Portfolio Submission 3: Tort and Liability

Portfolio Submission 3: Tort and Liability

Ashley Huston

Professor Webb

EDU 210

March 22, 2020

Portfolio Submission 3: Tort and Liability

A middle school student, Ray Knight, was suspended from school because he had too

many unexcused absences. The school district procedure required calling the parents and sending

a prompt written notice by mail. However, the school only sent home a written notice with Ray –

who threw it away before his parents saw it. Because this was the only communication, Ray’s

parents did not know he was suspended. On his first day of suspension, Ray went to a friend’s

house where he was accidentally shot. I will be evaluating if, based on previous court decisions,

Ray’s parents have a defensible case in pursuing liability charges against the school.

Glaser v. Emporia Unified School District (2001) will be my first case presented that

supports the position that Ray’s parents do not have a defensible case in pursuing liability

charges. In this case, a seventh-grade boy named Todd Glaser was injured by a car when chased

off school property by another student. Todd had arrived at school 25 minutes early and never

entered the school building. Although the school did provide supervision prior to school hours,

the courts noted that the school “does not exercise supervision before school until a student is in

the building” (Glaser v. Emporia Unified School District, 2001). The court found the school not

liable for Glaser’s injury as they did not have a duty to supervise him at that time and place. In

the case of Ray Knight, his school did not have a duty to supervise him – both while on

suspension and while at a friend’s house.

Cave v. Burt (2004) also supports the position the Ray’s school is not liable for his

injuries. In this case, the student Jonathon Cave decided to ride on top of student Burt’s car trunk

from the parking lot to the baseball field. When Burt began to drive the car, Cave fell off and

sustained injuries. Cave filed a case against the student Burt as well as the school for negligence.

The courts decided that the school (and other student) were not liable for Cave’s injuries as “it is

certainly within the common knowledge of reasonable people that riding on the exterior of
Portfolio Submission 3: Tort and Liability

vehicles involves a great deal of risk” (Cave v. Burt, 2004). When a reasonable person assumes

the obvious risks involved in an inherently dangerous activity, another cannot be held liable for

injuries sustained. In the case of Ray Knight, any activity with a firearm is inherently dangerous.

If the situation was that Ray and his friend were playing with the firearm, Ray – as a reasonable

person – knew that the situation was dangerous. In his choice to participate in a dangerous

activity, the school cannot be held liable for his injuries.

The case of D.C. v. St. Landry Parish School Board (2001) offers support to Ray’s

parents in finding the school liable for his injuries. In this case, the plaintiff’s daughter K.C. was

sexually assaulted while walking home from her junior high school. Although there was a

procedure in place that only the principal or vice principal could sign a student out during the

school day, K.C. was allowed to sign herself out and walk home in a dangerous area. The courts

found that the school did have a duty to supervise K.C. during the school day, and by allowing

her to leave campus unsupervised they were liable for what happened to her. In the Knights case,

the injury to Ray occurred during school hours when the parents were under the impression he

was supposed to be at school (as nothing else had been relayed to them). In such, the school

could then be liable for what happened to Ray when he was off campus because they had a duty

to supervise him.

The case of Eisel v. Board of Education of Montegomery (1991) also supports that Ray’s

school was liable for him when he was injured. In this case, Nicole Eisel had told multiple

friends that she intended to kill herself. When those friends told their counselor Morgan, Morgan

relayed the information to Nicole’s counselor Jones. When both spoke with Nicole, Nicole

denied having any suicidal ideation. The counselors did not make contact with Nicole’s parents,

and Nicole was later involved in a murder-suicide. The courts did rule in favor of Eisel, finding
Portfolio Submission 3: Tort and Liability

that the counselors had “a duty to use reasonable means to prevent a suicide” (Eisel v. Board of

Education of Montgomery, 1991). In the case of Ray Knight, his school admin did not follow

procedure and contact his parents by telephone and by mail. By failing to follow the set

guidelines, the parents had no way of knowing Ray wasn’t at school that day. The schools lack

of communication could leave them liable for Ray’s injuries.

Although there is precedent in previous cases that could support either the Knights or the

school, I believe that a court would deny the Knights case saying the school was liable for their

son’s injury. As decided in Glaser v. Emporia Unified School District (2001), the school would

not be responsible for Ray’s actions when he is not on campus and has no expectation of

supervision. Because he was on suspension, the school had no duty to be supervising him at the

time of injury. As decided in Cave v. Burt (2004), Ray’s choice to engage in inherently

dangerous activities with a firearm at his friend’s house remove any liability from the school and

shift liability onto Ray. Any reasonable person acknowledges the dangers associated with

firearms. While there is evidence that the school did not follow proper notification procedures,

that does not mean that they are liable for anything Ray chooses to do while on suspension.
Portfolio Submission 3: Tort and Liability

References

Cave v. Burt, 2004 WL 1465730 (Ohio App. 2004)

D.C. v. St Landry Parish School Board, 802 So.2d 19 (La. App. 2001)

Eisel v. Board of Education of Montgomery, 597 A.2d 447 (Md. 1991)

Glaser v. Emporia Unified School District No. 253, 21 P.3d 573 (Kan. 2001)