Republic of the Philippines administration of justice if judges cannot justly be accused of

SUPREME COURT apparent deficiency in their grasp of the legal principles. For,
Manila service in the judiciary means a continuous study and research on
the law from beginning to end. 2
THIRD DIVISION
In a letter-complaint 3 dated August 19, 1992, respondent Judge
Republic of the Philippines Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
SUPREME COURT Branch 54, was charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano,
Manila George C. Dee and Paterno V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law,
grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of
EN BANC the Code of Judicial Conduct, committed as follows:

A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994 1. That on August 13, 1992, respondent judge
issued an Order dismissing eleven (11) cases
(docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-
STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants,
101969, inclusive) filed by the undersigned
vs.
complainant prosecutors (members of the DOJ
JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 54,
Panel of Prosecutors) against the accused Mrs.
Manila, respondent.
Imelda Romualdez Marcos, for Violation of Central
Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions, as
consolidated in CB Circular No. 960, in relation to
the penal provisions of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as
PER CURIAM:
amended, . . .;
In assaying the requisite norms for qualifications and eminence of
2. That respondent Judge issued his Order solely
a magistrate, legal authorities place a premium on how he has
on the basis of newspaper reports (August 11,
complied with his continuing duty to know the law. A quality thus
1992 issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the
considered essential to the judicial character is that of "a man of
Daily Globe) concerning the announcement on
learning who spends tirelessly the weary hours after midnight
August 10, 1992 by the President of the Philippines
acquainting himself with the great body of traditions and the
of the lifting by the government of all foreign
learning of the law; is profoundly learned in all the learning of the
exchange restrictions and the arrival at such
law; and knows how to use that learning." 1
decision by the Monetary Board as per statement
of Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia;
Obviously, it is the primary duty of a judge, which he owes to the
public and to the legal profession, to know the very law he is
3. That claiming that the reported announcement of
supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to
the Executive Department on the lifting of foreign
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and
exchange restrictions by two newspapers which
procedural rules. Party litigants will have great faith in the
are reputable and of national circulation had the
effect of repealing Central Bank Circular No. 960,
as allegedly supported by Supreme Court
decisions . . ., the Court contended that it was
deprived of jurisdiction, and, therefore, motu,
prop(r)io had to dismiss all the eleven cases
aforementioned "for not to do so opens this Court
to charges of trying cases over which it has no
more jurisdiction;"
4. That in dismissing aforecited cases on August
13, 1992 on the basis of a Central Bank Circular or
Monetary Board Resolution which as of date
hereof, has not even been officially issued, and
basing his Order/decision on a mere newspaper
account of the advance announcement made by
the President of the said fact of lifting or liberalizing
foreign exchange controls, respondent judge acted
prematurely and in indecent haste, as he had no
way of determining the full intent of the new CB
Circular or Monetary Board resolution, and whether
the same provided for exception, as in the case of
persons who had pending criminal cases before
the courts for violations of Central Bank Circulars
and/or regulations previously issued on the matter;
5. That respondent Judge's arrogant and cavalier
posture in taking judicial notice purportedly as a
matter of public knowledge a mere newspaper
account that the President had announced the
lifting of foreign exchange restrictions as basis for
his assailed order of dismissal is highly irregular,
erroneous and misplaced. For the respondent
judge to take judicial notice thereof even before it
is officially released by the Central Bank and its full
text published as required by law to be effective
shows his precipitate action in utter disregard of the
fundamental precept of due process which the
People is also entitled to and exposes his gross
ignorance of the law, thereby tarnishing public
confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. How can
the Honorable Judge take judicial notice of
something which has not yet come into force and
the contents, shape and tenor of which have not
yet been published and ascertained to be the basis
of judicial action? The Honorable Judge had
miserably failed to "endeavor diligently to ascertain
the facts" in the case at bar contrary to Rule 3.02
of the Code of Judicial Conduct constituting Grave
Misconduct;
6. That respondent Judge did not even ha(ve) the
prudence of requiring first the comment of the
prosecution on the effect of aforesaid Central Bank
Circular/Monetary Board resolution on the pending
cases before dismissing the same, thereby
denying the Government of its right to due process;
7. That the lightning speed with which respondent
Judge acted to dismiss the cases may be gleaned
from the fact that such precipitate action was
undertaken despite already scheduled
continuation of trial dates set in the order of the
court (the prosecution having started presenting its
evidence . . .) dated August 11, 1992 to wit: August
31, September 3, 10, 21, & 23 and October 1,
1992, all at 9:30 o'clock in the morning, in brazen
disregard of all notions of fair play, thereby
depriving the Government of its right to be heard,
and clearly exposing his bias and partiality; and
8. That, in fact, the motive of respondent Judge in
dismissing the case without even waiting for a
motion to quash filed by the counsel for accused
has even placed his dismissal Order suspect.
Pursuant to a resolution of this Court dated September 8, 1992,
respondent judge filed his comment, 4 contending, inter alia, that
there was no need to await publication of the Central Bank (CB)
circular repealing the existing law on foreign exchange controls for
the simple reason that the public announcement made by the
President in several newspapers of general circulation lifting
foreign exchange controls was total, absolute, without qualification,
and was immediately effective; that having acted only on the basis
of such announcement, he cannot be blamed for relying on the
erroneous statement of the President that the new foreign
exchange rules rendered moot and academic the cases filed
against Mrs. Marcos, and which was corrected only on August 17,
1992 but published in the newspapers on August 18, 1992, and
only after respondent judge had issued his order of dismissal dated
August 13, 1992; that the President was ill-advised by his advisers
and, instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment
by assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's announcement,
they chose to toss the blame for the consequence of their failures
to respondent judge who merely acted on the basis of the
announcements of the President which had become of public
knowledge; that the "saving clause" under CB Circular No. 1353
specifically refers only to pending actions or investigations
involving violations of CB Circular No. 1318, whereas the eleven
cases dismissed involved charges for violations of CB Circular No.
960, hence the accused cannot be tried and convicted under a law
different from that under which she was charged; that assuming
that respondent judge erred in issuing the order of dismissal, the
proper remedy should have been an appeal therefrom but
definitely not an administrative complaint for his dismissal; that a
mistake committed by a judge should not necessarily be imputed
as ignorance of the law; and that a "court can reverse or modify a
doctrine but it does not show ignorance of the justices or judges
whose decisions were reversed or modified" because "even
doctrines initiated by the Supreme Court are later reversed, so how
much more for the lower courts?"
He further argued that no hearing was necessary since the
prosecution had nothing to explain because, as he theorized,
"What explanation could have been given? That the President was
talking 'through his hat' (to use a colloquialism) and should not be
believed? That I should wait for the publication (as now alleged by
complainants), of a still then non-existent CB circular? . . . As it
turned out, CB Circular No. 3153 (sic) does not affect my dismissal
order because the said circular's so-called saving clause does not
refer to CB Circular 960 under which the charges in the dismissed
cases were based;" that it was discretionary on him to take judicial
notice of the facts which are of public knowledge, pursuant to
Section 2 of Rule 129; that the contention of complainants that he
acted prematurely and in indecent haste for basing his order of
dismissal on a mere newspaper account is contrary to the wordings
of the newspaper report wherein the President announced the
lifting of controls as an accomplished fact, not as an intention to be
effected in the future, because of the use of the present perfect
tense or past tense "has lifted," not that he "intends to lift," foreign
exchange controls.
Finally, respondent judge asseverates that complainants who are
officers of the Department of Justice, violated Section 6, Rule 140
of the Rules of Court which provides that "proceedings against
judges of first instance shall be private and confidential" when they
caused to be published in the newspapers the filing of the present
administrative case against him; and he emphasizes the fact that
he had to immediately resolve a simple and pure legal matter in
consonance with the admonition of the Supreme Court for speedy
disposition of cases.
In their reply 5 and supplemental reply, 6 complainants aver that
although the saving clause under Section 16 of CB Circular No.
1353 made specific reference to CB Circular No. 1318, it will be
noted that Section 111 of Circular No. 1318, which contains a
saving clause substantially similar to that of the new circular, in turn
refers to and includes Circular No. 960. Hence, whether under
Circular No. 1318 or Circular No. 1353, pending cases involving
violations of Circular No. 960 are excepted from the coverage
thereof. Further, it is alleged that the precipitate dismissal of the
eleven cases, without according the prosecution the opportunity to
file a motion to quash or a comment, or even to show cause why
the cases against accused Imelda R. Marcos should not be
dismissed, is clearly reflective of respondent's partiality and bad
faith. In effect, respondent judge acted as if he were the advocate
of the accused.
On December 9, 1993, this Court issued a resolution referring the
complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation,
report and recommendation, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court, as revised, there being no factual issues involved.
The corresponding report and recommendation, 7 dated February
14, 1994, was submitted by Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A.
Bernad, with the approval of Court Administrator Ernani Cruz-
Paño.
The questioned order 8 of respondent judge reads as follows:
These eleven (11) cases are for Violation of
Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restrictions as
consolidated in CB Circular No. 960 in relation to
the penal provision of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as
amended.
The accused Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos pleaded not
guilty to all these cases; apparently the other
accused in some of these cases, Roberto S.
Benedicto, was not arrested and therefore the
Court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person;
trial was commenced as against Mrs. Marcos.
His Excellency, the President of the Philippines,
announced on August 10, 1992 that the
government has lifted all foreign exchange
restrictions and it is also reported that Central Bank
Governor Jose Cuisia said that the Monetary Board
arrived at such decision (issue of the Philippine
Daily Inquirer, August 11, 1992 and issue of the
Daily Globe of the same date). The Court has to
give full confidence and credit to the reported
announcement of the Executive Department,
specially from the highest official of that
department; the Courts are charged with judicial
notice of matters which are of public knowledge,
without introduction of proof, the announcement
published in at least the two newspapers cited
above which are reputable and of national
circulation.
Per several cases decided by the Supreme Court
(People vs. Alcaras, 56 Phil. 520, People vs.
Francisco, 56 Phil. 572, People vs. Pastor, 77 Phil.
1000, People vs. Crisanto Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225),
among others, it was held that the repeal of a penal
law without re-enactment extinguishes the right to
prosecute or punish the offense committed under
the old law and if the law repealing the prior penal
law fails to penalize the acts which constituted the
offense defined and penalized in the repealed law,
the repealed law carries with it the deprivation of
the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and
sentence persons charged with violations of the old
law prior to its repeal. Under the aforecited
decisions this doctrine applies to special laws and
not only to the crimes punishable in the Revised
Penal Code, such as the Import Control Law. The
Central Bank Circular No. 960 under which the
accused Mrs. Marcos is charged is considered as
a penal law because violation thereof is penalized
with specific reference to the provision of Section
34 of Republic Act 265, which penalizes violations
of Central Bank Circular No. 960, produces the
effect cited in the Supreme Court decisions and
since according to the decisions that repeal
deprives the Court of jurisdiction, this Court motu
proprio dismisses all the eleven (11) cases as a
 forestated in the caption, for not to do so opens this
Court to charges of trying cases over which it has
no more jurisdiction.
This order was subsequently assailed in a petition
for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Hon. Manuel T. Muro, Judge, RTC of Manila, Br. 54
and Imelda R. Marcos," docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 29349. When
required to file her comment, private respondent Marcos failed to
file any. Likewise, after the appellate court gave due course to the
petition, private respondent was ordered, but again failed despite
notice, to file an answer to the petition and to show cause why no
writ of preliminary injunction should issue. Eventually, on April 29,
1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 9 setting aside the
order of August 13, 1992, and reinstating Criminal Cases Nos. 92-
101959 to 92-101969.
In finding that respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of dismissal, the
appellate court held that:
The order was issued motu proprio, i.e., without
any motion to dismiss filed by counsel for the
accused, without giving an opportunity for the
prosecution to be heard, and solely on the basis of
newspaper reports announcing that the President
has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.
The newspaper report is not the publication
required by law in order that the enactment can
become effective and binding. Laws take effect
after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation unless it is
otherwise provided (Section 1, Executive Order
No. 200). The full text of CB Circular 1353, series
of 1992, entitled "Further Liberalizing Foreign
Exchange Regulation" was published in the August
27, 1992 issue of the Manila Chronicle, the
Philippine Star and the Manila Bulletin. Per
certification of the CB Corporate Affairs Office, CB
Circular No. 1353 took effect on September 2 . . . .
Considering that respondent judge admittedly had
not seen the official text of CB Circular No. 1353,
he was in no position to rule judiciously on whether
CB Circular No. 960, under which the accused Mrs.
Marcos is charged, was already repealed by CB
Circular No. 1353. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
A cursory reading of the . . . provision would have
readily shown that the repeal of the regulations on
non-trade foreign exchange transactions is not
absolute, as there is a provision that with respect
to violations of former regulations that are the
subject of pending actions or investigations, they
shall be governed by the regulations existing at the
time the cause of action (arose). Thus his
conclusion that he has lost jurisdiction over the
criminal cases is precipitate and hasty. Had he
awaited the filing of a motion to dismiss by the
accused, and given opportunity for the prosecution
to comment/oppose the same, his resolution would
have been the result of deliberation, not
speculation.
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion
of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised
by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite
notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should
be promptly resolved in the negative. 10
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not
doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court. 11 The provincial guide in
determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety. 12 Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is
limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety. 13
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely
another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be
dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise
acquired. 14 This is because the court assumes that the matter is so
notorious that it will not be disputed. 15 But judicial notice is not
judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is
not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to
make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or
professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance
is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known. 16
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial
notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally
in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be
matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are
capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. 17 Thus, facts
which are universally known, and which may be found in
encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so
generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of
the common knowledge of every person. 18
Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the
basis of a mere newspaper account which is sometimes even
referred to as hearsay evidence twice removed, took judicial notice
of the supposed lifting of foreign exchange controls, a matter which
was not and cannot be considered of common knowledge or of
general notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an administrative
regulation which was not yet in force when the order of dismissal
was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial notice cannot be
taken of a statute before it becomes effective. 19 The reason is
simple. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent,
cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and
unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the requirements
before a court can take judicial notice of a fact.
Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was
definitely not proper for him, to have taken cognizance of CB
Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time
the improvident order of dismissal was issued.
II. Central Bank Circular No. 1353, which took effect on September
1, 1992, further liberalized the foreign exchange regulations on
receipts and disbursements of residents arising from non-trade and
trade transactions. Section 16 thereof provides for a saving clause,
thus:
Sec. 16. Final Provisions of CB Circular No. 1318.
- All the provisions in Chapter X of CB Circular No.
1318 insofar as they are not inconsistent with, or
contrary to the provisions of this Circular, shall
remain in full force and effect: Provided, however,
that any regulation on non-trade foreign exchange
transactions which has been repealed, amended or
modified by this Circular, violations of which are the
subject of pending actions or investigations, shall
not be considered repealed insofar as such
pending actions or investigations are concerned, it
being understood that as to such pending actions
or investigations, the regulations existing at the
time the cause of action accrued shall govern.
Respondent judge contends that the saving clause refers only to
the provisions of Circular No. 1318, whereas the eleven criminal
cases he dismissed involve a violation of CB Circular No. 960.
Hence, he insists, Circular No. 960 is deemed repealed by the new
circular and since the former is not covered by the saving clause in
the latter, there is no more basis for the charges involved in the
criminal cases which therefore warrant a dismissal of the same.
The contention is patently unmeritorious.
Firstly, the second part of the saving clause in Circular No. 1353
explicitly provides that "any regulation on non-trade foreign
transactions which has been repealed, amended or modified by
this Circular, violations of which are the subject of pending actions
or investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as such
pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being
understood that as to such pending actions or investigations,
the regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued
shall govern." The terms of the circular are clear and unambiguous
and leave no room for interpretation. In the case at bar, the
accused in the eleven cases had already been arraigned, had
pleaded not guilty to the charges of violations of Circular No. 960,
and said cases had already been set for trial when Circular No.
1353 took effect. Consequently, the trial court was and is supposed
to proceed with the hearing of the cases in spite of the existence
of Circular No. 1353.
Secondly, had respondent judge only bothered to read a little more
carefully the texts of the circulars involved, he would have readily
perceived and known that Circular No. 1318 also contains a
substantially similar saving clause as that found in Circular No.
1353, since Section 111 of the former provides:
Sec. 111. Repealing clause. - All existing
provisions of Circulars 365, 960 and 1028,
including amendments thereto, with the exception
of the second paragraph of Section 68 of Circular
1028, as well as all other existing Central Bank
rules and regulations or parts thereof, which are
inconsistent with or contrary to the provisions of
this Circular, are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly: Provided, however, that regulations,
violations of which are the subject of pending
actions or investigations, shall be considered
repealed insofar as such pending actions or
investigations are concerned, it being understood
that as to such pending actions or investigations,
the regulations existing at the time the cause of
action accrued shall govern.
It unequivocally appears from the section above quoted that
although Circular No. 1318 repealed Circular No. 960, the former
specifically excepted from its purview all cases covered by the old
regulations which were then pending at the time of the passage of
the new regulations. Thus, any reference made to Circular No.
1318 necessarily involves and affects Circular No. 960.
III. It has been said that next in importance to the duty of rendering
a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will
beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge. 20 This
means that a judge should not only render a just, correct and
impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to be free
from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality and as to his
integrity. While a judge should possess proficiency in law in order
that he can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more
important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the
parties before him should have confidence in his impartiality. Thus,
it is not enough that he decides cases without bias and favoritism.
Nor is it sufficient that he in fact rids himself of prepossessions. His
actuations should moreover inspire that belief. Like Caesar's wife,
a judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. 21
Moreover, it has always heretofore been the rule that in disposing
of controverted cases, judges should show their full understanding
of the case, avoid the suspicion of arbitrary conclusion, promote
confidence in their intellectual integrity and contribute useful
precedents to the growth of the law. 22 A judge should be mindful
that his duty is the application of general law to particular instances,
that ours is a government of laws and not of men, and that he
violates his duty as a minister of justice under such a system if he
seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in
a particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to
be binding on him. Such action may have detrimental
consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He should
administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system
of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary
power, but a judge under the sanction of the law. 23 These are
immutable principles that go into the very essence of the task of
dispensing justice and we see no reason why they should not be
duly considered in the present case.
The assertion of respondent judge that there was no need to await
publication of Circular No. 1353 for the reason that the public
announcement made by the President in several newspapers of
general circulation lifting foreign exchange controls is total,
absolute, without qualification, and immediately effective, is
beyond comprehension. As a judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, respondent is supposed to be well-versed in the
elementary legal mandates on the publication of laws before they
take effect. It is inconceivable that respondent should insist on an
altogether different and illogical interpretation of an established
and well-entrenched rule if only to suit his own personal opinion
and, as it were, to defend his indefensible action. It was not for him
to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-
times human failing of yielding to first impressions. 24 He having
done so, in the face of the foregoing premises, this Court is hard
put to believe that he indeed acted in good faith.
IV. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous
interpretation of the law. The very act of respondent judge in
altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without
even a motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and
without at least giving the prosecution the basic opportunity to be
heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral
argument, is not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to
the Government but is palpably indicative of bad faith and partiality.
The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the
cases as early as possible is no license for abuse of judicial power
and discretion, 25 nor does such professed objective, even if true,
justify a deprivation of the prosecution's right to be heard and a
violation of its right to due process of
law. 26
The lightning speed, to borrow the words of complainants, with
which respondent judge resolved to dismiss the cases without the
benefit of a hearing and without reasonable notice to the
prosecution inevitably opened him to suspicion of having acted out
of partiality for the accused. Regardless of how carefully he may
have evaluated changes in the factual situation and legal standing
of the cases, as a result of the newspaper report, the fact remains
that he gave the prosecution no chance whatsoever to show or
prove that it had strong evidence of the guilt of the accused. To
repeat, he thereby effectively deprived the prosecution of its right
to due process. 27 More importantly, notwithstanding the fact that
respondent was not sure of the effects and implications of the
President's announcement, as by his own admission he was in
doubt whether or not he should dismiss the cases, 28 he
nonetheless deliberately refrained from requiring the prosecution
to comment thereon. In a puerile defense of his action, respondent
judge can but rhetorically ask: "What explanation could have been
given? That the President was talking 'through his hat' and should
not be believed? That I should wait for the publication of a still then
non- existent CB Circular?" The pretended cogency of this
ratiocination cannot stand even the minutest legal scrutiny.
In order that bias may not be imputed to a judge, he should have
the patience and circumspection to give the opposing party a
chance to present his evidence even if he thinks that the
oppositor's proofs might not be adequate to overthrow the case for
the other party. A display of petulance and impatience in the
conduct of the trial is a norm of conduct which is inconsistent with
the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge." 29 At the very least,
respondent judge acted injudiciously and with unjustified haste in
the outright dismissal of the eleven cases, and thereby rendered
his actuation highly dubious.
V. It bears stressing that the questioned order of respondent judge
could have seriously and substantially affected the rights of the
prosecution had the accused invoked the defense of double
jeopardy, considering that the dismissal was ordered after
arraignment and without the consent of said accused. This could
have spawned legal complications and inevitable delay in the
criminal proceedings, were it not for the holding of the Court of
Appeals that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. This saved the day for
the People since in the absence of jurisdiction, double jeopardy will
not set in. To stress this point, and as a caveat to trial courts
against falling into the same judicial error, we reiterate what we
have heretofore declared:
It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be
invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial
court's judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the
prosecution which represents the sovereign people
in criminal cases is denied due process. . . . .
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its
right to due process is thereby violated.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a
violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the
State's right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue . . . which cannot be glossed
over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a
decision rendered in disregard of that right is void
for lack of jurisdiction . . . . 30
It is also significant that accused Marcos, despite due notice, never
submitted either her comment on or an answer to the petition
for certiorari as required by the Court of Appeals, nor was double
jeopardy invoked in her defense. This serves to further underscore
the fact that the order of dismissal was clearly unjustified and
erroneous. Furthermore, considering that the accused is a
prominent public figure with a record of influence and power, it is
not easy to allay public skepticism and suspicions on how said
dismissal order came to be, to the consequent although
undeserved discredit of the entire judiciary.
VI. To hold a judge liable for rendering a manifestly unjust order
through inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be clearly
shown that although he has acted without malice, he failed to
observe in the performance of his duty that diligence, prudence
and care which the law is entitled to exact in the rendering of any
public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they
imply a manifest injustice which cannot be explained by a
reasonable interpretation, and even though there is a
misunderstanding or error of the law applied, it nevertheless results
logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and indisputable
manner, in the notorious violation of the legal precept. 31
In the present case, a cursory perusal of the comment filed by
respondent judge reveals that no substantial argument has been
advanced in plausible justification of his act. He utterly failed to
show any legal, factual, or even equitable justification for the
dismissal of the eleven criminal cases. The explanation given is no
explanation at all. The strained and fallacious submissions therein
do not speak well of respondent and cannot but further depreciate
his probity as a judge. On this point, it is best that pertinent
unedited excerpts from his comment 32 be quoted by way of graphic
illustration and emphasis:
On the alleged ignorance of the law imputed to me,
it is said that I issued the Order dismissing the
eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos
on the basis of newspaper reports referred to in
paragraph 2 of the letter complaint without awaiting
the official publication of the Central Bank Circular.
Ordinarily a Central Bank Circular/Resolution must
be published in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation, but the lifting of
"all foreign exchange controls" was announced by
the President of the Philippines WITHOUT
QUALIFICATIONS; as published in the Daily
Globe, August 11, 1992" the government has lifted
ALL foreign exchange controls," and in the words
of the Philippine Daily Inquirer report of the same
date "The government yesterday LIFTED the LAST
remaining restrictions on foreign exchange
transactions, . . ." (emphasis in both quotations
supplied) not only the President made the
announcement but also the Central Bank Governor
Jose Cuisia joined in the announcement by saying
that "the Monetary Board arrived at the decision
after noting how the "partial liberalization" initiated
early this year worked."
Therefore, because of the ABSOLUTE lifting of
ALL restrictions on foreign exchange transactions,
there was no need to await the publication of the
repealing circular of the Central Bank. The purpose
of requiring publication of laws and administrative
rules affecting the public is to inform the latter as to
how they will conduct their affairs and how they will
conform to the laws or the rules. In this particular
case, with the total lifting of the controls, there is no
need to await publication. It would have been
different if the circular that in effect repealed
Central Bank Circular No. 960, under which the
accused was charged in the cases dismissed by
me, had provided for penalties and/or modified the
provisions of said Circular No. 960.
The Complainants state that the lifting of controls
was not yet in force when I dismissed the cases but
it should be noted that in the report of the two (2)
newspapers aforequoted, the President's
announcement of the lifting of controls was stated
in the present perfect tense (Globe) or past tense
(Inquirer). In other words, it has already been lifted;
the announcement did not say that the government
INTENDS to lift all foreign exchange restrictions
but instead says that the government "has LIFTED
all foreign exchange controls," and in the other
newspaper cited above, that "The government
yesterday lifted the last remaining restrictions on
foreign exchange transactions". The lifting of the
last remaining exchange regulations effectively
cancelled or repealed Circular No. 960.
The President, who is the Chief Executive, publicly
announced the lifting of all foreign exchange
regulations. The President has within his control
directly or indirectly the Central Bank of the
Philippines, the Secretary of Finance being the
Chairman of the Monetary Board which decides the
policies of the Central Bank.
No official bothered to correct or qualify the
President's announcement of August 10, published
the following day, nor made an announcement that
the lifting of the controls do not apply to cases
already pending, not until August 17 (the fourth day
after my Order, and the third day after report of said
order was published) and after the President said
on August 17, reported in the INQUIRER's issue of
August 18, 1992, that the "new foreign exchange
rules have nullified government cases against
Imelda R. Marcos, telling reporters that the charges
against the widow of former President Marcos
"have become moot and academic" because of
new ruling(s) which allow free flow of currency in
and out of the country" (Note, parenthetically, the
reference to "new rules" not to "rules still to be
drafted"). The INQUIRER report continues: "A few
hours later, presidential spokeswoman Annabelle
Abaya said, RAMOS (sic) had "corrected himself'."
"He had been belatedly advised by the Central
Bank Governor Jose Cuisia and Justice Secretary
Franklin Drilon that the Monetary Board Regulation
excluded from its coverage all criminal cases
pending in court and such a position shall stand
legal scrutiny', Mrs. Abaya, said."
I will elaborate on two points:
1. If the President was wrong in making the August
10 announcement (published in August 11, 1992,
newspapers) and in the August 17
announcement, SUPRA, and thus I should have
relied on the Presidential announcements, and
there is basis to conclude that the President was at
the very least ILL-SERVED by his financial and
legal advisers, because no one bothered to advise
the President to correct his announcements, not
until August 17, 1992, a few hours after the
President had made another announcement as to
the charges against Imelda Marcos having been
rendered moot and academic. The President has a
lot of work to do, and is not, to my knowledge, a
financier, economist, banker or lawyer. It therefore
behooved his subalterns to give him timely (not
"belated") advice, and brief him on matters of
immediate and far-reaching concerns (such as the
lifting of foreign exchange controls, designed,
among others to encourage the entry of foreign
investments). Instead of rescuing the Chief
Executive from embarrassment by assuming
responsibility for errors in the latter's
announcement, these advisers have chosen to
toss the blame for the consequence of their failing
to me, who only acted on the basis of
announcements of their Chief, which had become
of public knowledge.
xxx xxx xxx
The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume and
expect that respondent judge is possessed with more than ordinary
credentials and qualifications to merit his appointment as a
presiding judge in the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region, stationed in the City of Manila itself. It is,
accordingly, disheartening and regrettable to note the nature of the
arguments and the kind of logic that respondent judge would want
to impose on this Court notwithstanding the manifest lack of
cogency thereof. This calls to mind similar scenarios and how this
Court reacted thereto.
In one case, an RTC Judge was administratively charged for
acquitting the accused of a violation of CB Circular No. 960 despite
the fact that the accused was apprehended with US$355,349.00
while boarding a plane for Hongkong, erroneously ruling that the
State must first prove criminal intent to violate the law and benefit
from the illegal act, and further ordering the return of US$3,000.00
out of the total amount seized, on the mistaken interpretation that
the CB circular exempts such amount from seizure. Respondent
judge therein was ordered dismissed from the government service
for gross incompetence and ignorance of the law. 33
Subsequently, the Court dismissed another RTC judge, with
forfeiture of retirement benefits, for gross ignorance of the law and
for knowingly rendering an unjust order or judgment when he
granted bail to an accused charged with raping an 11-year old girl,
despite the contrary recommendation of the investigating judge,
and thereafter granted the motion to dismiss the case allegedly
executed by the complainant. 34
Similarly, an RTC judge who was described by this Court as one
"who is ignorant of fairly elementary and quite familiar legal
principles and administrative regulations, has a marked penchant
for applying unorthodox, even strange theories and concepts in the
adjudication of controversies, exhibits indifference to and even
disdain for due process and the rule of law, applies the law
whimsically, capriciously and oppressively, and displays bias and
impartiality," was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement in any
branch of the government or any of its agencies or
instrumentalities. 35
Still in another administrative case, an RTJ judge was also
dismissed by this Court for gross ignorance of the law after she
ordered, in a probate proceeding, the cancellation of the
certificates of title issued in the name of the complainant, without
affording due process to the latter and other interested parties. 36
Only recently, an RTC judge who had been reinstated in the
service was dismissed after he acquitted all the accused in four
criminal cases for illegal possession of firearms, on the ground that
there was no proof of malice or deliberate intent on the part of the
accused to violate the law. The Court found him guilty of gross
ignorance of the law, his error of judgment being almost deliberate
and tantamount to knowingly rendering an incorrect and unjust
judgment. 37
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises and considerations,
the Court finds respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro guilty of gross
ignorance of the law. He is hereby DISMISSED from the service,
such dismissal to carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from
reemployment in the government service. 38
Respondent is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST immediately
from rendering any judgment or order, or continuing any judicial
action or proceeding whatsoever, effective upon receipt of this
decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and
Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Bidin, is on official leave.
Separate Opinions
DISSENTING OPINION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
In other jurisdictions, it is generally accepted that judges are not
accountable by way of either civil suit or discipline for their official
acts, even if clearly erroneous. Thus, open disregard of statutes,
rules, and cases has been held to be protected official activity.
Although a decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts
concerning a judge's integrity or physiological condition, absent
extrinsic evidence, the decision itself is insufficient to establish a
case against the judge. The rule is consistent with the concept of
judicial independence. An honest judge, if he were denied the
protection of the extrinsic evidence requirement, might become
unduly cautious in his work, since he would be subject to discipline
based merely upon the inferences to be drawn from an erroneous
decision. 1
In our jurisdiction, the law is no different. Thus, this Court has
repeatedly held that -
. . . it is a fundamental rule of long standing that a
judicial officer when required to exercise his
judgment or discretion is not criminally liable for
 any error he commits provided he acts in good
faith, that in the absence of malice or any wrongful
conduct . . . the judge cannot be held
administratively responsible . . . for no one, called
upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in
his judgment, and to hold a judge administratively
accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision
he renders . . . would be nothing short of
harassment or would make his position
unbearable. 2
A judge cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or
administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. 3 He cannot be held to
account or answer, criminally, civilly, or administratively, for an
erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith. 4 As a matter of
public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the
acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary
action, even though such acts are erroneous. 5 It is a general
principle of the highest importance to proper administration of
justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in
him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without
apprehension of personal consequences to himself. This concept
of judicial immunity rests upon consideration of public policy, its
purpose being to preserve the integrity and independence of the
judiciary." 6 This being settled doctrine, there is no choice but to
apply it to the instant case.
The facts: Respondent Manuel T. Muro, a native of Masbate,
Masbate, was appointed on 6 November 1986 as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 54, by then President
Corazon C. Aquino. A product of the College of Law, Far Easter
University, he graduated valedictorian in 1955, magna cum laude,
and placed sixth in the Bar examinations. Now he is being charged
with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules
2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct 7 for
dismissing motu proprio the eleven (11) cases filed by the
Department of Justice Panel of Prosecutors against Ms. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos for Violation of Central Bank Foreign
Exchange Restrictions after President Fidel V. Ramos had
announced, which was published in newspaper reports, the lifting
of all foreign exchange restrictions.
The majority opinion finds respondent judge guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and imposes upon him the supreme penalty
of dismissal from the service, forfeiture of leave credits and
retirement benefits, and disqualification from reemployment in the
government service.
With all due respect to my esteemed colleagues, particularly to
the ponente who is a recognized authority on various fields of law,
I cannot help viewing the circumstances in a different light.
There is no dispute that the order issued by respondent judge has
been reversed by the appellate court, which reversal has now
become final for failure of the accused to appeal therefrom; hence,
no damage has been caused except that complainants had to avail
of a judicial remedy to correct the mistake. But, as adverted to, the
overturned order alone does not necessarily make respondent
judge liable administratively, much more civilly or criminally. To be
answerable, the fault of the judge, if any, must be gross or patent,
malicious, deliberate or done in bad faith. 8Plainly said, fault in this
regard may exist only when the error appears to be deliberate or
in bad faith. 9
Thus, bad faith is imputed against respondent judge, first, for
insisting that "there was no need to await publication of Circular
No. 1353 for the reason that the public announcement made by the
President in several newspapers of general circulation lifting
foreign exchange controls is total, absolute, without qualification,
and immediately effective," 10 and, second, for "dismissing sua
sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash
having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the
prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter." 11
But, bad faith is the neglect or refusal to fulfill a duty, not prompted
by an honest mistake, but by some interested or sinister motive. 12 It
implies breach of faith and willful failure to respond to plain and
well understood obligation. 13 It does not simply connote bad
judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of
a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will. 14
Hence, I cannot ascribe bad faith to respondent judge for I see no
insidious intentions on his part. If he insists that there really is no
need to await the publication of Circular No. 1353, as he does here,
it merely shows that he sincerely believes that there is indeed no
necessity to await publication. Whether his belief is erroneous or
not is thus irrelevant. Further, dismissing motu proprio the eleven
criminal cases without affording the prosecution the opportunity to
be heard on the matter, erroneous though it may be, is not
inescapably indicative of bad faith. The immediate dismissal of the
charges is a necessary consequence of the belief that since the
restrictions were lifted, no law was then being violated. It is an
elementary principle in procedural law and statutory construction
that the repeal of a penal law deprives the court of jurisdiction to
punish persons charged with a violation of the old law prior to its
repeal. Thus, where the crime no longer exists, prosecution of the
person charged under the old law cannot be had and the action
should be dismissed. 15
On the contrary, there is no reason why good faith should not be
attributed to respondent judge. Good faith means that the motive
that actuated the conduct in question was in fact what the actor
ascribes to it, that is, that what he gives as his motive was in truth
his motive. 16 Hence, if he honestly believes that the bases for the
criminal charges against accused have been eliminated and thus
strikes down the information and consequently dismisses the
charges, respondent judge cannot be criminally, civilly, or even
administratively, held liable.
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper
consideration are sufficient defenses protecting a judicial officer
charged with ignorance of the law and promulgation of an unjust
decision from being held accountable for errors of judgment. This,
on the premise that no one called upon to try the facts or interpret
the law in the administration of justice can be infallible. 17
Respondent judge could not have seriously jeopardized the rights
of the prosecution, even if the accused invoked the defense of
double jeopardy, since the remedy of certiorari is very much
available. Precisely, as has been pointed out in the majority
opinion, the defense of double jeopardy is unavailing when the
prosecution is denied due process. This is in fact the office of the
prevailing doctrine - to correct indiscretions of lower court judges -
which does not necessarily make them personally liable. In fact, if
respondent judge was indeed in bad faith, he should have given
the prosecution an opportunity to be heard, and after a full-blown
trial, acquitted the accused. Then, the defense of double jeopardy
would have been proper and the accused would have gone scot-
free. Thus, in Negado v. Judge Autajay, 18 this Court affirmed the
conclusions of the Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals that
"[w]hen a person seeks administrative sanction against a judge
simply because he has committed an error in deciding the case
against such person, when such error can be elevated to a higher
court for review and correction, the action of such person can only
be suspect."
To equate the failure of accused Marcos to comment on the petition
before the appellate court, and consequently invoke the defense of
double jeopardy, with the errancy of the assailed order, 19 may be
indulging in needless speculation. And to imply that the influence
of the accused who is a prominent public figure brought about the
dismissal order is simply not borne out by the records.
Besides, the challenged order of respondent judge can hardly be
considered as grossly erroneous to merit his dismissal. For, while
his reasoning may be erroneous, as it turned out when the reversal
of his decision by the appellate court became final, it is not at all
illogical as even the President of the Republic, with his learned
legal advisers, after learning of the dismissal of the cases filed by
his administration against the accused, was quoted as saying that
Mrs. Marcos was an "accidental" beneficiary of the foreign
exchange deregulation policy of his administration. 20 Thus,
President Fidel V. Ramos further said that "[t]he forex deregulation
applies to everybody . . . . Now the cases filed by the government
against Mrs. Marcos, numbering about 11 out of 90 have become
moot and academic because of the new regulations that have
come out of the Monetary Board, but that is to her
advantage." 21 Where the conclusions of the judge in his decision
are not without logic or reason, it cannot be said that he is
incompetent or grossly ignorant. 22
It has been said that a judge, like Caesar's wife, must not only be
pure but beyond suspicion. 23 Ideally so. But the cold fact is that
every overturned decision provokes suspicion especially from the
successful appellant who feels certain that the lower court indeed
erred.
It is settled that "[a] judge should be mindful that his duty is the
application of general law to a particular instance, that ours is a
government of laws and not of men, and that he violates his duty
as a minister of justice under such system if he seeks to do what
he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case
and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding on him.
Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond the
immediate controversy. He should administer his office with due
regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering
that he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge under the
sanction of law." 24 As it has been said, he must interpret the books,
and not unload his ideas.
But while a judge must decide in accordance with existing laws and
established jurisprudence, his own personality, character,
convictions, values, experiences and prejudices are only sublimely
insignificant and unconsciously dispensable. In every decision he
makes, he is no more and no less human, his own beliefs,
perceptions and imperfections, as well as the laws he is bound to
apply, all having profound influence on his eventual choice. Thus,
Mr. Justice Cardozo of the Supreme Court of the United States
once wrote of judges: "We may try to see things as objectively as
we please. None the less, we can never see them with any eyes
except our own." 25 Hence, time and again, lower court judges, if
not reversed by the Court of Appeals and this Court, have
continued to set new trails in jurisprudence without exactly
conforming with what has been settled. yet, whether reversed or
merely unregarded, they do not receive displeasure from this
Court; on the contrary, they remain to be effective dispensers of
everyday justice.
In fine, there is no substantial proof, nay proof beyond reasonable
doubt, that respondent judge issued the assailed order in bad faith
or with conscious and deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice.
Mr. Justice Malcolm, speaking for this Court In re Horilleno, 26 said
that "[i]mpeachment proceedings before courts have been said, in
other jurisdictions, to be in their nature highly penal in character
and to be governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal
cases." Mr. Chief Justice Fernando, then Associate Justice of this
Court, reiterated the doctrine in Suerte v. Judge Ugbinar 27 where
he said that "[t]his is to defer the basic concept first announced in
1922 in this jurisdiction . . . in . . . In re Horilleno that proceedings
of this character being in their nature highly penal, the charge must,
therefore, be proved beyond reasonable doubt. To paraphrase the
opinion further, there is no showing of the alleged incompetence
and gross ignorance of the law by a preponderance of the
evidence, much less beyond a reasonable doubt. Such an exacting
standard has been adhered to by this Court in subsequent
decisions." 28
The law always imputes good faith to judicial action, and the
burden is on the one challenging the same to prove want of it.
Contraposed with the "exacting standard" required, complainant-
prosecutors in the instant case failed to prove the absence of good
faith on the part of the respondent judge. Consequently, the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed stands.
I find it difficult to compare the instant case with those cited in the
majority opinion. In Padilla v. Judge Dizon, 29respondent not only
allowed the accused to go scot-free, leaving the Commissioner of
Customs without any relief against the accused, the former
likewise ordered the release of US$3,000.00 to the accused. Thus,
respondent judge was found guilty not only of gross ignorance of
the law, but also of gross incompetence, and grave and serious
misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency, and was
consequently dismissed from the service. And, failing to learn a
lesson from his earlier administrative case, respondent judge, after
his reinstatement, this time erroneously acquitted the defendants
in four (4) different cases of illegal possession of firearms. Finally
the Court said, "[w]hen it has been clearly demonstrated, as in this
case, not only once but four (4) times, that the judge is either
grossly incompetent or grossly ignorant of the penal laws . . . . he
becomes unfit to discharge his judicial office." 30 Unlike former
Judge Dizon, this is the first time respondent Judge Muro is being
administratively charged.
In Buenavista v. Judge Garcia, 31 the Court found respondent guilty
of "serious misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, and knowingly
rendering an unjust order of judgment" for granting bail to an
accused who was charged with statutory rape, for "improper and
immoral intervention in brokering a compromise of the criminal
cases" against the accused, and thereafter for granting the motion
to dismiss the rape case on the basis of an Affidavit of Desistance
allegedly executed by the victim who was then a minor. Certainly,
the actuations of the respondent judge in the cited case are far
worse than the complained indiscretions of herein respondent
Judge.
In the proceedings instituted against Judge Jocson, 32 he was
charged with a litany of administrative cases, six (6) in all, i.e., from
gross misconduct to gross ignorance of the law, to incompetence,
to partiality. While not all the charges were sufficiently proved,
respondent judge was found to be "ignorant of fairly elementary
and quite familiar legal principles and administrative regulations,
(with) . . . a marked penchant for applying unorthodox, even
strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of controversies,
(and) exhibits indifference to, and even disdain for due process and
the rule of law, applies the law whimsically, capriciously and
oppressively, and displays bias and partiality." The Court thus
observed, "[t]he different acts of misconduct proven against
respondent judge demonstrate his unfitness to remain in office and
to continue to discharge the functions and duties of a judge, and
warrant the imposition on him of the extreme sanction of dismissal
from the service." There is nothing in the records of the instant case
which shows that respondent
Judge Muro, like former Judge Jocson, exhibits a pattern for
applying pecant and unaccepted theories which breed manifest
and irreversible injustice.
And, in Uy v. Judge Dizon-Capulong, 33 respondent aggravated her
ignorance of the law by her refusal to abide by the Decision of the
appellate court and later of this Court, showing utter disrespect for
and open defiance of higher courts. Consequently, she was not
only found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, but also of grave
and serious misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the judicial
service.
Contrastingly, in a fairly recent case, 34 this Court merely imposed
a fine of P10,000.00 on respondent judge who entertained the
petition for bail filed by the suspects prior to their actual arrest,
notwithstanding unrefuted allegations that the accused were
allegedly relatives of the congressman who "sponsored" the
appointment of respondent to the Judiciary. In other case, 35 this
Court imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on respondent judge for
ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority after he
improperly issued a warrant of arrest and set the case for
arraignment, in disregard of proper procedure. And, still in
another, 36 this Court in dismissing the complaint filed against
respondent ruled that a judge cannot be condemned unless his
error is so gross and patent as to produce an inference of
ignorance and bad faith or that he knowingly rendered an unjust
decision.
In sum, there is no extrinsic evidence which shows that the
assailed order of respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro was inspired
by a conscious and corrupt intent to do a disservice and commit an
atrocity, and thus his dismissal is uncalled for. Where there is no
clear indication from the records that the respondent's assailed
decision was inspired by corrupt motives or a reprehensible
purpose, and while there may be a misjudgment, but not a
deliberate twisting of facts to justify the assailed order, dismissal of
respondent judge from the service is not proper. 37
Holding respondent judge liable for issuing the challenged order
may curtail the independence of judges and send the wrong
signals to them who are supposed to exercise their office without
fear of reprisal, merely for expressing their uncorrupted views.
Regretfully, litigants may suffer and gain eventual justice only after
costly and long-drawn-out appeals from erroneous decisions, but
these are necessary evils which must be endured to some extent
lest judicial independence and the growth of the law be stifled.
Unlike collegial courts which afford their members the luxury of a
deliberation, a trial judge in handing down his decisions must brave
the loneliness of his solitude and independence. And, while this
Court may slightly bend backwards if only to avoid suspicion of
partiality and cliquism to a brother in the profession, it must also
step forward and take the lead to defend him against
unsubstantiated tirades which put to shame and disgrace not only
the magistrate on trial but the entire judicial system as well. As
champion — at other times tormentor — of trial and appellate
judges, this Court must be unrelenting in weeding the judiciary of
unscrupulous judges, but it must also be quick in dismissing
administrative complaints which serve no other purpose than to
harass them. In dismissing judges from the service, the Court must
be circumspect and deliberate, lest it penalizes them for exercising
their independent judgments handed down in good faith.
Respondent judge has impressive academic and professional
credentials which, experience shows, are no longer easy to recruit
for the judicial service. Above all, he has served the judiciary with
creditable distinction. It is unfeeling, if not unfair, to purge him
without extrinsic evidence of bad faith and then shatter his hopes
of ascending someday the judicial hierarchy which, after all, is the
ultimate dream of every sacrificing trial judge.
I VOTE FOR THE EXONERATION OF RESPONDENT JUDGE.
# Separate Opinions
BELLOSILLO, J.:
In other jurisdictions, it is generally accepted that judges are not accountable by way of either
civil suit or discipline for their official acts, even if clearly erroneous. Thus, open disregard of
statutes, rules, and cases has been held to be protected official activity. Although a decision
may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity or physiological
condition, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself is insufficient to establish a case
against the judge. The rule is consistent with the concept of judicial independence. An honest
judge, if he were denied the protection of the extrinsic evidence requirement, might become
unduly cautious in his work, since he would be subject to discipline based merely upon the
inferences to be drawn from an erroneous decision. 1
In our jurisdiction, the law is no different. Thus, this Court has
repeatedly held that -
. . . it is a fundamental rule of long standing that a
judicial officer when required to exercise his
judgment or discretion is not criminally liable for
any error he commits provided he acts in good
faith, that in the absence of malice or any wrongful
conduct . . . the judge cannot be held
administratively responsible . . . for no one, called
upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in
his judgment, and to hold a judge administratively
accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision
he renders . . . would be nothing short of
harassment or would make his position
unbearable. 2
A judge cannot be subjected to liability - civil, criminal, or
administrative - for any of his official acts, no matter how
erroneous, as long as he acts in good faith. 3 He cannot be held to
account or answer, criminally, civilly, or administratively, for an
erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith. 4 As a matter of
public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption, the
acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary
action, even though such acts are erroneous. 5 It is a general
principle of the highest importance to proper administration of
justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in
him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without
apprehension of personal consequences to himself. This concept
of judicial immunity rests upon consideration of public policy, its
purpose being to preserve the integrity and independence of the
judiciary." 6 This being settled doctrine, there is no choice but to
apply it to the instant case.
The facts: Respondent Manuel T. Muro, a native of Masbate,
Masbate, was appointed on 6 November 1986 as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 54, by then President
Corazon C. Aquino. A product of the College of Law, Far Easter
University, he graduated valedictorian in 1955, magna cum laude,
and placed sixth in the Bar examinations. Now he is being charged
with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules
2.01, 3.01 and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct 7 for
dismissing motu proprio the eleven (11) cases filed by the
Department of Justice Panel of Prosecutors against Ms. Imelda
Romualdez Marcos for Violation of Central Bank Foreign
Exchange Restrictions after President Fidel V. Ramos had
announced, which was published in newspaper reports, the lifting
of all foreign exchange restrictions.
The majority opinion finds respondent judge guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and imposes upon him the supreme penalty
of dismissal from the service, forfeiture of leave credits and
retirement benefits, and disqualification from reemployment in the
government service.
With all due respect to my esteemed colleagues, particularly to
the ponente who is a recognized authority on various fields of law,
I cannot help viewing the circumstances in a different light.
There is no dispute that the order issued by respondent judge has
been reversed by the appellate court, which reversal has now
become final for failure of the accused to appeal therefrom; hence,
no damage has been caused except that complainants had to avail
of a judicial remedy to correct the mistake. But, as adverted to, the
overturned order alone does not necessarily make respondent
judge liable administratively, much more civilly or criminally. To be
answerable, the fault of the judge, if any, must be gross or patent,
malicious, deliberate or done in bad faith. 8Plainly said, fault in this
regard may exist only when the error appears to be deliberate or
in bad faith. 9
Thus, bad faith is imputed against respondent judge, first, for
insisting that "there was no need to await publication of Circular
No. 1353 for the reason that the public announcement made by the
President in several newspapers of general circulation lifting
foreign exchange controls is total, absolute, without qualification,
and immediately effective," 10 and, second, for "dismissing sua
sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a motion to quash
having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the
prosecution the basic opportunity to be heard on the matter." 11
But, bad faith is the neglect or refusal to fulfill a duty, not prompted
by an honest mistake, but by some interested or sinister motive. 12 It
implies breach of faith and willful failure to respond to plain and
well understood obligation. 13 It does not simply connote bad
judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong; it means breach of
a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will. 14
Hence, I cannot ascribe bad faith to respondent judge for I see no
insidious intentions on his part. If he insists that there really is no
need to await the publication of Circular No. 1353, as he does here,
it merely shows that he sincerely believes that there is indeed no
necessity to await publication. Whether his belief is erroneous or
not is thus irrelevant. Further, dismissing motu proprio the eleven
criminal cases without affording the prosecution the opportunity to
be heard on the matter, erroneous though it may be, is not
inescapably indicative of bad faith. The immediate dismissal of the
charges is a necessary consequence of the belief that since the
restrictions were lifted, no law was then being violated. It is an
elementary principle in procedural law and statutory construction
that the repeal of a penal law deprives the court of jurisdiction to
punish persons charged with a violation of the old law prior to its
repeal. Thus, where the crime no longer exists, prosecution of the
person charged under the old law cannot be had and the action
should be dismissed. 15
On the contrary, there is no reason why good faith should not be
attributed to respondent judge. Good faith means that the motive
that actuated the conduct in question was in fact what the actor
ascribes to it, that is, that what he gives as his motive was in truth
his motive. 16 Hence, if he honestly believes that the bases for the
criminal charges against accused have been eliminated and thus
strikes down the information and consequently dismisses the
charges, respondent judge cannot be criminally, civilly, or even
administratively, held liable.
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper
consideration are sufficient defenses protecting a judicial officer
charged with ignorance of the law and promulgation of an unjust
decision from being held accountable for errors of judgment. This,
on the premise that no one called upon to try the facts or interpret
the law in the administration of justice can be infallible. 17
Respondent judge could not have seriously jeopardized the rights
of the prosecution, even if the accused invoked the defense of
double jeopardy, since the remedy of certiorari is very much
available. Precisely, as has been pointed out in the majority
opinion, the defense of double jeopardy is unavailing when the
prosecution is denied due process. This is in fact the office of the
prevailing doctrine - to correct indiscretions of lower court judges -
which does not necessarily make them personally liable. In fact, if
respondent judge was indeed in bad faith, he should have given
the prosecution an opportunity to be heard, and after a full-blown
trial, acquitted the accused. Then, the defense of double jeopardy
would have been proper and the accused would have gone scot-
free. Thus, in Negado v. Judge Autajay, 18 this Court affirmed the
conclusions of the Investigating Justice of the Court of Appeals that
"[w]hen a person seeks administrative sanction against a judge
simply because he has committed an error in deciding the case
against such person, when such error can be elevated to a higher
court for review and correction, the action of such person can only
be suspect."
To equate the failure of accused Marcos to comment on the petition
before the appellate court, and consequently invoke the defense of
double jeopardy, with the errancy of the assailed order, 19 may be
indulging in needless speculation. And to imply that the influence
of the accused who is a prominent public figure brought about the
dismissal order is simply not borne out by the records.
Besides, the challenged order of respondent judge can hardly be
considered as grossly erroneous to merit his dismissal. For, while
his reasoning may be erroneous, as it turned out when the reversal
of his decision by the appellate court became final, it is not at all
illogical as even the President of the Republic, with his learned
legal advisers, after learning of the dismissal of the cases filed by
his administration against the accused, was quoted as saying that
Mrs. Marcos was an "accidental" beneficiary of the foreign
exchange deregulation policy of his administration. 20 Thus,
President Fidel V. Ramos further said that "[t]he forex deregulation
applies to everybody . . . . Now the cases filed by the government
against Mrs. Marcos, numbering about 11 out of 90 have become
moot and academic because of the new regulations that have
come out of the Monetary Board, but that is to her
advantage." 21 Where the conclusions of the judge in his decision
are not without logic or reason, it cannot be said that he is
incompetent or grossly ignorant. 22
It has been said that a judge, like Caesar's wife, must not only be
pure but beyond suspicion. 23 Ideally so. But the cold fact is that
every overturned decision provokes suspicion especially from the
successful appellant who feels certain that the lower court indeed
erred.
It is settled that "[a] judge should be mindful that his duty is the
application of general law to a particular instance, that ours is a
government of laws and not of men, and that he violates his duty
as a minister of justice under such system if he seeks to do what
he may personally consider substantial justice in a particular case
and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding on him.
Such action may have detrimental consequences beyond the
immediate controversy. He should administer his office with due
regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering
that he is not a depositary of arbitrary power, but a judge under the
sanction of law." 24 As it has been said, he must interpret the books,
and not unload his ideas.
But while a judge must decide in accordance with existing laws and
established jurisprudence, his own personality, character,
convictions, values, experiences and prejudices are only sublimely
insignificant and unconsciously dispensable. In every decision he
makes, he is no more and no less human, his own beliefs,
perceptions and imperfections, as well as the laws he is bound to
apply, all having profound influence on his eventual choice. Thus,
Mr. Justice Cardozo of the Supreme Court of the United States
once wrote of judges: "We may try to see things as objectively as
we please. None the less, we can never see them with any eyes
except our own." 25 Hence, time and again, lower court judges, if
not reversed by the Court of Appeals and this Court, have
continued to set new trails in jurisprudence without exactly
conforming with what has been settled. yet, whether reversed or
merely unregarded, they do not receive displeasure from this
Court; on the contrary, they remain to be effective dispensers of
everyday justice.
In fine, there is no substantial proof, nay proof beyond reasonable
doubt, that respondent judge issued the assailed order in bad faith
or with conscious and deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice.
Mr. Justice Malcolm, speaking for this Court In re Horilleno, 26 said
that "[i]mpeachment proceedings before courts have been said, in
other jurisdictions, to be in their nature highly penal in character
and to be governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal
cases." Mr. Chief Justice Fernando, then Associate Justice of this
Court, reiterated the doctrine in Suerte v. Judge Ugbinar 27 where
he said that "[t]his is to defer the basic concept first announced in
1922 in this jurisdiction . . . in . . . In re Horilleno that proceedings
of this character being in their nature highly penal, the charge must,
therefore, be proved beyond reasonable doubt. To paraphrase the
opinion further, there is no showing of the alleged incompetence
and gross ignorance of the law by a preponderance of the
evidence, much less beyond a reasonable doubt. Such an exacting
standard has been adhered to by this Court in subsequent
decisions." 28
The law always imputes good faith to judicial action, and the
burden is on the one challenging the same to prove want of it.
Contraposed with the "exacting standard" required, complainant-
prosecutors in the instant case failed to prove the absence of good
faith on the part of the respondent judge. Consequently, the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed stands.
I find it difficult to compare the instant case with those cited in the
majority opinion. In Padilla v. Judge Dizon, 29respondent not only
allowed the accused to go scot-free, leaving the Commissioner of
Customs without any relief against the accused, the former
likewise ordered the release of US$3,000.00 to the accused. Thus,
respondent judge was found guilty not only of gross ignorance of
the law, but also of gross incompetence, and grave and serious
misconduct affecting his integrity and efficiency, and was
consequently dismissed from the service. And, failing to learn a
lesson from his earlier administrative case, respondent judge, after
his reinstatement, this time erroneously acquitted the defendants
in four (4) different cases of illegal possession of firearms. Finally
the Court said, "[w]hen it has been clearly demonstrated, as in this
case, not only once but four (4) times, that the judge is either
grossly incompetent or grossly ignorant of the penal laws . . . . he
becomes unfit to discharge his judicial office." 30 Unlike former
Judge Dizon, this is the first time respondent Judge Muro is being
administratively charged.
In Buenavista v. Judge Garcia, 31 the Court found respondent guilty
of "serious misconduct, gross ignorance of the law, and knowingly
rendering an unjust order of judgment" for granting bail to an
accused who was charged with statutory rape, for "improper and
immoral intervention in brokering a compromise of the criminal
cases" against the accused, and thereafter for granting the motion
to dismiss the rape case on the basis of an Affidavit of Desistance
allegedly executed by the victim who was then a minor. Certainly,
the actuations of the respondent judge in the cited case are far
worse than the complained indiscretions of herein respondent
Judge.
In the proceedings instituted against Judge Jocson, 32 he was
charged with a litany of administrative cases, six (6) in all, i.e., from
gross misconduct to gross ignorance of the law, to incompetence,
to partiality. While not all the charges were sufficiently proved,
respondent judge was found to be "ignorant of fairly elementary
and quite familiar legal principles and administrative regulations,
(with) . . . a marked penchant for applying unorthodox, even
strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of controversies,
(and) exhibits indifference to, and even disdain for due process and
the rule of law, applies the law whimsically, capriciously and
oppressively, and displays bias and partiality." The Court thus
observed, "[t]he different acts of misconduct proven against
respondent judge demonstrate his unfitness to remain in office and
to continue to discharge the functions and duties of a judge, and
warrant the imposition on him of the extreme sanction of dismissal
from the service." There is nothing in the records of the instant case
which shows that respondent
Judge Muro, like former Judge Jocson, exhibits a pattern for
applying pecant and unaccepted theories which breed manifest
and irreversible injustice.
And, in Uy v. Judge Dizon-Capulong, 33 respondent aggravated her
ignorance of the law by her refusal to abide by the Decision of the
appellate court and later of this Court, showing utter disrespect for
and open defiance of higher courts. Consequently, she was not
only found guilty of gross ignorance of the law, but also of grave
and serious misconduct prejudicial to the interest of the judicial
service.
Contrastingly, in a fairly recent case, 34 this Court merely imposed
a fine of P10,000.00 on respondent judge who entertained the
petition for bail filed by the suspects prior to their actual arrest,
notwithstanding unrefuted allegations that the accused were
allegedly relatives of the congressman who "sponsored" the
appointment of respondent to the Judiciary. In other case, 35 this
Court imposed a fine of P5,000.00 on respondent judge for
ignorance of the law and grave abuse of authority after he
improperly issued a warrant of arrest and set the case for
arraignment, in disregard of proper procedure. And, still in
another, 36 this Court in dismissing the complaint filed against
respondent ruled that a judge cannot be condemned unless his
error is so gross and patent as to produce an inference of
ignorance and bad faith or that he knowingly rendered an unjust
decision.
In sum, there is no extrinsic evidence which shows that the
assailed order of respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro was inspired
by a conscious and corrupt intent to do a disservice and commit an
atrocity, and thus his dismissal is uncalled for. Where there is no
clear indication from the records that the respondent's assailed
decision was inspired by corrupt motives or a reprehensible
purpose, and while there may be a misjudgment, but not a
deliberate twisting of facts to justify the assailed order, dismissal of
respondent judge from the service is not proper. 37
Holding respondent judge liable for issuing the challenged order
may curtail the independence of judges and send the wrong
signals to them who are supposed to exercise their office without
fear of reprisal, merely for expressing their uncorrupted views.
Regretfully, litigants may suffer and gain eventual justice only after
costly and long-drawn-out appeals from erroneous decisions, but
these are necessary evils which must be endured to some extent
lest judicial independence and the growth of the law be stifled.

Unlike collegial courts which afford their members the luxury of a

deliberation, a trial judge in handing down his decisions must brave
the loneliness of his solitude and independence. And, while this
Court may slightly bend backwards if only to avoid suspicion of
partiality and cliquism to a brother in the profession, it must also
step forward and take the lead to defend him against
unsubstantiated tirades which put to shame and disgrace not only
the magistrate on trial but the entire judicial system as well. As
champion — at other times tormentor — of trial and appellate
judges, this Court must be unrelenting in weeding the judiciary of
unscrupulous judges, but it must also be quick in dismissing
administrative complaints which serve no other purpose than to
harass them. In dismissing judges from the service, the Court must
be circumspect and deliberate, lest it penalizes them for exercising
their independent judgments handed down in good faith.

Respondent judge has impressive academic and professional

credentials which, experience shows, are no longer easy to recruit
for the judicial service. Above all, he has served the judiciary with
creditable distinction. It is unfeeling, if not unfair, to purge him
without extrinsic evidence of bad faith and then shatter his hopes
of ascending someday the judicial hierarchy which, after all, is the
ultimate dream of every sacrificing trial judge.

I VOTE FOR THE EXONERATION OF RESPONDENT JUDGE.

G.R. No. 177809 October 16, 2009
SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP, Petitioners,
vs.
ROSALIE PALAÑA CHUA, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300:1(1) reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 274, Parañaque
City in Civil Case No. 04-0052;2 and (2) reinstating and affirming in
toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch
78, of the same city in Civil Case No. 2001-315.3
First, we sift through the varying facts found by the different lower
courts.
The facts parleyed by the MeTC show that respondent Rosalie
Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial
building, located at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist
Road, Barangay Baclaran, Parañaque City.
On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus
damages against petitioners, Spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip
(Spouses Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint a contract of
lease over two cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as
lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof. 1 a vv p h ! 1
The contract of lease reads:
CONTRACT OF LEASE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Contract of Lease is entered into by and between:
ROSALIE PALAÑA CHUA, Filipino, of legal age, married with
office at 2/F JOFERXAN Building, F.B. Harrison St., Brgy.
Baclaran, Parañaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the
LESSOR,
- and -
OMAR LATIEF marriage to MOSHIERA LATIEF, also both
Filipino, of legal age with address at 24 Anahan St. RGV Homes
Parañaque City, and hereinafter referred to as the LESSEES.
WITNESSETH
1. That the LESSOR is the owner of the commercial building
erected at the lot of the Toribio G. Reyes Realty, Inc. situated at
158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran
in Parañaque Ctiy;
2. That LESSOR hereby leases two (2) cubicles located at the 1st
& 2nd Floor, of said building with an area of 56 square meters
under the following terms and conditions, to wit:
a. That the monthly rental of the two (2) cubicles in
PESOS, SIXTY THOUSAND (₱60,000.00),
Philippine Currency. However, due to unstable
power of the peso LESSEES agrees to a yearly
increase of ten (10%) percent of the monthly rental;
b. That any rental in-arrears shall be paid before
the expiration of the contract to the LESSOR;
c. That LESSEES agree to pay their own water and
electric consumptions in the said premises;
 d. That the LESSEES shall not sub-let or make any (sgd.) (sgd.)
alteration in the cubicles without a written 1. Daisy C. Ramos 2. Ferdinand C. Chua
permission from the LESSOR. Provided, however,
that at the termination of the Contract, the lessee
Republic of the Philippines)
shall return the two cubicles in its original
City of Manila)s.s.
conditions at their expenses;
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
e. That the LESSEES agree to keep the cubicles in
a safe and sanitary conditions, and shall not keep
any kinds of flammable or combustible materials. BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City of Manila
personally appeared the following persons:
f. That in case the LESSEES fail to pay the monthly
rental every time it falls due or violate any of the Rosalie P. Chua with CTC No. 05769706 at Parañaque City on
above conditions shall be enough ground to 2/1/99; Moshiera Latief with CTC No. 12885654 at Parañaque City
terminate this Contract of Lease. Provided, further, on 11/11/99; Omar Latief with CTC No. 12885653 Parañaque City
that, if the LESSEES pre-terminate this Contract on Nov. 11, 1999.
they shall pay the rentals for the unused month or
period by way of liquidated damages in favor of the known to me and to me known to be the same persons who
LESSOR. executed this instrument consisting of two (2) pages duly signed
by them and the two (2) instrumental witnesses and acknowledged
3. That this Contract of Lease is for six (6) yrs. only starting from to me that the same is their free and voluntarily acts and deeds.
December _____, 1999 or up to December ______, 2005.
IN FAITH AND TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed their my hand and Notarial Seal this ____th day of December, 1999 at
hands this ___th day of December, 1999 at City of Manila, the City of Manila, Philippines.
Philippines.
Doc. No. _____ ATTY. CALIXTRO B. RAMOS
(sgd.) (sgd.) Page No. _____ NOTARY PUBLIC
ROSALIE PALAÑA-CHUA MOSHIERA LATIEF Book No. LXV Until December 31, 2000
LESSOR LESSEE Series of 1999 PTR # 374145-1/11/99/-Mla.
IBP # 00262-Life Member4
(sgd.)
OMAR LATIEF A year after the commencement of the lease and with Spouses
LESSEE Latip already occupying the leased cubicles, Rosalie, through
counsel, sent the spouses a letter demanding payment of back
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF: rentals and should they fail to do so, to vacate the leased cubicles.
When Spouses Latip did not heed Rosalie’s demand, she instituted (sgd.)
the aforesaid complaint. 12-11-99 ____________________
Received by:6
In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted Rosalie’s claims. They
averred that the lease of the two (2) cubicles had already been paid Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999,
in full as evidenced by receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over two (2) cubicles in
total amount of ₱2,570,000.00. The three (3) receipts, in Rosalie’s Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods during the
handwriting, read: Christmas season, they readily accepted Rosalie’s offer to
purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which was still under
1. I received the amount of ₱2,000,000.00 (two construction at the time. According to Spouses Latip, the
million pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip immediate payment of ₱2,570,000.00 would be used to finish
for the payment of 2 cubicles located at 158 Quirino construction of the building giving them first priority in the
Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran occupation of the finished cubicles.
P[arañ]aque City. ROFERLAND5 Bldg. with the
terms 6 yrs. Contract. Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles were
finished, Spouses Latip occupied them without waiting for the
₱2,000,000.00 (sgd.) completion of five (5) other stalls. Spouses Latip averred that the
CHECK # 3767924 ____________________ contract of lease they signed had been novated by their purchase
FAR EAST BANK Rosalie Chua of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were surprised to
receive a demand letter from Rosalie’s counsel and the
subsequent filing of a complaint against them.
(sgd.)
____________________ The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie, viz.:
Ferdinand Chua
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [Spouses Latip] and all
2. Received cash persons claiming rights under them are hereby ordered to VACATE
₱500,000.00 the property subject of this case located at the 1st and 2nd floors
From Moshiera Latip of a Roferxane Building situated at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner
Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Parañaque City. The
(sgd.) [Spouses Latip] are also ordered to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of
Rosalie Chua SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱720,000.00)
12/10/99 as rent arrearages for the period of December 1999 to December
____________________
Received by 2000 and thereafter to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVENTY
TWO THOUSAND PESOS (₱72,000.00) per month from January
2001 to December 2002, plus ten percent (10%) increase for each
3. Received cash and every succeeding years thereafter as stipulated in paragraph
₱70,000.00 from 2(a) of the Contract of Lease x x x, until the [Spouses Latip] have
Moshiera Latip
completely vacated the leased premises subject of this lease.
Finally[,] the [Spouses Latip] are hereby ordered to PAY [Rosalie]
the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00) as
attorney’s fees and TWO THOUSAND PESOS (₱2,000.00) per
[Rosalie’s] appearance in Court as appearance fee and to PAY the
cost of this suit.
[Spouses Latip’s] counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.7
In stark contrast, the RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of
Spouses Latip. The RTC did not give credence to the contract of
lease, ruling that it was not notarized and, in all other substantial
aspects, incomplete. Further on this point, the RTC noted that the
contract of lease lacked: (1) the signature of Ferdinand Chua,
Rosalie’s husband; (2) the signatures of Spouses Latip on the first
page thereof; (3) the specific dates for the term of the contract
which only stated that the lease is for "six (6) y[ea]rs only starting
from December 1999 or up to December 2005"; (4) the exact date
of execution of the document, albeit the month of December and
year 1999 are indicated therein; and (5) the provision for payment
of deposit or advance rental which is supposedly uncommon in big
commercial lease contracts.
The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the contract of
lease was modified and supplemented; and the entire lease rentals
for the two (2) cubicles for six (6) years had already been paid by
Spouses Latip in the amount of ₱2,570,000.00. As to Rosalie’s
claim that her receipt of ₱2,570,000.00 was simply goodwill
payment by prospective lessees to their lessor, and not payment
for the purchase of lease rights, the RTC shot this down and
pointed out that, apart from her bare allegations, Rosalie did not
adduce evidence to substantiate this claim. On the whole, the RTC
declared an existent lease between the parties for a period of six
(6) years, and already fully paid for by Spouses Latip. Thus,
Spouses Latip could not be ejected from the leased premises until
expiration of the lease period.
The RTC disposed of the appeal, viz.:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed decision
of the [MeTC] dated January 13, 2004 is reversed as judgment is
hereby rendered for the [Spouses Latip] and against [Rosalie],
ordering the latter to pay the former –
(1) the sum of PhP1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
(2) the sum of PhP500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(3) the sum of PhP250,000.00 plus PhP3,000.00 per court
appearance as and for attorney’s fees; and
(4) costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.8
In yet another turn of events, the CA, as previously mentioned,
reversed the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MeTC. The
CA ruled that the contract of lease, albeit lacking the signature of
Ferdinand and not notarized, remained a complete and valid
contract. As the MeTC had, the CA likewise found that the alleged
defects in the contract of lease did not render the contract
ineffective. On the issue of whether the amount of ₱2,570,000.00
merely constituted payment of goodwill money, the CA took judicial
notice of this common practice in the area of Baclaran, especially
around the Redemptorist Church. According to the appellate court,
this judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of
the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill
money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat. Thus, ruling
on Rosalie’s appeal, the CA disposed of the case:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of RTC Parañaque City
Branch 274 dated September 24, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the January 13, 2004 decision of the MeTC is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED en toto.
SO ORDERED.9
Not surprisingly, Spouses Latip filed the present appeal.
The singular issue for our resolution is whether Spouses Latip
should be ejected from the leased cubicles.
As previously adverted to, the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and
upholding the ejectment of Spouses Latip, took judicial notice of
the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to
pay goodwill money to the lessor.
We disagree.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when
the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on the
courts, thus:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take
judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations,
the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the
political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts
of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. – A court may take
judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions.
On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro10 is instructive:
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion
of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised
by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite
notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should
be promptly resolved in the negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not
doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in
determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited
to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely
another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be
dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired.
This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious
that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial
knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the
judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make
his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally
known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of
those matters which are "commonly" known.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial
notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally
in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be
matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are
capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts
which are universally known, and which may be found in
encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so
generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of
the common knowledge of every person.11
We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial
notice in the recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,12 which cited State Prosecutors:
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general
knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not
doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in
determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited
to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a
reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate
and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial
notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally
in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be
matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are
capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts
which are universally known, and which may be found in
encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
noticed, provided, they are such of universal notoriety and so
generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of
the common knowledge of every person. As the common
knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular
facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common
knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which,
in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of
which the court has no constructive knowledge. 1avv phi 1
From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it
is apparent that the matter which the appellate court took judicial
notice of does not meet the requisite of notoriety. To begin with,
only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay
goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the
MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even ruling in favor of Rosalie,
found that the practice was of "common knowledge" or notoriously
known.
We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her
bare allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her claim that the
amount of ₱2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of
goodwill money. Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her
petition for review before the CA, containing a joint declaration
under oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had
paid goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor. On this score, we
emphasize that the reason why our rules on evidence provide for
matters that need not be proved under Rule 129, specifically on
judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of the usual form of
evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known, it will not be
disputed by the parties.
However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the
necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint
Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalie’s appeal before the CA. In
short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie;
contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court – What
need not be proved.
Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge
of the practice to pay goodwill money in the Baclaran area. As was
held in State Prosecutors, justices and judges alike ought to be
reminded that the power to take judicial notice must be exercised
with caution and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be
ample reason for the claim of judicial notice to be promptly resolved
in the negative.
Ultimately, on the issue of whether Spouses Latip ought to be
ejected from the leased cubicles, what remains in evidence is the
documentary evidence signed by both parties – the contract of
lease and the receipts evidencing payment of ₱2,570,000.00.
We need not be unduly detained by the issue of which documents
were executed first or if there was a novation of the contract of
lease. As had been found by the RTC, the lease contract and the
receipts for the amount of ₱2,570,000.00 can be reconciled or
harmonized. The RTC declared:
Definitely, the parties entered into a lease agreement over two (2)
cubicles of the 1st and 2nd floors of Roferxane (Roferland)
Building, a commercial building located at 158 Quirino Avenue,
corner Redemptorist Road, Baclaran, Parañaque City and
belonging to [Rosalie]. The lease agreement is for a term of six (6)
years commencing in December 1999 up to December 2005. This
agreement was embodied in a Contract of Lease x x x. The terms
of this lease contract, however, are modified or supplemented by
another agreement between the parties executed and or entered
into in or about the time of execution of the lease contract, which
exact date of execution of the latter is unclear.13
We agree with the RTC’s holding only up to that point. There exists
a lease agreement between the parties as set forth in the contract
of lease which is a complete document. It need not be signed by
Ferdinand Chua as he likewise did not sign the other two receipts
for ₱500,000.00 and ₱70,000.00, respectively, which contained
only the signature of Rosalie. Besides, it is undisputed that Rosalie
owns and leases the stalls in Roferxane Bldg.; thus, doing away
with the need for her husband’s consent. The findings of the three
lower courts concur on this fact.
The contract of lease has a period of six (6) years commencing in
December 1999. This fact is again buttressed by Spouses Latip’s
admission that they occupied the property forthwith in December
1999, bearing in mind the brisk sales during the holiday season.
On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the receipts
amounting to ₱2,570,000.00, we hold that the practice of payment
of goodwill money in the Baclaran area is an inadequate subject of
judicial notice. Neither was Rosalie able to provide sufficient
evidence that, apart from the belatedly submitted Joint Affidavit of
the stallholders of Roferxane Bldg., the said amount was simply for
the payment of goodwill money, and not payment for advance
rentals by Spouses Latip.
In interpreting the evidence before us, we are guided by the Civil
Code provisions on interpretation of contracts, to wit:
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties,
their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally
considered.
Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they
shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and
cases that are different from those which the parties intended to
agree.
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of
several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import
which is most adequate to render it effectual.
The RTC was already on the right track when it declared that the
receipts for ₱2,570,000.00 modified or supplemented the contract
of lease. However, it made a quantum leap when it ruled that the
amount was payment for rentals of the two (2) cubicles for the
entire six-year period. We cannot subscribe to this finding. To
obviate confusion and for clarity, the contents of the receipts,
already set forth above, are again reproduced:
1. I received the amount of ₱2,000,000.00 (two million
pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for the
payment of 2 cubicles located at 158 Quirino Ave. corner
 Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[arañ]que City. subsequently executed pointing to the obvious fact that the
ROFERLAND Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs. Contract. ₱2,000,000.00 is not for full payment of rentals. Thus, since the
contract of lease remained operative, we find that Rosalie’s receipt
₱2,000,000.00 (sgd.) of the monies should be considered as advanced rentals on the
CHECK # 3767924 ____________________ leased cubicles. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that
FAR EAST BANK Rosalie Chua Rosalie demanded payment of the lease rentals only in 2000, a full
year after the commencement of the lease.

(sgd.) Finally, we note that the lease ended in 2005. Consequently,

____________________ Spouses Latip can be ejected from the leased premises. They are
Ferdinand Chua liable to Rosalie for unpaid rentals on the lease of the two (2)
cubicles in accordance with the stipulations on rentals in the
Contract of Lease. However, the amount of ₱2,570,000.00,
2. Received cash
covering advance rentals, must be deducted from this liability of
₱500,000.00
Spouses Latip to Rosalie.
From Moshiera Latip
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
(sgd.) GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
Rosalie Chua No. 89300 is REVERSED. The petitioners, spouses Omar and
12/10/99
____________________ Moshiera Latip, are liable to respondent Rosalie Chua for unpaid
Received by rentals minus the amount of ₱2,570,000.00 already received by
her as advance rentals. No costs.
3. Received cash
₱70,000.00 from SO ORDERED.
Moshiera Latip

(sgd.)
12-11-99 ____________________
Received by:14

There is nothing on the receipts and on record that the payment

and receipt of ₱2,570,000.00 referred to full payment of rentals for
the whole period of the lease. All three receipts state Rosalie’s
receipt of cash in varying amounts. The first receipt for
₱2,000,000.00 did state payment for two (2) cubicles, but this
cannot mean full payment of rentals for the entire lease period
when there are no words to that effect. Further, two receipts were
G.R. No. 130656 June 29, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARMANDO REANZARES* also known as ARMANDO
RIANZARES, accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This case is with us on automatic review of the 26 May 1997
Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, finding
accused ARMANDO REANZARES also known as "Armando
Rianzares" guilty of Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD
5322 and sentencing him to the extreme penalty of death. He was
also ordered to pay the heirs of his victim Lilia Tactacan
P172,000.00 for funeral, burial and related expenses, P50,000.00
as indemnity for death, P1,000.00 for the cash taken from her bag,
and to reimburse Gregorio Tactacan P2,500.00 for the Seiko
wristwatch taken from him. 1âwphi1.nêt
The facts, except as to the identity of accused Armando
Reanzares, are undisputed. Spouses Gregorio Tactacan and Lilia
Tactacan owned a sari-sari store in San Miguel, Sto. Tomas,
Batangas. On 10 May 1994 at around 8:10 in the evening, the
Tactacan spouses closed their store and left for home in Barangay
San Roque, Sto. Tomas, Batangas on board their passenger-type
jeepney. As Gregorio was maneuvering his jeep backwards from
where it was parked two (2) unidentified men suddenly climbed on
board. His wife Lilia immediately asked them where they were
going and they answered that they were bound for the town proper.
When Lilia informed them that they were not going to pass through
the town proper, the two (2) said they would just get off at the
nearest intersection. After negotiating some 500 meters, one of the
hitchhikers pointed a .38 caliber revolver at Gregorio while the
other poked a balisong at Lilia's neck and ordered Gregorio to stop
the vehicle. Two (2) other persons, one of whom was later
identified as accused Armando Reanzares, were seen waiting for
them at a distance. As soon as the vehicle stopped, the accused
and his companion/approached the vehicle. Gregorio was then
pulled from the driver's seat to the back of the vehicle. They
gagged and blindfolded him and tied his hands and feet. They also
took his Seiko wristwatch worth P2,500.00. The accused then
drove the vehicle after being told by one of them, "Sige i-drive mo
na."3
Gregorio did not know where they were headed for as he was
blindfolded. After several minutes, he felt the vehicle making a u-
turn and stopped after ten (10) minutes. During the entire trip, his
wife kept uttering, "Maawa kayo sa amin, marami kaming anak,
kunin nyo na lahat ng gusto ninyo." Immediately after the last time
she uttered these words a commotion ensued and Lilia was heard
saying, "aray!" Gregorio heard her but could not do anything. After
three (3) minutes the commotion ceased. Then he heard someone
tell him, "Huwag kang kikilos diyan, ha," and left. Gregorio then
untied his hands and feet, removed his gag and blindfold jumped
out of the vehicle. The culprits were all gone, including his wife. He
ran to San Roque East shouting for help.4
When Gregorio returned to the crime scene, the jeepney was still
there. He went to the driver's seat. There he saw his wife lying on
the floor of the jeepney with blood splattered all over her body. Her
bag containing P1,200.00 was missing. He brought her
immediately to the C.P. Reyes Hospital where she was
pronounced dead on arrival.5
At the time of her death Lilia Tactacan was forty-eight (48) years
old. According to Gregorio, he was deeply depressed by her death;
that he incurred funeral, burial and other related expenses, and
that his wife was earning P3,430.00 a month as a teacher.6
Dr. Lily D. Nunes, Medical Health Officer of Sto. Tomas, Batangas,
conducted a post-mortem examination on the body of the victim.
Her medical report disclosed that the victim sustained eight (8) stab
wounds on the chest and abdominal region of the body. She
testified that a sharp pointed object like a long knife could have
caused those wounds which must have been inflicted by more than
one (1) person, and that all those wounds except the non-
penetrating one caused the immediate death of the victim.7
Subsequently, two (2) informations were filed against accused
Armando Reanzares and three (3) John Does in relation to the
incident. The first was for violation of PD 532 otherwise known as
the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for
allegedly conspiring, with intent to gain and armed with bladed
weapons and a .38 caliber revolver, to rob and carry away one (1)
Seiko wristwatch owned by Gregorio Tactacan and P1,000.00
cash of Lilia Tactacan, and on the occasion thereof, killed her. The
second was for violation of RA 6538, An Act Preventing and
Penalizing Carnapping, for taking away by means of violence and
intimidation of persons one (1) passenger-type jeepney with Plate
No. DBP 235 owned and driven by Gregorio Tactacan and valued
at P110,000.00. Only the accused Armando Reanzares was
arrested. The other three (3) have remained unidentified and at
large.
The accused testified in his defense and claimed that he could not
have perpetrated the crimes imputed to him with three (3) others
as he was in Barangay Tagnipa, Garchitorena, Camarines Sur, for
the baptism of his daughter Jessica when the incident
happened.8 His father, Jose Reanzares, corroborated his story.
Jose claimed that the accused borrowed P500.00 from him for the
latter's trip to Bicol although he could not say that he actually saw
the accused leave for his intended destination.9 To bolster the alibi
of the accused, his brother Romeo Reanzares also took the
witness stand and alleged that he saw the accused off on 9 May
1994, the day before the incident. Romeo maintained that he
accompanied the accused to the bus stop that day and even
helped the latter carry his things to the bus. He however could not
categorically state where and when the accused alighted or that he
in fact reached Bicol. 10
On 26 May 1997 the trial court found the prosecution's evidence
credible and ruled that the alibi of the accused could not prevail
over his positive identification by complaining witness Gregorio
Tactacan. The court a quo declared him guilty of Highway Robbery
with Homicide under PD 532 and sentenced him to death. It further
ordered him to pay the heirs of Lilia Tactacan P50,000.00 as
indemnity for death, P172,000.00 for funeral, burial and related
expenses, and P1,000.00 for the cash taken from her bag. The
accused was also ordered to reimburse Gregorio Tactacan
P2,500.00 for the Seiko wristwatch taken from him. 11 But the trial
court exonerated the accused from the charge of carnapping under
RA 6539 for insufficiency of evidence.
The accused insists before us that his conviction for Highway
Robbery with Homicide under PD 532 is erroneous as his guilt was
not proved beyond reasonable doubt. He claims that the testimony
of private complainant Gregorio Tactacan, who implicated him as
one of the perpetrators of the crime, is incredible. He maintains that
Gregorio failed to identify him because when the latter was
questioned he stated that he did not know any of the culprits. He
also claims that in the publication of Hotline by Tony Calvento in
People's Tonight, Gregorio even asked the readers to help him
identify the malefactors.
The trial court observed that Gregorio Tactacan testified in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and
was consistent on cross-examination. Indeed, Gregorio might not
have immediately revealed the name of accused Armando
Reanzares to the police authorities when he was first investigated
but the delay was not an indication of a fabricated charge and
should not undermine his credibility considering that he
satisfactorily explained his reasons therefor. According to him, he
did not immediately tell the police about the accused because he
feared for the safety of his family as his neighbors told him that they
saw some people lurking around his house on the day of the
incident. Moreover, he was advised not to mention any names until
after the burial of his wife. No ill motive could be attributed to him
for implicating the accused. If at all, the fact that his wife died by
reason of the incident even lends credence to his testimony since
his natural interest in securing the conviction of the guilty would
deter him from implicating persons other than the real culprits,
otherwise, those responsible for the perpetration of the crime
would escape prosecution.
To further undermine the credibility of Gregorio, the accused
underscores Gregorio's refusal to be subjected to a lie detector
test. We cannot subscribe to this contention as the procedure of
ascertaining the truth by means of a lie detector test has never
been accepted in our jurisdiction; thus, any findings based thereon
cannot be considered conclusive.
Finally, the accused chides Gregorio for supposedly suppressing
a very material piece of evidence, i.e., the latter failed to present
as witnesses a certain Renato and his wife who allegedly saw the
holduppers running away from the crime scene. But this is only a
disputable presumption under Sec. 3, par. (e), Rule 131, of the
Rules of Court on evidence, which does not apply in the present
case as the evidence allegedly omitted is equally accessible and
available to the defense.
These attempts of the accused to discredit Gregorio obviously
cannot hold ground. Neither can they bolster his alibi. For alibi to
be believed it must be shown that (a) the accused was in another
place at the time of the commission of the offense, and (b) it was
physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene. 12
In this case, the accused claims to have left for Bicol the day before
the incident. To prove this, he presented his father and brother but
their testimonies did not meet the requisite quantum to establish
his alibi. While his father testified that the accused borrowed
money from him for his fare to Bicol for the baptism of a daughter,
he could not say whether the accused actually went to Bicol. As
regards the claim of Romeo, brother of the accused, that he
accompanied the accused to the bus stop on 9 May 1994 and even
helped him with his things, seeing the accused off is not the same
as seeing him actually get off at his destination. Given the
circumstances of this case, it is possible for the accused to have
alighted from the bus before reaching Bicol, perpetrated the crime
in the evening of 10 May 2000, proceeded to Bicol and arrived
there on 12 May 2000 for his daughter's baptism.
Thus the trial court was correct in disregarding the alibi of the
accused not only because he was positively identified by Gregorio
Tactacan but also because it was not shown that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the crime scene on the date and time of
the incident.
Indeed the accused is guilty. But that the accused was guilty of
Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532 was erroneous. As
held in a number of cases, conviction for highway robbery requires
proof that several accused were organized for the purpose of
committing it indiscriminately. 1 There is no proof in the instant
case that the accused and his cohorts organized themselves to
commit highway robbery. Neither is there proof that they attempted
to commit similar robberies to show the "indiscriminate"
perpetration thereof. On the other hand, what the prosecution
established was only a single act of robbery against the particular
persons of the Tactacan spouses. Clearly, this single act of
depredation is not what is contemplated under PD 532 as its
objective is to deter and punish lawless elements who commit acts
of depredation upon persons and properties of innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another
thereby disturbing the peace and tranquility of the nation and
stunting the economic and social progress of the people. 1avv phil
Consequently, the accused should be held liable for the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide under Art. 294 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 14 as the allegation
in the Information are enough to convict him therefor. In the
interpretation of an information, what controls is the description of
the offense charged and not merely its designation. 15
Art. 294, par. (1) of the Revised Penal Code as amended punishes
the crime of robbery with homicide by reclusion perpetua to death.
Applying Art. 63, second par., subpar. 2, of the Revised Penal
Code which provides that "[i]n all cases in which the law prescribes
a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules
shall be observed in the application thereof: . . . 2. [w]hen there are
neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied," the
lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed in the absence of
any modifying circumstance.
As to the damages awarded by the trial court to the heirs of the
victim, we sustain the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for
the wrongful death of Lilia Tactacan. In addition, the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages is ordered. Also, damages for loss
of earning capacity of Lilia Tactacan must be granted to her heirs.
The testimony of Gregorio Tactacan, the victim's husband, on the
earning capacity of his wife, together with a copy of his wife's
payroll, is enough to establish the basis for the award. The formula
for determining the life expectancy of Lilia Tactacan, applying the
American Expectancy Table of Mortality, is as follows: 2/3
multiplied by (80 minus the age of the deceased). 16 Since Lilia was
48 years of age at the time of her death, 17 then her life expectancy
was 21.33 years.
At the time of her death, Lilia was earning P3,430.00 a month as a
teacher at the San Roque Elementary School so that her annual
income was P41,160.00. From this amount, 50% should be
deducted as reasonable and necessary living expenses to arrive
at her net earnings. Thus, her net earning capacity was
P438,971.40 computed as follows: Net earning capacity equals life
expectancy times gross annual income less reasonable and
necessary living expenses —
2 (80-48)
x = x [P41,164.00 - P20,580.00]
3
= 21.33 x P20,580.00
= P438,971.40
However, the award of P1,000.00 representing the cash taken from
Lilia Tactacan must be increased to P1,200.00 as this was the
amount established by the prosecution without objection from the
defense. The award of P172,000.00 for funeral, burial and related
expenses must be reduced to P22,000.00 as this was the only
amount sufficiently substantiated. 18 There was no other competent
evidence presented to support the original award.
The amount of P2,500.00 as reimbursement for the Seiko
wristwatch taken from Gregorio Tactacan must be deleted in the
absence of receipts or any other competent evidence aside from
the self-serving valuation made by the prosecution. An ordinary
witness cannot establish the value of jewelry and the trial court can
only take judicial notice of the value of goods which is a matter of
public knowledge or is capable of unquestionable demonstration.
The value of jewelry therefore does not fall under either category
of which the court can take judicial notice. 19
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIED.
Accused ARMANDO REANZARES also known as "Armando
Rianzares" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery
with Homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to
pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as indemnity for death,
another P50,000.00 for moral damages, P1,200.00 for actual
damages, P438,971.40 for loss of earning capacity, and
P22,000.00 for funeral, burial and related expenses. Costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.
1âw phi 1.nêt
G.R. Nos. 135695-96 October 12, 2000 sexual intercourse with the said offended party against the latter’s
will.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. CONTRARY TO LAW.2
TOMAS TUNDAG, accused-appellant.
Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel de parte,
DECISION pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charges.

QUISUMBING, J.: The two cases were consolidated and a joint trial ensued.

For automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Appellant’s defense was bare denial. He claimed that private
Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal Cases Nos.DU-6186 and complainant had fabricated the rape charges against him since he
DU-6203, finding appellant Tomas Tundag guilty of two counts of and his daughter, "had a quarrel when he accordingly reprimanded
incestuous rape and sentencing him to death twice. her for going out whenever he was not at home."3

On November 18, 1997, private complainant Mary Ann Tundag Appellant did not present any witness to reinforce his testimony.
filed with the Mandaue City Prosecutor’s Office two separate
complaints for incestuous rape. The first complaint, docketed as On August 31, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:
Criminal Case No. DU-6186, alleged:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Joint Judgment is
That on or about the 5th day of September, 1997, in the City of hereby rendered, to wit:
Mandaue, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being the father of complainant I. In Criminal Case No. DU-6186 -
MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate
intent, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG
sexual intercourse with the said offended party against the latter’s
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
will.
rape, said accused is hereby sentenced to the
penalty of death;
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann
The other, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-6203, averred: Tundag the following amounts:

That on or about the 7th day of November, 1997, in the City of (1) P50,000.00 by reason of the
Mandaue, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable commission of the offense of rape upon
Court, the above-named accused, being the father of complainant her; and
MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate
intent, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
 (2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages under Article 2219 in
relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the
New Civil Code for the pain and moral
shock suffered by her and for the
commission of the crime of rape with one
qualifying aggravating circumstance; and
c) To pay the costs.
II. In Criminal Case No. DU-6203 -
a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of
rape, said accused is hereby sentenced to the
penalty of death;
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann
Tundag the following amounts:
(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the
offense of rape upon her; and
(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles
2217 and 2230 of the New Civil Code for the pain
and moral shock suffered by her and for the
commission of the crime of rape with one qualifying
aggravating circumstance; and
(3) To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.4
In its judgment, the court below gave credence to complainant’s
version of what accused did to her.
The evidence for the prosecution as adduced during the trial on the
merits clearly shows that private complainant Mary Ann Tundag is
a 13 year old girl who does not know how to read and write and
has an IQ of 76% which is a very low general mental ability and
was living with her father, the herein accused, at Galaxy
Compound, Mandaue City.
xxx
That on September 5, 1997 at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening,
she was in the house together with her father. But before she went
to sleep, her father was already lying down on the mat while herself
(sic) just lied down at his head side which was not necessarily
beside him. However, when she was already sleeping, she noticed
that her father who was already undressed was beside her and
was embracing her. Then, he undressed her which she resisted
but her father used a knife and told her that he would kill her if she
shouts and after that, he inserted his penis into her vagina and told
her not to shout or tell anyone. In effect, his penis penetrated her
genital, which made her vagina bleed and was very painful.
That when the penis of her father was already inserted in her
vagina, her father was all the time asking by saying (sic) : ‘Does it
feel good?’ And at the same time, he was laughing and further, told
her that a woman who does not marry can never enter heaven and
he got angry with her when she contradicted his statement.
That while the penis of her father was inside her vagina and (he)
was humping over her, she felt intense pain that she cried and told
him to pull it out but did not accede and in fact, said: ‘Why will I pull
it out when it feels so good(?)’
That after removing his penis from her vagina and after telling her
that she could not go to heaven if she did not get married, her father
just stayed there and continued smoking while she cried.
That in the evening of November 7, 1997, she was at home
washing the dishes while her father was just smoking and
squatting. That after she finished washing the dishes, she lied (sic)
down to sleep when her father embraced her and since she does
not like what he did to her, she placed a stool between them but
he just brushed it aside and laid down with her and was able to
take her womanhood again by using a very sharp knife which he
was holding and was pointing it at the right side of her neck which
made her afraid.
That in the early morning of the following day, she left her father’s
place and went to her neighbor by the name of Bebie Cabahug and
told her what had happened to her, who, in turn, advised her to
report the matter to the police, which she did and accompanied by
the policemen, she went to the Southern Islands Hospital where
she was examined and after her medical examination, she was
brought back by the police and was investigated by them."5
Appellant’s claim that the complainant’s charges were
manufactured did not impress the trial court, which found him twice
guilty of rape. Now before us, appellant assails his double
conviction, simply contending that:6
THE TRIAL COURT HAS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN NOT
ABSOLVING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATIONS DESPITE THE PRESENCE
OF REASONABLE DOUBT TO EXCULPATE HIM OF THE SAME.
Appellant flatly denies that the incidents complained of ever took
place. He contends that on September 5, 1997, he was working as
a watch repairman near Gal’s Bakery in Mandaue City Market and
went home tired and sleepy at around 11:00 o’clock that evening.
On November 7, 1997, he claims he was at work. In his brief, he
argues that it was impossible for him to have raped his daughter
because when the incidents allegedly transpired, "he went to work
and naturally, being exhausted and tired, it is impossible for him to
do such wrongdoings."7
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with appellant and
urges the Court to affirm the trial court’s decision, with the
recommendation that the award of damages and indemnity ex
delicto be modified to conform to prevailing jurisprudence.
Considering the gravity of the offense charged as a heinous crime
and the irreversibility of the penalty of death imposed in each of
these cases before us, the Court leaves no stone unturned in its
review of the records, including the evidence presented by both the
prosecution and the defense. Conviction must rest on nothing less
than a moral certainty of guilt.8 But here we find no room to disturb
the trial court’s judgment concerning appellant’s guilt, because his
defense is utterly untenable.
Appellant’s defense of alibi and denial is negative and self-serving.
It hardly counts as a worthy and weighty ground for exculpation in
a trial involving his freedom and his life. Against the testimony of
private complainant who testified on affirmative matters,9 such
defense is not only trite but pathetic. Denial is an inherently weak
defense, which becomes even weaker in the face of the positive
identification by the victim of the appellant as the violator of her
honor.10 Indeed, we find that private complainant was unequivocal
in charging appellant with ravishing her. The victim’s account of the
rapes complained of was straightforward, detailed, and
consistent.11 Her testimony never wavered even after it had been
explained to her that her father could be meted out the death
penalty if found guilty by the court.12
In a prosecution for rape, the complainant’s credibility is the single
most important issue.13 The determination of the credibility of
witnesses is primarily the function of the trial court. The rationale
for this is that the trial court has the advantage of having observed
at first hand the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand and,
therefore, is in a better position to form an accurate impression and
conclusion.14 Absent any showing that certain facts of value have
clearly been overlooked, which if considered could affect the result
of the case, or that the trial court’s finding are clearly arbitrary, the
conclusions reached by the court of origin must be respected and Smears:
the judgment rendered affirmed.15
Conclusions: sperm identification (-)
Moreover, we note here that private complainant’s testimony is
corroborated by medical findings that lacerations were present in Gram staining of vaginal disc.16
her hymen. The examination conducted by Dr. Bessie Acebes
upon the private complainant yielded the following results: Dr. Acebes testified that her findings of healed hymenal lacerations
in the complainant’s private parts meant a history of sexual
Genitalia: grossly female congress on her part.17 According to her, the lacerations may have
been caused by the entry of an erect male organ into complainant’s
Pubic Hairs: scanty genitals. The examining physician likewise pointed out that
previous coitus may be inferred from complainant’s U-shaped
Labia Majora: coaptated fourchette since the fourchette of a female who has not yet
experienced sexual intercourse is V-shaped.18 While Dr. Acebes
Labia Minora: -do- conceded under cross-examination, that the existence of the
datum "U-shape(d) fourchette does not conclusively and
absolutely mean that there was sexual intercourse or contact
Fourchette: U-shaped
because it can be caused by masturbation of fingers or other
things,"19 nonetheless, the presence of the hymenal lacerations
Vestibule: pinkish tends to support private complainant’s claim that she was raped by
appellant.
Hymen: + old healed laceration at 3 and 9 o’clock
position(s). Appellant next contends that his daughter pressed the rape
charges against him because she had quarreled with him after he
Orifice: admits 2 fingers with ease had castigated her for misbehavior. He stresses that the
prosecution did not rebut his testimony regarding his quarrel or
Vagina: misunderstanding with private complainant. He urges us to
consider the charges filed against him as the result of his frequent
Walls: pinkish castigation of her delinquent behavior.20

Ruganities: prominent Such allegation of a family feud, however, does not explain the
charges away. Filing a case for incestuous rape is of such a nature
Uterus: small that a daughter’s accusation must be taken seriously. It goes
against human experience that a girl would fabricate a story which
would drag herself as well as her family to a lifetime of dishonor,
Cervix: closed
unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her
Discharges: Mucoid, minimal
honor.21 More so, where her charges could mean the death of her
own father, as in this case.
Appellant likewise points out that it was very unlikely for him to
have committed the crimes imputed to him considering that he and
his wife had ten children to attend to and care for. This argument,
however, is impertinent and immaterial. Appellant was estranged
from his wife, and private complainant was the only child who lived
with him.22 As pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant was
thus "free to do as he wished to satisfy his bestial lust on his
daughter."23
Nor does appellant’s assertion that private complainant has some
psychological problems and a low IQ of 76 in any way favor his
defense. These matters did not affect the credibility of her
testimony that appellant raped her twice. We note that the victim
understood the consequences of prosecuting the rape charges
against her own father, as shown by the following testimony of the
victim on cross-examination:
Q : Were you informed that if, and when your father will be found
guilty, your father will be sentenced to death?
A : Yes.
Q : Until now you wanted that your father will be sentenced by
death?
A (Witness nodding.)
xxx
Q : I will inform you, Miss Witness, that you have filed two cases
against your father and in case your father would be found guilty,
two death sentences will be imposed against him?
A: Yes.
Q: With that information, do you still want this case would proceed?
A: I want this to proceed.24
Indeed, appellant is guilty. But is the penalty of death imposed on
him correct?
Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
11 of R.A. No. 7659,25 penalizes rape of a minor daughter by her
father as qualified rape26 and a heinous crime. In proving such
felony, the prosecution must allege and prove the elements of
rape: (1) sexual congress; (2) with woman; (3) by force or without
her consent27 and in order to warrant the imposition of capital
punishment, the additional elements that: (4) the victim is under 18
years of age at the time of the rape and (5) the offender is a parent
of the victim.28
In this case, it was sufficiently alleged and proven that the offender
was the victim’s father.29 But the victim’s age was not properly and
sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt. She testified that she
was thirteen years old at the time of the rapes. However, she
admitted that she did not know exactly when she was born because
her mother did not tell her. She further said that her birth certificate
was likewise with her mother. In her own words, the victim testified
- 30
COURT TO WITNESS
Q: When were you born?
A: I do not know.
Q: You do not know your birthday?
A: My mama did not tell me exactly when I asked her.
COURT: Proceed.
FISCAL PEREZ: For our failure to secure the Birth Certificate Your
Honor, may we just request for judicial notice that the victim here
is below 18 years old.
ATTY. SURALTA: Admitted. …
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may
properly take and act on without proof because they already know
them.31 Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may either be
mandatory or discretionary. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court provides when court shall take mandatory judicial notice of
facts -
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take
judicial notice without the introduction of evidence, of the existence
and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of
government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the
admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the
political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts
of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the
geographical divisions.
Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when courts may
take discretionary judicial notice of facts -
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take
judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are
capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions.
Thus, it can be considered of public knowledge and judicially
noticed that the scene of the rape is not always nor necessarily
isolated or secluded for lust is no respecter of time or place. The
offense of rape can and has been committed in places where
people congregate, e.g. inside a house where there are occupants,
a five (5) meter room with five (5) people inside, or even in the
same room which the victim is sharing with the accused’s sister.32
The Court has likewise taken judicial notice of the Filipina’s inbred
modesty and shyness and her antipathy in publicly airing acts
which blemish her honor and virtue.33
On the other hand, matters which are capable of unquestionable
demonstration pertain to fields of professional and scientific
knowledge. For example, in People v. Alicante,34 the trial court took
judicial notice of the clinical records of the attending physicians
concerning the birth of twin baby boys as "premature" since one of
the alleged rapes had occurred 6 to 7 months earlier.
As to matters which ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions, an example would be facts which are
ascertainable from the record of court proceedings, e.g. as to when
court notices were received by a party.
With respect to other matters not falling within the mandatory or
discretionary judicial notice, the court can take judicial notice of a
fact pursuant to the procedure in Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules
of Court which requires that -
SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the trial,
the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may
announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and
allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court,
on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice
of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such
matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper,
despite the defense counsel’s admission, thereof acceding to the
prosecution’s motion. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to
any other matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts
can take judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age of the victim
may be proven by the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim, or
in the absence thereof, upon showing that said documents were
lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient
for the purpose.
Thus, in People v. Rebancos, 172 SCRA 426 (1989), the victim
was below 12 and we found that the rape committed was statutory
rape. The mother testified that her daughter was born on October
26, 1974, and so was only 9 years old at the time of the rape on
February 12, 1984. Although no birth certificate was presented
because the victim’s birth had allegedly not been registered, her
baptismal certificate was duly presented. Hence, we ruled that the
mother’s testimony coupled with the presentation of the baptismal
certificate was sufficient to establish that the victim was below 12
at the time of the rape.
However, in People v. Vargas, 257 SCRA 603 (1996), we ruled
that appellant can only be convicted of simple rape, and not
statutory rape, because of failure of the prosecution to prove the
minority of the victim, who was allegedly 10 years old at the time
of the rape. The prosecution failed to present either the birth or
1âwphi1
baptismal certificate of the victim. Also there was no showing that
the said documents were lost or destroyed to justify their non-
presentation. We held that testimony of the victim and her aunt
were hearsay, and that it was not correct for the trial court to judge
the age of the victim by her appearance.
In several recent cases, we have emphasized the need for
independent proof of the age of the victim, aside from testimonial
evidence from the victim or her relatives. In People v. Javier,35 we
stressed that the prosecution must present independent proof of
the age of the victim, even though it is not contested by the
defense. The minority of the victim must be proved with equal
certainty and clearness as the crime itself. In People v. Cula,36 we
reiterated that it is the burden of the prosecution to prove with
certainty the fact that the victim was below 18 when the rape was
committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty.
Since the record of the case was bereft of any
independent evidence thereon, such as the victim’s duly certified
Certificate of Live Birth, accurately showing private complainant’s
age, appellant could not be convicted of rape in its qualified form.
In People v. Veloso,37 the victim was alleged to have been only 9
years of age at the time of the rape. It held that the trial court was
correct when it ruled that the prosecution failed to prove the victim’s
age other than through the testimony of her father and herself.
Considering the statutory requirement in Section 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No.
8353, we reiterate here what the Court has held in Javier without
any dissent, that the failure to sufficiently establish victim’s age by
independent proof is a bar to conviction for rape in its qualified
form. For, in the words of Melo, J., "independent proof of the actual
age of a rape victim becomes vital and essential so as to remove
an ‘iota of doubt’ that the case falls under the qualifying
circumstances" for the imposition of the death penalty set by the
law.
In this case, the first rape was committed on September 5, 1997
and is therefore governed by the death penalty law, R.A. 7659. The
penalty for the crime of simple rape or rape in its unqualified form
under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 11
of R.A. 7659, is reclusion perpetua. The second rape was
committed on November 7, 1997, after the effectivity of R.A. 8353,
also known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on
October 22, 1997. The penalty for rape in its unqualified form
remains the same.
As to civil indemnity, the trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00
for each count of rape as civil indemnity. However, the award of
another P50,000.00 as "moral and exemplary damages under
Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the Civil Code"
for each count is imprecise. In rape cases, the prevailing
jurisprudence permits the award of moral damages without need
for pleading or proof as to the basis thereof.38 Thus, pursuant to
current jurisprudence, we award the amount of P50,000.00 as
moral damages for each count of rape.

The award of exemplary damages separately is also in order, but

on a different basis and for a different amount. Appellant being the
father of the victim, a fact duly proved during trial, we find that the
alternative circumstance of relationship should be appreciated
here as an aggravating circumstance. Under Article 2230 of the
New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.
Hence, we find an award of exemplary damages in the amount of
P25,000.00 proper. Note that generally, in rape cases imposing the
death penalty, the rule is that relationship is no longer appreciated
as a generic aggravating circumstance in view of the amendments
introduced by R.A. Nos. 7659 and 8353. The father-daughter
relationship has been treated by Congress in the nature of a
special circumstance which makes the imposition of the death
penalty mandatory.39 However, in this case, the special qualifying
circumstance of relationship was proved but not the minority of the
victim, taking the case out of the ambit of mandatory death
sentence. Hence, relationship can be appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance in this instance so that exemplary
damages are called for. In rapes committed by fathers on their own
daughters, exemplary damages may be imposed to deter other
fathers with perverse tendency or aberrant sexual behavior from
sexually abusing their own daughters.40

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of

Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal Case Nos. DU-6186 and DU-
6203, is hereby MODIFIED as follows: appellant Tomas Tundag is
found guilty of two (2) counts of simple rape; and for each count,
sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim the
amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.