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2 Routledge Handbook of
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19 The Routledge Handbook of South Asian Politics examines key issues in politics of the five
20 independent states of the South Asian region: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and
21 Nepal. Written by experts in their respective areas, this Handbook introduces the reader to
22 the politics of South Asia by presenting the prevailing agreements and disagreements in the
23 literature.
24 In the first two sections, the Handbook provides a comprehensive introduction to the
25 modern political history of the states of the region and an overview of the independence
26 movements in the former colonial states. The other sections focus on the political changes
27 that have occurred in the postcolonial states since independence, as well as the successive
28 political changes in Nepal during the same period, and the structure and functioning of the
29 main governmental and non-governmental institutions, including the structure of the state
30 itself (unitary or federal), political parties, the judiciary, and the military. Further, the
31 contributors explore several aspects of the political process and political and economic change,
32 especially issues of pluralism and national integration, political economy, corruption and
33 criminalization of politics, radical and violent political movements, and the international
34 politics of the region as a whole.
35 This unique reference work provides a comprehensive survey of the state of the field and
36 is an invaluable resource for students and academics interested in South Asian Studies, South
37 Asian Politics, Comparative Politics, and International Relations.
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39 Paul R. Brass is Professor (Emeritus) of Political Science and International Studies at the
40 University of Washington, Seattle. His most recent books are Forms of Collective Violence: Riots,
41 Pogroms, and Genocide in Modern India (2006) and The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in
42 Contemporary India (2003).
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 1
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Routledge Handbook of
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Edited by
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First published 2010
by Routledge
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2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 19
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Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge 21
270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 22
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This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2010.
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To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s 25
collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.
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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business 27
© 2010 Editorial selection and matter, Paul R. Brass; individual chapters, 28
the contributors 29
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All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now 31
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in 32
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing 33
from the publishers. 34
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data 35
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library 36
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data 37
Routledge Handbook of South Asian politics : India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 38
Sri Lanka, and Nepal / edited by Paul R. Brass. 39
p. cm. 40
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. South Asia—Politics and government. I. Brass, Paul R., 1936– 41
JQ98.A58R68 2009 42
320.954—dc22 2008047362 43
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ISBN 0-203-87818-3 Master e-book ISBN
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ISBN 10: 0–415–43429–7 (hbk)
ISBN 10: 0–203–87818–3 (ebk)

ISBN 13: 978–0–415–43429–4 (hbk)

ISBN 13: 978–0–203–87818–7 (ebk)
 1
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6 Contents
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19 List of Illustrations viii
20 List of Abbreviations ix
21 List of Contributors xiii
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23 1 Introduction 1
24 Paul R. Brass (editor)
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Part I Colonialism, Nationalism, and Independence in South Asia:
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India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka 25
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2 India and Pakistan 27
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Ian Talbot
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3 Sri Lanka’s Independence: Shadows over a Colonial Graft 41
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Nira Wickramasinghe
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36 Part II Political Change, Political Parties, and the Issue of Unitary
37 vs Federal Forms of Government 53
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39 4 Political Change, Political Structure, and the Indian State since Independence 55
40 John Harriss
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42 5 State-level Politics, Coalitions, and Rapid System Change in India 67
43 Virginia Van Dyke
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45 6 Pakistan’s Politics and its Economy 83
46 Shahid Javed Burki
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C O N T E N TS

7 Party Overinstitutionalization, Contestation, and Democratic Degradation 1

in Bangladesh 98 2
Harry Blair 3
4
8 Politics and Governance in Post-independence Sri Lanka 118 5
Neil DeVotta 6
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9 Nepal:Trajectories of Democracy and Restructuring of the State 131 8
Krishna Hachhethu and David N. Gellner 9
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10 The Old and the New Federalism in Independent India 147 11
Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph 12
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Part III The Judiciary 163
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11 India’s Judiciary: Imperium in Imperio? 165
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Shylashri Shankar
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12 Balancing Act: Prudence, Impunity, and Pakistan’s Jurisprudence 177
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Paula R. Newberg
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13 Confronting Constitutional Curtailments:Attempts to Rebuild
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Independence of the Judiciary in Bangladesh 191
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Sara Hossain
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14 Executive Sovereignty:The Judiciary in Sri Lanka 203
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Shylashri Shankar
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Part IV Pluralism and National Integration: Language Issues 211 30
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15 Politics of Language in India 213 32
E.Annamalai 33
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16 Language Problems and Politics in Pakistan 232 35
Tariq Rahman 36
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Part V Crises of National Unity 247
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17 Crises of National Unity in India: Punjab, Kashmir, and the Northeast 249
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Gurharpal Singh
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18 Communal and Caste Politics and Conflicts in India 262
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Steven I.Wilkinson
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19 Ethnic and Islamic Militancy in Pakistan 274
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Mohammad Waseem
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1 20 Ethnic Conflict and the Civil War in Sri Lanka 291

2 Jayadeva Uyangoda
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Part VI Political Economy 303
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21 The Political Economy of Development in India since Independence 305
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Stuart Corbridge
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22 The Political Economy of Agrarian Change in India 321
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Jan Breman
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23 Economic Development and Sociopolitical Change in Sri Lanka since
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Independence 337
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W. D. Lakshman
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17 Part VII Comparative Chapters 349
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19 24 The Militaries of South Asia 351
20 Stephen P. Cohen
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22 25 Corruption and the Criminalization of Politics in South Asia 364
23 Stanley A. Kochanek
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25 26 Radical and Violent Political Movements 382
26 Sumanta Banerjee
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28 27 International Politics of South Asia 399
29 Vernon Hewitt
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31 Glossary 419
32 Bibliography 423
33 Index 451
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Illustrations 6
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List of figures
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7.1 Bangladesh Freedom House democracy scores, 1972–2006 101 20
7.2 Bureaucracy + one ally, NGOs outside, 1972–1991 109 21
7.3 Military distracted, bureaucracy subordinated, NGOs likewise?, early 2000s 109 22
7.4 Military in charge, others subordinated, 2007 109 23
24
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List of tables 26
4.1 Prime ministers of India 58 27
4.2 Presidents of India 63 28
5.1 Party composition of state governments in India, 1998–2007 69 29
5.2 Election results in India by state: number of seats won by largest party 30
or coalition, 2003–2008 72 31
6.1 Political periods in Pakistan’s history 85 32
6.2 United States’ assistance to Pakistan 85 33
6.3 Economic performance in various political periods in Pakistan, 1947–2008 90 34
7.1 Votes and seats in Bangladesh elections, 1973–2001 100 35
9.1 Political party positions in the first, second, and third parliamentary elections 36
in Nepal 136 37
9.2 Governments of Nepal, 1990–2005 137 38
9.3 Population breakdown of Nepal (2001 census) (total: 23.15 million) with 39
figures for hill minority language loss 138 40
9.4 Presence of different groups in leadership positions in Nepal, 1999 138 41
16.1 Educational institutions in Pakistan by medium of instruction 238 42
16.2 Expenditure on cadet colleges in Pakistan 239 43
16.3 Differences in costs in major types of educational institutions in Pakistan 44
(Pakistani rupees) 240 45
16.4 Income and expenditure of educational institutions in Pakistan 241 46
25.1 Index of Democracy for South Asia, 2006 365 47
25.2 Corruption Perceptions Index for South Asia, 2006 366 48
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6 Abbreviations
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19 ACC Anti-Corruption Commission
20 ADAB Association of Development Agencies in Bangladesh
21 AIADMK All-India Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
22 AITC All India Trinamool Congress
23 AL Awami League
24 ANP Awami National Party
25 ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
26 B-C Pact Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact
27 BCS Bangladesh Civil Service
28 BCS (Admin) Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration)
29 BHT Baloch Haq Talwar
30 BILIA Bangladesh Institute of Law and International Affairs
31 BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
32 BLA Baloch Liberation Army
33 BNP Baloch National Party; Bangladesh National Party
34 BPL below poverty line
35 BRAC Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
36 BSP Bahujan Samaj Party
37 CA constituent assembly
38 CBI Confederation of British Industry
39 CC Constitutional Council (Sri Lanka)
40 CFA ceasefire agreement
41 CHA Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
42 CHT Chittagong Hill Tracts
43 CIC Ceylon Indian Congress
44 CII Confederation of Indian Industry
45 CJ chief justice
46 CJI Chief Justice of India
47 CP Communist Party
48 CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement

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A B B R E V I AT I O N S

CPI Communist Party of India; Corruption Perception Index 1

CPI (M) Communist Party of India (Marxist) 2
CPI (Maoist) Communist Party of India (Maoist) 3
CPI (M-L) Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) 4
CPN-M Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) 5
CSDS Centre for the Study of Developing Societies 6
CSP Civil Service of Pakistan 7
CSS centrally sponsored schemes 8
CWC Ceylon Workers’ Congress 9
DDC district development council 10
DMK Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 11
DWC Democratic Workers’ Congress 12
EFC Eleventh Finance Commission 13
EPDP Eelam People’s Democratic Party 14
EPRLF Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front 15
EPW Economic and Political Weekly 16
EROS Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students 17
FICCI Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry 18
FNB Federation of NGOs in Bangladesh 19
FP Federal Party 20
FRBM Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act 21
GDP gross domestic product 22
GOI Government of India 23
GRC Gram Rajya Committee 24
HDI human development index 25
HSS Halpati Seva Sangh 26
IAS Indian Administrative Service 27
ICES International Centre for Ethnic Studies (Sri Lanka) 28
ICS Indian Civil Service 29
ILO International Labor Office 30
IMF International Monetary Fund 31
IPKF Indian Peace Keeping Force 32
IR international relations 33
ISGA interim self-governing authority 34
ISI Inter-Services Intelligence Agency; import-substitution industrialization 35
IT information technology 36
JD(S) Janata Dal (Secular) 37
JHU Jathika Hela Urumaya 38
JI Jamaat-I-Islami 39
JKLF Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front 40
JMB Jamaat ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh 41
JUI Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam 42
JUI (F) Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazlur Rehman) 43
JUP Jamiat Ulema Pakistan 44
JVP Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna 45
JWP Jamhoori Watan Party 46
KHAM intercaste alliance in Gujarat of Kshatriyas, Harijans,Adivasis, and Muslims 47
KKC Krantikari Kishan Committee 48
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1 LSSP Lanka Sama Samaj Party

2 LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
3 MCC Maoist Communist Centre
4 MDG millennium development goal
5 MGP Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party
6 MJF Madhes Janadhikar Forum
7 MMA Muttahida Majlis Amal
8 MP member of parliament
9 MQM Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz
10 MRD Movement for Restoration of Democracy
11 MRPS Madiga Reservation Porata Samithi
12 NAP National Awami Party
13 NC Nepali Congress
14 NCA normal central assistance
15 NCEUS National Commission of Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector
16 NCG neutral caretaker government
17 NDA National Democratic Alliance
18 NGO non-governmental organization
19 NL National List
20 NPC National Planning Committee
21 NPT non-proliferation treaty
22 NREGS National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
23 NRI non-resident Indian
24 NRO national reconciliation ordinance
25 NSCI (Isak-Muvia) National Safety Council of India
26 NSS national sample survey
27 NWFP North-West Frontier Province
28 NWS nuclear weapons state
29 OBC other backward classes
30 OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
31 OIC Organization of the Islamic Conference
32 PA People’s Alliance
33 PCO provisional constitutional order
34 PCs provincial councils
35 PDB Power Development Board
36 PDP People’s Democratic Party
37 PDS Public Distribution System
38 PIL public interest litigation
39 PLA People’s Liberation Army
40 PLOTE People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam
41 PLQR permit-license-quota Raj
42 PML (N) Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)
43 PMO Prime Minister’s Office
44 PNE peaceful nuclear explosion
45 PPP Pakistan People’s Party; purchasing power parity
46 PQLI physical quality of life index
47 PR proportional representation
48 PSUs public sector units
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P-TOM post-tsunami operational mechanism 1

PWG People’s War Group 2
RSS Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 3
SAARC South Asian Regional Cooperation Council 4
SAD Shiromani Akali Dal 5
SC scheduled caste(s) 6
SLFP Sri Lanka Freedom Party 7
SLMC Sri Lanka Muslim Congress 8
SLMM Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission 9
SMP single member district plurality system 10
SPA Seven Party Alliance 11
SSP Sipah Sahaba Pakistan 12
SU Sinhala Heritage Party 13
TADA Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act 14
TC Tamil Congress 15
TDP Telugu Desam Party 16
TFC Twelfth Finance Commission 17
TMLP Tarai Madhes Loktantrik Party 18
TMVP Tamileela Makkal Viduthalaip Pulikal 19
TNA Tamil National Alliance 20
TULF Tamil United Liberation Front 21
US (or USA) United States 22
UCC Uniform Civil Code 23
UK United Kingdom 24
ULFA United Liberation Front of Assam 25
UML Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) 26
UN United Nations 27
UNF United National Front 28
UNMIN United Nations Mission in Nepal 29
UNP United National Party 30
UP Uttar Pradesh (formerly United Provinces) 31
UPA United Progressive Alliance 32
UPFA United People’s Freedom Alliance 33
WTO World Trade Organization 34
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 1
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6 Contributors
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19 Editor
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21 Paul R. Brass is Professor (Emeritus) of Political Science and International Studies at the
22 University of Washington, Seattle. His most recent books are Forms of Collective Violence: Riots,
23 Pogroms, and Genocide in Modern India (2006), The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in
24 Contemporary India (2003), and Theft of an Idol (1997). His current research is on a multi-
25 volume history of north Indian politics from 1937 to 2007.
26
27
28 Editorial board
29
30 Harry Blair, Yale University, US
31 Stephen P. Cohen, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, US
32 David Gellner, Oxford University, UK
33 John Harriss, Simon Fraser University, Canada
34 Gary Jacobsohn, University of Texas, Austin, US
35 Tariq Rahman, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, Pakistan
36 Gurharpal Singh, University of Birmingham, UK
37 Ian Talbot, University of Southampton, UK
38 Jayadev Uyangoda, University of Colombo, Sri Lanka
39
40
41 Contributors
42
43 E. Annamalai was Visiting Professor at Yale University and Director of the Central Institute
44 of Indian Languages, Mysore, India. His research areas include language policy and planning
45 and language diversity and contact. He is currently working on the modernization of languages
46 in India and the impact of English on them. His recent publications include Managing
47 Multilingualism in India: Political and Linguistic Manifestations (2001).
48
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Sumanta Banerjee is an independent researcher based in Dehradun, India, specializing in 1

the areas of contemporary Indian Left politics and the popular culture and social history of 2
nineteenth-century Bengal. His publications include Crime and Urbanization: Calcutta in the 3
Nineteenth Century (2006), The Parlour and the Streets: Elite and Popular Culture in Nineteenth- 4
Century Calcutta (1989) and In the Wake of Naxalbari:A History of the Naxalite Movement (1980). 5
6
Harry Blair is Professor (Emeritus) of Political Science at Bucknell University and presently
7
serves as Associate Chair, Senior Research Scholar and Lecturer in Political Science at Yale
8
University. He currently works on democratization, focusing in particular on civil society
9
and local governance in South and Southeast Asia, and the Balkans.
10
Jan Breman is Professor (Emeritus) of Comparative Sociology at the University of Amsterdam 11
and Fellow at the Amsterdam School for Social Science Research. He has conducted 12
fieldwork-based research since 1961, mainly in India and Indonesia. Some of his recent 13
books are The Jan Breman Omnibus (2007), The Poverty Regime in Village India: Half-a-Century 14
of Work and Life at the Bottom of the Rural Economy in Gujarat (2007), and The Making and 15
Unmaking of an Industrial Working Class: Sliding Down the Labour Hierarchy in Ahmedabad, India 16
(2003). 17
18
Shahid Javed Burki is former Vice-President of the World Bank and former Finance
19
Minister of Pakistan. He is currently Chairman of the Lahore-based Institute of Public Policy.
20
His most recent book is Changing Perceptions,Altered Reality: Pakistan’s Economy under Musharraf,
21
1999–2006 (2007).
22
Stephen P. Cohen is Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution,Washington, DC. His most 23
recent books include Four Crises and a Peace Process (2007), The Idea of Pakistan (2004), and 24
India: Emerging Power (2002). He has taught at the University of Illinois and also at universities 25
in India, Japan, and Singapore. He was a member of the US Department of State Policy 26
Planning Staff from 1985 to 1987. He is currently writing a book on Indian military 27
modernization. 28
29
Stuart Corbridge is Professor of Development Studies at the London School of Economics
30
and Political Science. His most recent books are Seeing the State: Governance and Governmentality
31
in India (2005, with Glyn Williams, Manoj Srivastava, and René Veron) and Reinventing India:
32
Liberalization, Hindu Nationalism and Popular Democracy (2000, with John Harriss).
33
Neil DeVotta is Associate Professor of Political Science at Wake Forest University. He is 34
the author of Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri 35
Lanka (2004), co-author of Politics of Conflict and Peace in Sri Lanka (2006), and co-editor 36
of Understanding Contemporary India (2003). 37
38
David N. Gellner is Professor of Social Anthropology at the University of Oxford. His
39
publications include The Theravada Movement in Twentieth-Century Nepal (2005, with Sarah
40
LeVine), The Anthropology of Buddhism and Hinduism: Weberian Themes (2001), and the edited
41
books Local Democracy in South Asia:The Micropolitics of Democratization in Nepal and its Neighbours
42
(2008, with Krishna Hachhethu), and Resistance and the State: Nepalese Experiences (2003).
43
Krishna Hachhethu is associated with the Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies (CNAS), 44
Tribhuvan University. His publications include Nepal in Transition: A Study on the State of 45
Democracy (2008), Party Building in Nepal: Organization, Leadership and People (2002), and the 46
edited book Local Democracy in South Asia:The Micropolitics of Democratization in Nepal and its 47
Neighbours (2008, with David Gellner). 48
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1 John Harriss is Professor of International Studies at Simon Fraser University, Canada, having
2 previously researched and taught at the universities of Cambridge and East Anglia and the
3 London School of Economics. His publications include Depoliticizing Development:The World
4 Bank and Social Capital (2001) and Reinventing India: Economic Liberalization, Hindu Nationalism
5 and Popular Democracy (2000, with Stuart Corbridge). His current research concerns India’s
6 social policy in the context of liberalization.
7
Vernon Hewitt is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Politics at the University of
8
Bristol, UK. His most recent books include Political Mobilisation and Democracy in India: States
9
of Emergency (2008), and Development and Colonialism: The Past in the Present (forthcoming,
10
co-edited with Mark Duffield).
11
12 Sara Hossain is a barrister practicing at the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. Her recent
13 publications include “Honour”: Crimes, Paradigms and Violence against Women (2005, co-edited
14 with Lynn Welchman). Her main areas of research and activism concern public interest law,
15 access to justice, women’s rights, freedom of expression, and the religious right.
16
Stanley A. Kochanek is Professor (Emeritus) at Pennsylvania State University, University
17
Park. His most recent book is India: Government and Politics in a Developing Nation (2008).
18
He is currently working on a comparative study of business and politics in India, Pakistan,
19
and Bangladesh.
20
21 Professor W. D. Lakshman is Professor (Emeritus) at the University of Colombo. A former
22 Vice-Chancellor of the University of Colombo, he currently serves as Senior Economic
23 Advisor to the Ministry of Finance, Sri Lanka. His edited publications, Sri Lanka’s Development
24 since Independence: Socio-Economic Perspectives and Analyses (2000) and Dilemmas of Development:
25 Fifty Years of Economic Change in Sri Lanka (1997), are among widely consulted recent studies
26 in the economic development of Sri Lanka.
27
Paula R. Newberg is the Executive Director of Georgetown University’s Institute for the
28
Study of Diplomacy, and is a specialist in governance, development, and democracy in transition
29
and crisis states. She is a former special advisor to the United Nations, a regular contributor
30
to Yale Global, and The Globe and Mail. Her publications include Double Betrayal: Human
31
Rights and Insurgency in Kashmir (1995) and Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics
32
in Pakistan (1995).
33
34 Tariq Rahman is Distinguished National Professor of Linguistic History in the National
35 Institute of Pakistan Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. His best known book is
36 Language and Politics in Pakistan (1996). Other books include Denizens of Alien Worlds: A Study
37 of Education, Inequality and Polarization in Pakistan (2004) and Language, Ideology and Power:
38 Language-learning among the Muslims of Pakistan and North India (2002).
39
Lloyd I. Rudolph is Professor (Emeritus) of Political Science, University of Chicago. His
40
recent books, co-authored with Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, include Making U.S. Foreign Policy
41
towards South Asia: Regional Imperatives and the Imperial Presidency (2008) and Postmodern Gandhi
42
and Other Essays: Gandhi in the World (2006).
43
44 Susanne Hoeber Rudolph is the William Benton Distinguished Service Professor (Emeritus)
45 of Political Science, University of Chicago. She is co-author, with Lloyd I. Rudolph, of
46 Explaining Indian Democracy: A Fifty Year Perspective (2008) and Reversing the Gaze: The Amar
47 Singh Diary, A Colonial Subject’s Narrative of Imperial India (1999).
48
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Shylashri Shankar is a Senior Research Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New 1
Delhi. She is the author of Scaling Justice: India’s Supreme Court, Anti-Terror Laws, and Social 2
Rights (2009). Her current research includes the medical jurisprudence of torture claims by 3
detainees under criminal and anti-terror laws, and a study of district and village-level politics 4
underlying an employment guarantee scheme in India. 5
6
Gurharpal Singh is the Nadir Dinshaw Chair in Inter-religious Relations at the University
7
of Birmingham. His recent publications include The Partition of India (forthcoming, 2009,
8
with Ian Talbot), and Sikhs in Britain (2006, with Dashan S. Tatla). He is currently working
9
on a volume on India’s democracy. He is the Deputy Director of the UK Department for
10
International Development-funded Religions and Development research program.
11
Ian A. Talbot is Professor of British History at the University of Southampton. He is the 12
editor of The Deadly Embrace: Religion, Politics and Violence in India and Pakistan 1947–2002 13
(2007) and the author of Divided Cities: Partition and Its Aftermath in Lahore and Amritsar 14
1947–1957 (2006). His current research is on Partition and violence. 15
16
Jayadeva Uyangoda is Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science and
17
Public Policy, University of Colombo, and Founder-Director of the Centre for Policy
18
Research and Analysis. He has written extensively and authoritatively on the civil war in
19
Sri Lanka for many years and on ethnic conflict, minority rights, and conflict resolution.
20
His most recent major publication is Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Changing Dynamics (2007).
21
Virginia Van Dyke is currently teaching in the South Asia Center, University of Washington, 22
Seattle. She was formerly an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of 23
Wisconsin-Milwaukee. She has published on the topics of religion and politics, religious 24
violence, and electoral politics. Her current research project is a comparison of coalition 25
politics in four Indian states. 26
27
Mohammad Waseem is Professor of Political Science at the Lahore University of
28
Management Sciences (LUMS) Lahore. His most recent book is Democratization in Pakistan:
29
A Study of the 2002 Elections (2006). His current research is on political conflict in Pakistan,
30
covering electoral, civil-military, ethnic, religious, and sectarian conflicts.
31
Nira Wickramasinghe is Professor of Modern South Asian Studies, Leiden University. Her 32
most recent book is Sri Lanka in the Modern Age: A History of Contested Identities (2006). She 33
is presently a research fellow at the Shelby Cullom Davis Center for Historical Studies where 34
she is writing a history of the reception of the Singer sewing machine in colonial Sri Lanka. 35
36
Steven I. Wilkinson is Associate Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Committee
37
on Southern Asian Studies at the University of Chicago. He is the author of Patrons, Clients
38
or Policies (2007, co-edited with Herbert Kitschelt) and Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition
39
and Communal Riots in India (2005). His current research interests include colonial legacies
40
for democracy, governance and conflict, and the causes of the Partition violence.
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
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3
4
1
5
6 Introduction
7
8
9
10 Paul R. Brass
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19 Part 1: Colonialism, in this volume, has remained an independent
20 nationalism, and Independence protectorate of India.
21 in South Asia: India, Pakistan, So, the differences are profound, but, at
22 and Sri Lanka the same time, the striving for open politics,
23 civil liberties, and parliamentary rule has
24 The states of the South Asian region are often remained alive, active, and renewable in every
25 thought to have shared a common colonial state in the region.The similarities and differ-
26 experience through British rule and/or domi- ences in these and every other respect are
27 nance, which has since profoundly influenced brought out in every section of this volume,
28 their political trajectories. Most notably, from which has been organized to encourage com-
29 a political standpoint, is the adherence, at least parison. With regard to most topics, the
30 in form, and in some measure in actuality as differences among the several countries are
31 well, of the leaders and the public in India so great that a separate chapter on each topic
32 and Sri Lanka to the basic principles of parlia- has been required. In other cases, where there
33 mentary rule through competitive elections, are important similarities or where differences
34 and the repeated striving, less successfully in have arisen despite a common heritage, the
35 the other states, towards the same end.Yet, it relevant topics have been analyzed in com-
36 should be obvious by now that the differences parative chapters.
37 in these respects are profound. First of all, of With regard to the transition from British
38 the five independent states in the South Asian rule to Independence, Chapter 2 (Talbot)
39 region, only three—India, Pakistan, and Sri addresses directly the similarities and diffe-
40 Lanka—arrived at Independence through a rences in the inheritances and legacies that
41 transfer of power from the British. A fourth, derive from British rule, the nationalist move-
42 Bangladesh, achieved its Independence only ment, and the partition of the subcontinent.
43 a quarter century later after a traumatic civil Among those inheritances and legacies,
44 war that left countless numbers of its citizens the catastrophe of Partition that occurred
45 dead. As for Nepal, it never experienced direct simultaneously with the achievement of
46 British rule and has followed a quite different Independence for both states stands out. It
47 trajectory in the 55 years since its termi- remains a living legacy that has affected both
48 nation. Bhutan, touched on only very briefly the internal development and the external

1
PAU L R . B R AS S

relations of both states, persistently endanger- At the same time, all three countries 1
ing the peace of the region and retarding its arrived at Independence with shared commit- 2
common development. It is a common legacy, ments to slogans of “democracy” and “secular- 3
but even here there is a profound difference ism,” although they differed on other 4
in its meaning for the two countries. For fundamentals. The latter included, for 5
India, Partition destroyed the dream of its example, the centrality of the state in 6
leaders for a unified subcontinent. For development: greatest in India; least in Sri 7
Pakistan, Partition signified freedom from Lanka where the state commitment was not 8
Indian and Hindu dominance. to development in the Indian sense, but, as 9
Also profound were the differences in the Wickramasinghe notes in Chapter 3, to “social 10
nationalist movement that brought Indepen- welfare”; and Pakistan, lacking any ideology 11
dence to each country upon the withdrawal of state development, rather more concerned 12
of the British. In this case, there are three with building an army capable of confronting 13
trajectories: the non-violent Congress move- India as needed. But, all states in the South 14
ment built over three quarters of a century Asian region, in common with most states 15
on the base of a strong, nearly subcontinent- everywhere, share an unshakable determina- 16
wide organization and led by Mohandas K. tion to retain at all costs the boundaries 17
Gandhi during the quarter century preceding bequeathed to them at Independence in the 18
Independence; the militant Pakistan move- face of several movements demanding separa- 19
ment led by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, with a tion. Only in the case of Pakistan—and there 20
history of a mere decade of organization, and only because of the intervention of India— 21
with very weak roots in the politically domi- has the division of a South Asian state 22
nant, western parts of the country; and the occurred. 23
peaceful granting of Independence to Ceylon Moreover, in all states in the region, the 24
that limited the building of a strong nationalist original commitment to secularism as an 25
movement. ideology has been battered and largely 26
Further, the nationalist movements in displaced with the rise of Hindu nationalism 27
the three countries suffered from different in India, recognition of Islam as the state 28
degrees of noninclusiveness. The Indian religion and the rise of Islamic movements 29
National Congress, the broadest of the three, in Pakistan, and Buddhist demands for official 30
did not have equal strength in all regions of recognition in Sri Lanka, accepted soon after 31
the country, and had little or none in some. Independence. Gellner, however, notes that: 32
Pakistan, of course, was created out of two “Nepal, on the other hand, which was an 33
entirely different cultural regions, united only officially Hindu state from 1962 to 2006, has, 34
nominally by the predominance of Islam in with the establishment of a secular republic, 35
both. Moreover, within the western region gone in the other direction.”1 36
of the country as well, as in India, there were 37
major regional, cultural, and ethnic diffe- 38
Part II: Political change, political
rences. Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) arrived at 39
parties, and the issue of unitary
Independence with a thin veneer of elite 40
vs federal forms of government
cooperation—which soon collapsed—among 41
the predominant Sinhala population; the 42
India
minority, regionally concentrated Tamil 43
population; and yet another minority group In the years since Independence, dramatic 44
of Tamils of relatively recent South Indian changes have taken place, affecting all the 45
origin, most of whom the new government countries of the region in substantially 46
promptly sought to disenfranchise and expel different ways. India has passed from a political 47
from the country. order dominated by the Indian National 48
2

1 Congress through a brief period of emer-
2 gency authoritarian rule under Indira Gandhi
3 to a functioning multiparty system. Moreover,
4 all these periods have been marked by intense
5 political activity, involving an array of political
6 parties across the entire spectrum of ideo-
7 logical differences in competitive elections
8 based on universal franchise, with large voter
9 turnouts in virtually every election. India, it
10 can be safely said, has long ago passed the
11 conventional tests of a stable, functioning
12 democracy, namely, frequent passing of power
13 to alternative political formations, complete
14 and unchallenged civilian control over the
15 military, and massive popular participation in
16 electoral politics. Moreover, the forms of party
17 mobilization and popular participation have
18 been distinctive in India, building on and
19 extending the many forms of nonviolent
20 protest against government policies and
21 actions that were developed during the
22 movement for Independence. Further, these
23 developments have also been accompanied by
24 the gradual incorporation of the middle and
25 lower castes into the electoral process and, in
26 recent years, the capture of political power
27 in several states by parties based on their
28 support.
29 These changes have been brought about
30 through the agency of vibrant, but highly
31 fragmented, political parties and the struggles
32 for power among them, in the course of
33 which both the predominant parties and the
34 relations among them have changed drama-
35 tically. The national one-party dominant
36 system under the Indian National Congress
37 prevailed from Independence until the late
38 1980s, since when it has been replaced by a
39 multiparty system reshaped into a three-front,
40 but dual coalitional system with the Congress
41 and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) the
42 principal protagonists.The rise of the militant
43 Hindu party, the BJP, has been the driving
44 force in this competitive realignment.
45 But the national system is not simply
46 replicated in the several states. Rather, most
47 state party systems have a distinctive character.
48 Indian politics at both state and national levels
I N T R O D U CT I O N
also have adapted to various forms of coalition
politics (Virginia Van Dyke, in Chapter 5) on
which there is an increasing literature. At the
same time, there has been a general movement
in most states towards forms of bipolar com-
petition, that is to say, predominantly two
party or two front.
Beneath the veneer of conventional parlia-
mentary democracy in India lie several other
features: a political-electoral order increasingly
based on money and muscle in which the
primary aim of most elected representatives
is to gain control over public institutions in
order to enrich themselves; in many states
also, a further degradation of the political
order through the outright criminalization of
politics; the move away from nonviolent
protest movements to mobilizations that lead
to considerable violence, often intended;2 the
continued, indeed in some ways increased
reliance of politicians on what Harriss
(Chapter 4) calls the social “identities of caste
and religion” to garner votes; and, most
importantly, the still limited ability of the vast
population of miserably poor people to
benefit from the political process, even to
achieve a measure of dignity and self-respect.
The literature on electoral politics in India
is fast becoming one of the richest in the
world that elucidates the great changes that
have taken place in popular participation and
the composition of the electorate.3 Not only
has there been a considerable increase in the
voting population (with variations over time
and from state to state), but whole new groups
of voters have been incorporated into electoral
politics through a process that I have described
elsewhere as “caste succession.”4 Whereas, in
the early years after Independence, upper castes
dominated as candidates and voters (often
bringing their lower caste dependents along
with them), the “backward” and “lower” castes
now are well represented by persons from their
own groups and dominate state governments
in many of the Indian states. Moreover, despite
occasional literature to the contrary, it is not
the case that the importance of caste voting
has declined.
3
PAU L R . B R AS S

Far from it, for the drive to garner benefits country as a reluctant ally in the fruitless war 1
of all sorts, available from state agencies, on in Afghanistan. Neither has American inter- 2
the part of caste groups, and the increased vention changed at all the primary focus of 3
capture of state power by leaders from castes the Pakistan military towards confrontation 4
newly incorporated into the political process, with India. 5
has been so central to the politicization of At the same time, it deserves mention that 6
the Indian population that one scholar has in Pakistan, as everywhere else in South Asia, 7
characterized India as a “patronage democ- there is a mass base that rejects military rule 8
racy.”5 Although the term is one that applies and supports parliamentary government 9
to many states in the past as well as the that has twice been decisive in altering the 10
contemporary world, its distinctive character country’s history: the first time in the mass 11
in India is the extent to which it implies a movement that led to the resignation of Ayub 12
high degree of cohesive voting on the part Khan in 1969 and the second occasion in 13
of particular caste groups for persons from 2007–08 that brought down the military 14
their own caste, who alone can be relied on regime of Pervez Musharaf and reinstituted 15
to accommodate their needs and demands. civilian government. However, the crux of 16
the problem of the failure of civilian rule in 17
Pakistan, apart from the persisting virtual 18
Pakistan
independence of the military from civilian 19
Pakistan’s post-Independence political history control, has been, as Burki notes (Chapter 6), 20
has been markedly different from that of India. the inability of “the civilian leadership, when 21
Whereas in India there was marked continuity exercising power . . . to institutionalize the 22
of political leadership under Nehru—and base of their support.” 23
even beyond under both Indira and Rajiv 24
Gandhi—Pakistan lost both its founding 25
Bangladesh
leaders, Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan within 26
a few years after Independence, the former Like Pakistan, Bangladesh belongs in the 27
through natural causes and the latter by category of a society in which aspirations for 28
assassination. Neither did the political parties the establishment of a democratic political 29
have any substantial base in the electorate at order based on free, competitive elections 30
Independence that would enable the firm have remained, but have been repeatedly 31
establishment of parliamentary government or undermined by violent conflict, including 32
even, for that matter, the promulgation of a assassinations of heads of state, repeated 33
constitutional framework. In contrast to India, military takeovers, and deep hatreds between 34
therefore, it is the military that has been the the leaders of the two principal contending 35
predominant political force in Pakistan since parties, the surviving spouses of former 36
the initial displacement of the parliamentary assassinated heads of state. Aspirations for 37
regime by Ayub Khan in 1958. independence and democracy arose in 38
A further profound difference between Bangladesh initially during one of undivided 39
these two polities has been the deleterious Pakistan’s longest periods of military rule. 40
influence of the United States that has The movement was crushed by the Pakistani 41
repeatedly and disastrously influenced the army, but ultimately prevailed through the 42
course of Pakistani politics by supporting and military intervention of India in 1971. 43
feeding successive military regimes with But none of the elected regimes in 44
massive “foreign aid,” most of it used by the Bangladesh has lasted long. Even in the case 45
military to fortify its armaments and wage of the country’s first leader, Sheikh Mujibur 46
wars against India over Kashmir. Moreover, Rahman, who had nearly total electoral 47
latterly, the United States has been using the support, democratic rule did not prevail. 48
4

1 Mired in corruption, soon losing respect and
2 support while attempting to shore up his rule
3 by building his own military force, Mujib and
4 most members of his large family were finally
5 slaughtered in 1975 during a military coup.
6 However, one daughter was left alive, Sheikh
7 Hasina, who was abroad at the time, and who
8 ultimately matured into one of the principal
9 contenders for power in Bangladesh politics
10 up to the present day.
11 One of the leaders of the military coup,
12 General Ziaur Rahman, emerged at the head
13 of a new military regime, which lasted only
14 until his own assassination in 1981. Since the
15 killing of Sheikh Mujib and General Zia, it
16 can be fairly said that politics in Bangladesh
17 has been a form of vendetta, in which Sheikh
18 Hasina, Zia’s wife, Khaleda, and successive
19 military leaders have struggled for power and
20 the support of the people of the country
21 through a series of competitive elections,
22 coups, countercoups, and military takeovers
23 that have persisted up to the present. At the
24 same time, these struggles have often involved
25 the mobilization of large numbers of people
26 from all walks of life in mass movements that
27 continue to testify to the aspirations in
28 Bangladesh society for popular government
29 or, at least, for competitive elections and “civil
30 liberties”(Harry Blair, in Chapter 7).
31 Indeed, one of the shared characteristics of
32 political behavior in the three states that were
33 formerly part of British-ruled India has been
34 the centrality of mass mobilizations as vehicles
35 for political change, transformation, and even
36 overthrow of military regimes to reestablish
37 elections as the proper mode of achieving the
38 power to rule. It is a curiosity, however, of
39 Bangladesh politics that, although elections
40 are considered the only valid means of
41 attaining power, the losers invariably cry foul,
42 insisting that the elections were marred by
43 fraud or even rigged, often protesting the
44 results by a return to the streets, as Blair puts
45 it. Moreover, no matter which party wins
46 power, the winner takes all the spoils that
47 include especially the corrupt income and the
48 control over the police to protect one’s friends
I N T R O D U CT I O N
and harass one’s enemies. Indeed, both Blair
and Kochanek (see Chapter 25) point out that
Bangladesh has most often sur-passed all other
countries in the world in Transparency
International’s corruption index. Yet, public
faith in the idea of popular rule through
elections continues to be high in Bangladesh
as elsewhere in South Asia, where turnout
rates consistently surpass anything in the
United States, self-reputedly the world’s
“greatest democracy.” Indeed, parliamentary
government was again restored and elections
called for December 2008. Sheikh Hasina and
the Awami League emerged triumphant in a
“landslide” victory in an election with more
than 80 percent turnout in which the party
won a two-thirds majority in parliament,
Throughout all the dramatic changes in
Bangladesh politics, however, there has been
one persistent feature, namely, the predomi-
nance of the bureaucracy in policymaking.
This partly reflects the common experience
of the pivotal role of the bureaucracy during
British rule that has carried over to some
extent in all three states. But it also reflects
the fact that the parties and the politicians
actually have little interest in policy, their
primary concerns being in amassing corrupt
income for themselves and distributing
patronage to their supporters. Moreover, as
in Pakistan, the bureaucracy maintains cordial
relations with the military whenever the
military reasserts its dominance in Bangladesh
politics. But, the military in Bangladesh has
by no means the power or the resources of
its counterpart in Pakistan.
Sri Lanka
Like India, Sri Lanka has had an unbroken
post-Independence history of civilian govern-
ment in which, despite repeated changes in
the constitution of the country, popular
elections have always determined which
parties and leaders are to govern the country.
In fact, Sri Lanka was the first country in
South Asia to pass the conventional test of a
nonviolent change of government from one
5
PAU L R . B R AS S

party or set of parties to another. Moreover, contest elections. For, as in India and the other 1
it passed that test repeatedly in election after countries of the region as well, it is the desire 2
election between 1948 and 1977 (DeVotta, for a ministerial portfolio or the directorship 3
Chapter 8). Moreover, despite the existence of a public corporation that motivates politi- 4
in earlier periods of a multiplicity of minor cians, who will barter their votes in parliament 5
parties, the basic pattern over time in Sri to the party that will provide them the 6
Lanka has been alternation between two main portfolios or directorships from which they 7
parties, the SLFP and the UNP, plus their will garner corrupt income.The scramble for 8
allies. At the same time, repeated changes in such opportunities provides an edge to politics 9
the constitution of the country have shifted both in Sri Lanka and elsewhere in the region 10
the balance of power in the political system that encourages as well resort to violent means 11
to the president rather than to parliament. to win elections and gain power. 12
Further, DeVotta has argued that, despite the Also of note is the fact that in none of 13
façade of a model democratic state, Sri Lanka the countries of South Asia, despite bows to 14
has not been a liberal democracy, but rather secularist ideals, has there been a separation 15
an “illiberal democracy,” in which the basic between religion and politics. In Sri Lanka, 16
rules of democratic governance have been Buddhism has been declared the state religion 17
repeatedly violated. The violations have and Buddhist monks have been active in 18
included refusal on the part of the ruling numerous political movements, including that 19
party “to hold scheduled elections in 1975,” for the establishment of Sinhalese as the sole 20
extending its rule by two additional years; official language of the country in the 1950s, 21
the use and abuse of the Prevention of for the suppression of the Tamil revolt, and 22
Terrorism Act of 1979 to victimize “innocent for strengthening the “unitary state.” 23
Tamils” as the government sought to suppress The consequences of the failures of Sri 24
the rise of ethnic separatism and “manifold Lankan politicians to accommodate the diffe- 25
human rights violations” justified by the need rences among the several ethnic groups on the 26
to defeat the Tamil rebellion led by the island have been great: 70,000 people killed, 27
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE); nearly 600,000 “internally displaced, between 28
“voting irregularities” and “malpractices” 800,000 and one million Tamils” fled from the 29
during elections, including the outright country during the past quarter century culmi- 30
“rigging” of a national referendum in 1982 nating in a humanitarian disaster with the vic- 31
by which the government of the day tory of the Sri Lankan army terminating the 32
extended its rule “for another term”; and the civil war and, in the process, adding thousands 33
“disappearance” of “over 40,000 Sinhalese” more killed and perhaps another 300,000 34
during the suppression of an “uprising” by persons displaced in its wake. Neither are these 35
the militant JVP. As in all the other South figures exceptional for the countries of South 36
Asian countries as well, nepotism, favoritism, Asia, where slogans of national unity and ethnic 37
corruption, and “gangsterism” have been supremacy justify the carnage and appear quite 38
prevalent features in governance in Sri Lanka. compatible with competitive regimes that 39
In addition, in common with all the other proclaim their devotion to the ideals of demo- 40
countries of South Asia, dynastic competi- cratic participation and governance. 41
tion among prominent families for succession 42
in power has been a recurrent aspect of 43
Nepal
politics. Also, as in Bangladesh, the com- 44
petition between dynasties provides the basic In a region where the unexpected is ordinary 45
core of political opposition in a system in and fundamental changes have been taking 46
which there is otherwise little loyalty of place everywhere, recent events in Nepal stand 47
politicians to the parties on whose labels they out, namely, the overthrow of the monarchy 48
6

1 through the success of a Maoist revolution
2 after a ten-year war from 1996 to 2006; the
3 victory of the Maoists in a free, competitive
4 election; and the elevation of Prachanda, the
5 leader of the Maoists, to the position of prime
6 minister. In the process, Nepal has moved
7 dramatically, as Hachhethu and Gellner note
8 (in Chapter 9), from a state whose leaders
9 proudly proclaimed that they were the only
10 true Hindu state left in the world to a “secular
11 state,” towards the transformation of the gov-
12 ernment from its unitary form to federalism,
13 and towards an “inclusive democracy” in con-
14 trast to the high-caste dominated polity that
15 preceded it. Proposals for a mixture of ethnic
16 and territorial federal units are currently (2008)
17 under lively and controversial discussion.
18
19
Federalism and center–state
20
relations
21
22 Most postcolonial states have opted for
23 unitary rule by a central government, which
24 has often turned into nothing more than
25 military rule. However, the enormous cultural,
26 linguistic, ethnic, and religious diversity of the
27 states of South Asia has naturally led to
28 demands from many groups for constitutional
29 arrangements to accommodate and mediate
30 actual or potential conflicts among them.
31 Federalism, combined with various forms of
32 local self-government, has been the method
33 of choice for India, but it has been resisted
34 in all other states in the region. Pakistan early
35 discarded federalism in favor of a unitary state
36 with two wings, east and west, in order to
37 counter the much greater unity of the eastern
38 wing of the country compared to the western
39 part comprised of several major ethnic and
40 linguistic groups.The failure to adopt a federal
41 solution as a means of accommodation,
42 however, was an important factor in the
43 ultimate breakup of the country, with the
44 separation of the eastern wing and the
45 formation of Bangladesh. The latter state has
46 felt no need for federalism since the principal
47 minority group is the remnant population of
48 Hindus who remained there after Partition,
I N T R O D U CT I O N
then fled during the civil war and returned
again after the division of Pakistan.They have
no significant regional concentration. Neither
would any demands from that quarter for any
special institutional recognition be likely to
be accepted. Further, no government of
Bangladesh has expressed the wish to make
significant concessions for institutional change
to the small minority of hill tribal peoples
who live in the southeastern parts of the
country. As for Sri Lanka, various forms of
so-called devolution have been discussed and
even partly implemented in the northern and
eastern provinces as a solution to the civil
war that raged there from 1983 to 2009.The
government of Sri Lanka steadfastly resisted
a federal solution to the conflict in favor of
military suppression of the Tamil rebels.
Neither was federalism ever seriously con-
sidered by the king in Nepal, a situation that
has changed dramatically with the victory of
the Maoists and the proposed adoption there
of a federalist framework.
India has been exceptional in this regard,
and has developed distinctive forms of
federalism, in which state and national politics
have been intertwined and in which the
balance of powers between what is called
in India, the “center,” and the states has
undergone significant changes over time. In
fact, federalism in India, perhaps more than
in any other federal system, has involved
“continuous negotiation” (Rudolph and
Rudolph, in Chapter 10) concerning the
relations between the center and the states.
India began as a unitary-biased federal
system, with a strong center and weak states.
That bias was especially evident in two
respects: the center retained and used the
powers “to create, abolish, divide, or combine
states” (Rudolph and Rudolph). It also
(mis)used regulary and increasingly, in the
first several decades after Independence, its
powers to take over governance of the states
directly from the center under the constitu-
tional provision known as the imposition of
President’s Rule. Moreover, during the heyday
of Indira Gandhi, the governing Congress
7
PAU L R . B R AS S

party at the Center virtually controlled the which allows it to distribute funds for, and 1
selection of Congress candidates to contest monitor development programs in the states. 2
state legislative assembly elections, selected While a return to the days of central govern- 3
the chief ministers of the Congress-ruled ment dominance of the policy process and 4
states, and dismissed those who in any way state politics is unlikely, the relations between 5
became troublesome to Indira Gandhi herself the Center and the states continue in “flux” 6
and to the dominance of the Congress. (Rudolph and Rudolph) and continue also 7
Nevertheless, the predominant pattern of to be based on negotiation, bargaining, and 8
shift over the past half century has been the relative political weight of particular states 9
towards pluralism, regionalism, and decentral- in national political coalitions. 10
ization.6 With the shift in the balance of 11
central and state powers, as well as inter- 12
vention from the supreme court, the imposi- Part III: The judiciary 13
tion of President’s Rule has been much less 14
frequent. That tendency has been reinforced Chapter 11 on the Indian judiciary (by 15
in the last two decades with the decline of Shylashri Shankar) documents a further aspect 16
the Congress as the sole ruling party at the of political change and development of Indian 17
Center and its decline as well into permanent institutions, namely, the gradual assertion and 18
minority status in most of the states. Multi- reassertion of the authority of the supreme 19
partism nationally and multipartism in the court to oversee and limit, albeit rarely to 20
states—or forms of bipolar competition with invalidate, laws passed by parliament.Although 21
parties that differ from state to state—have it does not in this respect approach the powers 22
been largely responsible for these changes. of the US Supreme Court, yet, after many 23
The fragility of ruling coalitions at the Center setbacks, including strong efforts to control, 24
has increased the power of parties based in suppress, and overturn its judgments and 25
particular states at times—now regularly— interfere in its functioning, especially during 26
when they have sufficient members in parlia- Indira Gandhi’s years in power, it has emerged 27
ment to bring down the central government, with a stable, authoritative position in the 28
quite the opposite situation from the days Indian political order and has carved out 29
of dominance by Nehru and his daughter. niches for itself in several areas of public law, 30
Additionally, the gradual shift since 1991 from in which it has adopted assertive positions, 31
a “command economy” directed by the notably, as Shankar has pointed out, in areas 32
Center and its planning commission to a involving “social and economic rights.” 33
liberalization regime—which, in India as the Once again, the contrast with Pakistan is 34
Rudolphs describe it, has become a “federal stark, illustrated clearly by Newberg (Chapter 35
market economy”—has also reduced the 12). Whereas, in India, the supreme court 36
levers of control formerly held by the center has gradually asserted its separate domain of 37
to influence state governments. The more authority against attempts to undermine it, 38
enterprising and energetic leaders in the states in Pakistan, in contrast, the supreme court— 39
have also used the opportunities opened up and the judiciary in general—continue to 40
by the liberalization regime to directly solicit struggle to formulate a set of criteria that 41
investments in their states by global cor- would enable it to challenge effectively and 42
porations. consistently the repeated assertions of exe- 43
It is not the case, however, that the central cutive power. Successive political regimes, 44
government lacks significant power to influ- whether under military or civilian control, 45
ence state powers and politics. It still controls have dismissed judges and/or packed the 46
vast resources as a consequence of its con- courts with their own, compliant judges.The 47
tinued dominance in revenue collection, court, for its part, has repeatedly bowed to 48
8

1 executive authority through decisions justify-
2 ing authoritarian rule and/or dubious trans-
3 fers of executive authority from the military
4 to civilian leaders and vice versa on the
5 grounds of such doctrines as “necessity” and
6 “revolutionary legality.” It has also repeatedly
7 accepted the legality of granting immunity
8 from judicial judgment and indemnity for the
9 repeated abuse and misuse of power by the
10 executive authority or, contrarily, has accepted
11 the legality of the execution of a former prime
12 minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, ordered by his
13 successor, General Mohammed Zia ul Haq.
14 Yet, even in Pakistan, the striving for
15 legitimate authority not only of the courts
16 but of all state institutions has continued from
17 time to time to involve intense conflict, mass
18 movements, and violence. The current crisis
19 of authority in Pakistan (2007–08), as yet
20 far from definitively resolved, has put the
21 supreme court at the very center of the
22 struggle for power and legitimate authority
23 of all its institutions (except the Army, which
24 continues to maintain—in reserve at the
25 moment—its separate and often decisive role
26 in the course of political change).The current
27 struggle for power in Pakistan has placed the
28 courts, especially the supreme court, in an
29 extraordinary position. President Musharraf
30 dismissed the chief justice and packed the
31 courts with his own men. However, the
32 dismissed chief justice then succeeded, along
33 with his colleagues in the judiciary and the
34 bar, and with the support of a mass public,
35 in launching a movement that led to the
36 restoration of free elections, the participation
37 of previously banned leaders and parties, and
38 the marginalization of Musharraf himself, and
39 finally (2008) his forced resignation. Yet,
40 neither Musharraf nor the country’s prime
41 minister, brought to power by the movement,
42 or even the new president, Benazir Bhutto’s
43 widower, Asif Ali Zardari, wished to see the
44 power and authority of the judiciary restored.
45 Musharraf was forced to retire as president
46 under threat of impeachment, but Zardari
47 resisted the restoration of the judges until
48 March 2009.
I N T R O D U CT I O N
The position of the supreme court—and
the judiciary in general—in Bangladesh since
the achievement of Independence from
Pakistan has been similar to that of Pakistan.
Despite the assertion in the Constitution of
1972 of the “principle of judicial Indepen-
dence” (Hossain, in Chapter 13), and periodic
assertions of that principle by the court itself,
it has experienced politicization during
parliamentary periods, on the one hand, and
subordination during alternating periods of
military rule, on the other hand. Attempts to
reassert the independence of the judiciary
have relied on a stance articulated first in
India, namely, asserting that certain features
of the constitution (in this case, judicial
independence) cannot be altered by parlia-
ment since they affect the “basic structure”
of the constitution itself. However, the upshot
of the struggles for judicial independence in
Bangladesh has been the reduction of the
independence of the judiciary and its politic-
ization by both “full-blown military govern-
ments” as well as “autocratic presidents and
elected parliaments.”
The authority and performance of the
Sri Lankan judiciary are intermediate between
the respective positions of the courts in
India, on the one hand, and Pakistan and
Bangladesh, on the other hand, but rather
closer to India than to Pakistan and
Bangladesh.The three successive constitutions
of Sri Lanka have, in several ways, limited the
powers of the judiciary, especially with regard
to judicial review of laws passed by parlia-
ment and the powers of the president.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the judiciary in
Sri Lanka has accorded “deference to the
other state institutions,” and avoided direct
conflict with the executive and parliament
(Shankar) and has not been free from
“politicization.” Nevertheless, it has not
subordinated its decisions to the whims of
the ruling power. Neither has it engaged in
“judicial activism” in the manner of the
Indian Supreme Court. In practice, however,
its deference to other state institutions has
also meant that it has provided no protection
9
PAU L R . B R AS S

to the Tamil minorities in the country against also been accommodated through the federal 1
discrimination and harassment by the state. system in a process that began with the 2
Similarly, its decisions on religious freedom reorganization of states in the 1950s and 3
have been biased in favor of Buddhism and 1960s, but continues in some respects up to 4
against the interests of Christians and Muslims the present. Various other accommodations 5
especially, for example, with regard to the have also been made, including recognition 6
right to proselytize. Most important, in of all regional languages as media of examina- 7
common with all institutions, policies, and tion for entry into the central government 8
procedures of the Sri Lankan state, judicial services and the addition of other languages 9
decisions on matters of human rights, into the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution 10
including the right not to be tortured, have of India, which grants their speakers certain 11
been negatively affected by the debilitating rights and privileges. Problems remain, 12
civil war, which has moved Sri Lanka’s polity nevertheless, with regard to minority language 13
increasingly towards “executive sovereignty.” speakers within the reorganized states, parti- 14
cularly concerning the provision of educa- 15
tional facilities for such speakers. Further, 16
Part IV: Pluralism and national there is also a considerable differentiation 17
integration: language issues with regard to status and possibilities for 18
advancement among the speakers of the 19
Issues concerning pluralism and national various languages of India such that English 20
integration have been at the forefront in remains the preeminent language of the 21
virtually every multiethnic, multilingual, educated elite of the country, who dominate 22
multicultural postcolonial state. They have the central government bureaucracy while 23
been especially difficult and longlasting in speakers of the principal vernacular languages, 24
India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Bangladesh who do not know English, remain confined 25
itself was created as a consequence of the to opportunities available within their home 26
politicization of linguistic issues concerning states. In effect, although there remain move- 27
the official language of the state, which, in ments for recognition of several language 28
turn, overlay conflict over broader cultural groups, the language issue in India as a whole 29
differences between Bengalis and West has become less a matter of official recog- 30
Pakistanis. Equally extreme in its conse- nition and more a socioeconomic and status 31
quences has been the civil war in Sri Lanka “issue of differential access to English edu- 32
between the Sinhalese-dominated state and cation” (Annamalai, in Chapter 15). 33
the territorially concentrated Tamil minority. Pakistan’s solutions to the problems posed 34
For their part, India and Pakistan, far more by a multiplicity of languages were initially 35
diverse in all respects than the other states in quite different from India’s and had disastrous 36
the region, have had to confront multiple results. Initial attempts to impose Urdu as the 37
issues concerning the status of ethnolinguistic national and official language for the entire 38
and religiously distinct groups. country derived from the symbolic impor- 39
The Indian state has been largely successful tance of the rivalry between Urdu and Hindi 40
in coping with demands for recognition on language promoters in India before Inde- 41
behalf of the multiplicity of language groups pendence, even though in Pakistan itself only 42
comprised within its boundaries. India’s the refugees (mohajirs) from India spoke Urdu 43
leaders resolved the issues of official language as their mother tongue. Lacking any other 44
for the central government through a com- language that could make a claim as the 45
promise between Hindi and English as the “national” language of the country, Jinnah 46
two official languages of state. Moreover, all chose Urdu on the mistaken belief that it 47
the major regional languages of India have would unite rather than divide the country. 48
10

1 However, the attempt foundered against
2 Bengali opposition and provided the symbolic
3 basis for the secessionist movement that
4 ultimately resulted in the Independence of
5 Bangladesh.
6 The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan,
7 however, provides a similar solution to that
8 of India for the question of the national/
9 official languages of the country, namely,
10 Urdu formally declared as the “national
11 language,” while allowing for the indefinite
12 use of English “for official purposes” in the
13 country as a whole and for the provincial
14 languages in the several provinces (Rahman,
15 in Chapter 16). Yet, movements demanding
16 greater recognition of the regional languages
17 of West Pakistan, such as Sindhi and Balochi,
18 have persisted. Why? In most cases, language
19 is the emblem for uniting ethnic collectivities
20 against other ethnic groups perceived as
21 dominant in a province (such as the Urdu-
22 speaking mohajirs in Sindh) or against the
23 Pakistani state itself (as in Balochistan). In
24 other words, as Rahman has put it, in such
25 cases language “serves as an identity symbol”
26 for movements that have other ends beyond
27 development and promotion of the use of
28 the language itself.
29 But there has also been a curious twist in
30 the symbolic and instrumental uses of
31 language identification for political ends in
32 Pakistan, namely, the preference of elite
33 Punjabis—who form the largest and the
34 dominant ethnic collectivity in Pakistan—for
35 English and Urdu, including their resistance
36 to the teaching of their own mother tongue
37 in the primary schools of the province. It is
38 a curious twist that has a parallel in the post-
39 Independence Indian province of Punjab as
40 well where, in order to resist the demands of
41 Punjabi-speaking Sikhs for a separate province
42 in which Sikhs would have a majority,
43 Punjabi-speaking Hindus disowned their own
44 language in favor of Hindi to such an extent
45 that an entire generation switched their
46 language both of identification and actual
47 practical usage.7 These two cases in themselves
48 provide the most striking evidence for the
I N T R O D U CT I O N
proposition that language movements may
be, and often are, symbolic representations of
other interests than the protection of the
language itself. Those interests everywhere
concern primarily power (Rahman) and
economic advantage.
One further issue of identity concerns the
question of “national language” itself. India
has wisely avoided using that term for either
Hindi or English, which conveys a sense of
superiority for one language among many,
preferring instead to characterize all the
widespread and predominant regional langu-
ages as “national languages,” with those given
preference being designated only as “official
languages.” Pakistan, however, less sure of its
own national identity, made the mistake of
attempting to assert it by elevating one
language to the emotively powerful status of
“national language.” The obvious solution,
however, as Rahman points out, is essentially
an Indian one for Pakistan, namely, designat-
ing “five national languages in the country
with Urdu as a language of inter-provincial
communication and English for international
communication.”
The feature of language use that is most
clearly shared by both Pakistanis and Indians
is the high status associated with English and
the class differentiation in its adoption. It is
in both countries the language of the domi-
nant elites in “private sector employment” and
in “the upper echelons of Pakistani society”
(Rahman).This, indeed, has become the most
important consequence of language policies
in both countries in the context of “a failed
educational system,” that is to say, one that
relegates the vast mass of the populations of
both countries to utterly inferior, decrepit,
and poorly funded government schools while
the rich and well-born attend English-
medium schools of high standard, the latter
even subsidized in Pakistan by government.
In Pakistan, there is yet a further consequence,
namely the spread of madrasahs as alternatives
to totally inadequate government-funded
vernacular schools. Although there is no
evidence that these madrasahs are producing
11
PAU L R . B R AS S

more anti-American “terrorists” than the Further, in the case of Jammu and Kashmir, 1
ordinary government schools, they are most where support or safe haven has been pro- 2
obviously producing generations of persons vided to insurgents against the Indian state 3
for whom religion provides their primary by Pakistan, India has gone to war to put a 4
loyalty while the dominant English-educated stop to its intervention, notably after Indepen- 5
elites constitute a “secular” governing minor- dence in 1947–48 and again in 1965 and, for 6
ity. Rahman concludes his chapter with the different reasons, in the short Kargil war of 7
very powerful statement that “the present 1999, fought at an altitude of 16,000 feet 8
language policies have the cumulative effect over the issue of the “line of control” in 9
of increasing inequality and polarization in Kashmir. It also intervened directly to bring 10
the country.” That polarization would seem about the secession of Bangladesh from 11
to place those who have political power, Pakistan in the 1971 war. While India’s 12
economic security, and secular values on one intervention might, on the face of it, appear 13
side in contrast to those disempowered, to undermine its own adherence to the 14
economically insecure, and oriented towards principle of the virtually sacred unity of 15
religious values as a primary identification. postcolonial states, from another point of view 16
it is wholly consistent with that principle, for 17
it has never accepted the legitimacy of the 18
Part V: Crises of national unity
original partition of the subcontinent, and 19
especially its basis in religious separatism. Its 20
India
intervention against Pakistan in that case, 21
All the countries of the region have, to greater therefore, was propelled in part by the 22
or lesser degree, faced crises of national unity, opportunity to demonstrate the illegitimacy 23
greatest, of course, in the case of the of the original partition and of a state whose 24
disintegration of Pakistan. But all have had creation was based on such a claim. 25
to confront, placate, or crush by military Indian leaders never tire of making claims 26
means demands for secession made by militant for their status as the “world’s largest democ- 27
organizations on behalf of minority ethnic, racy.” As indicated already, there is much to 28
linguistic, or religious groups. In the case of sustain such a view of India’s democratic 29
India, aside from a secessionist demand long politics, but it is a rare kind of democracy 30
ago abandoned in Tamil Nadu in south India, whose military forces have killed so many of 31
there have been three regions where violent its own people, perhaps 25,000 in squashing 32
secessionist movements have either continued the Punjab insurrection and another 25,000 33
since Independence or have recurred from in Kashmir, and perhaps 100,000 altogether 34
time to time, namely, Jammu and Kashmir, against all insurrectionary movements since 35
Punjab, and the northeastern states. In all Independence. As Gurharpal Singh notes (in 36
cases, the government of India over the past Chapter 17), this is a democracy that uses 37
60 years has made it abundantly clear that it what he calls “hegemonic control,” including 38
will not tolerate any demand whatsoever for “cooption, accommodation and symbolic 39
secession from the country while, at the same agreements” in dealing with secessionist 40
time, always being open to considering movements, but will also resort to “violent 41
demands that fall short of secession, including control” whenever necessary. Nowhere has 42
the creation of separate states and/or autono- this alternation been more apparent than in 43
mous regions within the Indian Union.Those the northeastern region of the country where 44
movements that persist in making secessionist agreement after agreement has been reached 45
demands, however, have met with massive through compromises with rebel groups that 46
violence at the hands of the various military never hold and are inevitably followed by 47
and paramilitary forces of the Indian state. renewed violence and the unbending resolve 48
12

1 of the government of India to use in response
2 the utmost force to suppress secessionist
3 movements.
4 Secessionist movements have not been the
5 only types that have led to strident and often
6 violent conflicts in Indian politics. More a
7 part of everyday politics, in fact, have been
8 issues pertaining to the status, political power,
9 and access to state resources of caste forma-
10 tions, on the one hand, and the place of the
11 two principal religious communities, Hindus
12 and Muslims, on the other hand. In the latter
13 case, the issue has also increasingly become
14 one not of secession, but of the definition of
15 the Indian state, whether it is to be defined
16 as a Hindu state or a secular state. While
17 intercaste conflicts have from time to time
18 led to intercaste violence, such violence has
19 been sporadic and mostly local in character.
20 Communal conflicts, in contrast, while often
21 arising out of local conflicts, have frequently
22 been magnified deliberately for political
23 purposes, and have been responsible for many
24 thousands of deaths since Independence up
25 to the present in what are labeled Hindu–
26 Muslim “riots.” These riots have been
27 produced or instigated by politicians from
28 many political parties for local advantage in
29 electoral contests since Independence. In the
30 past 15 years, however, the BJP and its sister
31 organizations in the RSS family of organ-
32 izations have been the principal promoters
33 of such violence in calculated efforts to
34 demonize the Muslim population of the
35 country and mobilize the Hindu population
36 in order to capture power in the several states
37 and in the Indian Union itself. It has had
38 substantial success in doing so in the past,
39 notably in the massive mobilization that led
40 to the destruction of the mosque at Ayodhya
41 in 1992. It has also been responsible for the
42 pogrom against Muslims in the state of
43 Gujarat in 2002, under a BJP government
44 that deliberately instigated and promoted the
45 violence for the purpose of shoring up its
46 electoral base in the upcoming state election.
47 Wilkinson (Chapter 18) and others have
48 demonstrated clearly that the strategy did, in
I N T R O D U CT I O N
fact, work to produce “a crushing victory”
for the BJP in the December 2002 elections.
The government, and the chief minister who
orchestrated the violence, remain in power
to this day (2008).Wilkinson, however, argues
that communal politics in India have only
limited and sporadic uses whereas caste
politics are central to Indian politics on an
everyday basis and, one should add, remain
the most important factors in most elections
in most states of the country up to the
present.
Indeed, there have been innumerable
movements based on caste solidarities and
caste antagonisms over the past century,
ranging from the non-Brahman movements
in southern and western India to the
movements of so-called “backward classes” (a
term commonly used for the middle status
castes) throughout the country, and the more
recent rise of “dalit” (“oppressed”) and other
movements of low caste groups for recog-
nition, government employment, and access
to state resources and political patronage.
Indeed, the preferred method of advancing
the interests of all the less privileged caste
groups in Indian society has been to demand
“reservations” of places for designated caste
groups in the legislatures and in government
service. As a result, various forms of reserva-
tion for such groups have been adopted both
in the central government and in most, if not
all the Indian states.While intercaste conflicts
have, as noted, sometimes led to violence, for
the most part the jockeying has taken place
through the political process, with bidding
common among political parties for the
support of the more numerous caste groups
during elections.
It should not, however, be imagined that
the status hierarchy that has always pervaded
Indian life will soon be eliminated in con-
sequence of such policies for the benefit of
the less privileged classes. In fact, the rise of
a vibrant private sector economy associated
with the economic liberalization process has
made it possible for the upper castes, displaced
from positions of power in many Indian states,
13
PAU L R . B R AS S

to retain their eminence in Indian society, to consider seriously any kind of settlement 1
for it is the upper castes who get the lucrative in Jammu and Kashmir that would involve 2
jobs in the fast developing private sector while significant concessions to Pakistan, and the 3
government jobs—especially at the lower United States, by its bungling, inadequate, and 4
levels—and the lower status accompanying incompetent intervention in Afghanistan that 5
them are reserved for the less privileged. has added to the destabilization of Pakistan 6
It is also important to note that the pri- and, as any knowledgeable South Asian speci- 7
macy of caste politics in India has an effect alist could have predicted, to the intensification 8
on communal politics, mainly to undermine of the hostile relationship between the two 9
it. The BJP’s use of communal politics in major South Asian countries. 10
elections has been designed to consolidate But, Pakistan’s issues of national unity are 11
the Hindu vote in areas where there is a large not at all the creations of other countries— 12
Muslim population that can be demonized which merely exacerbate them—but arise 13
and blamed for the riots that are, in fact, from the very conditions that led to its 14
produced by BJP or BJP-recruited Hindu foundation and its failures to accommodate 15
activists. But such unification of the Hindu successfully regional, ethnic, and Islamic 16
castes cannot be sustained indefinitely even movements and their demands. The status of 17
in particular electoral constituencies and is the Pakhtun population in the North-West 18
untenable most of the time in most con- Province was a problem from the beginning 19
stituencies in most states in the country. since its predominant leadership preferred to 20
Further,Wilkinson notes that, in states where remain part of India, but, in the midst of the 21
there are highly competitive electoral contests turmoil of 1947, could only boycott the 22
in which Muslims hold the potential balance referendum, which resulted in a favorable 23
in determining the outcomes, the benefits of vote for Pakistan, although with a low 24
polarizing Hindu and Muslim votes turn turnout. The Khudai Khidmatgars then 25
negative for the political parties, thereby demanded a semi-autonomous status for the 26
decreasing the likelihood of Hindu–Muslim region, which was denied.8 Many Balochistan 27
riots produced for political reasons. tribal leaders, for their part, have never 28
accepted the legitimacy of Pakistan’s rule 29
over the province, which has been a site of 30
Pakistan
unending insurgency since the creation of 31
The scale and intensity of violence in Pakistan Pakistan, although this huge territory also is 32
has sometimes seemed to threaten the viability internally divided by conflicts between the 33
of the state itself, which, after all, was one of Baloch and Pakhtun groups.Waseem (Chapter 34
the very few states in the world to split apart 19) attributes the persistent conflict there and 35
during the period of bipolar political domi- elsewhere in Pakistan to the general 36
nance by the United States and the Soviet preference of all ruling parties and the military 37
Union, when it was in the interest of neither for “coercive strategies for unification across 38
great power to allow such dramatic political ethnic divisions” that stand in sharp contrast 39
changes.Yet, it remains in the interest of none to the general policy in India of accom- 40
at this time, with the exception of al-Qaeda, modation of all ethnopolitical movements 41
to allow such a development in Pakistan.The that stop short of demanding secession and 42
paradox in all this is that powerful forces independence. In contrast to India, for exam- 43
remain at work internally and externally to ple, Pakistan has never seriously considered 44
undermine Pakistan’s stability and unity, federal solutions as a means of accommo- 45
including those two states that have the great- dating ethnonationalist demands. Banned, 46
est interest in maintaining it, namely, India jailed, and otherwise disrupted by the new 47
and the United States: India, by its refusal even Pakistan state, the secular, pro-India Pakhtun 48
14

1 movement was ultimately displaced in the
2 NWFP by Islamist movements. Islamist
3 movements have also been supported in
4 Punjab and Sindh by the mohajirs, migrants
5 from India, and their offspring.
6 Further problems have arisen as a con-
7 sequence of the very basis for the creation
8 of Pakistan, namely, the idea that it was to
9 be a homeland for the Muslims of India.
10 Although its founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah,
11 never wished for a homogenous Muslim state,
12 that was the result of the Partition violence
13 that led to the total transfer of the Hindu
14 and Sikh populations from western Punjab
15 to India and of the entire Muslim population
16 from Punjab to Pakistan. Despite Jinnah’s
17 declaration that Pakistan was to be a secular
18 state, not a Muslim state, the result has
19 been the opposite. Although, in fact, most
20 Pakistanis, like most Indians, do not wish to
21 see Pakistan become a state based on religion,
22 the circumstances of Pakistan’s creation have
23 enhanced the influence of the ulema in policy
24 formation and encouraged the proliferation
25 of intolerant Islamist political movements.
26 A further difference from India has been
27 the predominance of one province and one
28 ethnic collectivity, Punjab and the Punjabis,
29 with 58 percent of the country’s population.
30 In India, in contrast, although the north
31 Indian Hindi speakers constitute the largest
32 single linguistic conglomeration, they have
33 never been able to consolidate into a unified
34 political force that would dominate the rest
35 of the country. It never emerged “as the
36 power base” (Waseem, in Chapter 19) of the
37 country as has Punjab, which is also the most
38 economically dynamic region of the country.
39 There is, however, in all this a commonality
40 between India and Pakistan in one very
41 important sense, namely, the drive in both
42 countries to find a basis for achieving a
43 political majority to rule in countries that are
44 multireligious, multiethnic, and multilingual
45 and lack an overarching sense of cultural
46 identity. In India, that drive has been most
47 strongly articulated by the Hindu nationalist
48 movement of the BJP. In Pakistan, it takes the
I N T R O D U CT I O N
form of Islamist movements that seek to over-
ride or suppress regional, linguistic, religious,
and other cultural identities— including the
Islamic faultline of Sunni-Shi’a difference—
and are especially favored by those groups that
lack an indigenous identity, namely, the non-
Punjabi mohajirs, most of whom settled in
Sindh where “they remained unassimilated
in the host community” (Waseem). Their
numbers were later increased by a second
influx of so-called Bihari migrants from
Bangladesh after its separation from Pakistan.
Sri Lanka
The longevity and scale of killing that has
arisen out of ethnic, communal, and interstate
conflicts in South Asia—including the states
conventionally classed as “democracies,”
namely, India and Sri Lanka—should give
pause to their apologists. In the sorry tale of
seemingly unending violent conflicts in South
Asia, the civil war in Sri Lanka requires
attention. The civil war itself was a direct
consequence of the nationalist idea that has
overtaken the world especially in the past two
centuries, namely, that every territory has its
rightful nation and every nation has a
territory of its own. Since there are no
territories in the entire world that fit such a
description, this nationalist idea requires that
those who do not fit the ethnic definition
of the rightful owners of a particular territory
be defined as minorities who are either
allowed to remain on that territory at the
sufferance of the rightful owners or must be
evicted, if not destroyed.
The ideological backdrop to the conflicts
that arise from this exclusivism are usually
ignored in favor of interpretations that stress
their origins in inequalities that favor one
group over another or in religious or ethnic
or other antagonisms. But such differences
become irresolvable mainly when the issue
of “right” comes to the fore, namely, who
has the right to the resources and the
privileges and the status of equal citizens of
a common territory.
15
PAU L R . B R AS S

In Sri Lanka, conflicts that arose in part the fears of the Sinhalese leaders that any 1
out of resentments—or better, the creation such concession would be but a prelude to 2
of resentments by a political elite—against secession, with the unstated fear that the party 3
the alleged inequalities in Sri Lankan that allowed such a compromise would be 4
society that favored Tamils over the rightful wiped out in the next election. By the same 5
indigenous owners of the island, the Sinhalese token, the Tamil leaders proclaimed their 6
people, became irresolvable not because the insistence on the right of “national self- 7
issues themselves could not be resolved, but determination” (Uyangoda) which, of course, 8
because the dominant Sinhalese elites of all fed the Sinhalese fears. 9
parties found it politically helpful to make India’s failed intervention in the conflict 10
use of them to gain power through elections. in the mid-1980s was itself tarnished by the 11
That there were concrete ways of resolving same brush. Intervening in reality to protect 12
the conflicts was evident very early in Sri the Tamil population of the island in order 13
Lanka’s post-Independence history in the to satisfy the feelings of the Tamil politicians 14
agreements reached between Tamil and and people in Tamil Nadu itself, it evolved 15
Sinhalese leaders to resolve the language issue into a failed effort to crush the armed Tamil 16
that was the surrogate for the dispute. Those revolt in Sri Lanka.The effort itself, however, 17
agreements, especially in 1957 and 1965, was motivated by cross-purposes: protecting 18
however, were never implemented because Tamils while absolutely rejecting any 19
they immediately became hostage to the cries secessionist ideas that might also cross the 20
of opposing political formations that the waters and thereby revive the long ago 21
rightful place of the Sinhalese as the dominant abandoned dream in Tamil Nadu for secession 22
people on the island was being undermined. and independence from India. 23
So, what began as an “ethnic conflict” over That all such dreams of ethnonational 24
language rights—and behind that access to homogeneity of a people and a territory are 25
government jobs—in Sri Lanka ultimately chimeras is evident in the course of the civil 26
turned “into a civil war between the state war itself. In every such situation, there are 27
and Tamil nationalist groups . . . in the late inevitably small or large groups of people 28
1970s” (Uyangoda, in Chapter 20). In the interspersed in the contending groups, but 29
intervening years, so-called ethnic riots in who do not belong to either. Such is the 30
which mostly Tamils were killed, often with case of the Muslims in parts of Sri Lanka, 31
the complicity of state leaders, prepared the including especially the Eastern Province 32
ground for the final transformation of the where they have sizable populations, but also 33
conflict. But the progression, Uyangoda notes, in parts of the Northern Province. The 34
arose on account of the “inflexibility of conflict between the Sri Lankan state and the 35
Sinhalese nationalism in responding to Tamils thus led to a further demand, 36
minority ethnic grievances” and was fed in now from the Muslims, forced, in effect, to 37
a political process whose central feature was discover their “ethnic and political identity” 38
“ethnic outbidding.” (Uyangoda) as well. As Rupert Emerson 39
The failure to end this civil war through put it many years ago: “Who can say the 40
negotiations continued to founder on the nations nay, and yet who can say what nations 41
issue of whether or not the Sinhalese people are and when and how they may assert 42
own the entire island. Its specific form themselves?”9 In the meantime, the Sri 43
revolved around whether or not the war Lankan civil war continued at the highest 44
could be ended by transforming Sri Lanka level of intensity yet seen until the Tamil 45
into a federal state or agreeing to regional insurrection was finally crushed with huge 46
autonomy in the Tamil regions.The possibility loss of life and displacement of Tamil civil- 47
of agreement, however, always foundered on ians, “with life going on pretty much ‘as 48
16
 I N T R O D U CT I O N

1 normal’ in most of the Sinhala-dominated Most observers would probably find little
2 parts of the island.”10 to disagree with these statements. What is
3 mainly contested are the reasons for the new
4 growth and the means for extending its
5 Part VI: Political economy benefits to the population as a whole. Outside
6 India, it is generally assumed that it is
7 Discussion of issues of politics and economic economic liberalization, the freeing of the
8 development in the South Asian countries Indian economy from the constraints of state-
9 have been handled differently by the several directed, planned economic growth that is
10 contributors to this volume. As a result, there responsible for these changes. Within India,
11 are two chapters specifically concerning the however, where the Left is not dead, it is
12 political economy of India (Corbridge, argued that the earlier stage of planned
13 Chapter 21, and Breman, Chapter 22) and economic growth laid the basis for the current
14 one on Sri Lanka (Lakshman, Chapter 23), surge, which would not have been possible
15 but the discussion of economic issues in without the previous public investments.
16 Pakistan (Burki, Chapter 6) and Bangladesh The argument itself may appear academic,
17 (Blair, Chapter 7) have been included within but it carries forward to the present in policy
18 the chapters on the politics of those two debates concerning the second issue of
19 countries, referenced briefly later in this extending the benefits of the new growth.
20 chapter. Can it really be believed, in the jargon of the
21 acolytes of Milton Friedman, that the rising
22 tide of growth and prosperity will “lift all
23 India boats,” that public spending on health, edu-
24 Major transformations are occurring in the cation, and other forms of welfare cannot do
25 the trick and that all these matters are best
political economy of India, heralded in the
26 left for the private sector to resolve?
press and business magazines as the latest
27 In fact, these are issues of ideological belief
addition to the new global capitalist world
28 that cannot be resolved theoretically. What
of high growth. In India itself, the former
29 can be shown are the specific consequences
BJP government adopted the slogan of “India
30 of past and present economic policies for
Shining” to proclaim its entry into that new
31 categories of people.Who benefited and who
world. Corbridge (in Chapter 21) examines
32 lost or were left behind by the developmental
33 these claims as well as the explanations policies of the first decades after Indian
34 for the changes that have occurred. That Independence and what groups in the popu-
35 the Indian economy (before the current lation are benefiting or losing now from the
36 (2008–09) world economic crash) had been new liberalization policies? There is a con-
37 growing at a high and steady pace not sensus that crosses ideological dispositions that
38 previously seen since Independence is clear. the beneficiaries of the developmental regime
39 That its benefits have not reached in were the “richer farmers,” the “industrial
40 significant measure the poorest of India’s bourgeoisie,” and “the country’s leading
41 citizens—several hundreds of millions by bureaucrats” who profited from the corrupt
42 any measure—who continue to live in the income generated through the “permit-
43 utmost poverty and degradation is also clear. license-quota Raj” (Corbridge). The losers
44 That the changes have increased, rather than and those who gained little or nothing were
45 lessened, inequalities in a society historically mainly the poor and landless in the country-
46 based on one of the most rigid hierarchical side. With regard to the present, under the
47 systems the world has ever seen is not liberalization regime, it is clear enough already
48 surprising. that the main beneficiaries are the global
17
PAU L R . B R AS S

corporations, the high caste English-speaking while those, the vast majority, who have 1
Indians who find jobs in those corporations, remained in the countryside, continue to live 2
indigenous entrepreneurs freed from the a bleak subaltern life of labor for pay insuf- 3
restraints of the development regime, a loosely ficient for decent nourishment of themselves 4
defined urban middle class with rising and their families while faced with physical 5
incomes that enable them at last to obtain beatings from their overlords should they dare 6
easily the cherished goods of modernity— to protest or demand higher wages or even 7
refrigerators, TVs, automobiles for the richer the legally mandated wage. Many of those 8
among them, and the like. The losers remain who leave the land do not migrate to the 9
the same: the poor, the landless, the “lower” city, but to backbreaking “unskilled jobs such 10
castes, those displaced from their land by land as digging, hauling and lifting work” for 11
grabs supported by the state to construct which they get paid little more than the 12
large dams or to benefit entrepreneurs and prevailing wage for agricultural labor 13
corporations, safely ensconced in “special (Breman). 14
economic zones.” In brief, as Corbridge Yet, however wretched the contemporary 15
summarizes the matter: “The net effect of existence of the landless, there has been some 16
the reforms has been to widen the gulf improvement in their condition from the 17
between rich and poor people in India, and 1960s and 1970s: marginally better living 18
between rich and poor regions, but that was quarters and nourishment, some elementary 19
always going to be the case.” education, and some improvement in health 20
Another way of putting the matter is to care. Many of these improvements, however 21
say that the varna system is constantly repro- minimal, have come about through the 22
duced in India, that the benefits of economic political process as the Congress, especially 23
growth will go virtually exclusively to the during the heyday of Indira Gandhi, provided 24
upper castes, that the political order will specific benefits for the landless laborers, 25
become increasingly marginalized with the including tiny plots of land on which to build 26
economy dominated by the ruling classes and their homes. In Uttar Pradesh, where the 27
the vast majority of rural and urban poor BSP, under the leadership of Mayawati, has 28
experiencing marginal benefits and continued provided considerable funding for the 29
grinding poverty. improvement of the lives of the lowest castes 30
In this context, Breman (Chapter 22) in the villages as well as employment oppor- 31
provides a reality check. What really are the tunities in government service (including 32
conditions of life in “Shining India” for the most significantly in the police) the status 33
wretched of the earth, the poorest of the poor, and assertiveness of the lowest castes has 34
the laborers in agriculture? Agricultural policy decidedly increased. 35
in India in the post-Independence period Yet, the bulk of the population classified 36
focused primarily on eliminating the domi- as living below the famous “poverty line” 37
nant tax farmers in the countryside and continues to come from this class of land- 38
replacing them with a countryside dominated less poor. How then to summarize the 39
by a self-sufficient middle peasantry.Very little improvement in living conditions for the 40
was done to improve the living and working poorest compared to their past wretchedness? 41
conditions of the landless poor. Instead, they In a word, however much conditions have 42
were offered a chapati in the sky of a bright improved, the gap between the poorest and 43
future as factory laborers in a soon to be those who live a comfortable—or luxurious— 44
developed urban economy. In fact, however, life has increased so that there is “even greater 45
most of those who have moved to the cities inequity than before” (Breman). Not only 46
have merely shifted their underclass status to that, the Indian countryside continues to 47
an equally wretched urban environment, harbor large “landless colonies” whose popu- 48
18

1 lations consist of paupers and lumpen ele-
2 ments, living a “sub-human existence” without
3 hope of any improvement for themselves or
4 their children. Neither can the statistics of the
5 government of India concerning the reduction
6 in poverty in India be taken at face value for
7 two reasons: first, they ignore the question of
8 how decent life is, in fact, just above the
9 poverty line. Second, as Breman has suggested,
10 it is very likely that the data are being cooked
11 to fit the image of “Shining India.” Finally,
12 Breman argues very strongly that a combina-
13 tion of a policy of “market fundamentalism”
14 in a society with “an ingrained ideology of
15 social inequality are a deadly combination”
16 that offers little or no improvement in any
17 near future for the poorest of the poor.
18
19
Sri Lanka
20
21 The political economy of Sri Lanka has
22 differed in many ways from that of India and
23 the other countries in the South Asian region.
24 For one thing, a small island republic, it
25 was, during British rule, a classic “tropical”
26 export economy, “an export economy par
27 excellence” (Lakshman, Chapter 23) based on
28 estate tea cultivation and “other primary
29 commodities” such as coconut and rubber.
30 Sri Lanka’s social economy has also differed
31 significantly from that of India in its emphasis
32 on “social expenditures programs,” namely,
33 education, health, and food subsidies. In
34 consequence, Sri Lanka, in sharp contrast to
35 the rest of South Asia has had a very high
36 PQLI (Physical Quality of Life Index), as
37 high as 82 in the early 1980s.
38 In other respects, however, Sri Lanka has
39 followed a somewhat similar track to that of
40 India and other developing economies,
41 namely, a movement from “import substitu-
42 tion” to liberalization. Throughout the post-
43 Independence period, however, the perform-
44 ance of the Sri Lankan economy has been,
45 as Lakshman puts it, “lackluster.” Meanwhile,
46 however, there has been a significant reduc-
47 tion in the share of the economy contributed
48 by primary agricultural production, although
I N T R O D U CT I O N
it remains relatively high even now in both
percentage of GDP and total employment in
the country. The social consequences of the
shift to liberalization policies has, of course,
increased income inequalities, enriching the
already rich and the newly rich and con-
centrating wealth in the hands of entre-
preneurs, politicians, and high level bureau-
crats. Contrariwise, the poverty ratio has
hardly changed during the past 20 years,
remaining at “around 20–25 percent.” Overall,
however, the Sri Lankan combination of a
liberalization regime with significant social
welfare benefits stands in sharp contrast to
the tremendous inequalities and degradation
of life for the poorest in most of India, a
contrast that is starkly visible in the obvious
differences in the quality of human life to
anyone who spends some time in both
countries. That the same combination could
work in India is evident also in the Indian
state of Kerala, where the quality of life is at
least equal to that of Sri Lanka, if not even
better.
Pakistan
In Chapter 6, Burki has noted that, in the
repeated alternations of power between the
military and the politicians in Pakistan,
the latter have failed miserably to promote
either responsible government or economic
development. All the political leaders of the
last several decades, from Bhutto père to
Bhutto fille to Zardari and Nawaz Sharif have
amassed enormous wealth and property by—
to put it mildly—quite dubious means. Burki
has placed great importance on the failures
of the regimes led by the politicians to
produce economic results as favorable as those
produced by the military regimes (with, of
course, American economic aid) as a factor
in the acceptance by the public of the
repeated interventions by the military.
19
PAU L R . B R AS S

Bangladesh minimal. Sri Lanka had only very small military 1

forces. However, in the latter cases, the military 2
Throughout all the political changes, at least
have vastly expanded in size, power, and 3
since the 1990s, and despite the instability
importance since Independence, decisive in 4
and corruption, the Bangladesh economy, still
politics in Bangladesh in fact, although firmly 5
overwhelmingly dominated by the agri-
under the control of the civilian power in Sri 6
cultural sector, has done well, a paradox (Blair,
Lanka. Moreover, the two largest countries in 7
Chapter 7) for which there is no easy
the region, India and Pakistan, have been 8
explanation, although clearly massive foreign
engaged for many years in a nuclear arms race, 9
aid has had a great deal to do with it.
subterranean for decades, but marked by blatant 10
Whatever the reasons, Blair notes that there
displays of their existence from time to time, 11
has been a significant rise in foodgrain
beginning with the travesty of India’s first 12
production during the past two decades,
“peaceful nuclear explosion” in 1974 and 13
which translates into greater “food availability
culminating in the successive nuclear explo- 14
per capita” at reduced prices; some movement
sions by both India and Pakistan in 1998. 15
in “off-farm” sectors such as “transportation,
Neither have the two enemies shrunk on 16
construction, [and] retailing,” leading to some
several occasions from making outright nuclear 17
upswing in wages; and a significant overall
threats (Cohen). 18
drop in “the proportion of rural workers
The dispersion of military forces in South 19
whose primary occupation was in agri-
Asia has, moreover, gone far beyond tradi- 20
culture.” Blair attributes these favorable
tional forms in Weberian states that maintain 21
results to a combination of policy changes
a monopoly of the legitimate use of force. 22
towards a liberalization regime, fortified
There has been, in addition, a proliferation 23
initially by massive foreign aid, both of
of paramilitary forces, some under the control 24
which overrode—providing the paradox—
of the state, others maintained surreptitiously 25
the obvious “misgovernance” in the country
by the state, and still others engaged in 26
since Independence.
rebellion against the state, and in some cases, 27
especially Sri Lanka, in the form of outright 28
civil war. In Nepal, a Maoist insurrectionary 29
Part VII: Comparative chapters
force succeeded in 2007 in holding their 30
own11 against the weak and “ineffective” 31
Civil–military relations
(Cohen) Royal Nepal Army, thereby bringing 32
The similarities and differences among the about the downfall of the king and the 33
states of South Asia are brought out especially transformation of the political regime towards 34
clearly in the comparative chapters in this parliamentary rule. 35
volume. One of the most distressing features Although India has experienced the 36
of “development” in virtually all postcolonial proliferation and dispersion of various military 37
countries has been the growth in importance elements, it has maintained absolute and 38
of the military, not only or even especially unchallenged civilian control over the state 39
to prepare for battle with foreign enemies, military forces. Sri Lanka, too, has largely 40
but for the purpose of controlling their own maintained civilian control over the military, 41
populations and quelling protest movements with the exception of one farcical near coup 42
amongst them. d’état attempt in 1962 that was “called off ” 43
India and Pakistan inherited substantial at the eleventh hour.12 At the same time, the 44
military forces (Cohen, Chapter 24), including very extensive use of the military in dealing 45
considerable elements with experience in battle with “domestic violence” (Cohen) in both 46
in the Second World War. The Bangladesh these countries and the very considerable 47
component of those forces, however, was quite military expenditures lavished on the military 48
20

1 forces in them is part of the common pattern
2 in the region. Moreover, it is rather a well-
3 kept secret that Sikh forces posted in northern
4 India engaged in outright mutiny at the time
5 of the Indian army’s assault on the Golden
6 Temple in Amritsar in 1984 and had to be
7 rounded up as they sought to head towards
8 Amritsar.13
9 mental state, the corruption system promotes
10
Corruption and criminalization
11
12 The differences among the South Asian
13 countries with regard to corruption and the
14 criminalization of politics are rather less than
15 their differences with regard to the role of
16 the military. All countries in the region rank
17 high on the various indexes of global corrup-
18 tion, although Pakistan, Bangladesh, and
19 Nepal persistently rank higher than either
20 India or Sri Lanka.The literature on corrup-
21 tion in South Asia differs in its assessment of
22 its consequences. Kochanek (Chapter 25)
23 argues that it has negative consequences for
24 economic growth, while others suggest that
25 corruption has it uses, not merely in greasing
26 palms, but in greasing the wheels of
27 government to speed up economic develop-
28 ment projects.Thus, the term “speed money”
29 has been used in South Asia, as elsewhere, to
30 summarize its positive effects.
31 Right-wing and laissez-faire economists,
32 of course, blame the developmental state for
33 the high incidence of corruption in post-
34 colonial societies. Kochanek agrees. Further,
35 the stakes have become sufficiently high in
36 the developmental states of South Asia, where
37 control over the distributional resources of
38 the state has become the primary aim of
39 nearly all politicians, so much so that the
40 political process itself has become increasingly
41 criminalized.
42 Any assessment of the state of democratic
43 politics in South Asia that fails to note the
44 pervasiveness of corruption and criminality
45 that permeates all levels of the state and the
46 electoral process itself must be considered
47 deficient. In Bangladesh, criminality and
48 violence are integral to ensuring success in
I N T R O D U CT I O N
elections. In Pakistan, several of its heads of
state have had well-established records of
massive corruption. Even India, where most
heads of state have had reputations for
honesty, Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi, and
Narasimha Rao all had dubious records in
these respects.
Like all other features of the develop-
inequality. The principal beneficiaries are
those who have “money, status, and connec-
tions” (Kochanek). Those who cannot pay,
the poorest, are unlikely to receive even those
benefits that are specifically designated for
them.
Radical and violent political
movements
The states of South Asia, in common with
other postcolonial states, have all faced, and
continue to face violent insurrectionary
movements that challenge the authority,
legitimacy, and/or the boundaries of the
existing states. The parliamentary systems,
India and Sri Lanka—as the chapters on
pluralism and national integration illustrate—
have been no different in this regard from
the others. But there have been other forms
of violent challenge to the states of South
Asia, common primarily to India and Nepal,
namely, challenges to state authority coming
from radical leftist and Communist move-
ments, called in India “Naxalites” and also,
in both India and Nepal, “Maoists.” Nor, as
Banerjee points out in Chapter 26, has India
been able “to resolve them through a demo-
cratic process,” whereas, in Nepal (2008), such
a process is already underway (Hachhethu and
Gellner; see Chapter 9).
But the rebellions against state authority
in India do not threaten the authority and
power of the Indian state to anything like
the extent they have in Nepal. In fact, the
earliest rebellions, including especially those
promoted by the Communist parties in
Telangana and elsewhere, were either defeated
by Indian armed force or their leadership was
21
PAU L R . B R AS S

integrated into the parliamentary process. of rebels and “their sympathizers” in what 1
Both the earlier and the current anti-state are euphemistically called “encounters,” but 2
violence has come from “the most desperate in which the gunfire is only in one direction. 3
segments of the population who have The Indian government has also perfected a 4
remained deprived of the benefits of deve- tactic in the northeast that was used by the 5
lopment following Independence, and who United States in Vietnam: village “pacifica- 6
find that the prevailing ruling system has tion,” which, of course, translates into “razing 7
failed to fulfill its promises” (Banerjee). They of tribal hamlets,” just as the US burned 8
have also drawn support disproportionately Vietnamese villages to the ground. For these 9
from the most marginal segments of society— and so many other reasons noted by Banerjee, 10
especially tribal populations living in the more the Maoists in India cannot achieve the 11
remote areas of the country—while success of their counterparts in Nepal. 12
articulating the broader “demands of the poor 13
and landless peasantry” in general (Banerjee). 14
International politics of South Asia
Reports are periodically published by 15
various groups showing that a large swath of Perhaps the most striking feature of inter- 16
territory down through the middle of the national politics and interstate relations in 17
country has been experiencing or is South Asia is the extent to which they 18
continuing to experience violent insur- arise and are overwhelmingly influenced by 19
rectionary movements, including the assertion domestic considerations. That is to say not 20
of control over isolated pockets.There is even that popular domestic opinion influences 21
a weekly death count for the states of Andhra policy so much as that issues concerning the 22
Pradesh, Bihar, Chattisgarh, Jharkand, and sovereignty and boundaries of the states of 23
Orissa—areas said to be infested by “left-wing the region are all contested. It is also to say 24
extremism”—published by the right-wing, that even relations between the states of South 25
authoritarian online journal, South Asia Asia and extra-regional actors during most 26
Intelligence. Banerjee also asserts that the of the period since Independence have 27
current leading organization promoting revolved around domestic issues. Although 28
“guerilla war” against the Indian state Nehru and his successors sought to formulate 29
maintains effective control over large swaths a distinctive foreign policy in relation to the 30
of Indian territory, exceeding even the area world system, namely, nonalignment, even 31
under the effective control of rebel groups these efforts turned into another aspect of 32
in the northeastern part of India discussed interstate relations in the region. For, whatever 33
by Gurharpal Singh (Chapter 17). As yet, India did, Pakistan did the opposite, in this 34
however, these violent, mostly agrarian case turning towards outright alignment with 35
movements, pose no serious threat to the the United States in the Cold War. This in 36
stability and power of the Indian state, which turn influenced India’s own policies, which 37
retains the capacity, if it chooses to exercise increasingly then “tilted” towards semi- 38
it with full force, to decimate, if not crush alignment with the Soviet Union, culminating 39
them all.The government of India also retains in the 1971 Friendship Treaty, which also 40
the nonviolent ability, successfully exercised arose at a time when India was about to go 41
from time to time, to adopt “reformist to war to dismember Pakistan. 42
measures” (Banerjee) that undercut move- The states of the region, the least integrated 43
ments against its authority. At present, region in the world, where even trade 44
however, the tendency on the part of the relations and travel from one state to the other 45
GOI is more towards the use of increased have often been highly restricted, have sought 46
force that includes the tried and tested Indian external relations and alliances not only or 47
police tactic of cornering and killing groups even primarily for their own sake, but to 48
22

1 counter the moves of regional enemies and/or
2 dependencies.
3 The linchpin around which so much has
4 turned in South Asian history and inter-
5 national politics is, of course, the unending
6 conflict between India and Pakistan over the
7 status of Kashmir, which, in turn, has been
8 so bitter because it reflects the fundamental
9 conflict over the very definition of the two
10 states and even—in the eyes of many in
11 India—not just who should have sovereignty
12 over Kashmir but whether Pakistan itself
13 even has the right to exist.This conflict alone
14 has spawned four wars between the two
15 countries, including one that led to the
16 breakup of Pakistan and the creation of
17 Bangladesh as an independent state.
18 Further, the policies of the states are heavily
19 influenced by internal domestic conflicts such
20 as those described in several chapters in this
21 volume, and discussed earlier. As Hewitt has
22 put it: “The states of South Asia . . . must be
23 concerned as much with securing the state
24 from its own populations as from other states,
25 and from competing sub-nationalist claims
26 and ethnic separatism” (see Chapter 27).
27 Moreover, the interplay between domestic
28 and international considerations in South
29 Asia, most especially between India and
30 Pakistan, continues to be reflected in the
31 current “War on Terror,” which, like the older
32 Cold War, draws into its net states around
33 the world that make use of it to pursue their
34 own interests. So, India now seeks to tar
35 Pakistan with the brush of support for
36 “terrorists” in what its leaders describe as
37 cross-border attacks in Indian-held Kashmir
38 and bomb attacks within India itself while
39 Pakistan, as always, supports American
40 interests largely for the sake of feeding the
41 insatiable demands of its army, whose eyes
42 are always turned primarily towards India and
43 Kashmir and preparation for the next war
44 with India. In this contest, the “subtext,” as
45 it were, in America’s war against terrorism
46 in Afghanistan is the struggle between India
47 and Pakistan for influence and control in that
48 country.
I N T R O D U CT I O N
Neither has this interpenetration of
domestic concerns and regional interstate
relations been restricted to Indo-Pakistan
relations.They affect as well relations between
these two countries with the other states of
the region, each of the two large states
opposing whatever action the other takes in
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan or even
in the Maldives. However, in relation to all
these states, India remains the predominant
power, far overshadowing Pakistan, despite
the fact that relations between India and
Bangladesh have deteriorated considerably
since the halcyon days of India’s support for
Bangladesh’s Independence and that India’s
dominance and intervention have also been
resented in Nepal and Sri Lanka from time
to time.
Notes
1 Personal communication.
2 Especially important in this regard have been
the movements launched by the militant
Hindu organizations that are ostensibly non-
violent, but are in fact deliberately provocative
and generally productive either of violence
between Hindus and Muslims or outright
victimization and killing of Muslims, with the
aid of the police.
3 The leading source of such writings is the
Center for the Study of Developing Societies
(CSDS) in Delhi, and especially those of
Yogendra Yadav.
4 Paul R. Brass, Caste, Faction, and Party in Indian
Politics, Vol. II: Election Studies (New Delhi:
Chanakya, 1985).
5 Kanchan Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed,
Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India
(Cambridge: University Press, 2004).
6 Paul R. Brass, “Pluralism, Regionalism and
Decentralizing Tendencies in Contemporary
Indian Politics,” in A. Jeyaratnam Wilson and
Dennis Dalton (eds), The States of South Asia:
Problems of National Integration (London: Hurst,
1982), pp. 223–64; revised and updated in Paul
R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and
Comparison (New Delhi: Sage, 1991),
pp. 114–66.
23
PAU L R . B R AS S

7 Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion, and Politics Nepal army, “but they were not capable of 1
in North India (Cambridge: University Press, overrunning it—and it was the realization that 2
1974). military victory was not possible, along with 3
8 Mukulika Banerjee, The Pathan Unarmed strong pressure from India, which persuaded 4
(Oxford: James Currey, 2000). the Maoist leaders to join the parties in
5
9 Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The overthrowing the King.”
6
Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples 12 Donald Horowitz, Coup Theories and Officers’
(Boston: Beacon, 1960), p. 297. Motives: Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective 7
10 Comment from David Gellner. (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1980). 8
11 In a personal communication, Gellner notes 13 Personal interview. 9
that the Maoists “held their own” against the 10
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 1
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Part I
5
6 Colonialism, Nationalism, and
7
8 Independence in South Asia
9
10
11 India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka
12
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 1
2
3
4
2
5
6 India and Pakistan
7
8
9
10 Ian Talbot
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19 Contemporary political developments, in the organized around the principles of bureau-
20 Indian subcontinent as elsewhere, can only cratic rationalism, but representative political
21 be fully appreciated in their historical context. bodies at local, district, provincial, and national
22 Whether it is the case of the predominance levels. At the heart of socioeconomic trans-
23 of the army in Pakistan politics, or the formation was a communications revolution
24 periodical outbreaks of communal rioting in resulting from improved roads, the intro-
25 some north Indian towns and cities, under- duction of railways, and the explosion of
26 standing requires an assessment of the print.1 This impact was qualitatively different
27 inheritances from the colonial era. These from the earlier Mughal construction of canals
28 encompass not only the ideas and institutions and the fabled Grand Trunk Road, which
29 the British bequeathed, but the legacies arising helped to unify the subcontinent. Under the
30 from the nationalist struggle and from the British, not only goods and people, but ideas
31 1947 division of the subcontinent.These three circulated more rapidly than ever before.
32 legacies form the focus of this article.We will Western notions of community and nation
33 turn first to the colonial inheritance. were so powerful precisely because they were
34 linked with European technological accomp-
35 lishments.
36 The colonial impact The early generation of western-educated
37 Indians regarded the British presence as
38 The colonial state introduced educated progressive. For this reason, they distanced
39 Indians to western concerns with progress, themselves from the “traditionalist” uprising
40 technological mastery over nature and the of 1857, which the British ruthlessly crushed.
41 ideals of democracy and nationhood. These It was only a later generation of educated
42 were made available through the medium of Indians who sought to portray the uprising
43 English which, for the elite, enabled com- as the first war of Indian national liberation.
44 munication across regional and religious They had become disillusioned by the British
45 barriers to a much greater extent than either failure to live up to their self-proclaimed
46 the Mughal court language of Persian or the virtues of justice and fair play. Illiberalism and
47 hybrid Hindustani had previously done. New racism, in fact, lay barely concealed behind
48 institutions included not just an intrusive state the façade of high moral purpose. It was only

27
I A N TA L B OT

in the wake of Gandhi’s rise to power, a new radicalism with the foundation of the 1
however, that nationalist struggle was trans- Suyamariyatai iyakkam, the self-respect move- 2
formed from an elite to a mass undertaking. ment. 3
Non-violent struggle exposed the Raj’s Considerable scholarly interest has focused 4
authoritarianism to the world’s gaze. on the effects of the introduction of the 5
The colonial state differed from its Mughal decennial census.2 This was the crowning 6
predecessor both in terms of its coercive glory of the colonial rational bureaucratic 7
capacity and the relationship between know- state and of “Orientalist empiricism.” The 8
ledge and power. “Orientalist empiricism,” censuses that were conducted throughout 9
with its plethora of land settlement reports, India from 1881 onwards can be understood 10
caste handbooks, and census reports provided in Saidean terms as the “expropriation” of 11
the knowledge to control the colonized. It knowledge in order to sustain colonial 12
also bolstered “traditional” institutions and control. Their greatest significance was to 13
social structures by, for example, codifying solidify previously “fuzzy” boundaries 14
customary law. It could be argued that British between different group identities. Multiple 15
rule had a “traditionalizing” as well as a identities and fluid boundaries were replaced 16
modernizing effect by bolstering patriarchy, by essentialized categories of caste and 17
caste, and tribal identity. It is undoubtedly religious community. The process was 18
true that despite colonial stereotypes of a graphically illustrated in 1911 when Indian 19
“changeless” India, many of the hierarchies Census Commissioner E. A. Gait rapped the 20
that were in place by 1947 were of modern Bombay census superintendent over the 21
rather than ancient origin. knuckles for using the hybrid term “Hindu- 22
Orientalist philological studies provided Muhammadans” for groups that did not fit 23
the basis for ideas of both a Vedic and easily into any category. The persons 24
Dravidian golden age.The later developments concerned, Gait remarked, should have been 25
of Hindu and Tamil nationalism cannot be assigned to “one religion or the other as best 26
fully appreciated without reference to the he could.” Census requirements for clear self- 27
legacies of such Orientalist scholars as Max definition were key elements in encouraging 28
Müller and Robert Caldwell. The German- religious revivalisms, which attacked what 29
born Müller, who never set foot in the Harjot Oberoi has termed the “enchanted 30
subcontinent, maintained that an “instinctive world” of pluralism.3 31
monotheism” was present in the early hymns Simultaneously, patronage was disbursed in 32
of the Rigveda and that modern forms of terms of defined religious categories and 33
Hinduism were the result of subsequent demographic strength was for the first time 34
“decadent opulence.” Such ideas were taken linked with political power following the 35
up by Indian writers, who contrasted current introduction of representative politics. Good 36
degradation with the golden Vedic past and governance was primarily to be secured 37
linked a return to its “pristine” Hinduism with through the activities of the civil admini- 38
the recovery of national glory. The lesser stration. Nevertheless, part of the rationale 39
known Reverend Robert Caldwell argued for for British rule was the tutelage of Indians 40
the antiquity of Tamil and maintained that in the democratic arts. Moreover, the recur- 41
Aryan colonists had introduced idol worship ring financial crises of the 1880s encouraged 42
to South India and had termed the indigenous the establishment of a system of elective local 43
Tamilian chieftains, soldiers and cultivators as government to secure consent for additional 44
sudras. The demand that the term sudra taxation. Local bodies could form new “arenas 45
should be dropped for the Tamil castes was of conflict” for communal rivalries, especially 46
to become a major element of the later non- where socioeconomic change was unsettling 47
Brahman movement. It was soon to espouse old power arrangements. This process could 48
28
 I N D I A A N D PA K I STA N

1 be seen at work in a number of towns in The differential impact of

2 western UP where elected Hindu majorities imperial rule
3 on district boards used sanitation regulations
A number of writers have found India and
4 to control butchers’ shops and slaughterhouses
Pakistan’s contrasting democratic experiences
5 to further their religious interests by
striking, given the assumption that they
6 protecting cows. Such actions offended the
acquired almost identical intellectual and
7 local Muslim religious sensibilities in such
administrative inheritances from the colonial
8 places as Moradabad, Chandpur, and Bijnor
state.6 The colonial impacts we have been
9 and revealed the perils they faced as a religious
considering in the preceding paragraphs were
10 minority.4
not, however, spread evenly. The differential
11 British ideas of monolithically constituted
effects of colonial rule with respect to both
12 religious communities were institutionalized
socioeconomic transformation and admini-
13 in the granting of separate electorates for
strative systems were to exert a profound
14 Muslims in 1909 and, later, following the
influence. The politics of Muslim separatism
15 1932 Communal Award for Sikhs. The
in colonial north India and of the anti-
16 historical debate still rages whether this was Brahman movement in the south, for example,
17 part of a Machiavellian divide and rule policy were influenced by the domination of Hindu
18 or merely reflected a colonial balancing act. upper caste males over the new educational
19 While the creation of Muslim separate opportunities.Those regions and communities
20 electorates did not make Pakistan inevitable, which lagged behind in the processes of
21 it encouraged the premise lying behind socioeconomic change in late nineteenth-
22 communalism that people following a parti- century India have struggled to catch up since
23 cular religion naturally shared common Independence. West Bengal was at one stage
24 interests from which others were excluded. a leading commercial region, but its relative
25 Those seeking power took their cue and post-Independence decline dates back to the
26 mobilized politically around the symbols of decision to move the imperial capital from
27 religion, which had received state recognition Calcutta to New Delhi in 1911. It is possible
28 as important community markers. For many to argue that contemporary Pakistan’s
29 scholars, communalism which culminated in “overdeveloped” administrative and military
30 the 1947 Partition is seen as an important institutions in comparison with India’s
31 legacy of colonial rule.5 stronger political institutionalization are
32 Less contentious is the claim that rooted, at least in part, in differences in the
33 important institutional inheritances from the colonial impact. Khalid bin Sayeed first
34 Raj smoothed the path of nation building summed up the greater British emphasis on
35 in India and Pakistan. Both the Indian and the requirements of law and order rather than
36 the Pakistan Administrative Services inherited those of popular representation in the future
37 the traditions of the so-called “steel frame” Pakistan areas in terms of the concept of
38 of the Raj, the Indian Civil Service. Until “viceregalism.”7 I have expanded this argu-
39 the two countries introduced their first ment to conceptualize the inheritance of a
40 post-Independence constitutions, they were British security state in northwest India in
41 governed under the terms of the 1935 which political participation was far less
42 Government of India Act. India’s 1950 developed than in other areas of the sub-
43 constitution retained the federal structure of continent.8 The colonial priority in this
44 government it had established. region was to maintain law and order; the
45 encouragement of political representation was
46 a secondary consideration. Hence elected
47 bodies came into being later, if at all in the
48 case of Balochistan.
29
I A N TA L B OT

With the notable exception of Bengal, the for military service was based on “empirical” 1
future Pakistan areas lay in the security state ethnographic research. Recruiting officers pro- 2
region. They had been acquired for strategic duced detailed caste handbooks that provided 3
rather than commercial reasons in the face genealogies and histories of the martial castes, 4
of a threat of Russian expansion from Central all set within a fashionable late nineteenth- 5
Asia and Afghanistan and were accord- century Social Darwinist framework. While 6
ingly administered along “viceregal” lines.9 the post-Independence Indian Army has 7
Adjoining both British Balochistan and the widened its recruiting base, the bulk of the 8
North-West Frontier Province was a buffer Pakistan Army recruits are drawn from a 9
zone of tribal states and tribal areas. The narrow range of communities and districts 10
former were under the exclusive jurisdiction within Punjab. This has exerted a profound 11
of their hereditary rulers and were among impact on political developments in terms 12
the most backward areas of the subcontinent both of sections of Punjabi society’s identi- 13
at the time of Independence.The latter were fication with the military and in the encour- 14
overseen by a British political agent. Control agement it has given to the idea held by non- 15
was maintained by tribal levies with the carrot recruited communities that there has been a 16
of cash subsidies and the stick of punitive “Punjabization” of Pakistan.11 17
expeditions and collective fines. Customary The simultaneous development of the vast 18
law enforced through tribal jirgas was the canal colony areas in late nineteenth-century 19
order of the day. A similar system of admini- Punjab dramatically increased the resources 20
strative authoritarianism and the co-opting with which the colonial state could patronize 21
of traditional elites was followed in the its rural allies.12 In Punjab, and also in the 22
directly administered provinces of Balochistan Frontier, the colonial state abandoned 23
and the North-West Frontier Province. The economic laissez-faire principles to curb the 24
latter was eventually to achieve responsible predatory activities of moneylenders, which 25
government, after widespread unrest in threatened the growing prosperity of its local 26
1930–32, but Balochistan remained tied to allies. Moreover, whenever the principle of 27
the apron strings of its commissioner down election was conceded, the British safeguarded 28
to Independence.Within the Frontier, deputy the position of their rural allies by linking 29
commissioners wielded immense authority the right to vote with property qualifications 30
under the terms of the Frontier Crimes and introducing special landholders’ con- 31
Regulation. They could refer civil and stituencies. Significantly, ex-servicemen were 32
criminal cases to jirgas, which they had disproportionately represented both as land- 33
appointed, and they were also empowered to owners in the rich canal colony areas and as 34
impose collective punishments.The loyalty of voters.The entrenchment of elites considered 35
the large Khan clan was secured though a loyal to the Raj continues to influence 36
mix of “political pensions,” honorific titles, contemporary Pakistan politics. This under- 37
and cash and land grants. mined the development of a strong political 38
Punjab landowners were the recipients of party system. It also reinforced a culture of 39
similar rewards. The region’s strategic signifi- political clientelism and placed insuperable 40
cance increased when it became the main barriers in the way of future socioeconomic 41
recruiting area of the Indian Army from the reform by establishing the basis for a 42
1880s.10 The decision to shift recruiting opera- dominant landlord political interest.This was 43
tions to Punjab was based on a variety of strate- to form a marked contrast with the inheri- 44
gic, political and financial implications. It was tance of those areas which went to India at 45
rationalized in the martial castes ideology.The the time of the 1947 Partition. In those areas, 46
belief that the Muslim Rajputs, Sikh Jats and it was rich peasants rather than feudal 47
Hindu Dogras of Punjab were naturally suited landowners who dominated rural politics. 48
30
 I N D I A A N D PA K I STA N

1 The shadow side of British paternalism was The adherence of Congress to both the
2 the violent repression of any perceived chal- electoral politics of legislative council entry,
3 lenge to the status quo. Provincial admini- on the one hand, and mass agitation, on the
4 strations of the future West Pakistan areas all other hand, had ensured that it was not merely
5 had blood on their hands and a tradition of an oppositional force, but had produced leaders
6 calling on the army to aid civil power. The schooled in the arts of government. Finally,
7 most infamous incident was, of course, the the post-independence ability to oversee
8 firing on an unarmed crowd in the walled nation building was enhanced by the legiti-
9 area of Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar on macy of its leaders who had been prepared
10 13 April, 1919. to spend years in prison as part of their
11 In sum, in much of what was to become sacrifice for the greater cause of freedom.
12 Pakistan, a tradition of bureaucratic authori- Gandhi lay at the heart of both the
13 tarianism, along with the upholding of institutional transformation of Congress at
14 traditional elites, was deeply rooted by the the 1920 Nagpur Session and of the widening
15 time of the British departure. In Punjab, of its popular appeal.16 He was a charismatic
16 the future heartland of Pakistan, a special figure who embodied the unique philosophy
17 relationship between the peasantry and the of non-violence that he brought to the
18 army had been established which, as Clive struggle. Non-violence was remarkably suc-
19 Dewey has forcefully argued, holds the key cessful as a strategy against a ruling power
20 to understanding military dominance in that prided itself on the moral authority to
21 independent Pakistan.13 The tradition of ruth- govern. It also allayed the fears of the
22 less repression of unrest had also been estab- propertied classes that independence would
23 lished. Significantly, such leading Pakistani go hand in hand with social revolution.
24 administrative and political figures of the Significantly, the upper caste business and
25 1950s as Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, Ghulam industrial classes under Gandhi’s moral sway
26 Muhammad, and Iskander Mirza had spent bankrolled Congress. Between 1921 and 1923,
27 the formative parts of their careers in this Congress collected over Rs 13 million. This
28 atmosphere.14 The differential inheritances in huge war chest funded Gandhi’s “constructive
29 the future Indian and Pakistan areas of the program” of khadi (the production and
30 subcontinent thus explain in part the varia- wearing of homespun cloth) and the removal
31 tions in political experience of the two of Untouchability as well as Congress political
32 successors to the Raj. campaigns under his leadership. It made
33 possible the new phenomenon of the full-
34 time Congressite political worker. By the eve
35 The legacy of nationalist of the Second World War, the Congress
36 struggle possessed a membership of over four and a
37 half million. No anti-colonial nationalist
38 India’s democratic “exceptionalism” among movement elsewhere was ever to attain this
39 former European colonies has been linked by level of support. Gandhi introduced new
40 some writers to legacies from the nationalist groups and regions into the nationalist
41 struggle.15 These included a highly institu- struggle. D. A. Low has seen the alliance
42 tionalized political party in the Indian between the rich peasants, the educated
43 National Congress, which reached down into classes and the commercial classes as being
44 the villages. The narrow support base of the of crucial importance.17 Gandhi also appealed
45 nineteenth century had been transformed by for female support as he believed that women
46 Gandhi’s leadership. At the same time, his naturally possessed the ability to suffer and
47 genius in fundraising had allowed the estab- the moral strength required in non-violent
48 lishment of a cadre of paid political workers. struggle.18
31
I A N TA L B OT

Women were especially drawn to the its counterparts in Asia and Africa, in making 1
idealism of the nationalist struggle, whether the postcolonial switch from an oppositional 2
this was expressed in terms of Gandhian force to a party of government. Council entry 3
philosophy, or in the socialism of Nehru and was, however, not without its drawbacks, as 4
the Congress left wing. Thousands of it opened the way for factional rivalries 5
Congress activists had demonstrated their between the so-called ministerial and 6
commitment to a free India by submitting organizational wings of the party. Indeed, the 7
to the blows of the police and to extended decision of the High Command to ask for 8
periods of imprisonment. As Gopal Krishna the resignation of the provincial ministries in 9
has remarked: the wake of Viceroy Lord Linlithgow’s 10
unilateral declaration in 1939 that India was 11
The significant difference between the pre- at war, proclaimed without consulting Indian 12
1920 and the post-1920 Congress leadership opinion, can be understood as a useful release 13
lay in the fact that before 1920 it was social from these growing tensions. 14
position which automatically conferred a
The visions of Nehru and Gandhi for an 15
leading position in the movement; after 1920
independent India were markedly different. 16
The possibility of conflict was terminated by 17
it was the renunciation of social position and
Gandhi’s assassination on 30 January, 1948. 18
the demonstration of willingness to accept that
His anarchist vision of a decentralized polity 19
sacrifice was demanded of those who aspired
and economy based on the village was 20
to lead.19
reduced to the margins of the nationalist 21
enterprise, although the Mahatma was 22
Jawaharlal Nehru, independent India’s first
mythologized as the founder of the nation. 23
prime minister, spent several periods of Nehru based his nation-building enterprise 24
imprisonment in the early 1920s and 1930s. on the vision first articulated during the 25
His longest incarceration following the Quit independence movement. It sought to clothe 26
India Resolution of 1942 lasted for three the country in the “garb of modernity.” 27
years. During this period he wrote his most At the heart of the Nehruvian vision was 28
important work, The Discovery of India. commitment to democracy, secularism, 29
Nehru’s imprisonment, as well as that of statism, and socialism. In the international 30
countless lower rank Congressmen, created a arena, he espoused a commitment to non- 31
high public service ethos when India attained alignment. By the 1980s all these foundational 32
freedom in August 1947. It also ensured that ideas had been challenged by the rise of mili- 33
the prestige of the Congress surpassed that tant Hinduism, which articulated concerns 34
of all other parties. This, in part, explains its about Islamization in Iran and Pakistan, 35
electoral successes throughout the 1950s. increasing Indian Muslim linkages with the 36
Congress had combined agitation with the oil-rich Gulf region, and resentment about 37
working of the legislatures in the provinces the alleged “pampering” of the Muslim 38
which the British had introduced from the minority. But the clear vision of the early 39
time of the 1919 Government of India Act. post-independence period was undoubtedly 40
This approach to politics has been dubbed a a factor in ensuring stability. Unlike many 41
“struggle–truce–struggle” strategy. It enabled other nationalist movements, power had been 42
Congress to wear down the Raj’s stock of seized from the departing rulers not for its 43
moral and political capital while at the same own sake, but to bring about a major 44
time providing Indian politicians with the transformation. Despite their conflicting ideas, 45
opportunity to acquire experience of govern- Gandhi and Nehru shared the belief that 46
ment. This was one factor in the greater independence should mean a major break 47
success of Congress, compared with many of with the colonial past and that India’s freedom 48
32

1 could act as a source of inspiration well
2 beyond its national borders.
3 While the seeds for India’s democratic
4 success were sown during the nationalist
5 struggle, there were also warning signs for the
6 future. Hindu nationalist sentiments had always
7 been coeval with the territorial nationalism
8 of Congress. Many within the organization’s
9 broad tent profoundly differed from Nehru’s
10 secularist approach. Congress also contained
11 hegemonic tendencies that made it difficult
12 for the minorities to be accepted on anything
13 other than the majority’s terms.The partition-
14 related upheavals were to increase hostility to
15 the Muslim “other” well beyond the narrow
16 bounds of such communal organizations as
17 the Hindu Mahasabha.20 Indeed, for Gandhi,
18 at least, partition represented a defeat for all
19 that he believed in, causing him to dub
20 freedom a “bitter loaf.”
21
22
23 The legacy of the Pakistan
24 movement
25
26 The movement for Pakistan, like that for
27 Indian independence, was to provide an
28 important political inheritance. It was not,
29 however, to exert as favourable an impact for
30 future democratic consolidation and nation
31 building. The Muslim League was not as
32 firmly institutionalized as Congress. Neither
33 did its leaders possess a similar experience of
34 government. In the key areas that were to
35 form Pakistan, the Muslim League was a
36 relative latecomer. Apart from Bengal, the
37 party had failed dismally in the Muslim
38 majority provinces in the 1937 provincial
39 elections. In order to achieve a breakthrough
40 in the 1946 polls, it had been forced to
41 compromise with traditionalist systems of
42 clientelist politics. Within its ranks there was
43 much greater opportunism and lack of a
44 public service ideal than was evident in
45 Congress. The party was thus less well
46 equipped on a number of counts to perform
47 the tasks of political development. This was
48 a crucial weakness in the light of the
I N D I A A N D PA K I STA N
“democratic deficit” that had accrued as a
result of viceregal traditions inherited in the
areas that were to form Pakistan.
It was only in Bengal that the Muslim
League possessed a mass base of support and
an organization of full-time workers similar
to that of Congress. This was the result of
the efforts of its dynamic secretary, Abul
Hashim. Full-time workers were trained and
accommodated in party houses. By the eve
of the 1946 elections the Bengal Muslim
League had one million members. Over a
decade and a half later, Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s
first military ruler, was to turn to Abul
Hashim’s organizing genius to establish the
Convention Muslim League in East Pakistan.
The efforts of the 1940s could not, however,
be reproduced in a much more politically
hostile environment, with an increasingly frail
Abul Hashim deputing the work to Shamsul
Huda. There was some organizational
development in other “Pakistan areas” after
1944, but in many districts, League branches
existed only on paper. In Punjab, the corner-
stone of Pakistan, its membership stood at
just 150,000. Factional infighting in the
Frontier League prompted an enquiry by the
All-India Committee of Action in June 1944
which admitted that “there was no organ-
ization worth the name” in the province.The
Sindh Muslim League had just 48,500
members. Its annual report for 1943–44
acknowledged that: “We should require years
to create political consciousness among [the]
Muslim masses in the province, where on
account of long distances, scattered villages,
illiteracy and local influence it is rather
difficult to easily approach the people.”21
The pyramid of branches stretching from
the localities to the All-India level, which was
the hallmark of Congress, was thus noticeably
absent throughout most of the future Pakistan
areas. The Muslim League was thus far less
able to form a democratic pillar of the post-
colonial state than its Congress counterpart.
In 1946 the Muslim League achieved the
victories it required to lend credibility to the
Pakistan demand, despite this organizational
33
I A N TA L B OT

weakness. It had to compromise to do so. party, rather than schooling in the arts of 1
This involved accepting opportunistic con- government. Factionalism, corruption, and 2
verts from rival parties such as the Punjab violence formed part of the League’s everyday 3
Unionists. It also had to mobilize support experience. Together, inexperience, institu- 4
through existing power structures such as tional weakness, and the low level of political 5
biradari (kinship groups) and sufi networks. culture inherited from the freedom struggle 6
Loyal party officials were bypassed for election militated against Pakistan’s future democratic 7
tickets in favor of elite power holders. In consolidation. 8
Sindh, the Muslim League had to adapt itself The legacy of the freedom movement was 9
to the power of the large landowners (waderos) ironically most problematic in Bengal where 10
who dominated the lives of their labourers the Muslim League had put down the most 11
(haris).Votes could not be obtained in Sindh’s roots. There was incipient conflict between 12
interior without the support of the waderos, the Urdu- and Bengali-speaking elites even 13
but they were primarily concerned with their at the height of the freedom struggle. The 14
own factional rivalries, rather than mobilizing former remained loyal to Jinnah’s conception 15
support for the Pakistan ideal. The Muslim of an East Pakistan zone within a single 16
League’s approach to electioneering in future Pakistan state. They also subscribed to the 17
Pakistan areas was to be crucial in legitimizing belief, expressed as early as July 1933 by the 18
its demand, but stored up problems for the All-Bengal Urdu association, that “Bengali is 19
future. It endorsed clientelist politics with its a Hinduized and Sanskritized language” and 20
accompanying opportunism, factionalism, and that, “in the interests of the Muslims 21
corruption. themselves it is necessary that they should try 22
Of equal concern was the inexperience of to have one language which cannot be but 23
the provincial Muslim League leaderships. Urdu.”23 This was, of course, in keeping with 24
The League never formed a government in the Muslim League’s official two nation 25
Punjab before Independence. Its politics were theory, an ideology that viewed the com- 26
dominated by the cross-communal Unionist munity as monolithic and set apart from the 27
Party, whose power relied on a combination Hindus. These views were challenged by 28
of the personal influence of the rural elites Bengali-speaking Muslim Leaguers. In his 29
and legislative enactments to prevent expro- May 1944 Presidential address, the Muslim 30
priation by the moneylenders. When the League journalist-cum-politician Abul Manser 31
Coalition Unionist Government finally Ahmed maintained that Bengali Muslims 32
resigned in March 1947, Punjab remained were not only different from Hindus but 33
under governor’s rule until the end of the from Muslims of other provinces. He declared 34
Raj. While the Muslim Leaguers in Punjab this position as follows: 35
entered the post-Independence era with 36
little experience of office, their counterparts Religion and culture are not the same thing; 37
in Sindh were already well versed in using religion transgresses [sic] the geographical 38
power to feather their own nests through the boundary but tamaddum (culture) cannot go 39
manipulation of wartime contracts and beyond the geographical boundary . . . here 40
the control of rationed and requisitioned only lies the differences between Purba (Eastern) 41
goods.22 In the Frontier, it was only after the Pakistan and Pakistan. For this reason the people 42
imprisonment of many Congress repre- of Purba Pakistan are a different nation from 43
sentatives that it was able to form its first the people of the other provinces of India and 44
government in May 1943. What ensued was from the “religious brothers” of Pakistan.24 45
an undignified scramble for power and profit 46
marked by bitter rivalries between the It was, however, the Urdu-speaking Bengalis 47
ministerial and organizational wings of the who wielded influence in the All-India 48
34

1 Muslim League. Jinnah never nominated Abul
2 Hashim to its working committee. He pre-
3 ferred to deal with such trusted lieutenants
4 as Hasan and Ahmed Ispahani,25 who knew
5 little of Bengal outside Calcutta, or with the
6 conservative Nawab of Dhaka whose news-
7 papers dubbed Hashim and his supporters as
8 communists. They indeed fought for libera-
9 tion “from all forms of oppression.” Moreover,
10 their vision was for a sovereign East Pakistan
11 state. Indeed, Hashim prophetically warned
12 that a united Pakistan would result in the
13 imposition both of Urdu and an alien
14 bureaucracy and reduce East Bengal to a
15 stagnant backwater.26 Both the language issue
16 and the marginalization of Bengali political
17 influence were subsequently to dominate
18 East–West Pakistan relations and contribute
19 to the Bangladesh breakaway of 1971.
20 The clash between regional and Pakistani
21 identities was most pronounced in Bengal,
22 but it was present also in Sindh and the
23 Frontier. In both provinces the Muslim
24 League’s popular base of support rested on
25 local allegiances that were difficult to
26 harmonize with Jinnah’s All-India under-
27 standing of the Pakistan demand. In these
28 circumstances, it was hardly surprising that
29 provincialism, as it was termed, became a
30 barrier to nation building almost immediately
31 after Independence.
32 Finally, the freedom struggle had gained it
33 popular support by being deliberately vague
34 about the nature of a future Pakistan state.
35 Nevertheless, many of the leading Deobandi
36 ‘ulama (Islamic scholars) had opposed the
37 “secularist” Muslim League leadership. Syed
38 Abul A’la Maudoodi, who founded the
39 Islamist Jamaat-i-Islami in August 1941,
40 opposed the Pakistan campaign because it was
41 based on the notion of nationalism, which,
42 in turn, was opposed to the solidarity of the
43 worldwide Muslim community, the umma.
44 Maudoodi migrated from India at the time
45 of Partition and thereafter worked assiduously
46 to bring Pakistan’s laws into conformity with
47 Islam. But this goal of Islamization conflicted
48 with Jinnah’s famous speech on the eve of
I N D I A A N D PA K I STA N
Independence when he presented a vision of
Pakistan to the Constituent Assembly on
11 August that envisioned the goal of a plural
secular state. The debate about the role of
Islam in Pakistan has raged ever since. It is
rooted in the fact that the freedom struggle
itself was variously conceived as a movement
of Islam and a movement of Muslims.
The legacy of partition
Partition divided the Muslim majority
provinces of Punjab and Bengal and was
accompanied by mass migrations and killings.
The number of casualties has been estimated
at anything from around 200,000, as put
forward by the colonial official Penderel
Moon, to the MQM’s grossly inflated figure
of two million. Upwards of 100,000 women
were kidnapped on both sides of the border.
The epicenter of the social dislocation was
in Punjab, but much of north India was
affected. After uncontrollable spontaneous
flight, the two dominion governments over-
saw a virtually total exchange of populations
in Punjab. This involved the greatest refugee
migration of the twentieth century. Some
seven million people migrated to Pakistan.
Around five and a half million Hindus and
Sikhs crossed the new international boundary
in the opposite direction. In Bengal, despite
government efforts to assure minority popu-
lations, waves of migration continued
throughout the opening decades of Inde-
pendence whenever there were outbreaks of
violence or rumors of communal conflict.
Social dislocation on this scale inevitably
influenced political developments within
India and Pakistan as well as affecting deeply
their relations. The fledgling states had to
devote huge resources to refugee resettlement.
In the case of Pakistan, which was dispro-
portionately affected and had inherited
weaker political institutions, it has been
argued that the refugee problem was an
important factor in the strengthening of the
bureaucracy and the army to the detriment
35
I A N TA L B OT

of political parties.27 Muhammad Waseem has The issue of refugee resettlement increased 1
further maintained that the undercutting of tensions between the center and the provinces 2
parliament resulted from the refugees’ loss of in Pakistan. They became most marked in 3
their political base. “Recourse to elections,” Sindh where Prime Minister Muhammad 4
he states, “was considered suicidal by the Ayub Khuhro strongly opposed the demand 5
migrant-led government at Karachi because that it should accept those refugees who could 6
there was no way it could win elections and not be absorbed in West Punjab. By December 7
return to power in the center. Elections were 1947 Sindh had resettled only 244,000 8
considered dysfunctional for the political displaced persons, while West Punjab had 9
system of Pakistan in the immediate post- accepted over four million.32 Raja Ghazanfar 10
independence period.”28 Ali, Pakistani minister for refugees and 11
Political tensions were generated in both rehabilitation, severely upbraided Khuhro at 12
dominions by the huge refugee influx. a subcommittee of the Pakistan Muslim 13
Nehru’s insistence that the large numbers of League Council held on 23 February, 1948. 14
Muslims left behind after the creation of He dismissed the Sindh Prime Minister’s 15
Pakistan were not a “fifth column” but equal defense that the local populace was suffering 16
citizens led to a clash with Deputy Prime from the refugee burden as raising the “virus 17
Minister Sardar Patel.The latter was regarded of provincialism.”33 Khuhro’s stance was a 18
as the strongman of Congress. He had always contributory factor in his dismissal.34 This not 19
leaned towards Hindu nationalist sentiment. only strengthened Sindhi sentiment against 20
According to US reports, relations between the center, but also encouraged the precedent 21
the two men became so embittered that the of executive action against elected repre- 22
impression prevailed that Patel was “deter- sentatives, which boded ill for the future. 23
mined to get Nehru out of government.” Refugee resettlement not only created 24
According to Matthai, the Minister of political tensions, but also provided an 25
Transport who was the Americans’ New opportunity for the new Indian and Pakistan 26
Delhi informant, Gandhi came to Nehru’s states to assert their authority.They were able 27
rescue, making it clear that if Patel took any to prove their paternalistic credentials by 28
steps against Nehru, he “would be finished establishing a range of relief measures. The 29
with him for life.”29 Such an admonishment tentacles of refugee rehabilitation spread far 30
could not be taken lightly by Patel, who had into the economy with support for small 31
been the Mahatma’s associate since the 1920s. businesses, custodianship of evacuee property, 32
Nevertheless, accounts of Muslim atrocities and a range of grants and loans and training 33
in Pakistan raised the communal temperature schemes. Both states built satellite towns and 34
in India.30 The state’s secular policy would colonies to help accommodate refugees.35 35
certainly have been in greater peril had it State provision differentiated among classes 36
not been for the salutary lessons drawn in of refugees, with the result that its overall 37
the aftermath of Gandhi’s assassination by a impact was to re-establish community and 38
Hindu fanatic. Refugees from Pakistan in gendered hierarchies.36 39
such cities as Delhi have continued to pro- The state could never meet all refugee 40
vide support for Hindu nationalist parties demands. The Hindu nationalist discourse 41
and causes.31 Similarly, the politics of seized on this. Failure to protect the symbolic 42
Pakistan Punjab cities like Lahore, Sialkot, body of Mother India, which had been 43
Multan, and Gujranwala, of whose popula- vivisected, was linked with the reality of the 44
tion around half were enumerated as migrants violation of countless Hindu and Sikh 45
at the time of the 1951 Census, cannot be women. Such Hindu nationalist writers as 46
understood without reference to the refugee Chaman Lal called for a “strong and virile 47
dimension. state backed up by a powerful army” to 48
36

1 respond to the aggressor Pakistan state.37
2 Stereotypes of the Muslim “other” as a
3 sexually rapacious and violent aggressor have
4 been drawn from the stories, memories, and
5 distorted history of Partition and have been
6 repeated at times of communal conflict.There
7 is also evidence in the Partition-related
8 violence of the prototype of what Paul
9 Brass has termed the “institutionalized riot
10 system.”38 Just as in large-scale post-
11 Independence Hindu–Muslim violence, the
12 1947 killings display evidence of organized
13 political intent and were made possible by
14 the acquiescence of officials and police
15 authorities.
16 Gyanendra Pandey has revealed how
17 communities in both India and Pakistan have
18 built identities around mythologized accounts
19 of the partition.39 Common to these accounts
20 by both Brass and Pandey is blame displace-
21 ment for the violence, the emphasis on
22 stereotypical traits of courage and valor and
23 a retelling of stories of “victimhood.” Self-
24 identity is strengthened by the demonization
25 of the “other.” These community narratives,
26 along with the long-lasting personal scars and
27 material and psychological losses have meant
28 that Partition, rather than being a past event,
29 continues to be a living reality and reference
30 point at both societal and state levels.
31 Despite the ambiguities for Pakistan of the
32 division of the Muslim population of the
33 subcontinent, the state has used the event for
34 nation-building purposes by emphasizing the
35 sacrifices it entailed. Official histories have also
36 linked its attendant violence with stereotypes
37 of Hindu “treachery” and the desire to destroy
38 Muslim culture. These are expressed most
39 clearly in school textbooks sanctioned by the
40 state, which distort the events leading up to
41 Partition and the upheavals themselves. Such
42 distortions find their counterparts in India
43 where BJP-led governments have influenced
44 textbook production.
45 The Urdu-speaking refugee community
46 in Karachi and the East Bengal bhadralok
47 refugees now settled in Calcutta have experi-
48 enced the greatest problems of adjustment
I N D I A A N D PA K I STA N
that are common to all those displaced in
1947. Both communities weigh their per-
ceived post-independence marginalization
against their sacrifices and losses.The political
geography of both the metropolises is
inexplicable without reference to the refugee
influence. In Karachi, this has resulted in the
dominance of the ethno-nationalist MQM,
which appealed directly to the mohajirs.40 In
Calcutta, the educated refugees who were
reduced to illegal occupations of land formed
the main base of support for the Communist
Party.41
The responses of the Indian and Pakistan
governments both to autonomy demands and
to each other were profoundly influenced by
Partition. It has given birth to what has been
termed the “fearful South Asian state” by
some scholars,42 expressive of the deter-
mination to prevent future divisions. Demands
for greater autonomy by subnational groups
are thus viewed with suspicion. This is
especially the case in India if these are asso-
ciated with religious interests. The Khalistan
movement of the 1980s is sometimes referred
to as part of the unfinished business of
Partition because of the Sikh failure to acquire
a Sikhistan in 1947. The way the Indian
government responded to the Akali Dal
movement in the 1980s also requires reference
to the Partition era, as no less does the
Pakistan authorities’ response to the insur-
gency in urban Sindh a decade later.43
Neither state has displayed mercy towards
what they have deemed to be secessionist
movements, even when repression has been
counterproductive in radicalizing domestic
opposition and arousing international con-
demnation of human rights abuses.
For some writers, the long-running
Kashmir dispute is the single most important
legacy of Partition in that it not only has had
a major impact on relations between India
and Pakistan, but has distorted the latter’s
domestic political development. It is well
established that the conflict over the territory
has adversely affected the economic and
human development of the subcontinent
37
I A N TA L B OT

because the two rivals have traded less with group” and would continue to have priority 1
each other and have spent great resources on over economic development for appropria- 2
weapons. Another consequence has been the tions,” irrespective of the Indian factor.44 3
introduction of great power rivalries in the 4
region. Kashmir was not the only factor in 5
souring the Indo-Pakistan relationship at the Conclusion 6
time of independence. Distrust mounted over 7
the division of assets, water management Post-Independence India and Pakistan have 8
and water sharing between the two domi- experienced rapid socioeconomic change and 9
nions. The Partition-related massacres and other significant developments in both their 10
mass migrations also embittered relations. regional and international political environ- 11
Nevertheless, events in Kashmir in 1947–49 ment. These have introduced important 12
provided a defining moment both in Indo- discontinuities seen in postcolonial ethni- 13
Pakistan relations and for Pakistan’s domestic cization and regionalization of politics; the 14
priorities. growing middle-class influence in Indian 15
Any lingering hopes for continued politics; the establishment of large overseas 16
economic or military interdependence of the communities with a range of transnational 17
two dominions were snuffed out in Jammu’s linkages with the homeland; and the grow- 18
killing fields from where a flood of Muslim ing strategic asymmetry in the subconti- 19
refugees migrated to such bordering Pakistani nent. South Asia’s political environment is 20
cities as Sialkot where they formed an thus very different from what it was six 21
important anti-India lobby. Although the decades ago. 22
military conflict was confined to Kashmir, it Nevertheless, the foregoing analysis has 23
highlighted the strategic dangers for Pakistan. revealed that unresolved conflicts, competing 24
The priority of building up the armed sources of identity and political cultures 25
forces led to the establishment of a “political inherited from the Raj, and the nationalist 26
economy of defense.”The years 1947 to 1950 struggle still resonate. Moreover, the crisis 27
saw up to 70 percent of the national budget period of 1947–48 continues to influence 28
allocated for defense. Funds were diverted Indo–Pakistan relations and has undoubtedly 29
from nation-building activities at the same affected strongly the response of both states 30
time that the state’s administrative machinery to ethno-nationalist movements. In the case 31
was expanded to ensure the center’s control of Pakistan, crisis management at its birth 32
over the finances of the provinces.The long- shaped the state’s future political trajectory. 33
term repercussions were a strengthening of Contemporary South Asia is not fully 34
the non-elected institutions of the state—the explicable without reference to this past. 35
bureaucracy and the army—at the expense 36
of political accountability. This process con- 37
tributed not only to the failure to consolidate 38
Notes
democracy, but to the alienation of the eastern 39
wing of the country. Bengali politicians’ 40
1 The number of miles of railway track increased
priorities were of a different order and did 41
from 34 in 1854 to 8,500 in 1880. By the
not involve sacrificing democratic politics on beginning of the twentieth century there were
42
the altar of the Kashmiri Muslim cause. The nearly 1,400 newspapers with a total all-India 43
army increasingly acquired an almost insati- subscription of two million. Effective readership 44
able appetite for new technology, which was much greater, as newspapers were read 45
became ever more expensive. By 1958 an aloud and passed from hand to hand. 46
American intelligence report attested that the 2 See IanTalbot, India and Pakistan: Inventing the 47
“Pakistani army had developed as a pressure Nation (London: Arnold, 2000), pp. 12–16. 48
38
 I N D I A A N D PA K I STA N

1 3 The revivalist activities of the Singh Sabha 15 See Judith M. Brown, Modern India:The Origins
2 movement were undoubtedly spurred on not Of An Asian Democracy, 2nd edn (Oxford:
3 just by the attempts of the rival Arya Samaj University Press, 1995).
4 to reconvert Sikhs to Hinduism, but by the 16 See Judith M. Brown, Gandhi’s Rise to Power:
fact that, until the 1901 Census, only the Indian Politics, 1915–1922 (Cambridge:
5
orthodox Khalsa Sikhs were enumerated as University Press, 1972).
6 Sikhs. See, Harjot Oberoi, The Construction of 17 D. A. Low, “The Forgotten Bania: Merchant
7 Religious Boundaries: Culture, Identity and Communities and the Indian National
8 Diversity in the Sikh Tradition (Chicago: Congress,” in D.A. Low (ed.), Eclipse of Empire
9 University Press, 1994). (Cambridge: University Press, 1991), pp.
10 4 See Francis Robinson, Separatism Among Indian 101–19.
11 Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces’ 18 Contemporary Indian feminists decry this as
12 Mulims, 1860–1923 (Cambridge: University perpetuating sexual stereotypes. They point
13 Press, 1975), p. 82. out that female participation was linked with
5 See Gyanendra Pandey, The Construction of the traditional role models such as Sita and
14
Communalism in Colonial India (Delhi: Oxford with women’s sense of devotion and duty,
15 University Press, 1990).
16 which was extended from the family to the
6 See Asma Barlas, Democracy, Nationalism and nation; Madhu Kishwar,“Gandhi on Women,”
17 Communalism:The Colonial Legacy in South Asia Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 20, No. 40
18 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995). (5 October, 1985), pp. 1, 691–702.
19 7 K. B. Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 19 Gopal Krishna, “The Development of the
20 1857–1948 (London: Oxford University Press, Indian National Congress as a Mass
21 1968). Organisation, 1918–1923,” in Thomas E.
22 8 See Ian Talbot, Pakistan: A Modern History
Metcalf (ed.), Modern India: An Interpretive
23 (London: Hurst, 1998).
Anthology (London: Collier, 1971), p. 267.
9 The East India Company assumed the diwani
24 20 The Hindu Mahasabha was founded in 1915
or revenue collectorship in Bengal as early as
25 to safeguard Hindu interests, which its leaders
1765. The areas that formed British
26 claimed were being sacrificed by Congress. Its
Balochistan were acquired for strategic reasons
27 main concern was resistance to the Muslim
from 1876 onwards. Sindh had been seized
28 “other” rather than colonial rule. It sought to
from its Baloch Talpur rulers in 1843. Six years
overcome weaknesses arising from the disunity
29 later the British annexed the whole of Punjab
of the caste system and from an alleged lack
30 and the Frontier region, which had been part
of the Sikh kingdom. of physical strength.
31 21 Annual Report of the Sindh Provincial Muslim
32 10 Ian Talbot, Punjab and the Raj, 1849–1947
(New Delhi: Manohar, 1988) and Khizr League for 1943–4, Shamsul Hasan Collection
33 1:24 (Karachi).
Tiwana, the Punjab Unionist Party and the
34 Partition of India (London: Curzon, 1996). 22 S. F. Kucchi, member of the Working
35 11 See Yunas Samad, “Pakistan or Punjabistan: Committee Sindh Provincial Muslim League
36 Crisis of National Identity,” in Gurharpal Singh to G. M. Syed, Shamsul Hasan Collection,
37 and Ian Talbot (eds), Punjabi Identity: Continuity Sindh 11:37.
38 and Change (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995), 23 Harun-or-Rashid, The Foreshadowing of
39 pp. 61–87. Bangladesh: Bengal Muslim League and Muslim
40 12 Imran Ali, The Punjab under Imperialism, League Politics, 1936–1947 (Dhaka: Research
1885–1947 (Princeton, NJ: University Press, Society of Bangladesh, 1987), p. 45.
41
1988). 24 Harun-or-Rashid, p. 181.
42 25 The Ispahani family originated in Persia. It
13 Clive Dewey, “The Rural Roots of Pakistani
43 moved to Calcutta from its original trading
Militarism,” in D. A. Low (ed.), The Political
44 Inheritance of Pakistan (Basingstoke: Macmillan, centers in Madras and Bombay at the
45 1991), pp. 255–84. beginning of the twentieth century.
46 14 See Allen McGrath, The Destruction of Pakistan’s 26 Yunas Samad, A Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism
47 Democracy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, and Ethnicity in Pakistan, 1937–58 (New Delhi:
48 1996). Sage, 1995), p. 106.

39
I A N TA L B OT

27 See Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule:The 35 See Ian Talbot, Divided Cities: Partition and its 1
Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence Aftermath in Lahore and Amritsar 1947–1957 2
(Cambridge: University Press, 1990). (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2006). 3
28 Muhammad Waseem, The 1993 Elections in 36 See Ravinder Kaur, Since 1947: Partition 4
Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 1994), p. 163. Narratives among Punjabi Migrants of Delhi
5
29 Ian Talbot, India and Pakistan: Inventing the (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007).
6
Nation (London: Arnold, 2000), p. 164. 37 Urvashi Butalia, The Other Side of Silence:Voices
30 Mushirul Hasan has chronicled the economic, From the Partition of India (New Delhi: Penguin, 7
political and emotional depression of the 1998), pp. 183–84. 8
Indian Muslim community left leaderless and 38 Paul R. Brass, The Production of Hindu-Muslim 9
traumatized by Partition. Even in the Violence in Contemporary India (Seattle, WA: 10
Nehruvian era, the Muslims’ relations with the University of Washington Press, 2003). 11
Hindu majority were marked by a sense of 39 Gyanendra Pandey, Remembering Partition: 12
insecurity and desire to disprove any charges Violence, Nationalism and History in India 13
that they represented a fifth column. See (Cambridge: University Press, 2001). 14
Mushirul Hasan, Legacy of a Divided Nation: 40 See I. H. Malik, “Ethno-Nationalism in 15
India’s Muslims since Independence (Delhi: Pakistan: A Commentary on Muhajir Qaumi
16
Oxford University Press, 1997). Mahaz (MQM) in Sindh,” South Asia Vol. 18,
17
31 See Christophe Jaffrelot, “The Hindu No. 2 (1995), 49–72.
Nationalist Movement in Delhi: From ‘Locals’ 41 Prafulla Chakrabarty, The Marginal Men: The 18
to Refugees and Towards Peripheral Groups?,” Refugees and the Left Political Syndrome in West 19
in Veronique Dupont, Emma Tarlo and Denis Bengal (Kalyani: Lumiere Books, 1990). 20
Vidal (eds), Delhi: Urban Spaces and Human 42 S. Mahmud Ali, The Fearful State: Power, People 21
Destinies (Delhi: Manohar, 2000), pp. 181–203. and Internal Wars in South Asia (London: Zed 22
32 Dawn (Karachi), 12 December, 1947. 1993). 23
33 Statesman (Calcutta), 25 February, 1948. 43 See Gurharpal Singh, Ethnic Conflict in India: 24
34 For further details, see Sarah Ansari, Life After A Case-Study of Punjab (Basingstoke: 25
Partition: Migration, Community and Strife in Macmillan, 2000). 26
Sindh 1947–1962 (Karachi: Oxford University 44 Jalal, The State of Martial Rule, p. 238.
27
Press, 2005).
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
40
 1
2
3
4
3
5
6 Sri Lanka’s independence
7
8
9
10
Shadows over a colonial graft
11
12
13 Nira Wickramasinghe
14
15
16
17
18
19 Introduction domination, and monetarization of exchanges.
20 However, this depth should not be over-
21 Sri Lanka’s independence process is generally estimated: family structures, the caste system,
22 described as “the conversion of a colony into and Buddhism were maintained, especially in
23 an independent state by peaceful means”1 or the center of the island where foreign
24 as a “transfer of power” from British admini- domination was resisted for three centuries.
25 stration to the representatives of the new Traditions were transformed by reshaping or
26 independent state of Ceylon, a phrase that adapting to features of modernity.4
27 implies considerable continuity with a There are many ways of reading the
28 colonial era that lasted 400 years.2 Portuguese moment of the foundation of the state of
29 and Dutch rule left an imprint but not as Ceylon on 4 February, 1948: few would see
30 marked as the British (1796–1948), the first it as a fundamental disjuncture from colonial
31 power to conquer the entire island. The rule, the image of a continuum or a nexus
32 British attempted to intervene at the level of being more suitable. When reflecting on this
33 what Eric Stokes calls “society itself.”3 The critical moment one needs, however, to go
34 exceptional depth of the colonial impact on beyond the conventional reading of Ceylon
35 Ceylon, particularly in the coastal areas, in 1948 as a “satellite of Britain,”5 or as the
36 radically modified the social and economic theater of a consensual transition to inde-
37 structures of the island. In some respects, pendence. What I hope to provide in this
38 the colonial impact oriented the economy chapter is a more shadowy picture of a state
39 outward, overturned traditional streams of whose legitimacy was weak as it derived
40 trade, and distorted links with India, while neither from a political body bound by
41 introducing into society new elements of nationalist sentiment nor from a nationalist
42 heterogeneity: Christianity, the languages struggle against colonial autocracy in the
43 of the conqueror, new communities such as name of deeply felt democratic principles.
44 the Burghers (mixed European and native The transfer of power, occurring, as it did,
45 descent) and, later, Indian immigrant planta- in two stages (1931 and 1948) took place
46 tion workers. It also imposed unifying factors: within the institutional framework of a
47 modern modes of communication, a unified dominion. This chapter will first look at the
48 administrative system, a common language of years immediately before independence that

41
N I R A W I C K R A M AS I N G H E

paved the way for independence and wit- drawn up and published. Instead of the 1
nessed the nurturing of leaders for the new expected cabinet system, a scheme for exe- 2
state. It will then analyze the institutional cutive committees modeled on those of the 3
continuities in practice between the British League of Nations and the London County 4
colonial state and the newly founded state. Council was proposed. The Executive 5
Finally, it will address the legacies of unsolved Council was abolished. Instead of a ministry 6
issues—dominion status, citizenship, ethnic and an opposition, the unicameral legislature, 7
mistrust—that persisted into the following the State Council would divide into seven 8
decades. committees, each of which would be con- 9
cerned with a particular public department. 10
The main recommendation of the com- 11
Towards independence: The mission was the abolition of communal repre- 12
democratic graft of 1931 sentation and the extension of the franchise 13
to all males over 21 and females over 30 14
The two decades that preceded independence domiciled in Ceylon. Eventually universal 15
constitute a formative period for the future suffrage was adopted, with some restrictions. 16
statesmen of independent Ceylon: they gained The abolition of communal representation 17
experience in statecraft in the state councils and the adherence to the principle of equality 18
and introduced important and lasting legisla- between individuals signified—in effect— 19
tion in areas where power was delegated: Sinhalese rule.The aim of the commissioners, 20
namely agriculture, industry, education, in accord with the view prevailing at the 21
health care, and local administration. Colonial Office, was most probably to ensure 22
a gradual and limited transfer of power to 23
the moderates of the Ceylon National 24
The Donoughmore experience in
Congress,7 while keeping a strong minority 25
self-rule
group which was apprehensive of any more 26
Since 1915, the year of violent intercommunal advances towards self-government as a safety 27
riots, the island had been enjoying a relative valve against any potential radical moves by 28
calm, unlike its larger neighbor. In the decades the majority. It was also a way of reinforcing 29
that followed, the island’s westernized elite the power of the conservative leaders of the 30
was introduced to the ideals of parliamentary Ceylon National Congress, many of whom 31
debate within the confines of a system similar were rural notables, at the expense of the 32
to that of India, with limited franchise and labor leader A. E. Goonesinha who, the British 33
communal representation. In 1926, Sir Hugh felt, was gaining too much prominence in 34
Clifford, Governor of Ceylon, sent a dispatch the political life of the country. The project 35
to the Colonial Office that contributed to exceeded the demands of the Ceylonese 36
convincing the Under-Secretary of State of elites, who had asked for less democracy, but 37
the urgency for sending a small royal com- more autonomy. However, Britain retained 38
mission to examine on the spot the actual authority over finance, justice, law and order, 39
effect of the constitutional changes already and foreign relations. 40
granted.6 The arrival of the Donoughmore During the Donoughmore period the 41
Commission had the effect of stimulating transfer of power to a moderate Ceylonese 42
political activity in the country and spawned leadership was accompanied by a similar 43
a number of new associations based on transfer of power in the administration. The 44
region, caste, and community as well as period of the second State Council from 45
yearnings for greater political participation. 1936 onwards saw the near completion of a 46
Within a year following the sittings of the program of Ceylonization of the admini- 47
Donoughmore Commission, a report was stration There was no formal policy of 48
42
 S R I L A N K A’ S I N D E P E N D E N C E : S H A D OWS OV E R A C O LO N I A L G R A F T
1 “Sinhalization,” although the number of
2 Sinhalese increased dramatically in the
3 administration. A possible explanation is the
4 increase in the English literacy rate for the
5 whole population and consequently a higher
6 output of English-educated Sinhalese than
7 Burghers and Tamils. It is also possible that
8 many Sinhalese turned to employment in the
9 public service as a result of economic trends
10 in the 1930s. More importantly, however, the
11 officials who first served in the Ceylon Civil
12 Service were inculcated with a sense of the
13 public domain that transcended belonging to
14 particular communal groups.
15 The Donoughmore years entrenched the
16 idea that the state had a responsibility towards
17 its citizens. In the late 1940s, the principle
18 of collective provision for common human
19 and social needs through state intervention
20 was firmly established through the imple-
21 mentation of the Education Act of 1943 and
22 the establishment of the department of social
23 services in 1948. As early as the end of the
24 nineteenth century, some initiatives relating
25 to labor welfare had been forthcoming,
26 motivated essentially by the need of the state
27 to safeguard the highly profitable plantation
28 sector by giving special treatment to
29 indentured Indian labor. In 1927, for instance,
30 minimum wage legislation was enacted for
31 Indian estate workers.
32 The origins of welfarism can be more
33 clearly traced to the Donoughmore years
34 when social legislation laws relating to a wide
35 number of issues such as child and family
36 welfare, poverty alleviation, education, and
37 health and social security were promul-
38 gated. The commitment to improving living
39 standards through education and health
40 policies surfaced in these transition years of
41 semi-self-government as a concomitant of
42 universal franchise. However, the 1930s were
43 especially hard on the poorer sections of the
44 population, as those years were further
45 plagued by a severe drought and a devastating
46 malaria epidemic. Thus, it was necessity too
47 that sparked a number of measures, among
48 them the introduction of a Poor Law in 1939
following the Wedderburn Report of 1934,
which attempted to deal with poverty by
recommending state assistance, a measure that
was not, however, continued in the years that
followed. During the Second World War,
except for a food subsidy for the entire
population, social welfare was accorded little
priority.8 The Kannangara Report of 1943
recommended a system of universal and
compulsory free education from kindergarten
to university that led to a national system of
education founded on the principle of equal
opportunity.9
Another important welfare measure
directed at a particular segment of the popu-
lation, namely the peasantry, needs to be
mentioned. Under the leadership of Don
Stephen Senanayake, Minister of Agriculture
and Lands and Leader of the State Council,
an important program of state-sponsored land
colonization was initiated to provide landless
peasants with opportunities to settle in the
“dry zone,” the old Rajarata, or Land of
Kings.10 This issue would later become a
thorn in the relations between Sinhalese and
Tamils, since the latter saw this measure as
an attempt by a majoritarian state to conquer
lands where they themselves had lived for a
number of generations.
The nationalist movement
The British transferred power in 1948 to
a conservative multiethnic elite that had
spearheaded a reformist nationalist movement.
The British felt that this group would offer
the best resistance to the forces of cultural
nationalism and Marxism then gaining
momentum in the country. The westernized
elites had, on the whole, been willing partners
of the British.
What resistance there had been had
occurred in the first two decades of the
century when the temperance movement
rallied Sinhalese Buddhists against the imposi-
tion of Christian values. It was also a means
through which the newly emergent middle
43
N I R A W I C K R A M AS I N G H E

classes could challenge the social values of to a line of wealthy landowners from the 1
foreign Christian rulers and British rule as a Colombo region was a more virulently Sin- 2
whole. The social and religious reformers, halese nationalist organization. Bandaranaike 3
Anagarika Dharmapala and Walisinha had received an English and Protestant 4
Harischandra, led a campaign to protect places education, but learnt Sinhala and converted 5
of Buddhist worship. They were also leaders to Buddhism on his return from Oxford.The 6
of the temperance movement.This endeavor, Lanka Sama Samaja Party, a Marxist organ- 7
which peaked first in 1903–05 and, more ization formed in 1935, was nonsectarian in 8
importantly, in 1911–14, had a dual purpose: nature and led by members of the Sinhalese 9
first to reassert Buddhist strictures against elite. Minority groups were represented by 10
alcohol, which amounted to the renewed vocal individuals such as G. G. Ponnambalam. 11
assertion of the validity and relevance of There was, however, no united front of 12
Buddhist values in general after years of minorities to combat the increasingly majori- 13
acquiescence in the values of foreign rulers; tarian features of the State Council era. In 14
second, on the political plane, to attack excise 1944, the minority coalition was restricted 15
duties as an important source of British to the Ceylon Tamils and Ceylon Indians 16
revenue. The impact of this movement was (plantation Tamils, often referred to as Estate 17
not confined to the urban intelligentsia, but Tamils). 18
spread to the rural middle class and urban On the whole, the state councils saw an 19
workers. Dharmapala appealed to the middle under-representation of minority communi- 20
classes when he stressed the doctrinal tradition ties. In 1931, a Tamil boycott of the elections 21
and rejected peasant religiosity, especially the instigated by a Tamil radical group called the 22
worship of deities. After severe Sinhalese– Youth Congress further aggravated the 23
Muslim rioting in a number of locations in situation.This was rectified in 1934 with the 24
1915, the British colonial authorities clamped entry of four northern members.The relations 25
down on men associated with the temperance between communities soured further when, 26
movement, arbitrarily arresting many mem- in 1936, all seven ministers elected were 27
bers. Subsequently, the pattern of political Sinhalese. From then on, minority leaders 28
agitation underwent a distinct change. The presented their own solutions for political 29
shift started with the death of W. Harischandra reform—such as balanced representation for 30
in 1913 and was consolidated by the exile of minorities—quite separately from the reform 31
Anagarika Dharmapala to India. From this demands which the State Council, under the 32
time, the constitutional reform movement leadership of D. S. Senanayake, were crafting. 33
adopted a secular outlook and religion D. S. Senanayake was heir to a rich family 34
became of secondary importance. whose fortune came from graphite mines and 35
coconut plantations. He was very popular 36
with the peasant class, to whom he distributed 37
Reform and state councils, lands as Minister of Agriculture after 1931, 38
1931–36 as well as with the upper classes who were 39
reassured by his social conservatism. The 40
During the 1930s and until the mid-1940s, British saw him as an ideal ally. 41
the political space was occupied by a multi- It would be incorrect to suggest, however, 42
ethnic elite group that belonged to a variety that the political space was limited to the 43
of political formations: the Ceylon National conservative native elite in the State Councils. 44
Congress was essentially a Sinhalese moderate Many young village monks, who had studied 45
movement with a few minority Muslim and at seats of monastic learning such as Vidyoda 46
Tamil members; the Sinhala Maha Sabha Pirivena and Vidyalankara Pirivena, returned 47
created by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, the heir to their villages with high ideals of uplifting 48
44
 S R I L A N K A’ S I N D E P E N D E N C E : S H A D OWS OV E R A C O LO N I A L G R A F T
1 the lot of the peasants. In the 1947 elections
2 many would work under the banner of the
3 Marxist parties.11
4 Report and in the Ceylon (Constitution)
5 Order in Council for the protection of
6 Lineages of the colonial past:
7 Soulbury constitution and
8 continuities in political practices
9 counter majoritarian initiatives.The Soulbury
10 In July 1944, Lord Soulbury was appointed
11 head of a commission charged with the task
12 of examining a new constitutional draft that
13 the Sri Lankan ministers had proposed
14 but that was, in fact, the creation of Sir
15 Ivor Jennings, the Vice-Chancellor of the
16 University of Ceylon and the unofficial
17 advisor to D. S. Senanayake. After the fall of
18 Singapore to the Japanese, under pressure
19 from Sri Lankan politicians, the British finally
20 agreed to concede full participatory govern-
21 ment after the war, which meant full
22 responsible government in all matters of
23 internal civil administration. The Soulbury
24 Report, published in September 1945,
25 provided a bicameral parliamentary govern-
26 ment based on the Whitehall model. Universal
27 suffrage was retained. The executive com-
28 mittees and the posts of three officers of
29 state were abolished. Executive power was
30 to be vested in a prime minister and a cabi-
31 net appointed by the governor-general
32 but responsible to the lower house of the
33 bicameral legislature. The governor-general
34 was given overriding powers in matters of
35 defense, external affairs, and constitutional
36 amendments, but on all other matters could
37 only act on the advice of his ministers.
38 He would also appoint 15 of the 30 members
39 of the senate or upper chamber. The first
40 chamber or House of Representatives
41 would consist of 101 members, 95 of whom
42 would be elected, with six nominated by the
43 governor-general. The London Times quite
44 accurately described the treatment of the
45 issues by the Soulbury Commission as
46 “unimaginative.”12 Indeed, except for the
47 addition of a second chamber, it amounted
48 to an endorsement of the main principles
of the constitutional scheme formulated in
1944.
Provision was made in the Soulbury
minority rights, but the assumption was that
the minority communities constituted a large
and powerful enough bloc to be able to
Report ensured that the governor-general
would exercise his discretion on any bill that
evoked serious opposition by any racial or
religious community and that, in his opinion,
was likely to involve oppression or serious
injustice to any such community. The
Soulbury Report contained a clause, which
later became Section (29)2 in the 1946
Constitution modeled on clause 8 of the
ministers’ draft constitution, that prohibited
legislation infringing on religious freedom
or discriminating against persons of any
community or religion.The incorporation of
the principle of weightage in representation
was the chief safeguard against majority
domination. Area, as well as population, was
taken into account in the delimitation of
constituencies so that minorities scattered in
various parts of the country would be
represented. Minority rights were also to be
protected by the requirement of a two-thirds
majority in the house for any change in the
constitution or any piece of legislation aimed
at discriminating against a racial or religious
minority. There were multiple checks: if by
chance such legislation came to parliament,
the two-thirds requirement provided another
check against it. The concurrence of at
least 68 members in a House of 95 elected
members and six nominated members was
thus needed. The second chamber could
check and revise legislation of a discrimi-
natory character but not obstruct a bill.
The institutional safeguards for minorities
embodied in the Soulbury Report lagged far
behind the demands put forward by the
minorities at the commission’s sittings.While
other minorities gradually ceased their pro-
tests and prepared to collaborate with the
45
N I R A W I C K R A M AS I N G H E

majority, the Ceylon Tamil and Ceylon Indian paid workers reached another climax. The 1
leadership remained aloof. military was eventually called in; on 5 June 2
the police opened fire on a crowd of strikers 3
near Kolonnawa, killing one of them, a 4
Hazards of instability: Strikes government clerk by the name of Kandasamy. 5
The strike was broken after a month. 6
In the years following the end of the war, 7
after the publication of the Soulbury Report 8
and the subsequent framing of a constitution, Elections 1947 9
political activity was renewed with the 10
holding of elections for a new parliament. The general elections of 1947 for Ceylon’s 11
The end of the artificial prosperity that had First House of Representatives was the third 12
prevailed during the war years when troops held since the bestowal of universal suffrage 13
were stationed in Ceylon, together with the by the Donoughmore Constitution in 1931. 14
announcement of future elections, created The main parties that contested the elections 15
conditions of social unrest throughout the were the UNP, the Lanka Sama Samaj Party 16
island, instigated in the main by the three (LSSP), the Bolshevik Leninist Party (BLP), 17
Marxist parties the Communist Party (CP), the Labour Party, 18
Although the widely felt fear that the the Ceylon Indian Congress (CIC) and the 19
moderate leadership of the nationalist Tamil Congress. There were also two minor 20
movement was being submerged by the left parties, the Lanka Swaraj and the United 21
had no real substance, it had a double effect. Lanka Party.The 1947 elections were the first 22
First, it led the moderates of all ethnic groups in which class conflict was a factor, taking 23
to join hands and form the United National the form of a UNP-Left duel in the Sinhalese 24
Party (UNP) in April 1946.The UNP rallied areas of the country. The Lake House news- 25
non-Marxists of all communities except the papers, the country’s major written media, 26
Tamil Congress. Second, it acted as a bar- joined by the nationalist Sinhala Jatiya and 27
gaining card for D. S. Senanayake, the leader Sinhala Bauddhaya (founded by Dharmapala) 28
of the State Council, to compel Whitehall to constituted the main forces opposed to 29
make a decisive statement regarding the status Marxism. In the two decades preceding these 30
of Ceylon in order to reinforce the position elections, numerous Buddhist societies— 31
of the moderates.The British, indeed, had no the Sri Sanandhara Society (Society for the 32
desire to see Ceylon ruled by what they Support of the Buddhist Priesthood), 33
considered “extremists.” Class politics then Buddhagaya Defense League, and the All 34
made a shattering entry into the otherwise Ceylon Buddhist Congress were some of the 35
dormant political scene of post-war Ceylon. main ones—had emerged in response to the 36
Unrest started in October 1946 with the newly felt need for organizing the largest 37
bank clerks’ strike led by the Ceylon Bank religious community in the island. These 38
Clerks Union. The Union was more influ- developments prepared the terrain for Bhikku 39
enced by Goonesinha’s ideas than by the involvement in politics. The conservative 40
Marxist parties. It then spread to government forces were supported by the rural petit 41
workers and municipal employees, paralyzing bourgeoisie and many monks inspired by the 42
essential services.The government treated the Vidyodaya Pirivena (Vidyoda monastic 43
strike as a major emergency. The hartal was school), who travelled around the countryside 44
eventually suspended but it acted as a warning with a message of disaster should the Marxists 45
to the Board of Ministers. capture power. 46
At the beginning of 1947 agitation for an The left, with the help of Vidyalankara 47
increase in wages among government daily monks, had succeeded in winning to its side 48
46
 S R I L A N K A’ S I N D E P E N D E N C E : S H A D OWS OV E R A C O LO N I A L G R A F T

1 a significant number of radical Buddhists, turned successively to coffee in the 1840s,

2 who believed socialism was not alien to the tea and coconuts in the 1880s, and rubber
3 spirit of Buddhism as the sangha was a com- in the 1900s. The plantation structure
4 munity in which private property was remained, based on the exploitation of an
5 non-existent. Indian labor force in vast plantations of several
6 The election results were a disappointment hundred hectares, overseen by a British
7 for the UNP, which secured only 42 of managerial class, and with well-established
8 95 seats. The LSSP won ten seats, the BLP commercial networks: “Over 40 percent of
9 five seats, the CP three seats and Labour one the Gross Domestic Product in 1948 came
10 seat. Left-wing parties, which secured 20.5 from agriculture and the share of tea, rubber
11 percent of the votes, dominated the low and coconut in the agricultural output was
12 country, from Colombo to the southwestern over 60 percent.”15 The smallholding sector
13 coast to Matara at the southern tip. At the produced mainly for the domestic market
14 time, the success of the left was explained as at relatively low levels of productivity. At
15 a consequence of the post-war economic Independence, economic indicators were
16 slump. There was also a caste dimension to largely favorable. The balance of payments
17 the Marxist power base.The coastal fringe of recorded a sizeable current account surplus
18 the country contained a heavy concentration while external reserves were sufficient to
19 of the Karava, Salagama, and Durava castes, finance imports for about one year.16 The
20 castes that occupied an intermediate place in standard of living, owing to well-entrenched
21 the social hierarchy dominated by the welfare policies in education, health, and food,
22 majority Goyigama (farmer) caste. The left was among the highest of the South and
23 did not make any headway in non-Sinhalese Southeast Asian countries.
24 areas.13 Interestingly, the northern part of the Although legislation passed in 1949
25 country was the only area where the LSSP authorized the creation of the Royal Ceylon
26 won fewer votes than its Marxist rivals. Army, Royal Ceylon Navy and Royal Ceylon
27 Clearly the nonsectarian language of the LSSP Air Force and although, in the years that
28 was not attractive to the Tamil voter. followed, an independent military force was
29 Independents had secured 21 seats while established, the organization of the armed
30 the Tamil Congress and Ceylon Indian forces in existence during colonial times did
31 Congress gained seven and six seats respec- not change. Most officers continued to be
32 tively.As the UNP had not secured a majority, trained in military academies in Britain. The
33 anti-UNP forces gathered to try to form a basic structure of the colonial forces was
34 government at what is known as the Yamuna retained, as were the symbolic trappings—the
35 Conference.14 But no agreement was reached flags, banners, and regimental ceremonies. At
36 and D. S. Senanayake lured enough inde- that time, the army served a purely ceremonial
37 pendents in support to form a cabinet. The function and took up less than 4 percent of
38 left parties would never come closer to the national budget.17
39 forming a government. The Ceylon Civil Service had been
40 Ceylonized to the extent of 90 percent by
41 1949, but a small minority of administrative
42 Economy, bureaucracy, army officers remained as a vestige of colonialism
43 and social privilege.After independence, its 200
44 At Independence, the island remained heir members continued to enjoy special advant-
45 to a colonial system in which the economy ages and status. The new middle classes
46 was tied to the export of tropical goods and continued to feed into the Ceylon Civil service
47 the import of food products such as rice. First for another decade and a half.This anomalous
48 established with cinnamon, the export trade status would last until 1963 when the Ceylon
47
N I R A W I C K R A M AS I N G H E

Civil Service was incorporated into a unified qualifying date for completion of residence. 1
administrative service of 1,030 officers.18 Senanayake had proposed stringent condi- 2
tions, including a residence qualification of 3
seven years for married and ten years for un- 4
Unfinished legacies: The married adults, calculated since 31 December, 5
citizenship issue 1945, together with proof that the applicant 6
had adequate means of livelihood and con- 7
While the Soulbury constitution avoided all formed to Ceylonese marriage laws. Applica- 8
matters relating to citizenship, three pieces of tion would have to be made within two years 9
legislation, namely, the Ceylon Citizenship of the date of legislation. 10
Act of 1948, the Indian and Pakistani The new citizenship and franchise laws 11
Residents Act No. 3 of 1948, and the Ceylon altered the balance of power between the 12
Parliamentary Elections Amendment Act various communities and helped consolidate 13
No. 48 of 1949, clearly demarcated those a majority within the polity. Through these 14
considered sons of the soil from those laws, Estate Tamils were defined as an alien 15
considered aliens. The first law deprived the and marginal group. The laws in many ways 16
Estate Indian Tamils, constituting 12 percent also embodied a class position on the part of 17
of the population, of their citizenship, the a group in society which was closer in cultural 18
second made it possible for those with terms to a middle- or upper-class Briton than 19
property and education within the community to a Sinhala or Tamil worker. Documentary 20
to obtain citizenship, and the third deprived proof such as registration of birth was required 21
those without citizenship of the right to vote. for applicants. In this sense it was not 22
The Ceylon Citizenship Act No. 18 of surprising that the elites in Ceylon had 23
1948 created two types of citizenship: absorbed one of the main myth models of 24
citizenship by descent and citizenship by European cultures, which implied that writing 25
registration. In both cases, documentary proof epitomized learning, civilization, and all that 26
was required for applicants, a procedure that distinguished the west from the rest. 27
disqualified the majority of Indian Tamil The urgency for passing such stringent 28
workers who were illiterate. Citizenship laws lay in the links that had been forged 29
would be given only to those who satisfied between the estate population and the Left 30
the government concerning the intensity of parties before Independence. This became a 31
their desire to adopt Sri Lanka as their concern for the conservative elite to whom 32
home.19 Citizenship by descent was restricted power had been transferred. The laws just 33
to persons who could prove that at least two described had shattered any possibility of 34
generations had been born on the island. stronger interethnic and class alliances by 35
Citizenship by registration was open to those excluding the entire Estate Tamil population 36
residents who could prove that either parent from participating in the polity. They also 37
had been a citizen by descent and that the pandered to fears of the Kandyan constituency 38
individual had been a resident of Ceylon for that they would be swamped by the ever- 39
seven years, if married, or ten years, if growing Tamil population. D. S. Senanayake’s 40
unmarried.The minister in charge was given position was consolidated both within the 41
discretionary power to register 25 persons a UNP, where the threat of his rival, S. W. R. 42
year for distinguished public service. D. Bandaranaike, a favorite of the Kandyans 43
The Indian and Pakistani Residents owing to his marriage to a Kandyan woman, 44
(Citizenship) Act No. 3 of 1949 was based lessened, and in the state as a whole at the 45
on Senanayake’s proposals at the December expense of 10 percent of the population that 46
1947 negotiations, the only change being the was cast out as not belonging to the nation 47
decision to take 1 January, 1948 as the state.20 48
48
 S R I L A N K A’ S I N D E P E N D E N C E : S H A D OWS OV E R A C O LO N I A L G R A F T
1 The trade unions that represented the
2 Estate Tamils in the late 1940s and early
3 1950s—the Ceylon Workers Congress
4 (CWC) and the Democratic Workers’ Con-
5 gress (DWC)—issued conflicting instructions
6 to members. Tales of application forms that
7 were requested but never arrived because of
8 the connivance of postmasters, and of a
9 climate of suspicion and fear on the part of
10 illiterate workers, are part of the collective
11 memory of plantation labor workers.21 The
12 result was that most estate workers became
13 stateless.
14 The citizenship acts spelled the end of
15 any sort of trust between the Estate Tamils
16 and the Jaffna Tamils. Indeed, the leader of
17 the Tamil Congress, representing the Jaffna
18 Tamils, accepted a ministry in the UNP
19 government that had just disenfranchised
20 nearly one million Tamil plantation workers.
21 The stand taken on behalf of the Estate
22 Tamils by the newly created federal party
23 leader, S. J.V. Chelvanayakam, did not create
24 much of an impact among the isolated Estate
25 Tamils. The relative isolation of the Indian
26 Tamils from the rest of society, whether
27 Ceylon Tamil or Sinhala, as well as their low
28 caste status and poverty, ensured their lack
29 of political representation and mobilization
30 and their rapid marginalization in national
31 politics.
32
33
34 Ethnic issues: Divide and rule?
35
36 The reconquest of political power by the
37 Sinhalese majority was supported by the
38 British and excesses on their part did not
39 lead the British government to adopt a more
40 conciliatory attitude towards minority
41 demands. This was in keeping with the
42 Colonial Office preference for gradualism.
43 An overview of the Soulbury Report’s
44 treatment of minority grievances issued in
45 1945 is revealing. On the whole, it appears
46 that the Soulbury Commission felt the
47 minorities were exaggerating the precarious-
48 ness of their situation.They agreed that there
had been minor instances of discriminatory
action by the Sinhalese. However, the report
on discrimination concluded that there was
no substantial indication of a general policy
on the part of the government of Ceylon to
discriminate against minority communities.
Apart from remaining closed to the
political demands of the minorities, the British
played a role in the process of Sinhalese
national affirmation which was not negligible.
During the 1930s and 1940s, the colonial
rulers participated in defining what they
thought was the uniqueness of Sinhalese
civilization.The study, preservation, translation
and publication of Sinhalese texts were
encouraged. State sponsorship was given to
indigenous systems of medicine. Thus, in the
last decades of British rule, a “divide and rule”
policy designed to suppress nationalism by
fostering ethnic tensions was more mythic
than real.The urgency was on another plane:
left-wing parties such as the LSSP were
fomenting social unrest and threatening the
old order. The British policy of alliances was
one supporting moderates against “extrem-
ists.”The main concern of the British was to
hand over power peacefully. The near com-
pletion of the program of Ceylonization of
the administration was motivated by the same
concern.
Dominion status: A flawed
independence
On 18 June, 1947 the British government
made the official announcement that Ceylon
would receive “fully responsible status within
the British Commonwealth of Nations.”22
Contemporaries as well as scholars in the
decades that followed have debated whether
dominion status meant the continuation of
colonial rule under another name. Among
the main critics of dominion status in the
1940s were supporters of the leftist parties of
Ceylon. On Independence Day they made
sure that black flags were displayed in various
parts of the island as a protest against the Rs
49
N I R A W I C K R A M AS I N G H E

800,000 allegedly spent on the celebrations. of the 1950s would not disappoint its 1
The leftist newspaper Nidahasa (freedom) proponents: it would be the most conservative 2
recalled occasions when students were caned and pro-western regime Sri Lanka ever would 3
by their teacher for refusing to participate in know. 4
Independence Day festivities or to bring flags 5
to schools.23 Historians of the immediate 6
post-independence decades took positions on Conclusion 7
the issue, although today few people would 8
feel it is something worth debating. K. M. In 1948 the colonial power departed Ceylon, 9
de Silva, for instance, argued that D. S. but left behind real and important traces.The 10
Senanayake’s emphasis on moderation and transfer of power within the framework of a 11
pragmatism was tactical and that Sri Lanka dominion allowed the country to avoid the 12
only followed the constitutional approach of necessity or human costs of struggling for a 13
memoranda and talks that had brought national cause, but it also denied its ruling class 14
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand to a founding myth comparable to that which 15
independence status without the bloodshed accompanied the birth of the Indian Union 16
that, he argued, had occurred in India where and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan. For a founding 17
independence was said to have been won by myth, politicians would look back to a much 18
a mass-based nationalist movement.24 It was, more distant past that did not embody 19
however, the Defense Agreement signed by democratic ideals but conjured up images of 20
Ceylon and Britain in 1948 that was most violence, exclusiveness, and parricide. The 21
criticized by the leftists, who called D. S. Sinhala myth of Vijaya and the people of the 22
Senanayake a traitor for allowing the British Lion would fill the symbolic void created by an 23
to continue to maintain naval, air, and land ineffective nationalist movement. 24
forces on the island and use naval bases, The vestiges of colonialism remained in 25
airports, and other facilities.25 Leftists also the army, the civil service, the constitution, 26
regarded the agreements as “badges of and the Anglicized middle class, whose 27
inferiority” and “checks on full sovereignty members continued to rule in all walks of 28
in external affairs.”26 By this agreement the life. The island’s dominant political models 29
government of Sri Lanka and the government and idioms, including Marxism in its most 30
of the United Kingdom would give each intellectual form, were also imported from 31
other “military assistance for the security of the west. The absence of legitimacy of 32
their territories, for defense against external politicians, who cut themselves away from the 33
aggression and for the protection of essential culture of the rural people, led to the institu- 34
communications.” Wriggins makes the tionalizing of a system of vote catching that 35
important point, however, that Ceylon re- emphasized dynastic loyalty with regard to 36
tained the right to terminate the arrange- the Senanayake and Bandaranaike clans. In 37
ment.27 Further, Jennings notes that D. S. the next decade, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike 38
Senanayake signed the Defense Agreement would ride the rising wave of dissatisfaction 39
rather as an inducement to Britain to hasten of the common man with a regime from 40
Sri Lanka’s independence than for any which he felt alienated and leaders for whom 41
military purpose.28 These agreements that he had little regard. 42
gave credibility to the argument made by 43
Marxists that Sri Lanka’s independence was 44
flawed must be understood as an integral part Notes 45
of the independence package of the British 46
that aimed at keeping Sri Lanka free from 1 W. Ivor Jennings, “The Dominion of Ceylon,” 47
Soviet influences as far as possible.The regime Pacific Affairs,Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 1949), p. 1. 48
50
 S R I L A N K A’ S I N D E P E N D E N C E : S H A D OWS OV E R A C O LO N I A L G R A F T

1 2 See the mainstream historical works on the 16 Godfrey Gunatilleke, Development and
2 British period, especially K. M. de Silva (ed.), Liberalisation in Sri Lanka. Trends and Prospects
3 History of Ceylon,Vol. III (Colombo: Colombo (Colombo: Marga Institute, 1993), pp. 5–6.
4 Apothecaries, 1973); Robert N. Kearney, The 17 http//ieweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cs.
Politics of Ceylon (Ithaca, NY, and London: 18 James Jupp, “Constitutional Development in
5
Cornell University Press, 1973); Howard Ceylon since Independence,” Pacific Affairs,
6 Wriggins, Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Summer 1968), pp. 169–83;
7 (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1960). Robert N. Kearney, “Ceylon: A Year of
8 3 David Scott, Refashioning Futures: Criticism after Consolidation,” Asian Survey, Vol. 4, No. 2
9 Postcoloniality (Princeton, NJ: University Press, (1964), pp. 729–34.
10 1999), citing Eric Stokes, The English 19 A. Aziz, CIC President, Hindu Organ, 18 May,
11 Utilitarians and India (New Delhi: Oxford 1948.
12 University Press, 1989). 20 See the excellent analysis of Amita Shastri,
13 4 Eric Meyer makes this point very convincingly “Estate Tamils, the Ceylon Citizenship Act of
in his latest book, Sri Lanka: Entre Particularisme 1948 and Sri Lankan politics,” Contemporary
14
et Mondialisation (Paris: La Documentation South Asia, 8, 1 (1999), pp. 65–86. For more
15 Française, 2001). conventional approaches, see I. D. S.
16 5 See, for example, S. Arasaratnam, review of Sri Weerawardena, “The Minorities and the
17 Lanka: From Dominion to Republic, by Lucy M. Citizenship Act,” Ceylon Historical Journal, 1, 3
18 Jacob, in Pacific Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 4 (Winter (1951); S. U. Kodikara, Indo–Ceylon Relations
19 1974–75), pp. 567–68. Since Independence (Colombo: Colombo
20 6 Command papers 3131. 1928. Ceylon: Report Apothecaries, 1965).
21 of the Special Commission on the Constitution of 21 E.Valentine Daniel, Charred Lullabies: Chapters
22 Ceylon, July 1928 (London: His Majesty’s in an Anthropography of Violence: Sri Lankans,
23 Stationery Office, 1928), pp. 11–12. Sinhalas, and Tamils (Princeton, NJ: University
7 The Ceylon National Congress formed in Press and New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
24
1919 was constituted by notables belonging 1997), pp. 110–13.
25 to all ethnic and religious communities of 22 See K. M. de Silva (ed.), British Documents on
26 Ceylon to push for reforms of the constitution. the End of Empire. Sri Lanka. Part II. Towards
27 See Michael Roberts (ed.), Documents of the Independence (series B Volume 2) 1945–1948
28 Ceylon National Congress and Nationalist Politics (London: Institute for Commonwealth Studies,
29 in Ceylon 1929–1950, 4 vols (Colombo: 1997), pp. 350–51.
30 Department of National Archives, 1977). 23 Nidahasa, 25 February, 1948.
31 8 Nira Wickramasinghe, Sri Lanka in the Modern 24 K. M. de Silva, “Ivor Jennings and Sri Lanka’s
32 Age: A History of Contested Identities (London: passage to Independence,” in K. M. de Silva
C. Hurst 2006), pp. 306–307. (ed.), Sri Lanka’s Troubled Inheritance (Kandy:
33
9 Wickramasinghe, Sri Lanka, p. 306. ICES, 2007), p. 106.
34 10 Nira Wickramasinghe, “Politics of Nostalgia: 25 For the full text of the defense requirements
35 The Citizen as peasant,” Delhi School of Economics of the British government, see K. M. de Silva
36 Occasional Paper, (New Series), No. 2, 2005. (ed.), British Documents, pp. 299–305; H. S. S.
37 11 H. L. Seneviratne, The Work of Kings: New Nissanka, Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy—A Study
38 Buddhism in Sri Lanka (Chicago: University of in Non-Alignment (New Delhi: Vikas, 1984),
39 Chicago Press, 1999). pp. 9–11.
40 12 Cited in The Hindu Organ (a daily English- 26 K. M. de Silva, “Sri Lanka—D. S. Senanayake
41 language paper published in Jaffna). and the Passage to Dominion Status,
42 Seneviratne, pp. 228–43. 1942–1947,” Sri Lanka Journal of Social Sciences,
13 Seneviratne, pp. 228–43. Vol. 3, No. 2 (December 1980), p. 14.
43
14 N. Sanmugathasan, Political Memoirs of an 27 Howard Wriggins, Ceylon, p. 385.
44 Unrepentant Communist (Colombo: Colombo 28 Cited in Shelton Kodikara, Foreign Policy of Sri
45 Apothecaries, 1989), p. 70. Lanka: A Third World Perspective (Delhi:
46 15 Godfrey Gunatilleke, Welfare and Growth in Sri Chanakya, 1982), pp. 84–86.
47 Lanka, Marga Research. Studies No. 2.
48 (Colombo: Marga Institute, 1974), pp. 1–2.

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19 India is, famously, the biggest democracy in insurgencies had gathered momentum in
20 the world. And, given the failures of demo- Punjab and Assam, and latterly in Kashmir,
21 cratic political systems in so many other and there appeared to be growing violence
22 former colonies, a good many commentators and instability across the country, whether in
23 have found it remarkable that the country an “advanced” state like Gujarat, or a “back-
24 should have remained a democracy—except ward” one like Bihar (states to which Kohli
25 for the brief period between 1975 and 1977 devoted chapters in his book). Shortly
26 when the then prime minister, Indira Gandhi, thereafter the fabric of the Indian polity was
27 declared an “emergency” and suspended the torn as never before, at the moment in
28 Constitution. This chapter traces the history December 1992 when a mob of supporters
29 of Indian democracy and the implications of of the movement of Hindu cultural national-
30 political changes for the functioning of the ism, spurred but not overtly led by the
31 key institutions of government. Bharatiya Janata Party—that had by this time
32 In 1990 a leading writer on the politics emerged as the major force of opposition
33 of India,Atul Kohli, published a book entitled nationally to the Congress Party—tore down
34 Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis an old mosque in the north Indian town of
35 of Governability.The idea of “crisis” in his title Ayodhya. The 1990s then saw, on one level
36 accurately reflected views that were generally at least, greater political instability than India
37 held at the time. By the end of the 1980s had ever known. There were five general
38 the long period of the almost absolute elections in ten years in the 1990s (in 1989,
39 dominance of Indian politics by the Congress 1991, 1996, 1998, and 1999) whereas there
40 Party was coming to an end. Rajiv Gandhi, had been only eight such elections in the
41 Indira’s son, who had won an overwhelming previous 40 years, and the country experi-
42 victory in the 1984 General Election, follow- enced minority governments for the first time
43 ing her assassination, had failed in his efforts (starting with the government of V. P. Singh
44 to renew the organization of the party. His in 1989–90). Yet this was also the decade in
45 government had drifted, its programmes in which India changed course in terms of
46 disarray, and it had become embroiled in economic policy, as reforms that began to be
47 damaging charges of corruption at the high- instituted in 1991 brought in moderate
48 est levels, notably in the “Bofors affair”;1 liberalization. This, building on the earlier

55
JOH N HAR R ISS

development of a policy environment more Democracy under a universal franchise 1

sympathetic to private business, has borne (extending also to women in India well before 2
fruit in recent years in exceptionally high rates a number of western countries) was, in a 3
of economic growth. Even before the end of sense, the gift of a small and privileged, mainly 4
the decade Kohli apparently reached a upper caste, professional elite. Certainly India 5
different judgment about the state of India’s does not fit at all well with structural theories 6
government from that which he had held about the social basis of movements of 7
earlier, according to the title of an edited democratization, which hold, alternatively, 8
book, The Success of India’s Democracy. The that democratization depends on the existence 9
counterpoint between Kohli’s two titles of a developed middle class, or of a significant 10
suggests the enduring puzzle of the gover- organized working class. Although India by 11
nance of India: how is that a country with the late 1940s did have an influential industrial 12
so many contending social forces, character- bourgeoisie, and a politically mobilized pro- 13
ized by high levels of everyday violence, has letariat in the major urban centres, it remained 14
nonetheless remained united, politically a overwhelmingly a hierarchical agrarian society 15
fairly stable parliamentary democracy, and in which the power of large landholders 16
lately economically successful? The answer lies remained pervasive, together with the subtle 17
in large part in India’s constitutional design. and not so subtle forms of social exclusion 18
and oppression associated with caste. Pratap 19
Bhanu Mehta has argued that although the 20
India’s parliamentary nationalist movement and the impulse of 21
democracy social reform that “sometimes accompanied 22
it” delegitimized the more extreme forms of 23
The Preamble to the Constitution of India oppression of Hindu society, it did not 24
that came into force on 26 January, 1950 eliminate them: 25
declared: “WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA 26
[have] solemnly resolved to constitute India [T]he structure of what we might call India’s 27
into a SOVEREIGN DEMOCRATIC ancient social regime . . . survived into demo- 28
REPUBLIC.” It seems that by the late 1940s cracy relatively intact . . . The contradiction, 29
it was almost a foregone conclusion that between proclaimed political equality on the 30
independent India would be a parliamentary one hand, and deep social and economic 31
democracy, and there was little debate on this inequality on the other, was too obvious to go 32
point in the Constituent Assembly that drew unnoticed. But this feature, in part, constituted 33
up the constitution. It is sometimes thought the uniqueness of the Indian experiment. 34
that this was a natural inheritance from the Rather than political democracy following at 35
British colonial rulers, but such a viewpoint least a social transformation of sorts, ultimately 36
discounts the extent to which a commitment it was going to be the instrument of this 37
to a universal franchise, and also to federalism transformation.4 38
and to secularism, became a necessary part 39
of the struggle for independence.The leaders It is not inconceivable that political democ- 40
of the Congress movement needed to build racy should be the instrument of social 41
national unity amidst the enormous diversity transformation—and the experience of 42
of India in terms of caste, language, religion, certain regions of India, notably that of Kerala, 43
and local patriotisms,2 and to manage the shows that sometimes it has been.5 But with 44
groundswell of popular opposition to colonial regard to India as a whole, as Mehta notes 45
rule that built up after 1920. Their commit- perceptively: “The irony is that the more 46
ment to democracy was instrumental in the unequal the background institutions and 47
creation of national consciousness.3 practices of society, the more likely it is that 48
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1 politics will be a struggle to displace the the colonial government such as the bureau-
2 holders of power rather than an ambition to cracy and the police. The Congress was the
3 bring about social transformation.”6 This unifying force of the new India. Nehru could
4 point aptly reflects differences across India, proclaim with justice at the time of the first
5 and the character of politics in the Hindi general election to the Indian parliament, the
6 heartland as opposed to parts of the south Lok Sabha, in 1952, the slogan that “India is
7 and the west.7 Formal political democracy the Congress, the Congress is India.” By this
8 has generally proved to be a limited instru- time, following the death of Patel in 1950,
9 ment of social transformation in modern he himself held a position of undisputed
10 India where, however, Kerala, West Bengal authority in both party and government,
11 and, perhaps, Tamil Nadu are exceptions to though he was constrained by the majority
12 the general rule. Sudipta Kaviraj and Partha of Congress conservatives within the
13 Chatterjee have both referred to Gramsci’s Congress Working Committee.
14 idea of “passive revolution” in explaining the The governments that Nehru headed
15 process of social change in modern India, and pursued policies intended to build a broadly
16 have shown how, under the authority of socialist, secular, modern state through central
17 India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, planning, but in the context of an accom-
18 it was believed that social transformation modative political system. This was what he
19 could be brought about from above through once proclaimed as India’s “third way,” namely,
20 state–bureaucratic agency.8 Chatterjee argues, “planning under a democratic pattern of
21 however, that even after more than 50 years socialism.”10 Although India was far from
22 of independence, it remains the case that the being a one-party state, since the Congress
23 rights of democratic citizenship are meaning- was opposed by parties of both the left and
24 ful only for a minority of Indians. Only a the right throughout the 1950s and into the
25 minority have a role in “civil society,” the 1960s, the dominance of Congress was rarely
26 sphere in which citizens come together on threatened either in the central government
27 terms of political equality in voluntary asso- or in the states.The lone exception was when
28 ciations through which they are able to the Communist Party of India won control
29 deliberate on matters of public concern. The of the state government of Kerala in 1957.
30 great majority of Indians are left still to India’s political setup was described by W. H.
31 struggle for their rights as citizens of demo- Morris-Jones as a one-party dominant system
32 cratic India.9 Even now the structure of India’s and by Rajni Kothari, in similar terms, as a
33 “ancien régime” remains strong. “dominant party system,” in which domi-
34 nance coexisted with competition but with-
35 out a trace of alternation of parties.11 The
36 Act one in the political drama central government bargained with state
37 of independent India: The governments led by powerful state leaders
38 Nehruvian state and the era of from the Congress, although, ultimately,
39 Congress dominance authority lay in New Delhi.12
40 Still, Kaviraj argued in 1991 that the
41 The Indian National Congress, the organ- political elite of the new Indian state in the
42 ization that led the movement for Indian 1950s and 1960s largely failed to develop a
43 independence, was—it has been said—already “common political language” shared with the
44 “becoming the Raj” even before the end of masses.13 In the main, in the context of Indian
45 British rule, as its leaders, notably Sardar Patel, society in the first 25 years of Independence,
46 Nehru’s powerful home minister in the first the Congress-dominant party system operated
47 post-independence Congress government, through a structure of clientelistic relations
48 were careful to preserve key institutions of extending from local levels, both urban and
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JOH N HAR R ISS

rural, up to the apex of the pyramid of power. the Congress mistakenly thought would be 1
Those who were locally powerful, commonly the pliant instrument of their will. In 1967, 2
the larger landholders and the dominant in the fourth general election to the Lok 3
peasant proprietors, became, over much of the Sabha, the Congress majority was drastically 4
country, critical brokers, mediating between reduced, and the party also failed to win 5
the mass of the people and politicians.14 In majorities in no fewer than eight states. The 6
the end these local power holders were able era of Congress dominance was over, although 7
to defeat the reforming intentions of the it would take another 20 years before it was 8
Nehruvian elite.15 finally replaced at the end of the twentieth 9
century by an apparently quite stable political 10
system of opposing party coalitions (see Table 11
Act II: Congress dominance 4.1 for a listing of India’s prime ministers). 12
contested under the regimes Indira Gandhi split the Congress party in 13
of Indira and Rajiv Gandhi 1969 in her struggle for authority with its 14
senior leaders, the immediate cause being a 15
Nehru’s authority was declining even before dispute over the election of a new president 16
his death in May 1964, partly as a result of of India. In the general election that she then 17
India’s defeat in a war with China over called in 1971, she was successful in winning 18
borders in 1962, while the modernizing a convincing victory, in spite of having lost 19
efforts of the Nehruvian state were checked control of much of the Congress organization. 20
by the failures of planned economic develop- She was successful, as observers noted at the 21
ment. Declining electoral support for Con- time, in reaching voters “over the heads” of 22
gress showed that these failures called into the local notables who mostly remained 23
question the legitimacy of the exercise of stalwarts of the party machine that had 24
power by the government that Nehru headed. continued to be in the hands of Indira’s 25
Nehru was followed in the office of prime opponents.16 Thereafter, the Congress 26
minister by Lal Bahadur Shastri and then, organization that had served Nehru well, was 27
after Shastri’s death in 1966, by Nehru’s broken—and it has remained so to the 28
daughter Indira, who the senior leaders of present. 29
30
31
Table 4.1 Prime ministers of India 32
33
Period of office Party
34
Jawaharlal Nehru 1947–1964 Congress 35
Lal Bahadur Shastri 1964–1966 Congress 36
Indira Gandhi 1966–1977 Congress
Morarji Desai* 1977–1979 Janata
37
Choudhary Charan Singh 1979–1980 Janata 38
Indira Gandhi 1980–1984 Congress (I) 39
Rajiv Gandhi 1984–1989 Congress (I) 40
Vishwanath Pratap Singh* 1989–1990 Janata Dal 41
Chandra Sekhar 1990–1991 Janata Dal
P. V. Narasimha Rao 1991–1996 Congress (I)
42
Atal Behari Vajpayee* 1996 (for 13 days) Bharatiya Janata Party 43
H. D. Deve Gowda* 1996–1997 Janata Dal/United Front 44
Inder Kumar Gujral 1997–1998 Janata Dal/United Front 45
Atal Behari Vajpayee 1998–2004 Bharatiya Janata Party/National Democratic Alliance 46
Manmohan Singh 2004– Congress (I)/United Progressive Alliance
47
Note: * indicates that tenure of office ended with resignation (rather than electoral defeat or death). 48
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1 Atul Kohli revisited in the 1980s the
2 constituencies studied 20 years earlier by
3 Myron Weiner, who had found that the
4 Congress Party had local organization and
5 some semblance at least of internal party
6 democracy. Both organization and internal
7 democracy had withered,17 and nothing has
8 been done since then to restore the party as
9 an organization.What political scientists have
10 described as the “deinstitutionalization” of
11 Indian politics extends to most other party
12 political formations, which are little more (if
13 at all) than loose followings of more or less
14 charismatic political leaders. Elections in
15 individual states and in the country as a whole
16 have commonly been subject to “wave”
17 effects, and incumbents, more often than not,
18 have been booted out of office by the
19 electorate after one term. Politics has become
20 a kind of business, calling for significant
21 investments in order to win office, but with
22 the prospect then of making major gains from
23 kickbacks of various kinds.18
24 When opposition to her mounted in the
25 mid-1970s, in a context of increasing eco-
26 nomic failure and political unrest, Indira
27 Gandhi used a clause of the last major act of
28 the British, the Government of India Act
29 1935, that had been incorporated into the
30 Indian Constitution, to suspend that constitu-
31 tion, with the declaration of an “emergency.”
32 Democracy was suppressed for 20 months.
33 In the elections that followed, in 1977, Indira
34 was defeated, although less comprehensively
35 than some had expected, since Congress
36 remained strong in parts of the south and the
37 west of the country. But, for the first time,
38 India had a non-Congress government.
39 The Janata Party was a coalition in which
40 the Jan Sangh, founded in 1952 as the party
41 of those sympathetic to arguments for Hindu
42 nationalism, held the most seats. The Janata
43 government appears, with the advantage of
44 hindsight, to have been significant for this
45 reason, and also because it saw a much greater
46 share of members of the Lok Sabha than ever
47 before who were drawn from among the
48 peasantry. But the Janata government and the
broad-based Janata Party itself did not last,
both broken by petty squabbles among their
leaders. As a result, Mrs Gandhi was returned
to office in January 1980, an event that had
seemed almost inconceivable only shortly
before.
In the 1980s, as James Manor put it:“India
became increasingly democratic and increas-
ingly difficult to govern.”19 Despite their
electoral majorities, the authority of the
Congress governments of both Indira Gandhi
and then of Rajiv were fragile, being depen-
dent on the personalities of their leaders.
Both were leaders with attitudes rather than
policies,20 points of view rather than coherent
ideology. Indira developed a highly personal-
ized and centralized strategy of rule, destabi-
lizing state governments if ever a political
leader appeared to be developing an inde-
pendent power base. In the process, however,
she created opportunities for regional parties,
like the new Telugu Desam Party in Andhra
Pradesh.The Telugu Desam won success very
quickly in 1983 after a year in which, because
of Indira’s interventions, the state had as many
as three different chief ministers. In one way,
the Indian central state appeared to gain in
strength, and yet its capacity to realize its will
was weaker than before, so that it was
described by Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph as
a “weak–strong state”21—a far cry indeed
from the Nehruvian state.
Indian politics became increasingly
criminalized, too, in this time, with more and
more elected representatives having criminal
records.There is sometimes an unholy alliance
between politicians of this ilk and the police.22
And both Indira and Rajiv Gandhi made
increasing concessions, in their efforts to
maintain political support, to the Hindu
nationalist constituency. Rajiv, in spite of
winning the most crushing victory that
Congress has ever contrived, taking advantage
of the “sympathy wave” that followed his
mother’s murder in 1984, signally failed to
restore the Congress organizations and his
government drifted. By the end of the 1980s
there was a political vacuum in India.
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JOH N HAR R ISS

Act III: Towards a new political Ayodhya, in Uttar Pradesh, on the site 1
order occupied by an old mosque, the Babri Masjid, 2
that is held to be the birthplace of the Hindu 3
Into the vacuum there stepped at first the god, Rama. The Babri Masjid had become 4
Janata Dal, a political grouping formed mainly the object of increasing controversy since 5
by politicians who had at one time or another 1984, when a movement for the “liberation” 6
been on the left of Congress, which won of a number of holy sites in various parts of 7
office in 1989 under the leadership of India had been launched on the grounds that 8
Vishwanath Pratap Singh. However, in order they had been forcibly occupied by Muslim 9
to govern, the Janata Dal government conquerors and converted to use as Islamic 10
depended on the support from the outside sites.The Rath Yatra was only the most recent 11
of the successor to the Jan Sangh, the in a series of carefully staged political dramas 12
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which had won through which the BJP, together with its sister 13
86 seats, and of the communist parties. In the organizations of the sangh parivar—the 14
following year,V. P. Singh provoked opposition “family” of associations pursuing Hindu 15
over his proposal to implement the recom- cultural nationalism—were successful in 16
mendations of the Second Backward Classes winning wider support. From now on, the 17
Commission (the Mandal Commission, as it BJP, a well-organized force that recommended 18
was commonly known, from the name of the itself to the expanding middle classes as a 19
senior politician who had headed it), and lost party of order, in contrast to the fractious 20
the support of the BJP. In the meantime, the Janata Dal, became the center of opposition 21
BJP had won control of two state govern- to Congress. 22
ments for the first time, those of Madhya Through the 1990s, Indian politics 23
Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh, in January eventually settled into a new pattern, not so 24
1990. much of stable two-party politics, but rather 25
The Mandal Commission proposals called of stable “two-coalition” politics, albeit one 26
for an expansion of reservation of jobs in in which shifts in the balance of power depend 27
central government services and public on the changing allegiances of minority, 28
undertakings for people from the officially mainly regionally based parties. The general 29
defined “other backward classes,” that is, those election of 1991 saw Congress returned to 30
castes and classes held to have been socially power, partly as a result of the sympathy vote 31
and educationally disadvantaged and who had brought about by the assassination of Rajiv 32
not had the benefit of such reservations Gandhi in the midst of the election campaign, 33
previously granted to persons from the lowest but with the BJP, now with 120 seats and 20 34
castes in Indian society, categorized as percent of the popular vote, clearly in second 35
scheduled castes. In the outcry that followed place. Rather against the odds, the minority 36
from members of higher castes, V. P. Singh government of P.V. Narasimha Rao survived 37
was soon forced to resign, to be replaced as for a full term, but then, in 1996, the BJP 38
prime minister by Chandrasekhar, at the head emerged as the largest single party even 39
of a minority government that relied on though it did not succeed in expanding its 40
Congress support. The latter government in support base. The government that the party 41
turn lasted for less than six months before a formed survived for only 13 days, to be 42
fresh general election had to be called. replaced by a 13-party United Front gov- 43
The most significant event at this moment, ernment, which was kept going under two 44
however, was the Rath Yatra (“chariot prime ministers (Deve Gowda and I. K. Gujral) 45
procession”) across the country undertaken with the outside support of Congress. When 46
by the BJP leader L. K. Advani, intended to this support was withdrawn in 1998 and fresh 47
culminate in “rebuilding the temple” in elections were held, the BJP won more seats, 48
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 P O L I T I CA L C H A N G E , ST R U CT U R E , A N D T H E I N D I A N STAT E S I N C E I N D E P E N D E N C E
1 and the largest share that it has won so far of
2 the popular vote (25 percent). However, the
3 coalition that it headed failed in April 1999,
4 and it was only after the thirteenth Lok Sabha
5 elections of October 1999 that the party
6 succeeded in managing the support of
7 coalition partners in the National Democratic
8 Alliance in such a way as to run the
9 government through a full term. Then, in
10 2004, amidst the hubris of its claims to have
11 made “India Shining,” the BJP lost power to
12 Congress, which, on this occasion, managed
13 the coalition arithmetic more effectively, and
14 contrived to remain in office for five years
15 and to win power again in the 2009 elections.
16 The third phase in the history of Indian
17 democracy has, therefore, at last seen the
18 establishment of a “competitive multiparty
19 system which can no longer be defined with
20 [exclusive] reference to Congress.”23 In this
21 new system, state-based parties have become
22 nationally significant as never before,24 their
23 rise marking a definite shift away from the
24 centralizing thrust of the Constitution. This
25 change is reflected in the much more sparing
26 use of Article 356, authorizing “President’s
27 Rule,” through which governments at the
28 centre have regularly dissolved state govern-
29 ments (Indira Gandhi used this instrument
30 39 times between 1966 and 1977; and it was
31 used altogether upwards of 100 times before
32 the end of the last century).
33 Another very important development in
34 this phase has been what Yogendra Yadav has
35 described as “the second democratic upsurge.”
36 He refers to the way in which certain histori-
37 cally subordinated communities from among
38 the other backward classes, and even some
39 of the scheduled castes, have become politi-
40 cally mobilized and empowered through the
41 electoral process, yet behind political leaders25
42 and party political groupings that are far from
43 being democratic in their own functioning.26
44 The most recent, striking expression of this
45 tendency is the majority won by the dalit
46 leader, Mayawati, and her Bahujan Samaj Party
47 in state elections in Uttar Pradesh in 2007.
48 But, as Sunil Khilnani has put it, democracy
in India has come to mean little more than
“elections”:
As the sole bridge between state and society,
they have come metonymically to stand for
democracy itself . . . . This . . . has altered how
political parties now muster support.The most
recent period of India’s democracy has shown
a tenacity of community identities, in the form
of caste and religion, as groups struggle to
construct majorities that can rule . . . But the
fact that such identities were less significant for
four decades after independence . . . only shows
how much they are creations of modern
politics.27
So, as Khilnani says further, democracy has
reconstituted social identities in modern
India, but identities of caste and religion have
also “bent the democratic idea to their own
purposes.”28
The compromised character of Indian
democracy now, therefore, is that while
representative electoral politics do represent
the means whereby the mass of the people
can hope to realize the self-respect that is, as
Pratap Mehta argues,29 democracy’s deepest
aspiration, these politics provide for only the
most limited kind of agency on the part of
poor people.There is by now strong evidence
for the first proposition, for example in the
work of Javeed Alam,30 on the reasons why
in India, alone among major democracies,
there should be an inverse relationship
between income and social status and electoral
participation.Yet electoral politics provide for
only the most limited kind of agency on the
part of poor people, if they actually have to
enter into relationships of dependence with
powerful intermediaries in order to secure
their entitlements as citizens of the country.31
The institutions and functioning
of the Government of India
Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph have argued
that, alongside the political changes that have
61
JOH N HAR R ISS

taken place over the last 20 years, the character that it is “able to ensure executive account- 1
of government has undergone quite radical ability to only a limited extent.”34 There has 2
change: been a steady erosion of procedural norms 3
in the Lok Sabha over the last 30 years, 4
After 1989 both the planned economy and the and it has had a poor record in controlling 5
centralized state have gradually given way to the exercise of executive power. A striking 6
a regulatory state more suited to coalition demonstration of this weakness occurred in 7
governments in a multiparty system, to eco- the ninth Lok Sabha when “19 bills, including 8
nomic decentralization, and to more indepen- one on constitutional amendment, were 9
dent and competitive federal states.32 passed by members on a single day in March, 10
without referral to any committee or any 11
An important part of this change in the discussion.”35 By now, as we have seen, there 12
character of the Indian state, they argue, is has emerged a vocal opposition in India, but 13
that there has come about a shift in the because of the disunity of both governing 14
balance of power between the key institutions and opposing coalitions, the result “has been 15
of government, in favor of the president, the less the establishment of accountability, more 16
supreme court, and the election commission, a pervasive concern for office among those 17
and at the expense of parliament, the prime who seek to represent the Indian people.”36 18
minister, and the cabinet. These arguments 19
are examined here, in the context of a review 20
The prime minister and the cabinet
of India’s government institutions. 21
India’s system of government was set up 22
following the conventions of British cabinet 23
Parliament
government of the time, which gave a leading 24
The Indian parliament is bicameral. The 552 position to the prime minister, but along with 25
members of the lower house, the Lok Sabha, the principle of the collective responsibility 26
which is the supreme legislative body, are of the cabinet. And this was how Nehru 27
elected under a universal franchise from single operated. Then, under his successor, Shastri, 28
member constituencies in a first-past-the-post and more so under Indira Gandhi, the prime 29
system.The ratio between the number of seats minister’s personal secretariat (now the Prime 30
allotted to each state and the population of Minister’s Office), became an alternative 31
the state is supposed to be constant—although source of influence to the cabinet. Mrs 32
there are now concerns that this principle is Gandhi’s secretariat became an independent 33
giving an unhealthy weight to the more executive force; and the pattern of prime 34
populous and socially “backward” states of the ministerial dominance of a weak cabinet37 35
north.33 Turnout in elections has on average has continued and developed further. The 36
been between 50 and 65 percent. The upper personal authority of prime ministers has 37
house, the Rajya Sabha (“Council of States”), been weaker, however, since the time of Indira 38
has 250 members, 238 of them elected by and of Rajiv Gandhi, with the series of hung 39
state legislatures and 12 of them nominated parliaments (following the 1989, 1991, 1996, 40
by the president. The members, who sit for and 1998 elections) with minority govern- 41
six-year terms (with one-third retiring every ments.Atal Behari Vajpayee, a powerful prime 42
two years), can, and on occasion, have blocked minister in 1999–2004, was, however, con- 43
legislation passed by the Lok Sabha. It is co- strained by parliament not nearly so much as 44
equal with the lower house in the electoral by the influence on him of the other organ- 45
college for the election of the president. izations of the sangh parivar, while Prime 46
Arun Agrawal concludes his recent analysis Minister Manmohan Singh (2004–) is con- 47
of the Indian parliament with the argument strained by dependence for his personal 48
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1 authority on the sanction of Sonia Gandhi, vided space for presidents to act as guardians
2 Rajiv’s widow, as the effective leader of the of fairness and constitutional balance.
3 Congress Party and of what is sometimes Ramaswamy Venkataraman established an
4 called India’s “ruling [Nehru] family,” as well important precedent concerning the presi-
5 as by the dependence of his government until dent’s role in the formation of governments
6 mid-2008 on the support of the communist in hung parliaments when, in 1989, he first
7 parties. asked the largest single party (Congress,
8 following that election) to form the govern-
9 ment, a principle that has been followed by
President38
10 his successors. Among them, the one who
11 Under the constitution, virtually all executive most clearly asserted his independence, in the
12 powers are vested in the president, although defense of what he saw as constitutional
13 they are supposed to be exercised on the propriety, was K. R. Narayanan. In 1998 he
14 advice of the prime minister and the cabinet. refused a request from the Janata government
15 There have been longstanding concerns about of I. K. Gujral to impose President’s Rule in
16 the possibility of a president exercising dis- the state of Uttar Pradesh. Following the
17 cretionary power, but for most of the time, election later that year of a government
18 up until 1989, successive presidents of India headed by the BJP, he appeared, through
19 restrained themselves.39 Certain of the actions several actions, to criticize that government
20 of Sanjiva Reddy during the misadventures in a way that was unprecedented. He then
21 of the Janata government in the late 1970s pushed his powers to the limit in requesting
22 were controversial, and it is known that Prime Minister Vajpayee in 1999 to establish,
23 President Zail Singh considered dismissing the through a vote in the Lok Sabha, that he still
24 government of Rajiv Gandhi over the Bofors had majority support (when he might have
25 affair,40 but these were exceptions to the been expected to have waited for the
26 general rule (see Table 4.2 for a listing of opposition parties to table a non-confidence
27 India’s presidents).The era of hung parliaments motion). In January 2000 his address on the
28 since 1989, however, has created opportunities occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the
29 and even the necessity for assertive action by establishment of the republic questioned the
30 presidents because s/he is the referee in the BJP government’s efforts to change the 1950
31 game of government formation, while the Constitution by providing for a directly
32 perception of spreading corruption has pro- elected president. Narayanan, and his pre-
33 decessor Shankar Dayal Sharma, did much to
34 Table 4.2 Presidents of India ensure that the use of Article 356 of the
35 Election President Constitution, authorizing President’s Rule,
36 has come closer to the position Dr B. R.
1950 Rajendra Prasad
37 1952 Rajendra Prasad
Ambedkar (generally identified as the
38 1957 Rajendra Prasad principal draughtsman of the constitution)
39 1962 Dr. S. Radhakrishnan intended for it,“a matter of last resort.” More
40 1967 Zakir Hussain (died 1969) generally and most importantly, these two
41 1969 V. V. Giri presidents “found constitutional grounds and
1974 Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed (died 1977)
42 1977 Sanjiva Reddy
appropriate occasions to act independently of
43 1982 Zail Singh the union executive in the public interest.”41
44 1987 R. Venkatraman
45 1992 Shankar Dayal Sharma
1997 K. R. Narayanan The bureaucracy42
46
2002 Dr Abdul Kalam
47 2007 Smt. Pratiba Patil
It has been found that one of the critical
48 features of those polities that have been more
63
JOH N HAR R ISS

successful in terms of economic development inefficient and mired in petty corruption. 1

is the quality of their bureaucracies, in which The extent to which the IAS is involved in 2
it is considered that merit-based recruitment corruption is disputed, but senior officials, 3
plays an important part.43 The “higher” civil who can exercise a great deal of influence 4
services of India in which the Indian on public decision making, are certainly part 5
Administrative Service (IAS) is the senior of the dominant class of India and important 6
body, are recruited through stiff competitive beneficiaries of the actions of the state.46 7
examination. So, the principle of merit obtains 8
in recruitment—modified by the operation 9
of reservations—although subsequent promo- Conclusion 10
tion is based very largely on seniority. The 11
IAS is an all-India service and the practice This review of political change and the 12
of allocating large numbers of outsiders to a functioning of the institutions of government 13
state cadre is intended to secure a higher level in India suggests two strong conclusions, in 14
of impartiality. The service continues to be answer to the “puzzle of governance” set out 15
prestigious, and the quality of many officers in the introduction. First—in line with the 16
is undoubtedly exceptionally high, but it is Rudolphs’ argument concerning the shift to 17
known that whereas it was formerly the the “regulatory state”—it seems clear that 18
preferred career for the most able, now many increased political competition, and the 19
of the best young people opt rather for careers instability of the 1990s, have strengthened 20
in the private sector. some institutions (the president, the Supreme 21
The advent of the developmental state of Court and the election commission) and 22
independent India in the 1950s meant that weakened others. The weakening of the 23
members of the civil service, especially in the centralizing thrust of the Indian Constitution 24
higher echelons, were expected to take on a has probably had positive consequences. The 25
much wider range of functions, and the fact that the constitutional design sets up many 26
service continues to face problems having to “veto points”—checks on change, ranging 27
do with multiple goals. It remains capable of from the formal requirements for judicial 28
high-quality delivery but there are concerns review to the informal checks of procedural 29
about the deterioration of its general perfor- delay within the bureaucracy—has negative 30
mance that is thought to have come about consequences, no doubt, but provides defenses 31
as a result of the reduced independence of against the abuse of power.47 This points to 32
senior bureaucrats and increased political the second conclusion. The Indian state 33
interference. Political–bureaucratic relation- remains, it is said, “excessively procedural and 34
ships have been transformed, Brass argues, in rule bound.” This makes for inertia, for sure, 35
a patrimonial direction, with the political but also limits the capacity of particular social 36
leadership selecting officers who are per- forces to manipulate the state. As Kapur and 37
sonally loyal and will serve their narrow Mehta argue, it makes in the end for the 38
interests.44 The system of transfers of civil systemic stability that has puzzled so many 39
servants is manipulated by politicians and is observers of Indian politics and the state.48 40
one basis for corruption,45 while one of the 41
results of the frequency with which even 42
senior officers are transferred is their very Notes 43
short average tenure in any one post. 44
Below the senior levels of the civil service 1 The “Bofors affair” was a major corruption 45
there is an enormous army of minor civil scandal in which Rajiv Gandhi was among 46
servants whose salaries constitute a huge drain those accused of having taken illegal com- 47
on the public exchequer, who are notoriously missions from the Swedish firm Bofors, for 48
64
 P O L I T I CA L C H A N G E , ST R U CT U R E , A N D T H E I N D I A N STAT E S I N C E I N D E P E N D E N C E

1 winning a bid to supply field guns to the 14 F. G. Bailey showed this, seminally, in his work
2 Indian Army. on the politics of Orissa in the 1950s. See
3 2 On the formation of regional patriotisms in “Politics and Society in Contemporary Orissa,”
4 India see Christopher Bayly, Origins of in Cyril Phillips (ed.), Politics and Society in
Nationality in South Asia (Delhi: Oxford India (London: Allen & Unwin, 1963).
5
University Press, 1998). 15 Francine Frankel, India’s Political Economy,
6 3 Nehru wrote, for instance, in 1938 that a 1947–1977: The Gradual Revolution, 2nd edn
7 directly elected assembly would “represent the (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 2004)
8 people as a whole”; cited by Stuart Corbridge provides a compelling analysis of the way in
9 and John Harriss, Reinventing India which the Nehruvian project was derailed by
10 (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 27. And local power holders.
11 see Sumit Sarkar, “Indian Democracy: The 16 Marguerite Robinson is one commentator on
12 Historical Inheritance,” in Atul Kohli (ed.), this change in her observations of the electoral
13 The Success of India’s Democracy (Cambridge: process in rural Andhra Pradesh. By 1977
University Press, 2001). electoral outcomes no longer depended on
14
4 Pratap Bhanu Mehta, The Burden of Democracy “vote banks” controlled by local notables. See
15 (Delhi: Penguin Books, 2003), pp. 52–53. her Local Politics: The Law of the Fishes —
16 5 On Kerala, see Patrick Heller, “Social Capital Development through Political Change in Medak
17 as Product of Class Mobilization and State District, Andhra Pradesh (South India) (Delhi:
18 Intervention: Industrial Workers in Kerala, Oxford University Press, 1988).
19 India,” World Development,Vol. 24, No. 6 (1996), 17 See Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India’s
20 pp. 1055–71; and V. K. Ramachandran, “On Growing Crisis of Governability, (Cambridge:
21 Kerala’s Development Achievements,” in Jean University Press, 1990).
22 Drèze and Amartya Sen, Indian Development 18 On which, see the chapter by Stanley
23 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996). Kochanek in this volume.
6 Mehta, p. 48. 19 James Manor, “Parties and the Party System,”
24
7 On differences in political regimes across Indian in Atul Kohli (ed.), India’s Democracy: An
25 states, see John Harriss, “Comparing Political Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations
26 Regimes Across Indian States,” Economic and (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1988), p.72.
27 Political Weekly, Vol. 34, No. 48 (1999), pp. 20 This paraphrases Myron Weiner, “Congress
28 3367–77; and Ashutosh Varshney, “Is India Restored: Continuities and Discontinuities in
29 Becoming More Democratic?”, Journal of Asian Indian Politics,” Asian Survey, 22, p. 253.
30 Studies, Vol. 59, No. 1 (2000), pp. 3–25. 21 See Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber
31 8 See Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Rudolph, In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political
32 Fragments (Princeton, NJ: University Press, Economy of the Indian State (Chicago: University
1993); Sudipta Kaviraj, “On the Crisis of of Chicago Press, 1987).
33
Political Institutions in India,” Contributions to 22 Brass, p. 56.
34 Indian Sociology, 18 (1984), pp. 223–43; and “A 23 Yogendra Yadav, “Reconfiguration in Indian
35 Critique of the Passive Revolution,” Economic Politics: State Assembly Elections 1993–95,”
36 and Political Weekly, 23 (1988), pp. 45–47. Economic and Political Weekly, 31 (1996), pp. 2–3.
37 9 Partha Chatterjee, The Politics of the Governed: 24 The share of seats of national parties declined
38 Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World through the general elections of the 1990s
39 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004). from 78 percent in 1991 to 68 percent in
40 10 Cited by Corbridge and Harriss, p. 43. 1999, while that of parties based in single states
41 11 Rajni Kothari, Politics in India (New York: increased from 16 percent to 29 percent.
42 Little, Brown, 1970), Chapter v. 25 Examples of such political leaders are Mulayam
12 Paul R. Brass, The Politics of India Since Singh Yadav in Uttar Pradesh and Lalu Prasad
43
Independence (Cambridge: University Press, Yadav in Bihar.
44 1994), p. 37. 26 Yadav, p. 100.
45 13 Sudipta Kaviraj, “On State, Society and 27 Sunil Khilnani, The Idea of India (London:
46 Discourse in India,” in James Manor (ed.), Hamish Hamilton, 1997), pp. 58–59.
47 Rethinking Third World Politics (Harlow: 28 Khilnani, p. 59.
48 Longman, 1991). 29 Mehta.

65
JOH N HAR R ISS

30 Javeed Alam, Who Wants Democracy? (Delhi: 38 This section draws extensively on Rudolph and 1
Orient Longman, 2004). Rudolph,“Redoing the Constitutional Design”; 2
31 Partha Chatterjee, Politics of the Governed, argues and on James Manor,“The Presidency,” in Kapur 3
that this is frequently the case. See also S. Jha and Mehta. 4
et al.,“Governance in the Gullies: Democratic 39 Brass, pp. 43–45.
5
Responsiveness and Leadership in Delhi 40 See note 1.
6
Slums,” World Development, 35, 2 (2007), pp. 41 Rudolph and Rudolph, “Redoing the
230–46, on the slums of Delhi; and John Constitutional Design,” p. 154. 7
Harriss, “Antinomies of Empowerment: 42 A recent study of the civil service is by 8
Observations on Civil Society, Politics and K. P. Krishnan and T. V. Somanathan, “Civil 9
Urban Governance,” Economic and Political Service:An Institutional Perspective,” in Kapur 10
Weekly, Vol. 42, No. 26 (2007), pp. 2,716–24 and Mehta. 11
on local politics in Chennai. 43 See James Rauch and Peter Evans,“Bureaucratic 12
32 Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, Structure and Bureaucratic Performance in 13
“Redoing the Constitutional Design: From an Less Developed Countries,” Journal of Public 14
Interventionist to a Regulatory State,” in Atul Economics,Vol. 75, No. 1 (2000), pp. 49–71. 15
Kohli, Success of India’s Democracy, p. 161 44 Brass, p. 52.
16
33 Ashish Bose,“Beyond Population Projections: 45 On the transfer system see Robert Wade,“The
17
Growing North–South Disparity,” Economic Market for Public Office: Why the Indian
and Political Weekly,Vol. 42, No. 15 (2007), pp. State is Not Better at Development,” World 18
1,327–29. Development,Vol. 13, No. 4 (1985), pp. 467–97. 19
34 Arun Agrawal, “The Indian Parliament,” in 46 Brass, p. 54; and Pranab Bardhan, The Political 20
Devesh Kapur and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (eds), Economy of Development in India, 2nd edn 21
Public Institutions in India: Performance and Design (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998). 22
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 99. 47 Devesh Kapur and Pratap Bhanu Mehta, 23
35 Agrawal, p. 94. “Introduction,” in Kapur and Mehta. 24
36 Agrawal, p. 94. 48 Kapur and Mehta, p. 12. 25
37 Brass, p. 46. 26
27
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 1
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5
6 State-level politics, coalitions, and
7
8 rapid system change in India
9
10
11
12 Virginia Van Dyke
13
14
15
16
17
18 The Indian political party system has changed Democratic Alliance (NDA) joined the move
19 dramatically in the last two decades. These to bring the government down, while some
20 changes have included the rise of Hindu state-based parties attempted to establish a
21 nationalism and the emergence of the “third front”apart from the two main alliances.
22 Bharatiya Janata party as a true national party The maneuverings that went on as Congress
23 and a rival to the Congress party in electoral attempted to secure the requisite numbers
24 strength and ideology; the increase in strength threw into relief some of the fundamental
25 of state-based parties; the ethnification1 of changes and tendencies of the Indian political
26 politics in north India, that is, the emergence party system. First, in terms of the coalition at
27 of caste-based parties;and the arrival on center the Center, the regional parties continue to
28 stage of coalition governments at the national, tend towards forming a third front that cannot
29 state,and local levels.In 1994 Brass wrote of the be written off, even though the members of
30 “universal presence of the Congress” in all that front are transient.That is, it is not so clear
31 states,“even where Congress has been reduced that India is moving towards a permanent two-
32 to seemingly permanent minority status.”2 front system at the Center, despite the fact that
33 More recently, Yadav referred to a “post- it has been the pattern since 1998. Second,
34 Congress polity,”3 and a number of states regional parties are crucial at the Center, but
35 have no significant presence of Congress at all. participate there largely to extract benefits and
36 While the BJP was for some time expected to support at the state level where their interests
37 be unable to move outside of north and essentially lie.
38 northwest India, where its implicit slogan of There are numerous examples of this
39 “Hindi, Hindu, Hindustan” could resonate, it phenomenon of state-based politicians utilizing
40 won the assembly elections in Karnataka, one their participation in coalitions at the Center to
41 of the southern states, in 2008. accomplish goals at the state level. Mayawati’s
42 On 22 July,2008 a trust vote was held by the Bahujan Samaj Party had, in 2007, accomp-
43 Congress-led United Progressive Alliance lished the surprising feat of coming to power
44 (UPA) to establish its majority after the left in Uttar Pradesh in a one-party majority
45 parties withdrew support to protest the government in spite of all indications suggesting
46 India–United States agreement on sharing coalition governments would be the political
47 nuclear technology. The BJP-led National configuration in that state in the foreseeable
48
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V I R G I N I A VA N DY K E

future. Mayawati was a leader of the proposed In contrast to what is seen at the Center,the 1
third front at the Center and projected as the state-level systems do seem to be tending 2
prime ministerial candidate. Apparently as a towards a two-party system (or two coalitions) 3
result, her primary opponent and bête noire in as would be suggested by “Duverger’s law.”6 4
the state, Mulayam Singh Yadav, then reversed Coalitions are emerging as old party structures 5
his long-term previous policy, deciding to side break down:for example as Congress declines, 6
with Congress. Suddenly, “disproportionate fragments of the Janata Party become regional 7
assets”charges were filed by the Central Bureau parties and the BJP establishes itself.Over time 8
of Intelligence (CBI) against Mayawati, charges then, the tendency is towards two-party 9
that she maintains were politically motivated systems once again, that is, in some states the 10
and engineered by the Congress-led central coalition period looks like a transition period, 11
government.The leader of another party, Ajit much like the short-lived coalitions that 12
Singh, who controls a few MPs in UP, was emerged after Congress lost control of a 13
wooed by all three sides, opting finally to back number of states for the first time in 1967. 14
Mayawati who could offer berths in her cabinet The desire to expand and the need for 15
and who would be most useful in electoral regional party allies for national level 16
understandings that would benefit him in the coalitions, has led the BJP to seek a presence 17
next general as well as state-level assembly in every state, as, of course, does Congress. 18
elections. Congress has been less successful in forging 19
alliances with regional parties, as regional 20
parties first emerged in opposition to 21
State-level parties Congress; this is changing under the new 22
compulsions of politics. The importance of 23
Many states have a unique configuration of coalition building was clearly illustrated in the 24
parties; some states have parties which are 2004 general election when one of the crucial 25
specific to only that state. Chhibber and factors responsible for shifting the election 26
Petrocik have shown that even Congress is in result from the expected BJP-led NDA 27
some sense a different party in each region as victory to one for the Congress-led coalition 28
its support base varies by caste, class, religion, was the move of the DMK (with 16 seats) 29
or language,4 while Yadav and Heath have from the former to the latter. An ongoing, 30
demonstrated that Congress has different important change in state politics involves the 31
supporters depending on the nature of the emergence of the BJP as at least an alliance 32
opposition, that is, Congress is the party of the partner in every state but one. In spite of 33
well-off in opposition to the Left and the continued efforts,it has not been able “to open 34
party of the lower socioeconomic groups in its account,”by winning a seat in Kerala,as will 35
opposition to the BJP (see Table 5.1).5 be discussed further later. 36
In constructing a typology of state party Two-party systems comprised of the BJP in 37
systems, one would need to move fast as the opposition to Congress include: 38
situation is in a state of extreme flux. Formerly 39
one-party dominated states have over time ■ Chhattisgarh 40
become two-party systems and in some cases ■ Delhi 41
multiparty systems thereafter.Those fragmented ■ Gujarat 42
multiparty systems with a history of coalition ■ Himachal Pradesh 43
formation may become stabilized as two-party ■ Madhya Pradesh 44
systems, as seems to be occurring in UP. States ■ Maharashtra 45
where the BJP was allied with a regional party ■ Rajasthan 46
have become states where the BJP is making ■ Uttarakhand 47
inroads in the place of the regional party. 48
68
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1
Table 5.1 Party composition of state governments in India, 1998–2007
State Party composition of Pre-poll or post-poll Party composition Type of competition
government after arrangement of previous
last election government
Two-Party Competition: INC vs BJP
Chattisgarh BJP (2008) One-party government BJP (2003) BJP vs INC
Delhi INC (2008) One-party government INC (2003) BJP vs INC
Gujarat BJP (2007) One-party government BJP (2002) BJP vs INC
Himachal Pradesh BJP (2007) One-party government INC (2003) BJP vs INC
Madhya Pradesh BJP (2008) One-party government BJP (2003) BJP vs INC
Maharashtra INC/NCP (2004) Pre-poll INC/NCP post-poll BJP/Shiv Sena vs INC/NCP
alliance (1999)
Rajasthan INC (2008) One-party government BJP (2003) BJP vs INC
Uttarakhand BJP (2007) One-party government BJP (2002) BJP vs INC

Two-coalition competition: Left-led front vs INC-led front

Kerala LDF (2006) Pre-poll UDF (2001) INC-led front vs Left-led front

Left front vs INC

Tripura CPM and allies (2008) Pre-poll CPM and allies (2003) INC vs Left
West Bengal Left front (2006) Left front coalition Left front (2001) Left front has been in government since 1977.
Now challenged by INC, BJP and state party
in shifting coalitions
Multiparty competition with unstable coalitions
Andhra Pradesh INC (2009) One-party government INC/TRS/Left (2004) Shifting coalitions: state parties that were
allies of the BJP and Congress left them
Bihar JD(U)/BJP (Oct. 2005)* Pre-poll RJD/INC (2000) Multiparty with unstable coalitions
Jharkhand First JMM/INC, then Pre-poll Multiparty with unstable coalitions
BJP/JD(U)(2005)
Karnataka BJP (2008) One-party government JD(S)/INC (2004) Shifting alliances between state party and
then JD(S)/BJP INC, BJP
Kashmir INC/JKNC (2008) Post-poll INC/PDP (2002) Newly multiparty with shifting coalitions.
Elections held under threats by militants.
Table 5.1 continued
State Party composition of Pre-poll or post-poll Party composition Type of competition
government after arrangement of previous
last election government
Orissa BJD (2009) One-party government BJP/BJD (2004) State party that was in alliance with the BJP
severed ties before most recent electon
Uttar Pradesh BSP (2007) One-party government Initially BJP/BSP Four major parties; shifting alliances
(2002) then
SP-led coalition
INC vs state party/BJP
Assam INC (with independents) Post-poll INC (2001) INC vs regional party allied with BJP
(2006)
Goa INC/NCP (2007) Pre-poll (BJP/UGDP (2002) Unstable coalitions
Haryana INC (merged with HVP One-party government BJP/INLD (BJP did INC vs state party (HVP or INLD) allied with
before election) (2005) poorly) (2000) BJP
Punjab BJP/SAD (2007) Pre-poll INC (2002) INC vs persisting alliance between state party
and BJP
Two state parties in alliance with smaller state parties which form coalitions at the national level
Tamil Nadu DMK/INC/PMK/CPM/ Pre-poll alliance AIADMK/TMC/INC/ Two state parties ally with smaller state
CPI (alliance known as the PMK/CPN/CPI parties and the BJP or INC
DPA-Democratic Progressive (2001)
Alliance) (2006)

Note: * elections were held in Bihar twice in 2005: in February and in October.
Source: Compiled from http://www.indian-elections.com/assembly-elections/; and the Election Commission of India, available at: http://www.eci.gov.in/StatisticalReports/
ElectionStatistics.asp; “Tamil Nadu heading for a coalition government,” Rediff: India Abroad, March 14, 2006, online at http://www.rediff.com/news/2006/mar/14tn.htm; Kalpana Sharma,
“An election too close too call,” The Hindu, September 3, 2004, online at http://www.hindu.com/2004/10/03/stories/2004100301461400.htm; Peter Ronald deSouza, “Democracy’s
inconvenient fact,” 543, Seminar (Nov. 2004), online at http://www.india-seminar.com/2004/543.htm; Prakash Kamat, “Congress-NCP alliance set to form government in Goa,” The Hindu,
June 6, 2007, online at http://www.thehindu.com.2007/06/06/stories/2007060613320100.htm; Venkitesh Ramakrishnan, “Soren’s turn,” Frontline, September 13–26, 2008, online at
http://www.frontlineonnet.com/stories/20080926251903500.htm; Yogendra Yadav and Dhananjai Joshi, “The wave and what caused it,” The Hindu, March 6, 2005, online at
http://www.hindu.com/2005/03/06/stories/2005030603371600.htm
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8
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6
5
4
3
2
1

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42
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40
39
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37
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32
31
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 STAT E - L E V E L P O L I T I C S , C OA L I T I O N S , A N D R A P I D SYST E M C H A N G E I N I N D I A
1 In Maharashtra,the BJP has been in an alliance
2 with a regional party, the Shiv Sena, while
3 Congress may ally with its own breakaway
4 faction,the Nationalist Congress Party,as it did
5 in the last assembly elections. (Even in two-
6 party systems, it is very common to have
7 small parties—often breakaway factions—and
8 independents contesting.)
9 Another type of two-party system is
10 characterized by Congress in opposition to a
11 left front. In Kerala, this takes the form of two
12 opposing coalitions. In West Bengal, where
13 the Left front has been in power since 1977,
14 there is a third party, the All-India Trinamul
15 Congress (AITC), led by the mercurial
16 Mamata Banerjee, which has taken support
17 from the BJP or from Congress at different
18 times. In the last assembly elections, the BJP
19 was in alliance with the All-India Trinamool
20 Congress, but was not able to win a seat.
21 States which have multiparty systems
22 include Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Jharkhand.
23 In a fourth type of system, Congress is in
24 opposition to a regional party. In many cases
25 the BJP will strike up an alliance with a
26 regional party; sometimes it is able to parley
27 such alliances into a foothold in the state.That
28 is, or has been, the case in Andhra Pradesh,
29 Assam, Goa, Haryana, Karnataka, Orissa, and
30 Punjab. In Goa, for example, the BJP and the
31 Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (MGP)
32 together contested the assembly elections in
33 1994, with the BJP gaining four seats and the
34 MGP gaining 12. In 1999 Rubinoff suggested
35 that the BJP had “displaced the MGP as the
36 preferred party of the state’s Hindu voters.”7
37 By the 2007 elections the BJP and Congress
38 were splitting the votes and the regional parties
39 were relegated to one or two seats each.
40 This strategy is not always completely
41 successful.In 2000 the BJP had an alliance with
42 the Indian National Lok Dal in Haryana.The
43 INLD did very well in the elections, and its
44 partner, the BJP, did very poorly.8 During the
45 2009 state-level elections in Andhra Pradesh
46 and Orissa, a state party in each that had been
47 allied with the BJP abruptly decided to contest
48 the elections alone to the detriment of the
latter. The state party in Orissa, the Biju Janata
Dal, then came to power on its own.
Mayawati’s Bahujan Samaj Party in UP is also
an important exception to the BJP’s strategy as
Mayawati has utilized coalitions with the BJP
to enable it to come to power on its own while
the BJP’s strength in Uttar Pradesh has been
severely attenuated.
A fifth type of party system exists in Tamil
Nadu, where two opposing regional parties
drawing on Dravidian nationalism, the DMK
and the AIADMK, trade power, and each also
trades alliances at the national level between
the BJP and Congress. The AIADMK had
supported the BJP in its first attempt to
establish a coalition government at the Center
in 1998, and was responsible for bringing that
government down by withdrawing support.In
spite of the BJP’s giving the AIADMK a
prominent role, including the position of Lok
Sabha speaker, the leader of that party was
dissatisfied with the BJP’s refusal to dismiss the
state government in Tamil Nadu controlled by
her primary rival.
Coalition politics
Different configurations of party systems have
given rise to very different types of coalitions;
fragmented multiparty systems involving less
institutionalized parties (opportunistic and
rapidly changing),9 on the one hand, more
stable relationships among parties,on the other
hand. Kerala is the sole example of a system of
two “fronts,” which alternate in power, but
each expect to last the full five-year term once
in power. Coalitions differ in India from those
in many other political systems in that they are
characterized by factionalism and frequent
party splitting. They tend not to be defined
by ideology, except in the cases of religious
nationalist and left parties. In fact, McMillan
argues, drawing on Luebbert, parties may
prefer to maintain their uniqueness by not
allying with parties that are too similar. For
this reason it would be rare to find in India
the ideologically linked minimum winning
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Table 5.2 Election results in India by state: number of seats won by largest party or coalition, 2003–2008 1
State Date of Seats won by Seats won by Seats won by 2
most recent largest 2nd largest 3rd largest 3
election party/coalition+ party/coalition party/coalition 4
Andhra Pradesh 2009 157 (INC) 106 (TDP/TRS/Left) 18 (PRP)
5
Arunachal Pradesh 2004 34 (INC) 9 (BJP) 2 (NCP) and 2 (AC) 6
Assam 2006 52 (INC) 27 (AGP/Left) 10 (BJP) and 10 (AUDF) 7
Bihar 2005 143 (JD(U)/BJP) 65 (RJD/CPM/ 13 (LJP/CPI) 8
INC/NCP) 9
Chhattisgarh 2008 50 (BJP) 38 (INC) 2 (BSP)
Delhi 2008 42 (INC) 23 (BJP) 2 (BSP)
10
Goa 2007 16 (INC) 14 (BJP) 3 (NCP) 11
Gujarat 2007 117 (BJP) 59 (INC) 3 (NCP) 12
Haryana 2005 67 (INC) 9 (INLD) 2 (BP) 13
Himachal Pradesh 2007 41 (BJP) 23 (INC) 1 (BSP) 14
Jammu & Kashmir 2008 28 (JKNC) 17 (INC) 21 PDP
Jharkhand 2005 30 (BJP) 17 (JMM) 9 (INC)
15
Karnataka 2008 110 (BJP) 80 (INC) 28 (JD[S]) 16
Kerala 2006 98 (LDF) 42 (UDF) 0 others 17
Madhya Pradesh 2008 142 (BJP) 71 (INC) 7 (BSP) 18
Maharashtra 2004 140 (NCP/INC) 116 (BJP/SHS) 4 (JSS) 19
Manipur 2007 30 (INC) 5 (MPP)
Meghalaya 2008 25 (INC) 14 (UDP) 11 (NCP)
20
Mizoram 2003 21 (MNF) 12 (INC) 3 (MZPC) 21
Nagaland 2008 26 (NPF) 24 (INC) 2 (BJP) and 2 (NCP) 22
Orissa 2009 103 (BJD) 27 (INC) 6 (BJP) 23
Pondicherry 2006 10 (INC) 7 (DMK) 3 (AIADMK) 3 (PMC) 24
Punjab 2007 67 (SAD/BJP) 44 (INC)
Rajasthan 2008 96 (INC) 78 (BJP) 6 (BSP)
25
Sikkim 2009 32 (SDF) 26
Tamil Nadu 2006 163 (DMK+) 69 (AIADMK+) 2 others 27
Tripura 2008 46 (CPM) 10 (INC) 2 (CPI) 28
Uttarakhand 2007 34 (BJP) 21 (INC) 8 (BSP) 29
Uttar Pradesh 2007 206 (BSP) 97 (SP) 51 (BJP)
West Bengal 2006 227 (Left front) 30 (AITC/BJP) 21 (INC)
30
31
Notes: + Coalition here refers to pre-poll alliance; *BJP won 2 seats. 32
AC = Arunachal Congress JSS = Jan Surajya Shakti 33
AGP = Asom Gana Parishad LEF = Left Democratic Front; CPM-led alliance 34
AIADMK = All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam LJP = Lok Janshakti Party
AIMIM = All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul Muslimeen MNF = Mizo National Front 35
AITC = All India Trinamool Congress MPP = Manipur People’s Party 36
AUDF = Assam United Democratic Front MZPC = Mizoram People’s Conference 37
BJD = Biju Janata Dal NCP = Nationalist Congress Party
BJP = Bharatiya Janata Party NPF = Nagaland People’s Front 38
BSP = Bahujan Samaj Party PDP = People’s Democratic Party 39
CPI = Communist Party of India PMC = Pudhucherry Munnetra Congress 40
CPM = Communist Party of India (Marxist) PMK = Pattali Makkal Katchi
DMK = Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam SDF = Sikkim Democratic Front 41
INC = Indian National Congress SHS = Shiv Sena 42
INLD = Indian National Lok Dal SP = Samajwadi Party 43
JD(S) = Janata Dal (Secular) TDP = Telugu Desam Party
JKNC = Jammu & Kashmir National Conference TRS = Telangana Rashtra Samithi 44
JMM = Jharkhand Mukti Morcha UDF = United Democratic Front; Congress-led alliances 45
Sources: http://www.indian-elections.com/assembly-elections/; Election Commission of India, available at 46
http://www.eci.gov.in/StatisticalReports/ElectionStatistics.asp 47
48
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 STAT E - L E V E L P O L I T I C S , C OA L I T I O N S , A N D R A P I D SYST E M C H A N G E I N I N D I A
1 coalition proposed by theorists as the most
2 likely result of post-electoral coalition negotia-
3 tions in multiparty systems.10 Further, because
4 of factionalism and the strong likelihood of
5 party splits, governments with excess parties
6 are common, also challenging the ideal of the
7 minimum winning coalition (see Table 5.2).
8 As Sridharan notes, India’s first-past-the-
9 post electoral system, also known as a single
10 member district plurality (SMP) system,creates
11 a situation whereby a small swing in the
12 percentage of votes can produce a large swing
13 in seats, thereby encouraging brinksmanship
14 behavior among politicians.11 Parties tend to
15 gamble that their opponents might be deci-
16 mated in the next election;they do not assume
17 that they will be negotiating with the same
18 party leaders in a few years, as would be the
19 case in a more stable proportional representa-
20 tion system. Further, the intentions of the
21 coalition partners are often not to establish a
22 stable cabinet that can facilitate “good gover-
23 nance.”Coalitions are formed with very short-
24 term goals in mind, positioning themselves to
25 be ready for the next election and to be in
26 power long enough to reap some patronage
27 benefits from that as well. Often, not many
28 resources are expended in creating or running
29 a coalition that is expected to be short-lived.12
30 Further, politicians are aware that if they are
31 never in power only the most ideologically
32 dedicated supporters will continue to vote for
33 them; they need to establish themselves as
34 leaders of parties that may actually run the
35 government.As Luebbert argues,party “leaders
36 are motivated above all by their desire to
37 remain party leaders.”13 One cannot remain a
38 party leader long as the head of a party that is
39 never in the government,particularly given the
40 patronage nature of the system.
41 State politics cannot be considered in iso-
42 lation from the government at the Center.
43 Through the actions of the state governor,
44 appointed by the party in power at the Center,
45 and through the ability of the central
46 government to utilize the imposition of
47 “Presidents Rule” to dismiss state govern-
48 ments, state-level governments led by a party
that is not the party at the Center sometimes
have a limited lifespan. So, parties ally with
Congress or the BJP at the national level to
derive benefits,but also to ensure the longevity
of their governments. However, power in
India’s federal system is shifting in the direction
of the states for several reasons, including the
dislike of state parties for a policy that may lead
to their dismissal for partisan purposes (see
Rudolph and Rudolph, this volume).
The rise of the BJP and its impact
on state politics
1947–1967
Both at the national level and in many states
a one-party dominant system characterized this
time period. This term was developed
by Rajni Kothari to describe a political system
in which, although there were opposition
parties along with free, competitive elections,
the same party won every election. Part of
the success of Congress at this time can be
attributed to the fragmented opposition.Parties
such as Swatantra, a party of large landowners
advocating a more capitalist economic system,
and the Praja Socialist Party had limited
support in terms of constituency and geo-
graphical spread. Another advantage of
Congress was its ability to absorb the opposi-
tion. The Shiromani Akali Dal, for example,
actually merged with Congress on two separate
occasions.Congress,through its domination of
the national government could also control the
states. In 1959, when a Communist-led gov-
ernment was elected in Kerala, the Congress-
controlled central government was complicit
in organizing massive protests, and then
dismissing the state government, based on
argument that public sentiment had changed,
as evidenced, allegedly, by the protests.
Aiding in the development of regional
identities and regional parties was the gov-
ernment policy of redrawing state boundaries
along linguistic lines, known as the linguistic
reorganization of states. This policy enabled
parties that drew on a specific regional
73
V I R G I N I A VA N DY K E

identity tied to language to have its likely 1977–1989 1

constituency defined in one electoral arena. 2
The Janata Party fell apart due to infighting
To use the Akali Dal as an example again,it was 3
arising out of competing ambitions.The next
never able to win an election until the 4
elections brought Congress back to power as
boundaries of Punjab were redrawn to give 5
the “party that works.”However,Indira Gandhi
Sikhs a majority of the population in the 6
faced militant anti-state movements in both
reorganized unit. 7
Punjab and Assam.The latter was a protest by
8
Assamese-speaking Hindus against a lack of
9
1967–1977 government control over an influx of Bengali
10
speakers, largely Muslims, from Bangladesh.
In 1967, following the death of Jawaharlal 11
The former was a movement led by Sikhs for
Nehru in 1964 and the beginning of a long 12
greater economic, political, and social auto-
succession struggle which included a split in the 13
nomy for their state, which grew into a
party, Congress lost power in eight states. 14
Coalition governments emerged in many states. demand for outright secession about the same
15
These tended to be unstable and few lasted long, time as Indira Gandhi sent the Indian army
16
but it portended a future when Congress would into the Sikh central religious site to rout the
17
not be the dominant party. In 1967 in Tamil militants. Indira Gandhi was assassinated in
18
Nadu, a non-Congress government emerged retaliation for this course of action,and her son,
19
and two regional parties, the DMK and its Rajiv Gandhi, assumed the position of prime
20
offshoot, the AIADMK, have alternated in minister in 1984. Concerns about Rajiv
21
power ever since.Two-party systems emerged Gandhi’s alleged corruption and elitism
22
in Punjab and Uttar Pradesh the same year. In brought another “third front” government to
23
1977 a Communist government came to power power in 1989,the Janata Dal led byV.P.Singh,
24
in West Bengal and has held power from that supported from the outside by the BJP.
25
date. 26
Indira Gandhi, Nehru’s daughter, gaining 1989–2008 27
popularity for backing Bangladesh in the 28
Pakistan civil war, solidified her leadership The beginning of the BJP’s electoral success
29
of the party in the elections of 1971. She dates to 1989. Although its predecessor party,
30
restructured and centralized the party organ- the Bharatiya Jan Sangh,was a presence in Uttar
31
ization;she began personally to make decisions Pradesh, it was never able to gather significant
32
regarding state-level politics, undermining strength elsewhere. The Jan Sangh had been
33
institutional support for state Congress leaders. part of the Janata Party that provided an
34
Although originally admired for her populist opposition to Congress at the Center and in
35
and pro-poor measures, a series of economic many states in the 1970s. It established its new
36
and political challenges led to her declaring the identity as the BJP in 1980. In the general
37
“emergency,” involving a suspension of civil election of 1984, in the midst of the sympathy
38
liberties that gave her the opportunity to jail wave after Indira Gandhi’s assassination,the BJP
39
many of her political opponents. However, won a mere two seats. In 1989 it won 86; in
40
while in jail, opposition leaders were then able 1991, 120; and, by 1996, it had become the
41
to network with each other. After elections largest party (although far from a majority)
42
were called in 1977, a conglomeration of and was asked to form the government. This
43
opposition parties came together to form the it was unable to do because of its “majestic
44
Janata Party, which won a decisive victory, isolation,” shunned as a coalition partner by
45
allowing the first non-Congress government most parties at that time because of its Hindutva
46
to take power at the center, as well as in a ideology. However, in 1998, they were at
47
number of states. last able to form a government at the center.
48
74
 STAT E - L E V E L P O L I T I C S , C OA L I T I O N S , A N D R A P I D SYST E M C H A N G E I N I N D I A
1 It also won state-level elections for the first
2 time: in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and
3 Himachal Pradesh in 1990; in UP in 1991;
4 Delhi in 1993; and Maharashtra and Gujarat
5 in 1995. There are a number of explanations
6 as to why this party was able to make these
7 phenomenal gains.
8 BJP politicians and ideologues refer to the
9 BJP as “the party with a difference,” by which
10 they mean they are guided by an ideology and
11 a vision; they are not simply seeking the gaddi
12 or a powerful position. They are, in fact, a
13 party with a difference in that they are part
14 of a larger structure. The BJP grew out of a
15 pre-existing organization called the Rashtriya
16 Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS), which was
17 founded in 1925 in a context of Hindu–
18 Muslim riots.The intention of the organization
19 was to train young men, ideologically and
20 physically, to defend Hinduism against the
21 perceived Muslim threat,as well as to construct
22 a nation grounded in a specifically Hindu
23 culture.A women’s wing was added,somewhat
24 reluctantly, later. The RSS has spawned a
25 number of organizations, which are collec-
26 tively referred to as the Sangh Parivar [Sangh
27 family]. The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)
28 and its offshoot, the Bajrang Dal, are active in
29 advancing what they view as Hindu causes,
30 from creating agitations around “disputed
31 sites” such as the mosque in Ayodhya, or a Sufi
32 shrine in Karnataka, to protesting so-called
33 forced conversions and organizing attacks on
34 Christian Churches in Gujarat, Orissa, and
35 even Kerala.
36 All these organizations are closely inter-
37 twined; many members of the VHP and the
38 BJP were trained by the RSS and hold joint
39 membership.A particularly esteemed position
40 within the RSS structure is that of a pracharak;
41 an individual who is supposed to be a dedi-
42 cated celibate lifetime worker.The head of the
43 VHP is an RSS pracharak, as is former BJP
44 Prime Minister,Atal Bihari Vajpayee.
45 Jaffrelot argues that over time the BJP has
46 moved back and forth between agitation as a
47 method of creating support and a focus on
48 building up its grassroots organization.14 In the
late 1980s, the BJP committed itself to agita-
tional methods, joining a VHP campaign to
build a Hindu temple to Lord Ram on what
was said to be the site of his birth, then occu-
pied by a sixteenth-century mosque.The grand
processions and ceremonies that accompanied
this demand, along with favorable media
coverage in much of the vernacular press, and
the fortuitous timing of a television series on
the life of Ram, created what was referred to
as the Ram Lahar, or “Ram Wave.” This
emotional response to an upsurge of Hindu
nationalist sentiment challenged the ideals of
secularism associated with Nehru and the
Congress.
The BJP utilized a number of other
strategies to build its support, such as incor-
porating and promoting—even creating—
Hindu religious figures to represent its message
articulated through vitriolic speeches, some
distributed on cassette tapes.Despite its rhetoric
of a Hindu society undivided by castes, like
other parties, it created a support base com-
prised of specific caste groups. For example, in
UP, it gained the support of the Lodhi Rajputs
along with its usual base of high caste voters,by
promoting individuals from this caste into high
positions in the party including that of chief
minister. Again in common with other parties,
it incorporated local notables who have the
support of voters in their local area no matter
to which party they belong.15 Hansen argues
that one of the primary reasons for its success
in gaining the votes of the upper castes was that,
in an era of Congress decline and aggressive
caste-based mobilization by the backward castes
and the scheduled castes, this party articulated
an ideology of order and nationalistic pride in
India that attracted them, particularly police
officers and military personnel.16
Post-Ram Wave, other tactics have been
used. Although, the BJP has played down
Hindutva issues in the interests of coalition
formation, communal tension and violence
have continued to work to the BJP’s advant-
age.17 Horrific anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat
were followed by a resounding BJP victory in
the subsequent elections in that state in 2007.
75
V I R G I N I A VA N DY K E

But, the BJP has been particularly adept at axis,”the basis for the Janata Dal’s success.In so 1
coalition building,adopting this strategy when doing, the BJP was able to make inroads into 2
it was still disdained by Congress. Coalition the state.21 3
formation with smaller parties at the state level, Before the assembly elections in 2004, the 4
in conjunction with accommodating the state- Lok Shakti had become the Janata Dal (United) 5
based party at the Center, has been a useful while Deve Gowda’s faction had become the 6
policy. As a national,well-organized party,with Janata Dal (Secular), perceived as promoting 7
ideologically motivated extra-parliamentary Vokkaligas and also dynastic rule.22 In the state 8
activists, the BJP can erode the support base of elections in 2004 the BJP won the largest 9
smaller regional parties, who see their primary number of seats and two former adversaries,the 10
opponent as the Congress.18 Congress and the JD(S), formed a coalition 11
government, although there were some talks 12
between the BJP and the JD(S), as well. The 13
Karnataka: The BJP’s “southern Congress party nominally controlled the post 14
beachhead”19 of chief minister, but Congress Chief Minister 15
M. Dharam Singh was very solicitous of taking 16
Karnataka is an example of a state which the advice and recommendations of Deve 17
moved from a one-party-dominant system to Gowda, head of the JD(S), who was seen as 18
a competitive two-party system to a multiparty inordinately powerful.After the panchayat (local- 19
system after the entry of the BJP into this state’s level) elections, however, Congress moved 20
politics. After a series of unstable coalitions, a toward setting up joint councils with a dissident 21
BJP-led one-party government took power in from the JD(S), the former Deputy Chief 22
2008. Its success in Karnataka demonstrates Minister Siddaramaiah, who had chief mini- 23
the BJP’s ability to parlay short-lived alliances sterial aspirations, and who had also made joint 24
or coalitions into an expanded presence. appearances with Congress leaders at backward 25
Karnataka is a southern state,former bastion caste forums.This was perceived by the JD (S) 26
of the Congress party, which evolved into a as an attempt to split the party and absorb 27
two-party system in 1983 when Ramakrishna MLAs, as Congress had done during the previ- 28
Hegde of the Janata Party became chief ous Congress-led administration.Deve Gowda’s 29
minister with the support of the BJP. The son, Kumaraswamy, abruptly resigned from the 30
Janata Party split, but the three faction government, in spite of Deve Gowda’s assur- 31
leaders—H. D. Deve Gowda, Ramakrishna ances to Congress that he would rein in his son, 32
Hegde, and S.R. Bommai—were reunited in took the majority of MLAs with him, and 33
the 1990s and the party won the assembly formed a coalition government with the BJP. 34
elections in 1994, along with the general This was a shocking move considering the 35
elections in 1996. It built its strength by party’s secular stance. It appears to have been 36
combining the support of the two major castes, done in order to secure the post of chief minister 37
the Vokkaligas and the Lingayats, along with for Kumaraswamy; what is still not clear is 38
“other backwards, scheduled castes, and whether the outspokenly secular Deve Gowda’s 39
Muslims.”20 In 1998, the Janata Dal split again, protests were sincere or whether the split in the 40
and Hegde, who was a Brahman, but whose family was but a drama for the press and public.23 41
support base was among the Lingayat com- The BJP and the JD (S) agreed that each 42
munity,fashioned an alliance with the BJP with party would have a turn at the chief minister’s 43
his newly formed Lok Shakti party.According post for 20 months; an arrangement identical 44
to Gould, the BJP, whose state-level leader was to that which had not worked out for the BJP 45
a Lingayat, successfully combined “standard with Mayawati previously,an ominous sign for 46
Hindutva appeal[s]” and appeals around them. When Kumaraswamy was supposed to 47
farmers’issues to split the “Lingayat–Vokkaliga turn over the position to the BJP, complaints 48
76
 STAT E - L E V E L P O L I T I C S , C OA L I T I O N S , A N D R A P I D SYST E M C H A N G E I N I N D I A
1 against the BJP were concocted and the
2 deadline came and went. Much to the JD (S)’s
3 surprise, however, the BJP, rather than
4 continuing to support the alliance,withdrew its
5 support to the government, and President’s
6 Rule was imposed. Second-tier party leaders
7 then went back to Congress, attempting to
8 negotiate a new tie-up with the party that they
9 had snapped ties with so abruptly.When those
10 talks failed, the government was formed once
11 again with the BJP and the JD (S), but the BJP
12 chief minister resigned his position after a week
13 when the JD (S) would not commit to sup-
14 porting him in a confidence motion while
15 raising new conditions which were not part of
16 the original arrangement. Deve Gowda cer-
17 tainly did not want to be the person who
18 facilitated the establishment of a BJP govern-
19 ment in Karnataka. However, the unpopular
20 move of ending the government led to the
21 exodus of a number of party leaders, mainly to
22 Congress, but also to the BSP and the BJP.
23 The BJP capitalized on being the “injured
24 party”; in the 2008 elections, the BJP came to
25 power largely on its own,with the assistance of
26 a few independents. In spite of painstaking
27 organizational work in the state by the Sangh
28 Parivar,and an emotive issue as well,that of the
29 “disputed”Sufi shrine of Bababudangiri,it was
30 playing the factional politics game that enabled
31 the BJP to achieve its “beachhead.”24
32
33
34 Coalition in Punjab
35
36 Punjab is a Sikh majority state, in which the
37 party configuration includes a party that draws
38 its support specifically from Sikhs. The
39 Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) was founded in
40 1920 as the action group to lead a nonviolent
41 agitation to reclaim the historic Sikh gurdwaras
42 (places of worship and gathering) from private
43 hands into which they had devolved. This
44 organization then became a political party
45 which has led a number of campaigns to secure
46 specific rights for the Sikh community. Since
47 leadership of the community passed into the
48 hands of a dominant cultivating caste, the Jats,
the latter have largely supported this party,
while some urban and scheduled caste Sikhs
have tended to support Congress.
In 1997, the normal electoral system was
reestablished after more than a decade of a
militant movement which disrupted elections
and marginalized the mainstream parties in
Punjab. No assembly elections were held
between 1985 and 1992; the 1992 elections
were held in the face of a militant-declared
boycott, and few crossed that line, either out
of sympathy or fear. Since 1997 the Akali Dal
has been in coalition with the BJP, when the
Akali Dal is in power in the state, or a BJP-led
coalition is in power at the Center. This
coalition works politically and socially on a
number of different levels. At the national level,
the BJP adds members of parliament from the
Akali Dal to its own strength. At the state
level,it establishes intercommunal harmony (as
the BJP is supported by Hindus and the SAD
by Sikhs) which helps to assure continued
normal relations after an extended period of
communal tension and violence.25
From a political aspect, the support base of
each party is completely separate. As the two
parties are not trying to entice each other’s
supporters, they reinforce rather than under-
mine each other. Ideologically, they are both
religious nationalist parties. More than this, the
BJP alliance supports the Akali Dal against
factional splits that could undermine an Akali
Dal-led government.Promoting factional splits
was a way that Congress had been able to
undermine Akali Dal governments in the
past—and in fact is a strategy that Congress had
used against regional parties elsewhere—and
this alliance is a protection, particularly when
the BJP is in power at the Center. So the Akali
Dal has included the BJP in its government,
even when they have had a clear majority on
their own.Unlike in other states,where the BJP
has eroded the support of a regional party with
which it is allied, the Akali Dal is an institu-
tionalized political party whose voters would
be highly unlikely to vote for the BJP,except in
the case of seat adjustments (and maybe not
even then).
77
V I R G I N I A VA N DY K E

The Counterexample of Kerala ization since the BJP used the Ram Temple to 1
build support at the same time that V. P. Singh 2
Kerala is a counterexample in a number of introduced new job reservations in central 3
different ways: it has stable coalition govern- government departments and seats in educa- 4
ments made up of two fronts; it is one of only tional institutions for backward castes.This is 5
two major states where the communist parties referred to in India as Mandal (the name of the 6
have a strong presence; and it is the only major commission that recommended caste-based 7
state where the BJP has virtually no presence. affirmative action for backward castes) versus 8
The BJP has done its best to penetrate the party Mandir (Hindu temple). Cleavage-based 9
system in Kerala: there is a network of RSS politics is a type of identity politics where 10
shakhas,particularly in the capital;other Sangh parties compete to shape voters’ perception of 11
Parivar organizations are present; agitations the primary group to which they belong. For 12
over “Hindu issues” have taken place; and example,the Kurmis,a “backward caste”in UP, 13
members of the RSS sometimes clash some of whom have adopted the name, Patel, 14
physically with Communist Party members.In have been courted at election time by several 15
spite of all this, the BJP has not had the ability parties: 16
to penetrate the two fronts that dominate 17
Kerala politics, and there is little scope to 1 the BJP, appealing to the idea of an 18
contest outside these fronts, each of which “organic” Hindu whole 19
receives more than 40 percent of the vote,with 2 the Samajwadi Party attempting to put 20
little margin between them.26 Further, together a coalition of backward castes and 21
Chiriyankandath argues, the type of mobil- Muslims, but perceived as dominated by 22
ization that leads to actual communal violence Yadavs 23
has had the effect of undermining the BJP’s 3 Apna Dal (translates as “our own party”) a 24
position rather than reinforcing it.27 caste-based party based on Kurmis/Patels 25
Coalitions are more stable in Kerala than in 4 the BSP trying to form a coalition of 26
many other states in India for a number of the Bahujan Samaj (the majority of low 27
reasons. The two fronts are to some extent castes), but perceived as promoting mostly 28
based on ideology, particularly the Left front, Chamars. 29
in contrast to other states in India. An early 30
emergence of coalitions has led to the expec- Caste has, of course, always been important in 31
tation of continued coalitions, rather than Indian politics, which has had reserved 32
political parties indulging in brinksmanship constituencies for scheduled castes from its 33
behavior in an effort to establish one-party inception; in fact, some reservations stem from 34
rule. Therefore, the coalitions themselves the colonial period. In the 1970s Congress 35
are more institutionalized, with coordination utilized the KHAM strategy in Gujarat, which 36
among parties. The party system itself is also was an attempt to put together a coalition of 37
institutionalized;parties in many cases have had castes: Kshatriyas, Harijans, Adivasis, and 38
long-term support in castes or communities in Muslims. In UP, Charan Singh challenged 39
constituencies located in particular geo- Congress by putting together a coalition of 40
graphical regions. backward agrarian-based castes. What has 41
evolved since then, and represents a change, 42
is what Kanchan Chandra has referred to as 43
Uttar Pradesh and “ethnic the “ethnification” of politics or the tailored 44
parties” appeal to a specific caste by an “ethnic party” 45
that explicitly excludes other castes.28 While 46
Religious nationalism and caste-based politics Charan Singh, although himself a Jat, appealed 47
have been alternative forms of political mobil- to OBCs in general, his son, Ajit Singh, 48
78
 STAT E - L E V E L P O L I T I C S , C OA L I T I O N S , A N D R A P I D SYST E M C H A N G E I N I N D I A
1 appeals specifically to Jats.While the KHAM
2 strategy referred to “Harijans” as a category
3 to be included, the scheduled caste leader
4 from Uttar Pradesh, Mayawati, originally
5 appealed only to Harijans while vehemently
6 criticizing upper castes, and, in fact, her appeal
7 was most specifically to her own caste, the
8 Chamars. Meanwhile, Mulayam Singh Yadav’s
9 party has been so perceived as responding
10 specifically to the Yadav caste—despite the
11 fact that he also had broad support from
12 Muslims—that a new term emerged, the
13 “Yadavization” of politics in UP.
14 Caste-based parties are emerging because
15 of the heightened competition for government
16 benefits as more groups become politically
17 mobilized and come to include a strata of
18 educated, ambitious individuals. While
19 scheduled caste/low caste voters once voted
20 for their higher caste patrons, and landless
21 laborers voted as the landowners directed them
22 to vote,castes have begun to vote for their own
23 parties. That is, rather than patronage links
24 being vertical, linkages are now horizontal.As
25 India is a “patronage democracy,” status
26 recognition, and material goods have both
27 come from the state, not from achievement in
28 the private sector, although this is changing
29 rapidly.Those who can do so,opt for careers in
30 government service, those who cannot, gain
31 “material and psychic benefits” from their
32 “proximity”to the state.29 Political parties gain
33 the support of groups by incorporating their
34 members in important positions. Further,
35 Chandra argues that caste provides a shorthand
36 way for voters to identity who is “one of them”
37 and, therefore, likely to dispense government
38 benefits in their direction; therefore, the
39 tendency is to vote for parties that incorporate
40 one’s own caste,30 if, in fact, the party is large
41 enough to have an actual chance at office.31
42 The BSP, led by Mayawati, until its
43 transformation in 2007 to a broad-based party,
44 was the quintessential example of a caste-based
45 party, and the state of UP an example of the
46 impact caste-based parties have had.This state
47 has moved from a one-party dominant system,
48 to a basically two-party system to a multiparty
system in which Congress is by far the most
junior member. As Yadav and Heath argue,
wherever cleavage-based politics emerge,
Congress changes from a “catch-all party”to “a
catch-none party.”32 The BJP was able to
draw away the high-caste voters, along with
certain specific backward castes who supported
the BJP in their competition with other
backward castes; Mulayam Singh’s Samajwadi
Party was supported largely by Yadavs and
Muslims;and the BSP initially drew its support
from scheduled castes and some Muslims.
The BSP was founded by Kanchi Ram,
a Dalit government employee who initially
started the Backward and Minority Com-
munities Employment Federation (BAMCEF),
an organization of scheduled caste government
workers who felt they were not getting due
respect.33 Mayawati,once second in command,
but known for her autocratic leadership style,
emerged as the chief minister-designate.After
Kanchi Ram’s death in 2004,Mayawati utilized
a strategy that was focused unapologetically on
gaining political power for Dalits, a name used
by Kanshi Ram and Mayawati to broaden the
party’s appeal beyond its solid base among the
Chamars, to all the scheduled castes. Mayawati
allied first with the Samajwadi Party, then
abruptly left that alliance in an acrimonious
fashion when the SP seemed to be gaining
strength because of its participation in the
coalition.This led to the infamous guest house
incident in which Mulayam Singh supporters
surrounded the guest house where she was
staying, leading her to believe they planned to
kill her.Her response to this was to contact the
BJP, a high caste-based party with which she
never would have been expected to ally. She
ultimately formed coalitions with the BJP on
three occasions: June to October 1995; March
to September 1997; and March to October
2002.The BJP supported her in the belief that
she could and would transfer Dalit votes to
them in upcoming elections. In each case, she
unceremoniously pulled out of the alliance
when it suited her purpose to do so,for reasons
that often left analysts guessing as to her
motives.She also forced the BJP to support her
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V I R G I N I A VA N DY K E

Dalit-friendly policies, to the dismay of the coalitions. In India, ideology, or the desire to 1
BJP’s high-caste supporters.Although the BJP put into place particular policies, is less impor- 2
was counting on gaining the support of tant than gaining control over the government 3
scheduled caste voters, it really never reaped for several reasons:policy issues are not the stuff 4
such benefits.While allying with a high caste- of political campaigns; politicians’ goals are 5
based party like the BJP could have dampened often tied up with patronage distribution; and 6
her supporters’ enthusiasm, her clear upper there is a consensus among the parties on some 7
hand in these relationships actually enthused of the larger issues. For example, with the 8
those who supported her. introduction of neoliberal economic reforms 9
The BSP has successfully appropriated and in the early 1990s, states have a larger dis- 10
utilized symbols of empowerment to an extent cretionary role in attempting to attract foreign 11
unmatched by other parties, transforming the investment, and even in independently taking 12
political geography of the state. Ambedkar out loans from the World Bank for various 13
statues dot the countryside, the BSP head- projects.Many parties approve of these policies 14
quarters in Lucknow sits next to a large although this is more contentious in the states 15
mausoleum containing very large statues of controlled by the Left. 16
scheduled caste leaders, including Mayawati Further, the less policy is discussed, the 17
and Kanchi Ram, and some scheduled caste easier it is to keep a party together;in fact,once 18
villages, or scheduled caste areas in villages a state government is in power, it typically 19
contain “pucca”(brick) houses built with funds avoids being in session to the extent legally 20
from the government. Mayawati has also permissible. Much of what passes for policy- 21
constructed a very large park in the center of making has more to do with patronage 22
town, Ambedkar Park, containing statues of distribution, such as the decision by a state 23
Dalit heroes.When the previous Mayawati-led government to add a particular caste to the list 24
government ended its tenure and a Mulayam of castes that qualify for affirmative action 25
Singh-led government took its place, work benefits, or contesting over water distribution 26
stopped on the Ambedkar Park and started among states, which primarily affects farmers. 27
instead on Ram Manohar Lohia Park, There are specific powers that are granted to 28
dedicated to Mulayam Singh’s mentor. the states by the constitution; among these are 29
In the most recent assembly elections in UP, education and law and order. In both these 30
in 2007, Mayawati expanded both her appeal areas, the BJP has clearly made decisions 31
and her distribution of tickets,granting official unique to its interests.Certainly,the strategy of 32
party support to candidates from higher castes, the BJP to attract coalition partners has 33
which suggests that the party has actually compelled it to place some of its most 34
moved away from being an ethnic party. It was contentious issues on the backburner, such as 35
able to form the government on its own for the demand for a uniform civil code and 36
the first time,ending,at least in the short term, building a grand temple to the god Ram on 37
a long period of coalition government. the site of the demolished mosque. Lall argues 38
that it was in education policy that the 39
NDA government made its most distinc- 40
Conclusion tive mark on the Indian polity.However,efforts 41
by Murli Manohar Joshi, Human Resource 42
The focus here on the ability of parties to form Development Minister, to promote new 43
governments raises the question of what role textbooks that “saffronized” Indian history 44
ideology and policy play in state-level politics. while removing the work of prominent 45
Coalition theorists disagree on the degree to historians,were resisted by state-level coalition 46
which policy or power drives the decision- partners who were opposed to accepting the 47
making process among politicians forming new textbooks, insisting that education is a 48
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 STAT E - L E V E L P O L I T I C S , C OA L I T I O N S , A N D R A P I D SYST E M C H A N G E I N I N D I A

1 state subject.34 Mitra argues that,with regard to (1–14 April, 2000). http://www.hinduonnet.
2 minorities, the BJP’s policies represent less of a com/fline/fl1707/17070490.htm.
3 break with the past than many expected. 9 Brass has defined an institutionalized party
4 system as one that encompasses “parties [that]
Policies that the BJP has attempted to imple-
persist over time,that regularly win a number of
5 ment have, again, been blocked by coalition
seats, and that know their areas of strength.” He
6 partners at the state level,35 none of whom, argues that the degree of institutionalization of
7 with the exception of the Shiv Sena, supports a political party system correlates strongly with
8 a Hindutva ideology. Further, many state-level stable coalitions; Paul R. Brass,“Party Systems
9 parties are concerned about alienating Muslims and Government Stability in the Indian States,”
10 or other minorities. The most egregious The American Political Science Review, Vol. 71,
11 failings of the BJP governments at both the No. 4 (December 1977), p. 1,396.
12 central and state levels have been in the area of 10 Alistair McMillan, “The BJP Coalition:
13 violence against minority groups. Partisanship and Power-Sharing in Govern-
14 ment,”in Katharine Adeney and Lawrence Saez
15 (eds.), Coalition Politics and Hindu Nationalism
16 Notes (London and New York: Routledge, 2005),
pp. 20–21.
17
1 On which, see Kanchan Chandra, Why Ethnic 11 E. Sridharan, “Principles, Power and Coalition
18
Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts Politics in India: Lessons from Theory,
19 Comparison and Recent History,” in D. D.
in India (Cambridge: University Press, 2004).
20 Khanna and Gert W. Kueck (eds.), Principles,
2 Paul R. Brass, The Politics of India since
21 Independence, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: University Power and Politics (New Delhi:Macmillan,1999).
22 Press, 1994), p. 125. 12 Virginia Van Dyke, “‘Jumbo Cabinets,’
23 3 Yogendra Yadav, “The New Congress Voter,” Factionalism, and the Impact of Federalism:
24 Seminar 2003, No. 526 (http://www.india- Comparing Coalition Governments in Kerala,
25 seminar.com/2003/526/526%20yogendra%20 Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh,” in Paul Wallace
26 yadav.htm). and Ramashroy Roy (eds.), India’s 2004
27 4 Pradeep Chhibber and John R.Petrocik,“Social Elections: Grassroots and National Perspectives
28 Cleavages, Elections, and the Indian Party (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2007).
System,”in Richard Sisson and Ramashray Roy 13 Gregory M. Luebbert, Comparative Democracy:
29
(eds.), Diversity and Dominance in Indian Politics, Policymaking and Governing Coalitions in Europe
30 and Israel (New York: Columbia University
vol. 1 (New Delhi: Sage, 1990), reprinted in
31 Press, 1986), p. 46.
Zoya Hasan (ed.),Parties and Party Politics in India
32 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002). 14 Christophe Jaffrelot, The Hindu Nationalist
33 5 Anthony Heath and Yogendra Yadav, “The Movement in India (New York: Columbia
34 United Colors of Congress: Social Profile of University Press, 1996).
35 Congress Voters, 1996 and 1998,” Economic and 15 Bangarappa in Karnataka,for example,has been
36 Political Weekly [EPW], (21–28 August, 1999), a Congress CM twice, started two of his own
37 reprinted in ibid. parties, and then won a seat in parliament on a
38 6 This is argued by Eswaran Sridharan, in BJP ticket. When he left the BJP to join the
39 “Coalitions and Party Strategies in India’s Samajwadi Party,he resigned his seat in the Lok
Parliamentary Federation,” Publius: The Journal Sabha and stood for election again in 2005.
40
of Federalism, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Fall 2003), p. 136. Once again, he won.
41
7 Arthur G. Rubinoff,“Conflicting Ambitions in 16 Thomas Blom Hansen, The Saffron Wave:
42 Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in Modern India
Goa’s Parliamentary Elections,” in Ramashray
43 Roy and Paul Wallace (eds.), Indian Politics and (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1999).
44 the 1998 Election:Regionalism,Hindutva and State 17 Steven Wilkinson, Votes and Violence: Electoral
45 Politics (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999), Competition and Ethnic Riots in India (Cambridge:
46 p. 266. University Press, 2004).
47 8 Yogendra Yadav and Oliver Heath, “A Split 18 Sridharan, “Coalitions and Party Strategies.”
48 Verdict in Haryana,” Frontline, Vol. 17, No. 7 pp. 150–52.

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V I R G I N I A VA N DY K E

19 Term borrowed from Harold A. Gould, “The 26 James Chiriyankandath,“Bounded Nationalism: 1

12th General Election in Karnataka: The BJP Kerala and the Social and Regional Limits of 2
Achieves its Southern Beachhead,” in Hindutva,” in Thomas Blom Hansen and 3
Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace (eds.), Indian Christophe Jaffrelot (eds.), The BJP and the 4
Politics and the 1998 Election: Regionalism, Compulsions of Politics in India (Delhi: Oxford
5
Hindutva and State Politics (New Delhi: Sage University Press, 1998), p. 203.
6
Publications, 1999). 27 Chiriyankandath, p. 216.
20 Gould, p.189. 28 Chandra, pp. 3–5. 7
21 Gould, pp. 204–208. 29 Chandra, p.12. 8
22 The following two paragraphs are based on 30 Chandra, pp. 57–60. 9
interviews with politicians and political party 31 Chandra, p. 13. 10
workers in Karnataka in 2006. I am grateful to 32 Yadav and Heath, “The United Colors of 11
Mohan Kondajji for allowing me access to his Congress,” pp. 136–45. 12
extensive private collection of newspaper 33 This section draws on Van Dyke, “‘Jumbo 13
clippings. Cabinets,’ Factionalism and the Impact of 14
23 Interviews in Karnataka;and “A Clever Ploy by Federalism.” 15
a Humble Farmer?” Indian Express, 18 January, 34 Marie Lall, “Indian Education Policy under
16
2006. the NDA Government,” in Katherine Adeney
17
24 As predicted by James Manor in 1998,the BJP’s and Lawrence Saez (eds.), Coalition Politics and
success in Karnataka depended on the Janata Hindu Nationalism (London and New York: 18
Dal self-destructing; James Manor, “Southern Routledge, 2005). 19
Discomfort:The BJP in Karnataka,” in Thomas 35 Subrata K. Mitra, “The NDA and the Politics 20
Blom Hansen and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds.), of ‘Minorities’ in India,” in Katherine Adeney 21
The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India and Lawrence Saez (eds.), Coalition Politics and 22
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998). Hindu Nationalism (London and New York: 23
25 Ashutosh Kumar,“Electoral Politics in Punjab: Routledge, 2005). 24
Study of Akali Dal”, Economic and Political 25
Weekly (3–10 April, 2004). 26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
82
 1
2
3
4
6
5
6 Pakistan’s politics and its economy
7
8
9
10 Shahid Javed Burki
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19 Introduction has been and will continue to be the case
20 will be a recurrent theme of this chapter. In
21 This chapter has three parts.The first lays out Pakistan’s case, this interaction between
22 the main argument on which the analysis of economics and politics is further complicated
23 the chapter is based.It is followed by the listing by the enormous influence over the country of
24 and then development of some of the themes external forces and the changes in the external
25 that help to explain the country’s economic, environment in which the policymakers must
26 social, and political development in the past. operate. Both economics and politics are
27 The third part examines the current situation affected by the changes that are taking place
28 and indicates what might happen if the outside the country’s borders and over which
29 country’s political and economic leaders do policymakers have little or no control. The
30 not act to move the country in the right most important of these is, of course, the rise
31 direction at this critical juncture in its history. of Islamic extremism in the part of the world
32 in which Pakistan is situated. There is a
33 developing consensus that, for a variety of
34 Intertwining of politics and reasons, Pakistan is now at the epicenter of this
35 economics: The case of Pakistan movement.
36 Pakistan’s politics, its economy, and its
37 Political and economic developments are external relations have been on a rollercoaster
38 intertwined processes, with the one affecting ride ever since the country gained inde-
39 the other. Economists, particularly economic pendence on 14 August, 1947, some six
40 historians, have begun to recognize that it is decades ago. It ran into turbulence within a
41 difficult to map the economic progress of a year of its birth when Muhammad Ali Jinnah,
42 society without fully understanding its political the country’s founding father, withdrew from
43 evolution.That the relationship also works in active politics on account of ill health. His
44 the other direction is now being appreciated by death on 11 September, 1948 left a political
45 political scientists as well. void that was not filled for a decade. It was
46 Politics and economics have had a more the extreme turbulence and confusion that
47 profound impact on one another in Pakistan prevailed during the decade after Jinnah’s
48 than in most developing countries.Why that is, death that created an opportunity for General

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Muhammad Ayub Khan, the first Pakistani to regime change and brought the military back 1
be appointed to the position of commander- to power in 1977, this time under General Zia 2
in-chief, to bring the military into politics.1 ul-Haq. 3
Ayub Khan’s intervention created a precedent Economics contributed to regime change 4
that was followed by three other army com- once again—albeit somewhat less signifi- 5
manders. cantly—in the late 1990s when General Pervez 6
Pakistan became politically stable only Musharraf forced an elected prime minister 7
when the military was in charge. That was out of office. Had the economy fared better 8
for 33 years in the country’s 61-year history. economically under a succession of civilian 9
Only four leaders governed during the time prime ministers, the military’s intervention in 10
the military was in control. Only in one case 1999 might not have been as welcomed as was 11
did power directly flow from one military the case when Musharraf assumed control. 12
leader to another. That was when General Another transition from military to civilian 13
Yahya Khan forced the politically and physi- control has now (2008) occurred, but in 14
cally weakened Ayub Khan out of office in circumstances very different from those that 15
1969 and became president himself. prevailed on previous occasions.The military 16
Economics played an important role in Ayub was forced to yield control not because of 17
Khan’s departure. His economic model, economic difficulties but because of the 18
appreciated in particular by the community of extraordinary mobilization of some segments 19
foreign donors, had produced impressive of civil society. On 18 August, 2008, four days 20
macroeconomic results.2 GDP increased by 6.1 after President Pervez Musharraf celebrated 21
percent a year and income per head of the Pakistan’s birthday, he resigned after coming 22
population by 3.8 percent per annum. But an under intense pressure from the political parties 23
impression was created that the rewards of that had won massive victories in the elec- 24
economic growth ended up concentrated in a tions held on 18 February, 2008. The parties 25
few hands.There was considerable discontent in threatened to impeach the president in case he 26
the country’s eastern wing which first led to a did not surrender his position. After resisting 27
popular political movement against the regime for a few days, he tendered his resignation. 28
and finally to the breakup of the country. Economic difficulties followed the change 29
Economics was also the reason for the in the governing order rather than preceding 30
demise of the administration of Zulfikar Ali it.3 What will happen now will depend on 31
Bhutto that succeeded two successive military how the various forces that have had impor- 32
regimes and created the expectation that the tant roles in the past will affect the new, 33
economy would deliver more to the masses evolving situation. In order to anticipate how 34
than had happened during the Ayub Khan the current situation is likely to evolve,we will 35
period. Bhutto adopted an entirely different lay out some of the themes that explore the 36
model of economic management from that interaction between economic and political 37
followed by his military predecessors. He forces and how both are affected by the 38
placed the public rather than the private sector country’s external environment. However, 39
at the commanding heights of the economy. before spelling out these themes it would be 40
However,the expanded role of the state created useful to underscore one other feature of 41
different kinds of exploitation, this time by Pakistan’s political history. 42
government functionaries who were prepared In the two relatively long periods of civilian 43
to oblige their political masters by using the rule, each lasting eleven years, more than a 44
economic entities they controlled for granting dozen persons held power, but derived it not 45
favors.The result was growing discontent and from such political institutions as the parlia- 46
a sharp slow down of the economy.There was ment or political parties. Most of them gained 47
once again a popular movement which led to positions of power because of the alliances they 48
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 PA K I STA N ’ S P O L I T I C S A N D I TS E C O N O M Y

1 were able to forge outside the formal political This rollercoaster history raises two impor-
2 structure.There was much political turmoil in tant questions—important not only to develop
3 the decade immediately after independence a better understanding of Pakistan’s excep-
4 when seven prime ministers held power. In tionally turbulent history but also to lay down
5 1988– 99, another period of long civilian rule, some markers for the future.The questions are:
6 power changed hands seven times as well (see why did the military intervene so frequently
7 Table 6.1).The only time the country gained in the country’s political life? And,why did the
8 political stability during civilian rule was in the economy perform so well during the period of
9 six-year-period when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was military domination compared to the time the
10 in control. However, even Bhutto ruled as a civilians were in charge? Finding some answers
11 quasi-dictator rather than as the head of a to these questions will be the main subject of
12 political party. In other words, the civilian this chapter.
13 leadership, when exercising power, failed to
14 institutionalize the base of their support. Had
Themes to understand Pakistan’s
15 they done that, the military would have found
development: state, society, and
16 it more difficult to intervene.
economy
17 During the time the military held the
18 reins of power, the economy also did well We will structure the story of political, social
19 economically,growing at an average yearly rate and economic change in Pakistan around a
20 of 6.5 percent (see Table 6.2).Rapid economic number of themes concerning politics, eco-
21 progress was often used by the military to claim nomics, and relations with the world outside.
22 legitimacy for governing the country. These will be brought together into a fabric
23
24
25
26 Table 6.1 Political periods in Pakistan’s history
27 Period Type of governance
28
August 1947–October 1958 Competitive politics
29 October 1958–December 1971 Military control
30 December 1971–July 1977 Quasi-dictatorship
31 July 1977–August 1988 Military control
32 August 1988–October 1999 Competitive politics
33 October 1999–March 2008 Military control
March 2008– Competitive politics
34
35
36
Table 6.2 United States’ assistance to Pakistan
37
38 Period Amount ($ million) Yearly average ($ million)
39 Pre-first Plan 181.2 30.2
40 First Plan 1955–60 472.9 94.6
41 Second Plan 1960–65 504.1 100.8
Third Plan 1965–70 197.4 39.5
42 Fourth Plan 1970–75 141.1 28.2
43 Pre-first Afghan War 1975–1981 23.3 3.9
44 First Afghan War 1982–1989 1,517.2 216.7
45 Post-Afghan War 1990–98 2,216.4 246.3
46 Post-nuclear tests 1999–2001 303.3 75.8
Support for war on terror 2001–07 1,695.4 333.1
47
48 Source: various issues of Pakistan Survey

85
S H A H I D J AV E D B U R K I

that will keep on changing its weave and color institutions were built that would give 1
as time progresses. Some of these themes were voice to each of these groups, and the idea 2
developed in my earlier works;4 the rest are the of Pakistan6—that the Muslims of British 3
product of reflections on the way Pakistan has India needed a state of their own to 4
once again, at the time of yet another transfer preserve their distinct identity.An impres- 5
of power from the military to the civil,plunged sion was created that India wished to undo 6
into a serious economic and political crisis. Partition and create the unified state 7
I will first list these themes and then go on for which its leaders had campaigned dur- 8
to develop them at some length: ing the independence movement. Thus 9
threatened, the Pakistani establishment, in 10
■ There were constant changes in Pakistan’s particular the country’s military, placed 11
social landscape. These led to the emer- protecting the country’s integrity and 12
gence of new social and economic groups survival above issues concerning nation 13
that competed for power with those that building.7 14
were already established. Demography ■ The preoccupation with India’s real or 15
played an important role in this develop- perceived intentions towards the country 16
ment. led to the creation of a triangular relation- 17
■ Transfer of population following the ship involving Islamabad, New Delhi, and 18
partition of British India “Muslimized” Washington. This was to be tested a 19
Pakistan with the proportion of Muslims in number of times and is once again at the 20
the population increasing from 72 to 93 center of attention. 21
percent. This demographic event laid the ■ It was an accident of history that the 22
ground for the later radicalization of the opportunities for crafting close relations 23
society.Islam may not have developed such with Washington occurred mostly when 24
a prominent place in the society had there the military was in power in Islamabad.The 25
been a larger presence of non-Muslims in military’s preoccupation with India gave an 26
the population of the country. edge to the relations between Islamabad 27
■ There was an absence of an institutional and New Delhi. 28
structure that could have helped the socio- ■ On the surface, the military’s economic 29
economic groups to engage in dialogue performance was impressive.However,that 30
with one another in order to reach an performance was not based on urgently 31
understanding on the sharing of economic needed structural reforms that could have 32
power as well as the economic rewards that placed economic progress on a growth 33
come from access to power. trajectory that was continuous and ensured 34
■ The group conflict took place outside the large and sustainable increases in national 35
confines of a formal political structure.This income. Instead, the military leadership 36
produced conflict that, in the eyes of the relied on the economic sustenance pro- 37
military, seemed to threaten national vided by the United States. 38
security and justified its repeated ventures ■ The military used political power to 39
into the political space. improve its economic base.This was done 40
■ The first generation of Indian leaders took mostly to keep in line the senior officers.8 41
time to come to terms with the partition ■ Long periods of rule by the military led to 42
of British India and the creation of a new a highly centralized system of governance 43
state on the basis of religion.This led to a that made the provinces totally subservient 44
serious conflict between what some to the center. This contributed to the 45
scholars have called the idea of India5— emergence of serious tensions among the 46
that a state could accommodate diverse provinces. It was this conflict between 47
cultures, religions, and languages provided the military-dominated center and the 48
86

1 province of East Pakistan that led to a
2 bloody civil war between East and West
3 Pakistan in 1971 and to the emergence of
4 the country’s eastern wing as Bangladesh.
5
6 I will now develop in some detail each of
7 these eight themes and then discuss what may
8 lie in the country’s future if the current
9 leadership groups do not develop a strong
10 political–institutional base.
11
12
Changing social fabric
13
14 The continuous evolution of the social
15 landscape with the emergence of new groups
16 was an extraordinary feature of Pakistan’s
17 economic,social,and political development.In
18 that respect, Pakistan presents a more dynamic
19 picture than other countries of South Asia.The
20 creation of new social structures was the
21 consequence of at least three circumstances.
22 The first of these was the social composition of
23 the leadership that led the movement for the
24 creation of a Muslim state once the British left
25 India.The political elite that spearheaded the
26 movement came from the provinces in which
27 the Muslims were in a minority. It was
28 economically and socially very different from
29 the political elites who were dominant in the
30 areas that were to constitute the state of
31 Pakistan.A clash between the two groups—the
32 outsiders and the insiders—was inevitable. It
33 was only under President Ayub Khan that the
34 landed aristocracy won back its position in the
35 political system it had lost to the newcomers.
36 Also responsible for the enormous social
37 flux in the country was a number of profound
38 demographic developments, among them the
39 massive transfer of population that accom-
40 panied Partition; the flow of workers into
41 Karachi from the country’s northern areas to
42 help build the nation’s first capital; the
43 migration of millions of workers to the Middle
44 East during the first economic boom in
45 that part of the world that lasted for a decade
46 and a half (1974–91); the creation of three
47 Pakistani diasporas in Britain, the Middle
48 East, and North America; and the arrival of
PA K I STA N ’ S P O L I T I C S A N D I TS E C O N O M Y
three to four million refugees from Afghanistan
in the 1980s.
“Muslimization” of Pakistani society
and increase in Islamic radicalism
An important consequence of the transfer of
population that accompanied Partition when
eight million Muslims moved from India to
Pakistan and six million Hindus and Sikhs
went in the other direction left a deep imprint
on Pakistani society. One of these was the
“Muslimization” of Pakistan’s population. In
the mid-1940s, when the campaign for the
creation of Pakistan was conducted, Muslims
constituted 72.5 percent of the population of
the areas that now make up Pakistan.After the
transfer, the proportion of Muslims in the
country’s population increased to 93 percent.
Punjab, the most affected of Pakistan’s four
provinces, was thoroughly “cleansed” of the
non-Muslim minorities.One of the important
“what if?” questions about Pakistan’s history is
the impact the presence of a large non-Muslim
population would have had on the country’s
political and social development. It would not
have moved the country so far towards Islamic
radicalization as happened first gradually in the
1960s and 1970s and later more rapidly. The
fact that Pakistan today has become the epi-
center of Islamic extremism is, in part, because
of the Muslimization of society following the
partition of British India.
This process was given a further boost by
the temporary movement of millions of
Pakistanis to provide labor for the first eco-
nomic boom in the oil-exporting countries of
the Middle East.This boom lasted for a decade
and a half, from the oil embargo in the mid-
1970s to the first Gulf War in 1991. During
this time, some 12 to 15 million workers from
Pakistan went to the Middle East, mostly as
construction workers on three- to five-year
contracts. A very large number of them were
from the North-West Frontier Province
(NWFP) and the adjoining tribal belt as well
as from the northern districts of Punjab.The
workers lived in camps where they were
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exposed to Wahabism, the conservative form political life of the country. That turbulence 1
of Islam that was and remains the state religion would not have been so disruptive had com- 2
of Saudi Arabia.They brought the teachings of petition among the groups taken place within 3
this brand of Islam back to Pakistan.This con- institutional confines, as happened in India. In 4
tributed to the radicalization of this part of the Pakistan, the political system did not create an 5
country. institutional base within which political dis- 6
This move towards Islamic radicalism was course could take place. Consequently, group 7
reinforced by the way the allies, led by the politics became sharply defined because of the 8
United States, fought the Soviet Union’s absence of institutions that could have helped 9
occupation of Afghanistan in 1979–89.During to establish a dialogue among the various 10
this time Pakistan, one of the two US allies competing groups. The groups contending 11
actively involved in this struggle—the other for power included the refugees from India 12
being Saudi Arabia—was led by General Zia who had settled in Karachi and Hyderabad 13
ul-Haq,who was deeply committed to turning and had dominated politics for a decade after 14
the country he led into an Islamic state. The independence, the refugees who had settled 15
campaign against the Soviets was centered in Punjab’s countryside and were given the 16
around training and indoctrinating tens of land vacated by the Sikh smallholders and 17
thousands of young men, a large number of peasants who had migrated to India, the large 18
whom came from the Afghan refugee camps landlords of Punjab and Sindh who had been 19
located in Pakistan, to become mujahideen, politically powerful when the British ruled 20
Islamic holy warriors.While the US supplied India, the tribal chiefs of Balochistan and the 21
weapons for the fighters, the Saudis provided NWFP and the religious leaders in Punjab 22
finance for their procurement and Pakistan and NWFP. 23
set up hundreds of madrasahs in which the The emergence of Islamic groups has 24
warriors were trained.9 These moves resulted further complicated institution building in 25
in the defeat and withdrawal of the Soviet Pakistan.Most of these groups do not subscribe 26
Union from Afghanistan, but it left Pakistan to western notions of democracy, the rule of 27
and southeastern Afghanistan with a legacy that law based on a legal system devised by the 28
the two countries are still dealing with two elected representatives of the people, and 29
decades after the Soviet departure.The Taliban, tolerance of groups that do not accept their 30
who overran Afghanistan in the late 1990s,gave interpretation of the Koran and the Hadith. 31
sanctuary to Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda, and While many scholars, including several from 32
allowed Saudi renegades to mount an attack the West,10 have argued that Islam and 33
on the United States, were the product of democracy are not incompatible, this is not 34
these madrasahs. With Islamic radical groups accepted by more radical Islamist groups.They 35
digging their roots deep into Pakistani soil, the maintain that,in the Islamic system,there is no 36
country’s social fabric became even more place for man-made laws and institutions. 37
complicated. Some of these groups are now engaged in 38
military campaigns in parts of the northwest— 39
in particular in the Swat valley—to impose 40
Failure to develop formal political
Islamic sharia on the population. 41
structures
Wherever competition among the social 42
Pakistan’s inability to develop robust political groups became so intense that it adversely 43
institutions was in part a consequence of the affected the quality of governance,the military 44
enormous powers that remained concentrated intervened. In other words, political under- 45
in the hands of the members of a few social development and a persistent feeling of 46
groups. These groups competed with one insecurity created the space for the military to 47
another, causing great turbulence in the act on the political stage. 48
88

1 India’s perceived intentions and
2 concerns about the survival of the
3 state and the rise of the military as a
4 political force
5 part of those who were its leaders.12 General
Right from the time of its birth, the non-
6 Ayub Khan was perhaps the most politically
military groups that had political power were
7 ambitious military chief, but even he would
anxious over the country’s survival as a separate
8 not have ventured into politics had the
entity in South Asia.This feeling of insecurity
9 politicians not created an opportunity for him
10 was initially fed by the actions of the first
11 generation of India’s leaders,who took time to
12 come to terms with the partition of the
13 subcontinent and the creation of a separate
14 homeland for the Muslim community. As
15 Pakistan was struggling to find its feet, the
16 Indians took a number of steps designed to
17 cripple the country economically. These
18 included the refusal to pay the “sterling
19 balances” Britain provided New Delhi to
20 compensate for the effort India made during
21 the Second World War, a part of which was
22 owed to Pakistan.The Indians also refused to
23 accept the new rate of exchange between their
24 currency and that of Pakistan. In 1949 the rate
25 changed from parity to 144 Indian rupees for
26 100 Pakistani rupees when Pakistan refused
27 to devalue its currency in relation to the
28 US dollar as was done by all countries of what
29 was then called the “sterling area” (now the
30 Commonwealth). India sought to punish
31 Pakistan by halting all trade with its neighbor.11
32 This action was to have a profound impact on
33 the development of the Pakistani economy. In
34 1950 India began to divert water in the eastern
35 rivers of the Indus system for use in its state of
36 Punjab.It used the canal head works located on
37 its territory to block water from flowing into
38 Pakistan. This act was considered hostile
39 enough for Liaqat Ali Khan, Pakistan’s first
40 prime minister,to appear on the balcony of his
41 house in Karachi,raise his fist,and threaten war,
42 if India persisted in its designs.This dispute was
43 resolved a decade later when the World Bank
44 intervened and the two countries signed the
45 Indus Rivers Water Treaty in 1960.
46 One consequence of these moves by India
47 was to create a deep fear in Pakistan about the
48 intentions of its much larger neighbor. This
PA K I STA N ’ S P O L I T I C S A N D I TS E C O N O M Y
fear was used by the military leadership as one
reason for intervening in the country’s politics.
The military’s appearance on the political stage,
therefore,was not the result of ambition on the
to act and had India not continued to pose a
threat to Pakistan’s survival.
While the failure of the Pakistani political
establishment to create political institutions
within which it could function without
resorting to the politics of the street created the
space for the military to operate, the military,
once in power, did not consolidate its position
by systematically undermining the political
structure. All four generals-turned-presidents
used the political process and the politicians to
buy political longevity for themselves. Three
of the four did not succeed;the fourth,General
Zia ul-Haq, died in an aircrash while still
engaged in an attempt to manipulate the
political system to win more time for himself.
In other words, the failure to institutionalize
politics, has to be placed at the door of the
political establishment.
While the military establishment may not
have actively engineered its entry into the
political system,it used its position when it did
attain power to strengthen its economic base.
This was done mostly by those who held the
reins of power to keep in line the senior
members of the military. By now the military
has created an elaborate system for provid-
ing economic benefits to its senior officers.
General Pervez Musharraf went the furthest in
this regard, appointing military personnel to a
large number of senior positions in the
bureaucracy.This led to much resentment and
persuaded General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani,
Musharraf ’s successor as the head of the army,
to order military officers back to the barracks.
Kayani also made it clear that the civilian
leadership was fully in charge in all spheres of
policymaking and that the military’s role was to
be confined to that of an implementer of the
89
S H A H I D J AV E D B U R K I

policies made by the civilian administration. up and why no effort was made to develop 1
This resolve was put to the test when, on robust political institutions. Pakistan’s political 2
7 August, 2008, the political parties issued an leadership was prepared to take risks with 3
ultimatum to President Pervez Musharraf to the economy in the expectation that the 4
vacate his office. The military refused to country would be bailed out should it land in 5
intervene openly,confining its role to ensuring serious crises: and this happened time and 6
that the former chief of the army staff was not again. 7
humiliated in the process. There was serious talk in American policy 8
circles in the spring and summer of 2008 9
about changing the relationship with Pakistan 10
Close relations with the United
and moving towards an association that 11
States
placed much greater emphasis on a long-term 12
Once in power, the military leadership arrangement. Such an arrangement would 13
managed the country’s foreign affairs to bring not only provide assistance for strengthening 14
it closer to the west, in particular the United Pakistan’s security forces but also help with 15
States. During the long periods of its rule— economic development. It was finally recog- 16
1958 to 1969, 1977 to 1988, and 1999 to nized that there was no military solution 17
2008—it was able to forge close relations with to Pakistan’s problems, especially those that 18
the United States.This resulted in the flow of emanated from the increasingly disaffected 19
significant amounts of US assistance to the populations of the tribal belt and the NWFP. 20
country (see Table 6.2). There was a deep and growing resentment 21
This was one reason why the economy did among the people of the tribal belt and the 22
so much better during the time the military NWFP that the world, in particular the US, 23
held the reins of political power (see Table 6.3). had not treated them well. This, it was felt, 24
It was able to obtain large flows of assistance was especially the case since 9/11 when the 25
from the United States to augment paltry US, supported by Pakistan, launched an inten- 26
domestic savings.These remained low and did sive military campaign against the Taliban 27
not establish a sustainable structure that could regime in Afghanistan.The impression, widely 28
ensure growth on a long-term basis without held for some time in Washington, that the 29
resort to external savings. Taliban had been decisively beaten, turned 30
The easy availability of foreign assistance out to be wrong. The Taliban began, to re- 31
created a situation that economists describe as assert themselves after the snows melted in 32
a “moral hazard.” That Pakistan was able to 2008 and revived their campaign not only 33
obtain large amounts of foreign flows to against the US but also its NATO allies, who 34
augment domestic savings was one reason why had an active presence in Afghanistan. What 35
important structural reforms were not taken went wrong? 36
37
38
Table 6.3 Economic performance in various political periods in Pakistan, 1947–2008 39
GDP growth Population growth GDP per capita 40
rate (%) rate (%) increase (%) 41
1947–58 2.7 1.8 0.9
42
1958–69 6.1 2.3 3.8 43
1969–71 5.8 2.8 3.0 44
1971–77 3.9 3.1 0.8 45
1977–88 6.5 3.1 3.4 46
1988–99 4.7 2.7 2.0
1999–2008 6.1 2.3 3.8
47
48
90

1 The Taliban’s defeat brought to power in
2 Kabul the ethnic groups who had never been
3 comfortable with the much larger Pakhtun
4 population that had economically and politi-
5 cally dominated Afghanistan for decades.
6 Political power brings economic rewards; the
7 non-Pakhtun groups benefited from the
8 economic revival, albeit slightly, that followed
9 the occupation of Afghanistan by the US and
10 NATO. The Pakhtun were largely marginal-
11 ized even though Hamid Karzai, the country’s
12 president, belonged to that community. In the
13 absence of secure sources of income, the
14 Pakhtun population in the southern and eastern
15 parts of the country turned to the cultivation of
16 poppy and Afghanistan became the world’s
17 largest producer and provider of heroin. A
18 close relationship developed between the
19 people who ran the country’s drug economy
20 and the dissidents who constituted the Taliban.
21 Since the majority of the Pakhtun popu-
22 lation lived on the Pakistani side of the border
23 —Pakistan has an estimated 25 million of the
24 40 million people who identify themselves
25 as Pakhtun—it should not have come as a
26 surprise that the country’s tribal areas would
27 join in the fight. Their discontent began to
28 seep into the rest of Pakistan, which also
29 became restive.The economic downturn in the
30 country in 2007–08 provided an added
31 impetus to the groups operating out of the
32 northwestern hills to increase their activities
33 not only in their own areas but also in other
34 parts of Pakistan. The only way to counter
35 these trends was to ensure that the Pakistani
36 economy did not suffer a severe and long-term
37 decline, that economic revival was not
38 concentrated in the areas that benefited from
39 the short-lived prosperity that marked the
40 second part of the period of President Pervez
41 Musharraf, that a broad-based program of
42 economic development was initiated that
43 provided employment and incomes to the
44 country’s young population, and that a special
45 effort was made to bring the tribal areas and the
46 NWFP into the economic mainstream.
47 The US seemed to agree with this
48 approach.A bill was prepared by two powerful
PA K I STA N ’ S P O L I T I C S A N D I TS E C O N O M Y
senators to reflect this change in sentiment. Its
authors were Joe Biden, a Democrat, who
headed the Senate’s Foreign Relations
Committee,and Richard Lugar,a Republican,
who was the senior most member representing
his party on the same committee. The bill
was aimed at providing Pakistan $7.5 billion
over a five-year period with the assistance to
be directed towards the country’s economic
and social development.“Our bill represents a
genuine seachange—one which will set the
US’ Pakistan policy on a safer and more
successful course. For too long our policy
towards Pakistan has been in desperate need of
serious overhaul,” said Senator Biden, while
introducing the bill.“While our bill envisions
sustained cooperation with Pakistan for the
long haul, it is not a blank check,” added
Senator Lugar, the bill’s co-sponsor. The two
senators believed that the bill would have the
support of the House of Representatives, the
lower house of the Congress and, once passed,
would be signed into law by President George
W. Bush. However, the bill died, having failed
to reach the Senate floor before the end of its
term in January 2009. At the same time, the
Americans indicated that they would continue
to provide between one and $1.5 billion a year
for military purposes,an amount that included
the logistics support Islamabad was giving for
Washington’s efforts in Afghanistan.
The data presented in Table 6.2 show how
fickle the US has been in the past in aiding
Pakistan. It provided large amounts of support
when the country was ruled by the military;on
average $100 million a year during the first part
of the period of Ayub Khan, $217 million
a year during the period of Zia ul-Haq and
$333 million a year when Pervez Musharraf
held the reins of power. While it is true that
American strategic interests were strong in the
area in which Pakistan is located when the
latter was governed by the military,it is also the
case that Washington felt more comfortable in
working with the military than with the
civilian leadership.
As Pakistan enters into a new and possibly
economically more productive relationship
91
S H A H I D J AV E D B U R K I

with the US, it is important that the civilian Centralization of governance 1

leaders prepare themselves to deliver the 2
That Pakistan was governed for long periods
expected results.Their actions in the economic 3
by the military, which relied on the civil
arena have not given confidence that they will 4
services—initially on the powerful Civil
be able to do that. While many economic 5
Service of Pakistan (CSP)—for support
problems the country faced at the time 6
brought power to two groups that were
Musharraf resigned his position as president 7
comfortable with centralized command and
were inherited from the Musharraf period, it 8
should be recognized that more than four control.This led to the concentration of power 9
months elapsed between the effective transfer in the hands of the federal government located 10
of power from the military ruler to the elected at Islamabad.This happened in spite of the fact 11
representatives of the people without any that the constitution of 1973, written and 12
action having been taken to address either the adopted in the aftermath of the civil war in 13
deteriorating economic situation or the East Pakistan, opted for provincial autonomy. 14
worsening situation with respect to the insur- The schedule to the constitution provided 15
gency in the tribal areas. This was a long two lists of government’s responsibilities: the 16
enough time to display competence, confi- first listed the responsibilities of the federal 17
dence in economic matters, and willingness to government, the second spelled out those 18
take hard decisions. that were initially “concurrent”—to be 19
Pakistan has a long tradition of postponing performed by both the center and the 20
reform when large foreign capital flows provinces—but were to be fully transferred to 21
become available. There is also the feeling in the provinces. This did not happen. Zulfikar 22
the Pakistani political and economic establish- Ali Bhutto, the author of the constitution, 23
ments that the country will be rescued by its sabotaged the system the moment it came into 24
friends when the times are really difficult.This being. He fired the two provincial govern- 25
has happened in the past on several occasions. ments that were not controlled by his political 26
It was happening again in the summer of 2008. party, the Pakistan People’s Party, on flimsy 27
As previously noted, the world of finance has grounds and forced the parliament to postpone 28
a phrase for this phenomenon:“moral hazard” for a ten-year period most requirements of the 29
is the term financial people use when man- constitution that would have seen greater 30
agers postpone action and take risks in the exercise of provincial autonomy.His successor, 31
belief that their enterprises will not be allowed yet another military leader, had even less 32
to sink.Policymakers in Pakistan have behaved interest in sharing power with the provinces. 33
in much the same way. It has been recognized After the death of General Zia ul-Haq when 34
for many years that Pakistan needs deep the country was governed by a succession of 35
structural reforms in its political system and democratically elected governments, they 36
economy. In many countries, such reforms made no attempt to invoke the federal features 37
have been undertaken when there was a crisis. of the constitution.The country continued to 38
In Pakistan’s case, this was not done since be governed from Islamabad. 39
crises opened up foreign coffers. It could be Under General Pervez Musharraf, the 40
different this time around if the new leaders governing system became more centralized. 41
study the country’s history and draw some The provinces were given little power and, 42
lessons from it. even within the center, the prime minister 43
There are two other aspects of Pakistan’s gathered an enormous amount of authority in 44
history that should be briefly discussed— one his own hands, building a secretariat that 45
with a long tradition and the other more recent became all powerful.The only initiative taken 46
in origin—before we turn to the final part of by the Musharraf government towards 47
this chapter. decentralization was to establish a new system 48
92

1 of local government which, at least on paper,
2 was allowed to exercise considerable authority
3 in a number of areas previously under the
4 control of the federal and provincial govern-
5 ments.
6 Pakistan had failed to develop a viable
7 system of local government in spite of the
8 many efforts made by different regimes over a
9 period of six decades. It had tried five different
10 systems since its birth, starting with the system
11 of panchayats inherited from the British period.
12 In the 1950s, this system was replaced by
13 “Village Aid,”a local government structure that
14 had the moral and financial support of the US.
15 Ayub Khan introduced the system of “basic
16 democracies.” This was a multi-tiered system
17 that had elected councilors at the bottom who
18 then elected representatives to the higher tiers.
19 Government officials serving in the areas over
20 which the councils had jurisdiction were also
21 represented. This system worked well for
22 promoting development but it was also
23 entrusted with political responsibilities. The
24
80,000 “basic democrats,”40,000 from each of
25
the two provinces, constituted the electoral
26
college for the election of the president and
27
the members of the national and provincial
28
assemblies. The system was discarded by
29
General Yahya Khan who succeeded Ayub
30
Khan as president in 1969. The military
31
government headed by General Zia ul Haq
32
33 which took office in 1977 introduced another
34 system of local government which borrowed
35 heavily from the structure of Ayub Khan’s
36 “basic democracies.”This too was discarded by
37 the political governments that held the reins of
38 power in the 1990s.
39
40
Pakistan’s current situation: how it
41
might evolve with and without
42
appropriate public policy choices
43
44 At time timing of writing (early fall 2008),
45 Pakistan once again stood at a crossroads.This
46 situation arose on account of several events that
47 took place within the space of 17 months,from
48 March 2007 to August 2008. They destroyed
PA K I STA N ’ S P O L I T I C S A N D I TS E C O N O M Y
the government headed by General Pervez
Musharraf and brought the economy to its
knees. Although the rate of growth of GDP
was high during the Musharraf period it was
based on the growth of the sectors that did little
for employment creation and for the poor.The
government also let serious shortages develop
in the supply of such vital goods and services
as food grains, electric power, and natural gas.
While Islamabad’s policymakers were respon-
sible for some of these developments,a number
of them were the result of happenings over
which they had no control. It may be useful to
describe the internal developments briefly
since they illustrate a number of themes that
were identified in this chapter.
On 8 March, 2007 President Musharraf
summoned Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry of
the Supreme Court to his “camp office”
in Rawalpindi, the city that had the head-
quarters of the Pakistani army, and asked him
to resign from his position. The meeting
between the two men was filmed by Pakistan
Television, the official news channel, which
showed Musharraf in his army uniform facing
the chief justice. Several other senior generals
were present in the room, all in uniform.That
the meeting was held in the camp office used
by Musharraf when he operated as the army
chief was also significant.It is not clear whether
the intention was to communicate to the
judiciary the army’s displeasure at its conduct,
but that was the way it was perceived. Chief
Justice Chaudhry, to the surprise of General
Musharraf and his colleagues,refused to oblige.
The authorities were clearly not prepared for
this development; it was their assumption that
Chaudhry would quietly walk away, accept-
ing whatever compensation was being offered
to him. The government’s response to the
developing situation was panic. The chief
justice was prevented from returning to his
office; instead he was taken to his official
residence and was prevented from leaving
or meeting with anybody from the outside
world. His family was held with him in the
house.
93
S H A H I D J AV E D B U R K I

This drama was played out on the TV The case against Musharraf was based on 1
screens by dozens of private channels the the constitutional provision that a person who 2
government had not only allowed but was in the employ of the government could 3
encouraged to operate.This was a part of the not contest for political office within two years 4
government’s policy to modernize the political of leaving the service of the government. 5
and communication systems. The govern- Musharraf had won the second term as 6
ment’s objectives succeeded but not in the president while still holding the office of the 7
way it had hoped. The treatment meted out chief of army staff. By the time these cases 8
to the chief judicial officer of the country began to be heard Bhutto had returned to 9
incensed the legal community whose members Pakistan. On 18 October, when she arrived in 10
launched a countrywide campaign to have him Karachi, her cavalcade was attacked by suicide 11
reinstated. The government changed course bombers, resulting in the death of more 12
and allowed Chaudhry to leave his house than 140 people. She was the target of the 13
and meet with his supporters. He took this attack but escaped unhurt. 14
opportunity to travel widely and address Fearing that the Supreme Court would 15
various bar associations around the country. nullify his election, Musharraf, as the chief of 16
The “contact the people” campaign was the army staff, moved on 3 November to issue 17
inaugurated by a procession that started from a proclamation setting aside the constitution 18
Islamabad and took 25 hours to cover the and promulgating in its place a provisional 19
distance of 175 miles to Lahore. While this constitutional order (PCO).Sixty judges of the 20
campaign was drawing hundreds of thousands 21
Supreme Court were not invited to take the
of supporters out on the streets of urban 22
oath of office under the PCO. Musharraf ’s
Pakistan, a case was filed against Chaudhry’s 23
desperate action was termed as a “coup against
dismissal which was adjudged in his favor by his 24
himself.” Widespread condemnation of the
erstwhile colleagues in the court. The chief 25
move by several foreign governments and by an
justice took his position on the bench. 26
energized civil society led Musharraf to
Chaudhry lost no time to assert himself. 27
withdraw the PCO, restore the Constitution,
He allowed the case against Musharraf to pro- 28
and announce that general elections would be
ceed and he also took on board the challenge 29
to the passage of the National Reconciliation held in the first half of January. Nawaz Sharif, 30
Ordinance (NRO) that gave blanket amnesty the other former prime minister, who had 31
to a large number of people who had been spent eight years in exile, was also allowed to 32
charged with corruption by the Musharraf return. However, while the country was in the 33
government.Notable among these was Asif Ali grip of election fever,on 27 December,Benazir 34
Zirdari, the husband of Benazir Bhutto. It was Bhutto was assassinated after addressing a 35
well known that the administration of US public meeting in Rawalpindi. A total break- 36
President George W.Bush had encouraged the down of law and order followed for three days 37
two sides—Bhutto and Musharraf—to con- as Bhutto’s supporters expressed their anger by 38
clude this deal.Washington was of the view that coming out on the streets and attacking 39
by gaining the support of the country’s largest government property.The government reacted 40
and most popular party, Pervez Musharraf by postponing the election to 18 February, 41
would be able to gain legitimacy and thus be 2008. 42
able to fight al-Qaeda and the Taliban more The elections produced unexpected results. 43
effectively. These two groups had established While Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party 44
themselves in the country’s tribal belt and was expected to do well, especially after her 45
had begun to inflict heavy casualties on the assassination,Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) 46
American and NATO forces fighting in (PML(N)) performed better than expected 47
Afghanistan. even by the party’s senior leaders.13 The 48
94

1 Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid), the party
2 that had supported Musharraf and had
3 governed as his partner for five years after the
4 elections of 2002, did very poorly.The Islamic
5 parties also lost the support they had picked up
6 in 2002.
7 The PPP and PML (N) were able to set aside
8 their traditional differences and form a coalition
9 government at the federal level as well as in
10 Punjab.The old rivals were prepared to work
11 together for different reasons.The PPP wished
12 to ensure that its senior leaders would be
13 cleared of the charges of corruption that had
14 been leveled against them by both Nawaz
15 Sharif when he was prime minister and then
16 by the administration headed by General
17 Pervez Musharraf.The PML (N) wanted all the
18 judges removed by Musharraf on 3 November
19 to be reinstated.These differences could not be
20 resolved. The only common ground the two
21 sides could walk on was to force Musharraf to
22
leave office.On 7 August they announced their
23
agreement to launch impeachment proceed-
24
ings against the president. On 18 August
25
Musharraf resigned from office. On 6 Septem-
26
ber Asif Ali Zirdari, Bhutto’s widower, was
27
elected president by an overwhelming majority
28
of the electoral college. Zirdari’s election was
29
not supported by the PML(N) that moved
30
31 across to the opposition benches in the national
32 assembly. Not only did the coalition fall apart;
33 the two parties declared open war in February
34 2009. The president responded by dismissing
35 the provincial government in the Punjab after
36 the supreme court issued an order barring the
37 Sharif brothers from holding public office.The
38 PML(N) reacted by ordering its supporters to
39 march on Islamabad starting 12 March. The
40 party leaders ordered a dharna (sit in) in front of
41 the supreme court building for 16 March.This
42 is where the situation stood at the time of
43 writing.
44 Which way Pakistan will proceed depends
45 on a number of things. Among them, the
46 leaders will have to find the right answers to
47 a number of difficult questions. Whether
48 the leadership groups that now have poli-
PA K I STA N ’ S P O L I T I C S A N D I TS E C O N O M Y
tical power will be able to institutionalize
it? Whether the civil society that was respon-
sible for forcing political change by having
the military withdraw from center stage
and allow the elected leaders to occupy that
space will find a way of becoming a part of
the evolving political structure? Whether the
new leaders will find a way for resolving the
difficult economic situation the country
now faces will depend on how much attention
they will be prepared to give to economic
management and how much external support
they will receive to deal with some of the
macroeconomic imbalances that had mate-
rialized.
The economic situation worsened rapidly
in 2008 with severe power shortages, increase
in the prices of various foodgrains, and
increases in the fiscal, external trade, and
external accounts deficits. The strain on the
economy was partly the consequence of the
sharp increases in the prices of fuel oil, edible
oil,and foodgrains in the international markets
and also because of the spending spree by the
Musharraf government as it prepared for the
elections of February 2008. The new leaders
will need to find solutions to the problems the
economy faces without sacrificing long-term
growth and by changing the structure of the
economy in order to place it on a trajectory of
high rate of growth that can be sustained over
time without an excessive dependence on
external flows. These problems raise further
questions for the future.Whether the economy
can be developed in a way to provide pro-
ductive job opportunities to a very young and
increasingly restive workforce? Whether the
capital the country needs over the short term
will become available from the traditional
donors? Whether a strategy for dealing with
the rise of Islamic fundamentalism can be
developed that will have the confidence of a
world that is getting increasingly worried
about developments in the areas adjacent to
the border with Afghanistan? And whether
the political establishment will find political
as well as economic answers to deal with the
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S H A H I D J AV E D B U R K I

growing discomfort the provinces have with Notes 1

the government at the center? Whether posi- 2
tive answers can be found to these ques- 1 Ayub Khan provided a detailed account for his 3
tions will depend on how well the new set of move in his autobiography published at the 4
policymakers understand the dozen themes height of the campaign his administration 5
explored in the previous section. launched to celebrate what it called the “decade 6
While it is difficult to be positive about of development.” See Muhammad Ayub Khan, 7
Pakistan’s future in these dark times for the Friends not Masters: A Political Autobiography 8
country, there are a number of developments (London: Oxford University Press, 1967). 9
2 Several books were written on Pakistan’s devel- 10
that may lead the country to develop sus-
opment experience during the period of Ayub 11
tainable institutions of political governance and
Khan.Most of the authors had served in Pakistan 12
to set the economy on a trajectory of high level as advisors to the government. See, for instance,
growth that can also be sustained over time. 13
Gustav F. Papanek, Pakistan’s Development; Social
The reasons that give hope include the 14
Goals and Private Incentives (Cambridge, MA:
following. The military has withdrawn from 15
Harvard University Press, 1967).
politics, placing its faith in the development of 16
3 These were analyzed in some detail by a group
17
political institutions. A two-party political of six senior economists, including this author,
in the maiden report of the Institute of Public 18
order is emerging with the Centre-Left PPP
Policy, Status of the Economy: Challenges and 19
and the Centre-Right PML (N) accounting
Opportunities (Lahore: IPP, 2008). 20
for most of the political support.A few regional
4 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan under Bhutto, 21
parties operating in the troubled provinces
1971–77 (London: Macmillan, 1980) and 22
of Balochistan, the NWFP, and Sindh are
Pakistan:A Nation in the Making (Boulder, CO: 23
prepared to work with the mainstream parties. Westview Press, 1983). 24
A number of donors with interest in Pakistan’s 5 Anil Khilnani, The Idea of India (London: 25
economic survival are getting ready to provide Hamish Hamilton, 1997). 26
emergency assistance. Punjab remains well 6 Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (New 27
governed and, given its size and dynamism, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004). 28
may become the engine of growth for the rest 7 For a detailed history of the Pakistan Army and 29
of the country. There is now a growing how it affected the country’s political 30
consensus in the country that the problems development, see Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: 31
posed by the rise of Islamic extremism need to Pakistan: Its Army, and the Wars Within (Karachi:
32
be resolved. And finally there is a genuine Oxford University Press, 2008).
33
8 For an assessment of how the military used its
interest on the part of the new leadership 34
political power to build its economic strength
groups to reach a settlement with India on the 35
as an institution and the roles played by several
most difficult issues that have caused so much senior military officials, see Ayesha Siddiqa, 36
damaging hostility in the past. Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy 37
(London: Pluto Press, 2007). 38
9 This story is well told by Steve Coll in Ghost 39
Wars:The Secret History of the CIA,Afghanistan, 40
and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to 10 41
September, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 42
2004). 43
10 See, for instance, Noah Feldman, Fall and Rise 44
of the Islamic State (Princeton, NJ: University 45
Press 2008). 46
11 For a detailed account of this episode, see 47
Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, The Emergence of 48
96
 PA K I STA N ’ S P O L I T I C S A N D I TS E C O N O M Y

1 Pakistan (NewYork:Columbia University Press, Military (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endow-

2 1967). Ali, a senior civil servant at the time of ment for International Peace, 2005).
3 Independence, went on to become prime 13 I met Shahbaz Sharif,the chairman of PML (N)
4 minister in 1956. and the younger brother of Mian Nawaz Sharif,
5 12 The subject of the military in Pakistan’s politics a couple of weeks before the elections. His
6 has attracted some analytical attention in recent prediction about the number of seats his party
years. See, for instance, in addition to Nawaz, was likely to win was less than the number
7
Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and actually won.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
97
 1

7 2
3
4
5
Party overinstitutionalization, 6
7
contestation, and democratic 8
degradation in Bangladesh1 9
10
11
12
Harry Blair 13
14
15
16
17
18
[P]olitical parties [controlled in very hierarchical restoration of electoral politics in December 19
fashion by entrenched leaderships] have 2008 being the latest chapters. 20
monopolized the political process and thus so Electoral democracies like those in many 21
pervasively penetrated state and organizational developing countries are always incomplete,as 22
life that they have robbed interest groups and Diamond and others point out at some length, 23
other political institutions of their autonomy but they can function, and some serve as a 24
. . . This extreme domination and institu- transitional phase on the way toward liberal 25
tionalization of political parties . . . has been a democracy and democratic consolidation.3 26
central factor in eroding the effectiveness,legiti- But where party contestation becomes so 27
macy and stability of democracy. entrenched and ferocious that it precludes all 28
other aspects of the polity, a self-destructive 29
Larry Diamond made these observations pathology can set in.This is what happened in 30
about Venezuela’s party system in the late Venezuela,Colombia,and Pakistan,and,by the 31
1990s,2 but his observations on party “over- middle of the present decade, it is what had 32
institutionalization” could as well have appeared to have overtaken Bangladesh. 33
been written about Bangladesh in the middle For a while,it looked as if democracy might 34
of the first decade of the twenty-first century. take permanent hold in Bangladesh following 35
Other examples are not hard to find: its restoration in 1991.There was a near-death 36
Colombia in the later 1940s, Pakistan in the experience for the democratic experiment in 37
1990s.All ended unhappily. Some terminated 1996, but afterward the two major parties 38
severely—a Colombian civil war in the recovered with enough sobriety to agree on an 39
1950s that killed more than 200,000 people; electoral mechanism that steered the system 40
others came to a halt with less turmoil—a through a first turnover that year and then a 41
populist Venezuelan autocrat stifling civil second one in 2001. Thus the polity passed 42
liberties; a repressive Pakistani general Samuel Huntington’s “two turnover test”—the 43
continuing to postpone a promised demo- ruling party was removed from office by the 44
cratic restoration in the present decade. The voters and peacefully turned over charge to its 45
Bangladesh experience has yet to play out, successor not once but twice.4 46
with a military-backed emergency rule By the beginning of 2007, however, the 47
declared in January 2007, followed by the country’s political system appeared headed into 48
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 OV E R I N ST I T U T I O N A L I Z AT I O N , C O N T E STAT I O N , A N D D E M O C R AT I C D E G R A DAT I O N
1 an unstoppable downward spiral when the
2 military intervened to stop the political clock
3 for the third time since independence had been
4 won in 1971.5 As always with such takeovers,
5 a quick return to democracy was promised,but
6 within short order the timetable had already
7 been extended to a minimal 18 months before
8 a new national election would be allowed.
9 How did politics and political parties in
10 Bangladesh come to such a sorry pass? This
11 question will form the central query of this
12 chapter.We begin with a brief account of the
13 origins of the country’s principal political
14 parties and their history during the largely
15 authoritarian decades of the 1970s and 1980s.
16 But the main focus will be on the democratic
17 era beginning in 1990, and the debilitating
18 pathologies that came to hobble the political
19 system during that period, paradoxically at a
20 time when the economy was doing quite well
21 for the first time since independence.
22
23
24 Political parties and political
25 history during the first two
26 decades: 1971–19906
27
28 The dominant party at Bangladesh’s birth was
29 the Awami League (AL), founded in the mid-
30 1950s by Husain Shaheed Suhrawardy. After
31 his death in 1963 the party’s leadership passed
32 to the charismatic Sheikh Mujibur Rahman
33 (known generally as Sheikh Mujib or just
34 Mujib), who became the major leader of the
35 provincial autonomy movement for East
36 Bengal within united Pakistan.The movement
37 picked up momentum during the authori-
38 tarian rule of Ayub Khan, culminating twice
39 in massive outpourings of protest against
40 rule from the west wing of united Pakistan,
41 interrupted on both occasions by military
42 intervention.7 The first time came in 1969
43 when agitation led by the AL resulted in a
44 crackdown from West Pakistan, imposition of
45 martial law, and the ouster of Ayub, to be
46 replaced by another general,Yahya Khan.
47 Yahya promised national elections to form
48 a national government that would replace
Ayub’s indirect rule scheme,and,in the ensuing
poll of December 1970, Mujib’s AL won 75
percent of the East Bengal votes and all but two
of the province’s 162 seats to the Pakistan
Constituent Assembly.8 This overwhelming
victory in the East gave Mujib’s party an
absolute majority at the national level, but
negotiations to form a government soon broke
down over how much autonomy the country’s
eastern wing should get and, on 25 March,
1971,Yahya had Mujib arrested and ordered his
army to crack down on the AL. His move
immediately led to a bloody civil war between
the West Pakistan-dominated army and a pro-
independence force composed of those
Bengali soldiers who had revolted and allied
with a much larger contingent of guerillas,
collectively known as the Mukti Bahini. The
songram (struggle or conflict) lasted into
December, when the Indian army invaded on
behalf of the freedom fighters, captured the
provincial capital at Dhaka, and received the
surrender of the Pakistan army. Bangladesh
became independent on 16 December, 1971.
The AL winners of the 1970 elections (to
both the Pakistan National Assembly and the
East Pakistan Provincial Assembly) formed the
new parliament, which drew up a new con-
stitution creating a Westminster-type parlia-
mentary system and a polity based on the four
pillars of Mujibbad (Mujibism): nationalism,
socialism, secularism, and democracy. New
elections held in early 1973 for the jatiyo
sangsad (parliament) turned out to be a de facto
ratification of Mujib’s leadership role,awarding
the AL some 73 percent of the vote and 292
out of the 300 seats at stake (see Table 7.1).
But by the time of the election,corruption,
nepotism, favoritism, and incompetence had
seeped into the Mujib regime, and, com-
pounded by a severe and badly mismanaged
famine in 1974, popular confidence in the
Bangabondhu (Friend of Bengal, Mujib’s self-
assumed title) rapidly eroded, the economy
declined and security deteriorated. Mujib
responded to the crisis by building a parallel
military force alongside the army, declaring
a state of emergency in December 1974,
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H A R RY B L A I R

Table 7.1 Votes and seats in Bangladesh elections, 1973–2001 1

1973 1979 1986 1988 1991 1996 2001 2
3
AL (Awami League) Votes 73.2 24.5 26.2 30.1 37.4 40.2
Seats 97.7 13.0 25.3 29.3 48.7 20.8 4
BNP (Bangladesh National Party) Votes 41.2 30.8 33.6 42.3 5
Seats 69.0 46.7 38.7 64.1 6
JP (Jatiya Party) Votes 42.3 83.7 11.9 16.4 6.5 7
Seats 51.0 68.4 11.7 10.6 4.7
8
JI (Jamaat-i-Islam) Votes 4.6 12.1 8.6 4.2
Seats 3.3 6.0 1.0 5.7 9
Others and independents Votes 26.8 34.3 26.9 16.3 15.1 4.0 6.8 10
Seats 2.3 18.0 20.4 31.6 6.3 1.0 4.7 11
12
Notes: 1996 results pertain to the June election of that year, not the repudiated February election. Figures are in
percentages; votes in normal typeface, seats in italics, ruling party or alliance in boldface. 13
14
Source: Nizam Ahmed, “Bangladesh,” in Dieter Nohlen, Florian Grotz and Christof Hartmann (eds), Elections in Asia 15
and the Pacific: A Data Handbook, vol. 1, Middle East, Central Asia, and South Asia (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2001), 515–52; Nizam Ahmed and Sheikh Z. Ahmad, “The parliamentary elections in Bangladesh, October 16
2001,” Electoral Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2003), pp. 503–509 17
18
19
nationalizing the major newspapers and, the leader by the end of the 1970s. Democrat- 20
next month, amending the Constitution to ization measures reflected this change, as 21
make himself head of a presidential system of indicated in Figure 7.1. 22
government. He then abolished all political Unrest continued to infest the military, 23
parties in favor of a new one of his own and in however,resulting in Zia’s assassination in May 24
effect declared the country his personal 1981. His vice president, Abdus Sattar, suc- 25
fiefdom.In democratization terms,Bangladesh ceeded him in office and then won a mandate 26
took a rapid downward tumble, as is reflected on his own in a presidential election held in 27
in the Freedom House scores for political November of the same year. But his victory 28
rights and civil liberties (see Figure 7.1). proved to be short-lived, as a new general, 29
Reaction was not long in coming,and,in mid- Hussain Muhammad Ershad, seized power in 30
August 1975, a group of army officers a bloodless coup the following March. 31
organized a coup in which Mujib and most of Like Zia before him, Ershad launched a 32
his family were assassinated. political organization, the Jatiya Party, and in 33
A period of uncertainty followed, replete the spring of 1986 held a parliamentary 34
with coups and countercoups, but within a election.The BNP,now headed by Zia’s widow 35
few months, General Ziaur Rahman (known Khaleda, boycotted the poll, but under the 36
as Zia), who had been a hero in the songram, leadership of Mujib’s daughter, Sheikh Hasina 37
emerged as leader of a military-headed Wajid, the AL, which had been cooperating 38
government. After surviving several coup with the BNP in opposing the Ershad regime, 39
attempts, Zia tried popularizing his rule, broke ranks with it, and decided to contest 40
founding a political party that became the amid cries of betrayal from the BNP side. 41
Bangladesh National Party (BNP), and The ensuing election saw the Jatiya Party win 42
contesting a presidential election in 1978 as a bare majority of the parliamentary seats, but 43
well as a parliamentary election in 1979, both the victory was enough to give a patina of 44
of which he won handily (see Table 7.1).There legitimacy to the Ershad government.The AL 45
were, of course, charges of poll rigging, but took about a quarter of the seats (see Table 7.1), 46
evidence indicates that Zia proved able to but then boycotted the parliament.An addition 47
transform himself into a genuinely popular to the political spectrum this time was the 48
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 OV E R I N ST I T U T I O N A L I Z AT I O N , C O N T E STAT I O N , A N D D E M O C R AT I C D E G R A DAT I O N

1 Mujib Zia Ershad Democratic era

2 2
3
4
4 Combined PR + CL Score
5
6
6
7
8 8
9
10 10

11
12 12
13
14 14
15 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004
16
17 Figure 7.1 Bangladesh Freedom House democracy scores, 1972–2006.
18 Note: PR = Political Rights. CL = Civil Liberties. Each score ranges from 1 (most democratic) to 7 (least democratic).
When combined, the scores thus range from 2 to 14.
19
20
21 fundamentalist Jamaat-i-Islam,which had been “punctuated democracy,” in which more or
22 banned as a collaborationist organization after less free and fair national elections were held,10
23 the civil war but which Ershad allowed to and the print media were essentially free, but a
24 resume. It won only ten seats. virtually total hostility between the two major
25 Despite winning what were essentially parties almost completely debilitated political
26 uncontested presidential and parliamentary life, corroded the bureaucracy, encouraged
27 elections in October 1986 and March 1988 corruption, and fostered criminal behavior to
28 respectively—the AL and BNP boycotted both the point of gangsterism. In democratization
29 campaigns—the Jatiya Party never matured terms, the period began on a highly optimistic
30 into anything more solid. Opposition intensi- note but soon began declining,as is reflected in
31 fied with frequent processions,demonstrations, Figure 7.1. Exploring this pathology will take
32 and hartals (strikes) which at times shut down up the bulk of this chapter, but first it would
33 Dhaka for several days running.9 This drama be appropriate to sum up the condition
34 ebbed and flowed over the Ershad years, rising of the political parties at the outset of the
35 to a crescendo in late 1990,when an expanding democratic era.
36 movement composed of political parties,
37 student groups, professional associations, non-
38 governmental organizations, trade unions and Party ideologies and practical
39 government workers demanded Ershad’s differences
40 resignation. In a scenario reminiscent of
41 Ferdinand Marcos’ ouster in the Philippines In 1972 when it took power, the AL adopted a
42 several years before,Ershad was rebuffed by the somewhat vague ideology centering around the
43 military when he attempted to impose martial “four pillars of mujibbad” noted earlier. It saw
44 law and resigned office on 4 December, 1990. itself as the party spearheading the drive for
45 An interim caretaker government was set independence from Pakistan, placed the
46 up to superintend a new election, which was industry and banks owned by Pakistanis under
47 held in February 1991, ushering in a period of state control, emphasized the Bengali aspect of
48 almost 16 years of what might be called the country’s character rather than its Muslim

101
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dimension, and professed popular sovereignty avenging her father’s murder, convinced that 1
in contrast with the military dictatorships that Zia had a hand in it and that Khaleda was an 2
had dominated Pakistan for most of the time apologist for his complicity. Khaleda saw 3
since Partition in 1947. In addition, largely herself as continuing the legacy left by her hus- 4
because India had offered refuge to its leader- band and duty-bound to oppose the oppor- 5
ship cadres during the 1971 civil war and had tunist megalomania displayed by Sheikh Mujib 6
secured Bangladesh’s independence with its in his later days and (in Khaleda’s eyes) repli- 7
military intervention,the AL looked to India as cated by his daughter when she agreed to 8
an ally rather than as an antagonist.And it was contest the 1986 parliamentary elections allied 9
less friendly toward the US,which had,after all, with Ershad.The two leaders cooperated rarely, 10
sided with Pakistan during the civil war. as in the campaign to oust Ershad in the late 11
For its part, the BNP at its birth in the late 1980s and during the first days after the 1991 12
1970s emphasized the Bangladeshi nationalist election; otherwise they remained implacable 13
aspect of the new country, as opposed to its enemies, continuously “at daggers drawn” in 14
Bengali cultural character. It expressed no the subcontinental English idiom. 15
interest in socialism, neither was it much Lower-level leaders, party loyalists, and 16
concerned with secularism (which meant camp followers in these two top-down 17
essentially the fate of the minority Hindu organizations had successively less ideological 18
population). It was “democratic” in the sense inclination as time went on, working mainly 19
that,like the AL,it demanded elections and was for the rewards of power and patronage. 20
willing to support civil liberties while evincing Neither party showed any inclination toward 21
little enthusiasm for transparency or the rule intraparty democracy, with upward loyalty 22
of law. In contrast with the AL, it looked on being the strongest requirement for participa- 23
India with some hostility but with relative tion in party affairs. 24
favor on the United States. The Jatiya Party and Jamaat-i-Islam both 25
When it came into existence, in 1986, hung on into the new era, but very definitely 26
H.M.Ershad’s Jatiya Party more resembled the in a subordinate role. The Jatiya became a 27
BNP in its ideology, but tried to play the regional enterprise, strong in Rangpur 28
Muslim card slightly more strongly by declar- (Ershad’s home district) and Sylhet but almost 29
ing Islam the state religion (although not pro- non-existent elsewhere, while the Jamaat 30
claiming Bangladesh to be an Islamic state) in managed to establish something of a regional 31
1988.As the fourth party of consequence, the base in the Khulna region. The Jatiya Party, 32
Jamaat-i-Islam projected a very conservative never very strong on ideology in power, 33
Islamic ideology and pro-Pakistan political became even less so in opposition,but uncom- 34
stance when it was allowed to resume opera- promising Islam continued to be the Jamaat’s 35
tions in 1986. principal raison d’être.11 36
By the 1990s,however,differences between 37
the two major parties had largely disappeared 38
in practice,although they continued to surface Launching the democratic era 39
rhetorically as the BNP would accuse the 40
AL of being beholden to India, which would After Ershad’s ouster in December 1990, the 41
be countered with charges that the BNP combined opposition parties agreed on Chief 42
was oppressing Hindus. The real difference Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed as a caretaker 43
between the major parties was not ideological president to preside over a new election, held 44
at all but personal, in the form of the enmity in February 1991. Although the two major 45
between the “two begums”—party leaders parties were extremely close in the popular 46
Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia. Hasina built vote (see Table 7.1), the BNP won 140 of the 47
her life and her party around an obsession with 300 seats at stake,far more than the AL’s 88,but 48
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 OV E R I N ST I T U T I O N A L I Z AT I O N , C O N T E STAT I O N , A N D D E M O C R AT I C D E G R A DAT I O N
1 not enough to form a government,so it pulled
2 the Jamaat (18 seats) into a coalition—a portent
3 of things to come in the next decade.
4 In an initial—although, as it turned out,
5 brief —show of comity, the two major parties
6 agreed to change the constitution to replace
7 the presidential system with a parliamentary
8 model. After that, cooperation broke down,
9 and, by the spring of 1994, a dispute over a by-
10 election precipitated an opposition boycott of
11 parliament and then the obstructionism and
12 paralysis that came to plague the political
13 system thenceforward.The AL and the minor
14 opposition parties initiated demonstrations,
15 processions, and hartals reminiscent of the final
16 months of the Ershad dictatorship, in the hope
17 of bringing about a similar outcome:a collapse
18 of public confidence in the government,
19 desertion of its supporters, and (probably,
20 although this was not articulated) a military
21 decision to intervene and start the political
22 clock again with a new national election.
23 This scenario failed to unfold, but the
24 opposition was not deterred, and the major
25 cities continued to be roiled with strikes and
26 shutdowns. As the five-year lifetime for the
27 incumbent parliament began to reach its end,
28 the AL focused its demands on a caretaker
29 government to supervise the upcoming elec-
30 tions, employing the model established during
31 the interim between the Ershad government’s
32 collapse in December 1990 and the election
33 held the following February.Posturing on both
34 sides precluded any compromise, and an
35 election was held in February 1996 with the
36 opposition boycotting. Voters boycotted as
37 well,with a turnout estimated at 5–10 percent.
38 Although the unopposed BNP won almost all
39 the seats,the outcry at home and abroad proved
40 so strenuous and embarrassing that Khaleda
41 agreed to a neutral caretaker regime, which
42 supervised an election held in June and widely
43 regarded as free and fair.12 In the June election
44 (see Table 7.1), the AL won 146 of the 300
45 seats, as against 116 for the BNP, and it allied
46 with the Jatiya Party (whose leader Ershad was
47 in jail) to form the government.As the AL did
48 in 1991, so too in 1996 the BNP protested the
results as unfair and rigged, but this time the
BNP did not wait as long to launch processions,
demonstrations,and hartals that disrupted social
and economic life throughout the country.13
As the BNP did before it, while in power, now
the AL shut out the opposition from any role
except that of raising trouble in the streets.
In 2001 the AL government came to the end
of its five-year maximum lifetime, and turned
over state power to a new caretaker govern-
ment,now made standard procedure through a
constitutional amendment passed shortly after
the 1996 election. This time the BNP won
substantially (see Table 7.1), taking 64 percent
of the seats and attaining, in combination with
its electoral ally the Jamaat (which won 17 seats
or almost 6 percent) a supermajority sufficient
to amend the constitution over the objections
of the opposition.14 True to form, the AL
claimed fraud, rejecting the results and initially
refusing to take its seats in the new parliament.
Later, party leaders did allow their newly
elected MPs to join the parliament, but soon
returned to the “politics of the streets,” replete
with the same processions, demonstrations,
and hartals that the BNP had deployed against
it previously. The AL continued essentially
the same disruptive behavior right down to
the time the next election was to be held in
January 2007.15
Flouting “the rules of the game” or
following different rules?
One frequently heard during the three
successive democratically elected governments
in 1991–2007 that both ruling party and
opposition conspicuously failed to follow “the
rules of the game”prescribed for a Westminster
political system.16 The party in power totally
excluded the opposition from any role in
politics and used the power of the state, in
particular the police, to harass and undermine
it in every possible way. For its part, the
opposition used every possible means short of
outright insurrection to disrupt normal life, to
provoke the state into retaliating with force.
The political scene—and indeed the economic
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and social scene—was continually interrupted, than those allied with the opposition, for 1
often seemingly without any rules of behavior. they can operate under the protection (and 2
In fact, however, there was in place a very often with the connivance) of the police. 3
definite—but never publicly articulated—set ■ Both major parties (as well as the minor 4
of rules for the political game,well understood parties, to the extent that they are able) 5
by the parties, the police, and general public. endeavor to commandeer organized life in 6
The rules were more or less as follows:17 Bangladesh, politicizing professional asso- 7
ciations, trade unions, and most notori- 8
■ Elections are more or less free and fair. ously the universities. All these sectors 9
Considerable fraud (ballot box stuffing, become colonized by party “panels,”that is, 10
bogus voting, manipulation of voters’ lists, associations affiliated with one party or 11
etc.) occurs, and some parliamentary seats another.On university campuses,gangsters 12
undoubtedly go to the wrong candidate, infiltrate the associations, and gunfights 13
but the overall outcome is legitimate. become common. 14
■ Election winners take all political power, ■ Press freedom exists (with some harass- 15
leaving nothing for the opposition party. ment of journalists), although the print 16
Once in power, the ruling party enjoys a media are weak in investigative journalism, 17
mandate to do essentially whatever it wants fact checking, and the like. A generally 18
over the next five years, which generally unrecognized factor in freedom for the 19
means fostering corruption, skimming print media is their small circulation 20
foreign aid, diverting contracts to relatives, (especially the English language media), 21
and the like.The police become a political which reaches only the elite strata. Radio 22
arm of the ruling party,which uses them to remains a state monopoly, and while there 23
harass the opposition, break up opposition are several independent TV stations, their 24
rallies while protecting its own, and so on. efforts at news have not progressed beyond 25
■ The opposition party claims that the the embryonic stage.Even so,the media do 26
election was rigged and launches an inter- bring into public debate many of the worst 27
mittent five-year campaign of disruption. excesses of government and parties. 28
It boycotts parliament, mobilizes huge ■ An independent higher court system 29
processions, shuts down the major urban gives some protection to political rights 30
areas with hartals, demands that the and civil liberties, though access tends to 31
government resign, and calls for its be restricted to those who can afford to 32
overthrow. But there are distinct limits on lodge complaints with it, and this 33
the agitation. The opposition rants and protection does not extend to the lower 34
raves, but never really mounts the court system, which has continued since 35
barricades or engages in actual insur- colonial times to be part of the executive 36
rectionary activities. Instead, its purpose is branch and is thus subject to direction from 37
to call attention to itself as a viable the law ministry. Still, the safeguards 38
alternative in a system where it has no maintained by the high court and supreme 39
other way to generate publicity. court do provide a significant warning that 40
■ Parties develop extensive networks of limits exist on what the state can do to 41
thugs on call generally known as mastaans, impede or obstruct political participation. 42
who act as enforcers.The mastaans support ■ A new cycle begins with each successive 43
themselves through exacting protection election. The opposition that has been 44
money and “tolls” from merchants and making its case through the cacophonous 45
contractors, under the patronage of their protest of the street will have a reasonably 46
party bosses. Needless to say, mastaans fair chance at the ballot box to oust the 47
identifying with the ruling party do better incumbent regime. After the election, the 48
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1 losing side will replicate the obstructionism like.In many ways,it seemed that the mastaans,
2 exercised by the opposition in the previous as often as not in alliance with the police, had
3 cycle. taken charge of public life.20 On occasion, the
4 state did more than symbolically condemn the
5 These de facto rules of the game were violence. Responding to intense criticism, the
6 observed for the most part through the ruling BNP ordered the army to crack down
7 1991–2007 period, and they gave the political on criminal elements in “Operation Clean
8 system a certain degree of popular legitimacy. Heart,”which lasted from October 2002 to the
9 After a turnout of 55 percent in the 1991 following January. Thousands were rounded
10 national election, the second (i.e., the valid) up, reports of human rights abuses mush-
11 election of 1996 saw 75 percent of the electorate roomed, crime rates went down briefly
12 vote, a figure duplicated almost exactly in the (whether because the perpetrators had been
13 2001 election. Some of the large turnout can arrested or were just lying low for a while was
14 surely be explained by ballot box stuffing, but never clear), the army was given amnesty for
15 most of it appears to reflect a genuine popular any excesses committed, and crime rates
16 interest in political participation.A 2004 survey, shortly resumed their upward climb.The nexus
17 for example, found fully 80 percent of between the mastaans and the politicians was
18 respondents saying they would vote in the next evidently not interrupted for long, if at all.21
19 election.18 But, though they maintained the Violence affected the political sphere
20 system, the rules contained an inherent directly as well. In May 2004 Ahsanullah
21 instability, given the strong incentives for the Master, a prominent Awami League MP, was
22 ruling party to tilt the game in its favor. Indeed, assassinated in broad daylight,followed later the
23 it was just such an attempt on the part of the same month by a bomb attack on the British
24 BNP in the 1996 election that led the AL to high commissioner.The next January, Shah A.
25 resort to its only remaining weapon, a boycott M. S. Kibria, an Awami Leaguer and former
26 of the election,which,in turn,led to instituting finance minister, was assassinated.22 These
27 the caretaker setup.Beginning part way through high-profile incidents apart, numerous lower
28 the BNP’s second term in power,signs began to ranking party operatives were also killed, on
29 appear that the game was unraveling again. both sides.
30 Islamic fundamentalism became wrapped
31 up in the violence also. On 17 August, 2005
32 A metastasizing pathology: The over 400 small bombs went off in 63 of the
33 run-up to 2007 country’s 64 districts within the space of an
34 hour. Carefully planned to minimize harm
35 Within a couple of years of the 2001 election, (only three people were killed) while broad-
36 evidence began to accumulate that the BNP casting the existence of a countrywide net-
37 was again yielding to the temptation to work, the attack seized worldwide attention.23
38 reconfigure the de facto rules to give it an A group calling itself Jamaat ul-Mujahedeen
39 unimpeded route to victory in the next Bangladesh (JMB or Assembly of Holy
40 election,which constitutionally would have to Warriors of Bangladesh) claimed responsibility
41 come by the beginning of 2007. There were in leaflets distributed at the time. Shortly
42 several symptoms of the unfolding pathology.19 afterward, several suicide bombers, apparently
43 To the average citizen, undoubtedly the from the same group, targeted the judiciary,
44 most distressing signs of the deterioration were setting off bombs in courthouses and killing
45 the increase in violence and criminal behavior, perhaps two dozen people.24
46 manifested in extortion (often referred to as Most notoriously, during this time an
47 “tolls”), kidnappings, campus violence, death Islamist militant calling himself Bangla Bhai
48 threats, cinema house fire bombings, and the (Brother of Bengal) set up operations as a local
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H A R RY B L A I R

religious warlord in the countryside near Service of Pakistan members (the “CSP- 1
Rajshahi, imposing dress codes (burqas for wallahs”) who signed on with the indepen- 2
women and beards for men), enforcing daily dence cause in 1971 and became the inner core 3
prayers and Ramadan fasting rules, torturing of the Bangladesh bureaucracy. By the early 4
malingerers,and executing opponents in public 2000s, however, there were few if any 5
displays. Although he gave interviews to bureaucrats left who had not joined (or been 6
journalists,the government claimed alternately forced to join) one side or the other.31 7
that either he did not exist or that he could not The bureaucratic politicization facilitated 8
be located.25 It seemed clear that Bangla Bhai corruption by making it easier for government 9
was getting local police protection, and there officials and political leaders to work together 10
was much speculation that his ideas of justice in siphoning off funds from the public purse. 11
found favor with BNP bosses, who were With the ruling party exercising an uncon- 12
anxious to co-opt any challenge from the trolled (and between elections unaccount- 13
religious right by adding an active Islamic able) access to procurement, regulation of the 14
militant tone to the alliance they had built with economy, and the police power, corrup- 15
the Jamaat from the 2001 election onward.26 tion expanded. Transparency International’s 16
International concern mounted and pressure Corruption Perception Index, when it began 17
grew on the government to rein him in,fanned including Bangladesh annually in 2001,ranked 18
by a feature story in the New York Times the country as globally most corrupt and then 19
Magazine, appearing in January 2005.27 continued it in last place for five years 20
Over a year later, in March 2006, the running—an unparalleled achievement during 21
government finally moved in to arrest him and the Index’s lifetime. Finally, in 2006, the Index 22
other militant leaders, claiming a major “graduated”Bangladesh to the third place from 23
triumph for an act that could easily have taken last out of 163.32 The World Bank’s Governance 24
place a year or two sooner.28 Violence did Matters report for 2007 gave Bangladesh a 25
diminish after the crackdown,but few believed slightly more generous ranking among the 26
that Islamist militancy had withered away. more than 200 countries ranked—a berth in 27
Rather, the speculation was that the move- the 4.9 percentile—but its rating system 28
ment’s members were lying low, hoping that a showed the country declining more or less 29
BNP return to power after the 2007 elections steadily from the 35th percentile in 1996 to its 30
would free their leaders.29 4.9 rating in 2006.33 31
Less dramatic but likely portending a Along with the bureaucracy’s politicization 32
more profound long-term impact, madrasahs came a similar calamity within the NGO 33
expanded rapidly in Bangladesh during the first community—actually a greater tragedy, in a 34
part of the present decade, growing with state sense,because the NGOs had maintained their 35
support by 22 percent between 2001 and 2005, neutrality more or less untainted by politics for 36
as against a 10 percent growth in state schools much longer.With few exceptions, the NGO 37
over the same period.30 But it was widely sector had retreated from politics after some 38
believed that most of the support for them unhappy experiments in the flush of new 39
came not from the public budget but from the independence in the 1970s to an almost 40
Persian Gulf, in particular from Saudi Arabia, exclusively service delivery mode for the 1980s 41
which was also thought to be bankrolling the and 1990s. There were exceptions. On two 42
Jamaat and perhaps even JMB and Bangla Bhai. occasions in particular, the sector had entered 43
Politicization of the bureaucracy proceeded the political arena through its apex organ- 44
apace.Whereas earlier some officers had sided ization, the Association of Development 45
with one party or another, there were signifi- Agencies in Bangladesh (ADAB),once in 1990 46
cant numbers who remained neutral, still to join the movement to oust the Ershad 47
adhering to the esprit de corps of the Civil regime and then again in 1996 to protest the 48
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1 bogus election in February of that year.34
2 Otherwise,it had stayed clear,working its own
3 terrain quite successfully.
4 In 2003, however, the second largest NGO
5 in Bangladesh, Proshika, was accused by the
6 BNP government of having embarked on an
7 outright political campaign on behalf of the
8 AL. Many in the NGO sector thought the
9 charges were in significant degree (if by no
10 means completely) true, and left ADAB (of
11 which Proshika’s president had then assumed
12 the presidency by rotation) under the
13 leadership of BRAC (the largest single NGO
14 in the country) to form a new apex body, now
15 called the Federation of NGOs in Bangladesh
16 (FNB). Inasmuch as Proshika and ADAB were
17 perceived to be pro-AL,the new FNB came to
18 be seen by many as a BNP front. The NGO
19 sector’s neutrality (and not a little of its
20 legitimacy, which had remained very high as
21 long as it refrained from politics) had been
22 lost.35 With the politicization of the NGOs, it
23 seemed that there was no sector of public life
24 that had not been sucked into the maelstrom
25 of the parties.
26 The mechanics of elections also came to
27 be perceived as badly compromised. In early
28 May 2004, the BNP, relying on the help of
29 the Jamaat-i-Islam for a two-thirds parlia-
30 mentary majority, passed the 14th Amend-
31 ment to the Constitution, which specified
32 inter alia that the mandatory retirement age
33 for the chief justice of the supreme court
34 would be extended from 65 to 67 years of
35 age. This seemingly innocuous change had
36 huge implications for the next national
37 election, for the 13th Amendment passed
38 after the 1996 election had declared that
39 the Chief Adviser (i.e., administrator) of a
40 caretaker government superintending the
41 hiatus between parliaments would be the
42 most recently retired chief justice. Advanc-
43 ing the retirement age meant that by the
44 time of the 2007 election, the incumbent
45 chief justice would not have retired and so
46 his predecessor, widely recognized as a
47 BNP partisan, would take over the chief
48 advisor post and be in a position to condone
electoral malpractice,if not actually manipulate
it himself.
A second source of concern with elec-
tion mechanics arose in May 2006 with
the appointment of the Chief Election
Commissioner. The BNP government’s
appointee and his deputies were generally
believed to be BNP sympathizers, and the
election commission was soon charged
with padding the voters’ rolls by adding
millions of bogus names.36 In addition, the
government was alleged to have stacked
the election deck through secondments of
pro-BNP officers to supervise the elections
themselves.37
When the time came in October 2006
for the BNP government to step down and
turn over charge to a caretaker administra-
tion until the January 2007 election, the
AL raised a storm of opposition to retired
Chief Justice K. M. Hasan’s becoming Chief
Adviser. Bowing to the pressure, Hasan
withdrew, and after some jockeying President
Iajuddin Ahmed appointed himself to the
post. Agitation then shifted to the election
commission, and after a month the President
(and now chief advisor) announced that the
chief election commissioner would go on leave
until after the election, which was to be held
on 22 January, 2007.
Along with these manoeuvers, the protests,
demonstrations and counterdemonstrations
continued, with the AL playing its last card,
announcing that it would boycott the election
and organize a “siege program” against the
government, at which point three-fifths of the
parliamentary candidates withdrew their
candidacies.38 In early January, matters were
clearly building toward a crisis, and the donor
community made strenuous representations to
the caretaker government concerning the
dangers of an uncontested election and a
breakdown of the polity. The American
Embassy and British High Commission, along
with the European Union issued strong
statements, the American ambassador pro-
nounced a one-sided election unacceptable,
and international election-monitoring bodies
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H A R RY B L A I R

declared they would not act as observers for a government to back down, and the “two 1
flawed poll.39 begums” were not banned, although open 2
Then,on 11 January,three things happened. politicking was not allowed to resume. 3
Envoys from the United States, United Elections were postponed indefinitely, and 4
Kingdom, Japan, the European Commission, eventually the government declared they 5
Canada and Australia all held closed-door would be held in December 2008,holding that 6
meetings with both the AL and BNP alliances. it would take that long to establish a new 7
The United Nations resident coordinator voters’ registration system based on ID cards. 8
announced that Bangladesh participation in In February, Mohammed Yunus, founder– 9
future UN peacekeeping operations could be director of the world-renowned Grameen 10
jeopardized if the military supported a one- Bank and 2006 winner of the Nobel Peace 11
sided election.40 And President Iajuddin Prize,publicly floated the idea of starting a new 12
Ahmed declared a state of emergency while political party, but finding support lukewarm, 13
at the same time announcing that he was he had dropped the project by May.45 Bangla 14
resigning his position as chief adviser to the Bhai was convicted and executed in April, 15
caretaker government.41 The next day, more than a year after his arrest, and Islamist 16
Fakhruddin Ahmed, a former governor of the militancy appeared to have taken a holiday for 17
Bangladesh central bank, took office as chief the duration of the caretaker regime, at least 18
adviser to the caretaker government. for its first several months. General Moeen U. 19
Within a few days,it became widely known Ahmed, the army chief of staff, declared on 20
that the military had masterminded the sudden numerous occasions his intent to return the 21
change,42 with the UN letter (or at least the country to democratically elected civilian 22
sentiments behind it) thought to be a major rule, yet he also mused publicly about the 23
precipitating factor. Bangladesh had for some need for Bangladesh to have its “own brand 24
years been a major supplier of UN peace- of democracy.”46 But, as the months wore 25
keeping troops; in January 2007, the country on, popular speculation increased about the 26
had about 9,000 on UN duty, roughly 8 likelihood of the Bangladesh military follow- 27
percent of active duty army strength.43 The ing the example of General Musharraf in 28
special pay and allowances the military received Pakistan, who was by the summer of 2007 29
for its UN tasks had come to form a major part in his eighth year of power. 30
of its perquisites and would have been difficult 31
indeed to give up.44 32
The military-backed caretaker regime shut Discussion 33
down public political party activity and 34
arrested leading politicians from the major The management of the polity in Bangladesh 35
parties with accusations of various criminal has gone through several distinct phases.47 36
activities, but it steered clear of declaring The first phase, illustrated in Figure 7.2, lasted 37
martial law and allowed fairly open press a full 19 years, from Independence in 38
freedom (although the press appeared to avoid December 1971 until the ouster of the Ershad 39
any direct criticism of the military, perhaps dictatorship in December 1990. The 40
practicing a degree of self-censorship).At one bureaucracy, led by the “CSP-wallahs” carried 41
point the caretaker government moved to exile over from the Civil Service of Pakistan,formed 42
Khaleda Zia and prevent Sheikh Hasina’s the centerpiece, operating in a partnership 43
return from abroad,replicating,in effect,Pervez with either the ruling party elite or the 44
Musharraf ’s actions against Pakistan’s two military.The “either . . . or” term is key here, 45
feuding ex-prime ministers, Benazir Bhutto for the bureaucracy had only one partner at a 46
and Nawaz Sharif, but a combination of time.Initially,it was the Mujib regime and then 47
domestic and international pressure led the most of the time thereafter the military,though 48
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1 part way into the Zia era, the BNP basically major parties began to strain the political
2 displaced it as Zia transformed his authori- system, however, especially after 2001, the
3 tarian rule into a more popular one. Ershad picture changed, as shown in Figure 7.3.The
4 attempted the same kind of transformation political class had subordinated the bureaucracy
5 with his Jatiya Party,but never succeeded.Over by dividing it into factions allied to the main
6 the whole period, the bureaucracy remained parties, and it had begun to make similar
7 at the center: strategic policy decisions might inroads into the hitherto neutral NGO
8 be made by the political or military managers, community.The military continued to remain
9 but owing to its experience at operating the outside the political sphere, enjoying a
10 state’s machinery, the bureaucracy was critical gradually rising budget along with the per-
11 and at times the dominant partner in the quisites and monetary rewards of being among
12 management of state affairs.As for the NGOs, the top two or three providers of UN peace-
13 although a number of them got their start with keeping forces.
14 social change agendas in the early 1970s, In 2007, the picture changed to that
15 within a few years they had largely concluded depicted in Figure 7.4. After the emergency
16 that trying to introduce fundamental change proclaimed in January, the military formed the
17 into the socioeconomic structure was too caretaker government and provided broad
18 difficult and so reverted to a neutral service policy instructions to it (although presumably
19 delivery role. allowing it considerable latitude). In turn,
20 Essentially the same pattern prevailed at the the caretaker government directed the bureau-
21 outset of the democratic era in 1991,now with cracy while totally sidelining the political class.
22 the political class and the bureaucracy aligned. Relations between the military/caretaker
23 The military stayed out of the picture, even government and the NGO sector remained
24 during the critical period of the first 1996 uncertain.
25 election, when most elements of civil society Ultimately, the military followed through
26 (including the major NGOs) did involve on its repeated promises to turn over charge to
27 themselves. As the enmity between the two a democratically elected government by the
28
29
30
Military Bureaucracy Political class NGOs
31
32
33 Figure 7.2 Bureaucracy + one ally, NGOs outside, 1972–1991
34
35
Military
36
37 Instructing
38
Caretaker
39 government
Directing Influencing?
40 Military Political class
41 ? Manipulating?
Sidelining
42 Bureaucracy NGOs
43
Bureaucracy
44
45 NGOs Political class
46
47 Figure 7.3 Military distracted, bureaucracy Figure 7.4 Military in charge, others subordinated,
48 subordinated, NGOs likewise?, early 2000s 2007

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H A R RY B L A I R

end of 2008.It did not succumb to a temptation their profits to the military.52 Beyond that, 1
to follow the Musharraf route and find ways to Pakistan has become the beneficiary of an 2
hang onto power,even long past any semblance immense US government largesse in the post 3
of popular support.48 At least three factors 9/11 era, to the extent of some US$ 10 billion 4
would seem to have argued against long-term by the beginning of 2007.The likelihood is that 5
military control of the polity, two of them acts this generosity will continue for some time to 6
of the regime and the third a long-term pattern. come,given American dependence on Pakistan 7
First, the caretaker government committed in connection with its ongoing operations 8
itself to separating the judicial from the in neighboring Afghanistan.53 In short, the 9
executive branch. In India, the two functions Bangladesh military has nothing like the vested 10
have long been separated, but Bangladesh interest in maintaining control of the political 11
followed the path it had inherited from Pakistan system to feed its own demands that exists in 12
and, before it, Britain, in that it maintained the Pakistan. 13
lower judiciary49 under the executive branch 14
through the law ministry. Although the 15
The developmental paradox
constitution specified a separation for the entire 16
judiciary, and the supreme court had required In spite of corruption, unaccountability, and 17
it, successive governments had found it ex- frequent disruptions caused by the many 18
pedient to maintain control over the lower hartals, Bangladesh enjoyed a long period of 19
branches.50 In May 2007 the Supreme Court economic growth during the years after the 20
again required a separation, but this time the democratic restoration in 1991, especially in 21
caretaker government appeared to take the agriculture, which still absorbs roughly half the 22
order seriously, and in November 2007 the active labor force. In marked contrast with the 23
caretaker government did, in fact, order the country’s earlier years, when it was often 24
lower judiciary separated.51 referred to in terms of Henry Kissinger’s 25
Second, the caretaker regime launched the reported “international basket case” remark, 26
massive process of establishing a totally new Bangladesh began to do quite well econo- 27
voter registration system with individual mically. Over the period since 1990, foodgrain 28
ID cards, a move that indicated a degree of production grew significantly,rising from about 29
seriousness not exhibited by any previous 18–19 million tons to more than 28 million 30
government. tons in 2006–07.In the process,food availability 31
Third, the military has nothing like the per capita rose from about 0.46 kg/day to at 32
cosseted status enjoyed by Pakistan’s defense least 0.55 kg by the middle of the present 33
establishment over the years—a privileged decade. In consequence, foodgrain prices 34
position the military there would go to serious dropped in Bangladesh as elsewhere in the 35
lengths to protect.Bangladesh’s military has had world over this time. Meanwhile, growing off- 36
budgetary support rising at the same level as farm economic activity in sectors like trans- 37
GNP during the present decade, similar to the portation, construction, retailing, and small 38
pattern in Pakistan. But this has meant about enterprises generally were exerting an upward 39
1.4 percent of the gross domestic product pressure on wages. Between the late 1980s and 40
while Pakistan’s military was being allotted 3.5 2000, the proportion of rural workers whose 41
percent—about two-and-a-half times as primary occupation was in agriculture dropped 42
much—and Pakistan’s GDP in 2006 was from 66 percent to less than 48 percent, while 43
roughly twice that of Bangladesh, so the mili- those working mainly outside agriculture rose 44
tary rested on a much larger base. In addition, from 34 percent to 52 percent—a quite 45
there is the huge economic enterprise that remarkable shift. Not surprisingly, agricultural 46
Pakistan’s military has built up, consisting of wages (generally the baseline measure of rural 47
industries,banks and businesses,all funneling in welfare for the bottom strata) rose, and the 48
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1 terms of rental for agricultural land moved in
2 favor of the tenant/sharecropper.54
3 A good part of the explanation for these
4 favorable trends has to be accounted for by
5 food policy reforms adopted in the late 1980s
6 and continued in the early 1990s, including
7 privatizing inputs like tubewells and fertilizers,
8 allowing international foodgrain trading,
9 investing in infrastructure (especially trans-
10 portation), paring back subsidies in the food
11 sector,and supporting microcredit institutions.
12 Donor pressure, reinforced by decreasing
13 foreign aid helped induce the state to take up
14 these reforms,many of which were elements of
15 the “Washington Consensus” then in vogue in
16 the international development community.But
17 the reforms also found a ready partner in the
18 BNP and Awami League governments in
19 power. For, during this time, the state increased
20 its own revenue by about the same level that
21 had been lost in foreign aid—roughly 2 percent
22 of GDP.55 In other words, the state could have
23 afforded to continue with its subsidies but chose
24 instead to undertake a reform path.
25 While all these economic trends were
26 unfolding, Bangladesh became something of a
27 poster child in family planning circles as its
28 crude birth rate dropped by about one-third.
29 Total fertility rate, which had earlier dropped
30 from an estimated 6.3 in the mid-1970s to 5.1
31 by the end of the 1980s, continued to decrease
32 in the 1990s to 3.3 by 2000—still well above
33 replacement level (a rate of 2.2), but showing
34 substantial advancement along the demo-
35 graphic transition.Much of the explanation for
36 such progress lies in the changing economics
37 of household management, as the benefits of
38 child labor declined in an increasingly non-
39 agricultural economy while the costs of
40 childrearing increased. But state commitment
41 to family planning had to play a strong role.56
42 In addition, child mortality decreased and
43 primary education increased.
44 As the decade wore on, the Bangladesh
45 economic boom began to unravel. Fertilizer
46 shortages began to appear, and rice prices
47 began to creep upward. The poverty rate,
48 which had decreased from 68 percent to 44
percent between 1988 and 2004, had returned
to 55 percent by 2008.57 Still, the good times
had a long run before beginning to sag.
How could all these beneficial develop-
ments have happened with such misgover-
nance at the helm of the polity, where almost
every measure of good governance in the
World Bank’s reckoning ranked among the
world’s lowest?58 A large, energetic, and effec-
tive NGO sector working in agricultural
extension, education, health, and microcredit
can explain a good part of the country’s success
here,59 but there is more than a smattering
of paradox.At the least one is moved to ponder
whether good governance in the sense of
accountable democratic management of the
state’s business is necessary in the short or even
middle run.
Conclusion
Bangladesh has had several chances to develop
a viable political party system since achieving
its independence in 1971. So far, the country’s
political leaders have squandered them all in
their obsession to demolish opposition parties
and sequester all the spoils of office for
themselves. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman turned
1971’s promise of a democratic Sonar Bangla60
into a one-party dictatorship in 1975. The
BNP’s blatantly rigged February 1996 election
virtually ended the democratic experiment of
1991 before rescue came in the form of the
caretaker government scheme.And the BNP’s
attempts at rigging the 2007 election led in the
end to the military-supported emergency
declared in January of that year.
Can a genuine multiparty system ever take
hold in Bangladesh? Can the perverse and
degraded “rules of the game”that guided poli-
tics from 1991 to 2007 be replaced by some-
thing approximating a genuine Westminster
model? Perhaps the 18-month emergency rule
that ended with elections in December 2008
can begin seriously to separate the mastaans
from the parties and from the police, depoli-
ticize the bureaucracy and the NGO sector,
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H A R RY B L A I R

curb corruption, and defuse the militant the 1980s (and the Canadian Conservatives did 1
Islamist threat. The multitude of tasks seems after being reduced to two seats in the country’s 2
overwhelming, but even to achieve significant 1992 elections), or whether it would return to 3
success in just a couple of these spheres might the politics of disruption and obstruction as had 4
be sufficient to set a “virtuous cycle” into been the norm for losing parties over the 5
motion. If so, a country that has managed to previous 18 years.To say that the better part of 6
attain a very respectable rate of economic Bangladesh’s political future rides on the BNP’s 7
growth under severe malgovernance in recent decision would not be an overstatement. 8
years might well become a real development 9
success story. 10
Notes 11
12
Postscript 1 This chapter is based largely on my own 13
experience of some 20 visits to Bangladesh 14
beginning in April 1973, with the most
In December 2008 the Caretaker Government 15
recent ending in June 2004. My work there
made good on its promise to hold a national as an academic and a consultant has 16
election, which took place on the 29th of the been sponsored by Cornell University, the 17
month. Amid intense international atten- Department for International Development 18
tion and under the scrutiny of a large deployment (UK), the Ford Foundation, the Social Science 19
of foreign and domestic monitors (the author Research Council, the Swedish International 20
served as a member of the National Democratic Development Authority, the United States 21
Institute’s team), a peaceful and orderly election Agency for International Development,and the 22
transpired.Some 70.5 million voters went to the World Bank, to all of which I am most grateful. 23
I would also like to thank C. Christine Fair
polls (87 percent of those registered, a record 24
of RAND and Nawreen Sattar of Yale for
turnout).The results surprised virtually everyone, comments. None of these organizations or
25
not least the political parties themselves. The individuals bears any responsibility for the 26
Awami League captured fully 49.0 percent of the interpretations and views expressed here,which 27
vote,translating into 230 seats or 76.7 percent of are my own. 28
the total—the largest majority since Sheikh 2 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy:Toward 29
Mujib’s victory in 1973 just after independence. Consolidation (Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins 30
The BNP won only 32.7 percent of the vote, University Press, 1999), pp. 96–97, referencing 31
giving it 29 seats or 9.7 percent. Michael Coppedge, Strong Parties and Lame 32
The BNP’s loss was so stunning—“tsunami” Ducks: Presidential Partyarchy and Factionalism 33
in Venezuela (Stanford, CA: University Press,
was the word most frequently used to describe 34
1994).
it—and the verdict of the monitors so uniform 3 “Electoral democracies” refer to countries that 35
as to the election’s fairness that the party lodged do have regular elections with real competition, 36
only minor claims of fraud and rigging,turning but fall far short when it comes to other critical 37
quickly to a mode of self-reflection on how to components of democracy such as civil 38
regroup and reposition itself. A row soon liberties, guaranteed minority rights, and the 39
developed over seating in the new parliament like. “Liberal democracy” requires an absence 40
and the BNP began boycotting, but the efforts of unaccountable actors (especially the military) 41
seemed only half-hearted as the party licked its and the presence of horizontal accountability 42
between major actors (e.g., executive and
wounds. At the end of February 2009, two 43
legislature), extensive provisions establishing
months after the election, it was not clear pluralism, and perhaps most importantly the
44
whether the BNP would use its time in the “rule of law” guaranteeing political rights and 45
political wilderness to refashion itself as the civil liberties through an independent judiciary. 46
British Labour Party did after its successive See Diamond, Developing Democracy, for an 47
drubbings at the hands of Margaret Thatcher in extensive analysis; also Larry Diamond, 48
112
 OV E R I N ST I T U T I O N A L I Z AT I O N , C O N T E STAT I O N , A N D D E M O C R AT I C D E G R A DAT I O N
1 “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes: Elections
2 without Democracy,” Journal of Democracy,
3 Vol. 13, No. 2 (2002), pp. 21–35. “Democratic
4 consolidation” can be said to obtain when all
significant actors in a political system—winners
5
and losers—accept democracy as “the only
6 game in town” (see Juan J. Linz and Alfred
7 Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and
8 Consolidation:Southern Europe,South America,and
9 Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MA: Johns
10 Hopkins University Press, 1996), pp. 5–6). On
11 the incompleteness of democracy, in addition
12 to Diamond’s works just cited, see for instance
13 Guillermo O’Donnell, “The Perpetual Crises
of Democracy,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18,
14
No. 1 (2007), pp. 5–11.
15 4 See Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave:
16 Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century
17 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press,
18 1991), pp. 266ff.
19 5 The first time came after Sheikh Mujibur
20 Rahman’s assassination in 1975; the second
21 occurred with the coup that brought General
22 Hussein Muhammad Ershad to power in 1982.
23 6 There are many accounts of this period.Three
very good ones are Craig Baxter, Bangladesh:
24
From a Nation to a State (Boulder,CO:Westview
25 Press, 1997); Lawrence Ziring, Bangladesh from
26 Mujib to Ershad: An Interpretive Study (Dhaka:
27 University Press Limited, 1992); and Talukder
28 Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and
29 Its Aftermath, 2nd edn (Dhaka: University Press
30 Limited, 1988). Except where noted, most of
31 this section on the 1971–90 period has been
32 taken from these three sources.
7 For an analysis of the two sequences, the first
33
leading to a change in Pakistan’s government
34 and the second to the disintegration of Pakistan
35 itself, see Harry Blair,“Sheikh Mujib and Déjà
36 vu in East Bengal:The Tragedies of 25 March,”
37 Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 6, No. 52
38 (1971), pp. 2,555–62.
39 8 In contrast with West Pakistan and its four
40 provinces, East Pakistan consisted solely of the
41 province of East Bengal,so the two designations
42 were used interchangeably.
9 On hartals and their political uses, see
43
M. Rashiduzzaman, “Political Unrest and
44 Democracy in Bangladesh,” Asian Survey,
45 Vol. 37, No. 3 (1997), pp. 254–68.
46 10 With one very notable but ultimately redeemed
47 exception, the national election of February
48 1996, about which more later on.
11 On the place of Islamic parties in Bangladesh,
see Ali Riaz,“Islamist Parties and Democracy in
Bangladesh,”paper prepared for annual meeting
of the American Political Science Association,
Chicago, 30 August–2 September, 2007.
12 For an account of the two 1996 elections, see
Zillur R. Khan, “Bangladesh’s Experiments
with Parliamentary Democracy,” Asian Survey,
Vol. 37, No. 6 (1997), pp. 575–89; also Stanley
Kochanek,“Bangladesh in 1996:The 25th Year
of Independence,” Asian Survey,Vol. 37, No. 2
(1997), pp. 136–42.
13 See Rashiduzzaman,“Political Unrest,” on the
quick resumption of hartal s after the 1996
election.
14 In return for joining the ruling alliance, the
Jamaat received two important portfolios,
agriculture and social welfare. In the election
itself, the BNP won only 2 percent more of the
popular vote than the AL,as shown in Table 7.1.
15 The saga can be tracked most easily in Asian
Survey’s annual recap of Bangladesh politics
published in its first issue each year, e.g.,
M. Rashiduzzaman,“Bangladesh in 2001:The
Election and a New Political Reality?” Asian
Survey, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2002), pp. 183– 91, and
Rounaq Jahan, “Bangladesh in 2003: Vibrant
Democracy or Destructive Politics,” Asian
Survey, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2004), pp. 56–61.
16 See, e.g., N. Ahmed and Sheikh Z. Ahmad,
“The Parliamentary Elections in Bangladesh,
October 2001,” Electoral Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3
(4 September, 2003), pp. 503–509.
17 This account of the “rules” is based largely on
Harry Blair, Robert Charlick, Rezaul Haque,
Manzoor Hasan and Nazmul Lalimullah,
“Democracy and Governance:Strategic Assess-
ment of Bangladesh,” report for USAID,
Bangladesh (Burlington, VT: ARD, Inc.,
October 2004). But see also Rehman Sobhan,
“Structural Dimensions of Malgovernance in
Bangladesh,” Economic and Political Weekly,
39 (4 September, 2004), pp. 4,101–08.
18 See Associates in Rural Development,
“Bangladesh: Knowledge, Attitudes and
Practices:National Survey Covering Democracy
and Governance Issues” (Burlington, VT:
ARD, Inc., for USAID/Bangladesh, 2004).
19 There have been several insightful overviews
of the decline. See, inter alia, Mohammad
Mohabbat Khan, “State of Governance in
Bangladesh,” The Round Table, 370 (July 2003),
pp. 391–405; Rehman Sobhan, “Structural
113
H A R RY B L A I R

Dimensions of Malgovernance”;also Moazzem 29 After his arrest in March 2006, the BNP 1
Hossain, “Bangladesh: ‘Home-Grown’ government did not press a legal prosecution 2
Democracy,” Economic and Political Weekly, 41 up to the time of its leaving office in October. 3
(2006), pp. 791–93. The account given in the 30 See Rejaul Karim Byron and Shameen 4
present essay is based in large measure on Blair Mahmud, “Madrassas Mushroom with State 5
et al., “Democracy and Governance: Strategic Favour,” Daily Star (Dhaka), 4 August, 2005.
Assessment of Bangladesh.” 6
31 For an assessment of trends in relations between
20 At times the police substituted for the mastaans. politicians and bureaucrats since 1971, see
7
One account of the Eid season in 2005 reported Ahmed Shafiqul Huque and M. Taiabur 8
that a heavy presence of uniformed police to Rahman, “From Domination to Alliance: 9
keep order during Eid had displaced the usual Shifting Strategies and Accumulation of Power 10
extortionists from retail business establishments by the Bureaucracy of Bangladesh,” Public 11
in Dhaka but had filled in the gap by charging Organization Review:A Global Journal, 3 (2003), 12
their own “tolls” on the vendors. See Shaheem pp. 403–18. 13
Mollah,“Cops in Extortionists’Role on Streets: 32 There were many ties at the bottom of the scale, 14
Regular Thugs Stay Away in Fear of Rab,” so that Bangladesh actually shared the third
Daily Star (Dhaka), 1 November, 2005.
15
from bottom rank with three other countries 16
21 For a perceptive analysis of the linkages between in 2006. Burma, Guinea, and Iraq tied for next
mastaans and politics in rural Bangladesh,see Joe 17
to bottom,and Haiti rested by itself in last place.
Devine, “Wellbeing, Democracy and Political 18
See Transparency International “Corruption
Violence in Bangladesh,” paper for the 57th Perceptions Index 2006,” annual publication 19
Political Studies Association Annual Conference, available at http://www.transparency.org. For 20
University of Bath, UK, 11–13 April, 2007. further details, see the chapter by Kochanek in 21
22 Despite rhetorical demands from the prime 22
this volume.
minister to find the culprits, no one was ever 23
33 See Daniel Kaufmann,Aart Kraay,and Massimo
apprehended.
Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VI:Aggregate and 24
23 See, for instance, Associated Press, “Concerted
Individual Governance Indicators 1996–2006, 25
Bombs Hit 100 Bangladesh Sites,” New York
World Bank Policy Research Paper 4280 26
Times, 18 August, 2005; Nora Boustany,
(Washington:World Bank, July 2007).Actually, 27
“Bombings Force Bangladesh Envoy Home,”
Bangladesh had fallen to the 4.9th percentile 28
Washington Post, 19 August, 2005; and Raekha
in 2004, then showed an uptick to 7.8 in
Prasad, “Cities Shaken by 350 Co-ordinated 29
Attacks,” The Times (London), 18 August, 2005. 2005 before settling back to the 4.9 level in
30
24 See David Montero and Somini Sengupta, 2006.
34 The NGO sector had also involved itself in 31
“Bangladesh Blast Kills 1 and Hurts 100: 3rd 32
Attack in Days on Legal System,” New York political decision making during the Ershad
regime when the latter sought to establish 33
Times, 2 December, 2005; also Rounaq Jahan,
“Bangladesh in 2005:Standing at a Crossroads,” control over the sector in the mid-1980s. And 34
Asian Survey,Vol. 46, No. 1 (2006), pp. 107–13. there were at least a couple of prominent NGOs 35
25 See the several accounts in the Dhaka Daily Star that did become involved in local level politics 36
at the time of his capture http://www.the quite explicitly, viz., Gonoshahajjo Sangstha, 37
dailystar.net/2006/03/07/d6030701011.htm which sponsored specific candidates in local 38
(accessed 10 August, 2007). elections, and Nijera Kori, which explicitly 39
26 For a detailed account of the machinations pursued advocacy for social change at village 40
apparently involved, see International Crisis level. On the latter prospect, see Harry Blair,
41
Group, “Bangladesh Today,” Asia Report No. “Civil Society and Pro-poor Initiatives at the
42
121 (Brussels: ICG, 23 October, 2006). Local Level in Bangladesh: Finding a Workable
Strategy,” World Development, Vol. 33, No. 6
43
27 See Eliza Griswold, “The Next Islamist
Revolution?” New York Times Magazine, (2005), pp. 921–36. 44
23 January, 2005. 35 Data from interviews. See also World Bank, 45
28 Julfikar Ali Manik and Shamim Ashraf,“Tyrant “Bangladesh Economics and Governance 46
Bangla Bhai Finally Captured,” Daily Star of Nongovernmental Organizations in 47
(Dhaka), 7 March, 2006. Bangladesh,” Report No. 35861-BD 48
114
 OV E R I N ST I T U T I O N A L I Z AT I O N , C O N T E STAT I O N , A N D D E M O C R AT I C D E G R A DAT I O N

1 (Washington:World Bank, 16 April, 2006); and 40 The resident coordinator’s letter came in the
2 S. M. Nurul Alam, “Whose Public Action? form of a press release, so it attained maximum
3 Analyzing Inter-sectoral Collaboration for publicity. See Renata Lok Dessallien, “Press
4 Service Delivery” (Dhaka: International Statement by UN Resident Coordinator, Ms
Development Department, 2007). Renata Lok Dessallien, Dhaka,” Media release
5
36 The voters’ list prepared in 2006 contained (Dhaka:Office of the United Nations Resident
6
about 10 million more names than demo- Coordinator in Bangladesh, 11 January, 2007).
7 graphic estimates based on the last census could 41 The two daily newspapers Daily Star and
8 support, according to a pre-election assessment New Age provided detailed coverage of
9 team preparing for international monitoring, the tumultuous period during early January as
10 headed by ex-US senator Thomas Daschle and these various threads were unfolding. See web
11 sponsored by the National Democratic Institute page archives at www.thedailystar.net and
12 (see National Democratic Institute,“Report of www.newagebd.com.A good summary of the
13 the National Democratic Institute (NDI) pre- international pressure can be found in Nazrul
14 election delegation to Bangladesh’s 2006/07 Islam, “Military Role May Bear on Dhaka’s
15 Parliamentary Elections” (Dhaka: NDI, 11 Peacekeeping,” New Age (Dhaka), 12 January,
16 September,2006),p.6. Also International Crisis 2007.
Group, “Bangladesh Today;” and Karim and 42 See Jo Johnson’s articles in the Financial Times
17
Fair, “Bangladesh at the Crossroads.” The (London), on 15 and 17 January, 2007: “Ex-
18
Election Commission ignored High Court bank chief heads Bangladesh government,” and
19 rulings to remedy the inaccuracies.See Pavithra “Bangladesh generals plan anti-corruption
20 Banavar and Nicholas Howenstein,“The Future drive:The military leaders now controlling the
21 of Democracy in Bangladesh,” USIPeace government in Dhaka want to cleanse the
22 Briefing (Washington: United States Institute political system.”The Bangladesh press did not
23 of Peace, March 2007). note any army involvement with the emer-
24 37 As in other South Asian countries, the state gency until some days later, although it was
25 posts (“seconds”) large numbers of government surely understood.
26 servants temporarily to conduct elections as 43 Data from UN Department of Peacekeeping
27 returning officers, ballot counters, security Operations.See United Nations,“Contributions
28 guards, etc. For the 2001 election, the Awami to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,
League as ruling party was generally believed as of 31 January, 2007.” The Bangladesh con-
29
to have attempted the same approach, moving tingent amounted to about one-eighth of all
30
a party sympathizer into the presidency and UN troops on peacekeeping service in January
31 2007.Total army size from International Institute
chief adviser positions, as well as posting its
32 bureaucratic favorites into slots where they for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 107
33 could supervise the polling and ballot counting. (London: IISS, January 2007).
34 These efforts notwithstanding,however,the AL 44 There is some question about how serious the
35 lost the election, and proceeded to claim that it UN would have been about cutting back or
36 had been rigged. eliminating Bangladesh as a peacekeeper.
37 38 Daily Star (Dhaka), 4 January, 2007 (several After all, Pervez Musharraf ’s 1999 coup and
38 stories).Some 2,370 out of 3,935 parliamentary establishment of a dictatorship did not lead
39 candidates were said to have withdrawn to any penalties on peacekeeping assign-
40 (ibid.). ments. Pakistan maintained roughly the same
39 See Daily Star (Dhaka), “US, UK, EC number of peacekeeping troops in the field
41
disappointed,” 4 January, 2007; “Act Swiftly, as Bangladesh. All this was known to the
42 Bangladesh military, of course, and raises the
Impartially to Create Conditions for All-Party
43 Polls, US Urges CG,” 6 January, 2007; “One- question as to whether the army took advantage
44 sided Polls won’t be Credible, Acceptable, says of the uncertainty created by the letter to
45 US Envoy,” 9 January, 2007;“EU Poll Mission launch the declaration of emergency.
46 May not Go Ahead if Crisis Persists,”11 January, 45 See Muhammad Yunus,“Yunus’ second letter,”
47 2007;“NDI,IRI won’t Watch Jan 22 Elections,” Daily Star (Dhaka), 23 February, 2007;“Yunus
48 11 January, 2007. writes letter to all,” ibid., 4 May, 2007.

115
H A R RY B L A I R
46 On returning to democratic government and
denying political ambitions, see e.g., Daily Star
(Dhaka),“Moeen again Rules out Army’s Role
in Politics,” 13 August, 2007; and “Moeen says
Polls by 2008 end,” 18 August, 2007; also 54
“Moeen says Army has no Plan for Martial
Law,”24 May,2007.For an example of Moeen’s
speculation about governance, see New Age
(Dhaka),“Army Chief calls for ‘Own Brand of
Democracy,’” 3 April, 2007. For a good general
overview of political events over the emergency
period, see Economist Intelligence Unit,
“Bangladesh Country Report, April 2007”
(London:EIU,2007);and “Bangladesh Country
Report, July 2007” (London: EIU, 2007).
47 The discussion here represents a further
elaboration and development of thinking I
began in Blair, “Politics, Civil Society and
Governance in Bangladesh” and continued in
Blair et al., “Democracy and Governance:
Strategic Assessment of Bangladesh.”
48 For an example of the speculation on this
question, see Farid Bakht, “Army Entrenches
Itself in Bangladesh,” Economic and Political
Weekly,Vol. 42, No. 29 (2007), pp. 2,991–92.
49 The lower judiciary comprises the entire court
system save for the supreme court and high
court, which had become independent during
the Pakistan period and continued this status
through successive governments since the 1972
Constitution. But as in other countries, the
higher courts hear only a minute percentage of 55
the total cases.
50 The supreme court, presumably anxious to
avoid direct confrontation, continued allowing
extensions for the government to comply 56
with the constitutional requirement. The
twenty-first such extension, for example, was
allowed in October 2005.
51 Julfikar Ali Manik, “Judiciary Freed from the
Executive Fetters Today,” Daily Star (Dhaka),
1 November, 2007.
52 See Ayesha Saddiqa,Military Inc.Inside Pakistan’s
Military Economy (London: Pluto Press, 2007).
The Bangladesh military has some business
operations as well, but they are small scale
compared to those in Pakistan. See Siddiqa, 57
ibid., p. 50; also New Age (Dhaka),“Gen Moeen
contradicts law adviser,” 29 August, 2007.
53 Data on budgetary allotments from International
Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military 58
Balance, 102 (2002) and 107 (2007). (London:
IISS). For an account of US military aid to
116
Pakistan, see Craig Cohen and Derek Chollet, 1
“When $10 Billion Is Not Enough: Rethinking 2
U.S. Strategy toward Pakistan,” Washington 3
Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2007), pp. 7–19. 4
These developments are presented and analyzed
5
in an excellent series of articles in Economic and
Political Weekly edited by Isher Ahluwalia
6
and Wahiduddin Mahmud, “Economic 7
Transformation and Social Development in 8
Bangladesh,” Economic and Political Weekly, 39 9
(2004), pp. 4,009–52. See, in particular, 10
Raisuddin Ahmed, “Rice Economy of 11
Bangladesh: Progress and Prospects,” EPW, 12
4,043–52;Paul A.Dorosh,“Trade,Food Aid and 13
Food Security: Evolving Rice and Wheat
14
Markets,” EPW, 4,033–42; and Mahabub
15
Hossain, “Rural Non-Farm Economy:
Evidence from Household Surveys,” EPW, 16
4,053–58. Some data in this paragraph 17
were derived from the website maintained 18
by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics: 19
http://www.bbs.gov.bd/.The agricultural side 20
is analyzed in greater detail in Raisuddin 21
Ahmed, Steven Haggblade, and Tawfiq-e-Elahi 22
Chowdhury (eds), Out of the Shadow of Famine: 23
Evolving Food Markets and Food Policy in
24
Bangladesh (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2000). Some of the political
25
impact of these trends at local level are explored 26
in Blair,“Civil Society and Pro-poor Initiatives 27
at the Local Level in Bangladesh.” 28
See Wahiduddin Mahmed, “Macroeconomic 29
Management: From Stabilization to Growth?” 30
Economic and Political Weekly, 39 (2004), 31
pp. 4023–32. 32
Considerable argument exists as to whether a
33
changing economic calculus or family planning
34
intervention played the greater role here. See
Simeen Mahmud, “Health and Population: 35
Making Progress under Poverty,” Economic and 36
Political Weekly, 39 (2004), pp. 4,081–91; and 37
Shihidur R. Khandker and M. Abdul Latif, 38
“The Role of Family Planning and Targeted 39
Credit Programs in Demographic Change in 40
Bangladesh,” World Bank Discussion Paper 41
No. 337 (Washington:World Bank, 1996). 42
For a summary of these less happy trends, see
43
Abdul Bayes,“Beneath the Surface:Why is the
Price of Rice Still so High?” Daily Star, 24
44
August, 2008. 45
The conundrum is aptly summed up in 46
Shantayanan Devarajan, “Two Comments on 47
‘Governance Indicators:Where Are We,Where 48
 OV E R I N ST I T U T I O N A L I Z AT I O N , C O N T E STAT I O N , A N D D E M O C R AT I C D E G R A DAT I O N

1 Should We Be Going?’ by Daniel Kaufmann in Bangladesh: An Overview,” Economic and

2 and Aart Kraay,” World Bank Research Observer, Political Weekly, 39 (2004), pp. 4,109–13.
3 Vol. 23, No. 1 (2008), pp. 31–6. 60 “Golden Bengal”—the title of a poem by
4 59 On the NGO sector as a formidable engine of Rabindranath Tagore and the country’s national
development, see Sajjad Zohir, “NGO Sector anthem.
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
117
 1

8 2
3
4
5
Politics and governance in 6
7
post-independence Sri Lanka 8
9
10
11
Neil DeVotta 12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Sri Lanka was long considered a model colony, allowed the Tamils to operate as a second 19
and when Britain granted the island inde- “majority” community, despite Tamils being 20
pendence in February 1948 many believed it about 12 percent of the population (in 21
was the post-colonial state with “the best comparison to nearly 70 percent Sinhalese).4 22
chance of making a successful transition to The Donoughmore Constitution, however, 23
modern statehood.”1 The optimism was well discarded communal electorates and introduced 24
founded: universal franchise preceded inde- universal franchise; both measures vitiated the 25
pendence in 1931, just three years after being political influence of Tamils and encouraged 26
instituted in Britain; the country ranked attempts to minimize Sinhalese domination and 27
relatively high on various socioeconomic majoritarian politics. Strong camaraderie 28
indices, especially when compared to other between Sinhalese and Tamil elites, however, 29
Asian and African states undergoing decolon- enabled the 1946 Soulbury Constitution,which 30
ization; and, most important, ethnic tension lacked stringent minority guarantees: Article 31
between the majority Sinhalese and minority 29(2) merely required the government to treat 32
Tamils notwithstanding, the country’s poly- all ethnoreligious communities dispassionately. 33
ethnic and multi-religious elites had agreed to The article and minority input were disregarded 34
the transfer of power and the constitutional when Sinhalese elites crafted the 1972 and 1978 35
structure the British left behind.2 Yet within constitutions that consolidated the unitary state 36
eight years of independence the island adopted structure. 37
a trajectory that led to ethnocentrism, illiberal Sri Lanka’s transition from colonialism to 38
governance, and a gruesome civil war.3 independence was a tepid affair that contrasted 39
with the pre-independence mobilization 40
and ruckus in neighboring India. Indeed, 41
Post-independence politics the transfer of power was so seamless that 42
people in rural areas hardly realized a major 43
From 1931 to 1946 the Donoughmore Con- political change had taken place.The country’s 44
stitution,with its unitary structure,governed Sri mainly western-educated elite was well versed 45
Lanka (then called Ceylon). Communal in parliamentary traditions and practice, 46
electorates that preceded Donoughmore and which partly ensured that the two main 47
parity of representation with the Sinhalese political parties would respect subsequent 48
118
 P O L I T I C S A N D G OV E R N A N C E I N P O ST- I N D E P E N D E N C E S R I L A N K A
1 electoral verdicts. Indeed, between 1948 and
2 1977, power was transferred six times between
3 the United National Party (UNP) and Sri
4 Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). If two turn-
5 overs between opposition parties mark the
6 consolidation of democracy,5 Sri Lanka
7 achieved such vaunted status in March 1960.
8 But,in a true liberal democracy,the rules,laws,
9 norms, and conventions governing formal
10 democratic processes are scrupulously and
11 consistently observed; in this sense Sri Lanka
12 represents a classic illiberal democracy.
13 The most revolutionary post-independence
14 event took place in 1956,when Solomon West
15 Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike and his SLFP-
16 led coalition championed a “Sinhala-only”
17 policy to win parliamentary elections. English
18 had operated as the national language despite
19 the fact that only around 10 percent of the
20 population spoke it fluently. Initially the SLFP,
21 UNP, Tamil elites within the UNP, and the
22 main Tamil parties supported the replacement
23 of English by Sinhala and Tamil as national
24 languages. But when a grassroots move-
25 ment began clamoring for Sinhala only,
26 Bandaranaike—who had left the UNP in July
27 1951 on realizing that Prime Minister D. S.
28 Senanayake was grooming his son, Dudley, to
29 assume the party’s leadership—recognized
30 that he could use the issue to capture the
31 premiership. When the UNP, led by the
32 abrasive and hyper-westernized Sir John
33 Kotelawala, belatedly acknowledged that the
34 party could not win elections by championing
35 linguistic parity,it too embraced a Sinhala-only
36 policy.The UNP and SLFP thereafter resorted
37 to “ethnic outbidding,” trying to outdo each
38 other on who best could promote Sinhalese
39 preferences.6 Bandaranaike won the contest,
40 but the Sinhala Only Bill of 1956 led to Tamil
41 protests and the first ever anti-Tamil riots.
42 These riots were followed by more severe
43 Sinhalese–Tamil riots in 1958.7
44 The Sinhala-only movement was not
45 merely about defending language and culture;
46 it also had to do with socioeconomic realit-
47 ies and perceived opportunities. For instance,
48 northern Tamils had utilized missionary
schools to excel in English and become
overrepresented in the civil service, military,
and universities. Sinhalese were goaded into
believing that Sinhala only would expedi-
tiously and radically transform their fortunes.
This did not happen and it led to dis-
enchantment with Bandaranaike. The prime
minister’s attempts to accommodate the Tamil
language also upset Sinhalese Buddhist
extremists, and in September 1959 a Buddhist
monk assassinated him.
Bandaranaike’s wife, Sirimavo, soon
thereafter took over the SLFP and became the
first ever elected woman head of state in the
world,in July 1960.Her first government (July
1960–March 1965) claimed it was furthering
the revolution her husband had begun,but the
numerous anti-Tamil practices it embraced
further marginalized the Tamil minority.8 The
Dudley Senanayake-led UNP government that
followed (March 1965–May 1970) failed to
alleviate Tamil grievances, although neither
did it aggravate them.
Sirimavo Bandaranaike returned to power
in May 1970. In 1971 disgruntled Sinhalese
Marxist students belonging to the Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (People’s Liberation
Front—JVP) unleashed an insurgency that
nearly toppled the government. The insur-
gency was violently suppressed, but it spurred
the government toward an even more radical
pro-Sinhalese Buddhist and anti-Tamil agenda.
Tamils were required to score higher than
Sinhalese to get into university and they were
more or less blocked from entering govern-
ment service; furthermore, a new constitu-
tion was introduced in 1972 that gave
Buddhism “foremost status,”thereby relegating
Hinduism, Christianity, and Islam to second-
class status. In relation to the economy, the
government embraced dirigisme and autarky.
This led to the most basic goods becoming
scarce and rationed. The government also
nationalized mostly foreign-owned plantations
and corporations, insurance companies, and
banks. Furthermore, the government refused
to hold scheduled elections in 1975 and
extended its rule until 1977.
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The SLFP became so discredited that not the first-past-the-post electoral system for a 1
only did the J. R. Jayewardene-led UNP win complicated proportional representation-cum- 2
the July 1977 elections with a five-sixths preferential voting system. It was believed the 3
majority, but the Tamil United Liberation latter would increase the weight of the votes of 4
Front (TULF), comprising several Tamil minorities.12 Other features—such as a high 5
parties, won more seats than the SLFP to qualifying threshold and a bonus vote for the 6
become the country’s principal opposition. party that won a district—seemed designed to 7
Sri Lankans vote in high numbers during ensure that the UNP stayed dominant and to 8
parliamentary and presidential elections, and limit the proliferation of parties, which 9
voter turnout for the 1977 elections was a proportional representation typically facili- 10
stratospheric 86.7 percent,the highest thus far. tates.13 The constitution continued with the 11
The TULF, citing widespread discrimination unitary state structure, ensured Buddhism’s 12
against Tamils, had issued a resolution in 1976 special status, and made Tamil a national 13
(the so-called Vaddukoddai Resolution) call- language although little was done to eradicate 14
ing for the predominantly Tamil northeast the entrenched linguistic discrimination. 15
to secede from the rest of Sri Lanka. The Such discrimination continued even after the 16
resolution was likely designed to appease Thirteenth Amendment, passed in November 17
increasingly militaristic Tamil youth mobilizing 1987, made Tamil an official language and the 18
against the Sri Lankan state,but many Sinhalese Sixteenth Amendment, passed in December 19
considered the party a separatist entity and 1988, consolidated this status.14 20
treated it with hostility.This partly contributed Jayewardene bragged that the only thing he 21
to the August 1977 anti-Tamil riots. could not do under the new constitution was 22
Given the majority he commanded in change a man into a woman and vice versa 23
parliament, Jayewardene was best equipped to whereas his prime minister lamented he was 24
accommodate legitimate Tamil grievances; nothing more than a peon under the new 25
instead, he sought to use the ethnic problem setup. In this spirit, Jayewardene amended the 26
to consolidate his position. The increased constitution 16 times between 1978 and 1988, 27
restiveness in the northeast caused the govern- often in a partisan and whimsical fashion, and 28
ment to institute the draconian Prevention of ruled in an autocratic manner. In 1980 he 29
Terrorism Act of 1979,which allowed security vindictively stripped Mrs Bandaranaike of her 30
forces to arrest, imprison, and leave incom- civic rights for seven years (in retaliation for 31
municado for 18 months without trial anyone her previous extension of SLFP rule by two 32
deemed threatening to the state. Hundreds of years until 1977) and expelled her from 33
innocent Tamils were caught in its dragnet and parliament, thereby ensuring that his most 34
the torture and humiliation encountered effective opponent could not challenge him 35
radicalized them further.The worsening ethnic for reelection in 1982. Jayewardene thus set a 36
problem stymied the government’s develop- precedent for presidential rule that his suc- 37
ment plans, marginalized moderate Tamil cessors emulated. 38
leaders, emboldened extremist radical Tamil The new constitution’s electoral provisions 39
youth and their Sinhalese Buddhist counter- were not tested until the October 1982 40
parts, and contributed to the 1981 and 1983 presidential elections,which Jayewardene won. 41
anti-Tamil riots.9 This election evidenced voting irregularities: 42
J. R. Jayewardene used the massive UNP the most glaring was when the SLFP candidate 43
majority in parliament to introduce the 1978 for president went to the polls and found that 44
constitution. It created an all-powerful execu- someone had already cast his vote! The 45
tive president.10 To deal with the discrepancy government also used its majority in parlia- 46
between the percentage of votes parties polled ment to pass the fourth amendment, through 47
and the number of seats won,11 it jettisoned which it justified holding the first and only 48
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 P O L I T I C S A N D G OV E R N A N C E I N P O ST- I N D E P E N D E N C E S R I L A N K A
1 national referendum in place of scheduled
2 parliamentary elections. This allowed the
3 regime to use a simple electoral majority to
4 extend the party’s nearly five-sixths parlia-
5 mentary majority for another term. The
6 December 1982 referendum saw rigging on a
7 grand scale, with UNP supporters—especially
8 those in the party’s trade union—resorting to
9 ballot stuffing, intimidation, and violence to
10 ensure a UNP victory.
11 The same forces harassed and beat up
12 Buddhist monks, Catholic clergy, civil society
13 activists,academics,opposition supporters,and
14 supreme court justices who dared speak out or
15 protest against government policies.They were
16 also mostly responsible for the 1983 pogrom
17 targeting Tamils.
18 Proclaiming “let the robber barons in,”
19 Jayewardene collaborated with the IMF, World
20 Bank, and western governments to introduce
21 structural adjustment policies. Sri Lanka thus
22 embraced open market reforms two years
23 before China and 14 years before India. The
24 policies led to the creation of a class of nouveau
25 riche; but they also contributed to economic
26 disparity and disgruntlement. Overall, the
27 Jayewardene years saw more development than
28 under any previous Sri Lankan leader, and the
29 open market economy and 1978 constitution
30 remain his most important legacies. But he
31 also instituted a political culture smacking of
32 illiberal governance that was exacerbated
33 under his successors.
34 In December 1988 Ranasinghe Premadasa,
35 Jayewardene’s prime minister, became presi-
36 dent. Premadasa remains the first and only
37 Sri Lankan leader not from the dominant
38 govigama (cultivator) caste.Caste politics among
39 Sinhalese was more pronounced in pre-
40 independence times. However, there were
41 some senior UNP politicos who begrudged
42 and resented Premadasa for his low-caste
43 status, and this was one reason they sought to
44 impeach him in August 1991. Premadasa
45 stripped these detractors of membership in the
46 UNP and inducted many parliamentarians into
47 his cabinet, thereby buying their loyalty.Thus
48 it was under Premadasa that the so-called
“jumbo cabinet,” whereby most members of
the ruling party end up with ministerial or
deputy ministerial portfolios, took hold and it
has only magnified inefficiency, malpractice,
and corruption.
A second murderous uprising by the JVP
between 1988 and 1990 forced Premadasa to
retaliate in brutal fashion.Estimates suggest that
over 40,000 Sinhalese were disappeared as
state-sponsored paramilitary forces eradicated
the JVP leadership and suspected sympath-
izers.15 Prime Minister Premadasa was respon-
sible for a popular program called gam udawa
(village reawakening),which centered on rural
development and the building of thousands of
homes.He continued doing so as president and
was quite popular among the masses. The
crackdown against the JVP, however, led to his
being vilified, so much so that many Sinhalese
celebrated by lighting firecrackers when a
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
suicide bomber killed Premadasa in May 1993
and the location of his death was referred to as
“balla marapu thanna” (the place where the dog
was killed).
The lackluster but dignified Dingiribanda
Wigetunga succeeded Premadasa as president,
but the electorate was ready for political
change after 17 years of UNP rule. Chandrika
Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, daughter of
S. W. R. D. and Sirimavo Bandaranaike
who had become prime minister in August
1994, became president in November 1994.
Kumaratunga was supported enthusiastically
by civil society groups and Tamils who saw her
as the best bet to end the country’s civil war,
and she captured 62.3 percent of the votes cast.
She survived an LTTE assassination attempt
and was reelected in December 1999. A
solution to the country’s ethnic conflict,
however, eluded her partly because of the
LTTE’s intransigence as well as her belief that
no peace was possible unless the LTTE’s leader,
Vellupillai Prabhakaran, was killed and the
LTTE militarily defeated. The upshot was a
dubious “War for Peace” campaign that saw
thousands killed and the military suffer
humiliating reversals.
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N E I L D E VOT TA

President Kumaratunga failed most where The vast majority of Tamils now do not vote 1
she could have succeeded rather easily:crafting for the SLFP, and Rajapaksa may have bribed 2
a common peace agenda with an opposition the LTTE to prevent Tamils in rebel-controlled 3
that was, in the main, prepared to work with areas from voting in the presidential 4
her. But hostility toward UNP leader Ranil elections.19 This likely disenfranchise- 5
Wickremasinghe precluded consensus poli- ment led to the defeat of the UNP’s Ranil 6
tics, and her tenure was marked by moderate Wickremasinghe.Within a year of coming to 7
economic growth, corruption, favoritism, power Rajapaksa’s government began a new 8
political legerdemain, and further institutional war against the LTTE, although the latter’s 9
decay. repeated aggression provided the president 10
The SLFP under Kumaratunga also resorted ample reason to justify renewed hostilities.20 11
to vote rigging and violence to win elections. The government unilaterally abandoned the 12
The January 1999 Northwestern Provincial ceasefire in January 2008, with the president 13
Council elections saw her supporters resort claiming the LTTE had to be destroyed for 14
to blatant and even depraved electoral mal- peace and development to take root.In January 15
practices, making it the most violent election 2009, with the LTTE close to being defeated, 16
in Sri Lanka’s history.For instance,SLFP cadres the government also proscribed the group, 17
“not only assaulted UNP supporters but thereby signaling that it was averse to holding 18
stripped men and women naked and paraded any discussions with the rebels. 19
them on public roads!”16 The October 2000 Sri Lanka has been plagued with extremist 20
and December 2001 parliamentary elections ethnic ideologues: the LTTE refused to settle 21
were also conducted amidst widespread elec- for anything short of a separate state, while 22
toral malpractice, mostly perpetrated by Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists refused to 23
Kumaratunga’s party members and sup- acknowledge legitimate Tamil grievances. 24
porters.17 The October 2000 election was the Their maximalist demands are responsible for 25
most violent parliamentary election hitherto the carnage experienced in the past quarter 26
conducted. The Elections Commissioner century. Mahinda Rajapaksa is the first 27
apologetically noted that “the allegations of president to subscribe wholeheartedly to the 28
vote-rigging have to be seen in the context of Sinhalese Buddhist nationalist ideology,which 29
electoral systems in the developing world in is rooted in the belief that Sri Lanka is Sihadipa 30
general and the subcontinent in particular,” and Dhammadipa (island of the Sinhalese 31
thereby inadvertently highlighting how Sri ennobled to preserve and propagate Theravada 32
Lanka is more an “electoral” as opposed to a Buddhism) and that all minorities live there 33
“liberal” democracy.18 thanks to Sinhalese Buddhist sufferance.21 34
The UNP-led United National Front Indeed, Rajapaksa even claims that he must 35
(UNF) coalition won the December 2001 embrace Sinhalese Buddhist preferences since 36
parliamentary elections; its biggest achieve- Sinhalese Buddhists were the ones who mostly 37
ment was the ceasefire agreement reached with voted for him.With defeating the LTTE taking 38
the LTTE in February 2002. But “cohabi- precedence, Rajapaksa’s government tolerated 39
tation” between president and parliament manifold human rights violations, especially 40
failed to take hold,and President Kumaratunga against Tamils, including murder, rape, arson, 41
used her powers to dissolve the legislature and torture, kidnapping, extortion, and disappear- 42
conduct new elections in April 2004. The ances.22 No one has been charged for any of 43
SLFP-led United People’s Freedom Alliance the violations committed. 44
(UPFA) coalition won the elections,the fourth President Mahinda Rajapaksa has also 45
national election conducted in five years. resorted to blatant nepotism, appointing his 46
In November 2005 the SLFP’s Mahinda three brothers to highly influential positions 47
Rajapaksa became Sri Lanka’s fifth president. in government and nearly 130 relatives to 48
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 P O L I T I C S A N D G OV E R N A N C E I N P O ST- I N D E P E N D E N C E S R I L A N K A
1 other prominent governmental positions. Sri
2 Lankans complain that the Rajapaksa brothers
3 control over 80 percent of the country’s budget
4 through their ministerial portfolios; although
5 the president’s relative success in waging war
6 against the LTTE has made him popular. His
7 government,however,has taken to new heights
8 the culture of impunity prevalent in Sri Lanka
9 and has become adept at branding detractors
10 “traitors.” Furthermore, Rajapaksa has refused
11 to install the Constitutional Council, which
12 was created by the seventeenth amendment in
13 October 2001 to ensure independent commis-
14 sions to oversee the police, elections, bribery
15 and corruption, human rights, and judiciary.
16 This has allowed the president to appoint his
17 supporters and favorites to these commissions.
18 All evidence suggests that the Rajapaksas plan
19 to rule the country for the foreseeable future
20 by hook or by crook.
21 The ethnic politics that began to take shape
22 in the late 1950s gradually marginalized
23 minorities, seeking only to accommodate
24 Sinhalese, especially Sinhalese Buddhists.Thus,
25 Sinhalese, despite comprising around 75
26 percent of the population,now control over 95
27 percent of government jobs. Likewise, over 98
28 percent of military personnel are Sinhalese.
29 Over time, competence and merit were
30 discarded, and appointments to both low and
31 high government positions were based on
32 nepotism and favoritism. The attendant
33 mediocrity and corruption led to shambolic
34 governance that was tolerated at the highest
35 levels.A culture of violence also took root.The
36 majority Sinhalese initially tolerated illiberalism
37 and violence insofar as they were directed
38 toward Tamils; it became even easier to do so
39 when the LTTE resorted to terrorism to attain
40 its separatist goal. But illiberal governance
41 cannot be compartmentalized, and over time
42 the gangsterism and other malpractices
43 accompanying such governance spread to the
44 entire island. Today, a deadly nexus has taken
45 shape among politicians,security personnel,and
46 criminal elements.23 In short, Sri Lanka’s post-
47 Independence ethnocentric politics has led
48 not only to institutional decay and illiberal
democracy,but could well also lead to dictator-
ship.
Parties and politics
Under the Donoughmore Constitution, legi-
slators were divided among seven executive
committees in the state council and committee
chairmen, who together formed the board
of ministers, oversaw certain government
functions. It was a structure designed for
independents and discouraged the formation
of political parties. Nevertheless, leftists
motivated by trade union politicking created
the Trotskyist Lanka Sama Samaja Party (Lanka
Equal Society Party—LSSP) in 1935 and the
pro-Moscow Communist Party (CP) in 1943.
Sri Lanka’s conservative electorate never fully
warmed up to either the LSSP or the CP,
which reached their apogee in the early 1970s
when they joined Mrs. Bandaranaike’s second
government.
The United National Party was created
only in April 1946 in anticipation of inde-
pendence. A two-party system took effect
when S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike joined the
opposition and soon thereafter formed the Sri
Lanka Freedom Party. The SLFP has con-
sistently appealed to Sinhalese Buddhists and
drawn support mainly from rural areas,
while the UNP has enjoyed a more urban
base, appealing to those with western
proclivities, and still draws strong support
among minorities during presidential elec-
tions. Minorities also supported the party in
large numbers during parliamentary elections
until minority parties took hold.
The SLFP has operated as a dynasty,
with three family members—Mr and Mrs
Bandaranaike and their daughter, Chandrika
Kumaratunga—serving as the country’s leaders.
Mahinda Rajapaksa’s takeover of the SLFP
heralds an end to the Bandaranaike’s dominance.
Indeed, some in the Rajapaksa camp now
confidently talk about a Rajapaksa dynasty.
The UNP, by way of contrast, has been
labeled the “Uncle–Nephew Party,” given that
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N E I L D E VOT TA

four of the party’s six leaders have been related Accord, which stationed the Indian Peace 1
to its founder (and Sri Lanka’s first prime Keeping Force (IPKF) in the northeast. 2
minister) D.S.Senanayake:Dudley Senanayake The JVP began as a Maoist organization in 3
took over from his father D. S., and Dudley’s the 1960s.In its early years it sympathized with 4
cousin, Sir John Kotelawala, succeeded him; J. the plight of the Tamils and even acknow- 5
R. Jayewardene was closely related to D. S. ledged the community’s right to self- 6
Senanayake, and the UNP’s present leader, determination;but post-IPKF,it morphed into 7
Ranil Wickremasinghe, is Jayewardene’s a rabid nationalist party. The Premadasa 8
nephew. government killed all in the JVP’s politburo 9
During the post-Second World War period except Somawansa Amarasinghe, who fled to 10
many western European countries, includ- London and now heads the party. The JVP 11
ing the United Kingdom, adopted socialist reentered the political mainstream in 1994 and 12
policies. This no doubt influenced newly has allied with the SLFP in recent years. It 13
independent states like Sri Lanka. Conse- clamored for a military solution to the ethnic 14
quently, while the UNP is considered right of conflict and opposes devolution. The party 15
center and has traditionally embraced pro- won ten seats in the October 2000 parlia- 16
western and pro-market policies and the SLFP mentary elections and 16 seats in the 17
has preferred a left-of-center platform that December 2001 elections. In the April 2004 18
embraced state centrism, both resorted to elections it campaigned as part of the SLFP-led 19
populist, socialist practices until 1977. Socialist United People’s Freedom Alliance and won 39 20
rhetoric notwithstanding, both Chandrika seats.The JVP draws most of its support from 21
Kumaratunga and Mahinda Rajapaksa have the Sinhalese Buddhist lower classes in the 22
continued Jayewardene’s open market policies. south and is unlikely on its own to fare better 23
Ethnic outbidding between the UNP and than it did in April 2004. The April 2008 24
SLFP caused Sri Lanka to miss numerous split within the party is also bound to weaken 25
windows of opportunity to solve its ethnic it. But the JVP enjoys strong support among 26
imbroglio. As the ethnic conflict intensified, lower ranks in the military, and this can have 27
finding a solution became more difficult. adverse ramifications down the road. 28
During the late 1980s and 1990s, the JVP and In recent years the JVP has had to compete 29
other nationalist parties adopted a more for the nationalist vote with the Sinhala 30
uncompromising ethnic stance. However, Urumaya (Sinhala Heritage Party—SU) and 31
with Mahinda Rajapaksa’s election, the SLFP the Jathika Hela Urumaya (National Sinhalese 32
is now as nationalist and uncompromising Heritage Party—JHU), which succeeded the 33
as any other pro-Sinhalese Buddhist party. SU. The JHU is a party almost exclusively 34
The mainly Sinhalese Buddhist JVP first based on Buddhist monks, and its formation 35
gained prominence through the 1971 insur- caused Buddhists to debate whether the vinaya 36
gency. J. R. Jayewardene released the party’s (monastic law code) permitted monks to 37
leadership from prison and tolerated its reentry participate directly in politics and how doing 38
into politics, believing correctly that the JVP so may tarnish the clergy’s image.24 The party 39
would draw support away from the SLFP. stunned most observers by winning nine seats 40
However, seeking to absolve UNP cadres in the April 2004 elections.The JHU supports 41
involved in the 1983 anti-Tamil pogrom, the Mahinda Rajapaksa government and, like 42
Jayewardene, adopting the Indian term for the JVP, called for a military solution to the 43
radical, violent formations, claimed there was ethnic conflict and a strong unitary state. It 44
a “Naxalite” connection to the riots and opposed vociferously the ceasefire agreement 45
banned the JVP. The party went underground, with the LTTE and Norwegian involve- 46
only to resurface violently after Jayewardene,in ment in the peace process. The party thus 47
July 1987, signed the Indo-Lanka Peace applauded when the Rajapaksa government 48
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 P O L I T I C S A N D G OV E R N A N C E I N P O ST- I N D E P E N D E N C E S R I L A N K A
1 unilaterally abrogated the ceasefire and termi-
2 nated Scandinavian involvement in the peace
3 process.
4 The country’s Muslims used to vote for the
5 UNP and SLFP, but many now vote for the
6 Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), which
7 began contesting elections in 1989. The
8 SLMC originated in the Eastern Province but
9 gradually spread its influence to the south.
10 The party has fared well over the years,winning
11 four, seven, eleven, and ten parliamentary
12 seats in 1989,1994,2001,and 2004,respectively.
13 With the UNP and SLFP increasingly
14 dependent on coalitions to govern, the SLMC
15 and other ethnic parties wield influence
16 disproportionate to their small parliamentary
17 representations. The SLMC split after its
18 founder, M. H. M.Ashraff, died in a helicopter
19 crash in September 2000. The new faction,
20 called the National Unity Alliance, is led by
21 Ashraff ’s wife, and it has allied with the SLFP.
22 The rural Muslims of the Eastern Province have
23 different preferences from those in urban areas
24 like Colombo, and this dictates party loyalty.
25 However, during presidential elections the vast
26 majority of Muslims vote for the UNP
27 candidate.25
28 The Ceylon Worker’s Congress represents
29 the interests of the Indian Tamils, and their
30 leaders have usually allied with the governing
31 party. The Sri Lankan Tamils mostly voted
32 for the Ceylon Tamil Congress and the Federal
33 Party.These moderate parties became marginal-
34 ized as they achieved little by engaging with
35 Sinhalese politicians.Anti-LTTE Tamil militant
36 groups like the Eelam People’s Democratic
37 Party now operate as part of government
38 coalitions.The March 2004 split in the LTTE
39 has led to the Tamileela Makkal Viduthalaip
40 Pulikal (Tamileela People’s Liberation Tigers—
41 TMVP), which operates as a state-sponsored
42 paramilitary group and political party, domi-
43 nating (often via intimidation and force) Tamil
44 areas in the Eastern Province.With the loss of
45 the territories controlled by the LTTE, the
46 TMVP and other anti-LTTE parties will
47 certainly undermine the pro-LTTE Tamil
48 National Alliance (TNA).The TNA, with 22
seats in parliament,is presently the largest Tamil
party because the LTTE ensured that Tamils in
the northeast voted for it.
Tamil party leaders are often targeted by
their Tamil rivals. In the TNA’s case, govern-
ment forces may have also colluded in assassi-
nating its members. With anti-LTTE forces
targeting TNA parliamentarians and the LTTE
targeting Sinhalese and pro-government Tamil
legislators, it is not surprising that as of April
2008 seven parliamentarians elected in the
2004 elections were assassinated (with four
killed in the first three-and-a-half months
of 2008).
As of January 2008 there were 53 registered
parties in Sri Lanka.With fewer than a dozen
having a fair chance of winning even a single
seat in parliament, most have apparently been
organized to try to make money by selling
television and radio time allotted to them.26
For example, 52 parties/coalitions contested
the April 2004 parliamentary elections, yet
only seven won at least a single seat.
A sense of noblesse oblige once influenced
some Sri Lankan politicians, who forfeited
personal fortunes to run for office. With
ministerial portfolios akin to sinecures full of
perks sweetened by commissions and kick-
backs, it is the venal and predatory who, in the
main, seek political office today.This has also
affected the quality of candidates standing for
election. Furthermore, the quest for acquiring
wealth, prestige, and power via politics has
undermined party loyalty as opposition
politicians eagerly cross over to the governing
party provided they are afforded ministerial
portfolios. Some have done so four and five
times. Indeed, one irony in Sri Lankan politics
is that voters are more loyal to parties than are
the party candidates. For instance, soon after
Mahinda Rajapaksa became president, 11
UNP parliamentarians (including some senior
party members) crossed over to the govern-
ment, claiming they wanted to ensure good
governance. All were provided ministerial
portfolios. Indeed, as of April 2008, 24 UNP
members elected through the April 2004
parliamentary elections had crossed over to the
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N E I L D E VOT TA

government while nearly 50 parliamentarians and ammunition and some now work for 1
had bolted their parties to join the govern- politicians as bodyguards and storm troopers. 2
ment or operate independently. Thus, as of Elections won by corrupt practices are 3
February 2008 the Mahinda Rajapaksa rarely overturned in Sri Lanka, which 4
government comprised 51 ministers, 35 non- discourages free and fair polls. Furthermore, 5
cabinet ministers, and 21 deputy ministers. preferential voting forces politicians to 6
Frustrated Sri Lankans bemoan how an island compete against party colleagues in their 7
with 21 million people is saddled with 51 districts, adding intraparty violence to the 8
cabinet ministers while nearby India with 1.1 existing interparty violence. Some student 9
billion people manages relatively well with 32 unions in the universities are affiliated with 10
cabinet ministers. Indeed, the Rajapaksa political parties; the JVP’s Inter-University 11
government had to postpone its first cabinet Student Federation is especially notorious for 12
meeting since it could not find a room large its politically influenced gangsterism on 13
enough to accommodate the ministers, and campuses.The upshot is that parties and their 14
newspaper editorials suggested derisively that candidates now increasingly rely on violence to 15
the government rent a hotel ballroom. influence politics and win elections. 16
The island’s unicameral legislature has 17
225 members. Of these, 196 are elected in 18
multimember districts, while 29 are reserved Devolution and state and 19
for National List (NL) members. A party’s local politics 20
national vote determines the number of NL 21
members it may have, thereby allowing a party Sri Lanka has nine provinces and 25 districts. 22
to nominate prominent supporters and highly In July 1981 J. R. Jayewardene and the UNP 23
skilled and qualified citizens to parliament. discarded the existing village and town 24
Yet most NL appointees have been as oppor- councils and instituted a district development 25
tunistic as elected parliamentarians and have council (DDC) scheme, hoping to palliate 26
crossed over eagerly to government ranks Tamil demands for broad devolution. Rather 27
when provided portfolios. For instance, the than promoting autonomy, the DDCs 28
opposition UNP had 11 NL members,but ten reiterated the state’s predilection for central- 29
had crossed over to government ranks as of ization. The DDCs that operated between 30
February 2008.In fact,only four NL members 1981 and 1987 are thought to have played a 31
currently sit with the opposition; the rest minor role facilitating economic develop- 32
belong to the government. ment,27 but these and subsequent local/ 33
Violence and deadly weapons are part and regional institutions have hardly come close 34
parcel of Sri Lankan politics,and there are three to satisfying Tamil demands for autonomy. 35
main reasons for their proliferation.The civil As of 1978 the president had appointed as 36
war forced the government to recruit Sinhalese district ministers parliamentarians whose 37
home guards from villagers bordering LTTE- constituencies fell outside the district. While 38
controlled areas, and the arms provided them district ministers are not included in the 39
have been used to settle personal and political cabinet, the position generates the same perks 40
scores. When the second JVP insurgency as does a cabinet portfolio. 41
targeted politicians, the UNP distributed Most Tamils consider the Northern and 42
nearly 15,000 weapons among political Eastern Provinces to be their homeland, and 43
parties. Very few of these were returned; it is here that the LTTE wanted to create the 44
politicians and their supporters now use them state of Eelam.The Indo-Lanka Peace Accord 45
to perpetrate violence. Finally, in the past two of 1987 recognized the historical presence 46
decades,nearly 60,000 personnel have deserted of the Tamils in the northeast and necessitated 47
the military. Many absconded with their arms the Thirteenth Amendment to the constitu- 48
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 P O L I T I C S A N D G OV E R N A N C E I N P O ST- I N D E P E N D E N C E S R I L A N K A
1 tion, which merged the two provinces. That
2 same year, the supreme court upheld the
3 thirteenth amendment. Sri Lanka thus
4 consisted of eight provinces between 1987 and
5 2006, when a different Supreme Court ruled
6 that the merger was invalid.The decision was
7 hailed by Sinhalese nationalists who viewed the
8 merger and any devolution as precursors to the
9 island’s dismemberment.
10 Provincial Council elections were first held
11 in 1987 throughout the island and have since
12 been conducted with regularity outside the
13 northeast; but the state’s embedded pater-
14 nalistic and centripetal tendencies have
15 prevented the sharing of power between the
16 central government and the regions.28
17 Currently, the provincial councils are white
18 elephants beloved by party leaders desperate to
19 accommodate loyal supporters within the
20 government echelon. Thus, today national
21 party leaders, not provincial leaders, mostly
22 choose provincial councilors; and the country
23 currently has over 4,000 representatives of
24 the people at local, provincial, and national
25 levels. A further irony is that a system that
26 was primarily passed off as one to ensure
27 some Tamil autonomy has, in the main, func-
28 tioned throughout the island except in the
29 predominantly Tamil northeast.
30 Currently there are 18 municipal councils,
31 42 urban councils, and 270 pradeshiya sabhas
32 (local councils incorporating several old village
33 councils) overseeing local public health,
34 beautification,voter registration lists,and postal
35 services. Unsurprisingly, some units function
36 more efficiently than others.Overall,however,
37 lack of funding, widespread corruption,
38 ambitious provincial councilors, and over-
39 bearing parliamentarians combine to under-
40 mine the responsibilities and effectiveness of
41 these units.29
42 In 1949 S. J.V. Chelvanayakam and others
43 left the Tamil Congress (TC) and formed the
44 Federal Party (FP) because of concerns over
45 government-sanctioned Sinhalese colonization
46 of historically Tamil areas and disagreement
47 concerning the entry of the TC leader, G. G.
48 Ponnambalam, into the UNP Cabinet. As its
name indicates, the FP mainly clamored for a
federal structure, but Sinhalese nationalists
opposed federalism, claiming it would be the
first step toward separatism. The FP won ten
seats in the April 1956 elections to become the
largest Tamil party.This, combined with Tamil
protests over the Sinhala Only Act, led S.W. R.
D.Bandaranaike to meet with Chelvanayakam
to try and accommodate Tamil grievances.The
result was the July 1957 Bandaranaike-
Chelvanayakam (B-C) Pact, under which the
FP agreed to drop its demand for linguistic
parity and the government agreed to permit
the use of Tamil for all administrative pur-
poses in the northeast and to create regional
councils to deal with education, agriculture,
and Sinhalese colonization of Tamil areas.The
B-C Pact provided Tamil leaders a way out of
their demands for devolution,but it was vilified
by Sinhalese Buddhist nationalists and the
UNP.Under pressure,Bandaranaike abrogated
the pact in April 1958. After Bandaranaike’s
assassination, his wife worked to consolidate
the unitary state structure.
The FP provided support in parliament to
Dudley Senanayake’s UNP government
during March 1965 and May 1970. The two
parties had agreed to the Senanayake-
Chelvanayakam Pact of 1965,under which the
UNP promised to recognize the Northern and
Eastern Provinces as Tamil speaking,amend the
previous government’s Language of the Court’s
Act of 1961 so that both Sinhala and Tamil
could be used in the courts system,and provide
Tamils first preference when colonizing Tamil
areas while placing district governments under
national authority.Yet the UNP failed to honor
the pact.Thus for the second time a Sri Lankan
government discarded an agreement reached
with Tamils and provided a fillip to the budding
separatist tendencies among disenchanted
Tamil youth.
Constitutional change and devolution are
related issues, with which Sri Lanka has
grappled especially since the mid-1990s.
Presidents typically eschew relinquishing
presidential powers whenever constitutional
engineering is contemplated.The devolution
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N E I L D E VOT TA

debate, contrariwise, has ranged between minorities will have no choice but tolerate the 1
perpetuating the unitary state and introducing existing unitary state and Sinhalese Buddhist 2
a federal structure, with further debates on dominance. 3
whether devolution should only be extended 4
to the northeast or all nine provinces, and, if 5
the latter, whether devolution ought to be Conclusion 6
symmetrical or asymmetrical. Chandrika 7
Kumaratunga’s People’s Alliance (PA) govern- If relative consensus and compromise between 8
ment released a draft constitution in October Sri Lanka’s two principal ethnic groups facili- 9
1997 that sought to do away with the executive tated a peaceful transition to independence,the 10
presidency and devolve power to the regions. island’s opportunistic and ethnocentric post- 11
The attempt failed. In July 2000 the PA and Independence politics promoted institu- 12
UNP agreed to a watered-down version of the tional decay and ethnonational extremism. 13
1997 draft constitution only to have the UNP Consequently, a country once renowned for 14
back off amidst stiff opposition from Buddhist its tea and beaches is now just as famous for 15
clergy and Sinhalese nationalist forces. The suicide bombings and civil war: over 70,000 16
possibility that the Northern and Eastern people were killed, nearly 600,000 were 17
Provinces may not remain merged caused internally displaced,and between 800,000 and 18
Tamil parties also to oppose the parliamentary one million Tamils had fled the island during 19
bill to amend the constitution. Kumaratunga’s the past 25 years.The United Nations,western 20
insistence that she should be allowed to governments, and rights groups consider the 21
complete her presidential term irrespective country to be a serial human rights abuser. 22
of when the new constitution took effect did In 2006 and 2007 paramilitary forces and 23
not help. government soldiers were responsible for 24
Chandrika Kumaratunga’s malpractices disappearing more people in Sri Lanka than 25
notwithstanding, she promoted a federal anywhere else in the world. In its Global Press 26
solution to the ethnic conflict and even casti- Freedom report for 2007, Freedom House 27
gated those Sinhalese opposing devolution as branded the country “not free” and ranked it 28
“racists.” Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government, below Pakistan,Angola, and Egypt, although it 29
however, contemptuously abandoned any dis- ranked higher in the combined average rating 30
course on federalism.This suits the nationalist on all measures, a rank of 4, whereas Pakistan, 31
mindset of the Rajapaksa regime, which Angola, and Egypt are ranked far below at 5.5. 32
ardently believed in a military solution to When combined with the anomie,corruption, 33
the ethnic conflict and opposed meaningful and predatory politics outlined in this chapter, 34
devolution. For instance, the regime’s first Sri Lanka has by almost any measure regressed 35
devolution proposals mooted in April 2007 radically from the polyethnic and liberal 36
called for creating 30 districts from the extant democratic promise evidenced in 1948.30 37
25 districts and devolving power to these 38
miniaturized units. Under international pres- 39
sure, the government thereafter embraced the Notes 40
Thirteenth Amendment to the constitution as 41
1 Howard W. Wriggins, “Impediments to Unity
a potential solution, notwithstanding that the 42
in New Nations:The Case of Ceylon,”American
provincial council system created by the Political Science Review, Vol. 55, No. 2 (June
43
amendment had failed to meet even basic 1961), p. 316. 44
expectations. The Rajapaksa regime was 2 For an account of politics leading to 45
merely posturing, while adhering to its belief independence,see Nira Wickramasinghe,Ethnic 46
the LTTE could be defeated militarily; for Politics of Colonial Sri Lanka, 1927–47 (New 47
when this eventuates, the government knows Delhi: Vikas, 1995). 48
128
 P O L I T I C S A N D G OV E R N A N C E I N P O ST- I N D E P E N D E N C E S R I L A N K A
1 3 Neil DeVotta,“Illiberalism and Ethnic Conflict
2 in Sri Lanka,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13,
3 No. 1 (January 2002), pp. 84–98.
4 4 There are two principal Tamil communities in
the island: the Sri Lankan (Ceylon) Tamils and
5
Indian Tamils.The British transplanted the latter
6
to work on plantations starting in the 1830s.Just
7 prior to independence the Indian Tamils out-
8 numbered the Sri Lankan Tamils (11.73 percent
9 to 11.01 percent of the total population of the
10 island),but disenfranchisement and a repatriation
11 treaty with India have reduced their numbers to
12 just over 5 percent.The Indian Tamils are not
13 involved in Sri Lanka’s separatist conflict.
14 5 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave:
15 Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.
(Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press,
16
1991), pp. 266–67.
17
6 Neil DeVotta, Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism,
18 Institutional Decay,and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka
19 (Stanford, CA: University Press, 2004).
20 7 For a good account of these riots see Tarzie
21 Vittachi, Emergency ‘58:The Story of the Ceylon
22 Race Riots (London:André Deutsch, 1958).
23 8 For details, see DeVotta, Blowback, pp. 122–30.
24 9 The latter was one of the most violent ethnic
25 riots in South Asia and marks the beginning of
26 the ongoing civil war. It also created the vast
Tamil diaspora that now supports the Liberation
27
Tigers of Tamil Eelam, which seeks to create a
28
Tamil state in the northeast and is branded a
29 terrorist outfit by many countries.
30 10 For details of the 1978 constitution, see A.
31 Jeyaratnam Wilson, The Gaullist System in Asia:
32 The Constitution of Sri Lanka (1978) (London:
33 Macmillan, 1980).
34 11 For instance, in the 1970 elections, the UNP
35 received 37.9 percent of votes cast but won just
36 17 seats,while the SLFP captured 36.9 percent of
37 votes and won 91 seats. Similarly, in the 1977
elections,the UNP received 50.9 percent of votes
38
cast and won 140 seats, while the SLFP received
39
29.7 percent of votes,yet garnered just eight seats.
40 12 The effect has been insignificant. See Amita
41 Shastri, “Channelling Ethnicity through
42 Electoral Reform in Sri Lanka,” Journal of
43 Commonwealth and Comparative Politics,Vol. 43,
44 No. 1 (March 2005), pp. 34–60.
45 13 This has not prevented parties from pro-
46 liferating, although the country, in the main,
47 may be characterized as a two-party system, in
48 which each of the two main parties is assisted by
coalition partners. See Matthew Shugart
and John Carey, Presidents and Assemblies:
Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics
(Cambridge: University Press, 1992), p. 67;
Robert C.Oberst,“Proportional Representation
and Electoral System Change in Sri Lanka,” in
James Manor (ed.),Sri Lanka in Change and Crisis
(London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp. 118–33.
14 For instance, Tamils dealing with state
bureaucracies are forced to operate in Sinhala
and most southern police stations have no
personnel fluent in Tamil, causing Tamils who
seek redress at such stations to authorize entries
written in a language they do not read.
Likewise,Tamils living in the south have their
birth,marriage,and death certificates registered
in Sinhala even though the vast majority does
not read the language.
15 Mick Moore, “Thoroughly Modern Revolu-
tionaries:The JVP in Sri Lanka,” Modern Asian
Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (July 1993), p. 593, fn. 2.
16 See The Island,“When Political Pots and Kettles
Disparage One Another . . . ,” 13 March, 2008.
17 See Neil DeVotta,“Sri Lanka’s Political Decay:
Analysing the October 2000 and December
2001 Parliamentary Elections,” Journal of
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 41,
No. 2 (July 2003), pp. 115–42.
18 For a distinction between the two, see Larry
Diamond, “The Democratic Rollback: The
Resurgence of the Predatory State,”ForeignAffairs,
Vol. 87, No. 2 (March–April 2008), pp. 36–48.
19 The likely reason that the LTTE consented to
this ploy is because Ranil Wickremasinghe
deftly internationalized the peace process to the
point where the LTTE felt trapped.The group
believes that the Sinhalese Buddhists cannot be
trusted.It also believed correctly that a jingoistic
Mahinda Rajapaksa regime would highlight
Sinhalese Buddhist intransigence more than
would a Wickremasinghe-led UNP regime.
20 The LTTE used the ceasefire to target anti-
LTTE Tamils allied with the government,
military intelligence officers and soldiers.It also
violated the ceasefire agreement by continuing
to tax Tamils and Muslims in the northeast and
smuggling in weapons.The Rajapaksa regime
began full scale military action against the LTTE
after the group shut down the Mavil Aru anicut
in July 2006 and thereby deprived villagers of
water, although President Rajapaksa and his
advisors had in any case come into power
129
N E I L D E VOT TA

believing that military victory, as opposed to a 25 For details on Muslim politics see, Dennis B. 1
political solution, was the best way to end the McGilvray and Mirak Raheem, Muslim 2
civil war. Perspectives on the Sri Lankan Conflict, Policy 3
21 See Neil DeVotta, Sinhalese Buddhist Nationalist Studies 41 (Washington, DC: East West Center, 4
Ideology: Implications for Politics and Conflict 2007).
5
Resolution in Sri Lanka, Policy Studies 40 26 See The Island, “Beggar Woman’s Quintuplets
6
(Washington, DC: East West Center, 2007). and the Multitude as Kings,” 24 January, 2008.
22 See Human Rights Watch, Recurring Nightmare: 27 For details on the DDCs, see Bruce Matthews, 7
State Responsibility for “Disappearances” and “District Development Councils in Sri Lanka,” 8
Abductions in Sri Lanka,http://hrw.org/reports/ Asian Survey,Vol. 22, No. 11 (November 1982), 9
2008/srilanka0308/ (accessed 8 March, 2008); pp. 1,117–34. 10
U.S. Department of State, Sri Lanka: Country 28 For details on the provincial council system,see 11
Reports on Human Rights Practices—2007,Bureau Amita Shastri,“Sri Lanka’s Provincial Council 12
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 11 System: A Solution to the Ethnic Problem?” 13
March, 2008, at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/ Asian Survey, Vol. 32, No. 8 (August 1992), 14
rls/hrrpt/2007/100620.htm (accessed 12 March, pp. 723–43. 15
2008). 29 This negative appraisal contrasts with Robert
16
23 Neil DeVotta,“Explaining Political and Societal C. Oberst, “Government Structure,” in Craig
17
Violence in Sri Lanka,”in Laksiri Fernando and Baxter et al. (eds), Government and Politics in
Shermal Wijewardene (eds), Sri Lanka’s Ethnic South Asia, 5th edn (Boulder, CO: Westview 18
Conflict in the Global Context (Colombo: Press, 2002). 19
University of Colombo Faculty of Graduate 30 For further details in this regard, see Neil 20
Studies, 2006). pp. 113–26. DeVotta, “Sri Lanka at Sixty: A Legacy of 21
24 See Neil DeVotta and Jason Stone,“Jathika Hela Ethnocentrism and Degeneration,” Economic 22
Urumaya and Ethno-Religious Politics in and Political Weekly,Vol. 44, No. 5 (31 January–6 23
Sri Lanka,” Pacific Affairs,Vol. 81, No. 1 (April February, 2009), pp. 46–53. 24
2008), pp. 31–51. 25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
130
 1
2
3
4
9
5
6 Nepal
7
8
9 Trajectories of democracy
10
11 and restructuring of the state
12
13
14
15
Krishna Hachhethu and David N. Gellner
16
17
18 On 10 April, 2008 Nepal held wholly unpre- The monarch, held a prisoner by the Rana
19 cedented and epochal nationwide elections— Prime Ministers before 1951,had been an asset
20 the most peaceful in its history1—for a in the 1950–51 armed struggle against the
21 601-member constituent assembly (CA).Two century-old Rana oligarchy.Consequently,the
22 hundred and forty representatives were elected post-revolution period gave birth to a hybrid
23 in “winner-takes-all” or “first-past-the-post” system of sovereign monarchy and democratic
24 constituencies, 26 were to be nominated later structures. Even after 1960, when parties were
25 by the Council of Ministers, and 335 were banned, King Mahendra could plausibly
26 elected by proportional representation with the represent the monarchy as a defender of
27 whole country as a single constituency. Under democracy thanks to his father’s role in the
28 strict rules about representativeness, parties 1950–51 revolution. Public faith in royal
29 were obliged to ensure, both on their sub- leadership and an active king finally ran out in
30 mitted lists, and in their selection of successful the late 1980s. The 1990 mass movement
31 candidates, that there would be 50 percent against the Panchayat system was called jointly
32 women within each of the following categor- by the Nepali Congress (NC), a liberal
33 ies: 13 percent Dalits, 31.2 percent Madhesis, democratic party, and several communist
34 37.8 percent Janajatis, 30 percent “others,” and parties. The rise of an educated middle class
35 4 percent from nine backward districts.2 and rapid urbanization were the forces behind
36 The previous 60 years of Nepal’s history, the success of the 1990 mass movement.The
37 starting with the overthrow of the Rana auto- people’s representatives in the elected bodies
38 cracy in 1951, were marked by zigzags and of the 1990s were, therefore, predominantly
39 contention—numerous strikes,demonstrations, middle class, unlike the rural-based land-
40 revolts, and uprisings, followed by periods of owning classes who dominated in the 1950s
41 peace based on compromises between different and 1960s. The April 2006 popular uprising
42 forces. Until 2006 the palace had always been against monarchical rule was a shared effort,
43 an important, usually decisive, factor in the backed both by the parliamentary political
44 equation. In April 2006, for the first time, no parties and by the Communist Party of Nepal
45 compromise was made with the monarchy, and (Maoist) (CPN-M). It was the Maoists who
46 in the year and a half that followed, step by step had given most succor to ethnic and regional
47 its every symbolic presence was removed from movements.
48 events and edifices connected to the state.

131
K R I S H N A H AC H H E T H U A N D DAV I D N . G E L L N E R

The changes on which Nepal is about to orthodox Hindu social and legal code (the caste 1
embark are radical and comprehensive.The key division of labor and differential punishments 2
areas of departure from its past are: from by caste had the force of law), and a political 3
monarchy to republic, from Hindu state to system founded on hukum or peremptory 4
secular state, from unitary government to command. Confounding those who believe 5
federalism,and from the monopoly of political that modernization must precede democracy, 6
power by high-caste Hindus from the hills (the Nepal had a democratic revolution when its 7
Bahuns and Chhetris, who together make up literacy rate was less than 5 percent;having only 8
31 percent of the population) to inclusive a few kilometers of motorable road in the 9
democracy with guaranteed representation for capital; lacking any mass media except for one 10
all segments of Nepali society (hill people and government-run newspaper, the Gorkhapatra; 11
Madhesis;high castes,Janajatis,and Dalits;men and in the absence of any of the features of a 12
and women). capitalist economy, with the exception of one 13
This chapter is organized in two parts. bank in Kathmandu and two factories in the 14
The first provides a historical survey of the eastern Tarai.Contrariwise,the ease with which 15
development of democracy in Nepal with a the king was able to outmanoeuver democratic 16
very brief account of the internal and external politicians during the 1950s may be said to have 17
situations during and after each of the major had its roots in these very conditions of 18
political developments between 1950 and economic and social backwardness.The Ranas 19
2006.The second deals with the three major had themselves fully understood the connec- 20
agendas—peacebuilding, republicanism, and tion between modernization and political 21
inclusive democracy—that Nepal faces today. opposition, and had therefore sedulously 22
attempted to keep their population isolated 23
from foreign influences.The Ranas’ policy of 24
The dawn of democracy: isolation had a loophole, however—allowing 25
The 1950s the movement of people across the open border 26
with India for education, pilgrimage, political 27
Nepal entered the world community with exile, and recruitment into the British Army. 28
democratic aspirations in the early 1950s. For A small group of educated middle-class Nepalis 29
other South Asian countries, as for most of living in India and ex-Gurkha soldiers were the 30
the third world, the advent of democracy catalysts in the formation of political parties 31
was intertwined with the achievement of opposed to the rule of the Ranas. 32
independence. Nepal, by contrast, was never The NC, supported by other parties, 33
colonized, despite its dependent relationship launched a three-month armed revolution in 34
with the British Raj in India. Thus, democ- November 1950 that succeeded in winning 35
racy was intimately connected to liberation control of much of the eastern hills, as well as 36
from the native despotic rule of the Ranas. the towns of Birganj and Tansen in the west. 37
Inspiration came from the general Asian But the insurrection did not culminate in 38
resurgence of the 1940s and,in particular,from military victory,as some Congress activists had 39
the Indian independence movement in which hoped. Rather: “[T]he decisive battles of the 40
several early NC leaders participated.However, revolution were fought in New Delhi between 41
the structural conditions of Nepal’s internal the Indian government and the Rana gov- 42
environment of the time could not be said to ernment, at the diplomatic level.”3 This indi- 43
be highly conducive to democracy. cates how powerful external factors behind the 44
Nepal under the Rana oligarchy (1846– dawn of democracy in Nepal were. Despite 45
1950) was what South Asians call highly feudal their isolationist policies, the Ranas had failed 46
in its social order, with a subsistence agricul- to check the global trend towards national 47
tural economy, a society governed by an independence and democracy. Independent 48
132
 N E PA L : T R A J E CTO R I E S O F D E M O C R ACY A N D R E ST R U CT U R I N G O F T H E STAT E
1 India backed the democracy struggle in Nepal
2 in several ways: providing asylum to dissidents,
3 including King Tribhuvan; allowing space for
4 the organization of anti-Rana activities; trans-
5 mitting the ideology of democracy; and
6 exerting diplomatic pressure on the Ranas to
7 compromise with the King and the NC.India’s
8 predominant role was acknowledged by all
9 contending political forces in the country, and
10 it was India’s solution that was accepted,
11 although the Ranas initially resisted it: the
12 return of King Tribhuvan to the throne in place
13 of his grandson Gyanendra who had been
14 crowned in his absence,a coalition government
15 of the Ranas and the NC, and a new con-
16 stitution to be framed by an elected constituent
17 assembly.4
18 The restoration of the Shah monarchy and
19 advent of democracy were the twin goals of
20 the 1950–51 armed revolution and so the
21 Interim Government of Nepal Act 1951
22 provided for a polity based on the principle of
23 the King in Council of Ministers;this was later
24 modified to the model of King in Parliament
25 by the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal
26 1959. Alongside these constitutional arrange-
27 ments, the basic principles of democracy were
28 also adopted, i.e., the rule of law, a multiparty
29 competitive system, periodic elections, funda-
30 mental rights, an independent judiciary, a
31 modern bureaucracy, and so on. But, against
32 the spirit of the 1951 and 1959 constitutions,
33 which posited the monarchy and democracy as
34 complementary to each other, actual politics
35 in the post-Rana period moved in the
36 direction of a zero-sum game between tradi-
37 tional forces led by the king, on the one side,
38 and modern forces led by political parties, on
39 the other.5 The 1950s were, in effect, a
40 prolonged interim period with ten govern-
41 ments in eight years (including direct rule by
42 the king). King Mahendra, who ascended the
43 throne following his father’s demise in 1955,
44 gradually consolidated the bases of royal rule.
45 The often-postponed elections were finally
46 held in February 1959. The NC won two
47 thirds of the seats on 37 percent of the vote.
48 Their popular leader B. P. Koirala became
prime minister, but he was unable to check
King Mahendra’s ambition. Mahendra dis-
mantled democracy by means of a bloodless
coup in December 1960.
Restoring democracy, 1960–2002
The movement for the restoration of demo-
cracy (MRD)—although its roots go right
back to 1960 when King Mahendra intro-
duced absolute monarchy under the banner of
the partyless Panchayat democracy—reached
its climax with the 1990 mass movement
(called “Jan Andolan I”). King Mahendra
introduced a new constitution in 1962, which
for the first time explicitly designated Nepal as
a Hindu kingdom. On the one hand, Nepal
joined the ranks of many “guided demo-
cracies”such as Pakistan,Egypt,Indonesia,and
so on. On the other hand, in the early days,
Mahendra and his ideological supporters
imagined that they could “unleash the energies
of the country for development,” as they often
put it,by mobilizing youth and imitating some
of the methods of Chairman Mao. However,
sending Master’s students to the villages as a
compulsory part of their education turned out
to be a way to radicalize the villagers, and the
regime quickly put a stop to it.
Opposition to the authoritarian Panchayat
regime began with small-scale armed resistance
by the NC in the early 1960s and the early
1970s (including raids across the border and
the hijacking of a plane). Initially the regime
concentrated on its main opponent, the NC,
and did not attempt to repress communist
activity so severely; subsequently many com-
munists also spent long periods in jail. In
1972–73 there was a short-lived communist
revolt (a series of targeted assassinations of
landlords) in Jhapa, east Nepal, inspired by the
Naxalite uprising just over the border in India
six years earlier.The Panchayat regime was able
to suppress these struggles effectively for three
main reasons. First, India gave priority to its
security interests,in maintaining its supremacy
over the southern flanks of the Himalayas,
133
K R I S H N A H AC H H E T H U A N D DAV I D N . G E L L N E R

especially during and after its humiliation in and buying votes, won by 55 percent to 45 1
the India–China war of 1962. This correlated percent. Despite losing the referendum, the 2
with the primacy of strategic interest over parties had been allowed the freedom to 3
ideological interest on the part of the super- organize during the campaign, a freedom that 4
powers during the Cold War,although it fit less was hard to reverse after it was over. The 5
well with the high moral tone adopted by India Panchayat system itself moved in a more 6
in arguing for nonalignment on the world democratic direction with direct elections to 7
stage. (Nepal’s strategy in response to this was the national legislature, explicit responsibility 8
to attempt to cultivate ties also with China,and of the cabinet to the legislature, and limited 9
later, under King Birendra, to attempt to win political freedom.Thus, both the internal and 10
agreement from neighbors to declare Nepal a external situations developed in the direction 11
zone of peace. However, India never agreed to of greater democratization in the 1980s. 12
this.) Second, as a consequence of the adverse Increasingly, the legitimacy of the partyless 13
external situation,anti-establishment forces,in system became eroded; its incumbents were 14
particular the NC, were reduced to seeking mired in repeated corruption scandals, includ- 15
strategies for survival. Thus in 1968 Subarna ing some which were widely believed to reach 16
Shamsher,the leader of the NC in exile offered right up into the royal palaces. 17
“loyal cooperation [with the king].” B.P. Although democracy suffered a setback in 18
Koirala was then released from jail and went 1960, it was a key part of the legitimacy sought 19
into exile in India. Similarly, in 1977, the NC by King Mahendra that he aimed to be a 20
adopted a policy of “national reconciliation”: democratic, modernizing, and reforming 21
in 1975, after Mrs Gandhi declared her king— for all that he simultaneously sought to 22
emergency, staying in exile in India became portray himself as an authentic Hindu monarch 23
problematic for B.P.Koirala and his lieutenant, and to enlist the support of pro-Hindu groups 24
Ganeshman Singh;both of them were arrested in India. Thus, the process of modernization, 25
on their return to Nepal in 1976.Third,despite begun in 1951, was continued under the 26
some internal tensions and conflicts, the elite partyless Panchayat system. A new civil code 27
in Kathmandu was essentially united around the in 1963 established equality before the law 28
king in his determination to rule and to sup- regardless of caste, creed, and sex, and the 29
press violent opposition, a unity and deter- implementation of the Land Reform Act 30
mination which contrasted strongly with the 1964, with its provisions for ceilings on land- 31
attitude of the center when it was faced by holdings, the protection of tenancy rights, and 32
armed rebellion again in the late 1990s. the regulation of land rents, over time funda- 33
This determination gradually dissipated in the mentally undermined hierarchical depen- 34
1980s. dencies on upper-caste landholding families in 35
King Mahendra’s son Birendra, whose rule most areas of the country. This was comple- 36
began in 1972, was certainly a softer and more mented by rapid progress in infrastructure 37
compromising character than either his father developments, i.e., education, health, road 38
or his brother Gyanendra. In 1980, following transportation, communications, and so on, 39
violent student protests sparked by the hang- which in turn produced a critical mass of 40
ing of Zulfikar Bhutto in Pakistan, but clearly educated middle-class and urbanized Nepalis. 41
aimed at authoritarian government nearer By the end of the decade of 1980s the literacy 42
home, the king conceded a referendum on rate in Nepal had reached around 39 percent; 43
the future of the Panchayat system. The the road network was 7,330 kilometers long; 44
Panchayat side, making full use of the advant- the number of cities was 35; and communi- 45
ages of government incumbency and also, cation media, including television, had pro- 46
according to its opponents,thanks to consider- liferated. Progress was evident in infrastructure 47
able corruption in the form of selling forests and education,but jobs and income generation 48
134
 N E PA L : T R A J E CTO R I E S O F D E M O C R ACY A N D R E ST R U CT U R I N G O F T H E STAT E
1 opportunities were much harder to come by.
2 This led to the problem of educated unemploy-
3 ment, combined with price rises, as well as, for
4 many, perceived ethnic inequalities.The result
5 was a frustrated middle class, which, especially
6 in the 1980s, began to seek redress through
7 various civil society forms.“Nepali civil society
8 originated and revived as a part of [the]
9 democratic movement”6 and it was the
10 backbone of “extra systemic opposition”during
11 the Panchayat period.7 The 1990 mass
12 movement was largely a middle-class urban
13 movement; it combined student radicalism,
14 support from professional groups, such as
15 doctors, and an unacknowledged ethnic
16 element, since the revolts were based in the old
17 Newar cities of the Kathmandu Valley and
18 mobilized both men and women of the Newar
19 peasant caste.The young people of this caste are
20 suspended between a peasant (and pro-
21 communist) elder generation and past, on the
22 one side,and incipient middle-class identity,on
23 the other side, since they are urban dwellers
24 who have,for the most part,prospered from the
25 development of the capital.8
26 The 1990 mass movement in Nepal formed
27 one small part of the global “third wave” of
28 democracy. The fall of dictators in Eastern
29 Europe, Asia, Africa, and Latin America
30 boosted the morale of democratic forces of
31 Nepal. The international environment—the
32 global relaxation in east–west tensions, as well
33 as the détente in Sino–Indian relations—
34 reduced the room for maneuver of the
35 authoritarian Panchayat system. Moreover,
36 relations between Nepal and India in the late
37 1980s were strained for several reasons: in
38 particular, India took umbrage at Nepal’s
39 import of arms from China, which it held to
40 be in violation of the 1950 Friendship Treaty.
41 The semi-blockade imposed by the Indian
42 government in 1989 when Nepal tried to
43 renegotiate the Trade and Transit Treaty was
44 in part retaliation for this; the economic
45 hardships experienced in Nepal’s cities added
46 to dissatisfaction with the regime that
47 boiled over in 1990. However, in contrast
48 to its decisive and directing role in 1950–51,
the Indian government adopted a “non-
interference” attitude in 1990. Nonetheless,
Chandra Shekhar—at that time a leading
figure in the National Front government of
India, who became prime minister the
following year—provided very significant
moral support by visiting Nepal in January
1990 and publicly speaking out in favor of the
overthrow of tyrannical rule by democratic
forces.A similar role was played by US Senator
Stephen Solarz in mobilizing support from
American and other western human rights
activists and non-governmental organizations.
At the outset of the 1990 mass movement,
unity between two different ideological
streams—the NC, on the one side, and several
splinter communist parties,on the other— was
remarkable. Unlike in 1950–51, when the
Communist party was relatively insignificant,
the leftist forces had developed in size and
strength during the Panchayat period and so
they were able to play a prominent and active
role in 1990, which was duly acknowledged in
post-movement political arrangements. A
coalition government led by the NC, com-
prising representatives of both the Left and the
king, brought forward a new constitution,
namely, the Constitution of the Kingdom of
Nepal 1990, which adopted a Westminster
model of parliamentary democracy and con-
stitutional monarchy. This new constitution,
although vesting sovereignty in the people,kept
the king as head of state and of the armed
forces, and gave him the power, in the fateful
article 127, to take power in an emergency “in
order to remove difficulties.” Contentiously
also, the constitution continued to designate
Nepal as “a Hindu Kingdom,” even though it
also dubbed it “multiethnic”and “multilingual”
(the adjectives “multireligious” and “secular”
were conspicuously absent).Finally,the fact that
the constitution, although vesting sovereignty
in the people, had been granted by the king,
gave legitimacy to the Maoists’ demand for a
constituent assembly. Had the king and those
in the palace been convinced of the need to
help make constitutional monarchy work,none
of these problems would have been insuperable.
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In a context where many in the palace sought foreign business in to run major infrastructure 1
a return to the monarchical preeminence of the projects) neither generated employment nor 2
Panchayat era, they turned out to be fatal flaws inspired confidence in transparency and good 3
in the constitutional design. governance. The disparities between the 4
Three successive parliamentary elections remote rural areas and the cities were exacer- 5
were held in 1991, 1994, and 1999, and two bated. The country only remained afloat 6
nationwide elections for local government economically because of the growing remit- 7
institutions in 1992 and 1997.The NC and the tances sent from abroad (India, the Gulf 8
Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist- countries, Southeast Asia, South Korea) by 9
Leninist), usually known by the initials UML, poor Nepalis working in construction and 10
emerged as the two major parties. The former security; this was ironic since the elite was at 11
formed a majority government after the 1991 the same time exporting capital,either to invest 12
and 1999 general elections (on the latter abroad directly or in the form of school and 13
occasion thanks to a split in the UML). After college fees for their offspring in India, the 14
the 1994 mid-term elections, the UML was USA, and other Western countries. 15
the largest party in a hung parliament and The problem of underdevelopment and 16
formed a minority government. This was soon uneven development was further exacerbated 17
brought down, however, by a vote of no con- by disparities along caste/ethnic and regional 18
fidence,and the pattern of unstable,indecisive, lines. Ethnic difference had been downplayed 19
coalition governments that characterized the in the Panchayat era of nation building.People 20
mid-1990s and gave the political parties such of Indian origin living in the southern strip, 21
a bad name, was set (see Tables 9.1 and 9.2). the Tarai, were in a particularly sensitive 22
Although the second experiment with position.The border with India is completely 23
party democracy lasted longer than in 1959, it open: Nepalis may cross and work in India 24
was likewise full of stress and strains.9 The without papers and vice versa. In many border 25
political parties began with a huge fund of areas, Nepalis own fields in India and vice 26
goodwill, which they rapidly squandered. versa.Nepali citizens marry,shop,go to college, 27
Adopting neoliberal solutions to Nepal’s deep- and carry out business in India—and vice 28
seated economic and ecological problems versa.In other words,it is a border that,in many 29
(selling off nationalized industries, inviting of the modern understandings of the term, is 30
31
32
Table 9.1 Political party positions in the first, second, and third parliamentary elections in Nepal 33
Parties Number of seats elected % of popular vote 34
1991 1994 1999 1991 1994 1999
35
36
Nepali Congress (NC) 110 83 112 37.75 33.38 36.14 37
Unified Marxist-Leninist (NCP-UML) 69 88 70 27.98 30.85 30.74
Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP) 4 20 11 11.94 17.93 13.46
38
Nepal Sadbhawana Party (NSP) 6 3 5 4.10 3.49 3.13 39
National People’s Front – – 5 – – 1.36 40
Nepal Worker and Peasant Party (NWPP) 2 4 1 1.25 0.98 0.54 41
United People’s Front (UPF) 9 0 1 4.35 1.32 0.83 42
Communist Party of Nepal (Democratic) 2 0 0 2.43 0.38 0.06
Independents 3 7 0 4.17 6.18 2.83
43
Other small parties 0 0 0 6.04 5.49 10.92 44
Total 205 205 205 100.00 100.00 100.00 45
46
Source: Election Commission, House of Representative Members, 2048 (1991): Final Results; House of
Representative Members, 2051 (1994): Election Results; House of Representative Members, 2056 (1999): 47
Election Results 48
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1 Table 9.2 Governments of Nepal, 1990–2005

2 PM Parties Length Dates
3
1 KP Bhattarai Congress + ULF interim 13 months 19/04/90–25/05/91
4
5 First general election (1991) Congress 110 seats (37.8% votes), UML 69 (28%)
6 2 GP Koirala Congress majority 42 months 26/05/91–28/11/94
7 Second general election (1994) Congress 83 seats (33.4%), UML 88 (30.9%)
8
3 MM Adhikari UML minority 9 months 29/11/94–10/09/95
9 4 SB Deuba Congress–NDP–NSP coalition 18 months 11/09/95–11/03/97
10 5 LB Chand RPP–UML coalition 7 months 12/03/97–05/10/97
11 6 SB Thapa RPP–Congress–NSP coalition 6 months 06/10/97–25/03/98
12 7 GP Koirala Congress minority 5 months 26/03/98–25/08/98
8 GP Koirala Congress–ML coalition 4 months 26/08/98–22/12/98
13
9 GP Koirala Congress–UML–NSP coalition 5 months 23/12/98–26/05/99
14
15 Third general election (1999) Congress 112 seats (36.1%), UML 70 (30.7%)
16 10 KP Bhattarai Congress 9 months 27/05/99–09/03/00
17 11 GP Koirala Congress 16 months 10/03/00–22/07/01
12 SB Deuba Congress, later Congress (D) 14 months 23/07/01–04/10/02
18
13 LB Chand Non-party 8 months 11/10/02–31/05/03
19 14 SB Thapa Non-party (in practice RPP) 11 months 04/06/03–07/05/04
20 15 SB Deuba Cong (D) + NSP(Mandal) + UML + RPP 8 months 01/06/04–01/02/05
21
22
23 not a border.The fact that Madhesis,as Nepalis offices of state and society were dominated by
24 of Indian ethnicity and language are called, are Bahuns, Chhetris, and Newars could now be
25 indistinguishable culturally from Indians means documented and demonstrated (see Tables 9.3
26 that their loyalty to Nepal is always suspected and 9.4). For the first time, reservations
27 by hill people (Pahades or Parbatiyas).Madhesis (affirmative action) became possible, politically
28 know and resent this.For many years they have feasible, and increasingly unavoidable.10
29 felt that they have been treated like a colony of Frequent changes of government (see
30 the hills, despite the fact that the Tarai is now Table 9.2) meant that governments were
31 home to 50 percent of Nepal’s population, unable to address underlying issues. Neither
32 most of its industry, and the great bulk of its were they able to deal with the Maoist insur-
33 agriculturally productive land, and despite the gency,which was launched in the western hills
34 fact that the educational level and capabilities in February 1996.Instability and division at the
35 of many Madhesis is high. center were in marked contrast to the force and
36 The other big cleavages are between the determination with which the Panchayat
37 hill high castes, the Bahuns (Brahmans) and regime had been defended in its heyday. Each
38 Chhetris (Kshatriyas), and those groups that competing power center in Kathmandu sought
39 used to be called hill tribes and are now known to use the growing insurgency to bolster its
40 as Janajatis, and between all these and the own position:the NC hoped that it would split
41 Dalits (former untouchables). None of these the left and undermine its main competitor,
42 differences was acknowledged in the Panchayat the UML; the UML hoped that the main
43 period (it was considered that simply declaring targets would remain NC- and RPP-aligned
44 formal equality before the law was enough). landlords; the palace hoped that the political
45 Following the 1991 census,which recorded and parties would be undermined.The first force
46 published the results,ethnic difference emerged to benefit from increasing weakness and
47 into the public sphere and was increasingly instability at the Center was the palace. The
48 politicized.The extent to which all the major king seized power in two steps,first in October

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Table 9.3 Population breakdown of Nepal (2001 census) (total: 23.15 million) with figures for hill minority 1
language loss 2
Parbatiyas Hill minorities Language loss Madhesis Others 3
(“hill people”) (Janajatis) among minorities (“plains people”) 4
Bahun 13% Magar 7.2% 52.1% (67.9) Tharu 6.7% Muslims 4.2% 5
Chhetri (incl. Newar 5.5% 34.5% (33.7) Yadav 4% 6
Thakuri) 18% 7
Dalit 9% Tamang 5.6% 7.1% (11.2) (+ many small
8
castes incl. Dalits
and Janajatis) 9
Rai 3% 23.2% (16.4) 10
Gurung 2.4% 47.5% (49.5) 11
Limbu 1.6% 6.2% (14.5) 12
Total 40% 25% 30% 5%
13
Notes: Dalit = former untouchables; Janajatis (underlined) are mainly those who were formerly called hill tribes (many 14
Tharus, as noted, reject the label “Madhesi”): 59 groups were officially designated as Janajatis in February 2002, not all 15
of which had been included in the 2001 census. Estimated figures for language loss are courtesy of John Whelpton,
with the 1991 figures given in parentheses (see Whelpton 1997: 59). All figures are likely to be disputed. Those for
16
language loss require particular care. The apparent increase in minorities speaking “their” language since 1991 may be 17
ascribed to the increased politicization of the issue and the fact that many Magar activists, for example, campaigned for 18
people to return their language as “Magar” regardless of what they spoke at home.
19
20
21
Table 9.4 Presence (percentage) of different groups in leadership positions in Nepal, 1999 22
Dominant groups Marginalized groups 23
24
Bahun/ Newar Madhesi Janajati Dalit Other No. of
Chhetri individuals
25
26
1 Court 77 13.6 7.6 1.7 0 0 235 27
2 Constitutional bodies 56 24 12 2.8 0 0 25
3 Cabinet 62.5 9.4 15.6 12.5 0 0 32
28
4 Parliament 60 7.6 17.4 13.6 1.5 0 265 29
5 Public administration 77.6 17.6 3.7 1.2 0 0 245 30
6 Party leadership 58.8 10.9 15.8 15.2 0 0 165 31
7 Local elected bodies 55.5 15.7 16.2 12 0 0 191 32
8 Commerce and industry 16.7 47.6 35.7 0 0 0 42
9 Educational arena 77.3 11.3 7.2 2.1 1 1 97
33
10 Cultural arena 69.1 17.9 0 4.9 0 0 123 34
11 Science/technology 58.1 29 9.7 3.2 0 0 62 35
12 Civil society leadership 75.9 14.8 7.4 1.9 0 0 54 36
Total 66.5 15.2 11.2 7.1 0.3 1 37
Population % 31.6 5.6 30.9 22.2 8.7 1
38
Difference with +34.9 +9.6 –19.7 –15.1 –8.4 –1 39
population % 40
41
Note: Although Newars are officially included in the Janajati category, in practice their “advanced” position, as the
inhabitants of the capital with a higher HDI than any group in the country, makes it sensible to treat them 42
separately. 43
44
Source: Neupane, Govinda, Nepalko Jatiya Prashna (The Caste/Ethnicity Question in Nepal) (Kathmandu: Centre
for Development Studies, 2000) 45
46
47
48
138
 N E PA L : T R A J E CTO R I E S O F D E M O C R ACY A N D R E ST R U CT U R I N G O F T H E STAT E
1 2002, when he dismissed Prime Minister
2 Deuba and called for a technocratic govern-
3 ment of those with a “clean image,” and
4 subsequently with a full-blown coup d’état in
5 February 2005, when phone and internet
6 connections were shut down for a week and
7 the King himself became the chair of the
8 Council of Ministers.
9 a CA;second,the Maoists reciprocated with an
10
11 Reinventing democracy after
12 2002
13
14 Until the royal coup of February 2005 political
15 struggle took the form of a triangular conflict
16 with different roles and motives for each of the
17 key actors. The king, while sidelining the
18 political parties,attempted to tackle the Maoist
19 insurgency alternately by negotiation or
20 suppression (the army is said to have promised
21 to deal with the insurgency within six months,
22 which it signally failed to do).11 The main-
23 stream parties, united under the banner of the
24 Seven Party Alliance (SPA),launched a series of
25 street protests against the King’s “regression”
26 (pratigaman),while keeping their distance from
27 the Maoists and their violent methods. The
28 standing of Girija Prasad Koirala (the younger
29 brother of B.P.) in the post-2006 period
30 stemmed from his outspoken and unwavering
31 opposition to the king from October 2002
32 onwards, whereas other leading politicians
33 allowed themselves to be tempted into
34 compromise and accepting participation in the
35 king’s governments. Finally, the CPN (Maoist)
36 was able to escalate its “People’s War” more
37 intensely during the time of the royal regime,
38 winning some important morale-boosting
39 battles, such as over-running Beni, the district
40 headquarters of Myagdi, in March 2004 and
41 the hill town of Tansen in January 2006.
42 The king’s coup of 1 February, 2005, in
43 which the major leaders were all put under
44 house arrest and the leaders of civil society and
45 political activists were taken into military
46 barracks and in some cases tortured,forced the
47 parties closer to the CPN-M. The Maoist
48 leaders, aware that they would not be able to
conquer the cities militarily, were also looking
at the possibility of alliance with the parties.
This turning point in oppositional politics was
reflected in the 12-point understanding made
between the SPA and the CPN-M in Delhi in
November 2005. It contained three key
commitments: first, the SPA endorsed the
CPN-M fundamental demand for elections to
assurance that they accepted a multiparty
competitive political system, the prime
concern of the SPA; third, both the SPA and
the Maoists agreed to launch a peaceful mass
movement against the monarchy.
The 12-point pact was agreed with the
active involvement of India. As in previous
democracy movements, the external factor in
the April 2006 Jan Andolan II was extremely
important,although unlike 1951 or 1990 it did
not correspond to any global “wave.” The
change of government in India in May 2004,
with a Congress-led alliance replacing the BJP,
limited the king’s ability to play on Hindu
sentiment in India or to mobilize his kin links
with Indian royal families. Sita Ram Yechuri, a
leader of the Communist Party of India
(Marxist), a major supporter of the ruling
coalition in India, played a similar role to that
of Chandra Shekhar in 1990. Disappointed by
King Gyanendra’s attempt to bring in China as
an observer in SAARC, and frustrated by
his repeated rejection of Indian advice to
compromise with the political parties, India
took a tough stand against the king’s coup.
The international community had been sym-
pathetic to King Gyanendra’s post-October
2002 political project of combining the
monarchy and democracy to counter the
Maoist “terrorist” threat, but it unequivocally
condemned the King’s seizure of power in
February 2005. The principal suppliers of
military aid—India, the US, and the UK—
postponed their shipments. Many donors
withdrew or cut their earlier commitments to
development aid as well.There were attempts
in the international community to persuade
the leaders of the April 2006 popular move-
ment to accept a return to the status quo ante
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K R I S H N A H AC H H E T H U A N D DAV I D N . G E L L N E R

February 2005, i.e., retaining the monarchy as no longer be ignored or taken for granted by 1
an important actor. Such moves were rejected Kathmandu. Amendments to the interim 2
outright. Unlike the 1950–51 revolution, but constitution had to be made three times to 3
in some ways similar to 1990, it was internal take into account the demands of the Madhes 4
forces, rather than external pressures, that activists, as well as those of the Janajatis and 5
determined the course and outcome of the the Maoists, incorporating the provisions of 6
April 2006 movement. federalism, delimitation of constituencies 7
The April 2006 Jan Andolan II was unique according to the principle of population size, 8
and unprecedented both in terms of the degree and adaptation of a mixed electoral system 9
of the people’s participation and the nature of weighted more to proportional representation 10
the political demands.It was the most powerful (PR) than to first-past-the-post (FPTP) in the 11
anti-establishment struggle that Nepal has distribution of CA seats. 12
witnessed.The 1950–51 revolution was fought The CA election was held peacefully and 13
by the NC’s cadres as a guerrilla war, like the in a relatively free and fair manner despite 14
Maoist insurgency of 1996–2006, though on a massive pre-election apprehension about 15
much smaller scale. The 1990 MRD was a violence and rigging. (There was certainly 16
largely urban and middle-class movement,with some intimidation in districts where the 17
a specifically Newar ethnic element. By Maoists are strong, such as Rukum and 18
contrast, the April 2006 Jan Andolan II was Gorkha,but not enough to invalidate the result 19
rural in the specific sense that many among as a whole.) As expected the election pro- 20
the millions of people who participated in this duced a hung assembly but what was unex- 21
19-day popular uprising were rural dwellers pected and surprising, even to the winners 22
who had come (or, as many claimed, had been themselves, was that the CPN-M—a former 23
sent by the Maoists) to the cities for this very insurgent group—should come out on top 24
purpose. In Kathmandu the main sites of with a total strength of 220 out of 575 elected 25
opposition were around the ring road, i.e., seats, putting its rivals—the NC and the 26
close to the new poor suburbs settled by UML—far behind.The NC, which expected 27
migrants from the hills; the old city cores were to win, came second with 110. The UML, 28
very quiet by comparison. which was also confident—evidently over- 29
The post-April 2006 transition ushered in confident—of winning, came third with 103 30
important political developments, namely seats. The rise of regional ethnic parties was 31
reinstatement of the dissolved parliament along confirmed by the fact that the Madhes 32
with formation of a government led by NC Janadhikar Forum (MJF)—a party created 33
leader G. P. Koirala in April 2006, signing from the Madhes uprising of January 2007 — 34
of a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) won 52 seats and another Tarai party, the Tarai 35
between the government and the CPN-M in Madhes Loktantrik Party (TMLP), led by 36
November 2006 followed by placement of Mahantha Thakur who had defected from the 37
the CPN-M’s combatants in cantonments, NC, scored 20 seats. 38
promulgation of the interim constitution of Simply to hold the elections was itself a 39
Nepal in January 2007 and subsequent parti- major achievement. The other accomplish- 40
cipation by the CPN-M in the interim ments of the transitional period (April 2006 41
parliament and government in January–April to April 2008) flowed from the aim of 42
2007, and the Madhes uprising in January restructuring the state.The three key elements 43
2007, which recurred in January 2008. The of this project are the transformation of the 44
frequent bandhs, bombs, and assassinations, and armed conflict, the end of monarchical rule 45
the emergence of a plethora of small armed forever, and the advancement of inclusive 46
groups hiding over the border in India, estab- democracy. 47
lished that the strategically important Tarai can 48
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 N E PA L : T R A J E CTO R I E S O F D E M O C R ACY A N D R E ST R U CT U R I N G O F T H E STAT E
1 The transformation of armed
2 conflict
3 changed ideological position, the party was
4 The restoration of democracy in April 2006—
5 against the background of a decade-long war
6 (1996–2006) between the Maoist guerrillas
7 and the state security forces in which around
8 13,000 people lost their lives12—is closely
9 associated with the peace project. After the
10 1950–51 revolution, conflict transformation
11 was not a big challenge either technically or
12 politically. The NC Mukti Sena (liberation
13 army) was simply turned into the Nepal police
14 as Nepal did not have a proper police force at
15 that time. The NC’s intentions were not in
16 doubt because the political system introduced
17 after the 1950–51 revolution conformed to its
18 ideology of multiparty democracy. Today’s
19 parallel situation is not so simple, even though
20 the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is in
21 cantonments,its arms are locked in containers,
22 and the United Nations Mission in Nepal
23 (UNMIN) is monitoring the arms manage-
24 ment process. The CPN-M disclosed only
25 3,428 weapons, whereas the number of its
26 combatants living in the cantonments is
27 19,601. Moreover, the Nepal Army is firmly
28 against any integration with the PLA whereas
29 the CPN-M is unlikely to revise its proposal
30 for the integration of the Nepal Army and the
31 PLA. The PLA was constituted and trained
32 according to communist principles;clearly,the
33 restructuring of the state will require both the
34 party and the PLA to adapt to a multiparty
35 political system.
36 To the surprise of many observers, the
37 CPN-M as a party began to adapt in this
38 direction, even in 2003 when the insurgency
39 was at its peak. At this stage, it was running a
40 parallel administration in the many areas under
41 its control.13 Perhaps the decision was taken in
42 realization of the impossibility of military
43 victory over the state army, and with a plan for
44 collaboration with the mainstream parties in
45 order to consolidate all anti-monarchy forces.
46 After signing the 12-point understanding with
47 the SPA in November 2005, the CPN-M
48 publicly reaffirmed its faith in the multiparty
system, provided the SPA backed its demands
for a CA and a republic. In conformity with its
actively involved in every important decision
taken in the post-Jan Andolan II transitional
process. Despite some ambivalence and
inconsistency in words and deeds,the CPN-M
has basically been moving towards a new
commitment to peaceful politics.The crux of
the matter is that the transformation of the
CPN-M may very well be a necessary condi-
tion of the survival of multiparty democracy
in Nepal.
Establishment of a republic
Jan Andolan II was the final showdown in a
half-century-long confrontation between
democracy and monarchy. King Gyanendra
ascended the throne against the background of
the royal massacre of 1 June, 2001 in which
King Birendra along with all his immediate
family members and five other royals were
killed.The then Crown Prince Dipendra was
the culprit according to the official version.
However,because King Gyanendra was absent
and both his wife and his son Paras, who were
present, survived, the vast majority of Nepali
people became convinced that it was a con-
spiracy. The personal unpopularity of both
Gyanendra and Paras fueled republican
sentiment and massively undermined people’s
faith in the institution of monarchy. The rise
of ethnic activism, accompanied by demands
for a secular state, also had a negative impact
on the traditional legitimacy of the Nepali
monarchy. Since the unification of Nepal in
1768, the Shah dynasty had made concerted
efforts to blend inherent rights with divine
authority, promoting Hinduism as a symbol of
the Nepali nation. Now the whole package of
Hinduism and monarchy—far from being
a bulwark of democracy as Gyanendra’s
father Mahendra had claimed—was seen as
inimical to it.
Gyanendra’s own political ambitions were
also to blame for the rise of republicanism.
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The February 2005 royal coup—the logical The CPN-M’s relentless campaigns for a 1
culmination of the series of royal takeovers republic eventually forced the government, in 2
begun in October 2002—was primarily November 2007, to insert a provision into the 3
justified by the failure of the party regime to interim constitution declaring Nepal a federal 4
counter the Maoist insurgency. But people’s republic.The original provision that the fate of 5
initial hopes that there was to be a rapid monarchy would be decided by a simple 6
improvement in the situation were quickly majority of the CA members in its first 7
dashed by the lack of any plan— economic, meeting was retained and it was understood, 8
political, or military. Instead, the CPN-M’s certainly by the Maoists,that this meant simply 9
violent “People’s War” rapidly intensified and that the CA would put the already taken 10
spread all over the country. By systematically decision into operation. As parties contesting 11
opposing and undermining the political on a republican platform swept the CA 12
parties, King Gyanendra pushed them into the election and the CPN-M, long the leading 13
arms of the Maoists.The single biggest reason champion of republicanism, went on to head 14
for the success of republicanism in Nepal has the post-CA election government, it was 15
been the shortsightedness of the monarch. clear that the days of the Shah dynasty, which 16
Unlike his father’s assertion of authoritarian had ruled Nepal for nearly 240 years, were 17
rule in 1960, Gyanendra’s attempt cannot be numbered. 18
said to have corresponded to any worldwide 19
movement or tendency; Gyanendra himself 20
lacked either the toughness or the military Inclusive democracy 21
experience that would have enabled him to 22
follow such unhappy regional examples as The government of post-2006 Nepal will be 23
Pakistan or Burma, and it was the army radically different from anything that has gone 24
generals who went to him in April 2006 and before. The 1990 constitution, though it 25
told him the game was up. permitted reservations and designated the state 26
Jan Andolan II was, in fact, a republican as “multiethnic” and “multilingual,” neither 27
movement in spirit, even though the 12-point built measures of positive discrimination into 28
pact explicitly claimed only to be aiming at the structure of the state nor gave any con- 29
“the end of the absolute monarchical system.” sideration to the introduction of proportional 30
The post-Andolan period saw the rapid representation. This very weak support for 31
removal of monarchical relevance. The May restructuring was, it became apparent, not 32
2006 Declaration—considered the Nepali going to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of 33
Magna Carta—made by the reinstated House ethnic and regional activists as they became 34
of Representatives, formally cut off the increasingly better organized and mobilized 35
monarchy’s two arms—the Hindu religion and throughout the 1990s. Post-Jan Andolan II 36
the army’s loyalty—by declaring Nepal a politics include much more radical measures. 37
secular state and deleting the title “royal” from The declaration of Nepal as a secular state, the 38
the military and all other state organizations. adoption of bilingualism, a new provision of 39
The change in the popular mood was so radical 45 percent reservations in the bureaucracy for 40
that support for a republican system of govern- excluded groups, a provision ensuring 33 41
ment increased from 15 percent in 2004 to 59 percent representation for women in all state 42
percent in 2007.14 Consequently, the interim machinery, including elected bodies and 43
Prime Minister G. P. Koirala was forced to political parties, distribution of 335 PR seats 44
withdraw his proposal to save the monarchy by in the CA as per the size of the population of 45
installing a “baby king” through the voluntary different social segments, and political and 46
abdication of both king and crown prince in constitutional commitments to federalism are 47
favor of Gyanendra’s grandson Hridayendra. some of the concrete decisions in favor of 48
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1 inclusive democracy made during the transi-
2 tional period.
3 The restoration of multiparty democracy in
4 1990 coincided with an ethnic revival.As one
5 of us has written:“If the period 1960 to 1990
6 was one of nation-building, the [period] since
7 then has been a time of ethnicity-building.”15
8 The principles of popular sovereignty,equality,
9 freedom, cultural rights, and the right to
10 organize provided a platform for ethnic
11 activism.The disadvantaged of Nepal fall into
12 three large blocs: the Janajatis, Madhesis, and
13 Dalits and each of these groups has its own
14 organizations aiming to speak on behalf of
15 the bloc as a whole. Of all the political forces
16 seeking to cash in on post-1990 ethnic
17 mobilization, the CPN-M seems to have been
18 the most successful.It is certainly thanks to the
19 Maoists that the maximum ethnic demands —
20 for autonomy and federalism—have been
21 adopted into the political agenda.The CPN-
22 M’s concerted effort to blend ethnic rights and
23 class war was evident both in its opening of
24 ethnic “front organizations” and in its division
25 of the country into nine ethnic and region-
26 based “regional governments,” eight of which
27 were declared in the first half of 2004 at mass
28 meetings and heavily publicized afterwards.
29 The experience of the transitional period,
30 2006–08, suggests that street demonstrations,
31 bandhs,and other forms of political protest will
32 not stop just because the CA has been elected.
33 Dalits, women, Janajatis, Madhesis, and other
34 regional groups are all likely to protest if their
35 demands are not met, and some expectations
36 are bound to be disappointed. The NC and
37 UML may themselves turn to the politics of
38 the street now that they find themselves
39 in opposition. The Madhesi movement of
40 January–February 2007 was the strongest,
41 most violent, and most effective set of street
42 protests Nepal has seen—and the lesson has
43 surely not been lost on others. During the
44 21 most intense days of the Madhesi move-
45 ment, 27 people lost their lives, more than the
46 21 people who died in April 2006. A further
47 27 Maoists were massacred in Gaur, the capital
48 of Rautahat, right on the Indian border, when
a Madhes and a Maoist meeting were called
at the same place on the same day. It was the
sheer ferocity and persistence of the Madhes
uprising that convinced the interim govern-
ment that there was no alternative but to
accede to demands for federalism, the redistri-
bution of electoral constituencies on the basis
of the size of population, and ethnic repre-
sentation for the CA members elected under
the PR system.
For the first time in Nepali history, the hill
high castes will find their representation
reduced in the national legislature to their
own population size 31 to 32 percent, where
previously it had been between 54 and 63
percent. For the first time in the electoral
history of Nepal, the Janajatis, Dalits, and
Madhesis will be represented approximately in
proportion to the size of their population.
Having one-third women in the CA will also
be a new phenomenon.This may have a massive
demonstration effect on the whole country.
Conclusion: A comparison with
recent developments in Bhutan
For those looking from afar, Nepal is often
bracketed with Bhutan since both are (or, in
Nepal’s case,were) Himalayan kingdoms.There
are some fairly radical differences, however.
Nepal’s population is heading towards 30
million, half of whom live in the Tarai
bordering India and sharing much with the
neighboring Indian states of UP, Bihar, and
West Bengal.Bhutan’s population is less than 1
million. The ruling elite of Nepal is and has
always been Hindu and pro-Indian in outlook;
Nepali is close to Hindi and most Nepalis can
understand Hindi fairly easily.The ruling elite
and dynasty of Bhutan are Tibetan Buddhists
and the national language of Bhutan is a dialect
of Tibetan.
Despite these highly significant differences
of scale, culture, and history, there is a striking
(albeit inverted) structural similarity between
the problems faced by the two countries.
Nepal’s key ethnic problem—although most
143
K R I S H N A H AC H H E T H U A N D DAV I D N . G E L L N E R

Nepalis only woke up to the fact in January monarchical “democracy,” liberal party-based 1
2007—is the presence of a sizeable minority democracy, communist “people’s democracy,” 2
of Nepali citizens (over 30 percent) who are and multiculturalism.17 Bhutan has attempted 3
ethnically Indian and who are no longer to shortcircuit further internal dissent by 4
willing to accept second-class citizenship or moving from guided democracy without 5
being ruled by non-Madhesis. Bhutan’s key elections (somewhat similar to Nepal’s early 6
ethnic problem was the presence of a similarly Panchayat regime) to a form of guided party 7
sized minority of Nepali origin,likewise based elections.The first elections under this system 8
in the fertile south, the so-called Lhotshampas were held in March 2008. Only two parties 9
(“southerners”).Bhutan has,in the short term, were allowed to run.To the surprise of many, 10
attempted to solve this problem by a degree of the Bhutan Peace and Prosperity Party, led by 11
ethnic cleansing, expelling over 100,000 Jigme Y. Thinley, won over two thirds of the 12
Lhotshampas in 1990, who ended up crossing votes and 45 out of 47 seats in the new 13
the short span of Indian territory and being Parliament. In short, Bhutan is attempting to 14
settled in UNHCR-run camps inside Nepal. combine the first two models (monarchical 15
The achievements of Nepal’s Maoists are guided and liberal democracy), while firmly 16
arguably unparalleled in world history. What rejecting the latter two. Nepal, by contrast, has 17
other Maoist movement has gone from armed seen the definitive defeat of the first model and 18
movement to success in national polls in 12 a rapprochement between the other three. 19
short years? (Ironically, had they not pushed so 20
hard, along with ethnic activists, for the PR [We would like to thank John Whelpton for 21
system, they would, after the April 2008 helpful comments on an earlier draft. This 22
elections, have had 50 percent of the seats, chapter was composed in the immediate 23
instead of 229 out of 601.) These achievements, aftermath of the April 2008 elections, with 24
which produced a secular republic in Nepal, minor amendments made in March 2009.] 25
have had a powerful demonstration effect on 26
Bhutan’s Lhotshampa population, among 27
whom the Bhutanese Maoist Party (founded Notes 28
2003) started to become quite powerful. In 29
2008 it issued death threats to any Bhutanese 1 “Peaceful” is a relative term, and the judgment 30
refugee who came out openly in favor of could, of course, be disputed. INSEC, one of 31
the leading human rights organizations in
accepting the US offer to resettle 60,000 of 32
Nepal, recorded that, in 2007, 37 people
them,16 and in some cases carried them out.By were killed by the state, 15 by the Maoists, and 33
January 2009 these threats had died away as the 108 by nine different Madhesi groups 34
process of resettlement got under way. (inseconline.org);75 persons died from the date 35
Nepal’s trajectory towards democracy has of enforcement of the election code of conduct 36
been, as we have shown, highly chequered and (16 January) to the CA election day (Mahendra 37
marked by several phases of violent opposition. Lawoti, “Aspiration to Change and Threat 38
Only in the latter phases has mobilization on Factor” (in Nepali), Himal Khabar Patrika, 39
ethnic grounds been overwhelmingly signifi- 29 April–13 May, 2008, p. 53). 40
2 The category “other,” originally intended to
cant.In Bhutan,by contrast,developments have 41
protect groups not explicitly named, such as
been far more controlled.Violence has been 42
Muslims,was adopted as a reserved category for
less open and the regime’s concern, whether the high castes (i.e.,Bahuns,Chhetris,Thakuris, 43
in politics, tourism, or development projects, and Sanyasis).In 1996 a government committee 44
has been to avoid taking the Nepali path. published a list of 23 castes (by surname) that 45
It is possible to write the history of democ- would be recognized as Dalits. Fifty-nine 46
racy in Nepal and Bhutan in terms of a conflict officially recognized Janajatis (“nationalities,” 47
between four models of democracy: guided what in India are called “tribes”) are listed in a 48
144
 N E PA L : T R A J E CTO R I E S O F D E M O C R ACY A N D R E ST R U CT U R I N G O F T H E STAT E
1 government document published on 10
2 February, 2002; (see D. N. Gellner and M.B.
3 Karki, “Democracy and Ethnic Organizations
4 in Nepal”, in D. N. Gellner and K. Hachhethu
(eds),Local Democracy in South Asia (Delhi:Sage,
5
2008, p. 111) ; there is also a national confederal
6 Communism: Newars and the Nepalese State,”
body bringing together one representative
7 organization from each group, the Nepal
8 Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (see
9 nefin.org.np). Madhesis are the ethnically
10 Indian Nepali citizens who inhabit principally
11 the flat Tarai belt in the south of the country
12 bordering India. Some groups such as Tharus,
13 Santals, and Rajvamshis are both Janajati and
Madhesi, although they often do not wish to
14
be included in the Madhesi category. It is
15
essential for some double-counting of the PR
16
candidates in order for all the required per-
17
centages (which sum to 116 percent) to be
18
fulfilled.Whether Muslims are to be included in
19 the Madhesi category is controversial.The nine
20 backward districts (those lowest on human
21 development indices) are Achham, Kalikot,
22 Jajarkot, Jumla, Dolpa, Bajhang, Bajura, Mugu,
23
and Humla.All are either in the far west or on
24 the northern fringe, or both.
25 3 Bhuwan Lal Joshi and Leo Rose, Democratic
26 Innovations in Nepal (Berkeley, CA: University
27 of California Press, 1966), p. 79; cf. Martin
28 Hoftun,William Raeper, and John Whelpton,
People, Politics, and Ideology: Democracy and Social
29
Change in Nepal (Kathmandu: Mandala Book
30
Point, 1999), ch. 1.
31
4 Anirudha Gupta, Politics in Nepal (Bombay:
32 Allied Publishers, 1964), pp. 46–47. The
33 constituent assembly was never held and the
34 election of a new one became one of the key
35 demands of the Maoist insurgency launched in
36 1996.
37 5 R.S.Chauhan,The Political Development in Nepal
38 1950–70 (Delhi: Associated Publishing House,
39 1971).
40 6 Krishna Hachhethu,“Civil Society and Political
Participation,” in Lok Raj Baral (ed.), Nepal:
41
Quest for Participatory Democracy (New Delhi:
42 Adroit Publishers, 2006), p. 128.
43 7 Lok Raj Baral, Oppositional Politics in Nepal
44 (New Delhi:Abhinav Publishing House,1977).
45 For Nepali politics during the Panchayat
46 period, see also Rishikesh Shah, Essays in the
47 Practices of Government in Nepal (New Delhi:
48 Manohar Publishing House, 1982).
8 Krishna Hachhethu, “Mass Movement 1990,”
Contributions to Nepalese Studies, 17, 2 (1990),
p. 190. See Vincanne Adams, Doctors for
Democracy (Cambridge: University Press, 1998)
on the involvement of the doctors, and David
N. Gellner, “Caste, Communalism, and
in D. N. Gellner, J. Pfaff-Czarnecka, and J.
Whelpton (eds), Nationalism and Ethnicity in a
Hindu Kingdom (Amsterdam: Harwood, 1997)
on the unacknowledged ethnic background to
the 1990 uprisings in the cities of Lalitpur
(Patan) and Bhaktapur.
9 For details of Nepali politics in the post-1990
period, see Lok Raj Baral, Nepal: Problems of
Governance (New Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt.
Ltd.,1993);Lok Raj Baral,The Regional Paradox:
Essays in Nepali and South Asian Affairs (Delhi:
Adroit Publishers,2000);Lok Raj Baral,Krishna
Hachhethu, and Hari Sharma, Leadership in
Nepal (New Delhi: Adroit Publishers, 2001);
Michael Hutt (ed.),Nepal in the Nineties (Delhi:
Oxford University Press,1994);Martin Hoftun,
William Raeper, and John Whelpton People,
Politics and Ideology (Kathmandu:Mandala Book
Point, 1999); POLSAN, Political Parties and the
Parliamentary Process in Nepal: A Study of the
Transitional Phase (Kathmandu:Political Science
Association of Nepal, 1992); Ole Borre, Sushil
Raj Pandey,and Chitra Krishna Tiwari,Nepalese
Political Behaviour (New Delhi: Sterling, 1994);
Dhruba Kumar (ed.),State,Leadership and Politics
in Nepal (Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and
Asian Studies, 1995); Dhruba Kumar (ed.),
Domestic Conflict and Crisis of Governability in
Nepal (Kathmandu:Centre for Nepal and Asian
Studies, 2000);T. Louise Brown, The Challenge
to Democracy in Nepal: A Political History
(Routledge, 1996); Krishna Hachhethu, Party
Building in Nepal: Organization, Leadership and
People, A Comparative Study of the Nepali
Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal
(Unified Marxist-Leninist) (Kathmandu:Mandala
Book Point: 2002).
10 On ethnic aspects of Nepali politics, see
Frederick H. Gaige, Regionalism and National
Unity in Nepal (New Delhi:Vikas,1975);David
N. Gellner, Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka, and John
Whelpton (eds), Nationalism and Ethnicity in a
Hindu Kingdom (Amsterdam: Harwood, 1997);
Prayag Raj Sharma, “Ethnicity and National
Integration in Nepal: A Statement of the
Problem,” Journal of Nepalese Studies, 1
145
K R I S H N A H AC H H E T H U A N D DAV I D N . G E L L N E R

(July–December 1987), pp. 23–30; “How to Muni, The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: The 1
Tend This Garden,” Himal (May–June 1992), Challenge and The Response (New Delhi: Rupa, 2
pp. 7–9; Harka Gurung, “Representing An 2003); Arjun Karki and Binod Bhattarai 3
Ethnic Mosaic,” Himal (May–June 1992), (eds), Whose War? Economic and Social-Cultural 4
pp. 19–21; Marie Lecomte-Tilouine and Impacts of Nepal’s Maoist-Government Conflict
5
Pascale Dollfus (eds),Ethnic Revival and Religious (Kathmandu: NGO Federation of Nepal, n.d.);
Turmoil (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 6
and Kiyoko Ogura, “Maoists, People, and the
2003); Mahendra Lawoti, Towards a Democratic State as seen from Rolpa and Rukum,” in H. 7
Nepal: Inclusive Political Institutions for a Ishii, D. Gellner, and K. Nawa (eds), Political and 8
Multicultural Society (New Delhi: Sage, 2005); Social Transformations in North India and Nepal 9
Susan I. Hangen, Creating a “New Nepal”:The (New Delhi: Manohar, 2007). 10
Ethnic Dimension (Washington: East-West 13 See Kiyoko Ogura, “Maoists’ People’s 11
Center, 2007); G.Toffin, M. S.Tamang, P. Onta, Governments, 2001–05: The Power in 12
and S. Sato, Studies in Nepali History and Society, Wartime,” in D. N. Gellner and K. Hachhethu 13
Vol. 11, No. 2 (2006). (eds), Local Democracy in South Asia (Delhi: 14
11 On censorship and self-censorship during the Sage, 2008). 15
period of the king’s rule, see Michael Hutt, 14 Krishna Hachhethu,State of Democracy in Nepal:
“Things that Should not be Said: Censorship 16
A Survey Report (Kathmandu:SDSA/Nepal and
and Self-censorship in the Nepali Press Media, 17
International IDEA, 2004); and Krishna
2001–2,” Journal of Asian Studies, 65 (2006), pp. Hachhethu with Sanjay Kumar and Jiwan 18
361–92. For information on the way in which Subedi, Nepal in Transition: A Study on the State 19
internet blogs kept the outside world informed of Democracy (Stockholm: International IDEA, 20
of what was going on inside Nepal, see James 2008). 21
Sharrock, “Nepali Blogging and Democracy,” 15 David N. Gellner, “Caste, Ethnicity and 22
Studies in Nepali History and Society, Vol. 12, Inequality in Nepal,” Economic and Political 23
No. 1 (2007), pp. 55–94. Weekly,Vol. 42, No. 20 (2007), p. 1,823. 24
12 For details of the Maoist insurgency, see Arjun 16 On the US offer, see http://hrw.org/english/ 25
Karki and David Seddon (eds), The People’s War docs/2007/05/17/bhutan15936_txt.htm. For
26
in Nepal: Left Perspectives (New Delhi: Adroit an article about the appeal of Maoism to refugee
Publishers, 2003); Michael Hutt (ed.), youth in the camps, see R. Evans, “The Two
27
Himalayan People’s War: Nepal’s Maoist Rebellion Faces of Empowerment in Conflict,”Research in 28
(London: Hurst, 2004); Deepak Thapa and Comparative and International Education,3 (2008), 29
Bandana Sijapati,A Kingdom under Siege:Nepal’s pp. 50–64 (doi:10.2304/rcie.2008.3.1.50). 30
Maoist Insurgency, 1996 to 2003 (Kathmandu: 17 See David N. Gellner, “Democracy in Nepal: 31
The Print House, 2003); Deepak Thapa (ed.), Four Models,” Seminar, 576 (2007), pp. 50–56 32
Understanding the Maoist Movement of Nepal (available at http://ora.ouls.ox.ac.uk). 33
(Kathmandu: Martin Chautari, 2003); S. D. 34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
146
 1
2
3
4
10
5
6 The old and the new federalism
7
8 in independent India
9
10
11
12 Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph
13
14
15
16
17
18
19 Introduction terizations are too static, lacking a sense of
20 historical process.Federalism is better concep-
21 We start our consideration of federalism in tualized as a continuous negotiation about
22 independent India by contrasting the formal how sovereignty can be shared and layered.
23 characteristics and political dynamics of an Both historical trajectories and individual
24 “old” or founding federalism with those of a actors motivated by interests and ideologies
25 “new” or post-1990s federalism. We begin shaped the Indian state. The most important
26 with the federalism that emerged from the person in shaping the Indian state, including
27 writing of the 1950 constitution by the con- its federal dimension, was Jawaharlal Nehru,
28 stituent assembly that sat between 9 December, Gandhi’s designated heir,prime minister of the
29 1946 and 26 January, 1950, when the con- 1946–47 interim government, India’s first
30 stitution came into effect. prime minister (1948–64) and advocate of a
31 For some analysts, the text of the 1950 strong state capable of executing a socialist
32 constitution has a transparently essential nature. agenda.As the leader of a Congress party that
33 It can tell us, for example, whether India is or held 74 percent of the seats in the Constituent
34 is not a federal state.Ashok Chanda,a “heaven- Assembly, he and his Congress colleagues,
35 born” ICS officer and one of the first to write Vallabhai Patel, Maulana Azad, and Rajendra
36 a book on the Indian constitution, stated: “A Prasad, constituted an inner circle that
37 Constitution is either federal or unitary; the dominated the work of the assembly.3 Nehru’s
38 test is whether its provisions give it a unitary view of the kind of federalism proposed by the
39 bias or maintain fully the equality of the cabinet mission is captured by a remark
40 national and state governments in their demar- attributed to him in early 1947 after Lord
41 cated fields of authority and jurisdiction.”1 Mountbatten, the newly appointed viceroy,
42 Another early critic was the distinguished had indicated that the multilayered federal state
43 constitutional scholar, Sir Ivor Jennings. In his with a weak center and strong provinces of the
44 1953 appraisal, Some Characteristics of the Indian Cabinet Mission Plan would not work and that
45 Constitution,2 he declared that the Indian India would be partitioned. “Thank God we
46 constitution, admittedly the world’s longest are out of that bag at last,” said Nehru. Initially,
47 written constitution, was ruinously long, Nehru had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan,
48 detailed, and rigid. For us these charac- but backed out for several reasons, not least

147
L LOY D I . R U D O L P H A N D S U S A N N E H O E B E R R U D O L P H

because he “wanted a strong center so that 1 of article 246 provides for “federal supre- 1
development could be done in a planned macy” by stating “that in case of inevitable 2
manner and landlordism could be abolished.”4 conflict between union and state powers, the 3
Nehru was happy to be rid of the strong union powers as enumerated in list I shall 4
states and weak center of the Cabinet Mission prevail over the state powers as enumerated in 5
Plan.Dr B.R.Ambedkar,the law minister who lists II and III.”7 Contestation over legislative 6
guided the constitution through the assembly, authority in many arenas of policy, mostly in 7
too made the case for a “union” rather than a the courts but also in party politics and the 8
“federal” government.5 That said, the 1950 public sphere, has been continuous. 9
constitution’s strongest institutional inheri- India’s former provinces, now states (as of 10
tance from the act of 1935 was federalism.The 2008, there were 28) are represented in an 11
drive for a unitary state by the leaders of the upper house known as the Rajya Sabha or 12
constitutional assembly was countered by the Council of States. Seats are allocated on the 13
template of the 1935 Government of India Act, basis of population,8 and not equality as is the 14
an act whose dominant characteristic was a case in the US senate.For example,India’s most 15
federal state. The 1935 act reflected not only populous state, Uttar Pradesh, occupies 31 of 16
the federal experience of the 1919 Montagu- 241 seats in the Rajya Sabha. This feature of 17
Chelmsford reforms era and the 12 years when Indian federalism not only favors big over small 18
it served as India’s constitution, but also the states but also majoritarian democracy over 19
centuries of historical experience, from minority representation and rights. 20
Mughal to East India Company (EIC) to Members of the constituent assembly used 21
British rule, with the de facto federalism of the American example to distinguish Indian 22
shared and layered sovereignty. Its federal from American federalism. India’s federal 23
features were overdetermined by the attempt government was not constituted by inde- 24
to accommodate the princely states,a need that pendent states yielding up powers to a center, 25
faded when the princes acceded to inde- a metaphor that implies the power might 26
pendent India. revert and that residual powers lie with the 27
With only minor alterations, the 1935 act’s contracting states.“One thing is very certain,” 28
constitutional provisions became those of the said Justice A. M. Ahmadi, “that it is not a 29
1950 constitution.Closely following provisions federation like the United States, where it was 30
of the 1935 act, article 246 of the 1950 the states that created the federal or central 31
constitution deals with the distribution of government and invested it with some of their 32
legislative powers as between the union and powers.”9 The constituent assembly reversed 33
the state legislatures in terms of the three lists this process by making the states creatures of 34
found in the 1935 act and given in the seventh the center.Articles 2 and 3 give parliament the 35
schedule of the 1950 constitution,viz.,list I,the authority to create,abolish,divide,or combine 36
union list (97 items), including defense of states. 37
India, foreign affairs, intelligence; foreign and Paradoxically, the power of the center to 38
interstate trade; finance; custom duties and create and divide states has enhanced the 39
corporation and income taxes; list II, the state Indian union’s capacity to represent difference 40
list (66 items), including public order and by sharing sovereignty.In the face of Jawaharlal 41
police; public health; education; agriculture, Nehru’s majoritarian and rationalist resistance 42
land, land revenue and taxes on agricultural to the reorganization of the states on lingu- 43
income; and list III, the concurrent list (47), istic lines10 and warnings from influential 44
including criminal and civil law and procedure; observers11 that linguistic nationalism would 45
marriage and divorce; transfer of property lead to balkanization or authoritarian rule, 46
other than agricultural land; economic and sharing sovereignty through linguistic states has 47
social planning;labor and trade unions.6 Clause strengthened the Indian state’s stability and 48
148
 TH E OLD AN D TH E N EW FE DE RALISM I N I N DE PE N DE NT I N DIA
1 legitimacy. As Sanjib Baruah has observed:
2 “Federations can prevent the tyranny of the
3 majority by a variety of means, including
4 constitutionally guaranteed meaningful auto-
5 nomous spheres of action for the territorial
6 units.”12 And Katherine Adeney sums up the
7 effects of sharing sovereignty via linguistic
8 reorganization of India’s states by observing
9 that it “accommodated conflicts and stabilized
10 the federation.”13
11 The constitution’s emergency powers,
12 particularly article 356, provided an opening
13 for the center to intimidate and control state
14 governments as well as to deal with its stated
15 purpose, emergencies in the states. The
16 article 356 procedure calls for the report of
17 a governor—appointed by the government
18 of the day and often beholden to it— “that
19 the government of the state cannot be carried
20 on in accordance with the provisions of
21 the constitution.” The center, acting through
22 the president, can remove a state govern-
23 ment by imposing “President’s Rule,” i.e., a
24 government appointed and controlled by the
25 center.
26 Article 356 was intended as a measure of last
27 resort in times of severe governmental crisis.
28 Starting in 1957, when Indira Gandhi as
29 Congress president arranged for the dismissal
30 of a CPI-M [Communist] government in
31 Kerala, Congress governments began using
32 Article 356 routinely to remove troublesome
33 opposition state governments.Perhaps its most
34 constitutionally problematic use was in 1977
35 by the Janata government, which took power
36 after Indira Gandhi’s emergency regime.
37 Claiming that Congress “opposition” govern-
38 ments of nine northern states that had been
39 independently elected in separate state
40 elections had lost their mandate as a result of
41 the Janata Party’s parliamentary victory, the
42 Janata government used Article 356 to impose
43 President’s Rule on all nine.When a Congress
44 government under Indira Gandhi was returned
45 to power in 1980, it used the Janata govern-
46 ment precedent to justify the dismissal of
47 nine independently elected Janata state
48 governments.
The abuse of the provisions of article 356
has been mitigated not only by the Bommai
Supreme Court judgment of 1994,14 but also
because India entered an era of coalition
politics,in which regional parties are generally
unwilling to support the use of article 356
because future administrations may sanction its
use to dismiss their own state governments.15
Thus, a constitutional provision once thought
to advantage the center over the states now no
longer seems to do so.
State powers under the old
federalism
Discussion of the old and new federalism
proceeds in the context of our understanding of
federalism as a form of state forma-
tion characterized by sharing, layering, and
contesting sovereignty. Our analysis of a
movement from an old to a new federalism
involves state and political actors negotiating
sovereignty relationships in the context of
a formal constitution and changing poli-
tical, economic and ideological conditions.
Beginning about 20 years ago, with the
transformation of the party system in 1989
and of the economy in 1991, an old
federalism associated with Nehruvian planned
development and Congress party domination
was challenged by a federalism associated with
a multiparty system and a market-oriented
economy. Constitutional amendments can not
account for this change. Changes in the
informal constitution,such as the decline of the
planning commission and the transformation
of the party system,help explain the shift in the
balance of power from the center to the states.
The transformation from the old to the
new federalism was hardly abrupt. During
the first two five-year plans—1951–56 and
1956–61—Jawaharlal Nehru was able to
marshal the resources of the center,particularly
those commanded by the planning commis-
sion, to carry through “basic industrialization”
of the economy and,in his phrase,“occupy the
economy’s commanding heights.” He was also
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able to use Congress’ political capital and his Equally notorious are state government 1
own to convince state governments, most of subsidies to cultivators for electricity,water and 2
which were Congress governments, to use fertilizer. 3
their constitutional authority over agriculture It seems that even in the heyday of the old 4
to eliminate “intermediaries,” zamindars and federalism, the federalism of Congress domi- 5
jagirdars, and to vest operational control of the nance and of the command economy,the states 6
land in tillers of the soil.The result was to bring sat at the bargaining table with the center, 7
into being a vast voting population of culti- carrying enough political clout to scuttle 8
vators in India’s states.16 Nehru’s soon-to-be central government policy initiatives and to 9
nemesis in India’s most populous state, Charan introduce their own.17 10
Singh,compared this new class of cultivators to 11
western yeoman farmers,fiercely independent 12
and committed to self-cultivation and re- Economic pre-conditions of the 13
munerative prices. new federalism: From a planned 14
By 1958, Nehru, like Karl Marx, a city boy to a market economy 15
who reviled the “idiocy of rural life” and 16
thought the countryside could pay for Dramatic shifts in the nature of the India’s 17
industrialization, moved to collectivize Indian economic policy help account for the 18
agriculture under the rubric of “joint co- changing nature of Indian federalism. As we 19
operative farming.” He had been inspired by have seen, Jawaharlal Nehru welcomed the 20
the results being claimed in China for Mao strong center that partition made possible 21
Tse-tung’s collectivization policy.At Congress’ because it was a necessary condition for 22
annual session at Nagpur in 1959, he proposed realizing his goal of industrializing India. He 23
that the party adopt “joint cooperative spoke of “occupying the commanding 24
farming,” a proposal sharply opposed by heights” of the economy—basic and heavy 25
Charan Singh,the principal architect of the UP industry and infrastructure—what the former 26
Zamindari Abolition Act.Speaking for the self- Soviet Union referred to as primary indus- 27
employed cultivators, he argued that joint trialization. Consumer goods, the agricultural 28
cooperative farming was the first step toward a sector, and the bazaar and service economy 29
collectivized and industrialized agricultural remained in private hands. Investment was, for 30
sector. The Nagpur resolution threatened to the most part, state-funded and channeled 31
split Congress, and created a political climate through a planning commission created and 32
that enabled Congress governments at the state chaired by Nehru. 33
level to stymie Congress efforts at the center to In 1950 Nehru had the cabinet authorize 34
implement land ceilings legislation. the creation of a planning commission with 35
Another manifestation of power at the state the prime minister as its ex officio chairman. 36
level under the old federalism is the fate of Unknown to the constitution and an “advisory 37
what had been the largest source of provincial body” without legislative standing, it became 38
revenue under the British Raj, the land the most powerful institution of a “develop- 39
revenue.With agricultural producers being by mental state” and a command economy.A. H. 40
far the most numerous voters in the states of Hanson, who wrote the definitive study of the 41
independent India, it is not surprising that planning commission in its heyday, char- 42
state-level politicians seeking their support acterized its role this way: 43
quickly lowered the land revenue to a nominal 44
amount.Although it is notorious that incomes Gradually, the Commission . . . became, in fact, 45
in the agricultural sector are substantial, it has the supreme arbiter of future development in all 46
been impossible to date for state governments fields of administration except defence.Not only 47
to institute a tax on agricultural income. were the states required to submit projections of 48
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1 their revenue and expenditure budgets for the
2 five years covered by the plan, but they had also
3 to submit their capital programmes for approval.
4 The coordination of state plans, decision on
5 establishment and location of industries, char-
6 acter of education and health programmes
7 and assistance to be given to the states, all came
8 under the overall scrutiny and control of the
9 Commission.18
10
11 The policy succeeded in the short run but
12 failed in the long run. It achieved a modicum
13 of basic industrialization but the economy
14 grew at an annual rate of only 3.5 percent in
15 the 1960s, in what the late Raj Krishna
16 mockingly called “the Hindu rate of growth.”
17 This compared with the double digit growth
18 experienced by the export-oriented East Asian
19 Tigers—South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
20 and Singapore. Investment in public sector
21 enterprises was massive and furnished India
22 with the heavy industry that characterizes
23 modern economies. But, year after year, public
24 sector enterprises operated at a loss, showing
25 themselves incapable of generating the
26 surpluses needed for economic growth.
27 By 1991, when India changed course, the
28 system was literally broke. The planning
29 commission had no public funds to invest
30 and India could not pay its current account
31 balance. The crisis in India’s “socialist”
32 economy coincided with and was reinforced
33 by the collapse of the Soviet Union, its client
34 states,and their socialist economies,events that
35 were perceived as the victory of market
36 economies over planned economies. India
37 changed course.
38 The radical reduction of public investment
39 by the center created a need for private
40 investment to replace it that was quickly met
41 by the more enterprising state governments.
42 As Raja Chelliah put it:“The relative spheres
43 of the two levels of the government have
44 been thrown into flux. The scope for real
45 decentralization of economic power has been
46 greatly increased and new vistas have opened
47 for creative and innovative activities by the
48 subnational level of government.”19
Rob Jenkins added another dimension by
observing that “when the center, due to eco-
nomic reforms, gave up its vast discretionary
power over industrial licensing, the states
became the crucial point of contact for
entrepreneurs.”20 State chief ministers began to
play leading roles in what we have called India’s
emergent “federal market economy.”21 State
chief ministers could be found in New York,
Chicago and Dallas, Frankfurt, London, and
Tokyo,as well as in Davos,convincing investors
of the opportunities and incentives available in
their respective states.Whether led by high-tech
reformers such as Andhra’s Chandrababu Naidu
or market converts such as Bengal’s Communist
chief minister, Jyoti Basu, the more enter-
prising states became the engines of economic
liberalization and growth. Although much
remains to be remedied and accomplished, by
2007, India’s GDP grew by 9.6 percent, thanks
in large measure to state-level initiatives and
entrepreneurship.
Political conditions of the new
federalism: From a one-party
dominant to a multiparty system
Another important condition for a new
federalism was the transformation of the party
system from one dominated by a single party,
Congress, to a federalized multiparty system.
Congress entered the independence era with
a huge amount of political capital from its
active leadership during the nationalist era.
From Independence in 1947 until the ninth
national election in 1989, Congress, with
two exceptions,22 was India’s dominant
party. Its dominance in most state legisla-
tures as well as in the central parliament
enabled it to manage policy at both the center
and in the states. Party political power
countered the constitutional division of
function. So, for example, agriculture and
land revenue were state subjects, but the
leadership for land reform was provided by
Nehru in his role as the national leader of the
Congress Party. Facing a divided opposition in
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a first-past-the-post electoral system,Congress State-level opposition became visible as early 1

was able to win about 70 percent of the seats as 1969,three years after she was chosen by the 2
with roughly 45 percent of the vote in India’s “syndicate”—an informal collective of 3
first three national elections. weighty Congress state leaders led by Kamaraj 4
However, the year 1989 was a watershed. Nadar of Tamil Nadu—to succeed Lal 5
For the first time since independence, a Bahadur Shastri, Jawaharlal Nehru’s successor, 6
national election resulted in a hung parliament as prime minister. In August 1969, she 7
in which no party won a majority.This event successfully defied syndicate domination by 8
marked the end of the one-party-dominant having her candidate, V. V. Giri, elected 9
system and majority governments and the president of India over Sanjiva Reddy, the 10
beginning of a multiparty system of coalition Congress candidate picked by the syndicate. 11
governments. By November, the Congress split, with Indira 12
The multiparty system was “federalized” by Gandhi leading a majority faction, the 13
the rise of regional parties.State parties such as Congress-I (for Indira), that went on to 14
the Dravida Munnetra Kazagam, (DMK), in electoral success in both the 1970 state 15
the state of Tamil Nadu (formerly Madras), the assembly and the national election of 1971. 16
Telegu Desam Party (TDP) in the state of After Indira Gandhi returned to power in 17
Andhra Pradesh, and other state parties, began 1980 following her emergency rule (1975–77) 18
to play a key role in the formation of coalition and the Janata Party government that turned 19
governments at the center, and in the making of her out of office (1977–79), Bhagwan D. Dua 20
policy. could say: 21
In the tenth national election in 1991, it 22
became apparent that state parties were gaining [She] perceived the security and durability of a 23
on national parties. The national parties, of chief minister as more of a threat than an 24
which the Congress and the Hindu nationalist assurance to the continuity of her paramount 25
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), were by far the powers, made and unmade chief ministers and 26
largest,together won 78 percent of the seats and undermined the operation of the Indian federal 27
76 percent of the votes. By the 2004 election system in particular, and the Indian political 28
the share of the vote garnered by national system in general.[She] operated with a different 29
parties had dropped to 63 percent and their calculus of power to ensure (1) that there was 30
seats to 67 percent. In contrast, both the vote sufficient factionalism in the Congress-ruled 31
and seat shares held by regional parties had risen states so that the Congress provincial leaders 32
between 1991 and 2004 from 16 to 29 percent. could not dispense with her mediating ploys;and 33
It is these changed percentages that enable us to (2) that no state chief developed a local power 34
speak of a federalized multiparty system as a key base strong enough to challenge her supremacy 35
component in the new federalism. or circumvent a smooth dynastic succession to 36
her son [Rajiv Gandhi] to the office of prime 37
minister.23 38
State chief ministers push 39
back: Reshaping federal It is not surprising that the movement to 40
consciousness redo India’s federal constitutional design arose 41
in the first instance in Tamil Nadu. Its history 42
If a new federalism in the form of a federal of resistance to northern Sanskritic language 43
market economy and a federalized multiparty and culture was personalized in the Justice 44
system did not come into being until the Party’s anti-Brahman movement in the 1920s 45
1990s, it was not for want of trying by state and later under E. V. Ramaswami Naicker 46
leaders provoked by Prime Minister Indira (“Periyar” or Great Sage).As India approached 47
Gandhi’s arbitrary and authoritarian actions. independence, Periyar called for a sovereign 48
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1 Dravidistan, a state composed of those who
2 shared Dravidian culture and languages in
3 Madras, Kerala, and today’s Andhra and
4 Karnataka.His anti-Brahmanism went beyond
5 challenging the fact that 3 percent of Madras’s
6 population—the Brahmans—occupied 70
7 percent of the high-level posts in government;
8 to trashing the Laws of Manu (the ur text of the
9 purity and pollution caste hierarchy); to
10 creating reservations (“communal government
11 orders”) in government jobs and universities
12 for lower castes; to opposition to the Sanskrit-
13 based northern language of Hindi being taught
14 in the schools of Madras; to a retelling of the
15 great Hindu epic, the Ramayana, so that
16 Ravana,a southern hero-king is the conqueror
17 of Rama, the northern hero-king, and Sita,
18 Rama’s wife, Ravana’s willing paramour, not
19 Rama’s devoted faithful wife.24
20 By 1967, the DMK under Annadurai had
21 transformed itself from a secessionist move-
22 ment25 to a well-established regional party
23 that could win a landside victory over the
24 Congress. “Anna” died in 1969 and was suc-
25 ceeded by another film writer and director,M.
26 Karunanidhi. One of his first acts was to set up
27 the Rajamannar Committee on Center–State
28 Relations.26 Its report called for the radical
29 transformation of center–state relations,
30 including creating an interstate council to
31 advise parliament on all decisions of national
32 importance or that affect one or more states,
33 abolishing articles 249, 356, and 357 which
34 allowed the president (acting, of course, on
35 behalf of the government of the day) to
36 dissolve state governments and place them
37 under the central government,and transferring
38 certain crucial items from the central list of
39 legislative powers to the state list.
40 It took a decade under Indira Gandhi’s
41 centralized rule,including two years under the
42 Emergency (1975–77),for Tamil Nadu’s efforts
43 to gain a footing in other states. In 1978, the
44 CPI-M government of West Bengal published
45 a statement critical of center– state relations.27
46 Five years later,in 1983,the Janata government
47 of Karnataka, under the dynamic leadership of
48 Ramakrishna Hegde, held a highly visible
seminar on center–state relations that helped
to put reform of the constitutional balance
of power between the central and state
governments on the national agenda.28 When
Punjab’s Akali Dal-led government followed
Hegde’s lead by calling for a national com-
mission on center–state relations, Indira
Gandhi tried to preempt the issue by doing just
that, thereby taking the wind out of the
opposition sails, and making the inquiry to an
extent the creature of government.
The interventions of opposition chief
ministers intensified the rising drumbeat of
criticism that placed the federal question
front and center. Indira Gandhi, now re-
established and somewhat chastened was
forced to respond. On 24 March, 1983 she
called for a commission to examine center–
state relations and in June asked Rajinder Singh
Sarkaria, a retired supreme court justice from
Punjab, to head it.29
Momentous events soon followed, all
relevant to the federal story:the rise of violence,
including an insurrectionary movement in
Punjab; Operation Blue Star (3–6 June, 1984),
an assault ordered by Indira Gandhi on the
Golden Temple,the Sikh’s holiest shrine,by the
Indian Army to capture and kill Jarnail Singh
Bhindranwale, the leader of the Khalistan
rebellion; and Indira Gandhi’s assassination by
trusted Sikh bodyguards with automatic
weapons on 31 October,1984 while walking in
her garden at No. 1 Safdarjung Road.
It was not until 1988 toward the end of
Rajiv Gandhi’s prime ministership that the
commission submitted its 1,600-page final
report.30 It contained 247 recommendations
but none that fundamentally challenged the
center–state status quo with respect to the
distribution of legislative authority between
the center and the states, the role of governors
or the use of article 356. The efforts of the
states to compel the center via constitutional
amendment to change the balance of power
between the center and the states had
raised consciousness but come to naught
in their stated objective. We have shown,
however,that the federal system was ultimately
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transformed in the 1990s,not by constitutional have shown, over the past 15 years state parties 1
amendment but by a shift from a planned to a have increased their share of votes and seats from 2
“federal market economy” and from a one- 16 to 29 percent,percentages that come close to 3
party dominant to a “federalized multiparty threatening the capacity of the two largest 4
system.” national parties to form governing coalitions. 5
The transformation is illustrated by the Will the center hold? Will the Congress or BJP 6
access coalition politics has given enterprising be able to capture a high enough proportion of 7
state chief ministers and their governments to the votes and seats in the face of the challenge 8
central government bureaucratic networks that from state parties to maintain the viability of 9
manage procedure and policy. Aseema Sinha India’s federalized multiparty system? 10
has shown that, in 1999 and 2000, regional 11
parties accounted for 24 and 23 percent of 12
shares in national cabinet membership,31 and Beyond the new federalism? 13
that they are likely to hold a substantial number The transformations of fiscal 14
of key ministries. Their insider status, she federalism 15
argues, gives them access to information and 16
opportunities that had previously been Our story about the transformations of fiscal 17
unavailable to them.The need for their support federalism in India starts with the finance 18
to maintain the coalition’s viability means that commission that lies at its heart.The principles 19
they can influence, sometimes disproportion- the commission invokes to distribute the 20
ately, policy decisions and the allocation of federally collected taxes among the states are 21
resources in federalized central governments. central to defining the nature of the federal 22
On the negative side, the chronic political system.Shall all regions be brought to an equal 23
weakness of the lead parties in coalitions can level? Shall the more prosperous states subsidize 24
make it possible for state parties, even those the less prosperous? Or shall the allocation 25
with few seats, to practice extortion. of revenue reward effort, fiscal discipline, 26
There is a question mark that hovers over economic growth? In 2001, chief ministers of 27
what appears to be a well-established federal- the more prosperous and disciplined states 28
ized multiparty system. The dominant party challenged distribution by population and level 29
system of the Nehru-Gandhi eras depended of development.Their challenge was encour- 30
on Congress winning 40 percent or more of aged by the spirit of the new market economy. 31
the vote to claim 60 percent or better of parlia- In consequence, they modified the operation 32
mentary seats. Similarly, the viability of the of the finance commission. 33
federalized multi-party system has depended The constituent assembly framed provisions 34
for its effectiveness on the two largest national that made the union government the collect- 35
parties,Congress and BJP,whose organizations ing agent for most of the state governments’ 36
are built to address a national electorate, being revenues. In accepting article 246 and its 37
able to win enough seats/votes between them seventh schedule dividing legislative power, 38
to overshadow the state parties. including the power to tax and spend, into 39
To do so,the Congress and the BJP separately three lists—union, state, and concurrent—the 40
need to average between 25 to 33 percent of the states accepted not having tax heads adequate 41
vote in the typically three- and four-cornered to meet expenditures because they knew that 42
first-past-the-post contests for parliamentary the financial provisions of the constitution 43
seats. If they drop below those levels in three- would “resemble very closely their pre- 44
and four-cornered contests they will not be able decessors in the 1935 Act.”32 The Government 45
to win the plurality of seats they need to form of India Act of 1935 included a finance 46
and lead coalition governments that rely on the commission whose track record under the Raj 47
participation or backing of state parties. As we made it clear that the revenues collected by the 48
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 TH E OLD AN D TH E N EW FE DE RALISM I N I N DE PE N DE NT I N DIA
1 center would be divided fairly between itself
2 and the [then] provinces.33
3 From the first finance commission until the
4 eleventh, the guiding principle of its division
5 of revenues was “need,” i.e., redistributing
6 revenues from the richer to the poorer states
7 with a view to the latter’s “development”—
8 including infrastructure, investment in human
9 and physical capital and remunerative employ-
10 ment. According to Austin, the constituent
11 assembly provided that “the most lucrative tax
12 heads [income,corporate,excise duties] should
13 be levied and collected by the union and
14 distributed among the provinces according to
15 their need.” In addition, the union was to
16 distribute some of the proceeds from its own
17 revenues, or make grants-in-aid to the
18 provincial governments “again on the basis of
19 need.”34 “If federation means anything,” said
20 Pandit Kunzru, “it means there should be a
21 transfer of wealth from the richer to the poorer
22 provinces.”
23 The first finance commission recom-
24 mended that revenues be distributed in ways
25 that “attempt to lessen the inequalities between
26 states” and the second that 10 percent of
27 divisible revenue should be distributed on the
28 basis of collection and the remaining 90
29 percent according to population.35 The agent
30 of this policy,the institution expected to realize
31 distribution of revenue according to need, was
32 a finance commission. Appointed every five
33 years, finance commissions were to make
34 recommendations to the president (and thus
35 the government of the day) indicating the share
36 of the union and the states, respectively, in the
37 divisible taxes and to prescribe the principles
38 for the distribution of the states’ shares among
39 the states themselves.The expectation was that
40 the recommendations in finance commission
41 reports would be accepted “without question.”
42 And so they were until the year 2000, when
43 the Eleventh Finance Commission submitted
44 its report to the president. It is a commentary
45 on the solidarity of the consensus on socialist
46 economic policy, and/or on the durability of
47 ingrained bureaucratic habits, that the there
48 was no earlier challenge to the unquestioned
nature of the reports when so many of the
opposition governments were challenging
other aspects of the federal pattern.
Chandra Babu Naidu, Andhra Pradesh’s
entrepreneurial,high-tech chief minister and a
key player in Atal Behari Vajpayee’s National
Democratic Alliance coalition government,
led the prosperous, high-performing states
from the south and west in a challenge to the
Eleventh Finance Commission’s Report. As
the influential Business Line put it:
The recommendations of the Eleventh Finance
Commission [EFC] appear to be heavily loaded
in favour of States whose level of effort in terms
of taxation, development and Plan performance
has continued to be poor . . . The issue of
devolution of funds to the States is snowballing
into a major controversy between the Centre
and the States.
The acceptance by the centre of the EFC’s
recommendations militate against the spirit of
fiscal federalism and the concept of cooperative
federalism advocated in recent years.All southern
states and Maharashtra and Gujarat are at the
receiving end of the recommendations and are,
obviously, upset. [emphasis in original]36
Business Line went on to warn that “the entire
framework of fiscal cooperation between the
Centre and the States is now out of alignment
. . .Many states may worry about whether they
should be more efficient in the national interest
if the potential gains are all to be immediately
redistributed.”37
Writing in the spirit of the new market
culture spawned by the economic reforms
of 1991, Business Line also asked whether
the finance commissions’ concept of equity—
taking from the richer, efficient states and
giving to the poorer, profligate states—had
become obsolete. The “normative and pre-
scriptive”method of assessing post-devolution
state deficits (sometimes called “gap-filling”)
“appears to be loaded in favour of fiscally-
imprudent States.”38 In the new era popular
perception, the EFC seemed to be rewarding
the improvident bimaru39 or sick states (Bihar,
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Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh) of its grants conditional, to “draw a monitorable 1
the north at the expense of the six prudent, fiscal reform programme aimed at reduction 2
disciplined southern and western states. From of revenue deficit of the States and to recom- 3
the latter’s perspective, they were being mend the manner in which the grants to States 4
penalized for their successes and the bimaru to cover the assessed deficit in their non-plan 5
states were being rewarded for their failures. revenue account may be linked to the progress 6
Particularly galling was the EFC’s continued in implementing the programme.”41 The 7
reliance on population as a metric of “need,” a commission responded by recommending that 8
policy that seemed to reward the bimaru states 15 percent should be deducted from the grants 9
for their failure to control their libidos and the allocated to deficit states, that the government 10
consequent population growth while penal- match this amount, and that the total sum 11
izing the southern and western states for should be placed in an incentive fund for 12
controlling theirs. which all the states, both deficit and non- 13
In the context of challenging population as deficit, could compete by showing progress. 14
a measure of need, Business Line called for a The charge by the NDA government to the 15
new concept of equity based on a “Rawlsian EFC and the modifications it made represented 16
approach to justice” that treated efficiency as a startling change in the way finance com- 17
part of equity. It is only when some states are mission reports were perceived and treated. 18
more efficient, Business Line argued, that, Previously, they were thought of as insulated 19
overall, “the income of the economy can be from, and immune to political forces. The 20
larger, and potentially larger resources can be EFC’s supplementary report reflected the new 21
transferred to the worst-off regions.”40 federal balance between the states and the 22
Naidu’s initiative was indicative of the center and the inadequacy of the finance 23
changing federal balance of power in favor of commission’s concepts of social justice and 24
the states under the new federalism.The BJP- equity.The goal of equalization had seemed to 25
led National Democratic Alliance government be integral to the finance commission as a 26
responded with alacrity to Naidu’s challenge constitutional body dealing with the practical 27
to the convention that finance commission meaning of federalism. To impose conditions 28
reports, like supreme court judgments, are the on the allocation of revenues seemed alien to 29
law of the land. Many sage heads warned that its mission. But times had changed and with 30
if this were not so, the finance commission’s them the mission of finance commissions. 31
capacity to make fiscal federalism work in India The finance commission’s move toward 32
would be hopelessly politicized and the system merit and conditionality altered the dominant 33
ruined. In retrospect, this seemingly well- discourse. It highlighted the fact that the 1991 34
grounded fear did not prove justified. economic liberalization and the consequent 35
The NDA government responded posit- shift from a planned to a market economy had 36
ively to the Naidu initiative for the good reason changed priorities from “need” and social 37
that the stability of its government was depen- justice to effective use of resources and eco- 38
dent on the support of the TDP, Naidu’s party. nomic growth. The change was not uncon- 39
Although the EFC had delivered its report to tested; influential commentators questioned 40
the president,the government of India charged whether subjecting finance commission allo- 41
the commission with the task of writing a cations to conditionality were compatible with 42
supplementary report. It should address the Article 289 of the constitution.42 43
possibility of making finance commission Paradoxically, the Naidu-led challenge 44
grants to an extent dependent on the kind of to the Report of the Eleventh Finance 45
fiscal discipline and efficient use of resources Commission (EFC) resulted in the unintended 46
which the southern and western states had consequence of strengthening the center’s 47
exhibited.The commission was asked to make recently found role as a regulatory state.43 The 48
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1 shift from plan to market brought about by the
2 1991 and subsequent economic reforms had
3 the effect of dismantling an interventionist
4 state and contributing to the creation of
5 a regulatory state, a shift that seemed to
6 strengthen the states against the center. But
7 regulation too is a form of control. In the case
8 of fiscal federalism, regulation took the form
9 of the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget
10 Management Act of 2003 or FRBM, the
11 principles of which attempt to implement the
12 performance clause of the EFC-amended
13 report.Another instrument strengthening the
14 center against the states is a stealth-like return
15 to the interventionist strategy via centrally
16 sponsored schemes (CSSs).To the extent that
17 the centrally sponsored schemes induct the
18 policy priorities of the center into policy
19 priorities of the state governments, they give
20 the center a strong counterforce to the new
21 federalism.
22 The main aim of the 2004 FRBM legi-
23 slation was to eliminate the center’s revenue
24 and fiscal deficits by 2009.44 The states were
25 persuaded, by the threat of losing the debt
26 waiver facility offered by the Twelfth Finance
27 Commission, hurriedly to pass similar state
28 legislation, and to specify steps that would lead
29 to the deficit reductions goal.45 The states are
30 now subject to two kinds of central regulation:
31 the regulation imposed by the finance com-
32 mission conditionalities on central transfers
33 to the states and the constraint of the self-
34 imposed FRBM legislation. Critics from
35 across the political spectrum fear that meeting
36 the deficit elimination targets will suffocate
37 social expenditure and new development
38 initiatives.46
39 Centrally sponsored schemes (CSS) have
40 become a powerful instrument of central
41 intervention in the states. They are changing
42 the federal balance of power by making it
43 possible for the center to assume functions on
44 the state list.When the center makes transfers to
45 support the states’five-year plans,that is,freshly
46 introduced developmental projects,it can do so
47 via normal central assistance (NCA), i.e., block
48 grants that may be spent at the discretion of the
state.This funding is plainly under state control.
It can also make transfers via CSS. The latter
grants are for a specific purpose; the state must
spend them as designated. The most con-
spicuous instance of such a scheme is the
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
launched by the Congress-led United
Progressive Alliance (UPA) government soon
after it took power in 2004 and “hailed as a
major initiative in the Government of India’s
commitment to providing an economic safety
net to India’s rural poor.”47
CSS make it possible for the center to shape
state policy preferences and priorities even in
fields that are constitutionally placed under
state jurisdiction, such as education and
health.48 State ministries, departments, local
bodies, and externally funded autonomous
state societies and district societies registered
under the Societies Registration Act become
de facto agents of the center in ways that
subvert state autonomy. Needless to say, the
states prefer block grants that they control
whereas the center favors specific purpose
assistance, which implements the Center’s
priorities du jour.
The struggle between the states and the
center over control of funds to implement their
respective policy preferences is a longstanding
one. In 1969, the National Development
Council, a forum of state chief ministers and
central government ministers,determined that
CSS should not exceed one-sixth of the
amount to be given as NCA.CSS would be an
exception, to be used to fund projects of
national or regional importance that fall in the
domain of the states. The limit was observed
for a few years, but soon CSS expanded
enormously, outgrowing the level of NCA
assistance.
This growth was not the result of any
consensus achieved between the center and the
states.There was no second pronouncement by
the National Development Council to ratchet
up the level of acceptable CSS. Rather, it
appears to have been the result of a silent,
subterranean process that Rob Jenkins in
another context has characterized as “stealth.”
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Central government officials, in alliance with On the one hand, a mitigation of regional 1
state-level departments or civil society associa- imbalances in development would need a 2
tions (NGOs) that share program objectives stronger redistributive role for the Union. On 3
and/or funding have acted below the radar the other, many of the areas that call for 4
screen of the constitutional distribution of intervention to realize greater inclusiveness [such 5
powers to “normalize” the use of CSS. as] agriculture,irrigation,local development and 6
By 2005–06 CSS funding stood at Rs 54,580 health-care . . . are the domain of the states . . . 7
crores and NCA funding at Rs 15,451 crores Even in such areas, where the optimal response 8
of central government plan expenditures.49 is much more likely to differ locally, the increase 9
As one observer put it: “These schemes of resources to the states so that they can explore 10
have provided a major financial lever to the their own solutions, be they private, public or 11
central government to change states’ choices in-between, do not seem to be an option that 12
in these subjects, which are constitutionally the Union deems worthy of consideration.52 13
almost exclusively their mandates,”50 that is, of 14
the state governments,not the center.Whether The current condition of federalism is 15
Article 282 of the constitution authorizing the indeed in flux.At the same time, the center, as 16
union [or a state] to make grants “for any represented by both the BJP-led NDA and the 17
public purpose” validates CSS grants that Congress-led UPA governments,has exploited 18
encroach on or displace activities that are given the relative failure of the states to address the 19
on the state list in the seventh schedule seems needs of the constituencies at the bottom of 20
to be the current frontier in the ongoing the pyramid with development programs.The 21
struggle between the center and the states in decline of the interventionist state epitom- 22
India’s federal system.51 ized by the relative bankruptcy of planning 23
commission public investment has been 24
countered by the rise of a regulatory state 25
Conclusion epitomized by the center’s fiscal monitoring of 26
state revenues and spending via the FRBM of 27
In our examination of the major charac- 2003. At the same time, there has been a 28
teristics of Indian federalism and of the dyna- stealth-like return to an interventionist state 29
mics and crises of negotiated or bargaining via CSS that implement the center’s policy 30
federalism, we have contrasted two ideal preferences in the guise of state programs. 31
typical versions of federalism, a relatively Paradoxically, opposition BJP state govern- 32
centralized “old” and a relatively decentralized ments have claimed political capital for success- 33
“new” federalism. We then examined the fully implementing Congress’ most impor- 34
provenances of the models of federalism and tant CSS, the National Rural Employment 35
the changing conditions that led from about Guarantee Act.We are left to ponder whether 36
1990 onward to a shift from the old to the new the CSS should be counted as strengthening 37
federalism, the replacement of a planned the center or the states. 38
economy by a “federal market economy,” and 39
the replacement of a one party dominant by 40
a federalized multiparty system. Notes 41
As an editorial in the 8 March, 2008 issue of 42
the Economic and Political Weekly makes clear, 1 Ashok Chanda, Federalism in India: A Study 43
federalism remains at the center of the state of Union–State Relations (London: Allen & 44
formation and policy stories in India. An Unwin, 1965), p. 41. 45
EPW editor inquires, “How federal is the 2 See Sir Ivor Jennings, Some Characteristics of the 46
Union budget for 2008–9?”and then proceeds Indian Constitution (Madras: Oxford University 47
to elaborate the issues: Press, 1953). 48
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 TH E OLD AN D TH E N EW FE DE RALISM I N I N DE PE N DE NT I N DIA
1 3 See Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution:
2 Cornerstone of a Nation (Oxford: Clarendon
3 Press, 1966), pp. 1–25; also Ralph Retzlaff,
4 “The Indian Constituent Assembly and the
Problem of Indian Unity,” PhD dissertation,
5
Cornell University, 1959.
6
4 Ram Puniyani. “Social Roots of Partition
7 Process,”Issues in Secular Politics, Vol 1,No.2 (11
8 January, 2002). www.sacw.net, February 2002.
9 5 Dr.B.R.Ambedkar,known as the “father of the
10 Indian Constitution,” preferred to characterize
11 the newly constituted state as “unitary” rather
12 than federal. He explained that the word
13 “union,” as in “union of India” in Article 1 of
14 the constitution had been self-consciously
15 chosen over the weaker “federation.”Minutes of
the Union Constitution Committee, 7 June,
16
1947, Indian National Archives.
17
6 Continuity between the 1935 Act and the 1950
18 Constitution is suggested by the fact that when
19 the Union Powers Committee’s report was
20 presented in the constituent assembly by
21 N. G. Ayyangar there was “only a brief debate
22 on union subjects – only the first 37 items of
23 the union list and neither of the other two
24 lists was discussed.” See Austin, The Indian
25 Constitution, p. 197.
26 7 These provisions are spelled out in detail in
Durga Das Basu, Shorter Constitution of India,
27
13th edn (Agra:Wadhwa, 2001).The provisions
28
of article 246 are dealt with on pp.1164–71 and
29 the seventh schedule listing the subjects
30 specified in the three lists of article 246, along
31 with extensive citations of relevant cases, are
32 given on pp. 1,732–1,826.
33 8 Members are elected by the legislative assembly
34 of each state. Elections in the state legislatures
35 are held by using single transferable votes with
36 proportional representation. In 2006, with
37 the addition of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand
and Uttarakhand, and one member from
38
Pondicherry and 12 nominated members, the
39
Rajya Sabha had 242 members. Its power over
40 money bills, which must originate in the Lok
41 Sabha,is consultative;it has no power to dismiss
42 the prime minister or any minister, such
43 authority being the sole prerogative of the Lok
44 Sabha. In all other respects, the two houses of
45 parliament are equal.
46 9 Justice A.M.Ahmadi,“Federalism Revisited,”in
47 Pran Chopra, The Supreme Court versus the
48 Constitution; A Challenge to Federalism (New
Delhi: Sage, 2006), p. 147. As Dr. B. R.
Ambedkar told the Constituent Assembly,“the
Federation not being the result of an agreement
[among states], no State has the right to secede
from it”;Austin, The Indian Constitution.
10 Adeney observes that Nehru’s and Congress’
initial rejection of linguistic reorganization of
the Indian states was “a specific extension of the
majoritarian nature of of the Indian federation
. . . Although Nehru ultimately reversed his
position, he did so reluctantly and only after
overwhelming pressure from within the
Congress”; Katherine Adeney, Federalism and
Ethnic Conflict Regulation in India and Pakistan
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 77.
11 Selig Harrison,India:the Most Dangerous Decades
(Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1960).
12 Sanjib Baruah, India Against Itself: Assam and
the Politics of Nationality (Philadelphia, PA:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), p. 11.
13 Adeney, p. 78.
14 S. R. Bommai and others v Union of India.
A.I.R. 1994 Supreme Court 1918.
15 Adeney, p. 115 and fn.10, p. 203, says of the
Bommai judgment that it “restricts the ability
of the center to dismiss state governments
without following procedures, such as giving
the state government a chance to prove its
majority on the floor of the Legislative
Assembly . . . this has radically restricted the
power of the center to use it.”
16 We have discussed land reform in greater detail
in Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber
Rudolph, In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political
Economy of the Indian State (Chicago:University
Press, 1967), ch. 12; see esp., pp. 314–15.
17 Aseema Sinha has pointed out that under the
old federalism, too, the states were able to
influence the then much more empowered
center; see The Regional Roots of Developmental
Politics in India (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 2005), pp. 83–88.
18 Albert H. Hanson, The Process of Planning: A
Study of India’s Five Year Plans, 1950–1966
(London:Oxford University Press,1966),p.97.
19 Rajah Chelliah, Towards Sustainable Growth:
Essay in Fiscal and Financial Reforms in India
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996),
p. 19.
20 Rob Jenkins, Democratic Politics and Economic
Reform in India (Cambridge: University Press,
1999), p. 132.
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L LOY D I . R U D O L P H A N D S U S A N N E H O E B E R R U D O L P H

21 See Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber 26 Government of Tamil Nadu,Rajamannar Report 1
Rudolph, “The Iconization of Chandrababu: on Centre–State Relations (Madras: Inquiry 2
Sharing Sovereignty in India’s Federal Market Committee, Government of Tamil Nadu, 3
Economy,” in Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne 1971). The citation is from www.interstate 4
Hoeber Rudolph, Explaining Indian Democracy: council.nic.in/CHAPTER1.3.htm, accessed
5
A Fifty-Year Perspective, II. The Realm of 5 February, 2008.
6
Institutions: State Formation and Institutional 27 Government of West Bengal, Views on Centre–
Change (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, State Relations (Calcutta: Department of 7
2006). Information and Cultural Affairs, 1978). 8
22 The first exception was the fourth national 28 Government of Karnataka, Seminar on Centre– 9
election in 1967, after Nehru’s death in May State Relations, Bangalore, 5–7 August, 1983, 10
1964, when his relatively inexperienced organized by the Economic and Planning 11
daughter, Indira Gandhi, led the party. The Council, Government of Karnataka, in 12
second exception was in 1977,the election after association with the Institute for Social and 13
Indira Gandhi imposed the “emergency” of Economic Change, Bangalore and the Centre 14
1975–77. Congress lost that election to the for Policy Research (New Delhi and Bangalore: 15
Janata Party. Government of Karnataka Press,1983).See also
16
23 Bhagwan D.Dua,“Federalism or Patrimonialism: Sati Sahni, Center–State Relations: Proceedings of
17
The Making and Unmaking of Chief Ministers a Meeting of Leaders (New Delhi: Vikas, 1984).
in India,” Asian Survey,Vol. 25, No. 8 (August 29 Indian Express, 25 March, 1983. The Sarkaria 18
1985), p. 794. Commission is referenced as Government of 19
24 For E.V.R. and the non-Brahman movement India, Commission on Centre-State Relations, 2 20
and the Justice Party, see Eugene F. Irschick, vols (Delhi: Government of India Press, 1988). 21
Politics and Social Conflict in South India:The Non- 30 For a discussion of the Sarkaria Commission 22
Brahman Movement and Tamil Separatism, and the Inter-State Council (ISC) established 23
1916–1929 (Berkeley, CA: University of in its wake under article 263 of the constitution 24
California Press, 1969) and Robert L. by the V. P. Singh government in 1990, see 25
Hardgrave, The Dravidian Movement (Bombay: Lawrence Saez, Federalism Without a Centre 26
Popular Prakashan, 1965). For Dravidian (New Delhi: Sage, 2002). For accounts of the
27
ideology and politics in Madras,see Marguerite functioning of the ISC, see two articles by
28
Ross Barnett,The Politics of Cultural Nationalism V.Venkatesan,“Centre–State Relations:A Blow
in South India (Princeton, NJ: University Press, for Federalism,” Frontline,Vol. 18, No. 25 (8–21 29
1976). For retelling of the Ramayana from a December, 2001); and “Inter–State Council: 30
Dravidian perspective, see Lloyd I. Rudolph, A Blow for Federalism,” Frontline, Vol. 20, 31
“Dravidian Politics in Madras,” Journal of Asian No. 19 (13–26 September, 2003). 32
Studies,Vol. 20, No. 3 (May 1961), pp. 283–97, 31 Sinha, p. 87. 33
where, inter alia, Aubrey Menon’s best-selling 32 Austin, p. 226. 34
Ramayana Retold (London: Chatto & Windus, 33 See Austin, pp. 217–34.The quote is at p. 218 35
1949), is discussed. and is from The Report of the Expert Committee 36
25 For other subsequent secessionist movements on the Financial Provisions of the Constitution, para 37
and violent conflicts in Punjab,Assam,Nagaland, 28. According to M. M. Sury, the finance
38
Mizoram, and Kashmir, see the chapter in this commission is a feature unique to the Indian
39
volume by Gurharpal Singh. For an excellent constitution,“having no parallel in the existing
discussion of the factors contributing to federal constitutions of the world.” M. M. Sury, 40
secessionist conflicts see the chapter in Adeney, Fiscal Federalism in India (Delhi: Indian Tax 41
“Federal Instability in India,” particularly at Institute, 1998), pp. 80–81. 42
pp. 114–15 and 120–24. Two principal factors 34 The constitution makes it possible for the union 43
cited by Adeney as contributing to secessionist government to provide for grants-in-aid to 44
politics, language and religion, were theorized states that have a deficit on their revenue 45
and examined in Paul R.Brass,Language,Religion accounts. Called “gap-filling,” such grants-in- 46
and Politics in North India (NewYork:Cambridge aid acquired a bad name because more often 47
University Press, 1974). than not deficits were the result not of “need” 48
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1 but rather of wasteful expenditure and weak article, “Re-doing the Constitutional Design:
2 revenue effort. From the Interventionist to the Regulatory
3 35 Report of the Finance Commission [1952], 7, and State,” in Atul Kohli (ed.), The Success of India’s
4 Report of the Finance Commission [1957], 40, Democracy (Cambridge:University Press,2001).
cited in Austin, p. 224. 44 For a critical analysis of the FRBMA, see C. P.
5
36 Business Line,“Eleventh Finance Commission,” Chandrasekhar and Jayati Ghosh, “Fiscal
6
25 August, 2000. Responsibility versus Democratic Account-
7 37 Business Line, “Report of the Eleventh Finance ability,” Business Line, 27 July, 2004.
8 Commission:Implications and Re-examination,” 45 Among the steps were limits to state govern-
9 12 August, 2000. ment guarantees on debt; and limits to overall
10 38 Business Line,“Eleventh Finance Commission,” liabilities that could be incurred; Isaac and
11 25 August, 2000. Ramakumar,p.4971.Communist-ruled Bengal
12 39 Bimar means sick in Hindi. The adjective, refused to pass FRBM legislation.
13 bimaru, is formed out of the initial one or two 46 Isaac and Ramakumar, p. 4,973.
14 letters of the backward northern states men- 47 Arnab Basu et al., “The National Rural
15 tioned in the text. Guarantee Act of India, 2005,” in Oxford
40 Business Line,“Report of the Eleventh Finance Companion to Economics in India (New Delhi:
16
Commission,” 12 August, 2000. Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 1.
17
41 “Explanatory Memorandum as to the action 48 Subhas Chandra Garg, “Transformation of
18 taken on the recommendations made by Central Grants to States: Growing Condi-
19 the 11th Finance Commission Report sub- tionality and Bypassing State Budgets,” Economic
20 mitted to the President on 30 August, 2000.” and Political Weekly, Vol. 46, No. 48 (2
21 www.fincomindia.nic.in/eleventh.ernet.htm, December, 2006), p. 4,982. See also J. V. R.
22 accessed May 2008. Prasada Rao, “State Participation in the
23 42 Amiya Bagchi, a member of the Commission, Centrally Sponsored Schemes,” Family Welfare,
24 dissented from the modified report. Isaac and 5 May, 2003.
25 Kumar argued that the Twelfth Finance 49 Garg,“Transformation,”Table 4, p. 4,981.
26 Commission exceeded its constitutional brief by 50 Garg, “Transformation,” p. 4,982.
proposing conditions on federal transfers.T. M. 51 See B. P. R. Vithal and M. L. Shastry, Fiscal
27
Thomas Isaac and R.Ramakumar,“Why Do the Federalism in India (New Delhi: Oxford
28
States not Spend?” Economic and Political Weekly, University Press, 2001), p. 229.
29 Vol. 46, No. 48 (2 December, 2006), p. 4,972. 52 “Is the Union Budget a Federal Budget?”
30 43 The shift from an interventionist state to a Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 10
31 regulatory state is a principal theme of our (8 March, 2008).
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6 India’s judiciary
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9 Imperium in imperio?
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13 Shylashri Shankar
14
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19 We do not want to create an “imperium in According to economist Jean Drèze, the
20 imperio” and at the same time we want to give introduction of cooked midday meals in
21 the judiciary ample independence so that it can primary schools would not have happened
22 act without fear or favor. without the supreme court cracking the
23 (Speech by B. R.Ambedkar, India, Constituent whip. The Indian courts illustrate scholarly
24 Assembly Debates,Vol. 8, Book 3, p. 397) characterizations of this century as the global
25 age of “decline and fall of parliamentary
26 No court in the world—not the House of Lords, sovereignty,” the “global expansion of judicial
27 nor the US Supreme Court put together—has power,” and even a “juristocracy.”3
28 such vast jurisdiction, wide powers and final How did India’s judiciary become so
29 authority as the Indian Supreme Court. powerful? How does it use its power? Does it
30 (Iyer 1987), Our Courts on Trial, legitimate the majority coalition’s decisions, as
31 New Delhi: B. R. Publishing, p. 38) American political scientist Robert Dahl4
32 famously said about the American supreme
33 court? Or do the judges diverge from the
34 Introduction ruling party’s political preferences as they
35 discover and use broad powers of judicial
36 India’s supreme court is, to paraphrase George review to constitutionally protect new rights?
37 Gadbois, the “most powerful court in the Have India’s courts strayed into legislative and
38 world”, having virtually become an imperium executive space or have they played a support-
39 in imperio, an order within an order. In the past ing role to the other branches of the state? The
40 two decades, the higher judiciary transformed chapter addresses these questions.
41 constitutionally non-justiciable economic,and On 25 June, 1975, Prime Minister Indira
42 social rights to basic education, health, food, Gandhi suspended Article 21 and imprisoned
43 and shelter,among others,into legally enforce- hundreds of people (mainly political oppo-
44 able rights.1 In a famous judgment giving all nents and members of civil society groups)
45 children the right to elementary education,the under an executive order proclaiming a state
46 court said that a right could be treated as of emergency. When these detentions were
47 fundamental even if it were not present in challenged, nine high courts rejected the
48 the justiciable section of the constitution.2 constitutionality of the order. The supreme

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court, except for the lone dissenting voice of mentary system is less coherent. Having 1
Justice Hans Raj Khanna, overruled the lower appropriated the power of judicial review and 2
courts and, in the process, experienced a dent independence through its own judgments,9 the 3
in its authority for allowing Indira Gandhi and court has struggled to find ways to exercise the 4
her associates to violate the civil liberties of power meaningfully. 5
citizens.5 Legal scholars argue that the entry of I argue that the categorization of Indian 6
courts into new domains was a redemptive courts as activist and over-activist are pre- 7
move by the apex court to atone for its mature if we assess their track record in health 8
capitulation during the emergency.6 Most and education. Like Choudhary and Hunter, I 9
agree that the genesis of the judiciary’s activity define activism in quantitative terms:the more 10
on social rights can be traced to the immediate decisions that find government actions 11
post-emergency era when Justices P. N. unconstitutional,the more activist the courts.10 12
Bhagwati and Krishna Iyer evolved user- While the supreme court has expanded its 13
friendly approaches like public interest power of judicial review, it has neither 14
litigation (PIL). overturned laws frequently nor become a 15
I argue that the history of judicial activity in habitual policymaker. Rather, judges have 16
India is predominantly a story of judicial preferred to adopt what Tushnet11 calls “weak 17
pragmatism rather than activism (defined as remedies,” such as setting up committees and 18
overturning laws), evident in the weak negotiation channels to deal with negligence 19
compliance mechanisms favored by judges by the state.The court’s reluctance to overturn 20
who are aware of their dependence on poli- legislative actions or even penalize the govern- 21
tical and bureaucratic wings of the state. ment stems from its institutional rules 22
The judiciary remains, to paraphrase political emphasizing restraint, confirmed in the words 23
scientist Gerald Rosenberg, a hollow hope of a former justice that the higher courts 24
because of constraints imposed by institutional, “have unwittingly become conscience keepers 25
ideological, and structural factors.7 of the status-quo except in exceptional 26
The chapter first charts the path to power of cases.”12 27
the judiciary through an analysis of the con- The final section highlights the critical 28
stitutional role envisaged for (and appro- challenges faced by the institution.The irony 29
priated) by the supreme court. I argue that is that the court’s power to have an impact 30
the judiciary’s growing clout was a product of on the lives of citizens rests with the same 31
three factors:the ambiguity of the constitution government and bureaucracy that judges and 32
on the extent of judicial power; a crisis of others chastise for having been negligent. In 33
legitimacy induced by court-curbing moves the last five years or so, because of structural 34
of the executive in the 1970s, which coin- and political factors, the judiciary (particularly 35
cided with a third factor, the fragmentation the high courts) has become an overseer of 36
of political power in the 1990s. governance, in addition to its task of balancing 37
The second section assesses the use by citizen’s rights with the state’s goals of social 38
judges of their expanded powers. Scholars justice and harmonising relations with 39
like Tate and Vallinder contend that among minorities. I argue that the recent spurt in 40
parliamentary democracies a high degree of judicial activity in areas reserved for executive 41
party competition within the legislature tends and legislative actions is an alarming deve- 42
to invite challenges from the judiciary because lopment that will undercut the court’s 43
these systems produce weak governing coali- authority because of its inability to deliver on 44
tions.8 The evidence,culled from an analysis of the content of the right. 45
judgments on religious freedom and social 46
rights, suggests that the relationship between 47
courts and political configurations in a parlia- 48
166

1 The path to judicial power
2 committee, B. R. Ambedkar, that the con-
3 The characteristics of a powerful judiciary
4 include the authority to review legislation and
5 relative immunity from political machinations.
6 There are two sets of theories on how courts
7 become powerful. Juristocracy theories argue
8 that political elites transfer power to judges in
9 hopes that they will be conservative and/or
10 protective of rights.13 Conversely, others
11 attribute judicial empowerment to the legal
12 choices of judges.14 India’s experience validates
13 the second theory; the supreme court seized
14 autonomy by appropriating (through its
15 judgments) the power to appoint itself;political
16 elites did not transfer power to judges.
17 The Constitution of India (1950) established
18 a federal republic with a parliamentary system,
19 a strong central government and a unified
20 judiciary under an apex court. The supreme
21 court, which is on top of a three-tiered system,
22 has original jurisdiction over disputes between
23 the center and the states, and between states;
24 appellate function over criminal and civil courts
25 involving substantial questions of law; advisory
26 functions on matters referred by the presi-
27 dent; and special leave jurisdiction that allows
28 it to hear any issue in politics, except for
29 issues concerning the armed forces. At the
30 intermediate appellate level, the high court
31 stands at the head of a state’s judicial admini-
32 stration.15 The decision of the supreme court is
33 binding on all courts in India (article 141) and
34 non-compliance invites contempt of court.
35 Litigants can also approach a parallel statutory
36 system, the Lok Adalat (People’s Court), to
37 resolve disputes in a conciliatory manner.
38
39
Seizing the power of judicial review
40
41 The constitution’s ambiguity on whether it
42 explicitly endorsed parliamentary sovereignty,
43 implicitly allowed judicial review, or did
44 both arose from struggles in the constituent
45 assembly (CA) on the best way to ensure a
46 separation of powers among the executive,
47 legislature, and judiciary.16 The CA ultimately
48 emphasized balance rather than checks but
I N D I A’ S J U D I C I A RY : I M P E R I U M I N I M P E R I O ?
agreed with the chairman of the drafting
stitution had to walk the fine line between
creating a Leviathan and giving the judiciary
adequate power to act without fear or favor.
The majority decided that the supreme court’s
powers would be determined by law,i.e.,those
made by parliament rather than by the
constitution, but left room for ambiguity on
the extent of judicial scrutiny of legislation,the
powers of the federal court, the appointments
and removal process,and whether judges could
take post-retirement jobs.
Scholars argue that federalism (which
provides built-in opportunities for juris-
dictional conflict), a written constitution
(which provides judges with the basis for
rights-based decisions), judicial independence,
and a competitive party system (which could
produce weak governing coalitions) all invite
challenges from the judiciary.17 India has a
federal setup, a written constitution, de jure
judicial independence, and, in the late 1980s,
shifted from one-party rule to coalition
governments—all the structural conditions
that can produce judicial review.
An empirical examination, however, shows
that the court incrementally appropriated the
power to review legislation irrespective of the
political or structural conditions.The supreme
court enshrined judicial review by creating a
basic structure doctrine in 1973. The judg-
ment, which was a response to the twenty-
fourth and twenty-fifth amendments reducing
the level of judicial review of legislation, held
that parliament could not alter the basic
structure or framework of the constitution—a
structure that was undefined but knowable
only by the court.18 This occurred when the
Congress party had a dominant majority in
parliament, and the executive exercised
influence on judicial appointments.The basic
structure doctrine has been called anti-
democratic, used “mostly to protect judicial
power” by giving the final say to an unelected
body of judges.19
But the use of the basic structure doctrine
in later judgments was “haphazard” and “not
167
S H Y L AS H R I S H A N K A R

doctrinal or a general principle”;20 definitional Clashes with the executive and 1

problems plagued concepts like secularism, parliament 2
separation of powers, equality, rule of law and 3
The court’s growing clout evolved from clashes
judicial review, which were seen as part of the 4
with parliament over the extent of judicial
basic structure.21 In S. R. Bommai vs Union 5
review of some of the 104 constitutional
of India, the court upheld the president’s 6
amendments. The first amendment inserted a 7
authority,in the aftermath of the destruction of ninth schedule into the constitution, provid-
the Babri Masjid mosque in Ayodhya, to 8
ing that any law placed in the schedule would 9
dismiss three elected state governments for be immune to challenges asserting violation
failing to comply with the secular provisions of 10
of fundamental rights. The parliament got 11
the constitution, but, as Rajeev Dhavan notes, into the habit of inserting controversial laws 12
a “clear judicial statement of what constitutes in this schedule which, as Granville Austin 13
secularism continues to elude us.”22 The failure (1999) points out,25 would develop into a 14
to evolve a consistent jurisprudence on the predilection for undermining judicial powers 15
basic structure has become a recurrent theme broadly and even attacks on the judiciary as an 16
in how the court exercises its powers. institution during the prime ministership of 17
The Indian experience also challenges the Indira Gandhi (1966–77; 1980–84).26 But, as 18
argument that strong single-party majorities Sathe rightly notes, the Supreme Court 19
produce weak courts. The supreme court exercised “maximum restraint” in using the 20
fought with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s basic structure doctrine against constitutional 21
government (a single-party majority govern- amendments and was “reticent” in striking 22
ment) in the 1950s and 1960s on the extent to down an amendment.27 23
which social reform legislation, including 24
property and land reforms, could impinge on 25
fundamental rights. After Nehru’s death in Crisis of legitimacy 26
1964, the judiciary clashed with the govern- 27
ments of Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Judicial review was severely curtailed by the 28
Gandhi over populist measures such as the Indira Gandhi regime in the period preceding 29
nationalization of banks and abolition of privy and during the emergency (1975–77). The 30
purses. The supreme court appropriated the forty-second amendment in 1976 excluded 31
power of judicial review through decisions in constitutional amendments from the purview 32
the Golak Nath,bank nationalization and privy of judicial review. 33
purses cases.23 In response, and unlike her The judiciary had some respite during the 34
father, Indira Gandhi set out to pack the court Janata Party coalition (1977–80),which offered 35
with “committed judges,” prompting legal return transfers to those judges who had been 36
analysts to hark back wistfully to the summarily transferred during the emergency 37
Nehruvian era as a period when the court and reinstated the convention of appoint- 38
cautiously expanded its own authority while ing the most senior judge as chief justice. 39
maintaining a balance of power with the other Emboldened by these moves, the court 40
two branches. In the cabinet, Nehru had reasserted judicial scrutiny (assessed against the 41
successfully fought against the worst anti- basic structure doctrine) of amendments 42
and laws inserted into the ninth schedule after 43
judiciary sentiment, saying that a socialist
24 April, 1973 (the date of the Kesavananda 44
program could be pursued without striking at
judgment),saying that the constitution allowed 45
the judiciary’s roots.24
parliament only “limited amending power.” 28 46
In 2007, a nine-judge constitution bench 47
reiterated the right of the court to review the 48
168
 I N D I A’ S J U D I C I A RY : I M P E R I U M I N I M P E R I O ?

1 law in the ninth schedule.29 Although several A decade later, a majority led by Justice
2 legal observers and the media criticized the Verma reversed the ruling by holding that the
3 ruling “for weakening constitutional protec- CJI’s views on appointments and transfers must
4 tion given to progressive laws” and having be supreme for independence and separation
5 devastating results for judicial accountability, of powers to operate.34 The third judges case
6 the court’s self-aggrandized power of judicial outlined the process of consultation, which
7 review is now firmly part of the basic structure now included the CJI and four of his most
8 of the constitution.30 senior colleagues.Thus, structurally, the Indian
9 supreme court made itself virtually inde-
10 pendent of the executive and legislature with
11 Judicial independence and regard to entry procedures.35
12 political influence However, the extent of political influence
13 on the judiciary depended on the strength and
14 The apex court’s judgments seizing inde- predilections of the prime minister. During
15 pendence in appointments coincided with the Nehru’s leadership,the executive “by and large
16 fragmentation of political power in parliament respected the wishes of the Chief Justice,”36
17 as minority and coalition rule became the who had “virtually a veto over appointments,
18 norm. Judicial independence refers to the a result of the conventions and practices of the
19 autonomy of courts (institutionally and time, and the Chief Justice’s strength of
20 personally) from political influences. character.”37 But Indira Gandhi even aban-
21 India’s courts had some degree of institu- doned the seniority convention in choosing a
22 tional autonomy written into the constitution. chief justice in 1973 and 1977.38 The selection
23 Only parliament has the power to remove high process allegedly involved “communal and
24 court and supreme court judges; no judge political considerations,”39 leading to “havoc
25 has been impeached so far.31 The constitution with judicial decisions in crucial and sensitive
26 empowered the president (acting on the advice cases.”40 Some of the judges appointed during
27 of the prime minister and cabinet) to appoint the Janata regime “would not have sat on the
28 judges of the supreme court and the high bench had the Congress (I) been in office at
29 courts, after consultation with the CJI and CJs that time and vice versa.”41
30 of the lower courts (articles 124 and 217). But So, when the political actor was strong
31 consultation did not mean concurrence of the (single-party majority), prepared to take on
32 CJI, since it was “a dangerous proposition” to the courts, and had a policy agenda (as Indira
33 allow the CJI “a veto” because it would Gandhi’s government did), the supreme court
34 amount to a “transfer of authority.”32 was more constrained by the political milieu.
35 Initially, judges agreed with Ambedkar’s When the political actor was strong and had a
36 intent to keep the judiciary from appointing its policy, but was not prepared to strike at the
37 own members. When the Congress party led court’s autonomy (the Nehruvian regime),
38 by Indira Gandhi returned to power in 1980, or if there was a weak governing coalition/
39 several high court judges were transferred, minority government (post-1988 govern-
40 while the renewal or non-renewal of tenures of ments), the supreme court had more room to
41 others was rumored to have involved political maneuver. A variation on this is that single
42 considerations. Petitions questioning these party-dominated political systems will accord
43 transfers were decided in the first judges case: a courts less independence because of the
44 four-judge majority held that a judge’s consent governing party’s expectation that it will
45 was not necessary for his transfer but that continue to win elections,whereas competitive
46 such transfers ought not to be punitive, and parties favor greater judicial independence
47 that the CJI’s concurrence was not manda- in order to preserve a party’s legislative gains
48 tory.33 made while in office after it has lost power.42
169
S H Y L AS H R I S H A N K A R

This could explain why the 1977–80 Janata supreme court.48 Overt dissent is low, because 1
Party (coalition) government removed some of fragmented bench structures of decision 2
of the court-curbing amendments of the making (two and three judge panels),the norm 3
previous government, emboldening the court of assigning opinion writing responsibiliy to a 4
to reintroduce due process in 1978,and appro- senior judge, quick rotation of judges on 5
priate vast powers over administrative action. different panels, and heavy workload.49 6
Even the timing of the judgments that ex- It is debatable, however, whether executive 7
panded judicial autonomy over the appoint- interference in appointments before 1993 actually 8
ments process came during minority and occurred for a vast number of cases and reduced 9
coalition governments in 1993 and 1998. But the quality of judges.50 The author’s analysis of 10
the expanded autonomy for judges did not the biographies of 116 supreme court judges from 11
imply that they would support social rights; in 1950–2005 shows that over 50 percent had 12
fact, one study shows that judges were more worked for the state government at some point 13
conservative on the rights to health and prior to their induction in the high court,but less 14
education after 1993.43 than half (46 percent) had worked for a state or 15
Even after the court seized the power to central government just prior to their induc- 16
appoint its members, the political branches tion into the high court. Over 72 percent of 17
continued to retain influence through the supreme court judges had served in the high court 18
power to allot post-retirement jobs.44 Accord- for 11–16 years, indicating that those elevated to 19
ing to a retired judge, the court favored the the supreme court were senior judges. 20
state in the Prevention of Terrorist and What has the court done with its powers? 21
Disruptive Activities Act (TADA) 1985 cases 22
because a district judge on the verge of retire- 23
The promise and perils of judicial
ment could be appointed by the government 24
interventions
(with the CJ’s consent) to hear the case in the 25
relevant court, thus allowing him to continue 26
Religious freedom and gender
working even after retirement. “One who is 27
equality
obliged to the state by extension beyond 28
superannuation is less than impartial in a In 1985 the supreme court played a key role in 29
‘terrorist’trial.”45 This is partly substantiated by the clash between two constitutional rights: 30
data on TADA and preventive detention cases religious freedom (articles 25–30) and gender 31
where almost all appeals to the Supreme Court equality (articles 14 and 15 on equality and 32
had the state as a defendant, implying that the nondiscrimination) through a ruling that 33
state won in the lower courts.46 privileged civil law over religious laws. India 34
The judiciary’s decision-making process allows citizens to choose between religious and 35
emphasizes collaboration and seniority, thus civil laws in matters relating to personal law issues 36
making it difficult for us to gauge the effect of of marriage, divorce, inheritance, and adoption. 37
political influences.47 Institutional rules such Muslims can choose to marry under sharia law, 38
as short stints of four to six years at the apex Hindus under the Hindu Marriage Act 1955, 39
court prior to retirement at the age of 65 deter and so on.The court issued a ruling in the Shah 40
sustained clashes with the government.“Institu- Bano case giving Muslim women the right to 41
tional accommodation is crucial for preser- receive maintenance (available to non-Muslim 42
vation of democratic rights; attempts to women under civil laws) even if they had 43
preserve rights at the cost of endemic conflict married under Muslim religious laws.51 44
between the executive, legislature, and the Like the Dreyfus affair in late nineteenth- 45
judiciary are, according to Chief Justice century France, the Shah Bano case became a 46
Chandrachud, self defeating,” a statement that lodestone for warring groups. The Congress 47
sums up the attitude of the post-emergency party-dominated parliament immediately 48
170

1 passed the Muslim Women’s (Protection of
2 Rights on Divorce) Act in 1986 reversing
3 the Shah Bano ruling, drawing protests from
4 feminist groups and jubilation among Muslim
5 religious leaders. The act provided Muslim
6 women “a reasonable and fair provision
7 of maintenance” at the time of divorce but
8 forbade them to appeal to Section 125(8) of
9 the Criminal Procedure Code for such
10 maintenance unless their husbands consented
11 to it.Lower court judges (later endorsed by the
12 supreme court) interpreted the new act in
13 ways that awarded Muslim divorcees large
14 lump sums that would maintain them for a
15 lifetime, showing that the concerns of the act’s
16 opponents were unfounded.52
17 Muslim religious leaders were particularly
18 incensed with the CJI’s call for legislating
19 an uniform civil code (UCC), which was in
20 the directive principles, the non-justiciable
21 section of the constitution. They saw the
22 court’s recommendations,which were made in
23 reference to national integration, as an attack
24 on Muslim law, and as implicitly creating the
25 fiction that Hindus were governed by a secular
26 and egalitarian code. But as Agnes points out,
27 the court’s attitude towards bigamy by Hindus
28 has been lax.53 Scholars have also questioned
29 whether the enactment of a UCC can itself
30 bring about gender equality.54 However,judges
31 have not given up on the UCC; in October
32 2007,the supreme court set a new deadline for
33 states to frame rules making the registration of
34 marriages compulsory.
35 As several scholars point out, the judiciary
36 thus played a negative role through its bias in
37 favor of Hindu laws in the UCC debate, a
38 controversial role in the Shah Bano case where
39 it privileged group interpretations at the cost
40 of individual rights, and a positive role in its
41 interpretations of the 1986 Act allowing
42 Muslim divorcees to gain the substance of their
43 rights. The supreme court has been “high
44 sounding” in the area of group rights such as
45 affirmative action, gender justice and personal
46 laws,while “adroitly avoiding a too courageous
47 pursuit” of egalitarian social justice.55 We see a
48 similar pattern in the domain of social rights
I N D I A’ S J U D I C I A RY : I M P E R I U M I N I M P E R I O ?
where judges have struggled to reconcile their
power with effective delivery of the substance
of the right.
Social rights56
The often-cited cases of judicial activism
pertain to judgments from the 1980s onward,
transforming several directive principles such
as the right to a clean environment, health,
education, shelter, among others, into funda-
mental rights through an expanded notion of
the right to life (article 21).57 These judgments
came in the wake of innovations like public
interest litigation (PIL), which allow citizens
and NGOs to appeal directly to either the high
courts or the apex court.58 Sathe argues that
post-emergency judicial activism, which was
the liberal interpretation of articles 21 (right to
life) and 14 (right to equality), reconceptual-
ized the basic rules of the judicial process
with a view to making it more accessible and
participatory.59
Indian judges have not been activist in
health and education, and even on environ-
mental issues if we define activism as finding
government actions unconstitutional. Instead,
the judiciary played a more supportive role in
line with its inherent tendency to avoid
conflict with the government. Most of the
judgments legalizing social rights came in the
wake of the emphasis—and legislation—on
redistribution and social justice. For instance,
in 1971 and 1976, Mrs Gandhi’s govern-
ment amended the constitution to force the
courts to take more notice of the directive
principles.60
Judges focused on making the government
perform its statutory tasks and highlighted
legislative actions as the basis for the shift
towards justiciability of some social rights.Our
data on compliance mechanisms in 384
judgments in health and education show that
judges were more likely to prefer committee-
style collaborative measures (rather than strong
penalties) to elicit actions from the govern-
ment. The government complied with the
court’s directives in high-profile cases such as
171
S H Y L AS H R I S H A N K A R

those pertaining to clean air in Delhi or the Judicial woes 1

use of safe water by cola companies, but most 2
other cases and complex issues involving Overloaded dockets arising from the vast 3
multiple agencies such as public sanitation and jurisdiction,inadequate staff,and funding,have 4
administration of hospitals were left un- compromised the capacity of the court to 5
resolved. Even when the court instituted time deliver prompt justice. The supreme court’s 6
limits, enforcement depended more on docket had 2,614 cases in 1951 (67 percent 7
monitoring by litigants, such as the NGOs, for disposal rate), registered a spike in 1977 with 8
a right to food and education.Not surprisingly, 30,168 cases (34 percent disposal rate),139,796 9
the court’s impact on a citizen’s ability to enjoy cases in 1985 (36 percent disposal rate), and 10
the substance of the right was low. Despite 80,691 cases in 2005 (57 percent disposal 11
judicial support, the right to food campaign is rate).63 One report estimates that 24 million 12
looking beyond legal tools to carry out and cases are pending in different courts, with high 13
sustain its work because of the manpower and courts producing the biggest bottlenecks.64 14
funding needed for litigation. Judges were Persistent vacancies (with levels reaching 30 15
aware of the disconnect between their percent in Delhi over the last 12 years in district 16
directives and the propensity for compliance and subordinate courts) and the tendency of 17
judges to allow adjournments without valid
or noncompliance by the government, but 18
reasons add to the delay.65
could do little about it.61 Even when the 19
Corruption in the judiciary is another source
judgments found fault with the government, 20
of concern. One retiring chief justice provided
the phrases employed were “unfortunate,” 21
a shocking indictment of India’s judges, saying
“policy matter,” “conscious attempts must be 22
that more than 20 percent of judges were
made to increase budgetary allocations,” 23
corrupt.Among the causes of corruption are the
“moral and social obligation of the state,” and 24
low pay scales of the subordinate judiciary. In
the like.62 25
December 2006 the cabinet approved a bill to
The judiciary thus had a strong impact on 26
amend the Judges Inquiry Act and create a
the legal dimension of social and economic national judicial council that would examine all 27
rights. Judges had a selectively significant complaints of corruption and misdemeanors 28
impact on some policies such as those that against judges. But the problem is that judiciary 29
expanded free access to anti-retro virals (ARVs) will police itself, thus creating only an “illusion 30
for AIDS patients, created a right to food, of accountability.”66 31
enabled anti-pollution policies in Delhi, However, as Baxi points out, it is unfair to 32
provided part of the justification for an put all the blame on judges; the state, lawyers, 33
education guarantee scheme,and helped create and litigants also have to shoulder some of the 34
new regulatory mechanisms for blood banks responsibility.With a ratio of just 10.5 judges 35
and for processing medical negligence claims. per million population,when at least 50 judges 36
But such contributions were not tantamount are required, it is not surprising that there are 37
to judges becoming policymakers since,for the tremendous delays in lower courts. Contrast 38
most part, the institution or government acted this with the US, where there are 107 judges 39
only when it was ready to do so, not because per million citizens. Only 0.2 percent of the 40
the court demanded it.The constitutional right GNP is spent on the judiciary.The Malimath 41
to education was introduced ten years after the Committee, and more recently the supreme 42
judgment. The judiciary had the weakest court directed the state governments to fill 43
impact in ensuring the effective delivery of vacancies in subordinate courts by 31 March, 44
these rights,leading us to the question whether 2003 and increase the number of judges to 50 45
the judicial arena provides the best site for per million citizens by 2007.67 Unfortunately, 46
improving the realization of social rights. the deadline has not been met. 47
48
172

1 Conclusion
2 enforcement capacity, the emphasis on colla-
3 Scholarly studies and newspaper reports give
4 us contradictory images of the judge: activist,
5 political,confrontational,policymaker,corrupt,
6 apolitical, impartial, and inefficient. Our
7 analysis shows that they are not the puppets of
8 political masters,but neither are they strategists
9 nor idiosyncratic. Rather, Indian judges are
10 more likely to engage in a constant process of
11 negotiation with their identities as judges,
12 citizens, and as members of a state institution.
13 Rosenberg’s view that constitutional rights
14 are more likely to be implemented if they
15 reflect the preexisting beliefs of politicians,
16 policymakers and the public is an apt
17 characterization of the actual power of the
18 Indian judiciary. “Courts do not exist in a
19 vacuum. Supreme court decisions, even those
20 finding constitutional rights, are not imple-
21 mented automatically or in any straightforward
22 or simple way.They are merely one part of the
23 broader political picture. At best, they can
24 contribute to the process of change. In and
25 of themselves, they accomplish little.”68
26 The Indian Supreme court’s effect on policy
27 has been indirect for the most part. Even the
28 “right to education” that the court articulated
29 in a 1992 judgment became a constitutional
30 amendment only after it appeared as an
31 election promise of a political party and was
32 finally passed ten years later. The Indian
33 experience reinforces the theoretical and
34 empirical evidence from other countries that
35 there is no intrinsic link between judicial
36 independence and the expansion of rights.69
37 So what does our report card say about the
38 Indian judiciary? First, though Sathe70 is right
39 that the Indian supreme court has moved
40 beyond the traditional separation of powers
41 approach, the evidence from social rights
42 litigation suggests that, until recently, the
43 judiciary neither appropriated a policymaking
44 role nor was it activist in the sense of
45 overturning laws. Even in environmental
46 cases, the court provided temporary solutions,
47 while nudging the government to address
48 pressing issues such as cleanliness in cities.The
I N D I A’ S J U D I C I A RY : I M P E R I U M I N I M P E R I O ?
allocation of cases by the chief justice, lack of
boration rather than dissent in the two- or
three-judge panels encourage conformity and
status quo behavior by judges.
Second,the relationship between courts and
political configurations in a parliamentary
system is less coherent than is commonly
assumed.When the political actor was strong
(single-party majority), prepared to take on
the courts (as Indira Gandhi did), and had a
policy agenda, the supreme court was more
constrained by the political milieu. If the
political actor was strong and had a policy, but
was not prepared to strike at the court’s
autonomy (the Nehruvian regime), or if there
was a weak governing coalition/minority
government (post-1988 governments), the
supreme court had more room to maneuver.
But the judges predominantly played a
supporting role to the government.71
Third, theories of legal mobilization rightly
argue that the emergence and strength of
support structures within civil society enable a
rights revolution,72 provide critical support to
the courts against a belligerent executive,73 but
also constrain the court’s potential contribution
in the area of civil rights and liberties.74 The low
rates of litigation by NGOs and the minimal use
of PILs in these sectors confirm the argument
by Epp that social rights litigation (except
environmental cases) lacks the support structures
for a full-fledged rights revolution in India.
Other studies show that India’s higher judiciary
at best provided temporary solutions to com-
plex problems of public health and primary
education, but were more effective on simpler
issues dealing with government regulation of
private providers and obligations of private
providers to citizens.75 The higher courts often
used declaratory language that focused on the
strength of the right rather than the remedies.
The evidence raises concerns about
whether the court is the right arena to ensure
the provision of social goods. Judges are not
qualified to assess the implications of their
judgments. For instance, a recent interim
ruling by the supreme court allowing a
173
S H Y L AS H R I S H A N K A R

pharmaceutical policy that facilitated govern- 3 C. Neal Tate and Torbjörn Vallinder, “The 1
ment intervention when prices of essential Global Expansion of Judicial Power: The 2
drugs behaved abnormally was interpreted by Judicialization of Politics,” in C. Neal Tate and 3
the government as allowing a drug price TorbjörnVallinder (eds),The Global Expansion of 4
Judicial Power (New York: University Press,
control policy. Even PILs have come under a 5
1995),pp.1–24;Ran Hirschl,Towards Juristocracy
huge strain; the Prime Minister cautioned the 6
—The Origins and Consequences of the New
bench that PILs could not become vehicles for Constitutionalism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 7
settling political or other scores.76 University Press, 2004). 8
While the courts have been used in the past 4 Robert Dahl, “Decision-Making in a 9
by India’s political elites to decide thorny Democracy:The Supreme Court as a National 10
political issues such as the beneficiaries of Policy-Maker,” Journal of Public Law, Vol. 6, 11
affirmative action, the recent decade has No. 2 (1957), pp. 279–95. 12
increased this propensity—in line with the 5 ADM Jabalpur vs Shiv Kant Shukla (1976) 13
global trend—of promoting judicial inter- 2 SCC 52. 14
6 Upendra Baxi, “Taking Suffering Seriously: 15
vention and even policymaking to avoid
Social Action Litigation in the Supreme Court
responsibility for controversial decisions.77 16
of India,” in R. Sudarshan et al. (eds), Judges and
Plagued by fractured political support and 17
the Judicial Power (Bombay: Tripathi, 1985);
squabbling coalition partners, the executive S. P. Sathe, Judicial Activism in India (Delhi:
18
and legislature have shifted the burden of Oxford University Press, 2002). 19
governance to the judiciary.The judges seem 7 Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can 20
willing, and even justify their intervention on Courts Bring About Social Change? (Chicago: 21
grounds of growing lawlessness and ineffective University of Chicago Press,1991).For a similar 22
administration. But the court would do well argument on the pragmatic bent of India’s 23
to heed the words of Justice Pathak that “it judiciary, see Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “India’s 24
Judiciary,” in Devesh Kapur and Pratap Bhanu 25
possesses the sanction of neither the sword nor
Mehta (eds), Public Institutions in India (New 26
the purse and that its strength lies basically in
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005). 27
public confidence and support, and that 8 Tate and Vallinder.
consequently the legitimacy of its acts and 28
9 Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “India’s Judiciary,” in
decisions must remain beyond all doubt.”78 29
Devesh Kapur and Pratap Bhanu Mehta (eds),
Judicial intrusion may be well motivated, but 30
Public Institutions in India (New Delhi: Oxford
the resulting workload, the incapacity of the University Press, 2005). 31
judiciary as an institution to make policies, the 10 Sujit Choudhary and Claire E. Hunter, 32
stop-gap nature of the solutions devised by “Measuring Judicial Activism on the Supreme 33
Court of Canada:A Comment on Newfound- 34
courts, and the destabilizing campaigns initi-
land (Treasury Board) V. Nape,” McGill Law 35
ated by the political branches may overwhelm
Journal, 48, 2003. 36
the judiciary.
11 Mark Tushnet, Symposium: “Constitutional 37
Courts in the Field of Power Politics: Social 38
Welfare Rights and the Forms of Judicial 39
Notes Review,” Texas Law Review, Vol. 82 (2004). 40
12 V. R. Krishna Iyer, Our Courts on Trial (New
1 The Indian constitution distinguishes between
41
Delhi: B. R. Publishing, 1987), p. 144.
justiciable fundamental rights and non- 42
13 Hirschl.
enforceable directive principles; see H. M. 14 Tate and Vallinder. 43
Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, 3rd edn 15 Apart from writ jurisdiction,the 21 high courts 44
(New Delhi: N. M. Tripathy, 1983); and have jurisdiction over all lower courts in its 45
B. N. Rau, India’s Constitution in the Making territory.There are 3,150 district level courts, 46
(Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1960). 4,816 munsif/magistrate courts and 1,964 47
2 Unnikrishnan vs State of AP (1993) 1 SCC 645. magistrate II and equivalent courts at the 48
174
 I N D I A’ S J U D I C I A RY : I M P E R I U M I N I M P E R I O ?

1 bottom of the integrated judiciary. Arnab 30 V. Venkatesan, “Judicial Challenge,” Frontline

2 Kumar Hazra and Bibek Debroy (eds), Judicial (9 February, 2007).
3 Reforms in India— Issues and Aspects (New Delhi: 31 Even investigations into judicial conduct cannot
4 Academic Foundation, 2007). occur without prior written consent of the CJI,
16 Sathe, p. 39; Susanne Rudolph and Lloyd who will not consent unless there is clinching
5
Rudolph, In Pursuit of Lakshmi (Chicago, IL: evidence, which the police cannot get unless
6
University of Chicago Press, 1996). they investigate.
7 17 Tate and Vallinder, p. 30. 32 B. R.Ambedkar, CA Debates,Volume 8, Book
8 18 Keshavananda Bharati vs State of Kerala, AIR 3, p. 258.
9 (1973) SC 1461. 33 S.P.Gupta vs Union of India, AIR (1982) SC 149.
10 19 Raju Ramachandran, “The Supreme Court 34 Supreme Court Advocates on Record Association vs
11 and the Basic Structure Doctrine,” in B. N. Union of India (1993) Supp 2 SCR 659. For a
12 Kirpal et al. (eds), Supreme But Not Infallible critique,see Lord Cooke of Thorndon,“Where
13 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), Angels Fear to Tread,” in Kirpal.
14 pp. 107–33. 35 See Rajeev Dhavan, Justice on Trial:The Supreme
15 20 Mehta; Gary Jacobsohn, The Wheel of Law: Court Today (Allahabad: Wheeler, 1980); and
16 India’s Secularism in Comparative Constitutional Vijay K. Gupta, Decision Making in the Supreme
17 Perspective (Princeton, NJ: University Press, Court of India (Delhi: Kaveri, 1995) for detailed
2005). analyses of decision making in the supreme
18
21 Bommai vs Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1, court.
19 IR Coelho (dead) by LRs vs State of Tamil Nadu 36 Gupta, p. 37.
20 and Ors (2007) 2 SCC 1. 37 Austin, p. 125.
21 22 Rajeev Dhavan, “The Supreme Court and 38 On 25 April, 1973, Justice Ray was appointed
22 Group Life,” in Kirpal, p. 275. CJI, superseding three senior judges (Shelat,
23 23 In the Golak Nath case, a 6:5 majority held Hegde,and Grover),who subsequently resigned.
24 that parliament was not competent to amend In January 1977 Justice H. L. Khanna was
25 the chapter on fundamental rights; in the Bank superseded for dissenting in the habeas corpus
26 Nationalization Case, the majority held that case.
27 the right to property was a very important 39 Iyer, p. 13.
28 fundamental right; the Privy Purse Case held 40 Lawyer Indira Jaising, quoted by Iyer, p. 16.
29 that the claim to receive a privy purse was part 41 Iyer, p. 30. This practice is the norm in the
of the right to property; and the Kesavananda USA where supreme court judges are political
30
Bharti Case outlined the “basic structure of the appointees.
31 42 Mark J. Ramseyer, “The Puzzling
constitution doctrine”; Gobind Das, “The
32 Supreme Court:An Overview,” in Kirpal. (In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative
33 24 George Gadbois,“The Supreme Court of India Approach,” Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 23
34 as a Political Institution,” in R. Dhavan et al. (1994), pp. 721–47 and J. Mark Ramseyer and
35 (eds), Judges and the Judicial Power: Essays in Eric Rasmusen,“Judicial Independence in Civil
36 Honour of JusticeV.R.Krishna Iyer (London:Sweet Law Regimes: Econometrics from Japan,”
37 & Maxwell and Bombay: N. M.Tripathi, 1985). Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,
38 25 Granville Austin,Working a Democratic Institution; Vol. 13 (1997), pp. 259–86.
39 The Indian Experience (Delhi:Oxford University 43 Shylashri Shankar, Scaling Justice:India’s Supreme
40 Press, 1999). Court,Anti-Terror Laws and Social Rights (Delhi:
26 Two hundred and eighty-four laws were Oxford University Press, 2008).
41
inserted into the ninth schedule up to 2007, of 44 Supreme Court judges retire at the age of 65,
42
which 217 were enacted after 1973. high court judges at 62.
43 27 Sathe, p. 88. 45 Iyer, p. 64.
44 28 Minerva Mills vs Union of India (1980) 3 SCC 46 Shankar.
45 625, para 22, Waman Rao vs Union of India 47 Order VII of the Supreme Court Rules.
46 (1981) 2 SCC 362. 48 Baxi, p.81.
47 29 IR Coelho (dead) by LRs vs State of Tamil Nadu 49 Gupta, p. 147, reports that the two major
48 and Ors (2007) 2 SCC 1. dissenters between 1973–81 were Justice

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Bhagwati (seven dissents), and Justice A. P. 64 Eighty-fifth Report of the Parliamentary 1

Sen (six dissents). Standing Committee on Home Affairs on Legal 2
50 Mehta, p. 176, points out that a government Delays.The high courts of Allahabad (800,000), 3
affidavit in 1993, filed in the second judges Madras (650,000), Kerala (300,000) and 4
case, noted that, of 575 appointments, the Bombay (240,000) were the worst offenders.
5
government had rejected the chief justice’s 65 Hazra and Debroy.
6
opinion in only a handful of cases; also see 66 Prashant Bhushan, “Judicial Accountability or
Gupta. Illusion?” Economic and Political Weekly,Vol. 46, 7
51 Mohd. Ahmad Khan vs Shah Bano Begum, AIR No. 47 (25 November, 2006), pp. 4,847–48. 8
(1985) SC 945 67 All India Judge’s Association vs Union of India 9
52 Arab Ahmadhia Abdulla vs Arab Bail Humuna (2002) 4 SCC 247. 10
Saiyadbhai, AIA (1988) Guj 141 and Daniel 68 Gerald N. Rosenberg, “The Real World of 11
Latifi vs Union of India, AIR (2001) SC 3958. Constitutional Rights: the Supreme Court 12
53 Bhaurao Lokhande vs State of Maharashtra, and the Implementation of the Abortion 13
AIA (1965) SC 1564 and Sarla Mudgal vs Union Decisions,” in Lee Epstein (ed.), Contemplating 14
of India (1995) SCC 635. Courts (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1995), 15
54 Upendra Baxi, “The Rule of Law in India,” p. 417.
16
SUR – Revista Internacional de Direitos Humanos, 69 Tamir Moustafa, “Law versus the State: The
17
Vol. 6, No. 4 (2007). Judicialization of Politics in Egypt,”Law & Social
55 Dhavan, in Kirpal, p. 274. Inquiry,Vol. 28, No. 4 (Fall, 2003), pp. 883–930; 18
56 This section is based on an analysis by the Hirschl; Ceren Belge, “Friends of the Court: 19
author of 384 judgments in the higher courts The Republican Alliance and Selective 20
on the “rights to health/education.” Activism of the Constitutional Court of 21
57 Article 21 states that no person shall be deprived Turkey,” Law and Society Review,Vol. 40, No. 3 22
of his life or personal liberty except according (2006), pp. 653–92. 23
to the procedure established by law. 70 Sathe, passim. 24
58 Common law systems (adversarial) permit only 71 Also see S. Muralidhar, “Implementation of 25
a person whose rights are directly affected to Court Orders in the Area of Economic, Social 26
approach the court. The PIL, which is non- and Cultural Rights: An Overview of the
27
adversarial, allows any member of the public Experience of the Indian Judiciary,”First South
28
acting in a bona fide manner to espouse public Asian Regional Judicial Colloquium on Access
interest causes by sending a letter or petition to to Justice, New Delhi, 1–3 November, 2002. 29
the supreme court in case of a violation of a 72 Charles Epp,The Rights Revolution (Chicago,IL: 30
fundamental right (article 32), and to the high University of Chicago Press, 1998). 31
court for violations of legal rights (article 226). 73 Moustafa. 32
59 Sathe, pp. 100 and 107. 74 Belge. 33
60 Dhavan, Justice on Trial, p. 128. 75 Shankar, Scaling Justice. 34
61 Koolwal vs State of Rajasthan,AIR (1988) Raj 2. 76 Indian Express, 7 April, 2007, “Line Dividing 35
62 Ravindra Kumar,Advocate and Anr vs State of UP Activism and Over-reach is a Thin One: PM’s 36
(Writ Petition M/S 1746 of 1998, Allahabad Caution to Bench.” 37
HC). 77 Tate and Vallinder; Hirschl.
38
63 Supreme Court Registrar under an RTI request 78 Justice Pathak, in Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs
39
from the author. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 161 76.
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
176
 1
2
3
4
12
5
6 Balancing act
7
8
9 Prudence, impunity,
10
11 and Pakistan’s jurisprudence
12
13
14
15
Paula R. Newberg
16
17
18
19 We seek to inculcate the belief that laws are not Introduction
20 meant to be jealously preserved in juris-
21 prudential tomes but to be applied, by activist In the sixtieth year of Pakistan’s independence,
22 judges, for the protection of the common man, its president, General Pervez Musharraf, went
23 and that the rule of law is an idea worth fighting to war against its courts and judges. As the
24 for. Supreme Court took up petitions challenging
25 Muneer A. Malik, Supreme Court Bar the disappearances of citizens,1 corruption
26 Association, Dawn, June 2007 in the privatization of state enterprises,2 the
27 conduct of police and security forces, and
28 Whereas the Government is committed to the finally, the questionable legitimacy of
29 independence of the judiciary and the rule of Musharraf ’s tenure and re-election bid,
30 law and holds the superior judiciary in high Musharraf took on the judiciary.
31 esteem, it is nonetheless of paramount impor- Within a short period of time, Musharraf
32 tance that the Honourable Judges confine the removed the chief justice of the supreme
33 scope of their activity to the judiciary function court in March 2007, but was forced to return
34 and not assume charge of administration . . . I him to the court after public protests from the
35 hereby order and proclaim that the Constitution legal community and a formal restoration
36 of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall remain mandated by the Supreme Judicial Council.3
37 in abeyance. A few months later, fearing that the court
38 Proclamation of Emergency, November 2007 would thwart his re-election bid, Musharraf
39 declared a state of emergency, suspended the
40 By legitimizing military takeovers, the judges constitution, and promulgated a provisional
41 have abdicated their role to defend the constitutional order (PCO). He then fired
42 Constitution. more than 60 percent of the country’s superior
43 Justice (Retd) Saeeduzzaman Siddiqui, court justices, stacked the courts with loyalists
44 Newsline, May 2007 who were willing to swear their oaths to the
45 PCO, and placed several lawyers and Supreme
46 Court justices under house arrest.To cement
47 his power, he removed the licensing of lawyers
48 from professional associations,arrested lawyers

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who protested these attacks on the courts, and of intra-governmental strife, occasionally as 1
amended the Army Act to negate fundamental arbiters in the cause of constitutionality.When 2
rights otherwise guaranteed in the constitu- they have failed, the courts have contributed 3
tion. The newly constituted supreme court to an evolving culture of executive impunity in 4
validated Musharraf ’s constitutional revisions which anti-constitutional behavior regularly 5
and on his re-election as president.4 In one overrides promises of future good governance. 6
short year, the safety of judges and lawyers, This poisonous combination has repeatedly 7
the integrity of judicial institutions and the diminished the rule of law, limited access 8
foundations of the country’s jurisprudence to justice, and deeply injured democratic 9
were grievously compromised. development. 10
This was not the first time that the courts In the frequent absence of freely elected 11
ran afoul of the executive.Musharraf had issued governing bodies, the superior courts have 12
a previous PCO when he seized power in repeatedly turned their attention to the 13
1999,and in 2000 had promulgated an Oath of executive—whether civilian or military— and 14
Offices (Judges) Order that required judges of judicial dockets have consistently attended not 15
the higher judiciary to swear allegiance to only to the unfinished business of the state,but 16
that PCO. General Zia ul Haq had done the also to the soundness and validity of executive 17
same after imposing martial law in 1977. In action. The judiciary has often functioned 18
both instances, the courts were cleansed of without a valid constitution, and Pakistan’s 19
opponents to the ruling executives, providing jurisprudence reflects a constant struggle to 20
pliant judges to rule on the legality of military- arbitrate in its absence.Under military rule,the 21
led governments.As a result,through the 1980s courts have often acquiesced in executive 22
under General Zia, and for much of General actions that might otherwise be rendered 23
Musharraf ’s tenure as well, Pakistan’s superior unconstitutional.Under civilian governments, 24
judiciary was not only assumed to be in league judges have occasionally tried, in their rulings, 25
with the military, but also to be responsible for to impart a sense of judicial responsibility for 26
maintaining an executive-oriented judicial the stability of the state, although that has 27
culture. meant devaluing participatory politics. In so 28
Pakistan’s judicial history reflects a calculus doing, they have lurched from between active 29
of conflict and convenience that highlights and reactive roles, in each instance under- 30
the incomplete resolution of the country’s scoring the uncertain sources of their institu- 31
fundamental political disputes and deep tional powers and, too often, reducing their 32
structural tensions between the judiciary and potential strengths. 33
the executive. Since independence, Pakistan’s Pakistan’s jurisprudence therefore re- 34
courts have lived in a juridical universe defined mains inconsistent and idiosyncratic—long on 35
by a heavily bureaucratized, praetorian state prudence, occasionally short on justice, often 36
that has never completed a transition to repre- intellectually compromised and always inten- 37
sentative government.The regular imposition sely, if retrospectively, political. When courts 38
of military or emergency rule has consistently disagree with ruling authorities, they are 39
skewered constitutions for short-term political considered independent—politically, if not 40
gain, systematically undercutting citizen rights jurisprudentially—but judgments contrary to 41
as generals and presidents (often the same presidents and parliaments often boomerang, 42
individuals) have strengthened their role in the leaving the judiciary under greater duress than 43
state. As parliamentary leaders have sparred before.When judging the executive-centered 44
with presidents and military leaders in their state, however, the courts have often found 45
continual efforts to re-equilibrate executive– themselves complicit in its actions,and Pakistan’s 46
legislative relations, the courts have been left jurisprudence understandably reflects this 47
to dangle between them, sometimes as victims strained juridical environment. In all these 48
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1 senses,the judiciary has mirrored the weaknesses
2 of the Pakistani state,even as political society has
3 called on the courts to solve the problems that
4 such weaknesses have inevitably provoked.
5 Musharraf ’s antipathy toward the judiciary
6 reflected his difficulties governing the fragile
7 Pakistani state.In particular,his commitment to
8 the global anti-terrorism campaign led to
9 significant abuses of fundamental rights in the
10 name of strong executive rule. The court’s
11 so-called “activism” on this and other matters
12 became Musharraf ’s excuse to thwart the
13 courts and, by extension, Pakistan’s vocal legal
14 community. As it contested the sitting
15 government, the 2007 supreme court’s docket
16 and demeanor reflected 60 years of accumu-
17 lated frustration about executive prerogatives,
18 and the problematic role of the judiciary and
19 judicial rulings.
20
21
22 Constitutions and courts
23
24 The script for Pakistan’s troubled judiciary and
25 jurisprudence has been written on the pages of
26 discarded constitutions.5 Even when the
27 superior courts have been allowed to function
28 without explicit direction from the executive,
29 a cumbersome state bureaucracy often tied to
30 seemingly capricious politicians has limited
31 formal judicial capacities and the breadth of
32 court rulings. Motion has often been mistaken
33 for progress: frequent changes in political
34 leadership long ago turned the courts into
35 interpreters for political systems whose
36 constitutions did not, or could not, anchor the
37 state. Over and again, the executive, the
38 military or politicians have overstepped their
39 roles,making the courts part of the problematic
40 of the state, at the same time that they have
41 been cast as the assumed arbiters of the damage
42 done by the state, and even more tenuously, as
43 catalysts for the state’s transformation. These
44 tasks have been impossible to accomplish,
45 whether separately or together, and have led
46 alternately to contradictory rulings, timidity,
47 self-justification,or creative fence sitting.Only
48 recently have the superior courts turned their
inclinations to expand the judicial role into
sustained, outright confrontation about the
substance of policy.
Courts create and respect precedent, and
their formal interpretations of the juridical past
influence, and are influenced by, their informal
interpretations of the political and constitu-
tional environments in which they work. For
Pakistan’s courts, the foundation on which its
early decisions were drafted was the disputed
territory, ideology, and political practice of the
country’s early independent years. Pakistan
struggled to overcome the combined legacies of
the 1935 Government of India Act, the
1940 Lahore Resolution, and the 1947
Indian Independence Act and the 1956
Constitution mirrored conflicted efforts of
both the governor-general and a sequence of
constituent assemblies to identify the political
and legal theories that could and should ground
the state.With the western provinces divided,
and separated by India from Bengal in the east,
the assemblies found it difficult to reconcile the
diverse and potential meanings of political
sovereignty, provincial autonomy, political
representation and citizen rights, and religious
and communal identity.Then as now, religious
conservatives sought to ensure that sharia law
would be supreme—that is, that secular law
would comply with the Quran and Sunnah—
and liberals sought to organize a pluralist state
that can accommodate all religions and
ethnicities.By 1956,after sustained litigation in
the nine-year absence of a constitution,
agreement was reached to amalgamate the
western provinces into one unit, limit
parliamentary authority, and define the powers
of a strong governor-general, whose authority
was meant to echo the colonial role inherited
from the 1935 Government of India Act.The
Objectives Resolution, a preamble that has
been included in subsequent constitutions,paid
respect to the ideas of Islam in an otherwise
secular constitution. Fundamental rights were
guaranteed and the judiciary was made
nominally independent,but neither stipulation
could ensure that the constitutional provisions
would be respected.
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The gap between constitutional ideal and Widespread agitation in both East and West 1
political circumstance helped to divide a Pakistan led to an extra-constitutional transfer 2
fractious polity. Neither the bureaucracy nor of power in 1969 to General Agha Mohammed 3
the military had much patience with politics, Yahya Khan, with a concomitant reversion to 4
although both meddled quite freely with martial law. He confirmed past practice by 5
appointments, emoluments and policies, and limiting legislative authority, constrained 6
experiments with emergency rule in lieu of advocates for provincial autonomy, and after 7
electoral reform. This ensured that a consis- gaining temporary judicial sanction for his 8
tent jurisprudence would not easily develop. rule,palpably restricted the role of the courts— 9
Drafting constitutional text is a parliamentary, actions that nonetheless did not persuade 10
not a judicial responsibility, but as weak and judges to resign their posts.6 As increasing 11
changeable parliaments conflated their public discord met with executive intransi- 12
constitution-drafting and legislative roles, the gence, the space for negotiation between East 13
electorate—and often,disgruntled politicians— Pakistan and the center over provincial rights 14
turned to the courts to solve governance decreased. Although the 1970 elections were 15
problems that would otherwise be outside the among Pakistan’s fairest, dissension between 16
judicial ambit. the provinces in their aftermath—West 17
In 1958 martial law was declared through a Pakistan would not cede the election to the 18
coup d’état, adapting an emergency model majority from East Pakistan—led to the 19
used briefly in Lahore in 1953 to quell abrogation of the existing legal framework, 20
sectarian disturbances, and again by Governor devastating war, and finally, the independence 21
General Ghulam Mohammed in 1954 to of Bangladesh. 22
dissolve a constituent assembly. Although the First as civilian martial law administrator, 23
period of formal martial law was relatively then as president and finally as prime minister, 24
brief, it quickly led to the erosion of judicial Bhutto oversaw the drafting of a new con- 25
autonomy under Field Marshal Mohammed stitution,which was approved by parliament in 26
Ayub Khan, who ruled from 1958 until 1969. 1973. Its passage was not easy, and dissenting 27
After obtaining court validation of his coup voices raised issues that remain unresolved 28
d’état, and promulgating ordinances to today: devolution and decentralization, the 29
indemnify his regime,Ayub Khan took on the relationship between parliament and the 30
task of creating a new constitution to replace president, and, by implication, the inde- 31
the “amorphous document” of 1956. Among pendence of the courts. For the first time, 32
his goals for the 1962 Constitution were to constitutional text unambiguously raised the 33
reinforce presidential powers over repre- status of the prime minister relative to the 34
sentative bodies, limit provincial rights (while president, and guaranteed the separation of 35
strengthening the hand of West Pakistan in the judicial and executive powers, even if the path 36
federation), and notably, circumscribe the to achieving court autonomy was not clarified. 37
power of the courts. Although Ayub Khan Almost concurrent with the passage of the new 38
declared that “the courts are . . . the final constitution, the supreme court partially 39
arbiters of what is legal and binding,” his rule reversed its earlier rulings on the validity of 40
under the 1962 Constitution was designed to executive power transfers and,at the same time, 41
ensure the control of the executive over the expanded its concepts of judicial autonomy 42
judiciary:he allowed only circumspect dissent, and power to ensure, in a sense, that con- 43
whether from political parties or the courts, stitutionalism would be given a firmer footing 44
whose capacity to protect basic rights was for the future.But conflict arose almost imme- 45
limited.This rigid resistance to political debate diately: provincial rights advocates sought 46
became the constitution’s, and Ayub Khan’s, greater power in the federal relationship,setting 47
undoing. the stage for armed struggle in Balochistan 48
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 B A L A N C I N G ACT : P R U D E N C E , I M P U N I T Y, A N D PA K I STA N ’ S J U R I S P R U D E N C E
1 through the 1970s and constitutional amend-
2 ments restricting civil rights. Civil libertarians
3 warned that the uneasy relationship between
4 president and parliament could fail, and that
5 the government’s quick constitutional amend-
6 ments restricting minority rights would easily
7 undermine rights protections more generally.
8 Both predictions proved to be accurate,and the
9 end of the populist Bhutto era came four years
10 later with General Mohammed Zia ul Haq’s
11 coup d’état, and Bhutto’s subsequent, court-
12 sanctioned, execution.7
13 Zia ul Haq’s malign manipulation of the
14 political system set a juridical context
15 from which Pakistan has yet to recover. His
16 provisional constitutional order replaced the
17 1973 Constitution—euphemistically placing
18 the constitution “in abeyance”—by martial
19 law regulations and ordinances that were
20 unequivocally exempted from judicial contest.
21 Once again, ordinances were promulgated to
22 ensure that the regime would be indemnified,
23 leaving martial law authorities to function
24 freely in pursuit of the military’s goals.8 So-
25 called disloyal judges were removed from their
26 positions, further politicizing the administra-
27 tion of a rapidly waning justice system as
28 civilian institutions—including the courts—
29 were replaced by the military. The 1973
30 Constitution was partially restored in 1985,but
31 just as political society was becoming more
32 restive in the late 1980s,and before he was able
33 to amend or substantially redraft the constitu-
34 tion to ensure the primacy of the executive,
35 Zia ul Haq and almost all his top military
36 leaders died in a plane crash.Surprisingly,open
37 elections were allowed, and civilian
38 government—and the 1973 Constitution—
39 returned to Pakistan under the rule of Prime
40 Minister Benazir Bhutto.
41 None of the four civilian, elected govern-
42 ments between 1988 and 1999 completed a
43 full term. Prime Ministers Bhutto and Mian
44 Nawaz Sharif were thwarted by the unwork-
45 able relationships between military and civilian
46 institutions, and both proved unable to redress
47 the accumulated grievances that four decades
48 of uneven governance had brought to the
country. Neither confrontation nor accom-
modation with the military could save political
rule: the troika of president, prime minister,
and army chief proved to be self-defeating,and
a constitutional amendment to provide titular
primacy to the parliament further alienated the
military. Conflicts between prime ministers
and presidents about appointments,procedures
and rulings once again burdened the courts.9
Bhutto profoundly distrusted those judges
who had validated her father’s execution, and
when the Supreme Court did not acquiesce in
Sharif ’s power politics, his party members
stormed the supreme court.10
By the late 1990s, four contentious prob-
lems plagued political competition: political
corruption that led cumulatively to a growing
sense that governance had eroded beyond
repair; economic weaknesses, magnified after
Pakistan’s 1998 nuclear tests that led to inter-
national sanctions; the rise of sectarianism, the
parallel evolution of the Taliban movement in
neighboring Afghanistan, and renewed ten-
sions surrounding the prospects of sharia law
in Pakistan; and continued conflicts along all
Pakistan’s borders.
Unsurprisingly, Pakistan’s pendular parlia-
mentary politics, which swung from liberal to
conservative,secular to religious,and across the
entire spectrum of economic and foreign
policies, were often at odds with the army.
This led Army Chief Pervez Musharraf to
justify his coup d’état in 1999 as a critique of
the 1973 Constitution, erroneous state policy,
and of course, politicians.11 Musharraf ’s wari-
ness of rough-and-tumble politics led to politi-
cal manipulation, constitutional amendments
to extend his regime’s tenure, rigged elections
and, as with earlier regimes, disputes with the
Supreme Court over the judiciary’s docket and
judgments.The counterpoint to this domestic
wrangling was the toll that terrorism took on
the judicial system and individual rights pro-
tections in the wake of the events of September
2001, the resumption of war in Afghanistan,
and perilous cross-border militancy and insur-
gency. Pakistan’s foreign and domestic politics
converged in the denial of rights to the
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accused, including disappearances overseen by that the courts have helped to maintain a state 1
the military and intelligence agencies in pre- whose powers are based on coercion rather 2
sumed collaboration with foreign govern- than participation or consensus, they have also 3
ments.All these actions underlined the fullness been outlets for public discussions that were 4
of the civil-military alliance symbolized by unavailable elsewhere: even when the courts 5
Musharraf ’s dual role as army chief and have validated the misuse of power, they have, 6
president, and embodied in a legal framework sometimes counter-intuitively and unexpec- 7
order that he shepherded through parliament tedly, provided arenas for open discussions of 8
as the Seventeenth Amendment to the 1973 pressing matters of state policy when presi- 9
Constitution. dents,parliaments and generals have continued 10
These actions inevitably complicated the to disappoint or silence the electorate. 11
judiciary’s role,for once again the actions of the Pakistan’s difficult first years gave the 12
state were declared immune to judicial scrutiny judiciary unenviable tasks: negotiating the 13
or judgment.With parliament’s strength derived shoals of postcolonial governance meant 14
only from presidential patronage, and weary of setting a foundation for the rule of law while 15
imposed judicial subservience, Pakistan’s legal constitutionalism remained a distant aspira- 16
community forced the issues of constitu- tion. The 1950s judicial docket unwittingly 17
tionality and judicial autonomy onto the public set the ground for subsequent decades in two 18
agenda. In late 2007, Musharraf assailed the distinctive ways:first,by ruling on government 19
presumption of the superior judiciary to actions in the absence of a constitution (and 20
review the propriety of his re-election,removed thus with startlingly insufficient legal ground- 21
anti-government cases from the courts and, ing), and, second, by agreeing to validate 22
following past practice,unilaterally indemnified government actions in ways that presaged its 23
the emergency government against future legal later legitimating roles for military govern- 24
challenge. ments and extra-constitutional actions.In their 25
efforts to craft a legal language for the new 26
state, they dealt with questions of justiciability 27
Dockets and doctrines and standing, and struggled with questions of 28
legal doctrine that continue to color politics 29
Despite the limits on its role,Pakistan’s superior today. 30
courts have played critical—although rarely From the first cases of the 1950s, Pakistan’s 31
incisive, transformative, or progressive—roles higher courts were occupied with matters that 32
in formulating or judging the arrangement of went beyond the usual judicial ambit, forcing 33
state power and authority. The courts have judges to define their own roles in complex 34
rarely acted as impartially as constitutions transitional environments. In quick succes- 35
might have optimally decreed, but they have sion, they ruled on the propriety of actions of 36
equally rarely submitted fully to the strictures the governor-general and the constituent 37
imposed on them by overweening executives. assemblies,the contested nature of constitution 38
Unsurprisingly, the country’s contingent, making and the role of parliamentary pre- 39
conflicted jurisprudence has provided unclear rogative, the rights of the executive to exclude 40
guidance for the state. Its signal jurisprudential opposing political voices, and more generally, 41
principles—articulated in the double-barreled the relationships between political power and 42
doctrines of necessity and revolutionary legal authority.12 Responding to a reference 43
legality that justified coups d’état and the on the governor-general’s power to dissolve an 44
retrospective validation of unconstitutional elected assembly and declare a state of emer- 45
appropriations of power—have been funda- gency, the court raised (but did not resolve) 46
mentally detrimental to the development of a three questions that remain salient—and 47
democratic state. Although it can be argued largely unanswered—today:what counts as the 48
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 B A L A N C I N G ACT : P R U D E N C E , I M P U N I T Y, A N D PA K I STA N ’ S J U R I S P R U D E N C E
1 normal functioning of the state, when does a
2 political authority have the right to use power
3 to alter state institutions, and how do laws and
4 judicial institutions determine whether power
5 has been exercised rightly?
6 These questions, regrettable in their pro-
7 venance, proved to be even more unfortunate
8 in their resolution, for they presaged two
9 essentially contested questions about the state:
10 the nature of democracy in the evolving
11 polity—a choice articulated in 1955 “between
12 the substance and the shadow” of democratic
13 rule13—and the role of the courts in setting a
14 political course. Perhaps most important,
15 when the Supreme Court chose to define its
16 authority and independence as separate from
17 politics—meaning, perhaps, impartiality
18 between and among political parties—it
19 implicitly aligned itself with the executive
20 rather than the legislative branch and in so
21 doing, sullied the institutional neutrality it was
22 trying to establish for itself.
23 These early cases also provided oppor-
24 tunities for the Supreme Court to articulate a
25 self-justifying doctrine of state necessity that
26 has shadowed Pakistan’s jurisprudence and
27 politics ever since. Its 1955 advisory ruling
28 confirmed that “an act which would otherwise
29 be illegal becomes legal if it is done bona fide
30 under the stress of necessity.” The court thus
31 accepted not only the primacy of executive
32 action but also the right of the executive—in
33 this instance the governor-general, but in
34 subsequent years almost any executive—
35 to arrogate to himself powers well beyond
36 those articulated in the state’s constituting
37 documents.14
38 This implied alliance between court and
39 executive set the stage for the court’s actions in
40 the wake of the declaration of martial law
41 in 1958.The constitution became disposable,
42 democracy reverted to a theoretical end of
43 governance rather than a means to achieve
44 good government, and on the day after
45 Ayub Khan’s coup d’état, the supreme
46 court agreed—sadly, although inevitably—to
47 adjudicate a constitutional problem in the
48 absence of a formal constitution.15 It ruled that
the usurpation of power was legally valid, thus
equating force, efficacy and legality under the
cover of a legal order promulgated by the
usurping power itself. The doctrine of
revolutionary legality, as it was then coined,
took as its basis not the constitution—which
had already been abrogated by Ayub Khan’s
coup—but the seeming fact that the coup had
been a successful way to challenge a con-
stitutional order: “The revolution itself
becomes a law-creating fact,” the court wrote,
underscoring politically risky judicial func-
tionalism even as it eschewed any serious
analysis of the political events that brought the
case to the bench, and reinforcing the notion
that the court had allied itself against
representative, rights-protecting governance.
With time, however, the high courts,
particularly in East Pakistan, began to rule
against the legal framework established by
Ayub Khan’s 1962 Constitution. They posed
serious questions about the laxity with which
the legislature interpreted its constitutional
mandate, the individual rights of citizens, and
the assumptions about provincial autonomy
and representation on which the state was
based—in particular, Ayub Khan’s devolu-
tionary basic democracies policy, the dis-
qualification of politicians,and the civilianizing
of martial law.16 Their rulings argued for the
expansion of judicial review while at the same
time accepting the government’s arguments for
limiting political participation. In this way, the
courts enlarged their formal purview, while
leaving the substance of rights protections to
legislatures (both national and provincial)
whose powers to give substance to democracy
remained disturbingly limited.17
This vacillating judicial approach was
undercut by the extra-constitutional transfer
of power from Ayub Khan to Yahya Khan in
1969, the resumption of military rule, and the
imposition of a self-defeating legal framework
order that became the prelude to the separation
of East and West Pakistan. The end of war
between the two wings of the state brought a
new,albeit temporary,jurisprudence when the
courts ruled belatedly against the discredited
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doctrine of revolutionary legality in Asma delineate carefully, in a series of habeas corpus 1

Jilani’s case.18 But power seeks its closest moor- petitions and challenges to preventive deten- 2
ing. Although the supreme court retrospec- tion, the respective powers of the civil and 3
tively challenged Yahya Khan’s regime and military courts in order to ensure that the reach 4
the many instances of constitutional usurpa- of the Army Act would be limited.21 In its later 5
tion that preceded it, the new Bhutto judgment in a case brought by the government 6
government—which came into power under against an opposition political party, however, 7
the aegis of military rule, and, against judicial the Supreme Court once again tried to be 8
advice, only later legitimated its authority and clever rather than consistent. It interpreted its 9
drafted a new constitution—nonetheless role expansively—too much so, it seemed, for 10
supported the doctrine of necessity as a way to Bhutto—while at the same time accepting the 11
anchor its own legality and legitimacy. government’s version of explicitly political 12
Pakistan’s supreme court was nothing if issues rather than return them to the legi- 13
not cautious. Although it disavowed the slature.22 Paradox resulted: keen to underscore 14
rationale of revolutionary legality —one its own broad powers, the court aligned itself 15
amicus curia called it “a standing menace”—it with government actions that were bound to 16
did not declare the 1958 coup d’état to be redound negatively on judicial prerogative.The 17
illegal,opting to offer Ayub Khan retrospective unfortunate habit of hewing to the will of 18
validation via the constitution he drafted after extra-constitutional authority, even when 19
the fact. Instead, the court turned its attention costumed as valid law, eroded the necessary 20
to its future role:to distinguish good laws from boundaries between civil and military law. As 21
bad,ensure the public welfare,and differentiate a national security state began to take shape 22
judgments about legality from those about under Bhutto, civil cases were transferred to 23
political legitimacy. These were hardly viable military tribunals that,in turn,set aside judicial 24
tasks under circumstances of profound, post- precedents intended, for example, to proscribe 25
civil war uncertainty, but from the point of the the use of torture. 26
view of the courts,optimistic ones that put the Indeed, in a ruling on the expanding 27
new Bhutto government on notice that the purview of the Army Act, the Supreme 28
courts were willing to play a significant role in Court foreshadowed the opportunities for 29
the reconstituted Pakistani state.19 extra-constitutional authority in the 1973 30
Once again, however, the superior courts Constitution. In a judgment published shortly 31
found themselves navigating an unfamiliar and after Zia ul Haq’s coup d’état, the chief justice 32
distressingly brief political transition. In the reaffirmed the constitutional prohibition 33
four years between the passage of the 1973 against the imposition of martial law, but 34
Constitution and its abrogation in 1977, the speculated that, “if the Constitution is abro- 35
judiciary ruled on an enormous range of issues gated,set aside or placed in a state of suspended 36
for which it was only partially prepared: animation or hibernation, it might be possible 37
economic and political federalism, democracy to impose Martial Law outside the Constitu- 38
and emergency, and the prerogatives of an tion.”23 Such an action, he commented,“may 39
ideological government inclined to politicize or may not be justified by the doctrine of 40
state institutions.Pakistan’s first federal—rather necessity.” 41
than Westminster—constitution proved to be a It was as if the supreme court was offering 42
challenge to adjudicate.20 instruction to the military,and when the court 43
Bhutto held military and civilian powers was once again asked to judge the validity of 44
concurrently—not the first Pakistani leader to the military takeover, it returned to old 45
do so, and, of course, not the last—and the practice: the doctrine of necessity returned, 46
intersections of civil and military law under almost without limit, and the doctrine of 47
emergency rule impelled the courts to revolutionary legality was ignored.24 Zia ul 48
184
 B A L A N C I N G ACT : P R U D E N C E , I M P U N I T Y, A N D PA K I STA N ’ S J U R I S P R U D E N C E
1 Haq promised the courts that they would
2 continue to operate,and in return the supreme
3 court granted him the power to limit their
4 jurisdiction to a degree hitherto almost
5 unknown in Pakistan. In time, the peregrina-
6 tions of misapplied doctrine took their toll. In
7 1981, when Zia ul Haq abruptly canceled the
8 civil court powers that had been assumed in
9 the necessity case, his rule was by implication
10 legitimized by the otherwise discredited
11 doctrine of revolutionary legality.
12 Had the court ruled differently, it is hard to
13 imagine that the military government would
14 have changed its course.Judges,after all,do not
15 command army divisions. As years of martial
16 law continued, however, it was hard to escape
17 the conclusion that the superior courts had
18 validated the execution of an elected prime
19 minister and then presided over the near death
20 of civilian justice. The longer term effects of
21 judicial compliance were made clear when Zia
22 ul Haq premised a 1984 referendum and a
23 controlled election in 1985 on constitutional
24 revisions that gave continuing legal effect to
25 martial law, and provided immunity of unpre-
26 cedented scope to all actions and persons
27 involved in the martial law government.
28 However,stubborn politicians gave the high
29 courts some opportunities to reverse them-
30 selves and reclaim some authority.The Karachi
31 High Court had upheld the immunity of
32 martial law regulations from judicial ques-
33 tioning, but in 1987, it decided that some
34 military convictions could be challenged in
35 civilian courts, and the Lahore High Court
36 ruled further that Zia ul Haq had violated the
37 doctrine of necessity by going beyond the
38 promises he made when he seized power.25 In
39 the same year, the supreme court heard a
40 petition from Benazir Bhutto,the leader of the
41 People’s Party,in its effort to reinstate the rights
42 of political parties.The court underscored the
43 inconsistencies of Zia ul Haq’s revived, mixed
44 government constitution, a decision that
45 pointed the way toward the reinstatement of
46 political and electoral rights.26
47 Zia ul Haq died in the following year,
48 shortly after dissolving parliament, and only
after his death did the courts begin to assert
that the constitution—in some form, never
quite specified—should take precedence over
any regime or administration, and the courts
should be the constitution’s protector and
interpreter.27 It was a shallow response to a
deep problem, however, for both politics and
law were left almost irretrievably tangled in
Zia’s wake.Former parliamentarians wanted to
be reinstated,new contestants sought polls,and
the elected parliament led by Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto lacked sufficient power to
override the martial law constitution.The best
the courts could do,it seemed,was validate the
fact of political change—an ironic nod to the
old theme of revolutionary legality—and hope
that a new political order would represent a
step forward for constitutionalism and judicial
autonomy.
The transition to civilian rule was a critical
step in the evolution of the Pakistani state.
When viewed through the retrospective lens
of the law, however, hope triumphed over
progress. Bhutto quickly tried to cleanse
the supreme court of justices she deemed
unworthy of appointment,setting the judiciary
on edge before the real work of constitutional
revision could begin, and giving rise to
renewed suspicion that her party was keen
to meddle with the instruments of justice.
Neither Bhutto nor Sharif was able to
transcend the complexities that four decades
of civil-military rule had created; both were
keen to create a new culture of parliamentary
supremacy that, intentional or not, had the
effect of vesting inadequate authority in the
courts.The signal case during this period came
early in Bhutto’s tenure, when the supreme
court reviewed the eighth constitutional
amendment.28 This was the law that Zia ul Haq
had demanded as the price for lifting martial
law in 1985, and that gave sanction to the
president’s right to dissolve parliament.29 In
step with popular sentiment to strengthen the
legislative branch, the court sent the matter of
the amendment’s validity back to parliament,
where it languished until Sharif became prime
minister. When it was finally revoked—a major
185
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piece of legislation, supported in rare concord or permit to be called into question” the 1
by parliamentarians in both major parties—it validity of the PCO. When the PCO was 2
set off a political confrontation between the challenged in Zafar Ali Shah’s case, an obliging 3
presidency and parliament that contributed to Supreme Court cited the familiar doctrine of 4
the army’s growing distaste for parliamentary necessity to validate the coup d’état and 5
rule. Sharif tried as well to enact a con- subsequent constitutional amendments that 6
stitutional amendment that would arm the did not “change (its) basic features.”The court, 7
prime minister with emergency powers equal it seems,was immune to irony,for among those 8
to those of the President. Combined with basic features was a chimera:the independence 9
disagreements over foreign policy, the eco- of the judiciary. 10
nomy and alleged corruption, these legislative Like Zia ul Haq, Musharraf then choreo- 11
efforts led almost inexorably to the end of graphed a presidential referendum to ensure 12
Sharif ’s government. his tenure, and followed it with a Legal 13
Throughout the 1990s,therefore,the courts Framework Order in 2002 that restored the 14
struggled with overtly political issues: the president’s powers to dissolve parliament, 15
nature and limits of parliamentary rule, the extended his term as both president and army 16
problems that arise if courts ignore politics chief for five years, and provided immunity to 17
when judging constitutional issues,the intract- all actions taken since the coup.32 Some ele- 18
able problems of parliamentary sovereignty,and ments of this law were then included in the 19
the selective application of laws by beleaguered seventeenth amendment to the constitution, 20
and weak governments.30 Equally important, duly passed by the parliament—in return for a 21
judges came to realize that their own tenures promise, later broken, that Musharraf would 22
were no more stable under civilian than step down as army chief in 2004.33 A challenge 23
military governments, and indeed, that the to the seventeenth amendment failed when the 24
intensely political nature of even routine court fully supported the government and 25
hearings could pose as many dangers to them agreed to the constrained democracy put in 26
personally as to the law and constitution. place by rigged elections.34 27
The decade of parliamentary government The supreme court’s prospective docket 28
came to a close in 1999, when Musharraf took rather than its rulings were therefore the 29
the opportunities offered by disputes about cause for renewed tensions between the execu- 30
foreign policy and domestic governance to tive and the judiciary in 2007, and, from 31
depose Sharif and impose emergency rule.31 Musharraf ’s point of view, with good reason. 32
He followed Zia ul Haq’s model by combining The supreme court’s last opinion, published 33
the roles of army chief and president (initially after the 2007 emergency proclamation, took 34
calling himself chief executive), and Ayub up the constitutionality of the new PCO. Its 35
Khan’s lead by refashioning governing short opinion warned against the government’s 36
bodies to cleanse them of traditional political taking actions contrary to the constitution and 37
leadership. The supreme court set a deadline the independence of the judiciary, including 38
for elections—a generous three years—but the issuing of fresh oaths to the PCO.35 By the 39
found itself nonetheless hampered by the new time the opinion was issued, judges had been 40
government’s curbs on the judiciary.The PCO sacked, a new roster of compliant justices had 41
of 1999 gave the president the authority to indeed taken such an oath, and the deposed 42
issue ordinances, overriding all other laws, judges had assumed an unaccustomed place at 43
including the constitution and, predictably, the vanguard of a movement to return Pakistan 44
immunizing him from prosecution. Judges to constitutional rule.36 Their first target was 45
were required to take new oaths of office— Musharraf; their movement was critical in 46
although dissidents were instead removed or forcing him to step down as army chief after 47
retired—and to agree “not to call into question engineering his re-election as president. 48
186
 B A L A N C I N G ACT : P R U D E N C E , I M P U N I T Y, A N D PA K I STA N ’ S J U R I S P R U D E N C E
1 Questions of justice
2 courts have occasionally been added to the
3 The election of a new parliament in February
4 2008 was framed by a year-long boycott of the
5 courts by the legal community that followed
6 the dismissal and arrest of the chief justice and
7 later, his colleagues. In that sense, the election
8 underscored the importance of the judiciary’s
9 status and independence,but it left many ques-
10 tions unanswered. Although the new ruling
11 coalition initially promised to restore deposed
12 judges and return to the 1973 Constitution,
13 each party interpreted its intention differently:
14 the politically ambitious Muslim League
15 favored the unequivocal restoration of all
16 deposed judges, while the majority People’s
17 Party, negotiating with Musharraf (who
18 retained the office of president) preferred
19 partial restoration as part of a larger package of
20 political promises and constitutional reforms
21 that included indemnity for the emergency of
22 2007.37
23 Underlying debates about political efficacy
24 were serious, if unspoken, questions about
25 the meanings of justice in a state whose
26 constitutions have been compromised for so
27 long, the role of judges whose actions were
28 complicit in the steady diminution of judicial
29 independence, the proper venue for reviewing
30 the content of legislation (including the federal
31 sharia court), and the proper balance among
32 the executive, legislative and judicial branches
33 of government. Although the organization of
34 state power has been the particular province of
35 the superior courts,it has also affected the ways
36 that Pakistanis have been able to redress
37 grievances and secure their rights. In many
38 ways, access to lower courts has for the most
39 part been of only peripheral interest to those
40 in power. As a result, Pakistan’s class chasms
41 are reflected in the justice system, where
42 corruption and inattention are rampant in the
43 delivery of justice to the poor, and where
44 defendants and lawyers assume that the abuse
45 of state authority among the police is replicated
46 in the judicial system.38
47 As if to correct these problems—but
48 primarily to ensure that order is maintained
even when the rule of law is not—special
civilian judicial system. Speedy trial courts
were created in the 1990s, but were soon
shown to deliver judgments (if not justice) at a
slower rate than the regular courts. Special
courts, used to dispense justice under special
rules, seemed to bypass the rule of law, and
many observers referred to them instead as
“conviction”courts.Anti-terrorist courts,most
evident during states of emergency, and
particularly since 2001, have been used either
to remove defendants from the ambit of civil
law and rights protections, to secure con-
victions, or to sequester detainees when the
rule of law is absent. Qazi courts—local level
religious courts—have been peripheral,but the
Musharraf government’s campaign to add
them to the conflicted tribal agencies has led
to suspicions that they would be instruments of
the executive rather than voices for justice
The issues of injustice that permeate these
systems of adjudication are of paramount
importance as future parliaments take up
questions of justice in Pakistan. It is the role of
elected bodies, not the courts, to set aside
Pakistan’s sad history of indemnity in cases of
abuse of power so that the state can chart a clear
course toward the democracy promised in the
1973 Constitution.The juridical doctrines of
necessity and revolutionary legality that have
permeated political discourse reflect the
profound weaknesses of Pakistan’s govern-
ments, but they have offered little more than a
language with which a distressed, disem-
powered and often alienated public has been
able to voice its dissatisfactions with the state
and its governing elites.
No matter how unsatisfactory the hand
dealt to the courts by parliaments, presidents
and the laws they have enacted,the judiciary—
or at least, those judges who have chosen to
remain on the bench during the worst of
times—remains responsible for the misleading
pragmatism and awkward prudence that has
governed its rulings for six decades. A new
compact is therefore essential for the country’s
legal future, for no matter how firm the
187
PAU L A R . N E W B E R G

exhortations of judicial autonomy might be, powers were undercut as well by Order No. 2, 1
they are meaningful only if governments and which stated that “provided that the Supreme 2
citizens follow judicial rulings. If they are Court or a High Court shall not have the power 3
ignored—as they will be ignored if the courts to make any order of the nature mentioned in 4
do not craft incisive, constructive rulings that Article 199 of the Constitution against the 5
Chief Martial Law Administrator or a Martial
look to Pakistan’s future rather than its past— 6
Law Administrator or any person exercising
then Pakistan’s judiciary will revert to its powers or jurisdiction under the authority of
7
accustomed role as historian for a weak, and either.” See The Chief Martial Law Administrator 8
weakly governed state. & All the Zonal Martial Law Administrators, 9
Martial Law Regulations, Orders and Instructions, 10
4th edn (Lahore: Paw Publishing Company, 11
Notes 1983). 12
9 For example, the so-called Judges Case of 13
1 “Pakistan’s Supreme Court Takes Government 1996: Al Jehad Trust vs Federation of Pakistan, 14
to Task Over Missing Persons Issue,” 5 July, PLD (1996) SC 324 at pp. 363–67. See also 15
2007, available at Open Source Center SAP Sajjad Ali Shah, Law Courts in a Glass House:An 16
20070705094002. Autobiography (Karachi: Oxford University 17
2 Constitutional Petition No.9 of 2006 and Civil Press, 2001), ch. ix.
18
Petitions Nos. 345 and 394 of 2006 (Pakistan 10 See Ardeshir Cowasjee, “Storming of the
Steel Mills Case).
19
Supreme Court,” Dawn (Karachi), 31 October,
3 Under Article 209 of the 1973 Constitution, 1999. 20
the Supreme Judicial Council is a body 11 Sajjad Ali Shah, p. 671: Musharraf ’s military 21
comprised of supreme court and high court takeover came about “because the constitution 22
justices to whom the president must refer all did not provide any solution for the crisis with 23
issues concerning the performance or possible which the country was beset.” 24
misconduct of superior court judges. No 12 For example, in Mohammed Ayub Khuro vs 25
superior court justices can be removed from Federation of Pakistan, PLD (1950) Sind 49, the 26
office without the concurrence of the council. Sind High Court ruled that while the 27
4 Masood Rehman, “Rebirth of doctrine of constituent assembly held powers both to 28
necessity: Emergency and PCO validated,” legislate and to write a constitution,“there is no 29
Daily Times (Lahore),24 November,2007;Nasir limit imposed upon the legislative powers of the
Iqbal,“SC hands out clean chit to Musharraf,”
30
Constituent Assembly sitting as a constitution
Daily Times (Lahore), 24 November, 2007. 31
making body.” In the Reference by His
5 For a full discussion of these issues,see Paula R. Excellency the Governor-General, PLD 1955
32
Newberg, Judging the State: Courts and Federal Court 435, as well as in Maulvi 33
Constitutional Politics in Pakistan (Cambridge: Tamizuddin Khan vs The Federation of Pakistan, 34
University Press, 1994). PLD (1955) Sind 96 and Federation of Pakistan 35
6 Dorab Patel, Testament of a Liberal (Karachi: et al., vs Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan, the courts 36
Oxford University Press, 2000), p.101. ruled on the relative roles of the governor- 37
7 See Begum Nusrat Bhutto vs The Chief of Army general, the extent of the legislature’s powers, 38
Staff and Federation of Pakistan, PLD (1977) and the judiciary’s authority to limit executive 39
SC 657. authority. In Usif Patel and Two Others vs 40
8 On the night of his coup d’état, Zia ul Haq The Crown, PLD (1955) Federal Court 387 41
promulgated The Laws (Continuance in Force) (Appellate Jurisdiction), the court limited the
Order, 1977 (C.M.L.A. Order No. 1 of 1977). 42
scope of the governor-general’s powers.These
Article 1(2) mandated the continued func- 43
cases,and many others,highlighted not only the
tioning of the courts,but article 1(3) suspended indeterminacy of popular politics at the time,
44
the fundamental rights portion of the con- but the inadequacies of state institutions at this 45
stitution, as well as “all proceedings pending early stage of independence. 46
in any court, insofar as they are for the 13 “Pakistan’s Dilemma,”Civil and Military Gazette, 47
enforcement of any of these rights.” Judicial 6 March, 1955, p. 4. 48
188
 B A L A N C I N G ACT : P R U D E N C E , I M P U N I T Y, A N D PA K I STA N ’ S J U R I S P R U D E N C E
1 14 In Muhammad Umar Khan vs The Crown PLD
2 (1953) Lahore 528, High Court Justice
3 Mohammed Munir (later Supreme Court
4 Chief Justice in the 1955 Reference) equated the
declaration of military necessity by a military
5
ruler with civil necessity by a civilian ruler. By
6 1958 the two forms of necessity were joined in
7 a military coup d’état justified by a doctrine of
8 civil necessity.
9 15 Dosso and Another vs the State and Others, PLD
10 (1957) (W.P.) Quetta 9.
11 16 In Ayub Khan’s first years, the court
12 acknowledged the absence of justificable rights
13 and accepted its reduced power in The Province
of East Pakistan vs Md. Mehdi Ali Khan Panni,
14
PLD (1959) Supreme Court (Pak) 387, and in
15 Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din and Arif Iftikhar vs
16
Muhammaed Sarfraz and the Government of
17 Pakistan, and vice versa, PLD (1961) Supreme
18 Court 85, found it impossible to extend its
19 jurisdiction under Ayub Khan’s writ. Once a
20 written constitution was in force, however, the
21 court found it easier to push for more balanced
22 powers and the beginnings of rights pro-
23 tections. On conflicts between the executive
and parliament,and the right to judicial review,
24
see Fazlul Quader Chowdhry and others vs Mr.
25 Muhammad Abdul Haque, PLD (1963) Supreme
26 Court 486; on freedom of political speech, see
27 Saiyyid Abul A’la Maudoodi et al., vs The
28 Government of West Pakistan and the Government
29 of Pakistan, PLD (1964) SC 673. In Government
of East Pakistan vs Mrs. Rowshan Bijaya Shaukat
30
Ali Khan, PLD (1966) Supreme Court 286, the
31
Court reiterated the right of habeas corpus,
32
despite deep divisions among justices about the
33
effects of rights protections on executive
34 prerogative. This debate continued in Malik
35 Ghulam Jilani vs The Government of West
36 Pakistan, PLD (1967) Supreme Court 373,
37 which deepened the court’s debate about
38 judicial prerogative and political speech.
39 17 When the Supreme Court in Snelson’s Case
40 declared “the law of the country is what
the judiciary says it is,” Ayub Khan responded
41
that “any government worth its name should
42
be in a position to control its Executive
43
officers and rectify their errors.” Sir Edward
44 Snelson vs The Judges of the High Court of West
45 Pakistan, Lahore and The Central Government of
46 Pakistan, PLD (1961) Supreme Court 237.
47 18 Zia-ur Rahman vs The State, PLD (1972) Lahore
48 382.
19 The revocation of revolutionary legality in
Asma Jilani’s Case (Miss Asma Jilani vs The
Government of the Punjab [sic] and Mrs Zarina
Gauhar vs the Province of Sind and Two Others,
PLD (1972) SC 139) became a reference point
for the courts through the Bhutto years.
20 See Debates: Official Report, 10 April, 1973,
and 1973 Constitution, Preamble and Article
2(A).
21 State vs Yusaf Lodhi, PLD (1973) Peshawar 25;
Fakhre Alam vs The State and Another,PLD (1973)
SC 525; Liaqat Ali vs Government of Sind through
Secretary,Home Department,PLD (1973) Karachi
78.In the most important case concerning civil
law and military practice, F. B.Ali vs The State,
PLD (1975) SC 506, the Court claimed the
traditional power of judicial review and allowed
courts martial to keep powers provided by
subsequent constitutional amendments.
22 See Zafar Iqbal vs Province of Sind and Two Others,
PLD (1973), Karachi 243; Islamic Republic of
Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior and
Kashmir Affairs, Islamabad vs Mr.Abdul Wali Khan
MNA (Reference No. 1 of 1975).
23 Darwesh M. Arbey, Advocate vs Federation
of Pakistan through the Law Secretary and Two
Others, PLD (1980) Lahore 206, and earlier, F.
B.Ali vs The State, PLD (1975) Lahore 999.
24 Begum Nusrat Bhutto vs The Chief of Army Staff
and Federation of Pakistan,PLD (1974) Lahore 7.
25 Nazar Muhammad Khan vs Pakistan and Two
Others, PLD (1986) Karachi 516; Muhammad
Bachal Memon vs Government of Sind, PLD
(1987) Karachi 296.
26 Benazir Bhutto vs Federation of Pakistan and
Another, PLD (1988) Supreme Court 416, and
Benazir Bhutto vs Federation of Pakistan and
Another, PLD (1989) Supreme Court 66; on
indemnity,Federation of Pakistan and others vs Haji
Muhammad Saifullah Khan and Others, (1988)
PSC 338.
27 Benazir Bhutto vs Federation of Pakistan and
Another, PLD (1989) SC 66.
28 Haji Ahmed vs Federation of Pakistan through
Secretary, Ministry of Justice and Parliamentary
Affairs and 88 Others, Constitutional Petitions
D-76, 163, 168 of (1989).
29 See previously, Reference No. 1 of 1988, made by
the President of Pakistan Under Article 186 of the
Constitution, PLD (1989) SC 75, regarding the
question of dissolution at the time of Zia ul
Haq’s death.
189
PAU L A R . N E W B E R G

30 On questions of judicial independence, see 33 Zahid Hussain, “A Military State,” Newsline 1

Government of Sind vs Sharif Faridi, PLD (1994) (Karachi), October 2004. 2
SC 105, on divesting district government 34 The case also challenged the “President to Hold 3
officials of their judicial powers,and Mehram Ali Another Office Act of 2004” which was 4
vs Federation of Pakistan, PLD (1998) SC 1445; intended to clarify the relationship between
5
on the contentious questions involving Musharraf ’s two roles.
6
appointment of justices, see Al Jehad Trust vs 35 Proclamation of Emergency and Provisional
Federation of Pakistan, PLD (1996) SC 324 (the Constitutional Order, Gazette of Pakistan, 3 7
Judges Case), and Asad Ali vs Federation of November, 2007; Order to Further Amend the 8
Pakistan, PLD (1998) SC 161. Constitution,Gazette of Pakistan,20 November, 9
31 Former Justice Sajjad Ali Shah later noted that 2007. 10
the military took power “because the 36 See Library of Congress (US),“Suspension and 11
constitution did not provide any solution for Reinstatement of the Chief Justice of Pakistan; 12
the crises with which the country was beset,” From Judicial Crisis to Restoring Judicial 13
the same justification used by previous military Independence,” Current Legal Topics (web), 20 14
governments in Pakistan and, more recently, in March, 2008. 15
Bangladesh; Shah, p. 671. 37 “Article Inserted by Musharraf,” and “New
16
32 Zafar Ali Shah vs Pervez Musharraf, PLD (2000) Article in PPP Amendment Bill,” Dawn
17
SC 869 unsuccessfully challenged the coup (Karachi), 2 June, 2008. See also International
d’état, and Hussain Ahmed vs Pervez Mushrraf, Crisis Group, Winding Back Martial Law in 18
PLD (2002) SC 853 unsuccessfully challenged Pakistan, Asia Briefing #70 (Islamabad and 19
the referendum. See also Qazi Hussein Ahmed, Brussels) 12 November, 2007. 20
Ameer Jamaat-I-Islami,Pakistan vs General Pervez 38 http://www.adb.org/Documents/Periodicals/ 21
Musharraf, Chief Executive and Another, ADB_Review/2005/vol37–2/justice-all.asp# 22
Constitutional Petition No, 15, 17–24 and delays. See also Ali Saleem,“Inaccessible justice 23
512/2002. Supreme Court Bar Association vs in Pakistan,”Asian Legal Resource Center,Hong 24
Federation of Pakistan, Constitutional Petition Kong, 11 August, 2004. 25
No, 1 of 2002 unsuccessfully challenged 26
Musharraf ’s appointment of judges.
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
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2
3
4
13
5
6 Confronting constitutional curtailments
7
8
9 Attempts to rebuild independence
10
11 of the judiciary in Bangladesh
12
13
14
15
Sara Hossain
16
17
18
19 The independence of the Judiciary . . . is one of correctives to executive action and inaction
20 the basic pillars of the Constitution and cannot in the face of flagrantly arbitrary action and
21 be demolished, whittled down, curtailed or clear constitutional breaches. This approach
22 diminished in any manner whatsoever, except has also marked the efforts made to safeguard
23 under the existing provisions of the Constitution . . . the court’s own autonomy and independ-
24 we find no provision in the Constitution which ence.
25 curtails, diminishes or otherwise abridges this Experiences of executive control and inter-
26 independence. ference, which marked both the colonial and
27 (Masdar Hossain vs Bangladesh 2000 BLD (AD) the Pakistan periods, informed the framing of
28 104 Per Mostafa Kamal J. [emphasis added]) explicit provisions in the post-independence
29 Constitution of 1972, mandating independ-
30 ence of the judiciary and its separation from
31 Introduction the executive at all levels. However, amend-
32 ments to the original constitutional provisions
33 In the almost four decades since Bangladesh made under autocratic and military rule, the
34 became an independent nation, through failure to overhaul the inherited institutional
35 periods of continuing transition, from imme- structure, and the continued intervention of
36 diate post-war aftermath through parliamentary deeply embedded vested interests, further
37 to presidential to outright military rule and exacerbated by overt politicization of the
38 back again, the supreme court has repeatedly court, and new constitutional arrangements
39 been the focus of public attention, providing a enabling involvement of the senior most
40 forum not only for redress of rights against a members of the judiciary in the executive,
41 repressive state,but carving out,with greater or have—if not as yet demolished—certainly
42 lesser caution, parameters for determining diminished and curtailed the scope for the
43 relations between the state and political parties court to operate with full independence.
44 and,more recently,the duties and obligations of This chapter examines the legal and
45 the state to the people at large and to the public institutional framework for safeguarding the
46 interest. independence of the judiciary in Bangladesh,
47 The court’s approach has oscillated between focusing in particular on the role of the
48 permitting full frontal challenges followed by supreme court in this regard. It first outlines

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the provisions of the 1972 constitution, which constitution were fully alive to the need to 1
articulated the principle and promised the safeguard the judiciary from politicization and 2
potential for securing judicial independence executive control, the impact of which many 3
at all levels. It then describes how these prin- of them had suffered directly during both the 4
ciples were eroded through law and practice, British and Pakistan periods. 5
most significantly through enhancing the Consequently, the 1972 Constitution, in its 6
president’s powers to the detriment of the original incarnation, articulated a principle of 7
chief justice under the fourth amendment judicial independence (art. 22) as a principle 8
(accompanying the imposition of one-party of state policy, and explicitly guaranteed that 9
rule), fragmentation of the supreme court the chief justice and the other judges of the 10
by the eighth amendment (under effective supreme court would be independent in the 11
military rule) and then further—albeit more exercise of their functions (art. 22, read with 12
indirectly—by the thirteenth amendment art. 94 4). This constitutional mandate for 13
(under an elected government introducing independence at every level was buttressed 14
the caretaker government system), which with specific provisions addressing the 15
envisaged a role for the judiciary in the appointment, removal, and other terms and 16
executive, as well as through interference with conditions of service of members of both the 17
the appointments process.The discussion then higher and lower judiciary.1 Under this 18
traces the Supreme Court’s assertions of framework, the Supreme Court enjoyed an 19
judicial independence, focusing in particular unprecedented degree of administrative and 20
on the landmark judgments in Anwar Hossain’s financial control over itself. Supreme Court 21
case (which laid down the doctrine of the basic justices could only be appointed by the 22
structure of the constitution), and the more president, subject to consultation with the 23
recent Masdar Hossain case, which elaborated chief justice (art. 95).The retirement age was 24
a framework for separation of the lower 62, and no judge could be removed following 25
judiciary from the executive,and its outcomes. confirmation, except by the Supreme Judicial 26
(A third judgment, in Idrisur Rahman’s Case, Council by president’s order after a parlia- 27
which may ultimately join these in signi- mentary resolution with a two-thirds majority 28
ficance, is currently under appeal in the and on grounds of proved misbehavior or 29
appellate division and therefore not discussed incapacity (art. 96). Their remuneration, 30
here.) The discussion concludes with a reflec- privileges and terms and conditions of service 31
tion on the continuing legacy of the could not be varied to their disadvantage 32
politicization of the judiciary with regard to its during their term of office.2 Additional judges 33
effective functioning as well as current institu- were to be appointed by the president for 34
tional challenges to the delivery of justice. It two years, if the president was satisfied, after 35
also considers the approaches available to the consultation with the chief justice,of a need for 36
court as it seeks to put its own house in order, increase (art. 98). Retired judges (except 37
not merely by asserting autonomy, but additional judges) were barred from acting 38
examining whether it is as yet prepared for before any court/authority or being appointed 39
ensuring its accountability. to service of the republic (art. 99). 40
The supreme court also had powers of 41
superintendence and control over all courts 42
Constructing the pillar: subordinate to it.3 The chief justice was 43
The 1972 constitution empowered to appoint all district judges, and 44
the president all other judicial officers and 45
In the immediate aftermath of the inde- magistrates exercising judicial functions 46
pendence of Bangladesh, the members of the according to rules made by him in consultation 47
constituent assembly charged with drafting the with the Public Service Commission and 48
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 C O N F R O N T I N G C O N ST I T U T I O N A L C U R TA I L M E N TS
1 the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court also
2 had powers of control (including posting/
3 promotion/grant of leave) and discipline of
4 such judicial officers and magistrates exercising
5 judicial functions (art. 116). While the
6 regulation of appointment and conditions of
7 service was to be by law made by parliament,
8 subject to the constitution,it was also provided
9 that the president may make rules until such
10 laws were framed, which would be effective
11 subject to the law’s provisions (art. 133).
12 Significantly, there was a clear mandate that
13 separation “shall be implemented as soon as
14 practicable,” set out as a “transitory provision”
15 (see Fourth Schedule, art. 6 [6]).
16 This framework proved impermanent, and
17 the almost four decades since independence
18 saw major encroachments, by autocratic and
19 military rulers and indeed by democratic
20 governments, on the relevant constitutional
21 provisions, both through legal amendments
22 and in practice, as we shall see later.
23
24
25 Attempts at demolition
26
27 Within barely three years of the adoption of the
28 constitution, in 1975, the then Awami League
29 Government enacted the Fourth Amendment
30 to the Constitution,4 resulting in extensive
31 reworking, and virtual undoing, of the major
32 provisions concerning the judiciary (Part VI,
33 Chapters I and II). Most critically, this
34 amendment curtailed the powers of the chief
35 justice and the Supreme Court in the matter of
36 appointments of both the superior and
37 subordinate judiciary (arts 95 and 115). It
38 removed the express constitutional requirement
39 to consult with the supreme court or the chief
40 justice in either case. It also provided scope for
41 the president not to confirm the appointment
42 of additional judges of the Supreme Court (art.
43 98), and to remove Supreme Court judges
44 simply on grounds of misbehavior or incapacity
45 following the decision taken by the Supreme
46 Judicial Council (comprising the chief justice
47 and two other judges). The amendment also
48 resulted in the president taking over the
Supreme Court’s powers of control (including
posting, promotion, and grant of leave) and
discipline of the subordinate courts (art. 116).
The consequence—as noted by a respected
former judge of the Supreme Court—was
that “Article 116, as it stands now, is the
insurmountable block against separation of the
judiciary from executive control.”
Within the year, in 1976, martial law was
proclaimed, and the Supreme Court was
divided into the appellate division and High
Court division,only to be reunited again barely
a year later.5 More positively, however, the
requirement for the president to consult with
the Supreme Court regarding the control and
discipline of subordinate judges and magistrates
exercising judicial functions was restored
(art. 116).6
Further incursions into judicial inde-
pendence—in particular of the superior
judiciary—were made during the military rule
of Lt. General Ershad. First, the retirement age
of Supreme Court justices was changed to
62 or on completion of three years as chief
justice, whichever were earlier, in a deliberate
design to affect the sitting chief justice. This
provision was equally cavalierly repealed three
years later, to enable the next chief justice to
continue in office. By further martial law
proclamations, Ershad then sought to denude
the Supreme Court—a major source of
resistance to his rule—of its strength. He
established “permanent benches” of the high
court in six district towns and transferred
judges from the High Court to preside over
them,7 measures which faced massive protests
from lawyers across the country. Following
elections that were widely questioned,
parliament then adopted the Constitution
(Eighth Amendment) Act 1988, which
provided for establishing six permanent
benches outside Dhaka and empowered the
president (now Ershad) to determine their
territorial jurisdiction (art. 100).The political
and legal challenge against the breakup of the
High Court, and this effort to diminish its
powers,were ultimately to catalyze the popular
movement against the Ershad “autocracy.”
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Following Ershad’s fall in a popular cross- and long-term implications for the Supreme 1
party movement, which demanded transfer of Court’s ability to act as a “competent,impartial 2
power to a caretaker government headed by a and independent” forum of justice. 3
nonpartisan person, he appointed the sitting In each of these incidents, the issue of 4
chief justice, Mr. Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed consultation with the chief justice was central. 5
as vice president and then handed over power As noted by one leading lawyer, such con- 6
to him. Justice Shahabuddin headed the care- sultation was meant to be “effective, mean- 7
taker government and oversaw the return to ingful, consensus-oriented, leaving no room 8
a parliamentary system in 1991, and also for complaint of arbitrariness or unfair play in 9
the adoption of the Constitution (Twelfth appointment of judges.”10 Although the 10
Amendment) Act, which extended the constitutional provision requiring consultation 11
high court’s supervision and control over sub- with the chief justice had been obliterated 12
ordinate courts to include tribunals (art. 109). through the Fourth Amendment, there had 13
Attempts were made to restore the original never been any deviation from the actual 14
provisions of the 1972 Constitution but failed process of such consultation.This process was 15
in the face of parliamentary deadlock.8 followed as an unbroken convention until 16
Subsequently,in 1996,following renewal of 1992 when, for the first time, the president 17
demands for a caretaker government arrange- appointed nine additional judges without 18
ment in the wake of reports of massive vote consultation with the chief justice. The then 19
rigging under Khaleda Zia’s government, the chief justice (Shahabuddin Ahmed) declined 20
Thirteenth Amendment to the constitution to administer the oath to them and the legal 21
introduced the system of a caretaker gov- community considered the matter as a threat to 22
ernment overseeing parliamentary elections the independence of the judiciary. The then 23
every five years, and allowed for a retired chief prime minister had to comply with the 24
justice to be appointed as the chief advisor to demand of the lawyers and canceled the 25
each caretaker government. This provision appointment.The process of consultation with 26
blurred the lines regarding separation from the the chief justice was established as a corner- 27
executive, this time at the highest levels of the stone to the independence of the judiciary.11 28
judiciary (art. 58C). However, lack of consultation recurred as a 29
This series of constitutional amendments concern over the coming years and increas- 30
curtailed the scope for the court to operate ingly became mired in partisan disputes. 31
independently, enabling executive controls to Further appointments under the BNP-led 32
be manifested over the powers of appointments government were questioned on this basis, as 33
and removals, and their administration. The were some of the Awami League government’s 34
legacy of the Fourth Amendment bore out the appointments of additional judges to the high 35
prescient remarks of a former judge: “The court division, and the next BNP-led govern- 36
possibility of entry of political factors into the ment’s refusal to confirm the appointments of 37
question of appointment of judges of the these nine additional judges. The nadir was 38
Supreme Court cannot be ruled out.”9 reached in the wholesale appointment on a 39
Following the restoration of the parliamentary single day of 19 judges to the high court under 40
system, and under the elected governments in the BNP-led government in 2004 (one of 41
place from 1990, several significant crises whom later resigned when facing a proceeding 42
regarding appointments and non-confirmation before the Supreme Judicial Council in 43
of ad hoc judges of the Supreme Court took relation to the allegation of his having tam- 44
place.These incurred protests from the bar and pered with his mark sheets and obtained a 45
criticism from civil society, and also faced third-class LLB degree). In several instances, 46
constitutional challenges,resulting in a series of judges were appointed to the apex court by 47
damaging standoffs with potentially very grave supercession of others, in derogation of the 48
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1 tradition of appointment of the senior most Anwar Hossain’s case

2 judge. Such appointments under the Awami
As noted already, seven “permanent benches”
3 League-led government were followed by
of the high court had been set up under martial
4 physical attacks launched by lawyers sup-
law in 1982, and then when the constitution
5 porting the opposition Bangladesh National
was revived,following a constitutional amend-
6 Party (BNP) on the members of the apex court
ment in 1988, the permanent benches were
7 itself, and ultimately to counter–supercessions
treated as sessions of the high court outside the
8 by the BNP-led government.
capital.Each of these benches was given a fixed
9
territorial jurisdiction while the high court
10
was given a “residual” jurisdiction. The chief
11 Reconstructing the basic
justice also framed rules for transfer of pro-
12 structure
ceedings out of the high court to the perma-
13
nent benches. In 1988, three petitioners
14 A number of these constitutional amendments
challenged the refusal of the concerned court
15 and executive practices curtailing indepen-
official to allow them to affirm affidavits in
16 dence faced challenges before the Supreme
Dhaka on the ground that the main writ
17 Court,mainly by way of writ petitions filed by
petition had been transferred to a “permanent
18 lawyers acting in the public interest, members
bench” outside Dhaka under the Eighth
19 of the subordinate judiciary, and most recently
Amendment to the constitution.14 It was
20 by former Supreme Court judges. The first
argued that the constitutional amendment and
21 major challenge in Anwar Hossain’s case resulted
the rules had damaged the basic structure of
22 in perhaps the most important judgment of the
the constitution, which envisages the high
23 appellate division to date (declaring judicial
court as having plenary judicial power. The
24 independence to be part of the basic structure
high court rejected the petition, but the
25 of the constitution).12 Subsequently,following
appellate division, by a majority of three to
26 the return to the parliamentary system, the
one—and for the only time in Bangladesh’s
27 Masdar Hossain judgment laid out the legal
history—held that the constitutional amend-
28 and institutional framework for ending
ment was void and that the structural pillar of
29 subordination of the lower judiciary to the
the judiciary is basic and fundamental to the
30 executive. Most recently, a challenge by several
scheme of the constitution. They found in
31 former ad hoc judges of the high court to the
essence that the permanent benches of the
32 then president’s non-confirmation of their
high court, which the martial law authorities
33 appointment has been held to be wholly
had sought to justify—and later the govern-
34 unconstitutional, and currently faces final
ment and also the chief justice—as means of
35 determination before the appellate division.13
expanding access to justice to litigants beyond
36 It is too early to review this last judgment,
the capital, had in practice contributed to
37 which may have long-lasting implications for
reducing significantly the quality of justice.
38 the court,but the next two sections will discuss
Reflecting on the political context and the
39 how, through Anwar Hossain’s and Masdar
strains—and indeed dominance of the
40 Hossain’s case, the judiciary laid down some
executive—within which the judiciary was
41 fundamental principles for guiding relations
compelled to operate, Justice M. H. Rahman
42 between the legislature,judiciary and executive
remarked as follows:
43 as well as asserting its own autonomy and
44 independence.
The doctrine of basic structure . . . developed in
45
a climate where the executive, commanding an
46
overwhelming majority in the legislature, gets
47
snap amendments of the Constitution passed
48
195
SARA HOSSAI N

without a Green Paper or White Paper, without exercising judicial functions formed a class 1
eliciting any public opinion,without sending the distinct from other services of the republic,and 2
Bill to any Select Committee and without giving that they could not be “treated alike or merged 3
sufficient time to members of Parliament for or amalgamated with any other service,except 4
deliberation on the Bill for amendment. a service of an allied nature.”The apex court 5
addressed head on longstanding concerns 6
The court proceeded to ground the basic regarding executive control over the sub- 7
structure doctrine by reference to Article 7 that ordinate judiciary, reaffirmed the principle of 8
all powers in the Republic belong to the independence of the judiciary, elaborated on 9
people which,as noted by Justice Shahabuddin the constitutional position and practice 10
Ahmed: regarding separation of the judiciary from the 11
executive, and laid down a series of 12 12
[S]tands between the Preamble and Article 8 as declarations and directions for implementation 13
the statue of liberty, supremacy of law and rule by the government in this regard.16 14
of law and to put it in the words of an American This judgment addressed the larger colonial 15
judge . . . it is the pole star of our Constitution. legacy, perpetuated by succeeding regimes 16
No Parliament can amend it because Parliament both in Pakistan and independent Bangladesh, 17
is the creation of this Constitution and all powers involving an overlap and blurring of judicial 18
follow from this Article, namely,Article 7. and executive functions. In the lower criminal 19
(at paras 183, 184) courts, the area where executive control was 20
most apparent and most problematic, the 21
The judgment resulted in the termination pattern for lack of separation was set early on. 22
of the “permanent benches,” return of all The colonial view, happily adopted by the 23
judges to the Dhaka High Court, and postcolonial state, that administration could 24
restoration of the full plenary powers of the only be effective with a centralization of 25
high court, which went on to become the authority and the power to punish and dis- 26
forum in which many aspects of Ershad’s cipline,informed these arrangements.Thus,the 27
regime were to face challenge until his ultimate chief executive officer at the district level, the 28
downfall in 1990,and his handover of power— deputy commissioner, was also responsible for 29
in a pleasant irony—to the then Chief Justice, judicial functions as the district magistrate. 30
Shahabuddin Ahmed. Similarly,magistrates,appointed and controlled 31
by the executive, who performed executive 32
functions (for example issuance of licenses or 33
Masdar Hossain’s case
orders of detention) were also empowered to 34
In 1996,Masdar Hossain,a district judge,along exercise judicial powers including, among 35
with several others, challenged a law15 that others, taking witness statements, entertaining 36
purported to include judicial officers within bail applications, conducting trials and passing 37
the Bangladesh Civil Service. As in Anwar sentences in respect of certain offences.(These 38
Hossain’s case, the high court rejected the arrangements were embedded in the Criminal 39
petition but, on appeal, Masdar Hossain won a Procedure Code of 1898 [“the Code”].) The 40
landmark judgment, in which the appellate dilemma so eloquently expressed by John 41
division directed establishment of a separate Eames,serving in Chittagong as a magistrate in 42
judicial service, distinct from the executive the early 1920s, thus continued to plague all 43
and from the administrative cadres of the his successors into the century ahead: “It is 44
Bangladesh Civil Service, to include both troubling to be the executive officer in the 45
judicial officers and magistrates exercising morning, and then wear a judicial hat and sit 46
judicial functions. It stated that members of in judgment on my own decisions in the 47
both the judicial services and magistrates afternoon!”17 48
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 C O N F R O N T I N G C O N ST I T U T I O N A L C U R TA I L M E N TS
1 While attempts at separation were made in
2 the Pakistan period,they were either not main-
3 tained, or never implemented.18 Immediately
4 after liberation, new members of the con-
5 stituent assembly—who had directly or
6 indirectly faced unfair trials, arbitrary arrests,
7 denial of bail and prolonged periods of
8 incommunicado detention, resulting from
9 extensive use and abuse of magisterial
10 powers—acting at the behest of the executive
11 of the day, sought to chart a new path by
12 embedding a clear mandate for separation of
13 the lower judiciary. However, as noted earlier,
14 the onslaught on the original letter and spirit
15 of the constitution effected by the Fourth
16 Amendment, swiftly followed by 15 years of
17 direct and indirect military rule,put paid to the
18 hope and potential for reform in this area.
19 As noted already, prior to the Fourth
20 Amendment, the president could appoint
21 officers in judicial service and magistrates
22 exercising judicial functions “in accordance
23 with rules made by him” (art. 115), which
24 could be framed only following consultation
25 with the supreme court and Public Service
26 Commission. The president was also vested
27 with direct control (including the power of
28 posting, promotion, and granting of leave) and
29 discipline of the subordinate courts, although
30 this remained subject to his or her exercising it
31 in consultation with the Supreme Court.
32 Following the Fourth Amendment, and in the
33 absence of any rules having been framed, the
34 president appointed all judges of the sub-
35 ordinate courts as well as magistrates. These
36 recruitments were made from the judicial cadre
37 of the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS Judicial)
38 and the administrative cadre of the civil service
39 (BCS Admin) respectively.By delegation of the
40 president’s powers under the constitution, the
41 Ministry of Law was responsible for initiating
42 the process with regard to appointments, and
43 also for transfer,promotion,leave and discipline
44 of the subordinate courts. After preparing the
45 files, the ministry, in a nod to the consultation
46 requirement, would send these on to the
47 Supreme Court for approval. The executive
48 was thus placed in an extraordinarily strong
position of control over the lower judiciary,
and was able to use its power of appointments,
promotions, and postings as a carrot or stick as
necessary to manipulate both the composition
of the lower judiciary and its functioning.
These powers were in turn routinely abused
by all regimes as a tool to cement their
authority, and, too often, to control their
respective political oppositions.
Another arena for confusion between
judicial and executive functions was with
respect to the practice of deputation, whereby
judicial officers could be posted to purely
administrative or executive posts, as the law
officers of various ministries, including the
Ministry of Law.19
When Masdar Hossain challenged the
recruitment rules for judicial officers, he set in
motion a process that enabled the court to
examine each of the aspects of lack of separa-
tion between the executive and judiciary
already discussed. It also resulted in a clear
exposition of the contours of judicial inde-
pendence, and a realistic and pragmatic
understanding of its current constitutional
limits. Thus, the court identified five key
characteristics of independence of the judi-
ciary: security of tenure; recruitment to the
judicial service as a permanent posting and
through a transparent Judicial Service Com-
mission; security of emoluments, including
pension, etc.; institutional functional inde-
pendence of the subordinate judiciary from
parliament and the executive and, finally,
financial autonomy within the sphere of funds
allocated. The court further held that every
institution, authority and individual asso-
ciated with the judicial administration is
required to advance, strengthen and achieve
these measures. In one of its “12 command-
ments,” the court required the government to
set up two separate bodies, the Judicial Service
Commission (to recruit members of the judi-
cial service), and the Judicial Pay Commission
(to fix pay scales for members of the judicial
service), specifying the nature of their
composition, powers, and functions, and to
separate the executive and judicial functions of
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SARA HOSSAI N

the magistracy. To this end, it required the appreciation or shifting of evidence or the 1
government to adopt two sets of laws, one set formulation of any decision that exposes any 2
requiring regulation of the terms and person to any punishment or penalty or deten- 3
conditions of service of judicial officers,20 and tion in custody pending investigation, inquiry 4
the other requiring replacement of all or trial or other proceeding or would have the 5
references to “magistrates” in existing laws by effect of sending him for trial before any court, 6
the term “judicial magistrates,” and amend- while executive magistrates are responsible for 7
ment of all laws that empower magistrates to functions which are administrative or executive 8
try criminal cases. in nature,such as licensing matters,or decisions 9
For almost ten years after the Masdar to sanction or withdraw a prosecution. 10
judgment, it remained virtually unimple- Despite the institutional and legal frame- 11
mented. In 2001, the then caretaker govern- work for separation having now been 12
ment ensured that all the draft rules were established, several concerns have arisen in 13
prepared and was on the brink of approving regard to whether this framework is fully 14
these at its last meeting prior to handing over compliant with the letter and spirit of the 15
power to the newly elected government, but judgment. One set of concerns relate to the 16
did not proceed on receiving an assurance from continuing overlap between the powers of the 17
Khaleda Zia, prime minister-elect, that her judiciary and executive regarding appoint- 18
government would do so in fulfilment of their ments.With regard to appointments, control, 19
manifesto commitment. Once in power, and discipline of judicial officers, the Ministry 20
however, Begum Zia’s government took no of Law still initiates this process and thereby 21
steps other than to adopt one set of rules for continues to exert influence over it. This has 22
establishing the Judicial Service Commission21 already given rise to critical questions in the 23
and to provide for financial autonomy of the media regarding how the ministry had 24
Supreme Court, and otherwise took adjourn- nominated judicial officers for promotion 25
ment after adjournment before the Supreme overlooking “adverse remarks” in their con- 26
Court,claiming that the process was underway. fidential records, and the Supreme Court had 27
It was to take another five years and another approved this list of nominations without 28
caretaker government for all the rules to be further scrutiny. In one case currently (2008) 29
finalized and adopted.22 In 2007, the caretaker pending hearing, a national newspaper pub- 30
government ultimately adopted the remaining lished reports highlighting the continued 31
rules regarding the terms and conditions of dependence of the Supreme Court on the 32
judicial officers,as well as legislation amending executive, that is, the Ministry of Law, in 33
the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding the relation to the appointment of district judges. 34
nomenclature, powers and functions of the Following publication, a lawyer filed a 35
magistracy. The amended code replaced all contempt of court petition against the news- 36
existing references to “magistrate,”without any paper alleging interference in the functioning 37
qualifying word, by the term “judicial magi- of the supreme court.23 38
strate.” It provided for appointment of execu- Another set of concerns relates to the 39
tive magistrates from among persons employed practice of deputation. Deputation is a condi- 40
in the BCS (Admin) and appointment of tion of service; but the apex court in Masdar 41
judicial magistrates from among persons Hossain clearly held that “judicial service” falls 42
employed in the (newly created) Bangladesh outside this definition of service,and thus there 43
Judicial Service. It also set out the powers and can be no deputation from judicial service, 44
functions of executive and judicial magistrates observing that “as oil and water cannot mix, 45
both under the code and other laws. These the judicial and civil administrative executive 46
functions are now clearly identified, with services are non amalgamable.”24 Thus, the 47
judicial magistrates being responsible for the continuing practice of deputation—in respect 48
198
 C O N F R O N T I N G C O N ST I T U T I O N A L C U R TA I L M E N TS
1 of posting judicial officers to executive posts—
2 appears contrary to the spirit of the judgment
3 as well as the constitution.One concern is that
4 the long-term effect of such “executive
5 posting”might undermine the impartiality and
6 independence of the judicial service by allow-
7 ing judicial officers to operate within an
8 executive environment, thereby affecting their
9 capacity to operate neutrally and free of
10 executive influence. However, judicial officers
11 are continuing to demand that this facility be
12 allowed.This question has been highlighted in
13 litigation on the appointment of the Secretary
14 to the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parlia-
15 mentary Affairs, a member of the BCS
16 (Judicial) cadre who chose to opt out of the
17 judicial service and into the executive, but
18 whose appointment has been challenged in a
19 public interest petition brought by a former
20 judge.25
21 The Masdar judgment has also been
22 invoked to buttress long-standing demands
23 from the bar for a law containing specific
24 guidelines to prevent arbitrariness in appoint-
25 ments of Supreme Court judges, in order to
26 strengthen the court as an institution. When
27 the Supreme Judicial Commission Ordinance
28 2008 was promulgated,in apparent response to
29 this demand,a public interest petition was filed
30 challenging its constitutionality on the ground
31 that the proposed commission was comprised
32 of a majority of members from the executive
33 branch.26 While the petition was pending,
34 the government amended the ordinance,
35 ensuring that a majority of members were to
36 be drawn from the judiciary.
37 The High Court Division also recently
38 declared the Contempt of Court Ordinance
39 2008 to be unconstitutional on the grounds,
40 inter alia, that certain provisions contravened
41 the Masdar judgment, in particular regarding
42 the definition of contempt. The ordinance
43 had provided that non-compliance with a
44 court order would not constitute contempt if
45 such compliance was not practicable, and,
46 further, if it would involve contravention of
47 any existing laws, and would effectively have
48 benefited members of the executive.
Other more practical concerns regarding
implementation of the judgment relate to the
nature of recruitment—in terms of numbers
and quality—for both the civil and criminal
courts. In respect of the former, the Judicial
Service Commission has proceeded with
recruitment after a hiatus of several years,
during which many judicial posts had lain
vacant, and appointed over 200 judicial
officers, with some controversy arising regard-
ing the nature of these appointments. With
respect to the criminal justice system, the
relatively small numbers of magistrates opting
for the judicial service (presumably loath to
abandon their proximity to power in the
executive service) meant that there was, and
will continue to be, a serious shortfall in
judicial capacity at this level, compounding
existing delays and difficulties to be faced by
the users at the frontlines of the system.
Moving beyond Masdar:
Questions of accountability
While the steps taken to date are significant,
they are clearly only the beginning of a very
long process required for effective separation
and for full independence.As acknowledged in
Masdar Hossain’s case, without restoring the
original Articles 115 and 116 of the con-
stitution, the supreme court will be unable to
exercise full control and discipline over the
subordinate courts.Further amendment of the
current rules may be necessary. Other more
practical measures will also be needed, to
supplement the formal and legal frame-
work so that judicial officers and judicial
magistrates can operate freely. These would
require changes in their conditions of service
to include more appropriate remuneration
and benefits, raising the levels of competence,
introducing systems of monitoring and evalua-
tion, schemes for annual recognition and
reward, as well as greater transparency and
openness in the functioning of the courts, for
example,by holding annual conferences,or the
publication of annual reports containing case
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SARA HOSSAI N

data.The most crucial change needed, and the Conclusion: Repairing the 1
one impossible to address through legislation rebuilding 2
alone, will require the cultivation of inde- 3
pendence of mind and spirit immune to any The Anwar Hossain case involved reinsertion of 4
kind of influence, whether from partisan bricks into the pillar of the independence of 5
political forces, or other powerful actors or the judiciary,which had been flung out in four 6
agencies. directions, and Masdar Hossain’s has enabled 7
If the operation of the courts continues to rebuilding of a firm plinth in the form of 8
give rise to fears that they are not able to separation of the judiciary. Clearly, there is 9
operate free of “extraneous influences,” and if much still to be done, and the constitutional 10
there is no strong mechanism to check partisan petitions now pending before the courts raise 11
decision making, then concerns regarding the important questions regarding the manner and 12
accountability of the judiciary will also mode of this rebuilding process, and what it 13
multiply.27 The politicization of the appoint- will require if the foundation is to be solidly 14
ment process, and the consequences of these built. But most importantly, with Article 116 15
appointments in terms of the patterns of remaining in its present form, it is clear that 16
judgments and orders in certain politically there are major structural deficiencies in the 17
sensitive cases, have led to serious questioning pillar. And the new controversies regard- 18
of the image of the judiciary as an indepen- ing appointments and non-confirmation of 19
dent institution. These issues have, in turn, Supreme Court judges now call in question 20
raised concerns regarding the capacity of the whether the pillar is crumbling from within. 21
judiciary to ensure its own accountability. The discussion in this chapter has shown 22
Recent experiences have heightened these how movements for ensuring independence of 23
concerns.These include the refusal of the court the judiciary, and for reconstructing the 24
to investigate allegations raised in the media applicable legal framework have been first 25
regarding the lack of qualifications of a person catalyzed, and then driven from within the 26
appointed as an additional judge (who later legal system by activist judges and lawyers with 27
himself resigned when a proceeding was finally a commitment to maintaining the integrity of 28
initiated before the Supreme Judicial Council); the system and enabling it to continue to 29
the continuing lack of inquiry into the nature deliver justice,within all existing constraints.It 30
of these appointments,and the lack of any self- is equally evident that these movements have 31
corrective mechanism established by the court faced continued resistance from within the 32
to address them.These questions are likely to bureaucracy and, most important, from those 33
come to the fore in a pending appeal before holding political power at the highest levels 34
the supreme court against the high court’s (and elements partisan to them among both 35
judgment holding unconstitutional the earlier judges and lawyers),who have sought to retain 36
non-confirmation by the BNP-led govern- executive controls over the judiciary, not only 37
ment of nine additional judges.28 In this to manipulate the political opposition but in 38
judgment, the appellants include 19 sitting the more general expectation of favorable 39
judges of the high court, on the one hand, outcomes. 40
pitted against persons who had all served as Sadly, while lawyers actively engaged in 41
additional judges, on the other. It estab- political life, and members of the Bar actively 42
lishes unprecedented and complex hurdles for engaged in movements for democracy have 43
the court to overcome on the road to estab- advocated, inside and outside the courts, for 44
lishing both judicial accountability and the restoration of judicial independence, they 45
independence. have been less insistent on this demand once 46
their favored political parties achieve office. 47
And indeed the consistent pattern under all 48
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1 regimes—from full-blown military govern- Bangladesh: A Study of Standards and Practices

2 ments to autocratic presidents and elected (Dhaka: BILIA, 2001), p. 187. The Fourth
3 parliaments—has been to reduce indepen- Amendment inserted a new Article 116A
4 dence, on the one hand, and further politicize providing that “subject to the provisions of
this Constitution, judicial officers and
5 the judiciary, on the other. The fruits of this
magistrates shall be independent in the exercise
6 political patronage—exacerbated by the carrot
of their judicial functions” described by
7 and stick effect on the senior most judges of the Mahmudul Islam as “being without substance”
8 possibility of their elevation to the highest in view of the removal of the consultation
9 office in the land as chief advisor of the requirement (M. Islam, Constitutional Law of
10 caretaker government—have led to the current Bangladesh, supra, at p. 63).
11 crisis.Today, the higher judiciary remains the 5 Second Proclamation (Seventh Amendment)
12 forum of last resort against arbitrary executive Order 1976, the effect of this being undone
13 action. But its capacity and ability to provide by the Second Proclamation (Tenth Amend-
14 such protection is under question,and it is clear ment) Order 1977.
15 that its reputation has suffered serious erosion. 6 Proclamation (First Amendment) Order 1982,
this part being repealed by Proclamation Order
16 The current confrontation between appointed
No. IV of 1985. The retirement age was later
17 and non-confirmed judges and sitting judges
fixed at 65 in the Constitution (Seventh
18 further threatens the integrity of the institu- Amendment) Act 1986.
19 tion. It remains to be seen whether and how 7 The Proclamation (Second Amendment)
20 the apex court will steer itself through the crisis Order 1982 provided for the Chief Martial
21 that looms. Law Administrator to establish permanent
22 benches of the High Court at such places as
23 he may fix. By the Proclamation (Third
24 Notes Amendment) Order 1986, these were renamed
25 as Circuit Benches, and then later, after
26 1 The Chief Justice of Bangladesh presides over withdrawal of martial law, they were renamed
the supreme court and the subordinate courts. as Sessions of the High Court.
27
The supreme court itself has two divisions, 8 Salahuddin Yusuf MP (AL) introduced a
28
the appellate division and the High Court private member’s bill in parliament in 1991
29 to re-introduce the original Articles 95, 98,
division (see art. 94, Constitution). The sub-
30 115 and 116, which was sent to the Select
ordinate courts include civil courts (established
31 by the Civil Courts Act 1887), criminal courts Committee, where it was considered until
32 (established by the Code of Criminal Pro- 1993, but not ultimately enacted. See
33 cedure 1898) and other courts and tribunals discussion in M. I. Farooqui, infra, at p. 66.
34 as established by Parliament (art. 114, Con- 9 Naimuddin, supra, at p. 177.
35 stitution and specific laws). 10 M. I. Farooqui, “Judiciary in Bangladesh: Past
36 2 Art. 147, Constitution of Bangladesh; see also and Present,” in 48 DLR (1996) Journal 65;
37 Mahmudul Islam, Constitutional Law of see, in particular, discussion of pattern of
Bangladesh, 2nd edition (Dhaka: Mullick appointments in 1992 onwards and references
38
Brothers, 2002), para 6.59B, and Commissioner cited at p. 68 from Dr.Ahmed Hossain v Shamsul
39
of Taxes v Justice S. Ahmed 42 DLR (AD) 163 Huq Chowdhury 48 DLR 155.
40 11 There were no specified criteria for such
(exemption of Supreme Court judge’s salary
41 consultation relating, for example, to merit,
from payment of tax).
42 3 Art. 108-109 of the Constitution of 1972; see competence, honesty, integrity although
43 Shahar Ali v AR Chowdhury, Sessions judge, 32 presumably it was required that such issues
44 DLR (1980) 142 (on the ambit of art. 109). were to be taken into consideration.
45 4 Justice Naimuddin, “The Problems of the 12 1989 BLD (Spl) 1.
46 Independence of the Judiciary in Bangladesh,” 13 Idrisur Rahman v Secretary, Minister of Law, Justice
47 in Bangladesh Institute of Law and and Parliamentary Affairs, Writ Petition No.
48 International Affairs (BILIA), Human Rights in 1543 of 2003, judgment dated 17 July, 2008

201
SARA HOSSAI N

challenging the non-appointment by the was thus finally followed by the Bangladesh 1
President of Justice Abdus Salam and Justice Judicial Service (Pay Commission) Rules 2007, 2
Momtazuddin Ahmad, despite their having the Bangladesh Judicial Service (Service 3
served over three years as additional judges of Constitution, Composition, Recruitment and 4
the high court, and despite the Chief Justice Suspension, Dismissal & Removal) Rules
5
having recommended their appointment. 2007, the Bangladesh Judicial Service (Posting,
6
14 Anwar Hossain Chowdhury v Bangladesh, Promotion, Leave, Control, Discipline and
Jalaluddin v Bangladesh, Ibrahim Shaikh v other Service Conditions) Rules 2007 and the 7
Bangladesh (1989) BLD (1) Special. Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) 8
15 Bangladesh Civil Service (Reorganisation) Ordinance 2007. 9
Order 1980. 23 See report titled Jela judge Podonnoti’r khetrey 10
16 The review petition was disposed of in 16 joner biruddhey gurutoro obhijog (Serious 11
Secretary, Ministry of Finance v Md. Masdar allegations against 16 persons recommended 12
Hossain and others (20 BLD (2000) (AD) 141), for appointment to District judge), Daily 13
The judgment arose from an original petition Prothom Alo, 24 May, 2008. 14
filed by 218 members of the subordinate 24 At para 41. Deputation is a service condition 15
judiciary. provided for in Art. 8 of the Bangladesh Civil
16
17 John Beames, Memoirs of a Bengal Civilian Service Recruitment Rules, 1981 as follows:
17
(London: Eland, 2003[1961]). Beames joined “Rule 8. Relaxation. - (1) Notwithstanding
the Indian Civil Service in 1859; his last anything contained in these rules - (b) A 18
posting was in Chittagong. I am indebted to person holding a specific post in a Service 19
R. Sudarshan for recalling this reference. may be appointed by the Government to a 20
18 See Art. 55(4), Constitution of Bangladesh, read specified post in another Service on 21
with the Rules of Business, 1996. deputation.” This provision is applicable to a 22
19 In 2005, about 80 judicial officers were posted person who holds a specific post in a “Service” 23
in various ministries, departments and statutory as defined in Schedule I to the Rules.A person 24
corporations. Judicial officers posted on in the BCS (Admin) Cadre may be sent on 25
deputation mostly serve as legal advisors or deputation to a judicial post for up to three 26
administrative officers. The administrative years after the coming into force of the
27
functions discharged by judicial officers while Composition Rules.
28
on deputation include serving in the registrar’s 25 Aftabuddin v Habibul Awal, Writ Petition No.
office in the Supreme Court or in various 6219 of 2007, judgment dated 18 February, 29
tribunals; as solicitor or administrative officer 2007, upholding the challenge; the operation 30
at the Solicitors Office, the Ministry of Law, of the judgment has been stayed, pending 31
the Parliament Secretariat, the Judicial appeal before the appellate division. 32
Administration Training Institute and in the 26 Md. Idrisur Rahman v Bangladesh and others, 33
Prime Minister’s Secretariat. Writ Petition No. 3228 of 2008. 34
20 The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 provided 27 See discussion in Justice Latifur Rahman, 35
for the classification and powers of different “Judicial Independence and the Account- 36
categories of magistrates. ability of Judges and the Constitution of 37
21 The Judicial Service Commission Rules (JSC Bangladesh,” in 52 DLR (2000) Journal 65,
38
Rules) 2004. Masdar Hossain’s counsel and at p. 68, noting that there had been no
39
others had noted that the JSC’s composition effective functioning of the Supreme Judicial
was contrary to the requirements of the Council till that date, nor had any effective 40
judgment, which required that it should measures been taken to improve the account- 41
comprise majority members from “the Senior ability of subordinate courts nor had there 42
Judiciary of the Supreme Court and the been any implementation of the Code of 43
subordinate courts.” Conduct of 2000. 44
22 The Bangladesh Judicial Service Commission 28 Idrisur Rahman v Bangladesh,Writ Petition No. 45
Rules, 2004 (notified on 28 January 2004), 1543 of 2003. 46
47
48
202
 1
2
3
4
14
5
6 Executive sovereignty
7
8
9 The judiciary in Sri Lanka
10
11
12
13 Shylashri Shankar
14
15
16
17
18
19 Introduction after the merger’s effect and at the height of
20 renewed war, signalled a deliberate attempt to
21 In January 2006 the supreme court resolved drive a political wedge into the ethnic issue.”3
22 a case in favour of Sri Lankan President How are such decisions by the Supreme
23 Mahinda Rajapaksa in his petition against an Court of Sri Lanka to be judged? Is the Sri
24 investigation of alleged fraudulent transfers of Lankan judiciary merely a tool to carry out
25 tsunami funds into his private bank account. majoritarian impulses or has it championed the
26 The court ordered police officers conducting rule of law and fundamental rights?4 I argue
27 the investigation to personally pay a sum of that the court’s seeming bias towards the ruling
28 money to the president as damages for their regime and its inability to assuage the fears of
29 individual liability in violating his fundamental the minority stems from its structural attributes
30 rights.1 In October 2006 the apex court issued inscribed in the constitution. Parliamentary
31 a judgment that the merger of the North and sovereignty and the constitutional power of the
32 East Provinces, part of the 1987 Indo-Lanka executive over judicial appointments made the
33 Accord, was null and void from its inception. court less able to challenge the parliament.
34 The ruling had “detrimental” implications for This, coupled with an ongoing civil war with
35 the peace process with the rebel Liberation the LTTE,ensured deference to the other state
36 Tigers for Tamil Eelam (LTTE) that wanted a institutions in matters of national security and
37 separate state for the Tamil minority.2 Since its contributed to the court’s failure “to restrain
38 independence from the British,the Sri Lankan majoritarianism” and facilitate nation build-
39 state has grappled with the task of maintaining ing.5 Despite several opportunities, the Sri
40 the hegemony of Sinhalese Buddhist national Lankan judiciary (unlike its Indian counter-
41 identity without undermining other ethnic part) remained committed to legal positivism
42 (Tamil) and religious (Hindu, Muslim, and rather than some form of judicial activism.
43 Christian) identities. Critics argued that the The first section of this chapter charts the
44 judgments showed a clear political bias of the erosion of judicial review and independence in
45 apex court towards the ruling regime led by a three constitutional documents.I argue that the
46 Sinhalese nationalist president.Their argument two later constitutions supported a Sinhalese
47 is summarized in the following statement: majoritarian project at the expense of minority
48 “The timing of the court challenge, 17 years rights, with courts functioning as unwilling

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accomplices.The second section discusses the religious freedom.9 The court saw it as an 1
implications of parliamentary sovereignty on implicit power to declare such discriminatory 2
the behaviour of the court towards fundamental legislation invalid, and did so, but not as 3
rights and the rights of minorities. I argue that effectively as the minorities hoped.We shall see 4
the executive’s intervention in the appoint- later how courts interpreted this section.The 5
ments process created a higher judiciary that constitution was also silent on the separation of 6
was more likely to be circumspect and avoid powers, but allowed the judiciary a modicum 7
tussles with the president and parliament over of independence to control appointments, 8
minority freedoms.The conclusion highlights transfers, dismissals, and disciplinary actions 9
the detrimental implications of politicization against judicial officers,by vesting the power in 10
of the judiciary for law, governance, and a judicial service commission. 11
democracy in Sri Lanka. But the succeeding autochthonous con- 12
stitution of 1972, also known as the first 13
republican constitution,left no doubt about the 14
Three constitutions and judicial dominance of the National State Assembly as 15
independence: Executive control the supreme instrument of state power.“We are 16
trying to reject the theory of separation of 17
Since independence from the British in 1948, powers,” said Felix Dias Bandaranaike, the 18
Sri Lanka has formulated three constitutions. minister of justice during the constituent 19
A comparison with the Indian constitution assembly deliberations.10 “We are trying to say 20
highlights the control wielded by the executive that nobody should be higher than the elected 21
in Sri Lanka and explains the court’s deferential representatives of the people, nor should any 22
attitude.First,the constitutions (particularly the person not elected by the people have the right 23
1972 and 1978 ones) were explicitly designed to throw out decisions of the people elected by 24
to preserve Sinhala majoritarianism,in contrast the people.”The legislature made itself supreme 25
to the ameliorative bent of the Indian counter- with the power to take away the jurisdiction of 26
part.6 Second, unlike India, the constitution any court, thus making the judiciary “the most 27
could be (and has been) amended or repealed crippled arm” of the government.11 28
by a two-thirds majority in the legislature, The 1978 Constitution (the current one, as 29
implying a view of the constitution “as a statute of 2010), which was designed in the wake of 30
rather than as a special document.”7 Third, the severe criticism of the previous constitution’s 31
notion that sovereignty was vested in the restrictive provisions for judicial powers, 32
people, and, by implication, in parliament widened the independence of the judiciary by 33
prevented judicial review of legislative acts— recognizing the separation of powers (art. 4). 34
but not executive or administrative ones—with But it continued to deny judicial review, 35
profound implications for minority rights.8 thereby leaving the fundamental freedoms of 36
The court has rarely challenged the executive. all “open to governmental abuse and admini- 37
To understand the quiescence of the judiciary, strative non-compliance.”12 Significantly, it 38
we have to assess the nature of judicial created a bill of rights which Peiris calls the 39
independence in the three constitutions. most important single factor that allowed the 40
The first, the 1947 Soulbury Constitution, supreme court constitutional jurisdiction over 41
was a “product of positivist aspirations” and a fundamental rights: 42
legislative attempt to “reflect the necessary 43
conditions for peace and security.” Instead of a Today our Constitution recognises that there are 44
bill of rights, the Soulbury Constitution pro- certain matters, in respect of which, Parliament 45
vided for minority protection (Section 29[2]) does not have the competence to legislate.There 46
forbidding discrimination on the ground of are things Parliament cannot do. Parliament 47
race or religion and legislation infringing on cannot restrict the freedom of association, the 48
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 E X E C U T I V E S OV E R E I G N T Y : T H E J U D I C I A RY I N S R I L A N K A
1 freedom of publication, the freedom of move-
2 ment and so on except in circumstances which
3 fall in the provisos which form part and parcel
4 of the constitutional document.13
5 the court was restrained in its dealings with the
6 The court did not use the entrenched
7 articles, which were harder to amend, to
8 fashion a basic structure doctrine, as their
9 Indian counterparts did.14 In the Thirteenth
10 Amendment Case, permitting the repeal of
11 entrenched articles, the Supreme Court said:
12
13 If the Constitution contemplates the repeal
14 of any provision or provisions of the entire
15 Constitution,there is no basis for the contention
16 that some provisions which reflect fundamental
17 principles or incorporate basic features are
18 immune from amendment. Accordingly, we do
19 not agree with the contention that some pro-
20 visions of the Constitution are unamendable.15
21
22 What accounts for the reluctance of judges
23 to challenge the executive? Let us assess the
24 nature of judicial independence in the 1978
25 Constitution. Commenting on judicial
26 independence from 1978–88, C. R. De Silva
27 said that the judiciary was under great threat
28 from the legislative and executive branches
29 because they used select committees to inquire
30 into the conduct of judges.16 A parliamentary
31 committee was set up to investigate the
32 comments, made by the chief justice in a
33 speech, that were critical of the government’s
34 policy on the anti-Tamil riots of 1983.17
35 The establishment of a Special Presidential
36 Commission of Inquiry by the president in
37 1978 to oversee the conduct of public officials
38 including judges introduced political oversight
39 and eroded the power of the Judicial Services
40 Disciplinary Board.18 In the same year, the
41 president also used his appointing powers to
42 ensure that seven apex court and several high
43 court judges did not serve again in the
44 reconstitued courts. In several instances, the
45 government promoted police officers who
46 were held guilty by the Supreme Court of
47 violating freedom of speech,19 and did not
48 protect those judges hearing the case from mob
violence. Thus, the third constitution rein-
forced the president’s control over judicial
appointments, marring the capacity of judges
to operate independently.20 Not surprisingly,
executive,and allowed presidential authoritari-
anism to continue unchecked, which had
severe implications for minority rights and
religious freedom.
Implications of executive
sovereignty
Minority rights
The underlying ethos of the 1972 and 1978
constitutions supported Sinhalese nationalism
at the expense of minority aspirations.21
Scholars have explained Sri Lanka’s bloody
struggle as a product of a religious divide
between Tamil Hindus and Sinhalese
Buddhists;22 colonial practices of divide and
rule which inscribed race, class, and religious
categories (Wickramasinghe, 1995); short-
sightedness of political elites owing to the need
to accommodate minorities;23 minority com-
plex based on regional security considera-
tions;24 and Sinhalese linguistic nationalism.25
The Sinhalese–Tamil ethnic relationship
followed a sequence of ethnic cohabitation
(1948–56), autonomy (1956–72), soft separat-
ism (1972–83), and ethnic conflict and civil
war (1983–present).
The judiciary played a significant role in the
evolution of the conflict. Immediately after
independence,the failure of legal challenges to
three discriminatory pieces of legislation—the
Citizenship Act of 1948 and the Franchise
Legislation of 1949 depriving Tamil plantation
workers of Indian descent of franchise, and
the Official Language Act of 1956 making
Sinhalese the only official language—eroded
the faith of the minorities in the institutions of
the state.26 The Citizenship Act of 1948 was
changed to deprive Tamil workers in up-
country plantations of their franchise, but the
court dismissed the subsequent appeal on
grounds that it was not made explicit that the
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S H Y L AS H R I S H A N K A R

purpose of the legislation was to deprive castigate the Sri Lankan judges for being 1
a particular community of the franchise. As “needlessly diffident” and “ambivalent”30 and 2
Peiris wryly points out, when the provisions for taking a very “narrow view of their func- 3
required that one’s grandfather and great- tions,” while other critics condemned the 4
grandfather had to have been born in the court for failing to maintain a balance between 5
country in order to have the right to vote, it majoritarianism and constitutional limitations 6
would not have required a great degree of to protect individual freedom and minority 7
imagination or perception to arrive at a firm rights.31 8
conclusion with regard to the objectives of the The recent (2008–9) success of the Sri 9
legislature.The judges,however,found the laws Lankan military in wresting its territories back 10
intra vires (within the power of the legislature) from the LTTE, has been seen by powerful Sri 11
despite the Soulbury Constitution’s prohibi- Lankan elites as a victory for the Sinhalese 12
tion on parliament to enact discriminatory against secessionist claims by Tamils. Such 13
legislation (art. 29(2)). chauvinist sentiments carry a high price for the 14
Legal theorist Rohan Edrisinha describes Tamil and Muslim minorities who face severe 15
the approach of the court as “narrow and curtailment of their democratic liberties. 16
technical” because the judges refused to con- Recent events (discussed in the conclusion) 17
sider the motive and effect of the legislation. indicate that even if the judiciary supports their 18
The reason for the court’s position, argues petitions, the government is not likely to 19
political scientist Jayadeva Uyangoda, was that implement court orders. 20
the political climate in the 1950s and 1960s 21
favored the view that parliament could do no 22
Religious freedom
wrong. So, judicial invalidation of any law 23
would be seen as a challenge to the very idea of The preamble to the 1978 constitution pro- 24
parliamentary sovereignty.Not surprisingly,the mises all citizens freedom, equality, justice, 25
judiciary avoided “crucial political issues” and fundamental human rights, and an inde- 26
disappointed Tamil minorities in “its blindness pendent judiciary. Article 9, which was 27
to assertions of discrimination.”27 introduced in 1972 and continued in 1978, 28
The formal constitutionalization of Sinha- guarantee foremost place to Buddhism and 29
lese majoritarianism, according to constitu- made it the duty of the State to protect and 30
tional theorist Asanga Welikala, occurred in foster the Buddhasasana, while assuring to all 31
the1972 Constitution,which discontinued the religions freedom of religion and worship, 32
special protection accorded to minorities by guaranteed by articles 10 and 14 (1)(a) and (e). 33
the 1947 Constitution, entrenched the uni- This has resulted in imbalances between the 34
tary nature of the republic, impinged on the rights of Buddhist and non-Buddhist citizens. 35
secular principle, and trampled on multi- When Buddhism was not involved, as in a 36
cultural sensitivities by giving constitutional bigamy case dealing with two minority 37
recognition to the preeminent position of religions (Christianity and Islam), the court 38
Buddhism.28 Any impulse for constitutional adopted a strict legal interpretation of the 39
reform emanating from the Sinhalese political marriage contract, rather than a cultural one. 40
leadership was conceptualized not in terms of But when religious freedom had an adverse 41
democratizing majority–minority relations impact on the freedom of Buddhism, the 42
within a pluralist framework, but as a way of judges upheld the concerns of Buddhists. 43
giving juridical expression to the majority In two judgments dealing with rights of 44
community’s nationalist aspirations.29 The legal Christian missionaries to propagate religion, 45
positivist orientation of the court made it an the Supreme Court upheld the preeminent 46
unwilling accomplice in the majoritarian place for Buddhism and clarified that free- 47
project, leading scholars like G. L. Peiris to dom of religion did not include freedom to 48
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 E X E C U T I V E S OV E R E I G N T Y : T H E J U D I C I A RY I N S R I L A N K A
1 propagate. Critics chastised the judgment as
2 “clumsy” and said that it would exacerbate the
3 fragmentation of the polity and weaken the
4 credibility of state institutions.32
5 creeping Dravidian hegemony over the whole
6 country, and concerns about the future
Thirteenth Amendment Case
7 protection of Buddhist monuments and
8 The majority opinion in the Thirteenth
9 Amendment Case exemplified the court’s
10 support for the ruling regime’s interpretations
11 and for majoritarian concerns.The Thirteenth
12 Amendment arose from the decentralization
13 agreement negotiated under Indian auspices in
14 the Indo-Sri Lanka accord of 1987. The
15 agreement, which came after years of bloody
16 conflict between a guerrilla group, the LTTE,
17 and the Sri Lankan government, necessitated
18 changes to article 2, which had “entrenched”
19 the unitary nature of the state.The nine judge
20 bench of the supreme court considered
21 whether the amendment was a breach of
22 articles 2 (unitary state), article 3 (sovereignty
23 of the people) and 9 (preeminent position of
24 Buddhism). The shift towards federalism and
25 India’s role aroused violent protests from
26 sections of Sinhalese society, who saw the
27 agreement as eroding the sovereignty of the
28 country. An armed insurgency, led by the
29 Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), erupted on
30 the streets while Buddhist organizations
31 challenged President J. R. Jayawardene in
32 court.The court upheld the amendment by a
33 whisker (5:4).Explanations for the tenor of the
34 majority opinion emphasize the institutional
35 and political pressure from the president, who
36 had to implement devolution in order to please
37 India, whereas the minority opinion was seen
38 as reflecting the ethnic (rather than religious)
39 fear of Tamil control by the Sinhalese Buddhist
40 nationalists.
41 The debate on decentralization/devolution
42 affected the rights of Sinhalese and Muslims
43 living in the eastern part of Sri Lanka. Tamil
44 Hindus formed a majority in the north, while
45 the Eastern Province (at that time) had an equal
46 representation of Hindu Tamils,Muslim Tamils,
47 and Sinhalese. The new bill treated the
48 Northern and Eastern Provinces as a single
unit (the North–East province), which meant
that Tamils would become the majority group,
while earlier they were the majority only in
the north. It triggered historical fears of
culture. Chief Justice Wanasundera’s words (in
the minority opinion) reflected the worry of
the Sinhalese nationalists about the dis-
memberment of the country.
It is a fact that the single provincial council for the
North and East would be dominated by Tamils
with an overwhelming Tamil-speaking majority.
It would be controlled and administered by
Tamils,who had for nearly a half century claimed
this territory as their traditional homeland and
resisted a Sinhala presence.They have subscribed
to a two-nation theory and not to an ideal of a Sri
Lankan nationality [author emphasis].33
Nineteen years later, in October 2006,
the Supreme Court implicitly supported
Wanasundera’s position.The five-judge bench,
headed by Chief Justice Sarath de Silva,
unanimously agreed with the petitioners,
representing the JVP, that the merger of the
Northern and Eastern Provinces was invalid
because two conditions of the accord had not
been fulfilled,namely the cessation of hostilities
and the demobilization of militant groups.The
JVP’s argument in court focused on debunking
historical and current claims by Tamils to a
northeastern homeland and highlighted the
secessionist consequences of allowing it. In
agreeing with the petitioners, the court risked
being seen as a Sinhalese nationalist,anti-Tamil
entity even though the judges used the
rationale of a “right to equality.”
Other cases
Although, overall, the tone of the judgments
favored the positions adopted by the ruling
regime, the legal positivist attitude of the
judiciary had a silver lining for the victims of
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S H Y L AS H R I S H A N K A R

torture. The court evolved mechanisms to a petition challenging the President’s actions, 1
compensate the victims (usually Tamils sus- the Supreme Court ordered the government 2
pected of links with the LTTE) when state to establish the CC by 15 January, 2009.The 3
agencies infringed on fundamental rights such president lashed out at the court accusing it of 4
as freedom from torture (art. 11). Similarly, undermining his powers and made veiled 5
environmental activists benefited from a ruling threats that the judges could find themselves 6
in November 2005 that Galle Face Green, a the target of thugs. 7
14-acre seaside promenade in Colombo, was a In the name of national security, the 8
public utility and could not be leased out to Rajapakse government has curtailed basic 9
private developers.34 The government was democratic liberties, threatened the media and 10
directed to pay costs of Rs 50,000 to the NGO NGOs, and turned a blind eye to the hundreds 11
plaintiff. of “disappearances” and murders of political 12
opponents allegedly caused by death squads 13
operating with security forces. The decision- 14
Conclusion making power is now concentrated in the 15
hands of the president and his close associates, 16
In September 2006, a five-judge bench of particularly his three brothers.With the success 17
the apex court headed by the chief justice of the Rajapakse government in recapturing 18
ruled that the accession of the government to the eastern and the northern provinces from 19
the Optional Protocol of the International the LTTE, the judiciary has become the main 20
Covenant on Civil and Political rights was arena for the battle between president and those 21
inconsistent with the constitution.The judg- political/civil society groups who fear that 22
ment came after a petition by a Tamil man who Rajapakse is using the argument of national 23
had been arrested and convicted on evidence security to become autocratic. Several recent 24
that was coerced through torture; the United judgments—removal of the treasury secretary 25
Nations Human Rights Commission validated for corruption, halting the sale of government 26
the petitioner’s claim of torture and found the land to private developers—supported the 27
Sri Lankan state responsible for violating the position of these groups against the president. 28
Optional Protocol.35 Critics saw the judgment But the government has ignored court orders 29
as further undermining public confidence— or only partly implemented them (e.g.reduced 30
particularly that of minorities—in the state’s the price of petrol but not to Rs 100 as 31
(including the judiciary’s) commitment to the mandated by the court). In January 2009, the 32
rule of law and human rights and, in effect, supreme court terminated the proceedings on 33
removing the country from the international the oil case saying that the government was no 34
human rights community.36 longer implementing court orders on the issue. 35
Another worrying development has contri- Executive sovereignty looks set to ring the 36
buted to further politicization of the judiciary. death knell for the rule of law and democracy 37
The Seventeenth Amendment, enacted in (particularly for minorities) in Sri Lanka. 38
2001, decreed that the president’s nominees to 39
the higher judiciary had to be ratified by a 40
constitutional council (CC), a body with six Notes 41
members appointed by parliamentary con- 42
sensus, and four ex-officio members.The CC, 1 Mahinda Rajapakse vs Chandra Fernando and Ors, 43
however, has been defunct since 2005 because S.C. (FR) Application No. 387/2005 (also 44
of the president’s refusal to fill the vacancies.37 known as the Helping Hambantota Case), 45
Instead, the president bypassed the CC and reported in Center for Policy Alternatives, War, 46
appointed several judges on the recom- Peace and Governance in Sri Lanka: Overview and 47
mendation of the chief justice.38 Ruling on Trends 2006, p. 20. 48
208
 E X E C U T I V E S OV E R E I G N T Y : T H E J U D I C I A RY I N S R I L A N K A
1 2 Jayadev Uyangoda, The State and the Process of
2 Devolution in Sri Lanka, in Sunil Bastian (ed.),
3 Devolution and Development in Sri Lanka
4 (Colombo: ICES, 1994); Neelan Tiruchelvam,
Federalism and Diversity in Sri Lanka, in
5
Yash Ghai (ed.), Autonomy and Ethnicity
6
(Cambridge: University Press, 2000), pp.
7 198–200.
8 3 Center for Policy Alternatives, p. 21.
9 4 Sri Lanka has a professional judiciary, a strong
10 executive (which is the directly elected head of
11 the state and government), parliamentary
12 sovereignty, and emergency/anti-terror laws to
13 combat secessionism.
14 5 Rohan Edrisinha, “Sri Lanka, Constitutions
15 without Constitutionalism—A Tale of Three
and a Half Constitutions,” unpublished paper.
16
6 Gary Jacobsohn and Shylashri Shankar,
17
“Constitutional Borrowing in South Asia:India,
18 Sri Lanka,and Secular Constitutional Identity,”
19 forthcoming.
20 7 Author’s interview with Rohan Edrisinha,
21 Professor of Law, University of Colombo,
22 March 2006.
23 8 Article 80(3) which reads as follows: “[N]o
24 court or tribunal shall inquire into, pronounce
25 upon or in any manner call in question the
26 validity of such Act on any ground whatsoever.”
But the court can vet executive and admini-
27
strative infringements. R. Coomaraswamy
28
(1994) Devolution, the Law, and Judicial
29 Construction in Bastian, Devolution and
30 Development and Sunil Bastian, Ideology and the
31 Constitution (Colombo: ICES, 1996), ch. v.
32 9 Ivor Jennings reportedly said in a 1961 BBC
33 interview that a comprehensive bill of rights
34 should have been included:“If I knew then, as
35 much about the problems of Ceylon, as I do
36 now, some of the provisions would have
37 been different”; Jayampathy Wickramaratne,
Fundamental Rights in Sri Lanka (Pannipitiya:
38
Stamford Lake, 2006), p. 18.
39
10 Quoted in Lal Wijenayake, Independence of the
40 Judiciary in Sri Lanka Since Independence
41 (Pannipitiya: Stamford Lake, 2005), p. 5.
42 11 Radhika Coomaraswamy, Sri Lanka:The Crisis
43 of Anglo-American Constitutional Traditions in a
44 Developing Society (New Delhi: Vikas, 1984).
45 12 Lakshman Marasinghe, “An Outline for a
46 Constitutional Settlement in Sri Lanka,”
47 Address at the International Center for Ethnic
48 Studies, Colombo, March 2003, p. 11.
13 G. L. Peiris,“Judicial Review of Legislative and
Administrative Action,” unpublished con-
ference paper, 28 August, 1988, pp. 437–56.
14 Articles 1 (the State), 2 (Unitary State), 3
(Sovereignty of the People), 6 (National Flag),
7 (National Anthem), 8 (National Day), 9
(Buddhism), 10 (Freedom of Thought,
Conscience, and Religion), and 11 (Freedom
from Torture) are entrenched.
15 In Re The Thirteenth Amendment to the
Constitution and Provincial Councils Bill, S. C.
7/87 (Spl) TO S.C. 48/87 (Spl), p. 329.
16 The 1978 Constitution adopted a three-tiered
system of courts: the supreme court, court of
appeal, and the high courts. All judges of the
higher judiciary (supreme court and court of
appeal) were appointed by the president and
served until his/her retirement at the age of 63
in the case of supreme court judges and age 63
in the case of court of appeals judges retired
at 63, unless removed by the president for
misbehavior, which had to be endorsed by a
majority of the parliament.
17 Cited from C. R. De Silva,“The Independence
of the Judiciary under the Second Republic
of Sri Lanka, 1978–88,” unpublished paper
presented at the Eleventh Conference of the
International Association of Historians of Asia,
1–5 August, 1988, Colombo, p. 491.
18 Special Presidential Commission of Inquiry,
Law No. 7, 1978. The parliament declared
a judgment of the Court of Appeals
(Bandarnaike vs Weeraratne (1981) 1 SLR 10) null
and void.
19 Daramitipola Ratnasara Thero vs P. Udugampola
(1983) 1 Sri LR 461; Vivienne Gunawardene
vs Hector Perera (1983) S.C. Application
20/83.
20 The most recent example was the appointment
of Justice Sarath Silva as the chief justice,
overlooking Justice M. D. H. Fernando. See
Wijenayake, pp. 16–22.
21 With a population of 19.4 million, approxi-
mately 70 percent of the population is Buddhist,
15 percent Hindu, 8 percent Christian (mainly
Roman Catholics), and 7 percent Muslim
(mainly Sunnis).
22 David Little,The Invention of Enmity (Washington,
DC:United States Institute of Peace Press,1993).
23 Jonathan Spencer (ed.), Sri Lanka: History
and the Roots of Conflict (London: Routledge,
1990).
209
S H Y L AS H R I S H A N K A R

24 Stanley J. Tambiah, Sri Lanka: Ethnic Fratricide 30 Radhika Coomaraswamy and Neelan Tiruchel- 1
and the Dismantling Of Democracy (Chicago, IL: vam, The Role of the Judiciary in Plural Societies 2
University of Chicago Press 1986). (Delhi: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987). 3
25 Neil de Votta, Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism, 31 Coomaraswamy and Tiruchelvam,The Role of the 4
Institutional Decay,and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka Judiciary; Rohan Edrisinha, “In Defence of
5
(Stanford, CA: University Press 2004). Judicial Review and Judicial Activism,” unpub-
6
26 Mudanayake vs Sivagnasunderam (53 NLR 25); lished paper presented at the Eleventh
Kodikam Pillai vs Mudanayake (54 NLR 433); Conference of the International Association of 7
Kodeswaran vs Attorney General (70 NLR 121). Historians of Asia, 1–5 August, 1988, Colombo, 8
27 Jayadeva Uyangoda, Questions of Sri Lanka’s p. 476. 9
Minority Rights,Minority Protection (Monograph, 32 Asanga Welikala, “The Menzingen Deter- 10
South Asia Series-2, International Center for mination and the Supreme Court—A Liberal 11
Ethnic Studies, Colombo: Unie Arts 2001), p. Critique,” Monograph, Center for Policy 12
57. Alternatives, p. 10. 13
28 Asanga Welikala,“Towards Two Nations in One 33 In Re The Thirteenth Amendment to the 14
State,” unpublished conference paper, EURO Constitution and Provincial Councils Bill, 15
Regions Summer University of the Institute p. 377.
16
of Federalism, University of Fribourg, 34 EFL vs UDA FR 47/2004.
17
Switzerland, 21 September, 2002. 35 Sinharasa vs Sri Lanka, Case No. 1033/2004.
29 Uyangoda, Questions of Sri Lanka’s Minority 36 War, Peace and Governnance in Sri Lanka, p. 21. 18
Rights, points out that despite a clear victory in 37 In June 2006 the Court of Appeals rejected the 19
the Northern and Eastern provinces for a Tamil petition by two citizens in J. Dandaniya and 20
party fighting the 1977 elections on the idea of Edirimuni Samith de Silva v Sri Lanka, C.A. 21
achieving separate statehood for Tamils, the Appeal 66/2006. 22
new Sinhalese UNP government adopted a 38 For a critique of the chief justice’s actions, see 23
constitution reiterating all features of unitarism http://www.alrc.net/doc/mainfile.php/alrc_ 24
and centralization. statements/418/. 25
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6 Politics of language in India
7
8
9
10 E. Annamalai
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19 Framework behavior in public domains, covering the
20 historical period of colonial formation and its
21 Throughout its history, the Indian sub- consolidation, as well as the transition to
22 continent has been a place for many languages independence and social transformation in the
23 that are historically unrelated, but have new nation.The constant amidst change is the
24 interacted in geographical space.The political maintenance of some social, economic, and
25 relationships among them did not remain political relationships among languages. But
26 constant, but the shaping of their inter- changes in language policies are continually
27 relationships through policies formulated and redefining these relationships. The continu-
28 implemented by rulers is a phenomenon of the ously contested relationship of English with
29 modern period beginning with colonial rule. other languages,concerning its role in political
30 The recent history of the politics of language control and socioeconomic transformation
31 has been marked by changes in language through the phases of its emergence, contain-
32 policy, but with some continuity across the ment, and reemergence in the Indian political
33 colonial and postcolonial periods as well as scene, provides a vantage point to survey also
34 within each period.The factors that motivate the relationship among all the languages of the
35 policy changes are multiple, encompassing country.
36 both the goals of government and percep- The politics of language policy open a
37 tions of people concerning their interests, window to an understanding of the nature of
38 which include economic opportunities, social the Indian nation and its differences from
39 advancement, and cultural security. Language neighboring countries, whose national integ-
40 policies concern both the choice of languages rity was broken or is threatened on the issue of
41 that will be used in public domains, most language dominance. Pakistan split into two
42 importantly in government and education, by and Sri Lanka has endured violent conflict over
43 the state, and in private domains such as kin the division of the country,arising in both cases
44 networks, recreational activities, and cultural from issues of language dominance. Guha1
45 practices, including religious practices by the characterizes India in relation to its linguistic
46 people. A third domain, which overlaps the diversity, among other aspects of diversity, as
47 public and the private, is the market. This an “unnatural nation.”The way language con-
48 chapter is about language policy and language flicts, arising from the contested relationship

213
E. AN NAMALAI

among languages in India—which is a country power by the rulers and mobilization for 1
of linguistic minorities in which even an collective action by the ruled. The task of 2
amalgamated community of Hindi speakers choosing a language for administration,and by 3
make up less than half the population2—have extension for education, added a premium to 4
been resolved through policy decisions has demarcating languages by differentiating 5
been an important factor in sustaining the names. It created a need for standardizing 6
integrity of this unnatural nation. It is un- languages, which culminated in a process of 7
natural from the classical European criterion differentiating languages and distancing 8
of “one nation, one culture, one language,” languages used in formal domains from the 9
but is natural with respect to the traditional, languages of everyday speech. 10
historical existence of India as a country. The conflict arising out of the diffe- 11
India’s linguistic diversity has not blocked its rentiation of khari boli, a widely used speech 12
aspirations towards nationhood. form for communicating in the bazaar and in 13
the army, into Hindi and Urdu and associating 14
them with two religions, Hinduism and Islam, 15
Language differentiation and is a prime example of the political use of 16
norm building language categorization.4 The policies of the 17
colonial government and the actions of 18
The need of the colonists to equip themselves individual officers concerning the choice of 19
with knowledge of the country under their language for local use in public domains such 20
rule and the need to generate consent of the as courts of law were intended to support one 21
ruled for its legitimacy made it necessary for side or the other in the Hindi–Urdu contro- 22
the colonial government to take a direct, poli- versy, depending on government’s political 23
tical interest in the languages of the sub- exigencies at the time. 24
continent.3 This political interest manifested Contrariwise,erasure of language boundaries 25
itself not only in learning the languages, but in order to create an overarching language,build 26
also in constructing knowledge about them by a political force around it, and form a political 27
classifying them according to their historical interest group based on language is exemplified 28
relations and categorizing some as languages, by the projection of Hindi as the putative 29
others as dialects subordinate to the principal national language of the country.This political 30
languages. This knowledge was required in process was in turn aided by caste and religious 31
order to decide which among them would be calculations.5 32
used as prescribed languages in government Differentiating languages was essential for 33
and education.The analytical task involved was curriculum development and textbook pro- 34
identifying and naming languages and defining duction when they came to be controlled and 35
boundaries among them. The process of administered centrally in the colonial period. 36
boundary making worked to change the The differentiation began in the language 37
perception of languages among the peoples textbooks prepared for training colonial 38
of India from that of a mosaic with fluid rela- officers in the East India Company’s trading 39
tions to that of discrete entities with opaque posts in Calcutta and Madras and in the 40
boundaries. This opened the way as well making of a canon of literary texts for language 41
towards a coupling of languages with other learning. These activities formalized the 42
sociocultural entities, including religion. separation between languages, for example, 43
Language categorization by external actors, between Hindi and Urdu; they also involved 44
including colonial administrators,missionaries, decisions with regard to literary disputes such 45
and scholars, paved the way for language as what constituted the earliest Bengali literary 46
identification and grouping to be manipulated text,which could also be claimed to have been 47
for political uses, including the exercise of actually written in Oriya or Maithili, and so 48
214

1 on. The dialect or language chosen as the
2 language of textbooks and classrooms became
3 the legitimate form of that language.Thus, it
4 was the particular variety of a tribal language
5 used by Christian missionaries to translate the
6 Bible that then became the language of the
7 tribe.All these factors enabled the emergence
8 of a political consciousness of language distinct
9 from cultural consciousness.This development
10 of building political consciousness around
11 language became manifest later in the post-
12 colonial period in political agitations for
13 redrawing the administrative boundaries of
14 states to conform to new language boundaries.
15
16
17 Identity by mother tongue
18
19 A by-product of the political consciousness of
20 language is the concept of mother tongue
21 transplanted from its European origin in the
22 age of reformation. This concept gave a new
23 meaning to the conventional characterization
24 of their speech by ethnic communities as “our
25 speech,” opposing it to “their speech.” This
26 popular distinction denoted different ways of
27 speaking. The concept of mother tongue—
28 matru bhasha or thaay mozhi—is not just a shift
29 of boli (colloquial speech, as in khari boli) to
30 bhasha (formal language, as in Hindi bhasha),
31 but also an introduction of a powerful sym-
32 bolism to characterize one’s language.It shifted
33 the opposition between any two languages to
34 that of mother tongue versus other tongue. In
35 the regions other than northern India, bhasha
36 has been long in the consciousness of speakers,
37 but it was a cultural consciousness rather than
38 a political one. This is true even in southern
39 India, where languages have a longer literary
40 tradition.6 Mother tongue came to denote the
41 person claiming it as a different being culturally
42 and politically.This symbolism became a con-
43 venient political tool to be used for inclusive or
44 exclusive purposes to realize particular political
45 goals. Many of the political debates as well as
46 political conflicts in the colonial and post-
47 colonial periods were framed around this way
48 of conceptualizing one’s language.
P O L I T I C S O F L A N G UAG E I N I N D I A
Language, characterized as mother tongue,
with marked boundaries, became another
group characteristic to define and categorize
people along with others like caste, religion
and ethnicity and to create new political
formations. Beginning in 1917, with the
formation of the Andhra Provincial Congress
Committee to represent the Telugu region,the
regional units of the Congress party were
organized according to linguistic region.7 This
was done when the administrative units of the
colonial government or the principalities were
not coterminous with linguistic regions.
Language may provide an overarching
group identity, although it may not supersede
other characteristics for group formation such
as religion when it serves some political
purpose, as in the cases of Urdu (for Muslims)
and Punjabi (for Sikhs).Alternatively,language
unity may be undermined by caste differences,
as in the case of Maithili.8 The political potency
of language as a marker of group identity
multiplies when it is coupled with another
characteristic like religion. Such a coupling,
however, has not been witnessed in many
states, notably Tamil Nadu and Kerala, where
linguistic identity covers more than one
religion and where castes do not align with
different languages. Decennial variation in
mother tongue figures recorded in censuses
does not fluctuate significantly in such states,
in contrast to others where political identi-
fications based on religion, for example, have
led millions of people to adopt a different name
for their language or even to deny their own
language identity. At the same time, mother
tongue as a sign of social identity can be
politically negotiable. For example, the poli-
tical behavior of people with regard to their
declared mother tongue may not match their
actual linguistic behavior with regard to its use
at home or their choice with regard to medium
of instruction.
215
E. AN NAMALAI

Ascendancy of English and the positions in the government, and the idea that 1
social divide the class of people with leisure and a tradition 2
of learning are best equipped for intellectual 3
Colonial intervention in language identifi- pursuits.9 One result of this policy was that 4
cation and choice heightened the political students from lower castes were largely 5
consciousness of language in ways briefly excluded from English education.They were 6
described already. It also changed the nature of attracted by the missionaries to their schools 7
cultural, social, political, and economic with the hope of proselytizing them. This 8
relations among languages in the multilingual fostered the public idea that English education, 9
Indian constellation. The ascendancy of the where English is the medium,is for those in the 10
English language, which started with the upper echelons of the society and vernacular 11
official policy of the colonial government, education, where English is only a subject, is 12
formulated in 1835, to support English as the for those at lower echelons. English thus 13
language of education, reworked the rela- played,through differential access,a crucial role 14
tionship among languages.English replaced the in the reproduction of social inequality 15
classical languages, Sanskrit and Arabic, as the through education.This turned into a political 16
source and means of acquiring knowledge. problem in the colonial period, which was 17
With it, the nature of knowledge also changed more acute in western and southern India, 18
to conform to what the colonial administrators engendering demands from the excluded 19
and educationists called useful knowledge, lower castes for access to English, expressed 20
which was meant to be the knowledge of through petitions, protests and formation of 21
European thought,science,and morals.English political parties.This issue of differential access 22
also relegated the vernaculars in education to to English education remains a political 23
a secondary role as carriers, through transla- problem in postcolonial India. 24
tion, of this useful knowledge to the masses, English education took early roots in the 25
while these vernaculars continued to be presidency provinces of Bombay, Madras, and 26
repositories of their past literature for local Bengal,which were under the direct control of 27
consumption.Vernaculars were also a conduit the colonial government.The traditional elites 28
for Christian theology to reach the masses living in the presidencies, by virtue of their 29
through the activities of Christian priests and ritual high status and land ownership granted 30
pastors from Europe inside and outside to them for their ritual services to the ruling 31
missionary schools. classes, transformed themselves into new elites 32
The government schools, although through their access to the new temporal 33
notionally open to everyone, in fact provided power, status, and wealth that English edu- 34
education through the medium of English cation gave them.The elite status traditionally 35
mostly to students from upper castes. The sanctioned by knowledge of Sanskrit was 36
main contributor to this was the govern- augmented by a new sanction, namely, know- 37
ment’s education policy, based on what was ledge of English. Castes that were not ritually 38
known as the filtration theory, to provide at the top, but provided administrative service 39
English education to a few,who,in turn,would to the pre-colonial governments, also adapted 40
transfer (filter down) European knowledge to themselves to the needs of the colonial govern- 41
the masses through the vernaculars. The ment.The middle level castes that owned lands 42
evolution of this policy was shaped by the huge and traditional industrial production, such as 43
anticipated expenses in providing universal textiles, were behind in English education and 44
English education, shortage of teachers to the tillers and the low service castes were 45
provide this education, fear of social unrest largely left out of it.The aspirations for upward 46
from the frustration of a large number of mobility that were curtailed as a consequence 47
English-educated youth not finding gainful of the regionally and socially differentiated 48
216

1 access to English education, and hence to new
2 economic opportunities,led to political action
3 by the excluded people in the colonial period.
4 But the issues were far from resolved and
5 were carried over to the governments formed
6 after independence. Political conflicts in
7 independent India, arising out of regional
8 differences in material progress created by the
9 colonial economy, were fought in the name of
10 language; much of it was framed in terms of
11 “for or against English.” The social differences
12 in material progress have been echoed in the
13 politics of affirmative action, in demands for
14 reservation of seats in education and jobs for
15 scheduled and backward castes in independent
16 India. Language, however, figures in this
17 conflict of social equalization only secondarily,
18 and only recently in relation to the teaching of
19 English.10
20
21
22 Search for a language as a
23 national symbol
24
25 It has been claimed that acquisition of English
26 by the new middle class helped communi-
27 cation across linguistic regions within this class,
28 and thereby organization of the opposition to
29 colonial rule and the fostering of nationalism.11
30 However, English did not fill the need to
31 communicate with the masses and mobilize
32 them for political action against the British. It
33 was the regional languages that were used for
34 these purposes by political leaders in the
35 respective regions—although not so much use
36 was made of the minority languages in these
37 regions. Every national movement for
38 independence uses symbols by which people
39 identify themselves to represent the nation and
40 its elevation from the status of a colony. Under
41 Gandhi’s leadership, khadi (homespun cloth)
42 was one such symbol.With regard to language,
43 Gandhi sought to elevate Hindustani (which
44 he saw as an amalgam of Hindi and Urdu) to
45 such a national symbol.12 However,this choice
46 itself became a subject of political debate,
47 particularly concerning its relationship to the
48 Hindi and Urdu languages. Many in the
P O L I T I C S O F L A N G UAG E I N I N D I A
independence movement identified Hindi as
the national language and promoted learning
of Hindi as an expression of nationalism.This
was not, however, embraced by all com-
munities defined by religion or language.
Ambivalence among the people concerning
the desirability of having one language to
symbolize the nation13 and to develop citizen
allegiance to that language,was reflected in the
policy debates in the constituent assembly14
and in the later political agitations concerning
the choice of the official language of the
government of the new nation.
Postcolonial questions of
language
Two questions relating to language that the
nation faced on the eve of its independence
concerned the language of government and of
education. The first is a question of admini-
stration and the second of development.A third
question is dependent on these two. It con-
cerns communication among people across the
country to facilitate participation in the
government both in its administrative tasks and
developmental programs as well as to nurture
a sense of sharing a language common to all.
With regard to the search for answers to all
three questions,policies were made,contested,
and modified. Practice on the ground with
regard to actual use of languages was guided
by the policies at some levels and in some ways
and was at variance with policies at other levels
and in other ways. There is thus tangible
divergence between policy and practice in the
60 years after independence.The story of the
politics that has produced and continued this
divergence is essentially the story of the politics
of language in India.
Shift in multilingualism
One policy, however, where there is no
divergence, is that of maintaining the multi-
lingual and multicultural fabric of India. The
kind of nationalism built on one language and
217
E. AN NAMALAI

one culture has not been accepted by the whose members would be drawn from the 1
majority of people. The political parties that communities of languages in the list, to review 2
promote this ideology of a nation have not the acceptance and performance of Hindi as 3
been able to make it a legitimate policy and the official language of the union.The list, at 4
the people who subscribe to it at an ideational the time of writing the constitution, had 14 5
level practice multilingualism in real life.While languages, representing different historical, 6
there is no divergence from this policy of linguistic and cultural traditions in the regions 7
defining the nation as multilingual in practice, of India. The purpose of listing languages in 8
there has been a difference in the nature of the constitution changed, in the political 9
multilingualism as practiced in postcolonial perception of it at the ground level, soon after 10
India. The difference is in the public roles its adoption in 1950.The list was perceived at 11
assigned to languages and, consequently, in the the popular level to be granting political 12
differential access of promoters of languages to recognition and entitlement to some languages 13
the resources and patronage of the state.This over others,thereby placing those languages in 14
influences the composition of the linguistic a privileged position to receive a greater share 15
repertoire of people. This composition ulti- of the patronage and resources of the state for 16
mately stems from the larger political and their development and to acquire a political 17
economic interests of the people. Education status superior to that of other languages. At 18
plays a major role in bringing in this difference the bureaucratic level, the list was viewed as 19
in the linguistic repertoire. The shift in providing a “natural” criterion for federal 20
multilingualism since Independence is towards decisions concerning which languages, other 21
adding non-local languages, like English than the two federal official languages, would 22
and Hindi, to the repertoire of speakers. The be added to meet the language demands on the 23
premium on such non-local languages is federal government.These demands concerned 24
their literate variety taught in schools. This the languages that would be available for 25
shift cuts across communities, with the result candidates for civil service examinations,those 26
that the new multilingualism becomes less that could be taught as a third language in 27
community-based and more class-based.Local schools under the policy dubbed as three 28
variations in multilingualism that reflect local language formula,the languages that would be 29
conditions and needs get subordinated to the eligible to receive grants from the federal 30
national pattern. government earmarked for the development 31
of modern Indian languages, and so forth.15 32
Such uses of the list as a criterion for inclusion 33
Multilingualism as the national
and exclusion of languages to benefit from 34
symbol
major government decisions strengthened 35
Taking up first the third question mentioned people’s perceptions of the list as a mechanism 36
earlier (communication among people across for status elevation and material rewards for 37
the country),there is no officially mandated or these languages. The languages included 38
constitutionally recognized national language in the list are popularly believed—without any 39
of India.There is, however, a set of languages constitutional sanction for such belief—to be 40
listed in the constitution, which are called the national languages. Political demands to 41
scheduled languages, as they are placed in a include new languages in the eighth schedule 42
schedule (numbered eighth) annexed to the gradually increased in number and intensity. 43
constitution.The specified purposes of the list The first agitation for inclusion was in 1967 44
were to shape and monitor the development of on behalf of Sindhi, which did not have a 45
Hindi as a pan-Indian language, drawing from contiguous region of its own; the last four, 46
the resources of the languages in the list,and to added in 2004,are Dogri,Maithili,Santhali and 47
constitute an official language commission, Bodo, of which the second one is subsumed 48
218

1 under Hindi as one of its 48 “mother tongues”
2 or “dialects”16 and denied an independent
3 language status in the census, and the last two
4 of which are tribal languages.The total number
5 of languages in the list now stands at 22.
6 The criterion for inclusion in the list is now
7 political pressure by means permitted in a
8 democratic polity,including bartering political
9 support in elections, bargaining in coalition
10 politics, and street demonstrations.
11
12
13 Language of wider
14 communication
15
16 The other part of the third question concerns
17 lingua franca. It is generally coterminous with
18 the official language of a country, but not
19 always. There are two languages of wider
20 communication across linguistic regions in
21 India, viz., English and Hindi, which run
22 parallel along class lines.English is preferred by
23 the educated middle and upper class in
24 interactions among themselves. Hindi is used
25 by the working classes for communication
26 among themselves in situations such as labor
27 migration to another linguistic region, travel
28 to pilgrim centers, and with the middle and
29 upper classes from different language back-
30 grounds. English is the preferred language for
31 air travelers to speak with stewardesses,whereas
32 Hindi is the necessary one for train travelers to
33 speak with vendors.The lingua franca Hindi is
34 different from the official language Hindi in
35 words and grammatical structures, but is closer
36 to Hindustani in both respects. The English
37 used by rural college graduates who travel to
38 other regions or meet with people from other
39 regions is likewise different from official
40 English; it is also different from the pidgin
41 variety of English used by people, who may be
42 high school graduates or dropouts, for
43 example, tourist and pilgrim guides, whose
44 clients do not know any Hindi.
45 Hindi as a lingua franca is fostered and
46 transmitted through popular cultural media,
47 particularly feature films, rather than by any
48 federal government effort, which is limited to
P O L I T I C S O F L A N G UAG E I N I N D I A
supporting teaching of Hindi as a second
language in the voluntary sector.The govern-
ment’s Hindi teaching programs serve the
purposes mainly of increasing acceptance of,
access to, and use of the official language,
Hindi. The federal government’s actions in
displaying Hindi on signboards in areas of
public use such as train stations, milestones on
national highways, post offices, and national
banks serve the dual function of using the
official languages of the Union in federal
facilities and of using a common language all
over the county for people on the move across
regions.These actions have been resisted on the
political ground that the regional languages
must have a status on par with Hindi in the
regions or on the grounds that English and the
regional language will suffice for the intended
purpose, as in Tamil Nadu, where Hindi in
name boards was erased by political parties
subscribing to Dravidian ideology. The final
political solution was to have sign boards in
three languages in federal establishments, viz.,
English, regional language, and Hindi in that
order. There have been erasure campaigns in
some states, like Tamil Nadu and Karnataka, to
remove English or demote it to a secondary
place in commercial sign boards in bazaars.
These are by and large fringe movements
politically. The alphabet characters (and
numbers) used in the registration plates of
motorized vehicles are roman (and inter-
national), not in devanagari characters (and
numbers). Some state governments allow the
use of the script of the state official language for
the characters (and numbers), but the
enthusiasts who go for this option are a small
minority.In the public transport systems run by
state governments, destination signs on buses
are posted in their official language only,and in
English also in buses running to other states. It
is clear that the contestation for status as a
lingua franca is between Hindi and the regional
language in the public sector in states, while
English remains the unquestioned common
language of choice. It is also clear that the
question of lingua franca becomes salient
politically when the issue is symbolic,as in sign
219
E. AN NAMALAI

boards, but it ceases to be so when it concerns represented the colonial government and not 1
actual practice, as in travels or recreation of the masses of the new nation.The real contest 2
people. was between Hindustani,visualized by Gandhi 3
Acceptance and use of Hindi has increased as a language of the common people and as a 4
since independence in the private domain of bridge between the people of two religions, 5
entertainment, specifically films and tele- Hinduism and Islam, in northern India, and 6
vision. The language used in films is actually Hindi, visualized as the largest regional 7
Hindustani, not the official language, Hindi. language and as a bridge to the ancient past 8
Hindi films and television programs,which are symbolized by Sanskrit.These two languages, 9
mostly clips from films, are watched in all or two varieties of a language, differ more 10
linguistic regions. Music stores carry discs of ideologically than grammatically. They were 11
Hindi light music in all regions,but newspaper fostered in the anti-colonial movement with 12
and magazine stands carry minimal Hindi different political ideologies and goals and had 13
materials.The pop music programs in popular developed different political bases. Political 14
religious and other festivals in street corners mobilization for Hindi involved the political 15
have a component of Hindi songs along with incorporation of many geographically con- 16
the songs of the regional language and of the tiguous, but historically different, mother 17
larger minority languages in the state.This is, tongues into a language called Hindi and 18
however, more of an urban phenomenon. presumed the willingness of the people to 19
Learning basic Hindi in schools eliminates any surrender their distinct linguistic identities. 20
inhibition in learning it as a language, but the Political mobilization for Hindustani envi- 21
real understanding of the language comes from sioned an India united through a compos- 22
hearing it spoken in the entertainment media. ite culture, by which was meant a culture 23
Such acceptance of Hindi, however, does not incorporating ways of life in two religions, 24
extend to getting information from the media Hinduism and Islam.Hindi in devanagari script 25
or reading literature. It is more common for finally won the vote in the Congress Party and 26
the educated non-Hindi speakers to read then in the constituent assembly. 27
English fiction or watch English news in The other part of the first question about 28
addition to those in the regional language. the official language of the Indian Union 29
Among the second languages, Hindi is favored concerned the timing for the replacement of 30
in oral pop culture and English in literate the old official language, English, by the new 31
culture. official language, Hindi. After acrimonious 32
debate concerning the time of the switch, it 33
was decided that it would take place in 15 years 34
Language of the Federal after the constitution was adopted, which 35
Government would have been the year 1965.18 Until that 36
period, Hindi and English would be the two 37
The first question mentioned earlier con- official languages of the Union. The distri- 38
cerning the language of government in its bution of domains of use in the three branches 39
three wings of administration, judiciary, and of the government between the two languages 40
legislature is the most contentious one and the levels in each domain were spelled 41
politically.This was one of the hotly debated out with the proviso that the use of Hindi 42
questions in the constituent assembly17 and will progressively expand to the domains and 43
required political compromises for a solution. levels assigned to English.19 Hindi, during this 44
With regard to the central government, the period of transition, was to equip itself with 45
first part of the question concerned the choice technical terms and translations that would 46
of language. For ideological and senti- make it functional in running the business of 47
mental reasons, it could not be English, which government. 48
220
 P O L I T I C S O F L A N G UAG E I N I N D I A

1 The third part of the same question was Hindi or English were chosen as official
2 how to make Hindi acceptable to all the languages in non-Hindi-speaking states that
3 regions of the country. To reframe this ques- did not have an alternative majority language.
4 tion, it became one of concern about how to The choice between the two was motivated by
5 elevate Hindi from a language of a region, a political perception about the state’s rela-
6 however large, to a language of the national tionship with the central government or the
7 government. Hindi had a disadvantage com- nation defined in terms of relative political
8 pared to the languages of many regions in autonomy and economic advantage from the
9 lacking a long literary tradition and previous central government.
10 use in royal courts.This disadvantage had to be
11 made up to fortify its numerical strength.The
12 solution hit upon,as mentioned earlier,was the States based on language
13 creation of a list of languages of major regions
14 and literary traditions from which Hindi was to Elevation of the political status of regional
15 draw nourishment. This solution took on a languages to official languages goes along with
16 different purpose as those languages became the claim that speakers of the language in
17 competitors20 to Hindi for official benefits question are predominant in one political
18 from the federal government, which culmi- territory under one government. Status eleva-
19 nated in the amended Official Language of the tion and territorial consolidation feed each
20 Union Act, 1967 of organization of the party other. This aspect of language-territory
21 itself by linguistic units and previous party identification led to a major shift in the poli-
22 resolutions in favor of that principle for tical organization of the states in the union,
23 reorganizing the internal boundaries of the erasing the earlier one that reflected the
24 country as well.21 colonial history of annexation of territories
25 and divisions of them for administrative
26 convenience.The first state carved out of the
27 Languages of the State former Madras presidency and the Nizam’s
28 Governments state of Hyderabad on the basis of this
29 language-territory identification was Andhra
30 Regarding the official languages of the states, Pradesh.The language was Telugu.The creation
31 which were successors to the British presi- of Andhra Pradesh was conceded in 1956 after
32 dencies and native states, the constitution a violent agitation following the death of a
33 provided that the then existing state legislatures regional congress leader and a disciple of
34 could choose a language spoken in the state or Gandhi in 1952, who had gone on a fast unto
35 Hindi.Most states chose the majority language death to achieve this demand.22 The govern-
36 of their state.There were a few exceptions. For ment of independent India put on hold the
37 example, Jammu and Kashmir chose the formation of linguistic states in the aftermath
38 language associated with the majority religion, of partition of the country on the basis of
39 Urdu; Nagaland, when separated from Assam religion in spite of the Congress Party’s
40 to become a new state (much later, in 1963), principle.After the creation of Andhra Pradesh,
41 chose a language ordinarily not considered a many other linguistic states followed, usually
42 native language, namely, English. Himachal after agitations, often violent, based on the
43 Pradesh, where Hindi is not the majority principle of “one state,one language”(not one
44 language, nevertheless chose Hindi when it language, one state in the case of Hindi, which
45 became a state later on,in 1971.The reasons for was the official language of many states with
46 the different choices of official language in the Hindi as the majority language, and Bengali
47 states related to their different political orienta- with two states (West Bengal and Tripura) in
48 tions as well as their language demography. which it was the majority language).23 With
221
E. AN NAMALAI

the formation of Haryana, carved out of the new state. The campaigns were for con- 1
Punjab in 1966, language was combined with solidation of language groups with a majority in 2
religion in drawing the boundaries between one state, but having a minority status in 3
the two states. In the case of the formation neighboring states, thus leading to demands to 4
of new states carved out of Assam, language alter the borders between states in order not to 5
became secondary to ethnicity in defining leave the majority language speakers of the new 6
those states.Thus, the principle of establishing states as minorities in neighboring states. 7
states based on linguistic majority expanded in Nevertheless, such consolidation also has not 8
course of time to include establishment of new solved the problems of a majority language 9
states based on the identity of religion or community when majority language speakers 10
ethnicity of minorities with distinct languages in one state migrate to another state in search of 11
of their own. However, the new ethnically work and become a linguistic minority there. 12
defined states, such as Nagaland, either do not They lobby the government of their “home 13
have a majority language at all or, as in the case state”from which they migrated for educational 14
of Meghalaya (created in 1972), have a bare opportunities in their state of residence, espe- 15
language majority. cially in professional education for their 16
Linguistic states ended up becoming children, and make other demands such as for 17
subnations identified with a language, which waiver of residency conditions for allotment of 18
became the politically dominant language of house sites by municipal corporations. At the 19
the state. Those linguistic groups that con- same time, in some states, such as Karnataka, an 20
tested the establishment of Hindi as the only opposite form of political pressure has arisen to 21
dominant language in the union sought to make the claim that only the “sons of the soil,” 22
promote the majority language of their states that is, those who have resided in the state for 23
as the dominant language within them.In spite generations, were entitled to full rights and 24
of this principle of single-language dominance, privileges in the linguistic states.In other words, 25
every linguistic state in fact is multilingual, there are contradictory claims by those demand- 26
containing minority languages of different ing rights in a state based on residency in it 27
demographic strengths. Depending on their rather than language to ward off new linguistic 28
political strength, some minority languages communities that migrated into it in recent 29
have been given the status of a second official times from having rights to privileges in the 30
language of the state, as, for example, Urdu in state, and those demanding rights to privileges 31
Uttar Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh, Bodo in based on their natal affiliation to the dominant 32
Assam, or Kok Borok in Tripura.They are not language community in the state they migrated 33
called associate official languages, as in the case from rather than residency. A mother tongue 34
of English in the union, and often their status speaker of Kannada living in Maharashtra, to 35
as second official language is restricted to give an example, can claim a seat under the 36
particular districts in the state and to particular distributive control of the government in a pro- 37
domains of government. fessional college in Karnataka,but not a speaker 38
of Hindi from Rajasthan who migrated to 39
Karnataka in his generation and is living there. 40
Emergence of dominant regional The emergence of linguistic states with 41
languages dominant languages effectively eliminated 42
Hindi as an option for official language in those 43
The process of creating linguistic states also states.This option,provided in the constitution, 44
created boundary problems.Political campaigns was not even debated in any public forum in 45
were launched, some of which turned violent, non-Hindi states.The debate was only about 46
to claim adjacent areas or to claim a preeminent the timeframe for the transition from English 47
cosmopolitan city in the region as the capital of as the official language to the dominant 48
222

1 language(s).Nevertheless,as mentioned earlier,
2 the number of states in which Hindi was
3 declared the official language increased when
4 some newly created states with no majority
5 language chose Hindi, or when a Hindi
6 majority state was bifurcated, as in the cases of
7 Uttaranchal, Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand.
8 Hindi is now (in 2008) the official language of
9 nine states, as well as of the capital territory of
10 Delhi. Out of the 28 states of India, English
11 was chosen by only one state, Nagaland,
12 although it continues to be used—along with
13 the official language of the state—for some
14 intrastate and all interstate official purposes in
15 many states. In some tribal states in north-
16 eastern India, such as Arunachal Pradesh,
17 whose legislature has not yet passed a bill
18 establishing an official language, English
19 remains the de facto official language.
20
21
22 Challenge to the dominance of
23 Hindi
24
25 During the constitutionally mandated 15 years
26 allowed for the switchover to Hindi, official
27 use of Hindi in the central government
28 gradually increased, despite political protests
29 from southern and eastern states, particularly
30 Tamil Nadu, whenever an increase in use was
31 perceived to involve imposition of Hindi.Tamil
32 Nadu (formerly part of the former Madras
33 province), has had a long history of opposition
34 since the colonial period towards giving Hindi
35 any special status; such opposition has for long
36 been an important part of the platform of the
37 various political parties that have been
38 associated with the Dravidian movement.24
39 The first political agitation against Hindi
40 occurred in 1938 against the decision of the
41 Congress government of Madras presidency to
42 make Hindi a compulsory subject in high
43 schools.C.Rajagopalachari,the chief minister,
44 implemented the national policy of his party.
45 Congress had come to power winning the first
46 election in 1937 after the dual government run
47 together by the British and some Indian
48 political leaders (called dyarchy) ended with
P O L I T I C S O F L A N G UAG E I N I N D I A
the Government of India Act of 1935. The
Justice Party, which was in the government
during dyarchy, had political reasons to strike
against the new government. The 1938 anti-
Hindi agitation (the first in Tamil Nadu) ended
in loss of two lives from hardships in imprison-
ment and withdrawal of the order of com-
pulsory Hindi by the government.
Opposition to Hindi was part of a political
strategy to safeguard the interests of southern
India against the feared dominant position of
the numerically larger Hindi-speakers in
northern India, on the one hand, and of the
upper caste,southern Brahmans,who occupied
leadership positions in the Congress party and
were expected to fortify their advantage in
mastery of English with the learning of Hindi
as well,on the other.Organized political action
against Hindi in the form of conferences,
demonstrations, and agitations continued
intermittently for the next three decades from
the first agitation in 1938 whenever the
provincial government reintroduced Hindi in
the school curriculum or the central govern-
ment issued an order for its employees to learn
Hindi or to write sign boards in Hindi in its
departments in the province or to give more
time to Hindi programs in state-controlled
television, and such other actions perceived as
involving imposition of Hindi on unwilling
Tamils.25 Anti-Hindi agitations peaked in 1963
when an Official Language Act was being
framed to carry out the constitutional pro-
vision to make Hindi the sole official language
of the Union effective in 1965.The agitation
continued through 1965 to 1967 when the
Official Language Act was amended (see
below).This drawn-out, widespread, student-
led anti-Hindi agitation propelled the Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) (an offshoot
political party of the Dravidian Movement) to
come to political power in 1967 in Madras.
The new DMK government removed
teaching of Hindi in school altogether,
establishing a policy of two-language
instruction in schools against the national
policy of three-language instruction known as
three language formula, which had been
223
E. AN NAMALAI

designed to accommodate a combination of of progress, from a language of economic 1

the official language of the linguistic state and deprivation of the rural masses to a language of 2
the two official languages of the country, one centrally planned development for all, from a 3
of which happens to be an international divisive language of the administration to a 4
language. unifying language of the constitution, from a 5
language of political inequality to a language of 6
ethnic neutrality. The new Official Language 7
Change in the official language Act also made the central government 8
policy responsible for the development of regional 9
languages in the states as languages of the 10
The amended Official Language Act of 1967 nation, not just of their regions alone. The 11
includes the assurance given by India’s first earlier policy position that the central govern- 12
prime minister,Jawaharlal Nehru in Parliament ment was responsible only for supporting 13
in 1963,in response to the sustained anti-Hindi development of its official language,Hindi,the 14
agitation in Tamil Nadu, while piloting the country’s classical language, Sanskrit, and the 15
Official Language Act of 1963, that English “stateless” languages, Urdu, and later Sindhi, 16
may continue to be an official language as long changed with the allocation of money in the 17
as the non-Hindi population of the country federal budget and the creation of institutions 18
wants it. With this act, a reversal in official for the development of regional languages. 19
language policy was set in motion, namely, Thus, the Official Language Act of 1967 was 20
continuation of English, which made the politically significant in two respects. First, 21
policy of official language bilingual, not along with the new meaning of the eighth 22
monolingual either with Hindi or with schedule of the constitution (see earlier), the 23
English.This act also wrested the final decision national status of the regional languages was 24
about Hindi becoming the only official enhanced. Second, the national role of English 25
language of the country from the Hindi- was restored in administration and made to be 26
speaking majority and entrusted it to the a crucial vehicle for economic development of 27
collective of non-Hindi-speaking minorities.26 the country. 28
By this time,opposition to Hindi had found 29
its place in the mainstream of politics in Tamil 30
Minority languages in states
Nadu in the sense that no regional political 31
party or unit of a national party in the state, The place of the official languages of states 32
including congress, could speak openly in having been asserted in the national political 33
support of Hindi.27 Another development was arena, a further issue within the states con- 34
the political realization that the battle of cerned the claims for recognition from 35
regional languages (the majority languages of minority language groups.Their demands were 36
the linguistic states) to contain the supremacy for equal access to employment opportunities 37
of Hindi has better chances of winning by in the public sector and educational oppor- 38
having English as the contestant against Hindi tunities in government institutions, as well as 39
rather than the regional languages them- assurances that native speakers of the majority 40
selves.28 This realization was shared by many language would not have any special advantage 41
states in the southern,eastern,and northeastern by virtue of their language. They sought to 42
parts of India besides Tamil Nadu.29 It became achieve these goals by limiting the dominance 43
possible because of the changed political of the majority language through opposition to 44
equations, including the rise of regional compulsory teaching of it in schools and to the 45
political parties in many states and the changed requirement that knowledge of the state 46
attitudes towards English from being a language be required prior to selection for 47
language of political oppression to a language government employment.Further,they sought 48
224

1 to provide a place for English in education as
2 medium of instruction on the basis of the
3 constitutional provision (art. 30) that grants
4 rights to minorities to establish and administer
5 their own educational institutions. These
6 institutions may choose not to teach the
7 majority language and instead choose any
8 other language, provided they do not receive
9 any financial aid from the state government.
10 They admit students from the majority
11 language community also, subject to stipula-
12 tions decreed by the Supreme Court, thus
13 reducing the stake of the majority language to
14 be the language learnt by everyone having
15 school education. Students speaking the
16 majority language could take this route to learn
17 another language, Sanskrit or French, for
18 example.This offers the possibility for students
19 to finish school education without becoming
20 literate in the official language of the state.The
21 minority educational institutions more often
22 follow the legal route, basing their claims on
23 constitutional grounds,than the political route
24 to preserve their rights to manage their edu-
25 cational institutions on their own terms.30
26 Nevertheless, the success of the migrated or
27 border linguistic minorities in a state (such
28 as the Kannada-speaking community in
29 Maharashtra) and the autochthonous minori-
30 ties of a state (such as Tulu- or Urdu-speaking
31 communities in Karnataka), depends on their
32 political strength and leverage in the state. As
33 at the level of the relations between the
34 nation and the states, English plays the role of
35 keeping the powerful in check at the level
36 of relations between the majority and minori-
37 ties within states.
38
39
Constitutional safeguard for
40
minority languages
41
42 According to the constitution, the states
43 have a responsibility with regard to the use of
44 minority languages in government schools,
45 including tribal languages, and in primary
46 education under certain conditions, parti-
47 cularly concerning the numerical strength of
48 students speaking those languages. Imple-
P O L I T I C S O F L A N G UAG E I N I N D I A
mentation of this provision,which does not fall
under fundamental rights of citizens granted
in the constitution (arts 350A, 350B), but is
under the obligations of the states, has been
cursory and fragmentary. The apathy and
indifference of states in the implementation of
this provision are described in the Report of the
Linguistic Minorities Commission, which is sub-
mitted to parliament every year.But it does not
lead to any governmental action when the
linguistic minorities are politically weak.The
political and bureaucratic reasoning for in-
action is that promotion of minority languages
in education, particularly the tribal languages
in non-tribal states, will hinder the political
process of integrating minorities with the
mainstream. This is a reasoning rejected by
these same politicians and bureaucrats when it
concerns regional languages and national
integration.That leaves the cause of minority
languages in education to be taken up by the
nonpolitical voluntary sector.This sector runs
teaching centers for children left out or
dropped out of school education, which often
focus on children of tribal language com-
munities and other poor linguistic minority
children. These centers supplement main-
stream education by running classes after
school, or they provide alternative education
that includes the teaching of tribal and other
poor minority languages and using them as
medium of instruction in the initial years
before they are switched to mainstream
education.
Language of education
The second question mentioned earlier, the
question of language in education, is closely
tied to the first question, the question of
language in government, because the purpose
of education policy was seen as building skills
and knowledge for the development of the
country. Skills include language skills. When
national development takes precedence over
personal development in education policy, the
choice of language is made by the state. India
225
E. AN NAMALAI

developed a political consensus in 1961,31 regard to the language of government, the 1

following deliberations with the chief mini- policy enshrined in the constitution with 2
sters of states, that every child completing ten regard to education provides for Hindi or any 3
years of school must learn three languages: Indian language of the state legislature’s choice. 4
the regional language, English, and Hindi in The policy decision of the states was to provide 5
the non-Hindi-speaking states, but another for the official language of the state to be the 6
modern Indian language, preferably a south medium of education as well. No state other 7
Indian language, for students in Hindi- than the states where Hindi is the official 8
speaking states.This policy sought to achieve language chose Hindi as medium of instruc- 9
three goals: the acquisition of skills to enable tion.There is thus consistency in the language 10
participation in the economics and politics of policy in government and in education in the 11
the nation, a perception of an integrated states and near uniformity in exercising the 12
nation through language learning, and equal choice of language provided in the con- 13
distribution of “language load” for students in stitution.33 14
all regions. Failure to include a place for the There is, however, one crucial difference in 15
mother tongue in the formula (constitutionally the language policy for government as opposed 16
mandated for teaching in primary schools, as to education with regard to replacement of 17
mentioned above) and the classical language English.There is no timeline for switchover for 18
(Sanskrit and others) in the policy has led the language of education as there was for 19
in practice either to adding a language or, switchover in official language.This,along with 20
more commonly, to substituting the minority other factors mentioned earlier, including the 21
mother tongue or a classical language in place change in perception about English, has 22
of one of the three languages, often the contributed to the widest divergence between 23
regional language.32 When it comes to imple- policy and practice and between policies in 24
mentation of this policy of language choice in relation to education. Absence of a time line 25
education, insofar as the Hindi states are results in differential implementation of the 26
concerned,there is no instrumental motivation policy in higher and lower levels of education. 27
for students to learn a third, modern Indian This, in turn, mars the cohesion in policy 28
language. The preferred choice in the Hindi leading to lack of unity between policy and 29
states has been Sanskrit.Tamil Nadu follows a practice. It is possible, for example, to attribute 30
two-language policy, as mentioned above. It is the reluctance in using the national and 31
clear that the national policy in regard to provincial official languages at higher levels of 32
language education may not articulate well administration in part to their non-use at higher 33
with state policies and with parental prefe- levels of education, which supply bureaucrats 34
rences in practice. Thus there is variation in who work at higher levels of government. It is 35
language choice across the country in actual possible also to explain partially the parental 36
practice.Variation, it must be noted, is in the preference for the medium of English in school 37
first language (which is by and large the official education by the failure to switch from English 38
language of the state) and in the third language medium in higher education. 39
(which is mostly the primary official language All governmental commissions on edu- 40
of the Union, viz., Hindi); it is almost non- cation hedge the time line for switching to 41
existent in the second language, viz., English indigenous languages with words like “as early 42
throughout the country. as practicable”34 when it comes to changing 43
the medium of instruction in higher edu- 44
cation. The National Policy on Education 45
Medium of instruction in colleges promulgated in 1976 says that “urgent steps 46
The greatest challenge to language policy should be taken” without specifying a time. 47
concerns medium of instruction. As with The reasons for hesitancy are two: the speed 48
226

1 with which English emerged after indepen-
2 dence as the language of academic disciplines,
3 particularly in science and technology, and the
4 time needed for Indian languages to equip
5 themselves with terms and translations for the
6 new task.35 The switchover time has remained
7 the catch-up time with English, which does
8 not close up. It is a fallacy that form precedes
9 use; the belief that words and materials must
10 be ready before the language can be used takes
11 precedence over the fact that the use of a
12 language in new domains creates words and
13 materials. Another language ideology that
14 informs policy is language purism,according to
15 which the new state-controlled uses of the
16 language must not borrow forms from another
17 language, Persian in the case of Hindi, Sanskrit
18 in the case of Tamil.This results in delay in use
19 in the class room induced by the ideological
20 debate,incomprehensibility of the new register
21 of the language for students, and control over
22 the materials going into the hands of language
23 specialists rather than subject specialists.With
24 the new knowledge-based, globally integrated
25 economy that puts a premium on English, the
26 policy of switchover of language medium in
27 higher education will remain merely politically
28 symbolic, not substantive. The symbolic
29 offering of an option to have an Indian-
30 language medium of education draws to these
31 courses mainly students who are poor,
32 scholastically and economically, which further
33 corrodes the credibility of policies for Indian
34 language change.
35
36
Reversal of medium in schools
37
38 During dyarchy (1919–35), Indian political
39 parties shared power in the colonial govern-
40 ments in the presidencies and had the education
41 portfolio under their charge.At their initiative,
42 Indian languages were introduced as an
43 alternative medium of instruction in govern-
44 ment schools from 1921. By 1937, when the
45 political arrangement with provincial auto-
46 nomy was in force and the Congress party
47 formed the government in Madras presidency,
48 51 percent of secondary schools offered an
P O L I T I C S O F L A N G UAG E I N I N D I A
Indian language as a medium of instruction.36
The switchover of the medium at the school
level became nearly universal after Indepen-
dence. Indian language medium schools at
present comprise 90 percent of all schools in
India.37 The switchover from English to an
Indian language as the medium of instruction,
however, has been partially reversed in the last
few decades.The prestige and power of English
as the medium of education at higher levels has
percolated down to lower levels of education.
The government’s policy concerning school
education remains that the official language of
the state must also be the medium of instruc-
tion in the schools.This policy is implemented
in government schools and those that receive
financial aid from the government.38 The
government’s policy of disallowing use of its
funds in English medium schools is a reversal of
the colonial government’s education policy
from 1835.The popular demand,however,is to
have English as the medium for various reasons,
including the desire for success in higher
education in English medium and in the world
of work where English dominates,as well as the
desire of first-generation learners to catch up
with others, who have had the benefit of
English through education over two or more
generations.The gap coincides with the divide
between forward and backward castes and
between working and middle classes.This takes
the medium of education issue from pedagogy
to politics. It becomes a matter of seeking
government funds for English medium edu-
cation, thus bringing about a reverse switch-
over from existing Indian language medium
education. This demand amounts to a return
to the colonial policy. This also amounts to
reversal of the stated policy of extending the
Indian-language medium available in schools
to universities to one of extending the English
medium from universities to schools.
Governments have changed their policies
concerning the teaching of English as a subject
by pushing downwards the starting year to the
primary stage from the post-primary stage and
in some states to the first year of education.
They accommodate the popular demand with
227
E. AN NAMALAI

regard to medium not by changing the policy, Empowering the oppressed 1

but by allowing manoeuverability in the policy with English 2
through such means as providing parallel 3
streams of medium in aided schools,or parallel The politics of preserving or promoting the 4
structures of education such as matriculation economic and political interests of various 5
schools in Tamil Nadu. The new structure groups was played out in the name of language 6
added to the existing structures of the State soon after independence until it changed to 7
Board of Education and the Central Board of one of promoting the interests of various 8
Education, which implement government designated castes in the second half of the 9
policy in education in Tamil Nadu,is the board period. But the English language continues to 10
of matriculation schools; the latter are in the play a role in the pursuit of political interests, 11
private sector and have freedom in imple- as it does in economic pursuits. Socially and 12
menting the policy, although they are under economically advanced groups try to hold on 13
the administrative (not financial) control of the to their advantages by holding on to English 14
state with regard to accreditation. In the name while the disadvantaged groups try to advance 15
of increasing access to education, private socially and economically by acquiring 16
schools are encouraged, which are not knowledge of English.The latter suspect that 17
governed by the policy of the government there is a conspiracy by the elites in control of 18
with regard to medium of education,and some government to keep them from mastering 19
of which are accredited by bodies outside the English through the government’s language 20
country.These schools charge a heavy fee from policy in education. English is believed to be a 21
students,thereby restricting access to those who liberating force for them and a means of 22
can afford it. Schools run by minorities empowerment,39 which is not different from 23
are another source for providing education their perception of English in colonial times. 24
through English medium,as mentioned already. The politically active among them want their 25
It is an intriguing political question why voice heard across the nation and beyond it and 26
democratically elected governments do not to have a common language to communicate 27
change their policy to meet the popular with other dalits (economically and socially 28
demand for English-medium education.There deprived lower castes) in other states in the 29
is, of course, the pedagogical reason of the country to create a national political platform 30
advantage of teaching children though the to fight oppression, just as the elites used 31
language of their childhood experience. But English for interregional communication in 32
there is also the politics of symbols. Using the their fight against British oppression40 They 33
language of the state as the medium of edu- believe that they have a right to English,which 34
cation is an acknowledgement of its prestige was denied them by the colonial policy and 35
and an expression of its power.This policy gets that they should get it from the government, 36
legitimacy for the government from cultural since the fee for attending a private English 37
elites like littérateurs and language teachers and medium school is beyond their reach. Clearly, 38
from the general public as the custodian of in postcolonial times, the politics of language 39
their language. But in their personal lives they, in India has taken a new trajectory with roles 40
as well as the political leaders themselves, who reworked for English. 41
make the policy, make their choices on sub- 42
stantive grounds, notably economic oppor- 43
tunities.Hence the dichotomy between policy Differential gains 44
and practice is not perceived by the people as 45
contradictory. The narrative of the politics of language in 46
India suggests the following conclusions.The 47
minority languages without political clout are 48
228
 P O L I T I C S O F L A N G UAG E I N I N D I A

1 orphaned. Regional languages have gained 7 Gandhi initially opposed this idea,but soon gave
2 political dominance and retained their supre- it his approval. See M. S. Thirumalai, “Early
3 macy in the literate culture of the states. Hindi Gandhi and the Language Policy of the Indian
4 retains an edge in the competition for jobs National Congress,” in the online journal,
Language in India,Vol. 5, No. 4 (2005), www.
5 nationally,for social networking in the national
languageinindia.com. The Congress Party,
6 capital, and has gained acceptance as the persuaded by Gandhi, adopted Hindustani as
7 language of entertainment and urban pop the language of its official deliberations,
8 culture as well as a sign of desi (native) identity including proceedings of its conferences. Use
9 for the mobile youth in the globalized market. of Hindustani had been increasing in party
10 English, in contrast, has enhanced its status as conference speeches from the time of Gandhi’s
11 the language of economic power, elite status association with the party despite resistance to
12 and intellectual pursuits. it from some leaders from the south. But, by
13 1947, Gandhi had become an advocate of
linguistic reorganization of the states of India,
14
Notes although he had a lurking suspicion that the
15 regional languages may assert themselves,
16 thereby threatening the unity of India that had
17 1 Ramachandra Guha, India after Gandhi: The
been forged with Hindustani;see Ramachandra
18 History of the World’s Largest Democracy (New
Guha, pp. 189–90.
York: HarperCollins, 2007), “Prologue,”
19 8 Brass, pp. 78–90.
pp. 1–15.
20 9 Gauri Viswanathan, Masks of Conquest: Literary
2 This is true of religion also. Although Hinduism
21 Study and British Rule in India (New York:
is the majority religion, it is a heterogeneous
22 Columbia University Press, 1989), ch. vi,“The
religion with no organized structure of control
23 Failure of English,” pp. 142–65. See also
and designated authority. It does not have a
E. Annamalai, “Medium of Power: The
24 common language;Sanskrit is not a language of Question of English in Education,” in James W.
25 religious practice or identity for all Hindus. Tollefson and Amy B. M.Tsui (eds), Medium of
26 3 Bernard S.Cohn,“The Command of Language Instruction Policies:Which Agenda? Whose Agenda?
27 and The Language of Command,” in Ranajit (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2004),
28 Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies IV: Writings on pp. 171–94.
29 South Asian History and Society (Delhi: Oxford 10 The debate is about teaching English effectively
University Press, 1988). to subaltern students from social groups who
30
4 Christopher R.King,One Language,Two Scripts: had missed out education. The demands vary
31 The Hindi Movement in Nineteenth Century North
32 from teaching English to them from class one
India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994) is to using English as the medium of instruction.
33 a narrative of this differentiation. Distancing of One encounters a conspiracy theory also,
34 formal Hindi from its popular base is described according to which the educationists, who
35 in Alok Rai, Hindi Nationalism (Hyderabad: come from upper castes,teach a standard variety
36 Orient Longman, 2001). of English they speak, denying any role to
37 5 Paul R. Brass, Language Religion and Politics in subaltern English in order to make these
38 North India (Cambridge: University Press, students fail in English.
39 1974); reprint edn (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse, 11 For example, Bruce McCully, English Education
40 2005). and the Origins of Indian Nationalism (NewYork:
6 Tamil may be an exception, but the relation- Columbia University Press, 1942).
41
ship between Tamil and Sanskrit and the 12 Mohandas K. Gandhi, Thoughts on National
42 perception of Tamil as both a cultural icon and Language (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1956); also
43 a political icon is complex in its relation to Jawaharlal Nehru, The Question of Language
44 “Aryan” North India. See S. V. Shanmugam (Allahabad: Congress Political and Economic
45 (in Tamil), Mozhi vaLarcciyum mozhi uNarvum: Studies, 1937).
46 canka kaalam (Language Development and 13 This question continued to be debated even
47 Language Awareness: Sangam Period) (Madras: after the constitution did not choose to
48 Manivasagar Patippakam, 1989), p. 219. designate any language as the national language;

229
E. AN NAMALAI

see,for example,V.K.R.V. Rao,Many Languages, Thirumalai, in Language in India,Vol. 2, No. 2 1

One Nation:The Problem of Integration (Bombay: (2002). 2
Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Research and 20 At the level of political symbolism, the demand 3
Library, 1978). by the Dravidian parties in Tamil Nadu is to 4
14 For the intensity and diversity of beliefs about make all the scheduled languages the official
5
language and nationhood, see Kuldip Nayar, languages of the Union.This demand,irrespec-
6
“Bilingualism,” in Between the Lines (Bombay: tive of its impracticality by the number of
Allied Publishers, 1969), pp. 30–69. Nayar is a languages to be used and of the fact that the list
7
journalist who worked as the press information is open-ended, was still alive in 2008, as can be 8
officer of the Government of India. seen in a speech of the chief minister of Tamil 9
15 B.Mallikarjun,“The Eighth Schedule Languages: Nadu ruled by DMK on the seventieth 10
Critical Appraisal,” in R. S. Gupta et al. (eds), anniversary of the first anti-Hindi agitation: 11
Language and the State: Perspectives on the Eighth “Other regional languages should also be made 12
Schedule (New Delhi: Creative Books, 1995), official languages at the Centre” (The Hindu 13
pp. 61–83. online (Tamil Nadu section),27 January,2008). 14
16 The census reports what the citizens tell the Note the implication of “other”in the sentence 15
enumerators is their mother tongue, which is a cited suggesting that Hindi is also a regional 16
token of social identity rather than a distinct language that was elevated to be the official
17
language; neither is it a dialect in a linguistic language of the central government, which
18
sense.The reports group these mother tongues elevation other regional languages also deserve.
(raw data) into languages (processed data) on The idea is to have all regional languages 19
the basis of linguistic and political con- including Hindi as the symbolic official 20
siderations. Mother tongues reported by less languages of the country and English the 21
than 10,000 speakers are not counted.Hindi has working official language. 22
the largest number of mother tongues grouped 21 For the text of the act, see The Official 23
under it.The number will be more than 48, if Language Act, 1963 (as amended, 1967) in 24
these numerically smaller mother tongues are Language in India,Vol. 2, No. 2 (2002). 25
also included.The anomaly with Maithili is that 22 For detailed history, see History of Andhra 26
it is not given a language status in the census Movement (2 vols) by Committee for History of 27
but is on par with the country’s major languages Andhra Movement (Hyderabad:Goverment of 28
in the constitution. It is also recognized (along Andhra Pradesh, 1985). After the Congress
29
with Dogri) as a literary language by Sahitya Party’s electoral debacle in the Telugu region of
the Madras state on the question of having a
30
Akademi (National Academy of Letters) for
awards for best literary works. separate Telugu-speaking state, the central 31
17 See, for example, extracts from the Constituent government constituted the Commission on 32
Assembly Debates (1949) compiled by M. S. Linguistics Reorganization of States (New Delhi: 33
Thirumalai and B.Mallikarjun,“The Evolution Government of India, 1955), which evolved 34
of Language Policy in the Constituent Assembly criteria and recommendations for the forma- 35
of India,” in Language in India, Vol. 6, No. 2 tion of linguistic states. The linguistic basis of 36
(2006). the formation of states yielded later to demands 37
18 This scheme of things, however, was modified based on religion, ethnicity, and unequal 38
with the Official Language Act of 1963 issued economic development within a state. The 39
in response to agitations against Hindi becom- demand for a separate state of Telangana,which
40
ing the sole official language from 1965. This is Telugu-speaking, to be carved out of Andhra
41
Act provided for the continued use of English Pradesh on the basis of economic under-
development is likely to be met by the com- 42
beyond 1965 in domains in which it was in use
with the stipulation that all acts, government pulsions of electoral politics. 43
orders and such other documents made 23 B. R. Ambedkar, Thoughts on Linguistic States 44
originally in English must be accompanied with (Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1955). 45
their Hindi translation. 24 It should be pointed out that Hindi was first 46
19 See “The Constitution of India: Provisions introduced as an optional subject in 1926 47
Relating to Language,” compiled by M. S. during the period of dyarchy and, a few years 48
230
 P O L I T I C S O F L A N G UAG E I N I N D I A

1 later, was made a compulsory language in high 32 S. Aggarwal, Three Language Formula: An
2 schools in Madras presidency not by the Educational Problem (New Delhi: Gian, 1991).
3 government of the Congress Party, but by the 33 As there are departments of the central
4 government in which the Justice Party, the government in the states, there are schools run
progenitor of the Dravidian movement, shared by the central government in the states.These
5
power and was in charge of the education central schools have Hindi (along with English)
6
portfolio. See Eugene F. Irschick, Tamil as medium of instruction.
7 Revivalism in the 1930s (Madras: Cre-A 34 A phrase used by the University Education
8 Publishers, 1986), pp. 213–14. Commission, chaired by S. Radhakrishnan, in
9 25 For an analysis of anti-Hindi agitation from a 1977.
10 point of view of dialectical materialism, see 35 For arguments for and against switchover see
11 Mohan Kumaramangalam’s India’s Language A. B. Shah (ed.), The Great Debate (Bombay:
12 Crisis (Madras: New Century Book House, Lalvani, 1968).
13 1965); and from a cultural–political point of 36 S. Nurullah and J.P. Naik,A History of Education
14 view, see Mohan Ram’s Hindi vs. India: The in India (during the British Period), 2nd edn
15 Meaning of DMK (New Delhi: Rachna (Bombay: Macmillan, 1951), p. 650.
Prakashan, 1968). 37 National Council for Educational Research and
16
26 This assurance of Nehru was a long way from Training,Sixth All India Educational Survey:Main
17
Gandhi’s characterization, in 1931, of the Tamil Report (New Delhi, 1999).
18 Nadu Congress delegation’s failure to use Hindi 38 One section of a class in such aided schools may
19 in the party conference as an act of tyranny by have English medium instruction, whose
20 a minority;cited in Irschick,p.212.For Nehru’s teachers’ salary will be paid by the school
21 pragmatic views and influential role in management from its sources, not from grants
22 formulating and implementing official language given by the government.
23 policy, see Robert D. King, Nehru and the 39 S. Anand,“Sanskrit, English and Dalits,” EPW,
24 Language Policy of India (New York: Oxford Vol. 34, No, 30 (24 July, 1999), pp. 2,053–56.
25 University Press, 1997). 40 After Independence,the use of English by these
26 27 After he left the Congress, C. Rajagoplachari elites increased in literary production promoted
changed his earlier position in favor of Hindi globally in the name of postcolonial literature.
27
and became an advocate of English against Dalits are beginning to participate in this literary
28
Hindi; see his The Question of English (Madras: culture after half a century of Independence.
29 Bharatan, 1962). They have conflicting pulls between the desire
30 28 This political strategy is considered to be to have their voice heard globally and locally,
31 relevant even now in 2008. The current chief between participation through English in the
32 minister of Tamil Nadu said, in the speech national and international literary culture, and
33 cited in note 19, that “English will remain as in the historically longer literary culture of the
34 our shield” against Hindi. regional language they are born into. Meena
35 29 The choice of English as a political symbol by Kandasamy, a Tamil-speaking dalit poet in
36 the northeastern states is based on a different English,says in an interview (The Hindu online,
37 reasoning, namely, that it gives their tribal 6 January, 2008, magazine section), “Dalits
communities a non-Hindu (and,for some,non- need English for social empowerment, but
38
Indian) identity. English has become more or less another caste.
39
30 E. Annamalai,“Language Choice in Education: In India,after caste and class,the next important
40 Conflict Resolution in Indian Courts,” thing is whether you are English-speaking,(but)
41 Language Science, Vol. 20, No. 1 (1998), pp. unlike caste it is something you can change
42 29–43. (into) by yourself. (But) I think you have to be
43 31 This was originally proposed by the Central very conscious of your background, of where
44 Advisory Board of Education in 1957. It was your roots lie.” She goes on to say: “Some
45 incorporated in the National Policy on Educa- activist–academics like Kancha Ilaiah tell us to
46 tion in 1968 and has been repeated in every new bury our Indian language in favor of English;
47 formulation of education policy since then. but somehow I am very scared of that.”
48
231
 1

16 2
3
4
5
Language problems and 6
7
politics in Pakistan 8
9
10
11
Tariq Rahman 12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Introduction on the indigenous (weaker) languages of 19
Pakistan. 20
There are two major kinds of language 21
problems in Pakistan:those concerning the use 22
of language as a symbol of identity; and those Review of literature 23
concerning its use as a medium of instruc- 24
tion. The first feeds into the ethnic politics Paul Brass3 and Jyotirindra Das Gupta4 remain 25
of Pakistan; the second into the politics of the paradigmatic models for the study of the 26
social class, deprivation, marginalization and, relationship between language problems and 27
increasingly, of political Islam.The first may be politics in India. As Indian realities—brought 28
called horizontal, affecting as it does, collec- out in many studies5—parallel those of 29
tivities or would-be collectivities dispersed Pakistan,these models remain valid for students 30
over the geographical boundaries of the of the language politics of Pakistan. Language, 31
country. The second is vertical, affecting the however, remains almost as under studied a 32
way social mobility and class formation are variable in the ethnic politics of Pakistan as it 33
affected by language. Both are connected with was in 1995 when the present author’s work on 34
politics, i.e., the way in which power is dis- that subject just mentioned was published. 35
tributed in society and how it is pursued to The pioneering scholarly work in those days 36
secure goods and services for collectivities were articles by Hamza Alavi,6 articles on 37
(such as ethnic groups), social classes (such as “regional imbalances and the national ques- 38
the westernized elite), and individuals. tion” in a book edited by S. Akbar Zaidi7 and 39
This chapter studies the use of language in Tahir Amin’s full length study of the rise and fall 40
both ethnic politics and the politics of social of “ethnonational movements” in Pakistan.8 41
class in Pakistan.The first part owes its origin Hamza Alavi’s analysis deals with the over- 42
to my work, Language and Politics in Pakistan developed state, which creates a “salariat” 43
(1996),1 but it has been updated to take dependent on its patronage for goods, services 44
into account subsequent developments. The and power. Ethnic struggle, in his view, is the 45
second is based on recently published and struggle between the central and peripheral 46
still unpublished research.2 There is also a “salariats” for power. Although these con- 47
brief discussion of the present language policy tending elites “fracture (or align) along ethnic 48
232
 L A N G UAG E P R O B L E M S A N D P O L I T I C S I N PA K I STA N
1 lines,” they do not necessarily work in the
2 interests of the subordinate classes.9 Alavi was
3 wary of ethnic politics and paid no attention
4 to the role of language in constructing the
5 subordinate group or personality in Pakistan.
6 Akbar Zaidi’s edited book includes articles not
7 only on the language issue (Feroze Ahmed’s)
8 but also the underdevelopment of certain
9 regions;they are among the pioneering empiri-
10 cal writings on this subject in Pakistan.10 The
11 pioneering book-length study of ethnicity,
12 however,is by Tahir Amin.He gives a “dynamic
13 picture of changing group identities”11 with
14 reference to internal and external factors
15 without, however, paying much attention to
16 language.
17 The work of Feroz Ahmed, published
18 two years later, was a collection of his work on
19 this subject from a Marxist point of view, all
20 written earlier.12 However, Feroz Ahmed was
21 one of the first political scientists to study the
22 alienation of the Urdu-speakers (mohajirs) of
23 Sindh from the political process and to suggest
24 that they should be accommodated.13 After
25 that the only major study of a language-
26 based ethnic movement, based on the Siraiki
27 language of Southern Punjab, is Hussain
28 Ahmad Khan’s Re-Thinking Punjab: The
29 Construction of Siraiki Identity (2004).14 Apart
30 from that, though language has been touched
31 on in studies of ethnicity in Pakistan after
32 1996—Ishtiaq Ahmed, Adeel Khan15—it is
33 not the focus of these studies. Ishtiaq Ahmed
34 offers a comparative analysis of ethnic politics
35 in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka.
36 Language is given attention but, “since the
37 invocation of language or religion as a basis for
38 separatist national identity in contemporary
39 South Asia has not been consistent,”16 it is
40 seen in the context of resistance to the state’s
41 project of modernization, which is perceived
42 to benefit certain elitist groups at the expense
43 of the resisting minorities. Adeel Khan points
44 out that it is not only the economic dis-
45 advantages of modernization but the distance
46 from the state structure of the ethnic groups
47 that determines the degree of their resistance
48 to the ruling elite. In his view,“culture, history
and language have been part of the symbolic
and rhetorical armory of these movements but
not of their actual political agendas.”17 This
point, if interpreted to imply that languages
have iconic significance and are used to express
conflicts for power in a given political system,
needs no emphasis. If, however, this becomes a
justification for leaving language out of the
analysis altogether, or treating it in an inade-
quate manner, it needs to be corrected. This
chapter attempts to make this kind of correc-
tion in order to point out that language policies
and practices, both of the ruling elites and
those resisting them, have far-reaching con-
sequences for the politics of a country.
Language policy in Pakistan
Pakistan is a multilingual state with six major
languages—Punjabi (spoken by 44.15 percent
out of a population of 160 million in 2007);
Pashto (15.42); Sindhi (14.10); Siraiki (10.53);
Urdu (7.57); Balochi (3.57)—and about 57
minor ones. Urdu is the national language and
English the official one.18 English is spoken
spontaneously and fluently only by a small elite,
which is estimated to comprise between 5–6
percent of the population.19 The 1973 constitu-
tion of the country, which was suspended in
part both during the military rule of Generals
Zia ul Haq (1977–1988) and Pervez Musharraf
(1999–2008), is again in force. It provides the
following guidelines on language policy:
(a) The National language of Pakistan is Urdu,
and arrangements shall be made for its being
used for official and other purposes within
fifteen years from the commencing day.
(b) Subject to clause (1) the English language
may be used for official purposes until arrange-
ments are made for its replacement by Urdu.
(c) Without prejudice to the status of the
National language, a Provincial Assembly may
by law prescribe measures for the teaching,
promotion and use of a provincial language in
addition to the national language.
(Article 251)20
233
TA R I Q R A H M A N

This policy, as overtly declared and actually Pakistan and should also be used in public 1
put in practice, has led to ethnic resistance domains. This movement, called the Bengali 2
using language as a symbol of identity, the Language Movement or Bhasha Ondolan, was 3
continuation of a class-based, unequal system politically significant because it was a reaction 4
of education, and the weakening of the to the perceived domination and injustice of 5
indigenous languages of the country. Let us West Pakistani decision makers towards the 6
take these issues one by one. people of East Bengal. However, the Muslim 7
League in particular, and West Pakistanis in 8
general, saw it as a conspiracy of communists, 9
Language and ethnic politics
Indian agents and enemies of Pakistan to 10
With the death of Nawab Akbar Bugti, a tribal destabilize the new state.Among the few West 11
leader of the Baloch, in August 2006, and the Pakistanis who saw it as a spontaneous response 12
construction of the Gawadar port which is to West Pakistani hegemony were ethno- 13
seen by the Baloch nationalists as an outpost of nationalist leaders who were themselves 14
the Punjabis (and especially the army) in their regarded as anti-state forces by the West 15
motherland, the province of Balochistan has Pakistani establishment. 16
witnessed the re-emergence of a militant The Tamuddun Majlis, a private social 17
ethnic movement last seen there in the 1970s.21 organization, demanded Bengali as the 18
In Sindh, too, there is deep resentment against language of instruction, administration and 19
the army, ostensibly because of the construc- means of communication in East Bengal as 20
tion of cantonments. Indeed, since the late early as September 1947, only a month after 21
1990s, the ethnonationalists have formed an Pakistan was established. However, it was 22
alliance called the Pakistan Oppressed Nations ignored till December of that year when it was 23
Movement (PONM),which held a meeting in feared that Urdu alone would be the language 24
Islamabad on the 1st and 2nd of November of the state. The language movement started 25
1998.The declaration adopted there had eight off in earnest in 1948 when Mohammad Ali 26
demands, one of which was: Jinnah,or Quaid-i-Azam (the Great Leader) as 27
he is called in Pakistan, declared on 19 and 21 28
Pushto, Siraiki, Balochi, Sindhi and Punjabi March,1948 that the state language of Pakistan 29
languages should be declared national languages is “going to be Urdu and no other language.”24 30
and the culture of the federating nations should Jinnah made that statement on the assump- 31
be given an equal opportunity to develop and tion that one language unites a new nation and 32
prosper.22 that nobody, except anti-Pakistan agitators, 33
was against Urdu. Later, in 1952, Khwaja 34
However, language, though very much a part Nazimuddin, the then prime minister of 35
of rhetoric and declarations in conferences, is Pakistan,repeated these sentiments in Dhaka.25 36
not as strong a force as it was in the first 25 After this, the language movement really 37
years of Pakistan’s existence.The most powerful gathered momentum.The students of Dhaka 38
language-based ethnic movement of the first University were the leaders of the movement, 39
few years of Pakistan was the Bengali language who organized processions in favor of Bengali 40
movement. The most detailed and incisive every day. On 21 February, 1952 the police 41
account of this movement, though in the fired on the students who had decided to defy 42
context of left-wing politics and from a Section 144 by coming out of the University 43
Marxist perspective, is by Badruddin Umar.23 in batches of four and five. As a result of this 44
In 1948 and 1952 a number of urban firing, according to the police report given to 45
Bengalis—mostly students, intellectuals and the inquiry conducted by Justice Ellis of the 46
educated people—demanded that their langu- Dhaka High Court,there were “nine casualties 47
age, Bengali, should be a national language of of whom three were students and six out- 48
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 L A N G UAG E P R O B L E M S A N D P O L I T I C S I N PA K I STA N
1 siders.”26 This day, called Ekushe, became a
2 significant symbol of Bengali defiance of the
3 West Pakistani ruling elite and evokes strong
4 sentiments even today. The language move-
5 ment appeared to come to an end in 1954
6 when Bengali was accepted as one of the
7 national languages—the other being Urdu—
8 by the constituent assembly.27 However, the
9 sentiments it had created lingered on and
10 formed the basis of Bengali nationalism,which
11 led to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. In
12 short,the Bengali language movement remains
13 crucial for the understanding of identity
14 formation, ethnicity, nationalism and the clash
15 of elites and proto-elites in multilingual
16 aspiring nation states.
17 The conditions of East Bengal parallel those
18 of Sindh. Like Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the
19 leader of Bangladesh, G. M. Syed, the
20 nationalist leader of Sindh, also advocated the
21 creation of an autonomous state of Sindhu
22 Desh.28 However, this demand for autonomy
23 was sometimes accompanied by veiled threats
24 of secession. Here too Sindhi has been the
25 medium of instruction in government schools
26 as well as that of the judiciary and the admini-
27 stration at the lower levels, just as Bengali
28 was in East Bengal. Thus the ruling elite’s
29 policy of favoring Urdu, which is the
30 mother tongue of the mohajirs of the cities of
31 Sindh, is strongly resented. The mohajirs, a
32 non-assimilationist minority proud of their
33 urban Mughal culture, of which Urdu is
34 a symbol, resist all attempts at promoting
35 Sindhi. In 1970 when the Sindh University
36 and the Board of Intermediate and Secondary
37 Education made Sindhi compulsory for
38 mohajirs, they protested and there were riots
39 in January–February 1970 in the cities of
40 Sindh.29 In 1972, when the provincial PPP
41 tried to pass a bill to increase the use of Sindhi
42 and make mohajirs learn it, there were riots
43 again.30 The situation nowadays, ever since
44 1984, is that the mohajirs see themselves as
45 an ethnic group like the Sindhis and claim
46 power in Sindh on the basis of this distinct
47 identity. In other words the question is really
48 which community will rule Sindh—Sindhis or
mohajirs? This makes Sindh a potential battle-
ground for a vicious civil war.
Balochistan is a multilingual province
because some parts of Afghanistan were
included in it in British days. Thus, besides
Balochi and Brahvi, Pashto too is fairly widely
spoken in Balochistan.As the Balochi-speaking
and Brahvi-speaking people define them-
selves as Baloch,they insist on common origin
rather than language as a marker of identity.
However, there has been a Balochi language
movement since 1951 which aims at pre-
serving the Baloch cultural identity. Balochi
identity is expressed by coining words of
Baloch origin and, indeed, by writing in a
language which has little official patronage.31
Baloch ethnicity, which includes Brahvis also,
is expressed mostly through armed resistance,
as in 1948, 1960s, mid-1970s, and at present
(2006 onwards). This is probably because the
educated elite is so small that a language move-
ment is hard to sustain.
In Balochistan as well as in the North-West
Frontier Province (NWFP),Pashto serves as an
identity symbol. It was the moral code of the
Pathans,Pashtoonwali, which was such a symbol
in pre-modern times. The efforts of Khan
Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890–88), the anti-
British Pakhtun nationalist leader, made
Pashto such a symbol.32 Earlier, Persian was
the language of culture and prestige and was
used by the Persian-speaking population of
northern Afghanistan and the ruling Pakhtun
elite.After the 1930s,the ruling elite promoted
Pashto as a means of creating nationalism and
unity among tribes which were divided and
understood only their extended kinship system
and tribal loyalties. Thus Pashto was the new
symbol, like the national flag and other
centralizing icons, used to create the Afghan
nation out of a mere collection of tribes.
In both cases, Pashto was used for political
purposes under modern political conditions.
However, because of the Afghan claim to
Pakhtunistan, the ruling elite was mistrustful
of Pashto despite the fact that the Pakhtun
nationalist NAP (National Awami Party) chose
Urdu as the official language of the frontier in
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TA R I Q R A H M A N

its brief rule in 1972. It is only recently that internal colonialism, the Punjabi language 1
the Pakhtun elite has been co-opted by movement is hard to understand.The Punjabis 2
Pakistan’s ruling elite and the threat of the occupy most of the powerful positions in the 3
secession of the NWFP has disappeared.Pashto apparatus of the state: the federal government, 4
still remains an identity marker and part of legislature, and especially the army and the 5
Pakhtun nationalism as expressed politically by bureaucracy, and oppose the use of Punjabi 6
the Awami National Party (ANP, the new even in primary schools. They do so pre- 7
name for the NAP), which continues to sumably because they have internalized the 8
challenge the domination of the center. The low status given to Punjabi by all former rulers 9
events of 9/11 formed a watershed in Pakistan of Punjab and feel that this language cannot be 10
ethnic politics. By this time Pashto had come used in formal domains. Possibly, they also feel 11
to be associated with the Taliban who were that if the use of Punjabi is allowed in formal 12
ruling Afghanistan while Persian, once the domains, the speakers of the other languages, 13
major bureaucratic language and elitist symbol which are also ethnic identity symbols, will 14
of Afghanistan, was associated with the anti- increase the pressure on the state to give even 15
Taliban Northern Alliance. Thus, when the more importance to their languages. This, 16
coalition forces attacked Afghanistan in they reason, will lead to the intensification of 17
October 2001, the Pakistani Pakhtuns sup- ethnic sentiments and the weakening of the 18
ported their Afghan “brethren”out of religious federation of Pakistan. But this attitude of the 19
as well as ethnic (linguistic) affinity.The ANP Punjabi elite is precisely why there is such a 20
failed to defend Pakhtun ethnic interests and at movement. The activists of the movement 21
least part of the Pakhtun ethnic vote went to claim that the price of Punjabi domination 22
the religious coalition MMA (Mutahadda over Pakistan is the denial of the Punjabi ethnic 23
Majlis-e-Amal or United Congress for Action) identity. In fact, by teaching only English and 24
rather than the ANP.33 In short, in the Pashto- Urdu to the Punjabi elite, Punjabi language 25
speaking areas at least a certain fusion of reli- and culture have been suppressed.This culture 26
gious and ethnic feeling appears to have taken shame, they feel, should go; Punjabis should 27
place. learn to be proud of their Punjabi identity.This 28
The southern part of Punjab is under- is only possible if the state uses Punjabi in the 29
developed and the leaders of this area blame domains of power. But if the state does that, 30
the Punjabi ruling elite for this under- the ethnonationalist argument of using all the 31
development.From the 1960s they have labeled other indigenous languages in these domains 32
their language Siraiki and have standardized it too would be strengthened.Thus the status quo 33
for purposes of writing.The language had been continues.35 34
written even in the nineteenth century, but The theoretical insights used in this account 35
different writers used different orthographic of the relationship between language and 36
symbols of the Urdu script.The choice of the ethnic identity are constructivist. Language is 37
term Siraiki in the 1960s meant that the people not a primordial given but something which, 38
of southern Punjab could identify with one under certain circumstances, gains salience as 39
identity symbol instead of calling their langu- an icon. In short, an identity is imagined and 40
age by local names such as Multani, Derewali, language—along with shared myths, artifacts, 41
Riasati, and so on. Since a famous conference and history—help to “imagine” it.36 42
in Multan in 1975 a number of institutions— From this theoretical perspective it appears 43
like the Siraiki Lok Sanjh—have been pro- that in all language movements, except the 44
moting the language, with the support of Punjabi one, language has been more or less 45
Siraiki ethnic political parties.34 consciously manipulated by leaders for instru- 46
While the Siraiki movement is clearly a mental, rational, goal-seeking reasons: the 47
response to perceived Punjabi domination and creation of a pressure group to obtain greater 48
236
 L A N G UAG E P R O B L E M S A N D P O L I T I C S I N PA K I STA N
1 power, goods and services from the state; to
2 redress a situation of internal colonialism
3 which is perceived as being unjust. In the
4 Punjabi language movement, however, the
5 major motivation is sentimental or extra-
6 rational. It is the desire for self-respect; for the
7 acceptance of one’s identity without culture
8 shame; for psychological fulfillment without
9 adopting the language and behavior of another
10 culture.
11 However, this instrumentalist explana-
12 tion would be misleading if the emotional or
13 extra-rational motivation of the actors in a
14 movement were not taken into account.For,in
15 the heat of the moment,people are ready to die
16 or kill not for something as prosaic as a job
17 or admission in a college but for honor,
18 vengeance, love, hatred, and self-respect. This
19 extra-rational aspect of movements is difficult
20 to analyze unless one observes the deep
21 emotion of the actors and finds out their
22 subjective truth.
23 But, if language movements are part of
24 ethnic assertions meant to counter perceived
25 domination and injustice, only linguistic
26 policies will not be helpful. A language will
27 remain ghettoized and will be resisted even by
28 its own speakers—as mother tongue schooling
29 was in South Africa37 and the indigenous
30 languages in the NWFP38 and Balochistan—if
31 it is not used in the domains of power and
32 powerful jobs are not available in it or if it is
33 otherwise despised socially.To create a secure
34 country where ethnicity is no longer a threat,
35 a truly federal (or even a confederal) political
36 order may be necessary. That will mean that
37 there will be five national languages in the
38 country with Urdu as a language of inter-
39 provincial communication and English for
40 international communication. And, even
41 more important, it will mean that the
42 provinces, which may be rearranged along
43 ethnic and linguistic lines, will be genuinely
44 empowered. In such a political system, no
45 federating unit would want to opt out of the
46 system because it would then be responsible
47 for its fate and would no longer be dominated
48 by the center. Only then can ethnicity be
used to create a state with a rich and pluralistic
culture.
Language and class conflict
Besides being symbolic of ethnic identity,
language is also part of a divide along socio-
economic class lines. This is because certain
varieties and styles of a language, in the words
of Pierre Bourdieu,“can function as linguistic
capital, producing a profit of distinction on the
occasion of each social exchange.”39 If a
language is used in the domains of power—of
the state or the corporate sector—it can be
exchanged for wealth, power and prestige.
That is why the educational system sells it and
consumers buy it. Bourdieu puts it as follows:
The position which the educational system gives
to the different languages (or the different
cultural contents) is such an important issue only
because this institution has the monopoly in the
large-scale production of producers/consumers,
and therefore in the reproduction of the market
without which the social value of the linguistic
competence,its capacity to function as linguistic
capital, would cease to exist.40
Pakistan’s educational system gives the
highest value to English followed by Urdu and
Sindhi. However, Sindhi is restricted to the
province of Sindh and that too to mostly rural
areas and small towns. English, Urdu, and
Sindhi are, therefore, the media of instruction
in schools corresponding to a class-based
division of Pakistan society. The Ministry of
Education declares officially that Urdu is the
medium of instruction in government schools.
At the higher level, while English in used in
scientific and technical subjects, most students
opt for teaching and examinations in Urdu.
Parallel to this stream of ordinary students
and teachers is the elitist stream which studies
in English-medium schools, colleges and
universities. The elitist English medium
schools, where the teachers really teach in
English and the students come from elitist
backgrounds with exposure to English, are so
237
TA R I Q R A H M A N

expensive as to exclude lower middle and and Sindhi are used to explain concepts but the 1
working-class pupils. The Urdu and Sindhi language of examination is Urdu.42 2
medium schools, as well as the few schools The role of English in Pakistan has been 3
where Pashto is the medium of instruction at studied by Sabiha Mansoor43 and Tariq 4
the lower levels, are run by the state and are Rahman.44 Mansoor has conducted two major 5
quite affordable for most Pakistanis.Medium of surveys on the attitudes of students towards 6
instruction actually serves as an indicator of languages. The first survey, conducted in 7
socioeconomic class with the most affluent Lahore in 1992, suggests that students have a 8
going to the English medium schools, the linguistic hierarchy in mind, with English at 9
lower middle classes to the vernacular medium the top followed by Urdu, with their mother 10
ones and the poorest people, as well as people tongue (in this case Punjabi) at the bottom.She 11
in remote,rural areas,studying in the madrasahs. also found that English is associated with 12
Data concerning the number of schools modernity and efficiency while Punjabi is 13
according to their medium of instruction, as associated with informality and intimacy.45 The 14
provided by the ministry of education, are second survey provides a detailed analysis of 15
given in Table 16.1. the role of English in higher education. Both 16
The most affordable educational institu- studies confirm positive attitudes towards 17
tions—because they often provide free board English among Pakistani students, their 18
and lodging—are religious seminaries or teachers and parents, and university admini- 19
madrasahs reported by the ministry of strators. 20
education to number 12,979 in 2006. The English is the language of globalization.The 21
madrasahs preserve Arabic more as a symbol of international corporate sector, bureaucracies 22
continuity with the past and of Islamic identity (such as the United Nations and the World 23
than a living language; most of their graduates Bank), foreign-funded NGOs, the service 24
cannot function in Arabic.They do, however, sector and the internet work predominantly 25
function in Urdu which has spread through the in English in Pakistan. This is of enormous 26
madrasah network ever since the nineteenth advantage for the Pakistani elite, whose 27
century and is now associated with Islam and members are very proficient in English. 28
Muslim identity in both Pakistan and India.41 Consequently,lucrative private sector employ- 29
In the NWFP and parts of rural Sindh, Pashto ment is almost entirely dominated by the 30
31
Table 16.1 Educational institutions in Pakistan by medium of instruction 32
33
Type of management No. of institutions Medium of instruction
34
Urdu (%) English (%) Sindhi (%) Others* (%) 35
Total 227,791 64.6 10.4 15.5 9.5 36
Boys 57,868 77.3 2.9 6.7 13.2 37
Girls 48,475 78.3 2.6 9.3 9.8 38
Mixed 121,448 53.1 17.1 22.2 7.6 39
Public 151,744 68.3 1.4 22.4 7.9
Boys 50,265 82.2 1.2 7.5 9.1
40
Girls 41,878 80.6 1.4 6.7 11.3 41
Mixed 59,601 48.0 1.6 43.4 7.0 42
Private 76,047 57.2 28.4 1.8 12.7 43
Boys 6,597 63.7 10.7 2.6 23.0 44
Girls 7,602 44.4 1.4 1.3 52.9
Mixed 61,847 58.0 32.1 1.7 7.7
45
46
Note: * includes Pashto, Balochi, Arabic, etc. 47
Source: GOP Highlights, Table 23, p. 37 48
238
 L A N G UAG E P R O B L E M S A N D P O L I T I C S I N PA K I STA N

1 English-using elite while the vernacular edu- public money to subsidize these cadet colleges
2 cated proto-elite is increasingly joining public- (see Tables 16.2 and 16.3) while government
3 funded institutions (the state bureaucracy, schools (vernacular medium) receive much less
4 education, the judiciary, and the military). funding per student per year (see Tables 16.3
5 The Pakistani elite has invested in an elitist and 16.4).In the last 15 years or so the military
6 system of education through the medium of has expanded its business activities—including
7 English while allowing most Pakistanis to banks, business firms, real estate, insurance,
8 remain uneducated, seek madrasah education transportation, entertainment49—and has also
9 or remain confined to vernacular medium entered the business of education. Besides
10 schooling and substandard institutions of controlling schools it has also set up five
11 higher education. This has created a percep- universities, all using English as the medium of
12 tion of injustice, and hence anger. The elite’s instruction.50 In addition to the armed forces,
13 appropriation of English as cultural capital for a number of other institutions—bureaucratic as
14 themselves and a device for filtering out the well as corporate sector ones51—have estab-
15 less advantaged, as explained by Myers- lished English medium schools for their
16 Scotton,46 is a political strategy which per- employees. Even the federal government has
17 petuates the hegemony of the English-using established “model”schools and colleges which
18 elite over the upper echelons of Pakistani use English as the medium of instruction.
19 society. Tuition and fees at these institutions, like their
20 One component of this elite, the officer counterparts in the private sector,are high and
21 corps of the armed forces, has used its power either the state or the students, or both, must
22 and resources to establish and control edu- pay for them. In short, the state gives subsidies
23 cational institutions. Initially, the armed forces to the rich from public funds (see Table 16.3).
24 established cadet colleges, which are large Language policy and education, as we have
25 residential schools run along the lines of elitist seen, are subordinated to the class interests of
26 British private schools (the so-called public the urban, professional, English-using elite in
27 schools,such as Eton and Harrow).These were Pakistan. For its political interests, this elite
28 defended by Ayub Khan,the first military ruler has been using the name of Islam, and has
29 of Pakistan (1958–69).47 During the 1960s, strengthened the religious lobby in the last
30 however, a number of students opposed these many years. Given the state’s encouragement
31 schools.A special commission whose mandate of privatization in the recent past, this seems
32 was to investigate the causes of the students’ to be a trend which can have negative con-
33 mobilization declared that the system was sequences for peace in South Asia and the
34 unlawful because it discriminated between world. Privatization, with its concomitant
35 citizens but,nevertheless,allowed it to continue strengthening of English as an elitist preserve,
36 in the name of quality. The elitist schools, will lead to “ghettoization”in Pakistan’s public
37 therefore, kept flourishing.48 The state spends educational institutions and increase anger
38
39 Table 16.2 Expenditure on cadet colleges in Pakistan
40 Institution Donation from No. of students Yearly cost per
41 provincial govt student to govt
42 Cadet College, Kohat 5,819.800 575 10,121
43 Cadet College, Larkana 6,000,000 480 12,500
44 Cadet College, Pitaro 14,344,000 700 20,491
45 Laurence College 12,000,000 711 16,878
46 Cadet College, Hasanabdal 8,096,000 480 16,867
47 Source: information about donations and number of students was supplied by the offices of the respective institutions
48 in 2003 to the present author

239
Table 16.3 Differences in costs in major types of educational institution in Pakistan (Pakistani rupees)
Institution Average cost per student per year Contributors Cost to the state
Madrasahs 5,714 (includes board and lodging) Philanthropists + religious organizations *Rs 1.55 in 2001–02, an additional sum
of Rs 28.60 for subsidies on computers,
books, etc. in some madrasahs in
2003–04

Urdu medium schools (gigh) 2,264.5 (only tuition) State 2,264.5

Elitist English medium schools 96,000 for “A” level and 36,000 Parents None reported except subsidized land
for other levels (only tuition) in some cantonments

Cadet colleges/public schools 90,061 (tuition and all facilities) Parents + state (average of six cadet 14,171 (average of five cadet colleges
colleges + one public school) only)

Public colleges (provincial) 9,572 State + parents (parents pay Rs 1,591 7,981
per year on average)

Public colleges (federal) 21,281 Parents pay Rs 2,525 for BA on average 18,756

Note: * cost per student per year in a madrasah is calculated for all 1,065,277 students reported in 2000. In 2001–02, a sum of Rs 1,64,000 was given by the government to those
madrasahs that accepted financial help. However, not all students receive this subsidy as their madrasah may refuse government help.
Source: Data obtained from several institutions by the present author in 2003
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1

48
47
46
45
44
43
42
41
40
39
38
37
36
35
34
33
32
31
30
29
28
27
26
25
24
23
22
21
20
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
 L A N G UAG E P R O B L E M S A N D P O L I T I C S I N PA K I STA N

1 Table 16.4 Income and expenditure of educational institutions in Pakistan

2 PUBLIC EDUCATION
3
Institution No. Enrolment Expenditure Expenditure per
4 students per year
5
Middle school 14,334 2,788,727 NA NA
6
High school 9,471 4,544,724 NA NA
7 British system school 11 5,492 NA NA
8 Madrasah 354 44,780 NA NA
9
10 PRIVATE EDUCATION
11 Middle school 24,115 3,864,143 5,724,520,758 1,481.5
12 High school 13,484 3,778,322 14,050,542,801 3,718.7
13 Schools (mid and high) 37,599 7,642,465 19,775,063,559 2,587.5
British 270 143,774 1,363,779,186 9,487.6
14 Madrasah 11,799 1,504,462 2,723,533,797 18,10.3
15
16 Note: expenditure per student per year of public institutions (high schools 9,471, British system 11, madrasahs 354)
cannot be calculated as the data are not available.
17
18 Source: GOP 2006, Tables 1, 1.1, 1.2, 3 and 49

19
20 among the non-English educated and especi- that the rank and file of the Islamists owe their
21 ally the unemployed workforce of the country. existence to a failed educational system which
22 This will have several consequences. First, the excludes them or exposes them to pro-war,
23 most educated people will lose faith in the anti-India, and anti-Semitic ideas. Already
24 country and give up on it. Second, the ideo- resentful of the injustices of their society, they
25 logical polarization between the different now hear of American aggression in Iraq and
26 socioeconomic classes will increase even Afghanistan or Zionist expansion in the
27 further. And, above all, the incentive for Middle East, which tends to radicalize them
28 reforming Pakistan’s educational system and further.This includes madrasah students but, as
29 making it more conducive for creating a pointed out by a survey of those who had gone
30 tolerant and peaceful society will decrease. to fight against the US in Afghanistan after
31 Another trend will be to strengthen the 9/11, most of these militants are not from the
32 power of the military in Pakistan.As more and madrasahs. They are from the ordinary Urdu
33 more elitist schools and universities pass into medium schools.53 As law and order breaks
34 the hands of the military, the number of down in Pakistan and the military keeps
35 teachers,administrators,and business concerns appropriating the highest share of the country’s
36 under the patronage of the military will resources, vigilante groups seeking to impose
37 increase. More students will also be influenced their own interpretation of Islam increase their
38 by them. This will work in favor of the power. The rank and file of these groups,
39 military’s views about national interest, the although using the idiom of Islam, manifests
40 future of the country,and economic priorities. the same alienation from the state as do the
41 This may dilute ideas of civilian supremacy that ethnic militants.
42 underpin democracies and jeopardize the The present author has suggested that
43 chances of lasting peace in South Asia. private, elitist, English medium schools be
44 An even more dangerous possibility is the phased out and state-influenced ones (cadet
45 strengthening of political and militant Islam in colleges and public schools) be replaced by
46 the country.It is true,as pointed out by Hussain merit-based vernacular medium schools.
47 Haqqani,that the military has strengthened the Moreover, English ought not to be taught to a
48 Islamists in Pakistan.52 However, it is also true high standard only for the benefit of a small

241
TA R I Q R A H M A N

elite, but must be spread out as widely as with English at the top of the pyramid followed 1
possible, and, especially through innovative by Urdu and then the indigenous mother 2
methods,to all schoolchildren.This will appear tongues (other than Urdu). In the NWFP and 3
just to most people and reduce the perception Sindh, however, Pashto and Sindhi are seen as 4
of injustice and,hence,anger,which may create identity markers and are spoken informally. In 5
student militancy, possibly expressed through Punjab, contrariwise, there is widespread 6
the idiom of an Islamic revolution in Pakistan. culture shame about Punjabi.57 In all the elitist 7
On the negative side, the author has admitted English medium schools the author visited, 8
that this policy may empower the vernacular there were policies forbidding students from 9
proto-elite, which may in turn strengthen speaking Punjabi. If anyone spoke it, s/he was 10
traditional values and radicalize the Islamist called “paendu” (rustic, village yokel) and made 11
students even further by eroding their tradi- fun of. Many educated parents speak Urdu 12
tional religious culture and bringing them into rather than Punjabi with their children. In 13
contact with neofundamentalist thought short, UNESCO’s advice on teaching in the 14
through the internet.While these possibilities mother tongue,at least at the elementary level, 15
must be recognized,the alternative hope is that falls on deaf ears in Pakistan.58 16
the creation of a more just educational system Such prevailing attitudes have a negative 17
will reduce the potential for violence within effect on Pakistani languages. Urdu is secure 18
Pakistan and its possible spillover to other parts because of the huge pool of people very 19
of the world.54 proficient in it and especially because it is used 20
in lower level jobs, the media, education, the 21
court system, commerce, and other such 22
Effects of language policy on
domains in Pakistan.Punjabi is a large language 23
weaker languages of Pakistan
and will survive despite culture shame and 24
With the advent of modernity, the smaller neglect.It is used in the Indian Punjab in many 25
languages of the world, being denied any role domains of power and, what is even more 26
in the domains of power, began to die away. significant, it is the language of songs, jokes, 27
Globalization, having increased modes and intimacy, and informality in both Pakistan and 28
speed of communication,has hastened the pro- India. This makes it the language of private 29
cess.English,the major vehicle of globalization, pleasure and if it continues to be used in this 30
can be seen as a world language, or, alter- manner, it is in no real danger. 31
natively, as a “killer language”—an expression Sindhi and Pashto are both major languages, 32
used by Tove Skutnabb-Kangas, who cham- whose speakers have a sense of pride. Sindhi is 33
pions the notion of linguistic rights.55 Indeed, also used in the domains of power and is the 34
so great is the concern to save the world’s major language of education in rural Sindh. 35
6,000-plus languages that many linguists are Pashto is not a major language of education, 36
increasingly writing about it.56 In Pakistan, neither is it used in the domains of power in 37
however, concerns about language death are Pakistan. However, its speakers see it as their 38
rarely expressed. identity marker and it is used in some domains 39
The policy of promoting English and Urdu, of power in Afghanistan. It, too, will survive 40
in that order, at the expense of the other though it is under some pressure.The Pashto 41
languages of Pakistan, has weakened Pakistani variety which is spoken in cities in Pakistan is 42
languages, even though most of them are, now adulterated with Urdu words. Moreover, 43
numerically, major languages. However, since educated Pakhtuns often code switch between 44
they are not being used in the domains of Pashto and Urdu or English.Thus,the language 45
power they do not have cultural capital. As is under some pressure. 46
mentioned earlier, languages are given a Baloch and Brahvi are small languages 47
hierarchical value in the minds of Pakistanis, under much pressure from Urdu. However, 48
242
 L A N G UAG E P R O B L E M S A N D P O L I T I C S I N PA K I STA N
1 there is awareness among educated Balochi
2 that their languages must be preserved.
3 Although they are not used in the domains of
4 power, they will survive as informal languages
5 in the private domain. Nevertheless, the city
6 varieties of these languages will become very
7 “Urdufied.” About 55 very small languages
8 of Pakistan, mostly in the northern part, are
9 under tremendous pressure.59 The Karakorum
10 Highway linking these areas to the plains
11 has placed much pressure on these languages.
12 In the city of Karachi, Gujarati is being
13 abandoned,at least in its written form,as young
14 people seek to be literate in Urdu and English,
15 the languages used in the domains of power.
16 A number of smaller languages have dis-
17 appeared altogether and others are under
18 threat.
19
20
21 Conclusion
22
23 The language policies of Pakistan’s ruling elite
24 have referred to the ideologies of nationalism
25 and modernization for legitimacy.Nationalism
26 has been used to declare Urdu the national
27 language of the country and authorize its use
28 in the domains of non-elitist schooling, radio,
29 TV and some functions of the government at
30 the lower level. Modernization is used for
31 promoting English as a language of elitist
32 schooling, science education and elitist
33 domains, both public and private. These
34 policies have led to the use of the indigenous
35 languages of the country as markers of ethnic
36 identity.Such usage is mostly instrumental,i.e.,
37 to mobilize a pressure group in order to obtain
38 a certain share in the goods and services avail-
39 able in the country. However, the participants
40 in language-based ethnic movements find
41 motivation for their personal actions in notions
42 which have an emotional or extra-rational
43 appeal,i.e.,notions of self-respect,justice,love,
44 hatred, vengeance and group honor, etc.
45 The application of discriminatory
46 language-based policies to education have also
47 strengthened the class-based differences in the
48 country expressed through—among other
indicators—the medium of instruction one
can afford to buy. Yet another effect is the
weakening of the indigenous languages of
Pakistan, which are looked down on and are
becoming weaker as the forces of globalization
invest English with far more cultural capital
than ever before.
In short, the present language policies have
the cumulative effect of increasing inequality
and polarization in the country. While
inequality was rationalized in the name of
ordained fate (kismet) in traditional thought in
Pakistan, it is now increasingly being seen as a
consequence of bad governance. This creates
resentment, which feeds into both ethnic and
religious militancy in the country. Indeed, it
appears that class conflict too is expressed in
terms given currency by political Islam.60
Thus, there is a great danger that, unless lang-
uage policies are changed, their consequences
will become serious threats to the well-being
of Pakistan and its neighbors.
Notes
The following abbreviations have been used in the
annexures and the notes and references that follow:
GOP 2006 = National Education Census: Pakistan
(Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 2006)
GOP Highlights = National Education Census
Highlights (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan,
2006)
LAD-F = Legislative Assembly Debates; North West
Frontier Province (dates and pages numbers are given
parenthetically)
1 Tariq Rahman, Language and Politics in Pakistan
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1996);
reprint edn (Delhi: Orient Longman, 2007).
2 Tariq Rahman,Denizens of Alien Worlds:A Study
of Education, Inequality and Polarization in
Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press,
2004).
3 Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion and Politics
in North India (Cambridge: University Press,
1974).
4 Jyotirindra Das Gupta, Language Conflict and
National Development:Group Politics and National
243
TA R I Q R A H M A N

Language (Berkeley,CA,and London:University 16 Ahmed, p. 289. 1

of California Press, 1970). 17 Adeel Khan, p. 189. 2
5 R. K. Agnihotri,“Identity and Multilinguality: 18 The number of languages listed for Pakistan is 3
The Case of India,” in Amy B.Tsui and James 72 in Raymond G. Gordon Jr. (ed.), Ethnologue 4
Tollefson (eds), Language Policy, Culture, and Languages of the World, 15th edn (Dallas:
5
Identity in Asian Contexts (Mahwah, NJ: SIL International; online version 2005:
Lawrence Erlbaum, 2007), pp. 185, 204; http://www.ethnologue.com). The present
6
L. M. Khubchandani (ed.), Language in a Plural author, however, lists 55 languages and dialects 7
Society (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass and Indian in addition to the six major languages (Punjabi, 8
Institute of Advanced Studies, Shimla, 1988); Sindhi,Pashto,Siraiki,Urdu and Balochi) given 9
E. Annamalai,Managing Multilingualism in India: in the preceding text. This lower number is 10
Political and Linguistic Manifestations (New calculated as follows.The dialects of Pashto (3), 11
Delhi: Sage, 2001); Lachman Khubchandani, Balochi (3), Hindko (3), Greater Punjabi 12
“Language and Education in the Indian (Pahari, Potohari) are subsumed under the 13
Subcontinent,”in S.May and N.H. Hornberger language head itself. English, sign language,
14
(eds),Encyclopedia of Language and Education,2nd Badeshi (which is dead) are excluded. Marwari,
15
edn, vol. 1 (New York: Springer Verlag, 2008). mentioned twice,is counted only once. Kundal
6 Hamza Alavi,“Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan,” Shahi, not mentioned in the Ethnologue, is, 16
Pakistan Progressive, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer however, included. See the author’s list of 17
1987), cited in Hamza Alavi and John Harriss languages in Tariq Rahman, “Multilingualism 18
(eds), Sociology of Developing Societies (London: and Language Vitality in Pakistan,” in Anju 19
Macmillan, 1989), pp. 222–46. “Pakistan and Saxena and Lars Borin (eds),Trends in Linguistics: 20
Islam:Ethnicity and Ideology,”in Fred Halliday Lesser-Known Languages of South Asia: Status and 21
and Hamza Alavi (eds), State and Ideology in the Policies, Case Studies and Applications of 22
Middle East and Pakistan (London: Macmillan Information Technology (Berlin and New York: 23
and New York: Monthly Review Press, 1987). Mouton, 2006), pp. 73–104.
24
7 S. Akbar Zaidi (ed.), Regional Imbalances and the 19 According to the Census of Pakistan 1951 and
National Question in Pakistan (Lahore:Vanguard, Census Report of Pakistan 1961 (Karachi:
25
1992). Government of Pakistan, 1951 and 1961), the 26
8 Tahir Amin, Ethno-National Movements of number of Pakistanis who commonly spoke 27
Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors English was less than 2 percent of the population 28
(Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1988). (Tables 7 and 8a and statements 5.1 and 5.5 29
9 Alavi,“Politics of Ethnicity,” p. 265. respectively).The present author calculated the 30
10 Naveed Hamid and Akmal Hussain,“Regional number of fluent and spontaneous speakers of 31
Inequalities and Capitalist Development: English (the westernized elite) from the figures 32
Pakistan’s Experience”; Hafiz A. Pasha and of those who appeared in British school
33
Tariq Hasan, “Development Ranking of examinations in 2003. For details see Tariq
34
Districts of Pakistan”; S. Akbar Zaidi, “The Rahman,“The Role of English in Pakistan,” in
Economic Bases of the National Question in Amy and Tollefson, p. 235. 35
Pakistan: An Indication,” in Zaidi, pp. 1–42, 20 The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 36
43–89, 90–138. (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1963). 37
11 Amin, p. 256. 21 Nizamuddin Nizamani, “Socio-Political 38
12 Feroz Ahmed, Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan Unrest and Vulnerable Human Security in 39
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998). Balochistan,” in At the Cross Roads: South Asian 40
13 Ahmed, Ethnicity and Politics, p. 158. Research, Policy and Development in a Globalized 41
14 Hussain Ahmad Khan, Re-Thinking Punjab:The World (Islamabad: Sustainable Development 42
Construction of Siraiki Identity (Lahore: National Policy Institute, 2007), pp. 245–55.
43
College of the Arts, 2004). 22 Declaration of the Oppressed Nations Movement,
15 Ishtiaq Ahmed, State, Nation and Ethnicity in adopted on 2 November,1998,Islamabad,cited
44
Contemporary South Asia (London and New in Hussain Khan, p. 115. 45
York: Pinter, 1996); Adeel Khan, Politics of 23 Badruddin Umar, The Emergence of Bangladesh: 46
Identity: Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Class Struggles in East Pakistan (1947–1958) 47
Pakistan (New Delhi: Sage, 2005). (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004), 48
244
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1 pp. 190–229. Also see Anwar Dil and Afia Dil, 39 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power,
2 Bengali Language Movement to Bangladesh trans. Gino Raymond and Matthew Adamson
3 (Lahore: Ferozsons: 2000), pp. 131–91. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 55.
4 24 The negative reaction of students to these 40 Bourdieu, p. 57
statements is given in Tariq Rahman, Language 41 Tariq Rahman,“Urdu as an Islamic Language,”
5
and Politics, pp. 87–88. Annual of Urdu Studies, 21 (2006), pp. 101–19.
6 25 Pakistan Observer (Dhaka English daily), 29 42 Tariq Rahman, Language, Ideology and Power:
7 January, 1952. Language-Learning Among the Muslims of Pakistan
8 26 “Report of the Enquiry into the Firing by the and North India (Karachi: Oxford University
9 Police at Dacca on 21 February 1952,” in Press, 2002), pp. 7–8, 16–18.
10 B. Umar (Comp.), Bhasha Ondolan Prasanga: 43 Sabiha Mansoor, Punjabi, Urdu, English in
11 Katipay Dolil (The Language Movements: Pakistan: A Sociolinguistic Study (Lahore:
12 Some Documents), vol. 2 (Dhaka: Bangla Vanguard, 1993); Language Planning in Higher
13 Academy, 1986), pp. 43, 48. Education: A Case Study of Pakistan (Karachi:
27 Dawn, 8 May, 1954. Oxford University Press, 2005).
14
28 M. S. Korejo, G. M. Syed: An Analysis of His 44 Tariq Rahman,“The Role of English in Pakistan
15 Political Perspectives (Karachi:Oxford University with special Reference to Tolerance and
16 Press, 1998). Also see his A Testament of Sindh Militancy,” in Amy and Tollefson, pp. 219–39.
17 Ethnic and Religious Extremism: A Perspective 45 Mansoor, Punjabi, Urdu, English, pp. 51–56.
18 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002). 46 Carol Myers-Scotton, “Elite closure as a
19 29 Details in Dawn,Hilal-e-Pakistan,Pakistan Times, Powerful Language Strategy: The African
20 etc. Case,” International Journal of the Sociology of
21 30 Feroz Ahmed, op. cit., pp. 41–60. Knowledge, 103 (1993), pp. 149–63.
22 31 Carina Jahani, Standardization and Orthography 47 Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (Karachi:
23 in the Balochi Language (Upsalla, Sweden: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 25.
Almquist and Wiksell, 1989), p. 233. 48 Report of the Commission on Student Problems and
24
32 M. S. Korejo, The Frontier Gandhi: His Place in Welfare: Summary of Important Observations and
25 History (Karachi: Oxford University Press, Recommendations (Islamabad: Government
26 1993), p. 18. of Pakistan, Ministry of Education, Central
27 33 Mohammad Waseem, Democratization in Bureau of Education, 1966), pp. 17–18.
28 Pakistan:A Study of the 2002 Elections (Karachi: 49 Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc: Inside Pakistan’s
29 Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 196. Military Economy (London: Pluto Press, 2007).
30 34 Husain Khan. 50 Rahman,Denizens,pp.53–56 (schools),123–25
31 35 Rahman, Language and Politics, ch. 11. For the (universities).
32 role of history in the marginalization of 51 GOP 2006,Table 6, p. 61.
Punjab and its language and literature, see 52 Hussain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and
33
Tahir Kamran, “Imagined Unity as Binary Military (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005).
34 Opposition to Regional Diversity: A study of 53 Sohail Abbas,Probing the Jihadi Mind (Islamabad:
35 Punjab as a ‘Silenced Space’ in the Pakistani National Book Foundation, 2007), pp. 90–95.
36 Epistemic Milieu,”in At the Cross Roads,p.302. 54 For details see Rahman,“The Role of English
37 36 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: in Pakistan,” in Amy and Tollefson, pp. 231–33.
38 Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 55 Tove Skuntabb Kangas, Linguistic Genocide in
39 (London and New York: Verso, 1983). Also Education or Worldwide Diversity and Human
40 see Anthony D. Smith, “The Nation: Real or Rights? (Mahwah, NJ, and London: Erlbaum,
41 Imagined,” in E. Mortimer (ed.), People, Nation 2000), p. 46. The major work on the
42 and State: The Meaning of Ethnicity and imperialistic role of English is by Roberet
Nationalism (London: IB Tauris, 1999). Phillipson, Linguistic Imperialism (Oxford:
43
37 B.Hirson,“Language in Control and Resistance University Press, 1992).
44 in South Africa,” African Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 56 David Crystal, Language Death (Cambridge:
45 319 (1981), pp. 219–37. University Press, 2000); David Nettle and
46 38 For Pashto,see LAD-F 12 October,1932,p.132; Suzanne Romaine, Vanishing Voices: The
47 for Baluchi, Brahvi and Pashto in Balochistan Extinction of the World’s Languages (New York:
48 see Tariq Rahman, Language and Politics, p. 168. Oxford University Press, 2000).

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57 Mansoor, Punjabi, Urdu, English, pp. 51–56. and Language Vitality in Pakistan,” in Anju 1
58 UNESCO, Position Paper:Teaching in the Mother Saxena and Lars Borin, pp. 73–104. 2
Tongue (Paris: UNESCO, 2003). 60 Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for a 3
59 A list of these languages; including written New Ummah (New York: Columbia University 4
material in them and the domains in which they Press and Centre d’ Études et de Recherche
5
are used is in Tariq Rahman,“Language Policy Internationales, Paris, 2004).
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Part V
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6 Crises of national unity
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6 Crises of national unity in India
7
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9 Punjab, Kashmir, and the northeast
10
11
12
13 Gurharpal Singh
14
15
16
17
18
19 Introduction While most serious students of Indian
20 national unity are likely to be weary of such an
21 The recent sixtieth anniversary of India’s optimistic reading, noting the importance of
22 independence (August 2007) was marked by events like Kargil (1999) or the potential of
23 the absence of the usual angst about national resurgent Hindu nationalism to decouple such
24 unity1 that has all too often been expressed in long-term trends,any meaningful understand-
25 familiar anxieties about territorial integration, ing of contemporary—and likely future—
26 separatist violence,and fissiparous tendencies.2 developments in this area needs to address how
27 Instead, the occasion was notable for the the Indian state has dealt with crises of national
28 celebration of India as an emerging economic unity in the 1980s and 1990s.The rest of this
29 power that is redefining conventional assump- chapter will review the literature on this
30 tions about its polity and helping to shape a subject. It then examines these approaches in
31 new architecture of peace and development in more detail with reference to Punjab, Jammu
32 South Asia. In this changed environment, and Kashmir and the northeastern states, each
33 which by happenstance has coincided with of which has followed different trajectories.
34 better relations with Pakistan (post-9/11) and Finally, the chapter assesses whether we have
35 China, some of the old intractable issues— entered a new phase in the understanding of
36 Jammu and Kashmir, the Indo-China border India’s national unity.
37 and northeastern states, and the periodic
38 regional tensions in Punjab—have begun to
39 unravel while other concerns such as energy, Understanding the crises of
40 development, and reservations’ policy now national unity
41 dominate the national agenda.Indeed,as India’s
42 economic development proceeds apace, it can In the 1980s and 1990s, the peripheral states
43 reasonably be conjectured that the issue of within the Indian Union became the battle-
44 national unity, which has traditionally been grounds for ethnonationalist and regionalist
45 associated with the management of the struggles. In a period of almost 20 years
46 peripheral regions in the northwest and the (1980–2000), nearly 100,000 people were
47 northeast, might begin to diminish in political killed in terrorist and counterinsurgency vio-
48 salience. lence as these regions tied down the majority

249
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of India’s armed forces.3 Such conflicts created and militant nativist movements that have 1
a state of high anxiety concerning violence flourished in these states off and on since 2
“against the nation,” giving rise, among other Independence are regularly associated with 3
things,to a virulent form of Hindu nationalism “asymmetrical warfare” and targeted 4
led by the BJP, which grew from a marginal “terrorism”directed against India from foreign 5
force in the early 1980s to a national governing countries and designed to wrest these 6
party by the late 1990s. This meteoric rise territories from Indian control. During the 7
was not unrelated to the inability of BJP’s Cold War, moreover, the polar alignments 8
opponents—whether the Congress or non- of South Asian states turned the peripheral 9
Congress parties—to manage the troubled states into battlegrounds for “proxy wars.” 10
borderland states, and climaxed in two For Pakistan, the humiliation of the loss of 11
dramatic showdowns with Pakistan as well:the Bangladesh,it is frequently argued,has resulted 12
Kargil war and the nuclear standoff between in renewed efforts since 1971 in support of 13
the two countries in 2002. External threats insurgents in India, whether they were 14
to national unity and internal politics of reli- operating in Kashmir,Punjab,or the northeast. 15
gious identity became inextricably inter- For China, the territorial dispute that led to 16
twined, resulting in official promotion of the 1962 war, and remains largely unresolved, 17
cultural nationalism, violence against religious led to support for secessionist groups in the 18
minorities (for example, pogroms against northeast. In more recent years, the Nepalese 19
Muslims in Gujarat and elsewhere),and efforts and Bangladeshi authorities have also been 20
to restructure the politics of the peripheral accused of harboring dissidents who have been 21
regions.The election of a congress-led United instrumental in acts of violence and terrorism 22
Progressive in Alliance coalition administration in the borderlands.5 In addition, the trans- 23
in 2004 marked something of a turning point national diasporas from these peripheral 24
but also coincided with external events (parti- borderlands—the Kashmiris, Sikhs, Nagas, 25
cularly the regional implications of 9/11) that and communities settled in the developed 26
have had profound consequences for India’s countries, for example—are seen to be espe- 27
relations with its neighbors. cially active in promoting the external threat by 28
Given these developments,in what ways has mobilizing resources, “soft power,” and 29
scholarship addressed the crises of national diplomacy against Indian sovereignty .6 30
unity since the 1980s? How do the approaches 31
utilized provide meaningful insights into the 32
Crises of national unity as result of
way these crises have been managed as well as 33
regional factors
indicators of future developments? In the 34
section that follows, we review some of the Although most commentators recognize the 35
approaches identified. importance of external factors in the instability 36
that has reigned in the peripheral regions,some 37
emphasize the primacy of regional factors as 38
Crises of national unity as result of
the principal causes of the failures of these 39
“external threat”
states to develop along the lines of “main- 40
Perhaps the most common approach to the stream”7 states. In Punjab, for instance, the 41
subject is to argue that the difficulties of man- militancy of the 1980s and 1990s was seen as 42
aging the peripheral states arise principally the direct outgrowth of the consequences of 43
from “external threats”; that is, historically the the Green Revolution, which accelerated the 44
malevolent policies of India’s neighbors, prin- process of agricultural modernization but also 45
cipally Pakistan and China, but also on occa- produced a Sikh political leadership frustrated 46
sions,Nepal and Bangladesh,with whom India with the limited economic developmental 47
has territorial disputes.4 Violent secessionist opportunities for the state.That this agitation 48
250

1 eventually took the form of religious dis-
2 crimination and ultimately turned violent was
3 due to the particular dynamics of social and
4 political formation in the state.8 Similarly, in
5 Jammu and Kashmir, the uniquely contested
6 political heritage of the state notwithstanding,
7 the mismanagement of the Abdullah-Farrouq
8 dynasty in the 1980s is seen as the root cause
9 of the Kashmiri intifada which began after the
10 rigged elections of 1987. As in Punjab, the
11 religious and social dynamics of Kashmir
12 political life transformed regional dissent into
13 a generalized revolt that was subsequently
14 exploited by external influences.9 And, also as
15 in Punjab, external intervention by Pakistani-
16 sponsored groups occurred after a prolonged
17 period of conflict among the major political
18 forces within the state over competing visions
19 of governance.A similar pattern prevails also in
20 the northeast, a region that is desperately
21 underdeveloped and beset by perennial con-
22 flicts between locals and new migrants,
23 between settled populations and tribals, and
24 between those who have cornered the scarce
25 resources of development and the rest. Most
26
commentators agree that these conflicts have
27 not, by and large, been contained by “deve-
28 lopmental federalism,”10 that is, the gradual
29 establishment of various subnational units and
30 institutions for this region, which is home to
31 myriad social groups, but rather have been
32 exacerbated with the onset of modernization
33 as ethnic group competition has intensified.
34 Heavy-handed interventions by New Delhi
35 have, more often than not, added fuel to the
36 fire. In short, the regionally based accounts
37 highlight the need to focus on regional pro-
38 cesses in the peripheral states which,because of
39 the unique social,religious and political forma-
40 tions,often reinforce cumulative cleavages and,
41 as a consequence, quickly assume an exag-
42 gerated national importance.11
43
44
Crises of national unity as result of
45
national factors
46
47 The main political science explanation put
48 forward for the crises of national unity in the
C R I S E S O F N AT I O N A L U N I T Y I N I N D I A
peripheral regions is that it is an acute mani-
festation of the centralizing tendencies un-
leashed by the post-Nehruvian leadership, in
particular Indira Gandhi.Whereas the objec-
tive tendencies within Indian politics since the
mid-1960s were towards regionalism, plural-
ism,and decentralization,12 the response of the
national leadership to these pressures was to
centralize power in New Delhi, a process that
coincided with the destruction and “deinstitu-
tionalization”13 of the Congress party from the
early 1970s onwards and climaxed with the
emergency (1975–77). It is alleged that Mrs
Gandhi both undermined the historic congress
organization and turned the conventional
relationship between congress and religious
minorities on its head by courting a Hindu
majoritarian vote bank during her last admini-
stration. In most mainstream states, the growth
of powerful regional parties had mediated these
centralizing pressures, but in the peripheral
states the unstable competition between the
regional, and often religious and ethnic parties
and Congress frustrated such a development
with the consequence that Congress’s pursuit
of regional and national dominance drove the
main political formations in these areas, which
were essentially moderate, first into agitational
politics, and, subsequently, the arms of mili-
tants. Although the dynamics of these develop-
ments were substantially different in Punjab,
Kashmir,and the northeast,what distinguished
the center’s policy were repeated impositions
of President’s Rule, efforts to undermine
regional parties, and virulent rhetoric against
these parties on the grounds that they were
anti-national.The key to reversing this process,
it was argued, lay essentially in restructuring
center–state relations to better reflect India as
a diverse, regional, multicultural, and de facto
multinational society.14
Inevitability of crises of national
unity due to “wrongsizing” of India’s
borders and because India is an
“ethnic democracy”
Although the centralization thesis is clearly
valid in some cases, it fails to explain the
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persistence and resilience of ethnonationalist Crises of national unity after 9/11 1

movements in the peripheral regions.Reflect- 2
Post-9/11, the war in Afghanistan and
ing more critically on these movements as well 3
Pakistan’s emergence as a frontline state in the
as the failure of the center to manage them, 4
“war on terror” have marked something of a
one school of thought has suggested its roots 5
turnabout in the relations among South Asian
might lie in the wrongsizing of India at 6
states. Coming as these events do on the back
independence, referring to the inheritance of 7
of the latest wave of globalization and national
undemarcated colonial borders and border- polices directed towards economic liberaliza- 8
lands over which the Indian National Congress tion,they have been seen as an opportunity for 9
exercised limited influence before 1947.15 rethinking the fraught relations among South 10
However, the partition seared the “lineaments Asian states that have all too often been char- 11
of India’s territorial boundaries deep into acterized by territorial disputes and nation- 12
the national consciousness . . . [through] the building failures. Central to this change has 13
popular sacralization of territory,”16 and in so been the normalization of relations between 14
doing created enduring dilemmas concerning India and Pakistan, which has led to the 15
how these regions were to be governed. Post- de-escalation of hostilities, a peace process 16
1947 experience suggests that governance in involving the disputed issue of Jammu & 17
these regions has veered between authori- Kashmir, and a reemphasis in both states on 18
tarianism and “violent control,” that is, where economic development.To what extent these 19
Indian nation and state building has been changes mark a fundamental shift in priorities 20
accompanied by regional “nation destroying.” remains to be seen, and one might question 21
The distinction between peripheral and main- whether it will be possible in the long term to 22
stream states, moreover, corresponds to a place territorial disputes such as Jammu & 23
religious divide in that the former have non- Kashmir on the backburner while devel- 24
Hindu majorities: (Kashmir [Muslim], Punjab opment imperatives further strengthen the 25
[Sikh], Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya processes of normalization and mutual eco- 26
[Christian], Arunachal Pradesh [Buddhist], nomic dependency.Despite these reservations, 27
Manipur [Christian and Nativist], Tripura [a the positive example of improved Indo-China 28
majority tribal population classified in the relations suggests that there are possibly new 29
census as “Hindu”] and Assam [similarly with avenues for redefining the Indo–Pakistan 30
a “Hindu” majority that includes a substantial relationship in ways that would provide a more 31
tribal/native population]).The religious com- enduring settlement of the crises of gover- 32
position of these regions has led some to nance in the peripheral regions while also 33
suggest that India is in fact a de facto ethnic disarming the powerful religious nationalisms 34
democracy accommodating majoritarian in both countries that have undergirded state 35
Hindu sentiment while violent control is exer- and nation formations since partition.19 36
cised over religious minorities in the peripheral 37
states. The inbuilt, structured predominance 38
of Hindu majoritarianism within Indian Punjab, Kashmir, and the 39
democracy—whether articulated through northeast 40
congress or BJP—creates a perpetual momen- 41
tum to administer the peripheral states through The general approaches outlined earlier are 42
the “official regime”17 and violent control. In useful as overarching explanations but need to 43
fact, because Indian and Hindu nationalism be contextualized with reference to regional 44
substantially define themselves largely in terms specificities and histories since 1947. It will be 45
of territory, crises of national unity arising out argued that their main value lies in providing 46
of the management of peripheral states are useful insights into how crises of national unity 47
inevitable.18 have been constructed, especially by institu- 48
252

1 tions and parties at the center of Indian politics,
2 while the role of regional institutions and
3 actors—the more important dimension—has
4 been largely overlooked, if not deliberately
5 misrepresented. In this section we reassess
6 the events in Punjab, Kashmir, and the
7 northeastern states in light of the literature
8 reviewed at the beginning of the chapter and
9 what has happened after post-crisis phases in
10 each case.
11
12
Punjab
13
14 Apart from the wars with Pakistan (1948,1962,
15 1965, 1971, 1999), it is often argued that the
16 Punjab crisis (1984–93) was the most serious
17 challenge to India’s national unity since
18 Independence. The campaign for regional
19 autonomy led by the main Sikh political party,
20 the Akali Dal, from 1982 onwards, climaxed in
21 Operation Blue Star (June 1984) in which the
22 Indian Army stormed the Golden Temple, the
23 Sikhs’holiest shrine.The fallout from this event
24 led to the assassination of Mrs Indira Gandhi,
25 pogroms against Sikhs in several places in Delhi
26 and elsewhere,and almost a decade of sustained
27 militant and counterinsurgency violence in
28 which,by conservative estimates,some 25,000
29 people were killed.The number of involuntary
30 disappearances and illegal detainees was never
31 ascertained, although the latter were estimated
32 to vary between 20,000 and 45,000.20 At the
33 height of the insurgency in the early 1990s,
34 almost a quarter of a million military and
35 paramilitary personnel were engaged in
36 counterinsurgency operations against groups
37 campaigning for a separate Sikh state of
38 Khalistan. These groups were not without
39 significant popular support: in the 1989 Lok
40 Sabha elections, their representatives or
41 supporters won 10 of the 13 parliamentary
42 seats from Punjab and captured the majority
43 of popular support; and in June 1991, had the
44 newly elected national congress government
45 not postponed the impending assembly elec-
46 tions in Punjab, the militants would certainly
47 have won and made a declaration for a new
48 independent state of Khalistan. In the event,
C R I S E S O F N AT I O N A L U N I T Y I N I N D I A
Congress aborted these polls, launched an
aggressive counterinsurgency operation against
the militants, and held elections in extremely
difficult circumstances that were boycotted by
the Sikh militants and moderates, resulting in
a Congress landslide that was used as pretext to
intensify the “war on Sikh separatism.” By the
end of 1993, most leading Sikh militants and
their organizations had been eliminated, the
moderates had been muzzled, and Punjab
was being hailed as a model for combating
separatism.21
The conventional explanation of the Punjab
crisis is to argue that it was mainly the outcome
of centralization pressures unleashed by Mrs
Gandhi. Brass, in his systematic review of the
subject, argues convincingly that Mrs Gandhi
deliberately engineered the Punjab problem in
order to cover the weaknesses of her party,
which had become increasingly personalized,
as well as to cultivate a new constituency of
Hindu majoritarianism. In so doing, Mrs
Gandhi subverted the unwritten rules of ethnic
conflict management that had been carefully
crafted by her father.22
There are,however,a number of limitations
with this approach. First, it does not satis-
factorily explain why centralization drives
should have disproportionately adverse conse-
quences for India’s religious minorities,
especially a minority like the Sikhs, who were
so effectively integrated into state structures
(notably the army and bureaucracy). Second,
the differences in the centralization drives of
Nehruvian and post-Nehruvian leadership
were one of degree rather than kind: a more
critical reading of the Nehruvian era in Punjab
(and Kashmir and the northeast) reveals, even
by a set of objective criteria,the high degree of
“bossism,” constitutional subversion, and
authoritarian rule. Third, few scholars, Brass
included, recognize that underpinning the
Sikh demand for autonomy was a parallel claim
to sovereignty which would have been difficult
to accommodate within the existing structure
of Indian federalism. Indeed, the Sikh Magna
Carta,the Anandpur Sahib Resolution,around
which Sikh demands for autonomy were
253
G U R H A R PA L S I N G H

articulated,called for confederalism rather than to achieve Sikh national aspirations in post- 1
neofederalism. And fourth, the Punjab crisis Independence India. This failure was also 2
was managed without a restructuring of indicative of a type of statecraft used by the 3
center–state relations. To be sure, a number Indian state to manage ethnic conflict in 4
of developments since the early 1990s— Punjab. Repetitive symbolic accommodation 5
economic liberalization, the legal obstacles to was used in place of real tangible concessions, 6
the imposition of direct rule from New Delhi with special emphasis on the co-option of Sikh 7
by means of the imposition of President’s Rule, political leadership.Between 1982 and 1984,as 8
and the regionalization of Indian political the negotiations with the Center proved futile, 9
formations—have undercut the pressures Bhindranwale,a charismatic leader,was able to 10
towards centralization, if not reversed them, revive a vision of Sikh nationhood by drawing 11
but these secular changes are still unable to on a rich pool of Sikh religious and historic 12
accommodate Sikh demands, which remain symbolism that cut the ground from under 13
largely unrealized.23 moderate Akali politicians. Of course, this 14
Given the obvious shortcomings of the occurred at a time when there was a rapid 15
centralization thesis, how can we better commercialization of Punjab’s agriculture, 16
understand the causes and consequences of the external support to Sikh militants from 17
Punjab crisis? Pakistan, and growing involvement in Punjab 18
In a historically based account, I have affairs by the Sikh diaspora, but these were 19
argued that events that led up to 1984 and auxiliary factors which, on their own, could 20
unfolded afterwards have to be situated in a not have marshaled the resources of Sikh 21
broader context that recognizes how claims of ethnonationalism. 22
Sikh ethnonationalism have been accommo- Similarly, the role of the central congress 23
dated within the Indian Union since 1947.24 government needs to be reassessed against 24
Such accommodation has tried to undercut traditional explanations. By the 1980s the 25
Sikh claims to sovereignty by exercising creation of a Punjabi-speaking state had 26
hegemonic control, which makes an “overtly provided a bridgehead for resistance against 27
violent ethnic contest for state power either hegemonic control, which had become 28
‘unthinkable’ or ‘unworkable’ on [the] part of increasingly thin.The Nehruvian approach of 29
the subordinated communities,” and has co- disarming Sikh ethnonationalism through 30
existed with the formal structures of democ- accommodation, co-option, and symbolic 31
racy.25 When hegemonic control has broken agreements that were never implemented, had 32
down, as after 1984, violent control has been more or less exhausted the limits of statecraft 33
imposed, although not as often as in other by the mid-1960s. Mrs Gandhi’s innovations 34
peripheral states. included more direct interventions in Punjab 35
In Punjab after 1947, hegemonic control politics,coupled with a search for an alternative 36
was exercised by Congress, which successfully hegemonizing ideology in the form of Hindu 37
divided Sikh elites by co-option, accom- revivalism. If the Akali agitation of 1982–84 38
modation, and symbolic agreements while ultimately led to disaster,it was mainly because 39
thwarting, until 1966, the linguistic reorgan- Mrs Gandhi was hemmed in by the compul- 40
ization of the state. However, the reorganiza- sions of national politics and could not 41
tion was subsequently hemmed in by so much entertain making concessions to Akalis that 42
conditionality that it led to the autonomy would have meant dismantling hegemonic 43
agitation that climaxed in Operation Blue Star. control and surrendering to the discourse, and 44
This agitation marked the culmination of Sikh potential realities, of autonomy and secession. 45
ethnonationalist resistance, a “freedom move- Although, after 1984, attempts were made 46
ment,” which reopened the Sikh national to re-establish hegemonic control with the 47
question by drawing on the cumulative failures Rajiv-Longowal Accord (1985), the failure of 48
254

1 the center to deliver on the terms of the accord
2 undermined the newly elected moderate Akali
3 government while emboldening militants to
4 declare an open campaign for a Sikh state.
5 Thereafter the center quickly reverted to
6 violent control in which counterinsurgency
7 operations practiced in the northeastern states
8 were heavily utilized, with minimal regard for
9 political legitimacy in the region, resulting in
10 well-publicized human rights abuses.From the
11 mid-1980s to the early 1990s,the annual death
12 toll from militant and counterinsurgency
13 violence regularly hovered around 4,000 to
14 5,000 as the state became an area of darkness,
15 with the virtual collapse of the civilian admini-
16 stration and the rule of paramilitaries and the
17 police. In a crescendo of violence in 1992
18 involving 250,000 military and paramilitary
19 personnel, the militants were eliminated and
20 the khaki assembly elections held that restored
21 a Congress administration to the state.
22 The return to normalcy in Punjab through
23 the use of violent control by successive union
24 governments between 1986 and 1993 had one
25 primary objective: to restructure Sikh politics
26 within the framework of hegemonic control
27 that had characterized the pattern of Punjab
28 politics since 1947. Sikh ethnonationalism,
29 which had underpinned the politics of the
30 militants, was intellectually discredited and
31 physically smashed, with the result that, given
32 the limited resources available for Sikh nation-
33 building, a return to hegemonic control was
34 the only realistic strategy open to Sikh political
35 leadership, although this would occur only
36 after some time given Congress investment in
37 violent control.26 Indeed,this is precisely what
38 happened with the return of the Akali Dal to
39 power in the state in the assembly elections of
40 1997. The Akali Dal not only eschewed a
41 renewal of a campaign of demands for auto-
42 nomy that have so far remained unrealized,but
43 also formed a strategic alliance with the BJP to
44 secure a national patron against the center’s
45 continued intervention in the state. Since
46 1997, the Akali Dal and congress have alter-
47 nated in power in the state while the leadership
48 of both parties has sought to deflect Sikh
C R I S E S O F N AT I O N A L U N I T Y I N I N D I A
ethnonationalist aspirations into the discourse
of development in light of the post-Green
Revolution collapse of agriculture and the new
opportunities opened up by economic liberal-
ization. Nevertheless, these efforts to erase the
Punjab problem underestimate its potential to
evoke a multiplicity of unsettling memories for
the Sikh community, which could yet under-
mine the foundations of hegemonic control,
especially if large sections of Punjab’s pea-
santry remain unable to secure gains from the
growth of the non-agricultural sector of the
economy.27
Jammu & Kashmir
As in Punjab, developments in Kashmir in the
1980s and 1990s posed a serious challenge to
national unity.Yet most of the literature that
has addressed this subject focused on either the
changes in national government policy in New
Delhi or regional factors as the main drivers of
this threat.28 Although this approach recog-
nized the rupture caused by the rigged
elections to the regional assembly in 1987, it
fails to address adequately the periodic oscilla-
tions between violent control and hegemonic
control, or the new dimension created by the
intensity of violent control and its intersection
with developments in Afghanistan since the
withdrawal of the Soviet forces and the
engagement of Pakistani-based jihad groups
in the Kashmiri insurgency. The latter
undoubtedly further internationalized the
insurgency, leading to Kargil (1999) and,
indirectly, the nuclear confrontation between
India and Pakistan in 2002, but in retrospect it
also provided a new point of departure in
Indo–Pak relations after 2002 that hold the
potential to unlock the dispute that has
blighted relations between the two countries
since Independence.
The decision of the Hindu ruler of a
Muslim majority kingdom to accede to India
in October 1947 resulted in hostilities between
India and Pakistan, United Nations inter-
vention,and a de facto division of the province
in January 1949 along the ceasefire line.Jammu
255
G U R H A R PA L S I N G H

& Kashmir’s accession to India was secured by marred by the need to straddle regional 1
concessions to Kashmiri nationalism, most nationalism and the limits of autonomy 2
notably Article 370 of the Indian constitution imposed by New Delhi; his efforts to establish 3
that provided a substantial measure of auto- an all-India oppositional front for more 4
nomy.However,at the time of United Nations autonomy resulted, first, in his dismissal, and, 5
intervention in the dispute, this article was then, his return to power in alliance with 6
projected as a transitional measure towards the Congress in the rigged assembly elections of 7
exercise of self-determination by Kashmiris. 1987. It was the rigging of these elections and 8
Nehru personally gave an open pledge to the unwillingness to recognize the growing 9
ensure that the “fate of Kashmir is to be support of the Muslim United Front, that 10
ultimately decided by the people,” and triggered the uprising in the Kashmir valley 11
accepted the Security Council resolution of from 1987 onwards. Thereafter, the separatist 12
April 1948 that the dispute should be “decided groups (Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front 13
through democratic method of free and and Hizbul Mujahideen) transformed decades 14
impartial plebiscite.” Nevertheless, this com- of ethnic oppression, into a generalized 15
mitment soon waned as Congress first pro- uprising against the Indian state.Between 1990 16
moted National Conference of Kashmir and 1995 25,000 people were killed in 17
nationalists, led by Sheikh Abdullah, and then, Kashmir, almost two-thirds by Indian armed 18
in a volte face as a result of Hindu nationalist forces; Kashmiris put the figure at 50,000.29 In 19
pressure in 1952–53, Nehru began the addition, 150,000 Kashmiri Hindus fled the 20
piecemeal integration of Jammu and Kashmir valley to settle in the Hindu majority region of 21
into the Indian Union.Abdullah, the “Lion of Jammu. In 1991, Amnesty International 22
Kashmir,”was interned for almost two decades estimated that 15,000 people were being 23
while a compliant state legislative assembly, detained in the state without trial.30 24
established by extensive vote rigging,opted for The Indian government’s response to the 25
merger with the Indian Union in 1956. Kashmir crisis has been to use violent control, 26
Thereafter, India’s response to renewal of the justified according to four principles: that the 27
Security Council resolution (in March 1957) insurgency is externally supported and directed 28
for a “free and impartial plebiscite conducted by Pakistan; that it is rooted in Islamic 29
under the auspices of the United Nations”was fundamentalism which poses a serious threat to 30
to cloak its integrationist intent under the Indian state secularism; that the separatist 31
pretext of the Cold War threat emanating from movements have no legitimate claim to 32
the US policy of encirclement that included a independence; and that the insurgency is a 33
military alliance with Pakistan. threat to India’s overall security, territorial 34
Three wars (Indo-China [1962], and Indo- integrity, and nationhood.31 In furtherance of 35
Pakistan [1965 and 1971]) and the emergence these objectives, the Indian Army and para- 36
of India as an atomic power (1974) convinced militaries, aided by lumpen counterinsurgents, 37
Abdullah of the unattainability of the demand were unleashed against Kashmiri separatists to 38
for Kashmiri sovereignty. Towards the end of contain the violence and re-establish control. 39
his life, he signed an accord with Mrs Gandhi This strategy was partially successful and paved 40
(1975) that recognized Kashmir as a “consti- the way for fresh elections in September 1996, 41
tuent unit of the union of India” in return for which produced a dismal turnout of less than 42
the formal survival of Article 370, although its 30 percent, and led to the reelection of 43
actual provisions were extensively diluted in Farooq.32 But this “restoration” was soon 44
the application of central powers to the state. undermined by the conflict between India and 45
The accord enabled Abdullah to nurture a Pakistan over Kargil (1999) and the mobiliza- 46
political dynasty, and on his death (1982), his tion by both countries in 2002 following the 47
son Farooq took over. Farooq’s tenure was terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament that 48
256

1 brought the two countries to the brink of a
2 nuclear war.33 In the fallout and the emerging
3 peace process brokered by the US,34 new
4 assembly elections in 2002 marked a firm
5 rejection of the dynastic National Conference
6 of Farooq and brought to power a Congress-
7 PDP (People’s Democratic Party, a progressive
8 regional party) coalition that has begun a
9 dialogue both with New Delhi and the local
10 militant groups. The outcomes of these pro-
11 cesses will be determined by the broader peace
12 process with Pakistan, but India’s determina-
13 tion not to alter the boundary or “abandon the
14 people on the other side of Jammu and
15 Kashmir”(Azad Kashmir) in favor of a “people-
16 centric approach”35 is unlikely to provide a new
17 legitimacy for governance in the province or
18 undermine the claims for Kashmiri self-
19 determination, or, accession to Pakistan.
20 Indeed, India’s response to the Kashmir
21 dispute in the post-2002 dialogue with
22 Pakistan has been to pursue a piecemeal
23 approach rather than a grand settlement, one
24 that aims to make borders irrelevant rather than
25 redraw them. This approach, if allowed to
26 develop to its logical conclusion by India and
27 Pakistan, holds the potential of re-establishing
28 political autonomy in Kashmir.However,given
29 the bitter rivalry between the two countries
30 for control of the state’s territory, it is likely to
31 be a punctuated process, whose outcome will
32 be determined by the enduring difficulties of
33 settled governance in Pakistan, on the one
34 hand, and India’s vast experience in managing
35 a “people-centered” approach to maintain its
36 continued sovereignty over the province,
37 whether through hegemonic or violent con-
38 trol, on the other hand.
39
40
Northeastern states
41
42 In the northeastern states, Indian nation and
43 state building have been bitterly contested
44 since Partition. After 50 years of independence,
45 the region is still tormented by separatist
46 insurrection, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism,
47 with some of the movements having been
48 campaigning for independence since before
C R I S E S O F N AT I O N A L U N I T Y I N I N D I A
1947. The original inhabitants of the region,
nearly half of whom are from aboriginal tribes,
are uncertain of their place, whether within
India or outside it.In a visit to the area in 1996,
the former Prime Minister, H. D. Deve
Gowda, acknowledged that people in the
northeast feel New Delhi treats them like a
stepmother and pledged to provide basic
services to bring the region “to the standards
in the rest of the country.”
In August 1947 Nehru’s response to self-
determination movements in this region was
blunt: “We can give you complete autonomy
but never independence. No state, big or small,
in India will be allowed to remain independent.
We will use all our influence and power to
suppress such tendencies.”36 Thereafter the
strategic importance of this area in state expan-
sion led to state building and “nation destroy-
ing” as the inaccessible regions were brought
within the parameters of New Delhi’s rule.
Where economic exploitation of the region’s
vast natural resources resulted in indigenous
opposition to migration from the mainland, a
variety of administrative and constitutional
provisions were adopted to placate tribal
sentiment,including the creation of tribal zones
and councils, autonomous districts, union
territories and,eventually,new states.According
to one commentator, state building in the face
of separatist pressures has followed a three-step
strategy:“to fight the insurgency with military
force for some time;then,when the rebels seem
to be tiring,offer negotiations;and finally,when
the rebels are convinced that no matter what
the casualties are on either side, they are not
going to be able to secede, win them over with
the offer of constitutional sops, invariably
resulting in power being given to them in the
resulting elections.”37 Although the same
commentator emphasizes the capacity of the
Indian state to control these movements, he is
silent on numerous cases where constitutional
rehabilitation (“sops”) has been followed by
renewed struggles, violence, and endemic
terrorism. Since the 1950s, the histories of
Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura and
Manipur have been filled with “accords” with
257
G U R H A R PA L S I N G H

separatist groups signed by New Delhi that ful influences in mitigating these tensions as 1
remain unimplemented.In Assam,as in Punjab, well as strengthening New Delhi’s hold over 2
much of the resentment that fuelled the the traditionally “ungovernable” northeast. 3
separatist movement was the failure of New 4
Delhi to deliver on the regional accord agreed 5
in August 1985.This failure revived the fortunes Conclusion: Re-assessing crises 6
of the United Liberation Front for Assam, of national unity 7
resulting in the repeated deployment of the 8
army to crush the movement. In light of the evaluation of the three case 9
Unlike Kashmir or Punjab, coercion studies, what conclusions can we draw about 10
tempered by minimal consent has been the the contemporary understanding of crises of 11
main strategy by which New Delhi has main- national unity? How are these understandings 12
tained its hold on the northeastern states.In this likely to shape the future course of policy in 13
sparsely populated region, what is surprising is managing these crises and their potential 14
not the willingness of the insurgents to accept implications for India’s relations with its 15
hegemonic control in face of overwhelming neighbors? 16
odds against any other alternative, but their An optimistic reading would suggest that the 17
determination to sustain such opposition to the sixtieth anniversary of India’s Independence in 18
Indian state for so long. Current developments 2007 marked a decisive turning point in the 19
suggest that these states have been far from nation’s history, a new age of equipoise in 20
pacified or politically integrated into the Indian which a critical threshold has been crossed in 21
Union.The emergence of a first generation of which peripheral regions will become increas- 22
educated youth among these communities ingly less important in setting the parameters 23
combined with a growing realization of India’s of national policy.The significance previously 24
“internal colonialism”—Assam produces 70 attached to these regions is likely to be displaced 25
percent of India’s oil and the bulk of its tea— by new concerns such as economic develop- 26
has strengthened the arguments and the support ment and redistribution policies, particularly 27
base for separatism. with the growing mobilization of dalits and 28
As in Kashmir, geopolitical changes are lower castes. India’s territorial integrity, always 29
likely to have a significant impact on the future fragile in these regions,is no longer an issue for 30
of separatist and insurgency movements in this dispute or contestation. India’s emerging 31
volatile region. India’s increasing rapproche- economic might, like that of China before it, 32
ment with China—the territorial dispute over will ensure that such contestations,as in the case 33
the Indo-China border notwithstanding—has of Tibet, simply wither away. It is perhaps 34
removed one of the leading patrons of the because of this new emerging reality that India’s 35
separatist groups. Similarly, India’s close more belligerent neighbors (notably Pakistan) 36
relations with Burma, and efforts by both have redefined their strategic relationship from 37
countries to develop this region economically, hostility to diplomacy. This turn marks a 38
offer new horizons as well as potential risks in decisive shift in understanding the new 39
what has traditionally been India’s Afghanistan, economic realities in South Asia, with regional 40
that is, a lawless borderland that has tradi- economic cooperation becoming the principal 41
tionally been hostile to modernization and driver of change,and new patterns of economic 42
an intrusive central state. And while the integration are also likely to be accompanied 43
Indo–Bangladesh relationship remains fraught by alternative forms of regionalization and de- 44
with persistent tension over immigration, centralization. In the long term, these changes 45
border lines, and use of river waters, India’s could also redefine for a globalized age the rigid 46
demand for Bangladeshi natural gas and other post-1947 constructions of national unity in 47
Bangladeshi goods are likely to exercise power- South Asia. 48
258

1 A less optimistic reading from the case
2 studies,by the same token,would acknowledge
3 the profound changes that have taken place
4 both within the geopolitics of South Asia and
5 within India politics,but would also offer more
6 cautious insights about the potential of the
7 Indian state to manage the peripheral regions
8 and their capacity to invoke crises of national
9 unity in the future. As the case studies have
10 demonstrated, there appears to have been little
11 innovation in the way the peripheral regions
12 have been managed since the 1980s compared
13 with their handling in the 1950s and 1960s.
14 There are, of course, significant regional and
15 historical differences,but as a general rule their
16 administration has oscillated between hege-
17 monic and violent control. Even the attempts
18 to respond to post-9/11 developments are
19 permeated with efforts to create new hege-
20 monies, for example, by using the language of
21 people-centered approaches, or by regularly
22 restructuring the politics of these regions
23 through the ballot box.
24 Perhaps the main reason why the peripheral
25 regions are unlikely to decline in their ability
26 to create issues of national unity is that Indian
27 nationalism defines itself primarily in terri-
28 torial terms that are heavily encoded with
29 images of loss and “vivisection” at partition.
30 Mainly because Nehru and other Congress
31 elites were exceptionally successful in using
32 Partition to embed beliefs about the new state’s
33 borders, the mere questioning of these beliefs
34 subsequently became synonymous with sub-
35 version. Indeed, the self-determination move-
36 ments in the peripheral regions have provided
37 a mirror to the distorted image of Indian
38 nation–and state–building that historically
39 failed to command legitimacy in the Muslim
40 majority areas, and since 1947 has struggled to
41 accommodate effectively states with majority
42 non-Hindu populations. Such an accommo-
43 dation is possible, especially if the trends
44 outlined in this chapter take hold. For it to be
45 successful, however, it would have to over-
46 come two major obstacles:Congress’s historical
47 soft Hindutva and the BJP’s more strident
48 vision that sometimes speaks of wrongsizing
C R I S E S O F N AT I O N A L U N I T Y I N I N D I A
India through “akhand Bharat” (suggesting a
united India that incorporates Pakistan and
Bangladesh).
Notes
1 The focus of this chapter is on the crises of
national unity that have posed a threat to India’s
territorial integrity as a result of ethnic,
secessionist and/or regionalist movements in
the peripheral states in the 1980s and 1990s.
2 The year 1997 provides an interesting contrast
with 2007. For coverage of some of the
literature and wider implications,see Gurharpal
Singh, Ethnic Conflict in India: A Case-Study of
Punjab (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), ch.xii.
3 In Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab, according
to widely cited figures, at least 60,000 and
25,000 were killed, respectively.
4 See Maya Chadda, Ethnicity, Security and
Separatism in India (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1997).
5 See, for example, J. N. Dixit, India and Pakistan
in War and Peace (London: Routledge, 2002).
6 See Government of India, White Paper on the
Punjab Agitation (New Delhi, 1984). For soft
power, see Joseph Nye, Soft Power:The Means to
Success in World Politics (NewYork:Public Affairs,
2004). For Nye, the term soft power is used in
international relations theory to describe the
ability of states to indirectly influence the
behavior or interests of other political bodies
through cultural or ideological means. The
South Asian diasporas of these regions in the
west have been quite influential in utilizing
cultural and ideological means to advance their
case.
7 Soon after Partition, policymakers in New
Delhi, including Nehru, established a clear
distinction, especially following the demands
for linguistic reorganization of Indian states,
between the border, or peripheral states, where
special considerations applied, and the “main-
stream” or “heartland states,” where such con-
siderations were unimportant. The distinction
became especially popular in general discourse
during Mrs Indira Gandhi’s last administration
(1980–84).
8 See Gurharpal Singh, “Understanding the
‘Punjab Problem,’” Asian Survey,Vol. 27, No. 2
(December 1987), pp. 1,268–77.
259
G U R H A R PA L S I N G H

9 Balraj Puri, Kashmir:Towards Insurgency (New Gurharpal Singh and Ian Talbot (eds), Punjabi 1
Delhi: Orient Longman, 1995). Identity: Continuity and Change (New Delhi: 2
10 The term is Dasgupta’s; see Jyotirindra Manohar, 1996), pp. 159–85. 3
Dasgupta, “Democracy, Development and 21 Shekhar Gupta, India Redefines its Role 4
Federalism: Some Implications of Constructive (Oxford: University Press and IISS, 1995). 5
Constitutionalism in India,”in Subrata K.Mitra 22 See Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism, ch. v.
6
and Ditmar Rothermund (eds), Legitimacy and 23 Gurharpal Singh, “The Punjab Crisis since
Conflict in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 7
1984: A Reassessment,” Ethnic and Racial
1997), pp. 82–103. Studies,Vol. 18, No. 3 (1995), pp. 476–93.
8
11 What distinguishes the peripheral regions is 24 Singh, Ethnic Conflict in India. 9
their non-Hindu majorities. The religious 25 See Brendan O’Leary and Arthur Paul, 10
cleavage in which violence is sometimes “Introduction: Northern Ireland as the Site of 11
directed against Hindus has played a central role State- and Nation-Building Failures,” in John 12
in the construction of threats to national unity. McGarry and Brendan O’Leary (eds), The 13
12 See, in particular, Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Future of Northern Ireland (Oxford: Clarendon 14
Nationalism:Theory and Comparison (New Delhi: Press, 1990), p. 9. 15
Sage, 1991), chs iv–vi. 26 This point was made by Singh, “The Punjab 16
13 The term “deinstitutionalization”has been used Crisis.” 17
with reference to the Congress Party under the 27 For a detailed discussion of the challenges facing
leadership of Mrs Indira Gandhi,in particular in 18
the Punjab economy,see World Bank,Resuming 19
two senses: first, with reference to the destruc- Punjab’s Prosperity: The Opportunities and
tion of the historic Congress Party organization 20
Challenges Ahead (Washington: World Bank,
and,second,with reference to the enfeeblement 21
2004).
of state institutions. For further details, see Atul
28 See Puri, Kashmir; Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in
22
Kholi, Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing 23
Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace
Crisis of Governability (Cambridge: University 24
(Cambridge: University Press, 1997); Vernon
Press, 1991). 25
Hewitt, Towards the Future? Jammu and Kashmir
14 Brass, pp. 212–13. 26
in the 21st Century (Cambridge:Portland Books,
15 For an explanation of the concepts of “right-
2001);Sumantra Bose,Kashmir:Roots of Conflict, 27
sizing”and “wrongsizing”and its application to
Path to Peace (Cambridge, MA, and London: 28
India, see Brendan O’Leary et al. (eds), Right-
sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders
Harvard University Press, 2003). 29
29 K. Balagopal, “Kashmir: Self-determination, 30
(Oxford: University Press, 2001), Introduction
and ch. v. Communal and Democratic Rights,” Economic 31
16 Dipankar Gupta, The Context of Ethnicity: Sikh and Political Weekly,Vol.32,No.43 (2 November, 32
Identity in a Comparative Perspective (New Delhi: 1997), pp. 2,916–21. 33
Oxford University Press, 1996), p.17. 30 See Amnesty International, India:Torture, Rape, 34
17 The “official regime” is here defined as the and Death in Custody (London, 1992).
35
organizations of the Indian state in these regions 31 Jyotindra Nath Dixit, “Kashmir: The Con-
36
and their employees (including civil servants) temporary Geo-Political Implications for India
and Regional Stability,” unpublished paper 37
and political formations that lend them per-
presented at the School of Oriental and African 38
manent support.
Studies, London, 8 April, 1994, pp. 6–7. 39
18 This argument is most clearly developed
by Singh, Ethnic Conflict in India, chs iii and 32 India Today, 31 October, 1996. 40
xii. 33 Gurharpal Singh, “On the Nuclear Precipice: 41
19 For useful insight into the “composite dialogue” India, Pakistan and the Kashmir crisis,” 42
between the two countries, see Dennis Kux, OpenDemocracy, 7 August, 2002, http://www. 43
India-Pakistan Negotiations: Is Past Still Prologue? opendemocracy.net/conflict-india_pakistan/ 44
(Washington, DC: United States Institute for article_194.jsp, accessed 23 November, 2006. 45
Peace, 2006). 34 Gurhapral Singh, “The Indo-Pakistan Summit: 46
20 Shinder S. Thandi, “Counterinsurgency and Hope for Kashmir?”OpenDemocracy,16 February, 47
Political Violence in Punjab, 1980–1994,” in 2004,http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict- 48
260
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1 india_pakistan/article_1738.jsp, accessed 15 36 Neville Maxwell, India, the Nagas and the

2 November, 2006. North-East (London: Minority Rights Group,
3 35 Comments of Shyam Saran, Prime Minister’s 1980), p. 4.
4 special envoy on Kashmir, The Tribune, 37 Shekhar Gupta, India Redefines its Role, p. 25.
5 Chandigarh, 23 November, 2006 (online).
6
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18 2
3
4
5
Communal and caste politics 6
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and conflicts in India 8
9
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11
Steven I. Wilkinson 12
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17
18
Introduction The most important fact to understand 19
about the development of caste and communal 20
There is often a tendency to treat caste and politics and conflicts since Independence is 21
communal conflicts and politics as separate. In that, politically and constitutionally, caste is 22
fact,however,the degree to which one of these a privileged category, one that can deliver 23
identities is salient in politics or conflicts at a tangible benefits to communities and voters 24
particular time is often linked to the institu- (e.g., reservations in education, employment, 25
tional and economic incentives supporting and sometimes in politics) in a way that reli- 26
mobilization around the other, or to another gious identities cannot. So while attempts have 27
identity such as language or class.1 André been made, at various times since Indepen- 28
Béteille pointed out long ago for instance that dence, to use anti-Muslim, anti-Christian, and 29
communal politics seemed to take a Hindu– (much more rarely) anti-Sikh mobilizations and 30
Muslim pattern in the north but have a caste violence to create a Hindu majority for a 31
particular political party (and that party has not 32
pattern in the south, and he noted that even
always been the BJP), these attempts have only 33
within the south there was substantial regional
been successful in the short term, and have 34
variation, with Muslim political mobilization
typically foundered on the much greater 35
strongest in those areas such as Kerala and parts
resonance of caste appeals to the state,local,and 36
of Andhra, where the non-Brahman move-
even the national electorate.3 From 1989 to 37
ment had been weakest.2 In the late 1980s and
1992, for instance, it seemed as if the Ayodhya 38
early 1990s, the interconnectedness between campaign around the Babri Masjid and other 39
the salience of caste and communal identities “disputed” sites, which involved large-scale 40
became even more apparent in the violent yatras (processions) and demonstrations across 41
political contest between “mandir” and India, involving millions of participants, might 42
“mandal”:the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and be capable of generating a permanent Hindu 43
the Sangh Parivar, on the one hand, pushing a majority for the BJP. On the back of the 44
policy of Hindutva (“Hinduness”), and parties campaign to build a Ram Mandir on the site of 45
representing a variety of backward and lower the Babri mosque,the BJP’s representation shot 46
caste interests pushing a policy of caste up from two seats in the Lok Sabha to 88 in the 47
reservations. December 1989 elections,and then to 120 seats 48
262
 C O M M U N A L A N D CAST E P O L I T I C S A N D C O N F L I CTS I N I N D I A
1 in 1991. But, after the destruction of the Babri
2 Masjid on 6 December, 1992, the national
3 Hindutva agitation temporarily ran out of
4 steam, as the immediate goals seemed to have
5 been achieved, the violent destruction of the
6 mosque and subsequent communal riots turned
7 off many supporters, and the Congress gov-
8 ernment of P. V. Narasimha Rao imposed
9 emergency rule on four BJP-ruled states.The
10 BJP, contrary to its own expectations, then
11 suffered very severe electoral reversals in 1993
12 state elections in these states at the hands of
13 parties such as the Bahujan Samaj Party and
14 Samajwadi party in UP, which promised
15 concrete policies to particular lower castes
16 rather than the unclear future benefits of a
17 Hindu Raj.
18 Turning now to communal conflicts, the
19 fundamental fact about communal polarization
20 and violence in post-Independence India is
21 that whether it happens is the outcome of
22 political decisions. Riots are often, although
23 not always,fomented for political purposes,and
24 they are prevented or stopped by the state
25 police and administration when it is in the
26 interests of those who control the state govern-
27 ment to do so.4 To understand the political
28 incentives facing the state politicians who
29 control the 28 state governments which in turn
30 control the police is therefore the most impor-
31 tant factor in understanding why communal
32 violence takes place.
33 Riots pay political dividends: they unify
34 Hindus behind the party that seems best able
35 to defend “Hindu” interests, they help break
36 up the coalitions of other parties, and they
37 temporarily make the Hindu–Muslim cleavage
38 appear more significant than other political
39 issues,such as caste,urban vs.rural cleavages,or
40 development. Christophe Jaffrelot has rightly
41 pointed out that embracing Hindutva and the
42 organizational energies of militant organiza-
43 tions such as the RSS,VHP, and Bajrang Dal
44 seems to be especially attractive to BJP leaders
45 when the party has suffered reverses, and
46 therefore looks unlikely to win on other
47 issues.5 In 2001,most notably,the BJP govern-
48 ment in Gujarat, which had performed badly
since its election in 1998 in terms of develop-
ment and rehabilitation after the January 2001
earthquake, turned decisively to a “hard”
Hindutva policy to save itself after a succession
of defeats in local elections pointed to likely
defeat in upcoming Vidhan Sabha elections.
These defeats convinced the party leadership
that only a sharp turn to the right would help,
and the incumbent chief minister was replaced
by hardliner Narendra Modi. In March and
April 2002 the Modi government reportedly
fomented large scale riots and pogroms against
the state’s Muslim minority in order to solidify
a majority behind the party in upcoming
Vidhan Sabha elections. Perhaps a thousand
people, mainly Muslims, died in these
disturbances and tens of thousands more
were forced to flee their jobs and homes.6 The
riots paid clear electoral dividends, and, in
December 2002, the BJP won a crushing
victory in state elections over Congress, doing
especially well in riot-affected districts. Polls
taken during the elections suggested that the
riots were a major issue in helping swing voters
decide in favor of the BJP, as well as in increas-
ing turnout among the BJP’s core supporters.7
But, overall the anti-minority mobilization of
Hindutva and communal polarization, like
most other religious ideologies, makes much
more sense as an oppositional ideology, a
temporary way of unifying people against a
clear target, than it does as a way of govern-
ing.This is because in itself it (like secularism)
offers no clear roadmap to decide what Harold
Lasswell long ago identified as the key ques-
tions of politics: who gets what, when and
how?8 In the absence of rules bolstering
religious identities and favoring one religion
over another—rules that would be unconstitu-
tional in the secular framework created in India
in 1950—religion is inherently limited as a
political ideology, compared with linguistic or
caste identities that do benefit from this
government and institutional support.
263
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Institutional foundations of government employees in many branches of the 1

caste politics in India subordinate civil service in Madras despite 2
accounting for only 3.5 percent of the 3
The Indian Constitution of 1950 provides population, a percentage that reflected their 4
certain benefits for scheduled castes and tribes, much higher levels of wealth and education.11 5
and also in a 1951 amendment specifies that Further, 68 percent of the graduates of Madras 6
benefits may also be provided for other University in 1918 were Brahmans.12 7
backward classes (OBCs)—meaning, in effect, After the Second World War non-Brahman 8
castes—a category that might potentially movements used their access to sympathetic 9
incorporate most of the population, since policymakers in Madras and the princely 10
backwardness is in the eye of the political administrations of Mysore and Travancore and 11
beholder. In sharp contrast, however—and Cochin as well as their control of the new 12
understandably given that the Constitution elected provincial government in Madras 13
was drafted after Congress’ long struggle with (1920) to institute widespread government 14
the Muslim League during the campaign for reservations for backward classes.13 These 15
India’s independence, as well as the communal reservations created large numbers of poli- 16
violence of Partition that followed—the ticians, employees and voters who invested in 17
constitution is unambiguous in its opposition backward caste identities—the number of 18
to religious preferences, such as job reserva- castes formally recognized as backward in 19
tions, educational reservations, or the separate Madras shot up as a result from 45 to 245 20
constituencies that existed before 1950 for by the mid-1920s—and formed a well- 21
Muslim, Sikh, and Christian minorities in entrenched interest group that was able to 22
various provinces.The future of these religious resist legal and political challenges to the 23
reservations was extensively debated by the system of employment reservations after 24
Constituent Assembly from 1947–49, and the Independence.14 In 1950 and 1951, for 25
assembly decided to abolish them, the sub- example, there were large and violent protests 26
stantial support they still enjoyed at the time in Madras, led by E.V. Ramaswamy Naicker’s 27
from many in the Muslim and Sikh com- Dravida Kazhagam Party, after court rulings 28
munities notwithstanding.9 that placed caste reservations in the state in 29
Nehru would have liked to abolish caste jeopardy. These protests led the Madras 30
reservations as well, and move away entirely government to pass a motion defending the 31
from a society in which caste or religious labels reservations system in 1951, and soon after the 32
were important. His ultimate goal, as he wrote Indian National Congress backed down over 33
to Charan Singh in 1954, was to end the the issue, passing Amendment 15(4) to the 34
caste system, which he saw as “the biggest constitution, which permitted reservations for 35
weakening factor in our society.”10 That Nehru “backward classes.”15 36
could not achieve this goal,however,was largely The second way in which caste was 37
because caste was already entrenched in politics entrenched was through a historic com- 38
in two different ways. First, in the previous four promise that Congress itself had to make with 39
decades there had been a very substantial “non- Dr Ambedkar in the mid-1930s over the 40
Brahman”movement in the south,especially in question of political reservations for what came 41
the province of Madras and in the princely states to be called the Scheduled Castes. (The 42
of Mysore and Travancore-Cochin, against “Schedule” refers to a list appended to the 43
upper caste dominance in government employ- 1935 Government of India act, specifying 44
ment, education, and politics.This upper caste castes that were treated as untouchable by caste 45
dominance had been overwhelming in the early Hindus.) Congress was generally opposed to 46
twentieth century,with Brahmans,for instance, such reservations, and Gandhi in particular 47
accounting for around 50–80 percent of opposed them,seeing them as an insidious part 48
264
 C O M M U N A L A N D CAST E P O L I T I C S A N D C O N F L I CTS I N I N D I A
1 of a more general British divide-and-rule
2 policy. But Congress was forced to com-
3 promise over the issue in the 1932 Poona Pact.
4 The compromise involved accepting British
5 proposals for reserved SC seats but not their
6 proposals for separate caste electorates for these
7 seats as the price of enlisting lower caste
8 support in the campaign for independence.
9 The tangible electoral impact of such support
10 at the time may not have been great,given that
11 lower castes constituted a small share of the
12 electorate because of the property-based
13 franchise (around 14 percent could vote after
14 the 1935 act), but the symbolic value was high
15 and securing Ambedkar’s support also gave the
16 British one argument less to use when they
17 claimed that general devolution of power had
18 to wait until Indians were united in their
19 demands and that granting independence
20 would not unduly disadvantage any particular
21 important minority.
22 So, even before the Constituent Assembly
23 was elected and independence attained—and
24 at a time when Congress leaders spoke out
25 forcefully against the system of separate elec-
26 torates for religious minorities—caste reserva-
27 tions were well entrenched in the south, and
28 reservations for “depressed classes” (SCs) had
29 been accepted in principle by Congress leaders
30 in the Poona Pact.The practical political effect
31 of so many people already being nominally
32 included within the reservation system,at least
33 once southern politicians successfully blocked
34 legal efforts to end reservations in 1950–51,
35 was that politicians representing lower and
36 backward castes had no incentive whatsoever
37 to end reservations, and in fact if they wanted
38 to add supporters it was much more effective
39 to simply extend the principle of reservation to
40 more and more castes. This political logic
41 played itself out very quickly in the south after
42 Independence, as politicians recognized more
43 and more castes as “backward” and eligible for
44 reservations throughout the 1950s and 1960s:
45 by the mid-1950s over 40 percent of positions
46 in employment and education in Tamil Nadu
47 were reserved for members of the backward
48 and most backward castes, a proportion that
eventually rose to 69 percent. In the north, as
a result of backward caste mobilization, large-
scale reservations were gradually extended
to the OBCs in the same way in the 1970s
and 1980s, a process systematically explored
in Jaffrelot”s 2003 book India’s Silent
Revolution.16 By 1980,according to the Mandal
Commission, the number of castes officially
recognized as “Backward”in India had risen to
3,743, compared with 2,394 in 1955, at the
time of the first backward caste commission
headed by Kaka Kalelkar.17 In some states, the
rise was even more dramatic, with the number
of OBCs in Tamil Nadu that qualified for
reservations reportedly rising from 150 before
1970 to 310 castes in 1994.18
Much of this increase has come about as the
result of explicit quid pro quos, as politicians
have used promises of reservations to peel off
supporters from larger groups allied with
another party or leader, and caste leaders
themselves have indicated that the support of
their community can be obtained in return for
reserved status. In Rajasthan, for instance, the
Meena community was reportedly recognized
as a Scheduled Tribe in return for the support
of 13 MLAs for the chief minister during a
party leadership contest in 1957.19 In 1994 the
Vokkaligas and Lingayats in Karnataka were
recognized as OBCs in return for their support
of Mr Veerappa Moily in the state elections.20
The extension of reservation to more and
more jobs and positions and of reserved status
to a greater share of the population has, of
course, been resisted by upper castes, as well as
others (such as those on the Left, at least until
recently) who think that entrenching caste
identities in jobs and education might not be
the way to get beyond caste identities and end
caste inequalities. In 1989–90, most notably,
there were violent upper caste protests in large
cities and on university campuses against the
V.P.Singh government’s proposed implementa-
tion of the Mandal Committee’s nearly decade-
old recommendations to extend the scope of
OBC reservations in central government
employment. The commission had contro-
versially estimated the OBCs at 52 percent of
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the population, and the proposals involved groups that they will receive a specific share of 1
increasing the number of reserved places in benefits, rather than simply being included 2
government employment and universities by within a larger category in which better 3
27 percent, while decreasing the number of educated and wealthier jatis might secure most 4
“merit” places by a similar amount. One of the benefits.22 5
student at Delhi University, Rajiv Goswami, These efforts have, not unexpectedly, led to 6
set himself on fire, and several other students fierce conflicts and even some quite substantial 7
across the country followed suit in angry caste violence because some castes that benefit 8
demonstrations.And in 2006, in what became from the current classifications seek to prevent 9
known as the “Mandal II” protests, there were any changes that would disadvantage their 10
renewed demonstrations by upper castes against groups. As one backward caste minister who 11
plans to extend OBC reservations to one of the opposed such changes in UP put it in 2001: 12
few areas not yet affected, namely, higher level “Come what may, we will not allow anybody 13
graduate education, by Human Resources and to take away from our share.If separate reserva- 14
Development Minister Arjun Singh. But the tion is required for the most backward castes, 15
fact that opposition in both cases took the form let there be an increase in the [percentage of] 16
of public demonstrations by groups of students reservation.”23 17
without substantial political direction was, Politicians and caste leaders can use various 18
paradoxically, a sign of the anti-reservation methods to block changes to the reservation 19
movement’s fundamental political weakness. system that they do not like. Politically influ- 20
The fact is that, in both cases, but especially in ential backward castes in Kerala, for instance, 21
2006, the political arithmetic in favor of blocked a caste census proposed in 1995 that 22
reservations is simply so overwhelming that no would have increased pressure for reform of 23
major politician will come out openly against the existing reservation system by demon- 24
them. In a national survey done in 2004, 61 strating that their own “backward”groups were 25
percent of the Indian population supported in fact doing better than some “forward” 26
reservations and only 22 percent opposed them, groups.24 Three years later,in September 1998, 27
proportions very close to the percentages of the census was finally dropped.25 The Yadavs 28
dalits and Backward Castes in the population, and other relatively well-off OBCs in Uttar 29
on the one hand, and forward castes on the Pradesh successfully blocked Rajnath Singh’s 30
other.21 Given this overwhelming political proposals to create a southern-style MBC 31
support, violent demonstrations in urban areas category in UP, a measure Singh hoped would 32
where upper castes are a larger share of the split the political coalitions created by the BJP’s 33
population are one of the only ways, together rivals, the SP and BSP. Further, in Andhra 34
with court cases,in which opponents can try to Pradesh, Madigas and Malas have frequently 35
slow their growth. come to blows since 1994 as the latter have 36
The political currency of reservations has, tried—through direct action as well as their 37
however, become devalued through overuse, support for particular parties—to block efforts 38
with the number of groups being made eligible by the worse-off Madigas to reform the 39
for reservations increasing much more rapidly scheduled caste reservation system in a way that 40
than the supply of government positions or will disadvantage the Malas. In 1998 the 41
other benefits. So, in response, powerful caste Madiga Reservation Porata Samithi (MRPS) 42
groups have asked for and politicians have launched a statewide agitation in favor of the 43
promised more valuable forms of reservation: subdivision of the SC category that led, over 44
such as inclusion within “Most Backward the course of a week, to ten attempts at self- 45
Caste” classifications that offer more benefits immolation (one ending in death), 1,100 46
than are available to general backward castes,or arrests, several large-scale strikes, and the 47
specific “quotas within quotas” that guarantee burning or partial burning of 86 buses.26 This 48
266
 C O M M U N A L A N D CAST E P O L I T I C S A N D C O N F L I CTS I N I N D I A
1 violence was largely repeated by the MRPS in
2 2004. Similar conflicts have also arisen, so far
3 less violent,over subdividing reservations for
4 OBCs and SCs, for example between the
5 Meenas and Gujjars in Rajasthan, between
6 Jatavs and Pasis in Uttar Pradesh, and between
7 the Mahars and Mangs in Maharashtra.We can
8 expect these distributional conflicts within
9 ethnic categories to rise in number and
10 intensity in the future,unless the private sector
11 should quickly create large numbers of good
12 jobs for middle and lower castes outside the
13 reservation systems, which seems unlikely
14 given the very poor level of state primary,
15 secondary, and higher education to which
16 many of them have access.
17 Writing in October 1991, in the aftermath
18 of the violent street conflicts over the Mandal
19 Commission, the eminent sociologist André
20 Béteille rightly predicted that the economic
21 liberalization then beginning in India would,
22 sooner or later, be bound to collide with the
23 system of caste reservations. The economic
24 reforms would reduce the relative share of jobs
25 controlled by the center and the various state
26 governments, and the principles and mecha-
27 nisms of the market would conflict with those
28 of government planning and reservation.27
29 Since 1991, despite a growing population and
30 growing demand for jobs, the number of
31 positions in central and many state governments
32 has remained stable, and the massive retrench-
33 ment of many public sector units (PSUs) has
34 also meant that the overall number of reserved
35 places in industrial enterprises under state or
36 central government control has also been
37 stagnant. Overall, central government employ-
38 ment,in fact,dropped by 2.66 percent between
39 1995 and 2001, to 3,876,000.28 So, with the
40 number of options for expanding reservations
41 within the state sector diminishing,the political
42 focus of demands for reservations has, since the
43 late 1990s, begun to shift to the private sector,
44 which has long been a bastion of upper caste
45 dominance.This extension of caste reservations
46 to the private sector is not, of course, a new
47 idea.As far back as 1990,the then Union Social
48 Welfare Minister,RamVilas Paswan,floated the
idea of job reservations in the private sector as
a way of filling the gap between the aspirations
of the backward classes and SCs and the
available supply of government-controlled
jobs.29 But the cries for the extension of
reservation have grown more insistent since
then as the number of government jobs, their
status,salaries and perquisites have failed to keep
up with the obviously booming private sector,
especially given the very large number of
backward class parties and politicians on which
coalition governments in India now survive.
The privatization of public sector units (PSUs)
has been a particularly big flashpoint, prompt-
ing BSP leader, Mayawati for instance to make
several forceful speeches in parliament in 2001
claiming that the privatization policy and
reforms were “nothing but an attempt to
deprive us from getting jobs.”30
The Congress government elected in 2004
appointed a committee (staffed with known
supporters of reservations,such as Laloo Prasad
Yadav and Ram Vilas Paswan) in August that
year to look at the issue of whether and how
private sector reservations might be imple-
mented.But in the short term not much seems
likely to happen, partly because of very sub-
stantial business resistance to reservations (the
two main business federations, CBI and
FICCI, both came out against formal private
sector reservations) and partly because of
larger questions about how such reservations
would be implemented. In the near term, the
most likely outcome would seem to be some
voluntary affirmative action programs similar
to those in some US companies, with require-
ments that companies doing substantial busi-
ness with the government demonstrate that
they employ significant numbers of SCs and
OBCs. In the longer term, however, the issue
looks sure to return, and has the potential to
cause massive conflict between the largely
upper caste-controlled business world and the
increasingly OBC and SC-controlled world of
politics.
One aspect of caste politics and conflicts
that has not been extensively explored by
sociologists is the extent to which claiming
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“backwardness” in the narrow context of But,under Nehru,the communal tempera- 1

reservations over a substantial period of time, ture was significantly lowered. The Muslim 2
and formally claiming kinship with other castes League was clearly a spent force, with much of 3
for instrumental political purposes,might have the Muslim political elite having left for 4
long-term effects on the way in which caste is Pakistan.The Muslim social and economic elite 5
practiced in other spheres, such as in social or left behind was largely broken by the zamindari 6
market interactions. Srinivas, writing in the reform of the 1950s and the loss of economic 7
mid-1990s about the Vanniyar community in opportunities and discrimination so poignantly 8
Tamil Nadu,implied that the effect of success- displayed in M. S. Sathyu’s 1973 film Garam 9
fully claiming backwardness in a political Hava.Anti-cow slaughter legislation passed in 10
context had only a minimal impact on other most major states in the late 1940s and 1950s, 11
spheres, and that the community was “Janus- as did legislation enshrining the status of 12
faced . . . claiming high caste status in a Hindi written in devanagari script as an official 13
traditional context and a low one in the fierce language of India, taking both these important 14
struggle for access to scarce resources.”31 It symbolic issues off the political agenda after 15
seems to be the case that some communities decades of conflict. Further, pressure from the 16
which cooperate in caste politics are still at right wing diminished after the 1948 assassi- 17
loggerheads in local disputes over land and nation of Mahatma Gandhi,which allowed the 18
local political power. But studies of intracaste temporary ban of many organizations and, 19
conflicts in different spheres have been few and more importantly, cast a very negative light 20
far between, so there is little firm information over assertive support for a Hindu right agenda 21
on whether cooperation in one sphere will within the Congress party.The death of Sardar 22
ultimately reduce conflicts more generally in Patel in 1950 also allowed Nehru to take 23
areas such as disputes over intercaste marriages, stronger action against hardliners within con- 24
caste practices, or land. gress, most notably in his 1951 power struggle 25
with Congress President Purushottam Das 26
Tandon over the exclusion of a prominent 27
Communal politics Congress Muslim, Rafi Ahmad Kidwai, from 28
the Congress Working Committee. This 29
At independence in August 1947, few would standoff,in which Nehru threatened to resign, 30
have predicted that India’s first few decades ultimately led to Tandon’s own resignation as 31
would be relatively free from communal Congress president in September 1951.35 32
conflict. Under the British, India had a system That is not to suggest that everything was 33
of communal reservations in politics and perfect with communal relations under Nehru. 34
administration, and a system of “class recruit- Periodic episodes of violence against Hindus in 35
ment” in the army whose effect (and its inten- Pakistan led to refugee flows into India, 36
tion) was to accentuate communal divides and sparking tit-for-tat violence in West Bengal on 37
preserve their own rule.32 The partition itself more than one occasion in the late 1940s and 38
led to the killing of perhaps 200,000 people 1950s. In early 1950, for instance, more than 39
and the mass migration of 13 million more, in 50 people were killed and 256 injured in West 40
a process that was to continue well into the Bengal in strikes and riots that broke out in 41
1950s.33 Congress itself was also vulnerable to that state in protest at the death of perhaps 600 42
pressure from the Hindu right,especially in the Hindus in Dacca, violence that was to be 43
north and west,with both the powerful Hindu repeated again in 1964 in similar circum- 44
Mahasabha and Congress right wingers such stances.36 Although Nehru was personally 45
as Purushottam Das Tandon pushing for a more secular and demanded that Muslims be treated 46
supremacist policy towards members of the as full citizens, he could do little about 47
Muslim minority.34 day-to-day employment discrimination against 48
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 C O M M U N A L A N D CAST E P O L I T I C S A N D C O N F L I CTS I N I N D I A
1 Muslims in the states, despite urging chief
2 ministers to address the issue in 1959 and again
3 in 1961.37 The Muslim proportion in state
4 police forces and administrations declined
5 rapidly in the decade and a half after Partition,
6 and much of the legislation and ordinances
7 passed to protect Muslim educational interests,
8 such as regulations on the provision of Urdu
9 schools, or requirements that government
10 servants communicate in Urdu with citizens
11 under certain circumstances,were not enforced
12 because of political opposition.38
13 Moreover, throughout the long period of
14 Congress dominance in the post-Independence
15 period, there were periodic attempts by
16 politicians (sometimes Congress ones) to whip
17 up communal issues and instigate violence for
18 political or electoral advantage on one pretext
19 or another: the 1956 riots over a book with
20 an offensive biography of the Prophet
21 Muhammad, which Nehru thought had been
22 engineered to help Hindu parties in the
23 upcoming elections;39 the anti-cow slaughter
24 agitation in 1966 in New Delhi and elsewhere,
25 designed to help the Jana Sangh and other
26 communal parties in the run-up to the 1967
27 elections;40 the 1967 Ranchi-Hatia riots over
28 Urdu, designed to destabilize the coalition
29 government in Bihar; and the horrific 1969
30 riots in Ahmedabad, apparently instigated by
31 the RSS and Jana Sangh.
32 In the short term, the decline of Congress
33 from the mid-1960s seemed to many to be
34 directly related to the rise in communal
35 violence in India, which they blamed on the
36 absence of the steady Nehruvian hand at the
37 center, the decline of Congress as a party
38 organization, the growth of caste and com-
39 munal parties, and the increasing marginal-
40 ization of congress in state politics in some
41 areas. But ultimately, as I have suggested
42 elsewhere, the decline of Congress and the
43 growth of caste politics in the states was not, as
44 if often viewed,a bad thing for Hindu–Muslim
45 relations. It has, in fact, been helpful for
46 communal relations in the long term in several
47 important ways.41 It was in Kerala, lest we
48 forget,that Congress first lost power (in 1957),
and in which communalization of politics into
definable caste and religious parties has been
most advanced, and yet Kerala has had one of
the best records, compared to other states, in
preventing communal violence.
The growth of OBC parties has been a
good thing for Hindu–Muslim relations in two
ways. First, parties such as the Dravida
Kazhagam in Tamil Nadu and the Communists
in Kerala specifically included Muslims within
their broad concepts of “Dravidian” or “back-
ward” in order to build coalitions capable of
challenging Congress. Second, and more
importantly,the growth in each state of a larger
number of effective political parties created a
much more competitive environment for
Muslim votes, in return for which Muslims
could demand that states provide them better
security. Even if a coalition did not, at the
moment, need Muslim votes and Muslim-
supported parties, a competitive environment
in which there were five or six effective parties
in a state made it very likely that it would need
such support in the future, which gave it an
incentive to protect Muslims. Why should
Muslims, rather than militant Hindus, benefit
from such increased competition along caste
lines,and become pivotal swing voters in many
states? First, because Muslim demands tended
not to conflict with those of caste supporters
of backward caste parties because Muslims are
constitutionally banned from making effective
claims for reservations on the grounds of
religion equivalent to those made on the basis
of caste by the OBCs and SCs;42 second,
because Muslims placed a very high premium
on the state providing physical security, a
demand that was relatively cheap for Hindu
politicians to supply, as long as they were not
seen to be intervening too aggressively on
behalf of Muslims.
The rise in political competition in the states
as a consequence of the rise in OBC and SC
parties—there are now an average of 4.4 effec-
tive parties competing in large states and the
average level of electoral volatility (the seats
changing hand at each election) has gone up
from 20 percent in the 1957 election to 40
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ST E V E N I . W I L K I N S O N

percent in the mid-1990s—has created a recent years in which many of the parties that 1
powerful incentive for state politicians to culti- were victims of the misuse of President’s Rule 2
vate the large Muslim community, 13 percent in the past are important participants, make 3
of India’s total population but concentrated in them loath to sign off on any use of Article 356 4
particular states and especially in urban areas. outside Kashmir. 5
The changing political incentives in the The crucial importance of the minority 6
states are absolutely critical because the Indian support base of the party in power together 7
Constitution clearly makes local law and order with the overall level of party competition in 8
the responsibility of the 28 state governments, a state, in determining whether communal 9
not local or central governments.43 If a riot violence will be controlled or not, was tragi- 10
breaks out in a town or district, the army or cally demonstrated during the massive riots 11
central paramilitary forces may intervene only that afflicted Gujarat in 2002. In Gujarat itself, 12
at the explicit invitation of the district the incumbent BJP government had no 13
magistrate or state government, even if there is Muslim support, according to 1998 exit polls 14
a barracks just a few miles from the area in done by CSDS, and Gujarat also had very low 15
which the riot is taking place, as was the case levels of party competition, in what was 16
for instance at Ranchi-Hatia in 1967. In basically a straight fight between the BJP and 17
theory,the central government can threaten to Congress. The Modi government, uncon- 18
use its emergency constitutional powers and cerned about losing Muslim support and 19
get rid of a state government that allows standing to gain all the support that fell away 20
communal riots to take place. In practice, from Congress as a result of the riots, acted in 21
however, central governments only used this a biased and partisan way throughout, even 22
power five times between 1950 and 1996 over going so far as to transfer 27 officials for taking 23
the issue of communal riots, despite the many too aggressive a stance towards Hindu rioters.45 24
large riots that took place over this period (e.g., Outside Gujarat, though, the state political 25
Moradabad 1980,Ahmedabad 1969) and even environments in 2002 were all favorable to 26
then only in cases where the party in power in controlling communal violence. Every state 27
a state was not their own party, and where the government in 2002 either relied heavily on 28
center therefore had a clear electoral motiva- Muslim voters directly, as for instance was the 29
tion for dismissing the state government. So, case in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, or else 30
while the perceived threat of the imposition of was in a state that was very competitive in 31
President’s Rule can occasionally be useful— terms of overall levels of party competition.46 32
as Congress threats seem to have been in Bihar, for instance had 7.7 effective parties, 33
persuading the Modi government to quickly Maharashtra had 5.64, Uttar Pradesh 4.99, and 34
call in the army when riots broke out in Tamil Nadu 4.84 (compared with 2.97 in 35
Vadodara in May 2006, for instance—in Gujarat).47 These governments, therefore, had 36
practical terms the security of Muslims is an enormous incentive to act strongly to 37
largely dependent on state politics and the prevent violence when the RSS, VHP and 38
actions of the state government.44 This is even Bajrang Dal organized massive demonstrations, 39
more true after the Supreme Court’s March protests and strikes in the aftermath of the 40
1994 Bommai judgment,which severely limits Godhra massacre of 57 Hindus in Gujarat on 41
the freedom of the central government to 27 February, 2002. In Gujarat, these demon- 42
impose President’s Rule in cases where there strations were a prelude to the pogroms of 43
is not clear proof—subject to judicial review March and April. Outside Gujarat, however, 44
by the court—of the breakdown of the con- owing to very decisive police action,including 45
stitution.The effect of Bommai in restraining preventive arrests of thousands and, in some 46
the center has also been magnified because the cases, deadly firing on rioters, large-scale anti- 47
growth of central coalition governments in Muslim pogroms were completely avoided. In 48
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 C O M M U N A L A N D CAST E P O L I T I C S A N D C O N F L I CTS I N I N D I A
1 Rajasthan, for instance, a state adjacent to the
2 violence in Gujarat, the state police force used
3 deadly force to prevent riots from breaking out
4 in Gangapur and Silwara.48 In Andhra Pradesh,
5 the state police force successfully prevented
6 riots from breaking out in the highly sensitive
7 capital of Hyderabad,that city’s long history of
8 communal riots notwithstanding, which one
9 might have thought would predispose it to
10 violence.49
11
12
13 Conclusion
14
15 None of this is meant to imply that communal
16 relations in India are satisfactory. There has
17 been a creeping communalization in many
18 state administrations, with the growing display
19 of Hindu symbols and fraternization of state
20 servants with members of Hindu nationalist
21 organizations such as the RSS and VHP.There
22 have also been periodic attempts to rewrite
23 school textbooks to accentuate the conflictual
24 and anti-Muslim strands of Indian history
25 rather than its more hopeful aspects: more
26 Aurangzeb and temple destruction, in other
27 words, and much less about Akbar and other
28 rulers who employed many non-Muslims in
29 their administrations and endowed temples
30 across the land. And social and physical
31 segregation are still realities in many places
32 across India, with anti-Muslim prejudice and
33 fears preventing many upwardly mobile
34 members of the Muslim minority from
35 obtaining housing outside of recognizable
36 “ghetto” areas in the major cities.
37 But ultimately India’s strong caste, regional
38 and linguistic cleavages, and above all the
39 institutionalized nature of caste identities
40 through the Constitution, reservations, and
41 political parties have sharply undercut the
42 likelihood of massive polarization along
43 religious lines, despite the occasional terrible
44 episodes such as Gujarat. The way in which
45 strong lower and backward caste identities
46 crosscut Hindu identities, and provide massive
47 support for an overall “secular majority” in
48 India is quite nicely demonstrated by recent
survey data on support for majoritarian versus
pluralist policies among Indian voters. In a
large 2004–05 survey of the State of Democracy
in South Asia, 5,389 Indians were asked if they
agreed with the statement that “minorities
should adopt the ways of life of the majority
community.” Overall the good news is that
there is a substantial pro-diversity majority
among the Indian population, defined by the
pollsters as the ratio of those who strongly
disagreed with the statement compared to
those who agreed with it.50 In India this “pro-
diversity ratio” was 3.56. The corresponding
ratio in Bangladesh, just for comparison, was
2.78 and in Pakistan a very depressing 0.60,
indicating considerably more supporters of
majoritarianism in that country than those
who supported a more pluralist policy. Among
Indian Hindus, though, the poll found
considerable variation in terms of support for
majoritarianism. Support is highest for a pro-
majority policy among upper caste Hindus
(prodiversity ratio of 1.79) and lowest among
OBCs (2.77) and dalits (4.90).51 Thus,whether
because of their own lower and backward caste
ideologies, their association of Hindutva with
upper castes, or the lack of tangible benefits
that Hindutva supplies to them,the middle and
lower castes seem to be strongly resisting
majoritarian ideologies.
Notes
1 In Madras, for instance, the Hindu–Muslim
divide before the late 1930s was crosscut by the
divide between Brahmans and non-Brahmans;
see Eugene Irschick, Tamil Nationalism in the
1930s (Madras: Cre-A, 1986). In Bihar, the
Hindu–Muslim divide was crosscut in the same
period by the conflict between Biharis and
Bengalis over the latter community’s dispro-
portionate share of government employment.
See, e.g., the questions asked about Bengali
overrepresentation in the police in Bihar:
Legislative Assembly Debates Official Report,Vol.
4, No. 37 (26 April, 1937), pp. 2443–44.
2 André Béteille, Castes: Old and New (Bombay:
Asia Publishing House, 1969), p. 50.
271
ST E V E N I . W I L K I N S O N

3 Some have argued that Hinduism does not 10 Sarvepalli Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: An Anthology 1
work as a unifying identity in Indian politics (Delhi:Oxford University Press,1983),pp.324–25. 2
because it is cross cut by other identities such as 11 S. Saraswathi, Minorities in Madras State: Group 3
caste and language. It is certainly correct that Interests in Modern Politics (Delhi: Impex India, 4
religious identity in India is both diverse and is 1974), p. 48.
5
crosscut by multiple other identities, but this 12 Saraswathi, p. 49.
seems to me less important than the institu- 13 See Irschick, Tamil Nationalism in the 1930s;
6
tional benefits available to people who mobilize David Washbrook, The Emergence of Provincial 7
on the basis of caste rather than religion.In fact, Politics, The Madras Presidency 1870–1920 8
all potential identities in India are crosscut in (Cambridge:University Press,1976),pp.271–87. 9
some way or the other, so intragroup differ- 14 Irschick, pp. 36–37. 10
entiation is not a sufficiently good argument to 15 P.Radhakrishnan,“Backward Class Movements 11
explain why religion does not work but caste or in Tamil Nadu,” in M. N. Srinivas, Caste: Its 12
language (both of which can offer tangible Twentieth Century Avatar (New Delhi:Viking, 13
benefits) do,and,further,religion was,of course, 1996), pp. 110–34, 120–22.
14
highly salient as a unifying identity in Indian 16 Jaffrelot, India’s Silent Revolution:The Rise of the
politics before 1947, when it was institu-
15
Lower Castes in North India (New York:
tionalized by the British through separate Columbia University Press, 2003). 16
elections and employment reservations. 17 Srinivas, p. xxviii. 17
4 This fundamentally political view of riots, in 18 “Racketeering in Quotas,” India Today, 18
opposition to the more local and sociological 15 November, 1994, pp. 36–42. 19
view taken in Varshney (2002), is put forward 19 “Racketeering,” p. 37. 20
in both Brass, The Production of Hindu–Muslim 20 “Racketeering,” pp. 36–42. 21
Violence in Contemporary India (Seattle: 21 A poll of 17,885 voters conducted 26 July–5 22
University of Washington Press, 2003) and August,2004.“Mood of the Nation-Poll,”India 23
in Wilkinson, Votes and Violence: Electoral Today, international edn (New Delhi),
24
Competition and Ethnic Riots in India August 30, 2004, pp. 16–23.
(Cambridge: University Press, 2004). 22 The category of “most backward class” was
25
5 Jaffrelot presentation on Hindu nationalism, created in Madras in 1954 by Congress Chief 26
Michigan State University,April 2003. Minister Kamaraj as a compromise way of 27
6 See the three volumes of the Concerned Citizens addressing demands by backward class Dhobis 28
Tribunal—2002 for the most complete account and barbers that they be listed as scheduled 29
of the violence, available at http://www. castes, which would have entitled them to 30
sabrang.com/tribunal/. more benefits; Report of the Backward Classes 31
7 Sanjay Kumar, “Gujarat Assembly Elections Commission Tamil Nadu Volume I–1970 (Madras: 32
2002: Analyzing the Verdict,” Economic and Government of Tamil Nadu, 1974) (Chairman
33
Political Weekly,Vol.38,No.4 (25 January,2003), S. Sattanathan), p. 54.
pp. 270–75.
34
23 “Uttar Pradesh: The Reservation Plank,”
8 Harold Lasswell, Politics:Who Gets What,When, Frontline, 1–14 September, 2001. 35
How (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936). 24 M. Vijayanunni, “Caste and the Census of 36
9 Members of religious minorities within India,” unpublished paper, 2003, pp. 10–11. 37
Congress generally supported reservations for 25 Vijayanunni, p. 11 38
their communities in employment and politics 26 S. Ramakrishna, “Reservation Wars,” Indian 39
before Independence,although they opposed the Express, 20 June, 1998. 40
separate electorates insisted on by the Muslim 27 André Béteille, The Backward Classes in 41
League. Opinion surveys conducted among Contemporary India (New Delhi: Oxford 42
Muslim legislators in the 1960s suggested that University Press, 1992), pp. 108–10.
43
many were still in favor of separate electorates 28 Ministry of Labor,Government of India,Census
and employment reservations; Theodore P. of Central Government Employees, 2001 (New
44
Wright, “The Effectiveness of Muslim Delhi: Ministry of Labour, Directorate General 45
Representation in India,” in Donald E. Smith of Employment and Training, 2003). 46
(ed.),South Asian Politics and Religion (Princeton, 29 “Reservation in Private Sector Likely:Paswan,” 47
NJ: University Press, 1966), pp. 102–37. Times of India, 22 June, 1990. 48
272
 C O M M U N A L A N D CAST E P O L I T I C S A N D C O N F L I CTS I N I N D I A

1 30 “Mayawati Presses for Quota in Pvt. Sector,” reserving jobs and places in education for
2 The Hindu, 4 March, 2001 certain Muslim jatis on the basis of caste rather
3 31 M. N. Srinivas, “Introduction,” in Srinivas, than religion.
4 pp. vii–viii, ix–xxxviii. 43 In India, with only a few exceptions, all local
32 See, for instance, the clear support for divide law and order is controlled by the state police.
5
and rule in the quotes from Secretaries of State 44 “Army Deployed in Vadodara,” The Statesman
6
Wood (1862) and Hamilton (1897) in Sumit Weekly, 98, 18 (6 May, 2006).
7 Sarkar, Modern India 1885–1947 (New Delhi: 45 “Modi ties hands of cops who put their foot
8 Macmillan, 1983) pp. 16, 21. down,” Indian Express, New Delhi, March 26,
9 33 I follow the casualty estimate in Moon, Divide 2002, p. 1.
10 and Quit (London: Chatto & Windus, 1961), 46 The argument here follows that in Wilkinson,
11 p. 269, and the refugee estimate in Keller, Votes and Violence (2004) and Wilkinson,
12 Uprooting and Social Change:The Role of Refugees “Putting Gujarat in Perspective,” Economic and
13 in Development (Delhi: Manohar Book Service, Political Weekly, 27 April, 2002, pp. 1,579–83.
14 1975), p. 17. 47 The effective number of parties measure
15 34 For details of this pressure from the right, both (ENPV), widely used in political science, allows
inside and outside Congress,see William Gould, us to get a measure of the overall level of party
16
Hindu Nationalism in Late Colonial India competition in a state using a measure that
17
(Cambridge: University Press, 2005); and underweights the vote share of the many small
18 Mukul Kesavan, “Invoking a Majority: the parties that secure little support in an election.In
19 Congress and the Muslims of the United 2002 the effective number of parties in major
20 Provinces, 1945–47,” Islam and the Modern Age, states ranged from 2.78 in Andhra Pradesh
21 Vol. 24, No. 2 (1993), pp. 109–30. (where the two largest parties had 85 percent of
22 35 Jaffrelot, p. 101. the vote) to 7.7 in Bihar (where the two largest
23 36 Times of India, 24 February, 1950; 15 January, parties had only 43 percent of the vote).For more
24 1964. details see Wilkinson, Votes and Violence, ch. 5.
25 37 G.Parthasarathi (ed.),Jawaharlal Nehru:Letters to 48 Rajasthan Patrika, 27 March, 2002; “Police
26 Chief Ministers 1947–1964, vol. 5, 1958–1964 Firing in Rajasthan: Two Killed,”Indian Express,
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), 26 March, 2002.
27
pp. 233–46, 427–32, 446–59. 49 “Andhra Police on High Alert,” Indian Express,
28
38 See Wilkinson, Votes and Violence, ch. 4. 26 March, 2002.
29 39 Jaffrelot,The Hindu Nationalist Movement in India 50 Centre for the Study of Developing Societies,
30 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), State of Democracy in South Asia: A Report
31 p. 107, citing N. L. Gupta, p. 249. (Oxford: University Press, 2008), Table 5.5,
32 40 Jaffrelot, pp. 205–10. pp. 261–62.
33 41 Wilkinson, Votes and Violence. 51 The minority communities, not surprisingly,
34 42 Politicians in a few states, such as Tamil Nadu, strongly oppose majoritarianism, with pro-
35 Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, have tried to get diversity ratios of Sikhs (5.70),Muslims (16.25),
36 around this ban for at least some Muslims by and Christians (11.30).
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
273
 1

19 2
3
4
5
Ethnic and Islamic 6
7
militancy in Pakistan 8
9
10
11
Mohammad Waseem 12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Introduction suicide bombing,capture of government build- 19
ings, and abduction and beheading of security 20
In 2007,Pakistan entered into an era of suicide officers in Swat valley in pursuit of a home- 21
bombing,attacks on public rallies,government grown project of implementation of Sharia. In 22
property, military personnel, police stations, January 2009, the Swat valley was overrun by 23
and girls’ schools, killing of alleged ‘spies,’ and Tehrik Taliban Pakistan who issued their edicts 24
abduction of government officials and foreign relating to public morality and religious 25
diplomats. Proto-Taliban elements were able injunctions.A widely circulated video released 26
to torch a large number of containers carrying by the Taliban in the tribal areas of Pakistan 27
supplies for NATO forces across the border showed bodies of declared criminals dan- 28
with Afghanistan. They practically took over gling from electricity poles.1 Other incidents 29
Swat valley in late 2008 and early 2009, included burning of video shops,closing down 30
abolished the writ of the state and forced a educational institutions for girls and stopping 31
quarter of a million people to migrate. The administration of polio drops to children, 32
army started operations against the Taliban but suicide bomb attacks in the garrison city of 33
failed to make any headway.The government Rawalpindi near President Musharraf ’s office, 34
in Peshawar felt obliged to negotiate with the in Sargodha on a bus carrying air force cadets, 35
Taliban after the breakdown of social order and in Karachi on a million-strong rally for 36
in the valley. There were also incidents of Benazir Bhutto when she arrived in Pakistan 37
sectarian violence in Quetta in Balochistan and after an eight-year long exile. Curiously, while 38
Dera Ghazi Khan in Punjab which cost dozens there were demands to unmask the faces behind 39
of lives and created tension between the the suicide bombing on Benazir’s rally, she 40
followers of Shi’a and Sunni sects. pointed her finger at Zia’s remnants within the 41
Politics in Pakistan took a major turn political establishment. Others pointed to the 42
towards violence under Musharraf (1999– complete failure of intelligence agencies to 43
2008) and later under Asif Zardari (2008– ).The uncover terrorists,thus allowing them to spread 44
expanding profile of the building blocs of from tribal to settled areas, and indirectly 45
militant action in pursuit of political objectives hinting at their possible connivance in incidents 46
presented a grim picture of public life in the of violence.The political community and civil 47
country in 2008. This involved incidents of society generally held the Musharraf govern- 48
274
 E T H N I C A N D I S L A M I C M I L I TA N CY I N PA K I STA N
1 ment responsible for Benazir Bhutto’s assassi-
2 nation in a public meeting in Rawalpindi on
3 27 December, 2007. For its part, the gov-
4 ernment held the Taliban leader in Pakistan,
5 Baitullah Mahsud, responsible for killing
6 Benazir, which the latter denied.
7 At the other end, Balochistan continued to
8 be in the throes of a mini-insurgency in the
9 wake of an undeclared military operation,
10 involving attacks on gas pipelines, railway
11 tracks, and government buildings.The banned
12 Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) spearheaded
13 the militant activities. Its followers among
14 youth also opposed the nationalist parties
15 for participating in the February 2008 elec-
16 tions.They disrupted a public meeting of the
17 nationalist leader, a former chief minister of
18 Balochistan, Akhtar Mengal for not declar-
19 ing war against the state.2 In Balochistan, as
20 elsewhere in Pakistan,militancy was an indirect
21 outcome of the nation-building project,which
22 generally dwelled on coercive strategies for
23 unification across ethnic divisions. It was a
24 structural requirement of the state to disallow
25 subnational communities from claiming a share
26 in the political and economic resources beyond
27 the script. The inherently liberal constitutional
28 legacy of British India, which considered
29 mass mandate as the source of legitimacy and
30 federalism as the principle of unity in diversity,
31 operated against the perceived interest of the
32 postcolonial state.Dismissal of elected govern-
33 ments in provinces and successive unification
34 models of the federal government led to
35 various ethnonationalist movements.
36 In contemporary Pakistan, the quantum of
37 violence in an urban milieu is higher than in
38 the countryside, especially if the movement is
39 supported by a strong party organization, a
40 well-established cult of leadership, and an
41 electoral mandate. In consequence, politics of
42 the bullet and politics of the ballot may not
43 necessarily be contradictory.At the other end,
44 religious militancy is an indirect and long-term
45 consequence of the expanding power of
46 the ulema, as they flourished due to the state’s
47 quest for, and commitment to, divine sources
48 of legitimacy beyond the constitutional
framework. At the heart of the emergence of
the Islamic establishment was the so-called
Khaki-mullah alliance, which has operated for
decades from the late 1970s to the late 2000s.
The crucial input of the world of Islam
perspective in bringing forth a dichotomous
worldview based on Islam versus the West
cannot be overstated.3 In this context,empathy
with Muslim suffering in regional conflicts
ranging from Palestine to Bosnia, Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and Iraq has effectively exter-
nalized political identity in Pakistan.
Ethnic revival and Islamic ascendancy draw
on different sources of inspiration. However, it
is possible to point to the shared political
context experienced by them,which is shaped
by a state system struggling to operate in an
unstable regional setting characterized by wars
and revolutions involving India, Afghanistan,
Iran, and Iraq. The two movements have
sometimes operated in succession. Thus, the
Pakhtun nationalist movement, which domi-
nated the politics of the NWFP for decades
before and after Partition,gave way to a strident
Islamic movement from the 1980s onwards.
The latter culminated in the victory of the
alliance of Islamic parties, Muttahida Majlis
Amal (MMA) in NWFP in the 2002 elections.
However, in the 2008 elections, MMA lost
to the resurgent Pakhtun nationalist Awami
National Party (ANP). Similarly, mohajirs
(Urdu-speaking migrants) who generally
supported Islamic parties, the Jamat-i-Islami
(JI) and Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUP) in elections
in the 1970s, overwhelmingly shifted their
allegiance to a new ethnic party the Mohajir
(later Muttahida) Qaumi Movement (MQM)
in the 1980s. At the same time, the Islamic
movement typically operated at the behest of
the state authorities to contain the ethno-
nationalist movements in various provinces.To
that extent, we need to look at Islamism as a
force antithetical to ethnicity, as part of the
nation-building project of the state of Pakistan.
The legitimizing potential of Islam for the
ruling dispensation provided a filip to the
operational dynamics of ulema parties and
groups,whereas the perceived villainy of ethnic
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M O H A M M A D WAS E E M

parties,leaders and ideologies often invited the Punjabi middle classes.7 On the other hand, 1
wrath of the state. Pakhtuns, Bengalis, Sindhis, and the Baloch 2
In this chapter, we plan to look into ethnic operated at the margins of the emergent 3
and Islamic militancy as an outcome of the multiethnic society. While the former group 4
project of state building.Paul Brass located state looked at Pakistan as a nation state, the latter 5
policies and elite competition at the heart of perceived it as a “composite multination.”8 6
ethnonationalist movements.4 It makes perfect The perceived dichotomy between the 7
sense that state policies can and do lead to mohajir–Punjabi salariat and all others created 8
consequences which can be positive or an ethnic bipolarity that was absent in India.9 9
negative for the cause of national harmony. In The middle class shaped the authority 10
this context, two broad policy orientations structure of the new state through the civil 11
have been outlined: bureaucracy that controlled public policy,even 12
as the tribal and landed elite was formally 13
1 ethno-pluralism, especially its British represented in the national and provincial 14
variety of multiculturalism, whereby the assemblies.The national project was essentially 15
political system provides a space for conceived and put in place by the middle class, 16
multiple identities and communities, and which was ideologically Islamic modernist, 17
2 institutional pluralism whereby a variety ethnically mohajir and Punjabi, and socio- 18
of federal formulas emerge to provide logically urban-based and professionally 19
regional autonomy to the core com- oriented. It was socially progressive and poli- 20
munities living in the federating units.5 tically conservative. Pakhtuns, Bengalis, 21
Sindhis,and the Baloch had no sizeable middle 22
This approach tends to focus on government class and thus had meager representation in the 23
policies.6 It is argued here, however, that bureaucracy. Their political leadership con- 24
reliance on policy as an independent variable stantly knocked at the doors of the state in a bid 25
is problematic.Apart from the fact that policies to open them through elections.The relatively 26
do not operate effectively in the political less-developed ethnic communities,with their 27
context of a postcolonial society in which the leadership still immersed in a cultural ethos 28
state-building project is underway, we need to rooted in pre-modern values and norms 29
look at the context and the source of these characterized by oppression against tribesmen, 30
policies. peasantry, and women, upheld the cause of 31
electoral democracy. At the other end, the 32
state apparatuses of army and bureaucracy, 33
Structural dynamics of the state with their modern training, exposure to the 34
West and high educational and professional 35
The ruling elite of post-independence standards, often sought to dispense with elec- 36
Pakistan, which had pushed forward the toral democracy,parliamentarism,and political 37
agenda of a separate Muslim homeland in freedoms.This anomaly has operated through- 38
British India, embraced a set of policies that out Pakistan’s history. General Musharraf ’s 39
included: a foreign policy based on perceived promulgation of emergency on 3 November, 40
insecurity vis-à-vis India, that sought security 2007 reflected the middle-class ethos of con- 41
through Islamic unity; a constitutional policy trolling what was considered unbridled poli- 42
that denied parliamentary sovereignty, and tical participation. 43
emphasized a quasi-unitarian federalism; and a It can be argued that there is need to take 44
policy concerning Islam as the ultimate source one step back from policy proper to the policy- 45
of legitimacy in a supralegal sense.Partition led creating ethnic and class dynamics of the 46
to the emergence of a new ethnic hierarchy structure of power in Pakistan in order to look 47
led by a salariat based on the mohajir and for an explanation of ethnic revival and Islamic 48
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1 ascendancy along with potential or actual
2 violence.The operational context for exercise
3 of state power can be defined in terms of the
4 grand nation-building project. Structurally
5 speaking, Pakistan passed through four major
6 processes of political transformation in the
7 postcolonial period: centralization, militariza-
8 tion, Punjabization, and Islamization.
9 military recruitment from Punjab after 1857,
10
Centralization
11
12 The project of centralization brought in
13 political actors from outside the parliament,
14 especially the civil bureaucracy and later the
15 army. Various policy-related matters in pro-
16 vinces were handled by the bureaucracy,which
17 was recruited, trained, posted, and promoted
18 by the Center.Federalism in West Pakistan was
19 abolished when its four provinces and princely
20 states were merged into one unit (1955–70).
21 Presidentialism reigned supreme as the prin-
22 ciple of unity of the nation, enshrined in the
23 1962 Constitution. Later, the presidency was
24 eastablished as the supraparliamentary office
25 under the 1985 Eighth Amendment and 2003
26 Seventeenth Amendment. The upper house
27 of parliament, the Senate, emerged as a terri-
28 torial chamber as late as 1973, a quarter of a
29 century after Partition. It was supposed to
30 give strength to the provinces vis-à-vis the
31 centre. However, the differential in the policy
32 scope of the two houses continued to frustrate
33 the federalist ambitions of the smaller pro-
34 vinces.The Senate continued to be weak into
35 the late 2000s. Additionally, the Centre often
36 dismissed provincial governments led by oppo-
37 sition parties by using relevant constitutional
38 provisions. This “constitutional terrorism”
39 continued to play havoc with principles of
40 pluralism, often involving the judiciary on the
41 side of the federal government. A blatant
42 example of this was the 1976 verdict of the
43 Hyderabad Tribunal which banned an
44 opposition party, the NAP. In February 2009,
45 the supreme court disqualified the chief
46 minister of Punjab, Shehbaz Sharif of the
47 PML-Nawaz Sharif, from holding office,
48 allegedly at the behest of President Zardari.
Militarization
The military is to Pakistan what party is to
India. In common parlance, the army is con-
sidered to be a party by default, which is
permanently in power overtly or covertly
without being obliged to seek a mass mandate.
The militarization of politics in Pakistan has
followed a clear path. During a century of
the province provided half of the British Indian
army, and thus laid the basis of the new myth
of martial races cultivated by the British.10
During the interwar years, the soldiery
acquired proprietary rights through an
ambitious scheme for allotment of canal-
irrigated lands to men at arms. It also enjoyed
preferential treatment in voting rights for
the Punjab Legislative Assembly under the
prevalent system of restricted franchise.11
Thus, Pakistan inherited the most militarized
province of India, which soon emerged as the
power base of the new country. At the heart
of the partition of India lay the partition of
Punjab. The demobilized soldiery, belonging
to the rival Muslim, Sikh, and Hindu com-
munities, perpetrated violence on opponents
in an organized and professional way.12 This
more than anything else brought about the
exodus of Muslims from East Punjab and
Hindus and Sikhs from West Punjab. The
butchery during the partition riots and the
bloody process of migration in 1947 left deep
scars on the twin communities now living
across the newly drawn international borders.
However,unlike India where (East) Punjab was
a mere peripheral state, in Pakistan Partition
deeply securitized the national vision because
Punjab played a central role in the country
While Punjabis on both sides of the new
border committed acts of murder, arson, and
rape on the rival communities fleeing their
homes and hearths, the two governments of
India and Pakistan put together military
evacuation organizations to escort refugees
safely across the border.13 In Pakistan, army
units were exposed to the misery of Muslims
fleeing from East Punjab and living in
temporary refugee camps on their way to a life
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of extreme uncertainty in their new homeland. Other provincial capitals, namely, Peshawar, 1
This further militarized politics and greatly Quetta, and Hyderabad lost their pivotal 2
weakened the principle of civilian supremacy positions in their respective areas.This policy 3
over the armed forces even before the latter of coercive de-ethnicization of politics led to 4
formally took power in 1958. The strategic the emergence of rampant anti-Punjab feel- 5
vision of the army moved to the center stage ings. The erstwhile smaller provinces reacted 6
of all policy-making activity in the civilian sharply to the One Unit “steamroller,” which 7
sector, thus drawing the contours of political had disregarded popular ethnoregional aspira- 8
imagination along the ends and means of tions and identities.14 After the 1958 military 9
national security. Not surprisingly, centraliza- coup, the Punjab-based army put a lid on the 10
tion of the command structure, a unitary state federalist ambitions of the smaller provinces. 11
model, the presidential form of government Later, Ayub shifted the capital of Pakistan 12
and a non-sovereign parliament have repre- from Karachi to Islamabad. Thus, both the 13
sented the leading aspects of the state elite’s federal and provincial capitals were located in 14
political thinking for six decades. At the Punjab from 1960 to 1970, when finally Yahya 15
other end, the idea of a diversity of authori- restored the four provinces.The ill-conceived 16
tative institutions based upon principles of constitutional project to meet the challenge of 17
federalism, parliamentarism, provincial auto- demographic imbalance between the two 18
nomy and a pluralist framework of politics in wings ran adrift at a considerable cost to the 19
general continued to characterize the political cause of national harmony in the form of 20
vision of various ethnic communities not resurgent ethnic movements. 21
effectively represented in the state.In 2007–08, After the emergence of Bangladesh,Pakistan 22
Musharaf, as both a serving and later a retired again faced the one-province-dominates-all 23
army general,on the one hand and a coterie of situation. Now it was Punjab that enjoyed a 24
politicians including Nawaz Sharif and Benazir numerical preponderance at around 58 percent 25
Bhutto—later Asif Zardari—on the other, of the total population. During the following 26
characterized the divide in national thinking decades, Punjab emerged at the heart of the 27
along civil–military lines. new ethnic discourse.15 In the 1960s Punjab 28
had emerged as the hub of the Green 29
Revolution.With 66 percent of tubewells and 30
Punjabization
62 percent of tractors operating in Punjab, the 31
The demographic makeup of Pakistan has province progressed rapidly. It enjoyed huge 32
been such that various policy measures relating government subsidies for fertilizer, pesticides, 33
to federalism have focused on a concern that seeds, and agricultural machinery.16 By the late 34
one province may come to dominate all. For 1960s Punjab had overtaken Sindh in its 35
a quarter of a century after Partition, East manufacturing potential as well, especially in 36
Pakistan had a majority (around 55 percent) of the textile industry.Apart from the lion’s share 37
the country’s population. However, its demo- going to Punjab in both agricultural and 38
graphic strength could not be reflected politi- industrial development, that province increas- 39
cally because general elections were postponed ingly dominated the bureaucracy.By the 1980s 40
repeatedly. The power elite typically com- it occupied nearly 55 percent of the jobs in the 41
prising mohajirs and Punjabis, failed to public sector as opposed to its nearest rival, the 42
reconcile to the idea of a Bengali-dominated mohajir community,whose share declined from 43
parliament and government.This concern led a whopping 30 percent to less than 18 percent, 44
to the idea of inter-wing parity and thus to with Sindhis at 5.4 percent, NWFP at 13.4 45
constitutional engineering. Lahore, the capital percent, and Balochistan at 3.4 percent.17 The 46
of Punjab, became the capital of the “One army has been both numerically and symboli- 47
Unit,” comprising the whole of West Pakistan. cally Punjabi, initially with 79 percent of the 48
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1 men in uniform coming from that province.
2 The military operations against Bengalis
3 (1971), the Baloch (1973–77), Sindhis (1983)
4 and mohajirs (1992–94 and 1995) spread anti-
5 Punjab sentiment all around. The fact that
6 Pakhtuns and mohajirs also have a dispro-
7 portionately high share of the army’s officer
8 cadre is generally not part of the public
9 imagination of non-Punjabis. Neither are they
10 conscious of the underprivileged groups,
11 communities and regions within Punjab.The
12 story of ethnic militancy in Pakistan is one of
13 reaction to the perceived Punjabization of the
14 state in economic, political, cultural, admini-
15 strative, and military terms.
16
17
Islamization
18
19 Islam in Pakistan has played a role in mobilizing
20 the public as a means towards acquiring or
21 retaining power. The selection and use of
22 Islamic symbols and provisions changed
23 according to the prevailing situation in rela-
24 tion to the objectives of political actors. Over
25 decades, the state establishment followed a
26 strategy of depoliticizing the public by
27 appropriating Islamic sources of legitimacy in
28 addition to, or in lieu of, a mass mandate as a
29 source of constitutional legitimacy. Reetz has
30 outlined four major constituents of the legacy
31 of Islam inherited by Pakistan:18 street agitation
32 in pursuit of Islamic causes from the khilafat
33 and hijrat movements (1920s) onwards;institu-
34 tions of Islamic learning, especially in UP,
35 which recreated the glory and the pristine
36 message of Islam and led to a century of anti-
37 Western intellectual discourse;Wahhabist and
38 Deobandist orientations rooted in a purifying
39 mission at one end and reaction to heretical
40 interpretations of religious classics by Ahmadis
41 at the other; and mulla activism in the Pakhtun
42 belt along the border of Afghanistan in the
43 form of a tribal rebellion against the modern
44 state, which was perceived to be ungodly and
45 immoral. Examples of this near-xenophobic
46 tribal movement are the Wana rebellion in the
47 1970s, the Tehrik Nifaz Shariat Mohammadi
48 movement in Swat in the early 1990s and
again in 2007–09, and the Taliban and proto-
Taliban movements in the middle and late
2000s.
The Islamic legacy skirted around main-
stream politics led by the Muslim League, first
in pursuit of a Muslim homeland and later as
part of its nation-building project. Ishtiaq
Ahmad has suggested a fourfold typology to
define the relationship between Islam and the
state in Pakistan:19
■ the sacred state excluding human will
■ the sacred state admitting human will
■ the secular state admitting divine will
■ the secular state excluding divine will.
The independence generation of the
political and intellectual elite implicitly, and
Justice Munir professedly, believed in the
fourth model which envisaged disengagement
between church and state.20 Jinnah declared:
“You may belong to any religion or caste or
creed, that has nothing to do with the business
of the state . . . Hindus would cease to be
Hindus and Muslims would cease to be
Muslims,not in the religious sense because that
is personal faith of each individual, but in the
political sense as citizens of the state.”21
The 1956 Constitution represented a
compromise between the ulema and the ruling
elite whereby the non-Islamic provisions
would be taken off the statute book and the
sovereignty of Allah would be exercised in
Pakistan through public representatives.22 In
other words, the elite settled for the model of
a secular state while admitting the divine will
into the scheme. At the other end, the two
variations of the sacred state model continued
to knock at the doors of the state even as,
curiously, support from the public for this
model has been scant. The JI and the con-
servative intelligentsia in general deliberated
on the need for establishing an Islamic state,
acknowledging the agency of human will
in keeping with the requirements of the
modern age. However, the two decades of
the Afghan war in the 1980s and 1990s greatly
strengthened the Islamic establishment in
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Pakistan, which recruited, trained and armed to MMA, the pro-US Musharraf government 1
mujahideen for Afghanistan, as well as for formed a coalition government with them in 2
Kashmir from 1989 onwards. Pakistan’s Balochistan (2003–07). It also appointed the 3
involvement in Kashmir came to an end in Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F) chief, Fazlur 4
2003–04 as the composite dialogue with India Rehman, as leader of the opposition in the 5
moved ahead under Washington’s auspices. National Assembly even though he enjoyed the 6
But, the spillover of Taliban from Afghanistan support of only a minority from the opposi- 7
into the tribal areas and beyond brought the tion. Moreover, the army displayed a bias in 8
fourth model of the sacred state without favor of Sunni sectarian groups.This bias was 9
human will into full action.This has become operationalized in the backdrop of the largely 10
socially embedded through the Islamization Sunni-based Islamization program of the Zia 11
of the Pakhtuns and their rigid adherence government; support for the largely Sunni– 12
to rituals on the two sides of the Pak-Afghan Deobandi Afghan mujahideen; and the need to 13
border during the last quarter of the twentieth stem the tide of the much-feared revolutionary 14
century.This was part of an emergent Islamic fervor of Shi’as in Pakistan after the Iranian 15
vigilante culture formalized through the revolution.23 16
2006 Hasba Bill passed by the NWFP As a typically weak postcolonial state, 17
Assembly under the MMA government characterized by a quasi-unitary form of 18
(2002–07). authority system within a federalist framework, 19
During the six decades since Independence, Pakistan faced ethnonationalist movements in 20
Pakistan moved from a position in which the four out of five provinces. While the estab- 21
state defined religion to one in which religion lishment sought to pursue its agenda for nation 22
defined the state.As the 1970 election campaign building, it co-opted Islamic forces in order to 23
brought forth the leftist and Bengali nationalist activate the divine sources of legitimacy.These 24
movements in West and East Pakistan respec- initiatives ended up strengthening Islamic 25
tively, Yahya’s military government aligned movements directly by way of patronage and 26
itself with Islamic parties, especially the JI.This ethnic movements indirectly by alienating their 27
alliance was further cemented during the civil leaders still further. In 2009, the government 28
war in East Pakistan in 1971.A mulla–garrison was criticized both at home and abroad for 29
alliance came into being, which operated both appeasement of Islamic militants by entering 30
covertly,for example in opposition to the three into negotiations and signing ceasefire agree- 31
PPP governments (1971–77, 1988–90, 1993– ments with the Taliban leadership of Islamic 32
96) and overtly as under Zia (1977–88) and insurgency in FATA (Federally Administered 33
selectively under Musharraf (1999–2008). Tribal Areas) and Swat valley. 34
Islamic parties and groups gained tremendous 35
patronage from the army.They were catapulted 36
into prominence as contenders of power in Ethnic violence 37
their own right.They shared the military estab- 38
lishment’s political vision based on anti- Pakistan emerged as a migrant state. The 39
Indianism, anti-secularism, relative intolerance migration of more than seven million Muslims 40
for subnational identities rooted in ethnic from India to Pakistan provided a source for the 41
sentiments and, until recently, the presidential nationalist movements of both Sindhis and 42
form of government as a mechanism of unity mohajirs. Jinnah and Liaqat were both migrants 43
by command. Not that everything fit well.The from India, along with the majority of the 44
centrality of Islam as part of the state system members of the Muslim League Council and 45
demanded by Islamists was never on the agenda Central Working Committee.The civil bureau- 46
of the state. Conversely, despite the post-9/11 cracy was dominated by migrants from UP and 47
anti-US sentiment of Islamic parties belonging East Punjab, while the business community 48
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 E T H N I C A N D I S L A M I C M I L I TA N CY I N PA K I STA N
1 drew overwhelmingly from Bombay. Refugees
2 from India accounted for 20 percent of the
3 population in West Pakistan in 1951. The
4 migratory elite had a profound impact on the
5 literary, artistic, cultural, administrative, and
6 political aspects of public life in Pakistan. Urdu
7 became the national language even though
8 only three percent of the population had it as
9 its mother tongue.Islamic literature was written
10 predominantly in Urdu. The leaders of Islamic
11 parties were typically Urdu-speaking migrants,
12 including Shabbir Ahmad Usmani (JUI),
13 Maududi (JI) and later Noorani Mian (JUP).In
14 the new ethnic hierarchy, the Urdu-speaking
15 migrants were on top.As early converts to the
16 cause of Pakistan and voters for the Muslim
17 League in the 1937 elections, mohajirs mis-
18 trusted the popular leadership of the Pakistan
19 areas proper who voted for Jinnah’s Pakistan
20 only in 1946 as late converts. The former
21 cultivated a higher legitimacy for themselves
22 than for their lesser compatriots.24
23 It is true that migrants suffered through the
24 tragedy of leaving their homes and hearths
25 behind, along with the breakdown of family
26 and clan ties in many cases. However, it was a
27 migrant-dominated administration at the other
28 end of their journey that welcomed refugees,
29 arranged for their safe passage from India,
30 provided them shelter on arrival,allotted them
31 urban property and agricultural land eva-
32 cuated by the outgoing Hindus and Sikhs, and
33 extended loans to them for starting their
34 businesses. Migrants, especially those from
35 minority provinces, who generally cultivated
36 a self-image as makers of Pakistan, were
37 territorially agnostic in their political vision.
38 For them, Pakistan was a Muslim homeland,
39 the end product of a struggle for political
40 survival in India that was rapidly moving
41 towards a majoritarian democracy.The actual
42 territory and peoples of their land of migration
43 were never part of their imagination. In the
44 post-Partition years, deification of the state
45 emerged as the leading political attitude of
46 migrants, as they started their new life in an
47 “alien” society. They shunned ethnic and
48 linguistic identities and embraced an ideology
of “all-Pakistanism.”25 Islam now served to
unite the disparate provinces and states of
Pakistan that had never before formed a
territorial state. The new Muslim homeland
was conceived and projected as the “historical
spatial container” of somewhat unproblemat-
ized ethnic groups,and “a sacred place set aside
for God.”26
An acute sense of national insecurity
vis-à-vis India,mistrust of “local”politicians in
and out of parliament, and commitment to
firm leadership on top turned migrants into
supporters of military governments.The larger
section of migrants, almost two-thirds, who
had come from East Punjab and adjoining
states of India, got assimilated in West Punjab
within a generation, and lost its identity. A
shared legacy of language, literature, culture,
administration,politics,geography,and history
welded migrants and locals together.However,
the one-third of migrants who had come from
other parts of India outside Punjab and settled
mainly in Sindh remained unassimilated in the
host community. Being non-Sindhi speaking
in Sindh, they soon gravitated towards the
identity of an Urdu-speaking mohajir com-
munity that needed to carve out a niche under
adverse circumstances. As they descended on
Karachi from the north,south,east,and west of
India in their hundreds of thousands,the Sindh
government became concerned over the grim
prospect that Sindhis might become a minority
in their own homeland.
The Sindhi grievances against migrants
continued to accumulate on several counts.27
The central government moved to separate
Karachi from Sindh to become the federal
capital and, in 1948, pushed the Sindh
government to Hyderabad instead.The Sindhi
language was banned or discouraged at vari-
ous levels as a medium of instruction. The
Sindh University at Karachi was relocated at
Jamshoro near Hyderabad. The assets of
the provincial government in Karachi were
arbitrarily transferred to the central govern-
ment.The province of Sindh was merged with
One Unit. Mohajirs were accused of assuming
an attitude of cultural arrogance towards
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Sindhis, almost bordering on racism. Karachi led by the PPP and the MQM respectively. 1
overnight became a mohajir city where Sindhis Sindhi nationalists have been struggling with 2
were reduced to 3.5 percent of the popula- the perceived enemies within:mohajirs in urban 3
tion. Mohajirs occupied government jobs in areas,Punjabis in both urban and rural milieus, 4
numbers grossly disproportionate to their and Pakhtuns in Karachi.The Sindhi nationalist 5
population while representation of Sindhis in leadership remained firmly in the hands of the 6
jobs in both public and private sectors was landed elite, Sindhi intelligentsia, bureaucracy, 7
negligible.A large tract of land brought under and students. Banditry, the main form of 8
irrigation through Guddu and Ghulam traditional violence in Sindh, was occasionally 9
Mohammad barrages in Sindh was allotted to mixed up with ethnic militancy. Being non- 10
civil and military officers, both Punjabis and urban in its support base, the Sindhi ethno- 11
mohajirs. Refugees from India allegedly national movement remained somewhat 12
sponsored Hindu–Muslim riots in Karachi in contained despite violent outbursts such as in 13
1948 with a view to pushing Hindus out of 1983 and, to a lesser extent, in 1992. 14
Sindh. This was resented by Sindhi Muslims In contrast, mohajir nationalism had a 15
who swore by tolerance between followers of militant character from the start.28 The 16
the two faiths and accused mohajirs of bigotry. movement was born out of the “indigenous 17
Under Yahya (1969–71) finally One Unit was revival”in and around 1970,expressed through 18
disbanded, which led to restoration of the four Bengali and Sindhi nationalisms and the anti- 19
provinces,including Sindh.Karachi once more establishment revolt in Punjab identified with 20
became the capital of Sindh, and a new quota PPP.The “migrant” state finally took roots in 21
system was introduced with separate provisions the territory where it was based. In post- 22
for rural and urban Sindh to take care of Bangladesh Pakistan,Indus civilization became 23
Sindhis and mohajirs respectively. the new source of identity.The federating units 24
The PPP government in Karachi and were severally defined as four brothers, four 25
Islamabad (1971–77) was able to consolidate cultures, and four nationalities. Mohajirs in 26
the gains of the quota system by incorporating Sindh lost in many ways during the 1970s. A 27
it into the 1973 Constitution and imple- quarter of a million of their counterparts in 28
menting it at various levels. In a quarter Bangladesh, called Biharis, had fled to Pakistan 29
century, it produced a tiny middle class among through Nepal and India as well as by sea. 30
Sindhis and led to the emergence of a They were brutalized by years of insecurity, 31
rudimentary Sindhi civil bureaucracy. The ethnic hatred, and separation from their 32
execution of Z. A. Bhutto by Zia in 1979 families and friends back in Bangladesh.They 33
eventually led to insurgency in Sindh in 1983 eventually provided the core of the militant 34
as part of the agitation of the Movement for wing of the incipient mohajir movement in 35
Restoration of Democracy (MRD). Zia’s Sindh.The Sindhi nationalists reacted sharply 36
martial law government brutally suppressed to the prospects of another spate of migration 37
the Sindhi agitation.An indirect consequence destined to further upset the worsening demo- 38
of the Sindhi nationalist upsurge was the emer- graphic balance against them.At the other end, 39
gence of a mohajir nationalist party (MQM) in mohajirs had suffered under a series of reversals 40
1984, which many among its opponents of fortune during the first quarter of a century 41
believed was the creation of Zia.At the other after Partition,including:appropriation of jobs 42
end,PPP operated as an ethnonationalist party by Punjabis after the 1958 and 1969 military 43
in Sindh even as it had the profile of a federal coups; shift of capital from Karachi to 44
party elsewhere in the country. Islamabad in 1960; merger of Karachi back in 45
In this way, the province of Sindh produced Sindh in 1970; regionalization of the political 46
two rival ethnic movements of Sindhis and idiom along ethnic lines; and the affirmative 47
mohajirs, based in rural and urban sectors, and action policies which directly hit their poten- 48
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1 tial for recruitment into government services
2 on the basis of merit. Mohajirs further lost their
3 political,bureaucratic,commercial,and cultural
4 ascendancy under Z.A. Bhutto in the 1970s.
5 Mohajirs reacted to the widely cultivated
6 idea of Karachi as a mini-Pakistan where all
7 ethnic communities could settle and as a safe
8 haven for foreign refugees.Mohajir nationalism
9 represents a new sons-of-the-soil movement.29
10 The mohajir community sought to shed its alien
11 identity and develop nativist nationalism in the
12 process of transforming itself into a distinct
13 ethnic community. In this movement, we see
14 ethnicity-in-making, drawing on multiple
15 linguistic, cultural, historical, and geographical
16 identities. Mohajirs shared the minimal experi-
17 ence of having been non-Punjabi refugees
18 from India, dominated by the Urdu-speaking
19 community. The peculiar resettlement pro-
20 cess of migrants coming in successive waves
21 resulted in nearly half of the population in
22 Karachi living in squatter settlements by the
23 end of the twentieth century. It is here that
24 ethnic violence took birth in the midst of
25 rude competition for social space, amenities,
26 security, and habitat, largely outside the
27 purview of law. These groups at the bottom of
28 the social ladder hobnobbed with the criminal
29 underworld to obtain supplies of water,
30 electricity, and other amenities, and to fight
31 rival groups making similar demands.This type
32 of endemic violence spilled into the streets in
33 a situation in which Pakhtuns controlled public
34 transport in a mohajir-dominated metropolis.
35 The famous Bushra Zaidi incident in which a
36 young girl was killed in a road accident in 1985
37 brought to surface the simmering mohajir
38 anger. It was followed by MQM’s victory in
39 the local bodies’ elections in 1987 and suc-
40 cessive general elections thereafter.
41 The MQM soon emerged as a militant
42 party.It targeted the press for covering its mili-
43 tant activity by burning and looting property.
44 It also attacked the perceived renegades from
45 its own cause and non-conforming mohajirs in
46 general, thereby seeking to impose unity by
47 command. This “in-group policing” was
48 carried out by application of informal sanc-
tions characterized by social pressure or even
violence.30 MQM’s militant operational net-
work approximated what Paul Brass calls an
institutionalized riot system (IRS) in his
explanation of Hindu–Muslim riots in
Meerut.31 Brass claims that this system leaves
doors open for more riots and for their
eventual acceptance by the society.32 The
military operation against MQM in 1992–94
and the so-called Rangers Operation in 1995
sought to control the party’s militant politics.
The government resorted to extra-judicial
murder of MQM workers, ruthless searches
and intensive intelligence work.Under Nawaz
Sharif (1997–99), the party again joined the
coalition government, but later parted ways
with it on the issue of the murder of ex-
governor Hakim Saeed,alleged to be the work
of MQM. After an uneasy period under
Musharraf ’s military rule (1999–2001), the
MQM joined coalition governments in
Karachi and Islamabad with the “king’s party,”
Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-i-Azam
(PML-Q), from 2002 to 2007 and again with
the PPP in Sindh after the February 2008
elections. The party was accused of carrying
out bloody attacks on the occasion of the
defunct Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary’s
arrival in Karachi on 12 May,2007,on Benazir
Bhutto’s rally on 18 October,2007,and on the
lawyers’ offices on 9 April, 2008.
Lack of understanding between major
ethnic communities in Karachi turned the city
into a powder keg.The character of violence
was different in the two cases of mohajirs and
Sindhis.The mohajir violence has been planned
and organized, rooted in a social matrix of
sustained tension between communities in the
backdrop of an urban situation of extreme
congestion.As opposed to this, the rural-based
Sindhi violence operated from outside the
mainstream social fabric, generally identified
with the dacoit phenomenon. The Sindhi
militancy was characterized by a lesser quan-
tum of planning and organization,and was not
based on geographical proximity between
hostile communities in densely populated
areas.A major reason for this difference also lay
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in the phenomenon of party.The MQM had During the Afghan jihad against the Red 1
well-trained and ideologically indoctrinated Army, Baloch nationalists saw hundreds of 2
party cadres, who had internalized the cult of thousands of refugees from across the border 3
Altaf Hussain’s leadership. The production of settling in their province, which turned the 4
violence under these circumstances was far delicate demographic balance against the Baloch 5
more efficient than in the case of Sindhis.The in favour of Pakhtuns. After Musharraf ’s coup 6
father of Sindhi nationalism, G. M. Syed, was of 1999, the old wounds were reopened. 7
unable to win popular votes or establish a cult The government’s accountability drive led to 8
of his leadership. He consistently lost to rival incarceration of several Baloch leaders.That left 9
leaders, from Ayub Khuhro in the 1950s to Z. the field open for party cadres,student activists, 10
A.Bhutto in the 1970s.There was no all-Sindhi and intelligentsia to take the initiative in their 11
party per se, except that the PPP operated in own hands. The rape of a female Baloch 12
that province along ethnolinguistic lines. At doctor, allegedly by an army officer, in 2005 13
the heart of MQM’s politics was “ethnic finally ignited a fresh wave of violence from 14
outbidding,” which led to its monopoly over the Bugti tribe that spread to other areas and 15
representation of the perceived mohajir interests groups. 16
and identity.At the heart of the PPP’s politics The most obvious targets of Baloch mili- 17
was “ethnic underbidding” for fear of losing tant actions are: the gas pipeline, which is the 18
support in other provinces.33 symbol of nationalist resistance against the state 19
Unlike the Sindhi, mohajir and Bengali inasmuch as a local facility serves other parts of 20
movements, the Baloch and Pakhtun move- the country, providing four-fifths of the total 21
ments started from separatist agendas in the supply of gas; railway lines, which link 22
late 1940s. The congress government in Balochistan with other provinces; and military 23
NWFP was removed within days after Parti- cantonments, which carry a profile of an 24
tion. But the province gradually moved occupying force belonging to the dominant 25
towards integration with the rest of West ethnic community of Punjab. Baloch militants 26
Pakistan, both politically and economically. fired 30,000 mortars in three years from 2005 27
The Pakhtun leadership by Ghaffar Khan and onwards, with 1,570 attacks in that year 28
his family of the Khudai Khidmatgars, later alone, backed by an armory that included 29
transformed succesively into the National Kalashnikovs, machine guns, and grenades, 30
Awami Party (NAP) and the Awami National along with walky-talkies and satellite phones.34 31
Party (ANP), lost ground in a span of two Among the militants, the BLA, mainly 32
generations. In contrast, Balochistan remained comprising Bugti and Marri tribesmen, 33
without a pristine Baloch Party and an all- consistently made news headlines. It was 34
Baloch leader.The merger of Balochistan with banned as a terrorist organization. 35
Pakistan took place through annexation under Another irritant for Baloch nationalists was 36
alleged coercion and co-option.Tribal lashkars the government’s project for development of 37
(armed units) put up resistance, leading to Gawadar as an international port on the 38
counterinsurgency measures by successive Arabian coastline with the help of China.The 39
governments. The dismissal of the NAP’s Baloch resisted the project on various grounds: 40
popular government of Balochistan by the the fiercely ambitious land grab movement of 41
Bhutto government in Islamabad in 1973 led military and non-military personnel from 42
to a guerrilla war that lasted four years. It outside the province represented a colonial 43
involved a major military operation,a complex presence; the migration and settlement of 44
judicial process known as the Hyderabad people into the province from outside was 45
Tribunal, lengthy jail terms for the Baloch expected to dwarf the Baloch population; 46
leadership, and militarization of the Baloch the much-touted development work in 47
ethnic movement in general. Balochistan was perceived to be a conspiracy to 48
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 E T H N I C A N D I S L A M I C M I L I TA N CY I N PA K I STA N
1 increase the potential of the military and
2 security agencies to control the province rather
3 than improve the living conditions of people.
4 The Musharraf government followed a policy
5 of sorting out the recalcitrant tribal lords
6 (sardars) led by Nawab Bugti, who was later
7 killed in an ambush in 2006. A spate of
8 arrests and extra-judicial killings followed, and
9 several cases of “disappeared” persons came to
10 the surface, allegedly involving intelligence
11 agencies. Islamabad even sought to support
12 the Pakhtun-based Islamic parties to counter
13 the ethnic appeal of the Baloch nationalist
14 parties.35 After the February 2008 elections,
15 the PPP Chief Minister Raisani released
16 Akhtar Mengal and Nawab Bugti’s grandson
17 Shazain Bugti, among others. Prime Minister
18 Gilani stopped the military operation against
19 Baloch activists and announced a policy of
20 dialogue with them.
21 Militancy in Balochistan has been con-
22 sidered especially dangerous because of the
23 fear of a state-sponsored counterinsurgency
24 based on cultivation of Islam against Baloch
25 ethnicity, or of al-Quaeda moving in to fill
26 the vacuum.36 However, there are reasons to
27 believe otherwise. First, violence itself is
28 relatively contained. The number of militant
29 Baloch activists has been small, reflecting the
30 demographic weakness of Balochistan at a
31 mere 3.5 percent of the national population,
32 with only half of it belonging to the Baloch
33 proper. Second, with 42 percent of the land of
34 Pakistan, the province is sparsely populated.
35 This made guerrilla warfare extremely difficult
36 across hundreds of kilometers of rugged
37 territory. Third,tribal hierarchies led by sardars
38 and nawabs represented rival power blocs,often
39 organized as parallel political parties or party
40 factions. Thus, the Baloch National Party
41 (BNP) represented Mengals, Jamhoori Watan
42 Party (JWP) Bugtis, and Baloch Haq Talwar
43 (BHT) Marris. This pattern circumscribed
44 their potential of producing an all-Baloch
45 nationalist party along the lines of MQM, and
46 thus kept their militant activities bound to
47 certain localities and tribes.Fourth,for decades
48 the Baloch have been engaged in a quiet war
against Pakhtuns, the enemy within.The latter
dominated the economic and cultural life
of the capital city of Quetta and northern
Balochistan in general. The arrival of Afghan
refugees in the 1980s further changed the
profile of the city and the province
linguistically, culturally, demographically, and
economically in favor of Pakhtuns.
Identity formation seems to be a major and
continuing preoccupation of nationalists and
ethnonationalists alike.In Amartya Sen’s words,
“imposition of singular and belligerent
identities”on people can only serve to sharpen
divisions in society.37 Identity underscores the
cultural construction of the fear of the other.38
It serves the purpose of laying out the turf for
a pre-emptive attack out of fear for personal
and collective security.39 As such, identity-
based violence rooted in the imperatives of
security has prevailed in all the current ethnic
movements of Pakistan,namely,mohajir,Sindhi,
and Baloch.
Islamic militancy
While answering the question of whether
Islam provides a theory of violence, the con-
tributors to a recent book on Islamist violence
define a fundamentalist as “a messianic, death-
dealing hero who sacrifices his life on the altar
of God spurred by the promise of eternal
salvation of his soul in paradise.”40 This may be
the psychology of individual terrorists, but
it hardly explains the larger phenomenon,
namely, an extra-constitutional and aggressive
mode of political participation through vio-
lence. Jessica Stern’s exposé of Pakistan’s jihad
culture brings in the institutional background
of potential terrorists emerging from madrasahs,
the “schools of hate.”41 She sees it as a
principal–agent problem whereby the agent
(terrorist) has outgrown the principal (state).42
Islamism has been widely discussed with
reference to modernity from opposite per-
spectives. It is defined as a reaction to moder-
nity that brought down traditional mechanisms
of solidarity in Muslim communities at the
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hands of the Westernized elite.43 Alternatively, tomous worldview provides the background 1
it is understood in terms of serving a modern against which we need to judge the under- 2
agenda relating to statehood and interstate standing and action of Muslims in Pakistan.A 3
relations reflecting “sectarian utopian orienta- persecution syndrome has been part of the 4
tions.”44 Muslim self-image during the last half century 5
Western approaches to the phenomenon of in various geographical regions of the world. 6
Islamic militancy focus on a reified construct After 9/11, Islamabad turned its back on its 7
of that religion as an indomitable force pushing erstwhile allies,the Taliban in Kabul,in support 8
its adherents in a certain undesirable direc- of the US war effort. A large number of state 9
tion of action and behavior. The clash of functionaries, especially from intelligence 10
civilizations thesis deals with this phenomenon agencies led by ISI,who were recruited,trained 11
at a macro level, as do various analyses dealing and socialized into militant action against 12
with the current wave of Islamic militancy Russian “infidels” in Afghanistan under Zia, 13
flowing from central to southeast Asia. were jolted into changing sides, although in 14
However, following the research based on the some cases unsuccessfully. Combined with the 15
World Values Study 1995–2001, Pippa Norris invasion of Iraq in 2003, the latent goodwill 16
and Ronald Inglehart find that there is no for the Taliban among the general public was 17
fundamental difference of values between the increasingly couched in anti-American terms. 18
Islamic world and the West, that the post- The top brass of the army took the “prag- 19
communist European societies show far less matic” decision of joining the US-led war 20
support for democracy than Islamic societies, against terrorism. But, various Afghanistan- 21
and that certain sub-Saharan African countries savvy ex-generals, mid-career intelligence 22
and Catholic countries of Latin America officers, Islamic parties, remnants of pro- 23
provide an even stronger role for religious mujahideen and pro-Taliban elements from the 24
authorities than do Muslim countries. By the articulate sections including academia, media, 25
same token,they do find a real difference in the and the professions in general continued to 26
realm of gender equality and sexual liberal- oppose the new deal with America. They 27
ization.45 The typical Western scholarly believed that the war against terrorism was 28
approach seeks to unravel the “mystery” of fought in the American interest and not in 29
Islam. The conflation of religion and state in Pakistan’s interest. This led to ambiguity, 30
Islam has already become an academic confusion, and contradiction concerning reli- 31
orthodoxy, which belies the political scene on gious violence among politically motivated 32
the ground for almost the whole of the last sections of the public. Along with formal 33
1,500 years in almost all Muslim societies.46 condemnation of terrorism, one finds opposi- 34
These views ignore the professed subjective, tion to anti-terrorist operations such as the one 35
narrative and projective idiom of the practi- against the Red Mosque in Islamabad in 36
tioners of both politics and Islam in the August 2007, in Swat in October–November 37
Muslim world. One can argue that the world 2007 and January–February 2009, in South 38
view of Muslims has been increasingly shaped Waziristan in mid-2008 and Bajaur in 39
by a dichotomy between the world at large February–March 2009. The legitimacy and 40
dominated by the West and the mini-world high moral ground of the war against terrorism 41
of Islam conceived as two essentialisms. A were lost on the way. 42
pervasive world-of-Islam perspective operates We can point to regional instability as a 43
through projects such as the Organization of potent factor in shaping the contours of 44
the Islamic Conference (OIC) and support for contemporary Islamic militancy in Pakistan. 45
the perceived Muslim suffering in regional The Afghan resistance heavily influenced 46
conflicts ranging from Palestine to Chechnya, Pakhtun politics in Pakistan by discrediting the 47
Afghanistan and Iraq. In other words, a dicho- relatively secular ANP leadership in the 2002 48
286
 E T H N I C A N D I S L A M I C M I L I TA N CY I N PA K I STA N
1 elections. Pakhtuns moved from the ethnic
2 project to the Islamic project, in the pro-
3 cess leaving behind Ghaffar Khan’s ideology
4 of non-violence and embracing a militant
5 strategy to defeat the West as well as
6 “Westernism” at home. Like Afghanistan, the
7 tribal areas had no colonial legacy of a
8 constitutional state system, rule of law,
9 rational–legal bureaucracy, political parties,
10 elections, and independent judiciary. In the
11 absence of an urban-based middle class
12 committed to legal, educational, bureaucratic,
13 and technocratic careers,tribal-based resistance
14 in Afghanistan and in the tribal areas of
15 Pakistan produced the Islamic project identi-
16 fied with the Taliban. No constraint in the way
17 of implementation of Shari’a was to be
18 tolerated by various proto-Taliban elements
19 from north and south Waziristan and Wana.A
20 similar pattern of Pakhtun Islamism emerged
21 from the semi-settled areas from Swat and Dir
22 states, which became part of the mainstream
23 legal–administrative setup as late as 1970.The
24 latter states targeted the central government’s
25 implements of authority and sought to take
26 over government at the district level. In
27 October 2007, Sufi’s son-in-law, Fazlullah,
28 launched the movement for implementation
29 of Shari’a and took control of 59 villages in the
30 valley.The Musharraf government launched a
31 military operation in order to restore the
32 government’s writ.The pattern was clear: the
33 less constitutional the state, the more the
34 political violence.
35 Pakistan’s military engagement with
36 Afghanistan for two decades, first as a launch-
37 ing pad for guerrilla warfare and later as
38 creator, supporter, and patron of the Taliban,
39 produced an Islamic movement that was
40 predominantly Sunni-based. Zia’s own
41 Islamization program in Pakistan bore the
42 same character, reflecting the mainstream
43 sectarian commitment.The Iranian revolution
44 introduced a new factor in the whole Islamic
45 project in the form of reinvigorated Shi’a
46 dynamism,which soon led to resistance against
47 imposition of Sunni jurisprudence. From the
48 mid-1980s onwards, a sectarian war began in
various localities of Pakistan that involved
targeted killing of Sunni and Shi’a leaders,
throwing of hand grenades on mosques and
imambargahs, and demonstrations and violent
clashes between sectarian activists. The Zia
government and the first Nawaz Sharif
government (1990–93) were generally
perceived to be supporters of the Sunni
activists, who operated from the platform of
Sipah Sahaba Pakistan (SSP).47
Apart from Afghanistan and Iran, Saudi
Arabia played a significant role in shaping
Islamic attitudes in Pakistan along revivalist
lines. The Saudi influence operated in three
distinct ways:by financing the Afghan jihad and
providing it diplomatic, ideological and moral
legitimacy; by supporting anti-Shi’a activist
organizations, thus indulging in a proxy
war with Iran on the soil of Pakistan; and,
most significantly, by shaping the religious
beliefs and practices of millions of Pakistani
expatriates in Saudi Arabia along Wahhabist/
Salafi lines,thus seeking to reproduce a pristine
Islam.The returnees from Saudi Arabia brought
back petrodollars and also a commitment to
Islamic glory along with hatred for the
perceived enemies of Islam led by America and
Israel.
The tribal and semi-settled areas along the
northern borders with Afghanistan represent a
political culture that is not in consonance with
the style of a typical ex-British colony such as
India or Pakistan. This latter style is char-
acterized by issue formation and policy
orientation and even ideological expression
typically through party activity in and outside
the electoral framework.In this way,parliament
performed the function of taking protagonists
of various causes, Islamic or ethnic, off the
streets. By the same token, the tribal areas and
the recently annexed princely states such as
Swat, Dir, and Chitral continued to operate
according to the traditions of “indirect rule.”
These areas have been characterized more by
arbitrary rule than by adherence to the rule of
codified law based on the British Common
Law, a rational–legal bureaucracy, habeas
corpus and other writs for protection of
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citizens from the state, and a general respect establishments and men in uniform especially 1
for the will of the majority and piecemeal at the hands of the Taliban. Pakistan entered 2
accommodation of grievances. Instead, these the era of suicide bombing in 2007 after the 3
areas exhibited an arbitrary expression of army’s attack on the Red Mosque in Islamabad. 4
individual and group power, an unregulated However, Pakistan’s legal and institutional 5
public behavior, the will of a minority against infrastructure is reasonably strong by the Third 6
that of the majority, and the power of the World standards, sufficiently at least to keep 7
bullet prevailing over the power of the ballot. violence from becoming a way of life. 8
Democracy binds individuals to the state, There is a measure of consensus in Pakistan 9
prescribing duties for the former and on the normative ideal of democracy, at least 10
responsibilities for the latter. It controls the in procedural terms. Ethnic conflicts often 11
flight of imagination, restricts agendas, focuses reflect a desire to safeguard the rule of public 12
on resources, and allows only incremental representatives against centralized rule, espe- 13
change.48 Democracies carry far more cially in provinces and communities other 14
authority than authoritarian regimes, which than Punjab. State elites celebrate the 1940 15
depend on the rude exercise of naked power. Lahore Resolution as a milestone on the way 16
Bringing the unsettled and semi-settled to establishment of a Muslim homeland. 17
areas into mainstream politics requires care- Ethnonationalist leaders seek a (con)federal 18
ful planning for the transition from indirect arrangement on the basis of the same 19
to direct rule.49 resolution whereby provinces would have 20
maximum autonomy.50 Ethnic movements 21
drew heavily on grievances against the 22
Conclusion dismissal of the elected government in NWFP 23
in 1947,successive elected governments in East 24
Our observations bring out various factors that Bengal and Sindh,and the elected government 25
led to Islamic and ethnic violence in Pakistan of Balochistan in 1973, obliging the NAP 26
in recent years.First and foremost,the character government in NWFP to resign in protest. In 27
of violence needs to be defined in relation to other words, violence emerged as a desperate 28
the level of destruction, for example, by mode of politics after exhausting all constitu- 29
distinguishing indiscriminate killing from tional formulas and parliamentary initiatives. 30
precisely targeted attacks and individual acts of The failure of the Musharraf government 31
terrorism from group participation in violence. to implement the recommendations of the 32
In Pakistan, violence itself remains limited. It two senate committees to deal with the 33
does not approach the level of genocide such Balochistan issue contributed to the commit- 34
as in Rwanda and Burundi, massacres such as ment of Baloch nationalists to pursue their 35
in Sabra and Shatilla or in Bosnia, protracted mission outside the constitutional framework. 36
human suffering such as in Darfur, or a life of At the same time, Islamists have been 37
endemic insecurity involving recurrent loss of brought in by successive military governments 38
life and property as in Iraq, Afghanistan, and to subvert the constitutional source of 39
Gaza. In other words, the terrorist profile of legitimacy derived from mass mandate.Islamist 40
Pakistan is far higher than the reality on the groups duly obliged the military governments 41
ground. The enigma lies in the way the and, in the process, professed and practiced an 42
transnational Islamic networks have operated extra-constitutional agenda, while amassing 43
in Pakistan. Incidents of violence in the small arms in pursuit of jihad in Afghanistan 44
country include attacks on a perceived enemy and Kashmir.The chickens came home to roost 45
or its symbols such as government property, in the first decade of the twenty-first century. 46
railway lines, gas pipelines, holy places of other Public acceptance of violence outside the 47
religious sects, and, most recently, defense purview of law, even more than violence 48
288
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1 itself, is a persistant malaise of societies such as 15 Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Lahore:
2 Pakistan. Vanguard, 2005), pp. 207 and 223–24.
3 16 Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State,
4 pp. 213–16.
Notes 17 Charles Kennedy, “Pakistan: Ethnic Diversity
5
and Colonial Legacy,” in John Coakley (ed.),
6
1 Pervez Hoodbhoy, “It is our War,” Dawn, The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict
7 (London: Frank Cass, 2003),Table 7.2, p. 162.
23 October, 2007.
8 18 Dietrich Reetz, God’s Kingdom on Earth: The
2 Dawn, 11 June, 2008.
9 Contestations of the Public Sphere by Islamic Groups
3 See Mohammad Waseem,“Islam and the West:
10 A Perspective from Pakistan,” in James Peacock in Colonial India (1900–1947), rehabilitation
11 et al. (eds), Identity Matters: Ethnic and Sectarian thesis, Berlin University, Berlin 2001, abstract.
12 Conflict (New York: Berghahan Books, 2007), 19 Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Concept of an Islamic State,
13 pp. 191–92. PhD thesis, University of Stockholm
14 4 Paul R. Brass, Ethnicity and Nationalism (New (published) (Edsbruk, 1985), pp. 34–43.
15 Delhi: Sage, 1991), p. 8. 20 See Justice (Rtd) Munir Ahmed, From Jinnah to
16 Zia (Lahore:Vanguard, 1980), pp. 32–36.
5 William Safran, “Non-separatist Policies
21 Mohammad Ali Jinah, Speeches as Governor
17 Regarding Ethnic Minorities: Positive
General of Pakistan,1947–48 (Karachi,n.d.),p.9.
18 Approaches and Ambiguous Consequences,”
22 Article 198, Clause 1, Constitution of Pakistan
19 International Political Science Review, Vol. 15,
(1956); see also Fazlur Rehman, “Islam in
20 No. 1 (1994), pp. 63–64.
Pakistan,” Journal of South Asian and Middle
21 6 Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguli (eds),
Eastern Studies, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1985), p. 35.
22 “Introduction,”in Government Policies and Ethnic
23 See Vali Nasr,“Islam, the State and the Rise of
Relations in Asia and the Pacific (Cambridge,MA:
23 Sectarian Militancy in Pakistan,”in Christopher
MIT Press, 1997), p. 11.
24 Jaffrelot (ed.), Pakistan: Nationalism without a
7 Hamza Alavi,“Authoritarianism and Legitimacy
25 Nation (New Delhi:Manohar,2002),pp.88–92.
of State Power in Pakistan,” in Subrata Mitra 24 See Mohammad Waseem, “Functioning of
26 (ed.),The Postcolonial State in South Asia (London:
27 Democracy in Pakistan,” in Zoya Hasan (ed.),
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990), pp. 32–33. Democracy and Muslim Societies: The Asian
28 8 See Alain-G. Gagnon and James Tully, Multi- Experience (New Delhi: Sage, 2007).
29 national Democracies (Cambridge: University 25 Feroz Ahmed, Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan
30 Press, 2001), p. 2. (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999),
31 9 James Manor,“Ethnicity and Politics in India,” pp. 100–02.
32 International Affairs, Vol.72,No.1 (1996),p.463. 26 Robert J. Kaiser, “Homeland Making and the
33 10 Tai Yong and Gyanesh Kudaisya, The Aftermath Territorialization of National Identity,” in
34 of Partition in South Asia (London: Routledge, Daniel Conversi (ed.), Ethnonationalism in the
35 2000), pp. 206–10. Contemporary World (London:Routledge,2002),
36 11 Yong and Kudaisya, pp. 211–12. p. 230.
37 12 Swarna Iyer, “August Anarchy: The Partition 27 Mohammad Waseem, “Political Ethnicity and
38 Massacres in Punjab 1947,” South Asia, Special the State in Pakistan,” in The Nation-State and
39 issue, 18 (1995), pp. 23–24. Transnational Forces in South Asia (Tokyo, 2001),
13 Mohammad Waseem,“Muslim Migration from pp. 270–71.
40
East Punjab: Patterns of Settlement and 28 Mohammad Waseem,“Mohajirs in Pakistan:A
41
Assimmilation,” in Ian Talbot and Thinder Case of Nativisation of Migrants,” in Crispin
42 Shandi (eds),People on the Move:Punjabi Colonial Bates (ed.), Community, Empire and Migration:
43 and Postcolonial Migration (Karachi: Oxford South Asians in Diaspora (Basingstoke: Palgrave,
44 University Press), p. 69. 2001), p. 245.
45 14 Rafiq Afzal, Political Parties in Pakistan: 29 See, for comparison, Myron Weiner, Sons of the
46 1947–1958 (Islamabad: National Institute of Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India
47 Historical and Cultural Studies, 1998), (Princeton,NJ:University Press,1978),pp.6–7.
48 pp. 255–58. 30 Brubaker and Laitin, p. 433.

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31 Paul R.Brass,“Development of an Institutional- 41 Jessica Stern,“Pakistan’s Jihad Culture,” Foreign 1

ised Riot System in Meerut City,1961 to 1982,” Affairs (November/December 2000), p. 118. 2
Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 39, No. 44 42 Stern, p. 16. 3
(30 October–5 November,2004),pp.4,839–48. 43 Ira M.Lapidus,“Islamic Revival and Modernity: 4
32 Brass, “Development of an Institutionalised The Contemporary Movements and the
5
Riot System,” p. 4,845. Historical Paradigms,” Journal of Economic and
6
33 See Brubaker and Laitin, p. 434. Social History of the Orient, Vol. 40, No. 4 (1997),
34 Massoud Ansari,“Between Tribe and Country,” p. 444. 7
Himal (Khatmandu), Vol.20,No.5 (May 2007), 44 S. N. Eisenstadt, Fundamentalism, Sectarianism, 8
pp. 23, 27. and Revolution (Cambridge: University Press, 9
35 International Crisis Group (ICG),Pakistan: The 1999), pp. 2–3. 10
Worsening Conflict in Baluchistan,Report No.119 45 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Islam and 11
(Islamabad, 2006), p. 21. the West:Testing the Clash of Civilizations Thesis, 12
36 Fredrick Grare,Pakistan:The Resurgence of Baluch KSG Working Paper (April 2002),No.RWP02, 13
Nationalism,Carnegie Papers,No.65,6 January, pp. 14–15. 14
2006; and Rajshree Jetly, “Resurgence of the 46 Dale F. Eickleman and James Piscatori, Muslim 15
Baluch Movement in Pakistan: Emerging Politics (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1996),
16
Perspectives and Challenges,” paper for pp. 47–48.
17
International Symposium on Pakistan,Institute 47 See Vali Nasr,“The Rise of Sunni Militancy in
of South Asian Studies (ISAS) National Pakistan:The Changing Role of Islamism and 18
University of Singapore, 24–25 May, 2007, p. 8. the Ulema in Society and Politics,”Modern Asian 19
37 Amartya Sen, Identity and Violence:The Illusion of Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2000), pp. 145–54. 20
Destiny (London:Allen Lane, 2006), p. 2. 48 See Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn 21
38 Brubaker and Laitin, p. 442. Karl, “What Democracy is . . . and is Not,” 22
39 Stuart J. Kaufman, Modern Hatreds:The Symbolic Journal of Democracy (1991), pp. 50–54. 23
Politics of Ethnic War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 49 Brubaker and Laitin, p. 428. 24
University Press, 2001), p. 19. 50 See Mohammad Waseem,“Pakistan Resolution 25
40 Hamadi Redissi and Jan-Erik Lane,“Does Islam and the Ethnonationalist Movements,”in Kaniz 26
Provide a Theory ofViolence?”in Amélie Blom F. Yusuf et al. (eds), Pakistan Resolution Revisited
27
et al. (eds), The Enigma of Islamist Violence (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and
28
(London: Hurst & Company, 2007), p. 45. Cultural Studies, 1990), pp. 522–27.
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
290
 1
2
3
4
20
5
6 Ethnic conflict and the
7
8 civil war in Sri Lanka
9
10
11
12 Jayadeva Uyangoda
13
14
15
16
17
18
19 Beginning of the civil war through political reforms.3 The failure of the
20 Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam agreement of
21 The transition of Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict 1957 and the Senanayake-Chelvanayakam
22 into a civil war between the state and Tamil agreement of 1965 were crucial landmarks in
23 nationalist groups began in the late 1970s, and the ethnic politics of accommodation failure.
24 accelerated in the early 1980s,particularly after The inflexibility of Sinhalese nationalism in
25 the anti-Tamil ethnic riots of July 1983.1 There responding to minority ethnic grievances and
26 is a pre-civil war phase to the ethnic conflict, aspirations as well as the electoral politics of
27 running back to the early post-independence “ethnic outbidding” have been crucial in
28 years. Since political independence in 1948, shaping the breakdown of Sinhalese–Tamil
29 Sinhalese–Tamil relations, specifically the ethnic relations throughout these years.4
30 relations between the state and the minority The immediate circumstances that saw the
31 Tamil community, had been characterized by transition of Tamil ethnic politics from a
32 tension and conflict. The Tamil community’s demand for regional autonomy to secession
33 experience of discrimination and political evolved in the late 1970s.The promulgation of
34 exclusion had produced a particular project of a strictly unitary republican constitution in
35 minority aspirations translated into a demand 1972 by the United Front government,
36 for federalist regional autonomy. It is perhaps ignoring the Tamil demands for regional
37 fair to say that Sri Lanka’s ethnic minorities autonomy, created conditions for a decisive
38 were “unreconciled to the constitutional rupture of Tamil trust in the Sinhalese political
39 arrangements” that came along with political class.The resultant tension between the Tamil
40 independence; but only a “few expected that nationalist Federal Party and the United Front
41 the majority rule would be so quickly followed regime had produced some violence that
42 by discriminatory legislative measures.”2 The included police killing of Tamil civilians and
43 peaceful and parliamentary agitation for auto- assassinations by Tamil radical activists. These
44 nomy rights continued until the late 1970s,but incidents marked a shift towards confrontation
45 with little success. As Kearney, Roberts, in state–Tamil relations. At the parliamentary
46 Wriggins, and Wilson have documented and election of 1977, the newly formed Tamil
47 commented on in great detail, there were United Liberation Front (TULF) contested the
48 many barriers to interethnic accommodation seats in the Tamil-dominated Northern and

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Eastern Provinces, seeking a mandate from nationalist groups, and often encouraged by 1
Tamil voters to campaign for independence. sections of the state apparatus, attacked, 2
This was the beginning of the struggle for wounded, killed, and even burnt alive Tamil 3
“Eelam,” a separate Tamil ethnic state. The citizens in the Sinhalese majority areas,includ- 4
TULF, having won 17 of the 19 parliamentary ing the capital city of Colombo. Property 5
seats in the two provinces, seemed to have belonging to Tamil families, including houses 6
expected the ruling United National Party and commercial establishments, were set on 7
(UNP) to initiate negotiations so that some fire and destroyed almost as if in accordance 8
measure of autonomy could be won for the with a premeditated plan.The most troubling 9
Tamils. But the UNP government under aspect of this anti-minority violence was the 10
President Junius Jayewardene was not willing government’s inaction to control mob violence 11
to concede regional autonomy to the Tamils. for a few days. It indeed gave the impression 12
Instead, the government offered in 1981 that the government saw the violence as a 13
limited administrative decentralization by politically necessary development in order to 14
establishing a system of district development control a politically assertive ethnic minority. 15
councils (DDCs). The growing violence During the violence spread over a week in the 16
between incipient Tamil armed groups and the month of July 1983 many thousands of Tamil 17
state in the Northern Province had by this time citizens were displaced as internal refugees.The 18
created an atmosphere of increasing tension in government sent many of them to the Tamil 19
government–Tamil relations. The govern- majority Northern Province, ostensibly for 20
ment’s resort to emergency law and the their safety. But it also gave the Tamils the 21
enactment of the Prevention of Terrorism Act unfortunate signal that the state could not 22
in 1979 indicated that its priority was to defeat protect them outside the Northern Province.6 23
“Tamil terrorism” by means of law and order The atrocities of July 1983 widened the 24
measures, rather than addressing the political chasm between the Sri Lankan state and the 25
demands of the Tamil minority.5 The gov- Tamil community. It also led to the effective 26
ernment’s deployment of violence against replacement of parliamentary Tamil nationalist 27
Tamils in 1981 in Jaffna,the symbolic heartland politics by an armed struggle for separation. 28
of northern Tamil society, during the elections Tamil militant groups that were active 29
to the DDCs, sent the worst possible signal to in sporadic guerrilla operations against the 30
the Tamils:the Sinhalese political establishment government found the post-July 1983 situation 31
was not willing to concede even administrative most favorable to claims for their legitimacy 32
decentralization to the Northern and Eastern and the validity of their tactics.With support 33
Provinces. This provided the context for and solidarity from the Tamils in southern 34
greater radicalization of Tamil nationalist India,and access to new sources of recruitment 35
politics. Thus, the politics of bargaining that and material support, a number of militant 36
the TULF had been practicing, even after groups relaunched their “national liberation 37
obtaining an electoral mandate from the Tamil armed struggle,” seeking the establishment of 38
electorate, was increasingly replaced by the the state of Eelam in the Northern and Eastern 39
politics of “armed struggle” for “national self- Provinces. 40
determination.” 41
It was against such a backdrop of increasing 42
tension in state–Tamil relations that the anti- Trends in the Tamil armed 43
Tamil violence occurred in July 1983. This struggle 44
ethnic violence appeared to have been 45
sponsored by sections linked to the UNP In the early days of the Tamil nationalist 46
regime and even tolerated by the government insurgency in Sri Lanka in the late 1970s,there 47
and its leaders. Sinhalese mobs, backed by was no unified resistance movement as such. 48
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 E T H N I C C O N F L I CT A N D T H E C I V I L WA R I N S R I L A N K A
1 There were a number of armed groups with
2 different ideological commitments and organ-
3 izational identities. All were Tamil nationalist
4 in ideological persuasion,but some were Left–
5 oriented. The Left–nationalist groups were
6 the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation
7 Front (EPRLF), Eelam Revolutionary
8 Organization of Students (EROS) and People’s
9 Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam
10 (PLOTE). The Liberation Tigers of Tamil
11 Eelam (LTTE) was the most nationalist of all
12 the militant groups. After July 1983, all these
13 organizations operated from southern India
14 where they had obtained either political
15 asylum or enjoyed the status of guests.Almost
16 all these militant groups are reported to have
17 received training in guerrilla warfare while
18 in India. Some sources say that the Indian
19 intelligence agencies were instrumental in
20 providing military training for these groups, as
21 well as weapons and material support, an
22 allegation officially denied by India.7
23 In August 1984 the Tamil militant groups
24 formed a united front to take part in the peace
25 talks held in Thimpu, the capital of Bhutan.
26 These talks were facilitated by the Indian
27 government.The Tamil militant groups and the
28 TULF, which was in exile in India at the time,
29 seemed to be relying more on the outcome of
30 the armed struggle than a compromise through
31 negotiations. In the same vein, the Sri Lankan
32 government showed no interest in meeting
33 Tamil nationalist aspirations through negotia-
34 tions. From the perspective of the dynamics of
35 the civil war,it was too early for either party to
36 move away from unilateral outcomes which
37 they pursued through military means. The
38 government’s overall objective was to defeat
39 the Tamil insurgency militarily and “unify”the
40 state. By the same token, the Tamil militant
41 groups were committed to an armed struggle
42 for secession.Thus, negotiations did not mean
43 much for the strategies of either the govern-
44 ment or the Tamil nationalist rebels.Although
45 the Thimpu talks failed to produce an outcome
46 leading to ethnic conflict resolution, the talks
47 were significant in the sense that the Tamil
48 groups formulated four principles which,from
their perspective, were to constitute the essen-
tial framework for a negotiated settlement:
1 recognition of the Tamils as a distinct
nationality in Sri Lanka
2 recognition of a Tamil homeland
3 recognition of the right of the Tamil people
for self-determination
4 recognition of the right to full citizenship
of all Tamils living in the island.8
The role of the Indian government in
altering the trajectory of Sri Lanka’s ethnic
conflict in the early and mid-1980s is crucial to
an understanding of the ways in which the
Tamil nationalist insurgency developed in that
period. Although the Indian government of
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi gave covert
support to Tamil militants, there was also the
apprehension among policy circles in New
Delhi that the Tamil insurgency might become
an unmanageable conflict with regional con-
sequences.The Thimpu talks arranged on the
initiative of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi gave
a clear indication that the Indian political and
bureaucratic elites were exploring a negotiated
political settlement to the civil war.The Indian
engagement with both the Sri Lankan
government and the Tamil nationalist groups
through diplomatic channels eventually led to
the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987. The
accord was signed in Colombo by the Indian
prime minister and the Sri Lankan president.9
It proposed for the Sri Lankan government to
establish a system of “devolution of power” in
exchange for laying down of their arms by
the Tamil militant groups, disbanding their
guerrilla units, and joining the political
“mainstream.”The Indian government was to
act as the guarantor of the implementation of
the accord.At the time it was signed,the accord
appeared to be a major breakthrough in the
direction of resolving the ethnic conflict by
political–constitutional means.
The success of the Indo–Lanka Accord
depended on two crucial factors: the willing-
ness of the Sri Lankan government to con-
stitutionalize the devolution framework and of
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the Tamil militant groups to accept the peace to the LTTE’s continuing commitment to the 1
deal and give up the armed struggle. The goal of Eelam, a separate Tamil state, through 2
government, despite resistance from within it armed struggle. 3
and oppositionist Sinhalese nationalist forces, 4
established provincial councils through a 5
constitutional amendment before the end of Negotiations and their outcomes 6
1987. Most of the Tamil militant groups 7
also accepted the accord, surrendered their Sri Lanka’s civil war has also been interspersed 8
weapons, and agreed to join the parliamentary with a number of attempts at a negotiated 9
political process. The leading groups among political settlement.11 The first attempt, as 10
them were the EPRLF, PLOTE, EROS, and already noted, was made in 1984.The Thimpu 11
TELO, but not the LTTE. The last had by this talks did not produce an outcome.The second 12
time emerged as a powerful military entity. attempt was the Indo–Lanka Accord of July 13
The LTTE did not surrender weapons or 1987, with the involvement of the Indian and 14
accept the framework of political solution Sri Lankan governments. It produced a 15
offered by the Indo–Lanka Accord. Instead, it constitutional framework for a political 16
continued the armed struggle. In October solution—the provincial council system—and 17
1987 the Indian army was inducted in Sri created conditions for a number of Tamil 18
Lanka, in accordance with the terms of the militant groups to give up the armed struggle 19
accord, to ensure the surrender of weapons by and join parliamentary politics. But it did not 20
the LTTE.That engagement soon led to a new lead to the termination of the civil war or the 21
phase of Sri Lanka’s civil war between the resolution of the ethnic conflict. 22
Indian peacekeeping troops and the LTTE, The third attempt at a negotiated solution 23
which lasted until March–April 1990 when was made in 1989–90 by President Ranasinghe 24
the new Sri Lankan government forced the Premadasa, who assumed office in January 25
Indian government to withdraw from its 1989 amidst a massive political crisis.12 The 26
military engagement on the island.10 war between the Indian peacekeeping troops 27
The Indian involvement in 1987 through and the LTTE was raging and the armed insur- 28
the Indo-Lanka Accord in a way resulted in a gency led by the JVP against the government 29
significant transformation of Tamil militant was at its peak. In April 1989 President 30
politics in Sri Lanka. While it created condi- Premadasa called on both the LTTE and the 31
tions for the TULF to return to Sri Lanka from JVP for talks. While the JVP refused the 32
exile in India and re-enter parliament, it also invitation for talks, the LTTE responded 33
provided political space for a number of Tamil positively.The two sides held talks for about a 34
militant groups to give up the armed struggle year. During these talks, the JVP intensified its 35
for secession. They came to the conclusion that armed attacks on the state in the belief that it 36
a separate Tamil state was no longer a viable could push the government out of power in 37
political goal.In 1988,the EPRLF became the the midst of the crisis. However, utilizing the 38
governing party of the first provincial council breathing space created by the talks with the 39
of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. LTTE, the Premadasa regime launched a 40
Subsequently, the EPRLF as well as the massive and ruthless counterinsurgency war 41
PLOTE, EROS and TELO, and the newly against the JVP. By the end of 1989, the 42
emerged Eelam People’s Democratic Party government managed to crush the JVP 43
(EPDP) took part in parliamentary elections insurgency with deadly efficiency, resulting in 44
and their representatives were elected to 40,000–50,000 deaths. Meanwhile, the nego- 45
parliament.The EPDP even became members tiations between the Premadasa regime and the 46
of the SLFP-led cabinet.This transformation of LTTE during this counterinsurgency war 47
Tamil militant groups stands in sharp contrast seemed to be guided merely by the tactical 48
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1 consideration of both sides and not by any
2 serious commitment to a negotiated settle-
3 ment. The Premadasa regime’s immediate
4 tactical goal was the management of the
5 political crisis by defeating the JVP insurgency
6 and sending the Indian peacekeeping troops
7 back to India.The LTTE’s tactical goal was to
8 make use of the Premadasa regime to get rid
9 of the Indian peacekeeping troops, which had
10 risen above 75,000 in numbers. When both
11 sides were satisfied that they had achieved their
12 separate objectives,there was no need for them
13 to produce a tangible outcome from the talks
14 or even to continue them. In June 1990, the
15 LTTE broke the unofficial ceasefire with the
16 government and resumed hostilities. Thus
17 began the so-called Third Eelam War in Sri
18 Lanka that continued till the next ceasefire of
19 January 1995.
20 The change of government in 1994 led to
21 another round of negotiations between the
22 government and the LTTE. The newly formed
23 People’s Alliance,led by the Sri Lanka Freedom
24 Party (SLFP) with some Left parties as coali-
25 tion partners, campaigned for the parlia-
26 mentary election of August 1994 and the
27 presidential election of November that year on
28 a “peace platform.” The initial talks between
29 the two sides that began in September 1994
30 led to a formal Cessation of Hostilities
31 Agreement (CHA), signed in January 1995.
32 Although the two sides then held three rounds
33 of direct talks and exchanged many letters,
34 this engagement too failed to produce any
35 agreement to bring the civil war to an end.
36 Citing as its reasons the government’s lack of
37 commitment to the restoration of peace, the
38 LTTE unilaterally abrogated the CHA on 19
39 April,1995.That created immediate conditions
40 for the two sides to relapse into war.In this new
41 face of the conflict, the People’s Alliance
42 government, led by President Chandrika
43 Kumaratunga, adopted a dual strategy of con-
44 stitutional reforms and war.The constitutional
45 reform package, announced in August 1995,
46 promised greater devolution of power to the
47 existing provincial councils in a framework
48 approximating semi-federalism. The military
dimension of the government strategy had two
objectives.Weakening the LTTE militarily was
the first. The government expected that a
militarily weakened LTTE would eventually
return to the negotiation table and then the
government’s offer for enhanced devolution
would constitute the basis for negotiations and
a settlement agreement.The second objective
was to appeal directly to the Tamil people and
the non-LTTE Tamil parties to accept the
government’s unilateral offer and then even-
tually isolate the LTTE both politically and
militarily. None of these objectives was
achieved.The war continued till the year 2001
with huge human, material and battlefield
costs.Although the government succeeded in
capturing the Jaffna peninsula from the control
of the LTTE, the LTTE retreated to the Vanni
jungles located south of Jaffna and engaged
the state armed forces in a protracted war
that combined both the guerrilla tactics and
conventional warfare.
The next round of peace talks began in early
2002 after the change of government occa-
sioned by the parliamentary elections of
December 2001. The new United National
Front government, led by Prime Minister
Ranil Wickramasinghe, signed a ceasefire
agreement (CFA) with the LTTE on 22
February, 2002 and held five rounds of
negotiations.The peace talks of 2002 set three
specific conditions that were absent in previous
negotiations.First,a ceasefire agreement jointly
signed by the prime minister and the LTTE
leader and monitored by an international
(Nordic) monitoring committee provided a
framework for managing violence. Second, a
third party, the Royal Norwegian govern-
ment, acted as the facilitator and mediator for
the CFA as well as negotiations. Third, the
international community, coordinated by the
EU, the US, and Japan, came forward to
provide direct economic assistance to peace
building to encourage the parties to move
towards a comprehensive peace agreement.
Something closer to a breakthrough in the
negotiations occurred in December 2002
when, during the Oslo talks, the government
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and the LTTE agreed to “explore” a solution Violations of the CFA by both sides went on 1
to the ethnic conflict based on a “federal” unabated. The ceasefire monitors blamed the 2
framework within a “united” Sri Lanka. LTTE more than the government for the 3
However,that exploration did not go far when violations.In such a context of growing unease 4
the LTTE decided in March–April 2003 to and tension in conditions of “no war–no 5
suspend its participation in negotiations, peace,” the tsunami disaster occurred on 26 6
alleging that the UNF government was slow in December,2004.Coastal communities in areas 7
implementing promises made at negotiations. under the control of the government as well as 8
Attempts made by the international actors, the LTTE suffered massive destruction. The 9
local civil society groups and the government great humanitarian tragedy of the tsunami 10
to persuade the LTTE to return to the negotia- offered an opportunity for both the govern- 11
tion table throughout 2003 did not succeed. ment and the LTTE to resume engagement on 12
Meanwhile, in October 2003, the LTTE humanitarian grounds. But they failed to take 13
presented to the government a set of proposals that opportunity forward to resume formal 14
for an interim self-governing authority negotiations for ethnic conflict resolution. 15
(ISGA). The LTTE expected these proposals Even the initiative taken by the two parties to 16
to be the basis for the resumption of stalled set up a joint mechanism for humanitarian 17
negotiations.In the ISGA proposals,the LTTE cooperation through a post-tsunami opera- 18
envisaged a framework of self-rule and auto- tional mechanism (P-TOM) was thwarted 19
nomy for the Northern and Eastern Provinces by the judiciary, backed by the Sinhalese 20
that went beyond Sri Lanka’s existing constitu- nationalist forces.13 The subsequent change of 21
tion and even the conventional understanding government that occurred after the presidential 22
of federalism. The ISGA proposals actually election of December 2005 did not lead to 23
approximated a confederal model,although the resumption of the peace process as such, even 24
LTTE described them as a framework for an though two rounds of peace talks were held in 25
“interim” solution. Soon after these proposals Geneva.The period after 2006 saw a steady re- 26
were submitted, a political crisis developed escalation of violence leading to full-scale war. 27
in Colombo, leading to the dissolution of The government and the LTTE fought an 28
the government by the president. At the “undeclared war” until early 2007.When the 29
parliamentary elections held in April 2004,the government withdrew from the CFA in early 30
UNF, which had so far engaged the LTTE 2007, the international monitoring too ceased 31
politically, lost power. A new Sinhalese to exist. 32
nationalist coalition, led by the SLFP, won the 33
parliamentary election after a campaign that 34
portrayed the UNP–LTTE negotiations and A question of state 35
the CFA as having endangered national 36
security,state sovereignty,and the state capacity At the heart of Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict, civil 37
to fight terrorism by military means. In the war,and violence is the question whether state 38
new conditions of severe polarization of power should or should not be shared among 39
political forces on the question of war or peace, Sinhalese, Tamil, and Muslim ethnic com- 40
there was hardly any space for the new munities.14 The capture of the state by the 41
government and the LTTE to resume political ethnic majority and the exclusion of the ethnic 42
engagement.The return to war by either side minorities from exercising state power were 43
or both was prevented only by the CFA, developments that led to the consolidation of 44
monitored by the Sri Lanka Monitoring a postcolonial Tamil nationalist project in the 45
Mission (SLMM). immediate post-Independence years. The 46
The year 2004 saw the steady erosion of the formulation of a federalist demand took place 47
peace process that began in early 2002. as early as 1951, within three years of political 48
296
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1 independence, on the argument that the uni-
2 tary state needed to be reformed to accom-
3 modate minority aspirations. The citizenship
4 and franchise legislation of 1948 and 1949
5 enacted by the first post-Independence regime
6 in fact discriminated against the Tamil-
7 speaking minorities.The making of Sinhalese
8 the official language of the state further
9 entrenched the majoritarian character of the
10 postcolonial Sri Lankan state. When the Tamil
11 leaders formed the Federal Party in 1951, one
12 key political assumption on which the demand
13 for regional autonomy was formulated was that
14 the Sri Lankan Tamils constituted a separate
15 “nationality,”not just an ethnic minority.In the
16 Tamil nationalist imagination, a separate
17 nationality had the right to share state power
18 in a federal framework. The notion of self-
19 determination, in its initial phase, was inter-
20 preted in the Tamil nationalist project as the
21 right to regional autonomy.15
22 It is precisely this demand by the Tamil
23 minority for sharing state power on the
24 basis of ethnicity that generated much resis-
25 tance in the majority Sinhalese polity. Thus,
26 the Sinhalese nationalism of the post-
27 Independence years came to be defined not
28 only in opposition to the European ex-colonial
29 powers,but also against the politics of the Tamil
30 ethnic minority. The competing projects of
31 postcolonial state building had two perspectives
32 and paths that were mutually exclusive:
33 centralized unitary state or decentralized federal
34 state. The Eelam demand, which the Tamil
35 nationalists developed in the late 1970s,gave an
36 extreme interpretation to the concept of
37 national self-determination, namely, the right
38 to form a separate territorial state. This tran-
39 sition of the Tamil nationalist goal from regional
40 autonomy to statehood constituted the key
41 dimension that characterized Tamil politics after
42 the late 1970s.The civil war that began in the
43 early 1980s highlighted the incompatibility of
44 these two state formation projects.
45 A third dimension of state formation
46 developed in the 1980s in the midst of the war
47 between the state and Tamil rebels. That was
48 the aspiration of the Muslim community for
regional autonomy.The Muslims in Sri Lanka
are a dispersed minority, but in the Amparai
district of the Eastern Province,they constitute
a regional majority.In the Batticaloa district of
the Eastern Province, too, there is a sizeable
concentration of a Muslim population.There
have been such Muslim concentrations in the
Northern Province as well. Conventionally,
the Tamil nationalists had developed the
formulation, “Tamil-speaking people in Sri
Lanka” to include the Muslim community
whose language was Tamil. However, in the
context of repeated violence which the Tamil
militant groups had unleashed against the
Muslims in the north and east, a new Muslim
political leadership emerged in the late 1980s
to argue for a separate Muslim ethnic and
political identity. Consequently, the Sri Lanka
Muslim Congress was formed in 1988.
Subsequently, a number of other Muslim
political groups also emerged to campaign for
Muslim rights in the conflict areas. A key
argument developed by these Muslim groups
is that Muslims should be a direct party to any
negotiated settlement to the ethnic conflict
and that, in any power-sharing arrangement
between Sinhalese and Tamil political elites,
regional autonomy to the Muslims in the
north and east should be included.The Muslim
demand for regional autonomy has been
developed into the idea of a non-contiguous
Muslim-majority unit in the Northern and
Eastern Provinces.
One of the reasons why negotiations for
a political solution to the conflict have
repeatedly failed in Sri Lanka is the complexity
of the question of state power that the nego-
tiations failed to address.The Sinhalese political
establishment that represented the Sri Lankan
state was initially reluctant to reform the
state at all in response to minority demands.
They were committed to preserving and
maintaining the unitary and centralized state
with administrative decentralization granted to
the periphery.Reforming the state in response
to ethnic minority demands was seen by the
Sinhalese political establishment as conduct
unbecoming of the leadership of the majority
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J AYA D E VA U YA N G O DA

ethnic community.The federalist demand of a of “equality of status” with the Sri Lankan 1
relatively small ethnic minority was seen by government in negotiations was defined in this 2
the majority as an unreasonable demand. notion of a parallel state, which no Sri Lankan 3
Meanwhile,the Tamil nationalists thought that government or international actor has even 4
the Tamils constituted a nation,or a nationality, acknowledged.Thinking and even acting like 5
that deserved an equal share of state power a parallel state, the LTTE took part in peace 6
through a federal constitutional arrangement. processes with a particular vision of a possible 7
When the Sinhalese political leadership began political solution, that is, winning regional 8
to show some willingness to consider power statehood through negotiations.16 The ISGA 9
sharing, which occurred in response to the proposals of October 2003, to which we have 10
armed rebellion, the Tamil nationalists had by already made reference, were obviously 11
then moved far away from power sharing conceived in this framework of thinking and 12
towards secession. During negotiations in the acting like a parallel state. Such a maximalist 13
mid-1980s and after, the gulf between the perspective could hardly constitute the basis 14
framework of solution acceptable to the for negotiations for a settlement acceptable to 15
Sinhalese political establishment and the Tamil the Sri Lankan government. Sri Lanka’s 16
nationalist actors was vast.A middle ground on political reform agenda thus remained 17
which a compromise could be worked out entrapped in the minimalism of the Sinhalese 18
could have been a framework of federalism, political class and the maximalism of the Tamil 19
which was beyond the acceptable framework political class. 20
for the Sinhalese majority and much less than Can ethnicity-based state reforms provide 21
what the Tamil nationalism of the LTTE would a sustainable basis for a political settlement to 22
have accepted as an alternative to secession.As Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict? This question has 23
a middle ground, a federalist framework still emerged in Sri Lanka’s political debate from 24
remains unwanted. time to time. Some argue that ethnicity-based 25
The Muslim demand for recognition and devolution will further polarize the already 26
autonomy in the conflict has introduced a third divided ethnic communities, create ethnic 27
dimension to the central question of state enclaves and make interethnic reconciliation 28
power to be settled in the process of a difficult. Others argue that devolution or 29
negotiated political solution. As mentioned federalism without a strong human rights 30
earlier, the Muslim community in the Eastern framework would only create regional entities 31
Province demands territorial autonomy. The of authoritarianism in the name of peace.This 32
basis of their demand is that a two-party constitutes a major dilemma in the conflict 33
solution that would grant the Tamil com- resolution process in Sri Lanka. The ethnic 34
munity regional autonomy would make them, conflict and the protracted war have repeatedly 35
the Muslims, a permanently disempowered reinforced the ethnic identities,ethnic politics, 36
regional minority. A tripartite settlement, as and ethnicized political visions. Sri Lanka’s 37
they envisage it, would empower Muslims as a ethnic communities see political emancipation 38
regional minority. The Sinhalese and Tamil from ethnic eyes. Ethnicity is a political reality 39
political classes are quite reluctant to acknow- that cannot be wished away. At the same 40
ledge this Muslim demand for a share of state time, solutions to ethnic conflicts may not 41
power. necessarily be ethnic ones. Ethnic conflicts, as 42
One key issue that has made political the debate over Sri Lanka’s future suggests, 43
negotiations between the Sri Lankan govern- require democratic solutions. 44
ment and the LTTE quite complex is the self- 45
representation of the LTTE as the ruling 46
stratum of an emerging or parallel “state” of 47
the Tamil “nation.”The LTTE’s own concept 48
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 E T H N I C C O N F L I CT A N D T H E C I V I L WA R I N S R I L A N K A
1 Political economy of war
2 policymakers, the bureaucracy or the citizens
3 In discussing the dynamics of the reproduction
4 of war and violence in Sri Lanka,some analysts
5 have pointed out that the protracted war
6 produced a specific culture and economy of
7 war. Rajasingham-Senanayake is among the
8 earliest commentators to make the argu-
9 ment that the armed conflict had generated a
10 specific logic and momentum, exceeding the
11 ethnic roots of the conflict.17 This logic and
12 momentum are also propelled forward by what
13 has been termed a “hidden economy of war”
14 that has provided violence and war with an
15 internal momentum of its own. Rajasingham-
16 Senanayake makes the further argument that
17 the hidden economy of war moved the conflict
18 away from its ethnic foundations: the war was
19 not just about ethnic identities and ethnic
20 agendas, but it propel led forward for its own
21 sake.
22 Sri Lanka’s political economy of war
23 seemed to possess a number of key dimensions,
24 some open and others hidden.The capacity of
25 the national economy to adjust itself to the
26 continuing war amidst macroeconomic liberal-
27 ization and structural adjustment programmes
28 of the 1980s and the 1990s is noteworthy. As
29 some economists point out, the war did not
30 create a major economic crisis leading to the
31 necessity of war termination.18 Bastian argues
32 that Sri Lanka’s greater integration with the
33 global economy after economic liberalization
34 that began in 1977 had been a major factor that
35 paradoxically protected the economy from
36 war-induced crisis.19 The donor policy
37 towards Sri Lanka during the conflict was to
38 promote liberalization of the economy along
39 with liberal political reforms. Humanitarian
40 assistance and peace promotion, along with
41 macroeconomic support from bilateral and
42 multilateral sources, were fairly consistent
43 throughout the period of civil war. Donor
44 assistance for peace promotion was a particularly
45 significant policy plank that became salient after
46 the mid-1990s.20 In this context,it is important
47 to recall that the argument for a peace dividend,
48 highlighted in 1994–2000 and 2002–2003 by
peace constituencies, failed to convince the
that there was a strong economic argument for
termination of the civil war through a nego-
tiated political settlement.
The hidden economy of war has generated
another logic in conflict areas which can be
explained in the language of Charles Tilly.21 It
is about the emergence of informal regimes of
illegal taxation, extortion networks, and
protection rackets. In the conflict areas and in
the so-called border areas where there is no
clear political–military authority, these net-
works and rackets have emerged in the context
of state collapse.The LTTE’s so-called parallel
state could be considered as an institutional-
ization of this hidden political economy of war
in a context of relative absence in some conflict
areas of the Sri Lankan state,except in the form
of its war machine.In the “border”regions,the
agents of the hidden economy of war were
multiple, including especially the military and
a variety of paramilitary groups.
Future of the conflict?
Concerning how Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict
should end, there were five clearly discernible
perspectives.Two of them were unilateral and
extreme solutions.The LTTE’s goal of seces-
sion by mean of a protracted armed struggle
and the Sinhalese nationalist goal of restoring
the unitary state by militarily defeating the
LTTE and Tamil militancy were the two
extreme perspectives.A confederalist constitu-
tional framework of two nations within one
state having two political systems would have
been the LTTE’s option to reconsider the
secessionist goal. But as a model of a political
solution, it had no takers outside the LTTE,
certainly not in Sinhalese society. A federal
framework was the fourth perspective, which
had support among non-LTTE Tamil groups
and in Sri Lanka’s civil society. It sought to
expand the present framework of devolution
by granting more regional autonomy to the
provinces.The fifth was minimalist devolution
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that did not go beyond a limited imple- political goal, the conflict seems to possess the 1
mentation of the existing Thirteenth Amend- potential to reproduce itself for quite some 2
ment and the provincial councils. The time to come. 3
formulation developed by Sri Lanka’s present Summoning all the knowledge and experi- 4
government, “maximum devolution within a ence one may have gained trough observing 5
unitary state,” encapsulated this position. the ways in which Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict 6
Whether any of these five options will even- and civil war progressed, one can say only that 7
tually be adopted now that the LTTE has been de-linking the ethnic conflict from war and 8
defeated and its leaders killed is a difficult violence would have been a crucial pre- 9
question. condition for ethnic peace. 10
The trajectories of Sri Lanka’s conflict 11
have shown that its turns and developments 12
were characterized by a strong element of Notes 13
unpredictability.Political scientists and conflict 14
resolution professionals were particularly 1 The literature on the beginnings of the civil 15
vulnerable to the temptation of predicting the war is quite large. Some key writings are 16
future paths of the conflict, and specifically Keteshwaran Loganathan, Sri Lanka, Lost 17
outcomes of peace negotiations. A sober Opportunities: Past Attempts at Resolving Ethnic 18
Conflict (Colombo: University of Colombo
lesson to learn from the past experience is that 19
Press, 1996); K. M. De Silva, Reaping the
conflict outcomes are difficult to predict Whirlwind: Ethnic Conflict and Ethnic Politics in
20
because every conflict has a specific dynamism Sri Lanka (New Delhi: Penguin, 1998); 21
with a constant propensity and capacity to A.J. Wilson,Break up of Sri Lanka:The Sinhalese– 22
redefine and reconstitute itself. For example, Tamil Conflict (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1988); 23
ceasefire agreements and peace negotiations and John Richardson,Paradise Poisoned:Learning 24
did not lead to conflict mitigation or settle- about Conflict,Terrorism and Development from Sri 25
ment, but to redefining the dimensions of the Lanka’s Civil Wars (Kandy:International Centre 26
conflict, bringing new actors into the equa- for Ethnic Studies, 2004).Anton Balasingham, 27
tion, new contradictions to the process, new War and Peace in Sri Lanka, Armed Struggle and 28
fears and anxieties about the outcomes, Peace Efforts of Liberation Tigers (Mitcham: 29
Fairmax,2004) provides the Tamil nationalist—
and new priorities to the agenda. Inconclu- 30
or rather the LTTE—perspectives on the
sive peace attempts reinforced the arguments origins and spread of Sri Lanka’s civil war.
31
for giving war another, fresh chance. Similarly, 2 Neelan Tiruchelvam, “The Politics of 32
peace was never a clear concept throughout Federalism and Diversity in Sri Lanka,” in Yash 33
the conflict, although those committed to Ghai (ed.), Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating 34
peace continued to believe in it as a shared Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic States 35
moral goal for all. In fact, Sri Lanka’s (Cambridge: University Press, 2000), p. 198. 36
experience has demonstrated that peace is 3 See Robert Kearney, Communalism and Language 37
intensely contested as a process, as an outcome in the Politics of Ceylon (Durham, NC: Duke 38
and as a goal. For example, what the govern- University Press,1967;Wilson;Howard Wriggins, 39
ment envisioned as peace is not what the Ceylon:Dilemmas of a New Nation (Princeton,NJ: 40
University Press,1960);Michael Roberts,“Ethnic
Tamil nationalists sought as peace. In the same 41
Conflict in Sri Lanka and Sinhalese Perspectives:
vein, what the international actors perceived Barriers to Accommodation,” Modern Asian
42
as peace in Sri Lanka was not what the domes- Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1978), pp. 353–76. 43
tic actors wanted as peace. In Sri Lanka’s civil 4 For a detailed study of the politics of ethnic 44
war, both war and “peace” were mutually outbidding in the context of Sri Lanka’s party 45
sustaining processes. In the absence of a politics and electoral competition, see Neil 46
commitment to a shared understanding of DeVotta, “From Ethnic Outbidding to Ethnic 47
peace as a process, as an outcome and as a Conflict:The Institutional Bases for Sri Lanka’s 48
300
 E T H N I C C O N F L I CT A N D T H E C I V I L WA R I N S R I L A N K A
1 Separatist War,” in P. Sahadevan and Neil
2 DeVotta (eds), Politics of Conflict and Peace in Sri
3 Lanka (New Delhi: Manak, 2006), pp. 3–29.
4 5 N. Manoharan,Counterterrorism Legislation in Sri
Lanka: Evaluating Efficacy, Policy Studies No. 28
5
(Washington, DC: East-West Center, 2006)
6
provides a very useful account of the counter-
7 terrorism legislation introduced in Sri Lanka in
8 the context of armed insurgencies in the 1970s
9 and 1980s and their contribution to the overall
10 political process in the country.
11 6 For some useful accounts of the anti-Tamil
12 violence of 1983, see V. Kanapathipillai, “July
13 1983:The Survivors’ Experience,” in Veena Das
14 (ed.), Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots and
Survivors in South Asia (New Delhi: Oxford
15
University Press), 1990; James Manor (ed.), Sri
16
Lanka in Change and Crisis (London: Croom
17
Helm,1984);and Jonathan Spencer,“Collective
18
Violence and Everyday Practice in Sri Lanka,”
19 Modern Asian Studies, 24 (1990), pp. 603–23.
20 7 Academic literature in English on Sri Lanka’s
21 Tamil militant groups is extremely thin.
22 However, there are useful accounts written by
23 journalists who have had access to some of these
24 organizations and their leaders.Two important
25 works are Anita Pratap,Island of Blood (Bombay:
26 Penguin, 2001) and M. R. Swamy Narayan,
27 Tigers of Lanka: From Boys to Guerrillas (New
28 Delhi: South Asia Books, 1995).
8 Loganathan (pp. 104–05) provides the best
29
available account on the Thimpu talks. He was
30
a participant at these talks, representing the
31 EPRLF.
32
9 The Indian intentions and motives in pushing
33 for the accord have been given different
34 interpretations.For a firsthand account of it,see
35 J. N. Dixit, Assignment Colombo (New Delhi:
36 Konark, 1998). Dixit was India’s High
37 Commissioner in Colombo during these
38 crucial months. Krishna provides an academic
39 critique of Indian motives,basically arguing that
40 it was a part of the Indian ruling elite’s pre-
41 occupation with replicating its own political
and nation-state model in South Asia; Sankaran
42
Krishna, Postcolonial Insecurities: India, Sri Lanka
43 and the Question of Nationhood (Minneapolis,
44 MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1999). For
45 a set of Sri Lankan perspectives on the theme
46 see Shelton U. Kodikara, Indo–Sri Lanka Accord
47 of July 1987 (Colombo:University of Colombo
48 Press, 1989).
10 Literature on the Indian political and military
engagement in Sri Lanka in 1980s is quite
extensive. Some key texts are Dixit; Krishna;
and S.D.Muni,Pangs of Proximity:India’s and Sri
Lanka’s Ethnic Crisis (New Delhi: Sage
Publications, 1993).
11 There is a growing body of literature on peace
negotiations in Sri Lanka. The two-volume
anthology edited by Rupesinghe is most useful;
Kumar Rupesinghe (ed.), Negotiating Peace in
Sri Lanka:Efforts,Failures and Lessons (Colombo:
Foundation for Co-Existence, 2006).
12 The literature on Premadasa government–
LTTE negotiations is quite thin, but both
Jayatilleke and Weerakoon provide some useful
accounts of these talks; Weerakoon and
Jayatilleka were insiders of the Premadasa
regime. See Dayan Jayatilleke, “Premadasa-
LTTE Talks:Why they Failed and What Really
Happened,” in Kumar Rupesinghe (ed.),
Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka:Efforts,Failures and
Lessons, 2nd edn, vol. I (Colombo: Foundation
for Co-Existence, 2006), pp. 141–56; and
Bradman Weerakoon, “Government of Sri
Lanka and LTTE Peace Negotiations 1989/90,”
in Rupesinghe, pp. 111–28.
13 Sri Lanka’s failure to use the humanitarian space
of the tsunami disaster for peace building stands
in sharp contrast to the experience in Indonesia
where the government and the GAM rebels
(Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or Free Aceh
Movement) signed a peace agreement to end the
civil war.For a discussion of the political contro-
versies surrounding the post-tsunami attempts at
peace in Sri Lanka, see Jayadeva Uyangoda,
“Ethnic Conflict, the Tsunami Disaster and the
State in Sri Lanka,” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies,
Vol. 6, No. 3 (September 2005), pp. 341–52.
14 This point is further developed in Jayadeva
Uyangoda,Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka:Changing
Dynamics (Washington, DC: East-West Center,
2007).
15 The concepts “ethnicity”and “ethnic minority”
entered Sri Lanka’s academic and political
discourse only in the early 1980s. “Racial
minorities”was the term previously used to refer
to ethnic minorities. Similarly,“communalism”
was the term used to describe what later came
to be described as “minority nationalism” or
“ethnic politics.”
16 There has been an interesting discussion on the
issue of the LTTE’s building up of state-like
structures in the areas under its control.Stokke’s
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characterization of them in the language of state Markets and Supporting Peace (Colombo: 1
building has been passionately resisted by International Center for Ethnic Studies, 2007). 2
Muthukrishna; see Kristian Stokke, “Building 20 The literature that provides discussions on the 3
the Tamil Eelam State: Emerging State donor policy towards Sri Lanka amidst conflict 4
Institutions and Forms of Governance in and civil war are Bastian, The Politics of Foreign
5
LTTE-controlled Areas in Sri Lanka,” Third Aid; Kelegama, “Managing the Sri Lankan
6
World Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 6 (2006), pp. Economy”and “Transformation of a Conflict”;
1021–40; and Muttukrishna Sarvananthan,“In and David Dunham and Sisira Jayasuriya, 7
Pursuit of a Mythical State of Tamil Eelam: “Economic Crisis, Poverty and War in 8
Rejoinder to Kristian Stokke,” Third World Contemporary Sri Lanka: On Ostriches and 9
Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 6 (2007), pp. 1185–95. Tinderboxes,” Economic and Political Weekly,Vol. 10
17 See, Rajasingham-Senanayake (1998) and her 33, No. 49 (5 December, 1998) pp. 3,151–56; 11
subsequent writings. and Arve Ofstad,“Countries inViolent Conflict 12
18 See, for example, Saman Kelegama, “Economic and Aid Strategies: The Case of Sri Lanka,” 13
Costs of Conflict in Sri Lanka,” in Robert World Development, Vol. 30, No. 2 (2002), 14
Rotberg (ed.), Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil pp. 165–80. 15
War and Reconciliation (Washington, DC: 21 Tilly counterposes the idea of state as a “social
16
Brookings Institution,1999) and “Transformation contract,”with the suggestion that at least in the
17
of a Conflict via an Economic Dividend: The European contexts, war making and state
Sri Lankan Experience,” in Kumar Rupesinghe making have been analogous to organized 18
(ed.),Negotiating Peace in Sri Lanka:Efforts,Failures crime. In civil war contexts, as repeatedly 19
and Lessons, Vol. II (Colombo: Foundation for demonstrated in Sri Lanka, the practices of 20
Co-existence 2006), pp. 205–39. agents of the state and other multiple agents of 21
19 Sunil Bastian, “Foreign Aid, Globalization and war,violence,and terror approximates on Tilly’s 22
Conflict in Sri Lanka,” in Markus Mayer et al. characterization of war and state making. See 23
(eds), Building Local Capacities for Peace: Charles Tilly,“War Making and State Making as 24
Rethinking Conflict and Development in Sri Lanka Organized Crime,”in Peter B.Evans et al. (eds), 25
(Delhi:Macmillan,2003);and Sunil Bastian,The Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: 26
Politics of Foreign Aid in Sri Lanka: Promoting University Press), pp. 169–91.
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 1
2
3
4
21
5
6 The political economy
7
8 of development in India
9
10
since Independence
11
12
13 Stuart Corbridge
14
15
16
17
18
19 Introduction offered a vision of India far removed from one
20 of pot-holed roads shared by bullock carts,
21 India has been acclaimed in recent years as an scooters,and state-built Ambassador cars.In the
22 information technology (IT) superpower and words of Gurcharan Das, India had been
23 perhaps even as a major new player in the world unbound.2 It had escaped from a Kafkaesque
24 economy. The Indian economy has been world of bureaucratic red tape to take its place
25 growing at around 5 or 6 percent per annum in the global information age.
26 since 2003,adjusted for population growth,and There are clearly nuggets of truth in
27 there are good reasons to suppose that similar accounts of India’s political economy that
28 rates of growth of gross domestic product hinge around 1991, as Das’s book largely does.
29 (GDP) per capita might be sustainable over the Yet the notion that all was bad or sick before
30 next 20 years. Savings rates are very high in “the reforms,” or that all has been good or
31 India. Indeed, at just over 30 percent of GDP, healthy since,fails to provide a nuanced picture
32 gross domestic savings are approaching East of economic development in India since
33 Asian levels. The economy sits well inside its independence. Recent academic work points
34 total factor productivity frontier, in large part out that high rates of economic growth are
35 because of low levels of human capital forma- now being achieved in India in part because of
36 tion, and the country now has the chance to past legacies, some more intended than others,
37 reap a demographic dividend. The ratio of and not wholly in spite of them.Investments in
38 dependants to workers is set to decline from higher education and basic industries are two
39 just over 0.6 in 2000 to just under 0.5 in 2025.1 cases in point.3 Recent work also points out
40 The launch in January 2008 of the Tata Nano that economic reform did not begin overnight
41 seemed like icing on this cake of economic in 1991, but was prefigured in important
42 success.Much was made in the west about a car respects by the pro-business agendas pursued
43 selling for $2,500,but in India the marketing of by Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi and Rajiv
44 a car for Rs 1 lakh (100,000) spoke to the Gandhi in the 1980s. In any case, the real
45 existence of a mass middle class. It also signaled turning point in India’s trend rate of economic
46 the rise of a small group of Indian capitalists and growth was 1980–81, not the early 1990s,
47 entrepreneurs who could bestride the global although there are signs that the trend rate has
48 stage. Four-lane highways packed with Nanos improved again since 2003–04.4

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We also need to acknowledge that post- These inequalities are holding back eco- 1
reform growth in India has reduced absolute nomic and social development in post-reform 2
poverty less quickly than might have been India. They led John Harriss and me to 3
expected, particularly through the 1990s.The conclude that economic reform in India in the 4
incidence of absolute poverty is much less now 1990s had taken the form of an “elite revolt” 5
than it was at the end of the 1970s, when against those aspects of the dirigiste state that 6
something like 50 percent of Indians were poor, most constrained a loose coalition of business 7
but a Tata Nano driven from Delhi to Kolkata groups and the urban middle classes.8 That 8
still takes its riders through the epicenter of revolt has wrought some important and 9
world poverty.The government of India (GOI) much needed changes in India’s economy. It 10
uses a particularly brutal measure of absolute has also helped to rework key political relations 11
poverty, one that is more basic even than the between the central state and the provinces and 12
“one dollar a day” definition used by the lead- between the state and its citizens. But the 13
ing multilateral institutions.5 Yet even on this reform process remains highly uneven,both in 14
measure some 260 million people in India are its mainsprings and in its consequences. I shall 15
finding it hard to keep body and soul together— argue here that the term “elite revolt” still 16
fewer than 100 million people less, in total works well as a descriptor of the contradictory 17
numbers,than the figure of 350 million in 1980. dynamics of political and economic change in 18
Social and spatial inequalities have also India over the past two decades. 19
increased sharply since 1990.Rising inequality 20
levels are inevitable in a country escaping a 21
low-level equilibrium trap, a point made by Political economy of growth in 22
Simon Kuznets many decades ago.6 We can India, 1950–80 23
refer to “good inequality” where it is based on 24
higher rewards to talent and entrepreneurship. When the British quit India in 1947 they left 25
But there is also “bad inequality,” and this behind an economy scarred by two centuries 26
occurs when people are locked out of markets, during which first preference was given to 27
or from the schools, roads and other routes imperial interests. It is true that the British 28
that lead to the acquisition of human capital invested heavily in a railway system that linked 29
and other transferable skills, perhaps on the most of the major towns and cities in South 30
basis of gender or caste or ethnicity. What Asia. They also sank considerable sums of 31
is worrying about recent developments in money into the canal colonies of Punjab and 32
India is the abundance of bad inequality and provided new systems of property rights and 33
unemployment. Governments continue to commercial law in both rural and urban areas. 34
invest meagerly in the provision of public The British could even maintain in 1947 that 35
goods, particularly in the eastern part of the they had built India into the world’s tenth 36
country. Naxalism is one index of pervasive largest industrial power. There were large 37
government failure in a group of states running textile industries in Ahmedabad and Bombay, 38
south from Bihar to Andhra Pradesh. For rural and an iron and steel industry in Bihar and 39
people in these states, as the World Bank has Orissa (thanks mainly to Jamsetji Tata). But 40
recently reminded us,living standards are about what this rosy picture neglects is the involution 41
on a par with living standards in rural areas of of the countryside in Bengal that followed the 42
sub-Saharan Africa.7 They are a long way Permanent Settlement of 1793—a settlement 43
removed from the living standards of India’s that promoted rack-renting landlordism rather 44
urban middle classes. In contrast, as the World than capitalist farming—and the undermining 45
Bank also points out, the richer parts of New of many of India’s craft industries as imports 46
Delhi, Mumbai,and Bangalore can reasonably flooded in from Lancashire and elsewhere.The 47
be described as India’s “Latin Americas.” grim truth of British misrule was apparent in a 48
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1 series of famines that hit India at the end of the
2 nineteenth century, and which culminated in
3 the deaths of three million people in the Bengal
4 famine of 1943–44.Alan Heston has estimated
5 that average living standards in the Indian
6 countryside barely improved from 1900 to
7 1947.9 There were always significant regional
8 variations within this general picture, but it is
9 likely that as many as two in three Indians lived
10 in absolute poverty at the mid-point of the
11 twentieth century.
12 Against this backdrop, and given the loss in
13 1947 of the jute economy of East Bengal (now
14 Bangladesh),as well as the loss of the major port
15 city of Karachi, it is not surprising that India’s
16 first plans for economic development took
17 shape in an atmosphere of crisis.The first five-
18 year plan (1951–56) was something of a damp
19 squib and remained broadly neutral as between
20 the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors.
21 After the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in
22 January 1948, the remaining “tall men” of
23 India’s nationalist elite were forced to occupy
24 themselves mainly with nation building in a
25 broader sense, with Sardar Patel working hard
26 to ensure the de facto integration of India’s 565
27 princely states into the new republic, while
28 B.R.Ambedkar and Jawaharlal Nehru oversaw
29 work on the constitution. It was clear by 1950
30 that India would be a federal democratic
31 republic in which universal suffrage would be
32 coupled to the establishment of a central state
33 with considerable executive and emergency
34 powers and matching geographical reach.
35 Ambedkar and Nehru agreed that the social
36 and economic modernization of India would
37 have to be secured by vigorous planned actions
38 emanating from New Delhi. Conservative
39 politicians sitting in the states would need to be
40 disciplined by wiser and more far sighted men
41 sitting in the country’s capital. Modernization
42 was conceived as a diffusion process wherein
43 great pulses of social and economic change—
44 ultimately liberating and uplifting, if often
45 disruptive of established ways of being in the
46 short run—would push outwards from India’s
47 major cities to its smallest towns before reaching
48 into the countryside.10
Ambedkar would break with Nehru over
the failure of his government to transfer surplus
lands specifically to so-called untouchable (or
dalit) families.Ambedkar had warned at the end
of the Constituent Assembly debates that India
was about “to enter a life of contradictions. In
politics we will have equality and in social and
economic life we will have inequality.” In his
view, the failure to redistribute landed wealth
in India would put “our democracy in peril.”11
It seems likely that Nehru shared this view,
although he had more faith than Ambedkar in
the economically empowering effects of
political equality. In any case, by 1951 Nehru
was unchallenged in his leadership of the
Indian National Congress. His ascendancy
followed the death of Patel in December 1950
and the defeat of Patel’s close supporter,
Purushottam Das Tandon, in a struggle for the
presidency of the Indian National Congress.
But Nehru still had to secure consent for his
project of social and economic modernization,
and this meant that he had to deal with
precisely those state Congress bosses who
would conspire against his plans for land-to-
the-tiller land reforms in the 1950s.12
In retrospect, we can see that Nehru sought
to manage the modernization of India by
pursuing a development model that was
being widely touted by economists even as
the second five-year plan was drafted. Early
development economics took shape in the
1940s and 1950s around three key ideas. First,
there was a critique of comparative advantage
theory. Hans Singer and Raoul Prebisch took
issue with the idea that latecomer countries
could develop effectively as primary goods
producers.13 There were both theoretical and
empirical reasons to suppose that prices of
non-primary goods rose faster over time
than the prices of primary commodities.
Developing countries had to build up local
(infant) industries as a priority, even if this
meant erecting tariff barriers to protect the
domestic economy.14 Second, this commit-
ment to import substitution industrialization
(ISI) implied in the short term a run of balance
of trade deficits.Developing countries first had
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to import the machine tools and other goods leave the countryside to find more productive 1
that would help them build up local manu- jobs in the modern sector. This Lewisian 2
facturing capacity. A foreign exchange con- transformation would have to await the second 3
straint would become especially compelling in stage of India’s industrial revolution.16 Cheap 4
a country like India where ISI privileged the steel, chemicals and power could then be 5
production of capital goods (iron and steel, plugged into a plethora of efficient Indian-run 6
chemicals, heavy engineering, etc). Flows of companies that would produce bikes, radios, 7
foreign direct investment were thin on the two-wheel tractors and such like for the final 8
ground in the 1950s and 1960s, and probably consumer. 9
would not have been very welcome in India. Put another way, the Nehru-Mahalanobis 10
A surplus on the capital account would thus model presupposed that India would be 11
have to be achieved by large and continuing governed by a developmental state, of the sort 12
inflows of foreign aid. Nehru’s ability to that would soon take shape in East or Southeast 13
position India at the head of the nonaligned Asia.This would be a state that was relatively 14
movement helped in this respect.India was able autonomous of privileged local classes, as 15
to build a steel mill at Bokaro (Bihar) with Marxist theoreticians liked to put it. In 16
assistance from the USSR and another at India, it would be embodied in the planning 17
Rourkela (Orissa) with help from West commission and the five-year plans.The state 18
Germany. Third, the very scarcity of foreign would specify a social welfare function for the 19
exchange in the 1950s and 1960s,coupled with future (5, 10, 15 or 25 years away) and then 20
poorly formed local stock markets and often devise the best economic and statistical 21
weak private trading systems (some of which instruments to match inputs to outputs. The 22
were coded as “oppressive” or exploitative), model further supposed that the GOI could 23
inclined the Government of India (GOI) to funnel resources from the agricultural sector to 24
think of economic development as a project the non-agricultural sector without provoking 25
that had to be planned for and delivered by a a backlash among India’s rural population. 26
beneficent state. Ronald Inden exaggerates Nehru believed that he could square this circle 27
only a little when he says that, in the Nehru- in two main ways: first, by making use of food 28
Mahalonobis universe, planning came to aid from the US, and second, by means of 29
substitute for religion as the new godhead.15 land ceilings legislation that would break up 30
Nehru’s faith in reason and modernity unproductive estates and enfranchise efficient 31
complemented a more general mid-century small farmers. India’s countryside would be 32
faith in technology and progress,both of which bought off not with state funds, but with 33
needed support from good (or at any rate resources from abroad and by institutional 34
strong) government. reform at home. Agriculture was the “bargain 35
Thus conceived, India’s model of develop- basement” that would free up scarce resources 36
ment through most of the 1950s and 1960s for use elsewhere in the developing economy.17 37
made a virtue of deferred gratification. Nehru Except it did not, or not as Nehru had hoped. 38
and Mahalanobis believed that high rates of By the early 1960s it was apparent that 39
economic growth would depend on high rates increases in grain production were barely 40
of personal and government savings (equiva- keeping pace with population growth. Food 41
lent to present consumption foregone), and supply growth in the 1950s came mainly from 42
their efficient mobilization for purposes of increases in the area under cultivation, and 43
large-scale industrialization.By definition,this now the land frontier was closing. By the 44
first wave of capital goods-based production mid-1960s many farmers were bemoaning 45
would not be labor intensive; it would not their lot.The great jat farmers’ leader, Charan 46
create large numbers of goods for the under- Singh,had opposed Nehru’s plans for coopera- 47
employed peasants who wished (or needed) to tive farming in the 1950s. In 1967, he defected 48
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1 from the Congress, setting up the Bharatiya
2 Kranti Dal in 1969.Charan Singh,in his exten-
3 sive writings on agriculture and agricultural
4 policy in India, anticipated Michael Lipton’s
5 later claim that India was suffering from high
6 levels of urban bias.18 Government spending
7 decisions were denounced as inequitable,
8 inefficient and unsustainable. In a country
9 where more than 75 percent of the people still
10 lived in the countryside—agriculture’s share of
11 GDP was as high as 58 percent in 1950,and not
12 much less than 50 percent in the mid-1960s—
13 it made little sense to waste capital on inefficient
14 urban and industrial projects.The need instead
15 was to fund new irrigation systems and off-
16 farm employment growth in the countryside.
17 This view gained currency at the end of the
18 1960s, following the failures of the 1965 and
19 1966 monsoons and in the wake of new data
20 showing that the incidence of absolute poverty
21 in the Indian countryside had increased
22 between 1961 and 1969.19 Nehru died before
23 the crisis of India’s agriculture was fully
24 exposed and before the suspension of planning
25 in 1966–69. But his death also came after a
26 disastrous war with China in 1962, and these
27 events taken in the round would continue to
28 infect the poisonous political and economic
29 atmospheres in which first Lal Bahadur Shastri
30 (1964–66) and then Indira Gandhi had to
31 make their way as prime ministers.
32 Indira Gandhi has many times been com-
33 pared unfavorably with her father (Nehru),
34 and very often for good reason. She deserves
35 to be condemned above all for the disastrous
36 way that she fought religious fire with fire in
37 Punjab in the early 1980s, when she covertly
38 supported Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale,
39 and for her government’s suspension of demo-
40 cratic rule in India during the Emergency
41 (1975–77).But what is sometimes forgotten in
42 these comparisons is that Mrs Gandhi came to
43 power at a time when India’s democracy was
44 deepening, when the dominance of the
45 Congress system was for the first time being
46 challenged in New Delhi and the states, and
47 when state–society relations more generally,in
48 the words of Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph, had
moved from a pattern of “command politics”
to one of “demand politics.”20 The new poli-
tical landscape of the 1970s and 1980s saw not
only the deinstitutionalization of Congress and
the rise of credible opposition parties; it also
marked a period in India’s political economy
when a prospectively developmental state
imploded.21 That state had always been an
uneasy construct in India, as Partha Chatterjee
and Sudipta Kaviraj have several times
reminded us.22 Nehru mobilized large sections
of the English-speaking “progressive” elite in
support of his modernizing agenda. But this
elite was fated to see its ambitions translated at
local level by power brokers who rarely shared
its commitments to the “greater good” or the
“long run.” Local worlds were more often
vernacular worlds, or worlds where commit-
ments were most often forged at the level of a
household, kin group or caste community. As
Kaviraj so memorably puts it, India’s high
modernist state “had feet of vernacular clay.”23
Worse, the developmental state model pre-
supposes an executive state that is autonomous
from a country’s dominant proprietary elites.
Such was the case, for example, in Taiwan,
where the ruling elite after 1949 was trans-
planted from mainland China and was later
funded as much by the US as by rental incomes
from land. “Land-to-the-tiller” land reform
worked in Taiwan, just as it did in South Korea
in the 1950s. Regime changes ensured that a
developmental state was not confronted by
entrenched powers elsewhere in the land. In
India, in contrast, as scholars as diverse as
Francine Frankel, Pranab Bardhan, and Jagdish
Bhagwati have all shown, the developmental
state was captured by three interlocking
groups: India’s richer farmers (who blocked
agrarian reform), its industrial bourgeoisie
(business houses that took advantage of state-
induced scarcities and blocked competition
and innovation), and the country’s leading
bureaucrats (many of whom earned large rental
incomes from the “permit-license-quota Raj”
built up around ISI, and almost all of whom
enforced unproductive rent-seeking behavior
on smaller businesses and ordinary citizens).24
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The so-called “Hindu rate of growth” that from steel to cars to banking—was so great that 1
dogged India in the 1970s reflected the squeeze it suffocated innovation and new startups in 2
placed on the country’s developmental state by the organized private sector. Even into the 3
aggressively sectional interests. The state was mid-1980s, India’s leading industrial houses 4
now forced to accommodate to the demands were happy to connive in the reproduction of 5
of these interest groups, no matter whether this world of the second or third best. For that 6
they acted for the greater good or not.Average to change, or so this argument goes, the 7
GDP growth in the 1970s was 2.9 percent per contradictions of dirigiste development in India 8
annum,which was barely positive in per capita would necessarily come to a head, as they did 9
income terms. In some accounts, too, the with the fiscal and balance of payments crises 10
greater costs of participating in India’s of the early 1990s.Only then would politicians 11
competitive politics led some politicians to and leading businesspeople in India be forced 12
finance their campaigns illegally and/or to reform the economy and the systems of 13
through abuses of office. Civil servants, for politics that had supported economic mis- 14
example,were forced to stump up greater rents management on a grand scale. 15
to acquire a desirable posting, or to head off an 16
undesirable one. Criminals, for their part, 17
moved into politics, both to milk the system Political economy of reform 18
and to head off unwelcome attention from the in India 19
justice system.The criminalization of politics 20
became particularly marked in parts of north As ever, it is not difficult to recognize the truth 21
India from the 1970s and posed yet another of some of these claims.But what this narrative 22
barrier to economic reform there. of rise,decline and recovery cannot account for 23
Lobbying, of course, is endemic to all is the upturn in India’s rate of economic growth 24
political systems, and what is called lobbying post-1980.The fact is that per capita incomes 25
in Washington or London is all too routinely in India grew on average at 3.8 percent in the 26
described as corruption in New Delhi or 1980s, or at more or less the same rate as they 27
Dhaka.Corruption also comes in many forms, grew in the 1990s.There are three main reasons 28
and when it takes the form of speed money why this was so.To begin with,as Atul Kohli has 29
payments it can grease the wheels of an argued, the governments of Indira Gandhi and 30
economic system that otherwise tends to Rajiv Gandhi (1980–89) began to tilt eco- 31
atrophy or entropy. And it is at this systemic nomic policy more clearly in the direction of 32
level,as economic reformers like Bhagwati and big business.26 The courting of foreign direct 33
Srinivasan have consistently pointed out, that investment was still not a priority through the 34
the bigger picture lies.25 The failure of the 1980s, although a few joint ventures were 35
Congress party in the 1950s and 1960s to brokered in the autos sector. Nevertheless, the 36
support an executive/developmental state left strongly anti-capital (especially, anti-foreign 37
India’s economy between two stools. On the capital) rhetoric that Indira Gandhi had 38
one hand, the state was not strong enough to deployed in the 1970s was toned down. New 39
force the commanding heights of the economy initiatives were introduced that favored 40
to be lean and mean,let alone to dispense with established Indian producers. In place of garibi 41
the subsidies and protectionist barriers that hatao (an end to poverty),the political platform 42
were meant to provide them with temporary on which Indira Gandhi made her name in the 43
support. Neither management nor organized early 1970s, the Congress governments of 44
labor believed that governments in the 1970s the 1980s retired those parts of the Monopolies 45
or 1980s had the guts to get tough with them. and Trade Practices Act that made it hard for 46
On the other hand, the central role occupied big business to expand in core sectors like 47
by the state in India’s productive economy— chemicals and cement. Some efforts were also 48
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1 made to liberalize credit for large companies.
2 Perhaps most importantly, both Indira and
3 Rajiv Gandhi took steps to tame labor activism
4 in the organized sector, and to encourage
5 private sector investments with limited tax
6 concessions.
7 Kohli argues that a major effect of these
8 policy changes was to shift the balance of
9 capital formation in India through the 1980s.
10 Albeit at the margin, it was the private
11 corporate sector that now began to contribute
12 more to economic development, while capital
13 formation in the public sector stabilized after
14 a period of rapid growth in the 1970s. It seems
15 likely, too, that the growth-inducing effects of
16 a pro-business tilt were augmented by the
17 gradual diffusion of Green Revolution tech-
18 nologies out of Punjab, Haryana, and parts of
19 south India.West Bengal now became a Green
20 Revolution heartland, following significant
21 government investment in irrigation and
22 electricity supply.
23 Poor people in the countryside generally
24 escape from poverty by migrating to towns or
25 cities, or by winning more work in the
26 countryside at higher real wage rates.There is
27 some evidence that labor markets tightened in
28 the 1980s in several states, including West
29 Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, and Karnataka. By
30 1989–90, the percentage of people in India
31 living in absolute income poverty had reduced
32 to just under 39 percent from 51 percent in
33 1977–78.The GOI in the early 2000s liked to
34 claim that the rate of poverty reduction accele-
35 rated after the reforms of 1991. Most scholars,
36 however,have discounted the suggestion of the
37 55th round of the National Sample Survey
38 (NSS) that just 26 percent of people were
39 absolutely poor in 1999–2000—an astonishing
40 decline of 10 percent from six years earlier.The
41 55th round of the NSS broke with the long-
42 established convention of estimating household
43 spending on a uniform reporting period basis.
44 Under this system, respondents recall their
45 spending on all items over a period of 30 days.
46 The 55th round instead introduced a mixed
47 reporting period of weeks, months, and years.
48 This made sense for all sorts of reasons (greater
accuracy of recall, most notably), but it under-
mined the GOI’s efforts to track poverty trends
on a consistent basis.Adjustments made to the
55th round data by Angus Deaton and Jean
Drèze suggest that the rate of poverty reduction
in the 1990s was probably no greater than the
rate of poverty reduction in the 1980s.27
Others, notably Abhijit Sen and Himanshu,
have argued that the 1990s was a lost decade
for poverty reduction.28
Why then, “economic reform”? The usual
answer is that the economic growth that led to
poverty reduction in the 1980s was unsus-
tainable. Huge subsidies into and out of the
agricultural system (cheap fertilizer, water and
power in – cheap food out via the public dis-
tribution system) ensured that India’s growth
spurt in the 1980s would push the country into
the linked fiscal and balance of payments
crises that erupted in 1991. Limited tax con-
cessions to big business in the 1980s,combined
with pervasive tax evasion, also forced both
Congress party and National Front (1980–91)
governments to raise revenues by deficit
financing and by borrowing more at home and
abroad.Worse, the underlying structures of the
Indian economy remained as sclerotic and
irrational as ever. India had some of the highest
rates of effective protection anywhere in the
world. These barriers encouraged Indian
business to provide goods and services that were
increasingly unwelcome at home and that no
one else in the world would buy. Early propo-
nents of reform wondered aloud why Indians
at home were condemned to poor service and
poor jobs at the hands of the permit-license-
quota Raj while Indians abroad were acclaimed
for their hard work and innovation.
By circa 1990 it was clear that some ele-
ments within India’s business communities,led
by the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII),
as well as significant parts of the urban middle
class, were fed up with forms of economic
mismanagement that discouraged innovation
and which limited choice in the shops.They
objected to the pro-farming agendas of the
National Front government,and they resented
Prime Minister V.P. Singh’s attempts to reward
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his mainly rural, mainly “Backward Classes” situation. Cuts in defense spending and in 1
support base by extending systems of reser- subsidies for exports, sugar, and fertilizers 2
vation (for government and public sector jobs were meant to bring the fiscal deficit down to 3
and places in educational institutions) upwards 6.5 percent of GDP in the 1991–92 tax year.32 4
from the Scheduled Castes and Tribes to those Thereafter,the government of Narasimha Rao 5
designated as Other Backward Classes. By this moved steadily—but not at any great pace—to 6
time, too, the battles won by the likes of “adjust” the deeper structures of the economy. 7
Margaret Thatcher in the UK and Ronald Efforts were made to liberalize India’s trading 8
Reagan in the US were changing the land- regime, but even as late as 2000, despite 9
scapes of international economic thinking.The considerable progress, tariffs in India still 10
disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 also averaged close to 30 percent and the ratio of 11
had profound effects in India.These were felt international trade to GDP remained under 25 12
first in terms of a loss of export markets and percent (low by global standards). More 13
foreign assistance. Later on they helped push progress was made with industrial policy.The 14
India closer to the US and the World Trade system of industrial licensing that had taken 15
Organisation.29 In the early 1990s the shape since the 1950s was “dismantled in all 16
economist John Williamson felt able to but 18 designated industries (including drugs 17
describe a new Washington Consensus on and pharmaceuticals,cars,and sugar),and for all 18
“sensible” macroeconomic management. locations save for 23 cities with populations 19
Development economics was already out of above one million people where licenses were 20
fashion by then.30 Deepak Lal had charged in still required for new ventures or project 21
1983 that it was precisely a first generation of expansion.”33 Perhaps most significantly of all, 22
planners and development economists who “the reforms,” as they soon became known, 23
had done the most damage in the “third opened the door to greater foreign direct 24
world.”31 These were the “guilty men” who investment in India’s economy. Inward invest- 25
had stalled economic progress in India by 20 ment by western multinationals became a 26
years or more.Washington,for its part,used the major part of the new “Shining India”that was 27
debt crisis in Latin America to launch a broader trumpeted by the Bharatiya Janata Party-led 28
assault on dirigiste forms of economic manage- (BJP) National Democratic Alliance ahead of 29
ment. Developing countries needed to return the Lok Sabha elections in 2004. McDonald’s 30
to basics: to sound monetary and fiscal policies in Delhi and Mumbai, along with IBM and 31
and to open trade and capital accounts. The Infosys in Bangalore, signaled India’s connec- 32
elite revolt that led to Finance Minister tions to the new landscapes of globalization 33
Manmohan Singh’s famous budget of 1991, that had gathered pace in the 1990s, and 34
and to the devaluation of the rupee that year which were strongly registered in the tele- 35
by 18–20 percent against leading currencies, communications revolution that swept 36
was as much an echo of this thinking as it was through middle-class India. 37
a practical response to the balance of payments No one now expects India to return to the 38
crisis that so damaged India’s reputation for dirigiste models that it pioneered more than 39
economic competency. half a century ago.Significantly,Congress used 40
By the early summer of 1991 India’s fiscal the rise of the BJP in the 1980s, and the 41
deficit stood at nearly nine percent of GDP destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in 42
and the country had sufficient foreign currency December 1992, as a foil for its economic 43
reserves to finance only two weeks’ worth of agenda. Leftist parties were warned that strong 44
imports. Moody’s and Standard & Poor had opposition to that agenda would cause the Rao 45
downgraded India’s international credit rating. government to fall, and that this in turn would 46
Finance Minister Manmohan Singh’s budget bring the Hindu nationalists to power in New 47
was designed first and foremost to stabilize this Delhi.34 As things worked out, the BJP did 48
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 T H E P O L I T I CA L E C O N O M Y O F D E V E LO P M E N T I N I N D I A S I N C E I N D E P E N D E N C E
1 come to power in India in 1998 and ruled the
2 country until 2004. By then, however, the BJP
3 had made its peace with globalization and
4 reform. It gently retired its rhetoric of
5 “swadeshi liberalization” and its support for
6 “microchips but not potato chips.” By 2000 it
7 was an enthusiastic advocate for a continuing
8 process of economic liberalization that offered
9 clear advantages to some of its supporters in
10 the urban middle class.
11 Even the Communist Party of India
12 (Marxist) (CPM) came to embrace liberaliza-
13 tion. The CPM has continued to speak out
14 against some aspects of the national reform
15 agendas now being pressed by Prime Minister
16 Manmohan Singh (from 2004). But in its West
17 Bengal heartland it has embraced that agenda
18 vigorously and with surprisingly little concern
19 for its traditional support bases in the country-
20 side and among government workers.In 2007,
21 the public face of economic reform in India
22 was focused for a while on Nandigram, a rural
23 area in the Medinipur district of West Bengal.
24 In March 2007, 14 people were killed in
25 Nandigram after the ruling Left Front govern-
26 ment in Kolkata instructed CPM cadres and
27 the police to break resistance to their plans to
28 expropriate 10,000 acres of local farming
29 land. The land was earmarked for a Special
30 Economic Zone (SEZ) to be developed by the
31 Salim group of Indonesia. The Left Front
32 government argued that a linked group of
33 chemical works in Nandigram would create
34 up to 100,000 jobs in West Bengal. They
35 further noted that they had to do battle with
36 eight other states to host a joint venture with
37 the Salim group.
38 The killings at Nandigram have taken on a
39 significance that few in the Left Front govern-
40 ment could have anticipated when contracts
41 were signed. On the one hand, and most
42 immediately,they advertised the willingness of
43 the state in West Bengal to embrace what
44 Marxists call “accumulation by disposses-
45 sion.”35 In doing so, they dramatized the
46 violence of the accumulation process in other
47 parts of India —along the Narmada river
48 valley, for example, where resistance to large
dams continues, or wherever poor people are
“tidied out”of street environments marked for
improvement and upgrading (as they have
been in many of India’s leading cities,including
through the grotesquely named “Operation
Sunshine”in Kolkata).36 Development is never
easy or painless,whatever the platitudes offered
to the contrary by politicians or real estate
developers.
On the other hand, Nandigram provides
insight into changing geographies of power in
India. Nehru found to his cost in the 1950s
that he could not enforce land-to-the-tiller
reforms in the countryside, where power
resided mainly with richer farmers. (Agri-
cultural policy was handed to the states in the
Constitution of India, adopted in 1950.)
Nevertheless, the federal settlement that was
worked out between 1946 and 1949 placed
India’s states in a dependent relationship with
the Center.37 President’s Rule can be imposed
on states under Article 356 of the constitution,
and the inelasticity of major state revenues
often forced them to seek extra funding from
New Delhi in the form of grants-in-aid under
Article 275.
In the 1990s, in contrast, and more so in the
2000s, many of India’s states have been able to
improve their bargaining position against the
center.Rob Jenkins has argued that the reform
process has empowered states to behave as
“competition states.”38 Instead of competing
with one another to draw down funds from
New Delhi,states like Maharashtra,Karnataka,
Tamil Nadu, or West Bengal now fight with
one another to host foreign direct investment
or the funds of non-resident Indians (NRIs).In
Jenkins’view,the real momentum of economic
reform in India now lies in the states.A process
of “provincial Darwinism” has taken hold, he
argues, that compels states to compete with
one another for the foreign funds that will
reduce their fiscal deficits and dependence on
New Delhi. Forcible evictions of peasants and
harsher labor laws are just two instruments
deployed by business-oriented state elites to
attract capital to their states. In some cases,
too—and Nandigram illustrates this very
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ST UA R T C O R B R I D G E

well—states are being encouraged to free up and by the bringing on side of politicians as 1
extensive parcels of land as de facto fiefdoms of well as “rent-seeking” elites in the states, many 2
private capital: this, in effect, is the remit and of whom had benefited from the permit- 3
purpose of the roughly 300 Special Economic license-quota Raj and who might have been 4
Zones that were formed between 2005 and expected to slow down changes to it. 5
2007 under the act of that name. Significantly, too, the ongoing process of eco- 6
nomic reform in India has led to a sharpening 7
of the technical competency of some leading 8
Causes and consequences of departments of government. Arguably, that 9
uneven growth competency was not there in the 1950s or 10
1960s to support the Nehru-Mahalanobis 11
The privatization of space is a necessary model of development. 12
complement to the way the ongoing process of The net effect of the reforms has been to 13
economic reform in India is being negotiated. widen the gulf between rich and poor people 14
To date, that process has been focused on the in India, and between rich and poor regions, 15
non-agricultural economy, and in towns but that was always going to be the case.The 16
and cities.There are sound political reasons for strongest arguments in the pro-reform locker 17
this, and it is widely agreed that successive are these: (a) that rates of average per capita 18
governments in India since 1991 have income growth in India have been rising since 19
managed the reform process with levels of 2003–04 beyond the 3.5–4.0 percent levels 20
determination and skill that evaded policy- recorded in the 1980s and 1990s; and (b) that 21
makers in the 1960s and 1970s.This in turn is such rates of growth would not have been 22
causing observers of India to rethink their recorded without economic reform. Put 23
understandings of state–society relations. It is another way, low levels of economic growth 24
not simply that power is being leached from are no friend of the poor, neither are forms of 25
New Delhi to state capitals, important though economic management based on populist 26
this is. It is also becoming clear that a modern- politics and deficit financing. In the short run, 27
izing elite in India, pushed on no doubt by big this argument has it, economic growth must 28
business and the international community, but promote higher levels of income inequality— 29
ably fronted by a band of far sighted techno- not that Indian levels are yet on a par with 30
crats, first used the politics of crisis and now those of Brazil or China. Richer people will 31
uses the politics of success to create a climate pull ahead as the economy rewards talent and 32
for ongoing reform that is nonetheless at scarce skills, as for example in the IT sector. 33
odds with market fundamentalism or the Meanwhile, the gap between the western 34
Washington Consensus. This is the real and and eastern states in India is opening up not 35
considerable achievement of the CII and men because the latter are getting poorer, but 36
like Manmohan Singh, Montek Singh because the former are getting richer. Again, 37
Ahluwalia, and Palaniappan Chidambaram. If we are seeing talent, or good economic 38
the reform agenda in India can be criticized policies, being rewarded. By the same token, 39
for its partiality and unevenness, even for its poor people in Bihar are the victims of more 40
slow speed, it can also be hailed as a success than two decades of economic mismanage- 41
story that has avoided the pitfalls of the big ment. Lalu Prasad Yadav built a political 42
bang approach to liberalization.39 A lot of coalition that rewarded Yadavs and Kurmis 43
progress has been made by stealth, and this has with dignity (izzat), and Muslims with pro- 44
involved all manner of deals between different tection, no mean feats both, but what he did 45
members of India’s business and political elites. not promote was a politics of development 46
But the reform process in India has also been aimed at tightening labor markets (thus raising 47
advanced by the careful building of coalitions, real wages) or attracting inward investment. 48
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 T H E P O L I T I CA L E C O N O M Y O F D E V E LO P M E N T I N I N D I A S I N C E I N D E P E N D E N C E
1 Per capita net state domestic product at
2 constant 1993–94 prices actually fell in Bihar
3 from Rs 4,474 in 1990–91 to Rs 3,396 in
4 2003–04 (in part because of the loss of
5 Jharkhand), while the residents of Uttar
6 Pradesh, including the richer western parts of
7 that state (but not Uttaranchal), saw their real
8 incomes rise from Rs 5,342 in 1990–91 to a
9 meager Rs 5,975 in 2003–04. In the western
10 state of Maharashtra, meanwhile, the corres-
11 ponding figures show more than a 60 percent
12 increase in real terms over 13 years, from
13 Rs 10,159 and Rs 16,765. In Gujarat, the rate
14 of economic expansion was even greater, with
15 a per capita net state domestic product of
16 Rs 8,788 nearly doubling in 2004–05 to
17 Rs 16,878.40
18 What is now evident in India, even more so
19 than previously, is the yawning gulf between
20 the country’s haves and have-nots. For the
21 former, India is shining brightly. It is a land of
22 Tata Nanos and shopping malls. It is a country
23 that seems to be leapfrogging the industrial
24 revolution to land talented people directly in
25 those jobs—in IT,information processing, and
26 finance—that connect India to the globalizing
27 world outside. This is precisely the land of
28 SEZs, the Golden Quadrilateral, Gurgaon, the
29 Bandra Kurla complex in Mumbai,and various
30 technopoles in Bangalore, Chennai, and
31 Hyderabad. Henri Lefebvre reminds us that
32 capitalism advances “by occupying space, by
33 producing [abstract] space,” or by sweeping
34 away those legal, cultural or political forces
35 which conspire to slow down the circulation
36 time of capital.41 This is what we are beginning
37 to see in India: the building of new urban
38 and regional geographies that trumpet the
39 country’s modernity. Boosters of reform
40 argue, furthermore, that the benefits of higher
41 average rates of growth must in time trickle
42 down to the poor. After a decade (the 1990s)
43 when the rate of poverty reduction in India
44 seemed to slow down, there are signs now that
45 economic growth is again driving considerable
46 reductions in the headcount incidence of
47 absolute poverty.Even in Bihar,changes appear
48 to be underway, with Chief Minister Nitish
Kumar advertising a business-friendly climate
at some remove from the policies of his pre-
decessor, Lalu Yadav. More tellingly, perhaps,
the mushrooming growth of private, English-
language schools in Bihar suggests an appetite
on the part of some parents there to see their
offspring join the circuits of economic growth
and enrichment that are on offer elsewhere in
India.
But here too is the rub. The anti-growth
policies that have held back large parts of Bihar
and Uttar Pradesh have more to do with state-
level politics than with deliberate neglect on
the part of New Delhi. If Rob Jenkins is right,
pressures will grow even in these two states,
particularly among the middle classes,for their
ruling elites to embrace the reform agenda (as
the CPM is doing in West Bengal). But there
are also significant path dependencies at work
here, a point sometimes lost on those urging
Bihar to be more like Maharashtra. Aseema
Sinha makes this point very well in her book
on the regional roots of development politics
in India.42 We need to recognize that India’s
recent experiments with high-tech growth
depend in part on earlier (Nehruvian) rounds
of investment in tertiary education (notably the
institutes of technology and management) and
other forms of colonial and postcolonial sup-
port for private sector capitalist development in
western India. In parts of eastern India, in
contrast,slow growth may have been caused in
large part by bad governance. But the gover-
nance systems in place there also reflect the
continuing legacies of the permanent settle-
ment and the more recent consequences of a
Freight Equalization Act that worked strongly
to the disadvantage of states in India’s resource
triangle by reducing the cost of coal, iron, and
steel in non-producing regions of India.Tim
Besley and his colleagues note that the
poverty-reducing effects of a given unit of
GDP per capita growth in India are much less
than in East Asia, where the distribution of
landed wealth since circa 1950 has been much
more even. Poverty elasticities in East Asia and
the Pacific are greater than –1 (that is,1 percent
growth produces more than a 1 percent
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reduction in poverty), whereas in South Asia 2 percent of total services in India and only 1 1
they are close to –0.6. But Besley and his percent of GDP (although it contributes 2
collaborators also note that poverty elasticities around 5 percent of export earnings).46 That 3
in India vary from a high of –1.23 in Kerala to said, the manufacturing sector has been 4
a low of –0.30 in Bihar.43 Even if economic doing better than many critics have recog- 5
growth does come to Bihar, their research nized,and there has been enormous growth in 6
suggests, the unevenness of land holdings, employment since circa 1990 in the household 7
together with poor levels of existing infra- industry sector.What is clear looking ahead is 8
structure and primary education,will conspire that the mass movement of people from rural 9
to limit such poverty-reducing effects as it to urban India has only just begun.We will see 10
might and should have. much more of it over the next 20 or 30 years, 11
And here is a second difficulty. While it as the agricultural sector continues to shrink as 12
may be true that New Delhi has not set out to a supplier of employment and as a contributor 13
hold back Bihar since circa 1980 or 1991, the to GDP. When the GOI does finally turn its 14
particular way in which India’s urban and reforming spotlight on the countryside it will 15
industrial elites have pushed forward the reduce the remaining subsidies that agriculture 16
agenda of economic reform has done few enjoys.It will also encourage the consolidation 17
favors for the eastern part of the country. To of larger farms, a process that is already under 18
begin with, there is the matter of the way in northwest India. 19
agricultural economy.What is needed in Bihar, Finally, there is the matter of public goods 20
still, is agrarian reform, but this is not on the provision, broadly defined. The most serious 21
mainstream agenda.What we observe instead, impediment to continued high rates of 22
as across India, is a crisis of profitability in economic growth in India is the undersupply 23
agriculture. Young people are leaving the of infrastructure, from schools and hospitals to 24
countryside in droves,driven out by poor rates roads, railways and ports. The World Bank 25
of return on farming and pulled to the cities by estimates that “India must invest around 3–4 26
the prospect of less onerous work. Close to 60 percent more of GDP on infrastructure to 27
percent of Indians still find some employment sustain growth of around 8 percent, address 28
in agriculture and allied sectors, but the share existing gaps and meet policy-driven coverage 29
of the agricultural economy in India’s GDP is goals.”47 This is a considerable sum of money to 30
now below 20 percent. It will move down find in a country that is still returning significant 31
further over the coming decades.The country- fiscal deficits at both central and state levels 32
side is also becoming the preserve of women, (albeit that considerable progress has been made 33
as more young men earn the major part of their since circa 2004), and which still tolerates high 34
livelihoods in the urban economy. More so levels of tax evasion.48 It is also not clear there 35
than in the 1950s and 1960s, the cities of India is the political will yet in India to finance 36
really do represent the “modern” and there is improvements in public sector health care and 37
every reason to suppose that an increase in education provision. The preference is for 38
education supply in the countryside will push people to pay for such goods in the private 39
young men (and some young women) even sector, an elite-driven policy choice that is 40
faster to those places where they can wear hugely damaging to poorer families. 41
western clothes and hanker after office jobs.44 Much less widely recognized outside India, 42
Whether decent jobs for high school or although it has been referred to with some 43
college graduates will be on offer is another regularity by Prime Minister Manmohan 44
matter.45 There are worries that India’s reform Singh, is the worsening security situation in 45
trajectory is bringing with it jobless growth large swathes of eastern India, particularly in 46
and the urbanization of poverty.It is sometimes the so-called tribal belt. The retreat of func- 47
forgotten that the IT sector accounts for only tioning local government in parts of more than 48
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1 150 of India’s 602 Districts has opened the
2 door to a Naxalite movement that does on
3 occasions seek to provide both security and
4 basic goods for disadvantaged local people.It is
5 unlikely that the Indian state will lose control
6 of these territories in the same manner that the
7 government of Nepal lost almost all of the hill
8 areas outside Kathmandu in the years from
9 1996 to 2006. But any attempt to win back
10 these blocks and districts will take time, and
11 might be bloody.In the meantime,they are no-
12 go areas for economic development. Private
13 investment will not flow to regions lacking
14 clear property rights or an established rule of
15 law. For better or worse, these red zones pro-
16 mise to be a significant brake on the produc-
17 tion of abstract space—that is, functioning
18 spaces for capital and modernization—in large
19 parts of Bihar,Orissa,Jharkhand,Chhattisgarh,
20 and Andhra Pradesh, not to mention in some
21 of the northeastern states.
22
23
24 Conclusion
25
26 The transformation of the Indian economy
27 since 1980 has surprised most observers and
28 deserves a positive press.The Indian economy
29 will be the third largest economy in the world
30 sometime in the mid-2030s (trailing only the
31 US and China).It is already in third place once
32 adjustments are made for purchasing power
33 parities (PPPs). Nominal average per capita
34 incomes in India were just over $1,050 in
35 2007, rising to $4,550 in PPP terms: still
36 placing India in the World Bank’s band of low
37 income countries, but edging it closer to
38 middle income status. Moving forwards,
39 Rodrik and Subramanian note that: “Over a
40 40-year period, a 5.3 percent [per capita]
41 growth rate would increase the income of the
42 average person nearly eight-fold.”49 There are
43 reasons to believe that India is now hitting a
44 target rate of growth of GDP of 7 percent, and
45 that such growth rates can be continued at least
46 up to 2025 (if not to 2040 or 2045, by which
47 time some decline in the rate of growth is to
48 be expected, as capital–output ratios increase).
The incidence of absolute poverty, measured
by income, should fall sharply in the wake of
high growth and will likely induce improve-
ments in other measures of poverty and
deprivation, including in respect of sanitation,
child health, and gender equality.These are all
areas where India is behind its millennium
development goal (MDG) targets.
But nothing is guaranteed. India is still less
dependent on world market conditions than
many other emergent developing countries,
but that dependence is set to grow. India is not
immune to global crises,whether stock market
crashes, rising energy prices or adverse climate
change. Internally, the GOI has major political
issues to negotiate in future, not just with
regard to forms of cultural nationalism,includ-
ing a possible backlash against “westerniza-
tion,” but also in regard to gender issues (the
role of women in the workforce,most notably)
and the management of urban poverty or the
containment of urban unrest. As things stand,
all leading political parties in India support the
agenda of economic reform.There is a growing
sense that India’s reform agenda is being driven
by a culture of success, rather than by the
politics of fear or even necessity.The fruits of
that initial success have gone overwhelmingly
to India’s elites and its urban middle classes,and
upper castes, as was always bound to be the
case.The challenge now, however, is for India
to move on from a reform agenda inspired by
elites in revolt against the permit-license-quota
Raj. Opportunities need to be provided for
poor and excluded people to participate in the
new circuits of growth, not least if they are to
be deterred in some regions from the paths of
unrest, rebellion and/or secession.
The political enfranchisement of India’s
poorest groups might still be the country’s
long-term salvation, much as Nehru once
imagined. It is equally possible, however, that
the politics of exclusionary growth will be
reinforced.As yet,rapid economic growth does
not seem to be binding rich and poor Indians
closer together. The privatization of space
in India’s cities surely hints at another future
as well: that of the Latin America city, with all
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its glitz, crime, segregation, and violence. £1.03 against 2005 PPPs. For discussion, see 1
Whichever way it goes, the future for eco- Chen and Ravallion 2008. 2
nomic development and social change in India 6 Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth: Rate, 3
is intimately bound up with its cities, and Structure and Speed (New Haven, CT: Yale 4
with the politics of urban management. Of University Press, 1966). 5
7 World Bank, India: Inclusive Growth and Service
that we can be certain. 6
Delivery—Building on India’s Success (Develop-
ment Policy Review, Report No. 34580-IN)
7
(Washington, DC: World Bank 2006), Figure 8
Notes 1.12 and text. 9
8 Stuart Corbridge and John Harriss, Reinventing 10
1 Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian,“Why India: Liberalization, Hindu Nationalism and 11
India Can Grow at 7 Percent a Year or More: Popular Democracy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 12
Projections and Reflections,” IMF Working 2000). 13
Paper, 04/118 (2004), p. 6. 9 Alan Heston, “National Income,” in Dharma 14
2 Gurcharan Das, India Unbound: The Social Kumar and Meghnad Desai (eds), Cambridge 15
and Economic Revolution from Independence to the Economic History of India, vol. II (Cambridge: 16
Global Information Age (New York: Anchor, University Press, 1982), pp. 376–462.
2002).
17
10 André Béteille, Caste, Class and Power: Changing
3 Kalpana Kochar et al., “India’s Pattern of 18
Patterns of Stratification in aTanjoreVillage (Berkeley,
Development:What Happened,What Follows,” CA: University of California Press, 1965). 19
International Monetary Fund, Working Paper 11 Quoted in Sunil Khilnani, The Idea of India 20
WP/06.02, www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1997), p. 35. 21
wp/2006/wp0622.pdf (2006); see also Abhijit 12 See the chapter by Jan Breman in this volume. 22
Banerjee, “The Paradox of Indian Growth: A 13 Hans Singer,“The Distribution of Gains Between 23
Comment on Kochar et al.” (Mimeo: MIT, Investing and Borrowing Countries,” American 24
available at www.mit.edu/faculty/download_ Economic Review,40 (1950),pp.478–96;and Raúl 25
pdf.php?id+1340, 2006). Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin 26
4 After writing a first draft of this essay I was able America and Its Principal Problems (Lake Success, 27
to read Arvind Panagariya’s spirited and upbeat NY: United Nations, 1950). 28
account of India:The Emerging Giant (Oxford: 14 Dadabhai Naoroji anticipated this argument in
29
University Press, 2008). Panagariya accepts that his Poverty and Un-British Rule in India (London:
India’s growth rate stepped up in the 1980s (to 30
Swan Sonnenschein, 1901).
4.8 percent per annum 1981–88), but further 15 Ronald Inden, “Embodying God: From 31
argues that the growth rate stepped up again— Imperial Progresses to National Progress in 32
to 6.3 percent—from 1988. Given that the run India,” Economy and Society, 24 (1995), 33
of annual GDP growth rates from 1987–88 to pp. 245–78. 34
1993–94 are 3.8 percent, 10.5 percent, 6.7 16 William Arthur Lewis, “Economic Develop- 35
percent,5.6 percent,1.3 percent,5.1 percent,and ment with Unlimited Supplies of Labour,” The 36
5.9 percent, I find the cutoff date of 1988 (or Manchester School, 22 (1954), pp. 139–91. 37
1988–89: the year of 10.5 percent growth) 17 John Harriss,“Does the ‘Depressor’ still work? 38
unconvincing, if not indeed rather arbitrary. Agrarian Structure and Development in India: 39
5 Work for the World Bank’s 1990 World A Review of Evidence and Argument,” Journal 40
Development Report proposed an inter- of Peasant Studies, 19 (1992), pp. 189–227.
41
national poverty line of $1 per day at 1985 PPPs 18 Michael Lipton, Why Poor People Stay Poor:
(purchasing power parities). At that time, India A Study of Urban Bias in World Development
42
used an official poverty line of $0.75 per day. In (London:Temple Smith, 1977). Charan Singh’s 43
2008 the World Bank proposed a new views permeate much of his writings, but see 44
international poverty line of $1.25 per day,using esp. India’s Economic Policy: The Gandhian 45
2005 data on PPPs. India’s official poverty lines Blueprint (New Delhi: Vikas, 1978), ch. v; and 46
for 2004–5 were Rs. 17.71 in urban areas and Economic Nightmare of India: Its Cause and Cure 47
Rs. 11.71 in rural areas, which translate to just (New Delhi: National 1981), chs vi–viii. 48
318
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1 19 V. M. Dandekar and Nilkanth Rath, “Poverty 32 Drawing on Corbridge and Harriss,Reinventing

2 in India: Dimensions and Trends,” Economic and India, p. 152.
3 Political Weekly [EPW],Vol. 6, No. 1 (2 January, 33 Corbridge and Harriss,Reinventing India,p.153.
4 1971), pp. 25–48, 106–46. 34 See Ashutosh Varshney, “Mass Politics or
20 Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, Elite Politics? India’s Economic Reforms in
5
In Pursuit of Lakshmi:The Political Economy of the Comparative Perspective,” in Jeffrey Sachs et al.
6 Indian State (Chicago,IL:University of Chicago (eds), India in the Era of Economic Reforms
7 Press, 1987). (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999),
8 21 Atul Kohli. Democracy and Discontent: India’s pp. 222–60.
9 Growing Crisis of Governability (Cambridge: 35 David Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford:
10 University Press, 1990). Clarendon Press, 2003).
11 22 Partha Chatterjee, A Possible World: Essays in 36 On Narmada, see Amita Baviskar, In the Belly of
12 Political Criticism (New Delhi: Oxford the River:Tribal Conflicts Over Development in the
13 University Press 1977);also his The Politics of the Narmada Valley (New Delhi: Oxford University
Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of Press, 1995). On Operation Sunshine, see
14
the World (New York: Columbia University Chatterjee, Politics of the Governed, p. 61.
15 Press, 2004). Sudipta Kaviraj,“On the Crisis of
16 37 See Paul R. Brass, The Politics of India Since
Political Institutions in India,” Contributions to Independence, 1st edn (Cambridge: University
17 Indian Sociology, 18 (1984), pp. 223–43; also his Press, 1990).
18 “On State, Society and Discourse in India,” in 38 Robert Jenkins. “The Developmental Impli-
19 James Manor (ed.),Rethinking Third World Politics cations of Federal Political Institutions in India,”
20 (Harlow: Longman, 1991), pp. 72–89. in Mark Robinson and Gordon White (eds),
21 23 Kaviraj,“Crisis of Political Institutions,” p. 227. The Democratic Developmental State (Oxford:
22 24 Francine Frankel, India’s Political Economy, University Press, 1998), pp. 187–214. See also
23 1947–1977: The Gradual Revolution (Princeton, Lawrence Sáez, Federalism Without a Centre:The
NJ: University Press, 1978); Pranab Bardhan, Impact of Political and Economic Reforms on India’s
24
The Political Economy of Development in India
25 Federal System (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage,
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1984); Jagdish Bhagwati,
26 2002).
India in Transition: Freeing the Economy (Oxford:
27 39 See Bradford De Long, “India since Inde-
Clarendon, 1993).
pendence:An Analytical Growth Narrative,” in
28 25 Bhagwati, India; Thirukodikaval Nilakanta
Dani Rodrik (ed.),In Search of Prosperity:Analytic
29 Srinivasan, “Reform of Industrial and Trade
Narratives on Economic Growth (Princeton, NJ:
30 Policies,” EPW, Vol. 26, No. 37 (14 September,
University Press, 2003), pp. 184–204. See also
31 1991), pp. 2,143–45.
Rob Jenkins, Democratic Politics and Economic
32 26 Atul Kohli, “Politics of Economic Growth in
India,1980–2005,Parts I and II,”EPW, Vol.41, Reform in India (Cambridge: University Press,
33 1999).
No. 13 (1 April, 2006), pp. 1,251–59 and 14 (8
34 April, 2006), pp. 1,361–70. 40 Government of India, Economic Survey, 2006–7
35 27 Angus Deaton, and Jean Drèze, “Poverty and (New Delhi: GOI, Ministry of Finance, 2007),
36 Inequality in India:A Re-examination,” EPW, Table 10.4.
37 Vol. 37, No. 36 (7 September, 2002), 41 Henri Lefebvre,The Survival of Capitalism (New
38 pp. 3,729–48. York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976), cited in David
39 28 Abhijit Sen and Himanshu, “Poverty and Harvey,Spaces of Capital (Edinburgh:University
40 Inequality in India-I,” EPW, Vol 39, No. 38 Press, 2001), p. 376.
(18 September,2004),pp.4,247–63 and “Poverty 42 Aseema Sinha, The Regional Roots of Development
41
and Inequality in India-II,” 39, pp. 4,361–75. Politics in India: A Divided Leviathan (Bloomington,
42 IN: Indiana University Press, 2005).
29 Kohli,“Politics of Economic Growth,”p.1,362.
43 43 Tim Besley et al., Operationalising Pro-Poor
30 John Williamson, “Democracy and the
44 ‘Washington Consensus,’” World Development, Growth: A Country Case Study on India (Mimeo:
45 21 (1993), pp. 1,329–36. Working Paper of Department of Economics,
46 31 Deepak Lal, The Poverty of ‘Development London School of Economics, www.lse.ac.uk/
47 Economics’ (London: Institute of Economic collections/LSEIndia/pdf/propoorgrowth.pdf,
48 Affairs, 1993). 2004), p. 13.

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44 An important word of caution here. The North India (Stanford, CA: University Press, 1
feminization of the countryside in states like 2008). 2
Haryana and Punjab is taking place in a context 46 Jim Gordon and Poonam Gupta,“Understanding 3
where child sex ratios indicate there are now India’s Services Revolution,” paper prepared 4
fewer than 850 girls for every 1,000 boys aged for IMF-NCAER Conference, New Delhi,
5
0–6.Amartya Sen has argued that there are more November 2003 www.imf.org/external/np/
6
than 100 million missing from the world today. apd/seminars/2003/newdelhi/gordon.pdf.
Perhaps as many as 30 million of these women 47 World Bank, India, p.15. 7
are missing from India; Amartya Kumar Sen, 48 See Barbara Harriss-White,India Working:Essays 8
“More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing,” on Society and Economy (Cambridge: University 9
New York Review of Books, 20 December, 1990. Press, 2003). 10
45 See Craig Jeffrey et al.,Degrees Without Freedom? 49 Rodrik and Subramanian,Why India Can Grow, 11
Education, Masculinities and Unemployment in p. 6. 12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
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2
3
4
22
5
6 The political economy of
7
8 agrarian change in India
9
10
11
12 Jan Breman
13
14
15
16
17
18
19 Settling the agrarian question main outlines of economic policy after
20 decolonization.Radhakamal Mukerjee drafted
21 At the time of Independence, in the middle a paper on the land issue which was first
22 of the twentieth century,India could firmly be discussed in his working group on agriculture
23 classified as a peasant society.The rural-based and then endorsed by experts and politicians in
24 mode of existence had remained dominant a plenary meeting of the NPC at the end of
25 from generation to generation, and the large June 1940. Landlordism was to be abolished
26 majority of the population continued to live in and ownership rights transferred to the actual
27 the countryside and work in agriculture. A tillers of the soil. The family farm would
28 series of village monographs, most of which remain the main unit of cultivation and its size
29 were published between the 1950s and 1970s should be neither larger nor smaller than an
30 as the outcome of anthropological research, economic holding. It should provide adequate
31 showed that the habitat of peasants included a employment and income for the family
32 wide variety of non-agrarian households and without making use, at least not permanently,
33 that, moreover, the peasantry was highly of outside labour.
34 differentiated. A major point of departure in The architects of the postcolonial era clearly
35 the populist course steered by the nationalist envisaged an agricultural economy of self-
36 leadership was the restoration of a social order cultivating owners. In their directives the
37 which had been eroded under colonial rule. planners seemed to have ignored the existence,
38 The owner–cultivator, reported to have in most parts of the subcontinent, of a vast
39 steadily lost ground in the transition to a agrarian underclass completely bereft of
40 market economy, was to be shored up as the landownership.Their disregard for this landless
41 backbone of agricultural production. Solving mass was operationalized in the decision not
42 the agrarian question stood high on the to include them in the redistribution of the
43 political agenda of the Congress movement, surplus land that would become available with
44 which came to power at both central and state the fixation of a ceiling on land ownership
45 level. In preparation for the takeover of and the abolition of absentee ownership. By
46 government a national planning committee way of consolation, the planning document
47 (NPC) was set up under the chairmanship of suggested that agricultural labourers be allowed
48 Jawaharlal Nehru, with the task to frame the access to land not yet under cultivation, village

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commons and other wasteland waiting to be Practising land reforms: Gujarat 1

taken into production. Perhaps not by the 2
straightforward handing out of individualized What was the shape and outcome of the 3
ownership rights but indirectly, through the agrarian question in the villages of south 4
establishment of land-tilling cooperatives in Gujarat where I started my fieldwork in the 5
which various agrarian classes would join and early 1960s? Under the provisions of the 6
collaborate. Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act of 7
The cooperative model was one of the 1948 the Maratha inamdar (landholder), who 8
vaguely phrased socialist ideas which appealed lived in Baroda, lost most of the agrarian 9
to some sections of the Congress movement property which his family had held in 10
but which were never taken seriously in the Gandevigam village for many generations.The 11
execution of mainstream policies firmly Anavil Brahmans, who were already the 12
heading in a capitalist direction. Of similar dominant landowners, received the title deeds 13
symbolic value was the promise that agri- for the plots which they used to cultivate as his 14
cultural laborers would be released from tenants. Bania moneylenders and urban traders 15
bondage when they had been indebted to forfeited whatever land they had taken over 16
landowners for more than five years. A large- from farmers indebted to them. The same 17
scale, nationwide survey of agricultural labor happened in Chikhligam,the second site of my 18
conducted a few years after Independence fieldwork. For the Brahmans, Tillers’ Day— 19
showed that a substantial segment worked in a April 1957—heralded their consolidation as the 20
state of attachment that took away their landed elite in the region. By the same token, 21
freedom of employment.1 The land reform the subaltern castes—in Gandevigam,the Kolis, 22
operation was closely monitored.Thorner was and in Chikhligam, the tribal Dhodhias—lost 23
one of many observers who came to the out in the land transfer deals. In the past, local 24
conclusion that the redistribution of property Anavil farmers had leased out plots to them on 25
rights, both in making the design for a new a sharecropping basis and, under the new 26
agrarian blueprint and in the subsequent legislation, the low-caste cultivators could lay a 27
stage of implementation,fell short of what had claim to these fields.To avoid losing property, 28
been promised in the decades leading up the main landowners decided to discontinue 29
to Independence by Congress leadership.2 most sharecropping arrangements even though 30
Myrdal minced no words when he concluded their clients swore that they would never dare 31
halfway in his three-volume Asian Drama to register their names in the local record of 32
(1968) that the opportune moment for a rights.The land-poor were only beneficiaries if 33
radical reshaping of the agrarian structure had the land they worked belonged to owners not 34
passed. The land reforms, he wrote, have residing in the village. A land ceiling, fixed in 35
bolstered the political, social, and economic 1960 and scaled down in 1974, could have 36
position of the rural better-off segments on threatened the privileged position of the Anavil 37
which the postcolonial government depended Brahmans,but because of the many exemptions 38
for crucial support.The policy was not merely and loopholes in the act, the members of this 39
tilted in favor of the more well to do but had dominant caste—which to the present day 40
an anti-poor bias as well. average no more than 15 percent of the village 41
Measures that would deprive the upper population—managed to appropriate two- 42
strata in the villages of land and power, and thirds to three-quarters of the total arable land 43
would genuinely confer dignity and status on in the locality. 44
the underprivileged and the landless, are The landless were,of course,excluded from 45
among the last that those in power would find the reallocation of the meager amount of 46
acceptable.3 surplus land which became available. One of 47
the reasons given for their non-qualification 48
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1 was that they had never been,even in their own
2 memory, owner–cultivators. Their huts used
3 to be built on land owned by the Anavil land-
4 lords who had tied them as farm servants in a
5 relationship of bondage, which was passed
6 on from father to son. In the years between
7 Independence and the enactment of the land
8 reform,they were thrown out of the plots they
9 inhabited in their masters’ fields.When I came
10 for the first round of my research nearly half
11 a century ago, I found them living on the
12 outskirts of the village, occupying home-
13 steads for which they had not been issued
14 title deeds.The withholding of a legal status,
15 either as owners or tenants, meant that the
16 landless could be blamed for having invaded
17 as squatters the public domain kept as a reserve
18 open to the local community at large for graz-
19 ing cattle, cutting grass, collecting firewood,
20 and,not least,for defecation.The promise made
21 by the national planning committee that
22 members of the agrarian underclass be given
23 access to the still undivided land under the
24 control of the village panchayat was more often
25 broken than honored.
26 On the contrary, in a subsequent round of
27 land reform, the commons were privatized,
28 surreptitiously and in collusion with the local
29 bureaucracy, resulting in the registration of
30 ownership rights for what had always been
31 communal property in the names of the
32 dominant caste. As one of my informants in
33 Chikhligam caustically commented: “Even
34 when I go for shitting to the field where I
35 always have been doing that in the morning
36 I stand accused of trespassing.” And when
37 the agricultural laborers went on strike in
38 Gandevigam in their fight for higher wages,
39 the landowners retaliated with the threat that
40 they would stop the landless women and
41 children gathering firewood on “their” land.
42 One last effort was made to hand out land to
43 the landless for self-cultivation.AcharyaVinoba
44 Bhave started the Bhoodan (land gift) campaign
45 in the 1950s to deradicalize agrarian struggles
46 such as the agitation that had been going on in
47 Telangana. In his opinion the Gandhian
48 approach would persuade the well-endowed
elite to part with their surplus land.The move-
ment turned out to be a failure,4 although it
was quite popular for some time in south
Gujarat where a network of Gandhian institu-
tions had become firmly entrenched in the late
colonial era. Social activists were told that
agricultural laborers lacked the wherewithal
and discipline to work the land on their own
account.There was, however, a more genuine
argument why the landless segment should not
benefit from restructuring of the agrarian
order.The widely held verdict was that it made
no sense to burden households with a tiny
piece of land, which would, in any case, be
inadequate for them to make a decent living.
It would simply act as an obstacle to their
mobility.
Swami Sahajanand, the national leader of
the kisan sabha,the peasant union,had come to
the same conclusion. He pointed out that the
agricultural economy was unable to provide
enough employment for the mass of agric-
ultural labor.5 At least half of them would have
to get out and seek a better future in the urban
industries that were going to emerge after
independence.This was also the destiny which
the national planning committee had in mind
for the large number of households at the
bottom of the village economy.6 It was in line
with what Sardar Patel had advised the Dublas
of south Gujarat to do towards the end of the
1930s if they wanted to be free: to go
elsewhere.7 All those who said that they were
guided by what would be best for the rural
underclass suggested that a more dignified life
was awaiting these hapless people outside
agriculture.Migration to the cities and factory
employment were thus highlighted as an end
to the misery of the landless and the final
solution for the agrarian question.
Social profile of the landless
proletariat
The large majority of the agricultural laborers
in south Gujarat are Dublas (or Halpatis,as they
came to be called later).Their earlier name had
been given a derogatory meaning and sala
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Dubla8 is still a common curse.The denigration Outside agriculture,there was hardly any work 1
resonated in the suggestion that the word available in the village.In the slack season their 2
Dubla was to be understood as weakling, a already low food intake declined further and 3
reference to the inferior character ascribed to many families could not still their hunger for 4
the members of this community. Classified as days on end. Undernourishment, a lack of 5
a scheduled tribe in the colonial bookkeep- clothes to cover the bodies of adults and 6
ing, the Dublas had been tied to high-caste children, and inadequate shelter in huts that 7
landowners such as the anavil Brahmans for gave no protection against cold and rain made 8
many generations.Their work as farm servants them vulnerable to health risks,leading to high 9
included using the plow,which their employers morbidity, particularly for the youngest and 10
had to avoid to retain their purity. Although oldest age groups. Only a handful of children 11
they were bonded, the Dublas were not would attend school for a few standards, but 12
ranked as unclean and both men and women illiteracy was the general state of affairs. The 13
performed household chores, releasing their Minimum Wage Act, announced in 1948, was 14
masters from having to do such demeaning not put into effect and this did not change 15
work themselves. In my initial fieldwork, I still when the first and second Agricultural Labour 16
found traces of the earlier bondage. My Enquiries, held in 1950–51 and 1955–56 17
investigations focused on the changes that had respectively,provided abundant evidence of the 18
come about in the relations between these deprivation of the lowest class in the rural 19
landowning and landless castes-cum-classes at economy. In 1966 a panel of experts urged the 20
opposing ends of the social hierarchy. In my government of Gujarat to fix a floor price for 21
opinion, the fading away of bondage in the agricultural labor to prevent tensions which 22
preceding decades was more the result of had been building up in several parts of the 23
internal dynamics—on one side, landowners state from boiling over into open clashes. A 24
shedding clients whom they no longer wished better deal could not wait for much longer,the 25
to grant full employment and, on the other committee’s report warned, in order to pre- 26
side, agricultural laborers refusing to consider empt organized political radicalism from 27
themselves debt bonded to masters who surfacing.11 It took six more years of delibera- 28
impinged on their freedom of movement— tion and consultation before a legal minimum 29
than outside intervention.The external forces rate was finally introduced,later and lower than 30
at work were either the state unwilling to the downright conservative advisors had 31
condone any longer practices of unfree labor deemed both wise and fair. Further delay 32
or civil agencies, Gandhian activists in parti- would have risked losing a major vote bank of 33
cular, attempting in the late colonial era to the Congress party: the landless electorate that 34
uplift the Dublas.9 There is no doubt that made up more than half (55 percent in 1982) 35
Mahatma Gandhi himself had tried to elevate of the agrarian workforce in south Gujarat. 36
their social standing by renaming them Gandhian activists had begun to mobilize the 37
Halpatis, lords of the plow, to try to eradicate Halpatis in the late colonial era and remained 38
their dismal history as Dublas.Summing up my active as political agents who delivered the votes 39
findings, I reported in my fieldwork account of these downtrodden people to the Congress 40
that while features of patronage had dis- party in the early decades after Independence. 41
appeared over time the dimension of exploita- The well-established landowners who had 42
tion had remained as strong as ever.10 rallied behind Congress in the struggle for 43
The agricultural laborers continued to live independence did not appreciate the main- 44
in deep poverty because of the extremely low stream party voicing and articulating the 45
wages they received for their work: less than a interests of the rural poor.This was one of the 46
rupee a day in the early 1960s. It was far less major reasons why Mahatma Gandhi never 47
than they needed to meet their basic needs. became a popular figure in his own home state, 48
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 T H E P O L I T I CA L E C O N O M Y O F AG R A R I A N C H A N G E I N I N D I A
1 in contrast to the strong-handed Sardar Patel
2 who became idolized as the hero of the Bardoli
3 satyagraha.12 Already at this early stage, the
4 elite formations in the countryside began to
5 distance themselves from Congress stalwarts
6 and backed candidates who canvassed for Jan
7 Sangh and Swatantra. My informants among
8 the dominant caste insisted that giving Halpatis
9 the right to vote, as ordained by the principle
10 of universal suffrage, had been a grave blunder.
11 Such lowly people had fewer needs than full
12 citizens—a major argument why their wages
13 should not be fixed above reproduction level—
14 and should have remained excluded from
15 participating in the regular political process.
16 While the New Congress “high command”
17 did not go beyond paying mere lip service to
18 the garibi hatao (ban poverty) slogan when it
19 was coined after the split in the party, it was
20 good enough reason for the landed interests to
21 side with veterans such as Morarji Desai who
22 established their leadership of the old Congress
23 party (Congress-O) in opposition to Indira
24 Gandhi, whose new Congress party came to
25 be called Congress (I) (I for Indira). The
26 rupture between the rural rich and poor
27 further escalated when the main landowners
28 transferred their allegiance first to Janata and,
29 after the failure of that intermezzo at central
30 and state level, to the Bharatiya Janata Party
31 (BJP), which appealed to the rapidly spreading
32 mood of Hindu fundamentalism in the 1980s
33 and 1990s. Extending their power base to the
34 upwardly mobile castes helped the BJP and its
35 front organizations to tackle and defeat the
36 political strategy of new congress which had
37 formed the KHAM alignment, carrying for
38 some time the vote banks of Kshatriyas,
39 Harijans,Adivasis, and Muslims.
40
41
The failure of the Gandhian gospel
42
43 In the shifting political constellation during the
44 last quarter of the twentieth century the
45 Halpatis by and large remained faithful to the
46 Congress party. Their voting behavior was
47 more inspired by confronting the successive
48 choices made by their caste-cum-class oppo-
nents, who cast their votes for candidates
belonging to opposition parties.The Halpatis
never wavered from their loyalty to Congress,
although not out of gratitude for concrete
material gains.The minimum wage legislation
came too late and offered too little to be hailed
as clear proof of successful representation. In a
violent incident which took place in 1976 in
a village close to the sites of my research, two
Halpatis were killed by zim rakhas, private
guards hired by the landlords to protect their
fields against crop theft. A committee of
inquiry reported that the agricultural laborers
had become restive because they were paid
much less than the prescribed legal wage.
Heeding these signals, the government of
Gujarat set up a rural labor inspectorate in
1981 with the mandate to check whether
farmers paid for the labor they utilized in
accordance with the law. But, during their
rounds, the government labor inspectors
collected bribes rather than fines, so that
employers could buy off prosecution for
noncompliance.13 Nevertheless,Indira Gandhi
has remained a cult figure in the Halpati milieu
until the present day.If Mataji could not deliver
what she promised,freedom from exploitation
and oppression, it was because of the collusion
between the vested interests at local level
and the officials in charge of the district and
subdistrict bureaucracies. This political–
bureaucratic front of high caste domination
had prevented the rural landless from making
their numerical weight felt. There was the
famous statement made by one congress
minister who, when gheraoed (surrounded) by
angry farmers protesting against a rise in the
minimum wage rate for agricultural labor,
went on public record saying:“Some laws are
not meant to be implemented.” However,
when I came back in the late 1980s for a
restudy of my initial fieldwork villages, I
noticed some signs of progress in the landless
quarters. Huts had become houses, and
although they were not pakka (well-made of
brick), they were definitely better than the
shacks in which I had found them before.Floor
space had not increased much but the walls
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JAN B R E MAN

were higher and the thatched roofs were now social movement firmly refused to turn it into 1
tiled or covered with asbestos or corrugated a trade union fighting for freedom from 2
iron sheets. Not having to bend down low in bondage and higher wages for agricultural 3
order to pass through the opening and to be laborers. Its ideological stance was based on 4
able to stand erect once inside testified to an preaching harmony. Whenever conflicts 5
increase in dignity. broke out, caused by the antagonistic relation- 6
Housing programs were a major instrument ship between landowners and landless, the 7
with which congress bought the support of the Gandhian missionaries rushed to the scene 8
rural poor. The Halpatis required public and appealed to what they considered to be 9
subsidies to build their accommodation in the their flock to abstain from militant con- 10
new colonies because they needed at least frontation.The aim of their mediation was to 11
four-fifths of their daily income for food reach a compromise, which invariably meant 12
intake. What helped in that respect was the systematically understating and misrepre- 13
public distribution system, which provided senting the interests of the dominated class.14 14
a monthly ration of low-price grain to house- This leads me to conclude that the role played 15
holds officially declared as living below the by civil society in raising the visibility of the 16
poverty line. As a consequence, the number of landless mass and in helping them to acquire 17
days without at least one meal decreased.More better political representation has been more 18
children had started going to school, to some negative than positive. 19
extent motivated by the introduction of a 20
noon meal scheme.Although the dropout rate 21
remained high, a small minority managed to Opening up the countryside and 22
complete their basic education. Disease and modernizing the forces of 23
debilitation were still rampant, but access to production 24
public health care helped to moderate the 25
impact of chronic or recurrent illness. The Equally important as the efforts made by 26
primary health centers opened in subdistrict various state agencies in the 1970s and 27
towns played an important role in bringing 1980s to alleviate poverty somewhat was 28
down morbidity. the accelerated diversification of the rural 29
The Halpati Seva Sangh (HSS), founded in economy arising on account of road building 30
1946 by Gandhian activists and led by them and motorized transport. Distances could be 31
ever since, became a useful instrument for bridged much easier than before and new 32
spreading the public welfare benefits among modes of communication resulted in more 33
the landless of south Gujarat.The staff of social information about what was going on beyond 34
workers belonging to the ujliparaj, the higher the local boundaries.I have never endorsed the 35
castes, considered themselves to be engaged in view that, in the past, there had been a closed 36
a mission to civilize the tribal communities. labor market at the village level, but it would 37
Acting as a front organization for congress, the be difficult to deny that agricultural laborers 38
HSS was rewarded for its mobilizing role in became more mobile than they had been 39
election campaigns with large grants spent on before.They started to operate in a wider and 40
a network of boarding schools and social more fluid labor market and moved around 41
welfare schemes. Propagating vegetarianism both in spatial terms, going to sites of 42
and abstinence from drinking country liquor, employment which had been beyond their 43
a favorite pastime among the landless,the HSS reach in the past, and in finding access to other 44
leadership tried to convert its clientele to a economic sectors than agriculture. Not only 45
Hinduized way of life and, by strengthening did seasonal migration increase, but also daily 46
communal sentiments,to instill in the Halpatis commuting to the industrial estates that had 47
a sense of caste identity. The leaders of this sprung up in most district towns. Gaining 48
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 T H E P O L I T I CA L E C O N O M Y O F AG R A R I A N C H A N G E I N I N D I A
1 access to these new employment niches was
2 only possible for those who owned a bicycle,
3 which thus became a major asset also for the
4 younger generation of landless who continued
5 to work as agricultural laborers.What I found
6 quite striking was that only a few Halpatis left
7 the village to settle down in the urban localities
8 alongside the railway line, which rapidly
9 expanded from the 1980s onwards. Migration
10 became circulatory,with laborers leaving home
11 to work, but coming back at the end of the
12 day, every few weeks or at the onset of the
13 monsoon.Urbanization,in the sense of staying
14 on more indefinitely in the town or city,
15 required, apart from access to low-cost hous-
16 ing, a modicum of educational qualifications
17 and proper skills, a network of contacts to find
18 shelter, and a regular job. That kind of social
19 capital was rare in the bottom of the rural
20 milieu. Consequently, the Halpatis had no
21 other option but to remain footloose,hired and
22 fired according to the needs of the moment at
23 a wage level which was not much higher than
24 that paid by the farmers. Leaving the village
25 had become easier, but in and outside their
26 home base the landless mass turned into a
27 reserve army of labor dependent for irregular
28 work and low income on the steadily
29 expanding informal sector of the economy.15
30 Their hopes for a better future lay in the
31 prospect that a process of formalization would
32 eventually take place that would absorb the
33 surplus labor redundant in agriculture into the
34 better paid and more skilled jobs that were
35 bound to become available,if not in the village
36 then elsewhere.
37 In the second half of the twentieth century,
38 agricultural production became less dependent
39 on rainfall. The construction of, first, the
40 Kakrapar Dam and then the Ukai Dam in the
41 Tapti River led to a significant extension of the
42 irrigated area in the central plain of south
43 Gujarat. Crops could now be cultivated
44 throughout the year. The lengthening of the
45 agrarian cycle resulted in a growing demand
46 for labor,although this was somewhat lessened
47 by the mechanization of farming operations
48 and transport—the introduction of tractors and
power tillers. More damaging for the local
landless, however, was the influx of seasonal
labor from the remote hinterland.Throughout
the region, sugarcane became the major cash
crop and the agro-industry managing its
production and processing recruited harvesting
gangs from far off destinations for the duration
of the season. Elaborating on the political
economy of labor migration,I pointed out that
the decision to bring in these outsiders was not
caused by a local shortage of labor but was
conditioned by an employment strategy that
reduced the cost of the brutal work regime to
the lowest possible level.16 Labor migrants are
easy to discipline, are not allowed to bring
dependants along, can be put to work day and
night, and have to leave the region again when
their presence is no longer required.While the
local landless have to remain at home idle, an
army of more than 100,000 men, women, and
children camp along the roadside or in the
open fields from October to June to cut the
cane and take it to the cooperative sugar mills
that have been set up in nearly every taluka
(subdivision of a district).
As I was able to observe in Bardoligam,
which became the third village of my field-
work at the end of the 1970s, growing
sugarcane has been a very profitable business
for the landowners whose prosperity has
significantly increased in the last half century.
The houses in which they used to live have
been replaced by havelis mansions two or
even three storeys high, with well-furnished
interiors designed to demonstrate the wealth of
the inhabitants.They no longer use mopeds or
scooters to get around, but are the proud
owners of motor cars, preferably expensive
foreign models.The members of the dominant
castes had already given up working in the
fields one or two generations ago, and their
growing detachment from agriculture is
expressed in an unwillingness to invest time
and money in farming.In recent decades,milk
cattle have followed draught animals in
disappearing from the high-caste neighbor-
hoods. When I asked why, I was told that
keeping them was too much of a nuisance,
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JAN B R E MAN

despite the fact that looking after the animals Widening divide between 1
and cleaning the stables were chores done by winners and losers 2
the farm servants and maids anyway. Anavil 3
Brahmans and Kanbi patidars have dissociated The members of the village elite are, however, 4
themselves from the agrarian lifestyle of their not content to just shed their rurality.Their real 5
ancestors.Settling down in towns and cities has ambition is to settle abroad and join their caste 6
become increasingly popular among the mates as NRIs (non-resident Indians).Leaving 7
younger generations and attending college in for other shores is not a new phenomenon in 8
a nearby town helps them to prepare for a life south Gujarat, but the number of migrants 9
oriented more towards the world beyond the going overseas has increased enormously in the 10
village. Sons and, more particularly, daughters last quarter century. An earlier generation went 11
do not see a future for themselves living in the to East Africa and later on to the UK, but 12
village and working in agriculture.They really nowadays the US is the favored destination. 13
want to become embedded in an urban Getting hold of a green card to send a son or 14
environment,but because of the soaring prices daughter to America is a high priority in many 15
of real estate—the cost of even a small and well-established households. What they do 16
rather mundane apartment in the muni- there depends on the educational qualifications 17
cipalities of Valsad, Navsari, Bardoli, or Surat of the migrants.Running your own business is 18
runs to more than four lakh (hundred thou- the dream of every patidar youngster and the 19
sand) rupees—not all can afford it. Fathers popular saying hotel-motel-patel, in which the 20
complain that they find it difficult to get community at large takes pride, illustrates the 21
suitable girls to marry their sons because strength of their presence in this branch of 22
coming to the village inevitably implies having trade. Much less widely known is that at least 23
to take up the role of the dutiful daughter-in- part of the money spent on buying a motel 24
law. For the rich, their rural lifestyle has somewhere in the US comes from the profits 25
become sufficiently urbanized, with all the reaped from agriculture at home.Sugarcane,in 26
modern gadgets and conveniences until particular, has been a real moneyspinner, and 27
recently only available in the town. The the Rs 500 shares which a farmer had to buy 28
infrastructure has been upgraded and dis- many years ago to register himself as member 29
tances can be easily bridged by scooter or of the cooperative agro-industry processing the 30
motor car. It is, therefore, nowadays acceptable cane are now sold for not less than Rs 31
to continue to live in the village, also for the 150,000–250,000 on the open market. The 32
younger generation,but it is important to have landowners not only indulge in conspicuous 33
a proper urban job, i.e., white collar and in the consumption but also help to provide the cash 34
managerial ranks or, preferably, having your their sons need to buy the overseas property 35
own business so as to be your own boss. It is which has made them such successful 36
interesting to note that the trend away from emigrants. If it comes to the crunch they are 37
agriculture at the higher end of the village even willing to sell a piece of land because they 38
hierarchy rarely leads to land being sold off.A see it as an investment in the future well-being 39
new class of “absentee” landlords has emerged of their children and grandchildren abroad.To 40
who own most of the land but desist from that extent the NRIs regard themselves as 41
plowing their earnings back to raise pro- frontrunners in building up a globalized 42
duction. They manage their property by identity, not afraid to move themselves and 43
remote control and in a leisurely fashion— their capital around in the pursuit of happiness. 44
having fruit orchards and growing sugarcane— They come home to relax, to charge their 45
rather than as active, let alone innovative, religious batteries, to find marriage partners, 46
agrarian entrepreneurs. to check on the family property, to seek 47
medical care (the cost of which is much lower 48
328
 T H E P O L I T I CA L E C O N O M Y O F AG R A R I A N C H A N G E I N I N D I A
1 than in the US) or to spend their retirement,
2 but not to engage in business.The dominant
3 castes are strong, even vehement, supporters of
4 the BJP.Narendra Modi,the Hindutva supremo
5 and prime minister of Gujarat, is their hero.
6 They affectionately call him chhote sardar, the
7 little lion, who has stepped into the shoes of
8 his famous namesake, Sardar Patel. Patel was a
9 close associate of Gandhi in the struggle for
10 independence,but was strongly opposed to the
11 doctrine of piety preached by the Father of the
12 Nation and his steadfast concern for upliftment
13 of the poor.17 So far, however, Modi has not
14 been successful in his appeal to the NRIs to
15 bring their overseas profits back to the state
16 where they were born and bred. It has been
17 made clear to him that a precondition to their
18 willingness to build and run hotels and motels
19 in Gandhi’s homeland would be the repeal of
20 prohibition. Given the huge illegal intake of
21 alcohol in all quarters, that moment may
22 actually not be far off.
23 In the ongoing discussion on the shape and
24 magnitude of the current stagnation in agrarian
25 investment and production, most if not all
26 attention has usually been given to economic
27 factors.I have argued already that an important
28 feature of the crisis is that the main owners of
29 agrarian property are distancing themselves
30 from active farming, a way of life with which
31 they no longer feel comfortable. For totally
32 different reasons the class of agricultural
33 laborers is also turning away from what has
34 been, until now, the primary economic sector.
35 They are being pushed out from cultivating the
36 land because they get neither enough work nor
37 a wage that enables them to satisfy their basic
38 needs. Lack of sufficient employment has
39 reached the point at which the rural landless
40 in south Gujarat cannot be occupationally
41 classified any longer as spending most of their
42 working days in agriculture. What have
43 conventionally been registered as subsidiary
44 sources of income in other sectors of the
45 economy have become the main ones. It boils
46 down to a wide assortment of unskilled jobs,
47 such as digging, hauling, and lifting work,
48 which taxes their bodily strength and stamina
and for which they get a wage not much
higher than that paid by the farmers: in
2005–06, that was Rs 30–40 for eight hours,
and less even than that if their presence was
required for only half a day.
Have the poor become poorer since my
investigations in Gandevigam and Chikhligam
nearly half a century ago? That statement
would be difficult to substantiate if only
because their condition then could hardly have
been worse than the intense misery in which
I found them: steeped in hunger, prone to
illness, having only one set of clothes, without
adequate shelter.As I have already pointed out,
in all these respects some progress has been
made. But today, with a few exceptions, the
Halpatis are still stuck firmly below the poverty
line. It seems that more progress was made in
the 1970s and 1980s than since. The annual
income of most households does not rise above
Rs 15,000–20,000.That means that an average
household of four to five members can spend
at best Rs 50–60 a day on their basic needs,
which is less than 40¢ a day for each of them.
My informants in the landless colonies are not
impressed when I tell them that their parents
and grandparents were even poorer than they
are now.“How does that help us today?” they
reply.“We know it was very bad then but that
does not mean that our condition is much
better now.” They are right of course; they
should not be compared with the indigence of
an earlier generation, but with the highly
visible comfort, if not luxury, in which their
employers live.What they experience is relative
deprivation,an acute awareness that those who
were already much better off in the past have
appropriated most of the fruits of economic
growth.All stakeholders acknowledge that the
cake has become bigger, but the way it is cut
up shows even greater inequity than before.
And why not,is the widely held opinion in the
milieu of those who have become much better
off. They have no problem arguing that the
poor masses are non-deserving because of their
defective way of life.
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JAN B R E MAN

Policies of exclusion comprehensive policy of exclusion that has 1

turned the landless into a new class of 2
While in the past the landless used to live in the untouchables. The deterioration of public 3
shadow of the landowners, who kept a close health care over the last two decades, in the 4
check on their bonded servants, the demise of wake of the drive towards privatization, has 5
the beck-and-call relationship meant that made the Halpatis more vulnerable to disease. 6
having a permanent and abundant supply of Because of the prohibitive cost, they delay 7
agricultural labor had become more of a seeking medical help. Only if the problem 8
nuisance than a comfort. In all the sites of my becomes unbearable do they consult pro- 9
fieldwork the Halpatis were thrown off their fessionals with lower qualifications than the 10
master’s land and became squatters on the doctors,clinics and hospitals frequented by the 11
waste land at the outskirts of the village. As non-poor. Finally, segregation is a prominent 12
already noted, the houses in which they live— feature in seeking access to education. 13
although an improvement on the earlier huts— Although the percentage of Halpati children 14
are small, jerry-built and lack the basic going to school has steadily increased,still only 15
amenities,such as drinking water and drainage, half of them at best complete primary school. 16
which have upgraded the accommodation of A small minority go on to secondary school, 17
the non-poor. Electricity lines reach the but they too tend to drop out after the first few 18
landless colonies but many households cannot standards. If they have become literate, their 19
afford to have a meter installed and pay the ability to read and write soon wanes again 20
price of the two-monthly subscription. The because of lack of practice. By and large, the 21
uneven terrain on which the colonies are built children belonging to the higher castes 22
makes them difficult to access and the kachha continue their education for much longer. 23
(rough) roads leading to the outskirts are not Moreover, the route they follow is different 24
properly maintained, making them difficult to from the very beginning. The school in the 25
walk or ride on, particularly in the monsoon. village is nowadays only attended by the local 26
What I am describing are nothing less than poor. The high-caste parents send their 27
slums. For no good reason at all, this term is children to private schools in town, which are 28
reserved for labeling the settlements in which considered to offer better quality. Apart from 29
the urban poor congregate. Such quarters in better teachers, the return on the investment 30
the countryside may be smaller and somewhat is also growing up in the company of peers 31
less congested,but they are otherwise similar to who share a similar elevated caste–class 32
the deficient habitat of those who live a down- identity. The growing apartheid of the rural 33
and-out existence in the urban milieu. The underclass is the inevitable outcome of a policy 34
inhabitants buy their daily provisions in small of exclusion in all walks of life. 35
shops or gallas, roadside cabins in their own 36
neighborhood which sell a narrow range of 37
commodities, since in terms of both quantity Absence of collective action 38
and quality the customers have to be modest in 39
their purchases.Also in this respect,the contrast To cope with deprivation is a full-time occu- 40
with mainstream society stands out because the pation and most people living precariously 41
non-poor are not shy in demonstrating their do not have much energy left for engaging in 42
ability to consume more and better. All this joint activities leading to redemption from 43
contributes to making the gap in material well- their indigence. I am not suggesting that the 44
being more visible than ever. Halpatis’ way of life comes close to, or actually 45
Living in slums and being constantly is,a culture of poverty.Their behavior is indeed 46
exposed to the deprivations that are inherent marked by improvidence but this is mainly 47
to such a dire existence is only part of a more because the demand for their labor power is 48
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 T H E P O L I T I CA L E C O N O M Y O F AG R A R I A N C H A N G E I N I N D I A
1 intermittent and the employment for which
2 they qualify as unskilled or self-skilled workers
3 is casual rather than regular, and is invariably
4 paid on piece rates at the lowest possible level.
5 Due to a chronic shortage of income many
6 Halpatis have no other option than to ask for
7 payment in advance.They refuse, however, to
8 consider themselves subservient to one or
9 more employers who have bought a claim
10 on their labor power at some later stage.
11 Nevertheless, using debt as an instrument for
12 what I have called practices of neo-bondage
13 adds to the dependency that is a major feature
14 of poverty itself. Resistance against oppression
15 and exploitation is difficult to organize when
16 the supply of labor is structurally so much
17 higher than the demand for it. The vested
18 interests, by way of contrast, face fewer
19 problems in taking a united stand when their
20 domination is challenged.This does not mean
21 that the Halpatis accept with docility the
22 harsh treatment meted out to them. Agrarian
23 relations are fragile as well as tense, and what
24 begins as a quarrel may escalate into a regular
25 fight. I reported on one such incident which
26 began when an agricultural worker was beaten
27 to death to punish him for his impudence.18
28 Strikes do break out every now and then to
29 articulate claims for a higher wage. But they
30 tend to be spontaneous, rather then well
31 planned, usually remain localized instead of
32 spreading to other villages, and are short in
33 duration because the landless have no reserves
34 to live on. Lack of food brings them back to
35 work after only a couple of days,and if this does
36 not happen, the landowners back up their
37 refusal to bargain by bringing in outside labor.
38 It is true that the opening up of the rural
39 economy has made the landless more mobile,
40 but going out of the village or trying to gain
41 access to regular work outside agriculture is
42 not so easy.A proper job is difficult to come by
43 since the eagerly awaited formalization of
44 informal sector employment has not taken
45 place.On the contrary,labor has become firmly
46 informalized in all sectors of the economy.19
47 Instead of changing their occupational profile
48 from agricultural to industrial workers the
landless masses remain footloose, but in a fluid
and already saturated labor market. It is a
workforce without skills, social capital and
political leverage, a reserve army stuck in their
rural slums,pushed out for some time and then
pushed back again.They are fragmented over
a wide range of short-term work niches
and continually rotate among them. The
pretension that they are self-employed in
whatever they do at any moment needs to be
addressed critically.Their mode of employment
is a contractualized and casualized waged labor
relationship,but one which makes it difficult to
unite them in solidarity for concerted action.
Pauperism
Of the many problems I have with the great
debate on poverty, as it is complacently called
by a closed shop of number-crunching eco-
nomists,20 the major one is the fixing of a
highly debatable poverty line and then cluster-
ing together all those who live beneath it as if
they constitute a more or less homogeneous
segment.21 This kind of incomprehension
shows the lack of insight concerning the
various layers of deprivation, ranging below
and above a decent livelihood, and of the
differences among them. The households
inhabiting the rural slums are differentiated
from each other in composition and size as well
as in levels of consumption. Reducing these
variations to average figures would ignore a
range of lifestyles, running from coping with
adversities without being overwhelmed by
them to having lost even minimal control over
the circumstances conditioning one’s life and
giving up the fight for a better existence.
In contrast to the vast amount of literature
on poverty, not much has been written on
pauperism, but this is what strikes the eye
when going around the landless colonies in
the villages of my fieldwork: Gandevigam,
Chikhligam and Bardoligam. It is expressed in
symptoms suggesting that planning for today
or tomorrow, let alone investment in future
well-being,is impossible.Income from work is
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JAN B R E MAN

haphazardly spent without giving priority to of deprivation and discrimination, and reach- 1
the most basic needs, in particular a sufficient ing where they want to be, out of indigence, is 2
and adequate intake of food. Addiction to a long haul. Sliding back proves to be easier 3
drink means that up to a quarter or even half than moving up. 4
of the wages earned is set aside for the purchase 5
of illegally distilled alcohol. Quarrels with 6
neighbors or within the household are a A dangerous class? 7
frequent occurrence.Husband and wife fall out 8
with each other, unable to handle the misery Mass poverty tends to be seen as a political risk 9
in which they find themselves, and because of to the established order.In this line of thinking 10
desertion or neglect children already have to the reserve army of labor does not remain sunk 11
fend for themselves at a very young age. in apathy but can be mobilized for all kinds of 12
Sometimes,the men are unable or unwilling to subversive activities which put the security and 13
be the main providers for their households,but comfort of well-established citizens at risk. It 14
in other cases it is the women who default on has been argued that the threat the restive and 15
their role as caretakers. Outside intervention unwieldy lumpenproletariat posed to political 16
to avoid the situation getting worse is rare. stability was a major reason for giving this 17
Neighbors or relatives are often too much underclass access to mainstream society. To 18
bothered by their own problems to spend time defuse their nuisance value, the poor had to be 19
on mediation or giving support to the victims. given a fair deal and be co-opted into the social 20
“We can’t afford to live and act in solidarity,” security and other benefits which became 21
one of my halpati informants remarked. available.This is why and how, according to de 22
Communal institutions, such as the panch, Swaan, the welfare state came into being 23
which used to play an important role in during the restructuring of western economies 24
maintaining social mores, arranging the from a rural–agrarian to an urban–industrial 25
celebration of religious festivals and settling mode of production.22 Is it possible to discern 26
internal disputes, have disappeared and have such a sobering reappraisal in the code of 27
not been replaced by new conventions conduct of those who are better off and who 28
cementing togetherness in the landless milieu. see themselves not only as the driving force 29
Certainly, there is a section aspiring to achieve of “Shining India” but also as its natural 30
more respectability, to gain in dignity by beneficiaries? Are they genuinely making an 31
demonstrating behavior expressive of the desire effort to divide the spoils of economic progress 32
to belong to mainstream society. Women seem between the haves and the have-nots a in a 33
more than men to be at the forefront of that more balanced way than has been done so far? 34
endeavor. Their ambition is to run a self- In the context of my fieldwork in south 35
contained, well-ordered and sober household, Gujarat I observe a trend in the opposite 36
to avoid abuse or being abused, to live within direction: not a narrowing but a widening of 37
one’s means and not to indulge in con- the gap between the people at the top from 38
sumerism, to encourage their children to get those at the bottom of the heap. 39
educated beyond primary school, to econ- The landowning elite feel neither com- 40
omize on the inevitable rites de passage, to passion nor anxiety about the misery in which 41
consolidate what they have and to reach out the Halpatis live. Incidents do occur, when the 42
for more.Their presence is significant because local landless from the colonies on the outskirts 43
it shows that not all the inhabitants of the attack members of the dominant caste and 44
landless colonies can be classed as lumpen. their property in the village, but these are 45
Having said that,I also want to emphasize that, irregular mishaps which do not escalate into a 46
among the Halpatis, the “deserving poor” are kind of class war,spilling over into neighboring 47
a minority segment.They swim against the tide localities. Moreover, the district police can be 48
332
 T H E P O L I T I CA L E C O N O M Y O F AG R A R I A N C H A N G E I N I N D I A
1 relied on to deal firmly with the mischief
2 makers. How could the landless in their slums
3 challenge the social fabric from which they
4 have been excluded? Or rather, from which
5 they are said to have excluded themselves.
6 Because that is how Anavil Brahmans and
7 Kanbi patidars tend to qualify the subhuman
8 existence of Halpatis. Among those who are
9 better off, the received wisdom is that poverty
10 is the result of a defective way of life. In this
11 view the landless have themselves to blame for
12 remaining stuck in misery. This particular
13 instance of blaming the victims is justified
14 by various kinds of rationalizations, which
15 elaborate on the indolence, irresponsibility,
16 deceit, and malevolence of the Halpatis.
17 These are all traits typically associated with
18 criminality-prone lumpen behavior.I ventured
19 to conclude a short essay on the relevance of
20 the doctrine of social Darwinism with the
21 remark that the relatively low level of tech-
22 nology which characterized the early phase of
23 industrialization in the west ultimately enabled
24 the laboring masses, until then written off as
25 superfluous, to demand to become gainfully
26 and decently employed:
27
28 The industrial reserve army proved to be much
29 more than useless ballast. Schooling put an end
30 to the combination of hidden employment
31 and too low wages. Around the turn of the
32 [nineteenth] century and in the early years of
33 the twentieth century, the poor succeeded in
34 becoming full-fledged participants in the labour
35 process of Western societies and contributed to
36 growth in prosperity. Greater political repre-
37 sentation was a logical outcome of this
38 development.23
39
40 That same transformation does not appear
41 to be the course giving shape and direction to
42 the process of change that is currently under
43 way in large parts of the world. Globalization
44 is not for all those subjected to it a path towards
45 more and better inclusion.
46 Mine is a dismal account, one which I need
47 to qualify on two scores. In the first place, I
48 have not discussed what has happened to the
middle ranks in the countryside of south
Gujarat. My experience, based on recurrent
fieldwork,is that many of these people,holding
some land or other productive assets,have been
able to find somewhat more room for
manoeuver. Having said that I would like to
point out that the trend of change is set by the
two classes at the poles of village society: the
main landowners and the landless.They are at
the forefront when it comes to finding out
who has won and who has lost. Besides, as I
have argued, in figuring out the sum total, the
interdependency of the component parts needs
to be stressed.The misery of the Halpatis can
be understood only by tracing the dynamics
of their subordination to the village elite.
A second qualification which is required
concerns the tricky issue of generalization. I
immediately grant that landless labor elsewhere
in the South Asian subcontinent may have
fared better than the segment of this class in
south Gujarat. There are reliable reports
showing that where members of the rural
proletariat were able to increase their bar-
gaining strength by finding regular employ-
ment in the new industrial workshops or as
construction workers in urban localities,
farmers had no other choice but to raise
agricultural wages in order to motivate at least
part of the workforce to stay on.However,such
success stories must also be seen in a wider
perspective.They cannot be held up either as a
disclaimer to the outcome of my research or as
confirmation that the regional variation
is so enormous that any generalizations are
untenable. My findings are not unique; they
have a relevance which goes beyond the
villages I have closely investigated over a long
period of time.24 Moreover, the condition of
poverty on which I have focused is not caused
by backwardness. Gujarat is one of the fastest-
growing states in the country and the landless
I have been talking about belong to the
heartland of the capitalism that has come to
maturation here. In a new and vibrant stage,
yes, but also ferocious and predatory in its
impact.
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JAN B R E MAN

The retreat of the state and The retreat of the state in keeping a check 1
the urgent need to bring back on how the economy is run has not only 2
public space resulted in a policy of deregulation aimed at 3
repealing a host of restrictions on the free 4
An understated feature in my analysis of the interplay of the forces of production, but has 5
political economy of agrarian change so far also led to an erosion of the public domain. 6
has been the role of the state. In propelling The proponents of this approach maintain that 7
market fundamentalism,which has become the privatization is the ultimate solution and that 8
cornerstone of economic policy, the state the state has no business in poverty alleviation. 9
surrendered the agency it earlier claimed as a People living in that condition have to avail 10
balancing force between the interests of capital themselves of economic incentives which give 11
and of labor. “Inspection raj has gone,” a higher return to their labor power. In this 12
proclaimed Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, perception, appealing to self-interest is the best 13
the head of what is misleadingly called the route to upward mobility and the reward for 14
National Progressive Alliance. His rallying cry heeding that message is crossing the poverty 15
ended all pretension to insist on a minimum line. Nevertheless, in the face of immense 16
wage rate.The market would realize what the misery due to underemployment, low wages, 17
state failed to achieve: to raise more and more failing health or old age,by no means everyone 18
people above the poverty line. Statistics are is convinced by the logic of the free market and 19
its supposed benevolence. In the National 20
being produced to vindicate the righteous
Alliance which is currently (2008) in power at 21
choice made in favor of this most dogmatic
the central level, Congress has been put under 22
brand of free enterprise.In Gujarat,the number
pressure to generate employment by carrying 23
of people below the poverty line has—in state-
out public works, introducing social security 24
produced statistics—plummeted from 41.9
benefits for the more than 90 percent of the 25
percent in 1983 to 14.2 percent in 2004–05.
total labor force working in the informal sector 26
But on the Human Development Index,
of the economy, and upgrading labor standards 27
Gujarat ranks much lower than its official
in order to safeguard workers against hazards to 28
economic record would suggest. Traveling health and well-being. One of the measures 29
around urban and rural Gujarat it takes more suggested under the latter scheme put forward 30
than mere wishful thinking to accept the in a report of the National Commission of 31
government’s claim that the problem of Enterprises in the Unorganized Sector 32
indigence is on the verge of being solved. It (NCEUS), is the introduction of a minimum 33
requires the observer not to look behind the wage.25 The proposal seems to acknowledge 34
Potemkin façade that has been erected. The that the unbridled working of the market needs 35
statistical tally is engineered by sending to be tamed by public action. It is rather naive, 36
instructions from the commanding heights in to put it mildly—after having given in to the 37
the state to the district and subdistrict strong pressure for a thorough informalization 38
authorities not to issue new BPL (below of the economy and endorsing the verdict that 39
poverty line) identity cards and to unregister the formalization of employment is the root 40
households owning some durable assets, thus cause of sustained poverty—to suggest that the 41
taking away their right to buy a monthly food consequences of this policy can be repaired 42
ration at a subsidized price.Poverty has become with state-sponsored regulations that are in 43
a phenomenon which needs to be kept out of stark contrast to the spirit of market 44
sight and out of the government’s bookkeeping. fundamentalism.Paying lip service to the rights 45
Scaling down the size and intensity of misery, of workers and the promise to provide security 46
if not in reality then at least on paper, is part of for them at times of illness or old age may very 47
the “Shining India” operation. well be an electoral ploy. One wonders if the 48
334
 T H E P O L I T I CA L E C O N O M Y O F AG R A R I A N C H A N G E I N I N D I A
1 political will does exist to restore the public
2 domain and bring the state back into the pro-
3 motion of social welfare.My strong reservations
4 about such an emancipatory course of action
5 taking place in south Gujarat are in the last
6 instance based on the fact that the devolution
7 of political power has not been able to break
8 through the closed front of vested interests. In
9 my longstanding fieldwork experience it has
10 remained an exercise in pseudo-democrat-
11 ization.The landowning elite,working hand in
12 glove with the local state bureaucracy, has
13 consistently frustrated attempts to include the
14 rural poor. In a report on one of my field trips
15 a quarter of a century ago,I described what had
16 become of the gram majur kalyan kendra (rural
17 workers’ welfare center) set up by the gov-
18 ernment a few years before.26 These centers are
19 still there, as ineffective as before, and the new
20 welfare schemes are meant to be launched from
21 these nodal points of social action for poverty
22 alleviation. Going by their past performance, it
23 is not so difficult to predict that the outcome
24 will again be negative.
25
26
27 Conclusion
28
29 My conclusion is that, if space is not provided
30 for political empowerment of the rural poor,
31 their inclusion in mainstream society is bound
32 to remain a mere figment of the imagination,
33 nothing but an illusion which may well turn
34 into a fascist nightmare. The doctrine of market
35 fundamentalism and an ingrained ideology of
36 social inequality are a deadly combination. The
37 upshot of that reactionary regime is that the
38 landless caste–class should not be included.
39 From the vantage point of the well-to-do, they
40 get no less and no more than what they deserve:
41 exclusion from a decent existence,leading their
42 lives on the village outskirts and on the margins
43 of the economy.In this chapter,I have expressed
44 my skepticism that a reversal in the trend
45 towards exclusion is in the offing. But what
46 about the long-term perspective for emancipa-
47 tion of the rural underclass? One needs a
48 historicizing mindset to remain hopeful. A
definite step forward was when the Halpatis
managed to find redemption from age old
bondage half a century ago.Mere blinking at an
egalitarian mirage was how D.A.Low summed
up the outcome of the populist interlude in
India and other third world countries during
the second half of the twentieth century.27
Indeed, for large parts of mankind living in
decency and dignity is a faraway dream. But
have the landless in south Gujarat lost all hope
that such a day will come? Monitoring the
milieu at the bottom of the village economy in
the past decades at close quarters, I have found
no symptoms of an internalization of sub-
ordination and a passive acceptance of the
doctrine of inequality.The mood in the rural
slums is sultry, inspired more by sullenness,
resentment, and anguish than by docility. To
be sure, those feelings are not converted into
concerted action. But is it not only after the
event,in retrospect,that the turning point from
disguised resistance to open and more sustained
revolt can be identified?
Notes
1 Government of India, All India Agricultural
Labour Enquiry Report on Intensive Survey of
Agricultural Labour. . ., 1950–51,Vol. 1 (Delhi:
Manager of Publications [MOP], 1955).
2 Daniel Thorner, The Agrarian Prospect in India:
Five Lectures on Land Reform Delivered in 1955 at
the Delhi School of Economics, 2nd edn (Bombay:
Allied, 1976).
3 Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Enquiry into
the Poverty of Nations, Vol. II (New York:
Twentieth Century Fund, 1968), p. 1,375.
4 See Thorner, 1976, pp. 70–71.
5 Walter Hauser ,Sahajanand on Agricultural Labour
and the Rural Poor (Delhi: Manohar, 1994).Also
Walter Hauser, Culture,Vernacular Politics and the
Peasants ( Delhi: Manohar, 2006).
6 See Jan Breman, “The Study of Indian
Industrial Labour in Post-Colonial India,”
in Jonathan Parry et al. (eds),The Worlds of Indian
Industrial Labour (New Delhi: Sage, 2002).
7 Jan Breman, Labour Bondage in West India: From
Past to Present (Delhi: Oxford University Press,
2007), p. 168.
335
JAN B R E MAN

8 Sala, literally brother-in-law, is very commonly latter category is identified as having less than 1
used also as a term of abuse,so the meaning here three-quarters of the amount of the cutoff point 2
is, more or less, “miserable weakling,” but is for the poverty line. 3
really much stronger than that in Hindi and 22 Abram de Swaan, In Care of the State: Health 4
Gujarati. Care,Education and Welfare in Europe and the USA
5
9 I have elaborated on these issues in Breman, in the Modern Era (Cambridge: Polity Press,
6
Labour Bondage. 1988).
10 Jan Breman,Patronage and Exploitation:Changing 23 Jan Breman, “Return of Social Inequality: 7
Agrarian Relations in South Gujarat (Berkeley, A Fashionable Doctrine,” EPW, Vol. 39, 8
CA: University of California Press, 1974). No. 35 (28 August, 2004), p. 3,872. 9
11 Government of Gujarat, Report of the Minimum 24 See Jan Breman, The Poverty Regime in Village 10
Wages Advisory Committee for Employment in India: Half a Century of Work and Life at the 11
Agriculture (Ahmedabad: Government of Bottom of the Rural Economy in South Gujarat 12
Gujarat, 1966). (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2007). Factual 13
12 See “The Agrarian Question in the Struggle for evidence backing up my reading of rural 14
National Independence,” in Breman, Labour dynamics can be found in a large number of 15
Bondage. empirical studies. To name but a few:
16
13 See Jan Breman,“I am the Government Labour Government of India,Ministry of Labour,New
17
Officer,” Economic and Political Weekly [EPW], Delhi, Report of the National Commission on
Vol. 20, No. 24 (15 June, 1985), pp. 1,043–55. Rural Labour,Vols I and II (1991).See also Stuart 18
Reprinted in Jan Breman, Wage Hunters and Corbridge et al., Seeing the State: Governance and 19
Gatherers (Delhi: Oxford University Press, Governmentality in India, Part III The Poor and 20
1994), ch. iv. the State, pp. 219–74; and Barbara Harriss- 21
14 I have seen no reason to change my assessment on White, India Working: Essays on Society and 22
the role played by the HSS after my first critical Economy (Cambridge: University Press, 2003), 23
report in Jan Breman,“Mobilisation of Landless ch. ii; Arun Sinha, Against the Few; Struggles of 24
Labourers; Halpatis of South Gujarat,” EPW, India’s Rural Poor (London: Zed Books, 1991); 25
Vol. 9, No. 12 (23 March, 1974), pp. 489–96. P. Sainath, Everybody Loves a Good Drought; 26
15 This was the theme of my fieldwork in south Stories from India’s Poorest Districts (New Delhi:
27
Gujarat during the last decade of the twentieth Penguin Books, 1996). Specifically on rural
28
century; see Jan Breman, Footloose Labour: labor, see the Special Issue on Rural Labour
Working in India’s Informal Economy (Cambridge: published by the Journal of Peasant Studies, 29
University Press, 1996). Terrence Byres et al. (eds),Vol. 26, Nos 2–3 30
16 Jan Breman, Peasants, Migrants and Paupers: (1999). 31
Capitalist Production and Labour Circulation in West 25 National Commission for Enterprises in the 32
India (Oxford: Clarendon Press and Delhi: Unorganized Sector, Report on Social Security for 33
Oxford University Press, 1985). Unorganized Workers (New Delhi,2006);see also 34
17 See chapters 3 and 4 in Breman,Labour Bondage. Report on Conditions of Work and Promotion of 35
18 Jan Breman,“Silencing theVoice of Agricultural Livelihoods in the Unorganised Sector (New Delhi, 36
Labourers,” in The Labouring Poor in India 2007). 37
(Delhi and Oxford: University Press, 2003), 26 See Jan Breman,“State Protection for the Rural
38
ch. ii. Proletariat,” in Wage Hunters and Gatherers,
39
19 See Jan Breman, “A Question of Poverty,” in ch iv. When I recently paid a visit to one of
Breman, The Labouring Poor, ch. vi. these centers located close to Chikhligam I 40
20 See Angus Deaton and Valerie Kozel (eds), The found that nothing had changed at all.Window 41
Great Indian Poverty Debate (Delhi: Macmillan, dressing is the best way to explain why they 42
2005). have not been closed down. 43
21 The only concession made in part of the 27 D. Anthony Low, The Egalitarian Moment: Asia 44
literature is to separate the poor from the very and Africa 1950–1980 (Cambridge: University 45
poor or destitute, a distinction in which the Press, 1996). 46
47
48
336
 1
2
3
4
23
5
6 Economic development
7
8 and sociopolitical change in
9
10
Sri Lanka since Independence
11
12
13 W. D. Lakshman
14
15
16
17
18
19 Historical backdrop to this production pattern, in which a sub-
20 stantial part of the country’s natural and human
21 The beginnings of the modern economic resources was devoted to export production,
22 history of Sri Lanka are conventionally traced was an excessive dependence on imports, not
23 to the commencement (in the 1840s) of organ- only for manufactured,but also for agricultural
24 ized cultivation of export crops and the related goods. A dominant share of imports consisted
25 development of “modern” trading, transport, of essential food items. Some described the
26 communication, and financial activities under economy at the time, therefore, as an “export–
27 British colonial rule. Based initially on capital import economy.”
28 from Britain, capitalist development in the In the transformation of the system of
29 colony gradually gave rise to a capitalist class colonial rule, there was an experimental stage
30 of domestic origin.1 Workers brought from of “partial self-government” (1931–48).4
31 southern India to work in plantations as The practice of taxing part of the “surplus”
32 indentured labor formed the core of the generated in the export economy and using it
33 working class, which gradually expanded in for social development expenditures of the
34 numbers as well as in terms of trade union government—particularly to expand educa-
35 organization, drawing in workers from other tional and health facilities—was developed
36 growing sectors.2 during this period.5 Among these social
37 The overall result of these developments expenditure programs,the most far reaching—
38 since the beginnings of plantation agriculture and virtually unique in the colonial world—
39 has been the emergence of such conditions in were the free education and free medical
40 Sri Lanka as would make it an export economy facilities programs in relevant governmental
41 par excellence. Around the time of Indepen- institutions. To these social expenditures, a
42 dence in 1948,export earnings formed an esti- program of rationed distribution of certain
43 mated 30 percent of national product according essential food items, like rice at subsidized
44 to the country’s initial national accounting prices, was added during the Second World
45 statistics.3 Three primary commodities—tea, War. These social policy innovations were
46 rubber and coconut—formed more than 95 influenced by a widely prevailing political
47 percent of these exports, with tea alone con- philosophy of social democracy, actively
48 tributing as much as 60 percent.The corollary promoted by a group of Marxist intellectuals

337
W. D . L A KS H M A N

turned politicians, who initiated a vibrant success of export-oriented primary production. 1

socialist movement in the country.6 The The principal symptom of this change, seen 2
resulting sociopolitical and economic state of after the mid-1950s, was the secular deteriora- 3
affairs in the country at Independence was the tion in the country’s commodity terms of trade, 4
Sri Lankan variety of a welfare state. For its namely the ratio of export prices to import 5
sustenance, it depended on continued econo- prices.The deterioration of a country’s terms of 6
mic prosperity of the country and the ability of trade indicates a decline in the amount of 7
the state to tax the well-to-do classes without imports it can purchase with a unit of its 8
adverse effects on their earning capacity. It was exports. The deterioration in these terms 9
not a welfare state system integrally bound to from 1950 = 520 to 1990 = 100 was indeed 10
the system of production, employment and catastrophic.7 Sri Lanka moved in the direction 11
income generation. of import substitution industrialization— 12
Having become used to free services, so common in the rest of the third world 13
subsidies, and handouts from the government, after the Second World War—only about a 14
the electorate had learnt to expect all elected decade after Independence. 15
governments to continue the practice. The 16
majority in the electorate probably had neither 17
the knowledge nor the common sense to be Economic development since 18
concerned about who pays for these services. the late 1970s 19
Political parties contesting elections have 20
developed the practice of pledging more I have examined the character of develop- 21
“welfare” services at election times, to learn— ment Sri Lanka has achieved since political 22
if and when the implementation time came— Independence in some detail in an earlier 23
that the required sources of finance are not easy publication.8 I provide here only a brief sketch 24
to find.This is the sociopolitical foundation for of the development processes during the 25
some of the problems widely discussed during more recent half of the 60-year period since 26
the post-Independence period in relation to Independence, namely the period since 1977 27
development policy,namely,short-term policy when Sri Lanka moved into a package of 28
horizon, lack of long-term consistency in neoliberal economic policies. A violent 29
vision, the electoral policy cycle, sacrifice of separatist movement of ethno-political origin 30
logic and sense to populism in policymaking ran through the most part of this period.It was 31
and so on. spearheaded by a group from the minority 32
Another implication was that the ruling Tamil community – the Liberation Tigers of 33
class, to whom the British transferred the Tamil Elam (LTTE) – which gradually evolved 34
responsibility of managing Sri Lankan affairs into a fascistic-terrorist outfit* of significant 35
after their departure and the members of which domestic and international influence. This 36
were elected to governmental power in the rebellion was eventually put down and the 37
immediate aftermath of Independence, was LTTE annihilated by the country’s armed 38
enamored with the socioeconomic results of forces through a military campaign ending 39
colonial policy experience, that is to say, rea- on 18 May, 2009.This defeat of the LTTE is 40
sonably successful economic growth based on likely to become a critical watershed in post- 41
export-oriented primary production together Independence Sri Lankan history, opening up 42
with impressive state-engineered human as it does great opportunities for accelerated 43
development. These governments did not national development. 44
consider it prudent to change track. Economic Economic growth in Sri Lanka, in terms of 45
policy began to change only when post-war real GDP or real GDP per capita, in the first 46
world market conditions began to change, three decades after Independence was consis- 47
producing forces inimical to the continued tent but slow.Because of sluggishness in its rate 48
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 E C O N O M I C D E V E LO P M E N T A N D S O C I O P O L I T I CA L C H A N G E I N S R I L A N K A
1 of expansion, a number of Asian countries,
2 formerly at similar or lower standing, have
3 surpassed Sri Lanka economically.9 Great
4 concern has been expressed in many circles
5 about this relative stagnation of the country.
6 Moving into a regime of neoliberal policies in
7 the late 1970s was motivated—aside from the
8 ideological predilections of those in power—
9 by a desire to accelerate economic growth.Yet
10 Sri Lanka’s performance in terms of long-term
11 economic growth even under neoliberal
12 policies has been lackluster, significantly less
13 than in what the World Bank calls “high per-
14 forming economies” in Asia.10 Growth during
15 this period,contrary to expectations,was never
16 higher than 8.2 percent per annum—that too
17 in one single year (1978), soon after liberal-
18 ization of the economy, perhaps indicating an
19 element of “beginner’s luck.”11 The period
20 average of the growth rate was substantially
21 lower at 5.0 percent during the entire period
22 of 1978–2008. In the sub-periods 1978–87,
23 1988–97, and 1998–2008, the average growth
24 rates were respectively 5.2,4.8,and 5.0 percent.
25 The average growth rate of the last-mentioned
26 sub-period would have been higher if not for
27 negative growth (–1.6) recorded in 2001.
28 Growth rate remained above 6 percent after
29 2005.
30 This lackluster growth scenario reflects the
31 working of a complex array of underlying eco-
32 nomic, technological, social, and political
33 factors.These constraints have been reflected in
34 some important imbalances, leading often
35 to serious short-term instability as well as
36 imposing limits on long-term economic
37 growth. Capital formation as a proportion of
38 GDP,lower than in many fast growth countries
39 in East and Southeast Asia, was nevertheless
40 significantly higher than the domestic saving
41 ratio. For example, in 2008 these two ratios
42 were respectively 28 and 14 percent. In almost
43 every year during this period, domestic savings
44 fell short of investment, making the country
45 heavily dependent on “foreign” savings (from
46 foreign aid, foreign direct investments and
47 remittances from migrant workers) to maintain
48 the higher rate of investment. Two related
imbalances in the system have been observed in
the balance of payments and the government
budget. The current account deficit in the
balance of payments (as percent of GDP)
averaged –5.5 percent during 1978–2008 and
ranged between –0.4 percent in 2003 and –16.4
percent in 1980. The budget deficit averaged
10.9 percent of GDP during 1978–2008 and
ranged between 7.5 percent in 1999 and 23.1
percent in 1980.These savings,current account,
and budget deficits have figured prominently
in the country’s macroeconomic management
over almost the entirety of the last three
decades, making the movement on to a higher
growth trajectory problematic and difficult.
The modest economic growth of this period
was coupled with considerable structural
change.The share of primary (agricultural and
related) activities in the economy has declined
substantially to reach 13 percent of GDP in
2008.Their contribution to total employment
in 2008 was 33 percent indicating,among other
things, the relatively low productivity, on
average, of those engaged in primary activities.
These numbers for 2008, compared to a 30
percent GDP proportion for 1978 and a 53
percent employment proportion for 1978–
79,12 are indicative of substantial declines in
relevant percentages. The peculiarity of the
pattern of structural change in Sri Lanka,
considering the fact that the country is still at a
low level of economic attainment, is that the
declining agriculture share was offset not so
much by a rising industry/manufacturing
share13 but by a substantial increase in the share
of the services sector. In 2008, the share of
services in GDP was 57 percent.These services
included highly remunerative activities like
banking, financial, and IT services, not so well
paid but quite secure jobs in government
administration, and rather poorly remunerated
personal services.
Another important aspect of structural
change is reflected in shifts in the composition
of foreign trade. The significance of the trio
of agricultural exports—tea, rubber, and
coconut—has declined drastically, from 77
percent in 1978 to 19 percent in 2008.Their
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proportional drop was offset by a rise in a lesser extent than in the 1970s. Extensive 1
industrial exports (76 percent in 2008) among unemployment,often of long duration,among 2
which textiles and garments occupy the key the educated youth has proved to be extremely 3
position.The share of textiles and garments— destabilizing socially and politically. 4
4 percent in 1978 and 43 percent in 2008—is An unemployment rate of around 5 percent 5
only a few percentage points less than the 49 is historically the lowest recorded in Sri Lanka 6
percent share of tea in 1978. In terms of the since the beginnings of the practice of 7
extent of commodity concentration of exports, collecting detailed employment-related data 8
Sri Lanka has been transformed from its “tea from the late 1960s when the labor force and 9
country” position to a “garments country” socioeconomic survey of 1969–70 was con- 10
position.The increase in export values and the ducted.15 Allowing for frictional unemploy- 11
significant structural transformation of exports ment,16 an unemployment rate of 5 percent 12
over time have not been sufficient to meet the may be interpreted as a condition very close to 13
growing import needs of people and pro- full employment. Whatever it may be, the 14
duction sectors. The entire period of three production contribution of a large proportion of 15
previous decades was characterized by large the employed can be expected to have been very 16
annual trade deficits. In 2008 this was as large small.Several points may be noted in this regard. 17
as 14.4 percent of GDP.Commodity composi- First, given the stage of development of the 18
tion of imports too changed. The proportion country, self-employment or own account 19
of consumer goods in total imports declined. work has always been a major source of 20
This decline was compensated almost fully by employment for Sri Lankan workers. Own 21
a corresponding increase in the share of inter- account workers as a percentage of total 22
mediate goods. The proportion of investment employment during 1990–2007 ranged 23
goods in the total has remained virtually between 25 and 31 percent. The relevant 24
constant. The import proportion of inter- percentages for male workers were 30 and 35. 25
mediate goods, with petroleum and textiles Under neoliberal policies, both governmental 26
occupying large individual shares,was as high as and non-governmental organizations have 27
62 percent in 2008. actively promoted self-employment.The bulk 28
The pattern of economic growth and struc- of the self-employment opportunities opened 29
tural change appears to have been “employ- up are likely to have been subsistence/survival- 30
ment friendly,” perhaps because of pressures type activities of low productivity. 31
emanating from prevailing sociopolitical Second, since 2005—after a period of 32
forces.The rate of unemployment had its ups restrictions on recruitments to public service— 33
and downs during the last three decades, but tens of thousands of relatively more educated 34
since around 1990 its trend has been youth have been recruited to government 35
downward—from around 15–16 percent in service, already known for its overstaffing 36
the early 1990s to 5.2 percent in 2008.As has problems. The expansion of employment in 37
been normal in Sri Lanka, the unemployment public administration, and often also in state- 38
rate has been higher for women than for men, owned enterprises, is likely to have added to 39
for the young (15–24 years of age) members of “underemployed” full-time workers, implying 40
the labor force than for the older (above 25 that the service delivery could be maintained, 41
years of age) members and for the more both in quantity and quality terms, with 42
educated than for the less educated. The substantially lower employment numbers. 43
pattern of distribution of the unemployed, Third, a very large proportion of total 44
described by the International Labor Office employment—this time too in the public 45
(ILO) in 197114 as indicating a structural sector—comes from the armed services.This is 46
mismatch between aspirations and available the legacy of the 30-year armed conflict with 47
opportunities,continues to prevail,although to the LTTE, which ended on 18 May, 2009. 48
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1 The armed forces are likely to continue as a
2 large employer for some more years to come
3 as, for purposes of national security, those
4 recruited at the time of armed conflict are
5 retained in service together with a significant
6 number of new recruits. The government
7 continues to be concerned about the threats to
8 security coming from remaining elements of
9 the LTTE, from both within and outside Sri
10 Lanka.The production contribution of armed
11 forces, at the time of armed conflict, would
12 have been at best dubious.17 At the present
13 time with hard-earned peace, however, the
14 armed forces personnel are increasingly being
15 used in numerous developmental projects,
16 inaddition to their normal national-security-
17 related responsibilities, particularly in the
18 formerly LTTE-controlled areas in the north
19 and the east of the country .
20 To summarize,the average rate of economic
21 growth has been around five percent per
22 annum over the last three decades and the
23 economy has moved gradually toward virtual
24 full employment conditions.Yet, as the average
25 productivity of a large proportion of workers
26 in employment has remained low, total pro-
27 duction in the country is most likely to have
28 been less than potential. Given the political
29 economy conditions as described earlier, the
30 sharing of whatever was produced came to be
31 determined partly in markets and partly in the
32 political system.Market forces under neoliberal
33 policies, as elsewhere in the world, have pro-
34 duced conditions that favor a heavy concentra-
35 tion of incomes and wealth in the hands of the
36 rich classes—owners and managers of capital
37 and large land holdings, holders of remunera-
38 tive positions, and so on. The structural
39 transformations observed in the last three
40 decades have also produced a change in activity
41 areas from which the country’s wealthy have
42 accumulated their riches. Many of those who
43 became rich through large land holdings and
44 plantations in a different era continued to wield
45 power, but the richest stratum in the country
46 during the last three decades has come from
47 activity areas like banking and finance,export-
48 oriented manufacturing (e.g., garments), and
trade.18 Investments in the private sector
providers of social services like health and
education are also seen as sources of wealth for
the rich classes. Those who could exercise
power over markets,due to large market shares
controlled by them, have accumulated more.
The political mechanism, as it operated in Sri
Lanka, has added an additional dimension to
this market-led process of income and wealth
concentration. The politically powerful and
their helpers and cronies,often in collaboration
with the bureaucracy, used their political/
administrative clout to gain financially from
income- and wealth-generating processes in
the country. They gained in numerous ways.
Undue personal gains have been made in the
execution of tenders involving construction or
purchase contracts in government-funded
projects. Going by intelligent guesswork and
“whistleblowers” in the system, the practice of
commission-taking and bribery has been
rampant among the politically and bureau-
cratically powerful elements. There have also
been many cases of bribery investigated and
proven against,normally,lower level officials in
bribery commission investigations but only a
very few against the powerful.The politically
powerful have indeed become a very rich
stratum in society alongside owners and
managers of capital and land.
Coupled with relatively slow economic
growth and the economy remaining at less than
its production potential, there has been signi-
ficant social change. Society, including com-
munities in areas rather remote from the
metropolis, has been subject to varying degrees
of globalization influences.The spread of mass
communication facilities,particularly television,
and the extensive phenomenon of migration
of domestic workers to foreign countries have
been significant factors in this social trans-
formation. The preponderance of women in
household service jobs abroad constitutes a
major element in this labor migration phenom-
enon. During the time of the armed conflict
with the LTTE, people in the affected areas of
the north and the east were, to a large extent,
cut off from globalization influences.Yet large
341
W. D . L A KS H M A N

numbers of people have migrated abroad from services free of charge—e.g., water supply 1
these areas, not completely severing their links for domestic use—was abandoned, but free 2
with kith and kin left behind. education and free health services (in relevant 3
The important point here is that people public sector institutions) have been retained,in 4
in Sri Lanka, including the relatively not so spite of discussions at policymaking levels about 5
well-to-do, were aware of what they were the need for charging user fees.19 Various 6
missing in terms of basic necessities of life that populist measures have been introduced to 7
are available in more affluent societies. The satisfy the electorate—for example, “poverty 8
influence this awareness has had on people’s alleviation programs”—although at the 9
aspirations has obviously been strong. The implementation level these have often failed to 10
prevailing high level of literacy and relatively reach the stated goals. Subsidies on consumer 11
high school participation rates at all primary, essentials as well as for weaker production 12
junior secondary and senior secondary levels sectors like agriculture were also implemented. 13
have strengthened the process of social change, As noted, the combined operation of the 14
particularly those arising out of growing market and political mechanisms has made the 15
aspirations. There was, furthermore, the rich richer. According to data from the 16
experience gained by many people at even low Consumer Finances Surveys of the Central 17
income levels from participation in various Bank, the Gini coefficient for spending units 18
social movements—village-level voluntary has increased during the period of neoliberal 19
associations, electoral processes, trade unions policy reforms from 0.35 in 1973 to 0.46 in 20
and political protests. The experience in the 2003–04.The ratio of the income share of the 21
exercise of universal adult franchise at national highest quintile to that of the lowest changed 22
and subnational level elections for as many as from nine times in 1973 to 14 times in 23
75 years and that of changing governments 2003–04.20 Suspicion has often been expressed 24
through ballot on many occasions have perhaps concerning whether the poor actually gained 25
given a sense of power to the electorate, from programs maintained ostensibly for their 26
although this would have been deceptive when benefit. But these programs were anyway 27
taken out of the context of distribution of real offered mainly to satisfy these classes in order to 28
power in the society. win their support at elections and to gain their 29
The point to be highlighted is that all this acquiescence to maintain relative social peace. 30
has added another dimension to the process of In the multiethnic Sri Lankan society, these 31
contest for a share of the available resources and policies worked fairly satisfactorily most of the 32
opportunities. Ordinary people do not have time in regions dominated by the majority 33
any organizational or other power to influence community, the Sinhalese.21 This was not so in 34
markets in their favor. But over the years, they regions—northern and eastern—dominated 35
have learnt to use the available political by the principal minority communities of the 36
mechanisms to gain and retain economic and country. The armed separatist struggle in 37
social benefits provided by government. these regions, led by the LTTE had many 38
Without this political mechanism, these social causes. The failure of market and political 39
welfare benefits would have been denied to or mechanisms to provide a fair deal to the 40
withdrawn from them. country’s north and east appears to have been 41
In spite of the plea from Washington a major causal factor. The strong bias of 42
institutions advising the government to reduce neoliberal policies toward regional inequality 43
the scale of government activities, domestic is widely known.The Western Province,22 with 44
political compulsions have been such that Sri a population share of 29 percent, produces as 45
Lanka has retained much of the social welfare much as half of the GDP.Of the nine provinces 46
network built up over the years,even at the cost in the country, the market mechanism has left 47
of large budget deficits. Provision of certain several underdeveloped but the political 48
342
 E C O N O M I C D E V E LO P M E N T A N D S O C I O P O L I T I CA L C H A N G E I N S R I L A N K A
1 mechanism operated to lessen the disadvant-
2 ages suffered by those provinces dominated by
3 the Sinhalese community. Several special
4 programs were implemented to ease the degree
5 of regional underdevelopment there. The
6 political mechanism, however, did not operate
7 so favorably within the Northern and Eastern
8 Provinces. The people in these provinces,
9 particularly the Tamils, voted mostly for
10 political groups which stood against the ruling
11 party in the central administration on many
12 key issues.The government has therefore taken
13 very little action of positive discrimination in
14 favor of people in these regions.
15
16
17 Constitutional and political
18 processes
19
20 Sri Lanka gained political Independence
21 in 1948 after four-and-a-half centuries of
22 European colonialism:Portuguese,Dutch,and
23 British. The Independence movement, not
24 as intensively carried out as, for example, in
25 India, reached its goals largely on the basis of
26 negotiations between the British government
27 and the politically prominent elites in Sri
28 Lanka. In this process, at the last stages of
29 British colonial rule, in 1931, the people in Sri
30 Lanka were introduced to the principle of
31 electing their “rulers” through universal adult
32 franchise.This was perhaps an experiment on
33 the part of the British government at the time
34 as there was hardly any concerted agitation
35 locally for universal adult franchise. At Inde-
36 pendence, in any case, the adult population of
37 Sri Lanka had already gained the experience
38 of exercising their voting right for the election
39 of legislators over a period of 15 years.
40 Independent rule commenced with a
41 Westminster-type of parliamentary and cabinet
42 government. Sri Lankan elites at the time
43 opted for dominion status within the British
44 Commonwealth, with the British monarch as
45 the head of state represented by an appointed
46 governor-general. The prime minister, com-
47 manding a majority in the lower house in the
48 bicameral parliament, was the executive head
of government.The constitutional changes of
1972 had introduced a republican constitution
with an appointed president as head of state.
The parliamentary/cabinet system of govern-
ment was, however, retained. In a second far-
reaching constitutional reform in 1978, a
presidential system of government was intro-
duced, with an elected president as both head
of state and government. Under this constitu-
tion, the president enjoys enormous con-
stitutional power.The electoral system too was
changed from an electorate-based system of
electing candidates on the first-past-the-post-
principle to a district-based system of propor-
tional representation.
Until 1987, Sri Lanka had a highly
centralized form of government. Responding
to Tamil demands for self-government and
pressures exercised at the time by the Indian
government, a system of provincial councils
(PCs) was introduced in 1987 in a significant
amendment to the constitution.The purpose
was to introduce an element of devolution of
power. Within the country’s highly centralized
political culture, however, the system of PCs
has so far failed to devolve powers significantly.
The center has been hesitant to give up its
powers to PCs and PCs also were not agitating
strongly enough to win over what is their
constitutional right. To make matters worse,
the center has systematically encroached into
even the areas of jurisdiction entrusted to PCs
by the 1987 constitutional amendment.23
However, when compared to the failures of
many postcolonial states to retain representa-
tive forms of government, the maintenance of
a system of representative democracy for over
half a century in Sri Lanka, under the trying
conditions of overall sociopolitical and eco-
nomic underdevelopment, extensive armed
conflict, and increasing militarization of
society, is remarkable.Yet, shortcomings in the
exercise of electoral democracy have become
quite prominent in more recent times such that
discussions today would often highlight these
negative elements, neglecting the positive
achievements of Sri Lankan democracy. The
practice of politics is a contest for power.
343
W. D . L A KS H M A N

The character of participants in this contest at ficantly to 15 percent by 2006/07 – the latest 1
the leadership level, the manner in which year of data availability.The inequality in the 2
this contest is carried out, and the rules of the distribution of incomes and wealth, however, 3
game guiding the contestants have undergone remains, with the poverty ratio also varying 4
significant change over time. In early post- significantly as between different regions and 5
Independence times, persons who had already social segments. Sociopolitical forces, which 6
achieved elite status in society through birth, generated the Sri Lankan welfare state, were 7
wealth, or education prevailed in the political also referred to earlier. The superior human 8
contest for power. In more recent times, the development record of Sri Lanka, in terms of 9
practice of politics has become a path to such measures as the Physical Quality of Life 10
achieve elite status in society. In contrast to the Index (PQLI) and the Human Development 11
past,when many who came to practice politics Index (HDI) and various disaggregated social 12
were interested in social/national service,today indicators, amidst relatively low per capita 13
many in politics appear to use political power income conditions, has received attention in 14
to accumulate personal wealth.After a couple the development literature for about four 15
of violent anti-state movements,the society has decades.25 Life expectancy at birth at around 16
achieved in May 2009 conditions of relative 73 years,a population proportion of 93 percent 17
peace. Law and order situation and conditions with access to health services, an adult literacy 18
of human security have improved tremen- rate of 96 percent, an infant mortality rate of 19
dously. An element of the process of mili- 16 per 1,000 live births, primary school 20
tarization of society that operated during the enrolment rate of 98 percent are some of these 21
time of civil war 24 may prevail for some more human development achievements at a per 22
time.As a result of conflict-laden conditions of capita GNP of US $1,969. This is the 23
the last three decades, electoral politics too has foundation of the well-known Sri Lankan 24
become characterized by extensive use of policy achievement in terms of social indica- 25
violence. With transparency and accountability tors, often described as the country’s “outlier 26
becoming less highly valued in the use of status” in inter-country comparisons. At a 27
political power,issues of poor governance have relatively low level of economic attainment in 28
come to be highlighted by many domestic and terms of per capita income, Sri Lankans have 29
international commentators on Sri Lankan come to enjoy a level of human development 30
politics. There is, unfortunately, no simple corresponding to substantially higher income 31
formula to strengthen practices of good levels. It may be also noted that Sri Lanka has 32
governance, in the same way as there is no either already achieved or on target to achieve 33
simple formula and short cut to sustainable and the bulk of the Millennium Development 34
balanced development. Goals (MDG).26 Also noted in this literature is 35
the lower relative inequality in distribution of 36
income until about the end of the 1970s.The 37
Human development significant tendency toward income and 38
wealth concentration during the three recent 39
The operation of market and political mechan- decades of neo liberal policies has already been 40
isms of allocation,discussed earlier,has brought noted. 41
about important socioeconomic transforma- “Social indicators,” being aggregative in 42
tions, producing distinct and notable changes nature,have their weaknesses and limitations as 43
in the quality of life of ordinary people. measures of living conditions of ordinary 44
Absolute poverty for the whole country, people. Averages do hide distributional in- 45
measured by the familiar headcount ratio, equalities. It was through different types of 46
was at or above 23 percent in the preceeding “public action,” sometimes complementary to 47
quarter century but had come down signi- market forces, and sometimes contradictory, 48
344
 E C O N O M I C D E V E LO P M E N T A N D S O C I O P O L I T I CA L C H A N G E I N S R I L A N K A
1 that the country managed to achieve this outlier
2 status in terms of human development achieve-
3 ments. A significant factor to be noted in this
4 regard is the relative equality of the status of
5 men and women in terms of these human
6 development achievements.There has also been
7 substantial upward mobility in society, a
8 consequence of education, coupled with hard
9 work and good fortune. All this is indicative
10 of the social democratic directions in which the
11 contest for resources and opportunities has
12 been resolved in political and market processes.
13
14
15 Conclusion
16
17 As noted,Sri Lanka’s per capita income in 2008
18 was US $1,969. Over the last several years it
19 has been grouped into the “lower middle
20 income” category of countries in the World
21 Bank country classification.It has been under-
22 going a process of economic liberalization over
23 the last three decades. Although the main
24 objective behind liberalization has been to
25 accelerate economic progress, the rate of
26 economic growth during this period averaged
27 a moderate five percent. As has happened so
28 often elsewhere, the neoliberal policy package
29 has led to increased inequality in both income
30 distribution and regional development. The
31 poverty head count ratio, however, had come
32 down to 15 percent in 2006/7. This is the
33 lowest level to which the poverty headcount
34 ratio has dropped since regular computation of
35 poverty statistics began in the 1980s.
36 Yet Sri Lanka stands out among develop-
37 ing countries for its high average levels of
38 human development,whether measured by the
39 HDI or by social indicators taken separately.
40 Sri Lanka is ranked among countries with
41 “medium human development” in terms of
42 HDI. Its HDI ranking has consistently been
43 higher, that is to say, better than its GDP per
44 capita ranking. It has been described as an
45 outlier in intercountry comparisons of social
46 indicators vis-à-vis per capita GDP levels.
47 The argument in this chapter has been that
48 Sri Lanka’s superior performance in terms
of human development has been largely a
consequence of public action intervening in
market processes.
It was argued earlier that the unusual results
of the development process in Sri Lanka have
occurred through a combined operation of
two mechanisms, which determined resource
allocation and income distribution patterns,
namely, the market mechanism and the
political mechanism.Patterns of allocation and
distribution result from a contest among
different social groups and different economic
activities for available opportunities,resources,
and benefits. These contests are resolved
through both markets and the political system.
Distribution no doubt favored the rich but
welfare-oriented public action has persisted
because of the pressures of a politically con-
scious electorate. People seem to treat certain
welfare services provided by the state free of
charge as part of their fundamental rights.The
best examples in this sense are educational and
health services provided by the state free of
charge for those who care to use them. The
government too has come to view these social
welfare expenditures as indispensable to secure
and maintain social peace, an essential
prerequisite for the achievement of accelerated
economic growth.
Notes
* The editor does not agree with this designation
for the Tamil Tigers.
1 Kumari Jayawardena, Nobodies to Somebodies:
The Rise of the Colonial Bourgeoisie in Sri Lanka
(Colombo: Social Scientists Association and
Sanjiva Books, 2007); S. B. D. De Silva, The
Political Economy of Underdevelopment (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982); Donald R.
Snodgrass, Ceylon: An Export Economy in
Transition (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin,
1966).
2 Kumari Jayawardena, The Rise of the Labor
Movement in Ceylon (Colombo: Sanjiva Books,
2004).
3 Since the economic product of many “tradi-
tional” sectors of the economy is likely to have
been significantly underestimated, this export
345
W. D . L A KS H M A N

percentage would overestimate the contemporary Expectations: A Programme of Action for Ceylon: 1
contribution of exports to national product. Report (Geneva: ILO, 1971). 2
4 This was perhaps a unique experience in the 15 Sri Lanka Government, Department of Census 3
entire British colonial history. People in Sri and Statistics (DCS), Socio-economic Survey of 4
Lanka were given the right of universal adult Sri Lanka, 1969/70 (Colombo: DCS, 1971). 5
suffrage and a system of government in which 16 Due to normal institutional rigidities in an
6
seven out of the ten members in the executive— economy, a person laid off by one employer has
the board of ministers—came from elected to remain temporarily unemployed until he/
7
representatives in the state council. The other she finds a job with another employer. Such 8
three ministers were British government officials. unemployment is called frictional unemploy- 9
5 Patricia Alailima, “The Human Development ment. 10
Perspective,” in W. D. Lakshman and C. A. 17 The usual argument would be that armed forces 11
Tisdell (eds), Sri Lanka’s Development Since do not contribute to production. I formulated 12
Independence: Socio-economic Perspectives and my argument as in the text because when areas 13
Analyses (New York: Nova Science, 2000). have been freed,even partially,from “terrorism” 14
6 Y. Ranjith Amarasinghe, Revolutionary Idealism through the efforts of armed forces, there is an 15
and Parliamentary Politics: A Study of Trotskyism indirect contribution to production,as produc- 16
in Sri Lanka (Colombo: Social Scientists tion workers would begin to use those regions
17
Association, 1998). for agricultural and other productive activities.
7 By 1990, the trade pattern had undergone 18 The website wiki.answers.com/Q/Who_is_
18
substantial change. Sri Lanka became a deve- the_richest_person_in_Sri_Lanka indicates 19
loping country exporting manufactured goods. names of richest individuals/families in diffe- 20
Terms of trade movements after this year, more rent periods. Names like Maharajahs, Lalith 21
complex than before, are not taken up for Kotalawala, Sohli Captain, Anthony Page, and 22
comment here. H. K. Dharmadasa are mentioned in this con- 23
8 W. D. Laksham and C. A. Tisdell (eds), Sri nection for the 1990s, and Harry Jayawardena, 24
Lanka’s Development since Independence: Socio- Dhammika Perera,Amaleans, and Selvanathans 25
economic Perspectives and Analyses (New York: for the 2000s. These individuals and families 26
Nova Science, 2000), pp. 1–10. have accumulated their wealth in the activity 27
9 W. D. Laksham (ed.), Dilemmas of Development: areas mentioned in the text.
28
Fifty Years of Economic Change in Sri Lanka 19 The comment must be added that because of
(Colombo: Sri Lanka Association of certain elements of the neoliberal package,shifts
29
Economists, 1997), pp. 13–16. in budget allocations took place leading to 30
10 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic significant modifications in the free supply of 31
Growth and Public Police (Oxford: University education and health services in the public 32
Press, 1993), p. 21. sector. There is no space here for details. 33
11 W. D. Lakshman,“State Policy in Sri Lanka and 20 To save space the data from the surveys for 34
its Economic Impact 1970–85: Selected 1978–79,1981–82,1986–87,and 1996–97 have 35
Themes with Special Reference to Distributive not been cited here. 36
Implications of Policy,” Upanathi,Vol. 1, No. 1 21 Even with the majority community it did not 37
(January 1986), p. 21. work so well in the second half of the 1980s 38
12 Central Bank of Ceylon, Report on Consumer when there were increasingly violent protests
39
Finances and Socio Economic Survey 1981/82 Sri from among its members against the regime in
power.
40
Lanka (Colombo: Central Bank of Sri Lanka,
1984),Table 4.18, p. 136. 22 The Western Province consists of three 41
13 Industry share in 2006 was 27 percent and that Districts—Colombo, Gampaha, and Kalutara. 42
of manufacturing 16 percent.The relevant 1977 Commercial and adminnistrative capitals of 43
proportions were,respectively,29 and 17 percent. the country, as well as most large industrial 44
The national accounting data for the two years, and service enterprises are located in these 45
however, are of doubtful comparability. districts. 46
14 International Labour Organisation (ILO), 23 Asoka Gunawardena and Weligamage D. 47
Matching Employment Opportunities and Lakshman, “Challenges of Moving into a 48
346
 E C O N O M I C D E V E LO P M E N T A N D S O C I O P O L I T I CA L C H A N G E I N S R I L A N K A

1 Devolved Polity in Sri Lanka,” in Fumihiko Jayawardena,“Sri Lanka,”in H.B.Chenery et al.

2 Saito (ed.), Foundations for Local Governance: (eds), Redistribution with Growth (London:
3 Decentralization in Comparative Perspective Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 273–79.
4 (Heidelberg:Physica-Verlag,2008),pp.113–36. Amartya K. Sen,“Public Action and Quality of
24 Neloufer De Mel,Militarizing Sri Lanka:Popular Life in Developing Countries,” Oxford Bulletin
5
Culture, Memory and Narrative in the Armed of Economics and Statistics,Vol. 43, No. 4 (1981).
6
Conflict (New Delhi: Sage, 2007). 26 United Nations, ECOSOC, National
7 25 Paul Isenman, “Basic Needs: The Case of Development Strategies and Commitments to
8 Sri Lanka,” World Development, Vol. 8, No. 3 Achieve the Internationally Agreed Development
9 (March 1980), pp. 237–58; W. D. Lakshman, Goals, Including Millennium Development Goals:
10 “Economic Growth and Re-distributive Justice Sri Lanka National Report, Report No.
11 as Policy Goals: A Study of the Recent E/2009/111. Available at the following web-
12 Experience of Sri Lanka,” in Modern Ceylon site:www.un.org/ecosoc/newfunct/amrnational
13 Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1975), pp. 64–87; Lal 2009.shtml.
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6 The militaries of South Asia
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10 Stephen P. Cohen
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19 Introduction militaries,may be given official or semi-official
20 status in the future.
21 South Asia contains some of the largest and This chapter focuses on the origins and roles
22 most important military organizations in the of the three major subcontinental armies—
23 world today. The Indian Army is the world’s India,Pakistan,and Bangladesh—and in passing
24 second largest, Pakistan’s is the world’s sixth, discusses other South Asian forces.2 While
25 and both countries have a growing stock of their roles in politics will be emphasized (in the
26 nuclear weapons.1 The Bangladesh Army is Indian case, the absence of such a role is not-
27 active in UN peacekeeping activities and plays able),it should be borne in mind that all armies
28 an important political role in that country, are complex state bureaucracies that perform
29 although not as great as that of the Pakistan several functions. Their stated purpose is to
30 Army, which has directly or indirectly domi- apply force in a war against a foreign enemy, or
31 nated Pakistan for more than half of its 60-year to use force at home to maintain law and order.
32 history. Yet South Asia’s armies (far more than its air
33 While these three armies have much in forces or navies) have a complex relationship
34 common—notably a shared origin in the to their respective societies, especially to their
35 British Indian Army—the subcontinent is many ethnic, caste, and linguistic groups.They
36 home to other military forces with divergent may also play a role in decision making, and
37 beginnings. These include the navies and air their budgets are often the state’s single largest
38 forces of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, the expenditure.Finally,militaries (again,especially
39 three Sri Lankan services, and importantly, armies) often play a role in shaping both state
40 because of their political role and rapid growth and national identities.
41 over the last 20 years, South Asia’s many
42 paramilitary organizations. The latter include
43 both government forces and the proto-armies British roots
44 of numerous separatist, terrorist, and auto-
45 nomist groups. One such non-state military Over a nearly 200-year period, the British
46 force, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam evolved a military structure in India to serve
47 (LTTE) of Sri Lanka,challenged the state itself, their own purposes.At first this was to establish
48 and others, such as Nepal’s Maoist para- control over the territories they ruled directly

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and indirectly. Later, as part of a larger imperial regimental system is evident in the comparison 1
project, the British deployed Indian-based between Gurkha units in the British and 2
forces throughout Asia and Europe which Indian armies and those in the Royal Nepal 3
played a critical role in both world wars.This Army,which have proved militarily ineffective, 4
structure and these policies have shaped the as seen in their recent failure to take the field 5
present-day armies of India, Pakistan, and against Maoist insurrectionists. 6
Bangladesh. The British also saw to it that each ethno- 7
The first building block in the construction linguistic class was balanced by a social rival. 8
of the British Indian Army was the “sepoy” All Indian units were also balanced by British 9
system. The first regiment of what was to forces,which retained control over artillery,the 10
evolve into the Indian army was raised in 1748 era’s most advanced military technology.8 The 11
by Colonel Stringer Lawrence.3 Ironically, the railways,built with an eye towards the strategic 12
idea was borrowed from the French, then the unification of the subcontinent more than its 13
leading European rival to Britain in India.4 economic development, were also placed in 14
The sepoys (derived from the Persian sipahii; the hands of a loyal Anglo-Indian community. 15
after Independence they were renamed jawan, The one class that did not have its own 16
or youth) were drawn from rural and tribal regiment was Muslims. During both world 17
India, and trained along modern, professional wars, Punjabi Muslims were the largest single 18
lines under the command of British officers. class recruited to the army. Fearing another 19
Sepoys were recruited on the basis of merit and uprising, the British dispersed their Muslim 20
some were often as professionally competent as soldiers among regional regiments, such as the 21
the officers of the British Army. This system Punjab Regiment, where they were balanced 22
allowed the British to raise large and loyal by Sikh and Hindu soldiers.Today, the Indian 23
“native” forces, with which they defeated the Army’s Punjab Regiment is still “mixed,” but 24
French, various Indian rulers, and, ultimately, that of the Pakistani army is overwhelmingly 25
the Mughal Empire itself.5 Punjabi, although some regiments have 26
A second major innovation came in Pashtuns. This presented problems in dealing 27
response to the Mutiny of 1857 when Hindu with insurgencies in the FATA, where all- 28
and Muslim troops rose against their officers Punjabi units sent there found themselves 29
and nearly succeeded in routing the British. ill-equipped to deal with local issues. 30
Recruitment was subsequently restricted to Lord Kitchener,the British commander-in- 31
the most loyal regions, castes, and ethnic chief in India at the turn of the twentieth 32
groups; members of those groups (“classes” in century,turned the primarily constabulary and 33
Indian Army parlance) that were deemed border force into an expeditionary one, giving 34
disloyal were discharged.6 They also reduced the Indian Army a greater role outside the 35
recruitment from those regions, such as the subcontinent.This coincided with a growth in 36
south,which had been pacified,justifying both strength from 155,000 to 573,000 soldiers 37
steps in terms of a freshly invented theory that during the First World War,when the army was 38
deemed only some classes to be martial. The employed in France and Gallipoli, and to 2.5 39
designation of “martial races” shifted over the million during the Second World War, when it 40
next 100 years,and some groups,thought to be fought in North Africa and Burma.Kitchener’s 41
martial in the middle of the nineteenth century reforms also brought larger numbers of Indians 42
(such as Oudh Brahmans and Tamils) saw their into the officer corps, effectively nationalizing 43
numbers markedly reduced.7 the army before India’s Independence.When 44
In reorganizing the army after the Mutiny, British India was partitioned on the eve of 45
the British reinforced the regimental system, Independence in 1947, a new Pakistan Army 46
which tightly bound officers and soldiers was formed out of units of the old, and 47
together. The importance and utility of the officered by those Muslim Indians who opted 48
352

1 for Pakistan. Subsequently, the Indian and
2 Pakistani armies began to diverge markedly,
3 especially in their political roles.
4 the Japanese succeeded in invading India, the
5 role of the army might have turned out quite
6 India and civilian primacy
7 praised by Nehru and other politicians as great
8 In 1905 Kitchener forced the resignation of
9 the viceroy, Lord Curzon, after the two
10 disagreed over the extent to which Indian
11 forces would be used to protect imperial, as
12 opposed to Indian interests, in what was
13 possibly the last assertion of military power in
14 India.While Kitchener won the political battle,
15 the British Indian government evolved a
16 system of fiscal and political control over the
17 army that ensured civilian supremacy.
18 By the time of Independence, civilian con-
19 trol was firmly established, although opera-
20 tional matters remained in the hands of the
21 military.That the last two viceroys—Wavell and
22 Mountbatten—were from the military largely
23 obscured the degree of civilianization that had
24 taken place.Indian defense budgets were hotly
25 contested in the nascent Indian assembly by
26 Indian representatives,who were also critical of
27 the way in which the military was used to
28 support imperial goals.Directed by India’s first
29 prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, the relative
30 power of civilians was further enhanced.The
31 position of commander-in-chief was abolished
32 (the president of India is now the titular
33 commander-in-chief).Control over the armed
34 forces was lodged in the civilian cabinet under
35 the prime minister,and the status of the officer
36 corps vis-à-vis the civil service as well as
37 elected and appointed public officials was
38 sharply downgraded.
39 While in retrospect the bargain between the
40 nationalist movement and the Indian officer
41 corps—effectively brokered by the British—
42 seems inevitable, at the time there were other
43 viable possibilities. During the war, Nehru’s
44 rival, Subhas Chandra Bose, raised the Indian
45 National Army (INA) out of captured Indian
46 Army personnel in Southeast Asia.Bose’s force
47 was militarily ineffective but ideologically
48 potent—he challenged the martial races theory
T H E M I L I TA R I E S O F S O U T H AS I A
and there was no pretense that the INA was
anything but a revolutionary army. Bose died
in an air crash in 1945, but had he lived, or had
differently. As it was, the INA officers were
heroes, but were effectively denied re-entry
into the army.
Civilian control was further tightened after
the 1958 coup in Pakistan, as were contacts
with foreign armies. Nehru believed that the
Pakistan military’s coup had been facilitated by
ties to its American and British counterparts.
The Indian government had two other major
policies in the immediate post-Independence
era: it attempted to “democratize” the army by
effectively doing away with the martial race
theory and it kept military matters away from
public scrutiny.
As for organizational patterns, India’s new
leaders, encouraged by the British, permitted
the army to retain its colonial structure, but
emphasized loyalty to the new government.
One consequence of the way civilian control
was imposed in post-Independence India was
that the political leadership stayed away from
military matters while the military leadership
remained institutionally frozen. This implicit
bargain—internal autonomy in return for
political supremacy over the armed forces—
was strengthened by the events of the 1962 war
against China.India’s defeat in the conflict was
squarely blamed on political interference.Prior
to the war, Nehru and his defense minister
V.K.Krishna Menon had promoted politically
pliable generals, requiring them to pursue a
risky “forward strategy,”a move that had clearly
backfired. Later wars in 1965 and 1971 rein-
forced military autonomy. In 1971, in the war
that led to the independence of Bangladesh,
General Sam Maneckshaw, the army chief,
asked for operational freedom and came back
with the country’s only outright military
victory. This further ensured that political
leaders remained wary of interfering in the
internal matters of the military so long as the
armed forces accepted political supremacy. In
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later crises, notably with Pakistan in 1999 and politicians’and bureaucrats’hands. The defense 1
2001–02, civilians called the shots. The acquisition process has also been tainted over 2
stalemated 2001–02 crisis led to some re- the years by major scandals. Allegations that 3
examination of the essentially eighteenth- former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi received 4
century army structure, the archaic defense kickbacks from Swedish armament manufac- 5
budgeting system, and the absence of real turer Bofors for a major howitzer contract 6
“jointness” between the services and among resulted in his losing the 1989 general election. 7
the various civilian agencies responsible for In 2001 Defense Minister George Fernandes 8
national security policy.9 resigned after a media investigation uncovered 9
While India’s robust civil–military arrange- large-scale corruption related to defense 10
ment is different from virtually every other ex- acquisition. 11
colonial or developing society,it does not mean 12
that it is optimal.10 Civil “control” has been 13
achieved, the military is politically docile, but Internal security and the rise of 14
India has not really had a debate on the the paramilitaries 15
purpose and role of the Indian Army, let alone 16
its relationship to Indian society, and civilians Over the last 20 years, the Indian army has 17
generally lack the professional expertise or become enmeshed in the gargantuan task of 18
experience to make informed decisions maintaining internal security. An increase in 19
when it comes to the use of force, training, or domestic violence has taken place in most of 20
the South Asian states. While the immediate
weapons acquisition.Rather than institute real 21
causes may be different from state to state, or
reform, India prefers to expand its forces. 22
even from region to region in India, Pakistan,
The absence of a sound methodology for 23
Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Nepal, the general
making important strategic and military deci- 24
trend is the same. In an era of rapid social
sions has been often noted by India’s most 25
change and dislocation, caused in part by the
influential strategic writer,K.Subrahmanyam.11 26
impact of globalization on traditional societies,
While he and others have urged that a modern 27
more and more young men (and women) find
mechanism be established to develop and imple- themselves educated to the point where they 28
ment strategic policy, there is an unwillingness no longer have a place in traditional society, 29
to make the changes necessary.12 The move to but are unable to find a role in the slow- 30
create a national security council only wrapped growing modern sectors. 31
existing institutions in new cloth. Efforts to In India,this trend is especially notable in an 32
establish a chief of defense staff position have eastern belt stretching northwards from 33
been stillborn. India also lacks an effective, Andhra Pradesh through Chhattisgarh, Bihar, 34
transparent defense acquisition process. and Orissa, and extending into the north- 35
The Indian military is expected to modern- eastern states, where discontent has led to a 36
ize significantly over the next few years, an significant rural leftist militancy, called the 37
effort that is backed by an explosive growth in Naxalite movement. By government admis- 38
India’s defense budget enabled by a rapidly sion, over a quarter of India’s districts are 39
expanding economy.13 India’s defense budget affected by Naxalite activity. There are also 40
grew by 75 percent between 2002 and 2007. regions of endemic insecurity in Kashmir. 41
However, it remains under 3 percent of India’s Other uprisings have been dealt with more 42
GDP, less than China’s allocation of about successfully by the Indian government. The 43
5 percent. Between 1999 and 2006 India was massive Sikh uprising in Punjab in the 1980s 44
also the largest recipient of military equipment was contained by the Punjab police action,and 45
by value, importing $22.4 billion worth of there has been some success in containing 46
arms. While the military has some input in separatist and autonomist groups in Nagaland 47
acquisitions, decisions ultimately remain in and Mizoram. 48
354

1 Partly to meet such challenges, the Indian
2 Army has been dragged into an internal
3 security role. The only time the army was
4 called on for internal security during the Raj,
5 after Britain’s European rivals and rebellious
6 princely states had been defeated, was during
7 “aid to the civil” operations, such as quelling a
8 communal riot or containing a political
9 demonstration that had got out of hand. In
10 such cases, ultimate authority remained in the
11 hands of the local civilian magistrate who
12 directed the local army commander when and
13 where to apply force.While there were notable
14 excesses,such as the Jallianwala Bagh massacre,
15 the army’s role remained limited.
16 Recent army history has been as much
17 about internal security as it has been about
18 fighting external enemies. Indeed, the impor-
19 tance of internal security is reflected in the
20 dominance of the army over the other services.
21 Twelve of the Indian Army’s 18 major cam-
22 paigns between 1947 and 1998 were fought on
23 Indian soil.14 Constabulary duties in counter-
24 insurgency campaigns in the country’s north-
25 eastern states, Punjab, and Jammu & Kashmir,
26 eroded the country’s ability to project power
27 outside. In addition, long and arduous internal
28 duty led to soldiers from armored and air
29 defense units being rotated through counter-
30 insurgency formations.
31 The government’s response to the expand-
32 ing internal security challenge was to turn to
33 the army, and then, when the army resisted,
34 to create new paramilitary forces. These
35 now outnumber the army 1.3 million to 1.1
36 million.15 The major paramilitary forces
37 include the Border Security Force (208,422)
38 and the Central Reserve Police Force
39 (229,699).There are also about 450,000 state
40 armed police forces.The Indian paramilitaries
41 fall under the control of the home ministry,
42 and India’s home minister commands one of
43 the world’s largest armies,albeit one of its most
44 unruly, with a long record of abuse, dis-
45 obedience, and even mutiny. Yet, the
46 paramilitary task is so important that the army
47 has created its own paramilitary force, the
48 Rashtriya Rifles, which is manned by regular
T H E M I L I TA R I E S O F S O U T H AS I A
officers and soldiers who rotate through it from
regular army units.
Thus, the army in India suffers from an
identity crisis. It really is a three-in-one force:
a counterinsurgency army fighting primarily
in Kashmir and the northeast, backing up the
generally unreliable paramilitary forces; a
mountain defense force guarding against
a Chinese incursion, divided between the
borders in the north and the northeast, with
some elements, particularly in the latter, also
engaged in counterinsurgency;and a mechan-
ized and armored strike force, focused on the
next war with Pakistan along the western
border, but now made less relevant because
of nuclear weapons.
The air force, navy, and nuclear
forces
India’s other two services, the air force and the
navy, never acquired as many of the colonial
trappings as the Indian Army. They do not
recruit on the basis of caste or language, are
keyed to advances in military technology, and
play no role in Indian politics. For both these
services, however, acquiring and deploying
modern equipment has been a paramount
problem, and their share of the Indian defense
budget has always been very small, compared
with that of the politically more sensitive army.
In 2004, for example, the army was allocated
41.9 percent of the defense budget while the
Indian Navy’s share was 14.7 percent and that
of the Indian Air Force was 24.7 percent.16
Finally,it is important to consider the impact
of the introduction of nuclear weapons on the
role of the armed forces in India, and the
accompanying potential for miscalculation or
misjudgment. On the ground, there is a slow
but steady introduction and integration of
nuclear weapons in the military arsenal. Based
on its fissile material production capacity, India
probably has somewhere between 50 and 100
nuclear weapons of proven design and the
aircraft to deliver them.17 In the future, there
are plans for missile-delivered nuclear warheads,
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and even a nuclear navy, which would be able Pakistan, and the army became more overtly 1
to range widely, delivering nuclear weapons “Islamic” than at any time in its history. After 2
onto targets many thousands of miles from ten years of erratic democracy, the army again 3
the Indian mainland.The Indian government seized power in 1999, and Pakistan was until 4
has tried to apply the principle of civilian 2008 governed by General Pervez Musharraf. 5
supremacy in the use of these weapons, has a Most of Zia’s efforts to Islamize the army have 6
designated chain-of-command in emulation of been rolled back, although the army retains 7
western nuclear powers and the Soviet Union, close ties to some Islamist groups, and Islamic 8
and has built secure shelters to protect key dimensions of the army’s identity are still 9
decision makers in a crisis.Yet, there appears to taught in army schools. 10
be no integrated service nuclear doctrine, and Why did the army assume power in 11
the government has not faced up to the prob- Pakistan, when it stayed on the sidelines in 12
lem of command and control and delegation of India? There were three main factors that 13
authority during a crisis in which nuclear pushed the army into the role of Pakistan’s 14
weapons might be used.In the recent history of dominant political force. 15
the subcontinent, three crises (in 1990, 1999, First,Pakistan very early lost whatever com- 16
and 2001–02) involved nuclear threats, and petent civilian leadership it had. Mohammed 17
possibly the movement of nuclear assets.18 Ali Jinnah,the founding leader of Pakistan,died 18
only one year after Independence and there 19
was no follow-on leadership of equivalent 20
The Pakistan army stature. Neither was there another leader with 21
proficiency in strategic and military affairs,such 22
It has been said that Pakistan has an army in as Jinnah had developed early in his career.The 23
control of a state,and the army’s dominant role only Pakistani civilians with professional skills 24
is unlikely to soon change.The Pakistan army of a high order were the bureaucrats, and 25
is unique among armies of the world in its Pakistan was initially dominated by a coalition 26
combination of size,military professionalism,a of senior civil servants and army officers. 27
dominant political role, and its possession of Second,the Pakistan Army came to see itself 28
nuclear weapons. It still reflects its British as the only force that stood between Pakistan 29
Indian Army origins, and thus has much in and destruction by a hostile India, and was 30
common with the Indian and Bangladesh accepted as such by the people. Jinnah had 31
armies,as well as many western armies.Perhaps argued that Pakistan would be a homeland for 32
the most important aspect of this inheritance, oppressed Indian Muslims.The army came to 33
however, is that it more closely resembles the the view that this homeland had to assume the 34
military-centered Raj of the nineteenth shape of a fortress, besieged by a malevolent 35
century than the civilianizing Raj of the early India, and that the army best knew how to 36
twentieth century. prepare these defenses.Echoes of this view were 37
Beginning in 1954, the Pakistan Army’s also heard in President Musharraf ’s declaration 38
political role expanded rapidly and General that the Pakistan army knew best what 39
Ayub Khan seized power in a bloodless coup Pakistan’s “national interest”really was.Because 40
in 1958. He unsuccessfully “civilianized” of the army’s central role in Pakistani politics, 41
himself and, as a result of domestic unrest, was certain military formations are politically very 42
displaced by General Yahya Khan in 1969. relevant.This includes the 10 Corps, based in 43
Following Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s chaotic period Rawalpindi, and its 111 Brigade. Also politi- 44
of governance (1971–77),General Zia-ul-Haq cally critical are the corps in or near Pakistan’s 45
seized power in a third coup, and governed major cities, Karachi and Lahore.19 46
with an iron fist until he died in an air crash in Third, the army was strongly influenced by 47
1988.Zia built on Bhutto’s attempts to Islamize its contacts with Washington, which equipped 48
356

1 it in the 1950s and 1960s mainly to serve as
2 a bulwark against the Communist threat in
3 Asia. With US aid and encouragement, the
4 Pakistan Army grew from approximately
5 150,000 in 1947 to 320,000 in 1970, and
6 550,000 in 2006. During the 1980s, China
7 supplanted America as a major supplier of
8 military equipment, but the US role was
9 revived when a massive military aid program
10 was instituted after 9/11 and Pakistan assumed
11 the role of a frontline state in the so-called
12 “war on terror.”
13 Other than its gradual Islamization under
14 Zia, the Pakistan Army has not changed very
15 much in 60 years. Its corps and divisional
16 structure,the hierarchy of ranks,and its military
17 schools would be familiar to western (or
18 Indian) visitors. Neither has the officer–other
19 rank relationship changed very much.Officers
20 are drawn increasingly from Pakistan’s middle
21 classes and are overwhelmingly Punjabi, but
22 they are part of Pakistan’s ruling elite. Other
23 ranks are still predominantly rural and peasant
24 in their origin and most come from a few
25 districts in Punjab. Unlike India, where poli-
26 tical power is widely dispersed among geo-
27 graphical regions,in Pakistan it is concentrated
28 in dominant Punjab, which is home to more
29 than half the country’s population.
30 Despite its role in the “war on terror,”
31 Pakistan’s army is largely deployed to meet an
32 Indian conventional military threat.In the past,
33 the Afghan border was lightly covered, and the
34 army relied on frontier and paramilitary forces
35 for local security arrangements. But with the
36 rise of Islamic militancy in the North-West
37 Frontier Province,and separatist sentiments still
38 in evidence in Balochistan,this is fast changing,
39 and the Pakistan Army has moved several
40 divisions from the eastern front to fight
41 insurgents in the NWFP.
42 A balance sheet of the army’s stewardship
43 over the state of Pakistan would show that
44 while it has done well in some endeavors, it
45 was average in others,and was grossly deficient
46 in a few areas. The army has engaged in a
47 number of international peacekeeping opera-
48 tions, often under United Nations auspices,
T H E M I L I TA R I E S O F S O U T H AS I A
and these can be judged an unqualified success.
The professionalism of the officer corps, the
discipline of the other ranks, and its con-
siderable experience have earned the army
praise from many quarters.When it comes to
conventional military operations—all against
India—it has acquitted itself well militarily.
The 1965 war resulted in a standoff,despite the
greater numbers on the Indian side. Pakistan’s
conventional capabilities were also used to
good effect in the 1987 “Brasstacks” crisis,
when it maneuvered in such a way as to force
the Indians to abandon what might have been
a pre-emptive strike.
Since 1990 all of Pakistan’s conflicts with
India carry with them the threat of escalation
to nuclear war. In this regard, the army has
presided over a nuclear weapons program with
some success, involving the covert acquisition
of technology from many countries, including
the United States, Germany, Holland, and
China. Pakistan now has at least 80 nuclear
weapons, enough to deter any significant
Indian attack.
Pakistan’s covert military operations have
been a mixed success. In the 1980s it worked
with China, the US, and some Middle East
states to support the anti-Soviet mujahiddin in
Afghanistan. This support was effective, but
Pakistan suffered the consequences of “blow-
back”as drugs,weapons,and Islamic extremism
filtered back into Pakistan itself, destabilizing
several parts of the country, including Karachi.
Subsequently, the army supported jihadi
elements in Indian-administered Kashmir, and
the Taliban in Afghanistan. India and Pakistan
fought a mini-war in 1999 in the Kargil region
of Kashmir when Pakistan-supported Islamic
jihadis, operating alongside army units, infil-
trated across the Line of Control, triggering a
violent Indian response, and bringing the
United States to support India’s side.The 9/11
attacks forced Pakistan to nominally withdraw
its support to Kashmiri separatists and the
Taliban, although there are still allegations
that the Pakistan Army tolerates Taliban
operations that are directed against US and
NATO forces in Afghanistan. In Kashmir,
357
ST E P H E N P. C O H E N

the support seems to have declined, but a where the army,after being attacked by Islamist 1
major terrorist incident, especially one that is extremists, discovered that it lacked either a 2
traced back to Pakistan, could lead to another counterinsurgency doctrine or an understand- 3
crisis. ing of growing social dislocation. 4
The two areas in which the Pakistan Army As in India,Pakistan has responded to social 5
can be judged to have consistently failed are in dislocation and the breakdown of law and 6
the political management of the state of order by increasing paramilitary forces, which 7
Pakistan and in counterinsurgency operations now number well over 300,000, compared 8
on its own territory. to the army’s 550,000. Yet social turmoil, 9
The story of the Pakistan army’s involve- stemming in part from political incompetence 10
ment in politics is an oft-told tale. Three and from the effects of globalization on a 11
extended military regimes, those of Ayub hitherto conservative social order,continues to 12
Khan,Zia ul-Haq,and Pervez Musharraf,have grow, and is critical in the NWFP. So great is 13
each left the state worse off than it was before the problem that the army is now faced with a 14
the military took over.The army maintains a three-front war: in the east with India, in the 15
firm front against civilian rule, and this façade northwest against Taliban-like militants,and in 16
will have to crack before there is any real Punjab, against rising sectarian terrorist 17
progress in transitioning from a chronically violence. Ironically, some of the militants were 18
inadequate system of military rule to some- trained by Pakistan’s own intelligence services 19
thing that approximates a competent civilian- and shielded over the years. 20
led government. No change is in sight: the This confronts the army, and the state of 21
army still believes that it is Pakistan’s savior, Pakistan, with a deep existential crisis.20 22
and that the civilians will ruin the state. The Can the army engage in effective counter- 23
prognosis is that a stable transition is highly insurgency without the support of its own 24
population? Can a largely Punjabi army deal
unlikely, and that Pakistan will lurch from 25
with a Pashtun or Baloch separatist move-
domestic crisis to domestic crisis.This will be 26
ment, the former reinforced by Islamist
manageable as long as Pakistan receives signi- 27
extremism,the latter by subnationalist passions?
ficant amounts of economic and political 28
Army leaders have no clear answer to this, but
help from its major outside supporters, such 29
Pakistan’s politicians argue that only they, with
as Saudi Arabia, China, and the United States. 30
a popular mandate, can exert the force neces-
The army’s failure to manage domestic 31
sary to tackle these extremist and separatist
insurgency is paradoxical because Pakistani groups.They draw on classic British counter- 32
intelligence services and home-grown jihadis insurgency doctrine, which teaches that 33
have been successful in destabilizing Pakistan’s fighting an insurgency is 80 percent political 34
neighbors, notably parts of India and and economic and only 20 percent military. 35
Afghanistan, and Pakistan-based Islamic One strategic conclusion that can be 36
extremists have operated in China’s western drawn is that Pakistan may be driven into an 37
provinces as well. Historically, the army’s arrangement with India regarding Kashmir, 38
operations against Bangladeshi separatists were and that the long-cherished goal of prising 39
ineffective, and the army should never have Kashmir from India will have to be abandoned. 40
allowed the situation to deteriorate to the Some Pakistan army officers have reached this 41
point where it was faced with a massive conclusion, and embedded in Musharraf ’s 42
Indian-supported movement. Subsequently, unsuccessful peace overtures towards India was 43
its operations against insurrectionists in an understanding that Pakistan itself cannot 44
Balochistan failed to effectively combine afford to “bleed” India as it is itself facing a 45
political and military elements. This problem major threat of its own in the North-West 46
is evident today in Balochistan and in large Frontier Province, the FATA, and the Punjab 47
swaths of the North-West Frontier Province, itself. 48
358

1 The army’s political role is unlikely to
2 change dramatically in the near future. The
3 army is in the peculiar position of being unable
4 to comprehensively run Pakistan, but not
5 letting civilians do it either.It regards Pakistan’s
6 civilian politicians,not entirely without reason,
7 as self-seeking, corrupt and incompetent.
8 Under Musharraf,the army further dismantled
9 Pakistan’s civilian bureaucratic institutions. It
10 is attempting to reconstruct the entire edu-
11 cational system.It tries to contain the spread of
12 Islamist extremism while partnering with
13 radical Islamist parties.Since the army lacks the
14 expertise and training to actually administer
15 Pakistan, or to move it ahead economically, its
16 penetration of administrative and economic
17 sectors will eventually be costly. The army is
18 skilled at playing “balance of power” games
19 with Pakistan’s political parties, but it cannot
20 substitute for political parties that can broker
21 compromises among Pakistan’s contending
22 class, ethnic, sectarian, and regional elements.
23 The contradictions in the army’s position
24 became increasingly evident and, as of 2008,
25 Musharraf ’s position as Pakistan’s leader had
26 been undermined and the army’s position as
27 the state’s most important institution had come
28 under attack.
29 The Pakistan Amy faces challenges it is not
30 prepared to meet.The question suggests itself:
31 can a professional army with conventional
32 roots fight a major counterinsurgency war
33 against diverse enemies,prepare for both a con-
34 ventional and nuclear war with India, remain
35 the dominant political force in Pakistan, and
36 oversee Pakistan’s economic, educational and
37 administrative institutions? No army in history
38 has ever successfully coped with such a wide
39 range of tasks over a long period.The Pakistan
40 Amy is unlikely to do so either.
41
42
43 The Bangladesh experiment
44
45 Until 1971, East Pakistan, like West Pakistan,
46 was dominated by the Pakistan Army. A civil
47 war, followed by indirect and then direct
48 Indian military intervention led to the army’s
T H E M I L I TA R I E S O F S O U T H AS I A
surrender on 16 December, 1971 and the
establishment of Bangladesh.
When the Bangladeshi liberation struggle
broke out in March 1971, officers and men
from Pakistan army units were among the very
first to turn against the West Pakistanis.Most of
the Bengal Regiment’s battalions had been
trapped in the west, but enough were in the
east to form the core of military resistance.
They were joined by the Bengali elements of
the East Pakistan Rifles, a paramilitary border
force which had many non-Bengali officers.
These regulars and irregulars were led by
commissioned Pakistan army officers, all of
relatively low rank,but who eventually formed
the backbone of the Bangladesh Army.
A second component of the new
Bangladesh Army consisted of veterans of
various “bahinis,” or forces, which thrived
during the nine-month liberation struggle.The
regular Bengali soldiers who were brought
together as a resistance force were first known
as the Mukti Fauz and then as the Mukti
Bahini. Meanwhile, thousands of civilians had
formed themselves into guerrilla groups of
varying degrees of competence and training.
The Indian government covertly assisted these
groups, often via Indian Bengali officers who
temporarily resigned their commissions to lead
the bahinis.
The Bangladesh government in exile had
only limited control over the bahinis. Some
came under the control of the Awami League’s
student group. Others such as the Quader
Bahini, named after its leader Quader “Tiger”
Siddiqui,operated independently and retained
their identity after independence.
Unlike India and Pakistan, the new
Bangladesh government began with a clean
slate in creating an army. Its forces consisted of
regular Bengali officers from the Pakistan army
officers and jawans, plus the bahinis. However,
there were also strains between former Pakistan
army officers who fought with the bahinis and
those who were prisoners during the war,who
returned after liberation. In addition, there
were tensions between those who favored a
military establishment along Pakistani lines
359
ST E P H E N P. C O H E N

and were suspicious of India, and those who daughters. The two women traded places as 1
understood that large armored forces were prime minister and opposition leader for much 2
unnecessary and were willing to accommo- of the following decade, while Bangladesh’s 3
date the much larger India, especially given internal security situation steadily deteriorated. 4
Bangladesh’s dependence on Indian economic The military remained vital, and was called on 5
assistance. repeatedly to deal with general strikes, mass 6
With Indian encouragement, the decision bomb blasts, and the rise of Islamic militancy. 7
was made to stick as close to the British There were several attempts in late 2006 to 8
military model as possible, and in a few draw the military into politics, but the army 9
years the bahinis were terminated and a new resisted the temptation, intervening only in 10
Bangladesh army was established.This decision January 2007 when it moved to neutralize the 11
echoed that of Jawaharlal Nehru and his Home two major parties, possibly preventing massive 12
Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel when they civil strife. A state of emergency was declared 13
rejected the idea of folding the Indian National and the scheduled national election was 14
Army into the regular Indian Army. Eerily, postponed. The interim government—urged 15
however, Bangladesh soon began to replicate on by the generals—restricted the freedom of 16
the tortuous civil–military relationship that movement of both Khaleda Zia and Sheikh 17
had plagued Pakistan since the 1950s. Hasina, and continued to govern Bangladesh. 18
The first prime minister of Bangladesh, the Since then,the armed forces have worked with 19
charismatic Sheikh Mujibur Rahman,elevated the civilian administration to tackle corruption 20
himself to president in 1975 after launching a and maladministration, but remained overtly 21
scheme of nationalizing key industries,one that subservient to civilian authority. 22
paralleled the policies pursued in Pakistan by The Bangladesh Army, unlike its Pakistani 23
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.21 Mujib was assassinated counterpart, is reluctant to get deeply involved 24
later in the year, along with most of his family, in politics and openly govern again.Yet, it is 25
and General Zia Rahman assumed the fearful of continuing violence, and behind the 26
presidency, creating a political party, the scenes has urged discipline and calm on the 27
Bangladesh National Party (BNP) to rival political community. One reason why it has 28
Mujib’s Awami League.He lifted martial law in refrained from again intervening in domestic 29
1979, but was assassinated during an abortive politics is that it plays a major role as an inter- 30
military coup in 1981.After a period of further national peacekeeper. Bangladesh earns a good 31
instability and chaos, General H. M. Ershad deal of its foreign exchange through such 32
assumed power in a 1982 coup,suspending the peacekeeping missions, currently contributing 33
constitution and political parties. Ershad about 9,000 peacekeepers to eleven different 34
assumed the presidency and,to India’s conster- countries,the largest contribution of any state.22 35
nation, Islam became the state religion. Ershad Another consequence of a potential military 36
was forced to step down eight years later and coup could be sanctions that would reduce aid 37
was convicted and jailed on corruption programs to Bangladesh.Thus,civilian govern- 38
charges,returning to politics on his release,but ment is maintained in part by the concerns of 39
with little success. the international community, whose aid 40
Civilian rule returned, albeit shakily, when programs keep Bangladesh solvent. 41
Begum Khaleda Zia became prime minister in In addition, the military maintains a self- 42
1991 and the presidency returned to cere- imposed distance from politics. It understands 43
monial status. From this time onward, the the vast scale of Bangladesh’s developmental 44
military played no overt role in politics, but and sectarian problems.Two failed experiments 45
there remained a divisive rivalry between by Generals Zia and Ershad seem to have 46
Begum Zia, General Zia’s widow, and Sheikh deterred the current generation of officers 47
Hasina Wajed, one of Mujib’s surviving from attempting a third spell of military rule. 48
360

1 The Aspirants: Non-state armies
2 about 150,000 troops,largely Sinhala,although
3 An important development in the military
4 history of all South Asian states is the emer-
5 gence of significant paramilitary forces, on the
6 one hand, and non-state forces, some approxi-
7 mating professional armies in terms of their
8 capabilities, equipment, and discipline, on the
9 other hand.
10 Sri Lanka presents the most important case
11 of a non-state military challenging the state
12 itself, and holding the government’s forces at
13 bay. Ostensibly a political party, the Liberation
14 Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which claimed
15 to speak on behalf of the island’s ethnic Tamils,
16 was also an army with a political agenda,
17 engaged in a permanent war against the Sri
18 Lankan state.23 Unlike some of the Indian non-
19 state groups or Nepal’s Maoist insurgents, the
20 Tigers sought the practical dissolution of the
21 Sri Lankan state and its transformation into a
22 federal state to give the LTTE control of slightly
23 under one-third of the country as part of an
24 ethnic Tamil homeland. Further, the Tiger
25 ideology would not stop at the water’s edge,for
26 the LTTE at times articulated aspirations for a
27 much larger Tamil nation, to include the much
28 more populous Indian state of Tamil Nadu.
29 The LTTE was by far the most sophisticated
30 non-state army in South Asia, perhaps in the
31 world. It pioneered the technique of suicide
32 bombing, successfully assassinating Indian
33 Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, Sri Lankan
34 President Ranasinghe Premadasa, and senior
35 Sri Lankan general Parami Kulatunga in that
36 manner.24 The LTTE had an extensive over-
37 seas support network that relied on expatriate
38 Tamils, and it maintained offices, like a state,
39 around the world. Although declared a terror-
40 ist group in a number of countries, it still
41 managed to extract, willingly or otherwise, a
42 huge amount of money from expatriate Tamils
43 to purchase weapons, retain an army of about
44 8,000–11,000 fighters in the field, maintain a
45 small fleet of ships (the “Sea Tigers”), and even
46 a tiny air force, made up of a few light aircraft
47 purchased abroad and assembled in the jungle
48 fastness of northern Sri Lanka.
T H E M I L I TA R I E S O F S O U T H AS I A
Facing them was the Sri Lankan army of
there have been leading Tamil and Burgher
officers over the years.The Sri Lankan govern-
ment has a small air force that it sent on air
strikes irregularly. Its tiny navy was barely able
to monitor the comings and goings of the
Tamil Sea Tigers, and Sri Lanka relied on
Indian help to detain or sink supplies coming
to the LTTE from abroad.
Despite being immersed in a vicious civil
war for nearly 20 years, the Sri Lankan state
avoided the pitfall of militarization. Key
decisions were made by civilians, and the
parliamentary system worked as best it could
under near-wartime conditions.
Postscript
In Bangladesh the army yielded power to
civilians at the end of 2008, and Sheikh
Hasina once again became Prime Minister.
Bangladesh’s paramilitary border guards
mutinied in February 2009, only to be put
down by the army, but the mutineers
slaughtered many of their officers.
Pakistan’s President Musharraf resigned
after nine years in office, on 18 August, 2008,
leaving behind a weaker economy, domestic
political chaos, a chastened army, and a raging
insurgency in the federally administered areas
(FATA) and the North-West Frontier pro-
vince. He was eventually succeeded by Benazir
Bhutto’s widower, Asif Ali Zardari, who has
presided over further chaos. A reluctant army
is likely to step in again before the year is up.
A crisis with India was narrowly averted after
ten (or more) Pakistan-based terrorists
launched attacks on several Mumbai hotels, a
railroad station, and a Jewish center.The event
was televised globally over a three-day period,
which, along with the murder of nationals
from over twenty states, contributed to heavy
international intervention in an attempt to
avoid escalation and to identify and bring the
perpetrators to justice.Despite its achievements
in other spheres, India displayed supreme
361
ST E P H E N P. C O H E N

incompetence in coping with this attack 6 The Indian army’s use of the word “class” does 1
before, during and after the event. not refer to economic or social stratification,but 2
In Sri Lanka a fresh assault, aided by Tamil to the various castes, religious groups, and even 3
Tiger defectors, led in early 2009 to a com- regions that contribute men to the military. Each 4
class had its own quota.Thus, before Partition,
prehensive military victory, but the Tigers will 5
Punjabi Muslims and Punjabi Hindus were two
probably revert to guerrilla war. separate classes for purposes of recruitment. 6
The Nepali Maoists were the more success- 7 The British compiled a series of handbooks in 7
ful of the non-state paramilitaries, and have which the special qualities of each recruited 8
come to uncertain power in a debilitated class were narrated. See Nicholas B. Dirks, 9
Nepal.They abolished the monarchy and are Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of 10
attempting to supplant the Nepal army. Modern India (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 11
2001). 12
8 For details of army expansion, see Bisheshwar 13
Prasad (ed.), Official History of the Indian Armed
Notes 14
Forces in the Second World War: Expansion of
the Armed Forces and Defence Organization,
15
1 Throughout this entry figures on numbers of 16
1939–1945 (New Delhi: Combined Inter-
troops, paramilitary forces, and other armed 17
Services Historical Section, India and Pakistan,
groups, as well as defense budgets, are drawn 1965), p. 298. 18
from the authoritative Institute for Strategic 9 Perhaps the most scathing criticism of the 19
Studies, The Military Balance, 2006 (London: decision-making system was that of the Kargil 20
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Review Committee, a quasi-official body
2007).
21
appointed by the government in 1999; it 22
2 For a comparative study of the role of the army whitewashed the army’s performance but did
in these three countries, see Veena Kukreja, 23
offer some useful suggestions regarding defense
Civil–Military Relations in South Asia: Pakistan, 24
organization.
Bangladesh and India (New Delhi: Sage, 1991). 10 For a comparison of the Indian and Pakistani 25
3 For three different histories of the British Indian armies, see Cohen, The Indian Army, and 26
army, see Stephen P. Cohen, The Indian Army: Stephen P. Cohen,The Pakistan Army (Berkeley, 27
Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation, CA: University of California Press, 1984 and 28
rev. edn (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1992; rev. 29
1990); Philip Mason, Matter of Honour: An edn, Oxford University Press, 1998). 30
Account of the Indian Army, Its Officers and Men 11 For a definitive collection of his writings on 31
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1974); and Lt. Gen. strategy,defense organization,and civil–military
S.L Menezes,Fidelity and Honour:The Indian Army
32
relations see K. Subramanyam, Shedding
from the Seventeenth to the Twenty-first Century 33
Shibboleths: India’s Evolving Strategic Outlook
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999). (Delhi: Wordsmiths, 2005).
34
4 For a summary of the important French 12 For a discussion of Subrahmanyam’s views see 35
contribution, see Lt. Gen. Gurbir Mansingh, P. K. Kumaraswamy (ed.), Security Beyond 36
French Military Influence in India (New Delhi: Survival: Essays for K. Subrahmanyam (New 37
Knowledge World and United Services Delhi: Sage, 2004). 38
Institution of India, 2006); also see John A. 13 For a comprehensive overview of the relation- 39
Lynn, Battle: A History of Combat and Culture ship of the armed forces to Indian society and 40
(Boulder, CO:Westview, 2003). politics, and their search for a strategic frame- 41
5 There is a vast literature on the battles of the work, see Verghese Koithara, Society, State and 42
British Indian Army. For an historically Security: The Indian Experience (New Delhi:
informed and accessible description of the way
43
Sage, 1999).
in which it was used alongside the British Army 14 Jaswant Singh, Defending India (Basingstoke: 44
in India, see the Sharpe series of novels by Macmillan and New York: St. Martin’s Press, 45
Bernard Cornwell, the first three of which 1999). 46
cover the battles of Seringapatam, Assaye, and 15 For authoritative details, see The Military 47
Gawilghur. Balance, 2007, pp. 230–35. 48
362
 T H E M I L I TA R I E S O F S O U T H AS I A

1 16 The Military Balance 2007 (London:International 21 For a survey of the relationship between the
2 Institute for Strategic Studies), p. 310. politicians and the military, see Talukder
3 17 Accurately estimating the strength of India’s Maniruzzaman,Politics and Security of Bangladesh
4 nuclear arsenal is notoriously difficult. See (Dhaka: University Press, 1994).
George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The 22 The Military Balance 2007, p. 314.
5
Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley, CA: 23 For studies of the Tigers and the Sri Lankan
6
University of California Press,1999), p.430;and dilemma see Rohan Gunaratna, Sri Lanka’s
7 David Albright, “India’s Military Plutonium Ethnic Crisis and National Security (Colombo:
8 Inventory, End 2004,” Institute for Science and South Asian Network on Conflict Research,
9 International Security, 7 May, 2005. 1998); and, by the same author, International and
10 18 For a comprehensive overview of the role of Regional Security Implications of the Sri Lankan
11 nuclear weapons in these and other crises, Tamil Insurgency (Colombo:Taprobane, 1997).
12 see P. R. Chari et al., Four Crises and a Peace 24 A remarkable film, The Terrorist (1999), traces
13 Process: American Engagement in South Asia the recruitment of a female Tamil fighter to the
14 (Washington: Brookings, 2007). ranks of a suicide squad, and her journey to
15 19 The creation in 2007 of three army commands, (presumably) India to carry out a mission
each encompassing several corps, may change against a foreign politician.
16
the hitherto critical role of the corps com-
17
manders.
18 20 For an attempt to describe Pakistan’s possible
19 futures, see Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of
20 Pakistan (Washington: Brookings, 2004).
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
363
 1

25 2
3
4
5
Corruption and the criminalization 6
7
of politics in South Asia 8
9
10
11
Stanley A. Kochanek 12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Although corruption is a universal and per- the paternalism of the colonial civil service 19
sistent global phenomenon,it has tended to be created an equally strong legacy of centralized 20
more pervasive in developing countries. Most authoritarian rule. 21
global measures of corruption have repeatedly Like many former colonies,the major states 22
ranked the countries of South Asia at the top of South Asia began independence as liberal 23
of the list of the most corrupt countries in the democracies. Some states, however, quickly 24
world.The level of corruption in the region, succumbed to vice-regal authoritarian rule. 25
however, has varied considerably and appears The liberal democratic tradition has proved to 26
to be somewhat more pervasive in some be most enduring in India and Sri Lanka,while 27
countries than others. While Pakistan and the vice-regal system has come to dominate 28
Bangladesh, for example, repeatedly appeared Pakistan and Bangladesh. 29
at the top of the list of the most corrupt Despite divergent patterns of political 30
countries in the world, India and Sri Lanka development, the historical legacies in the 31
ranked much lower. region have helped to shape character of 32
Although the states of South Asia share a governance,the growth of corruption,and the 33
common history, bureaucratic tradition and increasing criminalization of politics. 34
British colonial heritage, since independence The current state of political develop- 35
in 1947 the countries of the region have ment in South Asia was summarized in a 36
followed divergent paths of political, bureau- study published by the London Economist in 37
cratic, and institutional development. British 2006. The study constructed a democracy 38
rule left behind two quite distinct governing index that was used to rank 165 independent 39
traditions. On the one hand, British liberal states and two territories that together 40
democratic values, educational policy, and the represented most of the world’s popula- 41
gradual introduction of elections and repre- tion. The variables used to construct the 42
sentative institutions in South Asia created a democracy index included the frequency of 43
new western-educated,urban middle class that elections, levels of political participation, the 44
developed a strong commitment to British- state of civil liberties, the character of political 45
style liberal democracy.On the other hand,the culture, and the quality of governmental 46
British vice-regal system of colonial rule and performance.1 47
48
364
 C O R R U P T I O N A N D T H E C R I M I N A L I Z AT I O N O F P O L I T I C S I N S O U T H AS I A
1 As seen in Table 25.1, India and Sri Lanka,
2 South Asia’s two longest-functioning democ-
3 racies, ranked well above the other countries
4 in South Asia on the Economist’s democ-
5 racy index. While India ranked 35th and Sri
6 Lanka 57th out of the 167 states and territories
7 included in the study, Bangladesh was ranked
8 75th, Pakistan 113th, and Nepal 126th. As
9 we shall see numerous parallel studies have
10 also shown that the type of political system
11 tends to be highly correlated with levels
12 of political corruption. Given their shared
13 colonial heritage, a study of the post-
14 Independence development of India,Pakistan,
15 and Bangladesh may provide helpful clues
16 to our understanding of the causes, scope,
17 forms and styles, economic costs, and political
18 consequences of corruption and strategies for
19 dealing with the growth of corruption and the
20 growing criminalization of politics in the
21 region.
22
23
24 The study of corruption and its
25 causes
26
27 Definitions of corruption vary considerably.
28 The World Bank has defined corruption as “the
29 abuse of power for personal or group benefit.”2
30 The United Nations Development Program
31 (UNDP) defines it as “the abuse of public
32 power for private benefit through bribery,
33 extortion, influence peddling, nepotism,
34 fraud or embezzlement.”3 While the Swedish
35 economist Gunnar Myrdal defined corruption
36 as “the improper or selfish exercise of power
37 or influence attached to public office,”4 others
38 have come to see corruption as a form of
39 narrative that focuses on what is or is not
40 proper moral behavior. Most definitions of
41 corruption focus especially on the intersection
42 between public and private spheres of activity.
43 Some critics, however, insist that the issue of
44 corruption should not be confined solely to
45 the public sector. Corruption, they argue, can
46 also be seen as a form of rent whereby the
47 private sector manipulates markets to secure
48 rewards that exceed normal market returns.5
Table 25.1 Index of Democracy for South Asia,
2006
Country Rank Score
India 35 7.68
Sri Lanka 57 6.58
Bangladesh 75 6.11
Pakistan 113 3.92
Nepal 126 3.42
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, Index of Democracy:
www.theworldin.com
In short, corruption involves the abuse or
misuse of power by public officials to provide
benefits to individuals and groups in return for
financial benefits,public sector jobs,or political
support. It takes a variety of forms includ-
ing the direct payment of bribes, the use of
patronage in the allocation of public sector jobs
on a non-merit basis, the awarding of non-
competitive government contracts, and the
payment of “speed money” to ensure timely
decisions. Corruption also entails a variety of
traditional modes of behavior in societies
dominated by a web of patron–client relations,
which entails a reciprocal exchange of benefits.
In India, this reciprocal exchange involves
giving as bakshish. In Pakistan, the exchange
of benefits is based on friendship and close
social relations known as safarish (friendship
and pleading on behalf of someone). In the
highly traditional social setting of Bangladesh,
patron–client relations rest on a complex web
of connections known as tadbir (connections).
The causes of corruption and its impact on
politics and development have generated con-
siderable debate among economists. Initially,
most economists tended to treat corruption as
a benign force or even as a positive device for
overcoming bureaucratic slough in developing
countries. Increasingly, however, the growing
pervasiveness of corruption has led economists
to portray the growth of corruption as a cancer
that distorts development priorities, heightens
economic uncertainties, aggravates inflation,
hurts the poor, slows the rate of economic
growth, and leads to ineffective governance
and political decay. Although countries have
succeeded in sustaining rapid growth despite
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high levels of corruption, most economists Table 25.2 Corruption Perceptions Index for South 1
insist that rampant corruption entails signifi- Asia, 2006 2
cant costs that slow economic growth and Country Rank Score 3
distort public choice.6 India 70 3.3 4
Renewed interest in the study of corruption Sri Lanka 84 3.1 5
has produced a variety of conflicting assess- Nepal 121 2.5 6
ments of its causes,modes of measurement and Pakistan 142 2.2 7
Bangladesh 156 2.0
impact. While Marxists see corruption as 8
inherently rooted in capitalism, World Bank Source: Transparency International, Corruption 9
studies have associated corruption with Perceptions Index, 2006 10
socialism and the developmental state. Gunnar 11
Myrdal blames the growth of corruption on tion among the countries in the region. The 12
government instability; Fred Riggs saw it as a most striking feature of the survey was the 13
concomitant of development; and a survey of significant difference in the perceived levels of 14
Indian administrators blamed it on moral corruption between democratic and non- 15
weakness,economic deprivation,and structural democratic states. In the 2006 Transparency 16
strains.7 Still others see corruption as rooted in International survey of corruption, India and 17
the traditional culture of patron–client rela- Sri Lanka, which were ranked high on the 18
tions,poverty,and low levels of development or democracy index of the London Economist, 19
as a form of discourse.The idea of corruption were also found to have much higher CPI 20
as discourse focuses on corruption as a form of scores than authoritarian countries. On a scale 21
narrative that determines what are considered of 1 to 5, India received a CPI score of 3.3 and 22
proper or improper forms of behavior and was ranked 70th out of a total of the 163 23
provides a cultural code designed to make countries surveyed. Sri Lanka received a CPI 24
sense of the political world.8 score of 3.1 and was ranked 84th. By con- 25
Whatever its causes, the widespread exis- trast, Nepal, Pakistan and Bangladesh, which 26
tence of corruption has proved very difficult to ranked much lower on the democracy index, 27
document or measure.Attempts to quantify the were ranked at the bottom of Transparency 28
level of corruption in various countries rely International’s list of the most corrupt 29
heavily on the results of indirect measures countries. Nepal was ranked 121st with a 30
based on survey research. Survey research has CPI score of 2.5, Pakistan was ranked 142nd 31
focused primarily on public perceptions of with a CPI score of 2.2 and Bangladesh was 32
corruption in an effort to measure its scope ranked 156th with a CPI score of 2.0. 33
and impact in various countries around the Pakistan and Bangladesh have had a long 34
world. The most comprehensive surveys of history of authoritarian rule and high levels 35
public perceptions of corruption have been of corruption. During most of the 1990s, 36
conducted by Transparency International (TI), Transparency International ranked Pakistan as 37
a Berlin based non-governmental organization one of the most corrupt countries in the 38
(NGO). Transparency International conducts world. As a result of a military coup in 1999 39
annual global surveys that it uses as the basis of led by General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan 40
its Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The initially improved its CPI score.The Musharraf 41
CPI is based on a scale of 1 to 5 with a score government introduced a range of economic 42
of 1 reflecting the existence of a very high level reforms, established a National Accountability 43
of corruption and a score of 5 indicating very Bureau and enacted a comprehensive national 44
low levels of corruption.9 anti-corruption strategy. As a result of these 45
As seen in Table 25.2,the 2006 Transparency reforms Pakistan’s CPI score rose from 2.2 in 46
International survey of perceptions of corrup- 1999 to 2.6 in 2002 and Pakistan’s global 47
tion in South Asia showed considerable varia- ranking went from 88 out of 99 countries 48
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 C O R R U P T I O N A N D T H E C R I M I N A L I Z AT I O N O F P O L I T I C S I N S O U T H AS I A
1 surveyed in 1999 to a ranking of 81 out of 105
2 countries in 2002. As a result of continued
3 military rule and the partial restoration of
4 democracy in 2004, however, Pakistan’s CPI
5 score and its global ranking began to decline.
6 In 2006 Pakistan received a CPI score of 2.2
7 and the country ranked 142 out of the 163
8 countries surveyed.10
9 Despite the end of military rule and the
10 restoration of democracy in Bangladesh in
11 1991, the country has faced a very difficult
12 process of democratic consolidation. The
13 country developed a highly polarized politics,
14 was faced by repeated anti-government move-
15 ments designed to topple elected governments,
16 and developed extremely high levels of poli-
17 tical corruption. As a result of these develop-
18 ments,Bangladesh had the dubious distinction
19 of being ranked by Transparency International
20 as the most corrupt country in the world from
21 2001 to 2005. Bangladesh finally succeeded in
22 improving its global ranking in the 2006 report
23 as a result of a major political crisis that led to
24 the creation of a military-backed neutral care-
25 taker government (NCG). The NCG took a
26 series of important steps that were designed to
27 reduce corruption. These steps included the
28 introduction of major economic reforms; the
29 reconstitution of the country’s ineffective Anti-
30 Corruption Commission (ACC); and filing of
31 numerous court cases against corrupt poli-
32 ticians, bureaucrats, and businessmen.11
33 Transparency International’s Political
34 Corruption Index provides useful comparative
35 data for measuring perceptions of corruption
36 at the global, regional, and country level.The
37 existence of these differences also raises several
38 important questions. How does one explain
39 the variation in the scope of corruption from
40 country to county? How do forms and styles
41 of corruption differ from state to state? How
42 does one explain differences in the pattern of
43 corruption in the region? And are there any
44 common elements that can account for the
45 pervasiveness of political corruption in South
46 Asia?
47
48
Development of corruption in India
The existence of corruption in India is not
a recent phenomenon. Because of its dual
civilian and commercial activities, the
British East India Company was plagued by
corruption during most of its history. The
introduction of recruitment to East India
Company’s Indian Civil Service (ICS) by a
process of open competition in 1853 and the
end of company rule in 1858 led to major
improvements in colonial administration.
Under direct crown rule, the ICS was trans-
formed into a cadre of some 1,000 or so
professional “covenanted officers”who became
the administrative “steel frame” of British
India.12 While the small, elite ICS became
renowned for its efficiency and high levels of
integrity, the same was not the case for the vast
army of “unconvenanted” Indian officers who
staffed the lower levels of bureaucracy. These
officials were accustomed to receiving tradi-
tional gifts, payments, and perks as part of the
routine performance of their duties. They
staffed the revenue services, police, excise and
public works departments which became
especially known for their high levels of
corruption.13
Despite its reputation for integrity, the
quality and performance of even the higher
levels of the civil service in India gradually
began to deteriorate under the stress of the
First World War, the depression of the 1930s
and, especially, the outbreak of the Second
World War. The introduction of wartime
controls, growing shortages, sharp increases in
government expenditures, and the explosion
of government contracting and procurement
resulted in widespread governmental corrup-
tion during the war years from 1939 to 1945
that carried into the postcolonial era.14
Following Independence in 1947 the leaders
of India’s freedom movement attempted to set
a high standard of integrity and honesty and
even minor transgressions were dealt with
severely. In the early years of Congress rule, for
example, India’s finance minister resigned
immediately when the propriety of one of his
actions was called into question, a Congress
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member of parliament was reprimanded for submitted a comprehensive report in April 1

acting on behalf of a client and even Congress- 1964, its impact proved limited.17 2
controlled state governments were censured by The death of Nehru in May 1964, followed 3
national Congress leaders for improper bidding by that of his successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, in 4
and tender practices in the allocation of January 1966, the erosion of congress popu- 5
government contracts.15 larity,the historic split in the party in 1969,and 6
Over time, however, the rapid expansion of the rise of personalized, dynastic rule under 7
the size of government and government Indira Gandhi further compounded the 8
programs, persistent scarcity of goods and problem. By the early 1970s India was faced 9
services, the weakening of the bureaucracy with a rapidly rising tide of official corruption. 10
because of the loss of experienced British and As money and muscle began to play a more 11
Muslim ICS officers, a flood of new recruits important role in Indian politics,Congress was 12
into the newly created Indian Administrative also forced to change its methods of raising 13
Service (IAS) and a rising tide of popular funds to fight elections. During the freedom 14
demands for government services contributed movement and for most of the Nehru-Shastri 15
to a series of major scandals in the 1950s.These era, the Indian business community provided 16
scandals included the purchase of jeeps by the generous support to the Congress Party. For 17
Indian military, the famous Mundhra affair the most part, money for elections was col- 18
involving improper transactions between an lected by a small group of Congress leaders 19
industrialist and the government-controlled with close ties to India’s large private sector 20
Life Insurance Corporation of India, and business houses. Businessmen and industrial- 21
allegations of corruption against Pratap Singh ists willingly contributed to Congress coffers 22
Kairon, the former chief minister of Punjab. as a way of guaranteeing ready access to mini- 23
These incidents combined to begin to tarnish sters and party leaders, keeping the Indian 24
the image of the ruling Congress Party.16 Communist Party at bay, and providing insur- 25
Faced by repeated charges of Congress ance that their interests would be protected. 26
corruption and growing public criticism, Contributions were made by individual busi- 27
Prime Minister Nehru complained that the ness leaders, major business houses, and 28
media were devoting far too much time and other companies, facilitated by laws allowing 29
attention to these wild allegations and became such donations to be tax deductible. 30
increasingly reluctant to investigate charges of The financing of political parties in India, 31
wrongdoing. The problem, however, did not however, was significantly altered in the early 32
go away. Corruption became increasingly 1970s as a result of the introduction of a legal 33
widespread as a result of the emergence of a ban on company donations to political parties, 34
socialist-oriented developmental state,central- a historic split in the dominant Congress Party, 35
ized planning, comprehensive government the rise of competitive politics,and the sharply 36
control, and regulation of the economy, the escalating costs of election campaigns. The 37
growth of public sector enterprises and popular results were an increasing reliance on the 38
demands for government services and sub- patronage capabilities of the developmental 39
sidies.The massive expansion of the role of the state to raise campaign funds and the use of 40
state was compounded by the Congress Party’s money and muscle to ensure victory at the 41
need to raise more and more funds in order polls. While the growing reliance on money 42
to be able to fight increasingly competitive and muscle to win elections led to an increas- 43
elections. By the early 1960s the corruption ing criminalization of politics, the use of what 44
issue was so pervasive that the government felt became known as the “permit-license-quota 45
compelled to appoint a special commission to Raj” (PLQR) as the basis of campaign finance 46
study the problem. Although the Santhanam led to a new era of “briefcase politics,” which 47
Committee on the Prevention of Corruption relied very heavily on the vast reservoir of 48
368
 C O R R U P T I O N A N D T H E C R I M I N A L I Z AT I O N O F P O L I T I C S I N S O U T H AS I A
1 unreported “black money” in the Indian eco-
2 nomy.18
3 Under Indira Gandhi’s leadership from
4 1966 to 1977 the PLQR was gradually trans-
5 formed into a major source of leverage to
6 extract funds from India’s business community.
7 Those businessmen who willingly cooperated
8 by generously providing financial support to
9 the ruling congress were allowed to amass
10 huge fortunes.Those industrialists who resisted
11 or failed to cooperate were faced with excru-
12 ciating delays, tax raids, and government
13 harassment.19
14 Under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi,who
15 succeeded his assassinated mother as prime
16 minister in the early 1980s, the leverage
17 provided by the PLQR was supplanted by the
18 huge commissions that could be demanded in
19 the awarding of large government contracts.20
20 The result was a series of defense procurement
21 scandals involving the purchase of German
22 submarines and a billion-dollar scandal involv-
23 ing the purchase of Swedish Bofors 155mm
24 howitzers21 that tarnished Rajiv’s Mr Clean
25 image and contributed to his defeat in the 1989
26 parliamentary elections.
27 The massive defeat of the Congress Party
28 in the 1989 elections brought about an end to
29 one-party dominance and the temporary
30 eclipse of dynastic rule and ushered in a new
31 era of coalition politics. While some of the
32 post-1989 coalition governments were in
33 office for far too short a time to suffer from
34 major scandals, others were not.The coalition
35 governments of V.P.Singh from 1989 to 1990,
36 H. D. Deve Gowda from June 1996 to April
37 1997, and the I. K. Gujral government from
38 April 1997 to 1998 were largely free of major
39 scandals.The government of Chandra Shekhar
40 from 1990 to 1991, the Congress-led govern-
41 ment of P.V. Narashima Rao from 1991 to
42 1996 and the BJP-led government of Atal
43 BihariVajpayee from 1998 to 2004,however,all
44 faced a series of devastating scandals.22
45 Although the new era of coalition politics
46 failed to reverse the trend toward increased
47 levels of corruption,it did result in opening the
48 political system to greater transparency. The
Indian media, the courts, and NGOs began to
focus greater public attention on the problem
of corruption by exposing an increasing
number of scandals and demanding account-
ability and reform.While greater transparency
has not led to an end to corruption in India, it
has led to a series of new initiatives that have
attempted to limit its impact, such as the
recently enacted Freedom of Information Act.
While the brief Chandra Shekhar govern-
ment was saved from disastrous scandals by the
intervention of the President of India, who
repeatedly blocked the award of major
government contracts, the government of
Narashima Rao faced a rash of corruption
scandals that directly implicated the prime
minister himself. If Indira Gandhi and
Rajiv were said to have presided over an era
of “briefcase politics,” the government of
Narashima Rao was charged with introducing
a new era of “suitcase politics” as a result of the
Harshad Mehta financial scandal. Mehta, a
Bombay stockbroker who faced charges
relating to a banking and securities fraud,
claimed he had delivered a suitcase containing
Rs 10 million to the prime minister’s resi-
dence on 4 November, 1991 in an effort to
secure patronage and support from Rao’s
government. The Harshad Mehta financial
scandal was only one of a series of major
scandals that came to plague the government
of Narashima Rao.These scandals included the
Jain hawala scandal, the Jharkhand Mukti
Morcha (JMM) scandal, the Pathak bribery
case, the St Kitts affair, and the Sukh Ram
scandal.The Jain Hawala scandal came to light
when on 16 January, 1996 the CBI accused
some 100 prominent politicians and admini-
strators, including three senior ministers in
Rao’s government,of receiving Rs 650 million
from three Delhi businessmen in return for
favors between January 1988 and April 1991.
The Pathak bribery case involved an allegation
by a British businessman of Indian origin who
claimed that he that he had paid Rao $100,000
as a bribe to secure a government contract in
1983.The JMM scandal involved a charge that
Prime Minister Rao had bribed four JMM
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STA N L E Y A . KO C H A N E K

MPs to gain their support on a no-confidence the state. The Delhi scandal involved the 1
vote in 1993. The St Kitts affair involved a allocation of petrol pumps in the city.26 2
charge that Rao had orchestrated the forgery Studies of corruption in India by 3
of documents designed to implicate the son of Transparency International and its local 4
V. P. Singh in an illegal transaction on the chapter provide a composite picture of the 5
Caribbean island of St Kitts. The Sukh Ram prevalence of corruption in India. In 2006 6
affair involved Rao’s minister of telecommuni- India was ranked as moderate on Transparency 7
cations, who was caught with millions of International’s global Integrity Index which 8
rupees in cash in his house that was believed to assesses the existence and effectiveness of 9
have been obtained from the allocation of anti-corruption mechanisms that promote 10
telecommunications licenses.From Narasimha public integrity.27 Similarly, Transparency 11
Rao’s perspective the most devastating scandal International’s Global Corruption Barometer 12
proved to be the Pathak case. As a result of 2006 survey that explores the larger issue of 13
Pathak’s allegations, P.V. Narasimha Rao how petty corruption affects ordinary people 14
became the first prime minister in Indian found that corruption in India affects the lives 15
history to be convicted of bribery by an Indian of some 31 to 50 percent of the population.28 16
court.His conviction,however,was overturned An earlier study of 11 public services in 17
eight years later by a higher court.23 20 major states conducted in 2005 by 18
The formation of a BJP-led government in Transparency International India found that 19
March 1998 brought to power a Hindu Indian citizens paid a total of Rs 21,068 crores 20
nationalist party that claimed to be “a party in bribes in order to secure public services.The 21
with a difference.”During its six years in office eleven services surveyed included the police 22
from 1998 to 2004, however, a series of (crime/traffic), the judiciary, land admini- 23
corruption scandals led to charges that the stration, municipal services, government 24
corruption under Indira Gandhi paled in hospitals, electric supply, income tax assess- 25
comparison to the systemic graft of the BJP- ment, water supply, schools, rural financial 26
led NDA government.24 Naresh Chandra, a institutions, and the public distribution system 27
former cabinet secretary, went so far as to (PDP) that is charged with issuing ration cards 28
charge that corruption under the BJP had and supplies.The survey found that the police, 29
“reached such unbelievable proportions that lower courts, and land administration were 30
almost nobody believes that there is anything considered to be the most corrupt government 31
that they can do about it.”25 agencies in the country.Government hospitals, 32
Among the major scandals that erupted public sector electric supply corporations, and 33
during the period of BJP rule were the March the PDP ranked next in line.While some states 34
2001 “Tehelka.com” corruption case, a sting like Kerala were found to be relatively free of 35
operation involving the BJP chief minister of corruption, the state of Bihar was found to be 36
Chhattisgarh, and the Delhi petrol pump far and away the most corrupt state in India.29 37
scandal. The Tehelka corruption scandal Despite the existence of high levels of 38
resulted from a sting operation initiated by corruption in India, P.V. R. Rao, a retired civil 39
an internet news service. Posing as arms servant,insists:“The normal individual can live 40
dealers, Tehelka.com journalists videotaped and carry on his vocation without succumbing 41
the president of the BJP and other coalition to graft, though he may have to put up with 42
party leaders accepting bribes to facilitate the frustrations and delays.”30 43
prospects of obtaining a defense contract.Two 44
years later, in another sting operation, the BJP 45
Corruption in Pakistan
candidate for chief minister of Chhattisgarh 46
was caught taking bribes in return for the Despite a common British colonial heritage 47
allocation of leases on protected forest lands in and similar development policies, the chaos 48
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 C O R R U P T I O N A N D T H E C R I M I N A L I Z AT I O N O F P O L I T I C S I N S O U T H AS I A
1 surrounding the birth of Pakistan and
2 Bangladesh, the absence of an established
3 political and administrative infrastructure, the
4 organizational weakness of their political
5 parties, and extended periods of military–
6 bureaucratic rule have led to higher levels of
7 corruption in both countries. Compared to
8 India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have been
9 repeatedly ranked among countries with the
10 highest levels of corruption in the world in
11 Transparency International’s surveys.
12 Unlike India which inherited the infra-
13 structure of the British Raj, the new state of
14 Pakistan emerged with a near non-existent
15 governmental infrastructure, limited admini-
16 strative capabilities and a divided polity. The
17 very weakness of the state limited the role of
18 government, severely curtailed the impact of
19 government on the country’s society and
20 economy, and enabled various economic and
21 social groups to exercise a considerable degree
22 of autonomy. The very survival of the state,
23 however, forced the country’s undersized and
24 inexperienced political, bureaucratic, and
25 military elites to develop an unstable symbiotic
26 relationship among themselves. Muslim
27 League politicians depended heavily on the
28 bureaucracy to help them consolidate their
29 power and in return provided high-level
30 bureaucratic officials with extensive autonomy,
31 support, and patronage. The result was the
32 emergence of an unstable political system
33 dominated by rampant corruption that ulti-
34 mately led to a military coup in 1958 under
35 the leadership of General Ayub Khan.
36 The military coup of 1958 ushered in an era
37 of political stability, administrative consoli-
38 dation, and state building in Pakistan. Under
39 the leadership of General Ayub Khan, the
40 country embarked on an ambitious economic
41 development plan and a major reconstruction
42 of the country’s political system. Ayub’s new
43 economic development strategy, financed by
44 massive amounts of foreign aid, created a large
45 government-owned public sector; introduced
46 a comprehensive system of bureaucratic
47 control and regulation of the economy that
48 granted enormous discretionary powers to
government officials; and attempted to create
a state-based corporatism designed to enable
the government to penetrate and control all
key sectors of Pakistani society and economy.
The newly created developmental state
enabled the government to use its power to
provide public benefits in return for political
support. These distributive benefits included
such things as industrial licenses, subsidized
loans and import/export permits.
General Ayub Khan also embarked on a
major transformation of the Pakistani political
system. In the name of creating a more indi-
genous form of government,Ayub introduced
a new political order that he called “basic
democracy.” The system of basic democracy
was based on a complex process of direct
elections at the local level and indirect elections
at the provincial and national levels. Under
the new system, village-level constituencies
directly elected 80,000 “basic democrats” on
the basis of mass franchise.These 80,000 basic
democrats then formed an electoral collage to
elect the provincial assemblies, the national
parliament,and the president.The new system,
however, was easily manipulated. It enabled
local elites to maintain their dominance; it
encouraged the use of the government’s
electoral machinery to ensure electoral success;
and it enabled national and provincial politi-
cians to buy votes in an effort to gain political
power and influence.31
Although General Ayub Khan came to
power promising to cleanse the old corrupt
parliamentary system of the 1950s, the institu-
tions of basic democracy and the emergence
of a bureaucratically dominated develop-
mental state resulted in an even more per-
vasive pattern of corruption. While Ayub
remained personally free of corruption, the
same was not the case for his friends,
supporters, and relatives. His son Gohar Ayub,
for example, was able to join the ranks of the
lucky 22 business families that were said
to dominate the Pakistani economy of
the 1960s.32 Ultimately, corruption and the
resulting social and regional inequalities
of Ayub’s development model led to a mass
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uprising, the collapse of the regime, and the Zia’s move toward the restoration of limited 1
breakup of the country. civilian rule and the formation of the Junejo 2
The breakup of united Pakistan, the government in March 1985 further aggravated 3
authoritarian character of the newly created the level of corruption in the country. From 4
government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and the 1985 onward, noted Rizvi, every Pakistani 5
socialist policies of the Pakistan People’s Party government “has surpassed its predecessor in 6
vastly increased the power and role of the state offering material rewards” to its followers and 7
in society and the economy. In an effort to supporters. These rewards included cabinet 8
reduce the economic power and political posts, ministerial perks, bank loans, quotas, 9
influence of Pakistan’s 22 families, Bhutto licenses,loan waivers,development funds,land 10
nationalized all private sector banks, insurance allocations, jobs, and other government 11
companies, most large-scale private sector benefits.35 12
industries, and a large portion of domestic and The death of General Zia and the full 13
international trade and commerce. Under restoration of civilian rule in 1988 were 14
Bhutto, the size of the public sector almost followed by 11 years of political instability; the 15
doubled overnight from 24 percent of gross emergence of confrontational politics between 16
domestic product (GDP) to 51 percent. The Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, the 17
nationalization policies of the Bhutto country’s two leading politicians;and the rapid 18
government not only increased the size of the growth of pervasive corruption. Numerous 19
public sector but also substantially enhanced studies of corruption perceptions in Pakistan 20
the capabilities of the Pakistani state to from 1988 to 1999 by Transparency Inter- 21
distribute benefits to private individuals and national revealed a steady rise in levels of 22
groups in return for political support. corruption with each change of government. 23
Bhutto’s attempt to renew his electoral During the first Benazir Bhutto government 24
mandate in 1977 proved to be a disaster. from 1988 to 1990, only 8 percent of those 25
The massive popular vote in favor of the PPP surveyed considered her government to be 26
led to opposition party charges of extensive corrupt. Corruption perceptions showed a 27
vote rigging and a mass movement demand- slight increase from 8 percent under Benazir 28
ing new elections. The political chaos that to 10 percent from 1990 to 1993 under Nawaz 29
followed the 1977 Pakistani elections was Sharif. 30
brought to a halt by a military coup led by The remainder of the 1990s, however, was 31
General Zia-ul-Haq and the arrest and marked by political instability and uncertainty 32
execution of Bhutto.33 Despite the over- that seemed to alter party behavior signi- 33
throw of the PPP government, General Zia ficantly. The second government of Benazir 34
was reluctant to upset the economic status Bhutto that ruled from 1993 to 1996 proved to 35
quo and faced enormous bureaucratic resis- be one of the most corrupt in Pakistani history. 36
tance to any attempt to reduce the size of A survey by Transparency International in 1996 37
the public sector by reversing Bhutto’s found that some 48 percent of Pakistanis 38
nationalization policies. Buoyed by a massive considered Benazir Bhutto’s second govern- 39
increase in foreign aid in the 1980s related to ment to be corrupt.The survey also found that 40
the Afghan war and a flood of foreign Pakistan ranked second only to Nigeria among 41
remittances from oversees Pakistani workers the most corrupt countries in the world. These 42
in the Middle East and Europe, Zia attempted perceptions of the Bhutto government based 43
to buy political support through the use of on survey data were later confirmed by a study 44
government benefits in an effort to establish commissioned by the country’s neutral care- 45
his legitimacy.As a result, the Zia government, taker government (NCG). The study con- 46
like its predecessors, was marked by rampant ducted by Burki and Pasha, two of Pakistan’s 47
corruption.34 leading economists, estimated that the cost of 48
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 C O R R U P T I O N A N D T H E C R I M I N A L I Z AT I O N O F P O L I T I C S I N S O U T H AS I A
1 corruption from 1993 to 1996 was equal to 20
2 to 25 percent of the country’s 1996–97 GDP
3 or about $15 billion.36
4 Both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif
5 have been accused of corruption and faced a
6 number of cases in the Pakistani courts. Both
7 were also known to have acquired valuable
8 foreign properties in London and elsewhere.
9 Bhutto, for example, purchased a 350-acre
10 estate in Surrey in the United Kingdom,while
11 Nawaz used bank loans and nonpayment of
12 taxes to accumulate additional wealth. Asif
13 Zardari, Benazir’s husband, is accused of
14 accumulating his wealth through kickbacks.
15 During Benazir Bhutto’s first term as Prime
16 Minister from 1988 to 1990, Zardari came to
17 be known as “Mr Ten Percent.” By Bhutto’s
18 second term from 1993 to 1996, however,
19 Zardari had become “Mr Twenty Percent.”37
20 Although perceptions of corruption
21 declined slightly during Nawaz Sharif ’s second
22 term in office from 1996 to 1999, the prime
23 minister’s attempt to gain total control of
24 Pakistani politics and his open challenge to the
25 power of the Pakistan Army resulted in a
26 military coup in 1999 that toppled his govern-
27 ment and led to his exile to Saudi Arabia.The
28 military coup led by General Parvez Musharraf
29 promised to restore honesty,economic growth,
30 and political stability to the country. Despite
31 considerable success in rehabilitating the
32 Pakistani economy and restoring high levels of
33 growth,a survey by Transparency International
34 revealed that some 32.69 percent of Pakistanis
35 considered the initial years of Musharraf ’s rule
36 from 1999 to 2002 to be corrupt. These
37 corruption perceptions changed dramatically
38 in the aftermath of the 2002 parliamentary
39 elections when a new survey revealed that
40 perception of corruption had reached a new
41 all-time high.Some 67.31 percent of Pakistanis
42 considered Musharraf ’s rule from 2002 to 2006
43 to be corrupt!38
44 The current scope of corruption in Pakistan
45 has been demonstrated by several recent
46 assessments. A study by the World Bank in
47 2003, for example, found corruption in
48 Pakistan’s education,police,and judicial sectors
to be much higher than in other countries in
South Asia.39 While Pakistan received the same
score as India in Transparency International’s
2006 Global Corruption Barometer, it was
ranked much lower in the organization’s 2006
Global Integrity Index.40 In addition a
Transparency International study in Pakistan
in 2006 concluded that bribery in Pakistan was
estimated to cost the average citizen in the
country Rs 2,303 per household. The study
also found that the police, the electric utility
sector, the judiciary, and land administration
were the most corrupt governmental sectors.
Overall,petty corruption was estimated to cost
the country about Rs 45 billion.41
Corruption in Bangladesh
The politics of patronage and corruption have
plagued every government in Bangladesh since
liberation.During the period of Awami League
rule from 1972 to 1975,Prime Minister Sheikh
Mujibar Rahman distributed government
benefits and jobs to party leaders and supporters
as a reward for their “suffering for the cause of
the nation.”42 Awami League activists received
jobs in newly nationalized industries,grew rich
as smugglers,appropriated abandoned Pakistani
houses and property, and sold government-
allotted permits and licenses to the highest
bidder.Awami League leaders,party supporters,
and Mujib’s relatives plundered the society in
almost every way possible.43
The assassination of Mujib in August 1975
was followed by a series of military coups and
the rise of General Ziaur Rahman. Zia
dominated Bangladesh politics from 1975 until
his assassination in May 1981. Under General
Zia, corruption in Bangladesh became institu-
tionalized and came to dominate all levels of
government. Although personally free of
corruption, Zia accepted corruption as a fact
of life and publicly admitted that corruption
and the misuse of power had led to the
misappropriation of 40 percent of the country’s
development funds. Under Zia’s rule, noted
one critic, corruption was “converted from a
crime to a habit.”Under Zia’s successor,Justice
373
STA N L E Y A . KO C H A N E K

Abdus Sattar, corruption became so rampant Causes of corruption in South Asia 1

that it was invoked by General H. M. Ershad as 2
Corruption in most Asian countries,argues Jon
the major justification for his military coup.44 3
S.T. Quah, has been driven by a multiplicity of
But then, corruption in Bangladesh under 4
factors, including: low civil service salaries,
General H. M. Ershad became all-pervasive. 5
the massive social and economic role of the
Petty corruption forced businessmen and citi- 6
developmental state, the near absence of
zens to pay fees to obtain routine application 7
detection and punishment, the primacy of
forms, to secure customs clearances, and even 8
family, nepotism and patron–client relations, a
to ensure proper billing for government ser- 9
strong tradition of gift giving, the absence of
vices. Public sector enterprises were especially political will on the part of dominant elites in 10
known for their high levels of corruption.The dealing with the problem, and the lack of an 11
Power Development Board (PDB), for exam- effective anti-corruption strategy.47 While 12
ple,which was responsible for the manufacture most of these factors also apply to the countries 13
and distribution of electric power, was unable of South Asia, the higher levels of corruption 14
to account for as much as 50 percent of the in the region have focused special attention on 15
electricity it generated. This electricity was the impact of the developmental state, the 16
either stolen by consumers or simply un- dominant role of family and group loyalties, 17
accounted for as PDB employees altered large the strength of clientelism and traditional 18
utility bills in return for a substantial cut. Even patron–client relations, and the absence of 19
public and private educational institutions effective anti-corruption strategies. These 20
were not immune from widespread corruption factors have not only contributed to the rise of 21
in student placement and teacher recruitment. corruption but also have contributed to the 22
Public procurement and contracting,however, growing criminalization of politics in the 23
were the most notorious sources of massive region. 24
payoffs. During the Ershad years, major 25
contracts for the acquisition of aircraft for the 26
state-owned airline, government food pur- Impact of the developmental 27
chases, and contracts for large development state 28
projects were all subject to the payment of 29
massive commissions that ranged between 20 The imposition of a highly centralized, 30
and 40 percent of cost.45 bureaucratically dominated developmental 31
The end of military rule and the restoration state on the decentralized, largely rural, highly 32
of democracy in 1991 did not fundamentally traditional agrarian societies of South Asia has 33
alter levels of corruption in Bangladesh.Under contributed significantly to the emergence of 34
both the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) corruption in the region.The developmental 35
governments of 1991 to 1996 and 2001 to state created by the political elites in South Asia 36
2006 and Awami League rule from 1996 to was superimposed on an agrarian society and 37
2001, corruption became increasingly per- an antiquated bureaucratic administrative 38
vasive. Corruption in Bangladesh in 2002 was system that placed vast discretionary powers in 39
estimated to cost the country 44 billion taka the hands of politicians and bureaucrats. 40
($745 million) or an estimated 10 percent of This administrative system was inherited from 41
the country’s budget and 67 percent of the the British and was known as the secretariat 42
foreign assistance received by the country.The system. The secretariat system was designed 43
World Bank has noted that corruption in to diffuse power and responsibility. It was 44
Bangladesh reduced the country’s economic procedurally complex, highly inefficient 45
growth rate by as much as 2 percent per year.46 and based on a case-by-case review of all 46
governmental policies and actions regardless of 47
size or importance. 48
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 C O R R U P T I O N A N D T H E C R I M I N A L I Z AT I O N O F P O L I T I C S I N S O U T H AS I A
1 The case-by-case decisions were reached
2 through a complex process of bureaucratic
3 consensus building that began at the very
4 bottom of the bureaucratic hierarchy and
5 slowly worked its way up to the top.Under this
6 system, all bureaucratic actions were based on
7 a unit of work known as the file.The file was
8 initially assembled by a low-level clerk, who
9 was responsible for collecting all papers and
10 documents related to the case and preparing a
11 note that cited all relevant government acts,
12 rules, and regulations that were applicable.
13 The file then moved slowly through the
14 bureaucratic maze as each level of the bureauc-
15 racy thoroughly vetted the file, recorded its
16 comments, and recommended appropriate
17 action. All disagreements were settled by a
18 painstaking system of repeated individual
19 discussions between officials and group meet-
20 ings until a consensus was achieved. Since the
21 notations on the file reflect a bargained bureau-
22 cratic consensus, senior-level officials charged
23 with making a final decision were extremely
24 reluctant to overrule the agreed consensus.
25 This complex process of decision making was
26 extremely time-consuming and subject to
27 inordinate delay, delegated enormous dis-
28 cretionary powers to government officials,and
29 diffused responsibility and accountability.
30 Overcoming the delays, procedural hurdles
31 and the ambiguity of decisions that emerged
32 from this Byzantine system required intense
33 lobbying at each level, close personal con-
34 nections with officials, and the distribution of
35 gifts,payments and rewards.Lower-level clerks
36 were given bakshish to ensure that the case was
37 properly prepared; and “speed money” was
38 distributed at various levels of the bureaucracy
39 to ensure that the file moved through the
40 system in a timely manner.At the senior levels
41 of the bureaucracy, small gifts, the payment of
42 domestic and overseas travel and hotel
43 expenses, and the provision of lavish enter-
44 tainment to officials usually proved to be
45 sufficient to facilitate the desired outcome.At
46 the political level, money and large campaign
47 contributions to ministers and politicians were
48 required.48
Despite the economic reforms introduced
in 1991, India continues to be plagued by the
residues of the old order. While the Indian
middle class and the large-scale industrial
sector have been freed from the restrictions of
the PLQR, the reforms have not reached the
rest of the economy.This is especially true of
the medium and small-scale sectors. Luce
thought otherwise:
Many believe, that corruption is therefore on
the retreat.What is less appreciated is the extent
to which India’s license Raj of quotas, permits,
and hairsplitting regulations continue to exist
outside the “organized” economy. Beyond the
manicured lawns of middle-class India, the
tentacles of the License Raj continue to reach
into the lives of vast numbers of Indians.Most of
them tend to be poor.
Even the large-scale industrial sector has
complained that the PLQR of the past has
simply been replaced by the new “Inspector
Raj.”In short,the developmental state in India
was said to be dominated by a simple formula:
M + D = C, Monopoly plus Discretion equals
Corruption.49
Criminalization of politics and
the role of the state
The corruption generated by the rise of
the developmental state in South Asia was
reinforced by electoral pressures that led to a
growing reliance on money and muscle to win
elections; the emergence of a linkage between
political parties and the underworld; and a
growing criminalization of politics in the
region. In the early years following inde-
pendence, elections in South Asia were largely
influenced by the popular appeal of nationalist
leaders and not by coercion or money or the
manipulation of election results. Over time,
however, noted Pai Panandikar, the growth of
factionalism, confrontational politics, and
increased electoral competition has led to the
increased use of violence,money and muscle at
375
STA N L E Y A . KO C H A N E K

the polls. Muscle has been employed by hired by politicians to engage in booth 1
candidates, political parties, locally dominant capturing decided to secure public office for 2
landed elites, factory owners, slum lords, and themselves. Election to the state assembly and 3
urban-based mafia dons to win elections.The the national parliament became a way for 4
growing criminalization of politics and the criminals to secure political protection for their 5
growth of electoral violence in South Asian illicit activities and guarantee safety from 6
politics have been reinforced by the decline of prosecution.Like the political bosses that came 7
ideology and ideologically-based political to dominate urban politics in the early part of 8
parties,the growth of anti-government revolu- the twentieth century in the United States, 9
tionary movements, the desire to gain control India began to develop its own mafia-style 10
of the patronage resources of the state, and the gangs and political bosses in places like the 11
increasing polarization of party politics. Over slums of Mumbai and the coalfields of Bihar. 12
time, criminals who initially were hired to The growing nexus between criminality 13
help politicians get elected began to contest and politics led the government of India to 14
elections in their own right as a way of appoint a special committee to study the 15
enhancing the scope of their profits from problem.TheVohra Committee Report issued 16
criminal activity and protecting themselves in 1995, however, had to rely largely on 17
from arrest and criminal prosecution.50 anecdotal data. A more comprehensive study 18
The criminalization of politics in India of criminality and politics by Paul and 19
began in the early1960s as the old nationalist Vivekananda based on an analysis of data taken 20
leadership began to pass from the scene and an from affidavits submitted by MPs to the Indian 21
increasingly divided Congress Party could no Election Commission found that 23.2 percent 22
longer count on the legacy of the freedom of the 541 MPs elected to the Lok Sabha in 23
movement to win elections. Following the 2004 had criminal cases registered against them 24
introduction of mass franchise, state-level or had criminal cases pending against them in 25
Congress leaders relied heavily on local court. The study also found that MPs repre- 26
notables and caste leaders to mobilize voters. senting smaller regional parties such as the 27
With the passage of time, however, Congress Rashtriya Janata Dal, the Biju Janata Dal and 28
leaders in various parts of the country began to the Shiv Sena had much higher proportions of 29
resort to the use of local thugs to disrupt the criminal cases filed against them than was the 30
polls and stuff ballot boxes in a desperate effort case for MPs from large national parties like 31
to ensure victory.51 By the late1970s and early congress and the BJP. A state and regional 32
1980s,the practice of ballot stuffing developed breakdown found that MPs from the north and 33
into a more organized system known as “booth the west had a higher number of MPs with 34
capturing.” Although the practice was widely pending criminal cases than was the case for 35
employed in various parts of the country, it MPs from other regions of the country. The 36
became especially prevalent in various parts of study also found that four north Indian states— 37
northern India.In Bihar and Uttar Pradesh,for Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and 38
example, politicians paid armed gangs of thugs Jharkhand—accounted for 50 percent of all 39
between Rs 50,000 and 100,000 to seize MPs with serious criminal cases filed against 40
control of a polling station, frighten away them that carried a penalty of five years or 41
potential voters, and stuff the ballot boxes as a more in prison.53 42
way to ensure victory.52 The criminalization of politics in 43
The steady decline of the once-dominant Bangladesh has followed a somewhat different 44
Congress Party and the increasing use of booth path from that of India. Since liberation, 45
capturing gradually led to a growing criminal- Bangladesh has experimented with several 46
ization of politics in the country. By the mid- political systems and has been heavily 47
1980s, the very criminals and thugs who were influenced by its brief but intense Pakistani 48
376
 C O R R U P T I O N A N D T H E C R I M I N A L I Z AT I O N O F P O L I T I C S I N S O U T H AS I A
1 experience.The political process in the newly-
2 created state of Bangladesh became highly
3 centralized, popular elections were repeatedly
4 manipulated by the government of the day,
5 elected assemblies were largely weak and irre-
6 levant, opposition groups repeatedly resorted
7 to direct action and violence,and the country’s
8 leaders created a highly personalized, patri-
9 monial, developmental state that rested on an
10 intricate network of patron–client connections
11 and patronage that in turn relied on control of
12 government resources in order to remain in
13 power.
14 Electoral irregularities in Bangladesh began
15 at the time of the first post-liberation parlia-
16 mentary elections held in March 1973.
17 Although the charisma of Sheikh Mujibur
18 Rahman and the popularity of the Awami
19 League all but guaranteed victory for the party
20 at the polls, the elections were marred by
21 numerous malpractices. The Awami League’s
22 determination to win a total victory led the
23 party to engage in a reign of terror against its
24 opponents in prestige constituencies; oppo-
25 sition candidates were prevented from filing or
26 were forced to withdraw their nomination
27 papers, and ballot boxes were stolen and
28 replaced by new ones stuffed with Awami
29 League votes. The massive corruption and
30 chaos that characterized Awami League rule
31 contributed to the assassination of Mujib, the
32 collapse off the Awami League government, a
33 series of military coups,and the rise of General
34 Ziaur Rahman.54
35 Like the Awami League,General Zia and his
36 newly created BNP were also accused of
37 engaging in corruption and electoral mal-
38 practices designed to ensure victory. Under
39 Zia, the official electoral machinery was
40 ordered to insure the victory of official party
41 candidates and the government-controlled
42 media announced what appeared to be tailor-
43 made results.The NewYork Times characterized
44 the 1979 Bangladesh parliamentary elections
45 as an “election of questionable integrity” and
46 the 1981 election led the Manchester Guardian
47 to conclude that: “No one who knows
48 Bangladesh well could expect an election free
from foul play.” Although General Zia was
personally free of charges of corruption, he
accepted the existence of corruption as a fact
of life. Following Zia’s assassination, the per-
vasiveness of BNP corruption was, as
previously noted, used by General H. M.
Ershad to justify his 1981 military coup.55
Elections under General H.M.Ershad were
popularly referred to as “voterless elections”
because of the abysmal voter turnout. Polling
officials during the 1986 and 1988 elections
were “instructed”to ensure victory for Ershad’s
Jatiya Party candidates;ballot boxes were seized
on election day and stuffed with votes for
ruling party candidates; and state-controlled
television simply declared that the Jatiya Party
candidate had won.56
The popular movement that led to the
overthrow of the Ershad government in 1990
was followed by an election supervised by a
Neutral Caretaker Government (NCG). The
elections held in February 1991 were declared
by both domestic and international observers
to be the first truly free and fair election in
Bangladesh since 1970. The successful tran-
sition to democracy in Bangladesh in 1991,
however, was followed by a failed effort at
democratic consolidation. Awami League and
the BNP, the two major parties in Bangladesh,
embarked upon a no-holds-barred struggle for
power. The patrimonial character of the
country’s politics led to a bitter polarization of
politics and a winner-take-all battle for control
of the state and its resources. While the
majority insisted its electoral victory granted it
an absolute mandate to govern as it pleased,
the defeated opposition parties countered that
the elections had been rigged and took to the
streets demanding new elections. The mass
demonstrations, hartals (general strikes), and
repeated resort to agitational politics had a
devastating impact on the economy and the
political stability of the country.
Even the adoption of a constitutional
amendment in 1996 that mandated the
creation of an NCG to conduct free and fair
parliamentary elections failed to stem the tide
of bitter confrontation between the two
377
STA N L E Y A . KO C H A N E K

parties. Despite the constitutional mandate, necessary, it manipulated the results of elec- 1
once it was in power,each party did everything tions. Elected civilian governments that failed 2
it could to undermine the country’s election to toe the military’s line or threatened military 3
commission, the newly created NCG system, dominance were dismissed by the president of 4
and the entire electoral process in an effort to Pakistan under instruction from the military.57 5
guarantee the party’s success at the polls.Efforts As in the case of Bangladesh, the use of the 6
by the BNP government to dominate the official electoral machinery of the state 7
election commission and the NCG appointed continues to play a critical role in determining 8
to oversee the 2006 parliamentary elections election results. 9
led to a major political crisis and the appoint- 10
ment of a military-backed NCG. In short, 11
elections in Bangladesh have been repeatedly Culture of corruption: 12
marred by the use of the official machinery of Patron–client relations and 13
the state to influence election results and by a patronage 14
resort to money,muscle,violence,and criminal 15
elements to ensure electoral success. Corruption in South Asia is deeply entangled 16
As in Bangladesh, the breakup of united in the cultural traditions and social structure of 17
Pakistan in 1971 resulted in the restoration of the countries of the region. In traditional 18
democracy. While Bangladesh fell under the South Asian villages, families and groups 19
sway of the Awami League led by Sheikh secure protection, security, and the necessities 20
Mujibur Rahman, Pakistan fell under the of existence through a complex network of 21
control of the PPP led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. patron–client relations. Patron–client relations 22
Unlike Mujib, Bhutto did not bother to seek depend on a comprehensive web of relations 23
a renewed electoral mandate until 1977. based on a reciprocal exchange of mutual 24
Although Bhutto claimed to have won a dependency and obligations. Those with 25
massive victory in the 1977 elections, his higher rank, wealth, and status command the 26
opponents refused to accept the results of the services and support of those of lower rank and 27
elections and took to the streets. Following the lower ranks receive the support and 28
months of mass agitation over the alleged protection from their patrons in return.These 29
rigging of the 1977 parliamentary elections, village-level relationships are integrated into a 30
the Bhutto government was overthrown by a larger complex web of factions and alliances 31
military coup. with more powerful patrons beyond the village 32
The restoration of military rule in Pakistan at the district and state levels. 33
in 1977 had a major impact on the country’s Patron–client relations and factional 34
political development.Following over a decade alliances divide rural society along vertical lines 35
of military rule, democracy was restored in and are held together by hierarchical relations 36
1988 after the death of General Zia. Despite based on mutual obligations, reciprocity and 37
the restoration of democracy, however, the need for support. This clientelist system 38
Pakistani polities from 1988 to 1999 continued continues to dominate social relations and 39
to be shaped by the military through the influence individual and group behavior in 40
behind-the-scenes manipulation of the Inter- India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. It has also 41
Services Intelligence (ISI) agency.The ISI was played a critical role in governance. Even 42
closely allied with the locally dominant landed during the colonial era, lower level govern- 43
elite and the country’s religious leaders. The ment officials felt compelled to maintain a 44
ISI sponsored the creation of a “king’s party” close alliance with local landed elites and group 45
by engineering defections from existing leaders. Government officials in the region 46
political parties; it supplied its allies with huge have traditionally relied on alliances, social 47
amounts of election funds; and, when networks, and locally powerful landlords as a 48
378
 C O R R U P T I O N A N D T H E C R I M I N A L I Z AT I O N O F P O L I T I C S I N S O U T H AS I A
1 way of supplementing the organizational
2 weakness of the state at the local level.
3 Traditional forms of gift giving played an
4 essential role in maintaining and sustaining
5 these social relationships.
6 The rise of the state and political parties
7 altered but did not destroy the old order.
8 Political parties and the state simply evolved a
9 new style of clientelism in which clients
10 received benefits from the state in exchange
11 for political support at the polls.58 Although
12 the new system continued to be based on
13 instrumental relationships and the distribu-
14 tion of benefits, it was less hierarchical, more
15 personal, more bureaucratized and more fluid
16 than the old. The new clientelism, in short,
17 evolved into a new style of special interest
18 politics based on the distribution of govern-
19 ment jobs and public resources in an effort to
20 build and sustain political support.
21 The durability of patron–client relations in
22 South Asia continues to be reflected in the
23 relationship between the state and society.
24 Given the tradition of bureaucratic paternalism
25 and the emergence of the developmental
26 state, groups and individuals in the region
27 continued to resort to the tradition of gift
28 giving, nepotism, patronage, money, and
29 lobbying to secure benefits.These tactics were
30 facilitated by traditional modes of behavior
31 reflected in the employment of bakshish in
32 India, safarish in Pakistan, and tadbir
33 (connections) in Bangladesh.These traditions
34 were based on the principle of reciprocity,
35 which required that a gift be returned with a
36 gift, a favor rendered for a favor, and favorable
37 treatment reciprocated by favorable treatment.
38 Wealth, rank and status continue to play
39 important roles in the politics of South Asia.
40 Support for the developmental state in the
41 region,for example,has survived the decline of
42 socialist and communist ideologies because of
43 the critical role it has played in the rise of the
44 urban middle class. The developmental state,
45 created in the name of helping the poor,
46 developed into a system of preferential access
47 that has primarily benefited the urban middle
48 class.The urban middle class has used its status
and political influence to gain access to a vast
array of public goods and state subsidies. Elite
connections based on family, school tie, and
community have continually enabled the
urban middle class to jump the queue, pull
strings, and secure services and benefits
allocated by the bureaucracy free of charge or
at highly subsidized rates. As a result, public
benefits created in the name of helping the
poor have tended to go largely to those who
have money, status, and connections while the
poor continue to pay for these services or are
forced to do without. In short, drawing on the
tradition of patron–client relations, the new
clientelism provided the urban middle-class
liberal access to public resources that gave them
very little incentive to support economic
reforms,demand a clamp down on corruption
or change a system that has supported their
private consumption.
Strategies for dealing with
corruption
Although numerous World Bank Studies have
concluded that there is no single solution to
dealing with the problem of corruption, the
most successful programs have focused on
capacity building, reducing opportunities, and
limiting benefits. Success depends largely on
the scope of the problem, its causes, and the
amount of resistance. The World Bank has
concluded that the most successful anti-
corruption strategies involve improved civil
service supervision, public awareness cam-
paigns, limiting the discretionary power of
bureaucrats and politicians,higher civil service
salaries, privatization, or public sector reform,
an effective anti-corruption enforcement
mechanism,and most important of all,political
will on the part of senior elected officials.The
most critical elements in any anti-corruption
strategy are strong political will, external
mechanisms to ensure accountability,and clear
objectives and priorities.
379
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Obstacles to reform 4 Gunnar Myrdal,Asian Drama:An Inquiry into the 1

Poverty of Nations, vol. II (New York:Twentieth 2
All reform programs, however, tend to Century Fund, 1968), p. 937. 3
encounter significant obstacles that must be 5 School of Advanced International Studies 4
overcome. The most significant obstacles (SAIS),Johns Hopkins University, Washington, 5
to reform in South Asia vary from country to DC, seminar on corruption, 30 March,
6
country.The most important common factors 2007.
6 Haller and Shore, pp. 3–6.
7
include the need to overcome the resistance of 8
7 Narendra Kumar Singh, Bureaucracy: Positions
entrenched elites, the absence of incentives to 9
and Persons (New Delhi:Abhinav Publications,
change, a lack of political will, the repeated 1974), pp. 198–99. 10
enactment of ineffective anti-corruption laws, 8 Sten Widmalm,“Explaining Corruption at the 11
and a refusal to reduce the role of the state in Village and Individual Level in India: Findings 12
the society and economy. from a Study of the Panchayati Raj Reforms,” 13
While reformers admit that a major Asian Survey (September–October 2005), 14
reduction in poverty in South Asia will require pp. 756–76. See also Akhil Gupta, “Blurred 15
continued state intervention, this objective, Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, 16
they argue, is unlikely to be achieved by an the Culture of Politics, and the Imagined
17
State,” American Ethnologist, Vol. 22, No. 2
unreformed and unaccountable state. The 18
(1995), pp. 375–402.
incentive to substantially alter the current 9 Transparency International, Corruption 19
system, however, has yet to emerge.While the Perceptions Index, 2006. 20
growth of civil society represents an important 10 Transparency International Pakistan, Press 21
development, civil society in South Asia has Release, 11 August, 2006. 22
been shown to be still too weak to achieve 11 Mahmuduk Rahman, Economic Governance 23
success. So long as government continues to Issues and Bangladeshi Experience of Growth and 24
totally dominate the society and economy, Governance (Dhaka, June 2006). 25
12 Judith M. Brown, Modern India:The Origins of 26
pervasive corruption and bribery will continue
an Asian Democracy (Oxford: University Press, 27
to play a major role in the political, social and 1994), p. 59.
economic development of the region. Most 28
13 B. B. Misra, Government and Bureaucracy in India:
reforms in South Asia in the past have been 29
1947–1976 (New Delhi: Oxford University
introduced largely in response to economic Press, 1986), pp. 270–71.
30
crisis, systemic breakdown, the rise of new 14 Government of India, Ministry of Home 31
social forces, international pressure, and global Affairs, Report of the Committee on the Prevention 32
of Corruption (Santhanam Committee Report), 33
change.What has been absent is the required
14 April, 1964, pp. 6–7. 34
political will.
15 P. V. R. Rao, Red Tape and White Cap (New 35
Delhi: Orient Longmans, 1970), p. 3. 36
16 Basudev Panda, Indian Bureaucracy: An Inside 37
Notes Story (New Delhi: Uppal, 1978), pp. 78–101. 38
17 Santhanam Committee Report. 39
1 Laza Kekic, “A Pause in Democracy’s 18 Stanley A. Kochanek, “Briefcase Politics in
40
March,” The World in 2007 (Economist, 2007), India: The Congress Party and The Business
41
pp. 59–60. Elite,” Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No. 12 (December
1987), pp. 1,278–301.
42
2 Dieter Haller and Cris Shore (eds), Corruption:
Anthropological Perspectives (London:Pluto Press, 19 Kochanek,“Briefcase Politics,” p. 1,291. 43
2005), p. 2. 20 R. Venkataraman, My Presidential Years (New 44
3 Rick Stapenhurst and Sahr J. Kpundeh (eds), Delhi: HarperCollins, 1994), p. 40. 45
Curbing Corruption:Toward a Model for Building 21 B. G. Deshmukh, From Poona to the Prime 46
National Integrity (Washington, DC: World Minister’s Office: A Cabinet Secretary Looks Back 47
Bank, 1999), p. 19. (New Delhi:HarperCollins,2004),pp.217–26. 48
380
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1 22 Paranjoy Thakurta and Shankar Raghuraman, 40 Transparency International, Integrity Index.

2 A Time of Coalitions: Divided We Stand (New 41 Transparency International Pakistan, Press
3 Delhi: Sage, 2004), pp. 337–44. Release, 11 August, 2006.
4 23 Stanley A. Kochanek, India: Government and 42 Stanley A. Kochanek, Patron Client Politics and
Politics in a Developing Nation, 7th edn (Boston, Business in Bangladesh (New Delhi/Newbury
5
MA:Thomson Wadsworth, 2008), pp. 304–05. Park/London: Sage, 1993), p. 258.
6
24 Francine R Frankel, India’s Political Economy: 43 Kochanek, Patron Client Politics, p. 259.
7 1947–2004 (New Delhi: Oxford University 44 Kochanek, Patron Client Politics, p. 259.
8 Press, 2005), pp. 725–26. 45 Kochanek, Patron Client Politics, pp. 261–62.
9 25 Financial Times Weekly (London), 12–13 46 See World Bank, Taming Leviathan: Reforming
10 October, 2002. Governance in Bangladesh (Dhaka:World Bank,
11 26 Thakurta and Raghuraman, pp. 337–44. 2002).
12 27 Global Integrity Assessment Index, http:// 47 Jon S.T. Quah,“Curbing Asian Corruption:An
13 www.globalintegrity.org/data/2006index.cfm. Impossible Dream?” Current History (April
14 28 Transparency International, Report on the 2006), pp. 176–79.
15 Transparency International Global Corruption 48 Stanley A. Kochanek, “The Politics of
Barometer, 7 December, 2006. Regulation: Rajiv’s New Mantras,” Journal of
16
29 Transparency International India, India Corrup- Commonwealth and Comparative Studies,Vol. 23,
17
tion Study 2005: To Improve Governance, No. 3 (November 1985), pp. 189–211.
18 30 June, 2005. 49 Edward Luce, In Spite of the Gods:The Strange
19 30 Rao, p. 198. Rise of Modern India (New York: Doubleday,
20 31 Karl Von Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan 2007), pp. 66, 78–84.
21 (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1965), p. 265. 50 V.A.Pai Panandiker (ed.),Problems of Governance
22 32 Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan in South Asia (Dhaka: University Press, 2000),
23 1962–1969 (London:Oxford University Press, pp. 355–57.
24 1972), pp. 295–96. 51 T. N. Seshan with Sanjoy Hazarika, The
25 33 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto: Degeneration of India (New Delhi: Penguin
26 1971–1977 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1980). Viking, 1995), pp. 24–25, 264–65.
34 Anita M. Weiss and S. Zulfiqar Gilani (eds), 52 Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India’s
27
Power and Civil Society in Pakistan (Oxford: Growing Crisis of Governability (Cambridge:
28 University Press,2001),p.111;and Shahid Javed University Press, 1990), pp. 212–26.
29 Burki and Craig Baxter, Pakistan Under the 53 Samuel Paul and M.Vivekananda, “Holding a
30 Military: Eleven Years of Zia ul-Haq (Boulder, Mirror to the New Lok Sabha,” Economic
31 CO:Westview, 1991), pp. 30–31. and Political Weekly, Vol. 39, No. 45 (6–12
32 35 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Military, State, and Society November, 2004), pp. 4,927–34.
33 in Pakistan (London: Macmillan, 2000). 54 Kochanek, Patron Client Politics, pp. 225–27.
34 36 See Burki and Baxter, Pakistan Under the 55 Shamsul Huda Harun, Bangladesh Voting
35 Military,p.173;and Transparency International, Behaviour: A Psychological Study 1973 (Dhaka:
36 Global Perception Survey, 1996. University Press, 1986), pp. 220, 244.
37 37 Owen Bennett Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm 56 Kochanek, Patron Client Politics, pp. 226–27.
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 57 Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque
38
2002), pp. 232–35. and Military (Washington, DC: Carnegie
39 38 Global Corruption Barometer, p. 1; and “News: Endowment for International Peace, 2005).
40 Pakistan Leads in Corruption”, http://puggy. 58 See Kanchan Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties
41 symonds.net/pipermail/corruption-issues/ Succeed:Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India
42 2003-June/000346.html. (Cambridge: University Press, 2004).
43 39 Global Corruption Barometer, p. 1.
44
45
46
47
48
381
 1

26 2
3
4
5
Radical and violent 6
7
political movements 8
9
10
11
Sumanta Banerjee 12
13
14
15
16
17
18
Prelude to violence improve their lot when all other means (such 19
as Gandhian satyagraha, or parliamentary 20
The violent forms that radical movements reforms) have failed. 21
are assuming in parts of South Asia today In fact, soon after Independence in 1947, 22
have a long tradition stretching back to the both newly formed states, India and Pakistan, 23
unresolved conflicts that were left behind in apart from getting embroiled in the high- 24
the wake of the transfer of power by the British profile territorial dispute over Kashmir, had to 25
colonial rulers to the nationalist leaders in the face the less publicized Communist-led armed 26
late 1940s. Since then, during the last half insurgencies, which had broken out in several 27
century or so,discord between the landless and areas on the eve of Independence and con- 28
the landed gentry,contention for power among tinued thereafter. These insurgencies were 29
different ethnic communities, and hostility mainly confined to the rural areas, involving 30
between religious majority and minority peasants and poor tribal people, who were 31
groups, among other divisive matters, had off fighting oppressive landlords and the police 32
and on reached flashpoints in the postcolonial force. Communist-led uprisings by the 33
states.The governments of these South Asian tribal hajongs in Mymansingh, and santhals in 34
states have been incapable of disentangling the Rajshahi against rack renting by feudal land- 35
roots of these conflicts which they inherited lords in the newly independent East Pakistan, 36
from the pre-Independence era,and have failed peasant guerilla movement in Kakdwip in 37
to resolve them through a democratic process. West Bengal, and similar acts of armed 38
Violence often becomes the ultimate and resistance by the rural poor of Kishengarh in 39
extreme response of the most desperate seg- Patiala and Tanjore in Tamil Nadu in the Indian 40
ments of the population who have remained state, were extensions of pre-Independence 41
deprived of the benefits of development anti-feudal struggles under Communist leader- 42
following Independence,and who find that the ship.1 These feudal forces were represented in 43
prevailing ruling system has failed to fulfill its the Indian countryside by an axis of upper caste 44
promises. The history of Communist radical landlords and orthodox religious patriarchs 45
movements in India testifies to the will of from all denominations, both notorious for 46
the poor peasantry and landless to opt for vio- their economic exploitation and social oppres- 47
lence as the last resort in their attempt to sion of the poor peasants, particularly their 48
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1 womenfolk.The most serious challenge to the
2 new government in New Delhi was posed by
3 the Communist insurgency in Telangana in
4 southern India.This area was a princely state
5 ruled by the Nizam, who controlled vast
6 feudatory lands and against whose oppressive
7 practices the Communist peasant leaders had
8 waged an armed resistance from 1946 onwards,
9 in the course of which they carved out
10 liberated zones over large swaths of rural
11 territory where they distributed land among
12 the poor, and set up gram raj or village soviets
13 for governance. Even after the Nizam’s rule
14 ended with the entry of Indian troops in
15 September 1948 and the official merger of the
16 Nizam’s state into the Indian Union, the
17 Communists continued the armed struggle
18 against the Indian army. The latter unleashed
19 a military offensive that took a heavy toll of the
20 Communist leaders and cadres. In 1951, the
21 CPI (Communist Party of India) central
22 leadership instructed its followers to surrender
23 arms and withdraw the movement, following
24 the party’s decision to abandon armed struggle
25 and join the mainstream of parliamentary
26 politics).2
27 The continuation of old armed struggles,
28 and initiation of new ones in the South Asian
29 subcontinent in the years immediately follow-
30 ing independence from British rule could be
31 traced partly to the local internal contradic-
32 tions just mentioned, and partly to the post-
33 Second World War international strategy of
34 Communists. This was the period when the
35 Cold War was heating up, with the US
36 expanding its economic and military influence
37 over the area, and the Moscow-led inter-
38 national Communist movement trying to
39 intensify national resistance against such
40 expansion.Communists in Burma,Malaya,the
41 Philippines, Indonesia, Indochina (today’s
42 Vietnam), were taking up the threads of their
43 erstwhile anti-Japanese war of resistance,
44 and were transforming their struggles into
45 national liberation movements either against
46 the still ruling colonial powers, or the new
47 native rulers who were close to Washington
48 and London. Representatives from these
various Communist parties gathered in
Calcutta in March 1948 to attend the second
party congress of the CPI there. It is believed
that sections of the then CPI leadership were
inspired to a large extent by the experiences
of militancy narrated by these Southeast
Asian Communist delegates, and news of
the approaching victory of the Chinese
Communists, in adopting a policy of armed
insurrection to overthrow the Congress
government, which it considered to be an
agent of “Anglo–American imperialism.”3
The insurrectionary program adopted
by the CPI at its second party congress in
1948 led to a string of urban actions, includ-
ing armed clashes between students and
the police and destruction of government
properties in cities like Calcutta and Bombay,
seizure of factories by Communist unions, an
abortive railway strike, and jail breaks among
other similar isolated and sporadic acts of
militancy, which were soon suppressed by the
police. In contrast to the swift collapse of
the CPI’s armed insurrection in the cities,
its program for the rural areas—guerrilla
warfare—was to find a more lasting echo in the
ongoing armed peasant struggles in Kakdwip in
West Bengal, and more importantly in
Telangana where the Communists were able to
build up and sustain their liberated zones for
quite some time. As mentioned earlier, the
Telangana peasant guerrillas laid down their
arms only in 1951 after being advised by their
party leaders. This inaugurated a new phase
in the strategy and tactics of the Indian
Communists, which was marked by a shift
of emphasis from armed insurrection to parti-
cipation in parliamentary politics, towards
their final aim of capturing state power.
Intermission
The period spanning the mid-1950s to the
mid-1960s could be described as a rather
peaceful interlude which was highlighted by
Communist participation in the parliamentary
system, both in the role of the opposition, led
383
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by able legislators and orators such as Hiren were getting increasingly strident in their 1
Mukherjee, A. K. Gopalan, and others in criticism of the congress government’s failures 2
parliament, and as a ruling party in the first- on the domestic front and were moving closer 3
ever Communist state government (in Kerala) to the Chinese Communist Party’s critique of 4
in 1957. But, in Kerala, when the Communists the Nehruvian policies. From the late 1950s 5
tried to implement land reforms, they faced onwards, the international Communist move- 6
tremendous opposition from entrenched ment was showing signs of splitting. The 7
feudal landlords.When they attempted reforms Chinese Communists attacked the Soviet 8
in the educational sector to provide access to leader Khrushchev for enunciating the theory 9
the underprivileged,they faced equally aggres- of “peaceful co-existence” with the capitalist 10
sive opposition from the religious orthodoxy west, and upheld instead the Maoist theory of 11
(the Catholic church in this case) which had the intensification of class struggles against 12
been running schools on commercial lines and the US-led western camp. The international 13
felt threatened by the reforms that would Communist policy to be adopted towards the 14
curtail their power. This again represented Indian government became one of the major 15
the typical axis of landlords and religious issues in the Sino-Soviet ideological debate. 16
patriarchs—a manifestation of the type of China’s leaders, who were embroiled in a 17
feudalism current in modern India, to which I border dispute with India, were peeved by the 18
have drawn attention earlier.These privileged Soviet Union’s support to Nehru, who, in the 19
sections, which had a vested interest in the opinion of the Chinese Communists, was 20
status quo, were mobilized by the Congress granting increasing concessions (like tax 21
party in a violent agitation to topple the benefits to the private sector and collaboration 22
Communist government in Kerala. The then with the US in business) to the Indian “big 23
Congress party President Indira Gandhi (who bourgeoisie” and “imperialism.”4 24
later as India’s Prime Minister in 1975–76 was Echoes of these global Communist dissen- 25
to impose emergency rule to suppress all sions reached Indian Communists when, in 26
democratic rights) played a major role in October 1962, war broke out between India 27
fostering this anti-Communist agitation, and and China over the disputed border.Although 28
persuading a Congress-led government at the the conflict lasted only a few days and ended 29
center (headed by her father Jawaharlal Nehru) with a humiliating defeat of the Indian Army 30
to dismiss the Communist government in and a status quo of sorts imposed by China, it 31
Kerala in July 1959 (on the plea of the aggravated the fissures within the Communist 32
breakdown of law and order), although the Party of India.While the pro-Moscow section 33
Communists still enjoyed a majority in the steadfastly supported India’s anti-China stand, 34
legislature. their opponents pleaded for unconditional 35
During the years that followed, the erosion negotiation with China, which led to their 36
of the credibility of the ruling national Congress being branded as “Chinese agents” by 37
at the center through such undemocratic acts, their rivals. Soon after, the police arrested the 38
was accompanied by an equally steady decline radical leaders of the CPI’s National Council, 39
in popular faith in its ability to bring about land who were opposing the party’s official pro- 40
reforms and stem the degradation of the rural government line, and swooped down on 41
masses. The Communist Party of India itself their followers. 42
also went through an agonizing phase of self- 43
introspection during this period. While one 44
section of the leadership and cadres felt that the Return to violence 45
party should continue to support the ruling 46
congress at the center (primarily because of its After their release from jail in 1964, these 47
pro-Soviet foreign policy), their opponents Communist dissidents got together, and the 48
384
 R A D I CA L A N D V I O L E N T P O L I T I CA L M OV E M E N TS
1 same year they broke away from their parent
2 CPI to form the CPI (Marxist). Although, in
3 their program, the latter pledged to set up a
4 “revolutionary” party dedicated to the task of
5 establishing a “people’s democracy,” they also
6 maintained, like their rival CPI, that they
7 would strive to achieve their objective through
8 “peaceful means.”This dissatisfied the radicals
9 in the party, who began to propagate among
10 the ranks their views in favor of armed
11 struggle. In under three years, the politics of
12 violence reemerged on the agenda of the
13 Indian Communist movement, leading to yet
14 another split in its leadership and ranks.
15 The contemporary economic and political
16 context needs to be explained in this connec-
17 tion. By the late 1960s, agrarian tensions had
18 surged to a boiling point with newspapers
19 reporting incidents of deaths from starvation
20 and sporadic pillaging of food warehouses in
21 different parts of India. In May 1966 Prime
22 Minister Indira Gandhi was compelled to
23 admit that 46.6 million people spread over 117
24 districts from north to south and west to east
25 (a little over one-tenth of the total population),
26 were suffering from “scarcity conditions”—an
27 euphemistic term for famine used in Indian
28 government documents.The mood of popular
29 discontent was reflected in the fourth general
30 elections held in March 1967, when voters in
31 many states rejected the hitherto one-party
32 Congress rule, and ushered in a new phase in
33 Indian politics. Since Congress was reduced to
34 a minority in several state legislatures, non-
35 Congress coalitions of various political hues
36 captured power in these states. In West Bengal,
37 a similar coalition termed the United Front
38 Government, was sworn in on 2 March, 1967.
39 A left-of-center government, it consisted of
40 breakaway groups from Congress,as well as the
41 CPI (M), the CPI, and some other leftist
42 parties.
43 It was against this backdrop that the first
44 spark of violent protest by a disgruntled pea-
45 santry, reminiscent of the days of Communist
46 insurgency of the 1940–50 period,was kindled
47 in May 1967 in a place called Naxalbari.
48 Ironically, the spot happened to be in West
Bengal, and the outbreak occurred when the
Land and Land Revenue Ministry of the newly
installed United Front government there was
being headed by the veteran CPI (M) peasant
leader Harekrishna Konar. The events in
Naxalbari revealed the complex tensions
between the radical aspirations of the rural
poor and the obligations and compulsions of a
leftist ruling party, which had agreed to
administer a state within a constitutional and
parliamentary system that is heavily loaded
against these poor sections, offering little
representation for their interests. That these
tensions continue to plague the Indian
parliamentary Left even 40 years after the
Naxalite uprising is evident in the recent
turmoil in the West Bengal countryside
following the Left Front government’s
plans for taking over land for industrializa-
tion (a subject to which we shall return later).
It indicates the still unresolved conflict of
political and economic priorities among the
Indian Left that continues to manifest itself in
violent conflagrations.
Naxalbari and its ripples
Let us look more closely at the events at
Naxalbari in May 1967. Situated in the
northeastern tip of West Bengal, it was popu-
lated primarily by poor tribal peasants and
tea plantation labor among whom the
Communists had a strong base built over years
of struggles against local landlords and
plantation owners. The uprising in May was
led by local leaders of the CPI (M), prominent
among whom were Charu Mazumdar and
Kanu Sanyal.Their immediate aim was to end
the feudal landlord system, redistribute land
through peasants’ committees, and arm the
peasants to resist landlords who opposed
such reforms.But Charu Mazumdar,the ideo-
logue, nursed a long-term strategy to carve
out “liberated zones” through such tactics,
following the Maoist model of the Chinese
revolution. In fact, Mazumdar had been
working on the strategy since 1965, and by
385
S U M A N TA B A N E R J E E

1967 he and his comrades had built up a November 1967, they met in Calcutta and 1
well–knit organization of militant peasant decided to form the All-India Coordination 2
cadres. Within two months of the United Committee of Communist Revolutionaries, 3
Front’s coming to power in West Bengal, in and issued a statement in their mouthpiece, 4
May 1967, these peasants occupied land, Liberation, referring to the Naxalbari uprising 5
cancelled all debts and interest owed by them and “revolutionary peasant struggle [that were] 6
to moneylenders, passed death sentences on breaking out or going to break out in various 7
oppressive landlords, formed armed bands and parts of the country,” and giving a call to “all 8
set up a parallel administration to look after the revolutionary elements inside and outside the 9
villages.5 After a series of clashes between party” to develop and lead these struggles by 10
peasants and the police and landlords, the coordinating their activities to build up a 11
CPI(M) ministers fell in with the govern- revolutionary party.6 12
ment’s decision to launch a massive police This brings us to the second development 13
action in Naxalbari in July 1967, as a result of that followed closely after the Naxalbari events, 14
which the rebellion was soon snuffed out. namely, the “revolutionary peasant struggles” 15
But it engendered a lasting and acrimonious referred to in an earlier statement. Sure 16
relationship between the CPI (M) and the enough, after news of the Naxalbari uprising 17
Maoist Communists to the detriment of spread, there was a noticeable increase in 18
the leftist movement in India. peasant agitations in the Indian countryside, 19
Although the rebellion in Naxalbari lasted spreading from Assam,Tripura,and Manipur in 20
hardly a couple of months and collapsed in the northeast, to Punjab in the northwest, 21
the face of a police offensive, future events and to the central states of Madhya Pradesh, 22
were to show that, although the Indian state Rajasthan, and Maharashtra down to the 23
won the battle in Naxalbari, it was not able to eastern and southern states of Orissa, Tamil 24
win the war that was to follow, which still Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh.They were serious 25
continues.The sequence of developments that enough to compel the home ministry of the 26
came on the heels of the Naxalbari upsurge then government of India to compile a report 27
was to change the course of the radical in 1969 in which it acknowledged that the 28
Communist movement in India. First, when land reform measures undertaken by the 29
the Communist rebels were still in control in government till then had “not benefited the 30
Naxalbari, on 28 June, 1967, Communist actual tiller,” and the failure “provided [a] 31
China’s official mouthpiece, Radio Peking, breeding ground for various political move- 32
welcomed the rebellion as “the front paw of ments.” Usually spontaneous, or led by local 33
the revolutionary armed struggle launched by militant groups, these agitations were marked 34
the Indian people under the guidance of Mao by occupation of land by the landless, forcible 35
Tse-tung,” and dismissed the West Bengal harvesting of crops by evicted sharecroppers, 36
United Front government (of which the demonstrations demanding increase in wages 37
CPI (M) was a part) as a “tool of the Indian of agricultural workers, and protest actions 38
reactionaries to deceive the people.” The against higher taxes among other features.7 39
Chinese Communist Party’s support for the Close on the heels of these incidents was 40
CPI (M) dissidents in Naxalbari was motivated the third major development. Soon after the 41
primarily by its then foreign policy of oppo- Naxalbari uprising,an agitation by forest tribals 42
sition to the Indian government (a carryover (known as girijans) living in the jungle-clad 43
from the 1962 Sino-Indian border dispute), as hilly region of Srikakulam in Andhra Pradesh 44
well as its ideological dispute with the Soviet in south India spread like wildfire towards the 45
party mentioned earlier.The Chinese support end of 1967. It was again led by radicals in the 46
bolstered courage among dissenters in the CPI Andhra Pradesh CPI (M), who organized the 47
(M) in other parts of India. In the middle of girijans to carry out raids on the houses of 48
386
 R A D I CA L A N D V I O L E N T P O L I T I CA L M OV E M E N TS
1 landlords, seize crops, and burn promissory
2 notes that were obtained from the debt-bound
3 tribals by the landlords, thus following the
4 familiar trends that marked peasant jacqueries in
5 the past. By 1968, however, the leaders of the
6 agitation, who had been facing reprisal from
7 the state armed police, had switched over to
8 guerilla actions with the objective of “seizing
9 political power.”They also got in touch with
10 the Naxalbari leader, Charu Mazumdar, and
11 the All-India Coordination Committee of
12 Communist Revolutionaries. By 1969, the
13 militant Communists in Srikakulam were
14 claiming control over some 300 villages, from
15 where the landlords had been forced to flee,
16 and which were being administered by the
17 Ryotanga Sangrama Samithi or peasants’ revolu-
18 tionary committees.The guerrilla movement
19 also expanded to the neighboring tribal areas
20 of Orissa, bordering Andhra Pradesh.8
21
22
The first phase: A decade of ups and
23
downs
24
25 The spread of peasant agitations, including
26 spontaneous uprisings and organized armed
27 struggles, inspired radicals in the CPI (M) to
28 make a final break with their parent party, and
29 on 22 April, 1969, they formed the CPI
30 (Marxist-Leninist). Describing the Indian
31 state as run by big landlords and comprador9
32 bureaucratic capitalists,the new party stated its
33 main objective as seizing power through armed
34 struggle of the peasants, the basic form of
35 which would be guerrilla warfare. In May the
36 next year, the party held its congress and came
37 out with a program, reiterating the path of
38 armed struggle,and stressing that the “principal
39 contradiction” of the period was that between
40 feudalism and the broad masses of the Indian
41 people, the resolution of which would lead to
42 the resolution of the other three contra-
43 dictions: (i) between imperialism and the
44 Indian people; (ii) between capital and labor;
45 and (iii) among the ruling classes.
46 The formation of the CPI (M-L) ushered in
47 the first phase of a new radical Communist
48 uprising in India, which came to be known as
the Naxalite movement. It traced its ideo-
logical beginnings to the middle of the 1960s
(when Charu Mazumdar and other Maoist
leaders tried to frame a strategy of agrarian
revolution through guerilla warfare), and it
could sustain itself till the mid-1970s (when
both internal dissensions and severe police
repression put an end to it).During this period,
the CPI (M-L)-led peasant struggles were
mainly concentrated in parts of Andhra
Pradesh and Orissa in the south,Bihar and West
Bengal in the east,and a few pockets in Punjab
and Uttar Pradesh in the north.
Significantly enough, the movement was
also able to draw a large number of urban
youth and intellectuals, who were inspired by
its egalitarian values, and, more importantly,
by its restoration of revolutionary humanism
in the Indian Communist movement that
valorized individual courage, and readiness to
sacrifice for a cause. They left their homes,
schools and colleges, abandoned their careers,
and went to the villages and joined the peasants
in guerilla struggles. In cities like Calcutta,
students took part in armed attacks on the
police and government establishments. The
role of urban youth in the Naxalite movement
needs to be understood in the context of the
international situation in the late 1960s. This
was the period of the growing anti-war
movement in the US in the background of the
Vietnam liberation war;the anti-establishment
student agitations in Paris, Rome, Berlin, and
other parts of Europe; and Che Guevara’s
heroic self-sacrifice in the jungles of Bolivia in
pursuit of the old dream of international
solidarity of all revolutionaries. In India, youth
found in the Naxalite movement an echo of
the international rebellious spirit of the times.
The movement recorded some successes as
well as failures. Their efforts to establish
temporary “liberated zones” in the tribal-
inhabited forest belt of Andhra Pradesh, the
villages of Birbhum and Medinipur in West
Bengal, and the plains of Bhojpur in Bihar,
were soon defeated, primarily because of their
inability to build up a strong armed resistance
to protect them from the onslaught of a
387
S U M A N TA B A N E R J E E

militarily far superior state, as well as because state, the CPI (M-L) squarely placed violence 1
of divisions within their leadership and ranks.10 as a persistent method of action in Indian 2
Although the CPI (M-L) claimed to adopt politics. It became a precedent for armed 3
Maoist guerrilla tactics as the means to achieve offensives by other groups, albeit ideologically 4
their goal, they ignored two basic tenets of the different, such as militants from religious and 5
Maoist military strategy: (i) the choice of a ethnic minority communities, who were to 6
favorable terrain to create a stable liberated crop up in the 1980s (e.g., Khalistanis of 7
zone from whence to expand; and (ii) the Punjab, JKLF (Jammu and Kashmir Liberation 8
building up of a people’s liberation army to Front) and Islamic secessionists of Kashmir, 9
take on the enemy.11 The imposition of ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam),and 10
“emergency” authoritarian rule in the entire similar separatist groups in Assam and the 11
country by Congress Prime Minister Indira northeast). 12
Gandhi on 26 June,1975,was the decisive blow But the main achievement of this first phase 13
that brought to an end the first phase of the of the CPI (M-L) movement was not its 14
Maoist movement. Along with the stifling of physical occupation and administrative control 15
the growing popular discontent against her over territory, but its success in spreading its 16
policies (which found expression in an all- ideological message of people’s power and the 17
India agitation headed by the Gandhian right of self-defense among the rural poor. It 18
socialist leader Jayaprakash Narayan), it also continues to arouse the latter to protest 19
smothered the last embers of the Naxalite and take up arms against their old landlord 20
armed struggle. oppressors and new industrial predators 21
Looking back at the brief but tumultuous encroaching on their lands, and to take on the 22
phase of the Naxalite movement in the 1960s’ Indian state whenever it sends its police to 23
period, a contemporary political observer protect these powerful interests,whether in the 24
cannot but acknowledge that it was a villages of Bihar and Jharkhand in the east, or 25
watershed in the recent history of India in the tribal hamlets of Chhattisgarh in central 26
more than one sense.For the first time in post- India,or the hills and forests of Andhra Pradesh 27
Independence India (barring the short-lived in the south. 28
Telangana struggles in 1947–51, mentioned 29
earlier), the movement set forth the demands 30
The second phase: Continuity and
of the poor and landless peasantry in a way that 31
change
shook the atrophied Indian political scene.The 32
violent outbreak sensitized the rest of society This brings us to the later history of the Maoist 33
to the problems of the hitherto downtrodden movement in India. Following the setback in 34
sections of the population.This was to lead to the 1970s, survivors of the state repression got 35
the development of a robust social activism a reprieve during the non-Congress Janata 36
among the Indian middle classes, after the government (a coalition of heterogeneous 37
Emergency was lifted. It continues in the rightist, centrist and social democratic parties) 38
shape of non-government voluntary organiza- that came to office in 1977.Both the old timers 39
tions working for the empowerment of the (who were released from jails, or resurfaced 40
dispersed underprivileged and dispossessed from years of underground) and a new genera- 41
groups; intervention of the media in exposing tion of revolutionary ideologues and activists 42
atrocities on the depressed castes and tribal began to pick up the threads left by their 43
peoples by the upper-caste landlords; affirma- predecessors in the Naxalite movement,trying 44
tive actions by human rights activists to protect to gather and rebuild the broken pieces. 45
citizens against police repression and illegal acts Although the newly elected non-Congress 46
of the state. Second, by openly asserting the government at the center restored democratic 47
right of armed resistance against the Indian rights,which led to the release of the Naxalites, 48
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1 it did not lead to any change in the traditional
2 oppressive land relations or any betterment in
3 the conditions of the rural poor. In fact, many
4 of the parties in the ruling coalition were
5 dominated by landlords.This posed a challenge
6 to the Naxalite movement. There were two
7 broad trends discernible in the movement in
8 the late 1970s and early 1980s: one preferring
9 to fight for their old demands through parti-
10 cipation in parliamentary elections and trade
11 union activities,which were rejected in the past
12 by the Charu Mazumdar-led CPI (M-L), and
13 the other returning to the path of armed
14 struggle. The first trend was represented by
15 Santosh Rana, (a leader of the 1969–70
16 Naxalite upsurge in Debra-Gobipallavpur in
17 West Bengal) who contested the 1977 state
18 assembly elections from his old area of revolu-
19 tionary activities,and won the electoral contest
20 after campaigning on the same demands of the
21 peasants (e.g.,land redistribution,higher wages
22 for agricultural laborers, end to usury) that he
23 had sought ten years earlier to gain through an
24 armed battle.12
25 The second trend was reflected in the
26 activities of a number of radical groups and
27 their leaders in Bihar and Andhra Pradesh,who
28 believed that the basic problems of the
29 peasantry could never be solved within the
30 prevalent parliamentary system that was heavily
31 loaded in favor of their oppressors. In Bihar,
32 three Naxalite groups resumed armed struggle
33 by regrouping members of the old guerrilla
34 squads and recruiting new members from
35 among the peasants: (i) one led by Vinode
36 Mishra under the aegis of the CPI (M-L); (ii)
37 the CPI (M-L) Party Unity group;and (iii) the
38 Maoist Communist Centre (MCC),which did
39 not join the CPI (M-L) at the time of its
40 formation in 1969. By the end of the 1980s, all
41 these groups had expanded their activities from
42 the traditional stronghold of Bhojpur to
43 further north in Patna,Arrah, and down in the
44 south to Gaya, Jehanabad, and Aurangabad in
45 Bihar.They drove landlords from the villages,
46 occupied their lands, distributed the harvested
47 crops among the agricultural laborers and
48 peasants, and set up rudimentary units of
administration in what they described as
“liberated zones.”Control over these clusters of
villages, however, often changed hands, with
the police frequently raiding and taking them
over, to be followed soon by Naxalites, who
recovered them. In Andhra Pradesh, two
groups of Communist revolutionaries resumed
armed struggle in the hill forests of Telangana
spread over the three districts of Khammam,
Karimnagar, and Warangal. One group came
to be known as the People’s War Group of the
CPI (M-L) led by Kondapally Sitaramayyah,
and another as the Central Committee of the
CPI (M-L) headed by Chandra Pulla Reddy.
They mobilized daily laborers from among the
forest tribals (the girijans) around struggles over
immediate demands such as better wages and
end to extortions by forest officials. They
recruited the younger tribals to form armed
squads, in order to resist the police who came
to suppress their movement.Visiting one of
these Naxalite strongholds in Khammam in
early 1980, the Swedish author Jan Myrdal
wrote as follows:
[D]uring one week we moved around with the
(Communist) armed platoon through the forest
district [where] 20,000 policemen have been
brought to restore order.We slept in the villages,
completely secure; people keep the platoons
informed about the movements of police, but
don’t say a word to the police troops about
where the platoons are.13
By the end of the 1980s, the armed
Naxalites had spread far and wide in different
parts of India. Reports prepared by the home
ministry of the Indian government in 1988
indicated that they were operating in 12
districts spread over Andhra Pradesh (in the
south), Madhya Pradesh (in the center),
Maharashtra (in the west), and Bihar and
Orissa (in the east).The authorities were more
concerned about the situation in Andhra
Pradesh, where in 1987 the guerrillas kid-
napped a group of civil servants, including the
senior S. R. Sankaran, and succeeded in secur-
ing the release of their arrested comrades.14
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Besides expanding their traditional base in other two Naxalite groups,the CPI (M-L) 1
Andhra Pradesh,during the 1980s,the People’s Party Unity and the MCC (Maoist Com- 2
War Group (PWG), established new guerrilla munist Center), continued to carry out armed 3
zones in the tribal belts of Bastar (in the pre- guerilla warfare in the villages of Bihar, and 4
sent state of Chhattisgarh), Garchiroli and succeeded in carving out guerrilla zones in 5
Chandrapur in Maharashtra, and Koraput and Gaya, Aurangabad, Jehanabad, and neighbor- 6
Malkangiri in Orissa, all contiguous to its base ing districts. By the turn of the millennium, 7
in the northern part of Andhra Pradesh.Thus, both the Bihar armed groups had joined 8
by the 1990s, a wide stretch spanning large together to form a single party and build up a 9
tracts of forest and hilly villages in at least four network with the CPI (M-L) People’s War 10
states came under the control of armed Group (PWG) of Andhra Pradesh, and to 11
Naxalites. During this period, other changes engage in joint operations in large parts of 12
were taking place in the Naxalite movement in Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, 13
West Bengal and Bihar.West Bengal,the cradle Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, and other states. 14
of the movement, gradually receded from the They also established links with various Com- 15
scene.The old Naxalite bases of the early 1970s munist radical groups in other parts of the 16
in the state—including Naxalbari itself (from world. In July 2003 these Indian Naxalite 17
which the movement took its name)— groups hosted a South Asia Regional Con- 18
changed from armed citadels of militant ference of the Parties and Organizations of the 19
peasant uprisings into electoral bulwarks for Revolutionary Internationalist Movement, in 20
the parliamentary CPI (Marxist) party, which, a guerilla zone located in what they described 21
along with other leftist parties,had formed the as the “Bihar-Chattisgarh-Orissa-Jharkhand 22
Left Front government in the state in 1977. Special Area.”It was attended by delegates from 23
The transformation of the mood of the the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), and 24
erstwhile militant peasantry, who formed the various Maoist groups from Bangladesh and 25
bulk of the voters in these areas, in favor of Bhutan, who narrated their experiences and 26
parliamentary politics in the 1980s, can be exchanged views regarding future coordina- 27
explained to a large extent by the Left Front tion.15 28
government’s success in distributing land Underlying the expansion of the armed 29
among the landless, guaranteeing the rights of Maoist movement during this period were two 30
sharecroppers, increasing the minimum wages major changes, one in the class character of its 31
for agricultural laborers, devolution of power local level leadership, the second in the 32
at the grassroots level through the panchayat broadening of its influence in civil society. 33
system, among other agrarian socioeconomic Over the years, activists from the poor pea- 34
reforms, the demand for which initially drove sant and tribal communities took over as 35
the rural poor to join the Naxalites. These leaders not only of guerrilla squads, but also 36
reformist measures neutralized the violent as members of the CPI (Maoist) state and 37
potentialities for rural unrest in West Bengal, central committees.Thus, a new generation of 38
and forestalled a resurgence of the Naxalite “organic” leaders (in the Gramscian sense) has 39
movement. emerged in the Maoist movement. This is 40
At the same time, in Bihar, two different corroborated by newspaper and police reports, 41
trends were observable among the Naxalites. which revealed that the Maoist leaders arrested 42
The Vinode Mishra group—known as CPI or killed in Andhra Pradesh and Chhattisgarh 43
(M-L) Liberation—was thinning out its armed in recent years, were mostly from the 44
squads, dismantling its underground apparatus rural depressed classes and the downtrodden 45
and increasingly moving towards parliamentary tribal communities, in contrast to the 46
politics by taking part in elections, and setting overwhelming middle class character of the 47
up open mass fronts and trade unions. The leadership in the 1970s.The second change in 48
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1 the movement is the setting up of mass The present situation

2 fronts—cultural groups,students’and women’s
In the guerrilla zones in this corridor, the
3 organizations, and others—which allow the
Maoists have been able to set up a parallel
4 Maoists to operate and propagate their views
administration of sorts.Visiting some of these
5 in society.
zones in the Jharkhand area some years ago, a
6
7 journalist from a national newspaper observed
8 The birth of the CPI (Maoist) that the Maoists had driven out the big
9 landlords, and set up revolutionary peasant
10 On 21 September, 2004, in one of their base committees (known in local parlance as KKC,
11 areas, the leaders and cadres of all the various or Krantikari Kishan Committee) to redis-
12 armed Naxalite groups met, and decided tribute land among the poor, ensure the
13 to form a single revolutionary party, called running of schools and health centers, and
14 the Communist Party of India (Maoist). The settle disputes among villagers. These com-
15 program drafted by their leaders, harked back mittees also undertook development projects
16 to the 1970 party program of the CPI (M-L), such as building roads and erecting dams.
17 describing the Indian state as run by big From where did they get funds to sustain their
18 landlords and a comprador bureaucratic class, activities? The journalist found that in areas
19 reiterating that the contradiction between where the Maoists had seized land from the
20 feudalism and the broad Indian masses landlords and distributed it among the
21 remained “principal,” and that armed peasant villagers, “one-fourth of the produce from
22 guerilla war was the main form of struggle land, orchards and ponds go to the KKC as
23 towards its goal of creating a “people’s tax.” He added:“From contractors engaged in
24 democratic state.”16 The CPI (Maoist) has building of roads and bridges,20 percent of the
25 today emerged as a formidable armed oppo- project cost has to be given to the KKC.In case
26 nent of the Indian state, its network of dams, the tax levied is 10 percent.” In order
27 spread over 160 odd districts in at least ten to resist the police, who often raided these
28 states of India, spanning some 400,000 square villages, the Maoists set up defense squads for
29 kilometers, equivalent to one-eighth of the every village, apart from full-fledged platoons
30 total Indian land mass. It effectively controls a (each consisting of three guerrilla squads),
31 long corridor of both forests and plains, armed with self-loading rifles, light machine
32 stretching from the northern states bordering guns, mortars and mines. Ironically, most of
33 Nepal along Bihar in the east, through these weapons were seized by the guerrillas
34 Jharkhand further south and Chhattisgarh, from the police. “The more the police use
35 Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra in the west, sophisticated arms,” one of the Jharkhand
36 down to Orissa and Andhra Pradesh in the Maoist leaders told the journalist, “the better
37 south. The corridor is twice the size of for us.”17
38 the geographical region of the other two Even more spectacular has been the success
39 insurgency-affected areas, that is, the five states of the Maoists in the Dandakaranya area of
40 of the northeast (Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, central India. Covered by thick forests, hills,
41 Meghalaya,Tripura) and Jammu & Kashmir in and rivers, this huge expanse is inhabited by
42 the northwest.The population inhabiting the several tribal groups, and is spread over 11
43 corridor is five times as great. Little wonder districts in the states of Madhya Pradesh,
44 then that the Indian prime minister, at a Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh,
45 conference in New Delhi in July 2006, and Orissa, spanning an area of over 110,000
46 described it as the “single biggest internal square kilometers.The Maoists began working
47 security challenge.” here from the 1980s, organizing the tribal
48 laborers against big landlords and contractors

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(who denied them their wages and socially of the agricultural community. Although 1
exploited them by abducting their women and their agitations at the moment (in 2007) are 2
selling them off to brothels—a business which being led by non-Communist organizations, 3
had been thriving in the tribal areas for years), both the parliamentary Naxalites of the CPI 4
industrial enterprises (which tapped the vast (M-L) Liberation group and the armed cadres 5
mineral wealth of their habitat without giving of the CPI (Maoist) are reported to have 6
them their dues), and forest officials (who stepped in. The ruling left in West Bengal is 7
denied them access to the forest produce to today in a catch-22 situation. Its land reforms 8
which they had been traditionally entitled). process has reached a plateau, unable to offer 9
They were soon able to build up guerilla further economic benefits to the villagers.The 10
squads from among the tribal youth, drive out present progeny of the earlier beneficiaries of 11
the forest officials and landlords, compel the land reforms are facing unemployment. In the 12
contractors to pay higher wages, and set up a industrial sector, closure of old factories that 13
new organ of power called the GRC or Gram were dependent on outmoded machinery, 14
Rajya Committee (village administrative which could not compete with new tech- 15
committee) for day-to-day governance in the nology, has thrown thousands of workers on 16
guerilla zones. Reports by Maoist activists the streets.The Left Front government in West 17
working in Dandakaranya in 2000 indicated Bengal is, therefore, seeking its next leap in an 18
that they had succeeded in setting up such industrial revival. But, having accepted the 19
parallel organs of administration in vast prevailing global economic model of deve- 20
stretches of the area. They set up “people’s lopment, it is compelled to agree to the norms 21
courts”to try and adjudicate local disputes,and laid down by both the Indian big business 22
also carried out campaigns against superstitious houses and multinational companies that are 23
practices and introduced modern medicines willing to invest in West Bengal even if it leads 24
among the tribal population.As in Jharkhand, to displacement of thousands from their home- 25
in the Dandakaranya area also, the Maoists lands, and establishment of special economic 26
undertook several development projects, zones (enclaves owned by big industrial houses 27
including construction of tanks for irrigation who are given land at throwaway prices and 28
and drinking water, setting up of schools and offered tax waivers, among other concessions) 29
health centers, and forming agricultural where workers are denied their traditional 30
cooperatives among other things.18 trade union rights. Thus, popular discontent 31
Even in West Bengal, where short-term in the agrarian sector and working-class 32
economic benefits and limited land reforms by disgruntlement in the new industrial zones,are 33
the Left Front government,blunted the edge of likely to fuel the resurgence of the Maoist 34
peasant militancy from the early 1980s till the movement in some parts of West Bengal. 35
late 1990s, the Naxalites appear to be staging a However, much depends on the Indian state’s 36
comeback now.Tensions are brewing on two political will for resolving these conflicts that 37
issues. First, the tribal poor in the backward are in the making. 38
districts of Bankura, West Medinipur, and 39
Purulia, who had been bereft of such benefits 40
Indian state’s response
during the last three decades of Left rule, are 41
getting restive and are gravitating towards the Ever since the beginning of the Naxalite 42
CPI (Maoist) cadres who have renewed their movement in 1967,the approach of the Indian 43
activities in these areas. Second, the Left Front state towards it had been marked by a 44
government’s policy of acquiring fertile land contradiction. While at the level of policy 45
for setting up industrial enterprises in Singur discussion it grudgingly admits that it is rooted 46
(for a motor car factory) and Nandigram (for in popular socioeconomic grievances, at the 47
a chemical industrial hub) has hit large sections ground level, instead of eradicating these 48
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1 grievances, it treats the Naxalite outbursts
2 against them as a law and order problem by
3 deploying the police to suppress them.
4 Bureaucrats and police of the Maoist-affected
5 states meet at regular intervals and admit that
6 prolonged neglect of the complaints of the
7 rural poor is driving them towards the
8 “extremists,” an admission that their pre-
9 decessors made some 40 years ago in the 1969
10 Home Ministry report entitled The Causes and
11 Nature of Current Agrarian Tensions (referred to
12 earlier in this chapter). If, after four decades,
13 they continue to reiterate the same view, it
14 shows how little the Indian state has pro-
15 gressed,and how it has learnt still less from past
16 failures in resolving socioeconomic conflicts in
17 vast stretches of the Indian countryside.At the
18 same time, instead of correcting the wrongs of
19 the past by addressing the demands of the rural
20 poor, the Indian state continues to devise ever
21 more militarist methods to suppress the
22 Maoists. In Jharkhand, the government has
23 come out with a Rs 3.4 billion proposal to set
24 up a special air force to be deployed against the
25 Maoist bases in the inaccessible terrain.19 In
26 Andhra Pradesh, the police have been given a
27 free hand to raid the homes of tribals sus-
28 pected of harboring Naxalites, arrest their
29 men folk, and kill their sympathizers in
30 fake “encounters.”20 In Chhattisgarh, the
31 administration has set up an organization of
32 vigilantes by arming a section of the tribals,
33 described as Salwa Judum,21 and unleashing
34 them on the Maoist tribals, thus leading
35 to internecine warfare among the tribal
36 community and displacement of thousands of
37 villagers.22 All these areas are at present under-
38 going a period of violent reprisal and counter-
39 reprisal,marked by razing of tribal hamlets and
40 false encounters by the police, on the one
41 hand, and retaliatory killing of policemen by
42 Maoist guerrillas on the other hand.
43 In the course of the past few years efforts
44 have been made by civil society groups to
45 bring an end to this recurring cycle of
46 destruction and killings, each year seeing
47 between 300 and 400 deaths on an average. In
48 Andhra Pradesh, one such group called the
Committee of Concerned Citizens,headed by
S. R. Sankaran (the senior bureaucrat, who as
mentioned earlier, was kidnapped by the
Naxalites in 1987) and consisting of human
rights activists, eminent advocates, and jour-
nalists initiated a process of dialogue between
the state government and the Naxalites. After
five years of patient negotiations with the two
adversaries, the committee succeeded in
bringing them together for talks in June 2002.
Although the first round of deliberations
between representatives of the then PWG of
the CPI (M-L) and ministers of the Andhra
Pradesh government were marked by
exchanges of conflicting views and demands,
the contending parties agreed on a sort of
ceasefire for at least a month, until July, when
they were expected to meet for the second
round of talks. But even before the expiry of
the period,the Andhra Pradesh police resumed
its repressive policies by killing four members
of the PWG, including a senior leader, on
2 July. Quite understandably, the PWG
withdrew from the talks, declaring that
the ceasefire was no longer operative.23
Undeterred, the committee continued with
its efforts, and, in October 2004, succeeded
again in persuading the leaders of the CPI
(Maoist) and the Andhra Pradesh govern-
ment to sit together.The talks ended with an
agreement on a ceasefire till 16 December that
year, during which period the government
promised to consider the main Maoist demand
for distribution of land among the landless.
When the state failed to keep the promise, the
Maoists began to forcibly distribute the land,
an action that immediately invited retaliation
by the police, who gunned down several
Maoists in January 2006. The CPI (Maoist)
leaders came out with a public statement
blaming the state police for violating the norms
of the October truce and withdrew from the
talks.Following this,things went back to square
one as the cycle of violence renewed its deadly
course.
From all available indications, it is evident
that, at the present moment, the option of
dialogue has been discarded by the Indian state
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S U M A N TA B A N E R J E E

in favor of intensified military offensive against with the recent success of their counterparts 1
the Maoists.But the militaristic policy is flawed in Nepal). As of now, the Indian Maoists are 2
in several respects. First, as the history of the confined to a narrow stretch of territory. 3
last four decades has shown, police repression Although larger in area and covering more 4
may curb Maoist insurgency in a few pockets states than the other insurgency-affected states 5
for a while, but cannot prevent its spread to in the border areas of the northeast and Jammu 6
wider areas and its resilience over longer & Kashmir, the Maoist “red corridor” is of 7
periods, as long as the basic socioeconomic less strategic importance to the Indian state. It 8
grievances that give rise to the insurgency is a hilly and forest belt that had remained 9
remain unaddressed. This brings us to the inaccessible and under-administered for years, 10
second problem with the militarist policy. By thus offering a favorable terrain to the rebels. 11
laying stress on armed retaliation, the Indian But increasing state-sponsored industrial 12
state has refused to recognize the distinct development and projects like roads and 13
ideological character of the CPI (Maoist), bridges are reducing the protective forest cover 14
namely, its concerns about economic inequity and opening up the hitherto unreachable 15
and social injustice, and the program of setting territory to the police. It is significant that the 16
up a secular and socialist society in India,which latest targets of the Maoists are contractors 17
are radically different from the sectarian or working on these road communications 18
religious fanatical belief systems and terrorist and industrial enterprises, their aim being 19
manifestations of other insurgent groups (such subversion of official plans to reach these areas. 20
as the ethnic-based secessionists in the Thus, unlike Nepal, where the Maoists were 21
northeast, or the Islamic militants in Kashmir in control of two-thirds of the country and 22
and elsewhere). were in a position to encircle the capital 23
But that apart, the state’s anti-Maoist of Kathmandu during the anti-monarchy 24
militarist policy has had damaging effects on movement, thereby disrupting the supply of 25
vast sections of Indian society (e.g., arrest essential commodities to the capital for days 26
and torture of innocent citizens as sus- together, what the Indian Maoists control can 27
pected Naxalites; persecution of human rights be described as only a bypass that is encircled 28
activists; ban on newsmen covering Maoist and besieged from either side by the Indian 29
activities) which threaten the democratic rights state’s powerful armed apparatus.The Maoists 30
of the Indian people,and have quite predictably have not yet acquired the decisive striking 31
drawn censure from global institutions like capacity that their comrades in Nepal enjoy. 32
Amnesty International. Further, in the coming years, besides losing 33
their military advantage, the Maoists will also 34
have to contend with the options being offered 35
Future of the CPI (Maoist)
by the development projects to their followers 36
movement
among the rural poor and tribal population, 37
Given the relentless militarist offensive that has who may be swayed by promises of a better 38
been launched by the Indian state,how can the deal such as jobs as unskilled laborers. Apart 39
Maoist movement resist it, sustain its existing from the loss of the favorable terrain, their 40
bases and extend them in future? These are political support base may also erode in the 41
questions that are being deliberated by the CPI future in these areas.A sense of panic generated 42
(Maoist) leaders.But as observers from outside, by such apprehensions is already evident in the 43
we can hazard a few guesses while critiquing increasing tendency among the Maoists to kill 44
the movement. individuals or families in villages on the 45
First, let us examine the actual power of the mere suspicion that they may be police 46
Maoists in terms of changing the course of informers, or working for the government. 47
India’s national policies (compared particularly This is threatening to alienate the movement 48
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 R A D I CA L A N D V I O L E N T P O L I T I CA L M OV E M E N TS
1 from the local people, sections of which are
2 already being wooed by the government with
3 promises of jobs, or are being recruited into
4 vigilante squads (such as the already mentioned
5 Salwa Judum organization in Chhattisgarh).
6 The Maoists have, of late, suffered a serious
7 setback in Andhra Pradesh, from where most
8 of their central leadership comes (including
9 their general secretary Ganapathy, who
10 apparently till now has escaped capture by the
11 police). In the hill and forest areas of Andhra
12 Pradesh, which had been the main Maoist base
13 all these years, the killing of several important
14 leaders by the police and the surrender of a
15 large number of disillusioned cadres by the end
16 of 2007, have eroded that stronghold to a large
17 extent. It is becoming increasingly evident that
18 confinement to a narrow geographical terrain
19 and within sections of the poor tribal and dalit
20 (the underprivileged castes) people alone,
21 cannot sustain the movement for long. The
22 history of the movement suggests that its
23 achievements and failures at different points of
24 time and in different areas were due to a
25 combination of several factors. In the 1969–70
26 period in Srikakulam in Andhra Pradesh, for
27 instance, it could draw on the long tradition of
28 tribal militancy in that area and at the same
29 time attract a large number of middle-class
30 intellectuals who spread their message among
31 the urban populace, thus creating a widespread
32 sympathetic support base. In the 1970–80
33 period in the plains of Bihar, they could bring
34 together the small farmers and the poor
35 peasants from the underprivileged castes on the
36 common issue of oppression by upper-caste
37 landlords, and drive out the latter from the
38 villages where, for a limited period, they set up
39 alternative administrative units. Interestingly,
40 unlike their comrades in Andhra Pradesh, who
41 mainly operated among the tribals in the hilly
42 and forest terrain, the Bihar Maoists mobilized
43 all sections of the rural poor in vast stretches
44 of the plains area during the peak of their
45 struggle, thus indicating the possibility of
46 breaking out from the model of the tribal-based
47 insurgency with which the Indian Maoist
48 movement is usually associated, as well as
confirming the persistence of popular griev-
ances among other sections of the poor, which
can take the form of armed resistance. By the
turn of the twenty-first century, although the
Maoists had lost most of their strongholds in
the Bihar plains (which were vulnerable to easy
attacks by the state police), they succeeded in
expanding their bases to areas that had till then
remained outside their influence, including
Malkangiri in Orissa, the forests of Jharkhand,
Garchiroli and Chandrapur in Maharashtra,and
Bastar in Chhattisgarh.
All these new Maoist strongholds are based
among the poorest tribal people who inhabit
these areas, and who are economically
exploited by local landlords and socially
deprived of basic amenities like medical
facilities, nutrition, and education, among
other things. But, one cannot conclude from
this that the Maoist movement covers all the
Indian tribal population.It has not been able to
extend its influence to other tribal poor in
different parts of the country (like the tribal
district of Dangs in Gujarat in western India,
where the rightist religious Hindu group, the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has managed to
muster the tribals to vote it to power in the
recent December 2007 legislative elections, or
in the northeast of India, where the Maoists
have no presence at all among the various tribal
groups who are fighting for secession from the
Indian state). Let alone the tribals, the Maoists
have failed to spread their influence to other
sections of the Indian poor and under-
privileged people in the rest of India. This is
due to several factors. First, the non-uniform
socioeconomic situation in India, where
religious and caste differences and ethnic
diversities prevent the poor from becoming
a homogeneous consolidation capable of
responding to the class-based call for a radical
transformation of the political system and
society. Second, the uneven levels of political
consciousness of the poor, varying from a
tradition of militancy among the tribals to that
of fatalistic submission among sections of the
underprivileged.Third, the indifference of the
Maoists to the task of building up mass
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S U M A N TA B A N E R J E E

movements in the vast stretches of the Maoists are stepping into the scene, trying to 1
countryside and urban areas by politicizing the mobilize these disgruntled people and initiate 2
rural poor, the industrial workers, and the them into their ideological beliefs. Their 3
middle classes. exposure to the popular needs and demands of 4
Along with these factors, because of their these wider sections of the people may help 5
strategy of selecting particular spots (which are them to come out from the underground of 6
militarily suitable) to set up liberated zones,the the tribal-based and territorially confined 7
Maoists’ bases remain confined to hill and militaristic tactics that they had been follow- 8
forest areas, where lack of roads and modern ing till now, and integrate themselves with 9
communication systems works to their the popular movements (e.g., environmental, 10
advantage. The unapproachable tiny hamlets feminist, etc.) which have been marking the 11
here, which are in close proximity with each Indian political landscape in recent decades. 12
other, cutting across the state borders, but 13
untouched by the modern market economy, 14
The options: Confrontation or
provide a militarily advantageous terrain and a 15
negotiation?
supportive bulwark of poor inhabitants. But in 16
the absence of a wider hinterland of popular Since negotiated settlement of conflicts is the 17
sympathy and backing of a mass movement cornerstone of democratic practice, one 18
(which the Maoists in Nepal enjoyed), it will expects the Indian state to resolve its conflicts 19
be difficult for the Maoists in India to expand with its opponents on those lines. But, 20
their bases and retain their present “liberated paradoxically enough, the Indian state, despite 21
zones” for long. Like their predecessors in the its swearing by the Gandhian doctrine of non- 22
hills and forests of Andhra Pradesh, today’s violence, has been following the Maoist 23
Maoist revolutionaries, confined in the doctrine of “power flowing from the barrel of 24
red corridor of the forests of Jharkhand, the gun,” judging by the record of its bloody 25
Malkangiri and Bastar,may soon fall victims to repression of popular protests. In response, 26
the more powerful Indian military forces that those among its opponents who seek radical 27
are closing in on them from all sides. changes have subscribed to the same doctrine 28
However, even if the Maoists lose their and taken up arms to challenge the state’s 29
existing strongholds in the red corridor, it may monopoly over violence. One of the longest 30
be a temporary setback for their cause.Like the insurgencies led by such opponents, with an 31
legendary phoenix rising from the ashes, they unbroken record, is that of the Nagas in the 32
have always bounced back, and with greater northeast, who began their struggle for an 33
intensity and larger expanse than in the past, as independent homeland soon after the Indian 34
evident from the history of the Naxalite state was born in 1947. Only after repeated 35
movement described so far. New zones of failures to suppress their movement,the Indian 36
conflict are emerging in different parts of India officials today have been compelled to sit with 37
in the wake of the government’s neoliberal the same leaders of the NSCI (Isak-Muivah),24 38
policies that force out villagers from their lands whom they denounced in the past as “seces- 39
and homes for the establishment of special sionist terrorists,” trying to chalk out a 40
economic zones, industrial enclaves, or some settlement that would satisfy the aspirations of 41
development projects.Instead of meeting their the Naga people. The Indian state is even 42
demands, the state machinery is resorting opening doors for talks to groups of recent 43
to militarist retaliation against their protests insurgent movements, such as the secessionists 44
(e.g.,police firing on protesters in Kalinganagar in Jammu & Kashmir and ULFA (United 45
in Orissa, Nandigram in West Bengal in 2006 Liberation Front of Assam) in Assam. What 46
and 2007). Invariably, such repressive actions then prevents the Indian state from taking up 47
are provoking violent public retaliation. the threads of the dialogue with the Maoists, 48
396
 R A D I CA L A N D V I O L E N T P O L I T I CA L M OV E M E N TS
1 interrupted in 2004? In fact, the Maoist
2 program of establishing a socialist and secular
3 society is more consistent with the Indian
4 Constitutional commitment to that goal than
5 the programs of the various terrorist groups,
6 which follow the design of dividing the Indian
7 people along religious, regional and linguistic
8 lines.Besides,we have to acknowledge that the
9 Maoist movement has acted as a major catalytic
10 agent, sensitizing the nation to the lot of the
11 rural poor,the tribals and dalits,and compelling
12 the ruling powers to give some relief to them.
13 However,a dialogue can succeed only when
14 both sides are willing to give up their maxi-
15 malist positions and meet halfway. In order to
16 enter a dialogue with the Maoists, the Indian
17 state must stop using the police to restore the
18 rule of landlords in villages where the Maoists
19 have already established a parallel socio-
20 economic order that allows the rural poor to
21 enjoy rights to their land and forest produce,
22 and that offers them educational and medical
23 facilities. The Indian state will have to
24 acknowledge that the battle it is fighting
25 against the Maoists is over issues that should
26 have been solved years ago, especially land
27 reforms and social justice for the rural poor.
28 It cannot hope to suppress the grievances of
29 the poor by continuing to ignore these issues.
30 It is a no-win situation where both the state
31 and the Maoists will have to think of new ways
32 to come to terms with the reality. As for the
33 Maoists,they should have a second look at their
34 hitherto-followed strategy and tactics. They
35 cannot hope to clone a Mao-led Chinese
36 revolution in today’s India, neither can they
37 expect (like the Nepali Maoists) to wield
38 power over the country’s vast plains and cities
39 in the immediate future, given the resilience
40 of faith (however grudgingly vested) by
41 the majority of Indians in the present
42 parliamentary system. At best, they can create
43 a few autarkic enclaves.A ceasefire is therefore
44 necessary, not only in their enlightened self-
45 interest for an intermission to allow them self-
46 introspection, but mainly in the humanitarian
47 interest of the thousands of poor and innocent
48 families who have been caught in the crossfire
between the police and the Maoists in the
affected areas.
But in the long-term perspective, there is
the more fundamental need for a new political
leadership at the helm of affairs in India. It has
to be a leadership that is courageous enough to
break out of the militarist paradigm and
negotiate with the Maoists by giving due
recognition to their ideology (even when
disagreeing with their tactics) and which is
bold enough not only to destroy the age-old
entrenched order of oppressive landlords and
religious orthodoxy by implementing the laws
that provide for land reforms and social
equality in the rural areas, but also to resist the
domination of domestic corporate magnates
and foreign multinationals in the Indian
economy in the garb of special economic
zones that are threatening the livelihood of
thousands. This putative leadership must
also be innovative enough to chart out an
alternative model of development that would
give priority to the demands of the vast
alienated and deprived sections of the Indian
people for equitable distribution of wealth,
social justice, access to education and medical
facilities, democratic rights, and protection of
their environment.
Notes
1 Moni Sinha, Jeebon Sangram (Dhaka: Jatiya
Sahitya Prakashani, 1983); and Amit Kumar
Gupta, The Agrarian Drama:The Leftists and the
Rural Poor in India (New Delhi:Manohar,1996).
2 P.Sundarayya,Telengana [sic] People’s Struggle and
Its Lessons (Calcutta: CPI [Marxist], 1972); and
Sumanta Banerjee, In the Wake of Naxalbari
(Calcutta: Subarnarekha,1980).
3 Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller,
Communism in India (Bombay:Perennial,1960).
4 People’s Daily, 6 May, 1959.
5 Kanu Sanyal, Report on the Terai Peasants’
Movement (Calcutta: CPI (M-L), 1969).
6 Liberation, December 1967.
7 Government of India, Ministry of Home
Affairs,The Causes and Nature of Current Agrarian
Tensions (New Delhi: GOP, 1969).
397
S U M A N TA B A N E R J E E

8 Liberation, May 1968 and June 1969. 16 Central Committee (P), CPI (Maoist), Party 1
9 A term used to denote agents of foreign Programme, 2004. 2
commercial interests exploiting Indian human 17 Aloke Banerjee, Inside MCC Country (Calcutta: 3
resources both economically and politically. K. Das, 2003), pp. 5–9. 4
10 Sumanta Banerjee; Shankar Ghosh, The 18 Biplabi Yug Publication, New People’s Power in
5
Naxalite Movement (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Dandakaranya (Calcutta: Biplabi Yug, 2000);
6
Mukhopadhyay, 1971); Biplab Dasgupta, The People’s March,August and December 2003.
Naxalite Movement (New Delhi: Allied, 1973); 19 The Telegraph, 4 February, 2006. 7
Ashis Kumar Roy, The Spring Thunder and After 20 Committee of Concerned Citizens, Third 8
(Calcutta: Minerva, 1975); Kalyan Mukherjee Report:1997–2002 (Hyderabad:S.R.Sankaran, 9
and Rajendra Singh Yadav, Bhojpur: Naxalism in 2002). 10
the Plains of Bihar (New Delhi: Radha Krishna, 21 “Salwa” is the local gondi tribal word for the 11
1980); Rabindra Ray, The Naxalites and their water that is sprinkled on a patient to cure 12
Ideology (Delhi:Oxford University Press,1988); him/her of illness, and “judum” is the word for 13
Marius Damas,Approaching Naxalbari (Calcutta: collective hunting, the term salwa judum thus 14
Radical Impression, 1991). meaning a purification hunt meant to cure 15
11 Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works, vol. I (Peking: tribal society of the Maoist “illness.”
16
Foreign Languages Press, 1965). 22 People’s Union for Democratic Rights, Delhi,
17
12 Partha N. Mukherjee et al., Left Extremism and et al., When the State Makes War on Its Own
Electoral Politics: Naxalite Participation in Elections People: A Report on Violation of People’s Rights 18
(New Delhi: Indian Council of Social Science during the Salwa Judum Campaign in Dantewada, 19
Research, 1979). Chhattisgarh,April 2006, Delhi. 20
13 Jan Myrdal, “Seven Days with Telengana 23 Committee of Concerned Citizens, Third 21
[sic] Naxalites,” New Delhi Magazine (29 Report,1997–2002 (Hyderabad:S.R.Sankaran, 22
September, 1980), pp. 16–20. 2002). 23
14 Sankaran, after his retirement, was to become 24 National Socialist Council of India, led by Isak 24
an important campaigner for human rights and Scu and Thuengaling Muivah, which had been 25
play a major role in peace talks between the carrying on an armed insurgency against the 26
government and the Naxalite leaders in 2002, Indian government since 1975 to set up a
27
a development that is discussed later in this sovereign,independent Nagaland which would
28
chapter. be “socialist and Christian” in character.
15 People’s March (Ernakulam,Kerala),Vol.4,No.10 29
(October 2003). 30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
398
 1
2
3
4
27
5
6 International politics of South Asia
7
8
9
10 Vernon Hewitt
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19 Since the Partition and Independence of the ideational factors on policy or process.3 The
20 British Indian Empire in 1947, and the sub- view that South Asian elites have of the
21 sequent Independence of Ceylon in 1948, international system itself is deemed irrelevant
22 academic literature on the international politics since all states are the same, and the deter-
23 of South Asia has proliferated, especially since mining factor is international anarchy and the
24 the 1998 nuclear tests. Issues such as nuclear way this determines state behavior.4 Even
25 weaponisation, religious and ethnic violence, within neoliberal and behavioral approaches,
26 revolutionary movements, Islamic “terror- “states have fixed identities and interests . . .
27 ists,” and “failing states” have informed—or they are rational egoists that seek to maximize
28 distorted—debates on what constitutes South their long-term utility gains and . . . this can
29 Asia, prospects for peace and stability in the best be achieved when states harness them-
30 states of the region,and how and to what extent selves to cooperative norms”5 through inter-
31 events and policies can be effectively influenced national organizations and conventions.
32 by outside sources—primarily the west, and This chapter will argue that the “natural-
33 specifically, US administrations.1 ization”of the state is,for South Asia,singularly
34 Although characterized by a series of unhelpful in dealing with a part of the world
35 diverging theoretical positions, this literature where state formation has been derivative, and
36 has been predominantly realist or neorealist in where formal sovereignty was granted (or
37 orientation. This has had a peculiar and won) at a unique moment in the international
38 unfortunate effect on the significance of South system, namely, the end of European primacy,
39 Asia in and of itself, reducing it to a systemic the rapid retreat from empire, and the rise of
40 understanding of the international system as bipolarity.6 Scholarship in the 1990s has,
41 seen primarily from somewhere else.2 This reassuringly, moved to problematize the links
42 predominantly static and ahistorical approach among the states, territoriality, sovereignty,
43 precludes any interesting or relevant discussion nationalism, and community in ways that take
44 between, say, the nature of state formation in history seriously and open the way for a more
45 South Asia, the links between the state and sociologically informed debate as to how
46 domestic politics, how domestic politics is “state–society complexes are agents that
47 influenced directly by international non-state both constitute and are in turn constituted
48 actors (and vice versa),or the role of cultural or by, sociodomestic and international global

399
VE R NON H EWITT

structures,”7 This dialectic interest in agency– Gould recently noted: “[T]he state in recent 1
structure–agency must also consider non- anthropological interest is less an efficacious 2
materialist sources of power, such as culture regulatory force, than a quasi mythical entity 3
and religion, if it is to have any real utility. with which competing actors attempt to 4
Influenced by post-structural and post- associate and thus legitimate their claims to 5
modern trends within international relations, public authority.”13 Such recent turns within 6
recent scholarship has sought to “recover the the field of international relations have done 7
roots of social constructs and categories of much to end the static ahistoricism and crude 8
action by tracing the knowledgeable activities positivism of the Waltzian “real world” 9
of culturally inscribed but strategic actors and approach to studying international politics, 10
the sometimes accidental turns that underline although one may still puzzle why it took quite 11
and define historical processes.”8 This is vital so long. 12
for an area of the world where “the artificial 13
vivisection of British India created two states, 14
India and Pakistan, with several nations and State formation and the end of 15
parts thereof,as well as multiple ethnies within empire 16
them.”9 The “constructivist”turn in nationalist 17
literature shows how nationalist elites inherited The impact of British colonialism on South 18
states that were, in effect, created by the Asia was contradictory and profoundly uneven. 19
colonial powers, and gave priority to the From 1857 onwards, part of the modernizing 20
challenges of state and nation building posed project was to reform society along lines already 21
for societies that were extremely pluralistic. It experienced in the west,including the creation 22
also reveals the social and cultural impact of of elected, institutionalized forms of govern- 23
colonial modernity that synchronized the ment, representative of the subcontinent’s 24
emergence of local, regional, and “national” religious, ethnic, and social diversity as initially 25
imaginations of the community at around the conceived by the British, while protective of 26
same historical moment.10 As such, the British material interest.14 Another part was a 27
dynamics that drive the international politics of desire to shield aspects of so-called “traditional” 28
South Asia are not primarily derived from the society from the impact of modernity and 29
international system but almost equally “rooted the “inappropriateness” of capitalism and 30
in contending national and ethnic claims and majoritarian forms of democratic practice. 31
the failure of the state to capture the loyalty of Informed partly by preconceived notions of 32
its citizens.”11 Orientalism, the importance of religion, and 33
The state is a constructed and contested the distinctiveness of a Hindu majority from 34
concept. The degree and nature of this minority Muslim practices, and partly by what 35
contestation critically affects the foreign policy was evidently important to social elites and 36
of the states of South Asia, which must be communities collaborating with the British 37
concerned as much with securing the state state, the path of colonial reform by the early 38
from its own populations as from other states, twentieth century thus faced in two quite 39
and from competing subnationalist claims and contradictory directions.15 40
ethnic separatism.12 In deconstructing the The British created a powerful state with a 41
state, the study of international relations has commitment to democracy and individual 42
begun to accommodate the rich ethnographic rights, but rights that were also subordinated 43
and subaltern approaches that stress the to collective or communal identities. These 44
significance of domestic politics and identity were defined through separate electorates, 45
formation, how the state is “experienced and nomination to legislative bodies, and the 46
perceived” by local elites competing for scarce preservation of so-called traditional rulers.The 47
cultural and material resources. As Jeremy British created a state that was administratively 48
400

1 centralized,but in other ways federal,in which
2 individual provinces or states were guaranteed
3 rights in a written constitution interpreted by
4 a supreme court.Yet they also created a state
5 that contained, until the final moments of
6 Independence, pre-Westphalian sovereign
7 entities known collectively as Princely India,
8 the most significant one being the Princely
9 State of Jammu & Kashmir. Two-fifths of
10 the British Indian Empire consisted of
11 feudal entities embedded within the Raj. In
12 the cases of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim, the
13 British sought solely to protect traditional
14 societies rather than modernize and trans-
15 form them.
16 The consequences that followed from
17 these conflicting ideologies of the Raj16 led,
18 at Independence, to the formation of a
19 regionalized state system,and not,as the British
20 had hoped,a single sovereign state cemented to
21 Britain through an active, militarily-defined
22 commonwealth that would ensure Britain’s
23 continuing role as a great power.17 The
24 Partition of India was a product of elite
25 negotiation among leaders, the status of some
26 of whom had been defined in relation to com-
27 munal categories recognized by the British;
28 disagreements between Muslim minority and
29 majority provinces; and intra-elite disputes
30 over the spoils of central office. It created two
31 states that were to have quite differing
32 capacities to govern themselves, and two quite
33 different personalities within the international
34 system. The driving process behind colonial
35 disengagement was the speedy collapse of
36 British authority and will to govern as much
37 as it was the mass resistance to British colonial
38 authority.18 This collapse was in part a pro-
39 duct of the Second World War, and increased
40 US pressure on British colonial reformers
41 from the late 1930s, but it was structured
42 by a massive victory in Britain for a socialist
43 Labor government committed to granting
44 India full sovereign independence as quickly as
45 possible. Independence was facilitated by the
46 change in the international system from one
47 dominated by a European empire to one
48 shaped by the emerging Cold War.19
I N T E R N AT I O N A L P O L I T I C S O F S O U T H AS I A
The carving out of East and West Pakistan,
between June and August 1947, as a separate
state for the Muslims of South Asia,seems now
less the product of Jinnah’s articulation of the
two-nation theory, premised on Muslim
minority fears of Hindu domination, than a
bungled attempt by the Muslim League to
assure a weakly federal India with significant
power vested in the provinces.20 It was not
desired in principle by the British or, in its
actual form—the creation of two widely
separated new states comprising in both wings
much less territory than claimed—by the
Muslim leadership.The territorial configura-
tion of Pakistan did not even map onto areas
of electoral support for the League, or to areas
that shared any cultural or linguistic similarities
other than that they were majority Muslim
areas defined crudely by the two boundary
commissions coordinated and entirely domi-
nated by Sir Cyril Radcliffe.
In some areas, such as the North-West
Frontier Province (NWFP), the League was a
relatively marginal political actor with little
legitimacy. Even if it is accepted that Jinnah
wanted a separate state, he was ambiguous
about what the Muslim “nation” would be:
religious or secular, pluralist or homogenous.
Where societal pressures existed to mobilize
support for Muslim separatism, it did so inde-
pendently of the League’s central leadership.21
The process of state formation left a significant
minority of Muslims behind in India, even
after approximately nine million mohajirs
(refugees), Urdu speakers, migrated to a
“homeland” that was largely unknown. As
such, Pakistan was founded by an émigré
nationalist movement, and facilitated by the
end of empire that created an impasse between
regional and national identities as well as
disputes over federal and confederal ideas of
sovereignty.22 The formation of India and
Pakistan thus prefigured the difficulties of
ethnic irredentism that would characterize
Africa from the late 1950s,where cartographic
lines crossed cultural and linguistic com-
munities, and where notional territorial
sovereignty did not match the much weaker
401
VE R NON H EWITT

coercive,extractive,and institutional attributes impartiality and weakness failed to resolve their 1

of the Weberian state.23 disagreements, and their disagreements further 2
“Fixing” the boundary was bewildering. marginalized the relevance of the common- 3
Disputes followed between Pakistan and wealth in South Asia.26 4
Afghanistan, with particular reference to the 5
Pathan-speaking areas in the NWFP, with Iran 6
Kashmir, Pakistan, and India
over Baloch nationalist identities, and with 7
India over several areas in Gujarat, the Thar 8
Kashmir
desert, and in the northeast with reference to 9
Assam and the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). The Kashmir conflict of 1947–49 illustrated 10
India and China disputed significant areas of the tensions inherent in seeking to fix state 11
India’s northeast (tucked in behind East boundaries free of any pre-existing local or 12
Pakistan), the status of Tibet, and the role regional consensus, and where loyalties to the 13
of both states with reference to Nepal. prince were overlapping, feudal in origin, and 14
Preliminary drafts of the boundary com- in the case of the Poonch district, in active 15
mission gave Chittagong and Lahore to India, rebellion.27 Social and political movements 16
while the final award, published the day after acting to their own agenda, even with covert 17
Independence, left numerous ethnic enclaves support from a neighbor, reveal the dynamics 18
such as Gurdaspur and Sylhet arguably in the of state and non-state agency that were to 19
“wrong” state. Even on the island of Ceylon, bedevil the region through to the 1999 Kargil 20
the close proximity of the Tamils of southern conflict, and beyond. Kashmir remains central 21
India, from the Jaffna peninsula through the to understanding the emergent relationship 22
Palk straits, troubled Sinhalese Buddhists between India and Pakistan, and how the lines 23
concerning Tamil nationalism as much as it of foreign alliances radiated out from the 24
concerned Nehru over Dravidian separatism centrality of this conflict to the international 25
in the South. But the critical divide was system. 26
Partition itself. The process of resolving princely India was 27
India and Pakistan were born amid botched by the British, who, having shored up 28
animosity, recrimination over the partition of the princes as a bulwark against nationalist 29
the Raj’s financial and military resources, and sentiment, swiftly abandoned them in 1946. 30
with an actual armed conflict taking place in Having been reassured that, once their treaty 31
the JhelumValley.The regional state system was obligations to the British were laid aside, they 32
heavily dominated by India, which inherited would revert to sovereign entities, the British 33
over 70 percent of the territory of the British political department proceeded to bully the 34
Indian Empire, and over 77 percent of its princes into deciding which one of the two 35
industrial and institutional capacity.Whatever proto-dominions they wanted to join. The 36
the contradictions and tensions within the decision appeared to be one of princely 37
Indian National Congress over issues of fiat, but even this degree of agency was 38
secularism, the role of language, and the exact compromised by the overriding demand for 39
constitutional balance within an inherited geopolitical contiguity for the new states that 40
federal structure, it was a more homogenous was demanded by both the Congress and the 41
entity than the League24 and it had greater League.28 Where the princes were of a differing 42
legitimacy and a more coherent (albeit religious persuasion from their subjects, these 43
improvised) idea of what it wanted its nation to two principles clashed.The Nawab of Deccan 44
look and feel like.25 Both states were relatively Hyderabad was a Muslim presiding over an 45
poor,but the physical imbalance between them overwhelming by Hindu population. He was 46
was telling even in 1949.Each remained linked also situated in the middle of Indian territory. 47
to the British Commonwealth, but British To Nehru’s outrage, he initially opted for 48
402

1 Pakistan, made a dash for independence, and
2 then was finally incorporated into the Indian
3 Union.This drama was played out in a number
4 of locations in the panic and drama of
5 Independence.29 In Kashmir, the situation was
6 reversed, with the Dogra Rajput Hindus
7 residing in an overwhelmingly Muslim Vale,
8 and with diverse communities of Muslims and
9 Buddhists throughout the kingdom.Moreover,
10 Jammu & Kashmir was the only significant
11 princely state that was so located as to be
12 contiguous to both new states and thus be able,
13 in principle, to join either India or Pakistan.30
14 The Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir first
15 sought independence as a sovereign state, but
16 then, faced with ongoing unrest in Poonch,
17 and tribal incursions from the NWFP
18 (i.e., from Pakistan) ostensibly to aid fellow
19 Muslims, he opted for India with the promise
20 of imminent military aid. There followed
21 significant confusion over the exact sequence
22 of events, and over the exact meaning of the
23 Indian offer to hold a plebiscite to settle the
24 dispute once the violence in the valley had
25 abated and Pakistani forces withdrawn.31 The
26 allegation that “Pakistan” instigated a covert
27 tribal invasion is undermined by the weakness
28 and incoherence of Pakistan at the time.The
29 support by the National Conference Party—a
30 popular movement in the Valley itself—for
31 Nehru and the Congress,which is well attested
32 in Indian historiography, meanwhile under-
33 plays the desire for independence as a sovereign
34 socialist state, and an “idea of Kashmir” that
35 places Sheikh Abdullah, a sunni Muslim with
36 a secularist outlook, closer to the Hindu
37 Maharaja and to Jinnah than to Nehru. The
38 portrayal of Muslim interests as being pro-
39 Pakistan likewise downplays the desires of
40 many leading politicians, later presidents
41 within Azad (Pakistan-administered) Kashmir,
42 to create an independent state as well. This
43 apparent consensus in favor of independence,
44 however, was compromised by the fact that
45 differing actors imagined different forms of
46 national sovereignty.32
47 With the arrival of Pakistani troops
48 into Baltistan, the Kashmir war became an
I N T E R N AT I O N A L P O L I T I C S O F S O U T H AS I A
overt “interdominion” conflict, initially—and
bizarrely—involving British commanding
officers on both sides. In an attempt to display
international leadership, partly in the naive
conviction that India’s position was above
reproach, Nehru referred the crisis to the UN
Security Council, after which, in 1949, a
ceasefire was declared that effectively parti-
tioned the state. India was left in control of
roughly two-thirds of Jammu & Kashmir,
including the Vale, with its nearly 90 percent
Muslim population.India resented subsequent
UN involvement, suspecting US and British
support for Pakistan.
Much has been made of the fact that the
inclusion of a Muslim-majority province in
India provided an essential litmus test of
secularism, while the exclusion of such a
province made a mockery of Pakistan as the
state for the Muslims of South Asia. Other
arguments, strategic and geopolitical, were
advanced that supported either the Indian or
Pakistani position, while gradually a “third
way,” namely the idea of a Kashmir separate
from both Pakistan and India,reemerged in the
1980s and 1990s. In 1965 Pakistan launched a
series of covert infiltrations across the ceasefire
line on the eve of Operation Gibraltar—the
code name for the Pakistani attack on Indian-
administered Kashmir—but a second armed
conflict failed to resolve the issue. In 1971, in
response to Indian support for the Bangla
rebels,Pakistan attacked parts of western India.
The resulting conflict did not significantly
change ground realities.The Shimla Accord of
1972 converted the ceasefire line into a Line of
Control,an attempted “soft border”that sought
to compromise the requirements of statehood
with shared cultural and social communities
on either side, and remove the issue from the
clutches of the UN. Nonetheless, both
India and Pakistan set about furthering the
integration of their respective parts of
Kashmir into their state structures and
nationalist narratives. Pakistan continued to
seek international support for sustaining the
dispute, and to counterbalance India’s per-
ceived hegemonic strategy, making Kashmir a
403
VE R NON H EWITT

precondition for any discussion with India over socialist rhetoric, Pakistan’s strategic position 1
improving bilateral relations. lent itself to CENTO and SEATO member- 2
Thus the Kashmir conflict provided the ship and soft loans and grants from a variety of 3
prism through which these two states and their US administrations. By 1972, the Sino–US 4
elites perceived each other, and the crisis that rapprochement seemed to cement Pakistan’s 5
structured Pakistan’s foreign policy both within ties with two key allies.Yet both these alliances 6
the region and towards the wider international were rather tenuous. 7
community. Jinnah’s conviction that Nehru Initiated by the 1954 mutual security pact, 8
was determined to “strangle” the Muslim state the US commitment to Pakistan unraveled in 9
at birth remains to many Pakistanis a demon- the early 1970s, despite its rhetorical support 10
strable fact. And in Indian eyes, Pakistan for Pakistan in the Bangladesh war and the 11
remains a state that will stop at next to nothing delay in granting diplomatic recognition to 12
to revise the territorial settlement of 1972, Bangladesh.To many in Pakistan, the US has 13
including masterminding covert militant been found wanting in failing to act more 14
strikes deep inside Indian-occupied Kashmir decisively to defend Pakistan’s territorial 15
in 1999, allegedly funding terrorist strikes integrity. The US commitment unraveled 16
against the Srinagar and New Delhi parliament further with increasing US mistrust concern- 17
buildings between 2001 and 2003. ing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons intentions,until 18
the hapless Soviet intervention in Afghanistan 19
in 1979–80 transformed a tenuous military 20
Pakistan
government (under General Zia) back into a 21
Pakistan’s concern over provincial instability frontline state. China’s support did not involve 22
and international vulnerability emphasized the active military engagement in 1971 against 23
role of the military and an alliance with the India, and China has been equivocal in its 24
mohajirs around the central bureaucracy and the attitude towards Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 25
non-elective aspects of state power from the 1998. 26
beginning. Military expenditure dominated During the 1980s, a new domestic political 27
Pakistan as a need to underpin domestic order settlement led to a search for more useful allies. 28
and police an almost impossible territorial This involved General Zia’s espousal of an 29
configuration that placed East Pakistan over “Islamic” Pakistan, that would unite frag- 30
1,000 miles across an assumed hostile India. mentary ethnic identities into a single reli- 31
The state of martial rule had foreign and gious community under a unitary presidential 32
international policy implications as well as system, and cooperation with the Arab states, 33
ramifications for a proclivity towards authori- especially Saudi Arabia, and until 1979, with 34
tarian forms of governance in which political Iran as well. It also led to an active member- 35
parties were fragmented and personalized.33 ship within the Organization of the Islamic 36
From the moment of Independence, Pakistan Conference. Stressing the religious links 37
sought International allies willing to secure between the Middle East and Pakistan made 38
prohibitive defense requirements against India, some economic sense,but it also facilitated and 39
and against Bengali, and later Sindhi and encouraged the growth of domestic Islamic 40
Baluchi separatism. These requirements were movements, which the state failed to control 41
funded primarily by the US, and involved the effectively; nor did they provide a basis for a 42
apparent support by Pakistan for Soviet con- lasting new consensus on a “mainstream,” i.e., 43
tainment,but it also—more problematically— moderate Muslim identity. Often it placed 44
involved support from China. Defined as an Pakistan in the middle in disputes between 45
ally in US containment policy towards the moderate and extremist Muslim states. 46
Soviet Union,and encouraged by Washington’s Seemingly as ignorant of intra-Muslim identi- 47
mistrust of India’s emergent non-aligned, ties within Pakistan as the British were of those 48
404

1 within British India, Zia’s policies generated
2 sectarian violence as well as the proliferation of
3 religiously and ethnically defined non-state
4 actors active in the region, primarily in
5 Afghanistan, and then, from 1989 onwards, in
6 Indian-administered Kashmir.
7 Until the horrors of 9/11, Zia’s policies
8 dovetailed neatly with US support for the
9 Islamic resistance to the Soviet regime,and the
10 strategic use of Saudi resources. However,
11 the end of the Cold War, and of the Soviet
12 adventure in Afghanistan,facilitated a return to
13 democracy within Pakistan in the wake of Zia’s
14 likely assassination in a plane crash in 1988.Yet
15 the domestic creation of the militant, anti-
16 western Taliban within Pakistan Punjab, its
17 involvement in executing the Pakistan Army’s
18 foreign policy in Afghanistan, and then, in
19 fomenting the rise of religious violence in
20 Karachi and Islamabad,meant that the restora-
21 tion of democracy was problematic. Between
22 Zia’s death in 1988, and the declaration of
23 martial rule by General Musharraf in 1999, it
24 was Pakistan’s misfortune that an emergent
25 post-Cold War order emphasized conceptions
26 of good governance,democratization,and civi-
27 lian leadership, three areas in which Pakistan
28 was particularly vulnerable. US concerns over
29 Pakistan’s “Islamic”bomb also resurfaced in US
30 policy circles. During 11 years of political in-
31 stability and constitutional decline,the Pakistan
32 state—never a unitary actor—fragmented into
33 a series of parallel and disconnected areas of
34 political and legal authority: president against
35 prime minister, secular against religious
36 authority, the judiciary against the executive,
37 the executive against the legislature. In 1993,
38 1997, and again in 2007–08, such rivalries
39 paralyzed the government and threatened the
40 state with endemic instability. The impact of
41 such duplication and rivalry on policy and its
42 implementation remains serious.The security
43 threats to Pakistan’s elites were diverse and
44 diverging and they frequently collapsed distinc-
45 tions between internal and external enemies.
46 The rise to prominence of the Inter-
47 Services Intelligence unit within the executive,
48 its combination of foreign and domestic
I N T E R N AT I O N A L P O L I T I C S O F S O U T H AS I A
intelligence and surveillance, and its domi-
nance over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
the office of the prime minister, indicate the
weakness of democratic accountability or even
the existence of established norms for foreign
policy formulation. In 1999, prior to his
removal in a bloodless coup, Prime Minister
Sharif was significantly under-informed about
the role of Pakistan’s military involvement in
Kargil (an area within Indian-administered
territory), and confused about the role of
mujahideen irregulars in the fighting.34 When
pressured by the Clinton administration to
disengage from the conflict, Sharif appeared
concerned about possible political revenge
from the military, and especially from
Musharraf who had headed up the Kargil
operation. Earlier, in 1998, Sharif had struck a
senior US negotiator as being entirely
uninformed on Pakistan’s emergent nuclear
posture, excluded from foreign policy matters,
and more concerned about the army threat to
his power base.35
Musharaf ’s coup in 1999 was domestically
popular,although internationally condemned.
Despite having demonstrable links with
Islamic militants and ISI policy in Kashmir at
the time of Kargil, Musharraf urged the
Pakistani army to offer complete assistance to
the US Bush administration in their planned
attacks on Afghanistan in 2001–02. It was
argued that significant economic and military
resources would be forthcoming, while active
resistance would lead the US to throw their
support behind India, if not to “bomb[ing]
Pakistan back to the stone age.”36 Such
pragmatism overturned earlier army support
and diplomatic recognition of the Taliban
government, and was pressed home in the face
of open hostility toward the US by domestic
religious groups and communities, especially
in the frontier and tribal areas of Pakistan.37
The paradox of a Pakistani state supporting
Islamic militants, while drawing on the US as
a principle ally in the US “war on terror,” was
not lost on India,and provided the backdrop to
a sustained crisis in Indo–Pakistan relations
from 1998 through to 2002–04. By 2004–05,
405
VE R NON H EWITT

US State Department officials were increasing India can be,and the extent to which the cliché 1
pressure on the Pakistani leader to demonstrate of the world’s “largest democracy” should not 2
he was being tough on Islamic organizations be taken at face value. Insurrections in the 3
operating within Pakistan, and active against northeast, as well as Kashmir, and Punjabi 4
unlicensed madrasah schools alleged to be violence throughout the 1980s do compel 5
training militants drawn from the wider comparison with Pakistan. However, to draw 6
Muslim diaspora.38 too many parallels with Pakistan significantly 7
By 2006–07, US pressure was also aimed at misrepresents the extent to which India’s 8
improving Musharraf ’s democratic credentials, political elite has managed to connect an 9
by coercing him into a dialogue with Pakistani inherited state structure to emergent, and 10
politicians, especially Benazir Bhutto, in the indeed diverging, sections of civil society, and 11
run-up to scheduled elections in early 2008. given the state ideological and national 12
That US foreign policy was pushing Pakistan cohesion. Important differences between the 13
in two differing directions seemed lost on the Muslim League and the Indian National 14
US State Department. Even the British Congress as national movements, and the 15
Foreign Office continuously downplayed the differences in their leadership (or crudely put, 16
generic weaknesses of the Pakistan People’s between Jinnah and Nehru) translated into 17
Party (PPP) as a democratic social movement, very different international “personalities”and 18
ignoring the basically feudal,over-personalized very different foreign policy aspirations. 19
elite that surrounded Ms Bhutto. The More geographically cohesive, less trau- 20
Washington–London axis thus compelled matized by Partition, and less hamstrung by its 21
Musharraf into a political accord with Benazir own internal security concerns,India’s political 22
Bhutto that alienated sections of his own army, leaders were able to initially articulate a foreign 23
and angered Muslim hardliners, especially in policy premised less on survival than on an 24
the NWFP and areas affected by the influx of ideological commitment to internationalism, 25
Pathan refugees.39 The assassination of Ms nonalignment, and an active solidarity with 26
Bhutto in December 2007 fragmented opposi- colonial peoples. From the outset, India’s 27
tion to the regime, and further underlined the political and intellectual elite set their 28
systemic fragility within Pakistan and the ambitions apart from Pakistan,indeed arguably 29
extent to which the domestic compulsions of from South Asia itself.41 Individuals such as 30
its foreign policy are ill conceived and little Nehru, Krishna Menon, and K. M. Panikkar 31
understood.40 came from a westernized intelligentsia that 32
inherited from the British a conception of 33
“great power” status, and the belief that India, 34
India
by virtue of its size and ancient civilization 35
Ayesha Jalal has argued that the tendency to would quickly assume a position of global 36
compare democratic–civilian India with an responsibility.Such apparent continuities in the 37
authoritarian–military Pakistan, ignores the view of Indian greatness led Nehru to refer the 38
shared political and institutional legacy nascent Kashmir issue to the United Nations as 39
between them. At crucial moments, each a sign of India’s commitment to inter- 40
country has demonstrated very similar forms of nationalism, and to engage with China in 41
political dynamism, such as authoritarian lengthy debates over the status of Tibet and 42
populism during the 1970s, the institutional India’s northeastern and northwestern borders, 43
decline of party structures, and high levels of despite the fact that such idealism yielded few 44
social violence. Gujarat in 2002–03, and the results.Yet nonalignment was certainly not a 45
widespread communal violence associated pacifist stance, and the rhetoric of third world 46
with the rise of the BJP to power in the early solidarity was to give India a high profile 47
to mid-1990s clearly indicate how volatile within the British Commonwealth on matters 48
406

1 of African and Asian decolonization, and as an
2 active member of the UN General Assembly
3 important enough to influence the voting
4 behavior of many member states.42
5 Yet the sophistication of the Nehruvian
6 view of India’s place in the world was lost on
7 various US administrations, irritated by the
8 equation between oppressive neocolonialism
9 and US foreign policy and, by the late 1960s,
10 the growing collusion between India and the
11 Soviet Union. India’s position on the Nuclear
12 Non-Proliferation Treaty further irritated
13 Washington. Nehru’s socialism and his sus-
14 picions of capitalism contrasted sharply with
15 that of Pakistan, as did his condemnation of
16 apartheid and Israel. As the formalized
17 nonaligned movement continued to merge
18 with Soviet allies such as Cuba,Iraq,and Libya,
19 US concerns about India’s tilt towards Moscow
20 were expressed more stridently, and were
21 reflected as well in diminishing economic
22 support.Although military humiliation at the
23 hands of China in 1962—and another draw in
24 the second Indo-Pakistan war of 1965—
25 undermined much of Nehru’s naive illusions
26 about the effectiveness of diplomacy,the search
27 for military aid did not soften India’s criticism
28 of the US. Neither did India allow the US to
29 broker any deals over Kashmir, or provide any
30 support for US global aims and objectives in
31 East Asia, as during the Vietnam War, or over
32 disputes concerning UN recognition of
33 Cambodia.Subsequent difficulties over Indian
34 socioeconomic planning, the forced devalua-
35 tion of the rupee,and the conditional US food
36 imports created resentment and concerns over
37 Indian self-reliance.
38 The nadir of New Delhi’s relationship
39 with Washington came in 1970–72, especially
40 when Indira Gandhi signed a 25-year friend-
41 ship treaty with the Soviet Union in 1971, and
42 was able to utilize this effectively in the wake
43 of the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War to checkmate
44 US–Chinese support for Pakistan. Misread by
45 US analysts as a mutual defense pact, and
46 distorted by US global strategy aimed at using
47 Pakistan to facilitate an opening with China,
48 the State Department ignored the excesses
I N T E R N AT I O N A L P O L I T I C S O F S O U T H AS I A
committed by the Pakistan army in their
attempt to suppress the movement of Bengali
speakers in the eastern wing of the country,
and interpreted India’s military incursion into
East Pakistan as a Soviet-sponsored enterprise.
In fact,the Soviets were as anxious to constrain
India as the US, and were evidently relieved
when India declared a unilateral ceasefire in
the west following the surrender of Pakistan at
Dhaka.43
India’s peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) in
1974 deepened tensions with Pakistan.
Moreover,India continued to challenge the US
over whether the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) was an arms control or arms elimi-
nation agreement. India’s objections to the
NPT were both principled and pragmatic.
They were principled in that they argued that
the NPT was discriminatory in preventing
non-nuclear weapon states from acquiring a
legitimate means to defend themselves, while
not compelling existing nuclear weapon states
to eliminate their nuclear weapons.Indeed,the
vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons
throughout the 1980s confirmed to India that
the treaty was worthless. Delhi’s objections
were also pragmatic in that China’s status as a
nuclear weapons state created a security
dilemma that was of regional significance to
India, especially in the context of a Pakistan–
China alliance. India’s allegations of US
support for (or at least indifference to) a covert
Pakistan bomb program, as well as criticisms
over the Pakistan–China security relationship,
blighted any attempts to improve US relations
while the Cold War lasted.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
1979–80 heightened tensions with the US,
while seriously compromising India’s under-
standing with Moscow. Again misinterpreted
by the US, India was not so much complicit in
the Soviet move as angered by the attack
against a fellow member of the nonaligned
movement, and at a time when Mrs Gandhi
was the chairperson of the organization. India
realized that Pakistan’s subsequent realignment
with the US would have significant financial
and military implications for the South Asia
407
VE R NON H EWITT

region,and increase the chances for Pakistan to publicly attacked for allegedly leading to “50 1
acquire nuclear weapons covertly.44 wasted years.”46 The rise of the BJP to power 2
The subsequent implosion of Afghanistan, in the central government coincided with a 3
and the support by the US and Pakistan for more overtly strident use of great power 4
Islamic mujahideen fighters was to have regional language. In 1998, the new BJP-led National 5
and domestic consequences for India as well.In Democratic Alliance (NDA) government 6
1989–90, the situation in Kashmir took a authorized a series of nuclear tests. Unlike 7
dangerous turn when longstanding grievances the PNE of 1974, and in part provoked by 8
against New Delhi’s disregard for the region’s Washington’s move towards a comprehensive 9
autonomy, and its willful intervention into the test ban treaty that threatened to delegitimize 10
political processes of the state’s ruling party, any future Indian move to go nuclear,the 1998 11
coincided with the rise of insurgency from tests were aimed at overt weaponization, and 12
Pakistan’s NWFP in protest over the Line of were justified by reference to China, and later 13
Control. Such insurgency marked in part a Pakistan. The significance of China’s support 14
conscious Pakistan design to use covert forces in for the Pakistan missile program was not lost on 15
an asymmetrical campaign against India, Indian intelligence, and the greater challenge 16
especially in the wake of the Paris Peace Accords that China posed to Indian ambitions was 17
that ended the Afghan conflict.Yet it also marked not lost on western analysts either. 18
the rise of non-state actors with their own A series of statements made it clear that 19
socio-religious and political agendas acting both India now claimed the de facto status of a 20
on Pakistan and within both Azad Kashmir and nuclear weapons state (NWS). The move 21
the Indian State of Jammu & Kashmir. required an immediate reciprocal move by 22
Although India supported the restoration Pakistan, despite concerted efforts by the 23
of party politics in Pakistan after 1988, Clinton administration to prevent it.47 In the 24
and Pakistan’s subsequent return to the face of international condemnation and sanc- 25
Commonwealth, the irony remained that tions imposed by the US and other members 26
Indo–Pakistan relations tended to deteriorate of the OECD, India and Pakistan had suc- 27
during such democratic interludes.The rise of ceeded in undermining the NPT and the 28
coalition governments often compromised ability of the US to prevent the horizontal 29
mainstream politicians such as Benazir Bhutto proliferation of nuclear weapons. Both India 30
and Nawaz Sharif, who found themselves and Pakistan had sufficient expertise in the 31
dependent on the support of Islamic parties development and refinement of delivery 32
with extreme agendas concerning Kashmir. systems to make deployment a reality, with 33
From 1989 onwards,with the exception of the India having a notable edge in domestic 34
Rao congress government, coalition politics ballistic technologies, including guidance 35
weakened India as well, but less extensively on systems and software and satellite capabilities. 36
issues of foreign policy than on matters of Although the unilateral declaration by India 37
regionalism and local autonomy. of its status as an NWS appeared at one level 38
The prolonged crisis in Kashmir during to indicate a significant ideological and policy 39
the years 1989 to 1996 especially, and India’s break from previous governments, there was 40
deteriorating relationship with Pakistan much continuity behind India’s policy on 41
throughout the 1990s45 coincided with a nuclear capability broadly defined, in which 42
profound political change within the Indian possession of nuclear weapons was less a matter 43
political system. Socioeconomic and political of practical value than a symbolic emblem of 44
violence in the name of religion, associated great power status. Indian attempts to assert its 45
with the rise of Hindu nationalism,challenged moral superiority by claiming that New Delhi 46
the basis of Nehru’s secularist state. Also for would renounce nuclear weapons once global 47
the first time, Nehruvian foreign policy was nuclear disarmament was restored to the heart 48
408

1 of the NPT regime, was a rhetorical gesture,
2 a figleaf hardly able to hide India’s realist
3 intentions.48 Yet, as always, the allegations of
4 western and US moral duplicity struck their
5 targets.The BJP leadership was candid, if not
6 slightly crude, in recognizing that, armed with
7 nuclear weapons, India would by definition
8 become overnight an influential power whose
9 views would be difficult to ignore or patronize.
10 Opinion polls revealed that over 70 percent of
11 the population supported the move by the
12 Indian government to the status of a NWS.
13 This support was not affected by the growing
14 realization that Pakistan too had visibly
15 increased its international profile, and by the
16 growing risk of a nuclear arms race not only in
17 South Asia but in the entire East Asian region.49
18 The complexity of the tradeoffs between
19 status and security became apparent in 1999,
20 when India and Pakistan engaged in open
21 conflict over Kargil.As Kundu has noted,“the
22 Kargil conflict, the first armed confrontation
23 between . . . states equipped with nuclear
24 weapons, [was] fought without either side
25 having established a formal tactical or strategic
26 doctrine for their use.”50 Subsequent alle-
27 gations that “unauthorized” movements of
28 Pakistan’s nuclear weapons took place during
29 the conflict heightened tensions by revealing
30 the very real lack of transparency or even
31 defined procedure within the Pakistan chain
32 of command. Many western observers were
33 struck by the distressing level of “nuclear
34 threats” uttered by statesmen on both sides in
35 1999,and in the subsequent crisis that followed
36 Islamic terrorist attacks on the Kashmir parlia-
37 ment and then the Indian national parliament.
38 However, by 2003–04, both India and
39 Pakistan had moved to clarify their nuclear
40 doctrines, and had to some extent created or
41 revised institutional arrangements to house,
42 oversee, and ultimately authorize the use of
43 nuclear weapons. In the meantime, ongoing
44 negotiations with the Clinton administration
45 aimed at putting the genie back in the bottle
46 moved towards condoning some sort of
47 “limited”Indian nuclear deterrent.In the wake
48 of Clinton’s successful visit to India in 2000 (by
I N T E R N AT I O N A L P O L I T I C S O F S O U T H AS I A
far the most successful visit by a US president),
the nuclear gamble of 1998 appeared, para-
doxically, to have transformed the US–Indian
relationship (or as one analyst stated, to have
finally “lanced the boil”of the NPT issue once
and for all).51 By contrast, the sight of a US
president lecturing the Pakistanis on
democracy boosted the BJP realist view as both
appropriate and necessary for Indian success.
By 2003–04, a more complex analysis of the
security dilemma post-1998 implied that
nuclear weapons might have prevented the
Kargil incident from escalating into a full
international conflict. While there remained
concerns that India and Pakistan might use the
threat of nuclear war to encourage low-
intensity conflict, there was some room for
optimism that it would proscribe the overall
use of force in pursuit of political and strategic
aims.However,the role and influence of armed
non-state actors, and their proliferation and
association with international militant groups
linked to global terrorism against the west,
would soon become of increased concern.
The election of George W. Bush, and the
new international era that emerged in the wake
of 9/11, hampered the Indian momentum
towards rapprochement with the US because
of Pakistan “outbidding,” but it did not stop it.
While it restored Pakistan to US favor, it did
not undo the gains that New Delhi had made
from 1998 or blight the emergent symmetry
between western concerns over Islamic terror-
ism and Indian concerns over “Pakistani”-
backed terrorism. While retaining links with
the Russians, and pursuing independent
initiatives aimed at Iraq prior to the invasion by
the coalition,India strengthened its new found
understanding with Washington by forging an
alliance with Israel. A series of intelligence and
arms deals with this country opened the way
for the modernization of some of India’s
aging Soviet-era military hardware,while neo-
conservative rhetoric from within the Bush
administration complemented Indian con-
cerns over China’s continuing economic and
military growth. Indo–US relations have
continued to develop, despite India’s refusal to
409
VE R NON H EWITT

participate in the Iraq involvement without a mines Indian claims to greatness.It also follows 1
UN mandate. that India needs a stable and workable “idea of 2
The successful transformation of the Pakistan” and not a failing Pakistani state that 3
US–Indian relationship cannot be under- would destabilize the entire Central and South 4
estimated. It has paved the way for the recent Asian region. 5
and,to some,surprising recognition of India as 6
a great power by a British prime minister and 7
open support for an Indian seat on a revised Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, 8
UN security council. Yet such views reflect and the international system 9
not so much the success of the BJP’s “outing” 10
of Pakistan’s nuclear capability, but more India dominates the South Asian subcontinent, 11
significantly,the economic transformation that and presides over a regional state system that 12
has been gathering pace since the early 1990s. shares numerous ethnic,religious,and linguistic 13
India’s economic “takeoff ” and its ability to identities. These states are constantly mediat- 14
combine a nationalist strategy with the neo- ing, resisting or encouraging specific forms of 15
liberal compulsions of globalization are social identity.It has been argued in this chapter 16
complex and open to dispute,52 but they have that such dynamics blur the anodyne dis- 17
been transformative, both on the nature of the tinctions made in IR literature among 18
Indian federal system itself, and the role that domestic, regional, and international politics. I 19
India is playing in international entities such as wish to conclude this chapter by a brief over- 20
the World Trade Organization (WTO), the view of the regional dynamics of cooperation 21
World Bank, and the International Monetary and resistance, and their consequences for the 22
Fund (IMF).Taken as a whole, it is the degree smaller states of South Asia. 23
of Indian economic prosperity that has The state elites of South Asia use resources 24
commanded US and western attention as gleaned from the international community— 25
much if not more than its status as an NWS. both material and ideological—to forward 26
During the late 1990s, India–US trade grew domestic ideas of the nation, and to shape the 27
by a staggering 264 percent, with the US regional state system to their own liking and 28
providing a market for one-fifth of Indian for their own security.The search for security 29
exports. Moreover, India is the second largest is often as much a domestic one as it is inter- 30
source of immigrants to the US after Mexico national.As we have seen, shared sociocultural 31
and has begun to generate a societal presence and religious identities facilitate such strategies, 32
in the US,and a powerful lobby that is creating as well as encourage the risk of blowback.Both 33
a domestic constituency that may influence US India and Pakistan have intervened in the 34
policy towards India in the future. More internal conflicts within the other state, 35
significantly still,the need to sustain economic covertly or overtly. India has intervened in 36
growth and to deepen economic cooperation Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives. It has 37
in the region as a whole, has improved also sought almost continuously to influence 38
the position of the troubled South Asian and control the domestic and foreign policy of 39
Association of Regional Cooperation, and led Nepal. India’s bilateral relations with the 40
to significant moves towards enhancing India’s smaller states of South Asia have often been in 41
role in the Association of South East Asian competition with Pakistan, but also with 42
Nations (ASEAN) as well.53 China, especially in the sensitive areas of 43
India’s recent willingness to talk “trade” northeast India. Bhutan and—until its inte- 44
with Pakistan without pre-conditional postur- gration into India—the state of Sikkim, 45
ing over Kashmir, overcoming the deadlock of occupied curious positions as quasi-sovereign 46
the Agra summit in 2001, seems to imply a states under implicit forms of “trusteeship” 47
recognition that regional instability under- that have had more in common with ideas of 48
410

1 British paramountcy than with notions of
2 Westphalian statehood. All have felt the
3 attempted assertion of India’s primacy, and all
4 have sought to challenge it.
5 international allies in turn.57 Intense party
6 competition and social mobilization compli-
Bangladesh
7 cated and compromised these options further,
8 In 1971–72, Pakistan became the first post-
9 Second World War state to disintegrate.54 East
10 Pakistan, containing a bare majority of its
11 population, emerged from almost 25 years of
12 economic and social discrimination against its
13 Bengali-speaking community, to stake a claim
14 to statehood.Delivered by Indian intervention,
15 and conscious of a shared language and
16 community that united it with West Bengal,
17 Bangladesh has curiously mirrored Pakistan’s
18 own political and social instability in trying to
19 establish a national community congruent
20 with the territorial state. This has involved a
21 shift from a secular, socialist democracy to an
22 Islamic republic, premised on sharia law that
23 implies an important role for the mullahs.It too
24 has veered from prime ministerial to
25 presidential systems of government, and from
26 civilian to military dictatorship.These struggles
27 have been driven in the main by different
28 images of the nation held by competing elites,
29 who have used domestic, regional, and
30 international resources to seize state power.55
31 A short but brutal civil war generated a
32 radicalized, pro-Maoist liberation movement,
33 a more orthodox Bengali secularist movement
34 premised around the Awami League,and a pro-
35 Pakistan movement linked to religious parties
36 associated with ex-patriot officers and soldiers
37 returned to Bangladesh after the war.56 The last
38 group, exemplified by General Ershad, who
39 held power between 1982 and 1990, had been
40 influenced by Pakistani army views on Islam,
41 and been removed from the profoundly
42 galvanizing experiences of the civil war itself.
43 Political parties quickly formed around each
44 potential national signifier—Islamic and
45 secular linguistic—despite the dominance of
46 the Awami League,and although the Jamaat-i-
47 Islami (JI) was proscribed in Bangladesh until
48 1976. Neighboring states supported one
I N T E R N AT I O N A L P O L I T I C S O F S O U T H AS I A
preferred option over another, India a secular
version of Bangladesh derived from its own
experiences, and Pakistan a more Islamic
version. And behind them emerged their
especially following the restoration of party
politics in 1990.
Indian support for the Awami League and
Bangladesh’s first secular and socialist con-
stitution of 1973 backfired. It was alleged that
India was bullying Bangladesh on matters of
economic assistance and trade, even implying
that Bangladesh was a satellite of India. The
murder of Mujibur Rehman brought to power
an army that turned Bangladesh back towards
Pakistan, and a strategic alliance with the US,
Saudi Arabia,and the Gulf states,and away from
India and the Soviet Union. This occurred
despite the fact that the US was initially hostile
to the Awami League and was pro-Pakistan
throughout the civil war. This foreign policy
shift,brought about by General Ziaur Rehman
(in power 1976–81), went along with a move
to construct a conservative Muslim—but not
necessarily Islamist—nationalism led by the
newly formed BNP, and through the
rehabilitation of former so-called Pakistani
collaborators. Gulf remittances into the
Bangladesh economy made a significant con-
tribution to state revenue, but also furthered
external Islamic influences that competing
elites charged were alien to Bengali Islamic
traditions.
In the mid-1980s, during the presidency of
Ershad, Bangladesh played a critical role
in setting up the South Asian Regional
Cooperation Council (SAARC) in the hope
of getting away from India’s domination
through collaboration with other smaller states
anxious over Indian designs.At the same time,
difficulties within Bangladesh, especially with
reference to the ongoing insurgency within
the Chittagong Hill Tracts,and the dispute over
the sharing of water resources from the Ganges
(especially in the wake of India’s completion of
the Farakka Barrage in 1974), compelled
411
VE R NON H EWITT

cooperation with India,regardless of emerging and 2006, Bangladesh has received approxi- 1
ideological differences.Throughout the 1980s, mately $45 billion in grants, and $44 billion in 2
Indo–Bangladeshi relations were bitter and soft loans. These grants and loans have 3
confrontational. However, despite issues of constituted between 12 and 25 percent of all 4
illegal migration from Bangladesh into India’s government expenditure.Yet, some argue that 5
northeastern states, and India’s attempt to up to 75 percent of this glut of external 6
construct a border fence, bilateral relations funding has failed to reach its targeted project 7
improved under I. K. Gujral’s brief policy of or constituency.59 By 2005 pledges of further 8
close cooperation between India and its aid had declined considerably. 9
immediate neighbors. Relations were also 10
improved through SAARC, and in part by a 11
Nepal
more sophisticated appreciation by India of the 12
internal constraints of its neighbor. Given the role of Maoist parties in the 13
The termination of military rule in formation of Bangladesh, and the location 14
Bangladesh was facilitated by the end of the of the new state close to regions and terri- 15
Cold War and by democratic restoration in tories contested between India and China, 16
Nepal, which momentarily demonstrated the Bangladesh has proved relatively immune to 17
power of mass protest. Still, although the Sino-Indian rivalry. Nepal, in contrast, has 18
restoration of elected government from 1990 often found itself in the position of a “yam 19
fits to some extent within the so-called “third between two boulders.” Nepal shares the 20
wave”of democratization,the results have been complex social and cultural pluralism of the 21
more complex and more disappointing than rest of South Asia,as well as the preservation of 22
the democratization literature would have us feudal-like political structures within a modern 23
suppose.58 Intense competition between the territorially defined state.60 Its traditional elites 24
Awami League and the BNP has led to a are drawn from Hindu migrants who left India 25
degree of Islamic outbidding, similar to the from the fourteenth century onwards, estab- 26
experience of Pakistan between 1988 and lishing themselves in and around Kathmandu. 27
1999.The refusal of political elites to abide by These elites supported a particularly orthodox 28
electoral verdicts within Bangladesh has led to Hinduism not found throughout the rest of 29
outside attempts at mediation from such Nepal or,for that matter,in modern India.The 30
diverse actors and organizations as the British Bahun families dominated courtly politics, 31
Commonwealth, British labor politicians and retaining hereditary offices such as head priest 32
US ambassadors.The extent of instability has and prime minister,and managing non-Bahun 33
led to Indian concerns over the role of Islamic clans through a form of amoral familism,61 in 34
groups, and also has raised concerns within the form of strategic patron–client linkages 35
the international community over issues of known as the chakari system.Superimposed on, 36
good governance and corruption, especially and refracted through such alliances, was an 37
following the intense electoral instability older division between the hills and the plains 38
since 2006. or the tarai, dominated by Hindus who 39
Bangladesh’s extraordinary dependence on migrated from the nineteenth century on- 40
international aid,at a time of reluctance on the wards, and influenced by social and cultural 41
part of aid givers to commit to future grants, reforms stimulated in India during British 42
as well as increased conditionality on proposed colonial rule. 43
loans, threatens to alienate domestic opinion Nepal emerged after the British withdrawal 44
concerned over compromising national as an independent state, but with India 45
sovereignty. Such concerns also have the concerned over the former’s proximity to 46
potential to strengthen Islamicist parties that Tibet and, later, with Chinese collusion 47
denounce western intervention.Between 1972 with Pakistan. Indian influence in Nepal was 48
412

1 facilitated by shared sociocultural and devel-
2 opment goals and, between 1948–61, close
3 cooperation between the Indian National
4 Congress and the Nepali Congress. However,
5 in 1961,the monarchy banned political parties
6 and imposed a Panchayat Raj scheme of local
7 governance, which provoked tensions with
8 India. As Sino–Pakistan relations solidified in
9 the wake of the first and second Indo-Pak wars,
10 Nepal’s fragmented elite came to resent India’s
11 talk of nonalignment as a cover to support pro-
12 democracy movements within the kingdom,
13 and isolate Nepal from Pakistan.Chinese offers
14 of developmental aid were also accepted as a
15 counterbalance, but the construction of the
16 strategically vital Karakorum Road linking
17 China to Pakistan,especially following a border
18 agreement between Pakistan and China over
19 territory claimed by India, led to direct Indian
20 pressure on Nepal. Bilateral relations deteri-
21 orated dramatically in the late 1980s, when
22 various transit deals on commodities were held
23 up by New Delhi,with immediate and serious
24 consequences for the Nepal economy.SAARC
25 provided a much needed opportunity for
26 Nepal to negotiate with Bangladesh and
27 Pakistan to try and reduce transit costs as
28 alternatives to India’s control of the border
29 through airlifting supplies from its two
30 neighbors. Following the restoration of party
31 politics in 1990,India has continued to support
32 the Nepal Congress and assist in a series of
33 bilateral aid and trade deals, while China
34 tended to support the main Marxist opposi-
35 tion, but resisted supporting the Maoist
36 insurrection.The fragmentation of the Nepali
37 Left in the wake of the Cold War, and China’s
38 own reform and moderation from the 1990s
39 onwards, led to a lessening of overt Chinese
40 antagonisms against India,and limited Chinese
41 intervention within Nepalese domestic politics
42 during the recent insurgency. In 1996, the
43 decision by the Maoist Communist Party of
44 Nepal to quit the institutions of parliamentary
45 government and head a people’s rebellion
46 paralyzed the constitutional monarchy. At
47 one stage, the Maoists controlled over 70 per-
48 cent of the territory of Nepal, but it did so
I N T E R N AT I O N A L P O L I T I C S O F S O U T H AS I A
without China’s backing.The struggle among
king, parliament, and rebels led to a bewilder-
ing set of competing alliances (after 2005,
increasingly between a fragmented parliament
aligned with the rebels, against the absolutism
of King Gyanendra), with the king seeking to
reestablish local institutions of government in
an attempt to undermine parliament’s claims
to represent the will of the people.Such a move
aimed at retaining the power of the monarchy
incurred the risk of alienating support from
both the US and India, both of whom favored
party-based governance as a requirement
for socioeconomic reform. Although China
strangely remained more sympathetic to the
king, its refusal to support the Maoists
indicated a significant degree of conversion
among the US, India, and China on regional
politics in general and Nepal in particular.
Sri Lanka
Finally, the regional dynamics of state
formation over and above shared senses of
community and belonging can be dramatically
illustrated with reference to the crisis and
tensions within Ceylon (Sri Lanka after 1972)
and their consequences for regional and
international politics. Despite a very different
colonial heritage from that of India and
Pakistan, and despite a very different route to
independence, Sri Lanka has been beset by
internal conflict over the nature of national
identity, what kind of state it supports, and
what foreign policies such a state should
pursue. Separate Tamil kingdoms, centered on
the Jaffna peninsula, linked the island to India’s
Dravidian south, while its long exposure to
maritime trade brought diverse influence
from Southeast Asia and ultimately Europe.
Although administered separately from India,
the transportation throughout the nineteenth
century of indentured Tamil laborers to work
the tea plantations added another connection
that threatened Sri Lanka’s Sinhala Buddhist
majority with the fear of Indian dominance.
Unitary in origin, and initially elitist and
solidly pro-western, pro-Commonwealth and
413
VE R NON H EWITT

pro-US in foreign policy, the formation of bilateral relationship by providing intelligence 1

exclusively Sinhalese political parties (the and support for “counterterrorist” operations. 2
United National Party, and later the Sri Lanka Sri Lanka remains the most consistently pro- 3
Freedom Party) led to ethnic mobilization western, pro-US ally in the region.The recent 4
based on xenophobic Sinhala-Buddhist stress on the need for economic growth, and 5
majoritarianism that resulted in a civil war that the “Look East” (i.e., to East Asia) policies of 6
for long dominated an otherwise wealthy and recent governments in New Delhi, have also 7
successful polity. Sinhala-dominated govern- complemented Sri Lanka’s East Asian connec- 8
ments sought to accommodate Tamil political tions, especially with reference to Japan, 9
parties while abjuring federalism or even Thailand and the newly emerging economies 10
acknowledging the cultural diversity of the of Vietnam and Cambodia.The breakdown in 11
northern and eastern parts of the country in the ceasefire, and the intense warfare that 12
particular.The consequence was to create the therefore developed,imperils had the potential 13
very Tamil separatist movement they most wealth of the island, and the role that SAARC 14
feared and compelled the very Indian inter- and global wealth can play in providing 15
vention they most desired to avoid. resources to buy off separatist national claims. 16
During Rajiv Gandhi’s term in office, They can only play such a role, in any case, if 17
India sought forcibly to impose a settlement domestic political institutions are redesigned 18
on the island, moved as much by electoral to substantially devolve economic, social, and 19
fallout for Congress in southern India, cultural power. 20
especially in Tamil Nadu where pro-Tamil 21
sympathies were high. The ill-fated Indo–Sri 22
Lankan Accord that led to Indian intervention Conclusions 23
between 1987 and 1990 seriously undermined 24
India’s attempts to broker a deal, revealing that This chapter set out to show that an under- 25
it could not act to disarm the Tigers, influence standing of the international politics of the 26
the Sri Lankan government to negotiate states of South Asia requires an awareness of 27
seriously, or prevent Tamil support in India for the contingent nature of state formation, 28
an independent Eelam. India lost more troops and the role played by elite competition in 29
during its intervention in Sri Lanka during the forming national communities that are con- 30
peace accord than it did during its interven- gruent with state boundaries. Only a histori- 31
tion in East Pakistan in 1971. The incident cally grounded, constructivist approach to 32
reinforced Sri Lankan mistrust of India as a South Asia can reveal the dynamics working 33
regional hegemon and resulted directly in the themselves out among the states of India, 34
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. Such Pakistan, and Nepal. International forces have 35
adventurism proved costly to Indian claims to constrained the foreign policy of state elites, 36
be an emergent great power with global but less so than might at first be imagined.The 37
responsibilities,instead underlining its inability search for security has often as not entailed 38
to influence events in its own backyard. realigning domestic forces and institutions as 39
Active in SAARC, supportive of ties with much as changing foreign allies. And it has 40
China and with ASEAN, Sri Lanka has most often required the pragmatic use of 41
continued to view Indian ambition with external ideological quarrels, especially those 42
concern,and has in particular remained a critic of the US during the Cold War, and even the 43
of the nuclearization of the subcontinent since Bush administration’s ill-named “War on 44
1998. Nonetheless, changes in the US–India Terror,” for domestic and regional purposes. 45
relationship,as well as between India and Israel, The roots of conflict are,often as not,domestic, 46
have complemented India and Sri Lanka’s but changes within the international system 47
search for a more nuanced and intimate have enabled them either to have sustained 48
414

1 themselves or threatened them with a scarcity
2 of resources.
3 What of the future? Globalization, and the
4 convergence of elites around the search for
5 economic wealth through market-based
6 solutions open up some scope for regional
7 accommodation and cooperation even as they
8 reveal new arenas of competition and risk. At
9 the heart of the crisis of state formation in
10 South Asia lies the strategic standoff between
11 India and Pakistan over Kashmir, with both
12 India and Pakistan preoccupied with identity
13 and stability. India’s search for global power is
14 still an irritant to China and a stark challenge
15 to the status and prospects of Pakistan and the
16 smaller states of South Asia. However, the
17 prospects of economic growth and shared
18 markets may well erode the crude assertions of
19 power as a form of mercantilist, zero-sum
20 assertion of “hard” power. Economic wealth
21 not only complements hard power, it actually
22 pays for it, and in the long term may actually
23 be more sustainable.
24 In his work on the states of the Middle East,
25 Michael Barnett analyzes how, despite shared
26 religious and linguistic identities that chal-
27 lenged the premise of the modern Westphalian
28 state, elites nonetheless managed to institu-
29 tionalize their states in such a way that re-
30 imagined Arab nationalism as complementary
31 to a stable system of Arab states.62 Can any
32 insights be taken from the Middle East and
33 added to that of South Asia? Given the con-
34 tingent nature of state formation, nationalist
35 elites need to structure interaction around
36 processes that share cultural and economic
37 activity in ways that increase cooperation. Can
38 political structures be created that facilitate
39 sharing resources among states, such as soft
40 borders, social and cultural movements, free
41 trade zones in place of foreign donor condi-
42 tionality? It is ironic that the western powers
43 have paid more attention to an India with a
44 sustained and impressive growth rate, than an
45 India with nuclear weapons.
46 It remains the dominant challenge within
47 South Asia whether the ideas of sovereignty
48 can be made to work without generating
I N T E R N AT I O N A L P O L I T I C S O F S O U T H AS I A
domestic or regional conflict. State formation
entails violence, but it also entails a search for
order and stability. If states, nations and
communities are creative acts of political
imagination, if they exemplify agency and not
ahistoric, fixed and essentialized entities, then
however difficult and demanding,solutions are
possible because they lie firmly in the hands of
elites and subalterns themselves.
Postscript
The political formation of the Zardari
coalition in Pakistan throughout 2008,and the
on going proliferation of Taliban forces within
the areas of Gilgit and Hunza continue to
create tensions within the Pakistan state, and
between Pakistan and India. The terrorist
attacks on Mumbai in late 2008 reiterate much
of the dynamics of state-nation-international
system discussed in this chapter.The events in
Mumbai exposed the extent to which non-
state and state actors are either complicit in acts
of social and political violence, ot powerless to
prevent them. Despite immediate denials,
subsequent US pressure from the newly
elected Obama administration led to Pakistan’s
acceptance of Indian findings that a majority of
the operatives in the attack—members of
Lashkar-e-Toiba—prepared for the attack
within Pakistan, and drew on a wide range of
resources from international Islamist groups
as far away as Spain and the US itself.
While Pakistan denied actively deploying the
terrorists as a covert state-sponsored act of
terrorism, India remains skeptical of the claim
and of the ability of the Pakistani state to bring
the sole surviving terrorist to justice, ques-
tioning the control the state has over non-
state actors working within its jurisdiction.
Furthermore, President Zardari’s decision to
compromise with Islamic extremists in Swat
by allowing the application of Shari’a law and
ending military activity against the extremists
undermines Pakistan’s internal sovereignty
and the ability of the state to prevent the
forcible and violent implementation of a form
415
VE R NON H EWITT

of medievalism that is neither Islamic nor Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, State 1
popular. These two facets of the crisis of Sovereignty: A Social Construct (Cambridge: 2
Pakistan: internal and external, domestic and University Press, 1996), p. 148. 3
foreign, are part of the on going struggle over 12 See Christopher Clapham’s innovative Africa 4
and the International System:The Politics of State
what sort of social order the state wants to 5
Survival (Cambridge: University Press, 1996);
construct,and how successful the resulting state also Paul R. Brass “National Power and Local 6
shall be in achieving regional peace. Politics in India: A Twenty Year Perspective,” 7
Modern Asian Studies,Vol. 18, No. 1 (February 8
1984), pp. 89–119; and his Ethnicity and 9
Notes Nationalism:Theory and Comparison (New Delhi: 10
Sage,1991);and Subrata K.Mitra and R.Alison 11
1 See Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan Lewis (eds),Subnational Movements in South Asia 12
(Washington, DC: Brookings, 2004). (Boulder, CO:Westview, 1995). 13
2 SeeVernon Hewitt,The New International Politics 13 Jeremy Gould,“Anthropology,”in Peter Burnell
14
of South Asia (Manchester: University Press, (ed.), Democratization through the Looking-Glass
15
1997). (Manchester:University Press,2003),pp.24–40.
3 See R. B. J.Walker, Inside/Outside: International For a further discussion of this, see Vernon 16
Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Hewitt, Political Mobilisation and Democracy in 17
University Press, 1992). India: States of Emergency (Oxford: Routledge, 18
4 See introduction to S. Hobden and John M. 2008), esp. the introduction and chapter 2. 19
Hobson, Historical Sociology of International 14 Thomas. R. Metcalf, Ideologies of the Raj (New 20
Relations (Cambridge: University Press, 2002). York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 21
Exceptions to this exclusion of elites came, 15 C. A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence 22
until recently, in “crisis” situations where the Gathering and Social Communication in India, 23
psychological or personal prejudices of leaders 1780–1870 (Cambridge:University Press,2000).
24
might be important, but even then these were 16 Metcalf.
not seen as requiring a societal perspective; see 17 R. J. Moore, Churchill, Cripps, and India, 25
Richard Little and Steve Smith, Belief Systems 1939–1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). 26
and International Relations (Oxford: Blackwell, 18 Maulana Azad, India Wins Freedom (London: 27
1988), pp.10–12. Sangam, 1988). 28
5 Hobden and Hobson, p. 11. 19 A. W. Brian Simpson, Human Rights and the 29
6 Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments: End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the 30
Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton, European Convention (Oxford: University Press, 31
NJ: University Press, 1993). 2001). 32
7 Hobden and Hobson, p. 21 20 Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the
33
8 Michael Barnett, “Historical Sociology and Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan
Constructivism,” in Hobden and Hobson, (Cambridge: University Press, 1994). See also
34
p. 101.The sociological turn within IR has led the very useful edited work by Mushirul Hasan 35
to an intriguing debate between constructivists (ed.), India’s Partition: Process, Strategy and 36
and postmodernists;see Alexander Wendt,Social Mobilisation (New Delhi: Oxford University 37
Theory of International Politics (New York: Press, 1993). 38
Cambridge University Press, 1999). 21 See David Gilmartin, Islam and Empire: Punjab 39
9 T. K. Oommen, “New Nationalisms and and the Making of Pakistan (Berkeley, CA: 40
Collective Rights:The Case of South Asia,” in University of California Press, 1995). 41
Stephen May et al. (eds), Ethnicity, Nationalism 22 Gilmartin. 42
and Minority Rights (Cambridge: University 23 See the final chapter of Clapham.
Press, 2004), p. 128.
43
24 See Ayesha Jalal, Authoritarianism and Democracy
10 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical
44
South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective (Cambridge:University Press,1995). 45
Perspective (Cambridge:University Press,1995). Jalal seeks, perhaps too emphatically, to correct 46
11 Michael Barnett “Sovereignty,Nationalism and the view that India is a “success” and Pakistan a 47
Regional Order in the Arab State System,” in “failure.” 48
416
 I N T E R N AT I O N A L P O L I T I C S O F S O U T H AS I A

1 25 See Sunil Khilnani, The Idea of India (London: Jeyaratnam Wilson, The Post-Colonial States of
2 Hamish Hamilton, 1997). South Asia: Democracy, Development and Identity
3 26 See R.J.Moore,Making the New Commonwealth (New York: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 41–68; see also
4 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). Ian Talbot, Pakistan:A Modern History (London:
27 For one particular take on the Poonch Hurst, 1998), part iv.
5
rebellion,see Alistair Lamb,Kashmir:A Disputed 40 See Katharine Adeney, “What Comes After
6 Legacy:1846–1990 (Hertingfordbury:Roxford, Musharraf?,” Brown Journal of World Affairs,
7 1991). Vol. 16, No. 1 (Fall/Winter 2007), pp. 41–49.
8 28 For a discussion of the Standstill Agreements 41 In this sense, whatever their differences,
9 and the Treaty of Accession,see Vernon Hewitt, Nehru would have agreed with Jaswant Singh’s
10 Reclaiming the Past? The Search for Political and rebuke to Strobe Talbott in 1997 condemning
11 Cultural Unity in Jammu and Kashmir (London: the US habit of always hyphenating India with
12 Portland Books, 1995). Pakistan;Talbott, p. 85.
13 29 See Vernon Hewitt, “Ethnic Construction, 42 See Vernon Hewitt, New International Politics,
Provincial Identity and Nationalism in Pakistan: ch. ii.
14
The Case of Baluchistan,” in Mitra and Lewis, 43 Nixon’s “that bitch” statement is now pretty
15 pp. 43–67. legendary. See Walter Isaacson, Kissinger:
16 30 See S.R.Ashton,British Policy Towards the Indian A Biography (London: Faber & Faber, 1992);
17 States, 1905–1939 (London: Curzon Press, also Katherine Frank, Indira:The Life of Indira
18 1982). Nehru Gandhi (London: HarperCollins, 2001),
19 31 Obviously the entire narrative of the Kashmir pp. 339–40.
20 crisis from 1947–49 is contested. For a dis- 44 The argument here was along the lines of covert
21 cussion on the holding of all the plebiscites at “selective” proliferation (such as in the case of
22 the ending of the British Indian Empire, see Israel), by the US, in defiance of the logic of
23 Michael Brecher,India and World Politics:Krishna the NPT.
Menon (Oxford: University Press, 1959). 45 Vernon Hewitt,“Creating a Common Home?
24
32 See Vernon Hewitt, “Never Ending Stories: Indo–Pakistan Relations and the Search for
25 Recent Trends in the Historiography of Jammu Security in South Asia,” in Shastri and Wilson.
26 and Kashmir,” History Compass, Vol. 5, No. 2 46 Jaswant Singh, Defending India (Basingstoke:
27 (2007), pp. 288–301. Macmillan, 1999).
28 33 Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The 47 William Walker, “International Nuclear
29 Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence Relations after the Indian and the Pakistani Test
30 (Cambridge: University Press, 1990). Explosions,” International Affairs,Vol. 74, No. 3
31 34 Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, (July 1998),pp.505–28;see alsoVernon Hewitt,
32 Democracy and the Bomb:A Memoir (Washington, “Containing Shiva: India, Non-Proliferation,
DC: Brookings, 2004). and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,”
33
35 Talbot, pp. 108–9. Contemporary South Asia, 9 (2000), pp. 25–39.
34 36 Owen Bennett-Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm 48 Confirmed by recent Indian discussions over
35 (New Delhi: Viking, 2002), ch. i. Iranian nuclear ambitions and India’s support
36 37 Bennett-Jones, pp. 27–9. for US sanctions.
37 38 This was a particular concern for the British, in 49 See Apurba Kundu, “The NDA and National
38 the wake of terrorist attacks in London in 2005, Security,” in Katharine Adeney and Lawrence
39 which linked British Muslims with religious Sáez (eds), Coalition Politics and Hindu
40 seminaries and “camps” in Pakistan. See also Nationalism (London: Routledge, 2005), ch. iv.
41 Waheguru Pal Singh Sadu et al., Kashmir: New 50 Kundu, p. 219.
42 Voices, New Approaches (Boulder, CO: Lynne 51 See C. Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon:The Shaping
Rienner, 2006). of India’s New Foreign Policy (New Delhi:
43
39 Care needs to be taken when trying to analyze Viking Press, 2003); also Dennis Kux, Estranged
44 the exact reasoning for this animosity to elected Democracies:India and the United States 1941–1991
45 politicians and parties; some has genuinely to (New Delhi: Sage, 1993).
46 do with corruption and incompetence. 52 See Rob Jenkins, Democratic Politics and Economic
47 See Samina Ahmed, “The Fragile Base of Reform in India (Cambridge: University Press,
48 Democracy in Pakistan,”in Amita Shastri and A. 1999).

417
VE R NON H EWITT

53 See Rob Jenkins,“The NDA and the Politics of 58 Much of this literature derived from Latin 1
Economic Reform,” in Adeney and Sáez, America and Eastern Europe.For representative 2
pp. 173–92. application to South Asia, see John M. 3
54 Cohen, p. 2. Richardson, Jr. and S.W. R de A. Samarasinghe 4
55 See Tazeen M. Murshid, “State, Nation and (eds),Democratisation in South Asia:The First Fifty
5
Identity: The Quest for Legitimacy in Years (Kandy: International Center for Ethnic
6
Bangladesh,”in Shastri and Wilson,pp.158–82. Studies, 1998).
56 Richard Sisson and Leo Rose,War and Secession: 59 World Development Report, Development and 7
India, Pakistan and the Creation of Bangladesh the Next Generation (Washington, DC: World 8
(Princeton,NJ:University Press,1989).There is Bank, 2007). 9
some evidence that Indian intervention was in 60 See Leo E. Rose, “The National Political 10
part determined by radical Left movements Culture and Institutions in Nepal,” in Shastri 11
within the civil war making common cause and Wilson, pp. 114–38; also Rishikesh Shaha, 12
with the Left in West Bengal; see Tariq Ali, Can An Introduction to Nepal (Kathmandu: RPB, 13
Pakistan Survive? (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976). 14
1983). 61 See Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a 15
57 See D. Hugh Evans, “Bangladesh: South Asia’s Backward Society (New York: Free Press, 1958).
16
Unknown Quantity,” Asian Affairs, 75 (1988), 62 Michael Barnett,“Sovereignty,Nationalism and
17
pp. 306–16; and D. Hugh Evans, “Bangladesh: the Regional Order in the Arab State System,”
An Unsteady Democracy,” in Shastri and in Biersteker and Weber, pp. 148–89. 18
Wilson, pp. 69–87. 19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
418
 1
2
3
4
5
6 Glossary
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19 Adivasi Literally “original dweller,” it is taken as equivalent to the English “indigenous”;
20 some use it loosely as equivalent to Scheduled Tribe and in some places both “ST” and
21 “Adivasi” designate the same people, but in fact usage is very varied across India: some
22 STs either reject or are ignorant of the Adivasi label and, v.v., some who claim to be
23 Adivasis do not have ST status.
24 Article 356 An emergency provision of India’s constitution under which the central
25 government can remove a state government and institute President’s rule for a period up
26 to six months on a finding by the Governor that the government of the state cannot be
27 carried on in accordance with the provisions of the constitution. Until the mid-1990s it
28 was often used for political purposes.
29 bakshish gift; gratuity
30 Bangla Bhai Brother of Bengal (name of an Islamic militant in Bangladesh)
31 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Hindu nationalist party which led the National Democratic
32 Alliance (NDA) coalition that governed India from 1999 to 2004.
33 bhasha formal language
34 bhasha ondolan Bengali language movement
35 boli colloquial speech
36 Cabinet Mission Plan An effort by the postwar Labour Government of British Prime
37 Minister Clement Atlee to resolve the conflict between the Indian National Congress
38 and the Muslim League and other long-standing constitutional problems that stood in
39 the way of realizing the Labour Government’s commitment to Indian independence. Its
40 proposal of a multi-layered federal state with a weak center and strong provinces was
41 rejected by Nehru and the Congress leadership, who wanted a strong activist state.
42 Center/Centre The term used throughout South Asia to refer to the central government.
43 Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) Central government transfer of funds to the states to
44 realize national objectives in areas allocated to the states. The funds must be utilized
45 according to the priorities established by the central government. CSS schemes are an
46 expanding form of central intervention that can dictate state choices with respect to
47 subjects that are constitutionally allocated to the states.
48
419
G LO S S A RY

Congress Party Common alternative form of referring to the Indian National Congress, 1
founded in 1885 to lead the nationalist movement. It was transformed in the 1920s into 2
a mass organization by Mohandas Gandhi. At Independence in 1947 it was able to form 3
majority governments from the first national election in 1952 until the ninth in 1989. 4
Thereafter it has led coalition governments in 1991–1996 and 2004–2009. 5
CPN-M Nepal Communist Party (Maoist), the name adopted in 1995 by one of the two 6
factions into which the Communist Party of Nepal (Unity Centre) had split the previous 7
year; it launched its “People’s War” in February 1996; following the Second People’s 8
Movement of April 2006, it entered mainstream politics and won the largest number of 9
votes (nearly 30 percent) in the elections of April 2008; from January 2009, having merged 10
with another small Maoist party, it became known as the CPN-UM (“unified”). 11
CPN-UML Nepal Communist Party (Unified Marxist-Leninist), the main parliamentary 12
opposition party in Nepal between 1991 and 2002, which formed a minority government 13
on its own for nine months from 1994 to 1995 and was later a partner in coalitions; 14
despite the name and the communist history and affiliation, it is essentially a social 15
democratic party; came third in the elections of April 2008. 16
crore ten million (10,000,000) Indian rupees 17
dalit Modern term for ex-untouchables, the lowest category in the caste system, outside 18
and below the four varnas; literally “the oppressed”. 19
Dravida Munnetra Kazagam (DMK) Tamil Nadu regional party lending crucial support to 20
the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) which formed the national government in 2004. 21
Emergency The authoritarian government instituted between 1975 and 1977 by Prime 22
Minister Indira Gandhi. 23
Finance Commission An autonomous, constitutionally mandated commission appointed 24
every five years to make recommendations to the Parliament of India with respect to the 25
distribution between the union and the state governments, as well as among the states, 26
of how the net proceeds of taxes are to be divided. 27
garibi hatao “abolish poverty.” A slogan used in Indira Gandhi’s election campaigning in 1971. 28
girijans forest tribals 29
Government of India Act,1935 Enacted by the British Parliament twelve years before 30
independence, the act continued the effort, launched in 1909 and advanced in 1919, to 31
realize responsible government in India. It provided for a federal system, and strongly 32
influenced the 1950 constitution of free India. 33
Gram Rajya Committee village administrative committee 34
Halpati Seva Sangh Halpati Service Organization 35
haris laborers 36
hartal general strike 37
Hindutva Hinduness 38
hung parliament A parliament in which no party achieves a majority of seats following a 39
national election. 40
Jamaat ul-Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB) Assembly of Holy Warriors of Bangladesh 41
Janajati Originally a Hindi neologism coined to translate “tribe” in the 1930s, it was adopted 42
in Nepali at the very end of the 1980s and gained currency after 1990 to refer to tribal 43
groups in Nepal. 44
Jan Andolan People’s Movement (Nepal); the commonly accepted name for the revolution 45
of 1990 that overthrew the Panchayat regime; the revolution of 2006 is known as Jan 46
Andolan II. 47
jawan Literally youth, usually for army personnel. 48
420
 G LO S S A RY

1 khadi homespun cloth

2 kisan sabha peasant association
3 lashkar armed unit
4 Madhesi Literally “an inhabitant of Madhes/Madhyades,” it has become a highly contested
5 new ethnic category within Nepal for inhabitants of the Nepalese Tarai who share language
6 and cultural heritage with Indians on the other side of the border, principally castes such
7 as Yadavs, Rajputs, and Brahmans. Other groups, such as Muslims and Tharus, have been
8 listed as Madhesis by the Nepalese state and are claimed as Madhesis by Madhesi political
9 parties and activists, but their own activists organized vociferously during 2009 to insist
10 that they should be considered indigenous Tarai-dwellers and a religious minority
11 respectively instead of Madhesis.
12 Magar Largest of the Janajati groups in Nepal with a population of 1,622,399 (7.2 percent)
13 according to the 2001 census.
14 mastaan thug
15 matru bhasha mother tongue (Hindi)
16 mohajirs Urdu-speaking migrants
17 Mukti Sena liberation army (Nepal)
18 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) A coalition of 22 small and regional parties, led by
19 the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which constituted the central government from 1999
20 to 2004.
21 Nepal Sadbhawana Party A regionalist party based in the Nepalese Tarai.
22 panchayat/Panchayat (i) Literally and originally “rule of five [elders],” i.e., supposedly
23 “traditional” local or caste councils widely found across South Asia; hence the name was
24 adopted for (ii) democratically elected local councils, the new institutions of local self-
25 government in India after independence; it was also adopted as (iii) the name both of
26 specific local (village, district) and national councils and the national legislature in the
27 period of “partyless democracy” (1960–1990) in Nepal; hence (iv) it is also used as the
28 name of the regime and period in Nepal of that time.
29 panchayati raj Literally “rule by panchayats,” it is the Indian term used for local government
30 with elected bodies (panchayats) at the levels of village (gram), block (kshetra), and district
31 (zilla).
32 Parbatiya Literally “hill person” (cf. Pahadia), now an ethnic term; it can be used for anyone
33 of hill provenance, but is often used more restrictively in the Nepalese context to refer
34 to the high castes, Bahuns and Chetris, and associated Dalit service castes, as opposed to
35 Janajatis and Madhesis.
36 People’s War (jan yuddha) The name given by the Maoists to their insurgency, begun in
37 Nepal in 1996.
38 pracharak Whole-time party worker (term especially used by the RSS).
39 President’s Rule Imposition of rule of a state government in India by an appointee of the
40 central government, as authorized by article 356 of the Constitution of India.
41 Quaid-i-Azam Great leader, always in reference to Mohammad Ali Jinnah.
42 Rajya Sabha Council of States; upper house of the Indian parliament; represents the states
43 of India’s federal system on the basis of population.
44 Rana Surname assumed by the family (previously named Kunwar) who provided the
45 hereditary prime ministers of Nepal from 1845–1951; hence the name of the period of
46 Nepalese history when the Shah kings were reduced to figureheads without real power.
47 RPP Rashtriya Prajatantra Party a.k.a. Nepal Democratic Party (post-1990 Nepal): rightist
48 party led by prominent politicians who had participated in the Panchayat regime.
421
G LO S S A RY

RSS Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh or National Volunteers Association, founded in 1925 1

by K.B. Hedgewar as a national movement of Hindus for social welfare; RSS members 2
were involved in the murder of Gandhi and the RSS was banned for a year thereafter. 3
safarish Friendship and pleading on behalf of someone. 4
Sangh Parivar The “family” of associations pursuing Hindu cultural nationalism. 5
Sanskritization Term introduced by Indian anthropologist M.N. Srinivas to label the process 6
of attempted upward group mobility through imitation of the “purer” Brahmanical customs 7
(e.g., banning widow remarriage, alcohol, meat-eating) by lower-ranked castes. 8
Sarkaria Commission Appointed in 1983 by Indira Gandhi, to ward off mounting pressure 9
to strengthen the federal system, it reported in 1988. Prime Minister V.P. Singh made an 10
effort to implement many of its recommendations in 1990, but his government fell before 11
being able to do so. 12
Scheduled Castes (SC) Official Indian term for those formerly untouchable castes placed 13
on a schedule that entitles members of the caste to preference in admission to educational 14
institutions and in government jobs, and other positions, i.e., positive discrimination. 15
Scheduled Tribes (ST) Official Indian term for those tribal groups placed on the “schedule” 16
and entitled to “reservations,” i.e., positive discrimination. 17
Shiv Sena Literally “the army of Shiva” (i.e. Shivaji): a political party founded by Bal 18
Thackeray in 1966, it has ruled Mumbai for the last twenty years on a Mumbai for 19
Maharashtrians platform; it is often in alliance with the BJP. 20
Special Economic Zones Enclaves of land owned by big industrial houses, allotted to them 21
by government for purchase at well-below market prices, along with tax waivers and 22
other concessions. 23
tadbir connections 24
Tarai (Terai) Strip of Gangetic plains territory belonging to Nepal and bordering India, 25
now home to half the Nepalese population; the term is also used for the territories on 26
the Indian side of the border, usually not capitalized, and commonly referring to previously 27
marshy, mosquito-ridden (and, therefore, malarial) land. 28
Telugu Desam (TDP) The Andhra Pradesh regional party which lent crucial support to 29
the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) between 1999 and 2004. 30
VHP Vishwa Hindu Parishad or World Hindu Council, founded in 1964, with the 31
involvement of the RSS; ostensibly non-political, its aim is “to promote Hindu values”; 32
it pressurizes the BJP and acts in concert with the RSS (e.g., over the Ramjanam 33
Bhumi/Ayodhya mosque issue) and campaigns for the “re-conversion” of Muslims and 34
Christians. 35
yatra procession 36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
422
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 1
2
3
4
5
6 Index
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19 Page numbers in italics denotes a table
20
21 Abdullah, Sheikh 256 All-India Coordination Committee of
22 Adeney, Katherine 149 Communist Revolutionaries 386, 387
23 Advani, L.K. 60 All-India Muslim League 34–5
24 Afghanistan 14, 286, 357, 405; and Pakistan 88, All-India Trinamool Congress (AITC) 71
25 236, 274, 280, 286, 287, 357, 405; re- Amarasinghe, Somawansa 124
26 emergence of Taliban 90; Soviet invasion Ambedkar, Dr B.R. 148, 167, 264, 307
27 and occupation of 88, 404, 407; US Amin, Tahir 232, 233
28 military campaign against Taliban 90, 236; Amritsar massacre (1919) 31
29 see also Taliban Andhra Pradesh: language 221; Naxalite
30 Africa 401–402 movement 389, 390, 393, 395
Agrawal, Arun 62 Andhra Provincial Congress Committee 215
31
agriculture: Bangladesh 20, 110–11; India 18, Annadurai 153
32 150, 308, 313, 316; Sri Lanka 47, 339 ANP (Awami National Party) 236, 275, 284
33 Ahmed, Abul Manser 34 Anwar Hossain’s case 196, 200
34 Ahmed, Fakhruddin 108 armies 351–62; functions 351; influence of
35 Ahmed, Feroz 233 British rule on 351–52; non-state 361;
36 Ahmed, Ishtiaq 233, 279 see also Bangladesh Army; Indian Army;
37 Ahmed, President Iajuddin 107, 108 Pakistan Army
38 Ahmed, Shahabuddin 102, 196 Army Act (Pakistan) 178, 184
39 AIADMK (All-India Dravida Munnetra ASEAN (Association of South East Asian
40 Kazhagam) 71, 74 Nations) 410, 414
41 Akali Dal 37, 73–4, 77, 253, 254, 255 Ashraff, M.H.M. 125
AL (Awami League) 5, 12, 99, 100, 101–2, 103, Assam 258
42
105, 107, 111, 194, 360, 373, 374, 377, Association of Development Agencies in
43 411, 412 Bangladesh (ADAB) 106, 107
44 al-Qaeda 14, 88, 285 Austin, Granville 168
45 Alam, Javeed 61 Awami League see AL
46 Alavi, Hamza 232–3 Awami National Party see ANP
47 Ali, Chaudhri Muhammad 31 Ayodhya: destruction of Babri Masjid mosque
48 All Ceylon Buddhist Congress 46 (1992) 13, 55, 168, 263, 312

451
INDEX

Ayub, Gohar 371 with India 23, 258, 411–12; relations with 1
Ayub Khan, General Muhammad 4, 33, 84, 87, United States 411; restoration of 2
89, 93, 99, 180, 183, 184, 239, 356, 371 democracy (1991) 374, 377; restoration of 3
electoral politics (2008) 98, 361; rules of 4
backward classes (OBCs) 13, 264, 265–6, 269 the political game 104–5, 111; supplier of
5
Backward and Minority Communities UN peacekeeping troops 108, 360
6
Employment Federation (BAMCEF) 79 Bangladesh Army 351, 359–60, 361
bahinis 359, 360 Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) 197 7
Bahujan Samaj Party see BSP Bangladesh National Party see BNP 8
Bajrang Dal 75, 263, 270 Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee 9
Baloch 234, 276, 279, 284 (BRAC) 107 10
Baloch Haq Talwar (BHT) 285 Barnett, Michael 415 11
Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) 275 Baruah, Sanjib 149 12
Baloch National Party (BNP) 285 Bastian, Sunil 299 13
Balochi language 11, 42, 235, 241–2 Basu, Jyoti 151 14
Balochistan 14, 29, 30, 235, 237, 275, 278, 280, Bengal 33, 34, 35 see also West Bengal 15
284–5, 288, 357, 358 Bengali Language Movement 234–5
16
Bandaranaike, Felix Dias 204 Bengalis 276, 279
17
Bandaranaike, Sirimavo 119, 120 Besley, Tim 315–16
Bandaranaike, S.W.R.D. 44, 48, 119, 123, 127 Béteille, André 262, 267 18
Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact (1957) 127, Bharatiya Janata Party see BJP 19
291 Bhave, Acharya Vinoba 323 20
Bangla Bhai 105–6, 108 Bhindranwale, S.J.S. 153, 254, 309 21
Bangladesh 4–5, 7, 98–112; agriculture and food Bhutan 1, 143–4, 410 22
policy reforms 20, 110–11; arguments Bhutan Peace and Prosperity Party 144 23
against long-term military control 110; Bhutanese Maoist Party 144 24
Constitution (1972) and amendments 191, Bhutto, Benazir 94, 181, 185, 274, 372, 406; 25
192–4; corruption 5, 21, 104, 106, 364, assassination (2007) 275, 406; and 26
366, 366, 367, 373–4; criminalization of corruption 373
27
politics 376–7; and democracy 98, 100–1, Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali 9, 84, 85, 92, 134, 184, 282,
28
101, 365, 367, 412; economy 20, 110–11; 356, 372
elections 100, 102–3, 104, 105, 377; Biden, Joe 91 29
elections (2007) 107–8, 111; elections Bihar 314–15, 316, 370, 376, 389, 390, 395 30
(2008) 111, 112; electoral malpractices Biharis 282 31
377–8; electoral process and political bin Laden, Osama 88 32
participation 5, 104–5, 107; family planning Birendra, King 134, 141 33
and birth rate 111; foreign aid 20, 412; BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) 3, 12, 55, 60, 60–1, 34
increase in violence and criminal behaviour 67, 68, 71, 74–5, 79, 80, 152, 154, 250, 35
105–6; independence (1971) 1, 7, 11, 12, 262, 263, 312–13, 325, 408; alliance with 36
99; international relations 411–12; and Akali Dal in Punjab 77, 255; alliance with 37
Islamism 105–6, 360, 411; judiciary and BSP 79; attempt to penetrate Kerala party
38
courts 9, 104, 110, 191–201; liberation system 78; and coalition building 61, 71,
39
struggle 359; linguistic issues 10; mass 75–6, 77, 80; and corruption 370; and
movements in 5; military takeover and Karnataka 76–7; rise of and impact on 40
emergency proclaimed (2007) 98, 99, 108, state politics 73–6; use of communal 41
109–10, 109, 360; and NGOs 106–7, 109, politics in elections 13, 14 42
111; ‘Operation Clean Heart’ 105; party BNP (Bangladesh National Party) 100, 101, 43
ideologies and practical differences 101–2; 102, 103, 105, 107, 109, 111, 112, 195, 44
political assassinations 105; political history 360, 374, 377, 411, 412 45
and parties 4–5, 99–104, 111, 360, 373, Bodo (language) 222 46
411; politicization of bureaucracy 5, 106, Bofors affair 55, 63, 354, 369 47
109; poverty 111; and press 104; relations Bolshevik Leninist Party (BLP) 46, 47 48
452
 INDEX

1 Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act Chelliah, Raja 151

2 (1948) 322 Chelvanayakam, S.J.V. 49, 127, 291
3 booth capturing 376 Chhibber, Pradeep 68
4 Border Security Force 355 China 150, 250, 384; and Naxalbari uprising
Bose, Subhas Chandra 353 386; and Nepal 413; relations with India
5
Bourdieu, Pierre 237 252, 258; war with India (1962) 58, 134,
6
BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement 250, 309, 353, 384
7 Committee) 107 Chiriyankandath, James 78
8 Brahmans 152, 222, 264, 322 Citizenship Act (1948) (Sri Lanka) 205–6
9 Brahvi language 242 citizenship issue: Sri Lanka 48–9
10 Brass, Paul 37, 64, 67, 232, 253, 276, 283 civil service: India 64
11 Britain: impact of colonialism on South Asia Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) 92, 106
12 364, 400–02; and India 27–9, 306–7, civil society 380
13 351–52, 401, 402; and Sri Lanka 41, 49, CJI (Chief Justice of India) 169, 171
14 49–50, 343 clash of civilizations thesis 286
15 British Indian Army 352 class: Pakistan language issues and 237–42
BSP (Bahujan Samaj Party) 61, 67, 71, 79–80, clientalism 378–9
16
263 Clifford, Sir Hugh 42
17
Buddhagaya Defense League 46 Clinton, Bill 409
18 Buddhism: in Sri Lanka 2, 6, 10, 119, 120, 206 coalition politics: and India 3, 68, 71–3, 72, 74,
19 Bugti, Nawab Akbar 234, 285 149, 154, 369, 408
20 bureaucracy: India 63–4; politicization of in Cold War 250, 383
21 Bangladesh 5, 106, 109 Colombia 98
22 Burghers 41 colonialism: and India 27–9; and Pakistan
23 Burma: relations with India 258 29–31
24 Bush, George W. 94, 409 Committee of Concerned Citizens 393
25 Bushra Zaidi incident (1985) 283 communal politics: India 13, 14, 268–71, 406
26 Business Line 155, 156 Communist Party (CP) (Sri Lanka) 46, 47,
123
27
cadet colleges (Pakistan) 239, 239 Communist Party of India see CPI
28
Calcutta 37 Communist Party of India (Maoist) see CPI
29 Caldwell, Robert 28 (Maoist)
30 caste politics: India 3–4, 13–14, 56, 60, 78–9, Communist Party of India (Marxist) see CPI
31 262–71; Sri Lanka 121 (M)
32 Central Reserve Police Force 355 Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) see
33 centrally sponsored schemes (CSSs) (India) CPN-M
34 157–8 Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-
35 Ceylon see Sri Lanka Leninist) see UML
36 Ceylon Bank Clerks Union 46 Communist radical movements 218, 382–96;
37 Ceylon Citizenship Act (1948) 48 CPI (Maoist) 390, 391–97; formation of
Ceylon Indian Congress (CIC) 46 CPI(M-L) 387; girijan agitation 386–7;
38
Ceylon National Congress 42, 44 insurgencies 382–3; revolutionary peasant
39
Ceylon Parliamentary Elections Amendment Act struggles 386; see also Naxalite movement
40 No.48 (1949) 48 Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) 311
41 Ceylon Tamil Congress 125 Congress Party see Indian Congress Party
42 Ceylon Workers’ Congress (CWC) 49, 125 Convention Muslim League 33
43 Chanda, Ashok 147 corruption 21, 364–75, 378; Bangladesh 5, 21,
44 Chandra, Kanchan 79 104, 106, 364, 366, 366, 367, 373–4; causes
45 Chandra, Naresh 370 365–6, 374; definitions 365; impact of
46 Chandrasekhar 60 developmental state 374–5; India 21, 55,
47 Chatterjee, Partha 57, 309 64, 172, 310, 364, 366, 366, 367–70, 375;
48 Chaudhry, Iftikhar 93–4 measurement of 366; Nepal 21, 366, 366;

453
INDEX

obstacles to reform 380; Pakistan 21, 181, Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front 1
187, 364, 366–7, 366, 370–73; Sri Lanka 6, see EPRLF 2
123, 364, 366, 366; strategies for dealing Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) 294 3
with 379–80 Eelam Revolutionary Organization of Students 4
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) see EROS
5
(Transparency International) 5, 106, 366, electoral malpractices and violence 375–6,
6
366, 367 377–8
CPI (Communist Party of India) 57, 383–4, 385 Eleventh Finance Commission (EFC) (India) 7
CPI (M-L) (Communist Party of India 155–6 8
(Marxist-Leninist)) 387, 388, 389, 391 Emerson, Rupert 16 9
CPI (Maoist) (Communist Party of India) English (language): high status associated with 10
(Maoist) 390, 391–97 11; in Sri Lanka 119; in India 10, 129, 11
CPI(M) (Communist Party of India (Marxist)) 213, 216–17, 220, 223, 224, 226–8, 229; in 12
313, 385, 386–7 Pakistan 11, 233, 237, 238–9, 242 13
CPN-M (Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)) EPRLF (Eelam People’s Revolutionary 14
131, 135, 136, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143 Liberation Front) 293, 294 15
criminalization of politics 21, 375–8; Bangladesh EROS (Eelam People’s Democratic Party) 293,
16
376–7; India 368–9, 376; Pakistan 378 294
17
Curzon, Lord 353 Ershad, General H.M. 100, 101, 102, 103, 109,
193, 360, 374, 377, 411 18
Dahl, Robert 165 Estate Tamils 48, 49 19
Dalits 13, 79–80, 131, 132, 137, 143 20
Dandakaranya: Maoists in 391–92 family planning: and Bangladesh 111 21
Das, Gurcharan 305 Farooq, Sheikh 256, 257 22
De Silva, C.R. 205 Federal Party (FP) 127, 291, 297 23
democracy: Bangladesh 98, 100–1, 101, 365, federalism 7; in India 7, 147–58 24
367, 412; India 12, 56, 61, 365, 365; Federation of NGOs in Bangladesh (FNB) 107 25
Nepal 132–40, 142–3, 144, 365; Pakistasn Fernandes, George 354 26
365, 381; Sri Lanka 6, 55, 119, 343, 365, Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management
27
365 Act (2003) (FRBM) 157, 158
28
Democracy Index 364–5, 365 foreign direct investment: and India 310
Democratic Workers’ Congress (DWC) 49 Freedom House 100, 101, 128 29
Dharmapala, Anagarika 44 Friedman, Milton 17 30
Dhavan, Rajeev 168 Friendship Treaty (1971) 22 31
Diamond, Larry 98 32
DMK (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) 71, 74, Gait, E.A. 28 33
152, 153, 223 Gandhi, Indira 4, 7, 8, 21, 55, 61, 62, 74, 149, 34
Donoughmore Constitution (1931) 42–3, 46, 152, 168, 251, 407; anti-Communist 384; 35
118, 123 assassination 74, 153, 253, 361, 414; 36
Dravida Kazhagam Party 264, 269 declaration of state of emergency 37
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam see DMK (1975–77) 3, 55, 59, 74, 152, 165–6, 309;
38
Drèze, Jean 165 and judiciary 168, 169, 173; and Kashmir
39
Dua, Bhagwan D. 152 256; and PLQR 369; and Punjab 253, 254,
Dublas see Halpatis 309; splitting of Congress Party 58 40
Gandhi, Mohandas (Mahatma) 2, 31, 32, 36, 41
Eames, John 196 217, 268, 324 42
East India Company 214, 367 Gandhi, Rajiv 4, 21, 55, 59, 60, 74, 293, 354, 43
East Pakistan Rifles 359 369 44
Economic and Political Weekly 158 Gandhi, Sonia 63 45
Economist: study (2006) 364 gender equality: and religious freedom in India 46
Edrisinha, Rohan 206 170–1 47
Education Act (1943) (Sri Lanka) 43 Ghaffar Khan, Abdul 235, 284, 287 48
454
 INDEX

1 Ghazanfar Ali, Raja 36 Inden, Ronald 308

2 gift giving 367, 374, 375, 379 India 2–4, 55–64;
3 Giri, V.V. 152 agrarian change 321–35; absence of collective
4 girijans 386–7 action by landless 330–1; deprivation and
globalization 242, 354, 415 poverty of landless 18–19, 324, 330, 331;
5
Goonesinha, A.E. 42 land reform 321–6; landless as dangerous
6
Gould, Jeremy 400 class 332–3; migrants settling abroad 328–9;
7 Government of India Act: (1919) 32; (1935) 29, opening up the countryside and
8 59, 148, 154, 179, 223 modernizing forces of production 326–8;
9 Gowda, Deve 60, 76, 77, 257, 369 paupism 331–2; policies of exclusion 330;
10 Gramsci, A. 57 role of state 334; social profile of landless
11 Green Revolution 250, 311 323–5; widening divide between winners
12 Guha, Ramachandra 213 and losers 328–9, 332–3
13 Gujarat 406; agrarian change 322–33, 334, 335; agriculture and food production 18, 150,
14 economic growth 315; failure of Gandhian 308–9, 313, 316
15 gospel 325–6; Godhra massacre (2002) 270; British rule and colonial impact 27–9
land reform 322–6; program against bureaucracy 63–4
16
Muslims (2002) 13, 270; social profile of caste politics/conflicts 13–14, 56, 60, 78–9,
17
the landless proletariat 323–5 262–71; ‘backward class’ movements 13,
18 Gujarati language 242 264, 265–6, 269; and Constitution (1950)
19 Gujral, I.K. 60, 369, 412 264; institutional foundations of 264–8;
20 Gupta, Jyotirindra Das 232 Mandal II protests (2006) 266; private
21 Gyanendra, King 139, 141–2 sector reservations 267; reservation system
22 and demonstrations against 265–7; and
23 Halpati Seva Sangh (HSS) 326 voting 3–4
24 Halpatis 323–4, 325, 326, 327, 329–33, 335 and centrally sponsored schemes (CSS) 157–8
25 Hansen, Tomas Blom 75 coalition politics 3, 68, 71–3, 72, 74, 149,
26 Hanson, A.H. 150–1 154, 369, 408
Haqqani, Hussain 241 communal politics/conflicts 13, 14, 268–71,
27
Harischandra, Walisinha 44 406
28
Harriss, John 306 Communist radical movements in see
29 Harshad Mehta scandal 369 Communist radical movements (India)
30 Hashim, Abul 33, 35 conflict with Pakistan over Kashmir 23, 37–8,
31 Hasina, Sheikh 5, 100, 102, 108, 360, 361 255–7, 402–4, 415 see also Kargil War
32 Heath, Anthony 68 Constitution (1950) 29, 56, 64, 147, 148, 149,
33 Hedge, Ramakrishna 76 158, 167, 168, 225, 264
34 Heston, Alan 307 corruption 21, 55, 64, 172, 310, 364, 366,
35 Hindi language 214, 217, 218, 219–21, 223–4, 366, 367–70, 375
36 226, 229 criminalization of politics 368–9, 376
37 Hindu Marriage Act (1955) 170 decennial census 28
Hindu nationalism: rise of in India 2, 67, 250, declaration of ‘emergency’ by Gandhi
38
408 (1975–77) 3, 55, 59, 74, 152, 165–6, 309
39
Hindu-Muslim relations: India 12, 14, 36–7, defense budget and arms imports 354, 355
40 263, 268–71 and democracy 12, 56, 61, 365, 365
41 Hindustani (language) 217, 219, 220 economy 17–19, 55, 150–1, 151, 305–18;
42 Hossain, Anwar 192, 195–6 (1950–80) 306–10; beneficiaries and losers
43 Hossain, Masdar 192, 195, 196–9 in liberalization 17–18; and big business
44 Human Development Index (HDI): and Sri 310–11; budget and devaluation of rupee
45 Lanka 344 (1991) 312; causes and consequences of
46 uneven growth 314–17; fiscal deficit 312,
47 Idrisur Rahman case 192, 195 316; five-year plans 307, 308; growth of
48 IMF (International Monetary Fund) 410 and reasons 17, 305–6, 310, 311, 314, 317,

455
INDEX

410; impact of British rule on 306–7; support of insurgent groups by neighbors 1

labour markets 311; per capita incomes 250; violent conflicts in regions 249–50; 2
317; reform process 157, 305, 310–14, 317; and ‘wrongsizing’ of India’s borders 252 3
savings 305, 308; and the states 151, nationalist struggle and legacy of 2, 28, 4
313–14 31–3, 56
5
education 216, 225–6 Nehruvian state and era of Congress
6
elections 59, 72 dominance 57–8
elections (2004) 68, 152 nuclear confrontation with Pakistan 250, 255, 7
electoral politics and participation 3–4, 62, 256–7 8
73 and nuclear weapons 355–6, 407, 408–9 9
federalism and center-state relations 7–8, parliament 62 10
147–58, 251, 254, 313 Partition and legacy of 1–2, 35–8, 401 11
finance commissions and division of revenues peasant struggles 386, 387 12
to states 154–7 planning commission 150–1, 308 13
financial scandals 368–70 political history 2–3, 55–61 14
financing of political parties 368 political parties 3, 61, 67, 68–73, 69–70, 15
fiscal federalism 154–8 151–2
16
foreign aid 308 political structure and institutions 61–4
17
and foreign direct investment 310, 312 poverty 17, 306, 309, 311, 315–16, 317,
Hindu-Muslim relations and riots 12, 14, 334 18
263, 268–71 presidents 63, 63 19
independence 1, 2, 401 prime ministers and cabinets 58, 62–3 20
industry 151, 312 and public interest litigation 171 21
inequalities 306 refugee resettlement after Partition 35–6 22
internal security and rise of paramilitaries relations with Bangladesh 23, 258, 4011–12 23
354–5 relations with Burma 258 24
international politics 22, 406–10 relations with China 252, 258 25
and Israel 409 relations and conflicts with Pakistan 23, 26
judiciary and courts 8, 165–74 37–8, 86, 89, 250, 252, 255, 258, 357,
27
language issues 10, 11, 213–29; challenge to 361–62, 404, 405, 408, 410
28
dominance of Hindi 223–4; change in relations with Nepal 132–3, 135, 139, 412–13
official language policy 224–5; relations with Sri Lanka 414 29
differentiation in colonial era 214–15; relations with United States 407, 409–10 30
disadvantaged and English 228; dominance religious freedom and gender equality 31
of English language and social divide 170–1 32
216–17; and education 225–8; of federal rise of BJP and impact on state politics 33
government 220–1; and Hindi 214, 217, 73–6 34
218, 219–21, 223, 226, 229; minority 24–5, rise of Hindu nationalism 2, 67, 250, 408 35
228–9; mother tongue 215, 226; secessionist movements 12–13, 37 36
multilingualism 217–19; and nationalist social rights and judiciary 171–2, 173 37
movement 217; and Official Language Act and Soviet Union 22, 407
38
(1967) 221, 223, 224; regional 222–3, 229; and Sri Lankan civil war 16, 293–4, 414
39
and states 221–3, 224–5, 226; of wider state formation in 401–2
communication 219–20 state-level politics 67–81, 148, 149–50, 151, 40
military forces 20 152, 154 41
Mutiny (1857) 352 transformation to multiparty system 151–2 42
national unity crisis 12–14, 249–59; after unemployment 306 43
9/11 252; and ‘ethnic democracy’ of India urbanization 327 44
252; and northeastern states 257–8; and war with China (1962) 58, 134, 250, 309, 45
Punjab 253–5; as a result of ‘external 353, 384 46
threat’ 250; as a result of national factors widening of gap between rich and poor 18, 47
251; as a result of regional factors 250–1; 314 48
456
 INDEX

1 Indian Administrative Service (IAS) 64, 368 Janata Party 59, 68, 74, 76, 149, 170
2 Indian Air Force 355 Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna see JVP
3 Indian Army 351, 352, 353–4; British roots Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) 124–5
4 352–3; identity crisis 355; increase in Jatiya Party 100, 101, 102, 103, 109
civilian control of 353–4; internal security Jayewardene, J.R. 120, 121, 124, 292
5
role 354, 355; recruitment from Punjab JD(S) (Janata Dal (Secular)) 76–7
6
region 30, 352 Jenkins, Rob 151, 157, 313
7 Indian Civil Service (ICS) 29, 64, 367 Jennings, Sir Ivor 45, 147
8 Indian Congress Party 2, 3, 7–8, 18, 31, 33, 55, JI see Jamaat-i-Islam
9 57–8, 67, 73, 151, 154, 251, 368, 402; Jinnah, Mohammad Ali 2, 4, 10, 15, 35, 83, 234,
10 ability to absorb opposition 73; and 279, 280, 356, 401, 404
11 corruption issue 368; decline in dominance jirgas 30
12 58–9, 67, 74, 152, 269, 369, 376, 384; JMM (Jharkhand Mukti Morcha) scandal
13 dominance of 57, 151–2; electoral successes 369–70
14 in 1950s 32; and nationalist struggle 31–2, Joshi, Murli Manohar 80
15 57; revival of 61; split (1969) 58, 368 Judicial Pay Commission (Bangladesh) 197–8
Indian Independence Act (1947) 179 Judicial Service Commission (Bangladesh) 197,
16
Indian National Army (INA) 353, 360 199
17
Indian Navy 355 judiciary: Bangladesh 9, 104, 110, 191–201;
18 Indian and Pakistani Residents Act No.3 (1948) India 8, 165–74; Pakistan 8–9, 177–88, 277;
19 48 Sri Lanka 9–10, 203–8
20 Indian Union 12, 13, 50, 148, 256 Junata Dal (Secular) see JD(S)
21 Indo-Lanka Accord (1987) 124, 126–7, 203, JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna) 6, 119, 121,
22 207, 220, 249, 254, 256, 293–4, 414 124, 207, 294
23 Indus Rivers Water Treaty (1960) 89
24 Inglehart, Ronald 286 Kairon, Pratap Singh 368
25 Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency 378, 405 Kannangara Report (1943) 43
26 Interim Government of Nepal Act (1951) 133 Kapur 64
internal security 354 Karachi 37, 242, 281–4
27
International Labor Office (ILO) 340 Karachi High Court 185
28
Iranian revolution 287 Kargil war (1999) 12, 250, 255, 256, 357, 402,
29 Iraq war (2003) 286 405, 409
30 Islamabad 5, 86, 91, 92, 93, 282, 285 Karnataka (India) 76–7
31 Islamism 285–6; and Bangladesh 105–6, 360, Karunanidhi, M. 153
32 411; Pakistan 2, 15, 35, 83, 86, 87–8, 241, Karzai, Hamid 91
33 275–6, 279–80, 281, 285–8, 357, 404 Kashmir 12, 14, 37–8, 251, 252, 255–7, 280,
34 Israel: and India 409 357, 402–4, 408; Indo-Pakistan conflict
35 over 23, 37–8, 255–7, 280, 402–4, 415;
36 Jaffna Tamils 49 intifada 251; and Kargil war (1999) 12, 250,
37 Jaffrelot, Christophe 75, 263; India’s Silent 255, 256, 357, 402, 405, 409; regional
Revolution 265 dissent 251
38
Jain Hawala scandal 369 Kaviraj, Sudipta 57, 309
39
Jalal, Ayesha 406 Kayani, General Ashfaq Pervez 89–90
40 Jallianwala Bagh massacre (1919) 31, 355 Kerala 16, 19, 56, 57, 71, 78, 215, 269, 370, 384
41 Jamaat ul-Mujahedeen Bangladesh (JMB) 105 Khaki-mullah alliance 275
42 Jamaat-i-Islam (JI) 35, 101, 102, 106, 107, 280, Khalistan 37, 253
43 411 Khan, Adeel 233
44 Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP) 285 Khan, Hussain Ahmad 233
45 Jammu 12, 14, 251, 252, 255–6, 257, 403 khari boli 214
46 Jana Sangh 59, 269 Khilnani, Sunil 61
47 Janajatis 131, 132, 137, 138, 140, 143 Khudai Khidmatgars 14
48 Janata Dal (United) 60, 76 Khuhro, Muhammad Ayub 36

457
INDEX

Kibria, M.S. 105 Madhesis 137, 138, 143 1

Kidwai, Rafi Ahmad 268 Madiga Reservation Porata Samithi (MRPS) 2
Kissinger, Henry 110 266–7 3
Kitchener, Lord 352, 353 Madigas 266 4
Kochanek 5, 21 madrasahs 11–12, 39, 106, 238
5
Kohli, Atul 55, 56, 59, 310, 311 Maharashtra 315
6
Koirala, B.P. 133, 134 Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party (MGP) 71
Koirala, G.P. 139, 140, 142 Mahars 267 7
Konar, Harekrishna 385 Mahendra, King 131, 133, 134 8
Kotelawala, Sir John 119, 124 Mahsud, Baitullah 275 9
Kothari, Rajni 57 Malas 266 10
Krantikari Kishan Committee (KKC) 391 Mandal Commission 60, 265, 267 11
Krishna, Gopal 32 Mandal II protests (2006) 266 12
Krishna, Raj 151 Maneckshaw, General Sam 353 13
Kulatunga, General Parami 361 Manor, James 59 14
Kumaratunga, Chandrika Bandaranaike 121–2, Mansoor, Sabiha 238 15
124, 128, 295 Maoists 21, 391–97; in India 391–97; insurgency
16
Kundu 409 in Nepal 7, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 144,
17
Kuznets, Simon 306 394, 413, 414
Marxism: and Sri Lanka 50 18
Labour Party (Sri Lanka) 46, 47 Masdar Hossain’s case 196–9, 200 19
Lahore Resolution (1940) 179, 288 mastaans 104, 105, 111 20
Lal, Chaman 36–7 Master, Ahsanullah 105 21
Lal, Deepak 312 Maudoodi, Syed Abul A’la 35 22
Lall, Marie 80 Mayawati 61, 68, 71, 79–80, 267 23
Land Reform Act (1964) (Nepal) 134 Mazumdar, Charu 385–6, 387 24
language issues 10–12; Bangladesh 10; India 10, Mehta, Harshad 369 25
11, 213–29; Pakistan 10–11, 232–43 Mehta, Pratap Bhanu 56–7, 61, 64 26
Lanka Sama Samaja Party see LSSP Menon, V.K. Krishna 353
27
Lawrence, Colonel Stringer 352 middle class 379; Nepal 134, 135; Pakistan 276
28
Lefebvre, Henri 315 Middle East 415
Lhotshampas 144 militaries 351–62 see also armies; individual 29
Liaqat Ali Khan 4, 89, 280 countries 30
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam see LTTE Minimum Age Act (1948) (India) 324 31
life expectancy: Sri Lanka 344 Mirza, Iskander 31 32
Linlithgow, Viceroy Lord 32 Mitra, Subrata K. 80 33
Lipton, Michael 309 MMA (Muttahida Majlis Amal) 236, 275, 280 34
literacy rate: Nepal 134 Modi, Narendra 263, 329 35
Lok Shakti party 76 Mohajir Qaumi Movement see MQM 36
Low, D.A. 31, 335 mohajirs 15, 235, 275, 278, 279, 280, 281–3, 37
LSSP (Lanka Sama Samaja Party) 44, 46, 47, 49, 404
38
123 ‘moral hazard’ 90, 92
39
LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) 6, Morris-Jones, W.H. 57
121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 128, 203, 206, Mountbatten, Lord 147 40
207, 293, 294–6, 298, 299, 300, 342, 351, Movement for Restoration of Democracy 41
361 (MRD) 282 42
Luce, Edward 375 MQM (Mohajir Qaumi Movement) 37, 275, 43
Luebbert, Gregory M. 73 282, 283, 284 44
Lugar, Richard 91 Muhammad, Governor General Ghulam 31, 45
180 46
McMillan, Alistair 71 Mujib (Sheikh Mujibar Rahman) 4–5, 99–100, 47
Madhes Janadhikar Forum (MJF) 140 102, 111, 360, 373, 377 48
458
 INDEX

1 Mukerjee, Radhakamal 321 achievements 388; negotiations with

2 Mukti Bahini 99, 359 government 393; present situation 391–92;
3 Müller, Max 28 role of urban youth 387; state response to
4 multilingualism: India 217–19 and repression of 392–4, 396–7; successes
Mumbai: terrorist attacks on (2008) 361, 415 391–92; trends in 389
5
Mundhra affair 368 Nazimuddin, Khwaja 234
6
Musharraf, Pervez 4, 9, 89, 90, 91, 94–5, 177, NC (Nepali Congress) 111, 131, 132, 133, 134,
7 181, 278, 356, 359; centralization of 135, 136, 137, 140, 141, 143
8 governance 92; and corruption 373; court Nehru, Jawaharlal 4, 32, 36, 57, 58, 62, 147,
9 case against 94; imposing of emergency 307, 313, 353, 406; and caste politics 264;
10 rule (2007) 186, 276; and judiciary 93, and communal politics 268; and economy
11 177–8, 179, 181, 182, 186; military coup of 307–8; and federalism 147–8, 149–50;
12 (1999) 84, 366, 373, 405; resignation (2008) foreign policy 408; and judiciary 168, 169;
13 84, 95, 361 and Kashmir 256; response to self-
14 Muslim League 33–5, 187, 234, 268, 279, 280, determination movements in northeastern
15 371, 401 states 257; social and economic
Muslim United Front 256 modernization 307; vision for independent
16
Muslim Women’s (Protection of Rights on India 32
17
Divorce) Act 171 Nepal 2, 6–7, 20, 131–44; border with India
18 Muslims: in Pakistan 86, 87; relations with 136–7; and China 413; comparison with
19 Hindus in India 12, 14, 36–7, 263, 268–71; Bhutan 143–4; Constitution (1990) 135–6,
20 in Sri Lanka 16, 297, 298 142; corruption 21, 366, 366; and
21 Muttahida Majlis Amal see MMA democracy 132–40, 142–3, 144, 365;
22 Mydral, Jan 389 disadvantaged blocs in 143; economic
23 Myrdal, Gunnar 322, 365, 366 problems 136; elections 136, 136; elections
24 (2008) 131, 140, 144; electoral system 131,
25 Nagas 396 140; ethnic differences 136–7, 138; and
26 Naidu, Chandra Babu 155, 156 federalism 7; governments of 137;
Nandigram (India) 313–14 international relations 412–13; literacy rate
27
NAP (National Awami Party) 235–6, 284, 288 134; Madhes uprisings 140, 143; Maoist
28
see also ANP insurgency (1996–2006) 7, 137, 139, 140,
29 Narayanan, K.R. 63 141, 142, 144, 394, 413; mass movement
30 National Accountability Bureau (Pakistan) 366 (1990) 131, 133, 135, 140; May 2006
31 National Awami Party see NAP Declaration 142; middle class 134, 135;
32 National Commission of Enterprises in the Panchayat regime 133–5, 137; political
33 Unorganized Sector (NCEUS) 334 history 6–7, 132–40; political parties 136,
34 National Conference Party 403 136, 140; popular uprising against
35 National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 67, 156, monarchical rule (2006) 131, 139–40, 141,
36 312, 408 142; population breakdown 138; post-2006
37 National Development Council 157 government 142–3; relations with India
National Progressive Alliance 334 132–3, 135, 139, 412–13; republicanism and
38
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act reasons for success 141–2; revolution
39
157, 158 (1950–51) 131, 132, 140, 141; royal coup
40 National Sample Survey (NSS) 311 (2005) 139, 142; royal massacre (2001) 141;
41 National Unity Alliance 125 under Rana oligarchy 132–3; understanding
42 Nationalist Congress Party 71 between SPA and CPN-M (2005) 139,
43 Nawab of Deccan Hyderabad 402–3 142
44 Naxalbari 385–7 Nepal Army 141
45 Naxalite movement 21, 354, 387–97; armed Nepali Congress see NC
46 struggles and spread of 389–90; changes in NGOs: and Bangladesh 106–7, 109, 111
47 390–91; and CPI (Maoist) 391–97; 9/11 286, 409
48 emergence of 387; impact of and non-state armies 361 see also LTTE

459
INDEX
Norris, Pippa 286
North-west Frontier Province see NWFP
NRIs (non-resident Indians) 328–9
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 407
nuclear weapons 20, 351; and India 355–6, 407,
408–9; and Pakistan 357, 408, 409
NWFP (North-West Frontier Province) 15, 90,
96, 236, 237, 242, 275, 284, 288, 357, 358,
401
OBCs (other backward classes) 265–6, 269
Official Language Act (1956) (Sri Lanka) 205
Official Language Act (1967) (India) 221, 223,
224
Operation Blue Star (1984) 153, 253, 254
Optional Protocol (International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights) 208
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)
286, 404
PA (People’s Alliance) 128, 295
Pakhtuns 14–15, 91, 236, 275, 280, 284, 285,
286–7
Pakistan 4, 83–96; and Afghanistan/Taliban 88,
236, 274, 280, 286, 287, 357, 405;
center-provinces relations 86, 92–3, 277;
centralization of governance 86, 92–3, 277;
changes in social landscape 86, 87; civil
service 92; civil war between East and West
(1971) and independence of Bangladesh
87, 99, 180, 183, 280; colonial impact
29–31, conflict with India over Kashmir
23, 37–8, 255–7, 280, 402–4, 415 see also
Kargil War; Constitution (1956) 179, 279;
Constitution (1962) 180, 183, 277;
Constitution (1973) 11, 92, 180, 181, 182,
184, 233; constitutions and courts 179–82;
corruption 21, 181, 187, 364, 366–7, 366,
370–73; criminalization of politics 378;
current situation (2008) 9, 84, 93–6; and
democracy 365, 371; demographic
developments 87; economy 19, 84, 85, 85,
89, 90, 90, 91, 92, 93, 95, 371; education
237–41, 238, 240, 241, 243; elections
(2008) 94–5; electoral system 371; ethnic
militancy and violence 274–5, 280–5, 288;
ethnic politics and language 234–7, 243;
failure to develop formal political
institutions 86, 88–9; foreign aid 372;
formation of Zardari coalition (2008) 361,
415; as frontline state in ‘war on terror’
252, 286, 357, 405; future issues 95–6;
460
independence 1, 2, 83; interaction between 1
politics and economics 83–96; international 2
politics 404–6; Islamization and Islamic 3
militancy 2, 15, 35, 83, 86, 87–8, 241, 4
275–6, 279–80, 281, 285–8, 357, 404;
5
judiciary and courts 8–9, 177–88, 277;
6
language issues 10–11, 232–43, 281; and
class conflict 237–42; and education 7
237–41, 238, 240, 241, 243; effect of 8
language policy on weaker languages 9
242–3; and ethnic politics 234–7, 243; 10
literature on 232–3; policy guidelines 11
233–4; local government 93; militarization 12
of politics and military rule 4, 20, 86, 13
89–90, 110, 274, 277–8, 358; military coup 14
of Ayub Khan (1958) 180, 183, 184, 353, 15
356, 371; military coup of Musharraf
16
(1999) 84, 366, 373, 405; military coup of
17
Yahya Khan (1969) 84, 99, 356; military
coup of Zia-ul-Haq 184, 356, 372; military 18
dominance and factors contributing 31, 84, 19
356–7; Musharraf ’s regime 181, 186, 366; 20
‘Muslimization’ of population 86, 87; 21
national unity crisis 14–15; nationalist 22
movement and legacy 2, 33–5; nuclear 23
confrontation with India 250, 255, 256–7; 24
and nuclear weapons 357, 408, 409; 25
paramilitary forces 358; Partition and 26
legacy of 1–2, 35–8, 86, 87, 276, 277, 401;
27
political history and system 4, 83–5, 85;
28
Punjabization 278–9; refugee resettlement
after Partition 35–6, 281; relations with 29
Arab states 404; relations with China 404; 30
relations and conflict with India 23, 37–8, 31
86, 89, 250, 252, 255, 258, 357, 361–62, 32
404, 405, 408, 410; relations with and 33
support from United States 4, 22, 85, 86, 34
90–2, 94, 110, 356–7, 404, 405–6, 407–8; 35
resignation of Musharraf (2008) 84, 95, 36
361; restoration of civilian rule (1988) 185, 37
372, 378, 405; state formation 401–2;
38
structural dynamics of the state 276–80;
39
suicide bombings 274, 288
Pakistan Army 30, 38, 351, 352, 356–9; covert 40
military operations 357; dominant political 41
role 356–7; failure to manage domestic 42
insurgency 358; formation of 352–3; 43
inheritance 356; international 44
peacekeeping operations 357; and Islam 45
356; officer-other rank relationship 357; 46
political role 358–9 47
Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) see PML (N) 48
 INDEX

1 Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid) see PML-Q Power Development Board (Bangladesh) 374
2 Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement PPP (Pakistan People’s Party) 92, 94, 95, 96,
3 (PONM) 234 187, 282, 284, 372, 406
4 Pakistan People’s Party see PPP Praja Socialist Party 73
Panandikar, Pai 375 Prebisch, Raoul 307
5
panch 332 Premadasa, Ranasinghe 121, 294, 361
6
Pandey, Gyanendra 37 President’s Rule 7, 8, 61, 63, 149, 251, 254, 270,
7 paramilitary organizations 351, 361; Pakistan 313
8 358; rise of in India 354–5 Prevention of Terrorism Act (1979) (Sri Lanka)
9 Partition (1947) 1–2, 29, 30, 86, 255, 268, 276, 6, 120, 292
10 277, 399 Proshika 107
11 Pashto (language) 235–6, 238, 242 Punjab 11, 12, 15, 30, 31, 88, 236, 253–5,
12 Paswan, Ram Vilas 267 278–9; coalition in 77; dominance of
13 Patel, Sardar 36, 57, 268, 307, 323, 325, 329 278–9; and Green Revolution 278;
14 Pathak bribery case 369, 370 militancy 250–1; and Muslim League 34;
15 Pathans 276, 279 and Partition 35, 277; Sikh uprising (1980s)
patron-client relations 365, 366, 378–9 354; violence in 255
16
patronage 364, 378–9; Bangladesh 5, 102, 104, Punjab crisis (1984–93) 253–5, 309
17
201; India 4, 13, 28, 73, 79, 80, 218, 324, Punjab Unionists 34
18 368, 369; Pakistan 280 Punjabi (language) 215, 236, 238, 242
19 Paul, Samuel 376
20 PCO (provisional constitutional order) 186 Quader Bahini 359
21 PDP (People’s Democratic Party) 257 Quah, Jon S.T. 374
22 Peiris, G.L. 204–5, 206
23 People’s Alliance (PA) 128, 295 Radcliffe, Sir Cyril 401
24 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 141 radical and violent political movements 21–2,
25 People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam 382–97
26 see PLOTE Rahman, Justice M.H. 195–6
People’s War Group (PWG) 389, 390, 393 Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur see Mujib
27
Periyar (E.V. Ramaswami Naicker) 152–3 Rahman, Tariq 238; Language and Politics in
28
Permanent Settlement (1793) 306 Pakistan 232
29 permit-license-quota Raj see PLQR Rajapaksa, Mahinda 122–3, 124, 128, 203,
30 Persian (language) 236 208
31 Petrocik, John R. 68 Rajiv-Longowal Accord (1985) 254–5
32 Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) 19, Ram, Kanchi 79
33 344 Rana, Santosh 389
34 PILs (public interest litigations) 173, 174 Ranchi-Hatia riots (1967) 269, 270
35 Pirivena, Vidyalankara 44 Rangers Operation (1995) 283
36 Pirivena, Vidyoda 44 Rao, Narasimha 21, 60, 263, 312, 368–70
37 PLA (People’s Liberation Army) 141 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh see RSS
PLOTE (People’s Liberation Organization of Rath Yatra (chariot procession) 60
38
Tamil Eelam) 293, 294 Reddy, Chandra Pulla 389
39
PLQR (permit-license-quota Raj) 368–9, 375 Reddy, Sanjiva 63
40 PML (N) (Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)) Reetz, Dietrich 279
41 94, 95, 96 Rehman, Fazlur 280
42 PML-Q (Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid)) 95, Riggs, Fred 366
43 283 Rizvi, Hans-Askari 372
44 Poona Pact (1932) 265 Rosenberg, Gerald N. 173
45 Poor Law (1939) (Sri Lanka) 43 Royal Nepal Army 352
46 poverty: Bangladesh 111; India 17, 306, 309, RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) 75, 78,
47 311, 315–16, 317, 334; Sri Lanka 19, 263, 269, 270, 271
48 344 Rudolph, Lloyd and Susanne 61–2, 64

461
INDEX

SAARC (South Asian Regional Cooperation Sinhalese Buddhists 43–4, 122, 123 1
Council) 411, 412, 413, 414 Sinhalese language 297 2
Saeed, Hakim 283 Sinhalese-Tamil relations 10, 16, 43, 118, 119, 3
Sahajanand, Swami 323 123, 205, 291 4
St Kitts affair 370 Sipah Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) 287
5
Samajwadi Party 79, 263 Siraiki language 236
6
Sangh Parivar 262 Siraiki Lok Sanjh 236
Sankaran, S.R. 389, 393 Sitaramayyah, Kondapally 389 7
Sanskrit 224, 226 Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove 242 8
Santhanam Committee 368 SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party) 6, 119, 120, 9
Sanyal, Kanu 385 122, 123, 124, 295 10
Sathe 171, 173 SLMC (Sri Lanka Muslim Congress) 125, 11
Sattar, Abdus 100, 374 297 12
Saudi Arabia 106, 287, 404 Solarz, Stephen 135 13
Sayeed, Khalid bin 29 Soulbury Constitution (1947) 45–6, 48, 49, 14
Scheduled Castes (SCs) 264–5, 269 118, 204 15
self-employment: Sri Lanka 340 South Asia Intelligence 22
16
Sen, Amartya 285 South Asian Regional Cooperation Council
17
Senanayake, D.S. 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 50, 119, 124 see SAARC
Senanayake, Dudley 119, 124 Soviet Union 384; collapse of 151, 312; and 18
Senanayake-Chelvanayakam agreement (1965) India 22, 407; invasion and occupation of 19
291 Afghanistan (1979–80) 88, 404, 407 20
sepoy system 352 SPA (Seven Party Alliance) 139, 141 21
Seven Party Alliance see SPA S.R. Bommai vs Union of India 168 22
Shah Bano case 170–1 Sri Lanka 5–6, 41–50, 118–28; agriculture 47, 23
Shamsher, Subarna 134 339; armed forces 47; balance of payments 24
Sharif, Nawaz 94, 181, 185–6, 283, 287, 372, 339; and Buddhism 2, 6, 10, 119, 120, 206; 25
373, 405 budget deficit 339; caste politics 121; 26
Sharif, Shehbaz 277 citizenship issue 48–9; civil service 47–8;
27
Sharma, Shankar Dayal 63 class politics 46; colonial impact and legacy
28
Shastri, Lal Bahadur 58, 62, 168 41, 47, 50, 237, 343; Constitution (1972)
Shekhar, Chandra 135, 369 204, 206, 343; Constitution (1978) 120, 29
Shimla Accord (1972) 403 204–5, 206, 343; constitutional and political 30
Shiromani Akali Dal see Akali Dal processes 343–4; constitutions and judicial 31
Sikh Magna Carta 253–4 independence 204–5; corruption 6, 123, 32
Sikhs 74, 77, 410; campaign for autonomy in 364, 366, 366; crushing of JVP insurgency 33
Punjab 253–5 294; Defense Agreement with Britain 34
Silva, K.M. de 50 (1948) 50; and democracy 6, 55, 119, 343, 35
Sindh 96, 242, 281–2 365, 365; devolution 7, 126–8, 207, 343; 36
Sindhi (language) 11, 218, 224, 235, 237, 238, district development council (DDC) 37
242, 281 scheme 126; Donoughmore Constitution
38
Sindhis 181–2, 276, 278, 279, 280 42–3, 46, 118, 123; economy 19, 47, 121,
39
Sing, V.P. 311–12 299, 338–43, 345; elections and electoral
Singer, Hans 307 system 46–7, 120, 122, 124, 343; ethnic 40
Singh, Ajit 68, 78 conflict and civil war 10, 15–17, 49, 121–2, 41
Singh, Charan 78, 150, 308–9 124, 128, 207, 291–300, 342, 414, 1126; 42
Singh, Manmohan 62–3, 312, 334 anti-Tamil measures and riots 119, 120, 43
Singh, V.P. 55, 60, 74, 369 124, 291, 292; continuing of civil war by 44
Singh, Zail 63 LTTE 294; events leading to civil war 45
Sinha, Aseema 154, 315 291–2; future 299–300; and Indo-Lanka 46
Sinhala Heritage Party (SU) 124 Accord (1987) 124, 126–7, 203, 207, 220, 47
Sinhala Maha Sabha 44 249, 254, 256, 293–4, 414; negotiations 48
462
 INDEX

1 between LTTE and government 294–6, Supreme Court (Bangladesh) 110, 191, 192–4,
2 298, 300; political economy of war 299; 197, 198, 199
3 and question of state 296–8; reasons for Supreme Court (India) 8, 165, 167–9, 170–4,
4 failure of political solutions 297–8; Thimpu 225, 270
talks (1984) 293, 294; transition of ethnic Supreme Court (Pakistan) 8, 9, 177, 180, 183,
5
conflict to civil war 291; trends in Tamil’s 184–5, 186, 277
6
armed struggle for secession 292–4 foreign Supreme Court (Sri Lanka) 202–3, 206–8
7 trade 337, 338, 339–40; human Supreme Judicial Commission Ordinance (
8 development 344–5; human rights issue 2008) (Bangladesh) 199
9 128; income and wealth concentration 19, Swatrantra party 73
10 341, 342, 344; independence 1, 41–50, 118, Syed, G.M. 235, 284
11 343; international relations 413–14;
12 judiciary and courts 9–10, 203–8; Taiwan 309
13 liberalization policies 19, 121; life Taliban 88, 90, 181, 236, 274, 279, 280, 286,
14 expectancy 344; market reforms 121; 287, 357, 405
15 migration of workers to foreign countries Tamil Congress 46, 47, 127
341–2; military 20; minority rights 205–7; Tamil Nadu 152–3, 153, 215, 223, 224, 226,
16
nationalist movement 43–4; per capita 228, 265
17
income level 344; and Physical Quality of Tamil National Alliance (TNA) 125
18 Life Index 19; plantation structure 47; Tamil United Liberation Front see TULF
19 political history and structure 5–6, 118–23, Tamileela Makkal Viduthalaip Pulikal (TMVP)
20 343–4; political parties 6, 123–6; poverty 125
21 19, 344; provincial councils 127, 343; Tamils 2, 6, 118; and devolution 126–8, 207;
22 public administration employment 340; ethnic conflict and civil war in Sri Lanka
23 referendum (1982) 121; reform and state see Sri Lanka; see also LTTE
24 councils (1931–36) 44–5; relations with Tamuddun Majlis 234
25 India 414; religious freedom 206–7; self- Tandon, Purushottam Das 268
26 employment 340; services sector 339; Tarai Madhes Loktrantrik Party (TMLP)
Sinhalese dominance 43–4, 49, 119, 123; 140
27
sociopolitical change 337–8, 341; Soulbury Tata Nano car 305
28
Constitution (1947) 45–6, 48, 49, 118, 204; Tate, C. Neal 166
29 strikes 46; structural change 339; TDP (Telugu Desam Party) 59, 152, 156
30 temperance movement 43–4; Thirteenth ‘Tehelka.com’ corruption case (2001) 370
31 Amendment Case 205, 207; transition from Tehrik Niaz Shariat Mohammadi movement
32 colonialism to independence 118–19; 279
33 unemployment 340; violence and Telangana 383
34 gangsterism 126; welfare system 43, 337, TELO 294
35 342, 344, 345 Telugu Desam Party see TDP
36 Sri Lanka Freedom Party see SLFP Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA)
37 Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) 296 170
Sri Lanka Muslim Congress see SLMC Thinley, Jigme Y. 144
38
Sri Lankan Army 361 Tilly, Charles 299
39
Sri Sanandhara Society 46 TNA (Tamil National Alliance) 125
40 Sridharan, E. 73 Transparency International 366, 367, 372;
41 Srinivas, M.N. 268 Corruption Perception Index 5, 106, 366,
42 State of Democracy in South Asia survey 271 366, 367; Global Corruption Barometer
43 state formation 400–2 370, 373; Global Integrity Index 370,
44 Stern, Jessica 285 373
45 Subrahmanyam, K. 354 Tribhuvan, King 133
46 sugarcane industry: India 327, 328 tsunami disaster (2004) 296
47 Suhrawardy, Husain Shaheed 99 TULF (Tamil United Liberation Front) 120,
48 Sukh Ram affair 370 291–2, 293, 294

463
INDEX

ulema 15, 275, 279 Vivekananda, M. 376 1

ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam) 258, Vohra Committee Report (1995) 376 2
396 3
UML (Communist Party of Nepal (Unified ‘war on terror’ 23, 252, 414; and Pakistan 252, 4
Marxist Leninist)) 136, 137, 140, 143 286, 357, 405
5
umma 35 Waseem, Muhammad 14, 36
6
unemployment: India 306; Sri Lanka 340 Washington Consensus 111, 314
Unionist Party 34 Wedderburn Report (1934) 43 7
United Liberation Front of Assam see ULFA Welikala, Asanga 206 8
United National Front (UNF) 122 West Bengal 29, 71, 74, 143, 153, 221, 268, 311, 9
United National Party see UNP 312, 313, 315, 390, 392 10
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Wickremasinghe, Ranil 2, 122, 124, 295 11
365 Wigetunga, Dingiribanda 121 12
United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) Williamson, John 312 13
141 women; and nationalist struggle in India 31–2 14
United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) 122, World Bank 306, 316, 365, 366, 373, 379, 410 15
124 World Trade Organization (WTO) 312, 410
16
United Progressive Alliance (UPA) 67 World Values Study (1995–2001) 286
17
United States: and Afghanistan/Taliban 14, 90; Wriggins, Howard 50
and Bangladesh 411; and India 407, 18
409–10; relations with Pakistan 4, 22, 85, Yadav, Lalu Prasad 314 19
86, 90–2, 94, 110, 356–7, 404, 405–6, Yadav, Mulayam Singh 68, 79 20
407–8 Yadav, Yogendra 61, 67, 68, 79 21
UNP (United National Party) 6, 46, 47, 48, Yahya Khan, General 84, 93, 99, 180, 183, 184, 22
119, 120, 121, 123–4, 126, 128, 292 278, 280, 282, 356 23
Urdu 10, 11, 214, 215, 217, 221, 222, 224, 233, Yechuri, Sita Ram 139 24
234, 235, 237, 238, 242, 243, 281 Youth Congress 44 25
Uttar Pradesh 18, 79–80, 148, 315, 376 Yunus, Mohammed 108 26
Uyangoda, Jayadeva 16, 206
27
Zaidi, S. Akbar 232, 233
28
Vajpayee, Atal Bihari 62, 63, 75, 369 Zardari, Asif Ali 9, 95, 361, 373, 415
Vallinder, Torbjörn 166 Zia, General (Ziaur Rahman) 5, 100, 287, 360, 29
Venezuela 98 373, 377, 404, 405, 411 30
Venkataraman, Ramaswamy 63 Zia, Khaleda 100, 102, 108, 198, 360 31
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) 75, 263, 270, Zia ul Haq, General 9, 84, 88, 89, 93, 178, 181, 32
271 184–5, 356, 372 33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
464