberation through
wisdom” and the realization of Nibbāna.
Conceptualization
Nature/World
Patthāna has a realistic view. Mind (nāma)
˙˙
and matter (rūpa) are distinct phenomena
which really exist for a short instant and
which cannot mix, associate, or substitute
each other. But they are related as taught in
the Patthāna. Some of these relations can be
˙˙
experienced, seen or known in nature, between
human actions and the environment or among
beings.
The following issues are the same as in the
entry “Abhidhamma.” Therefore, they are treated
briefly here.
Human Being
A human being is not of interest and not directly
defined in the Patthāna, as this is a system of
˙˙
mere abstract relations, causes and effects.
The concept of a human being can appear only
as a conventional object as conditioning state –
never as effect which can be only ultimate
realities.
1983 R
Life and Death
Life
Life is characterized in the Abhidhamma by two
phenomena called life faculty (jı̄vitindriya), one
mental, the other physical. The physical life
faculty is special in Patthāna as it is involved
˙˙
in the only matter-to-matter relation. It is
related by the force of the faculty-condition
(indriya-paccaya) only to coexisting material
phenomena of the same material group
(rūpa-kalāpa), which are supported by it and
protected from decay.
By contrast, the mental factor (cetasika) of
mental life faculty is involved in various relations
and is conditioning mental phenomena by
maintaining them especially.
Origin of Life
The main cause for life is kamma according to
Buddhism. In the Patthāna, it is the asynchronous
˙˙
kamma relation (nānakkhanika-kamma) which
˙
has the power to produce a new life.
Death
What conventionally is called “death” is
precisely speaking a concept which according
to the teaching of Patthāna is conditioning
˙˙
but cannot be conditioned itself. Death
consciousness (cuti-citta) is conditioned, and
kamma – productive as well as destructive –
and kammic result (vipāka) are also
conditioned.
R
Reality
Most important for the understanding of
Patthāna is the definition and usage of “reality”
˙˙
and especially “ultimate realities” (paramattha
dhammas). All realities, conventional (paññatti)
and ultimate (paramattha), are included as
cause or conditioning state in the system of
relations, but as effect or conditioned states,
only three types of ultimate realities are
possible: consciousness (citta), mental factors
(cetasika), and matter (rūpa). Nibbāna, the
unconditioned, cannot be produced, supported,
or influenced in any way. When “seen,” i.e.,
grasped as an object, the effect on our mind
will be peace and bliss.
R 1984
Knowledge
Knowledge (ñāna) or wisdom (paññā) is an
˙
ultimate reality, a beautiful mental factor
(sobhana cetasika). Knowledge can be devel-
oped, increased, conditioned – e.g., through the
study of Patthāna or through insight meditation
˙˙
(vipassanā-bhāvanā). There are several factors
and circumstances conducive to knowledge such
as a concentrated mind, examples of teachers,
healthy food, etc. Knowledge itself can be a con-
ditioning state as well, i.e., is working as
a condition, e.g., bringing clarity and equanimity,
removing doubt, etc., and resulting in right view
and finally in liberation.
Truth
Truth is not directly mentioned in Patthāna.
˙˙
All the explained relations are true in the
highest sense and can be proved. In the
meaning of reality, although conventional
and ultimate truth both take part in the system
of relations, definitely, ultimate truth is
emphasized.
Perception
Perception (saññā) according to Abhidhamma is a
universal mental factor (cetasika) that associates
with all types of consciousness. Setting marks
and recognizing marks, which are the functions
of perception, are both conditioned by various
facts, e.g., the object itself, one’s eyesight
and mindfulness (sati). Perception is also
conditioning, e.g., one’s emotional reactions on
a recognized object and the physical effects on
the body.
Time
According to Abhidhamma, time is as concept
and relative. In Patthāna, time is used to
˙˙
compare different events and distinguish their
simultaneousness, conascence, prenascence, or
postnascence. This is an important difference
as it determines which conditional forces are
involved.
Consciousness
Consciousness (citta) is one of the four ultimate
realities in Abhidhamma, and 89 or 121 types
Relations in Buddhism
are differentiated. In Patthāna, consciousness
˙˙
plays an important role concerning the condi-
tioning as well as on the conditioned aspects of
many relations. For each single consciousness
in the continuous “stream of consciousness” or
in one mental process, various conditions are
necessary to coincide in order to produce, sup-
port, maintain, or in any way influence the
respective consciousness. One of these condi-
tions is the previous consciousness, which by
dissolving gives opportunity to the next one to
arise. The specific, fixed sequence of con-
sciousness (citta niyāma) comes about because
of the conditional relations working in the
process.
Rationality/Reason
The system of conditionality as found in the
Patthāna is scientific, rational, and logical. But
˙˙
the intellectual understanding in theory is only
scholasticism. The application and penetration in
daily life is the way to liberation.
Mystery
In Patthāna, all conditionality is well
˙˙
explained in great detail. No questions
concerning cause and effect remain unan-
swered. Hence, there is no space for mystery
in Patthāna. Only the legend of the Buddha
˙˙
contemplating in the Jewel House with the
issuing of the rays from his body seems a bit
mysterious – but that is not at all the essence
of Patthāna.
˙˙
Cross-References
▶ Abhidhamma, Southern
▶ Anatta
▶ Consciousness (Buddhist)
▶ Dependent Arising
▶ Dukkha
▶ Impermanence (Buddhist)
▶ Karma (Buddhist)
▶ Psychology in Buddhism
▶ Reality in Buddhism
▶ Science in Buddhism
▶ Truths, Four Noble
Relativity 1985 R
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Relativism Cultural
Bodhi, B. (Ed.). (2007). A comprehensive manual of
Abhidhamma – The Abhidhammattha sangaha of
▶ Cross-Cultural Psychology
Ācariya Anuruddha (trans: Nārada, M., Rewata
Dhamma, U., Sı̄lānanda, U.). Kandy: BPS. http://
www.bps.lk. ISBN 955-24-0103-8. Wisdom Publica-
tions. http://www.wisdom-books.com
Buddhaghosa. (2011). Visuddhimagga. The path of
purification (trans: Bhikkhu Ñānamoli), Buddhist
Relativity
Publication Society. ISBN 955 24 ˙ 0023 6. (http://
www.bps.lk) Russell Stannard
Buddhaghosa. (1975). Visuddhimagga. The path of purity Department of Physics and Astronomy,
(trans: Tin, P. M.). London: Pali Text Society. ISBN
Open University, Milton Keynes, UK
978-086013-008- 8. http://www.palitext.com
Ko Lay, U. (1986). Guide to Tipitaka. Burma: Buddha
Dharma Education ˙
Association. http://www.
buddhanet.net/pdf_file/tipitaka.pdf Related Terms
Mehm Hla Aung Gyi. (1998a). An introduction to
Patthāna, conditional relations, Pāḷi-Myanmar Pāḷi-
˙˙
English (pp. 7–13). Myanmar: Yangon. Eddington; Free will; God’s foreknowledge;
Mehm Hla Aung Gyi. (1998b). An introduction to Gravity; Length contraction; Principle of
Patthāna, conditional relations (p. 22). Myanmar: relativity; Space; Spacetime; Speed of light;
˙˙
Yangon)
Time; Time dilation
Naing, H. (2005). Patthana Dhamma. Ebook. http://www.
wisdomlib.org/buddhism/book/patthana-dhamma/
Nandamālābhivamsa, S. (2007). – Audio-files from
˙
Patthāna-courses, Patthana Pāḷi chantings and
˙˙ ˙˙ Introduction
Dhamma study notes. http://patthana.blogspot.com/
Nārada Mūla Patthāna Sayadaw U. (1992/1993). Conditional
˙˙ thāna) (Vols. I and II), (translation of part
relations (Pat Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity is divided into
of the Tikapat˙˙ thāna only), and Guide to conditional two parts. He proposed his special theory of rela-
relations (Part˙˙I and II), (1979). (trans: Nārada Mūla tivity in 1905. This dealt with the effects on space
Patthāna Sayadaw, U.). London: Pali Text Society.
˙˙ and time of uniform motion. The general theory
ISBN 978-086013-028-2, 978-086013-264-1, and
978-086013-198-X. http://www.palitext.com was put forward in 1916 and incorporates the
Nyanatiloka. (2008). Guide through the Abhidhamma effects on space and time produced by gravity and
Pitaka. Kandy: BPS. http://www.bps.lk. ISBN: 978- accelerated motion. We begin with the special
955-24-0321-7. Wisdom Publication. http://www.
theory.
wisdom-books.com. ISBN: 955-24-03219. http://
www.abhidhamma.com/guide_Abhidhamma_pitaka. R
pdf
Ledi. (1986). Sayadaw. The Buddhist philosophy of rela- The Principle of Relativity and the Speed
tions – Patthānuddesa Dı̄panı̄. Kandy: Buddhist Pub-
˙˙
lication Society. The Wheel Publication No. 331/333.
of Light
http://www.bps.lk
van Gorkom, N. (2010). The conditionality of life: An The principle of relativity states that the laws of
outline of the twenty-four conditions as taught in the nature are the same for all inertial frames of
Abhidhamma. London: Zolag. ISBN 978-1-897633-
reference. An inertial frame is one in which,
26-7. (http://www.zolag.co.uk/). Ebook. http://www.
abhidhamma.org/Patthana%201.htm according to Newton’s law, an object will
continue at rest or in a state of uniform motion
in a straight line unless acted upon by an
unbalanced force. The principle encapsulates
the common observation that, provided one is
Relationships moving in a steady fashion, neither accelerat-
ing nor changing direction, life carries on
▶ Attachment: Theory and Patterns normally.
R 1986
Among the laws of nature are Maxwell’s laws
of electromagnetism. From these, one is able
to calculate what the speed of light, or of any
other electromagnetic radiation, should be in
a vacuum. It is denoted by the symbol c and
comes out to be approximately 300, 000 km/s.
The principle of relativity and the laws of elec-
tromagnetism were well known to all physicists. It
took the genius of Einstein to recognize that,
although they each made perfect sense when
thought of separately, they did not seem to make
sense when put together. According to the princi-
ple, the laws were the same for all inertial
observers, and that must apply to Maxwell’s
laws – including the conclusion to be drawn
from them that the speed of light had the value c.
In other words, the speed of light must be the same
for all observers, regardless of the motion of the
observer or that of the source of light.
Thus, for example, the speed of the light
emitted by a moving car’s headlights must be
seen by the driver to leave the car at speed c
but must also be observed by a pedestrian
standing by the roadside to approach at the
same speed c. How can this be? If the light
behaved like a bullet being fired from a moving
gun, then one would expect the pedestrian to
find that, just as the speed of the car would
have to be added to the muzzle speed of the
bullet, so the speed of light would be c plus the
speed of the car. On the other hand, if light
were to behave like water ripples given out by
a boat moving over the surface of a lake, then
the driver would expect to find that the speed
of light ahead of the car would be slower
relative to the car than the light emitted to the
rear – the car chasing after the forward-moving
waves and leaving behind the rear-going waves.
However, neither is the case. It is an experi-
mental fact that the speed of light is a constant
– depending neither on the speed of the
observer nor the speed of the source of light.
The constancy of the speed of light together
with the principle of relativity has come to be
known as the two postulates (or fundamental
principles) of special relativity. All the conclu-
sions of special relativity stem from acceptance
of these two postulates.
Relativity
Taken together, they demonstrate that there is
something amiss in the way we conventionally add
and subtract velocities. And if there is something
wrong with our conception of velocity (which is
simply distance divided by time), then that in turn
implies there must be something wrong with our
conception of space, or time, or both.
It is important to note that what we are dealing
with here is not some peculiarity of light or elec-
tromagnetic radiation. Anything traveling at the
same speed as that of light will have the same
value for its speed for all inertial observers. What
is crucial is the speed (and the implications for
the underlying space and time) – not the fact that
we happen to have come across this problem in
the context of electromagnetism.
Time Dilation
To see what is amiss, imagine an astronaut in
a high-speed spacecraft and a mission controller
on the ground. They both have identical clocks.
The astronaut is to carry out a simple experiment.
On the floor of the craft, she is to fix a lamp which
emits a pulse of light. The pulse travels directly
upwards at right angles to the direction of motion
of the craft (see Fig. 1). There, the pulse strikes
a bullseye target fixed to the ceiling. Let us say
that the height of the craft is 4 m. With the light
traveling at speed c, she finds that the time taken
for this trip t0 , as measured on her clock, is given
by t0 ¼ 4/c.
Now let us see what this looks like from the
perspective of the mission controller. As the craft
passes him overhead, he too observes the trip
performed by the light pulse from the source to
the target. According to his perspective, during
the time taken for the pulse to arrive at the target,
the target will have moved forward from where it
was when the pulse was emitted. For him, the
path is not vertical; it slopes (see Fig. 2). The
length of this sloping path will clearly be longer
than it was from the astronaut’s point of view.
Let us say that the craft moves forward 3 m in the
time that it takes for the light pulse to travel from
the source to the target. Using Pythagoras’s the-
orem, where 32 + 42 ¼ 52, we see that the
Relativity
Relativity, Fig. 1 The
astronaut arranges for
a pulse of light to be
directed towards a target
such that the light travels at
right angles to the direction
of motion of the spacecraft
Relativity,
Fig. 2 According to the
mission controller on earth,
as the spacecraft passes 4
overhead, the target moves
forward in the time it takes
for the light pulse to
perform its journey. The
pulse, therefore, has to
traverse a diagonal path
distance traveled by the pulse to get to the target
is, according to the controller, 5 m.
So what does he find for the time taken for
the pulse to perform the trip? Clearly it is the
distance traveled, 5 m, divided by the speed at
which he sees the light traveling. This we have
established is c (the same as it was for the astro-
naut). Thus, for the controller, the time taken, t,
registered on his clock, is given by t ¼ 5/c.
But this is not the time the astronaut found.
She measured the time to be t0 ¼ 4/c. So, they
disagree as to how long it took the pulse to per-
form the trip. According to the controller, the
reading on the astronaut’s clock is too low; her
clock is going slower than his.
And it is not just the clock. Everything going
on in the spacecraft is slowed down in the same
ratio. If this were not so, the astronaut would be
able to note that her clock was going slow (com-
pared, say, to her heartbeat rate, or the time taken
to boil a kettle, etc.). And that in turn would allow
her to deduce that she was moving – her speed
somehow affecting the mechanism of the clock.
But that is not allowed by the principle of rela-
tivity. All uniform motion is relative. Life for the
1987 R
4
5
3
astronaut must proceed in exactly the same way
as it does for the mission controller. Thus, we
conclude that everything happening in the space-
craft – the clock, the workings of the electronics,
the astronaut’s aging processes, her thinking
processes – all are slowed down in the same
ratio. When she observes her slow clock with
her slow brain, nothing will seem amiss. Indeed,
as far as she is concerned, everything inside the
craft keeps in step and appears normal. It is only R
according to the controller that everything in the
craft is slowed down. This is time dilation. The
astronaut has her time; the controller has his.
They are not the same.
And this is the case whenever one has two
observers moving relative to each other; the
time dilation effect is always there. This means
that, strictly speaking, whenever we undertake
a journey – say, a bus trip – on alighting we
ought to readjust our watch to get it back into
synchronization with all the stationary clocks and
watches. The reason we do not is that the effect is
so small. For instance, someone opting to drive
express trains all their working life will get out of
step with those following sedentary jobs by no
R 1988
more than about one millionth of a second by the
time they retire, hardly worth bothering about.
At the other extreme, were an astronaut capa-
ble of traveling at a speed very, very close to that
of light, time for her would effectively come to
a standstill. She would hardly age at all and
would, in effect, live forever. The downside, of
course, is that her brain would have almost come
to a standstill, which in turn means she would be
unaware of having discovered the secret of eter-
nal youth.
So much for the theory. But is it true in prac-
tice? Emphatically, yes. In 1977, for instance, an
experiment was carried out at the CERN labora-
tory in Geneva on subatomic particles called
muons. These tiny particles are unstable, and
after an average time of 2.2  106 s (i.e., 2.2
millionths of a second), they break up into
smaller particles. They were made to travel
repeatedly around a circular trajectory of about
14 m diameter, at a speed of v ¼ 0.9994c. The
average lifetime of these moving muons was
measured to be 29.3 times longer than that of
stationary muons – exactly the result expected,
to an experimental accuracy of 1 part in 2,000.
In a separate experiment carried out in 1971,
the theory was checked out at aircraft speeds
using identical atomic clocks, one carried in an
aircraft and the other on the ground. Again, good
agreement was found. These and innumerable
other experiments all confirm the correctness of
the time dilation prediction.
Length Contraction
Imagine the spacecraft traveling from the earth to
a distant planet. Knowing both the speed of the
craft and the distance from the earth to that
planet, the mission controller can work out how
long the journey should take as recorded on his
clock. The astronaut can do the same kind of
calculation. She agrees with the mission control-
ler about their relative speed, but her journey time
will not be the same as the controller’s – because
of time dilation. So, will she not find that she has
arrived too soon – that she could not possibly
have reached the distant planet at the agreed
Relativity
speed in the reduced time? That would allow
her to conclude that it must be she who is really
moving. This would violate the principle of rela-
tivity which holds that the laws of nature are the
same for all inertial observers, so one cannot
decide who is “really moving.” Something is
clearly wrong. But what? It cannot be the speed;
both observers are agreed as to that. No, the
resolution of the dilemma lies with their respec-
tive estimates of the distance from the earth to the
planet. Just as the controller has his time and
the astronaut has hers, he has his estimate of the
distance between the earth and the planet, and she
has hers. The astronaut is perfectly happy about
her arrival time at the planet. If her recorded
journey time is, say, half that of the controller,
then her estimate of the distance separating the
earth and the planet is half that which it is
according to the controller. Thus, her estimates
of time and distance are perfectly self-consistent –
just as the controller’s set of estimates are
internally self-consistent.
In this way, we come across a second conse-
quence of relativity theory. Not only does speed
affect time, it also affects space. As far as the
astronaut is concerned, everything that is moving
relative to her is squashed up, or contracted. This
applies not only to the distance between earth and
the planet but to the shape of the earth itself and
of the planet itself; they are no longer spherical.
All distances in the direction of motion are
contracted, leaving distances at right angles to
that motion unaffected. This phenomenon is
known as length contraction.
Four-Dimensional Spacetime
All this talk about different observers having
different perceptions about space and time can
be disorienting. One occasionally hears people
claiming that relativity theory can be summarized
in the phrase “all things are relative” – implying
that it is a free-for-all and anyone can believe
anything they want! Nothing could be further
from the truth. Observers might not assign the
same values for time intervals and spatial dis-
tances, but they do agree about how their
Relativity
respective values are related – through the rele-
vant formulae for time dilation and length con-
traction. These are determined with mathematical
rigor.
Not only that, there is a measurement about
which all inertial observers can agree: In ordi-
nary, everyday life, we are happy to accept that if
someone were to hold up a pencil in a room full of
people, everyone would see something different.
Some would see a short-looking pencil, others
a long one. The appearance of the pencil depends
on one’s viewpoint – whether one is looking at it
end-on or broadside-on. Do these differing
perceptions worry us? Do we find them discon-
certing? No. This is because we are all familiar
with the idea that what we see is merely a two-
dimensional projection of the pencil at right
angles to our line of sight. What one sees can be
captured on a photograph taken by a camera at the
same location, and photographs are but two-
dimensional representations of objects that
actually exist in three spatial dimensions. Change
the line of sight and one gets a different projected
length. We are happy to live with these different
appearances because we are aware that when one
takes into account the extension of the pencil in
the third dimension – along the line of sight – then
all observers in the room arrive at the same value
for the actual length of the pencil – the length in
three dimensions. Those who are viewing the
pencil end-on, and thus see a short projected
length, have to add in a large contribution for
the component of length along the line of sight;
those viewing broadside-on with a long projected
length have little to add in the way of the compo-
nent along their line of sight. Either way, they
arrive at the same value for the true length in
three dimensions.
We use this as an analogy for explaining our
differing perceptions of time and space. In 1908,
3 years after Einstein had published his special
theory of relativity, one of his teachers, Hermann
Minkowski (who once described his distin-
guished student as “a lazy dog”!), approached
the subject from a different angle and suggested
a reinterpretation. He proposed that what relativ-
ity was telling us is that space and time are much
more alike than we might suspect from the very
1989 R
different ways in which we perceive and measure
them. Indeed, we should stop thinking of them as
a three-dimensional space plus a separate one-
dimensional time. Rather, they were to be seen
as a four-dimensional spacetime in which space
and time are indissolubly welded together. The
three-dimensional distance we measure (with
a ruler, say) is but a three-dimensional projection
of the four-dimensional reality. The one-
dimensional time we measure (with a clock) is
but a one-dimensional projection of the four-
dimensional reality. These ruler and clock
measurements are but appearances; they are not
the real thing.
The appearances will change according to
one’s viewpoint. Whereas in the case of the pen-
cil being held up, a change of viewpoint meant
changing one’s position in the room relative to
the pencil, in spacetime, a change of viewpoint
entails both space and time and consists of
a change in speed (which is spatial distance
divided by time). Observers in relative motion
have different viewpoints and therefore observe
different projections of the four-dimensional
reality.
What is the nature of this four-dimensional
reality? What are the contents of spacetime?
These will depend on the three dimensions of
space and the one dimension of time. In other
words, they are events. Events are characterized
by their happening at a certain point in three-
dimensional space and at a certain instant of
time. Four numbers then precisely locate the R
position of the event in spacetime. One event
might be the spacecraft leaving earth at a certain
time. A second event might be the arrival of the
craft at the distant planet at a different location in
space and at a later instant of time.
Our two observers, the astronaut and the mis-
sion controller, disagree about “appearances,”
that is, the difference in time between the two
events and also the difference in space between
the two events. However – and this is the crucial
thing – they do agree about the separation
between these two events in four-dimensional
spacetime – as would all other observers, regard-
less of their speeds. And it is the fact that all
observers are agreed as to what exists in four
R 1990
dimensions that strengthens the idea that
spacetime is what is real.
One of the disconcerting features about four-
dimensional spacetime is that nothing changes.
Changes occur in time. But spacetime is not in
time; time is in spacetime (as one of its axes). It
appears to be saying that all of time – past, pre-
sent, and future – exist on an equal footing.
In other words, events that we customarily think
of as no longer existing because they lie in the
past do exist in spacetime. In the same way,
future events which we normally think of as not
yet existing do exist in spacetime. There is noth-
ing in this picture to select out the present instant,
labeled “now,” as being anything special –
separating past from future.
We are presented with a world where it is not
only true that all of space exists at each point in
time but also all of time exists at each point
in space. In other words, wherever you are seated
now reading this book, not only does the present
instant exist, but also the moment when you
began reading and the moment when you later
decide you have had enough and you get up and
go off to make a cup of tea.
We are dealing with a strangely static exis-
tence, one that is sometimes called “the block
universe.” Now there is probably no idea more
controversial in modern physics than the block
universe. It is only natural to feel that there is
something especially “real” about the present
instant, that the future is uncertain, that the past
is finished, that time “flows.” All these conspire
against acceptance of the idea that the past still
exists and the future also exists and is merely
waiting for us to come across it. Some leading
physicists, while accepting that all observers are
indeed agreed on the value of the mathematical
quantity we are calling “the distance, or interval,
between two events in four-dimensional
spacetime,” nevertheless deny that we must go
that extra step and conclude that spacetime is the
true nature of physical reality. They maintain that
spacetime is merely a mathematical structure;
that is all.
The block universe idea does have its prob-
lems. Where does the perceived special nature of
the moment “now” come from, and where do we
Relativity
get that dynamical sense of the flow of time? For
a discussion of such topics, see the entry ▶ Time.
There are various other consequences of spe-
cial relativity, such as, for example, nothing can
travel faster than the speed of light. Matter can be
shown to be a locked-up form of energy, which
when released provides us with nuclear energy
and fuels the Sun. You are directed to the further
reading if interested (Stannard 2008). Mean-
while, we turn to Einstein’s general theory of
relativity.
Curved Spacetime
Consider a spacecraft orbiting the earth with its
engines off. It travels in a curved orbit rather than
moving in a straight line because of the action of
the earth’s gravity. The astronaut steps out of the
craft and floats there alongside the craft. She too
is in orbit about the earth – more or less the same
orbit as the craft. The force of gravity pulls on the
spacewalker and upon the craft in just the right
way to make them both travel the same trajectory.
In order to do this, it must pull on the heavier
spacecraft more strongly than on the astronaut.
How does it know how to do this? In any case,
why would gravity want to make them travel the
same path?
Einstein’s response to this was to suggest that
in the presence of a gravitating body, the “natu-
ral” motion of an object is not that of remaining
stationary or moving at constant speed in
a straight line. Instead, he proposed that near
gravitating bodies such as the earth, the space
itself becomes distorted. It is curved in such
a way that the natural path followed by all objects
is whatever path we observe it to be: the orbit
followed by the spacewalker and the craft around
the earth.
One way of thinking about this is to imagine
a banked race track. On such a track, two very
different vehicles can cruise around with little
need for the driver to steer because the cars are
induced to follow the curved path by the way the
track is banked at the corners. The track is
distorted or curved in such a manner that it is no
longer “natural” for the vehicle to continue in
Relativity
a straight line. It no longer requires a steering
force to alter its direction of motion. The
“steering” is provided by the shaped track.
So what Einstein is saying is that we do not
need to invoke a force – the gravity force – to
keep the astronaut and the craft in orbit about the
earth. There is no force that needs to be fine-tuned
to keep objects of different mass on the same
path. Instead, both the astronaut and the craft
are just following the natural path that all objects
will follow if they start out from the same posi-
tion with the same velocity. Thus, Einstein
replaced the notion of gravity forces with
a completely new conception – that of a curved
space.
And such curvature would be expected to
affect everything passing through that region of
space – including light. This prediction of
Einstein’s was triumphantly verified in 1919
when Arthur Eddington, in a famous experiment,
showed that starlight grazing the rim of the sun
during an eclipse was indeed bent – the star
emitting the light appeared to be in a different
position in the sky to where it is normally found
when the sun is in a different part of the heavens.
Thus, it seems that the sun produces a dimple in
space, much like that which one would get when
placing a heavy ball bearing on a sheet of rubber.
Certain massive stars, when they run out of
fuel, can no longer hold themselves up under their
own gravity; they collapse. Their gravity
becomes ever more intense, and the curvature of
space becomes so great that nothing can escape –
even light. This gives rise to a black hole.
The crux of general relativity is that matter
tells space how to curve, and space tells matter
how to move. Space is no longer to be regarded as
the passive stage on which the actors – material
objects and light – perform their drama. Space
itself becomes a performer.
Bearing in mind how we were led by special
relativity to conclude that space and time consti-
tuted a four-dimensional spacetime, we must fur-
ther conclude that we ought not to be thinking
solely of a curved space but rather of curved
spacetime. The time axis together with the three
spatial axes is all affected by the presence of
the gravitating body. This gives rise to
1991 R
a phenomenon known as the gravitational red-
shift. It means that time runs at different rates in
the presence of gravity. It runs slightly slower
downstairs than it does upstairs. This effect has
been verified experimentally by flying a precise
atomic clock in an airplane and comparing it with
an identical one on the ground. The effect is
normally very tiny, but in the extreme case of
a black hole, at the edge of the hole (called its
event horizon), time actually comes to a halt.
Now you might be thinking that this is all very
well: replacing the notion of gravitational forces
with that of a curved space or spacetime. But is
this not just a matter of personal preference as to
how one chooses to see things? Can one not stick
with the Newtonian idea of gravity forces if one
wishes?
In most everyday situations, Newton’s theory
holds to a level of precision that is perfectly
adequate. Even when computing the orbits of
satellites, it is fine to use the familiar inverse
square law of gravitation. Mathematically,
Newton’s theory is much easier to handle than
general relativity. For this reason alone, physi-
cists will go on talking about gravity forces and
will use Newton’s law. Nevertheless, they know
that the general theory of relativity provides the
more accurate predictions and is a superior way
of understanding the physics. Newton’s law,
while being a useful “recipe” for solving most
problems – those involving weak gravity and
speeds much less than that of light – offers little
insight as to what is really going on. R
Relativity and Religion
It has long been recognized that God’s relation to
time could be different from ours. Although we
interact with God in time – for example, when we
engage in intercessory prayer – it is also believed
that God is, in a sense, beyond time – he is
transcendental; he is unchanging. But this raises
a difficulty: If he never changes, what is the point
of asking him for anything; our request will not
change his mind.
Furthermore, it is held by Christians that
God has foreknowledge – he knows the future.
R 1992
This has never been easy to accept. After all, how
can God know the future before I and everyone
else have made up our minds as to what we shall
do? Surely God could only have such knowledge
if humans were nothing more than totally predict-
able automatons. What then of our supposed free
will? For this reason, it is understandable that
many people – including those theologians called
“process” theologians – reject this claim. And
yet, God’s foreknowledge is part and parcel of
orthodox Christian belief. It is what gives
believers added confidence in the assurances
from God that all in the end will be well for
those who love him. It is not a case of God having
a better judgment as to what the future might
contain; he actually knows the future – so it is
claimed. If we are somehow to accommodate
these strange ideas about God in relation to
time, then our commonsense notions of time
need a shake-up. And that is what relativity the-
ory does with its conception of spacetime.
According to this block universe idea, all of
time exists on an equal footing, past, present, and
future. Though we do not ourselves have access
to that future, in some sense it is held to exist – it
is waiting for us to come across it and experience
it consciously. That would seem to make it easier
to believe in a God who might not be subject to
such a constraint – a God who, in addition to
being imminent in the world, interacting with us
in a dynamic day-to-day relationship, can also
adopt a transcendental viewpoint from which to
take in the broad sweep of the whole of the
spacetime reality.
Does acceptance of spacetime compromise our
sense of free will? Not necessarily. One can regard
all the events of our life, etched into the fabric of
spacetime, as being a record, much like some video
recording. The existence of a video recording of
some sequence of events does not, of course,
detract from the recorded incidents being actions
freely undertaken at the time. In the same way, the
transcendental record of our lives as they exist in
spacetime consists of freely taken decisions.
How can asking God for anything in time
affect the outcome when the future, in physical
terms, is fixed – set in concrete? This in fact poses
no problem if one believes God has
Relativity
foreknowledge and has therefore been able to
build the answer to the prayer into the fabric of
spacetime. Indeed, some religious people think
nothing of praying for events that have already
happened, but about which they do not as yet
know the outcome. They do so confident that an
all-knowing God will be aware that such a prayer
will be offered up later and so takes that into
account in determining the outcome.
One final thought: resurrection. What gets
resurrected when we die? How were we at the
very end of our life? Unfortunate for those who
end up with Alzheimer’s or some other debilitat-
ing disease, but with spacetime, all instants of
time are present to God. Our childhood is just as
vivid to God as any other time. That being so,
why would God resurrect only the final point of
our life story? He might prefer the way we used to
be rather than how we subsequently turned out!
Why not in some sense raise the whole of one’s
life? That would make for a rather strange resur-
rection “body.” But no one knows what kind of
“body” we shall have anyway. Thoughts of
a block universe can really transform one’s think-
ing about what can and cannot be done.
Cross-References
▶ Cosmology
▶ Energy in Physics
▶ Gravity
▶ Physics in Christianity
▶ Space
▶ Space and Time
References
To follow up the subject in greater detail, you are directed
to the following book by the author of this entry:
Stannard, R. (2008). Relativity: A very short introduction.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Other accessible introductions are as follows:
Bondi, H. (1964). Relativity and common sense.
New York: Dover.
Born, M. (1962). Einstein’s theory of relativity.
New York: Dover.
Einstein, A. (1954). Relativity. Reprinted (2001). London:
Routledge.
Religion and Pseudoscience
Giulini, D. (2005). Special relativity: A first encounter.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hawking, S. (2005). A briefer history of time. London:
Bantam.
Mermin, N. David. (2003). It’s about time. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Schutz, B. (2003). Gravity from the ground up.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Taylor, J. (1998). Black holes. London: Souvenir Press.
Relativity Theory
▶ Space
▶ Time
Religion
▶ Modernity in Buddhism and in Islam
Religion and Pseudoscience
Sven Ove Hansson
Division of Philosophy KTH, Royal Institute of
Technology, Stockholm, Sweden
Related Terms
Pathological science; Quasi-science
Pseudoscience is False Science
Pseudoscience means false science. In a strict
sense, the term refers to teachings that contradict
science but are nevertheless presented as
scientific. In a wider sense, pseudoscience also
covers teachings that contradict science even
though they are not presented as scientific. In
this wider sense, a pseudoscience is a doctrine
that is claimed to represent the best available
knowledge on some particular subject matter
but does not do so because it contradicts legiti-
mate scientific knowledge. An astrologer who
1993 R
makes false scientific claims in favor of astrology
pursues pseudoscience in both senses. An astrol-
oger who repudiates science and claims that
astrology is better than science pursues pseudo-
science in the wide but not in the strict sense.
The conflict between science and pseudosci-
ence only arises in areas where scientific knowl-
edge is obtainable. Science cannot determine
how best to perform Johan Sebastian Bach’s
music, since this is a matter of taste and not of
science. For analogous reasons, standpoints on
ethics, metaphysics, and religious faith that do
not concern scientific subject matter cannot
legitimately be labeled as pseudoscientific.
The Demarcation Problem
Philosophers of science have proposed various
criteria for the demarcation between science
and pseudoscience. The most famous of these is
Karl Popper’s (1902–1994) criterion that in order
to be scientific, a statement has to be falsifiable.
By this it is meant that it must be possible to
specify some (hypothetical) empirical evidence
that would be sufficient reason to give it up. Imre
Lakatos (1922–1974) put forward a modified ver-
sion of Popper’s criterion. In his view, the demar-
cation criterion should not be applied to an
isolated hypothesis or theory. Instead it should
refer to a whole research program that is charac-
terized by a series of theories successively
replacing each other. Science is characterized
by each new theory having a larger empirical
content than its predecessor; pseudoscience vio- R
lates this criterion. Thomas Kuhn (1922–1996)
suggested a radically different demarcation crite-
rion, namely, that science must be capable of
puzzle-solving. George Reisch (b. 1962) pro-
posed that scientific disciplines are characterized
by being adequately integrated into the other
sciences.
More complex, multi-criteria demarcation
criteria have also been put forward. Robert
K. Merton (1910–2003) characterized science as
ruled by an ethos with four institutional impera-
tives: Science should be based on universal,
impersonal criteria of truth (universalism). It
should proceed through social collaboration and
therefore belong to the community rather than to
R 1994
individual persons (communism). It should have
institutional control mechanisms to curb the
effects of any personal or ideological motives
that individual scientists may have (disinterest-
edness). Finally, it should allow detached
scrutiny of beliefs that are dearly held by other
institutions (organized skepticism).
Many authors who are practically concerned
with exposing pseudoscience have proposed
multi-criteria lists consisting of common traits
of pseudoscience, such as belief in authorities,
non-repeatable experiments, unwillingness to
test one’s own theory, disregard of refuting infor-
mation, etc.
In spite of this diversity in demarcation
proposals, there is virtual unanimity among
scientists in most particular issues of demarca-
tion. There is widespread agreement, for
instance, that astrology, homeopathy, ancient
astronaut theory, creationism, and Holocaust
denialism are pseudosciences. In spite of a few
points of controversy, for instance, the status of
Freudian psychoanalysis, the general picture is
one of consensus rather than controversy in
particular issues of demarcation. The reason for
this seems to be that most pseudosciences deviate
from science to such a large extent that they fail
by multiple criteria. For the same reason, much
less than a complete characterization of the
borderline between science and pseudoscience
is needed to characterize most cases of pseudo-
science (Hansson 2009).
Most writers on the demarcation issue agree
that the demarcation between science and pseu-
doscience changes as science progresses. Yester-
day’s science, now refuted, can be today’s
pseudoscience. Shifts in the opposite direction
occur, but much more rarely.
Pseudoscience and Religion
Pseudoscience can have many types of motiva-
tions, e.g., personal, political, and religious ones.
In modern societies where science is perceived as
having more authority than what religion has, the
prospect of proving one’s religious standpoints
with science may appear attractive. Attempts to
do so can be found in virtually all religions,
but they tend to be particularly common in new
Religion and Pseudoscience
religious movements. Some of the practices in
movements such as New Age are based on
magical beliefs that are at the same time
criticized by scientists for being pseudoscientific
and by theologians for being superstitious or
pseudo-religious. Attempts at scientific verifica-
tion of religious beliefs often have their origin in
religious doubt; neither the firm believer nor the
firm disbeliever needs empirical verification.
In secularized societies such as Western
Europe and antireligious societies such as
China, religious beliefs have sometimes been
presented as science in order to further their
acceptance. Anthroposophy has extensive teach-
ings on reincarnation, and recognizes many
supernatural beings, but denies being a religion
and instead describes itself as “spiritual science.”
In China, Qigong has been cleansed of spiritual
elements and presented as a science-based prac-
tice. Conversely, in some social circumstances,
there may be advantages to gain from being iden-
tified as a religion. Scientology, whose extensive
pseudoscientific teachings contain comparatively
few religious elements, puts much emphasis on
being a religion and a church. Such a classifica-
tion has substantial advantages, legally and taxa-
tion wise, for the movement in question, but it is
not obvious that self-attributions of this nature
should be taken for granted in scholarly assess-
ments of a movement.
Some pseudoscientific movements, such as
UFO movements focusing on their leaders’
alleged encounters with aliens, have character-
istics in common with religions but are usually
not classified as such. There are also examples
of pseudoscientific assertions about religious
subject matter that are not part of any religious
strivings. Claims that Dan Brown’s novel The
Da Vinci Code represents actual facts about
Christianity belong to the clearest examples of
this.
From the viewpoint of religious purpose,
religiously intended pseudoscience can be
divided into four main categories:
1. Alleged scientific proof of the literal veracity
of Scriptures or traditional dogmas
2. Alleged scientific proof of the authenticity of
venerated physical objects
Religion and Pseudoscience
3. Alleged scientific proof of afterlife or the
existence of nonhuman spiritual beings
4. Alleged scientific proof of divine interference
or the spiritual powers of humans
In what follows, major examples from each of
these categories will be discussed.
The Veracity of Scriptures and Traditional
Dogmas
Creationism, one of the largest and most influential
pseudoscientific movements, attempts to prove
that biological evolution did not take place. In its
place creationists promote accounts of the origin
of species that are compatible with their literalist
interpretation of Scripture. In much the same vein,
archeological evidence has been misrepresented to
make it confirm scriptural narrations. In
recent years, attempts have also been made to
find scientific justification for traditional religious
views related to human reproduction, in particular
views negative toward homosexuality.
Creationism has its origin in American
Protestant biblical fundamentalism. Although
theological critique of evolution was expressed
in the nineteenth century, evolution did not
become a major issue until around 1920. At that
time, the teaching of evolutionary biology
became more widespread due to the rapidly
increasing number of public high schools. In the
first phase of the movement’s history, its goal was
to ban the teaching of evolution. However, in
1968, the US Supreme Court ruled that state
legislation banning the teaching of evolution
was unconstitutional (Epperson v. Arkansas). In
the years that followed, the creationist movement
adjusted their tactics to this decision. This led to
a second phase in their history, when the primary
goal was to make it legally required for biology
teachers to devote equal time to evolution and
so-called creation science. In 1987, the Supreme
Court ruled that such a regulation was illegal
since it was intended to advance a particular
religious view (Edwards v. Aguillard). After
that, the creationist movement made a new
adjustment, entering a third phase in which
“intelligent design” was the catchword. God
was replaced by an unidentified “intelligence,”
but the argumentation against evolution was
1995 R
essentially the same as in the previous phases.
In 2005, this third strategy met the same fate as its
two predecessors: It was defeated in a federal
court. The court found that “intelligent design”
was just a new guise for religiously motivated
creationism. Therefore, it was unconstitutional
to require that biology teachers read aloud
a statement promoting intelligent design before
teaching evolution (Kitzmiller v. Dover Area
School District). The creationist movement
is now in a fourth phase in which none of its
previous three strategies are legally viable. It is
as yet unclear what its future strategy will be
(Matzke 2010).
There are two major creationist factions:
young earth creationism and old earth creation-
ism. According to the former view, all species
that have ever lived on earth were created sepa-
rately by God in the course of 6 days, not more
than about 10,000 years ago. Proponents of the
latter view believe that all species (or “kinds”)
were created separately but on a longer time
scale. Old-age creationists steer clear of most of
the conflicts that young earth creationists have
with geology, physics, and astronomy in issues
concerning the age and development of the earth
and its geological structures. However, the two
types of creationism share the same conflicts with
biology since they both deny the overwhelming
paleontological and genetic evidence of biologi-
cal evolution and of the common origin of all
living species.
Creationist argumentation consists largely in R
reinterpretations of selected parts of the paleon-
tological evidence. In addition, considerable
efforts have been spent on attempts to show that
the mutations required for the development of
complex organs are too improbable to be credi-
ble. Hence, it is claimed that the eye could not be
the result of mutations – it is a highly complex
organ, and if only one of its many essential parts
is missing, then it would be of no use to the
individual. However, biologists have shown
how the eye has developed in small steps from
simple light-sensitive cells to eyes similar to ours
(that first appeared around 540 million years
ago). Each step in this development provided
a functional advantage over its predecessor that
R 1996
explains its evolutionary success (Young and
Edis 2006).
Although creationism originated in Christian-
ity, it has spread to Judaism and Islam. Both these
transferred versions rely heavily on pseudoscien-
tific arguments from American Christian funda-
mentalism. Islamic creationism is particularly
strong in Turkey.
Biblical archeology. Since the middle of
the nineteenth century, attempts have been
made to prove the veracity of biblical narratives
with archeological means. The so-called biblical
archeological school, founded by William
F. Albright (1891–1971), interpreted a wide
variety of archeological findings as confirmations
of the Bible. This approach was popularized by
Werner Keller (1909–1980) in a mass-market
book, The Bible as History (German original in
1955). In the second half of the twentieth century,
this approach was persistently criticized by
academic archeologists, and it is now academi-
cally marginalized. Research by the British
archeologist Kathleen Kenyon had an important
role in these discussions. In the 1950s, she
performed methodologically outstanding excava-
tions at Jericho that resulted in reliable strati-
graphic dating. Previous excavators had found
traces of a military defeat of Jericho and
concluded that they resulted from events
described in the Bible. Kenyon showed that the
events inferable from the archeological evidence
took place much earlier than the Biblical events.
Other alleged archeological proofs of scrip-
tural accuracy have been similarly refuted, but
outside of academia, attempts to obtain such
proofs still take place. Probably the most popular
objective of such ventures is to find Noah’s Ark.
Claims have repeatedly been made that the vessel
has been found on Mount Ararat, but none of
these identifications have withstood critical
scrutiny.
Mormon archeology. The Book of Mormon
that was introduced in 1830 has given rise to
a considerable amount of spurious archeology.
Latter Day Saints have tried to prove the veracity
of the book’s claim that people from the Middle
East traveled to America and settled there around
600 B.C. Attempts have been made to associate
Religion and Pseudoscience
various historical monuments and other findings
in America with the narratives in the Book of
Mormon, but there is consensus among
archeologists that these interpretations are not
credible. Factual inaccuracies in the Book of
Mormon, such as claims that horses and elephants
existed at America at times when they did not,
have contributed to bringing the Mormon version
of American history into academic disrepute. In
addition, the claim that American Indians largely
descend from migrants from the Middle East
contradicts the solid genetic evidence that has
recently been obtained, showing that the indige-
nous American population came from Asia.
Sexual reorientation therapies. Christian,
Mormon, Jewish, and Muslim organizations that
consider homosexuality to be sinful have created
organizations working to convince gay and les-
bian persons to reform themselves. In particular
in the USA, they offer sexual reorientation
therapy, often in combination with religious
efforts. Mainstream psychiatric and psychologi-
cal organizations have criticized this type of ther-
apy. They consider it to be both pseudoscientific
and unethical, and this for three major reasons:
lack of evidence that homosexuality is a mental
health problem in need of treatment, lack of
evidence indicating long-term success of such
treatment, and risks of negative effects of the
intervention (Grace 2008).
The Authenticity of Venerated Physical
Objects
Relics are either bodily remains or objects that
have been in contact with a holy person. Relics
have an important role in Buddhism, Catholic and
Orthodox Christianity, and to a smaller extent
also in Hinduism and Islam. The authenticity of
a relic is usually seen as a prerequisite for its
veneration. In some cases, attempts have been
made to prove the authenticity of a relic with
scientific means. The most famous example
when this has led to pseudoscience concerns the
shroud of Turin.
The shroud of Turin is a 4-m long cloth of
linen that carries what seem to be the imprints
of the front and back of a crucified man. It is kept
in the Cathedral of St. John the Baptist in Turin
Religion and Pseudoscience
where it is venerated as the burial cloth of Jesus
Christ. The earliest known record of its existence
dates from the middle of the fourteenth century. It
was then kept in a church in Lirey in France. In
a letter to (anti)pope Clement VII in 1389, the
French Bishop Pierre d’Arcis reported that the
Dean of the church of Lirey had acquired “a
certain cloth cunningly painted, upon which by
a clever sleight of hand was depicted the twofold
image of one man, that is to say, the back and
front.” The Dean was “falsely declaring and
pretending that this was the actual shroud in
which our Saviour Jesus Christ was enfolded in
the tomb.” In order to attract pilgrims “so that
money might cunningly be wrung from them,
pretended miracles were worked, certain men
being hired to represent themselves as healed at
the moment of the exhibition of the shroud.”
However, his predecessor Henri de Poitiers had
performed an investigation and then “discovered
the fraud and how the said cloth had been
cunningly painted, the truth being attested by
the artist who had painted it, to wit, that it was
a work of human skill and not miraculously
wrought or bestowed.” Clement VII decided
that the shroud could only be exhibited if it was
announced that “it is not the True Shroud of
Our Lord, but a painting or picture made in the
semblance or representation of the shroud.”
After a period of private ownership, the shroud
was transferred to Turin in 1578. Its modern prom-
inence began in 1898 when it was first
photographed. The supposed imprint appeared
more clearly on the photographic negatives than
in direct inspection of the cloth. In the 1970s,
scientific investigation of the cloth was under-
taken. Some of the investigators made pro-
authenticity claims that could not be substantiated,
e.g., claims that pollen grains from plants that
grew only in Palestine had been found on the cloth.
In 1988, the outcome of carbon dating of the
cloth was reported. Three independent laboratories
had analyzed samples, and they had all obtained
dates between 1260 and 1390. This is compatible
with Pierre d’Arcis’s report but not with the theory
that the cloth is authentic. However, some
“shroudologists” have questioned the dating,
claiming, for instance, that a burst of radiant energy
1997 R
at the moment of Christ’s resurrection had changed
the carbon ratio. Such a radiological process has as
little support in physical science as it has in evan-
gelical and traditional Christian accounts of the
resurrection.
Early shroud advocates claimed that the
picture had been produced on the cloth by contact
with sweat, blood, and ointments. However, such
contact would not give rise to the distinct picture
that is seen on the shroud. Furthermore, a direct
imprint of a face would be distorted in a way
that the picture on the shroud is not. Modern
investigators have shown one way in which the
shroud could have been produced by a medieval
artist, namely, by rubbing of the cloth on a
bas-relief sculpture. There is no evidence that
this method was actually used, but its availability
shows that the shroud could in fact have been
“cunningly painted” as d’Arcis reported it to
have been (Nickell 2007).
Afterlife and Nonhuman Spiritual Beings
Attempts to contact the spirits of the deceased
and other spiritual beings have a long tradition,
although religious authorities in some of the
major religions have condemned such practices.
The surge of spiritualism in the late nineteenth
century Northern America and Europe was
accompanied by endeavors to authenticate séance
room phenomena. Attempts to prove the reality
of reincarnation have primarily been based on
reports on alleged past-life memories.
Scientific spiritualism. In 1848, Kate and R
Margaret Fox, two young sisters in Hydesville,
New York, appeared before the public as spirit
mediums. In their presence, spirits communicated
through knocking sounds. (Later, Margaret Fox
confirmed that these sounds were produced by
natural means such as the cracking of joints.) This
was the impetus of a rapidly growing movement,
and a large number of mediums came forward. The
usual format was a spiritualist séance that took
place in the dark. The medium conveyed messages
purportedly emanating from the spirits of deceased
persons, usually relatives of the séance partici-
pants. A variety of so-called physical phenomena
flourished in the darkness of the séances, such as
levitation, table-lifting, and “materialized” spirits.
R 1998
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, spiritualism had several million practi-
tioners, i.e., participants in séances. However, the
movement was severely damaged by a series of
exposures. Critics and ex-mediums explained
how the physical phenomena were produced.
(The creation of illusions requires much less
skill in a dark room than on the illuminated
stage of the performing illusionist.) It was also
revealed how mediums cooperated by providing
each other with information about séance partic-
ipants and their deceased relatives. In the 1920s,
spiritualism lost most of its appeal and influence
(Brandon 1983).
Spiritualism attracted the attention of scien-
tists and scholars of different persuasions; some
were critical of spiritualism whereas others hoped
for scientific evidence of afterlife. The Society
for Psychical Research was formed in London in
1882, and the corresponding American organiza-
tion 3 years later. Scientific investigations caused
problems for many mediums whose physical phe-
nomena were exposed. On the other hand,
a significant amount of pseudoscience was also
produced. In particular, some scientists lacking
competence in the art of magic illusions declared
trivial darkroom illusions to be genuine spiritual
phenomena. When standard scientific criteria of
evidence have been applied, no proof of spiritu-
alist phenomena has been obtained.
Since the 1930s, investigators have largely lost
interest in séances and mediums. Psychic research
has developed into parapsychology that has its
focus primarily on alleged phenomena such as
telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, and psycho-
kinesis (the act of moving an object with the
unaided power of mind). These phenomena have
weaker connections with religion than the classical
séance room phenomena. Due to the lack of
a phenomenon that can be shown in experiments
satisfying standard criteria such as repeatability,
parapsychologists have not been able to convince
mainstream science that their objects of study exist.
Weight of the soul. In 1907, the American
physician Duncan MacDougall (c. 1866–1920)
reported investigations on six patients who had
all consented to spend their last hours in a bed
placed on a large scale. He reported an average
Religion and Pseudoscience
weight loss of 21 g in the course of dying. Similar
studies on 15 dying dogs showed no such weight
loss. This was taken to indicate that humans differ
from dogs in having a soul weighing about 21 g
that leaves the body at the moment of death.
However, the experiment was so badly executed
that no conclusions can be drawn from it. The
method of weighing was not reported but appears
to have been grossly inaccurate. The time of death
was also uncertain in several cases. The experiment
is scarcely taken seriously today. This is partly due
to its pseudoscientific character, partly also due to
the combined scientific and religious difficulties
with the concept of a soul with a weight.
Reincarnation. Interest in reincarnation was
stimulated in the West by spiritualism and by the
theosophical movement. Some psychical
researchers made studies of persons who appeared
to have memories from earlier lives. Such
endeavors were intensified in the second half of
the twentieth century, largely through the work of
Ian Stevenson (1918–2007) who made a large
number of case studies. Most of these concern
children between the ages of 3 and 7 years who
reported memories from previous lives. Attempts
were made to corroborate these narrations by iden-
tifying the deceased persons in question and com-
paring the narrations to what was known about
their lives. Stevenson also put much emphasis on
findings of birthmarks in places where the previous
person had been injured. However, despite exten-
sive search for convincing cases, none has been
found that defies natural explanation.
Other parapsychologists have used hypnosis
to bring forth hidden memories from previous
lives in adult persons (so-called past-life regres-
sion). The most famous of these cases was the
“Bridey Murphy” case. An American woman,
hypnotized in 1952, reported having lived as an
Irishwoman in the early nineteenth century.
According to the hypnotist, her knowledge of
Ireland was unexplainable, except by reincarna-
tion. However, further investigations revealed
severe inaccuracies in the reporting of this case.
The major problem with hypnotic past-life
regression is that false memories are easily cre-
ated under hypnosis. Such memories are at least
as vivid as real memories, and once they are
Religion and Pseudoscience
created, the subject cannot distinguish them from
real memories. Due to information that the sub-
ject has, for instance, from historical films and
books, hypnotically induced past-life narratives
often appear to be historically credible. However,
on closer scrutiny, inaccuracies have been found
even in seemingly impressive past-life “recollec-
tions”; these narrations correspond better to
today’s popular views of previous periods than
to what life was really like in these periods.
In summary, neither the “memories from pre-
vious lives” obtained from children nor those
obtained under hypnosis from adults have fea-
tures that require a nonnatural explanation.
Claims that reincarnation has been scientifically
proved will therefore have to be classified as
pseudoscientific (Edwards 2002).
Divine Interference and Spiritual Powers
Pseudoscience has often been invoked in support
of claims that divine or other supernatural inter-
ference takes place in a way that interrupts the
flow of naturally caused events. Such claims dif-
fer in how much emphasis they put on the causal
role of deity, respectively, that of the (gifted)
human beings who bring forth such interventions.
At one end of this continuum, we find accounts of
divine interventions in the form of miracles that
are initiatives by God. At the other end, we find
individual persons (mediums or psychics) who
are reported to be in command of spiritual pow-
ers. Many of latter type of cases can be described
as modern forms of magic.
Miracles. A miracle is a fortuitous event, not
following the ordinary causal laws, that is attrib-
uted to deity. Miracles have a place in most major
religions. In most cases, healing from disease is
the most important form of miracle that is recog-
nized. However, judgments that such a miracle
has been proven tend to be problematic from the
viewpoint of medical science. Religious authori-
ties often take the lack of any known natural
explanation of a cure from a disease as proof
that a miracle has taken place. Such an inference
disregards the natural phenomenon of spontane-
ous remission from serious diseases.
Attempts have been made to scientifically val-
idate the efficacy of praying for the health of
1999 R
another person. In such studies, severely ill per-
sons have been randomized between groups that
were subject to prayers and groups that were not,
and the medical outcomes with and without
prayers were statistically compared. The results
from these studies are contradictory, and many of
them have methodological limitations. The larg-
est and methodologically one of the best of these
studies failed to show any positive effect of
prayer, but a (unexplained and possibly spurious)
negative effect was found of knowing that one
was prayed for (Benson et al. 2006). Obviously,
these studies make use of a problematic concept,
namely, that of divine interventions that can be
controlled and randomized.
Some alleged miracles are much less purposeful
than recovery from disease. Weeping and drinking
statues and the liquefaction of congealed blood are
examples of this. Such miracles usually have less
support from religious authorities. In most of these
cases, no attempts are made to invoke science in
support of the miracles, but scientifically minded
critics have nevertheless been keen to point out the
possibility of pious fraud or other natural explana-
tions (Nickell 1992). Religiously motivated skep-
ticism against some of these phenomena has
referred to difficulties in explaining why deity
would choose such trivial demonstrations.
Psychic powers. Individuals have tried to
prove their spiritual powers by demonstrating
a variety of so-called psychic abilities. Some of
the phenomena that have been used for such
purposes in close connection with organized reli- R
gion are fire immunity, handling of poisonous
snakes, eating poison, survival for long periods
without food (inedia), and levitation. At longer
distance from organized religion, a large variety
of physical phenomena explainable as legerde-
main have been used to prove the special powers
of (self-)chosen individuals. As yet, none of these
phenomena have been produced under controlled
conditions that exclude sleight of hand or other
natural explanations. Attempts to prove their gen-
uineness have often resulted in pseudoscience.
Science, Pseudoscience, and Religion
In view of the last century’s experience of pseudo-
science and its connections with religion, the
R 2000
traditional picture of the relationship between sci-
ence and religion needs to be modified. The prev-
alent view is that science creates problems for
religion. In the modern age, it is much more com-
monly pseudoscience that creates serious problems
for religion. Creationism and other forms of reli-
giously motivated pseudoscience unnecessarily
transform religion to a falsifiable set of doctrines,
doing thereby a disservice to religion as well as to
science. Fortunately, there is an antidote against
pseudoscience. It is called science.
Cross-References
▶ Alchemy
▶ Astrology
▶ Creationism
▶ Intelligent Design
▶ Magic
▶ Philosophy of Science
▶ UFO Cults
References
Benson, H., et al. (2006). Study of the therapeutic effects
of intercessory prayer (STEP) in cardiac bypass
patients: A multicenter randomized trial of uncertainty
and certainty of receiving intercessory prayer.
American Heart Journal, 151, 934–942.
Brandon, R. (1983). The spiritualists. The passion for the
occult in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
Edwards, P. (2002). Reincarnation: a critical examina-
tion. Amherst: Prometheus Books.
Grace, A. P. (2008). “The charisma and deception
of reparative therapies: When medical science beds
religion”. Journal of Homosexuality, 55, 545–580.
Hansson, S. O. (2009). Cutting the Gordian knot of demar-
cation. International Studies in the Philosophy of
Science, 23, 237–243.
Matzke, N. J. (2010). “The evolution of creationist move-
ments”. Evolution: Education and Outreach, 3,
145–162.
Nickell, J. (1992). Looking for a miracle. Weeping icons,
relics, stigmata, visions & healing cures. Amherst:
Prometheus Books.
Nickell, J. (2007). Relics of the Christ. Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky.
Young, M., & Edis, T. (Eds.). (2006). Why intelligent
design fails. A scientific critique of the new creation-
ism. New Brunswik: Rutgers University Press.
Religion as Attachment
Religion as Attachment
▶ Attachment: Theory and Patterns
Religion, History of
Christa Shusko
English and Humanities Department, York
College of Pennsylvania, York, PA, USA
Related Terms
Religionswissenschaft
Description
The term “history of religions” described
a type of scholarship in the study of religions
that incorporates multiple methodologies in
order to gain a better understanding of the
many varieties of religious belief, practice, and
expression. Typically, the discipline traces its
roots to F. Max Muller who developed what he
called Religionswissenschaft, or the “science of
religions.” Muller used this term to indicate
a study of religion that was “scientific,” that is,
removed from questions of personal belief.
When translated to English, Muller’s term most
commonly became known as the “history of
religions.” Alternate terms for “history of
religion” that have been used (though not always
considered interchangeable by all scholars)
include “the academic study of religion,”
“comparative religion,” “the phenomenology of
religion,” and sometimes simply “the study of
religion” (Kitagawa 1959; Capps 1995).
In describing and analyzing religions, most
historians of religion came to acknowledge that
the task needs to be self-reflective; since a purely
objective perspective is an impossibility, the
scholar’s subjectivity contributes importantly –
whether harmfully or benevolently – to the
study itself. As historian of religions, Jonathan
Religion, History of
Z. Smith has famously stated that “religion is
solely the creation of the scholar’s study. . .For
this reason. . .the historian of religion must be
relentlessly self-conscious” (Smith 1982).
Yet this self-consciousness does not make
the discipline of the history of religions
solipsistic. Instead, historians of religion locate
themselves within the study of religion and thus
can honestly assess religious phenomena
by acknowledging their own gains from these
studies. Only by doing this can the study of
the history of religions become relevant and
significant to the self and others. As Charles
Long has written, “It is [the] reciprocal criticism
of self and other which permits the interpolation
of the phenomenon into our lives” (Long 1986).
More recently, the history of religions has
turned this self-consciousness upon the discipline
itself. By uncovering the ethically questionable
methods and goals used by the discipline in the
past, contemporary scholars hope to illuminate
the ways that the concept of religion continues
to be meaningful for human beings. For example,
David Chidester has suggested that viewing
religions is dynamic rather than static human
endeavors (Chidester 1996). Perspectives such
as these may help to cultivate a sense of humility
and fallibility that could contribute to better
studies of religion in the future. In thus “compli-
cating” rather than “clarifying,” the historians of
religions “celebrate the diversity of manners,
the opacity of things, the variety of species”
(Smith 1978).
Self-identification
Science
The history of religions is a subcategory within the
human sciences; the term “human sciences” is not
one that is commonly used today, more frequently
such human sciences are counted among the social
sciences or the humanities/humanistic studies.
According to Joseph Kitagawa, translating
F. Max Muller’s term Religionswissenschaft as
“science of religions,” never gained popularity
among English-speaking scholars due in part to
the fact that “the English word ‘science’ tends to
2001 R
be misleading”; it typically refers to the biologi-
cal, physical, chemical sciences, rather than to the
“human sciences” (Kitagawa 1959). As science in
the broad sense, the history of religions seeks to
comprehend religions from as objective a stance
as possible. Yet as a human science, the history of
religions recognizes that objectivity is, in fact,
impossible, and it acknowledges that the
subjective position of the scholar is both inevita-
ble and of central importance to the study of
religion itself (Wach 1967).
Religion
The history of religions seeks to critically analyze
and comprehend religious traditions, beliefs,
practices, and texts rather than instill or actualize
religious experiences or expressions.
Characteristics
The distinctiveness of this discipline lies in its
ability and propensity to synthesize and make use
of multiple methodologies in order to contribute
to a richer understanding of human experience
and creativity. While specific methodologies,
such as psychology, philosophy, theology,
sociology, etc., may be used in order to study
religions, the historian of religions typically
does not limit herself to an isolated or singular
methodology, but works to gain understanding of
the phenomena of religions through a synthesis
of methodological practices. The history of R
religions is also a distinctive discipline in its
subject of study; it examines the complex and
multiple ways that humans have sought to
creatively and meaningfully make sense of the
world through practices and beliefs categorized
as religious.
Relevance to Science and Religion
Some historians of religion would be interested in
the area of “science and religion” insofar as some
religions or subjects of study within the discipline
might themselves be interested in the interactions
between science and religion. Another impetus
R 2002
for interest in this area might come more
clearly from the historian of religions herself;
if a historian of religions has a specific interest
in relationships between science and religion,
this interest may inform and dictate not only
the subject but also the methodology used in
analyzing that subject.
Sources of Authority
As some scholars of religious studies have noted,
the study of religion could be considered a “field”
rather than a “discipline.” From this perspective,
it means that the “field” of religious studies
makes use of a variety of methodologies of
other disciplines in order to assess religion(s).
The history of religions would certainly fall
under this conceptualization. Thus, there are
numerous sources of authority, and whether
a source would be considered authoritative
would depend upon the methodologies employed
by a particular historian. There are two main
ways to conceptualize “authoritative sources” in
the history of religions. (1) In general, authorita-
tive sources for the history of religions would
include religious and theological texts, commen-
taries on such texts by religious practitioners,
personal accounts of religious experiences,
observations of and interviews with religious
practitioners, and examinations of material
cultures. These sources would be considered
authoritative only insofar as they might be
considered exemplars of a particular form of
human creativity and religious expression or
experience; such sources are not necessarily
considered authoritative because of the personal
religious or ethical perspectives of the scholar.
(2) Another way to identify authoritative sources
within the history of religions would be to
consider the contributions and perspectives of
important past historians of religion. Yet contem-
porary scholars of the study of religion are
frequently critical of their forebears in the
discipline while acknowledging the significance
of such earlier contributions. Thus, contemporary
scholars often grant more authority to the findings
of contemporary colleagues in recent journal
Religion, History of
articles and book publications in the discipline
as they seek to continually improve and enlarge
the discipline itself.
Ethical Principles
The genealogy of the ethical principles that guide
the discipline of the history of religions can best be
located in the Enlightenment. The “Enlightenment
impulse,” according to Jonathan Z. Smith, “was
one of tolerance and, as a necessary concomitant,
one which refused to leave any human datum,
including religion, beyond the pale of understand-
ing, beyond the realm of reason.” Thus, the history
of religions has at its core the desire to know and
appreciate the creativity of human beings as they
attempt to make sense of their places in the world.
Much contemporary scholarship in the history of
religions has sought to uncover the problematic
realities of such Enlightenment impulses, including
an examination of the relationship between often
violent colonial and imperial enterprises and the
early history of the discipline. The ethical princi-
ples guiding such developments stem from a desire
to reduce the ideological and sometimes physical
violence common in encounters between cultures
and individuals. Of course, such an ethical perspec-
tive still contains the core Enlightenment goal of
attempting to understand humanity and the world
at large. In more contemporary scholarship, how-
ever, this impulse acknowledges the fact that
such understanding will always be partial and tem-
porary. See, for example, Jonathan Z. Smith’s
Imagining Religion (Smith 1982) and Relating
Religion (Smith 2004) and David Chidester’s
Savage Systems (Chidester 1996).
Key Values
The key values of the discipline of the history
of religions are those of the Enlightenment,
which sought to increase both understanding
of human religious experiences and tolerance
for different cultures, societies, and individ-
uals. For more explanation, see Ethical
Principles above.
Religion, History of
Conceptualization
Note on the Definitions
In its current state, the history of religions
does not so much seek to create overarching
definitions for such terms as to examine the
varying ways in which human beings have
conceptualized these terms and understood them
as meaningful and diverse. Therefore, these terms
would be defined anew each time they are
reconsidered in culture and scholarship.
Nature/World
Typically refers to the natural environment in
which human beings formulate meaning and
significance.
Human Being
Typically refers to Homo sapiens. Human beings
are usually understood as being central to reli-
gious creativity.
Life and Death
Conceptions vary widely depending on religio-
historical context.
2003 R
Consciousness
The state of being conscious or aware; usually
implies some awareness of one’s place in the
world.
Rationality/Reason
One method by which humans gain knowledge
about the world.
Mystery
Something unknown or only partially knowable;
may possess religious significance.
Relevant Themes
Additional issues as regards the history of reli-
gions’ engagement with science and religion
would be study-specific; that is, issues and
themes would be particular to a specific histo-
rian’s scholarly concerns. See Relevance to Sci-
ence and Religion above.
Cross-References

Reality ▶ Critical Theory

May be visible (the natural environment), invisi-
ble, or a combination of both. The place toward
which humans seek to orient themselves in
meaningful ways.
Knowledge
Information gained about reality.
Truth
Verified or authentic knowledge. May be
accessed by a person to help that person orient
themselves to reality.
Perception
One method by which humans gain knowledge
about the world, or the knowledge gained from
that human activity.
Time
Conceptions vary widely depending on religious
context.
▶ Cultural Studies
▶ History of Ideas (Intellectual History)
▶ Philosophy of Religion
▶ Religion, Sociology of
▶ Religion, Theory of
▶ Religious Experiences R
▶ Religious Studies
▶ Worldview
References
Capps, W. (1995). Religious studies: The making of
a discipline. Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press.
Chidester, D. (1996). Savage systems: Colonialism and
comparative religion in South Africa. Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press.
Kitagawa, J. (1959). The history of religions in America.
In M. Eliade & J. Kitagawa (Eds.), The history of
religions: Essays in methodology. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Long, C. H. (1986). Significations: Signs, symbols, and
images in the interpretation of religion. Philadelphia:
Fortress Press.
R 2004
Smith, J. Z. (1978). Map is not territory: Studies in the
history of religions. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Smith, J. Z. (1982). Imagining religion: From Babylon to
Jonestown. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Smith, J. Z. (2004). Relating religion: Essays in the study
of religion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wach, J. (1967). The meaning and task of the history of
religions (Religionswissenschaft). In J. Kitagawa, M.
Eliade, & C. Long (Eds.), The history of religions:
Essays on the problem of understanding. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Religion, Sociology of
Roberto Cipriani
Full Professor of Sociology, University of
Rome 3, Rome, Italy
Related Terms
Role of religion in society; Sociology and
religion
Society and Religion
▶ Sociology of religion is a social science that
studies the religious phenomenon. There has
been much discussion of possible definitions of
sociology of religion, and of ▶ religion in
particular as an object of sociological study.
Generally, a distinction is made between
a substantive and a functional approach. The
substantive approach may be exemplified by
Durkheim (1915) when he speaks of “beliefs
and practices” as the ground of the “moral
community” called a “church.” Luckmann
(1967) is said to demonstrate the functional
approach when he refers to “symbolic universes”
as “socially objectified systems of meaning” by
way of “social processes” considered as
“fundamentally religious,” which lead to the
“formation of the Ego” and the “transcendence
of biological nature.”
However, when we make a thorough explora-
tion of Durkheim’s and Luckmann’s writings, we
Religion, Sociology of
observe that Durkheim is also alive to function
(religion helps solidarity), and that Luckmann is
not only concerned with function (religion is
a conception of the world made up of specific
contents). Thus, in reality, those quoted as exem-
plary champions of one or other perspective
emerges as more possibilistic and open to less
rigid, more polyvalent formulations. In short,
contents and functions are inseparable and should
rather be considered as a unique whole which
permits realizing much more complex and
interconnected analytical and interpretative
procedures.
For example, we might start from the idea that
the meta-empirical referent in attributing mean-
ing to human existence is a particular character-
istic of religion. At the same time, however, it is
sensible to leave an opening also for responses
which do not envisage an explicit referral to
the dimension of the empirical non-verifiability
and the inaccessibility of direct experience.
Thus, a meta-empirical referent would possess
a merely indicative character. There is no conflict
between the transcendent level and that of the
real. It is rather as though we were to look at
the same object from two different viewpoints;
the canalizing of a non-human presence within
reality. One vision does not exclude the other.
They are not in opposition and indeed at times
they may converge on the same conclusion –
the understanding-explanation of life in
a religious key.
Thomas Luckmann’s theorization regarding
the “invisible religion” (Luckmann 1967) has
attracted much attention on the part of sociolo-
gists, even though it has not always brought sci-
entific consensus. The idea of a functional
substitution of church religion by a series of
topics, such as “individual autonomy, auto-
expression, auto-fulfillment, mobility ethos, sex,
and familism” has developed parallel to the the-
ory of secularization.
Luckmann further believes that the modern
sacred cosmos has a relative instability
depending on the various social strata in which
it is active, as proof of its internal incoherence
and disarticulation. In fact, Luckmann reminds us
that traditional, customary religious themes are
Religion, Sociology of
re-ordered in the orbit of the secular and the
private, especially by the young and urban
dwellers. Thus, Durkheim’s prediction of
a wholly individual religion would seem to
come true.
Robert N. Bellah and collaborators (1985,
1996) define the intensification of individualism
by the term “Sheilaism,” as a wholly personal
religious form which can, thus, take the name of
the person who embodies it (Sheila Larson).
“I believe in God. I’m not a religious
fanatic. I cannot remember the last time I went
to church. My faith has carried me a long way. It
is Sheilaism. Just my own little voice.” On the
other hand, as Bellah makes clear, religious indi-
vidualism may be present in “church religion”
itself, but historic roots go back in time, in
the exemplary case of Anne Hutchinson, to the
eighteenth century. She “began to draw her own
theological conclusions from her religious expe-
riences and teach them to others, conclusions that
differed from those of the established ministry.”
Still more typical is the religious individualism
shown by Tim Eichelberger: “I feel religious in
a way. I have no denomination or anything like
this.” For these subjects, as in invisible religion as
hypothesized by Luckmann, one of the main
objectives is “self-fulfillment,” and perhaps in
Freud’s terms the Ich-Leistung, the autonomy of
the individual.
Bellah’s “civil religion” has not really been
taken into consideration because of the ethnocen-
tric perspective of the sociological reading of the
“religious dimension” which is specifically appli-
cable to United States society. It is a well-known
fact that Bellah attaches major importance to
a series of beliefs, symbols, and rituals which
have not removed the religious factor from poli-
tics. The contents of this kind of “civil religion”
are furnished by the perception of a universal
reality bearing religious characteristics which
are reflected in a people’s initiatives, especially
those referring to biblical concepts: exodus, cho-
sen people, new Jerusalem, sacrifice, etc. The
religious element often acts as a unifying factor
among individuals or groups otherwise in con-
trast. Religious identity can, thus, partly make up
for the lack of a national identity. Seen from this
2005 R
dimension, “civil religion” was held to be the
unifying element which made possible the birth
and development of the United States of
America.
The Berger and Luckmann (1966) lesson
remains authoritative: the social construction of
reality is the basis from which the value system
branches out, a circuitry which directs social
action and rests on an objectified and historicized
world-view which is, thus, endowed with
a religious character it is hard to lose.
The ultimate meaning of life itself is clearly writ-
ten therein and orientates attitudes and behaviors.
In Roberston’s (1970) approach, religion is
a part of the process of globalization, based on
relationship between individuals, mankind,
national societies, and the systems of various
societies. But it should be borne in mind
that some religious organizations foster a nation-
alistic fundamentalism to protect their roots and
to reshape the world order. Besides, Robertson
rejects at the same time both the hypothesis of
secularization and of desecularization. Therefore,
religion will play a central role in the construction
and reconstruction of societal identities, because
it is capable of enhancing closeness among dif-
ferent cultures, creating in such a way the basis
for the globalization.
For Luhmann (1977) religion is a social system
which regulates the relationships of people with the
world in a comprehensive and ultimate meaning.
But the “environment” is more complex than the
system. And society is a social (external) system R
that aims to regulate the environment (internal).
The system (and religion itself as system) is able
to reduce the complexity of environment that is
external with respect to the system, which elabo-
rates the answers to the complexity of system. This
systemic differentiation presupposes that religion
fulfills the function of transforming the indetermi-
nate world, to reduce its complexity. At the end,
religion does not disappear but it is not so central
because it is just interpretative of reality, instead of
being integrative in durkheimian terms.
However, it may now be more convenient to
aim at disarticulating religious phenomenology
from within, following a reading with more strat-
ified dynamics and multiple faceting. In practice,
R 2006
it is not clear there are only church religion and
invisible religion à la Luckmann (1967). Rather,
we may propose another hypothetical solution
which envisages intermediate categories more
or less close to the two extremes defined in
terms of visibility and invisibility.
An initial post-Luckmann interpretation was
articulated in 1983 and applied to the Italian
situation (but not only) during the International
Conference of Sociology of Religion (held at
Bedford College, London): “besides the interests
and pressures coming from ecclesiastical sources,
are there any other premises or factors which can
explain religious bearing on Italian politics? In
particular, it is important to verify first of all how
the institution fares under the pressure of an
extended ‘religious field’ containing varied and
attractive options, including anti-institutional
purposes. Second, we must ask ourselves whether
in practice religious influence in political choices
concerns only Catholicism (or Christianity) or
any religious expression in general. Third, we
must see whether the country’s history or its
national culture marks the existence of fixed ele-
ments, bearing common values leading (directly
or indirectly, in specific or vague ways) to
a widespread model of religious socialization
(based prevalently on patterns of Catholic refer-
ence)” (Cipriani 1984).
Stark and Bainbridge (1980) have elaborated
on “exchange theory” and on the idea of “com-
pensation” as a promise for a future reward that
could be accepted as a compensatory form to be
exchanged for the established objective. Actually
the persons accept religious compensators for
rewards that do not exist in their life. Stark,
in particular, has a peculiar idea of religious mar-
ket and therefore, he carries out research on reli-
gious conflict, on the stability and dynamics of
religious economies, and on the development of
Christianity. The market pluralism does not lead
to the end of religious confessions, because reli-
gions become stronger and competitive,
especially if they give a convincing answer to
individual expectations.
In Hervieu-Léger (2000) perspective, the
emotion has a key role. The new Christianity
consists of “emotional communities,” deriving
Religion, Sociology of
from a strongly personalized choice that creates
a direct bond between the community and each of
its members. There is a quest for self-fulfillment
through a compromise between Christianity
and modernity. Religion is a kind of “authorized
collective memory” which plays a critical role
vis-à-vis the institutions.
“Believing without belonging” is another suc-
cessful theoretical expression that accompanies
Grace Davie’s suggestion: in a situation of reli-
gious individualism, the religious experience
tends to be separated from institution and religious
practice. But, in Nordic countries of Europe, it
seems that formula can be reversed: “belonging
without believing.” Another proposal comes from
Davie: a “vicarious religion” which means “the
notion of religion performed by an active minority
but on behalf of a much larger number, who implic-
itly at least not only understand, but quite clearly
approve of what the minority is doing” (Davie
2007). It is a key point to understand the situation
of religious Europe: few Europeans attend weekly
rites but many appreciate the presence of religious
buildings in their countries.
The “invisible religion” perceived by Thomas
Luckmann (1967), which is based on the assump-
tion of a crisis of the institutional apparatus,
seems to be applicable only in relation to certain
aspects of modern societies, and does not
completely destroy the so-called church religion.
Today, we must ask if we are faced with an
absolute novelty or whether, rather, the
Luckmann’s “modern religious themes” are noth-
ing more than the sedimentation of preexisting,
more or less subterranean channels, long incor-
porated in traditional religious modes, and sur-
facing now not for simply contingent reasons.
The lack of research in this regard and the great
weight of social control found in some particular
historical and geographical contexts may be
among these reasons.
An example is provided by the sociological
trajectory of the Polish Solidarnosc movement.
Its link to the Polish Catholic church was useful
for a while. Then, once liberation from the com-
munist system was attained, its influence began to
wane, to the point of reducing to a glimmer. Mean-
while, other individualistic and familistic demands
Religion, Sociology of
had been able to prevail, damaging the previous
solidarity between the politico-trade union move-
ment and religious membership. Today, religious
practice, though still high in comparison with other
European nations, is marking time, indeed
retreating, in the face of the new modern demands
of the rising generations unaware of the previous
experience and, in addition, not averse to welcom-
ing the westernizing (and secularizing) breezes of
consumerism and the use of free time. But this
occurred not only because of the passage from
one age cohort to the next, but also because of
prior sources already functioning within the for-
mal, compact facade of solidarity of the past. Thus,
even in a Poland sacralized to the utmost there
were the forerunners of a future secularization in
nuce. In fact, surveys show a lessening of confi-
dence in the church from 82 % in 1990 to 57 % in
1992. To complete the argument one must, how-
ever, point out that this has not involved the total
supersession of Catholic religious experience, but
has rather favored the regeneration of previously
existing impulsions not wholly evident and visible.
In short, in the practicing, believing Pole too there
was concealed the individualist, familistic subject,
wholly inclined toward self-fulfillment and -
expression.
Again, we see the ambiguous, ambivalent
character of secularization. It seems to erode the
religious institution, but really only assists the
principal factors of a very complex acceptance,
made up of consensus on values and dissent in
fact, of facile decision and conflicting choices.
The new mode of belief supplants the church-
religion model but readapts it to new behavioral
spheres which proclaim individual autonomy and
independence.
After the wave of secularization and the
more recent development defined as “religious
revival,” social scientists studying the
religious phenomenon are becoming far more
cautious about the use of certain data, which
even today give importance to either the secular-
ization or the revival hypothesis. It has already
become apparent that in both cases this process is
probably due to a tendency toward the “sociolog-
ical construction of inconsistency” by means of
purely theoretical reasoning, or of a marked use
2007 R
of figures and results which are put together in
scientifically feeble ways.
If we then examine other hypotheses which on
the international level, in the field of sociology of
religion, are frequently under discussion, we can
see that they are not totally applicable in many
cases. In fact, any effort to verify these hypothe-
ses has generally failed.
Modernization increases with security, but
diversity of nations is at the origin of different
behaviors linked to value systems of Christians,
Muslims, Confucians. The economic trend
remains the same in various regions of the
world, but cultural heritage influences the output.
Now new religious communities and religious
organizations are settling in different parts of con-
tinents, sometimes very far from their original hab-
itats. Christianity (Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and
Protestantism) is the most widespread religion
together with Islam. Religions are well diffused
around the world, but there are substantial differ-
ences in belief, behavior, and practice, and there
are various branches of each religion, with some
specificity in religious movements. In general, reli-
gions are supported by national culture, and are
peculiar of a region, but many influences can be
found all over the countries. In any case the impact
of the religious presence is evident everywhere.
Two hundred and fifty years have passed since
David Hume published in 1757 Four Disserta-
tions: The natural history of Religion, of the
Passion, of Tragedy, of the Standard of the
Taste followed by Dialogues Concerning Natural R
Religion, in 1779: thanks to the English empiri-
cist – whose books were enlisted by the Catholic
Church in the Index Librorum Prohibitorum – the
first systematic attempt of a religious study
starting from human experience instead of
a metaphysical perspective.
Sociology started with A. Comte, approxi-
mately one century later. However, the studies
of Hume were to anticipate the principles of
a scientific approach to religious phenomenon.
This approach was continued by Durkheim and
Weber, further developed by Le Bras and Bellah,
up to now when sociology of religion is
experiencing a particularly good period, even if
great theories and masters are lacking (such as
R 2008 Religion, Sociology of

Parsons and Luhmann), and others (like Berger with no pre-coded responses, can give way to
and Luckmann) are less present. a higher level of spontaneity in the answers and
Certainly, the number of good quality as consequence a deeper knowledge of crucial
researchers has increased, notwithstanding the religious issues. This solution will favor a more
absence of absolute excellence normally recog- complex interpretation of data.
nized by the majority of the scientific community.
In the meantime, there are a good number of field
researches, illustrating interests ranging from the Nature/World
more traditional sector of Christian religious
experience to that of new religions, with Both are objects of religious perceptions of indi-
a particular increase in Islamic studies and in viduals and give reasons for the meaning of life.
the generally neglected Asiatic realities.
A backward situation is noted, however, on
the state of the studies concerning religious diver- Human Being
sity in Africa.
Sociology of religion seems to be in good stand- He is conceived mostly as social actor with atti-
ing at the beginning of new millennium. But tudes and behaviors.
a comparative approach is necessary more and
more, namely regarding European and American
context, just to begin. Generally speaking, at the Life and Death
moment, for instance, European and North Amer-
ican publications of sociology of religion seem to This discipline do not deal with these specific
ignore the scientific production in other continents. topics.
And Asian, African, and Australian contribution is
not known as it would deserve. Linguistic barrier is
still an obstacle. But now new solutions can be Reality
found. And Internet can help very much. In partic-
ular in Central and South America as well as in It is socially constructed through socialization
Africa, in Asia, and in Oceania new trends are in and daily life.
progress. A stronger effort must be done for a better
reciprocal knowledge at international level in order
to diffuse theories and empirical results that remain Knowledge
unknown just because of lack of translation, and of
communication. It is the way of approaching reality thanks to
From a theoretical point of view, sociologists education received and know how accumulated.
of religion are not ready to afford new situations
created by migration processes. And methodo-
logical and technical tools of analysis still lack Truth
of an accurate profile, reliable in new and differ-
ent situations. A religious truth doesn’t exist from a sociological
More than in the past, sociological approach to point of view.
religion needs qualitative empirical studies. The
nature of religion and religiosity escape from
traditional questionnaires. Sociologists of reli- Perception
gion should concentrate on detailed interviews
of individuals coming from different back- It is useful to understand the individual Weltan-
grounds, on the supposition that freedom of schauung and to define the situation that social
expression, without any kind of restriction and actor is living.
Religion, Theory of 2009 R
Time Cipriani, R. (1984). Religion and politics. The Italian case.
Diffused religion. Archives de Sciences Sociales des
Religions, 58(1), 32.
It is a core category in terms of diachronic Davie, G. (2007). The sociology of religion: A critical
research and memory. agenda (p. 127). London: Sage.
Durkheim, E. (1915). The elementary forms of the reli-
gious life. London: Allen & Unwin.
Hervieu-Léger, D. (2000). Religion as a chain of memory.
Consciousness Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
Luckmann, T. (1967). The invisible religion. The trans-
It can be individual or collective (Durkheim) and formation of symbols in industrial society. New York:
can refers to aspects of moral nature. Macmillan.
Luhmann, N. (1977). Funktion der Religion. Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp.
Robertson, R. (1970). The sociological interpretation of
Rationality/Reason religion. Oxford: Blackwell.
Stark, R., & Bainbridge, W. S. (1980). Towards a theory of
religion: Religious commitment. Journal for the Sci-
According to rational choice theory, it refers to entific Study of Religion, 2, 114–128.
maximizing behavior, through market preferences.

Mystery
Religion, Theory of
It is outside the field of discipline but concerns
a lot of religious phenomena. Victor E. Taylor
Issues/themes/concepts relevant for the disci- Department of English and Humanities, York
pline: belief, church, sacred, secularization, College of Pennsylvania, York, PA, USA
symbols.

Related Terms
Cross-References
Deconstructive theology; Postmodern a/theology;
▶ Das Heilige, Concept of Postmodern religious theory; Postmodern
▶ Faith and Belief theology
▶ Magic
▶ Pilgrimage R
▶ Psychology of Religion Description
▶ Religiosity
▶ Religious Studies Religious theory, derived from variations and
▶ Religious Experiences appropriations of poststructuralism and postmod-
▶ Ritual ernism of the 1970s and 1980s, stands today for
▶ Secularization, Secularity, Secularism a reappraisal of a traditional, modernist form of
thinking in religious studies and theology; reli-
gious theory is a form of radical thinking that
References abandons recourse to foundations, epistemologi-
cal, metaphysical, logical, or ethical. Recent
Bellah, R. N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W. M., Swidler, A., & developments include an expansion of religious
Tipton, S. M. (1985, 1996). Habits of the heart: Indi- studies into the fields of art history, contemporary
vidualism and commitment in American life. Berkeley/
Los Angeles/London: University of California Press.
continental philosophy, literary theory, digital
Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1966). The social cultural studies, post-Lacanian psychoanalysis,
construction of reality. Garden City: Doubleday. post-colonialism, and political theology.
R 2010
Religious theory is largely associated with
a generation of scholars after the development of
the death-of-God theology in the 1970s. Earlier
figures, Carl A. Raschke, Charles E. Winquist, and
Mark C. Taylor, although considered postmodern
theologians, are central to the subdiscipline today.
Religious theory is poststructuralist or postmod-
ernist in its methodology and emphasizes the
contingent, relational, and non-totalizing aspects
of religious thought, language, and culture.
Self-identification
Science
The poststructuralist and postmodernist
methodologies of religious theory places it in an
antagonistic relationship to science and social
science. Poststructuralist and postmodernist
theories of epistemology, especially (post)
Enlightenment epistemology as it is outlined by
Jean-François Lyotard in The Postmodern
Condition: A Report on Knowledge, reject the
possibility of objective, total knowledge.
Religious theory understands science and social
science as totalizing discourses that preempt,
eclipse, or repress different forms of knowing,
experience, and valuation.
Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition is an
extended critical analysis of the ways in
which science forms historical, ideological, and
political hegemonies.
Religious theory, as an (anti)method, does
not attempt to reduce “religious” events or
phenomena to a set of discernible criteria.
In other words, religious theory emphasizes
the relational and contingent elements of “reli-
gious” events or phenomena by investigating
linguistic, cultural, historical, philosophical, and
theological matrices that make such events or
phenomena visible and meaning within specific
contexts.
Religion
Religious theory is a subfield of study in religious
studies that privileges poststructuralist and post-
modernist methodologies. It is an approach to the
study of religion and theology.
Religion, Theory of
Characteristics
Religious theory’s intellectual turn to a
postmodernist, deconstructionist, non-referential,
post-death-of-God theology as a way of remarking
religious studies and theology through “linguistics”
is distinctive as a methodology. This linguistic turn
was especially significant for the early develop-
ment of the subdiscipline. In his 2000 encyclopedic
essay entitled “Theology,” Charles E. Winquist
sketches theology’s trajectory across three phases
of analysis, beginning with theology’s “close
alliance” with “philosophies of being” to “philos-
ophies of consciousness,” and finally to “philoso-
phies of language.” It is the latter, “philosophies of
language,” that Winquist views (after 1984) as
forming the conceptual context for a postmodern
theology or religious theory. Language, more pre-
cisely a post-Saussurean understanding of lan-
guage, opened a space for early religious theorists
to challenge the traditional rules of theological
and religious studies language, reconfiguring the-
ology and religious studies as a self-referential
linguistic system with “no positive term”
(Saussure) or no “outside” the text (Derrida).
Relevance to Science and Religion
Religious theory, as it develops from poststruc-
turalism and postmodernism, see itself as
a necessary counter methodology to the methodol-
ogies of an Enlightenment science and, later, social
science. Religious theory is not regressively
antiscience, but it does refuse science’s claims to
epistemological certitude. Religious theory, at the
methodological level, finds flaws in any methodol-
ogy that claims to unfold absolute, objective truth,
epistemological, metaphysical, or ethical.
Sources of Authority
The major sources of religious theory are poststruc-
turalist and postmodernist discourses of the late
1970s and 1980s. These discourses, advanced by
such thinkers as Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze,
Michel Foucault, and Jean-François Lyotard,
Religion, Theory of
radically transformed thinking and research in the
humanities. Religious theory also develops from
a more general continental philosophy of religion
in which figures such as Hegel, Kierkegaard, and
Heidegger figured prominently.
In many ways, religious theory as a subfield of
religious studies begins as a postmodern field in
which multiple disciplines and methodologies
come to inform its praxis.
Ethical Principles
Religious theory does not accept “ethical
principles” as a self-evident set of procedures
and outcomes. Ethics in religious theory is
a problem of ethics requiring epistemological
and metaphysical inquiry.
Key Values
Religious theory values transdisciplinary
inquiry in the study of religion and theology.
It also values the self-reflective use of
poststructuralist and postmodernist discourses
in critical analysis of key terms, concepts, and
issues within the wider field of religious
studies.
One key value in religious theory comes from
postmodernism—non-totalization. Religious the-
ory does not seek to form a totality; instead,
religious theory, informed by poststructuralist
and postmodernist discourses, is a perpetual cri-
tique of all totalizing, reductive maneuvers in
religious studies.
Conceptualization
Nature/World
An inaccessible and/or wholly nondetermined
space mediated by language, consciousness,
history, culture, ideology, and the senses.
Reality
There is no discernible ultimate reality in reli-
gious theory. Reality is a site of contestation
2011 R
within historical, cultural, ideological, theologi-
cal, and philosophical spaces.
Knowledge
Contingent, contextual, and unavailable in any
absolute form.
Truth
See Knowledge.
Perception
Sensory perception is mediated by culture,
history, ideology, and language.
Time
Temporality is a construct and not necessarily
organized in a linear fashion.
Consciousness
See Knowledge.
Rationality/Reason
Rationality/reason is an historical, cultural, polit-
ical, and ideological construct. This is especially
true of the “universality of reason.”
Mystery
Mystery is traditionally everything that is not
explainable through conventional scientific,
rational discourse. It also has the connotation of
belonging to a transcendent reality and therefore
has no significance to religious theory.
R
Relevant Themes
Religious theory is antagonistic to the totalizing
and reductive practices of modern science and
social science. Religious theory, however, is
open to scientific conversations, especially those
in contemporary physics in which a uniform real-
ity is called into question.
Cross-References
▶ Critical Theory
▶ Humanities
R 2012
▶ Physics
▶ Philosophy of Science
▶ Quantum Theory
▶ Technonature and Theology
References
Caputo, J. D. (1997). The prayers and tears of Jacques
Derrida: Religion without religion. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press.
Derrida, J. (1998). Of grammatology. G. C. Spivak, trans.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Foucault, M. (1973). The order of things: An
archaeology of the human sciences. New York:
Vintage Books.
Hart, K. (2000). The trespass of the sign: Deconstruction,
theology, and philosophy. New York: Fordham Uni-
versity Press.
Lyotard, J.-F. (1988). The differend: Phrases in dispute.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Trans:
Georges Van Den Abbeele.
Raschke, C. A. (2000). The end of theology. Aurora:
Davies Group.
Taylor, M. C. (1987). Altarity. Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press.
Taylor, V. E. (2000). Para/inquiry: Postmodern religion
and culture. New York/London: Routledge.
Winquist, C. E. (1995). Desiring theology. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
Winquist, C. E. (2000). “Theology.” The encyclopedia of
postmodernism. New York/London: Routledge.
Religionswissenschaft
Carl Raschke
Department of Religious Studies, University of
Denver, Denver, CO, USA
Related Terms
Religion, History of
A German word that literally means “the sci-
ence of religion,” or more generally the scholarly
study of religion, that is, “religious studies.” In
the nineteenth century, German scholars sought
to identify the nature of Gnosticism, which prior
to that time had simply been condemned as a
Religionswissenschaft
form of doctrinal deviance or “heresy,” not by
theological argument but by critical and
empirical research into its appearance in the
context of the ancient history of religion.
Cross-References
Religion, History of
Religiosity
Hans-Ferdinand Angel
Faculty of Catholic Theology, Karl-Franzens
University, Graz, Austria
Katholisch–Theologische Fakultaet, University
of Graz, Graz, Austria
Related Terms
Religious experience; Religiousness
The term “religiosity” originates in a western
tradition of reflecting religious phenomena.
“Religiosity” is – from a linguistic/etymological
point of view – related to other terms like “reli-
giousness,” “religious,” “religion,” which all root
in the Latin word religio. From a conceptual point
of view, religiosity is related to terms such as
“spirituality,” “piety,” “devoutness,” or even
“godliness.” Obviously, in a semantic sense, the
meaning of these religiosity-related terms is dif-
ferent with overlapping components. Further-
more, the term “religiosity” carries an emotional
charge of varying degrees dependent upon
their historical associations and attitudes. In
some languages, like the English, the term is
more related to religious practice; in others, it
can be used as a general anthropological term
which covers cognition, emotion, attitude, and
self concepts. For example, the French term ré
ligiosité means both “religious disposition” and
“religious affection.” This means there is no
need to relate the term “religiosity” to some
established religion. Similarly it is for the
Religiosity
German term Religiosit€ at, and the Swedish,
Danish, and Norwegian, among other terms.
That the term is understood as a religious dispo-
sition, for example, opens it for an interdisciplin-
ary understanding. Indeed, one can ask, what are
the underpinning variables (genes, evolutionary
perspective) for such disposition? However, this
involves some difficulty for cross-language con-
versation as well as for translating English texts
into other European languages and opens the
floor to many misunderstandings. Furthermore,
the ability to distinguish between “religiosity”
and “religiousness” is a privilege of the English
language, which signals the possibility of two
different perspectives of the same phenomenon.
There is no scientific discipline which really
conceives “religiosity/religiousness” as the
central matter of its field (Angel et al. 2006).
The fact that there is no consensus of the
most appropriate meta-theoretical approach to
defining “religiosity/religiousness” implies
that it is hard, perhaps even impossible for scien-
tists to design and undertake investigations of
“religiosity/religiousness.” There are concepts
which define religiosity into a sociological,
a psychological, an anthropological category, or
has been reclaimed as a key term of theology or
religious studies. It is worth stressing that the
adjective “religious” corresponds to the two
nouns “religion” and “religiosity” (Angel et al.
2006). Therefore the adjective “religious” func-
tions as a relating term, by which personal expe-
rience of individuals on the one hand can be
connected to systematic or cultural aspects of
religion (van Belzen 1997) or to civil religion
on the other hand (Bellah 1967). In this regard,
“religious experience” may be understood as an
integral concept to qualify the relationship
between the cultural and subjective dimensions
of religiosity.
The theoretical status of religiosity or
religiousness is, compared to the theoretical
status of religion, highly under-reflected. That
might be one of the reasons why especially in
Anglo-Saxon publications within psychology of
religion, the term “religiosity” or “religiousness”
is rarely found. On the contrary the term
“religion” is frequently used even when the
2013 R
term “religion” actually refers to “religiosity or
religiousness” or to specific religious experi-
ences. We can find examples of such misunder-
standings or misinterpretation of the meaning of
religion within psychology of religion, neuropsy-
chology of religion, cognitive science of religion,
neuroimaging studies of religious experiences,
biological/evolutional studies of religion, studies
of Western religion, studies on children
and religion. Also, the study of “evolution of
religion” seems to be merged with the study of
“evolution of religiosity.”
One of the major problems is that the term
“religiosity” is not well understood, and hence,
its essential function as a key concept is
neglected. One of the actual challenges is to find
an accurate definition for religiosity. Clearly, this
would be an advantage for performing interdisci-
plinary research on religion as well as on individ-
ual or social religious experience. Religiosity,
especially when conceived in an anthropological
way, offers this excellent chance, because it
allows to distinguish between a formal notion of
human self-expression (in English the term “reli-
giosity” might be favored) and a “personally
qualified,” meaningful self-expression, strictly
bound to the private atmosphere of human
beings.
On the other hand, there is emerging interest to
work out a distinction between religiosity and
religiousness in regard to its phenomenology.
You even may find interest for these attempts
especially in concepts of psychology of religion R
(Wulff 1997; Paloutzian and Park 2005). Similar,
though lesser efforts have been made by sociol-
ogy of religion (Clarke 2009) and philosophy of
religion (Phillips 1976; Tilghman 1993). But
even psychology of religion (which is strange
enough – not named psychology of religiosity),
in contrast to sociology and philosophy of reli-
gion, refers to the term “religiosity” to identify its
own research field as well as to define its scien-
tific self-understanding. In these discussions, the
concept of religiosity is clarified and investigated
on its validity and soundness, its varieties, and
range of meanings.
As a formal concept, religiosity can basically
be linked to philosophical and scientific
R 2014
approaches, especially to the question “what it is
to be a human being” (e.g., to be a human being in
relation to her environmental, historical, cultural
[including religious], mental, and biological sta-
tus). In this sense, religiosity might have the
function of “homoeostasis type II”: Usually
homoeostasis (type I) means a self-regulating
system with tendency to maintain stable in
a bio-physiological sense. The idea of religiosity
as “homoeostasis type II” intends to
broaden the horizon. Introducing religiosity as
a “homoeostasis type II,” hence implies a self-
regulating system with tendency to maintain
stable in a holistic and transcendent sense
(Angel et al. 2006).
To put it differently, the whole spectrum of
psychological and sociological research on reli-
giosity would contribute to the understanding of
religiosity in its developmental, personality-
related, and dynamic aspects. This way of think-
ing was actually already opened by William
James in his Edinburgh Gifford Lectures
and published in his milestone “The Varieties of
Religious Experience” (James 1902). In order to
understand religiosity, it is necessary to inte-
grate into its conception the cognitive and emo-
tional aspects, credition (the process of
believing), and this, both in a moral and action-
related dimension. Psychology of religion has
worked out a wealth of rating scales measuring
different dimensions of religiosity (Hill and
Hood 1999. A variety of approaches to the
study of religiosity may also include investiga-
tions of the biological (genetic) underpinnings
and the biochemical processes related to
entheogen (psychedelic).
The function of religiosity can be seen as
a way to achieve balance, orientation, and mean-
ingfulness in everyday life. In this regard, not to
be neglected are the roles played by attachment
(Kirkpatrick 2005), coping (Pargament 1997),
stress reduction, and mental health (Koenig
2001), by forgiveness, flourishing, and so forth.
However, not to be neglected either are the more
negative sides of religiosity, namely, aggressive-
ness, neuroticism, rigidity, and fundamentalism
(Hood et al. 2005), which are dysfunctional to
processes of healing and coping. Indeed, patient’s
Religiosity
(client’s) religiosity has been taken into account
within clinical, psychotherapeutic psychology
and psychiatry.
Cross-References
▶ Credition, the Process of Belief
▶ Emotion
▶ Faith and Belief
▶ Gifford Lectures
▶ Love (Alterity, Relationship)
▶ Philosophy of Religion
▶ Psychology of Religion
▶ Religion, Theory of
▶ Religious Experiences
▶ Worldview
References
Angel, H-F., et al. (2006). Religiosit€ at. Stuttgart:
Kohlhammer.
Bellah, R. N. (1967). Civil religion in America. Daedalus.
Journal of the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences, 96, 1–21. Boston, MA.
Clarke, P. B. (Ed.). (2009). The Oxford handbook of
the sociology of religion. Oxford/New York: Oxford
University Press.
Hill, P. C., & Hood, R. W. (1999). Measures of religiosity.
Birmingham: Religious Education Press.
Hood, R. W., Hill, P. C., & Williamson, W. P. (2005). The
psychology of religious fundamentalism. New York:
Guilford Press.
James, W. (1902). The varieties of religious experience. A
study in human case. Cambridge MA: Harvard
University Press 1985 (Original edition 1902).
Kirkpatrick, L. A. (2005). Attachment, evolution, and the
psychology of religion. New York: Guilford Press.
Koenig, H. (2001). The healing power of faith. New York:
Simon & Schuster.
Paloutzian, R. F., & Park, C. L. (Ed.). (2005). Handbook of
the psychology of religion and spirituality. New York:
Guilford Press.
Pargament, K. I. (1997). The psychology of religion and
coping. New York: Guilford Press.
Phillips, D. Z. (1976). Religion without explanation.
Oxford: Blackwell.
Tilghman, B. R. (1993). An introduction to philosophy of
religion. Oxford: Blackwell.
van Belzen, J. (1997). Hermeneutical approaches in
psychology of religion. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Wulff, D. (1997). Psychology of religion (2nd ed.).
New York: Wiley.
Religious Education Theory, Roman-Catholic, Southern Europe
Religious
▶ Biology of Religion
Religious Affiliation
▶ Conversion
Religious Beliefs and Philosophy
▶ Philosophy of Religion
Religious Commitment
▶ Conversion
Religious Coping
Carolyn M. Aldwin and Michael R. Levenson
Program in Human Development & Family
Sciences, Oregon State University, Corvallis,
OR, USA
Religious coping is a multifaceted concept
reflecting a variety of ways of bringing one’s
religious life to bear on stressful experience.
Pargament and colleagues have researched and
written extensively upon the varieties of reli-
gious coping. In general, religious coping is
more likely to be healthy and can lead to pres-
ervation of physical and emotional health, a
greater sense of self-efficacy, and recognition
of real threats to well-being, rather than denial
of them. However, it is possible to distinguish
helpful from harmful kinds of religious coping.
Pargament argues that the most important dif-
ference between them may be that in helpful
religious coping there is an experience of
2015 R
collaboration with the transcendent or divine to
cope, whereas in harmful religious coping,
“anger at God” or a feeling that one is being
punished predominates.
Religious Education
▶ Practical Theology
Religious Education (RE)
▶ Religious Education Theory, Roman-Catholic,
Southern Europe
Religious Education Theory,
Roman-Catholic, Southern Europe
Ulrich Hemel
Professor of Catholic RE Theory, University of
Regensburg, Regensburg, Germany
Related Terms
Church; Religious education (RE)
R
General Background
Christian communities since ever have taken care
for the religious education of their children. As an
academic discipline, the development of a field
called “Religious Education Theory” is closely
linked to the general development of universities,
of academic theology, and of its institutional set-
ting within a society and its legal framework
(Hemel 2002, 50–53).
While Italy, France, and Spain all are coun-
tries with huge majorities of a catholic popula-
tion, the social mind-set toward institutional
catholic religious education (RE) is enormously
diverging.
R 2016 Religious Education Theory, Roman-Catholic, Southern Europe
France
In France, since 1905 there is a strict rule
concerning the separation of State and Church.
It is accepted also by Church members and valid
throughout France with the exception of the East-
ern provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. Academic
Theology exists at the level of a private Catholic
University (“Institut Catholique”) in Paris and
within one State University (Strasbourg in
Alsace/Alsatia). Religious education is seen
mostly as a task of both, families and the local
community. As a consequence, the wording
nearly always refers to “catéchèse,” that is, cate-
chesis, seen as the effort of Christians to transmit
their religious belief to the next generation.
Where RE in schools exists (such as in the East
of France), it is still called “catechesis,” and
participation is strictly voluntary. This means
that French catholic RE is less academic in style
than in other countries, more focused on building
a Christian community including songs and litur-
gical celebrations (Adler and Vogeleisen 1981).
Spain
In Spain, academic theology includes RE theory as
part of “Practical Theology.” As RE is part of the
normal school curriculum and Spain has more than
90% of a nominally catholic population, the orig-
inal idea of RE in public schools was the “integral
Christian education” of the young generation.
Political and social changes brought about
a structure where now RE – although being
a voluntary school subject – is part of the normal
school curriculum. It is seen as a task of both,
public schools and the Catholic Church, to give
young persons the chance to learn something
about religion and religious culture even if they
are not active members in their Christian commu-
nities. As an alternative, “Ethics” is an optional
school curriculum to be chosen instead of
“Religion.”
Generally speaking, Spain has been moderniz-
ing tremendously during the past decades. As
a part of this development and despite the crisis
of 2008/2009, parts of public life are “anticlerical”
in nature, eager to minimize educational influ-
ences of religious forces. As a consequence, the
academic study of RE theory does not only include
the professional training of future teachers but also
involves reflections concerning the importance of
a school curriculum of RE for “all” young persons,
independent from their religious interest (Pajer
1991; Documentos colectivos 1980).
Italy
In 1984, a State Agreement between the Vatican
and Italy (“Concordato”) has given a new structure
to the public teaching of religion in Italian schools.
“Religion” is an optional school curriculum within
the context of public schools, aiming at teaching
the value of the “cultural heritage” of Catholic
Christian religion in Italy. Specialized teachers of
religion, mostly educated in “Faculties of Reli-
gious Sciences,” feel integrated into the public
school while being, at the same time, committed
to a “disclosure” of religious content to their pupils.
Activities of pastoral care for the youth, of cate-
chetical preparation of the sacraments and of other
social or religious activities are seen as the specific
focus of parish communities and of other catholic
associations. This means that the reflection on RE as
a school curriculum is not strongly linked to the
general theological discussion which is typical for
faculties of theology in major centers. RE theory
rather has a position of “making use” of contempo-
rary theology, always having in mind the specific
purpose of “religion” in schools. On the other hand,
Italian teachers of Catholic religion in schools have
made a tremendous effort to professionalize the
school teaching of religion, maintaining high didac-
tical standards and at the same time a high level of
loyalty to the Catholic Church who formally
empowers them to their profession (Ruta 2004).
RE Theory in Italy, France, and Spain
Oscillating Between Scientific Discipline
and Spiritual Practice
For a clear evaluation of the rather spiritual, reli-
gious, or rigorously scientific character of RE
Religious Education Theory, Roman-Catholic, Southern Europe
theory in each country, it will be useful to see the
purpose of the discipline in the framework of
religious communities and overall societies. Italy
has a long tradition of universities, and “Bologna”
is the first European university ever. Still today,
the Bocconi University in Milan, the Gregorian
University in Rome, and others enjoy a high sci-
entific reputation far beyond religious disciplines.
Therefore, RE theory in Italy tends to claim aca-
demic rigor, suffering – at the same time – from
the rather particular status of the various “Facul-
ties of Religious Sciences.” As the name itself
states, there is the conviction that “Religious Sci-
ences” are a serious part of the scientific world.
In France, things are completely different, and
there is no specific college for the training of
future teachers of religion, simply because of
the separation of State and Church. As
a consequence, RE theory is seen as a historical
and practical part of theological studies (e.g., at
the Faculty of Theology in Strasbourg which
exists due to the Concordate, that is, a historical
State Treaty between Alsatia and the Vatican).
Taking into account this context, a spiritual and
religious view of RE prevails (“catechesis”).
Spain somewhere is in between France and
Italy. The Catholic Church, unrivaled as State
Religion during centuries, is proud of its theo-
logical faculties. In those faculties, however,
RE plays a minor part. As a consequence,
some see it as “the application” of theology in
the context of school learning, and others have
a more modern view including a scientific claim
for RE in its various life contexts (Gevaert
1986).
The Scientific Contribution of RE Theory
in Italy, France, and Spain
The concept of science in itself is not as clear
as that which the predominance of empirical,
methodological, and natural sciences might
suggest. If science is seen as a specific
endeavor of human reason to discover, under-
stand, describe, and change the natural and
cultural world, then “dense description” of
religious education and of educational reality
2017 R
in the context of societies with a very distinc-
tive historical pattern is in itself part of
a scientific exercise. Beyond this, a lot of
empirical data and studies are being produced
more in Italy than in France.
Finally, there is a rich flavor of historical work
showing the distinctive patterns of educational,
social, and theological framing in the course of
centuries.
Nevertheless, the scientific content of most of
RE literature in Italy, France, and Spain is lim-
ited. This is due to at least two reasons: First,
most of the RE literature refers to a specific
interpretation within a specific context, that is,
it is part of a “flow of interpretations.” Second,
there is no strong tradition of experimental
approach to RE theory. Giving reasons to this
attitude, most of the protagonists would argue
that human dignity in such a particular situation
as RE is not in line with the methodological
setting of a scientific experiment. As a matter
of fact, RE theory is more part of social and
cultural sciences than part of an experimental
tradition.
Sources of Authority, Ethical Guidelines,
and Key Values of RE Theory in Italy,
France, and Spain
Talking about Catholic RE theory in countries
like Italy, France, and Spain makes it easy to
refer to the Bible and to the teaching of the R
Church as sources of authority. It would be too
easy, however, to stop there. As a matter of fact,
in all of these countries, a deep respect of the
individual and unique nature of each young per-
son is part of the common set of convictions and
values in RE theory. This means that the respect
for the biological, moral, spiritual, and personal
development of each young person is a key value
in treating any kind of religious subject. While in
the past the integration of the young generation
into the Church community might have
prevailed, today’s RE theory aims at the individ-
ual, personal growth and the promotion of each
individual personality by disclosing them the
spiritual, intellectual, and emotional world of
R 2018 Religious Education Theory, Roman-Catholic, Southern Europe
Catholic Christian religion. This “client-cen-
tered” perspective has the consequence of “addi-
tional” authorities in a state-of-the-art knowledge
of psychology and sociology, of general educa-
tional theory and other cultural sciences. One of
the key values, therefore, is also (1) the continu-
ous effort of finding out which kind of knowledge
is reliable and (2) in discussing which is the best
way of using both, spiritual and religious tradi-
tions and modern psychological and educational
knowledge.
Basic Concepts from the Standpoint of
RE Theory in Italy, France, and Spain
If we look at basic concepts such as (1) nature/
world, (2) human being, (3) life/death, (4) reality,
(5) knowledge, (6) truth, (7) perception, (8) time, (9)
consciousness, (10) rationality/reason, and (11)
mystery, we never should forget the double context
in the framing of RE theory as a discipline which is
(a) the context and history of a specific country and
society, and (b) the spiritual and academic context
of theology, social and cultural sciences.
Let us take the example of (1) nature/world. It is
absolutely clear that RE theory in all of our refer-
ence countries will refer to God as the creator of the
world. Nature corresponds to the loving will of
God to create and maintain nature. On the other
hand, within the European context, it is equally
clear that virtually no protagonist of RE theory
will find a difficulty in combining this religious
standpoint with the actual debate concerning evo-
lution, origin of the universe, and the more. The
standard tenet of RE theory is a “convergence”
between religious convictions and scientific theo-
ries. Looking at the concept of “human being” (2),
the standard argument would be that all proven
scientific data on human beings can be valid but
that there is some “intellectual and spiritual” value
added for a religious perspective of human beings
as created and loved by a personal God. Reality (4),
therefore, is more than what science can tell us, and
it is God who guarantees the truthfulness of knowl-
edge (5), of truth (6), and of the trustworthy nature
of our perceptions (7), as far as they are not strictly
determined and limited by our biological nature.
Concepts such as life/death (3) are habitually seen
from a double perspective, that is, from all which
can be actually known from scientific evidence and
– on top – from the spiritual and religious perspec-
tive of a religious believer who believes in a life
after death. Even time (8) is seen as part of God’s
creation, independent upon any other linguistic and
intellectual endeavor in understanding the nature of
time. One of the advantages of such a religious
perspective is the insight into the limitations of
everybody’s consciousness (9) and individual
rationality (10). Human reason takes part in the
global universe of reason but the ultimate reason
is God.
As these reflections are part of a common reli-
gious world-view of European Catholic Christian-
ity, there is no distinctive difference between Italy,
Spain, and France as far as such concepts are being
concerned. Due to the general setting of RE, how-
ever, French authors and protagonists favor
a stronger spiritual perspective which means that
the “mystery” (11) of our existence, of the world,
of God, and of all the riddles of life may have
a stronger evidence in the practice and theory of
RE. It is clear, however, that “mystery” is
a category in line with the limitations of human
reason, and that all mystery would be disentangled
by God and God’s ultimate reason.
Issues of Particular Relevance in RE
Theory in Italy, France, and Spain
Similar to other regional and linguistic traditions
of Christian and Catholic RE, one of the interest-
ing issues in RE is a comprehensive world-view
within the context of a religious framework. Dif-
ferent from other disciplines, this means that RE
theory dares to speak out hypotheses (e.g., on
a life after death) which are beyond scientific
evidence and which at the same time opens for
revision, better insight and doubt.
Contrary to what could be expected, the use of
rational arguments is therefore generally broader
than in other disciplines because religious ratio-
nality will argue even in those fields where safe
knowledge is far from being available. On the
other hand, the unified structure of the universe
Religious Education, Protestant
allows for minimum requirements of logical
coherence even if strong evidence cannot be
expected. It is not astonishing, therefore, that
the relationship of “faith” and “reason” continues
to be an important issue, not only within RE
theory but also (and probably not by chance)
within the pontificate of Benedict XVI.
Another common but also distinctive issue is
the topic of interreligious dialogue. It is strongly
present in Italy, not so strong in France and until
recently barely existing in Spain. The reason is
simple: A dialogue with the Islam, in general, is
driven by a strong presence of Muslims which has
not been the case before the recent immigration
waves in such Southern and West European
societies.
One of the consequences of the new situation
of “religious competition” will probably be the
fact that Christian Catholic RE theory in Italy,
Spain, and France during the coming years will
focus more on what is so specific and valuable in
their own world-view, as compared to other reli-
gious and nonreligious traditions.
Cross-References
▶ Religious Education, Protestant
References
Adler, G., & Vogeleisen, G. (1981). Un siècle de caté
chèse en France (1893–1980). Paris, Beauchesne.
Documentos colectivos del Episcopado Espanol sobre la
Formación Religiosa y Educación 1969–1980,
Madrid, 1980.
Gevaert, J. (1986). Dizionario di Catechetica. Torino:
Leumann.
Hemel, U. (2002). Religionsp€adagogik im internationalen
Vergleich. In G. Bitter, R. Englert, G. Miller,
K. E. Nipkow (Hrsg.), Neues Handbuch
religionsp€ adagogischer Grundbegriffe (pp. 50–53).
Munich, kösel.
Pajer, F. (Ed.). (1991). L’insegnamento scolastico della
religione nella nuova Europa. Torino: Leumann.
Ruta, G. (2004). Catechesi e insegnamento della religione
cattolica oggi in Italia: risorse, problemi e prospettive.
In Intinerarium 12, pp. 95–112 (German translation:
RpB Nr.52, 2004, pp. 91–104).
Sutcliffe, J. M. (Ed.) (1984). A dictionary of RE. London,
SCM Press.
2019 R
Religious Education, Protestant
William H. Jeynes
Witherspoon Institute, Princeton, NJ, USA
California State University, Long Beach,
CA, USA
Related Terms
Christian education; Protestant education
Description
Protestant education has long had a central role in
religious training in the Christian tradition. As
Henri Marrou, Adrian Dupuis, and other histo-
rians note, a major reason that Protestants place
such an emphasis on schooling is because Chris-
tianity was the first school of thought to assert
that all people are created as equal before their
Creator and therefore all should be educated. The
Greek, Roman, Asian, and Middle Eastern phi-
losophies and religions focused on training the
elites. But Christianity asserts that, “There is
neither Jew nor Gentile, neither slave nor free,
nor is there male and female. . .” (Galatians 3:28,
Holy Bible, NIV). It also asserts that “God shows
no partiality. . .” (Romans 2:11, Holy Bible,
NIV). For centuries, in various places throughout
the world, Protestant education and public school
R
instruction were closely aligned. Protestant edu-
cation generally now operates as distinct from the
public school system, but one advantage of that is
that churches are able to operate with greater
autonomy than they did when the Christian
worldview was more integrated in the public
school system.
Self-Identification
Science
Protestant education views itself as in many ways
a science both in terms of the study of improving
itself and also in terms of the part of education
R 2020
that involves science and scientific inquiry. Prot-
estants generally view scientific discovery as
very connected to the Christian faith. In the
Christian mindset, there is no contradiction
between the quest for scientific truth and God.
And indeed, Christians view the growth of sci-
ence as a quest for truth as totally consistent with
a personal relationship with God. For Protestants,
the key tenet in this regard is found in the Bible
text of John 8:32 (NIV, Holy Bible) where Jesus
Christ declares, “You will know the truth and the
truth will make you free.” Admittedly, when
Christ made this statement, He referred primarily
to spiritual truth. Nevertheless, the attitude of the
Protestants toward education was generally very
forward-looking (Bartlett, 1978). They believed
that since all of God’s creation represented His
truth, that education in a more general sense was
worth pursuing.
Religion
By definition, Protestant education involves reli-
gion, but leaders and teachers in this discipline
view themselves as teaching academic truth.
Although these educators view themselves as
first and foremost teaching spirituality and char-
acter, they are also pleased that their students far
exceed public school students in academic per-
formance. Research indicates that their students
outperform their counterparts in traditional pub-
lic schools and public charter schools in every
single major subject matter, that is, math, science,
reading, and social studies. Usually that advan-
tage is about 1 year. Research also indicates that
the racial and socioeconomic achievement gaps
are a good deal smaller in their schools than is
commonly witnessed in the public schools.
Research indicates that students in these faith-
based schools outperform public school students
for reasons strongly associated with the fact that
these schools are religious (Jeynes, 1999).
For example, both meta-analyses and
national-wide studies demonstrate that the stu-
dents indicate that they view Christian teachers
as considerably more caring and possessing
higher expectations than educators commonly
do in the public schools (Jeynes, 1999). These
schools also emphasize the work ethic, a sense of
Religious Education, Protestant
purpose in life, and self-discipline far more than
what one is going to see in the public schools
(Jeynes, 2007). Studies also indicate that Protes-
tant schools have much higher levels of racial
harmony and considerably fewer gang problems
than one generally finds in the public schools
(Jeynes, 1999). Research evidence suggests that
these advantages are linked to the Christian
nature of these schools. And therefore even
though Protestant schools view themselves as
concurrently both religious and academic, the
leaders of these schools view these two emphases
as concurrently active in Protestant schools.
Characteristics
Protestant education views scientific inquiry as
inextricably connected with the pursuit of God
and divine truth much more so than other reli-
gions do. In Protestant schools, the Christian faith
of scientists such as Nicholas Copernicus (1473–
1543) and Francis Bacon (1561–1627) is often
highlighted. Schools often point out that Pope
Clement approved and suggested that Copernicus
publish his work and that Bacon asserted that
thorough philosophic inquiry would lead people
to Christian faith. Protestants naturally empha-
size the contributions of Johannes Kepler
(1571–1630), who established the laws of plane-
tary motion around the sun. Kepler was a devout
Lutheran, who made many references to God in
his works. Protestant schools also often empha-
size Galileo Galilei’s (1564–1642) and Rene
Descartes’ (1596–1650) convictions, who both
emphasized in the inerrancy of Scripture.
Protestant schools also emphasize the consis-
tency of intellectual and theological pursuits by
pointing out that a number of scientists were
active in writing works in both spheres, for exam-
ple, Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) and Robert Boyle
(1627–1691). Evangelical Protestant churches
highlight the conservative religious views of
Isaac Newton (1642–1727) and Michael Faraday
(1791–1867), whose discoveries in mathematics,
physics, and magnetism represent some of the
finest examples of scientific genius in history.
These schools are also quick to point out that
Religious Education, Protestant
the vast majority of these scientists were
creationists, including Lord William Kelvin
(1824–1907), who is one of the most influential
physicists of all time.
Protestant schools, more so than other tradi-
tions, spend time examining the personal faith
practices of these scientists, including Nobel
Prize–winning quantum theorist Max Planck
(1858–1947), a church warden, and Gregor
Mendel (1822–1884), a monk. They point out
that even Albert Einstein (1879–1955) stated,
“I want to know how God created this world”
and “Science without religion is lame, religion
without science is blind.”
Relevance to Science and Religion
The Protestant world is open to science and is
very interested in the area called “science and
religion.” Much of this interest surrounds the
theory of evolution. A myriad of Christians
believe that evolutionary theory is misguided
and built on myth and wishful thinking, rather
than scientific evidence. Contrary to the stereo-
types that many people maintain regarding Chris-
tian beliefs, their reluctance in embracing
Darwin’s theories has as much to do with the
shortcomings of evolutionary theory, as they do
with adhering to the Bible’s teaching per se.
Many Christians have three primary scientific
objections to evolution, as well as several sec-
ondary ones.
First, they object to the fact that the fossil
record shows virtually no potential transition
forms, from one species to another. They assert
that if evolution reflected the truth, there would
be thousands upon thousands of these transitional
forms.
Christians believe that the absence of these
forms should in itself cause many to question
the accuracy of the theory of evolution. Chris-
tians state that one reason it has not is because
many who adhere to Darwin have an agenda to
attempt to show that it is a godless universe and
one dictated purely by chance. If this atheistic
perspective is true, then there is no God or
“higher power/authority” to whom people have
2021 R
to answer. But Christians contend that it takes
a far greater “leap of faith” to believe that there
is no “first cause” and there is never any spiritual
intervention and that rather everything is guided
by pure chance than to believe that God exists. In
the minds of Christians, evolutionists often cut
off any need for debate on these issues because
their goal is to advocate the agenda that people
should be able to do anything they please. Chris-
tians do not ask that everyone share their perspec-
tive, but they do believe that evolutionists are
often narrow-minded and quickly truncate or pre-
vent any meaningful debate on origins.
Second, they question the accuracy of the dat-
ing methods that are used by evolutionists. They
note that dating has often been shown to be wildly
inaccurate, with some bones of bodies of those
recently passed on shown to be millions of years
old. In addition, scientists are well aware that
accurate dating depends on the notion that the
geological and atmospheric conditions of the
earth have remained quite stable. The reality of
a catastrophic flood, for example, is well
documented, and this alone could throw off the
accuracy of the dating results.
Third, they believe that the theory of evolution
is inherently racist and believe it to be greatly
inaccurate in this way. They affirm that if Dar-
winist evolution is so patently in error regarding
race, then it is not logical to easily embrace its
assertions on other issues. Christians believe that
the writings of Charles Darwin and a myriad of
his followers contributed to the growth of insti- R
tutional racism and the teaching of scientifically
based racist thought. They also assert that Dar-
winist evolutionary thought affected many
nation’s beliefs about those with special needs.
To a copious number of believers, these blatant
inaccuracies of evolution regarding race and
those with special needs raise questions about
the theory’s overall veracity and how teachers
should approach instruction regarding Darwin’s
theory.
The pervasive nature of the racism and insti-
tutional racism that has risen from Darwin’s
hypotheses is sufficiently obvious that the
cofounder of the theory of evolution, Alfred
Russel Wallace, found the racism and
R 2022
discrimination inherent in evolutionary theory so
reprehensible that he disavowed evolutionary
theory and became a creationist. In the mind of
countless believers, to whatever extend evolu-
tionary theory has yielded scientifically based
racism and discrimination, one has justifiable
reasons to reexamine various aspects of the
value and accuracy of many of the theory’s
claims (Gould, 1981).
The presence of racism in Darwin’s writings is
patent even in the title of his work that is com-
monly called the Origin of Species (1859). Actu-
ally, this is not the full title. One reason why few
cite the full title is because it is offensive. The full
title is On the Origin of the Species by Means of
Natural Selection or the Preservation of the
Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (1859).
The context of Darwin’s writings confirms what
the title asserts. Darwin states that there are cer-
tain races that are superior to others and therefore
favored in the natural selection process. Darwin
was quite specific in his claims, asserting that the
smallest gap between ape and humankind was
between the gorilla and blacks. Darwin (1871,
p. 201) states, “The break will then be rendered
wider, for it will intervene between man in a more
civilized state, as we may hope, than the Cauca-
sian, and some ape as low as a baboon, instead of
at the present between the Negro or Australian
and the gorilla.” Not surprisingly therefore, Dar-
win predicted that the darker a group’s skin, the
faster members of that group would go extinct.
Hence, while many Christians have a very
positive view of science, they have some major
reservations about evolutionary theory.
Sources of Authority
In one sense, the Bible is the most authoritative
book within Protestant education. The Bible is
recognized by scholars around the world as the
most influential book in the history of humanity.
William Shakespeare alone cited the Bible over
1,300 times. And beyond this, a large portion of
the authors who wrote before the early 1960s on
four continents assume the readers have a strong
working knowledge of the Bible. Understanding
Religious Education, Protestant
the Bible is also vital for comprehending world
history. Protestants value a wide variety of other
books on various topics, especially those that are
among the finest in their field that integrate Chris-
tian faith with the finest books on academics.
Ethical Principles
Love is at the heart of the Christian religion. God
identifies His essence in I John 4:18, where it is
declared that, “God is love,” (Holy Bible, NIV).
Moreover, when Christ is asked what the two
most important commandments are, He declares
that they are love of God and love of neighbor.
The esteemed German sociologist Max Weber
elucidates on how this translates into academic
achievement, by asserting what he terms
a “Protestant ethic” that emerges from the
emphasis that God has a loving purpose for
one’s life. Weber declares that Protestants work
hard, demonstrate sacrificial love to help others,
and are cognizant of a calling from God upon
their lives that keeps them highly motivated.
Weber asserts that while Protestantism empha-
sizes love, grace, and God’s purpose, which
results in highly motivated followers, other faiths
are less likely to create this level of academic
creativity. In contrast, Weber avers that Islam
emphasizes submission and Buddhism presents
Nirvana as an ideal, neither of which is especially
conducive to individual academic effort. Simi-
larly, Weber states that Hinduism emphasizes
fate via its insistence on a caste system and
includes the judgmental orientation of karma,
which is not conducive to individual academic
creativity and effort. Weber believes that, in con-
trast, the Protestant’s emphasis on love, grace,
and purpose is conducive to high levels of schol-
arly output.
Key Values
Protestant educators desire to produce people of
character who are highly learned people. The
commitment to scientific learning by people of
faith is evident in the fact that the world’s finest
Religious Education, Protestant
universities tend to be founded by Christians. In
the United States, Christians founded 121 out of
the first 122 colleges. Christians also ran many of
Europe’s first and finest universities. They all saw
it as consistent with their faith and the pursuit of
God’s truth. And indeed when the Puritans
founded Harvard and Yale and when other groups
founded Princeton and most of the other early
schools, it was with the teaching of spiritual
truth that these people were most concerned.
Nevertheless, the attitude of the Puritans toward
education was very forward-looking. They
believed that since all of God’s creation
represented His truth, education in a more general
sense was a worthy goal. When they arrived in
Massachusetts, the Pilgrims elected Deacon John
Carver to be governor. Carver died only a few
months after being chosen. His successor, Wil-
liam Bradford, was a strong believer in
supporting an intelligent gospel. Bradford, like
many of the Puritan leaders of the time, owned
a prodigious number of books in his library for
the time (400). The fact that the Puritans kept
records of the number of volumes owned by the
leaders demonstrates the emphasis that they
placed on literacy. The Puritans set the stage for
centuries of an academic orientation both in west-
ern and northern Europe and in the United States.
Conceptualization
Nature/the World
God is viewed as above the world, and He has
entrusted human beings, as those made in His
image, to be caretakers of the world. Therefore,
God wants His people to be concerned about
preserving the environment. In addition, the
Bible states that the righteous should be
concerned about the needs of animals. However,
God is grieved when people have compassion for
animals more than they do for human beings.
Protestants, especially Evangelicals, tend to
believe that life begins at conception and that
people ought to care for the welfare of all
human beings, including those in the womb.
Christians also view death in a more complex
way than secularists generally do. They
2023 R
distinguish between physical death and spiritual
death. To be spiritually dead is not to know Christ
as one’s personal Lord and Savior.
Human Being
The Bible views all human beings as made in the
image of God. On this basis, in the views of many
Christians, human beings have inherent value and
have some element of the divine both in terms of
their worth and their potential. They believe that
this emphasis on the “divine spark” encourages
people to live up to their full potential and often
brings out the best in them. They believe that it
only follows that if humans are viewed as mere
animals, they will tend to succumb to their animal
instincts and behave in a less loving and more
primitive fashion. In the mind of Christians, the
Bible’s assertion that “God is love” (I John 4:18,
Holy Bible, NIV) has important ramifications for
the way the people should be treated. The highest
quality we can show when dealing with other
individuals is to love them, even as God does.
Protestants often view evolution and the rac-
ism that accompanies it as a dehumanizing influ-
ence. For example, Darwin believed that “some
humans were incapable of civilization” (Ander-
son, 2007, p.157). Jackson and Weidman (2004,
p.69) declare that to Darwin “the gap in intelli-
gence and moral sense between civilized people
and animals was a great one.” But one could look
to the lower races, which in his view were those
darkest in hue, to fill the gap (Alland, 2002).
To Darwinists, “savages” of Africa and South R
America represented the “missing link” between
lower animals and human beings. Darwin and his
followers instigated this brand of racism by
propounding an evolutionary rubric of a chain
of being that portrayed some of the features of
nonwhite races as being animallike. Protestants
view humans much more favorably and believe
that all people are equal before God.
Reality
Christians believe that reality exists at many
levels and that there are some of these levels
that are more discernable by human beings than
others. Christians believe that just as human
beings can access only a small part of the light
R 2024
spectrum and the auditory spectrum, the same
thing is true of the spiritual spectrum. Christians
believe that it is naı̈ve and ignorant for secularists
to assume that if one is unable to see a certain
item it, therefore, does not exist. Christians
believe that sound waves, electricity, radar detec-
tors, and light waves often involve frequencies
that cannot easily be discerned by normal human
senses, and yet each of these realities can be
powerful. Some Christians point to ultraviolet
and infrared light pictures yielding unusual pat-
terns when people are praying for healing and the
fact that there are a plethora of phenomena that
humans simply are unable to explain, as evidence
of a largely unseen spiritual ream.
Knowledge
Christians view knowledge differently than many
other individuals. There are several ways in
which this is the case. First, the Bible declares
that, “The fear of the Lord is the beginning of
knowledge” (Psalm 111:10; Proverbs 1:7, Holy
Bible, NIV). Christians believe that God is omni-
scient and that He is the ultimate source of knowl-
edge and truth. In contrast, Christians believe
that human beings are small and finite and have
very limited knowledge compared to what God
possesses. Therefore, if these people want to
have true knowledge, they need to seek God to
obtain that information. Second, Christians
believe that the most vital form of knowledge
and truth is spiritual knowledge and truth. They
argue that from spiritual knowledge proceeds
character and a more complete intellectual
insight. Christians believe in the assertions of
Cicero and Martin Luther King that the most
dangerous person in the world is someone who
is very intelligent, but who lacks morality.
Third, they believe that mental knowledge is
important and worthy of pursuit, but such
a venture is undertaken in the context that by
doing so, one will understand more about God
and His universe.
Perception
Christians believe that the accuracy of a person’s
perception is dependent on one’s relationship
with God. They believe that the more one matures
Religious Education, Protestant
in the Christian faith, the greater the likelihood
that one will develop what the Bible calls “the
mind of Christ” (I Corinthians 2:14–16, Holy
Bible, NIV). Christians believe perception can
exist at the physical, emotional, and spiritual
level.
Time
Protestants believe that students in schools
should use their time well, because to the degree
that they are God’s children, they are called of
God and should use their time well. In terms of
history, the Bible really does not specify the time
of the origins of the earth and the universe.
Consciousness
The Bible is filled with references to various
levels of consciousness, and based on the
Scripture, Christians especially respect what
can occur in one’s dreams and during one’s
sleep. Christians feel most comfortable though
with numerical research and are less trusting
of theories based on personal experience and
what they view as wild conjecture, with little
scientific evidence. Although the work of
Sigmund Freud is perhaps the best example
of this, some believers also think that Jean
Piaget’s theories, which were based primarily
on the observations of his own children, were
embraced much too readily without adequately
testing them.
Rationality/Reason
Christians are strong believers that God gave
human beings a mind that can be used to produce
much good. What is vital, in the Christian way of
thinking, is that Christians “be transformed” by
the renewal of one’s “mind” (Romans 12:2, Holy
Bible, NIV). Christians believe that a corrupt
mind will cause people to be blind to reason and
common sense and will cause them to engage in
many counterproductive and destructive
behaviors.
Mystery
Protestants believe that many of the keys to
understanding salvation, spirituality, and the
world and universe are found in the Bible.
Religious Experiences
For example, a large number of Christian aca-
demics are quick to point out that long before
humans concluded that the earth was round,
the Bible referred to the earth as being round.
In Isaiah 40:22 (Holy Bible, NIV), which was
written approximately 700 years before the
birth of Christ, the Bible has been understood
as asserting that the earth was a circle.
Christians believe that the Bible can provide
guidance and insight into the major issues and
mysteries of life.
Relevant Themes
Probably the major issue pertinent to this engage-
ment is the extent to which issues relating to
science and religion are even permitted to be
discussed, particularly in American schools.
Presently, most European educators are far more
open than their American counterparts to exam-
ining these issues. There is a certain degree of
irony to this fact because one of the main tenets of
the American Constitution is “freedom of reli-
gion.” In reality, however, there are dozens of
nations around the world, particularly in Europe,
that probably have freedom of religion to
a greater extent than is practiced in the United
States. Part of this may be due to the fact that the
philosophical tradition in Europe possesses
deeper roots than is the case in the United States.
Consequently, there is more of an understanding
in various parts of Europe that religion is an
important part of the overall philosophic “con-
versation” and that to be an educated individual,
one needs to be familiar with the Bible. The
American academics, on the other hand, are not
as quick to understand the importance of
multidisciplinary interplay. It is hoped that this
will change.
Cross-References
▶ Agape
▶ Bible as Literature
▶ Biblical Studies
▶ Christianity
2025 R
References
Alland, A. (2002). Race in mind: Race, IQ, and other
racisms. New York: Palgrave-MacMillan.
Anderson, K. (2007). Race and crisis of humanism.
London: Routledge.
Bartlett, R. M. (1978). The faith of the pilgrims. New
York: United Church Press.
Gould, S. J. (1981). The mismeasure of man. New York:
W.W. Norton.
Jackson, J. P., & Weidman, N. M. (2004). Race, racism &
science. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO.
Jeynes, W. H. (1999). The effects of religious commit-
ment on the academic achievement of black and His-
panic children. Urban Education, 34(4), 458–479.
Jeynes, W. H. (2007). American educational history:
School, society, and the common good. Thousand
Oaks: Sage Press.
Religious Epistemology
▶ Epistemology, Reformed
Religious Experience
▶ Religiosity
Religious Experiences
Anne L. C. Runehov
R
Department of Systematic Theology,
Copenhagen University, Copenhagen,
Denmark
Description
Religious experiences belong to the subjective
experiences which have fascinated and still fasci-
nate researchers from different disciplines. Hence,
within the scope of the present article, it is impos-
sible to do justice to all explanations. The choice
then has fallen upon explanations of religious expe-
riences coming from theologians and scholars of
religious studies having a profound impact on the
R 2026
issue today. The present article comprises defini-
tions of religious experiences; religious experiences
understood as a relationship, the reality of religious
experiences; the differences between religious and
nonreligious experiences, that is, when does an
experience become a religious one, the object(s)
of religious experiences; the ways in which it is
possible to have religious experiences; and finally,
six types of religious experiences are accounted for.
Defining Religious Experiences
To refer to religious experiences, without also
referring to William James’ (1842–1910) Varie-
ties of Religious Experience, would be a mistake
beyond correction. In his ▶ Gifford Lectures on
natural religion at the University of Edinburgh,
1901–1902, William James defines the essence
of religious experiences in terms of their specific
quality or element, “the thing by which we finally
must judge them, must be that element or quality
in them which we can meet nowhere else.” He
observes that the quality will be most obvious in
those religious experiences that are “most one-
sided, exaggerated, and intense.” A religious expe-
rience, he continues, is a state of mind only obtain-
able by religious persons and no others. However,
not everybody would agree with James here:
Your whole subconscious life, your impulses, your
faiths, your needs, your divination, have prepared
the premises of which your consciousness now
feels the weight of the result; and something in
you absolutely knows that that result must be
truer than any logic-chopping rationalistic talk,
however clever, that may contradict it. (James
1997, 74)
Such religious experiences provide absolute
knowledge. James refers to the noetic quality or
aspect of religious experience by saying that the
experiencer remembers his or her religious expe-
rience as being immediate rather than of being the
result of conscious thought and inference. Fur-
thermore, that quality is such that it has the power
to completely change a person’s personal and
social life.
In Economy and Society, Max Weber
(1864–1920) calls such a converting experience
Religious Experiences
metanoia and means by it that the person having
a metanoia entirely changes his or her central
attitude toward the value of meaning of life and
the universe (Weber 1968, 163). The example he
gives is the converting religious experience Saint
Paul had in Damascus (Acts. 9:1–25).
Generally, religious experiences are under-
stood as belonging to the variety of experiences
human beings are able to have. In The Epistemol-
ogy of Religious Experience, Keith Yandell
argues that a human experience (including
a religious one) x is an aspect of the subject of
experience y (Yandell 1993, 42). Furthermore, if
an item A is so related to person S that S does not
exist by itself or together with some set of truths,
entails A does not exist, then A is an aspect with
respect to S (Yandell 1993, 38). He argues that
every human being is an aspect with respect to
her- or himself but not to another person. Our
hopes and dreams, beliefs, and attitudes are
aspects with respect to ourselves, but objects
with respect to another person. The subject of
experience is not the experiencer as one might
think but is that of which an aspect relative to the
experiencer is presented to him or her (Yandell
1993, 42). A human experience, religious or not,
x is an aspect of a subject y and sometimes, but
not necessarily, has an object “y.” For example,
there is no object in the experience of thirst. The
experience of being thirsty is an aspect of the
subject of experience, namely, neural signals
from the central nervous system (the part of the
brain that integrates the information that it
receives from, and coordinates the activity of,
all parts of the body). Experiencing drinking
water, on the other hand, has an object, namely,
water. An experience (religious or other) is
a conscious state (or a state of mind in William
James’ words) in which a person phenomenolog-
ically seems to be aware of an aspect or object
(Yandell 1993, 42). By seems, Yandell means
“how things appear, whether or not they are that
way or not” (Yandell 1993, 16). This means that
for an experience of something (an aspect of
a subject of experience with or without an object)
to be recognized as an experience of that some-
thing, it does not necessarily imply that that
something really is as it is experienced.
Religious Experiences
In Perceiving God The: ▶ Epistemology of
Religious Experience, William Alston maintains
that religious experiences are those experiences
in which it seems that God appears (presents
Godself) to a person in a certain way (Alston
1991, 20–23).
Hence, in Sacred or Neural, the Potential of
Neuroscience to Explain Religious Experience,
Anne Runehov observes that a significant differ-
ence between a religious and nonreligious expe-
rience lies in the context of the experience. The
context of the religious experience (or what the
context of the religious experience is part of or
related to) is mostly (but not always) presupposed
by the experiencer. In other words, there may be
(but not necessarily) a specific commitment
between the experiencer and the context of the
experienced (Runehov 2007, Chap. 2). In Reli-
gious Experience, Wayne Proudfoot argues, on
the other hand, that there always is a commitment
between the experiencer and the context of the
experienced. Therefore, ineffability of religious
experiences does not mean that religious experi-
ences are not analyzable. According to him, reli-
gious experiences always mirror the theological
commitments of the experiencer. Furthermore,
because religious commitments are different in
different religions, the religious experiences will
be interpreted differently as well (Proudfoot
1985). With this, Proudfoot does not seem to
give room for experiences that do not fit within
the frame of reference of the religion the person is
committed to. For instance, Carl Gustav Jung
maintained that religious experiences can be so
powerful that they destroy the experiencer totally
(both mentally and physically) if he or she does
not have the adequate religious framework to
encapsulate the experience. As an example of
such an anxiety laden religious experience, Jung
uses the religious vision experienced by a Swiss
mystic by the name of Brother Klaus. It is told
that he was so terrified by his vision that his face
was deformed in such a way that people who met
him afterward were frightened. Even if Brother
Klaus was committed to the Christian religion, it
was only after many years of contemplation that
he concluded that what he had seen was the Holy
Trinity and he painted his vision on the walls of
2027 R
his room. Jung writes that “[t]hrough subsequent
elaboration this vision then became the so-called
Trinity Vision” (Jung 1958, 319). Brother Klaus
(Nicholas of Fl€ue) was canonized by Pope Pius
XII in 1947. The painting can be seen in the
church in Sachsen.
Another difference is that religious experi-
ences often, but not always, typically involve
subjective features such as ineffable
(unexplainable) joy and exultation, calmness,
sweetness, timelessness, unification, etc. (Alston
1991, 20–23). In other words, religious experi-
ences usually include subjective features unusu-
ally experienced in nonreligious ones. The sense
of awe of a religious experience is what Rudolf
Otto (1869–1937) terms numinosum. In The Idea
of the Holy, Otto explains the numinosa as includ-
ing both the element of fear and trembling
(mysterium tremendum) and the element of love
(fascinosum) in the presence of God or Ultimate
Reality or, in Otto’s term, the Wholly Other (Otto
1970, 8–41). See further entry on Das Heilige.
Such experiences, he maintains, are ineffable.
Such experience, which also reflects the experi-
ence had by brother Klaus as mentioned above,
grips or stirs the human mind. The feeling of it may
at times come sweeping like a gentle tide, pervad-
ing the mind with a tranquil mood of deepest wor-
ship. It may pass over into a more set and lasting
attitude of the soul, continuing, as it were, thrill-
ingly vibrant and resonant, until at last it dies away
and the soul resumes its “profane,” nonreligious
mood of everyday experience. It may burst in sud-
den eruption up from the depths of the soul with R
spasms and convulsions, or lead to the strongest
excitements, to intoxicated frenzy, to transport, and
to ecstasy. It has its wild and demonic forms and
can sink to an almost grisly horror and shuddering.
(Otto 1970, 12–13).
Jonathan Edwards (1703–1758) explains reli-
gious experiences in terms of a new sense of the
heart. In Treatise on Religious Affections, he writes
that genuine religious affections consist in a new
sense of the heart which is analogous to our five
ordinary senses apart from that it cannot be
reduced to one of them. The new sense of the
heart can only be grasped by experience. “Affec-
tions that are truly spiritual and gracious, do arise
from those influences and operations on the heart,
R 2028
which are spiritual, supernatural and divine”
(Edwards (1959) part III). Thus, Edwards explains
religious experiences in terms of direct and spe-
cific sense perception. This sense perception
affects the heart, which in Western religious tra-
ditions is often associated with feelings derived
from God or Ultimate Reality.
A completely different understanding comes
from Robert Forman. In The Problem of Pure
Consciousness, he claims that certain religious
experiences do not have content at all; they are
contentless, nonintentional, immediate, and pure.
Actually, they are experiences of nothing at all but
are nevertheless powerful experiences. Because
one does not experience anything, such experiences
cannot be embodied in culture (Forman 1990).
Religious Experiences Seen as
a Relationship
All human experiences are expressions of
a relationship between the experiencer and the
experienced. Hence, a religious experience can be
understood as an expression of a relationship
between the believer and what the believer refers
to as Divine, God, or Ultimate Reality. Considering
religious experiences in terms of a relationship goes
back to Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) to
whom, in The Christian Faith (1830), a religious
experience is a feeling (or intuition). This feeling is
an immediate ▶ cognitive relation (immediacy of
awareness) to some object giving an insight that is
not mediated by any concepts (Schleiermacher
1928). In On Religion (1799), he explains that
feeling is a person becoming immediately aware
of his or her absolute dependency of God. In other
words, the feeling of absolute dependency is an
immediate consciousness of the relationship
between Ultimate Reality or God and oneself in
a way that is absolute and indistinguishable
(Schleiermacher 1923).
In The Sociology of Religion, Max Weber
maintains that Saint Paul’s conversion, for exam-
ple, was not merely a vision but also recognition
of the inner relationship between the resurrected
Christ and the doctrines and soteriology of that
time. In other words, Paul’s experience was
Religious Experiences
recognition of a relationship between Jesus Christ
(earlier rejected by Paul) and the Jewish concep-
tions of ▶ salvation. From this relationship,
a further relationship emerged, namely, the rela-
tionship between Paul’s religious experiences
and the change of his social actions (instead of
persecuting Christians, Paul now became one
of their leaders).
Yet, another way to express the relationship is
to emphasize the religiousness of the relation-
ship. In other words, it is not God or Ultimate
Reality who/that is religious, it is not the
experiencer who is religious: the real religious
feature emanates in the interface between the
two (Runehov 2007, Chap. 2). In other words,
the religious experience emerges out of the rela-
tionship between the experiencer and what the
experiencer takes to be God or Ultimate Reality.
To Alston, it is God (or Ultimate Reality)
presenting Godself that is the cause of the rela-
tionship (the conscious state). The reason why
Alston does so is because he wants to dissent
from the idea that all experiences of God and
God agents are nothing but subjective experi-
ences (Alston 1991, 14–20). The experiencer is
passive because it is the world presenting itself to
the experiencer (Alston 1991, 28).
According to Yandell, the experiencer is
active and the cause of the religious experience
is the recognition of the religiousness by the
experiencer.
The Reality of a Religious Experience
Regardless of whether it is the sender, the
receiver, or the relationship in between that is
responsible for the experience (or conscious
state), the experience will be real to the
experiencer. For example, one of William
James’ informants said, “Everything else might
be a dream, but not that” (James 1997, 64). Also,
anthropologist Eugene d’Aquili (1940–2001)
argues that the religious experience they called
Absolute Unitary Being (the ultimate or experi-
ence, the experience at the most intense moment
of meditation, which some also call pure con-
sciousness, or the highest state of consciousness)
Religious Experiences
is real – so real do these experiences appear when
recalled in baseline reality that they have the
ability to alter the way the experiencers live
their lives [. . .]. “[T]he word real is not here
used poetically or metaphorically. It is used in
the same sense as in the utterance ‘This rock and
this table are real’” (d’Aquili and Newberg 1999,
192). Neither James nor d’Aquili and Newberg
maintain that the object of the experience exists,
but regardless of whether it exists or not, the expe-
rience of it is real. For example, assume a person
who is afraid of snakes and sees the tail of a cat
wagging from behind some stones. The cat tail
seems to the person to be a snake. The person
will be frightened as though the snake was really
out there. In other words, the persons’ experience
of fear is real (Runehov 2007, Chap. 2).
When Is an Experience a Religious One?
Keith Yandell also argues that an experience is
a religious one if it is doctrinally and
soteriologically central to a religious tradition
(Yandell 1993, 15). In other words the experience
needs to be in accordance with the theory of faith
and of salvation central to a religious tradition.
Yandell wants to exclude those religions and
religious experiences that are implausible and
even evil (Yandell 1993, 15). Yandell distin-
guishes in addition between de facto evidence
and effective evidence and maintains that an
experience x is de facto evidence for a claim c if
the experience x meets the relevant conditions
(those conditions making the experience legiti-
mated) (Yandell 1993, 44). An experience x is
effective evidence if it is both de facto evidence
and accepted as such by the experiencer. For exam-
ple, person A seeing a cross on the water draws his
experience to the attention of person B. Assume
that person A recognizes the cross on the water to
be a Christian sign (de facto evidence) but argues
that the sign is formed by the sunlight reflecting on
the water (no effective evidence). Person B, on the
other hand, also recognizes the cross to be
a Christian sign but tells her friend A that seeing
the cross gave her an experience of ineffable joy, as
if she was touched by the Divine. Hence, person
2029 R
B’s experience will also be effective evidence,
while person A’s is not. Person B’s experience
has fulfilled the criteria to be a religious experi-
ence, person A’s has not done so.
Following Alston’s thinking, there is the pos-
sibility that even though a person does not recog-
nize the evidence for his experience, his
experience might be evidence for another person
(Alston 1991, 11–12). Moreover, one may actu-
ally be experiencing God without even being
disposed to identify the object of the experience
as God if the question arose, just as one can see
a cyclotron without realizing that what one sees is
a cyclotron. Indeed, how many people actually
know what a cyclotron looks like (Alston 1991,
11–12)? Moreover, it may also be the case that
the person refuses to recognize that it was
God presenting Godself to him or her (e.g., the
Pharaoh in Exodus).
The Object of Religious Experiences
Because religious experiences are subject to all
religions and not to, for example, the Christian
religion only, the understanding of God, the
Divine, or Ultimate Reality needs to be broad-
ened. For instance, in A Pluralist View, John Hick
intends with the Divine, God, or Ultimate Reality
as “absolutely real, [and] which corresponds suf-
ficiently to the Sanskrit sat and the Arabic al
Hagg” (Hick 1996, 47). In A Concise Encyclope-
dia of the Philosophy of Religion, Anthony R
Thiselton understands God as “the Ground of
Being” (Thiselton 2002, 307). Runehov com-
pletes and means that the Divine, God, or Ulti-
mate Reality is the absolute ground of everything
that is and ever will be (Runehov 2007, Chap. 2).
The advantage is that if we understand God as the
absolute ground of everything that is and ever will
be, then God could present Godself to a person in
a way that nobody has ever experienced and no
religion has yet thought about. That perceptions of
God are possible is defended by Alston by way of
his theory of appearance, dictating that “the notion
of x’s appearing to S as so-and-so is fundamental
and unanalysable [. . .]. For S to perceive x is
simply for x to appear to S so-and-so.” We should
R 2030
understand unanalyzable as “not analyzable in
terms of conceptualizations, beliefs, takings or
anything else of the sort” (Alston 1991, 55–59).
Alston also maintains that the theory of appear-
ance allows for the possibility that what is per-
ceived in an experience may diverge from what it
actually is (Alston 1991, 55). As an example,
Alston mentions Moses’ experience of God in
a burning bush (Leviticus 3:3–10).
Are Psychical Experiences Religious
Experiences?
According to what William Braud says in his
article “Brains, Science, Nonordinary & Tran-
scendent Experience,” psychical experiences are
not religious experiences, because according to
him, psychical experiences are those experiences
that people use to influence the world around
them using other than the common five senses
(Braud 2002, 124). The most common (or
known) psychical experiences are:
1. Clairvoyance, which roughly is a way of
mind-to-object communication or interaction.
It implies to have sudden knowledge of some
objective event, usually at a distance (Braud
2002, 124).
2. Precognition, which is about having accurate
knowledge of future events that have not yet
occurred and that could not have been
predicted on the basis of rational inference
nor accounted for on the basis of chance coin-
cidence (Braud 2002, 24–25).
3. Telepathy is a way of distant mind-to-mind
communication or interaction (Braud 2002,
124).
4. Psychokinesis is known as mind-matter inter-
action in which one’s attention and intention
may directly influence other persons, other
living systems, or inanimate physical systems
usually from a distance (Braud 2002, 125).
According to Runehov, the borderline
between religious and psychical experiences is
not always very clear, that is, religious experi-
ences may also be manifested by way of, for
example, clairvoyance (which in Christian tradi-
tions probably would be regarded as a vision) and
Religious Experiences
precognition (which in Christian traditions prob-
ably would be considered as prophecy).
Ways of Experiencing Religiously
There are different ways in which a person could
have religious experiences.
In Reason & Religious Belief, an Introduction
to the Philosophy of Religion, Michael Peterson’s
theory is that we have experiences in which we
actually participate (like playing chess) and those
in which we take part as witnesses (Peterson
2003, 16). Keith Yandell distinguishes between
perceptive experiences in which we are aware of
an object relative to us and introspective experi-
ences in which we are aware of an aspect (of the
subject of experience) relative to us (Yandell
1993, 42–43). However, introspection, as
Yandell defines it, should not be understood as
the act of looking into one’s own thoughts and
feelings. Rather, an introspective experience con-
cerns aspects rather than objects (Yandell 1993,
43, 38, 280). William Alston makes a division
between having sensory and nonsensory experi-
ences. His idea is that in sensory experiences,
something is literally presented to us in contrast
to nonsensory experiences where there is
a specifiable mode of consciousness through
which something is perceived (Alston 1991, 19–
23). Contrary to Yandell, Alston’s nonsensory
concept can be understood as a looking into
one’s own thoughts and feelings. Since God is
pure spirit, God will probably present Godself in
a nonsensory experience rather than in a sensory
one, for example, loving, powerful, or good.
A sensory religious experience would be
experiencing Jesus in human form: “[A]ccording
to the Christian doctrine, Jesus of Nazareth is
both man and God; so that to see him, even in
human form, is to see God” (Alston 1991, 20).
Out of Peterson’s, Yandell’s, and Alston’s the-
ories, Runehov constructs six adequate ways of
religious experiencing (Runehov 2007, Chap. 2):
1. The participating perceptive sensory way of
experiencing
2. The participating introspective sensory way of
experiencing
Religious Experiences
3. The participating introspective nonsensory
way of experiencing
4. The witnessing perceptive sensory way of
experiencing
5. The witnessing introspective sensory way of
experiencing
6. The witnessing introspective nonsensory way
of experiencing
Examples
Reading the scriptures is a good example of
a participating perceptive sensory way of
experiencing because one participates in the expe-
rience, the experience clearly has an object (the
scripture), and it involves one’s senses (eyes).
A religious experience obtained by way of
meditation in which the meditator repeats and
concentrates on a mantra would be an example
of a participating introspective sensory way of
experiencing because such experiences need the
experiencer’s participation, but the experience is
introspective, it has no objects; nevertheless, one
of the five senses are needed to have such an
experience.
A religious experience obtained by way of via
negativa meditation act would turn the experi-
ence into a participating introspective
nonsensory way of experiencing. The experience
is participating because to concentrate on some-
thing (emptying one’s mind of all thought) needs
one’s participation. It is introspective because the
idea of the via negativa meditation technique is to
empty one’s mind of all thought and the experi-
ence is nonsensory for the same reason.
Watching and witnessing (but not participat-
ing) in a mass would be examples of a witnessing
perceptive sensory way of experiencing. You wit-
ness how the preacher preaches without partici-
pating yourself. The experience involves objects,
and it hence is perceptive in kind, and you have to
use some of the five senses.
Experiencing God in nature would be an
excellent example of a witnessing introspective
sensory way of experiencing. One witnesses the
beauty of nature and recognizes God in it. The
experience is clearly introspective, and it is sen-
sory because you see the beauty of God in nature
and not merely in your thoughts.
2031 R
Finally, we find a distinguished example of a
witnessing introspective nonsensory way of
experiencing in Marcel Proust’s A la recherche
du temps perdu (Remembrance of Things Past). In
this frequently quoted experience, Proust does not
participate in the sensation which the eating of the
petites madeleines arouses, but instead witnesses
his past. Therefore, there is no object involved (he
experiences merely the memory of his aunt Léonie
dipping the madeleine cookie in her tea cup). Fur-
thermore, it is a nonsensory way of experiencing
because, even though it was the smell and taste of
the madeleine cookie that triggered the experience,
these are not the experience itself. Observe that this
witnessing introspective nonsensory experience has
evolved from a participating perceptive sensory
experience (the cookie’s smell and taste are merely
the channels that lead him to the experience of his
past). A religious experience of this kind would be
remembering the ceremony in church on a later
occasion, triggered or not by something.
Types of Religious Experience
There is a tremendous variety of religious expe-
rience. Alston, for instance, writes that “[i]n the
widest sense, ‘religious experience’ ranges over
any experiences one has in connection with one’s
religious life, including any joys, fears, or long-
ings one has in a religious context” (Alston 1991,
94); to name some: feeling thankful toward God or
Ultimate Reality, feeling guided by God or Ulti- R
mate Reality, seeing God or Ultimate Reality in
nature, feeling a sense of ecstasy, experiencing
pure consciousness, experiencing universal love,
having visions or revelations, experiencing
a union with God or Ultimate Reality, etc. In The
Existence of God, Richard Swinburne collects all
religious experiences in five main types which he
classified from the perspective of the experiencer
and which he considers to be mutually exclusive
and totally exhaustive of the possibilities (Swin-
burne 1979, 250–251). His categories are:
1. A religious experience obtained through
a perfectly ordinary nonreligious object
2. A religious experience obtained through very
unusual public objects
R 2032
3. A religious experience obtained through cer-
tain sensations private to himself or herself
that are of a kind describable by normal vocab-
ulary used for describing the sensations which
result from the use of our five senses
4. A religious experience obtained through pri-
vate sensations not describable by normal
vocabulary
5. A religious experience obtained without
sensations
Examples
Religious experiences obtained through a perfectly
ordinary nonreligious object (Swinburne 1979,
250). Among other possibilities, this might
include experiencing God or Ultimate Reality in
a beautiful sunset or in a piece of Gregorian
music. The sunset and the music are the channels
through which God or Ultimate Reality is
experienced.
Religious experiences perceived through very
unusual public objects (Swinburne 1979, 250).
Swinburne gives the example of the burning
bush which Moses claimed to be God appearing
to him in a fire out of that bush.
Religious experiences mediated through certain
sensations private to himself [or herself] and sen-
sations of a kind describable by normal vocabulary
used for describing the sensations which result
from the use of our five senses (Swinburne 1979,
250). Good examples are experiencing God in
a dream, in a vision, or during a trance. A specific
variant of this type of religious experience could
be experiences of God or Ultimate Reality in
near-death and life-beyond-life experiences.
Religious experiences mediated through private
sensations, yet these are not a kind describable by
normal vocabulary (Swinburne 1979, 251).
An example of such a religious experience,
experienced in a witnessing introspective sensory
way, comes from Saint Teresa of Avila who was
completely aware of Jesus sitting next to her and
was talking to her, even though she did not see him.
Religious experiences obtained without
sensations (Swinburne 1979, 251). For example,
this could be experiencing God or Ultimate Reality
intuitively and immediately. One intuitively
knows that it is God or Ultimate Reality that one
Religious Experiences
experiences. Nicholas of Cusa maintained that he
“perceive[d], not with [his] flesh eyes, which look
on this icon of [God], but with the eyes of [his]
mind and understanding, the invisible truth of
[God’s] face” (Peterson 2003, 19).
One religious experience is however not
covered by Swinburne’s classification but is
presented in Visions of Jesus by Philip Wiebe
(1997, 74–82): religious experiences with
observable effects (Runehov 2007, Chap 2.
inspired by Wiebe 1997, 74–82). These are expe-
riences in which more than one person is affected.
It may happen that two or more persons take part
in the same religious experience that they really
saw the same thing, or that one person undergoes
the experience while another (or others) felt
a tactile sensation. In Wiebe’s example, John
shared his room with Nathan who came down
with a virus and stayed in bed to recover. As
John was praying for Nathan one night, he
opened his eyes to look at his friend. He was
shocked to see someone standing over Nathan’s
bed, but facing and looking at him. John imme-
diately identified the person as Jesus, in part,
because of the sense of awe that the appearance
of the person evoked. John was about to tell his
sick friend what he was seeing when Jesus
reached over and placed his hand on Nathan’s
forehead and disappeared. At that instant, Nathan
leaped out of bed and ran down the halls of the
dormitory shouting, “I’ve been healed, I’ve been
healed.” Nathan later said that although he did not
see anyone, he felt something touch his head
(Wiebe 1997, 76).
At least since the 1970s, religious experiences
have become of increasing interest for neurosci-
entific studies. This has entailed the meaning of
religious experience changing from being a hard
to grasp abstract description of some mental state
(only of interest for a limited group of philoso-
phers and theologians) to becoming a measurable
function of the brain (of interest for both
researchers and laymen). Even if sacred or
neural, the potential of neuroscience to explain
religious experience engages in the problem’s
causes by neuroscientific studies on the issue,
and the explanation of these studies is left to the
neuroscientists themselves.
Religious Studies 2033 R
Cross-References Wiebe, P. H. (1997). Visions of Jesus. Oxford, UK/
New York: Oxford University Press.
Yandell, K. (1993). The epistemology of religious experi-
▶ Consciousness ence. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
▶ Experience
▶ Meditation
▶ Neuropsychology
▶ Neuroscience Religious Faith
▶ Religious Experience
▶ Revelation ▶ Faith and Belief
▶ Spirituality

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Alston, W. (1991). Perceiving God: The epistemology of ▶ Practical Theology

religious experience. New York: Cornell University
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Braud, W. (2002). Brains, science, nonordinary & tran-
scendent experiences. In R. Joseph (Ed.),
NeuroTheology, brain, science, spirituality, religious Religious Ritual
experiences (pp. 123–135). California: University
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d’Aquili, E. G., & Newberg, A. B. (1999). The mystical
mind: Probing the biology of religious experience.
Minneapolis: Fortress Press.
Edwards, J. (1959/2004) A treatise concerning religious
affections, Electronic version, www.netlibrary.com. Religious Sociology
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Hick, J. (1996). A pluralist view. In J. Hick, C. H. Pinnock, ▶ Catholic Sociology
A. E. McGrath, R. D. Geivett, & W. G. Phillips (Eds.),
Four views on salvation in a pluralistic world.
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James, W. (1997). Varieties of religious experience. Religious Studies
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Otto, R. (1970). The idea of the Holy. London: Oxford
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(2003). Reason & religious belief, an introduction to the Colorado Denver, Denver, CO, USA
philosophy of religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Proudfoot, W. (1985). Religious experience. Berkley,
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Runehov, A. L. C. (2007). Sacred or neural? The potential “Comparative Religion,” “World Religions”
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Schleiermacher, F. (1928/1976). The Christian faith.
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Swinburne, R. (1979). The existence of God. Oxford, UK: Religious Studies is an academic discipline that
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philosophy of religion. Oxford, UK: Oneworld.
classed in the division of humanities. Typically,
Weber, M. (1968). Economy and society. In P. Hamilton
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R 2034
specialists in subfields, though the subject is also
sometimes housed in Departments of Philoso-
phy. The distinction between “Religious Stud-
ies” and “religion” is an important one.
Reference to “religion” will sometimes be
taken automatically to imply adherence to
a specific religion. But “Religious Studies”
refers to the disinterested, academic study of
religion that assumes a secondary position, at
a step removed from the actual beliefs and prac-
tices of a given religion. Academicians in Reli-
gious Studies study the various aspects of
religion, such as its belief systems, ritual
forms, the role it plays in peoples’ lives and in
society at large, and so on.
In the West, religion was one of the first areas
to become the object of serious study. Many of
the original universities in Europe owe their
beginnings to religious orders. The traditional
model of “religious” schools, whose program of
instruction involves the promotion of a particular
religious belief, still survives today in the form of
seminaries and schools of ▶ theology. Students
in these institutions are typically interested in
ordination or a career in religious service. Their
programs of study vary in important ways from
the curricula of modern Religious Studies depart-
ments which do not promote belief in any
religion.
The academic study of religion is grounded in
the same ▶ enlightenment norms which produced
the critical, “scientific” method of examination of
other subjects in the university. Religion is exam-
ined in the light of reason following the principles
of ▶ critical thinking. ▶ Enlightenment rational-
ism produced a methodology called “secular
humanism” which approached the Bible from
a “secular” point of view, that is, unaffiliated
with any religion’s ▶ theology, and considered
the Bible to be a work of human hand,
containing human error. This naturally produced
waves of reaction, as those who viewed the
Bible as the unquestioned holy word of God,
attempted to counter the arguments of Biblical
scholars.
Religious Studies might be said to have orig-
inated in the mid-nineteenth century, with the
groundbreaking work of German scholar Max
Religious Studies
M€uller, who is sometimes referred to as the
father of the “science of religion.” He was also
among the first to open up to the West some of
the great works of Eastern religions, such as the
Vedas and Upanishads of India. This had an
enormous impact on Western scholarship,
when it was recognized that the subject “reli-
gion” had been held unconsciously to be synon-
ymous with Christianity, or at its broadest range,
“Judeo-Christian” traditions. In the wake of
M€uller’s influence, scholars began to turn their
attention to all the other religious traditions of
the world. Because early researchers concen-
trated on the question of the origins of religion,
they focused on religion in primal or indigenous
societies. Among the most prominent of the
earliest researchers were E. B. Tylor, (Religion
in Primitive Culture, 1871), James G. Frazer
(The Golden Bough: A Study in Comparative
Religion, 12 Vols. 1911–1919), Claude Levi-
Strauss (The Savage Mind: Introduction to the
Science of Mythology, 1912), Lucien Levy-
Br€uhl, (Primitives and the Supernatural, 1935),
Bronislaw Malinowski, (Magic, Science and
Religion, 1935), and Max Weber (The Sociology
of Religion, 1922).
Due to this early emphasis on the study of
“primitive religion,” many of the earliest scholars
on religion came from anthropology. But soon,
scholars from other fields began to address the
subject of religion including sociologists (Max
Weber), psychologists (Sigmund Freud, Carl
Jung, Abraham Maslow), and literary scholars
and critics (Robert Graves, Northrop Frye).
Because of this background, Religious Studies
has suffered from a chronic case of identity crisis.
Is it a subsection of anthropology as it was for
Tylor, Levy-Br€uhl, and Malinowski, or is religion
more properly an issue for psychologists to
explore? Some contend that Religious Studies
has not really developed its own methodologies,
but borrows these from other disciplines. Some
have even suggested that Religious Studies
should disappear as a separate field and the vari-
ous lines of the discipline be absorbed back into
those parent disciplines. Other scholars struggle
to develop methodologies that are unique to Reli-
gious Studies.
Religious Studies
Because of its very nature, religion must
be approached within a multidisciplinary frame-
work. It is so widespread that to date, no society
has been found anywhere in the world that does
not have religion. Religion is a multifaceted phe-
nomenon, with a public dimension, involving
social norms and overarching worldview. On
the private side, religious experiences are
among the most profound an individual can
have. Religion has inspired powerful institutional
forms and literary and artistic works throughout
history and across the globe. The degree of inter-
action between a religious tradition and its host
society makes it essential to consider for
a genuine understanding of that culture.
Because of this extraordinary degree of over-
lap with other disciplines, a kind of “dimension”
or “subfield” approach to the subject of religion
has emerged. These include ▶ theology, philoso-
phy of religion, ontology/metaphysics/cosmol-
ogy, ethics, history of religions, psychology of
religion, anthropology of religion, sociology of
religion, the sociopolitical dimension of religion,
myth and ritual studies, religion and literature,
and religion and art.
Developments in the field include this ongoing
debate over the definition of our core term “reli-
gion” and what methodologies could/should be
used to study it. In addition, each subfield hosts
its own vigorous debates. We might mention two
exciting new developments as representative of
the robust scholarship in the field: first, in the area
of New Testament studies, the convening of the
“Jesus Seminar” by Robert Funk, beginning in
the mid-1980s, whose work continues to impact
the discipline profoundly. The Fellows of the
Seminar, a collection of some of the most
respected scholars in the world in this field,
closely examined the traditions assigned to
Jesus in the text of the New Testament. One
finding of the Seminar is that Jesus probably
never said some 80 % of what is attributed to
him in the New Testament. Second, the exciting
work of the “Pluralism Project,” spearheaded by
Harvard professor Diana Eck, represents an
attempt to take the pulse of the growth and sig-
nificance of religious pluralism in contemporary
American society.
2035 R
Self-Identification
Science
Max M€uller, one of the founders of the modern
discipline of Religious Studies entitled his
endeavor, the “science of religion.” What he
meant by “science” is informed by the ▶ enlight-
enment norms of “▶ critical thinking.” The
extent to which the discipline of Religious Stud-
ies is founded on and continues in that vein with
twentieth and twenty-first century challenges and
modifications is the extent to which Religious
Studies could be considered a “science.”
Included in these “scientific” norms of scholar-
ship are careful attention to sources of informa-
tion and their legitimacy, weighing of possible
alternative explanations, grounding in evidence,
consistency and validity of argument as a basis
for sound conclusions which always remain prob-
abilistic and not absolute or colored by personal
bias, and sensitivity to the meta-questions, that is,
what criteria are to be used and by whom to
determine the validity of any answers offered to
these questions?
Religion
Religious Studies is the academic discipline that
studies the phenomena of religion from the perspec-
tive of critical analysis. As an academic field, Reli-
gious Studies does not profess religion as such, so it
could not properly be called a “religion” itself.
However, what may be relevant here is the dilemma
for many in the field, of functioning as an academic R
professional in Religious Studies, and following
one’s own religion or spiritual path. Here, the
waters can get murky. In some subareas within
the discipline, adherence to a religion and studying
it academically are explicitly intertwined. Many
scholars in the field of Islamic Studies today, for
example, are themselves practicing Muslims. In
fact, some institutions will require a professor in
their program to adhere to a specific religious per-
spective, as in the explicit mission statements of
Evangelical, Catholic, or Rabbinic institutions. The
majority of these self-identify as theological
schools. In programs that do not specifically iden-
tify with a religion, academics often walk a fine
line. In general, the attitude of the discipline is that
R 2036
if individual scholars do hold any specific religious
beliefs, such views remain their own private busi-
ness and are not to be put forward as a basis for
instruction in their classes or in their published
work. The discipline places prime importance on
avoiding any semblance of advocacy of any specif-
ically religious point of view.
Characteristics
The extent of the overlap of Religious Studies
with so many other disciplines is due to the
many dimensions of religion itself. Yet no matter
whether the approach is historical, philosophical,
social, or political, there is still something in the
mixture that makes it “religion.” This religious
element itself is the focus of Religious Studies,
whereas for scholars in other disciplines, “reli-
gion” is a subset of their primary interest. The
proof that Religious Studies really constitutes its
own field is seen when we focus on the specifics.
Religious Studies overlaps with anthropology
and owes its origins, in part, to their ranks, but
that discipline only focuses on the cultural
aspects of religion, not the psychological or phil-
osophical. Nor would the subject of European
religious history be a traditional topic in the
field of anthropology. This might belong more
to a history curriculum, yet the historian’s interest
in religion will not typically extend to the cosmo-
logical and philosophical questions themselves.
Whereas metaphysics and ethics clearly overlap
with the subject of philosophy, studies of sha-
manism, or religious ritual, do not appear to
belong naturally to a philosophy curriculum.
Each discipline will represent a piece of this
multifaceted “thing” we call religion. Yet all
these are traditionally recognized topics within
Religious Studies.
What it is exactly that makes something “reli-
gious” is a question that fuels great debate in the
field. The referent of “religion” is the sacred, the
divine, and is itself ineffable, beyond description,
so that it will always elude precise definition. It
cannot be properly “defined” because something
like “the sacred” is not a category that is itself
“definite” or “finite.” The factor that makes
Religious Studies
something “religious” is finally a je ne sais
quoi, as the French would have it, an “I don’t
know what.” Seemingly always present in the
“religious” is the quality of awe, the experience
of numinosity, around which “religious” teach-
ings and institutions evolve. Here, the “religious”
overlaps with the “spiritual” and is taken to con-
vey the qualities of awe, numinosity, meaning,
value and recognition of the sacred and of the
operation of conscience and consciousness. It is
Religious Studies’ engagement with this central
factor of awe/numinosity that makes it distinctive
from other disciplines.
Relevance to Science and Religion
It might seem at first blush that science and reli-
gion are enemies of a sort in the postmodern
world. Some religious believers feel science is
somehow denying truths that they live by, but
which cannot be empirically demonstrated.
Those who speak for science in public debate
often claim that “science” is a methodology that
asks certain kinds of questions, how’s not why’s.
Science can only speak in the language of empir-
icism, so it claims to have no way to legitimately
arrive at answers to “religious” or “spiritual”
questions and thus ultimately should not be rele-
vant to “spiritual” matters. “Religion” becomes
an “enemy” to scientists in cases when “religion”
influences school boards to prohibit the teaching
of the theory of evolution in public schools. The
pressure the “religious right” exerts on this issue
and others, such as the development of stem-cell
research, which stands poised to introduce the
next revolution in medical science, becomes
problematic for scientists who want to see their
work grow in these areas unfettered by religious
bias. “Science,” for its part, examines physical
phenomena using empirical methods to derive
data and draws tentative conclusions about these
data, in order to add to the sum of human knowl-
edge about our world. “Religion” involves
“belief,” whereas “science” deals only with
observable “fact.”
However, religion scholars point out that
when examined in depth, at its foundation,
Religious Studies
“science” also entails “belief” and operates on
unproven, because unprovable, presuppositions
that finally must be taken on “faith.” One such
scientific axiom is that our senses do report accu-
rate information about our world. This ultimately
is a philosophical question, to which there is no
absolute answer. This very assumption is called
into question by early twentieth-century scientist
Werner Heisenberg’s “Uncertainty Principle”
and the theories in quantum physics of the
“participating observer” who inescapably distorts
whatever “facts” are observed.
Thus, in the debate over definitions in Reli-
gious Studies, “science” itself could be under-
stood as a kind of “religion.” The two bear an
underlying affinity because both of them are
essentially worldviews. “Science” and “religion”
ask some of the same questions: Who are we?
How did we get here? Why are we here? The
answers to these questions that a given individual
accepts, whether they are “scientific” or “reli-
gious/spiritual,” will constitute that individual’s
“worldview” and his or her vision of the universe
and place in it. Both “science” and “religion/
▶ spirituality” function as paradigms and models
through which experience is filtered. They clash
head-on only when considered from the point of
view of rigid approaches of both scientific meth-
odologies and absolutist religious dogma.
But these very public “culture wars” by and
large are being waged by the most extreme rep-
resentatives of “religion.” When one looks
beyond the raucous public display of hard-line
animosity into the academic study of religion,
a very lively and much more sympathetic conver-
sation has been shared between “religion/▶ spir-
ituality” and “science.” Their points of
intersection find perhaps no better illustration
than in the example of Albert Einstein, one of
the most influential figures of the twentieth cen-
tury. Einstein was a “scientist,” who initiated
a sea change or “paradigm shift” in his own
field of physics. Yet he was also
a “philosopher,” who eloquently articulated
a “spiritual” orientation toward the universe that
could be called “cosmic consciousness.” We
need an interdisciplinary approach that encom-
passes “science” and “▶ spirituality” just to
2037 R
appreciate the work of Einstein, let alone the
phenomena toward which he pointed.
The new paradigm shifts from viewing things
as mechanical objects toward perceiving them as
complex, interacting systems with emergent
properties. It regards the older scientific para-
digm as reductionistic of phenomena that are far
too complex to be adequately represented by
quantifiable data alone. The centerpiece of the
new paradigm is the recognition of active (even
“conscious”) holistic systems interacting on sub-
atomic, physical, biological, psychological,
social, environmental, and spiritual levels. The
emerging paradigm in the sciences has led to
exciting new developments such as relativity
theory; chaos theory; string theory; quantum
physics; theories of strange attractants, synchro-
nicities, nonlocality, and interconnectedness; and
phenomena that are quite familiar in a “religious/
spiritual” context.
In environmental science, the paradigm shift
has produced the Gaia model of the earth as
a superorganism biosphere central to sustainabil-
ity studies, representing a reemergence, in mod-
ern scientific dress, of ancient mother-earth
worldviews. The emerging paradigm is an eco-
paradigm that self-consciously invokes a sacred
earth/sacred cosmos worldview.
In the medical sciences, the paradigm shift has
produced a wave of holistic, complementary, and
alternative medical practices that use non-
Western spiritual healing techniques which have
been inherently holistic since their inception. R
Models for bringing issues in health care and
spirituality together are being incorporated in
medical curricula across the country, as in the
University of Massachusetts Medical School’s
“Center for Mindfulness” and the University of
Pennsylvania Medical School’s “Center for Spir-
ituality and the Mind.”
Proponents of the new paradigm posit that
meaning/value/awe/conscious (“spiritual”)
dimensions are at work in physical, biological,
environmental, psychological, social, and health
phenomena (science). These dimensions call for
open-minded dialogue and broad interdisciplin-
ary overview that avoids the compartmentalizing
of the old paradigm. So in the end, appearances
R 2038
are deceiving. “Science” and “religion” really do
intersect with each other to a far more profound
extent than one might suspect on the surface.
These developments in cutting-edge science
have produced an exciting arena of discussion
and cross-fertilization between “science” and
“spirituality,” leading to a dizzying array of
works by scientists, such as Fritjof Capra’s The
Tao of Physics, Brian Greene’s The Elegant Uni-
verse, and Gary Zukov’s The Dancing Wu Li
Masters.
Sources of Authority
Religious Studies maintains a rigorous academic
review program, including a range of over 200
scholarly journals and international professional
societies, such as the American Academy of Reli-
gion and the Society for Biblical Literature.
Scholars of religion do not assume an authorita-
tive voice on any of religion’s great impondera-
ble questions; they only examine the answers that
religious systems themselves have offered.
Sometimes, a scholar’s theories will gain a wide
credence across the field and become normative
for other scholars. Examples might include the
“documentary hypothesis” in Old Testament
Studies, in which nineteenth-century Biblical
scholar Julius Wellhausen discerned at least
four separate authors from different time periods
of the Torah, the first five books of the “Old
Testament.” In New Testament studies, it is the
mid-twentieth-century scholar Rudolph Bult-
mann who set the standard; his students domi-
nated this field for decades. Another example
might be cited in the “history of religions” school
founded by Mircea Eliade at the University of
Chicago’s Divinity School, a tradition carried
on by his students and colleagues, Joachim
Wach, Joseph Kitagawa, and others.
Ethical Principles
Academic norms apply to Religious Studies in
the area of “ethical principles” as well. These
principles include professionalism, courtesy,
Religious Studies
acknowledgement of the work of fellow
scholars, respect for all points of view, and the
importance of treating each individual with dig-
nity. This basic ethic of respect and empathy
can be quite difficult in an area like religion,
where intense emotions can at times reach
fanatical levels. Respect for the atheist, as only
one example, can sometimes prove too much of
a challenge for some religious zealots. The dis-
cipline of Religious Studies insists on such
basic ethical principles as mutual respect and
courtesy.
Key Values
As an academic field of study, Religious Studies
places prime value on the norms of ▶ critical
thinking that inform all scholarship. Yet, due to
the ineffable nature of the referent, the object of
religion, scholars cannot ignore the extra or
nonrational aspects of their subject. Value is
also placed in this field, on intuitive faculties,
depth of feeling, and experience. The extraordi-
nary value religion places on “the sacred” is held
in high regard by academics who study religion.
Whereas religious adherents sometimes accuse
academic “critics” of “attacking” what to them
is “holy scripture”; in fact, Religious Studies
scholars place tremendous value on the religious
texts, works of art, rituals, and traditions of the
various religions they study, for the wealth of
information they afford, as well as for their pro-
found beauty and elegance of expression of
humankind’s deepest longings and most gripping
experiences.
Conceptualization
Being an academic field of study, Religious
Studies is a step removed from the beliefs
and practices of religion itself and as such
does not take a specific position on what con-
stitutes any of these terms, each of which is
a core modality of religion/▶ spirituality.
Because of this second-level removal, each of
these terms will be “answered” by providing
Religious Studies
examples of the kinds of perspectives religious
traditions themselves have assumed toward
them. In the case of each term, meanings and
values cover a spectrum:
Nature/World
From the “ensouled universe” of many primal
religions that envision spirits, nymphs, and fairies
to enliven natural features of the environment to
the nature as the living body of God, as viewed by
pantheists; to the world as a prison-house in
which we sojourn as aliens, of the Platonists;
and to the fallen world which has been plunged
into sin by human disobedience against God for
the Christians, for whom the physical world is the
testing ground for earning one’s way back to
one’s “true home” in heaven.
Human Being
From the dignified seat of the sacred and kin to all
other living beings characteristic of Native Amer-
ican and other indigenous religions; to flawed
sinner who is redeemed only by the savior Jesus
Christ for Christians; and to the “Atman,” the true
or higher self in Hindu yogic traditions, that is
“indivisible,” identical with “Brahman,”
Godhead.
Life and Death
From that which is infused with “ruach” in
Hebrew, “pneuma” in Greek, or the “breath,”
or “spirit,” of God in the Jewish and Christian
perspectives, as life’s origin is described in
Genesis: God breathed into all life the breath
of life, and they became living beings; to the
continuous unfolding of divine energy as
poured into the material plane in Hinduism;
▶ death: from the “wages of sin” and victory
of the Evil Lord of the Christian and Zoroas-
trian perspectives, yet the saved among human-
ity will earn eternal paradise after dying, with
a corresponding damnation in hell for those not
saved, as in the Christian and Islamic traditions;
to the concept of “samsara” in Hinduism and
Buddhism, the “stream” of continual reincarna-
tions after death until the deliverance of enlight-
enment can be won by one’s own spiritual
efforts.
2039 R
Reality
From the basic observable world of the senses of
the atheist (whose perspective must be included
somewhere under the rubric of Religious Studies,
which studies topics in theism and atheism), to
the unfolding of the Tao, the Way of nature,
which arose from the interaction of yin and
yang, negative and positive energies, in the Tao-
ist tradition, and to the concept of “maya,” char-
acteristic of classical Indian religion, that the
physical world is an illusion, a “mayic/magic”
show, while true reality is entirely unseen but
ubiquitous, its true nature, divine.
Knowledge
For Religious Studies proper, knowledge is the
product that is built up by academic methods of
investigation, study, and analysis of religious
phenomena. For some of the religions them-
selves, true “knowledge” shows its significance
by reference to its etymological kin: it is “gnosis”
in Greek and “jnana” in Sanskrit, which point to
the mystical, direct apprehension of the divine in
Platonic and Hindu traditions.
Truth
Another key technical term in the field of Reli-
gious Studies, taken variously to apply to the
“real” nature of the universe, as opposed to its
oblique appearance to the senses, that it is infused
with the divine in many spiritual traditions; to the
hidden nugget of existence that once grasped will
deliver its bearer from suffering as in the Chris- R
tian adage, “you shall know the truth and the truth
shall set you free”; and to the truth of the atheist
that the world is devoid of any spiritual entity or
aura, no matter how much religious believers
want to imbue it with such. For Religious Studies
scholars, knowledge always remains tentative
and hypothetical, subject to modification as new
data emerge, so no academician can finally pro-
nounce what is “true.”
Perception
A faculty of apprehension which is one of the
“skandhas,” the “aspects” that constitute the
human being in Buddhism that will misdirect its
owner to cling to the object of perception and thus
R 2040
end up in a condition of suffering and to the
individual’s determinant of reality for the quan-
tum physicist who studies the effect of perception
on reality. For Religious Studies scholars, per-
ception entails the manner in which a given
scholar views religious phenomena. Such percep-
tion can be colored by religious or antireligious
bias, whether the scholar is aware of it or not.
Time
Viewed in two primary ways across religious
traditions, first is the cyclical concept of time,
characteristic of the annual festival sequences of
Paganism and indigenous traditions, and the
complex cosmological system of Hinduism that
counts cycles within cycles of never-ending time
in trillions of year blocks; secondly, the concept
of linear time, often said to have been introduced
by the ancient Jews, who reckoned time as having
begun with God’s creation of the universe and has
progressed through events, from past to future,
and in apocalyptic thought of late Judaism, Zoro-
astrianism, Christianity, and Islam, will culmi-
nate in an end of time when the dead will be
raised and the saved will inherit the “kingdom
of heaven.”
Consciousness
Another of the key terms in Religious Studies that
is ultimately ineffable. It covers a range from the
concept of the network of consciousness posited
by some quantum theorists, a membrane that
allows communication across molecules and
cells, to the core principle of primal energy sym-
bolized by the “kundalini” in the Hindu tradition;
its focus will determine if an individual manifests
power or sexual consciousness, appetite, compas-
sion, and artistic or spiritual consciousness,
crowned by the achievement of transcendental
or God consciousness.
Rational/Reason
This is the core method of approach assumed
toward religion in the academic field of Religious
Studies, inherited from the eighteenth-century
European ▶ enlightenment model of dispassion-
ate, unbiased examination of religious phenom-
ena in the light of reason. Conclusions drawn
Religious Studies
about any object of study must be based on
demonstrable data and sound argumentation and
be responsive to criticism.
Mystery
Another core category approached by academics
in Religious Studies. Religion/▶ spirituality is
the product that flows out from the wellspring of
the core mystery of existence. Religion’s texts
and rituals provide the believer a mechanism for
direct experience of the numinous and bring one
into encounter with the essential mystery of exis-
tence, characterized by foundational religion
scholar Rudolf Otto, as the mysterium tremendum
et fascinans. Engagement with this essential mys-
tery of the universe is the very stuff of religion.
Relevant Themes
Owing to its grounding in ▶ enlightenment ratio-
nalist perspectives, and its promotion of courtesy
toward, and empathy for all religious and
nonreligious points of view, the “scientific” aca-
demic study of religion has been of enormous
service to contemporary society. In this era of
religious posturing, fanaticism, and terrorism
which bases itself on religion, it is more impor-
tant than ever for scholars to offer a sound edu-
cation in this volatile subject, religion.
Cross-References
▶ Buddhism in the West
▶ Consciousness, the Problem of
▶ Cosmology
▶ Ethics
▶ Faith and Belief
▶ Humanities
▶ Meaning, the Concept of
▶ Philosophy of Religion
▶ Psychology of Religion
▶ Religion, History of
▶ Religion, Sociology of
▶ Religion, Theory of
▶ Religiosity
▶ Religious Experiences
Revealed Knowledge 2041 R
▶ Ritual
▶ Science and Religion Dialogue and the Reproductive Success
Interreligious Dialogue
▶ Theism, Classical ▶ Biology of Religion
▶ Truth
▶ Worldview
Research Design
References
▶ Methodology in Psychology
Daniel, P. (2006). Eight theories of religion (2nd ed.).
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Emile, D. (1995). Elementary forms of religious life.
New York: Simon & Schuster. Research Methods
Huston, S. (1991). The world’s religions. San Francisco:
Harper. ▶ Methodology in Psychology
Jacques, W. (1960). Classical appraches to the study of
religion. New York: Macmilan.
Mircea, E. (1959). The sacred and the profane: The nature
of religion. New York: Harcourt.
Rudolf, O. (1958). The idea of the holy. Oxford: Oxford Residual Vision
University Press.
Streng, F. J. (1976). Understanding religious life. Encino: ▶ Blindsight
Dickenson.
William, J. (1961). The varieties of religious experience.
New York: Modern Library.
Respiratory Medicine

▶ Pulmonary
Religious/Spiritual Marketplace

Alexander Darius Ornella

Department of Humanities/Religion, University
Respirology
of Hull, Hull, United Kingdom
▶ Pulmonary

R
The term usually refers to the plurality and variety
of religious offers in culture. In addition to tradi- Restoring Health
tional and institutional religious communities,
today, new “competitors” enter the marketplace ▶ History of Medicine
where the individual can choose from whatever
offer caters best to his/her religious needs. Media,
for example, books, television, films, websites of
religious communities and new religious move- Revealed Knowledge
ments, is one place where this religious or spiritual
marketplace becomes manifest. Carl Raschke
Department of Religious Studies, University
of Denver, Denver, CO, USA
Religiousness
Knowledge that cannot be attained through
▶ Religiosity philosophical, or the merely human, powers of
R 2042
reason and inquiry, but through God’s revelation
in Scripture. Unlike Catholic Medieval theolo-
gians, the Protestant Reformers insisted that the
attainment of all “higher” knowledge depends on
the illumined understanding gained through a
close and consistent reading of Scripture. Reli-
gious traditions and ancient authorities are not on
a level of parity with this kind of knowledge.
Revelation
Mark Sluys
Department of Theology, Johannelund
Theological University College, Uppsala,
Sweden
Related Terms
Christian faith; Philosophy of religion
In theistic religions, especially the Abrahamic
religions of ▶ Judaism, ▶ Christianity, and
Islam, God is often thought of as a God that
reveals. Yet ideas about divine revelation are
not as clear as might be expected given their
prominence in many religious discussions. It is
important to be aware of some of the chief ways
divine revelation has been conceived in order to
better understand some of the main discussions.
Therefore, we will look at different models of
revelation in the first section and then two broad
categorizations of it in the second. It is also com-
monly thought among religious people that any
divine revelation that takes place is intentional.
God is in full control and sees to it that we are
able to see or come to know what is required to
flourish as persons by not only letting us discover
things, but also by revealing things to us. This
idea of intentional divine agency will mainly be
taken up here by talking of views of revelation
that stress God’s agency. In talking about action
there is an act-object ambiguity that it is impor-
tant to be aware of. This will be discussed in
combination with the different models of revela-
tion. In the third section, we will then proceed to
Revelation
talk about propositional content in order to bring
some clarity into what role such content might
play in revelation. Then, before summing up, we
will discuss different ways revelation is related
to truth.
Models of Revelation
Various models have been put forward for divine
revelation. Avery Dulles has a categorization of
different models of revelation that has received
much attention in numerous discussions of
revelation (Dulles 1985). Dulles distinguishes
between five main models of revelation. The
models are abstractions, so in practice the differ-
ent models can overlap each other. Since many
people have found Dulles’ categorization of
models to be helpful, it is worth presenting them
here. The five models are revelation as doctrine,
history, inner experience, dialectical presence,
and new awareness.
1. Revelation as doctrine is essentially a model
that focuses on speech acts and their content.
A catch phrase for this model is “The God
who speaks.” God’s speaking to people can
be revelation. (See Mavrodes (1988) and
Wolterstorff (1995) for a discussion of this
type of model.)
2. Revelation as history is essentially a model
that emphasizes that divine revelation takes
place in history. So the phenomena that do
the revealing or manifesting are historical.
A catch phrase for this model is “The God
who acts” and it is meant by this that God
acts in history. (See Baillie (1956) and
Mavrodes (1988) for a discussion of this type
of model).
3. Revelation as inner experience, also empha-
sizes the acts of God, but here the phenom-
ena that do the manifesting are not external
to the self, but internal. Friedrich Schleier-
macher, for example, emphasized people’s
feeling of absolute dependence on God. The
main focus in this model is on people’s
inner religious experience (See Schleierma-
cher (1963) for an example of this type of
model).
Revelation
4. Revelation as dialectical presence emphasizes
an encounter with God. If one does not
encounter God and realize that this places
certain demands on one (divine imperatives
in Emil Brunner’s terminology), then no
divine revelation has taken place. This is so
because all divine revelation is encounter with
God. The focus in this model is on God’s
initiating an I-Thou encounter (See Brunner
(1964) for an example of this type of model).
5. Revelation as new awareness emphasizes
subjective awareness and human agency in
contrast to divine agency. People find meaning
for the ultimate questions of life through their
shared reflection on the world and themselves.
The focus is on our arriving at a new
consciousness or awareness by correlating
ultimate questions with the meaning that can
be found in religious sources. God comes into
the picture as a ground for this meaning.
(See Teilhard de Chardin (1971) for an
example of this type of model).
Several things should be pointed concerning
these models before going on. First, it is impor-
tant to be aware of an ambiguity called the
“act-object ambiguity.” If, for example, one
talks of Martin Luther King’s famous speech “I
have a dream,” one can mean the datable activity
of speaking or the content of what was said. The
speech-content is easily obtainable. The speech-
activity is no longer available, it being a historical
event – even if recordings of the event may be
available. So in talking of King’s speech one can
be concerned with the activity, the content or
both. This act-object ambiguity applies to many
acts and their content including revelation. So
both the act of revealing and its content may be
referred to as revelation.
We can also note concerning these models that
religious sources support more than one model.
For example, it is easy to find support for both of
the first two models in biblical sources. For
instance, there is this passage: “Now Samuel did
not yet know the Lord, and the word of the Lord
had not yet been revealed to him” (1 Samuel 3.7,
NRSV used here and hereafter). Furthermore,
one has passages like this one: “The secret things
belong to the Lord our God, but the revealed
2043 R
things belong to us and to our children forever,
to observe all the words of this law” (Deuteron-
omy 29.29). Such passages are seen as assuming
that God speaks, but that it is not always clear that
God is doing this, yet that it can be made clear and
that it is then important to live in accordance with
what is said. This supports well the revelation
as doctrine model in which the focus is on
a “God who speaks.”
At the same time we can see that the bible uses
“revelation” for open divine activity in the his-
torical arena. For instance, one can read, “Thus
says the LORD: Maintain justice, and do what is
right, for soon my salvation will come, and my
deliverance be revealed” (Isaiah 56.1). What is
revealed here is the deliverance, so it is the con-
tent of the revelation. Yet at the same time the
deliverance is apparently not only the content of
the revelation, but also the activity that reveals.
So this is arguably a case of revealing something
by doing it openly. One can often reveal that one
can do something by doing it openly or that one is
in the process of doing something by doing it
openly instead of secretly. In this passage, it
may well be that God is even then in the process
of providing deliverance – even though not as
openly and strongly as would soon be manifested.
Something more than openness is meant, though,
when it is said that help will soon be revealed. It is
not only that God’s deliverance is under way
before it dawns on us, but also that when it
dawns it will come with the intensity of
a sunrise on a bright summer day. Hope in such R
deliverance can make biblical authors say such
things as, “I consider that the sufferings of this
present time are not worth comparing with the
glory about to be revealed to us” (Romans 8.18).
All this supports a view of revelation in which
God is a God who acts in history – even if a part of
history is still in the making.
Note though that all of the above models
except for the new awareness model have spoken
of God’s agency to some degree: through God’s
speaking, through God’s acting in such a way as
to be experienced in history or in inner religious
experiences, or through God’s initiating an
I-Thou encounter. The new awareness model, in
contrast, has spoken of people’s coming to a new
R 2044
consciousness of religious answers by correlating
them to life’s ultimate questions. So even though
the answers have a religious content to them, it is
persons who do the correlating of the answers
with the questions.
In thinking of the dialectical presence model
of revelation it is important to think of it in the
right way. One should not, for example, ask how
can one grasp a revelation, if there is not already
an existing revelation waiting to be grasped. This
would misrepresent the view by making it look
incoherent. To help understand this model, one
can draw an analogy with the planting of seeds.
On the one hand, there are various models of
revelation that see (or at least leave it open
whether it is possible to see) revelation as
the spreading of seed that can have, as
a consequence of the nature of the seed and its
nurture, a fruitful harvest in people’s lives
(understanding in the case we are talking about).
This model, on the other hand, sees the fruitful
harvest as revelation, the spread seed having
become fruitful by being nurtured or taken in
productively. Revelation in this model can also
be seen on the analogy of something’s turning
out to be persuasive, such as a credible argument.
Just as a credible argument must persuade
someone in order to turn out to be persuasive,
something that is intelligible and has the potential
to be revelation must be grasped by someone in
order to turn out to be revelation.
Now it is time to continue to two other major
categorizations of revelation: general and special
revelation. These categories are ones that all the
above models can use.
Revelation: General and Special
It is common to employ two major categories of
revelation: general revelation and special revela-
tion. In order to be properly classified as general
revelation a purported revelation must be gener-
ally available by general means. As noted above,
some people claim that there is no revelation that
is not grasped. If this is assumed, then what is
made available and called “general revelation”
above is at most the continuous possibility of
Revelation
revelation that is found in creation and the course
of history. It becomes (general) revelation only
when understood (generally). To be properly
classified as special revelation, on the other
hand, a purported revelation, while not being
generally available, must be available for some
person or other through special means and at
some particular time. Or, again, if one claims
that there is no revelation that is not grasped,
then what is called “special revelation” above is
simply a unique possibility for revelation. It
becomes special revelation when grasped by
a particular person.
It should be noted that traditionally it was
believed that something could be divine revela-
tion even if not grasped as such. A central reason
for this is the concern to speak of a general rev-
elation of God even if not grasped generally and
this would be impossible otherwise. Modern
theology has been more prone to deny that some-
thing could be revelation if it were not grasped as
such. This has led some modern theologians to
deny that there is any general revelation, since
this would require them to affirm that there is
a revelation that has been grasped generally and
not all modern theologians have been willing to
make such a claim when so many people deny
that there is such a revelation. Of course, this does
not mean that these theologians have no use for
the concept of general revelation. It just means
that they deny that there is anything that satisfies
the concept. But where might general revelation
be found, if it is there to be found?
General revelation might be found in nature,
including the nature of persons, and in general
history. Thomas Aquinas, for example, claimed
that it is possible to see purposefulness in the
world and that the world is contingent on a first
cause, God. Many have claimed that by consid-
ering persons and their moral beliefs one can see
that a ground for morality is needed, again God. It
is also claimed that by looking at history it is
possible to see, despite all the tragedies, that
there is providence at work in it, that there is
a God who provides.
Special revelation might be found in particular
historical events (such as the biblical account of
the experience of Moses at the burning bush), in
Revelation
divine discourse and in the life of Jesus Christ.
There are also sacred writings that, if not merely
taken to be stories or records of revelations, are
often taken to be a type of revelation. They are
selective in what they present as their main pur-
pose is considered to be relational – acquaintance
with God and “his-story.”
Here it should be pointed out that whether
sacred writings are revelation or not might have
to do with the act-object (or process-product)
ambiguity spoken of above. It was said earlier
that if someone reveals something, then the word
“revelation” could be used either for the act of
revealing or for what was revealed, or both. So if
particular sacred writings are the object or con-
tent of God’s revealing activity, then it is possible
on an object-interpretation to say that they are
revelation. They are a product of the process of
revealing.
Still, there is another objection to calling the
sacred writings revelation, which is much
discussed. It is claimed that in divine revelation
people relate to God not to propositions or sacred
writings that are propositional. This is the propo-
sitional versus personal revelation debate. We
now turn to this issue.
Revelation and Propositions
Propositional revelation has often been distin-
guished from personal revelation. And it has
also often been claimed that in divine revelation
it is a person – God – that is revealed not prop-
ositions. Propositions are seen as impersonal.
One does not want propositions; one wants
a God who acts. At the same time it has been
argued by others that the issue is not so much
whether revelation is propositional or not, but
rather the important issue is what function prop-
ositions have. A weakness in many of these
discussions is that very little is said about how
the word “proposition” is being used. Not
a whole lot will be said here either. Yet, since
the word “proposition” is rather technical com-
pared to a word like “personal,” something
should be said about how it is being used here
before proceeding.
2045 R
Sometimes propositions are identified with the
statements (either in the act or object sense). Such
an identification has caused much confusion in
discussions of propositional revelation. It is true
that propositions are expressed in statements, but
they are also expressed in many other types of
speech acts. In speech acts such as requesting,
promising, and ordering one says something with
a propositional content. Propositions are also the
content of many different attitudes that we have,
whether we express these attitudes in speech or
not. Propositional attitudes such as believing,
doubting, desiring, fearing, and hoping have
propositional content. So propositions are not to
be identified with acts of stating or for that matter
with mental attitudes such as belief. They are
rather the propositional content of speech acts
and propositional attitudes.
Propositions are often expressed by using that-
clauses and many different attitudes and speech
acts can share the same propositional content.
That we can share what we believe or wonder
about and what we desire or approve of and many
other thoughts is vital for communication
and translation between language communities.
Propositions involve reference (or supposed
reference) to something that is presented in
a certain way for thought. A state of affairs is
presented for thought. In the following examples
of propositional content, the same proposition is
used throughout to show how it can be shared by
different speech acts and attitudes. The proposi-
tion is (that) David cut the grass. So David is R
referred to and presented as cutting the grass. Let
us call the proposition p in the following
examples.
1. Hanna desires p.
2. Hanna asked p.
3. Hanna wonders if p.
4. Maria doubts p.
5. Maria asserts p anyways.
6. David knows p.
7. Dan does not care if p, but he cares that Hanna
asked p.
Propositions can serve all these functions and
many more. It is quite a reduction to identify
propositions with the assertion of them, seen in
the light of this analysis of them. (See Searle’s
R 2046
analysis of propositions in Searle (1969) for more
on this).
It is important to note that typically the
propositional content is only a part of what is
said – not the whole content. So, for example,
the entire content of a speech act that is
a statement that David cut the grass is not just
the propositional content. If the propositional
content were all that we had to go on we would
not know if this proposition were expressed as
part of a question, an order or another type of
speech act. If we only said that David cut the
grass without expressing it with any force (i.e.,
as an assertion, request, etc.) Then all we have is
the expression of a thought of David cutting the
grass and nothing more. This would be quite
unusual, but I cannot see that it is impossible.
But if we were asked what was said in the above
case, we could reply that it was stated that David
cut the grass. So what was said, its content, was
a statement with the specified propositional con-
tent. And in that case, as in most if not all cases,
the propositional content is not the whole story.
The full content does include, but also goes
beyond the propositional content. Similar conclu-
sions hold for our thinking as well as they do here
for speech acts. (See Alston (2000) for more on
propositional content as only part of the content
of what is said).
In light of the foregoing, it is possible to see
that the propositional view of revelation does not
deny that revelation has to do with God and his
acts merely because it stresses content. Rather, it
is typically argued in this view that speaking and
expressing thoughts are central types of acts of
God and that these types of acts express proposi-
tional content. As noted above, people use prop-
ositions to say something about something; we
refer to someone or something and predicate
something of that person or thing by using
propositions. This applies not just to statements
but also request and other types of speech acts.
Furthermore, a principal trait of persons is that
they speak and so this view can hardly be criti-
cized for being a view that is not personal. Of
course, speakers can be impersonal, but that usu-
ally is not because they speak at all, but because
they speak in a certain manner: rudely, at the
Revelation
wrong time and so on. Would not criticizing
someone for the mere fact that they spoke when
one wanted to get to know them be like saying,
“Please do not express your thoughts to me or
speak to me – I want (to know) you, not your
thoughts”? To claim that one must choose
between propositional and personal revelation is
to treat the two as mutually exclusive. But there
are good reasons for thinking that personal
revelation would include the communication of
content.
Revelation and Truth
It is true that propositions present states of affairs
that either do or do not obtain, but it is not true
that all propositions are expressed in the making
of truth-claims. If this is right, as argued above,
then the question of truth does not arise in the
same way as might be supposed if one identified
propositions with the asserting of propositions.
Nonetheless questions of truth are still quite
relevant to speech acts other than assertion. So
in familiar contexts Daniel’s proposal to marry
Margarreta would typically have something to do
with whether it is true that Daniel and Margarreta
are not already married and that it is possible for
them to get married. And if Margarreta accepts
the proposal, then she is making a commitment
that also has to do with the truth of these things.
Requests, promises, and other familiar speech
acts besides assertions have something to do
with how things are in the world. So questions
of truth are still relevant.
Just how truth enters the picture is another
story. Note the following. Even though promises
ought to be sincere, one can make a promise even
if it is not true that one intends to do what one
promised. One can give an order even if it is not
true that one has the authority to do so. One can
express gratitude even when one is not thankful.
And, of course, a lie is an assertion even though
one ought to tell the truth. What this shows is that
even thought these speech acts are subject to
norms that require that certain conditions obtain
in the world for proper performance, the condi-
tions must not actually obtain to perform the
Revelation
speech acts. William Alston has done much inno-
vative work that shows this (Alston 2000, espe-
cially p. 34ff). The idea of normativity plays
a central role for Alston in explaining why one
can do things: What is necessary is certain con-
ditions that one is subject to even if one need not
conform to the conditions in order to perform
a given speech act. Promises and expression of
gratitude ought to be sincere and assertions ought
to be true even when they are not. So in the
performance of speech acts certain things ought
to be true for correct performance. But even if
they are not, one can have performed the speech
acts nonetheless. Much more could be said about
this, but this is enough for us to see how this
might be applied to divine revelation.
We can begin by asking whether God can lie
and make insincere promises. People like you and
I can, but should we also say that it is possible for
God to do this? This does not seem so be
a promising way to go. It is more common to
conceive of God as being incapable of lying or
of making commitments with no intention of
keeping them. And even if God could lie, the
very concept of revelation implies that if one
reveals something, what one reveals is a truth or
a fact. One can assert falsehoods, but one cannot
reveal them, though one can reveal that they are
falsehoods. It may appear to be the case that in the
case of divine revelation the distinction between
subjecting oneself to speech-act norms and
conforming to them does not play such a central
role, since any norms God may be subject to God
necessarily conforms to. This would be true even
if it were the case, as some argue, that God is not
subject to norms. For in that case God is not
subject to any speech-act norms. But do we
want to say, then, that God is not required to,
for example, keep promises? Even if it may be
true that God is not subject to any external norms,
still it is quite common to conceive of God’s own
character requiring certain things. God’s charac-
ter, it is argued, requires that God keep promises
and does not lie (See Wolterstorff (1995)
(Chapter 6) for interesting discussions of being
character-required and other related topics. See
also Sluys (2000), p. 65ff.). It is only when divine
revelation is about persons who are capable of
2047 R
missing the mark in some way, such as by lying or
making insincere promises, that the distinction
between norm-subjection and norm-conformity
plays any practical role. But, since purported
divine revelations report on normal human
persons like you and I who are capable of such
things, the distinction has a role to play. The
speech acts reported may be deficient in some
way, but that in itself does not make the report
of them untrue or deficient.
So far so good, but now we can ask whether
God could command persons to do things that
God has no interest in their doing. It is usually
consider one of the conditions for making the
speech act of a command that one issues one’s
utterance as subject to the norm or rule that one
has some interest in people doing as one has
commanded them to do. But is this just a matter
of statistics? As Alston interprets the rules, they
are not just descriptions of how we usually act,
but rather norms that guide what we should do. If
that is how things are, then there is something
wrong with issuing an utterance as a command
when one does not want what is commanded
done. It is incorrect to break the rule, if indeed
it is a rule for the correct performance of issuing
an utterance as a command. So if this is
a requirement for commanding, then it seems to
be the case that God must meet the requirement in
order to issue a command correctly.
A problem arises for this view in that most
people who hear the story of God’s commanding
Abraham to offer his son Isaac do not believe that R
God would actually desire that Abraham do such
a thing. At the same time, we have the rule-
formulation above that requires that one only
command something if one has an interest in it
being done. So it seems that either the rule must
go or one’s interpretation of God’s commanding
Abraham must go. I think that there are good
reasons for rejecting the truth of the rule-formu-
lation, rather than the interpretation of the story.
For we know that it is possible to command
persons to do things that we do not want done
for a variety of reason, even good reasons. We
could, for example, command a person to do an
impossible task, which they think is possible, in
order for them to come to the realization that it is
R 2048
not possible. We need have no interest whatso-
ever in getting what was commanded done; rather
it is not getting done serves the purpose of teach-
ing someone something. So even if we were to
use a command for another purpose than what
commands normally would be used for, this does
not mean that this use would be an incorrect use
of a command or that it was not a command at all.
So if God revealed to Abraham that he was com-
manding him to sacrifice his son, this does not
mean that it is true that God wants Abraham to
actually do so. The command is believed by most
to have served another function than that. (This is
in line, for example, with the interpretation of
the story in Wolterstorff (1995, p. 22) when
Wolterstorff discusses the relationship of com-
manding to revealing (that they are distinct from
one another)).
One last issue concerning truth has to do with
sacred writings (I am indebted to Evans (2005)
for detailed discussions of the issues discussed in
this paragraph). One might think, for example,
that if God dictated scripture and God could not
be in error, then the scriptures are inerrant. Yet
most Christian theologians deny that God dic-
tated the scriptures. Though it is true that other
religious traditions, such as Islam, can claim that
God dictated sacred writings, still even if not
dictated, one can think that the writings are iner-
rant because in some way God inspired the writ-
ings. This is quite a common view actually, but is
usually qualified in some of the following ways.
We have copies and translations and not the orig-
inal writings and errors have crept into the copies
and translations. Furthermore, the writings use
ordinary language, phenomenal language (i.e.,
the language of appearance), and rough approxi-
mations rather than scientific language in com-
municating, so we should not expect scientific
precision. Some limit inerrancy to religious and
moral matters excluding historical and scientific
matters, since they believe that God only
intended to communicate such truths. Others
think it important that historical claims are still
included such as that Jesus actually rose from the
dead. Wherever the limit goes, if there is a limit
to the inerrancy, all seems to be in agreement
that whenever God makes a truth-claim or
Revelation
a commitment to something being true, what
God is committed to is true. But where no claim
or commitment to truth is made there can be no
error either. If, for example, one use phenomenal
language and makes no commitment to the truth
of the proposition that the sun rose when one
says, “The sun rose,” then one is not in error if
it did not rise but only appeared to.
Summary
Some of the conclusions that have been drawn are
the following. In looking at different ways to
construe divine revelation none of Dulles’
models alone seemed to do justice to the way
many religious people construe revelation (and
Dulles does not claim that they do). In many
religious people’s eyes, God initiates encounters
with people and acts in ways so as to be experi-
enced in inner religious experience and in history
and God does all this sometimes through speech
and sometimes not. Furthermore, we took note of
an act-object ambiguity that can lead to confusion
if not taken notice of, since sometimes it is the
activity that we are concerned with and some-
times the content. We also noted that a personal
revealing need not exclude an exchange of ideas,
but, on the contrary, normally includes such con-
tent. Such content includes propositional content
and, therefore, personal revelation does not
exclude propositional revelation. We discussed
many different ways that revelation is related to
truth-claims. One main conclusion here was that
in speaking of error one has to pay considerable
attention to what it was that was being attempted.
One cannot be making an error in regard to some
truth, if one has not committed oneself in
some way in regard to it.
References
Alston, W. P. (2000). Illocutionary acts and sentence
meaning. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Baillie, J. (1956). The idea of revelation in recent thought.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Brunner, E. (1964). Truth as encounter. Philadelphia:
Westminster.
Revelation in Judaism
Dulles, A. (1985). Models of revelation. New York:
Doubleday.
Evans, C. S. (2005). Faith and revelation. In
W. J. Wainwright (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of
philosophy of religion (pp. 323–343). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Mavrodes, G. (1988). Revelation in religious belief.
Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Schleiermacher, F. (1963). The Christian faith. New York:
Harper and Row. Edited by H. R. Mackintosh and
J. S. Stewart.
Searle, J. R. (1969). Speech acts: An essay in the
philosophy of language. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Sluys, M. (2000). Must divine revelation produce under-
standing? Philosophical reflections on revelation and
its realization. Dissertation, Uppsala University.
Uppsala: Universitetstryckeriet, Ekonomikum.
Teilhard de Chardin, P. (1971). Christianity and evolution
(trans: René, H.). New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich.
Wolterstorff, N. (1995). Divine discourse: Philosophical
reflections on the claim that God speaks. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Revelation in Judaism
Norbert M. Samuelson
School of Historical, Philosophical, and
Religious Studies, Arizona State University,
Tempe, AZ, USA
Related Terms
Jewish science and revelation; Science and
revelation and the Jews; Science and revelation
in Jewish culture; Views of revelation in Judaism
One of the three primary acts associated with
God as the active agent is “to reveal” (galah).
The other two are “to create” (bara) and “to
redeem” (padah). Creating is what God does to
originate the universe and redeeming is what he
does to conclude it. Between these two poles,
one the origin and the other the end, is “this
world” (ha-‘olam ha-zeh) of entities moving in
time through space. The act that God performs
among them and in between them is “revela-
tion.” In the narrative of the Torah, what he
reveals is his law. The divine laws, which are
2049 R
the counterpart in the Hebrew Scriptures of the
laws of nature, are commandments by which
everything in this temporal world is directed to
behave and is judged for its behavior. They are
in most respects like natural law, only they are
personal (commanded “face to face”) and moral,
for they are the rules by which we humans can
come to know (to the best of our abilities) how
God rules his creation but also to know how God
judges his creatures.
Those through whom God directs this commu-
nication are called “prophets.” Prophets come in
all sizes and shapes, from every class of people
within the nation as well as from nations other
than Israel. There seem to be no rules for who can
or cannot be a prophet, from kings to female
servants and even to animals. But there is
a sharp distinction made between true and false
prophets and the penalty for confusing them by
following the wrong prophets is death. Time and
again, the nation finds prophets who interpret
God’s speech and the people follow the prophet’s
interpretation. When the interpretation of the true
prophet is right, God prospers the people, and
when it is wrong, God punishes the people for
disobedience. More often than not, the nation
Israel will choose a wrong interpretation.
This tendency of the nation Israel (perhaps of
all nations) to make the wrong choice is the
foundation of the destruction twice within the
history of God’s chosen people. Perhaps the
Hebrew Scriptures emphasize this causal account
in order to justify the lengths that the subsequent R
early rabbinic Judaism goes to regularize and
control what do and do not count as acceptable
(i.e., true) instances of prophecy. Increasingly
through this post-biblical literature, direct
appearances of God to the people become
restricted, so that in the end they almost entirely
disappear. “Almost entirely,” but not completely.
God continues to appear and to teach lessons
about reality to the Jewish people, but these
appearances cease to have legal moral authority.
In the place of direct divine communication, the
rabbis establish a series of institutions (viz.,
courts and academies) whose members bear the
formal title “sage” (chakham) or “master” (rab)
through whom new applications of the now
R 2050
established laws of the Torah are applied in
accordance with formalized rules of legal prece-
dence. In all of these cases where new applica-
tions of the law are formulated, God is said to be
present at the deliberations to guide the rabbis to
divine approved judgments. As God functions in
this indirect role of political guidance, he is asso-
ciated with a “holy wind/spirit” (ruach ha-kodesh
in Hebrew) and said to be the “presence”
(shekhinah in Hebrew). Ever increasingly, the
God of revelation is identified by the rabbis pri-
marily as this shekhinah (presence).
Late Hellenistic and medieval Jewish philos-
ophers tended to associate the words of the
Hebrew Scriptures not only with divine revela-
tion but also with a general notion of “wisdom”
(chakhmah). That the words of the Torah are
wisdom has its source in the biblical text itself
(e.g., in Proverbs), but increasingly the two
terms, Torah and wisdom, came to be used more
or less interchangeably. Now “chakhmah”
(wisdom) is also the term for what we today
would call “science,” so that increasingly all of
revelation was closely associated if not identified
with science. Hence it comes to be assumed, by
Jews as well as Christians as well as Muslims,
that any truth of the Scriptures and their tradition
of interpretation is science and (conversely) all
science can be found in the Scriptures if you
know how to read them. Revealing how to read
the Scriptures became the primary task of the
medieval Jewish philosophers, from Philo and
Saadia through Moses Maimonides and Hasdai
Crescas.
The “science” in terms of which the medieval
Jewish philosophers interpreted the Scriptures
reflected the best science of their day, notably
a mixture of the world and life views of Plato-
nists, Aristotelians, and even Epicureans, but
unfortunately the best science of that day could
no longer be accepted as truth by the dawn of
modernity. This problem applies not only to phil-
osophical interpretations of moral issues; it
applies equally to philosophical interpretations
of physicalist issues. So, not only does the medi-
eval literalist interpretations of political texts that
endorse, for example, the institution of slavery,
become problematic, but so too do non-literalist
Revelation in Judaism
interpretations of physical events taken by the
rabbis to be the texts’ true meaning. For example,
in terms of cosmology, the laws of the heavens
are not different from the natural laws of the earth
and there is no watery ring (the “raqiyya”) that
separates space from the atmosphere of the earth,
and this universe is billions of years old and not
just thousands of years old. Similarly, in the light
of contemporary neuroscience, there is no ethe-
real entity called a “soul” that directs the volun-
tary motions of human beings and animals, and,
in the light of modern evolutionary biology, there
is no radical difference between human beings
and animals. Rather they are all part of a single
chain of beings that extends through the
centuries.
There remain circles of contemporary tradi-
tional rabbis who continue to read the Hebrew
Scriptures according to the interpretations of
medieval rabbis, but there are other more liberal
rabbis who reason, why should a medieval inter-
pretation whose sources are in the ancient sci-
ences of the Platonists and Aristotelians be more
authoritative than the literal meanings of the
Scriptures themselves. Hence, in their use of the
holy texts, they go back to uncover original sim-
ple (peshat in Hebrew) interpretations. But they
do not claim that these interpretations are true.
Rather they claim that for religious Jews they are
“authoritative.” What these modern Jewish inter-
preters mean by “authority” varies. Of these
readers perhaps the most radical was Martin
Buber who claimed that what the Scriptures
reveal is limited to God’s presence but that the
content of the texts is itself not revealed. Hence
the Scriptures function not as a national divine
constitution, but as a testament to the ancient and
continued “presence” of God to the Jewish
people.
Of the three central Jewish theological claims
about God (viz., creation, redemption, and reve-
lation) only revelation is commonly given this
extreme heterodox interpretation. Creation and
redemption come to be understood in accord
with mathematical notions of origin and end
respectively, and as such are independent of tem-
poral-spatial claims. While anyone who inter-
prets these terms literally (and in general the
Risk Analysis
traditional rabbis never interpreted them liter-
ally), such interpretations seem radical, but to
anyone who knows the writings of the medieval
philosophical rabbis, they are not extreme. (See
“Judaism: Scientific Views of Creation” and
“Judaism: Scientific Views of Redemption.”)
These two core concepts are seen to have content.
However, to interpret revelation as Buber and
other modern Jewish philosophers like him do
seem to have no connection to rabbinic tradition
whatsoever.
The response to this objection is two-fold, one
based on rabbinic texts and a second based on
modern science in a very broad general sense.
With respect to the second factor, modern sci-
ences raise a number of distinct troubling ques-
tions, as we have already seen, and the more
evasive the answer is to these questions, the
greater the inclination to free revelation from
the burden of being content dependent.
With respect to the first factor, it is an
established rabbinic tradition that the Song of
Songs is the primary biblical text for
interpreting God’s revelation to Israel, and
this biblical poem talks only about forms of
human love and says nothing directly about
revelation. In this context, the Hebrew term
for revelation, “galah,” literally and physically
means an act of revealing oneself or (to say the
same thing) uncovering oneself. In revelation,
as in love, especially in physical love, the
lovers make themselves naked to each other.
In this sense, revelation is not about content,
but is rather about the quality of the act, an act
of maximum intimacy, especially (in the case
of rabbinic theology) between God, the lover,
and the people of Israel, the beloved.
Combining the two factors, the first from the
revealed texts themselves and the second from
the examination through reasoning by scientists
of nature, yields a content-less conception of
revelation which places prime importance for
religious faith on noncognitive factors of experi-
ence and leaves cognitive judgments to the sci-
ences. Needless to say this dual track
understanding of religion and science has more
consent among Jewish scientists than among
modern rabbis.
2051 R
Cross-References
▶ Creation in Judaism
▶ Judaism: An Overview
▶ Kabbalah in Judaism
▶ Natural Sciences in Judaism
▶ Philosophy in Judaism
▶ Redemption in Judaism
▶ Redemption in Judaism
▶ Revelation in Judaism
▶ Theology in Judaism
References
Buber, M. (1970). I and thou (English trans: Kaufmann,
W.). New York: Scribner.
Leakey, R. (1994). The origin of humankind. New York:
Basic Books.
Maimonides, M. (1963). The guide of the perplexed
(English trans: Pines, S.). Chicago: University of Chi-
cago Press.
Pinker, S. (1997). How the mind works. New York:
Norton.
Samuelson, N. M. (1994). Revelation and the God of
Israel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Spinoza, B. (1965). Tractatus theologico-politicus
(English trans: Wernham, A. G.). Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Tattersall, I. (1995). The fossil trail: How we know what
we know what we think we know about human evolu-
tion. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Weinberg, S. (1977). The first three minutes. New York:
Bantam.
R
Risk Analysis
Linda Sherrell
Department of Computer Science,
The University of Memphis, Memphis, TN, USA
Risk analysis is actually one step in the overall
process of risk management. However, in Barry
Boehm’s original Spiral Model the entire
endeavor of risk management was called risk
analysis and was depicted as lying in the second
quadrant of the spiral.
For a better understanding of risk manage-
ment, in general, we list its four major stages as
R 2052
described by Ian Sommerville in his 8th edition
of Software Engineering.
1. Risk identification: The development team
lists possible risks in the categories of project,
product, and business.
2. Risk analysis: The development team assesses
the list of risks by determining the likelihood
of each risk and its consequences.
3. Risk planning. The team constructs plans to
avoid the risks or to minimize their damage.
4. Risk monitoring. Risks are continually
assessed throughout the project. During this
process, risks may be resolved or mitigated.
Rite
▶ Ritual
Ritschlianism
▶ Liberal Theology
Ritual
Maria Liljas Stålhandske
Department of Theology, Uppsala University,
Uppsala, Sweden
Related Terms
Celebration; Ceremony; Rite; Ritualization
Description
All attempts to define ritual or even to classify the
different theoretical approaches to ritual will be
heuristic. The problem of definition lies in the
fact that Catherine Bell is cautious to point out:
ritual is a construction and nothing to be found
“out there” (Bell 1997). As the study of ritual and
Rite
the discipline ritual studies have evolved, each
researcher has created his or her specific way to
understand “ritual” and has related this word to
different sets of phenomena found in diverse cul-
tural contexts. This has led to the development of
numerous definitions of ritual and a number of
ritual theories and models. Among scholars out-
side the ritual field, “ritual” is often used simply
as a label for senseless routine. Within the ritual
field, on the other hand, narrow definitions con-
ceptualize ritual as a specific, distinctive activity,
whereas broader perspectives point out the con-
gruity between ritual and other forms of human
action. Ritual has also been a topic for many
different scholarly disciplines, with their differ-
ent viewpoints and interests. Thus, it is possible
to find ritual theory within approaches from, for
example, anthropology, phenomenology, ethnol-
ogy, political science, psychoanalytic theory,
sociology, theology, ethology, and fine arts. To
complicate the picture even further, many ritual
theories unite ideas from different perspectives
and disciplines, making it even more difficult to
classify different ritual perspectives.
This exposé will start out with a historical
perspective, following some of the trends that
have appeared in the study of ritual by introduc-
ing scholars of great importance to the field. This
will lead to some notes on scientific approaches
to ritual as well as the interactions between the
scholarly study of ritual and ritual practice.
Ritual Theory
Ritual theory is interesting to study from a theory
of science perspective since the development of the
field in many respects reflects the changing self-
understanding among Western scholars. When
research in this area began in the nineteenth cen-
tury and scholars wanted to focus on what they
thought of as activities and behavioral patterns
accompanying mythical and religious systems in
the colonized world, ritual emerged as a concept.
Evolutionary perspectives dominated the field, and
the early discourse on ritual differentiated between
“ritual” and “liturgy” where the former was under-
stood as a more primitive form, related to magic
Ritual
and superstition. The confidence in industrial
development made it easy to assume that all cul-
tures followed a similar route and that both tech-
nological and religious development would lead to
ever higher and better forms of human life. As
cultural awareness and political climate changed,
so did the understanding of ritual, and evolutionary
perspectives were successively replaced by func-
tional and structural understandings. Global injus-
tice, accelerating pollution, and arms race made
human development seem less of a linear process,
and modernity was put under question. When mod-
ern culture could be described as inhuman and
technocratic, ritual could be presented as a natural
spiritual and emotional resource. The early under-
standings of ritual as a part of a primitive and static
tradition have thus in some of the later theories
been countered with the image of ritual as poten-
tially revolutionary and liberating.
The early ritual theories from the late nine-
teenth century struggled with the quest to find the
origins of religion. Was ritual or myth the origin –
had religion primarily developed from practice or
thought? Within what has been called the myth
and ritual schools, scholars argued for the pri-
macy of ritual, whereas the phenomenologists
saw myth as the primary source. The former
school was informed by anthropologists like
Edward B. Tylor (1832–1917) and Sir James
George Frazer (1854–1941) and linguists like
William Robertson Smith (1846–1894). Myth
developed from ritual practices, these theorists
argue, and is as a primitive way of reasoning
that can reveal insights on human cognition.
Religion, and cognition, is here seen as a part
of evolution, and these theorists argue for
a developmental line from primitive magic to
the “high religions” of Judaism, Christianity,
and Islam. Phenomenologists like Rudolf Otto
(1869–1937) and later Mircea Eliade (1907–
1986) argue instead that myths are much more
stable than rituals, although they are interrelated
and dependent upon each other. From the phe-
nomenological point of view, religious experi-
ence is understood as universal and irreducible,
and the study of religious myths or rituals must
therefore focus the experience of the “wholly
other,” trying to find structural similarities.
2053 R
Although the debate between myth and ritual
eventually faded away, these early theorists
paved the way for the coming ritual perspectives,
where the relation to cognition and structure, to
different degrees, continued to be important
objectives. While the functionalistic and
structuralistic perspectives that emerged empha-
size society and predominantly understand ritual
as a cultural reflection or enforcement of it, the
culturalistic, linguistic, performance and practice
perspectives on ritual rather stress culture as the
primary level of meaning and understand social
organization as shaped by it. The classic example
of a functionalistic theorist is Émile Durkheim
(1858–1917). He describes society as the basis
and origin for religion and ritual. Through ritual,
Durkheim maintains, the social structure is
sacralized as a collectively projected image. Rit-
uals work as rules of conduct that make commu-
nal identification possible and that strengthen the
bonds between the individuals in a society. In
order to achieve this, rituals arouse experiences
of passionate intensity that ties the participants
together. Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown
(1881–1955) and Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–
1942) are other examples of important function-
alistic ritual theorists. Sigmund Freud’s (1856–
1939) perspective can also be sorted among the
functionalistic approaches. Freud’s quest is to
unfold the hidden purpose of ritual and the
“unconscious myth.” Phylogenetically, Freud
describes religion and ritual as safeguards against
those impulses of aggression and lust that are R
hidden and buried in the ritual form. Ontogenet-
ically, Freud points out the similarities between
ritual actions and the activities of the obsessional
neurotic. Through his work, Freud begins a psy-
chological scholarly tradition of associating ritual
and religion with pathology. In all the early func-
tionalistic theories, the evolutionary perspective
lingers. Evolutionism is apparent both in the
works of Durkheim and Freud. As humanity
develops, Durkheim argues, the need for rituals
will be surpassed, and science will enter in its
place. In Freud’s perspective, the mature individ-
ual will sublimate his wishes and thus make ritual
superfluous. René Girard (b. 1925) presents
a perspective on ritual with many resemblances
R 2054
to Freud’s theory; although it is not strictly Freud-
ian in its outline. Girard also relates ritual to
primal violence and the need to restrain destruc-
tive impulses and desires – albeit not sexual.
The need to curb human violence, Girard holds,
is the very source of society and culture, and
this is managed through the ritual sacrifice
of a scapegoat, a surrogate victim. Through the
original murder, the group simultaneously
becomes conscious of itself as a group and uncon-
scious of the desire and violence that made the
sacrifice necessary. Ritual, in Girard’s sense, is
thus a means of substituting a “good,” contained
form of violence for free-floating revenge.
In the neofunctionalistic approaches, religion
and ritual are no longer seen as caused or
influenced by one single force. Instead, an inter-
action of multiple systems results in different
religious and ritual forms. What is universal
according to these different theories is the func-
tion the ritual act is thought to hold; however, its
form and expressions will vary in accordance
with historical context and physical environment.
Roy Rappaport (1926–1997) is perhaps the most
prominent and well-known neofunctionalistic
theorist. According to him, ritual regulates both
the relationships in society and between society
and its environmental resources. Thus, ritual is
able to create an environmental balance. The
function of ritual is not conscious to the partici-
pants, Rappaport maintains; however, this mysti-
fication is for the good of the society. Through the
claims of traditional and divine roots, the ritual
works as a much more effective maintainer of the
social system than any economical or ecological
regulations would do (Rappaport 1999). In Mary
Douglas’ (1921–2007) functional-structuralistic
approach, ritual is explained through the concepts
grid and group. While grid refers to the level of
organization of human relations through rules,
roles, and formal positions, group refers to how
tightly knit a society is. Ritual, Douglas holds,
reinforces both grid (through its maintenance of
structure) and group (through its enforcement of
solidarity and social connection). Arnold van
Gennep (1873–1957) develops a neofunctio-
nalistic stress on context. Van Gennep argues
that ritual has no intrinsic meaning, but needs to
Ritual
be seen in relation to the cultural context. Van
Gennep devotes his work mainly to the form of
rituals he labels “rites of passage.” Functionally,
these rituals work as a help to order chaotic social
changes – mainly when there is some kind of
individual change in status because of age, edu-
cation, or maturity. The passage rituals are
described as important for the well-being of the
group during these precarious moments. Van
Gennep’s functionalistic perspective is also
connected to a more structural outlook, and
what he is most known for is a description of
three decisive ritual stages or phases. Through
the structural set of separation, transition, and
incorporation, the potentially dangerous move
of a person from one status role to another can
be safely performed, van Gennep holds.
Although he started out from a nonuniversalistic
point of view, van Gennep’s focus on structural
comparison and a presupposed general ritual pat-
tern led to a more universalistic perspective van
(Gennep 1960).
For a number of ritual scholars, the structural
setup has been the main focus, and here the influ-
ence from linguistics has been crucial. The
anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908–
2009), as a central example, builds his theory on
the perspectives developed by structural linguists
like Roman Jakobson and Ferdinand de Saussure.
Lévi-Strauss argues that all social phenomena,
like ritual, are symbolic systems of communica-
tion and as such shaped by cognitive structures in
the human brain. Contrary to Durkheim’s under-
standing, Lévi-Strauss holds that it is the cogni-
tive structures, visible in ritual, that shape social
relations. Social organization is thus understood
as secondary. Lévi-Strauss compares ritual and
symbolic action with language and argues that it
is possible to decipher ritual or mythical systems
with the help of linguistic rules. By decoding the
underlying grammar, often organized in binary
oppositions, the unconscious infrastructure
of ritual and symbols can be revealed (Lévi-
Strauss 1966). Stanley Tambiah (b. 1929) and
Edmund Leach (1910–1989) are other ritual
scholars within the linguistic tradition. Another
important scholar within the culturalistic and lin-
guistic tradition is Clifford Geertz (1926–2006),
Ritual
who views religion as a cultural system. In ritual,
he argues, the participants are presented with
a model of the world (how things are) and
a model for the world (how things should be).
The world as lived and the world as imagined
thus fuse in ritual, Geertz holds. Within contem-
porary ritual theory, Lawson and McCauley con-
tinue the cognitive-structural approach to ritual,
combining insights from cognitive and develop-
mental psychology, linguistics, and cognitive sci-
ence. Their perspective is described further
below.
Some neofunctionalistic psychological theo-
ries stress the ability of rituals to release harmful
thoughts and feelings and thus fulfill some form
of cathartic function. Gluckman (1911–1975),
who focused on social systems rather than
individual positions, modifies Durkheim’s theory
in this direction. Ritual, Gluckman argues, does
not mainly express and enforce social unity.
Instead, it is the tension inherent in each society
that makes ritual so important. Through ritualized
rebellions, Gluckman continues, these tensions
and conflicts can be channeled, albeit not solved.
This has a cathartic effect since it relieves the
society of the threat of “real” rebellions. In the
end, ritual functions to restore social equilibrium
and maintain status quo (Gluckman 1963).
Gluckman’s perspective widens the field for rit-
ual research and understands ceremony as any
kind of activity that is conventionally formalized
and ritual as the specifically religious version of
ceremony. Victor Turner (1920–1983) develops
a kind of synthesis of van Gennep’s and
Gluckman’s works. Turner understands ritual in
terms of social dramas. Social structures are not
static but dynamic, Turner holds. They need to be
constantly created anew. Rituals, therefore, have
the function of recreating the unity of the group
by legitimating but also modifying the social
order. Turner agrees with Gluckman’s thesis of
a needed rebellion allowed within the ritual form,
and he gives this rebellion a more specific form
by a reworking of van Gennep’s three-stage
sequence. Turner recasts the transitional stage in
van Gennep’s theory into a more fundamental
idea of disorder. People need a chance to get
away from social structures, Turner maintains;
2055 R
therefore, rituals play with the dialectic between
structure and antistructure, order and chaos. Dur-
ing the transitional stage of “liminality” and
“communitas,” status roles and ordinary struc-
tures are relieved, and a sense of equality and
belonging is enforced. By allowing these inver-
sions of social order, rituals give form to and
dramatize both the society’s dominant values
and its inherent conflicts. Social order is, through
this ritual function, both legitimated and
reformed, and the community is thus not simply
restored by their rituals, but redefined, renewed
(Turner 1967).
Through his understanding of ritual as a social
drama, Turner also paved the way for perfor-
mance theorists who developed their perspective
during the 1970s combining the neofunctio-
nalistic perspective with drama theory. Ronald
Grimes is the most well-known scholar in this
field (Grimes 2000). Rituals are described, by per-
formance theorists, as events rather than as expres-
sions or enactments of values and symbols. The
emotional aspects of ritual are underlined, and an
interest in the ritual role of the body evolves. The
physical and sensual aspects of rituals are stressed,
and although performance theories are varied, they
generally agree that the ritual functions through its
physical character and not only through its relation
to either tradition or cognition. Within the perfor-
mance approach, ritual is not understood as a kind
of literal communication but as a physical event. It
is furthermore seen as an event that includes or
gives the possibility to individual transformation. R
In other words, a ritual achieves something; it is an
act that constructs a new situation. The performance
approach also brings a new perspective on the ritual
participants as active in their role of both designing
and interpreting ritual. Performance theorists have
furthermore underlined that the efficiency of ritual
depends on its specific “framing” (see Gregory
Bateson below). The ritual frame helps people
understand what kind of an act they are taking part
in. The announced beginnings and ends, a stylized
form of speech, ceremonial costumes, etc. all work
as signals for the ritual performance.
Performance theory has also brought an interest
for modern-secularized examples of ritual, outside
the formal religious ones. Practice theory has
R 2056
a similar bodily focus as the performance
approach, but with its roots in Marxist theory.
Practice theory also moves away from the intellec-
tualistic concentration on mind and focuses on the
concrete and immediate aspects of human activi-
ties. What distinguishes the practice orientation
from the performance approach is, firstly,
a greater interest in developing generalized theo-
ries about cultural activities and, secondly,
a discussion on power and domination. Pierre
Bourdieu is the most prominent contributor to this
theoretical school; however, he never treated the
ritual topic more than briefly. Catherine Bell, can
be placed within this line of thinking, and her
theoretical perspective on ritual is one of the
more influential today. Bell, as many performance
theorists, rather speaks of ritualization than ritual.
This is to avoid the sense of ritual as a ready-made
and stable unit. Instead, Bell argues, ritualization
should be understood as a circular practice.
Through ritualization, a ritualized agent is created
– a person that embodies the flexible cultural
schemes that the ritual involves. The body is pri-
mary in this process, Bell maintains; it both defines
the world through its actions and receives
a worldview through its experiences. The ritualized
agent can deploy this knowledge both outside the
ritual situation and in new ritualizations. The cir-
cularity of ritualization also includes a specific
analysis of power. With the help of Foucault, Bell
describes how the power of ritual works in two
directions. The ritual forms the participants,
while, at the same time, the participants have the
possibility to both resist this power and make use of
it in their own idiosyncratic ways (Bell 1997).
Bell’s definition of ritualization is original in
that it does not include references to specific
ritual features, like formalism or repetition – fea-
tures that many influential ritual scholars have
singled out as specific for ritual activities. This
is the case with, for example, Frits Staal, who
speaks about the meaninglessness of the ritual
act and for whom ritual “consists in the precise
execution of rules.” Many ritual definitions also
include repetition, formalism, and invariance –
like those of Victor Turner, Evan Zuesse, or Roy
Rappaport. Thus, idiosyncratic, improvised, or
unique activities have mostly been understood
Ritual
as contrasts to the commonality, formalism, and
repetition of rituals. In contrast to this, Bell
argues that what is specific with ritualization is
that it makes a distinction by privileging certain
activities. What strategies are used to privilege
the event depend, Bell points out, on the cultural
context and what practices the ritual distinguishes
itself against. In other words, when ritual form is
related to the cultural context within which it
occurs, ritual features cannot be understood as
universally determined. Bell’s perspective thus
makes spontaneous or individually performed rit-
uals conceivable. This is an advantage in relation
to contexts signified by individualization and reli-
gious change since it enables the researcher to
track people’s ritual needs and practices beyond
the institutional forms of religiosity. However,
opening up the ritual field for studies of individ-
ual ritualization makes it important to consider
the aspect of intention. Many definitions of ritual
also specify some aspect of intention, conscious-
ness, or voluntarity. This makes it possible to
avoid including phenomena that might have
some aspects in common with rituals, but that
are not considered to be rituals by those that are
involved. In the Encyclopedia of Religion, Evan
Zuesse defines ritual as “conscious, and volun-
tary, repetitious and stylized symbolic bodily
action that are centered on cosmic structures
and/or sacred presences.” One of the front figures
of ritual studies, Ronald Grimes, also stresses the
importance of intention, and he does so through
a distinction between ritualizations and rites. The
latter refer in his understanding to acts that are
culturally acknowledged as rituals within a specific
tradition. Ritualizations, on the other hand, are rit-
ual-like activities that need not be intended as rituals
by the performers. A ritualization is, with Grimes’
rather vague words, an activity that “is not culturally
defined as ritual but that someone could interpret as
if it were” (Grimes 2000). Another perspective,
building on Bell’s concept ritualization, is Maria
Liljas Stålhandske’s model of privileged bodily
praxis (PBP). This model outlines different PBPs
in relation to two different axes. The first axis refers
to intentionality, implying that a privileged mode of
praxis can have a more or less formalized privileging
intention – it can be more or less consciously
Ritual
designed and referred to as a ritual or ceremonial
activity. The other axis is related to the existential
dimension: shared or individual approaches to the
questions about the meaning, value, and purpose of
life and death. This axis amounts to the degree to
which the praxis is related to the existential dimen-
sion. The model thus gives room for four different
types of PBPs: celebration (a PBP that neither has
a formalized ritual intention nor explicit references
to the existential dimension), ceremony (a PBP con-
sciously designed and thought of in ritual terms, but
without explicit references to the existential dimen-
sion), ritualization (a PBP explicitly related to the
existential dimension, but without a formalized rit-
ual intention), and finally ritual (a PBP that has
a formalized ritual intention and that is explicitly
related to the existential dimension). If used as flex-
ible, heuristic categories, open for change and devel-
opment, Stålhandske argues that the model can work
as a tool to analyze ritual activities in a late modern
context, signified by religious change and individu-
alization (Stålhandske 2005).
Caroline Humphrey and James Laidlaw pre-
sent a fully elaborated ritual theory with many
resemblances to Bell’s perspective. Similarly to
Bell, Humphrey and Laidlaw argue that ritual is
a quality of the action, not a specific content or
idea. There is no underlying meaning of ritual;
instead, the participants ascribe the meaning of
each ritual. Thus, Humphrey and Laidlaw refer to
ritual as nonintentional. The ritual participant
does not need full knowledge about the ritual or
the cultural or religious context of which it is a
part, but creates his or her own idea of what the
ritual is about. The ritual process is thus much
more complicated than a reproduction of cultural
consensus. However, ritual is closely related to
cultural conventions. To do something ritually,
according to Humphrey and Laidlaw, is not pri-
marily to believe in something but to act in
a specific, culturally defined way. In line with
Bell’s circular approach to ritual, Humphrey and
Laidlaw describe rituals neither as expressions of
personal intentions nor reproductions of cultural
consensus. Instead, the individual makes use of
the culturally formed ritual and interprets the
meaning of it out of his or her own knowledge
and need (Humphrey and Laidlaw 1994).
2057 R
Ritual Theory and Science
From a scientific perspective, ritual has been an
interest for a number of disciplines, primarily
ethology, neuroscience, and cognitive science.
For ethologists, ritual is not a topic in itself, but
a concept used to understand animal and in exten-
sion also human behavior. Julian Huxley (1887–
1975) and Konrad Lorenz (1903–1989) are the
most well-known scholars in this field. Through
observations of animals, ethologists identify for-
malized patterns of behavior in, for instance,
mating and grooming. Ethologists argue that
these ritual-like activities promote clearer and
more efficient communication and reduce dam-
age among the own species. Ritualized animal
behavior, ethologists conclude, is dependent
upon formalized codes or signals. In the work of
Gregory Bateson (1904–1980), both biologist
and anthropologist, the idea of framing and
metasignals is developed. When metasignals of
“play” or “ritual” are clear and well developed,
animals can, for example, communicate domina-
tion without lethally harming each other. For
ethologists, ritualization among animals has
both genetic and social roots and is a question
of adaptation and survival. Being mammals,
human beings also ritualize behavior, and ethol-
ogists argue that rituals of humans and animals
can be considered as siblings in the biological
evolution. Some ethologists also further discuss
human ritualization, and Huxley criticizes mod-
ern society from his ethological perspective, R
arguing that much of the problems related to
modern civilization have to do with deteriorating
ritualization among humans.
Another attempt to conjoin ritual theory with
a scientific approach is presented by Charles
Laughlin and Eugene d’Aquili, through their the-
ory biogenetic structuralism. Laughlin and
d’Aquili’s attempt is to merge Lévi-Strauss’
structuralism with neurosciences. Ritual is one
of their main concerns due to its role in control-
ling cognition and experience, and Laughlin and
d’Aquili also compare animal and human behav-
ior. They argue that invariant patterns of human
behavior must be lodged in the nervous system.
Their ambition is to develop a theoretical
R 2058
perspective that is nondualistic in the modeling of
mind and body, that is nonreductionistic in the
positivist sense, and that is informed by data
about human consciousness and culture. Thomas
Lawson and Robert McCauley present perhaps
the most influential scientific perspective on rit-
ual. They introduce a cognitive-structural
approach to religious ritual and include insights
from cognitive and developmental psychology,
linguistics, and cognitive science. Lawson and
McCauley’s aim is to develop empirically test-
able claims about religious ritual, arguing that
participants understand ritual on basis of univer-
sal conceptual systems. In contrast to the contex-
tual understanding of ritual meaning, where ritual
can be understood only from the perspective of its
specific cultural frame, they argue that ritual
competence rests on universal cognitive abilities.
The cultural dimension of ritual is thus
downplayed, and the cognitive aspects are
underlined. However, the ritual participants are
pictured as developing ritual competence in the
same intuitive way that they learn their natural
language – the learning of ritual is social, not
biological or psychological. Through this per-
spective, Lawson and McCauley can describe
the religious ritual as a social action that invokes
roles present in all human actions. Since these
roles are a universal part of human cognition,
there is no need for specifically theological or
religious knowledge to understand ritual, or to
conclude if it is successful or not. Focusing solely
on religious ritual, Lawson and McCauley
include “nonnatural consequences” and “super-
human agency” in their definition of ritual.
A religious ritual is thus an act where (1) someone
(2) does something (3) to someone or something
(4) in order to bring about some nonnatural con-
sequence (5) by virtue of appeal to a superhuman
agency. The primary conceptual tool in their the-
ory is what they call the action-representation
system – a conceptual system thought to operate
in any kind of action, religious and nonreligious.
Central to this system is actor (agent), action
(instrument), and object, or the part receiving
the action (patient). The structure of the ritual is
analyzed through a linguistic focus on syntax as
well as an analysis of the symbols and how they
Ritual
are interrelated. The postulated superhuman
agency can appear at all levels – as agent, instru-
ment, or patient. For a ritual to be successful, the
intention behind the religious ritual is of greater
importance than its exact execution, Lawson and
McCauley hold. However, it is mainly through
the correct performance that the intention can be
made visible (Lawson and McCauley 1990).
The relation between ritual and science can
also be described from another perspective.
The relationship between “research” and “real-
ity” is intriguing, when it comes to ritual studies,
since the ritual field to a great extent has been
influenced by the political and cultural climate
surrounding the different ritual scholars. Cather-
ine Bell refers to the changing understanding of
ritual in the late twentieth century as “ritual
romancing” (Bell 1997). From the view on ritual
as outdated and primitive, ritual began to be seen
as something vital for the health and well-being
of modern people. It was argued that the use and
function of ritual had been lost through modern
development and that this was a cause of many
social and individual problems. This inclined
a number of scholars to portray ritual as
a powerful means to be relieved from the bonds
of civilization. This understanding also altered
the relation between the scholar and the field –
the distance between ritual scholars and practi-
tioners decreased. The positive view on ritual
promoted by scholarly authority also influenced
people to return to ritual and to request guidance
in their newly (re)discovered ritual practice.
Ronald Grimes, Tom Driver, and T. J. Scheff
are examples of scholars who have promoted
the liberating possibilities of ritual and who, to
different degrees, have offered their knowledge
to develop practical ritual competence through
tools for ritual criticism and improvement. The
loss of “scientific detachment” is of course not
peculiar to ritual studies, but a conundrum is
present in all fields where postmodern theories
and constructionism have relevance. Ritual
scholars, as all scholars within the field of
human behavior, have to conclude how they con-
ceive the relation between research and reality.
What is special with the ritual field is perhaps
the close interaction some researchers have
Robot Emotions
developed toward the practitioners. This can have
a positive effect on ritual and religious commu-
nities, and if based on a conscientiously devel-
oped epistemological perspective, need not be
problematic. However, one problem that Bell
points out is that when scholars construct ritual
as a basically good praxis lost for modern people,
this is done at the cost of excluding examples of
contemporary ritual forms that work in service of
modernity. Moreover, the power of academic
perspectives is considerable, and when the
views of scholars start to form the world they
are exploring, there is always a risk of cultural
subordination.
To conclude, the concept ritual, like religion,
offers multiple possibilities to analyze human
behavior from structural, functional, cultural,
and scientific perspectives. The many different
options and associations related to ritual make
the field both interesting and creative, but also
bring many challenges that demand each scholar
to make conscious and sensitive theoretical
choices.
Cross-References
▶ Landscape
▶ Pilgrimage
▶ Theater
References
Bell, C. (1997). Ritual: Perspectives and dimensions.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Gluckman, M. (1963). Order and rebellion in tribal
Africa. London: Cohen & West.
Grimes, R. L. (2000). Deeply into the bone: Re-inventing
rites of passage. Berkely and Los Angeles: University
of California Press.
Humphrey, C., & Laidlaw, J. (1994). The archetypal
actions of ritual. Oxford: Clarendon.
Lawson, E. T., & McCauley, R. N. (1990). Rethinking
religion: Connecting cognition and culture.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lévi-Strauss, C. (1966). The savage mind. London:
Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Rappaport, R. A. (1999). Ritual and religion in the
making of humanity. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
2059 R
Stålhandske, M. L. (2005). Ritual invention: A play per-
spective on existential ritual and mental health in late
modern Sweden. Uppsala: Uppsala University.
Turner, V. W. (1967). The forest of symbols: Aspects of
Ndembu ritual. Ithaca/New York: Cornell University
Press.
van Gennep, A. (1960). The rites of passage
(M. B. Vizedom & G. Caffee, Trans.). London:
Routledge & Kegan.
Ritualization
▶ Ritual
Robot Embodiment
▶ Robot Programming
Robot Emotions
Kolja K€uhnlenz
Institute of Automatic Control Engineering
(LSR), Technische Universit€at M€unchen,
Munich, Germany
Related Terms
Computer science; Emotional robots R
Description
The field of Robot Emotions aims to integrate
principles of human emotions, emotionally
enriched communication, emotional decision
making, and behavior control in design and con-
trol of ▶ autonomous and/or interactive robotic
systems. It is as such strongly interdisciplinary,
integrating technological, psychological, and
neurobiological aspects. The main objectives
are to make human-robot communication and
interaction more natural, intuitive, and efficient
and/or to complement cognitive control of robot
R 2060
behavior. Target applications are manifold and
range from edutainment, to improved assistance
in humans’ daily lives, to therapy. While emo-
tional robots are a regular topic in literature and
movies, the field of Robot Emotions is concerned
with robots that seem emotional, rather than
robots that have emotions in a psychological or
philosophical sense. Nevertheless, the synthesis
of emotions in terms of models and their impact
on behavioral control are core topics. Further
areas of interest in the field are concerned with
emotion expression, emotion-integrated ▶ cogni-
tive systems and control architectures on individ-
ual as well as on group/social levels, recognition
of (human) emotions, and acceptance and social
integration aspects. To whom it may concern,
control architectures denote modularized con-
cepts and/or implementations of computational
algorithms, which produce actions in response
to perceptual inputs comprising means of
memory.
Expression of robotic emotions is predomi-
nantly based on principles of facial expressions
connecting activation of facial muscle groups,
and the corresponding robotic mechanical ele-
ments, to emotion states perceived by an observer
and body postures, which is covered by method-
ical frameworks from psychology. Facial expres-
sions as well as peripheral physiological data
such as skin conductance, heart rate, and pupil
dilation are usually used for recognition of human
emotions by robots. However, the connection of
such measured signals to real human emotions is
still not sufficiently understood. To date, archi-
tectures for robot behavior control based on inner
“emotion” states of the robot have only been
addressed weakly. So have system models con-
sidering group interactions of several agents
(human or robotic) on an emotional level. Control
approaches are mostly concerned with selecting
appropriate emotion expressions in the context of
a communication or interaction with humans.
Only few works cover psychological or neurobi-
ological modeling of (human) emotions and
transfer to robotics, which typically use algorith-
mic descriptions of emotional state progressions
as a function of various input modalities
(e.g., visual and/or auditory perception),
Robot Emotions
situational and interactive context in combination
with some form of short- and long-term memory.
While emotions have been a topic of intensive
research in software agents for several decades
now, for example, in computer games or military
training simulations, this intensity is not visible
in robotics yet. The main reason may be the lack
of their availability to the general public and
therefore the lack of data on long-term interaction
between humans and robots. However, there
is already a current commercial trend of low-
cost implementations in the form of “emotional”
pet robots. Moreover, to date, public acceptance
of emotive robots is ambivalent due to the tension
between complex interactive behavior and natu-
ral interactivity versus the apparent loss of
control by humans (Fig. 1).
Robot head EDDIE; animal-like features
complementing human-like facial elements for
improved emotion expression (K€uhnlenz et al.
2010).
Self-identification
Science
This discipline/subdiscipline does self-identify as
a science. Scientists in the field aim at transfer-
ring models of human emotions, emotion expres-
sion, emotion recognition, emotionally enriched
communication, decision making, and action
control from psychology and neuroscience to
technology in order to develop robots that can
interact in a natural and intuitive way with
humans. They also aim to develop behavior con-
trol mechanisms which complement conven-
tional cognitive control capabilities of robots.
This means that the robots have the ability to
select appropriate actions in response to percep-
tual input incorporating learning and knowledge/
experience.
Religion
This discipline does not self-identify as
a religion. Most scientists working on the field
would consider their work as focused on
nonreligious topics. However, in a more general
cultural context, there may be religious aspects
Robot Emotions
Robot Emotions,
Fig. 1 MIT’s Kismet,
a robot “that mimics and
responds to human
emotions.” (http://web.mit.
edu/newsoffice/2001/
kismet.html as of October
10, 2012.)
involved in the motivation for emotive robots,
for example, the adscription of life to inanimate
structures. Moreover, similarly to Artificial
Life, the limits between technology, philoso-
phy, and religions are blurred in this field.
Typical borderline questions are how to prove
existence of emotions in robot, what is needed
to make a robot emotive, whether a robot
that behaves emotionally will be inherently
emotional, or even whether artifacts will ever
have emotions.
Characteristics
Robot Emotions sets itself apart from the broader
disciplines/subdisciplines robotics, human-robot
interaction, and cognitive robotics by in-depth
consideration of motivational and affective
aspects in design and control of robots. It is
implicitly strongly interdisciplinary, involving
engineering, computer, psychological sciences,
and philosophy.
Relevance to Science and Religion
There is no major interest of scientists working in
Robot Emotions in “Science and Religion.” Reli-
gious implications of borderline questions like
2061 R
“Does a robot that behaves emotionally really
have human-like emotions?” or “Will artifacts
ever have human-like emotions?” are typically
not considered.
Sources of Authority
Typically, experimental evaluation, benchmark
measures, a measure with sufficient generality
in order to facilitate comparative evaluations of
different systems or processes, mathematical
proofs, empirical data and statistical analyses
with significance and effect measures, experi-
mental or simulative verification/falsification. R
Also, publications in journals, conference pro-
ceedings, and books with quality assessment
based on a peer-review process.
Ethical Principles
Disclosure of methods and data in order to
facilitate reproducibility of results. Compliance
with ethical guidelines in experiments
involving human participants, particularly, de-
personalization of data, participation on the
basis of free will, (de-)briefing of participants,
and implementation of controls for ethics com-
pliance verification.
R 2062
Key Values
Improve living conditions of humans, in particular,
assistance and therapy, such as support of human-
human socialization of the elderly or the autistic.
Conceptualization
Nature/World
Matter/energy and (psycho-)social relations in
space-time.
Human Being
A cognitive, emotional, and social life-form
Life and Death
There is no generally acknowledged concept of
life and death among scientists in the field. How-
ever, in contrast to biologists, many of them
would consider a definition of life that general-
izes to artifacts. In this context, typical phenom-
ena considered by biologists to be exhibited by
living organisms may also generalize. Among
those, reproduction could generalize to creation
of child agents, and homeostasis to self-regulation
in terms of a balanced technical system state, for
example.
Reality
What can be perceived/measured or be subjected
to individual perceptual embodiments and mea-
surement methods and that can be changed in
response to actions by individual embodiments
of actuators.
Knowledge
Information gain/learned information by obser-
vation or interaction.
Truth
What is proven, verified/falsified, tested are usu-
ally models as approximations of the truth. Truth
itself is considered not attainable.
Perception
The acquisition of data and limited processing
for information extraction in a process that
Robot Emotions
depends on the means of acquisition, and as
such is subjective and possibly erroneous. How-
ever, borders between perception and cognition
in Robot Emotions and robotics in general are
blurred.
Time
A physical unit as defined by the Système inter-
national d’unités.
Consciousness
A higher mental state. It is usually not explicitly
considered in the field of Robot Emotions, but it
is, however, tightly linked to emotion, for exam-
ple, self-conscious emotion.
Rationality/Reason
Scientists in the field would consider rationality
and reason fundamental concepts of cognition
and scientific research. In particular, rationality/
reason is regarded as complementing or ratio-
nalizing emotional decision making.
Mystery
Scientists in the field would consider a mystery as
not being explainable with currently available
scientific methods.
Relevant Themes
Work on emotions is commonly based on
biological principles. Developing emotive
robots implies the development of life-like
artifacts and even artificial humans, which
gives raise to questions regarding social and
religious implications. Similar to questions
raised by the field of Artificial Life, one may
ask what distinguishes an individual (robot/
human) showing emotional characteristics
from one, which/who actually experiences
emotions, as well as whether artifacts will
ever be capable of experiencing human-like
emotions. Social integration of robots into
human groups and communities is also an
issue of interest with religious implications
tightly linking the field to the field of robot
societies.
Robot Programming 2063 R
Cross-References Description

▶ Affective/Emotional Computing Robot programming is the process of developing

▶ Algorithms, Computer software that will control a robot. At the most
▶ Brains, Artificial and Computational basic level, a robot is nothing more than
▶ Control Theory (Cybernetics) a collection of sensors, actuators, and computers.
▶ Intelligences, Multiple Programming a robot is, therefore, similar in
▶ Philosophy of Science many ways to programming a desktop computer.
▶ Religion, Sociology of The primary difference is the incorporation of
▶ Robotics and Religion online data collection via sensors, and of
the ability to manipulate the environment using
actuators. The ▶ computer languages used to
References program a desktop computer are equally applica-
ble to programming a robot.
Breazeal, C. (2002). Designing sociable robots. A typical robot contains programs developed
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
using a mixture of languages – ranging
HUMAINE, European Network of Excellence on Emotion
Research. http://emotion-research.net from low-level assembly typically found in firm-
International Society for Research on Emotions (ISRE). ware (a small control program similar to
http://isre.org/index.php a software program), to mid-level languages,
K€uhnlenz, K., Sosnowski, S., & Buss, M. (2010). The
such as c, c++, or python, which typically handle
impact of animal-like features on emotion expression
of robot head EDDIE, Advanced Robotics, Brill, most, if not all, of the logic programming, to
Leiden, Netherlands. Advanced Robotics, 24(8–9), high-level languages, such as the Task Descrip-
1239–1255. tion Language (TDL) and Charon, which have
Minsky, M. (2006). The emotion machine. New York:
been designed specifically for robot
Simon & Schuster.
Picard, R. W. (1997). Affective computing. Cambridge, programming.
MA: MIT Press. Most robot programming is done by engineers
and scientists. Hobbyists have recently become
active developers as hardware has become
cheaper and more readily available. A nontrivial
amount of skill and experience is required to
Robot Languages program a robot. Professional software engineers
who write code for use on robotic systems
▶ Robot Programming typically have degrees in computer science, R
software engineering, or electrical engineering.
Accompanying their education is years of hands-
on experience, which provides them with the
Robot Programming ability to choose and implement algorithms for
a particular task and robot configuration.
Nathan Koenig A robot typically goes through a series of
Interaction Lab, Computer Science Department, programming iterations before it can become
University of Southern California, Los Angeles, operational. Historically, the first robots were
CA, USA built and programmed from the ground up by
a small group of talented individuals. Now,
many people with diverse backgrounds all help
Related Terms to program a robot. The first programming step is
performed by the manufacturer of the physical
Computer science; Machine learning in robots; structure or embodiment of the robot. This phys-
Robot embodiment; Robot languages ical structure through which a robot interacts with
R 2064
its environment may take many forms, from sim-
ple wheeled devices to complex humanoids. It is
needless to say that the range of behaviors that a
robot can achieve is limited by its embodiment.
During this stage firmware is added that provides
software access to the various sensors and actua-
tors. At this stage, the robot is still not completely
functional. It has the necessary code to move and
receive data from its environment, but nothing is
in place to decide what actions to take and when
to take them.
Building on top of this minimal functionality,
mid-level programming languages are used to
create a convenient application programming
interface (API). This software provides methods
that abstract away the details of the robot’s
hardware, and provide a general interface for
robot programming. This middle-ware facili-
tates rapid prototyping, encourages code reuse,
and creates a common platform around which
many different applications can be designed.
Examples of such middle-ware include Robot
Operating System (ROS), Player Project, and
Carmen.
The final step is to imbue the robot with
intelligent behavior. This step involves the use
of either a mid-level or high-level programming
language. It is at this step where a robot gains the
ability to interpret sensor data such that it can
make intelligent decisions. Usually this step
involves significant testing, debugging, and anal-
ysis. As a result, significant time is spent here,
and tools have been designed to aid programmers
in their task.
These tools typically consist of one or more
▶ simulators designed to recreate the robot, its
capabilities, and its environment. By using
a simulator, a programmer can constrain problems
by manipulating the artificial robot’s environment.
This can take the form of slowing down or speeding
up time, altering the complexity of the environ-
ment, and changing the physical structure of the
robot. As a result, ideas can easily be tested, and
problems can be debugged without the bottlenecks
associated with using the scare resources of
a physical robot.
Robots are being designed to aid humans
in a wide range of tasks, including inherently
Robot Programming
dangerous scenarios, such as search and rescue,
making our lives more comfortable through
household robots, and improving precision, accu-
racy, and speed as seen in assembly line robots.
As robots are expected to perform even more
complex tasks, engineers and scientists need to
imbue these machines with more intelligence.
This is being tackled through the use of algo-
rithms designed to let a machine learn. These
algorithms span a wide range of fields including
computer vision, natural language processing,
pattern recognition, and bioinformatics. This
field of machine learning has witnessed great
advances and is currently at the point where
machines can learn to walk, fly planes and heli-
copters, drive cars, interpret human speech, and
identify a wide range of objects. Machine learn-
ing involves creating a program that when exe-
cuted can learn something new based on data
from sensors or databases.
Building off of machine learning is
a relatively new field of study called learning
from demonstration, or programming by dem-
onstration, that redefines how a robot acquires
knowledge. The central principle behind learn-
ing from demonstration is to improve knowl-
edge transfer by giving a robot the ability to
observe and learn from human behavior. This
can take the form of direct guidance through
manipulation of a robot’s actuators, imitation
where a robot observes and repeats human
actions, or tel-operation where a person drives
the robot using a joystick. In each situation, the
robot makes observations about itself and its
environment during the demonstration. This
data is then used to generate a control policy.
The robot programmer has only to implement
the means by which a robot can observe
a teacher, and learn appropriate policies. While
this is no small feat, it does allow a robot to
program itself with a potentially arbitrary num-
ber of policies.
There is no one set method in which
a robot can be programmed. In many instances,
a hand-generated finite state machine is suffi-
cient. In others, machine learning is used due
to the complexity of the task and environment.
However, all robot programming still relies on
Robot Programming
a human to create an application using one of
the many programming languages available
today.
Self-identification
Science
Robot programming by itself is not considered
a science, but rather an engineer task that
requires problem solving, critical thinking,
and experience. However, programming is an
important part of the scientific processes.
Computer scientists and engineers rely on robots
and programming languages to test theory, and
implement new algorithms.
Characteristics
Robot programming is a unique form of software
programming since the programs being created
must control a physical structure that operates
within a dynamic world. Other types of programs
are designed to operate on a device that
cannot automatically gather information from its
surroundings and change its environment. As
a result, programming a robot requires the engineer
to consider issues, such as sensor properties, motor
control, safety, how to best handle error conditions
and unforeseen events, and in what environmental
conditions will the robot fail. A notable outcome
that is often encountered is emergence, where
interactions with the environment cause a robot to
behave in an unexpected and beneficial manner.
See further entry on Theories of emergence.
Relevance to Science and Religion
The discipline of robot programming is not
concerned “Science and Religion.” The closest
question related to religion that a robot program-
mer may have to consider is the possibility of
creating an artificial life, and what implications
it has on society. However, at this point in
time the possibility of creating such an entity is
remote at best.
2065 R
Sources of Authority
There is no one person or group that can
be looked upon as providing an authoritative
perspective on robot programming. Over the
relative brief history of robots, there have been
numerous papers published on robot control
architectures, and the results from these have
guided many people in their efforts. However,
every robot is different, and designed to perform
different tasks. Furthermore, this young field
experiences rapid advances in technology and
algorithms. As a result techniques are rapidly
eclipsed by ever newer approaches.
However, there has recently been advances
made by a variety of groups to create software
tools designed to reduce development time,
increase code reuse, and improve the process
of research and development in robotics. These
projects enforce, or strongly encourage, a general
guideline for robot programming and can be
looked upon as being a pseudo-authority in
robot programming.
Ethical Principles
Robots are extremely useful tools that can aid
humans in many different ways. The military
views robots as the next great advancement in
warfare. A robot on the battlefield or performing
reconnaissance does not put a human directly in
harm’s way, and can perform some tasks much R
more efficiently. A robot does not have emotions,
can operate in adverse conditions, will obediently
perform any action, and can be controlled
remotely. Proponents of robotic warfare claim
that robots will reduce causalities, and save
lives. However, machines that are designed for
war can have horrific effects, and many
researchers and engineers abstain from develop-
ment of these robot warriors. While a robot essen-
tially puts its corresponding human counterpart
out of harm’s way, it is this ability that could
make robots a dangerous weapon to deploy. By
limiting the loss of life, the cost of war decreases.
This, in turn, could potentially increase
a population’s willingness to engage in war.
R 2066
The current trend shows that robots are being
rapidly developed for use by the military, and
only time will tell if this was a wise decision.
Recently, there has been a strong push to use
robots as tools to aid the elderly and people
with disabilities. Concerns of privacy and safety
necessarily come to the forefront. Some of these
problems will naturally be solved as people
become more comfortable with artificial entities
operating with and around them. In other
instances, assurances will have to be made that
a robot will repeatedly operate correctly. In much
the same way as the drugs and food must go
through testing and gain government approval,
also robotic systems and their software will
probably one day be regulated to ensure no
harm will come to end users.
Conceptualization
Nature/World
This is the environment in which the robot
operates. Robots are typically sized between
a small animal and a human, although great
advances have been made with nanorobots.
A robot can collect data from and interact with
the world, but lacks the human concept of nature.
Human Being
Human beings are dynamic objects in the
world that can program a robot, and interact
with it. A robot cannot understand that a human
has created and programmed it. The extent
of a robot’s knowledge about humans depends
on the amount of knowledge it has been
programmed with.
Life and Death
Robot programming could potentially lead to
the generation of artificial life; however, this is
speculation especially since the concept of life is
ill defined. Since a robot is not considered to be
alive it cannot die. A robot is often said to have
died, however, when it becomes nonfunctional
due to hardware or software failures. However,
the use of the term death in this context is not
equivalent as when applied to living things.
Robot Programming
Reality
Robots operate in the real world and as such are
governed by the laws of physics. From a program-
mer’s perspective, the control code for a robot must
take into account their kinematic and dynamic
constraints and capabilities. From the robot’s
point of view, reality depends on its sensors, and
its ability to process data from these sensors.
A robot does not have a concept of reality, but
just the ability to gather information from its envi-
ronment, and perform actions based on this data.
Knowledge
Information from humans is transferred onto
a robot by means of programming. Knowledge
can also be gained by the robot automatically as it
collects data from its environment. Without
some minimal information, a robot is incapable
of performing meaningful behaviors. The most
minimal knowledge a robot should have is how
to interpret sensor information and control its
actuators. The complexity of the knowledge
required by a robot scales proportionally with
the complexity of the desired behavior.
Truth
Truth in robot programming is based on laws
governing the physical world. Data from
a robot’s sensors is derived from interactions
(passive or active) from the surrounding environ-
ment, and must be taken as truth, with some
amount of noise.
Perception
A robot’s view of the world is defined and limited
by its sensors. This in turn constrains how the
robot is programmed, and the tasks it can
accomplish.
Time
Time is viewed by the robot in much the same
way as it is viewed by humans. The primary
difference is that a robot can operate at a much
faster rate than a human. A robot programmer
will often deal with time scales of a few millisec-
onds or smaller to minutes and hours. This
wide range of time can often lead to unexpected
outcomes and errors.
Robotics and Religion
Consciousness
The current state of art in robot programming
does not incorporate the ability to be self-
aware. A robot is, therefore, not considered
to be a conscious entity. There is belief that
robots could one day become conscious, but
the path to achieve this goal is not well
understood.
Rationality/Reason
Robot programming requires rational thinking
and problem solving. One must understand
complex interactions that sensors and actuators
can have with the robot’s environment, and how
best to implement control logic that minimizes
the weaknesses of a robot and improves robust-
ness and efficiency.
Mystery
There is very little mystery associated with robot
programming. A mysterious error or unexplained
problem may appear when programming a robot.
However, these can always be explained after
careful analysis of the robot and its environment.
Relevant Themes
There is a long-standing stigma surrounding
robots, starting with Karel Capek’s play
“Rossum’s Universal Robots.” Books and
movies have historically portrayed robots as
evil, and as a result many people have apprehen-
sions concerning robots. The concept of being
evil requires that a robot is capable of making
moral judgments, and is a sentient entity. This
also requires that a robot has been programmed to
be evil. While nothing is certain, the possibility of
robots designed and programmed in such a way is
extremely minimal.
If one day an artificial life form is created, this
will raise interesting moral questions for us as
a society. In particular, we will have to decide
how such an entity will fit into our society, and
what kind of rights they would or should have. On
a more personal level, a robot programmer may
have to decide how his beliefs fit in with his
ability to create another form of life.
2067 R
Cross-References
▶ Computer Science in Human Learning
▶ Control Theory
▶ Software Engineering
▶ Space and Time
Robotics and Religion
Robert M. Geraci
Associate Professor of Religious Studies,
Manhattan College, Riverdale, NY, USA
Related Terms
Alchemy; Computer science; Golem;
Homunculus; Kurzweil; Robot singularity
Description
Although many of the optimistic predictions
made by early cyberneticists and roboticists
remain far from fulfilled, the rapid progress of
robotics and artificial intelligence (AI) in the late
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has
inspired reflection on the religious implications
of intelligent robots. Faith in one or more reli-
gious visions of robotics has percolated through
modern culture, inspired by experts in technical R
fields, theologians, and the lay public. Interest-
ingly, the science of robotics both emerges out of
and critically engages religious practice, despite
the fact that only a minority of roboticists or AI
researchers engage the subject. Naturally, some
observers object to (possibly) hyperbolic expec-
tations for robotics, and feel that the advocates of
such positions stand outside of science (properly
understood) and perhaps in opposition to tradi-
tional religions. As a result, at present there is
neither a “science” nor a “religion” of robot faiths
that clearly stands out as a source of authority in
the field, although the scientific approach appears
to be more prevalent. Meanwhile, enthusiasts
across a wide variety of disciplines tend to fall
R 2068
in one of three camps: robotics will (1) allow us to
complete the divine creation or create partners for
humankind, (2) create gods worthy of our wor-
ship, and/or (3) provide humankind with immor-
tal salvation. In the case of robotics and religion,
it is transparently clear that no simple dynamic of
conflict or cooperation dictates how observers
will integrate the two.
The twin sciences of robotics and artificial
intelligence developed out of ▶ cybernetics
research in the mid-twentieth century, and subse-
quently became part of a wide array of techno-
logical practices, from hobbyist to professional.
See further entry Control Theory (Cybernetics).
The majority of roboticists and AI researchers see
nothing religious in their work, but simply engi-
neer solutions to technical problems. At present,
robots and AI systems are used in assembly lines,
inventory management, stock trading, search pro-
cesses, the military, video gaming, and private
homes, to name but a few sites they occupy.
Simple robots vacuum floors or engage children,
but more sophisticated versions also watch over
soldiers and carry weapons. Some robots are
humanoids capable of running, dancing, and con-
versing with people; others are cars that can drive
across the USA unassisted. As researchers take
advantage of increases in computing power and
solve hardware problems (such as having ade-
quate battery power), robotic applications will
become even more widespread, perhaps trigger-
ing a revolution in how we live. In addition to
laboring on our behalf, robots may become suffi-
ciently intelligent that they become our partners,
our friends, or our betters.
According to roboticists who engage the ques-
tion of consciousness, thought is a process
enacted by a material substrate, but is not depen-
dent in any essential way upon the constitution of
that substrate. In principle, argue roboticists,
there is no reason why a robot could not be as
intelligent (or more so) than a person, as there is
widespread agreement in the field that in impor-
tant ways human beings are simply very sophis-
ticated machines. Consciousness appears to be
a by-product of massively parallel computation,
not tied to the hardware in which it takes place
(brains and bodies), and can be mimicked in
Robotics and Religion
a machine. If this is true, then a sufficiently pow-
erful robot could become our equal, and take on
a life of its own.
As a corollary, advocates for intelligent robots
believe without doubt that such machines will be
“alive.” Various definitions for life exist, and
most commentators consider it base chauvinism
to deny that robots could possess it. By necessity,
many advocates of machine intelligence, such as
Hans Moravec and Ray Kurzweil, claim that bio-
logical life is evolving into machine life
(Kurzweil 2005; Moravec 1988).
The desire to build artificial life was not born
in the twentieth century; rather, robotics and AI
extend a millennia-long exercise deeply tied to
religious thought and practice. Particularly in the
West, religious groups have looked upon the cre-
ation of life as the ultimate in imitatio dei (imita-
tion of God), a tradition that extends across
Judaism, Islam, and Christianity (though with
more ambivalence in this last). In Judaism, for
example, stories of learned and holy rabbis cre-
ating ▶ Golems trace back to the Babylonian
Talmud, and were adapted into the legends of
two early modern rabbis: Elijah of Chelm
(d. 1543) and Judah Loew of Prague
(1525–1609). Across the same time span,
Muslims and Christians developed parallel and
intertwined practices, mostly revolving around
the creation of an ▶ homunculus, which is a mag-
ical creature, usually but not always humanoid
(though smaller), produced through existed in
classical Islam and in medieval Europe. Theories
of the homunculus both influenced and were
influenced by those of golems. Jābir ibn Hayyān
(c. 721–815), known as both the father of chem-
istry and the “Paracelsus of the Arabs,” believed
that basic elements could be manipulated and
balanced to produce life. His descriptions of the
▶ homunculus influenced later Islamic works,
such as the Book of the Cow, and also alchemists
in Christian Europe, such as the aforementioned
Paracelsus (1493–1541). Unlike Paracelsus and
the alchemists, the early modern rabbis almost
certainly did not attempt to produce ▶ Golems,
yet the politics of the eighteenth- through the
twentieth-century Europe led Jews to develop
and sustain legends of ▶ Golems who could
Robotics and Religion
save them from persecution, and these stories
subsequently had a significant impact on the
twentieth-century culture, from silent films to
science fiction.
Early in the robotics era, science fiction
authors imagined ways in which robots might
participate in the religious traditions of human-
kind, with a range that includes developing their
own religious sensitivities. Isaac Asimov, for
example, has had an extraordinary influence
upon robotics, and many contemporary
roboticists continue to cite his stories as inspira-
tional in their career choices. In his collection of
robot stories, I, Robot, Asimov uses religious
themes to help explore robotic potential, as
when one group of robots establishes a religion
that mimics the fundamental tenets of Islam,
though applied to machines. Whereas Muslims
aver that “there is no God but God, and Muham-
mad is his messenger,” the robots in Asimov’s
story “Reason” claim that “there is no Master but
the Master, and QT-1 is his prophet.” In this
transmutation, a space station is the Master, and
QT-1 is the robot who first began to worship it
rather than obey its human creators. While Asi-
mov uses religion to write a story about the oper-
ating possibilities of robots, other authors have
used robots in order to explore religious themes,
such as Clifford Simak, whose Project Pope
describes human beings and robots collaborating
in an attempt to produce a universal religion. The
intersection between religion and robotics is not
confined to science fiction, however, but has been
a crucial element in popular explorations into the
potential of robotics research and predictions
about the future of the world.
Critical engagement between robotics and
religion began in earnest with the publication of
Hans Moravec’s Mind Children: The Future of
Robot and Human Intelligence in 1988. In Mind
Children, Moravec argues that Moore’s Law and
the pace of improvements in computer vision
indicate that robots are gaining intelligence at
an exponential rate, which means that robots
will reach human level intelligence in the near
future before sailing rapidly beyond that level. As
robotic technologies improve, Moravec argues,
we will solve human handicaps and eventually
2069 R
copy our personalities into robotic bodies. Ray
Kurzweil, a prolific and famous inventor,
extended Moravec’s ideas in The Age of Spiritual
Machines (1999) and The Singularity Is Near
(2005), presenting them to a wider audience and
supplementing them with insights from nano-
technology and other technical fields.
In Moravec’s apocalyptic vision of our robotic
future, nature values technology over biology.
This latter has evolved specifically to produce
the former, and will eventually be transformed
into it. There is nothing “unnatural” about artifi-
cial intelligence, as technology is perceived to be
an inevitable outcome of biological intelligence,
and machine intelligence is taken as inevitable
once technology has become widespread.
Historical time, in this apocalyptic vision of
robotics, progresses indefatigably toward the
Mind Fire (Moravec’s term) when computation
has taken over all material reality. According to
Moravec, evolution guarantees that the superior
thinking of machines will outcompete that of
humanity. Kurzweil argues that a law of acceler-
ating returns guarantees that the world will expe-
rience a technological ▶ singularity in the first
half of the twenty-first century. Subjective time
is speeding up, he argues, and the coming decades
will include unprecedented advances that will
culminate in true artificial intelligence and the
merger of biology and technology.
Moravec’s ideas spread, thanks particularly to
Kurzweil, and thus commanded attention from
theologians whose own desires were in conflict R
with Moravec’s. For obvious reasons, those who
believe in immortal souls were never enamored
with Moravec’s plan to provide immortality by
“uploading” minds from bodies into machines.
Were such a process possible, it would stand in
the way of an individual’s ascent to Heaven; even
faith that it might be possible could lead the
faithful astray. It is not just theologians, but lay
people who see ▶ mind uploading as a threat to
traditional religions. Mind uploading is the hypo-
thetical process of scanning the contents of
a human brain onto a machine emulating a
brain, so that human consciousness can continue
in the machine. Kurzweil was featured in popular
venues such as the New York Times and Rolling
R 2070
Stone; as a consequence, some members of the
Christian laity learned of his ideas and voiced
their opposition (Tamatea 2010).
Despite the criticisms leveled against ▶ mind
uploading, many Christian theologians have seen
value in robotics research, suggesting that it
could either contribute to the establishment of
a kingdom of God or that it could be an important
continuation of divine creation (e.g., Foerst 2005;
Jackelén 2002; Herzfeld 2002). On the one hand,
research in robotics could provide important
advances in human prosthetics, perhaps helping
the blind to see and the lame to walk. In addition,
some theologians believe that by creating intelli-
gent robots, we will do so in our image, and hence
in the image of God. Lutheran theologian Anne
Foerst has developed this idea the furthest, argu-
ing that, to be in the image of God means, funda-
mentally, to be in loving relations with others
(as she believes that God is with humanity). As
such, producing robotic friends and companions
would expand the circle of love and contribute to
the outflowing of divine love in creation.
Outside of Christianity, at least one commu-
nity shares the belief that robots could become
partners in human life. In Japan, the only non-
Western community where the relationship
between robotics and religion has received any
attention, many people look forward to compan-
ionship between humanity and its mechanical
progeny. Early in the introduction of robots to
Japan, the public embraced them, even including
them in religious practices (Hornyak 2006;
Schodt 1988). Early industrial robots, for exam-
ple, were welcomed into factories with Shinto
rituals and gifts of flowers. As a number of indi-
viduals have recognized, the traditional accep-
tance that nonliving objects can be kami
(loosely translated as having “holiness”), implies
that robots can be kami. They can have spirit. At
the same time, Japan’s other long-standing reli-
gious tradition, Buddhism, also provides room
for the inclusion of machines. One engineer,
Masahiro Mori, attained notoriety for his claim
that robots have the Buddha nature in them (Mori
[1981] 1999). Many Japanese cite their affection
for and acceptance of robots as a consequence of
their love of Tetsuwan Atomo (“Mighty Atom,”
Robotics and Religion
known in the USA as “Astro Boy”). The cartoon
robot never threatens humanity, as do many
robots in the Western world; instead, he works
to save us from harm. Broadly speaking, his
influence, combined with the persistence of
Shinto and Buddhist ideas in the largely agnostic
country, promotes a spirit of cooperation and
affection between human beings and robots.
As a result, many Japanese eagerly look forward
to the introduction of functioning, intelligent
humanoid robots.
If robots become equal to humankind, there is
a strong possibility that they might develop reli-
gious inclinations. Clearly, the standard questions
of meaning, purpose, and ultimate origins will be
as relevant to the robots as they are to human
beings. Theologians like Foerst, along with a few
computer scientists, such as Edmund Furse,
believe that when robots become conscious, they
will join our religious congregations or perhaps
create religions of their own. Kurzweil claims that
machines will be more “spiritual” than human
beings, thanks to their superior thinking and pow-
ers of concentration. It is highly likely that devel-
oping religious sensitivities will, in fact, be
closely intertwined with any social movement to
provide legal rights to robots; if robots show
a religious imagination, then they will go far
toward entering human circles of empathy and
earning themselves the rights and responsibilities
of citizens; commensurately, a universal absence
of religious feeling among robots would likely be
taken as indicative that they are not and cannot be
true persons (Geraci 2010).
At the same time, intelligent robots will with-
out question have some kind of moral or ethical
system by which to make decisions. From
a human standpoint, it is impossible to separate
questions of right and wrong from the matters of
free will, consciousness, and personhood. As
such, ethics will be as crucial as religion to any
empathy directed toward intelligent machines
(Geraci 2010). Should robots become intelligent,
however, and acquire some set of ethics, they will
have to do so while sailing between the twin
dangers of the military and capitalism. These
two institutions, like Scylla and Charybdis,
could swallow up any good that we might hope
Robotics and Religion
of our creations. Although Moravec believes that
intelligent machines will be our “mind children,”
and thus retain essential parts of our humanity,
the science fiction author Charles Stross rightly
points out that the majority of funding for artifi-
cial intelligence comes from military and eco-
nomic strongholds, neither of which has any
vested interest in developing altruistic and gen-
erous machines. As we continue to develop arti-
ficial intelligence, it behooves us to keep these
concerns in mind, to ensure that if we truly can
develop intelligent machines, then we will create
machines worth befriending.
Both Moravec and Kurzweil, the leading fig-
ures at the intersection of religion and robotics,
believe that advances in robotics and AI are mor-
ally good and will result in a morally beneficent
universe. Both believe that as we merge with
machines over the coming century, we will bring
essential aspects of our humanity, including our
good will and altruism. Technology should solve
human problems, they argue, and both devote
considerable time in their books to exploring
how technology might solve our ecological crisis,
provide renewable energy, improve food produc-
tion and distribution, etc. In short, the merger of
biology and technology will not only make human
beings more capable, it will help us to overcome
our past mistakes and create a better world.
It remains possible that, upon attaining human
level equivalence, robots will rapidly progress to
unimaginable heights of intelligence and power;
if this happens, they may become as gods unto us.
If this proves true, perhaps cyborg prostheses will
permit humankind to match them in power, but
this seems unlikely. After all, human bodies have
limits to their size, mobility, and capacity.
A robot freed from such constraints could – at
least in theory – grow well beyond humanity. One
AI theorist, Hugo de Garis, has gained some
measure of infamy for his belief that such robots,
which he labels “artilects,” will indeed become
gods worthy of worship. While he recognizes that
such divine machines may well find humanity an
unnecessary burden or unacceptable competition,
he believes this is a morally valuable outcome.
That is, he has suggested that humanity may fight
world wars over whether to build godlike
2071 R
machines, or the machines might choose to exter-
minate many or all human beings, but that the
successful construction of one divine robot will
make all human suffering worthwhile. De Garis
thus reconfigures ethics into an inhuman and pos-
sibly antihuman crusade for intelligent machines,
where no other species has a claim to life, free-
dom, or happiness.
Moravec and Kurzweil, however, believe that
humanity will join the godlike robots in their
cosmic quest. In their apocalyptic predictions,
the world will come to an end as we know it,
and humanity will transform into a race of divine
machines through ▶ mind uploading (Geraci
2010). Every advantage held by one of de Garis’s
artilects will be shared by ex-humans; thus our
immortal salvation will be assured. For Kurzweil,
this outcome will be spiritual in addition to intel-
lectual: First, as human beings add computational
power, they will acquire new capacity for spiri-
tual reflection; second, as the world, the solar
system, and eventually the universe are converted
to thinking entities, the universe will itself “wake
up” and move inexorably toward traditional
Christian conceptions of God.
There are rich areas for speculation in the
intersection of religion and robots. While some
hope that the construction of robots will fulfill
long-standing religious goals, others expect that
robotics will overthrow our traditional religions,
producing either gods or substitute forms of sal-
vation. Alongside all of this, the vast majority of
professional roboticists have little or no invest- R
ment in any of the varying intersections between
robots and religion. Rapid growth and deploy-
ment of robotics throughout the world, however,
means that the expectations of people on the
ground – the scientific laity – should be more
carefully explored. It is particularly important
that researchers collect meaningful data from
observations and interviews conducted among
relevant populations, and not merely draw
abstract conclusions on the basis of beliefs that
the researchers presume people hold. The ethical
implications of our current robots, such as weap-
onized military robots, certainly have religious
overtones and should be examined through such
a lens. In addition, we simply do not know enough
R 2072
about how differing religious environments will
affect either the development or use of robotic
technologies. While research has begun in the
Christian West, this remains largely abstract and
broad, with little attention to the particulars of
given Christian communities. More pressing,
almost no research has been done outside of that
context. There have been intriguing forays into
Japanese practice, but more remains to be done in
that area and, especially, beyond.
Cross-References
▶ Artificial Intelligence, General
▶ Brains, Artificial and Computational
▶ Consciousness, the Problem of
▶ Cyborgs
▶ Imago Dei
▶ Posthuman Condition
▶ Robot Emotions
▶ Robot Societies
References
Foerst, A. (2005). God in the machine: What robots teach
us about humanity and god. New York: Dutton.
Geraci, R. M. (2010). Apocalyptic AI: Visions of heaven in
robotics, artificial intelligence, and virtual reality.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Herzfeld, N. (2002). In our image: Artificial intelligence
and the human spirit. Minneapolis: Fortress.
Hornyak, T. N. (2006). Loving the machine: The art and
science of Japanese robotics. New York: Kodansha
International.
Jackelén, A. (2002). The image of god as Techno Sapiens.
Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 37(2),
289–302.
Kurzweil, R. (2005). The singularity is near: When
humans transcend biology. New York: Penguin.
Moravec, H. (1988). Mind children: The future of robot
and human intelligence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Mori, M. ([1981] 1999). The Buddha in the robot: A robot
engineer’s thoughts on science and religion (trans:
Terry, C. S.). Tokyo: Kosei.
Schodt, F. L. (1988). Inside the robot kingdom: Japan,
mechantronics, and the coming robotopia. New York:
Kodansha International.
Tamatea, L. (2010). Online Buddhist and Christian
responses to artificial intelligence. Zygon: Journal of
Religion and Science, 45(4), 979–1002.
Robot Singularity
Robot Singularity
▶ Robotics and Religion
Robot Societies
Klaus Mainzer
Department of Philosophy of Science, Technical
University of Munich, Munich, Germany
Related Terms
Artificial life; Computer science; Multi-robot
systems
A robot society is a group of robots which has the
ability to communicate, interact, and to perform
tasks jointly. A society is defined by its information
and control structure which make possible com-
mon task planning and execution. Most of the
autonomous mobile robots are operating in neither
stable nor structured environments. Therefore,
a major trend in robotics is going toward multi-
robot systems. In many cases, the decomposition of
a complex task into parallel subtasks is a possible
way to speed up the performance. Sometimes, sev-
eral robots work with the same subtask, increasing
the redundancy of the system. Furthermore, there
can be tasks where successful completion requires
close cooperation among the robots. Such case is,
for example, the carrying of a large object together.
It requires some sort of interaction between robots,
whether it is a direct communication or some sort
of indirect communication through sensing the
forces in the object to be transported. This kind of
task as well as many other tasks normally related to
multi-robot systems has clear analogy to biological
systems. A group of ants solve the problem through
sensing the forces and torque in the object. Based
on this information they change the direction of
force. Numerous similar examples can be found
from nature. Tests by evolution during millions of
years are proven to be feasible in dynamic and
hostile environments and can thus provide valuable
Robot Societies
information and inspiration for similar type of engi-
neering tasks.
Artificial life represents an attempt to under-
stand all life phenomena through reproduction in
artificial systems, typically through their simula-
tion on a computer. To attain this ambitious goal,
artificial life relies on the theory of complex
dynamical systems and on the power of computers.
A complex dynamical system is a system that can
be described at different levels, in which global
properties at one level emerge from the interaction
of a number of simple elements at lower levels.
Global properties are emergent in the sense that
they cannot be predicted from a knowledge of the
elements or the rules by which the elements locally
interact, given the high nonlinearity of these inter-
actions (see the entry “▶ Complex Systems”). In
engineering science, evolutionary robotics shares
most of these characteristics with artificial life, but
it also stresses the importance of using physical
devices in robots instead of simulated agents.
Cooperative robots are constantly interacting
not only with the dynamic environment, but
also naturally with each other and with the persons
who are using them. This large variety of interac-
tions will produce behaviors that are going to be
superior compared to performed by current single
robots. The robots will be equipped to survive as
a part of a complex system, where the cooperation is
essential for their survival. Collective intelligence
emerging from these interactions gives a reason to
call these systems, at their highest level, “robot
societies.” Multi-agent systems, whether software
or hardware agent based, have to solve some funda-
mental problems. They must formulate, describe,
decompose, and allocate tasks among a group of
intelligent agents. Agents must be enabled to com-
municate and to interact. They must be ensured to
act coherently in their actions. Further on, they
must recognize and reconcile conflicts. Therefore,
a model of distributed robotic systems must be
defined and designed. All functions of these systems
are obviously realized through their members. The
members’ behaviors are results from their own
needs and from the constraints set of the system,
environment, or operator.
The number of distributed autonomous
robotic system applications will increase as the
2073 R
technology and knowledge improve. Various
robot societies will move from research
laboratories into everyday life. Normal applications
concern everyday tasks like cleaning, monitoring,
caring people in households or hospitals, etc. In the
future, robot societies will be taken to distant
planets, deep-sea module collection missions, and
mining operations, among others. Nanosized robots
will be sent into veins in search of tumors, which
they will attack at close range. Just as in natural
systems, the intelligence of the collective system
will emerge from the multiple interactions among
the members and with the environment.
In first steps of development, natural
populations, for example, ant societies, were stud-
ied to find the key issues. Next steps were to design
a physical society. It consists of two types of
autonomous mobile robots, and the task for the
society is classical, to gather stones from an
unknown environment along with the mapping of
the environment while operating. The society has
been implemented both as a physical society and as
a simulated one. A possible application is the use of
a robot society inside industrial processes.
A profound challenge of interdisciplinary
importance is the question how culture may
emerge and evolve as a novel property in groups
of social animals. The question can be solved by
focusing the attention on the very early stages of
the emergence and evolution of simple cultural
artifacts. Therefore, one should start by building
an artificial society of embodied intelligent agents
as real robots, creating an environment or artificial R
ecosystems. Even with small populations of simple
robots, a large number of interactions between
robots can be generated. The inherent heterogene-
ities of real robots, and the noise and uncertainty of
the real world, increase the space of possibilities
and the scope for unexpected emergence in the
interactions between robots.
The goal is to create the conditions in which
proto-culture can emerge in a robot society. Robots
can copy each other’s behaviors and select which
behaviors to keep. Behaviors will mutate because of
the noise and uncertainty in the real robots’ sensors
and actuators. Successful types of behavior will
undergo multiple cycles of copying (heredity), selec-
tion, and variation (mutation). With evolutionary
R 2074
time, a genetic algorithmic process will grow and
evolve the robots’ controllers so that the emerging
patterns of behavior become hard-wired into the
robots’ controllers.
The behavioral artifacts emerging and
evolving will not be human but robotic. They
will be meaningful only within the closed context
of this artificial society. A significant challenge
for these projects will be to identify and interpret
these patterns of behavior as evidence for an
emerging proto-culture.
Based on the economic ideas about cost and
utility, robot ecosystems were developed.
From an ethologist’s point of view, robots are
interesting for investigating biologically realistic
issues. The emergence of cooperation can be stud-
ied by experiments with robots. For example, in
a robot ecosystem, there are a few robots and a few
boxes with infrared lamps. The lamps are called
competitors because they (like robots) consume
energy from the ecosystem. As the overall amount
of electricity is limited, the robots have to compete
with the lamps for the electricity. A constant but
restricted influx of energy into the system limits the
amount of electricity available. The robots have to
push against the competitors to reduce the compet-
itors’ energy consumption.
Reducing the infrared lamps’ energy consump-
tion dims their lights. The darker the boxes, the
more current there is in the charging station. The
robots are equipped with the sensors whose activa-
tion levels can be coupled to motivations. If the
environment is made more taxing by increasing the
number of energy-consuming boxes, the robots
have to exploit these sensors to produce beneficial
sensor-to-motor couplings. Beneficial in this case
means leading to higher available energy levels.
For example, the robots have a sensor for
internal energy level. If the sensor is coupled
directly with the motivation for forward move-
ment, the robot moves more slowly when the
energy is low, which makes the robot take longer
to move through the charge station. The robots
also have a sensor for detecting the charging
station. If the sensor is inversely coupled to the
motivation for forward movement, this keeps
the robot in the charging station even longer. In
addition, the robots have light sensors, and the
Robot Societies
charging station is marked with a light, so they
can potentially use phototaxis to approach the
charging station. If the robots exploit the various
sensory modalities in appropriate ways, they get
an advantage in terms of energy management.
This implies increasing the complexity of
their behavioral repertoire, for example, better
exploitation of the motor system.
When an evolutionary perspective is applied,
one needs a value system. In the robot’s case, it is
related to energy supply: Increase in energy level
is of value. The task of energy management is
difficult, because the beneficial effects of certain
actions manifest themselves only much later.
This is a fundamental issue in reinforcement
learning. The entire experiment can also be put
into an evolutionary context. It would be interest-
ing to study what sorts of value systems would
evolve.
Cooperation can also be studied in this
experiment. The energy influx into the charging
station increases if another robot pushes against
the energy-consuming boxes. In a sense, the robot
that pushes against the boxes works for the one in
the charging station. If the robots cooperate in
this way, they can potentially draw more current
from the charging station. Thus, they may be able
to support more robots, because they manage to
divert electricity from the competitors. This
entire procedure can also be embedded into an
evolutionary cycle. In this case, one can see
which sensors will be exploited, given
a particular environmental pressure. The fitness
criterion in this case would be: How long the
agents can survive?
The behavioral economics approach to auton-
omous agents brings in important ideas. Thinking
in terms of utilities rather than specific quantities
leads to plausible models of rational behavior.
This framework is highly useful in understanding
animal behavior and behavior of autonomous
agents in general. The idea that rational behavior
can occur without rational thinking or that the
problems of thresholds can be avoided by using
utilities is highly appealing. The fact that behav-
ior is an emergent property of the interaction
between robots and their environment has the
consequence that simple robots can produce
Rule-Based Ethics 2075 R
complex behavior. However, it also has the con- Pfeifer, R., & Scheier, C. (1999). Understanding intelli-
sequence that, as in most dynamical systems, the gence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Steels, L. (Ed.). (1995). The biology and technology of
properties of the emergent behavior cannot easily intelligent autonomous agents. Berlin: Springer.
be predicted or inferred from the knowledge of
the rules governing the interactions. The reverse
is also true: It is difficult to predict which rules
will produce a given behavior, since the behavior Role of Religion in Society
is the emergent result of the dynamical interac-
tion between the robots and the environment. ▶ Religion, Sociology of
However, the behavioral economics approach
has some problems. The main drawback of
behavioral economics is that the approach is
more analytical than synthetic. It does not pro- Roman-Catholic Pastoral Theology
vide heuristics on how to derive the mechanisms in Europe
that lead to the desired behaviors. Another diffi-
culty is that the approach is top-down and sug- ▶ Pastoral Theology, Roman-Catholic, Europe
gests that careful prior analysis of the problem
can produce optimal designs. Experience with
software engineering suggests that a top-down
approach may not work well in an unstructured Romance
domain. Moreover, from a cognitive science
perspective, a bottom-up approach seems more ▶ Love (Affective, Sexual)
promising.

Cross-References Romantic

▶ Evolution Roland Karo

▶ Intelligence, Swarm University of Tartu, Tartu, Estonia
▶ Robot Emotions
▶ Robot Programming
Refers to the specifically erotic type of interper-
sonal attraction, in contrast with the nonsexual R
References varieties of affection. For example, the Ancient
Greek texts distinguish between agapic (ideal,
Braitenberg, V. (1984). Vehicles. Cambridge, MA: MIT divine - from the word agapē), erotic (passionate,
Press. desire-oriented - from the word erōs), friendly
Brooks, R. (1999). Cambrian intelligence. Cambridge,
(the Greek word for this type of affection is
MA: MIT Press.
Mainzer, K. (2003). KI – K€ unstliche Intelligenz philia), parental (the word storgē that was used
Grundlagen intelligenter Systeme. Darmstadt: to denote it refers to natural affection), and xenia
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. (the Greek word stands for hospitality) type
Mainzer, K. (2007). Thinking in complexity. The compu-
tational dynamics of matter, mind, and mankind
of love.
(5th ed.). Springer: New York.
Mc Farland, D., & Bösser, M. (1993). Intelligent
behavior in animals and robots. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Nolfi, S., & Floreano, D. (2001). Evolutionary robotics.
Rule-Based Ethics
The biology, intelligence, and technology of self-
organizing machines. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ▶ Deontology