Reliability PDF

PSS®SINCAL 16.
0
Reliability
Supply Reliability Calculations in Electrical Networks
Published by
Siemens AG
Smart Infrastructure
Digital Grid
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91058 Erlangen, Germany
SIEMENS PSS SINCAL Reliability
Preface
Preface
The PSS SINCAL manuals can be divided into the following parts:
● the PSS SINCAL System Manual

● manuals for Electrical and Pipe Networks
● the Database Description
● the Automation Manual
The PSS SINCAL System Manual contains a general description for using the application.
The technical manuals for Electrical Networks contain detailed descriptions of the various
calculation methods for electrical networks - such as load flow, or short circuit calculations - and
their input data.
The technical manuals for Pipe Networks contain detailed descriptions of the various calculation
methods for pipe networks - water, gas and heating/cooling - and their input data.
The Database Description contains a complete description of the data models for electrical and
pipe networks.
The Automation manual contains the documentation of the automation functions for PSS SINCAL.
Copyright
This manual and all the information and illustrations contained in it are copyrighted.
SIEMENS retains all rights, in particular the right to publish, translate, reprint, photocopy, make
microcopies or electronically store in a database.
Previously expressed written permission from SIEMENS is required for any reproduction or use
beyond the limits specified by copyright law.
Warranty
Even though our manuals are thoroughly checked for errors, no liability can be taken for errors
found or any resulting problems or difficulties. Modifications are frequently made to the text and the
software as a part of our routine updates.
PSS® is a registered trademark of SIEMENS AG

Copyright SIEMENS AG 2019 All Rights Reserved
Table of Contents
1. Introduction to Reliability 7
1.1 General Remarks 7
2. Reliability Procedure 9
2.1 Terminology 9
2.1.1 Dependability 9
2.1.2 Component and System States 10
2.1.3 Failure, Outage and Supply Interruption 11
2.2 Reliability Indices 12
2.3 Program Structure 14
2.4 Calculation Part 15
2.5 Analysis Part 18
3. Modeling of the Network 21
3.1 Defining Components 21

3.2 Assigning Reliability Indices 22
3.3 Busbars and Switching Stations 23
3.4 Lines 26
3.5 Transformers 27
3.6 Infeeders 27
3.7 Load Modeling 29
3.8 Protection System 32
3.9 System Borders and Neighboring Networks 34
3.10 Grouping of Network Elements 36
4. Modeling of Failure Events 40
4.1 Short or Long Independent Single Failure 40

4.2 Common Mode Failure 41
4.3 Short or Long Maintenance 42
4.4 Multiple Ground Fault 42
4.5 Malfunction of Protection Device 43
4.6 Unnecessary Protection Operation 44
October 2019
PSS SINCAL Reliability SIEMENS
Table of Contents
4.7 Independent Unnecessary Protection Operation 44

4.8 Malfunction of Circuit Breaker 45
4.9 Data Requirements of the Failure Models 45
5. Modeling of Remedial Measures 47
5.1 Switching Operations 48

5.2 Generation Schedule 51
6. Predefined Reliability Indices 53
7. Reliability Results 56
8. Load Flow Algorithm 61
8.1 Standard and Extended 61

8.2 Connection Check 61
8.3 Maximum Flow 62
8.4 Network State Analysis 62
9. Short Circuit Calculation 64
10. Example for Reliability 65
10.1 Presetting Calculations Settings 66

10.2 Network Modeling for Reliability 66
10.3 Starting the Reliability Calculations 68
10.4 Displaying and Evaluating the Results 68
10.4.1 Results in the Network Diagram 68
10.4.2 Enhanced Results Log 70
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Introduction to Reliability
1. Introduction to Reliability
The probabilistic reliability calculations in PSS SINCAL let you calculate supply reliability in
electric power systems. The calculation is independent of network structure and voltage level. This
means you can analyze any low, medium, high or extra-high voltage network, assuming you have
the relevant data.
Due to the complexity, probabilistic reliability calculations require the user to obtain a more
profound knowledge of the subject than with other network planning tools.
This manual contains the following chapters:
● Reliability Procedure
● Modeling of the Network
● Modeling of Failure Events
● Modeling of Remedial Measures
● Predefined Reliability Indices
● Reliability Results
● Load Flow Algorithm
● Short Circuit Calculation
● Example for Reliability
Reliability Procedure
To calculate reliability or enter special data for the reliability calculations, the Reliability procedure
must first be switched ON in the Calculation Methods.
The most important steps needed to enter and assign reliability data are:
● Define an annual load duration curve

● Assign the annual load duration curve in the network level data
● Create protection devices:
The network topology and the protection devices’ main protection direction are used to
calculate the area to be shut down for reliability.
● Assign load limits for network elements:
In the outlet state (load flow), the network must not have any overloads.
● Enter controller data for supply sources
● Enter number for primary power for supply sources
● Create reliability type data
● Assign the reliability type data to the elements:
This can be done either at the network level or directly at the elements.
1.1 General Remarks

Supply reliability is an important aspect of electric power supply. A secured power supply is a basic
factor for nearly all kind of processes in our modern society. Thus, for example, the German
Energiewirtschaftsgesetz (Federal Power Supply Regulation) demands supply as reliable, cheap
and environmentally compatible as possible.
October 2019 7
Introduction to Reliability
Up to now, supply reliability is implemented in network planning through the usage of heuristic
planning criteria in most cases. An example is the well-known (n-1)-criteria. In this method, supply
reliability can be regarded merely indirectly as a restriction that cannot be quantified.
This method nevertheless proved to deliver sufficient results in a monopolistic supply structure.
Experience shows that the deregulation of energy markets leads to new requirements that are
beyond the capability of the traditional methods. Rising pressure to reduce costs and to increase
efficiency as well as the establishment of reliability, as a competitive factor, push the importance of
supply reliability in network planning and the interest in detailed reliability analysis. Thus, also the
interest in probabilistic reliability calculation, allowing quantified results, and the relevant tools is on
the rise.
Programs for reliability calculations are being developed since the 80's. Meanwhile, they have
reached a standard enabling unrestricted usage in planning tasks. In completion to classical
planning tools, they can be used to gain quantitative results on the reliability of complete systems
or of separate customers in the power system. In doing so, it has to be taken into consideration that
probabilistic reliability calculations are based on the analysis of stochastic equipment outages.
Thus, the results of probabilistic reliability calculations cannot be compared to reality by short-term
measurements in order to determine their quality, as it is possible with other calculations, e.g.
power flow calculations. The results serve to give an overview of the supply reliability in the
analyzed system, to identify any weak points in the network or to compare several planning
variants and to solve similar questions. In this field, many actual examples have proven that
probabilistic reliability calculations is a valuable and sometimes even the only available tool to
fulfill certain requirements of modern network planning tasks.
History of how PSS SINCAL Reliability Calculations Developed
PSS SINCAL’s reliability calculations were originally based on a program known as ZUBER.
ZUBER was developed to analyze 110-kV-networks with overhead lines and ground-fault
compensation. The algorithms were developed and expanded for general use in several steps.
Substantial development was achieved at universities, as the field of reliability analysis was
virtually a mere research topic until recent years in Germany.
The Darmstadt University of Technology, the Saarland University and the Siegen University are
involved in the ZUBER development. Research and development are coordinated by FGH e. V.
since 1996 in close cooperation with Saarland University and Siegen University.
In the meantime, PSS SINCAL’s probabilistic reliability calculations have been completely
integrated into its object-oriented calculation methods. When we did this, we were able to both
enhance the functions of the reliability calculations and greatly increase the processing speed,
particularly for large networks.
8 October 2019
2. Reliability Procedure
Models, methods and programs for probabilistic reliability analysis exist since the 80's, though only
in recent years the liberalization of power markets leads to a rising interest in the planning practice.
The following figure shows the schematic sequence of a reliability analysis.
Past system performance

Reliability
Observable indices
Evaluation/
Failure models Equipment prognosis
reliability data
Comparison
Observable
Reliability
calculation Future system performance
The data basis is derived from the past system performance. It is used to gain the reliability data of
the equipment which are the input data for the actual reliability calculation. At the same time, out of
the operational experience in the past several failure models have been developed which allow a
classification of the manifold fault occurrences and thus enable a mathematical description.
The actual reliability calculations now – based on the network data and the reliability data of each
component – calculate the reliability indices for each load node and also the complete system.
Those indices have to be evaluated and interpreted according to the given task, eventually using
special analysis of the reliability calculation.
In some rare situations, a comparison with the actual present system performance is possible.
Because of the rarity of the failure events, in general this will not be the case. It has to be noticed
that the calculated values represent the expectation values of probabilistic indices which are
calculated for an infinite time period. So, even observations lasting for several years cannot
determine the quality of reliability calculations. Observations can only represent a random sampling
of the calculated universe.
2.1 Terminology
This chapter explains the most important terms behind reliability calculations.
2.1.1 Dependability
The term dependability is defined according to DIN 40 041 as "the condition of an entity relating to
its capability to fulfill the dependability requirement during or after a given time span with given
application conditions". This definition shows that further arrangements relating to the application
conditions and the dependability requirement of the considered entity are necessary.
October 2019 9
The definition of dependability according to IEC 60050-191 as "The collective term used to
describe the availability performance and its influencing factors: reliability performance,
maintainability performance and maintenance support performance" integrates dependability as a
partial aspect of the quality of service. Correspondingly, supply reliability is a partial aspect of the
quality of electric power supply. Other aspects, like e.g. frequency stability and voltage stability,
usually are combined in the term voltage quality. It is remarkable about this definition that
dependability not only includes the question of the unit performance itself, but also regards options
for maintenance (maintainability performance) and the ability of a responsible organization to
perform this maintenance (maintenance support performance), and thus also includes the
performance during outage situations.
2.1.2 Component and System States
Systems engineering analysis, like the reliability analysis of electric power systems, require the
definition of the considered system and its components.
Components in the field of reliability calculations are defined as "smallest considered entities of a
system for modeling, analyzing or calculating reliability which cannot be further subdivided".
Components for reliability analysis can be defined in different ways. Usually, several equipment
entities are combined in one component and the component's macroscopic performance is
considered. Interest focuses on the component being able or not to fulfill its function, and in the
latter case, also on the duration of the fault state. It is not regarded which part of the component
caused the fault state for what reason in this context. The reliability calculations use a component
definition corresponding to the protection tripping areas of the main protection system. Thus,
components consist of all equipment entities being switched off together according to the protection
concept after a fault has occurred. Usually, there are the components line, busbar and
transformer.
According to IEC 50(191), five different item related states are distinguished. These can be
combined in an up state and a down state. The separate component states are:
● Operating state:
The component is connected and is performing a required function.
● External disabled state:
This state e. g. applies for thermal power stations suffering fuel shortage.
● Idle state:
The component is able to operate but its performance is not required in the actual operation
situation so that it is disconnected.
● Fault:
This component state is caused by a failure.
● Preventive maintenance state:
The component is disconnected, with the disconnection being planned for maintenance
purposes and not being related to any failure.
10 October 2019
The following illustration shows component states.
Up state Down state
Disabled state (outage)
unplanned planned
External Preventive
Idle Operating
disabled Fault maintenance
state state
state state
The external disabled state is included in the up state, as the cause for the outage cannot be
assigned to the component under consideration. It is also combined together with preventive
maintenance state and fault state as disabled state. The reliability of electric power systems is
affected above all by unplanned outages.
In the field of reliability calculation, only the ability of the component to fulfill its function is relevant
in the sense of the component's macroscopic consideration. Hence network components are
modeled in the reliability calculations with two states only. Solely power station units are described
using more states in order to be able to implement e. g. startup failures.
The limitation of the system under consideration in a reliability analysis is derived from the given
task. Here, it is important to draw the limitations of the considered system far enough to take into
regard all relevant influences on the system performance, or to take into regard the consequences
of the system limitations on the results respectively. Thereby, system is defined as the "functional
connection of those components which have influence on system reliability". In contrast to the
component performance the system performance is considered microscopically.
Because of the multitude of system states occurring in practice, there are several ways for their
classification. In network planning, the judgment on system states results from the application of
corresponding planning criteria, as for example the (n-1)-criteria. In doing so, the analyzed system
states are divided into two groups: states fulfilling the criteria and states violating the criteria. In
practical application there are usually also states violating the criteria that have to be accepted
because of economic considerations.
2.1.3 Failure, Outage and Supply Interruption
The term failure is defined especially for use in the field of reliability analysis as follows:
A failure is any unintended change of the system's normal operation state characterized by:
● Sufficient voltage level

● Intact isolation state
● Circuit state intended by the system management
● Intact equipment
October 2019 11
The term failure refers to components as well as to the complete system and specifies the state
that the component or system is in. Therefore, it is incorrect to designate the state transition into
the fault state as fault.
This state transition into the fault state is designated failure according to the following definition:
"The termination of the ability of an item to perform a required function". Hence the fault state itself
cannot be designated as failure.
In consideration of the above definition it is neither correct to use the term failure duration, as this
time span includes only the state transition and is not relevant in reliability analysis. The time span
during which a component is in fault state is designated down time.
Within the scope of reliability analysis of electric power systems only those faults are of interest that
have an effect on system reliability, i.e. those faults that lead to a supply interruption in at least one
location of the system.
A supply interruption on a load node occurs when the required power cannot be made available.
Successful automatic reclosures are not regarded as supply interruptions. Moreover, it is possible
to regard voltage band violations as supply interruptions. The system is in the state of supply
interruption in case that at least one load node suffers an interruption.
2.2 Reliability Indices

Probabilistic reliability calculations provide a quantitative description of supply reliability through
appropriate characteristic indices. In the field of reliability calculations there exists internationally a
multitude of different indices being more or less meaningful and widespread. However, certain
basic indices have proved to be valuable, and from those basic indices further sizes can be
calculated on demand. The following table gives an overview of the sizes calculated by the
reliability calculation:
Symbol Name Unit

Fi Frequency of supply interruptions 1/a
Ti Mean duration of supply interruptions h or min
Qi Unavailability 1 (common: min/a)
Pi (Cumulated) interrupted power MVA/a
Ei (Cumulated) energy not supplied MVAh/a
Ci (Cumulated) interruption costs €/a
Ai (Cumulated) reimbursement €/a
It has to be noticed that the respective reliability indices have their own meaning each. The higher
an index is aggregated, i.e. the more aspects are relevant for its calculations (e. g. the energy not
supplied depends on the frequency and the duration of supply interruptions as well as the
interrupted power), the more difficult is its interpretation with regard to its cause. In general,
restricting on one reliability index for the evaluation of a given problem is not sufficient.
As the calculated reliability indices are probabilistic indices of rare events the indices may have a
high scatter. Therefore, it has to be regarded that the calculated values represent the expectation
value of the indices. For a complete evaluation of the situation, especially in the field of risk
management, it is sometimes necessary to take into regard also the distribution.
12 October 2019
Frequency of Supply Interruptions
The frequency of supply interruptions describes the number of interruptions related to the period
under consideration. It is usually specified in the unit 1/a. This index contains no information on the
effect or the duration of an interruption.
Mean Duration of Supply Interruptions
The mean duration of a supply interruption specifies the mean time span ranging from the start to
the end of a supply interruption on a load node or the system respectively. It is given in h or min. A
supply interruption is eliminated as soon as the undersupplied load can be fully supplied again by
means of switching operations, implementing of provisional equipment or repair of the failed
element.
Probability of Supply Interruption/Unavailability
The probability of supply interruptions, also called unavailability, describes the possibility to find the
network or a single load node in the state of supply interruption on a randomly given point in time. It
is the product of frequency and mean duration of supply interruptions and has no unit. For means
of better presentation, it is common to specify the unavailability in min/a.
(Cumulated) Interrupted Power
The interrupted power indicates the sum of interrupted power in the period under consideration
related to the period under consideration. Its unit is MVA/a. The interrupted power depends on the
frequency of supply interruptions and the sum of interrupted power of each affected load. It does
not depend on the duration of the interruption. It gives an indication on the magnitude of the
interruption.
(Cumulated) Energy Not Supplied
The energy not supplied is the sum of the energy that cannot be delivered to a load or to all the
loads in a system in the period under consideration, related to the period under consideration. Its
unit is MVAh/a. In addition to the influence coefficients listed above for the interrupted power, the
energy not supplied also depends on the duration of the interruption.
(Cumulated) Interruption Costs
Interruption costs reflects the attempt to monetarily value the damage to the customers arising from
supply interruptions. Due to the great differences in the customers cost structures, depending as
well on the customer classification (e. g. household, trade, commercial, industrial, agricultural) as
on the time of day and season, the monetary evaluation can only give a rough idea of the actual
economic damage.
October 2019 13
A typical approach consists in assigning two parts of cost to a supply interruption: a part relating to
the interrupted power and another part relating to the energy not supplied. Both parts can
additionally depend on the duration of the supply interruption, i.e. the power specific factor k S (in
€/kW) and the energy specific factor kW (in €/kWh) conform to the duration of the interruption. The
following table shows an approach for reasonable values of these factors.
Duration Up to 12 min 12 min – 1 h 1 h – 10 h More than 10 h

Factor kW 5,11 €/kWh 5,11 €/kWh 5,11 €/kWh 5,11 €/kWh
Factor kS 5,11 €/kW 10,23 €/kW 20,45 €/kW 40,90 €/kW
(Cumulated) Reimbursement
Analogously to the interruption costs it is possible to calculate reimbursements in the

reimbursement model. The difference is that calculations for interruption costs are based on the
actual power requirement of the load, where calculations for reimbursements are based on the
agreed connection power of the customer.
2.3 Program Structure

The probabilistic reliability calculation consists of a Calculation Part which generates the
component failure combinations and models their sequence up to complete restoration of supply
and an Analysis Part which conducts a detailed analysis based on the calculated failure
sequences. The following figure gives an overview of the program structure of the reliability
calculation.
PSS SINCAL Network Database
Analysis Part
Network data
Equipment • Selection of component
reliability data failure combinations
• Analysis of component
failure combinations
•
Calculation Part
• Data preparation Sorted list
• Generation of component Sequence list
failure combinations
Table of results
• State analysis Results File
XML failure
Reliability
combinations
results
database
14 October 2019
The clear separation of Calculation and Analysis of the failure combination sequences has the
advantage that the calculations are by far the most time consuming part of the network analysis
and is normally performed only once in a reliability analysis. Typically, the calculation results then
are analyzed in several different ways. As the calculation results are stored already in a database,
the runtime for the analysis is quite short.
2.4 Calculation Part

The Calculation Part is to model the failure events in the power system under consideration and to
save the indices of those component failure combinations leading to a supply interruption in a XML
database. The following figure shows the schematic flow chart of the Calculation Part.
Start
Read network data
Data preparation
Generation of failure combinations

Calculation of state indices
No
Failure combination relevant?
Yes
Network state analysis
Modeling of remedial
Yes
Supply interruption? measures or expiration of
down-time
No
Storage in database
No All failure combinations

processed?
Yes
End
The input data of Calculation Part include the network data and the reliability data of the
equipment. Also, control information on the generation of the component failure combinations and
on the evaluation of their sequence is required.
After reading the data and some subsequent plausibility checks, the data are prepared, e. g. the
formation of the reliability elements (components), assigning the failure data to the reliability
elements, limitation of protection tripping areas of the protection system and the definition of
neighboring protection tripping areas responding in case of protection device malfunction are
performed.
October 2019 15
Then component failure combinations – i.e. combinations of elements that are affected by a failure
at the same time – are generated. There are two different methods available:
● At the Analytic Calculation Method all failure combinations are combinatorially generated. Only
those combinations having a probability above a given threshold value are further regarded in
the calculation. Another possibility to limit the number of the combinations to be regarded in the
calculations is the limitation of the order, i.e. the number of simultaneously failed elements, of
the combinations.
● The time-sequential Monte-Carlo Method simulates outage occurrences in the power system,
i.e. the time correlated sequence of equipment states. This method allows a more detailed
modeling of the events in the power system but consumes more calculation time
correspondingly.
It is common to both methods that for each failure situation the supply situation of the customers
has to be evaluated. In case of a supply interruption suitable remedial measures have to be taken.
The state analysis can use the load flow, the complex maximum flow algorithm or the very fast, but
less precise connection check.
Analytic Calculation Method
The component failure combinations are generated by the analytic method. The calculation method
and controlling are entered in the Reliability Settings in a special screen form.
In the analysis of failures according to the malfunction of protection device model it is sometimes
reasonable not to apply the criteria for limiting the failure combinations to be considered. These
criteria are described in the next section. The reason is that also extremely rare outage events
caused by malfunction of protection devices often have an extremely large effect on the system
reliability, thus being able to influence the final results significantly.
If in the reliability data set those failures causing a common mode failure with multiple lines also
would cause independent single failures with single lines. But such failures are not included in the
reliability data of the independent single failure, the values for the frequency of the independent
single failure and the common mode failure have to be added for single lines.
At last, certain values influencing the calculations are to be given in the control parameters, like
e.g. the maximum allowed down time or the simultaneity factor of the loads in the system. The data
on the overload factor are only used in the calculations for those elements that are not assigned an
individual overload factor.
Controlling the Analytical Calculation Method
Analytic methods, also called enumeration methods, generate component failure combinations to
be analyzed one after the other with the help of appropriate algorithms. The separate failures and
their effect on the network and the supply situation are regarded independently from each other.
The advantages of analytic methods are that computation time is, in most cases, shorter and the
calculations are more transparent so the results are easier to comprehend. It is disadvantageous
that the detailed modeling of temporal succeeding events, like e.g. daily load curves or
maintenance schedules with a multitude of states to be considered, is only possible with several
simplifications.
16 October 2019
The analytic method used by the reliability calculations is a semi-Markov process. It is assumed
that the failure probability of the reliability elements in the network is exponentially distributed in
time. The failure probability in a given time interval thus does not depend on the location of the time
interval and the previous history of the element. So, the frequency of an element failure is assumed
to be Poisson distributed. The distribution of the down time is not required in the analytic method.
The high number of possible combinations of failed elements requires a limitation of the number of
failure combinations to be analyzed. Generating the failure combinations thus is performed:
● Regarding a minimal state probability or

● Maximum order of simultaneously failed components.
In doing so, the separate failure models are not distinguished. Only in calculating the state
probability of the failure combinations it is checked which failure model is able to cause the given
failure combination.
The reliability calculations do not have to consider those failure combinations having a state
probability being so low that its effect on the reliability indices is negligible. Thus, the failure
combinations are generated by a systematic starting with failures of first order and increasing the
order of the combination until the state probability is below a selectable threshold. The maximum
order varies according to the affected elements. In choosing the unavailability threshold a
compromise between the precision of the results and the required computation time has to be
found. Experience shows that the threshold should not be greater than 10 -9 with HV networks.
Thresholds lower than 10-11 do not influence the results substantially.
In the generation of the failure combinations according to the failure order all combinations of the
chosen orders are calculated. The minimum and maximum order must be declared in the
parameter data file.
For the failure mode malfunction of protection device, the criteria for limiting the failure
combinations can be invalidated. This is reasonable if separate failures caused by malfunction of
protection device occur extremely rare but have a great effect on the network because of the loss
of selectivity in the tripping of the backup protection systems.
The selection on the option for limiting the failure combinations and for setting its parameters is
done with the Reliability Settings.
Monte-Carlo Method
The Monte Carlo method repeats random experiments multiple times to disclose the basis. An
attempt is made – with the help of probability theory – to solve problems numerically that either
could not be solved analytically or would take too much time to solve in this way. This method is
primarily based on the law of large numbers.
For the reliability calculations, this means that the malfunctions are generated with a random
number algorithm. This random number algorithm is used to determine when the malfunction
occurred inside the observation period.
To get relevant results, the observation period needs to be scanned multiple times. If this is not
done enough times, an element might either malfunction too often or not enough and be assigned
the wrong parameters by the random number algorithm. Multiple observations are needed to obtain
realistic parameters. This main problem with this simulation procedure is, of course, the amount of
calculation time required.
October 2019 17
Controlling the Monte-Carlo Method
To obtain reproducible calculation results with the Monte Carlo simulation, the random number
algorithm can always be initialized with the same number. Then, if the calculations are repeated,
there will be an identical random sequence of malfunction combinations.
The Reliability Settings are used to select the options for Create Identical Failure Sequence and
Number of Views.
There are even different control settings that influence the calculations, such as, for example, the
simultaneity factor for loads in the system. The data on the overload factor are only used to
calculate elements that are not assigned individual data. You can also enter the undervoltage
factor from which the load will be shed in this screen form.
2.5 Analysis Part

The Analysis Part reads the component failure combination sequences generated in the calculation
part and first computes the appropriate reliability indices. Subsequently, the failure combinations
are filtered with regard to the specified selection criteria, so that only the combinations of interest
are further analyzed. The schematic flow chart is shown in the following figure.
The analysis itself is performed in one of the following ways:
● Sequence list:
The sequence of all selected component failure combinations is listed in detail. The output
includes the initial supply restrictions and any remedial measures with their effect on the
customers until full supply is reestablished.
● Sorted list:
All selected component failure combinations are sorted according to a chosen reliability index
and listed.
● Results table:
The data of all selected component failure combinations are sorted and accumulated according
to several criteria. Finally, the reliability indices for certain load nodes or the complete system
are calculated and listed in a table.
18 October 2019
Start
Read network data
Yes
All failure combinations processed?
No
Calculation of reliability
indices
Failure combination within No

selection criteria?
Yes
Processing according to
selected analysis form
End
Evaluating Reliability Results
The Analysis Part reads the sequence of the component failure combinations generated by the
Calculation Part and analyzes them according to the control parameter settings. Therein, the failure
combinations are filtered through appropriate selection criteria. The analysis itself either produces a
results table with the reliability indices of the load nodes and the complete system, a list showing
the detailed sequence of individual failure combinations or a list sorted according to a specified
reliability index. Only a combination of these different analysis modes allows an extensive analysis
and evaluation of the supply reliability in the system under consideration.
Controlling the Evaluation
The component failure combinations to be analyzed can be limited by appropriate selection criteria
with respect to the reliability elements or the failure modes to be considered. The selection of limits
for the calculated reliability indices can serve to further focus the results. The Reliability Settings
screen form is used to make detailed settings for the evaluation.
Available Printouts
There are three different ways to log the results for reliability evaluations. Each of them observes
the calculated parameters in a different way:
● Sequence list
● Sorted list
● Result table
The one you select is preset with the Reliability Settings.
The sequence list especially facilitates the analysis of the main failure occurrences in the network.
October 2019 19
The component failure combinations selected according to the selection criteria are listed with its
detailed temporal sequence. All failure affected equipment units as well as the elements located in
the same protection tripping area and thus commonly disconnected are specified. Additionally, the
indices can be differentiated according to the separate failure models. Also, the supply levels of the
supply-restricted customers can be listed after every switching operation.
The sorted list allows the fast identification of the failure combinations having the greatest effect
on the supply reliability, and thus is an important instrument in the analysis of the reasons for
supply interruptions. In this case the component failure combinations corresponding with the
selection criteria can be listed sorted according to a fixed reliability index. The index and the sort
sequence can be declared in the control settings.
In the results table, the indices for selected component failure combinations are accumulated for
each load node. The calculated reliability indices thus allow a detailed survey of the supply
reliability in the system under consideration. Especially, weak points in the network can be
identified.
The calculated indices are given for the separate customers and the complete network
respectively. For the network, also the indices for failures without supply interruption can be
specified. Additionally, the percent share of each index of a customer of the network indices or the
shares of the separate reliability elements or protection tripping areas respectively of the node
indices can be determined. Also, a differentiation according to the failure modes, the affected
reliability elements, the failure order or the affected protection tripping areas is possible.
It has to be regarded that the calculated reliability indices of the separate load nodes are highly
aggregated. Therefore, a conclusion on the causes is normally not possible. The indices allow an
overall evaluation of any interruptions; a detailed study requires further analysis.
20 October 2019
Modeling of the Network
3. Modeling of the Network
Probabilistic reliability calculations impose some special demands on the data basis so that usual
data sets for power flow calculations are not sufficient. Modeling of the network topology should
include disconnected elements as well as the exact busbar configurations (sectionalized busbar,
multiple busbars etc.) because of their possible effect on remedial switching actions in the
correction of incidents. Analyzing different failure scenarios and their effect on system reliability
also requires some basic information on the protection devices used in the network.
Reliability Data
In addition to the data required by classic methods like power flow calculations or short-circuit
calculation, reliability calculations also is based on data beyond topological and electricity
characteristics of the equipment. Above all, statistical data on the reliability of the equipment are
necessary.
These data can be provided e.g. by the BDEW-Störungs- und Schadensstatistik (BDEW Statistic of
Incidents). This statistic is based on the complete outage incidents in Germany and can be
evaluated differentiated according to the neutral-point connection and other criteria. In case that
sufficient data on the system under consideration itself are available these may be used to achieve
a more precise modeling.
3.1 Defining Components

A component in the field of reliability calculations is the smallest entity under consideration that is
not further subdivided. It has the characteristic that it can fail or be restored to operating state only
as a whole. A component contains equipment that has a similar effect on the supply power system
in case of their failure. Neglecting failures that lead to a reduced transmission capability (e.g.
failures in the cooling system of a transformer), the effect of failures on the electric power system
can be described solely by the circuit state. Individual reliability data can be assigned to each
component. Within the scope of reliability calculations, the most important component characteristic
is the unavailability, i.e. the frequency and down time of failures. It has to be noticed that e.g. a line
component does not only consist of the line itself, but also includes the adjacent outgoing
switchbay with circuit breaker, grounding switch, voltage and current transformer etc.
The protection tripping area specifies a group of equipment devices being disconnected
automatically according to the protection concept in case of a fault in the dedicated protection
zone. The following figure shows the example of a station fed by radial-line connection and a
station looped in with disconnecting switches, presuming that the lower level network cannot feed
power.
Protection
tripping area
Protection
a) b) tripping area
October 2019 21
Using the protection tripping area oriented component limitation generally results in the component
classes:
● Line (overhead line or cable)

● Busbar
● Transformer
It has to be noticed that protection tripping areas and components do not match in all cases.
Generally, a protection tripping area can include several components. Also, protection tripping
areas of different components may overlap partly.
With the protection tripping area oriented component limitation, as used in the reliability calculation,
there exists no switchbay component. Of course, also equipment units installed in switchbays can
cause failures of the components used in the reliability calculation. So, it is also possible in the
reliability calculations to declare reliability data for switchbays, separated for outgoing and busbar
side of the switchbay. The corresponding shares are added to the branch or busbar component
respectively. It can be defined individually for each component whether to model switchbays on any
side.
3.2 Assigning Reliability Indices

The power system under consideration can be divided into different Network Levels for increased
clarity. Standard reliability indices can be defined for individual network levels. These are then
assigned to all network elements in this level, assuming they do not have individual reliability
indices.
22 October 2019
Independently, it is possible to assign individual reliability data to any network element. Use the
Reliability tab to assign these characteristics at the network element.
3.3 Busbars and Switching Stations

Switching stations and other node points are quite reliable elements compared to long overhead
lines or cables, transformers, and especially power stations. Despite their rare failure it is important
to model switching stations in great detail. First, busbar failures normally lead to a supply
interruption in networks planned according to the (n-1)-criteria. Second, a detailed and exact
modeling of switching stations is essential for modeling remedial actions that have great influence
on several reliability indices. For example, the existence of an open-circuited reserve busbar allows
a bus transfer with double busbar stations after failure of the connected bus, thus shortening the
down time of the interrupted customers. Common power flow calculations do not require reserve
busbars to be modeled.
In the modeling of switching stations it is especially important to validate that the performance of
the modeled protection system corresponds with the real situation as exact as possible.
Generally, three types of switching stations are distinguished in reliability calculations:
● Outdoor switching station

● Indoor switching station
● SF6-insulated switching station
The reliability data of these different types vary greatly in part.
October 2019 23
Single Busbar Stations
The modeling of single busbar stations is trivial. According to the switching station type the
appropriate reliability data are assigned to the node point.
A switching station is classified as either a busbar or a busbar with results. This is defined with the
Reliability node data.
Busbars
Reliability results are only provided if a consumer (load, motor, etc.) is connected at the busbar.
Busbars with Results
Reliability results are provided irrespective of the connected network elements.
Multiple Busbar Stations
Multiple busbar stations with the possibility of a remotely or manually controlled bus transfer allow a
fast restoration of supply in case of busbar failures. In the modeling of multiple busbar stations it is
important to correctly implement the circuit state in normal operation and the protection system.
With regard to the circuit state special attention should be paid to:
● Bus couplers operated in disconnected or connected state and

● The exact allocation of the outgoing feeders to the separate busbars
In contrast to power flow calculations, here also busbars disconnected in the normal operation
state have to be regarded. Otherwise, eventual switching options for remedial actions are
neglected.
In the modeling of differential protection systems, it has to be regarded whether this system
protects the complete multiple busbar station or whether it protects separate busbars selectively.
The same conventions apply to the provision of results as for single busbar stations.
Bus Coupler Units
Usually, a bus coupler unit in the HV and EHV level consists of two disconnecting switches and
one circuit breaker. In this case, the separate busbars of the multiple busbar station usually are
protected selectively. With this configuration, both a bus transfer after failure of one busbar, and a
bus coupling and a bus transfer with both busbars in operation are possible.
24 October 2019
Bus Section Units
Bus section units usually only consist of a disconnecting switch operated in connected or
disconnected state. Operating the sectionalized busbar with disconnected switch restricts the
effects of a busbar failure to those outgoing feeders assigned to the actual busbar section. In case
the sectionalized busbar is operated with connected switch, failures on any section cause the
complete busbar to be disconnected. In this case, the bus section unit only effects remedial
measures as the section not affected by the failure can be reconnected immediately after
disconnecting the bus section.
H-Type Stations
With H-type stations, you need to specially take the correct limitation of the protection system and
the switching options taken into account for a detailed reliability oriented modeling.
The following figure shows the schematic illustration of an H-type station together with the
limitations of the protection tripping areas. A short circuit on line 1 causes disconnection of
protection tripping area 1 according to the protection concept, thus interrupting supply of the MV-
system A, unless there is a different supply connection. After opening disconnecting switch DS1
and reclosing circuit breakers CB1 and CB2 supply for MV-system A can be restored. In case of an
additional failure of circuit breaker CB1 or the corresponding protection devices, the outage is
extended and also supply of MV-system B is interrupted. Now, opening disconnecting switch DS4
would allow at least supply of MV-system B to be restored. A short circuit on disconnecting switch
DS1 itself also causes protection tripping area 1 to be disconnected. A limitation of the outage by
reclosing circuit breakers CB1 and CB2 now would not be possible any more. The area between
circuit breaker CB2 and disconnecting switch DS1 must be assigned a twofold busbar side
switchbay share for the frequency of failures.
Line 1 Line 2
DS1 DS2
Protection DS3 CB1 DS4 Protection

tripping area 1 tripping area 2
CB2 CB3
MV-system A MV-system B
October 2019 25
Auxiliary Nodes
Auxiliary nodes, e. g. with line branches, usually are neither protected selectively nor equipped with
any kind of switching devices. Therefore, auxiliary nodes are not to be assigned any reliability data,
and any switchbays and protection devices must not be specified.
Auxiliary nodes are classified as either auxiliary nodes or auxiliary nodes without switches. This is
defined with the Reliability node data.
Auxiliary Nodes
If there are malfunctions, the connected branches are switched on and off at both ends.
Auxiliary Nodes without Switches
If there are malfunctions, the branches are switched on and off at one end or not at all.
3.4 Lines
Line elements usually represent overhead lines or cables. The reliability indices are defined either
by the network level or by assigning directly at the line. If there are reliability data declared for the
outgoing side of switchbays, the line data are surcharged by the outgoing side parts of switchbays.
In the Line Reliability Data it can be declared explicitly whether to model switchbays on any end of
the line.
Also, it is possible to declare for each line the protection or overload factor respectively, beyond
which the line will be disconnected.
Line with Branches
The respective segments of lines with branches, e. g. of a tripod line, represent separate line
elements each. The branch node usually is modeled as an auxiliary node. The separate segments
and auxiliary nodes are combined in a function group that is regarded as an entity in the reliability
calculation.
Multiple Lines
Common-mode failures, i.e. the failure of at least two systems on a multiple line originating from a
common cause (e. g. lightning strike in the overhead ground wire and back flashover to two
systems), generally have a clear effect on the reliability of the network under consideration. Multiple
lines need to be declared specifically with the help of a Multiple Line Group.
26 October 2019
Connectable Lines
Connectable lines that have been switched off have to be specially marked. Use the individual Line
Reliability Data for this.
3.5 Transformers
The reliability indices are defined either by the network level or by assigning directly at the
transformer. If there are reliability data declared for the outgoing side of switchbays on the
connection nodes, the transformer data are surcharged by the outgoing side parts of switchbays on
the connection nodes. In the Transformer Reliability Data it can be declared explicitly whether to
model switchbays on any connection node.
Transformers can be equipped automatically with a differential and a distance protection system,
without having to declare these protection devices explicitly.
Connectable Transformers
Connectable transformers that have been switched off have to be specially marked. Use the
individual Transformer Reliability Data for this.
3.6 Infeeders
Outages of network feeders and power stations have a clear influence on the reliability of power
supply.
If there are no explicit entries to the reliability data file for network feeders and power stations,
these units are regarded as unconditional reliable. Network feeders normally have reliability within
the scope of that of load busbars, which is generally a high reliability. On the contrary, power
station units are much more unreliable units compared to network equipment. Therefore, a correct
modeling is important.
The reliability calculations have several ways to model injection units. Generally, network injections
(2 state model) and power stations (6 state model) are distinguished in reliability calculation. These
reliability related models can be assigned to any infeeder in the network database, i.e. infeeders,
synchronous machines or power units. The detailed modeling is created with the help of Supply
Type Reliability.
The easiest way to model an injection unit regarding possible failures is assigning a frequency and
mean duration for an independent single failure to the corresponding infeeder.
Connectable Infeeders
Connectable infeeders that have been switched off have to be specially marked. For this use the
individual reliability data of the infeeder, synchronous machine or the power unit. However, only
duration for the connection is provided, the injection itself is regarded to be unconditionally reliable.
Therefore, this kind of modeling is only a rough approximation for power unit start-ups.
October 2019 27
State Models for Power Stations
Especially power station units usually are described using explicit models to include specific
failures. The reliability calculations offer the 6 state model. Always use Supply Type Reliability to
assign reliability indices. By neglecting certain parameters also a 4 state model can be
implemented. Also, a 2 state model is possible but not recommended.
The 6 state model not only considers the operation and repair states, but also distinguishes
whether the power unit is needed in the actual situation. Furthermore, the start-up phase of the
power unit is modeled in a separate start up state, enabling the consideration of startup failures.
Also, it is regarded that failures in power stations not necessarily cause the complete unit to be
shut down, but that in some cases a deranged operation for a certain period of time is allowed.

(1-s)/Tz
R S B1

 s/Tz  (1-D0)
D0
A2 A1 B2


No need Need
 … Transition rate into period of need

 … Transition rate into period of no need
 … Failure rate
 … Repair rate
 … Turn off rate in case of incident
s … Probability of starting failure
D0 … Probability of immediate breakdown
Tz … Duration of start up
R … Reserve
S … Start up
B1 … In service
B2 … Incident operation
A1 … Forced out in period of need
A2 … Forced out but not needed
The 4 state model abandons the modeling of startup failures and deranged operation.
Correspondingly, the values for the indices probability of starting failure s and duration of startup Tz
are to be set to 0 and the value for the probability for an immediate shut down D0 to 100 %.
28 October 2019
3.7 Load Modeling

In power flow calculations the separate customer loads usually are represented by their annual
peak power value. This method is insufficient for reliability calculations. Here, it has to be regarded
that the customers normally do not require their annual peak power during the complete period
under consideration. So, consumer loads in the reliability calculations are modeled by sorted and
standardized annual load duration curves.
Network Level Reliability Data assigns the Annual Load Duration Curve to the load.
In addition, a load priority different from the default value can be assigned to an individual load.
Loads with higher priority are allocated power preferentially in case of supply interruptions caused
by power shortages.
Sorted and Standardized Annual Load Duration Curves
The following figure shows the sorted annual load duration curve standardized to the yearly peak
power of a typical MV-system with a mixture of industrial and residential customers. This load
duration curve may be used for example in the reliability calculations of a 110-kV network with the
lower level MV-systems being modeled as loads.
Standardized
load in %
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0 1.000 2.000 3.000 4.000 5.000 6.000 7.000 8.000
Duration in h
The form of annual load duration curves depends strongly on the type of the network under
consideration. Especially the configuration of the customers connected to the network (e.g.
urban/rural, industrial/residential, mixtures) have a great effect on the duration curve.
A characteristic index of the duration curve is the load ratio m. This index is given as the relation of
the area under the sorted and standardized annual load duration curve to 8760 h:
8760
1 𝑆𝑖
𝑚= ×∑ ×1ℎ
8760 ℎ 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑖=1
Si … Apparent power in the ith hour

Smax … Maximum apparent power of the year
October 2019 29
m … Load ratio
Comparing two load duration curves, the one with the higher load ratio is above the one with the
lower load ratio for most of the time.
The form and the load ratio of the load duration curve have effect on the reliability indices:
● Frequency of supply interruptions

● Mean interrupted power
● Energy not supplied
Some of the supply interruptions with the respective component failure combinations are caused by
the additional disconnection of equipment units because of overloading. The question whether
overloading occurs strongly depends on the power demand state of the affected customers at the
time of the failure. It is possible that overloading may exist in times of high power demand which
does not exist in times of low power demand with the individual failure combinations. In case of a
situation with overloading in the power system, the reliability calculations compute the power
threshold from which on the overloading occurs. In the load duration curve, this power threshold
marks the point below which the system operates as normal and above which an overloading
occurs in the failure combination under consideration. The frequency of supply interruptions in this
failure combination thus is the frequency of this failure combination weighted with the temporal part
of the load duration curve above this power threshold.
Further, the load ratio m of the load duration curve directly effects the mean interrupted power, as
the mean power demanded by a customer increases with the load ratio.
The reliability index energy not supplied depends among other factors on the frequency of supply
interruptions and the mean interrupted power. So, also this index strongly varies with the form and
load ratio of the load duration curve.
Power Allocation Models
In case that in the modeling of remedial measures of a component failure combination already all
possible measures to reduce overloading have been taken and there are still connections or
injection units exceeding their capacity, only a reduction of the loads can achieve a stable
operation state without overloading. This load reduction is necessary to achieve a power system
state without violation of given restrictions.
Therefore, a power allocation model is required in order to transform equipment overloading or

violation of the valid voltage bands into power not available to the load nodes, or to allocate the
power available to the separate load nodes. Two models exist in ZUBER: the optimistic and the
pessimistic power allocation model. Their influence on the reliability indices "interrupted power"
and "energy not supplied" is substantial.
30 October 2019
For the reduction of the consumer load, the maximum power available to the supply-restricted
power system area is determined at first. It is given by the maximum transfer capacity of the
elements feeding into the supply-restricted power system area. In case that the reason for the
power shortcoming is not overloading of branches but insufficient power injection, the allocation of
the power available also regards the priority of the load nodes. The power allocation models start
with determining the temporal share of the year in which the demand of the customers (according
to the annual load duration curve or the daily load curves respectively) is below the available
power. For this part of the year, the respective failure combination does not cause a supply
interruption.
Optimistic Model
It is assumed that the customers are able to adapt to the restricted available power during the rest
of the year, and that the customer also receives this power. So, power allocation is modeled as
being separable into grades of arbitrary size. Thus, also in times with demand exceeding the
available power, only the difference between demand and available power is regarded as
interrupted power. The optimistic model produces the smallest possible effects of an overloading.
Pessimistic Model
For the remaining part of the year it is assumed that the customers are not able to adapt to the
restricted power available. Thus, the overloaded branch fails and the affected customers are
disconnected from the power system. Here, the interrupted power for the part of the year with
demand above the available power is the complete power of the supply-restricted system area. The
pessimistic model produces the greatest possible effects of an overloading.
Usage of the different power allocation models on a power system state with a supply degree v < 1
for certain customers during the time tx is demonstrated in the following figure.
1.0 1.0
v v
P/Pmax P/Pmax
0.5 0.5
Interrupted
power
0.0 0.0
0 4380 8760 0 4380 8760
tx tx
t t
a) Optimistic power allocation model b) Pessimistic power allocation model
October 2019 31
3.8 Protection System
Limitation of Protection Tripping Areas and Backup Tripping Areas
The replication of the protection system of electric power systems in the field of reliability
calculations serves mainly for the limitation of the protection tripping areas and the backup tripping
areas. Thus it can be determined which components are in a common protection tripping area so
that they are commonly disconnected in case of a failure with subsequent protection tripping. The
importance of the design and correct modeling of the protection system for the effects of a short
circuit are demonstrated in the following example.
The protection tripping area of busbars depends on the existence of a differential protection device
and, in case there is no differential protection device installed on the busbar, on the different
protection types. The following figure shows the protection tripping area of busbar SS1 according to
the protection concept:
● Case 1:
Differential protection device on busbar SS1.
● Case 2:
No differential protection device on busbar SS1, power feedback by the lower level network. A
distance protection relay is installed on the busbar side of the transformer switch which is
graded backwards without delay.
● Case 3:
No differential protection device on busbar SS1, power feedback by the lower level network.
The distance protection relay is graded only in direction of the transformer.
● Case 4:
No differential protection device on busbar SS1, no power feedback by the lower level network.
32 October 2019
SS1
Protection tripping
area of SS1
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3
Lower level
Case 4
power system
With a protection system designed according to case 1, a short circuit on SS1 only affects the
busbar itself. In case 2, the busbar is no longer protected selectively. So, the same failure also
causes the disconnection of the lines feeding busbar SS1. According to case 3, also the
transformer is disconnected additionally after a failure. Assuming that there is no other supply
connection to the lower level network, i.e. the lower level network is unable to feed back power into
the higher level network in case of a failure on busbar SS1 (case 4), any failure on busbar SS1
causes a supply interruption in the lower level network. This example indicates the importance of
the protection system modeling on the extent of an outage.
Besides of the protection tripping areas also the determination of the backup tripping areas is
important for the reliability calculation. Backup tripping areas are required for the failure models
malfunction of protection device or malfunction of circuit breaker. In those cases, the extent of an
outage depends mainly on the limitations of the backup tripping areas.
Data Requirement for the Protection System Modeling
Modern protection relays offer a vast variety of settings to the user, easily topping 500 different
parameters. It is neither reasonable nor required to consider this plenitude of data in reliability
calculations. Solely those data are relevant in the field of reliability calculations that have an effect
on the limitation or extent of outages.
Position and Operative Direction of the Protection Relay
Position and operative direction of the protection relay defines the protection tripping areas for each
component. These data enable the determination of non-selectivity in the protection system
limitations.
October 2019 33
Type of Protection Relay
For determining the limitation of the backup tripping areas the type of the appropriate protection
system has to be known. For example, a differential protection unit of a busbar does not in every
case serve as a backup protection system for an outgoing feeder. Basically, two types of protection
systems are distinguished:
● Protection systems affecting only a component or a group of components, like e. g. a

differential protection system.
● Protection systems also serving as a backup protection system for other components like e. g.
distance protection or definite-time overcurrent-time relays.
In reliability calculations, PSS SINCAL differentiates between the following protection systems,
which can be simulated with PSS SINCAL’s Protection Device Types.
● Differential protection relay

● Distance protection relay
● Definite-time overcurrent-time relay
The limitation of protection tripping areas is given by the separate protection relays associated with
each outgoing branch (terminal) of a network element.
3.9 System Borders and Neighboring Networks

Within the scope of reliability calculation, normally only limited parts of networks consisting mainly
of equipment at one voltage level are analyzed. On the borders of these partial systems there
generally exist connections to other network parts or networks respectively. Modeling of these
neighboring systems can strongly affect the calculated reliability of the network part under
consideration.
Normally, three different types of neighboring systems are to be regarded:
● Higher level networks

● Lower level networks
● Parallel networks
34 October 2019
~ ~ ~ ~
Transportation
1 1
(EHV)
~ ~
2 2 Distribution
(HV)
1 Higher level power systems
2 Parallel power systems

3 3 3 Distribution
(MV) 3 Lower level power systems
The assignment of a neighboring system to one of the above categories is given by the direction of
the power flow in normal operation. For higher level networks, the power flow is directed from the
neighboring system into the network under consideration at most times, whereas for parallel
networks no definite direction can be decided.
A complete modeling of neighboring system normally is not reasonable, as it would evoke

substantial effort regarding data procurement and computing time. Moreover, the data of
neighboring systems often is not known, especially if those networks are operated by a different
utility.
Therefore, equivalents for neighboring systems have to be used. Reliability calculations require
three types of equivalents for each neighboring system:
● A power flow equivalent in order to perform a network state analysis in normal operation state
and in fault state.
● A short circuit equivalent in case short-circuit calculations are required for, e. g., the failure
model of unnecessary protection operation.
● A reliability model in order to consider the availability of the neighboring system.
The equivalents for power flow and short-circuit calculations can be regarded as solved. However,
there is no commonly approved method for the equivalent modeling of the reliability of neighboring
systems. For higher level and lower level networks some practicable approaches have been
developed that will be described in the following. The reliability equivalent for parallel networks is
an unsolved problem at the moment.
Modeling of Lower Level Networks
Modeling of lower level networks not representing the focus of the study is especially important for
the power flow calculations of the network under consideration in the reliability analysis.
October 2019 35
Also, back-up supply of the lower level network to the network under consideration has to be
modeled exactly. If remedial measures in the network affected by failures with supply interruptions
are unable to restore supply to all customers, an improvement in the supply situation can be
achieved in some cases by connectable reserves in lower level networks. Those reserves of lower
level networks have to be modeled in simplified form with regard to their stochastic and
deterministic performance (failure, restoration of supply) and their power flow. An appropriate
modeling can be achieved for example by using the model shown in the following figure.
Connectable reserve with connection

time and peak power (e.g. reserve from
Res. neighboring system areas)
Equivalent power unit with

~ failure modeling
Power system
under consideration Equivalent load with load characteristic
Equivalent
power system ~ Equivalent connection with switches
and limited transmission capacity
Res. Res. Res.
This model generally takes into consideration the following aspects:
● Sufficient power flow modeling of the lower level network

● Consideration of switching options in the lower level network
● Consideration of reserve power units in lower level networks, if necessary with failure modeling
and maximum peak power limitation
● Consideration of connectable reserves (e. g. reserve power stations, connections to other
networks disconnected in normal operation circuit state)
Modeling of Higher Level Networks with Reliability Equivalents
In the reliability calculation, higher level networks can be approximated as network feeders. A far
more detailed modeling for reliability calculations is offered by the method of reliability equivalents.
This model is, however, not yet available in PSS SINCAL.
3.10 Grouping of Network Elements

In order to model the failure event, it may be necessary to treat individual network elements as a
group.
Function Groups
A function group is a group of network elements that can only be in operation together. A network
element can only be assigned to one function group.
In the event of a malfunction within the function group the repair time of the affected network
element has to elapse before all the elements of the function group can be restored to operation.
36 October 2019
In the event of a network element malfunction outside of the function group, the complete function
group is not connected until the longest reconnection time of all network elements has been
reached.
Function groups must be defined with the Network Element Groups.
Network with Modeling of Lines with a Reconnection Time of 3 h, 4 h and 5 h as a

Function Group
tre = 3 h
tre = 5 h Tis = 10 h Ti = 10 h
tre = 4 h
Ti = 5 h
Ti … Interruption duration
tre … Reconnection
Tis … Short independent single failure
A malfunction of 10 h on an element outside of the function group causes supply interruptions of

5 h or 10 h.
Function Units
A function unit is a group of network elements that can only be in operation together.
In the event of a network element malfunction within the function unit the repair time of the affected
network element has to elapse before all the elements of the function unit can be restored to
operation.
In the event of a network element malfunction outside of the function unit, all network elements are
reconnected individually at one end after the reconnection time.
Function units must be defined via the Nodes. All elements connected to auxiliary nodes without
switches are automatically combined into a function unit.
In the event of a network element malfunction outside of the function unit, a faster reconnection
may be possible when the function units are defined than for function groups, depending on the
network topology.
October 2019 37
Network with Modeling of the Common Node of Lines with a Reconnection Time of
3 h, 4 h and 5 h as an Auxiliary Node without Switches
tre = 3 h
tre = 5 h Tis = 10 h Ti = 10 h
tre = 4 h
Ti = 4 h
Ti … Interruption duration
tre … Reconnection
Tis … Short independent single failure
In the event of a malfunction of 10 h on an element outside of the function unit there are supply
interruptions of 4 h or 10 h.
Common Mode Group
A common mode group contains network elements which can fail together. Common mode groups
must be defined with the Network Element Groups.
The following forms for the input are provided.
Common Mode Group (General):
The failure rate and the duration of the common mode failure must be entered by the user.
Common Mode Group (Overhead Lines):
The failure rate and the duration of the common mode failure can be entered by the user. Entering
0.0 for the failure rate and/or the duration enables PSS SINCAL to determine these in the following
way.
The reliability data is determined with the highest failure rate for the common mode failure from the
reliability data of the lines in the group.
Entering a failure rate of 0.0 causes the failure rate of the group to be calculated as follows using
the common mode route:
𝐻𝐶𝑚 = 𝐻𝐶𝑚 𝑚𝑎𝑥. 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 × 𝐿𝑐𝑢𝑟
38 October 2019
If 0.0 is entered, the duration of the line with the highest failure rate is used.
𝑇𝐶𝑚 = 𝑇𝐶𝑚 𝑚𝑎𝑥. 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒
October 2019 39
Modeling of Failure Events
4. Modeling of Failure Events
The networks of the public energy supply in Germany are affected by about 30000 to 40000
incidents yearly. The main causes for these incidents are atmospheric impacts. As it can be seen in
the figure, these incidents, especially in the HV and EHV levels, rarely cause supply interruptions.
The reason for this fact is the planning of the networks according to appropriate criteria that are to
assure a sufficient reliability. Today, the question arises on the level of supply reliability that is
really required, as this is a matter of effort and cost.
25.000
Number of incidents 1994
21.788 Number of incidents 1995

19.687
Number of incidents 1996
20.000 14.672
Number of incidents with supply interruption 1994
15.000
10.118
9.866
10.000 7.316
8.224
6.538
5.606
5.000 4.213
3.830
3.702 3.458
3.401 3.480
1.064
844 743
678 261 288 628 444
512 573
176 219 289 212 390 8 3 3
16 16 5
0
10 kV 20 kV 30 kV 110 kV 220 kV 380 kV
The aim of reliability analysis is a modeling of the failures occurring in network operation as precise
as possible. The failure models described in this section as well as the methods for remedial
actions shown in section Modeling of Remedial Measures serve for qualitatively correct modeling of
failure events. In the past, quantitative statements on the frequency of the failure models could only
be determined by analyzing individual incident protocols. Since 1994, the new BDEW-Störungs-
und Schadensstatistik offers a broad and reliable data base for networks of the 110 kV level and
above for usage of the corresponding failure models in reliability calculation. These models are
described in the following.
4.1 Short or Long Independent Single Failure

An independent single failure is the failure of one unique component. The independent single
failure is not related regarding its cause to any other incident or failure that may occur at the same
time. For each element, frequency and down time of the independent single failure are declared.
An example for an independent single failure is shown in the following figure. The line L2 is
disconnected according to the protection concept after a short-circuit has occurred. No other
disconnection is related to this event.
40 October 2019
Customer 1 Customer 2 Customer 3
Line L1
Line L2 Line L4
Line L3
Protection tripping
Independent single failures include:
● Automatic protection tripping caused by short circuits

● Unnecessary disconnections of protection tripping areas
● Double ground faults in networks with ground-fault compensation, if only one ground fault is
disconnected automatically and the remaining element affected by a ground fault remains in
operation
Single failures may overlap in time without a causal relation between these failures. This usually is
the case e. g. with failure accumulations below wide thunderstorms. Though this causes several
components to be in fault state at the same time, each failure is an independent single failure only
accidentally overlapping.
Self-extinguishing ground faults and successful automatic reclosures are not regarded as failures.
4.2 Common Mode Failure

Common mode failures are characterized by the synchronous failure of multiple protection
tripping areas on a common cause. A frequent example for a common mode failure is shown in
the following figure: lightning strike into the pylon or overhead ground wire and back flashover on
two or more circuits of a multiple line, causing disconnection of the affected circuits by the
protection system. This example is predominant in the 110 kV level.

Line L1
Line L2 Line L4
Line L3
Protection tripping
Other typical examples include:
● Disconnection of two or more circuits of a multiple line because of wire oscillations

(predominant in the EHV level)
● Pylon fracture with multiple lines
● Damage to several cables laid in one cable pit because of e. g. landslides or excavator works
In modeling common mode failures of multiple overhead lines, the voltage level has to be
considered. Multiple lines including only circuits with a nominal voltage V n < 110 kV suffer common
mode failures mainly because of lightning strikes and back flashover. Here, one common mode
failure is modeled affecting all circuits of a multiple line. Circuits with a nominal voltage V n > 110 kV
suffer common mode failures mainly because of wire oscillations. This kind of common mode
failure has a far lower frequency. With multiple lines consisting of more than two circuits, double
failures of any two neighboring circuits of the multiple line have to be modeled. Thus, the
configuration of the mast and the separate circuits is required.
October 2019 41
With multiple lines including circuits with nominal voltage Vn > 110 kV and Vn < 110 kV, one
common mode failure for the circuits with Vn < 110 kV and additionally failures according to the
geometric configuration have to be modeled.
In principle, common mode failures of components other than lines are also possible, e. g. of a
busbar and a transformer in case of fire, explosion or flooding of a switching station. Analyzing the
BDEW-Störungs- und Schadensstatistik shows that in recent years this kind of common mode
failure is extremely rare.
The disconnection of a circuit because of a short circuit and the following disconnection of another
circuit because of overloading is not regarded as a common mode failure. Normally, there is no
simultaneousness of disconnections. In any case the disconnections are not on a common cause.
Where the cause of the first disconnection is a short circuit, the cause of the second is overloading.
4.3 Short or Long Maintenance

This model describes disconnections for the purpose of maintenance work on the element. This
has an effect on system reliability in combination with stochastic failures. Normally, maintenance
work itself does not cause supply interruptions. Nevertheless, maintenance poses a weakening of
the network. One further, stochastic failure will cause a supply interruption in networks planned
according to the (n-1)-criteria.
The probability of deterministic isolation in analytic procedures can be described for individual
components such as the frequency and duration of such measures. This distinction makes it easier
to display different maintenance measures after short and long shutdowns. In addition, one needs
to consider that these shutdowns can often be terminated prematurely if operational necessities
such as supply interruptions at failures during shutdown make this necessary. For this reason, the
user needs to enter the duration in the component characteristics.
4.4 Multiple Ground Fault

The multiple outage by multiple ground fault is started with a permanent fault on element i. Thus,
this failure model only exists in networks with ground-fault compensation. The permanent ground
fault causes the voltage to increase. In case another 1-phase fault occurs, the permanent ground
fault becomes a double short circuit to ground causing a protection operation. In 90 % of those
cases, both protection tripping areas affected by the faults are disconnected, which does not
correspond to the protection concept. Else, only one of the affected protection tripping areas is
disconnected automatically while the other one has to be disconnected by manual operation. This
sometimes can prevent a supply interruption to certain customers. The occurrence of a multiple
ground fault failure is described by the conditional probability p me. pme is the probability for a second
fault on an element on condition that a permanent ground fault already exists in the network. The
down time of the multiple ground fault failure normally is the duration for reconnection of the
affected elements. It has to be considered that the probability for the occurrence of a second fault
is much higher than the probability for a first ground fault because of the voltage increase in the
conductors not affected by the first fault.
The permanent ground fault also has to be disconnected if there is no multiple ground fault. This
may cause a supply interruption, too. Using the Monte-Carlo simulation this situation can be
modeled correspondingly.
42 October 2019
The following figure shows an example for the above failure model. After a permanent ground fault
on line L2 the voltage increase in the network, causing another 1-phase failure on another
conductor of line L1. This invokes a fault current similar to a short-circuit current, causing the
protection system to disconnect both fault affected elements in contrary to the protection concept.
Second fault Permanent ground fault

Line L1
Line L2 Line L4
Line L3
Protection tripping
4.5 Malfunction of Protection Device

A multiple element failure caused by malfunction of protection device starts with the failure of one
element, normally caused by a short circuit. The element affected by the short circuit is
disconnected selectively by the protection system according to the protection concept. In case that
this does not happen, the backup protection system has to conduct the disconnection. This implies
the disconnection of all elements of the backup tripping area, thus extending the effect of the
original failure. This sequence is described by the conditional probability p sv. Here, psv is the
probability for a malfunction of protection device in the protection tripping area of element i with
failure on element i. The outage after malfunction of protection device is ended after the time
needed to recognize and unlock the fault affected element and for reconnecting the elements of the
backup tripping area.
Which protection tripping areas are backup tripping areas depends on the protection concept, i.e.
the question which protection device represents the main protection for the fault affected element
under consideration and which protection devices represent reserve systems. The following figure
shows an example. Starting point is a short circuit on line L2. If the protection system on the busbar
of customer 2 fails, also lines L1 and L3 have to be disconnected by the backup protection system
according to the protection concept. This implies an extension of the incident; customer 2 now
suffers a supply interruption.
Line L1
Line L2 Line L4
Line L3
Malfunction of protection device Protection tripping
The difference between malfunction of circuit breaker and malfunction of protection device is that in
case of a malfunction of circuit breaker only one backup tripping area is disconnected, and not, like
in case of a malfunction of protection device, all related backup tripping areas. In networks that are
only equipped with graded distance protection relays there is no difference between the failure
models of malfunction of circuit breaker and malfunction of protection device.
October 2019 43
4.6 Unnecessary Protection Operation

The partial short-circuit currents carried on many circuits in case of a short circuit cause a response
in several protection devices and may trigger unnecessary protection operations disconnecting
further protection tripping areas in contrary to the protection concept. Thus, the failure model of
unnecessary protection operation can only occur as a succeeding failure within the scope of an
extension of the incident. This is described by the conditional probability psue. psue is the probability
of an unnecessary protection operation at element j while short circuit on element i. The down time
after unnecessary protection operation is the duration for the reconnection of the elements
disconnected unnecessary.
For determining the protection devices carrying a partial short-circuit current above the starting
threshold a short-circuit calculations is required. Only these devices are able to cause an
unnecessary protection operation. The cause for unnecessary protection operations may be:
● Insufficient protection adjustment

● Measurement errors
● Wrong direction decisions
● Transformer saturation
● Damages to the protection device
The following figure shows an example for the unnecessary protection operation failure model. A
short circuit on L2 causes the disconnection of this line according to the protection concept. A relay
of the protection system on L4 responds to the partial short-circuit current and causes an
unnecessary operation. Thus, the effect of the original failure is extended on customer 3, now
suffering a supply interruption.
Line L1
Line L2 Line L4
Line L3
Unnecessary protection operation Protection tripping
4.7 Independent Unnecessary Protection Operation

This failure model regards independent unnecessary protection operations, i.e. operations of the
protecting system without a preceding failure. Thus, this model is a primary event and not a
succeeding outage. This failure model corresponds in great parts to the independent single failure.
In some cases, though, the resulting outage situation is different, as only individual protection
devices trigger, and not necessarily a complete protection tripping area like with an independent
single failure.
An example is the line tripod shown in the following figure. In contrary to the independent single
failure on line L6, which would also cause lines L4 and L5 to be disconnected, thus separating the
network in two partial systems, the independent unnecessary protection operation only causes a
supply interruption for customer 4.
44 October 2019
Line L1
Line L2 L4 L5
Line L3 L6
Independent unnecessary
protection operation
Protection tripping
Customer 4
4.8 Malfunction of Circuit Breaker

The malfunction of circuit breaker model considers several aspects. First, the failure of the circuit
breaker in case of a short circuit is modeled. The malfunction of the circuit breaker immediately
extends the incident on the backup tripping areas as these elements now have to disconnect the
failure. This corresponds mainly to the malfunction of protection device model.
The difference between malfunction of circuit breaker and malfunction of protection device is that in
case of a malfunction of circuit breaker only one backup tripping area is disconnected, and not, like
in case of a malfunction of protection device, all related backup tripping areas. In networks that are
only equipped with graded distance protection relays there is no difference between the failure
models of malfunction of circuit breaker and malfunction of protection device.
Second, this model also considers unnecessary circuit breaker operations. This mainly
corresponds to independent unnecessary protection operation.
Lastly, this model also regards malfunction of circuit breaker in normal operation, e. g. when
connecting an equipment unit. In case that the circuit breaker fails, the switching operation cannot
be performed and the desired connection is not available.
4.9 Data Requirements of the Failure Models

The following table lists the data requirements of the presented failure models.
Failure model Indices Remarks

Independent single Frequency Fi The frequency is given related to the length with
failure Down time Ti overhead lines and cables (hi).
Frequency short failure Fis
Down time short failure Tis
Frequency long failure Fil
Down time long failure Til
Common mode failure Frequency FCM The frequency is given related to the length with
Down time TCM overhead lines and cables (hCM). For TCM often the
duration to the first reconnection is used.
Maintenance Frequency FIN Maintenance itself is planned and therefore no failure
Down time TIN event. Only further failures may affect supply reliability.
Duration to reconnection in case The down time of short and long maintenance is given
of maintenance abort TWib related to the length with overhead lines and cables (tIk,
Frequency short maintenance FIs tIl).
Down time short maintenance TIs
Duration to reconnection in case
of maintenance abort short
maintenance TWik
October 2019 45
Frequency long maintenance FIl

Down time long maintenance TIl
Duration to reconnection in case
of maintenance abort long
maintenance TWil
Multiple ground fault Frequency of a permanent ground The frequency and the conditional probability are given
fault F1P related to the length with overhead lines and cables
Conditional probability pME (h1P)
Down time of the multiple failure
TME
Duration to disconnection of
permanent ground fault TA1P
Down time of the permanent
ground fault T1P
Malfunction of Conditional probability pSV
protection device Down time TSV
Unnecessary protection Conditional probability pSÜ
operation Down time TSÜ
Independent Frequency FSP
unnecessary protection Down time TSP
operation
Malfunction of circuit Conditional probability pLV Malfunction in case of a failure in the network (LV),
breaker Down time TLV unnecessary operation (VS) and failure in normal
Frequency FVS operation (SVN) are distinguished.
Down time TVS
Probability for breaker failure in
normal operation pSVN
The data requirement of these models in the HV and EHV level can be met by the BDEW-
Störungs- und Schadenstatistik since this statistic was complemented in 1994 by a protocol
regarding the failure sequence. From 2001 on, the BDEW-Störungs- und Schadenstatistik will also
collect the appropriate data in the MV level.
46 October 2019
Modeling of Remedial Measures
5. Modeling of Remedial Measures
Incidents in electric power systems caused by failures of equipment units may lead to supply
interruptions or violations of certain operating restrictions like overloading or violation of voltage
bands. Methods for reliability calculations of electric power systems calculate reliability indices
based on the analysis of modeled incident sequences. In order to be able to correctly calculate
indices like e. g. duration of supply interruptions or energy not supplied, it is required to model the
complete sequence of a supply interruption, from the failure to the complete restoration of supply.
Therefore, additionally to the failure models describing the start of an incident including its
frequency of occurrence, also models for remedial measures until complete restoration of supply
are necessary.
The realization of system management strategies in programs for reliability analysis is expendable,
as the algorithms automatically have to detect the method suited best for the appropriate situation,
to conduct this method and to judge the success or failure of this method with regard to the supply
situation of the customers and the avoidance or reduction of operating restrictions. It has to be kept
in mind that because of the large number of failure combinations to be evaluated only a restricted
computing time is available.
A set of measures to reduce or eliminate the effect of failures is at disposal of the system
management in case of an incident before the failed element is repaired and can be reconnected.
The measures are classified into quasi-continuously and discreetly modifiable parameters.
Quasi-Continuous Parameters
Quasi-continuous parameters include, for example:
● Control of the power flow by transformer taps

● Alteration of the reactive and active power injection of power stations, e. g. for reducing or
eliminating voltage problems or overloading caused by failures
These measures can be modeled in the reliability calculations by using the AC power flow in the
network analysis and its corresponding Reliability Settings.
Discreet Parameters
Discreet parameters are switching operations. The following list of typical measures was chosen
out of the multitude of possible switching operations and realized in the reliability calculation:
● Connection of circuits disconnected in normal operation state

● Coupling with neighboring system areas
● Coupling of multiple busbars disconnected in normal operation state
● Unlocking of failure affected elements and reconnection of intact elements of disconnected
protection tripping areas
● Bus transfer
● Start-up of injection units
● Connection after maintenance abort
● Load relocation
October 2019 47
Switching operations are conducted in the sequence of the state analysis. In case that a supply
interruption on one or several load nodes is detected, the program chooses the switching operation
leading to partial or complete restoration of supply. If several switching operations are necessary,
the program proceeds chronologically. Additionally, the sequence of the switching operations is
influenced by the respective priority of switching operations. The switching duration can be given
individually for each operation. Switching operations are mostly more effective than quasi-
continuous measures.
The actions of the system management in the fault recovery varying in detail with each failure can
be schematized according to the following figure.
t  seconds t  minutes t  minutes t  hours

up to hours up to days
Time t
Failure and Automatic Remotely con- Manually con- Repair,
protection tripping transfer gear trolled operations trolled operations replacement
The stable or at least for some minutes acceptable network state after the protection tripping or the
automatic transfer gear action respectively is the basis for the fault recovery of the system
management. At first, it is tried to achieve an improvement in the supply situation by remotely
controlled operations. This step usually is completed after 10 to 20 minutes. In case that network
parts not remotely accessible are affected or that remotely controlled operations are unable to
eliminate the supply interruption, it is necessary to send personnel on place for the location of the
fault and for transaction of remedial measures. The time requirement for this step is about several
hours. If there are still interrupted customers after these measures, complete supply can only be
restored by (provisional) repair or replacement of the defect equipment units. This may take several
days.
5.1 Switching Operations

The possibilities of remedial measures include a multitude of switching operations that can be
taken by the system control center. These operations aim at restricting, decreasing or eliminating
the effects of failures. In order to model switching operations in programs for reliability calculation,
theoretically all experience and intelligence of the system control center had to be recreated with
appropriate models and algorithms, or all possible combinations of switching operations had to be
analyzed to find the optimal strategy for the fault recovery.
To define an optimal fault recovery strategy is not possible in most cases because of the high
degree of freedom and a weighting of contradictory aims that often is not definite. The overriding
purpose of the fault recovery is the restoration of the system function, which in general is the
supply of all customers for electric power systems. Thus, not the exact topology after completing
the remedial measures, but the supply level achieved is the goal for reliability calculation programs.
In the analysis of component failure combinations, immediately after the failure switching
operations for unlocking the failure affected elements and for reconnection of the intact elements of
disconnected protection tripping areas are performed. In many cases, this can already eliminate
supply interruptions that may have occurred with the failure, especially if areas with non-selective
protection limitations, e. g. often with H-type switching stations, are affected.
48 October 2019
The following figure shows a H-type station with circuit breakers in the transformer feeders (CB1
and CB2) and one circuit breaker in the coupling (CB3).
L1 L2
CB3
CB1 CB2
Customer 1 Customer 2
The distance protection system disconnects the circuit breakers CB1 and CB3 in case of a fault on
line L1, thus interrupting supply for customer 1. Supply for this customer can be restored by
unlocking line L1 and reconnecting circuit breakers CB1 and CB2.
In general, immediately after a failure the fault-affected elements are unlocked. The protection
tripping after the failure eventually also disconnects elements that are not affected by the fault.
These elements can be reconnected. In case that a supply-restricted customer is located on a
multiple busbar, it is attempted to achieve a higher supply level by a bus transfer. The unlocking
and reconnecting is done automatically in the reliability calculations after each failure.
If supply still has not been completely restored after the unlocking and reconnecting, the reliability
calculations search for additional switching operations. A graph theoretical approach is used to find
reasonable switching operations. This method is a relatively simple, but very robust method
proceeding in chronological sequence.
From the network analysis the supply level of all load nodes is known. Each node is assigned a
subnetwork identification relating to the network topology. The algorithm now searches for the next
possible switching operation according to the individual switching duration T Schalt. The condition for
the connection of an element disconnected in normal operation state is a different supply level on
the end nodes of the element. After each switching operation a network analysis is performed to
determine the supply levels and subnetwork identifications. In case that the system supply level
has decreased, the switching operation is withdrawn. The search and performance of switching
operations continues until all customers are fully supplied or the down time of the failed elements is
reached and reconnecting these elements allows restoration of the normal operation state. A
schematic overview of the algorithm is shown in the following figure.
October 2019 49
Start
Network state analysis (supply levels

and subnetwork identifications)
Search for temporal next switching operation

between nodes with different supply level
Switching operation No Supply restoration

found with TSchalt < TA? after expiry of TA
Yes
Network state analysis (supply levels
and subnetwork identifications)
Complete restoration Yes Complete supply

of supply? restoration
No
No Decrease of supply
level?
Yes
Withdrawal of the
switching operation
The following figure shows two MV-systems of different voltage level that provide reserve to each
other through a three-winding transformer. For better illustration the disconnecting switches are not
shown. Changes in the state of the topology or the supply level are marked in the table.
CB5
HVB1 HVB2
CB1 CB3 CB7
CB6
T1 T3 T2
CB2 CB4 CB8

MVB1 MVB2
C1 C2
Switch position
Switch position Switch position Switch position
Switch after second
originating state fault state after first switching op.
switching op.
CB1 On Off Off Off
CB2 On On On On
50 October 2019
CB3 On Off Off Off

CB4 Off Off Off On
CB5 Off Off Off Off
CB6 On On On On
CB7 Off Off On On
CB8 Off Off On On
Supply level
Supply level Supply level Supply level
Busbar after second
originating state fault state after first switching op.
switching op.
HVB1 1 0 0 0
HVB2 1 1 1 1
MVB1 1 0 0 1
MVB2 1 0 1 1
5.2 Generation Schedule

Incidents in the network or the generation units may also have effect on the generation schedule.
Starting from the generation schedule before the failure event, first there are primary and
secondary controls according to UCTE rules. This is emulated in the reliability calculations
automatically through the appropriate power flow modeling. Further power units or network feeders
are disconnected on demand (in case of power injection surplus), or power units are started or
network feeders connected respectively at the next possible point in time in order to meet power
injection deficits. If the network disintegrates into subnetworks, island operation is possible when
required. The Load Flow Calculation Settings can be used to define whether an island operation is
permissible.
Primary Control
Primary control serves to avoid an active power unbalance, i.e. a decrease or increase of the
network frequency. All generators being able to provide an active power reserve within a short
period of time participate in the primary control. The following figure shows the primary control
characteristic of a generator with the planned active power injection P G0 with nominal network
frequency fn, injected power PG0 + ∆P with a frequency deviation ∆f and the active power limits of
the generator PGmin and PGmax.
October 2019 51
PGmax
PG
PG0+P
PG0
PGmin
fn-f fn
f
The ratio
∆𝑃
𝐾𝑟 = −
∆𝑓
is designated as the controlling energy Kr of a generator. It has, together with the active and
reactive power limits, to be declared in the network database.
The power flow calculations assume a constant frequency f = fn. The complete control power
required is partitioned to the generators according to the value of their controlling energy with
regard to their power limits. In case that all generators have reached their upper power limit, the
power demand cannot be supplied completely and shedding has to occur. The shedding can
consider user defined priorities. In case that all generators have reached their lower power limit,
injection units are disconnected.
Secondary Control
Secondary control is active additionally to the primary control. The secondary control is based on
the idea of balancing power unbalances in the very subnetwork in which they emerge. Between
separate subnetworks fixed power exchanges are given.
The generator control starts from the planned power injection PG0. The generators of a subnetwork
are controlled so that the fixed power exchange is met. Therein, each generator participates in
balancing an active power unbalance in its subnetwork according to its controlling energy. In case
that all generators reach their maximum power limit, all generators of the interconnected system
are to participate in balancing the active power unbalance, regardless of the fixed power
exchanges.
52 October 2019
Predefined Reliability Indices
6. Predefined Reliability Indices
PSS SINCAL provides predefined reliability indices for the different failure models based on various
reliability publications by IEEE, CIGRE and VDN/FNN:
● IEEE 493-2007 IEEE Recommended Practice for the Design of Reliable Industrial and
Commercial Power Systems (Gold Book)
● CIGRE WG A2.37, Transformer Reliability Survey: Interim Report, Electra No.261, April 2012
● CIGRE WG A3.06, Final Report of the 2004-2007 International Enquiry on Reliability of High
Voltage Equipment – Part 2: Reliability of High Voltage SF6 Circuit Breakers, Technical
Brochure 510
● CIGRE TB379: Update of service experience of HV underground and submarine cable
systems; Working Group B1.10
● Ermittlung von Eingangsdaten für Zuverlässigkeitsberechnungen aus der VDN-
Störungsstatistik (Berichtsjahre 1994 bis 2001) / Using the VDN Statistic on Incidents to Derive
Component Reliability Data for Probabilistic Reliability Analyses, IAEW der RWTH Aachen,
FGH e.V. Mannheim, Verband der Netzbetreiber – VDN – e.V. beim VDEW, Berlin
● Ermittlung von Eingangsdaten zur Zuverlässigkeitsberechnung aus der FNN-Störungsstatistik
(Auswertung der Berichtsjahre 2004 – 2011) / Using the FNN Statistic on Incidents to Derive
Component Reliability Data for Probabilistic Reliability Analyses, IAEW der RWTH Aachen,
FGH e.V. Mannheim, Forum Netztechnik/Netzbetrieb im VDE (FNN), Berlin
The predefined reliability indices are available for the following component types:
● Switchbay type
● Busbar type
● Line type
● Transformer type
The predefined reliability indices are provided using the PSS SINCAL network
"RelTypes\ZuverTypes_INT" and can be imported to the current network with the Importing Row
Sets function.
Naming Conventions for Predefined Reliability Indices Based on IEEE
Statistics_Voltage level_Component type
Example: IEEE_60-100kV_Line-aboveground
Component type
Line type Line-aboveground
Line-aerial
Line-belowground
Transformer type Transformer-Dry
Transformer-Liquide
Switchbay type Switchgear
CB-3phase, fixed
CB-Drawout
CB-vacuum
Supply type Dieselengine generator
Gas turbine generator
October 2019 53
Naming Conventions for Predefined Reliability Indices Based on CIGRE
Statistics_Voltage level_Component type
Example: CIGRE_60-100kV_Cable-Submarine-AC-HPOF
Component type
Line type Cable-Submarine-AC-HPOF
Cable-Submarine-AC-SCOF
Cable-Submarine-AC-XLPE
Cable-Submarine-DC-MI
Cable-Submarine-DC-SCOF
Cable-Land-AC-XLPE
Cable-Land-AC-SCOF
Cable-Land-AC-HPOF,GC
Cable-Land-AC-EPR;PE
Cable-Land-AC-PILC
Transformer type Transformer
Busbar type Cable Joint-AC-XLPE
Cable Joint-AC-SCOF
Cable Joint-AC-HPOF,GC,EPR;PE
Cable Joint-AC-PILC
Switchbay type CB-live tank
Note: In reliability data of cable, joints and terminations is given separately. Based on the number
of accessories and the circuit length an average of joints and terminations per km is derived. The
data given in PSS SINCAL comprises contributions per km of conductor, 6.74 joints and 3.32
terminations for the component type "Line".
Naming Conventions for Predefined Reliability Indices Based on VDE/FNN
The naming convention consists of the following elements:
● Data source of the reliability data (statistics)

● Voltage level, for which the reliability data applies
● Neutral point treatment in the network
● Failure model
● Specification of local conditions
Statistics_Voltage level_Neutral treatment_Failure model_Component type
Example: FNN_10kV_iso_ISF_cable
Neutral treatment
Iso Isolated
LIG Low impedance earthed
res Resonant grounded
Failure model
54 October 2019
ISF Independent single failure

ISFsl Independent single failure (short and long)
COM Common mode failure
MPD Malfunction of protection device (consequential failure)
MCB Malfunction of circuit breaker (consequential failure)
UPO Unnecessary protection operation (consequential failure)
SUP Spontaneous unnecessary protection operation
PEF Permanent earth fault
MEF Multiple earth fault with multiple outage
Component type
Line type OHL
Cable – all
Cable – mass
Cable – oil
Cable – PE
Cable – PVC
Cable – XLPE
Transformer type All
Built-in
Housing
Compact
Pole-mounted
Other
Busbar type Built-in
Housing
Compact
Pole-mounted
Other
Switchbay type Bay (feeder part)
Bay (busbar part)
VDE/FNN failure statistics and evaluation methodology differentiate between short and long outage
time in case of the failure model ISF (Independent Single Failure). The indices with this
differentiation are named "ISFsl".
For the ISF indices without differentiation (i.e. without "sl"), only the weighted average value of
short and long ISF has to be defined in the input data screen form. It can either be inserted in the
input dialog box of the short reliability value or of the long reliability value. The other value can be
set to "0". To be sure calculating with the specified values, the correct Failure Models Calculation
has to be checked in Reliability Settings.
October 2019 55
Reliability Results
7. Reliability Results
PSS SINCAL load flow calculation method provides a wide range of results to help you evaluate
and analyze the network’s security. To help you understand them better, we will describe the
following results in more detail:
● Network Results
● Group Results
● Results for Consumers
● Results for Components
Network Results
PSS SINCAL uses all the malfunctions in the network results. PSS SINCAL provides different
results for all malfunction types activated in the reliability calculations as well as a total value.
Note that values for individual malfunctions are highly aggregated and, as such, provide an overall
evaluation of the malfunction. It is no longer possible to draw any conclusions about individual
malfunctions.
Switchings and Switch Costs only include switchings needed to remove the malfunction.
PSS SINCAL provides the following results for the network results.
The Interrupted Power is determined from the active power of the elements in the load flow.
56 October 2019
Reliability Results
Group Results
The network area results contain Sustained and Momentary reliability indices according to IEEE
1366.
● Sustained reliability indices:

Basically, these are SAIDI and SAIFI or ASIDI and ASIFI values. PSS SINCAL calculates them
for all areas of the network. According to IEEE 1366, only consumer interruptions lasting more
than five minutes.
● Momentary reliability index:
The reliability index MAIFI is available. PSS SINCAL calculates it for all areas of the network.
According to IEEE 1366, only consumer interruptions lasting less than five minutes.
For individual evaluations, however, the minimum down time (5 minutes) can also be set in the
Reliability Settings. If no malfunctions in a network area meet these criteria, this network area has
no results.
PSS SINCAL provides the following results for the network area.
The following table shows the reliability indices according to IEEE 1366.
Reliability index Unit Number of consumers Consumer power

Interruption frequency 1/a SAIFI, MAIFI: ASIFI:
∑𝑗 𝑛𝑗 ∑𝑗 𝑠𝑗
𝐹𝑖 = 𝐹𝑖 =
𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑡
Unavailability min/a SAIDI: ASIDI:
∑𝑗 𝑛𝑗 𝑡𝑗 ∑𝑗 𝑠𝑗 𝑡𝑗
𝑄𝑖 = 𝑄𝑖 =
𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑡 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑡
Interruption duration min CAIDI:
October 2019 57
Reliability Results
∑𝑗 𝑛𝑗 𝑡𝑗 ∑𝑗 𝑠𝑗 𝑡𝑗
𝑇𝑖 = 𝑇𝑖 =
∑𝑗 𝑛𝑗 ∑𝑗 𝑠𝑗
Designations according to IEEE 1366
nj … Number of interrupted customers per interruption block

ntot … Total number of customers supplied
sj … Interrupted rated apparent power per interruption block
Stot … Total rated apparent power installed
tj … Duration of the interruption block
j … Interruption blocks
Calculate according to IEEE 1366 – number of consumers: The number of actual customers'
needs to be stored at the consumers. PSS SINCAL calculates the total number of customers for all
the consumers in a network area. PSS SINCAL then uses the calculated interruption time to
determine the number of interrupted customer. According to IEEE 1366, only interruptions of more
than five minutes are used in the calculations.
Calculate according to IEEE 1366 – consumer power: PSS SINCAL used the input data of the
consumer power and the interrupted power and interruption time supplied by the reliability
calculations to calculate settings. The same five-minute time limit is used as in number of
consumers.
The following results are provided depending on the consumed power used.
● Installed power:
Installed interruption duration index
● Active power in the load flow:
Active interruption duration index
● Peak power:
Peak interruption duration index
The power determined from the basic data of the elements (consumers, motor, etc.) is used as the
active power in the load flow.
The installed power and the peak power must be stored in the reliability data of the elements.
The State field defines whether power values equal to 0 were specified.
● OK:
No power values equal to 0 were entered.
● Missing input data:
Power values equal to 0 were entered.
The hierarchical structure of the network areas are also considered in these calculations. This
means every network area also contains data of all the subordinate network areas.
58 October 2019
Reliability Results
Results for Consumers
The reliability calculations provide two different results in the database. PSS SINCAL differentiates
between the results for consumers and components.
The results for consumers contain all the malfunctions of the individual load node to provide an
overall evaluation of the malfunction.
PSS SINCAL provides the following results.
October 2019 59
Reliability Results
Normally PSS SINCAL only provides these results for nodes with power removal (i.e. connected
consumers). An enhanced control attribute in the reliability input data for the node can also be
switched ON to display results for nodes without power removal.
Note: The values for individual malfunctions are highly aggregated. Generally, it is no longer
possible to draw any conclusions about individual malfunctions.
Results for Components
The reliability calculations provide two different results in the database. PSS SINCAL differentiates
between the results for consumers and components.
PSS SINCAL calculates the Results for Components for all malfunctioning network elements. It
determines reliability indices for all the malfunctioning elements and any type of malfunction. This is
done by cumulating the resulting values for each malfunctioning network element, assuming it is
causing a malfunction combination. These results provide information on how these network
elements contribute to the malfunction making it easy to determine which network elements play
the greatest role in the malfunction.
60 October 2019
Load Flow Algorithm
8. Load Flow Algorithm
Load flow algorithms can determine the supply level for individual loads of the network.
The following load flow algorithms are available:
● Standard
● Extended
● Connection Check
● Maximum Flow
● Network State Analysis
8.1 Standard and Extended

The complex load flow, which is normally used for power flow analysis in power system planning, is
best able to model the real power system, on cost of a high computing time. For power systems
operated closed to its peak capacity that face problems with voltage stability, the complex load flow
is the only algorithm to produce useful results.
Load flow can use all the PSS SINCAL load flow modeling possibilities, such as primary and
secondary control, automatic transformer tap controlling, shedding or island operation.
The reliability calculations calculate load flow after any change in network structure. This is
necessary, among other things, to determine whether all the consumers are properly supplied or
equipment in the network is overloaded. The quality of the load flow results depends on what
procedure is being used. Load flow calculations provide exact results, but require fundamentally
more calculation time than simple connection checks.
To evaluate special network situations for individual malfunction combinations, PSS SINCAL has
two options: Standard and Extended. In any malfunction combination, an attempt is first made to
obtain a load flow solution with strict ratings. If this cannot be done, extended impedance load
conversion is switched ON to determine the supply levels. If PSS SINCAL still cannot find any load
flow solution, the Extended option automatically switches ON the precalculate mode of the load
flow calculations. This assures you always have results, even if the preset entries for accuracy
cannot be met. These results (approximation solution) are then also used to determine the supply
levels.
8.2 Connection Check

If it can be assumed that instabilities, voltage drops or overloading will not cause supply
interruptions in the power system under consideration, the question whether all customers are
supplied can be reduced to whether all customers are connected to an injection unit. The electric
power system thus is reduced to a mere graph without any further characteristics. Only the
topology is relevant.
October 2019 61
Load Flow Algorithm
At first, all branches affected by the respective component failure combination are removed from
the power system. Thereafter, it is verified whether all customers are connected to an injection unit.
This is done using a tree formation. Starting node of this tree formation is a fictive injection node
connected to each real injection node by a fictive circuit. The tree formation is completed when no
new node can be reached. In case that the tree formation does not reach all customer nodes, the
failure combination under consideration causes a supply interruption on these nodes.
This algorithm allows the state analysis with an extremely low computing effort. The results are
only valid in power systems in which overloading and voltage drops have negligible effect.
The connection check algorithm is only available for symmetrical networks. Asymmetrical networks
use network state analysis instead of a connection check as the load flow algorithm.
8.3 Maximum Flow

The maximum flow algorithm also considers the power transport through the power system and
verifies overloading of separate elements. The maximum power transfer capacity of circuits is given
by the thermal limit rating or the protection settings respectively in case that certain overloading is
accepted in a fault state of the power system. The power transfer capacity describes the power that
can be transferred by a circuit without causing an overload tripping.
The maximum flow algorithm only complies with the 1. Kirchhoff law, i. e. the flow distribution
according to the separate impedance of the power system branches cannot be determined. Thus,
losses, reactive power transport or voltage drops cannot be calculated. The power flow is assumed
to be arbitrary controllable, which simulates the activities of a load control center and the control
devices in an optimistic manner. Therefore, the maximum flow calculation doesn't produce exact
results either, but an optimistic estimation of the actual supply situation in a component failure
combination.
The algorithm used can be separated into two partial algorithms. The first part, which is called only
once on the beginning of the reliability calculation, determines the power flow in normal operation
state. The second part uses these results for the normal operation state and calculates the
changes caused by the respective failure combination. In most cases, these changes are restricted
to several connections in the vicinity of the failed elements. If there does exist an overloading on a
circuit, the effect on customers can be estimated using power allocation models.
The maximum flow algorithm is only available for symmetrical networks. Asymmetrical networks
use standard load flow instead of maximum flow as the load flow algorithm.
8.4 Network State Analysis

As with a Connection Check, one also assumes that instabilities, voltage drops or overloading will
not cause supply interruptions in the power system under consideration, the question whether all
customers are supplied can be reduced to whether all customers are connected to a supply source.
This reduces the electricity supply network to a pure graph without any other determining
parameters. It only depends on the topology.
At the beginning, all the branches of the malfunction combination in the network are specified
temporarily as "not available". In the object-oriented network model, PSS SINCAL then finds all the
network elements connected to a supply source that specifies the voltage (amount and angle).
62 October 2019
Load Flow Algorithm
Finally, all the nodes that have a connection to the supply source are assigned a load voltage
identical to the rated voltage and a supply level of 100 percent. Nodes without connections are
assigned a voltage and a supply level of zero. Branch elements (lines, transformers, etc.) do not
receive any results and are thus never considered to be overloaded in any further observations.
This algorithm allows the network analysis with an extremely low computing effort. The results are
only valid in power systems in which overloading and voltage drops have negligible effect.
October 2019 63
Short Circuit Calculation
9. Short Circuit Calculation
The PSS SINCAL Reliability uses a short-circuit calculation to determine the response of protection
devices in case of a short circuit for the unnecessary protection operation failure model.
The occurrence of an unnecessary protection operation is characterized by the synchronous failure

of at least two elements. One thereof is the element affected by an independent single failure. The
corresponding protection device is to selectively disconnect this element from the power system in
order to limit the incident both locally and temporally. The partial short-circuit currents in the power
system can also cause the response of other protection devices and thus eventually may cause
unnecessary protection operations on circuits not affected by the failure.
PSS SINCAL Reliability uses a short-circuit calculation to determine for every short circuit those
protection devices carrying a partial short-circuit current above the response threshold. So, the
possibilities for the occurrence of unnecessary protection operations are isolated.
The results for simplified short circuit current calculations can be displayed in the sequence log.
64 October 2019
Example for Reliability
10. Example for Reliability
Below is a simple example of how Reliability works. The following descriptions show:
● Presetting Calculation Settings

● Network Modeling for Reliability
● Starting the Reliability Calculations
● Displaying and Evaluating the Results
Basic Data
All descriptions are based on the following example network:
When you install PSS SINCAL, the program automatically provides a network ("Example ZU"),
which can be used to check the simulation procedure. This is a 110 kV network very much like a
real network with a compensated neutral point. The network gets its energy from a base load and
medium load power station as well as from a permanent and a connectable network supply.
PSS SINCAL simulates the supplied medium voltage networks as consumers.
To calculate reliability, Reliability in the Calculate – Methods menu has to be activated (see
Presetting Calculation Methods in the chapter on User Interface in the User Manual).
October 2019 65
10.1 Presetting Calculations Settings

To configure the reliability calculations, PSS SINCAL has its own screen form to set detailed
parameters for the entire simulation procedure. Calculate – Settings in the menu calls up the
screen form.
The reliability parameters let you configure the actual reliability calculations as well as the results
(= evaluation) that are prepared at the end.
For a more precise description of reliability settings, see the section on Simulation – Reliability
Settings in the chapter on Calculation Settings in the Input Data manual.
10.2 Network Modeling for Reliability

To describe the behavior of network elements in the reliability investigation, you need to have data
in addition to the electrical network model. The most important points are presented below:
● Assigning reliability indices

● Modeling network components
● Modeling failure events
● Modeling remedial measures
66 October 2019
Assigning Reliability Indices
Reliability indices must be assigned to the network equipment. Basically, these characteristics
describe the malfunction rate and malfunction period of the equipment. The data can, for example,
be taken from BDEW-Störungs- und Schadensstatistik. These statistics reflect all the incidents of
equipment in Germany. If you already have sufficient data especially for the system being
inspected, these data should of course be used.
The power system under consideration is divided into different Network Levels for increased clarity.
You can define standard reliability indices for individual network levels. PSS SINCAL assigns these
to all the network elements in this level, assuming they do not already have individual reliability
indices.
Independently, it is possible to assign individual reliability data to any network element. Use the
Reliability tab to assign these characteristics at the network element. These are:
● Busbars and switching stations

● Lines
● Transformers
● Infeeders
Modeling Network Components
For reliability calculations, a correct simulation of the network can be particularly important because
these data provide the basis for all the observations. Multiple busbars, multiple lines and, of course,
also protection zones for protection devices in the network have to be modeled correctly. For more
precise information on this, see the chapter on Modeling of the Network.
For reliability calculations, PSS SINCAL has to model disturbances in network operations in as
much detail as possible.
Basically, PSS SINCAL uses the following kinds of malfunction to describe the disturbances:
● Independent single failure

● Common mode failure
● Maintenance
● Multiple ground fault
● Malfunction of protection device
● Unnecessary protection operation
● Independent unnecessary protection operation
● Malfunction of circuit breaker
For more precise information on this, see the chapter on Modeling of Failure Events.
Modeling Remedial Measures
A set of measures to reduce or eliminate the effect of failures is at disposal of the system
management in case of an incident before the failed element is repaired and can be reconnected.
The restoration of supply models these measures.
October 2019 67
Basically, a distinction is made between:
● Switching operations and

● Generation schedule
For more precise information on this, see the chapter on Modeling of the Remedial Measures.
10.3 Starting the Reliability Calculations

Calculate – Reliability – Reliability starts the reliability calculations.
The Reliability Settings configure the sequence of reliability calculations in detail. Among other
things, you can define the kinds of malfunction to be considered, how the supply is restored and
much more.
Since PSS SINCAL simulates a number of load flows in these calculations, the procedure can take
a long time (depending on the size of the network). In networks with 1000 nodes, calculation times
of more than 30 minutes are not uncommon, so the reliability calculations separate the calculation
part from the analysis part. The clear separation of Calculation and Analysis of the failure
combination sequences has the advantage that the calculations are by far the most time
consuming part of the network analysis and is normally performed only once in a reliability analysis.
Typically, the calculation results then are analyzed in several different ways. As the calculation
results are stored already in a database, the runtime for the analysis is quite short.
Once the reliability calculations are finished, Calculate – Reliability – Reliability Evaluation in the
menu can be used to start evaluating the results. Reliability Settings configures the details of the
contents and scope of the evaluation.
10.4 Displaying and Evaluating the Results

PSS SINCAL provides the results of the reliability calculations in different forms to facilitate a
variety of analyses and evaluations:
● Results in the Network Diagram

● Enhanced Printout
10.4.1 Results in the Network Diagram
After reliability calculations, PSS SINCAL provides two different kinds output data in the network
diagram. PSS SINCAL differentiates between the results for consumers and components.
68 October 2019
The Show Input Data and Results dialog box is used to select the results to be displayed.
PSS SINCAL provides Results for Consumers for all the nodes in the networks attached to
consumers. PSS SINCAL calculates reliability indices for all types of malfunction. The values for
the individual consumer node are cumulated as soon as these are unsupplied in an analyzed
malfunction. These results let you evaluate how reliable the supply of a consumer node actually is.
PSS SINCAL calculates the Results for Components for all malfunctioning network elements. It
determines reliability indices for all the malfunctioning elements and any type of malfunction. This is
done by cumulating the resulting values for each malfunctioning network element, assuming it is
causing a malfunction combination. These results provide information on how these network
elements contribute to the malfunction making it easy to determine which network elements play
the greatest role in the malfunction.
October 2019 69
PSS SINCAL also provides Network Group Results with the reliability indices according to IEEE
1366. The network area results contain IEEE 1366 reliability data. Basically, these are SAIDI and
SAIFI or ASIDI and ASIFI values. PSS SINCAL calculates them for all areas of the network.
According to IEEE 1366, only consumer interruptions lasting more than five minutes with a supply
voltage less than or equal to 32 kV are used. If no malfunctions in a network area meet these
criteria (e.g. high-voltage), this network area has no results.
10.4.2 Enhanced Results Log
The reliability analysis part can generate special logs detailing the results of the reliability
calculations and the measures that have been taken to restore supply. The generated logs are
displayed in the message box.
70 October 2019
A PSS SINCAL message box displays the logs generated for hyperlinks. The sequence log of the
calculations has a detailed list of all the malfunction combinations analyzed during the reliability
calculations as well any measures for resupply. PSS SINCAL’s evaluation results include a
detailed list of the analyzed malfunction combinations as well as the reliability indices. The
evaluation results are provided as a "flat" ASCII file. Or, if you wish, these can be generated as a
HTML file that is easier to use optically.
The scope of the sequence log for the calculations and the contents and scope results from the
evaluation results can be configured with the Reliability Settings. For more precise information on
this, see the chapter on Analysis Part.
October 2019 71

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PSS®SINCAL 16.

● the PSS SINCAL System Manual

PSS® is a registered trademark of SIEMENS AG

1.1 General Remarks 7

3. Modeling of the Network 21

3.1 Defining Components 21

4. Modeling of Failure Events 40

4.1 Short or Long Independent Single Failure 40

4.7 Independent Unnecessary Protection Operation 44

5. Modeling of Remedial Measures 47

5.1 Switching Operations 48

6. Predefined Reliability Indices 53

8. Load Flow Algorithm 61

8.1 Standard and Extended 61

9. Short Circuit Calculation 64

10. Example for Reliability 65

10.1 Presetting Calculations Settings 66

This manual contains the following chapters:

● Define an annual load duration curve

1.1 General Remarks

History of how PSS SINCAL Reliability Calculations Developed

Past system performance

2.1.2 Component and System States

The following illustration shows component states.

Up state Down state

Disabled state (outage)

2.1.3 Failure, Outage and Supply Interruption

● Sufficient voltage level

2.2 Reliability Indices

Symbol Name Unit

Frequency of Supply Interruptions

Mean Duration of Supply Interruptions

Probability of Supply Interruption/Unavailability

(Cumulated) Interrupted Power

(Cumulated) Energy Not Supplied

(Cumulated) Interruption Costs

Duration Up to 12 min 12 min – 1 h 1 h – 10 h More than 10 h

Analogously to the interruption costs it is possible to calculate reimbursements in the

2.3 Program Structure

PSS SINCAL Network Database

2.4 Calculation Part

Read network data

Generation of failure combinations

No All failure combinations

Analytic Calculation Method

Controlling the Analytical Calculation Method

● Regarding a minimal state probability or

Controlling the Monte-Carlo Method

2.5 Analysis Part

The analysis itself is performed in one of the following ways:

Read network data

Failure combination within No

Evaluating Reliability Results

Controlling the Evaluation

The one you select is preset with the Reliability Settings.

3. Modeling of the Network

3.1 Defining Components

● Line (overhead line or cable)

3.2 Assigning Reliability Indices

3.3 Busbars and Switching Stations

Generally, three types of switching stations are distinguished in reliability calculations:

● Outdoor switching station

The reliability data of these different types vary greatly in part.