RULE 67

EXPROPRIATION
Section 1. The complaint.
 
The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by the filing of a
verified complaint which shall state with certainty the right and
purpose of expropriation, describe the real or personal property
sought to be expropriated, and join as defendants all persons
owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or
interest therein, showing, so far as practicable, the separate
interest of each defendant. If the title to any property sought
to be expropriated appears to be in the Republic of the
Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the
title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff
cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real
owners, averment to that effect shall be made in the complaint.
Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized
government depositary.
Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and
after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the
right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property
involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary
an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for
purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the
orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in
lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of
deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines
payable on demand to the authorized government depositary.
If personal property is involved, its value shall be
provisionally ascertained and the amount to be deposited shall be
promptly fixed by the court.
After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or
other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in
possession of the property involved and promptly submit a report
thereof to the court with service of copies to the parties.
Sec. 3. Defenses and objections.
If a defendant has no objection or defense to the action or the
taking of his property, he may file and serve a notice of
appearance and a manifestation to that effect, specifically
designating or identifying the property in which he claims to be
interested, within the time stated in the summons. Thereafter, he
shall be entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the
same.

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If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the
allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense to the
taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within the time
stated in the summons. The answer shall specifically designate or
identify the property in which he claims to have an interest,
state the nature and extent of the interest claimed, and adduce
all his objections and defenses to the taking of his property. No
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be
alleged or allowed in the answer or any subsequent pleading.
A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but
the court, in the interest of justice, may permit amendments to
the answer to be made not later than ten (10) days from the
filing thereof. However, at the trial of the issue of just
compensation, whether or not a defendant has previously appeared
or answered, he may present evidence as to the amount of the
compensation to be paid for his property, and he may share in the
distribution of the award.
Sec. 4. Order of expropriation.
If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the
plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, or when no
party appears to defend as required by this Rule, the court may
issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has
a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated,
for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon
the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date
of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
whichever came first.
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property
may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal,
however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just
compensation to be paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be
permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such
terms as the court deems just and equitable.
Sec. 5. Ascertainment of compensation.
Upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall
appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested
persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the
just compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order
of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first
session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and
specify the time within which their report shall be submitted to
the court.

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Copies of the order shall be served on the parties. Objections to
the appointment of any of the commissioners shall be filed with
the court within ten (10) days from service, and shall be
resolved within thirty (30) days after all the commissioners
shall have received copies of the objections.
Sec. 6. Proceedings by commissioners.
Before entering upon the performance of their duties, the
commissioners shall take and subscribe an oath that they will
faithfully perform their duties as commissioners, which oath
shall be filed in court with the other proceedings in the case.
Evidence may be introduced by either party before the
commissioners who are authorized to administer oaths on hearings
before them, and the commissioners shall, unless the parties
consent to the contrary, after due notice to the parties to
attend, view and examine the property sought to be expropriated
and its surroundings, and may measure the same, after which
either party may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The
commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the
property not taken and deduct from such consequential damages the
consequential benefits to be derived by the owner from the public
use or purpose of the property taken, the operation of its
franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business
of the corporation or person taking the property. But in no case
shall the consequential benefits assessed exceed the
consequential damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the
actual value of his property so taken.
Sec. 7. Report by commissioners and judgment thereupon.
The court may order the commissioners to report when any
particular portion of the real estate shall have been passed upon
by them, and may render judgment upon such partial report, and
direct the commissioners to proceed with their work as to
subsequent portions of the property sought to be expropriated,
and may from time to time so deal with such property. The
commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court
of all their proceedings, and such proceedings shall not be
effectual until the court shall have accepted their report and
rendered judgment in accordance with their recommendations.
Except as otherwise expressly ordered by the court, such report
shall be filed within sixty (60) days from the date the
commissioners were notified of their appointment, which time may
be extended in the discretion of the court. Upon the filing of
such report, the clerk of the court shall serve copies thereof on
all interested parties, with notice that they are allowed ten

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(10) days within which to file objections to the findings of the
report, if they so desire.
Sec. 8. Action upon commissioners’ report.
Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in
the preceding section, or even before the expiration of such
period but after all the interested parties have filed their
objections to the report or their statement of agreement
therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept the report and
render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it
may recommit the same to the commissioners for further report of
facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint new
commissioners; or it may accept the report in part and reject it
in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as
shall secure to the plaintiff the property essential to the
exercise of his right of expropriation, and to the defendant just
compensation for the property so taken.
Sec. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims.
If the ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are
conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order any
sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property to be paid
to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the same
proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require
the payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or
the court before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or
retain it for the public use or purpose if entry has already been
made.
Sec. 10. Rights of plaintiff after judgment and payment.
Upon payment by the plaintiff to the defendant of the
compensation fixed by the judgment, with legal interest thereon
from the taking of the possession of the property, or after
tender to him of the amount so fixed and payment of the costs,
the plaintiff shall have the right to enter upon the property
expropriated and to appropriate it for the public use or purpose
defined in the judgment, or to retain it should he have taken
immediate possession thereof under the provisions of section 2
hereof. If the defendant and his counsel absent themselves from
the court, or decline to receive the amount tendered, the same
shall be ordered to be deposited in court and such deposit shall
have the same effect as actual payment thereof to the defendant
or the person ultimately adjudged entitled thereto.
Sec. 11. Entry not delayed by appeal; effect of reversal.
The right of the plaintiff to enter upon the property of the
defendant and appropriate the same for public use or purpose

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shall not be delayed by an appeal from the judgment. But if the
appellate court determines that plaintiff has no right of
expropriation, judgment shall be rendered ordering the Regional
Trial Court to forthwith enforce the restoration to the defendant
of the possession of the property, and to determine the damages
which the defendant sustained and may recover by reason of the
possession taken by the plaintiff.
Sec. 12. Costs, by whom paid.
The fees of the commissioners shall be taxed as a part of the
costs of the proceedings. All costs, except those of rival
claimants litigating their claims, shall be paid by the
plaintiff, unless an appeal is taken by the owner of the property
and the judgment is affirmed, in which event the costs of the
appeal shall be paid by the owner.
Sec. 13. Recording judgment, and its effect.
The judgment entered in expropriation proceedings shall state
definitely, by an adequate description, the particular property
or interest therein expropriated, and the nature of the public
use or purpose for which it is expropriated. When real estate is
expropriated, a certified copy of such judgment shall be recorded
in the registry of deeds of the place in which the property is
situated, and its effect shall be to vest in the plaintiff the
title to the real estate so described for such public use or
purpose.
Sec. 14. Power of guardian in such proceedings.
The guardian or guardian ad litem of a minor or of a person
judicially declared to be incompetent may, with the approval of
the court first had, do and perform on behalf of his ward any
act, matter, or thing respecting the expropriation for public use
or purpose of property belonging to such minor or person
judicially declared to be incompetent, which such minor or person
judicially declared to be incompetent could do in such
proceedings if he were of age or competent.
RULE 68
FORECLOSURE OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
Section 1. Complaint in action for foreclosure.
 
In an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage or other
encumbrance upon real estate, the complaint shall set forth the
date and due execution of the mortgage; its assignments, if any;
the names and residences of the mortgagor and the mortgagee; a
description of the mortgaged property; a statement of the date of
the note or other documentary evidence of the obligation secured

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by the mortgage, the amount claimed to be unpaid thereon; and the
names and residences of all persons having or claiming an
interest in the property subordinate in right to that of the
holder of the mortgage, all of whom shall be made defendants in
the action.
Sec. 2. Judgment on foreclosure for payment or sale.
If upon the trial in such action the court shall find the facts
set forth in the complaint to be true, it shall ascertain the
amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or obligation,
including interest and other charges as approved by the court,
and costs, and shall render judgment for the sum so fo

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CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY [40 Phil 349; No. 14355; 31 Oct 1919]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes 
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: The City of Manila, plaintiff herein, prayed for the expropriation of a

portion private cemetery for the conversion into an extension of Rizal
Avenue. Plaintiff claims that it is necessary that such public improvement be
made in the said portion of the private cemeteryand that the said lands are
within their jurisdiction.

Defendants herein answered that the said expropriation was not necessary

because other routes were available. They further claimed that the
expropriation of the cemetery would create irreparable loss and injury to
them and to all those persons owing and interested in
the graves andmonuments that would have to be destroyed.

The lower court ruled that the said public improvement was not necessary on
the particular-strip of land in question. Plaintiff herein assailed that they have
the right to exercise the power of eminent domain and that the courts have
no right to inquire and determine the necessity of the expropriation. Thus,
the same filed an appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the courts may inquire into, and hear proof of the
necessity of the expropriation.

Held: The courts have the power of restricting the

exercise of eminentdomain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case
and for the purposes designated by the law. The moment the municipal
corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority conferred, it must
comply withthe conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for
conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right
of eminentdomain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But

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whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a
particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, is a
question that the courts have the right to inquire to.

PEOPLE V. FAJARDO                         G.R. No. L-12172; August 29, 1958

FACTS:

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Fajardo and Babilonia (son-in law) are charged with violation of Ordinance 7 Series of 1950 of
the Municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur which penalizes a person who constructs a building
without permit from the mayor.

After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside the gasoline station
near the town plaza. His request was repeatedly denied due to the reason that it  “hinders the
view of travelers from the National Highway to the public plaza”.

Appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit, because they
needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon
and hitherto they had been living on leased property.

Appellants were charged and convicted by peace court of Baoo for violating such ordinance.

ISSUE:

WON Ordinance No. 7 is a valid exercise police power in its regulation of property.

HELD:

NO. The ordinance doesn’t state any standard that limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is
an arbitrary and unlimited conferment.

The subject ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to guide or limit the
mayor’s action. The standards of the ordinance are entirely lacking making it unreasonable and
oppressive, hence, not a valid ordinance. While property may be regulated to the interest of the
general welfare, and the state may eliminate structures offensive to the sight, the state may not
permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate
them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the community.

Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for urban purposes. To
do this legally, there must be just compensation and they must be given an opportunity to be
heard.

An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of
the property.

Hence, the conviction of herein appellants is reversed, and said accused are acquitted, with
costs de oficio

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Republic vs. Vda. De Castellvi, et al. G.R. No. L-20620 August 15,
1974

FACTS: This case involves two cases of a complaint for eminent domain –

one against Carmen Vda. de Castellvi, as the administratix of the estate of
the late Alfonso de Castellvi, and the other is against Maria Nieves Toledo-
Gozun.

Republic: the fair market value of the subject properties, according to the
Committee on Appraisal for the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P
2,000 per hectare, or a total market value of P 259,669.10.

Castellvi: the subject land, being a residential land, had a fair market value of
P15.00 per square meter, so it had a total market value of P 11,389,485.

: The Republic, through the Philippine Air Force (PAF), had been, despite
repeated demands, illegally occupying her property since July 1, 1956,
thereby preventing her from using and disposing of it, thus causing her
damages by way of unrealized profit.

: This stemmed from the fact that there was a lease agreement between
Castellvi and the PAF on a yearly basis, which started on July 1, 1947. When
the contract expires, Castellvi did not renew the same because they want to
sell the leased property.

Toledo-Gozun: the parcels of land owned by her were residential lands and
the fair market value of said lands was P 15.00 per square meter, so they had
a total market value of P 8,085,675

: the complaint be dismissed, or that she be paid the amount of P 8,085,675,

plus interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from October 13, 1959,
and attorney’s fess in the amount of P 50,000.

RTC: ordered that the Republic be placed in possession of the lands after it
had deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga the amount of P
259,669.10.

               : authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay Toledo-

Gozun the sum of P 107,609 as provisional value of her lands

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               : authorized the Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga to pay Castellvi
the amount of P 151,859.80 as provisional value of the land

               : appointed three commissioners to determine the value of the

subject properties

Commissioners: Atty. Amadeo Yuzon, as commissioner for the court; Atty.

Felicisimo Pamandanan for the plaintiff; and Atty. Leonardo Lansangan for
the defendants

: after having determined that the lands sought to be expropriated were

residential lands, they recommended unanimously that the lowest price that
should be paid was P 10.00 per square meter, for both lands of Castellvi and
Toledo-Gozun. An additional P 5,000 be paid to Toledo-Gozun for
improvements found on her land. Legal interest on the compensation,
computed from August 10, 1959, be paid after deducting the amounts
already paid to the owners, and that no consequential damages be awarded

RTC: the court finds that the unanimous recommendation of the

commissioners of ten pesos (P10.00) per square meter for the lots of Castellvi
and Toledo-Gozun is fair and just

: the Republic will pay 6% interest per annum on the total value of the lands
to Toledo-Gozun from the time that the provisional value has been deposited
(August 10, 1959) until full payment

: Republic will pay 6% interest per annum from July 1, 1956 when Republic
commenced its illegal possession of the Castellvi land until July 10, 1959
when the provisional value thereof was actually deposited in court

ISSUE: (As alleged by the Republic) Whether or not the “taking” of the

properties under expropriation commenced with the filing of the action.

Republic: the “taking” should be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue
of a special lease agreement between the Republic and Castellvi, the former
was granted the “right and privilege” to buy the property should the lessor
wish to terminate the lease and that in the event of such sale, it was
stipulated that the fair market value should be as of the time of occupancy;
and that the permanent improvements amounting to more than half a million
pesos constructed during a period of twelve years on the land, subject of
expropriation, were indicative of an agreed pattern of permanency and
stability of occupancy by the Philippine Air Force in the interest of national
security.

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Castellvi: the “taking” of property under the power eminent domain requires
two essential elements, to wit: (1) entrance and occupation by condemnor
upon the private property for more than a momentary or limited period, and
(2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.

               : the two elements are lacking

RULING: YES. A number of circumstances must be present in the “taking” of

property for purposes of eminent domain.

1)     The expropriator must enter a private property – this circumstance is

present in the instant case, when by virtue of a lease agreement the
Republic, through PAF, took possession of the property of Castellvi

2)     The entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary
period – the word “momentary” when applied to possession or occupancy of
property should be construed to mean “a limited period” – not indefinite or
permanent. The entry on the property, under the lease, is temporary and
considered transitory considering that the said contract is renewable from
year to year. The fact that the Republic constructed some installation of a
permanent nature does not alter the fact that the entry into the land was
transitory or intended to last a year.

3)     The entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal
authority – this circumstance is present in the instant case because Republic
entered the Castellvi property as lessee

4)     The property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally

appropriated or injuriously affected – this is likewise present in this case
because the property was used by the air force of the AFP

5)     The utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property
– this is wanting in this case as Castellvi remained as owner and she was
receiving the monthly rentals of the property; hence, she was not deprived of
the beneficial enjoyment of the property.

We hold, therefore, that the “taking’ of the Castellvi property should not be
reckoned as of the year 1947 when the Republic first occupied the same
pursuant to the contract of lease, and that the just compensation to be paid
for the Castellvi property should not be determined on the basis of the value
of the property as of that year. The lower court did not commit an error when
it held that the “taking” of the property under expropriation commenced with
the filing of the complaint in this case.

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Under Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the “just compensation” is
to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court has
ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes
place subsequent to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the just
compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed
in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on August
10, 1959. The “taking” of the Castellvi property for the purposes of
determining the just compensation to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned
as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent domain was filed

Political Law.  Powers of the State.  Power of Eminent Domain.

Republic v. PLDT
GR No. L-1884;  January 27, 1969

FACTS:
The Bureau of Telecommunications set up its own Government Telephone System
by utilizing its own appropriation and equipment and by renting trunk lines of the

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PLDT to enable government officers to call private parties. One of the rules of PLDT,
however, is the prohibition on the Bureau’s public use of the service furnished only
for the private use of said Bureau. The Bureau has extended its services to the
general public since its inception (also using the lines of PLDT). PLDT contends that
said bureau was violating the conditions under which their Private Branch Exchange
is inter-connected with the PLDT’s facilities and, after giving an ultimatum, PLDT
disconnected the trunk lines rented by the Bureau, effectively isolating the
Philippines from the rest of the world (except the United States). Petitioner thus
filed for judgment commanding PLDT to execute a contract with plaintiff.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the PLDT may be forced to execute a contract with petitioner

HELD:
The parties cannot be coerced to enter into a contract where no agreement is had
between them. While the Republic may not compel the PLDT to celebrate a contract
with it, the Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain,
require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government
telephone system and that of the PLDT subject to just compensation. The use of
PLDT’s lines and services are subjected to a burden to the respondent for the public
use and benefit, thus, they constitute properties over which the power of eminent
domain may be exercised

AMIGABLE VS CUENCA

G.R. No. L-26400       43 SCRA 487       February 29, 1972

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

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NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees

Facts:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in its Civil Case,
dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint.

Victoria Amigable, the petitioner is a rightful owner of a lot in Cebu City. Without prior
expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot for the
construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.

Amigable’s counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of the
portion of the said lot. It was disallowed by the Auditor General in his 9th Endorsement.
Petitioner then filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas
Cuenca, in his capacity as Commissioner of Public Highways, for the recovery of
ownership and possession of the lot.

Defendants argue that the: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not having been
filed first with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the
recovery had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against the Government,
the claim for moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs had no valid basis since the
Government had not given its consent to be sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it was the
province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of
Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.

The court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s cause
of action for the recovery of possession and ownership of the lot on the ground that the
government cannot be sued without its consent; that it had neither original nor appellate
jurisdiction to hear and decide plaintiff’s claim for compensatory damages, being a money
claim against the government; and that it had long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction
over said claim because the government had not given its consent to be sued.
Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed.

Issues:

Whether or not petitioner Amigable, may properly sue the government under the facts of
the case.

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Decisions:

The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice to a citizen.

Quoting the decision from Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, “Where the
government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may
properly maintain a suit against the government without violating the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit

Rulings:

Yes. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of
her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any
portion of her lot to the government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot.
As registered owner, she could bring an action to recover possession of the portion of
land in question at any time because possession is one of the attributes of ownership.
However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither
convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road
purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due compensation
which it could and should have done years ago. To determine the due compensation for
the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking.

As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal
interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is
made by the government. In addition, the government should pay for attorney’s fees, the
amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after hearing

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PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC [244 SCRA 272; G.R. No. 119694; 22
May 1995]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes 
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772

directingnewspapers to provide free Comelec space of not less than one-half
page for the common use of political parties and candidates. The
Comelec spaceshall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among
allcandidates to enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand
on public Issue and their platforms of government. The Comelec spaceshall
also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election
information.

Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-profit organization

ofnewspaper and magazine publishers, asks the Supreme Court to declare
Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it
violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon
thegovernment against the taking of private property for public use without
just compensation. On behalf of the respondent Comelec, the Solicitor
General claimed that the Resolution is a permissible exercise of the power of
supervision (police power) of the Comelec over the information operations of
print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a
fair, impartial and credible election.

Issue:

Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is unconstitutional.

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Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as unconstitutional. It held
that to compel print media companies to donate “Comelec space” amounts to
“taking” of private personal property without payment of the
just compensation required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the elementof
necessity for the taking has not been established by respondent Comelec,
considering that the newspapers were not unwilling to sell advertising space.
The taking of private property for public use is authorized by the constitution,
but not without payment of justcompensation. Also Resolution No. 2772 does
not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state. In the case at
bench, there is no showing of existence of a national emergency to take
private property ofnewspaper or magazine publishers.

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Sumulong  vs. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461 (1987)

Sumulong vs. Guerrero

Facts:
On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed a complaint for
expropriation of parcels of land covering approximately twenty-five (25) hectares in
Antipolo, Rizal including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-
Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 square meters respectively.
The land sought to be expropriated were valued by the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per
square meter adopting the market value.
Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the
properties. The NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National
Bank, representing the "total market value" of the subject 25 hectares of land, pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 1224 which defines "the policy on the expropriation of private
property for socialized housing upon payment of just compensation."
On January 17, 1978, Judge Buenaventura Guerrero issued a writ of possession
when the NHA deposited with the Philippine National Bank the amount of P158, 980.00.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived
of the possession of their property without due process of law, which was however
denied. Hence, the resort to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not PD 1224 is violative of the due process clause since “socialized
housing'' for the purpose of condemnation proceeding is not really for a public purpose.

Ruling:
No. PD 1224 is not violative of the due process clause since “socialized housing''
for the purpose of condemnation proceeding is really for a public purpose.
The "public use" requirement for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a
flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. In this jurisdiction, the
statutory and judicial trend has been summarized as follows: The taking to be valid
must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a literal meaning
should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be
for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not
allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the purpose of the taking is public, then the
power of eminent domain comes into play. As just noted, the constitution in at
least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what public use is. One is the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to
individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of
utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then
that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare
satisfies the requirement of public use.

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 Manosca vs. CA 
G.R. NO. 106440, January 29, 1996 

Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land when the parcel was

ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo,
the founder of Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, declaring
the land to be a national historical landmark. Petitioners moved to
dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended
expropriation was not for a public purpose and, incidentally, that the
act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious
entity, contrary to the provision of Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987
Constitution.

 Issue: Whether or not the expropriation of the land whereat Manalo

was born is valid and constitutional.

Held: Yes. The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a
time when it was felt that a literal meaning should be attached to such
a requirement. Whatever project is undertaken must be for the public
to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is
not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the purpose of the
taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As
just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt,
determines what public use is. One is the expropriation of lands to be
subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals. The other is
the transfer, through the exercise of this power, of utilities and other
private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to state then that
at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general
welfare satisfies the requirement of public use

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G.R. No. L-59603 Case Digest
G.R. No. L-59603, April 29, 1987
Export Processing Zone Authority
vs Hon. Ceferino Dulay
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr.

Facts:
January 1957, president of the Philippines issued proclamation no
1811 reserving a parcel of land in Lapu-lapu for the
establishment of an export processing zone. Not all the reserved
land was public. EPZA then offered to purchase the lands from its
registered owners, in the valuation set by PD 464,as amended. The
owners did not agree.

EPZA filed with CFI-Cebu a complaint for expropriation with a

prayer for the issuance of a writ of possession against the
landowners. Judge Dulay, later issued a writ of possession
authorizing EPZA to take immediate possession of the premises.

After the recommendation of the appointed commissioners as to the

just compensation, EPZA filed for a motion for reconsideration
saying that the PD 464, as amended, superseded the rules of
court. The trial court denied the motion. EPZA then filed for
certiorari and mandamus with preliminary restraining order.

Issue: Whether PD 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have repealed the Revised
Rules of Court, such that in determining just compensation in
expropriation shall be based only in its market value as declared
by the owner or by assessor, whichever is lower.

Ruling:
PD 464 on just compensation is unconstitutional and void. The
method of just compensation provided by PD 464 is an encroachment
on judicial prerogatives, contradicting the Constitution which
reserved the power to determine just compensation to the Court's
final determination. We are convinced and so rule that the trial
court correctly stated that the valuation in the decree may only
serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining
just compensation but it may not substitute the court's own
judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at
such amount.

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Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of
the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss
sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and
its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be
considered. The determination of "just compensation" in eminent
domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or
the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a
party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights
that private property may not be taken for public use without
just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can
mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into
the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.

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Municipality of Paranaque v VM Realty G.R. No. 127820. July 20, 1998
J. Panganiban

Petition for review on certiorari

Facts:
Under a city council resolution, the Municipality of Parañaque filed on September 20,
1993, a Complaint for expropriation against Private Respondent  V.M. Realty
Corporation over two parcels of land of 10,000 square meters. The city previously
negotiated for the sale of the property but VM didn’t accept.
The trial court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994, authorizing petitioner to take
possession of the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount
equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration.
According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it
was filed pursuant to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the
Local Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was barred by a prior
judgment or res judicata. Petitioner claimed that res judicata was not applicable.
The trial court dismissed the case. The petitioner’s MFR was denied.  The CA affirmed.

Issues:
1. WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same force and
effect of an ordinance and will not deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of
action.
2. WON the principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not applicable
when public interest is primarily involved.

Held: No to 1st Yes to 2nd. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:
1. Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by the municipal council for the
purpose of initiating an expropriation case “substantially complies with the requirements
of the law” because the terms “ordinance” and “resolution” are synonymous for “the
purpose of bestowing authority [on] the local government unit through its chief executive
to initiate the expropriation proceedings in court in the exercise of the power of eminent
domain.
To strengthen this point, the petitioner cited Article 36, Rule VI of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code, which provides:  “If the LGU
fails to acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through purchase,
the LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of the Sanggunian
authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation proceedings.”
Court-No. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of
government, which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and
public utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property
only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latter’s control and restraints,
imposed “through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
Sec 19, RA 7160
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare
for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws.

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Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the
power of eminent domain:
1.  An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2.  The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for
the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3.  There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4.  A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of eminent
domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council.  Thus, there was no
compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an ordinance.
We are not convinced by petitioner’s insistence that the terms “resolution” and
“ordinance” are synonymous.  A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution.  An
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of
a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and
permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere
resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government
Code.  But Congress did not.  In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government
Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act
pursuant to an ordinance.
Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a
fundamental or private right of the people.[35] Accordingly, the manifest change in the
legislative language -- from “resolution” under BP 337 to “ordinance” under RA 7160 --
demands a strict construction.
When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater public purposes,
appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law
should not be enlarged by doubtful interpretation.
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a
resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain.  It is axiomatic that the clear
letter of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule
issued for its implementation.
Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not
eminent but “inferior” domain, since it must conform to the limits imposed by the
delegation, and thus partakes only of a share in eminent domain.
2. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals and the trial court, all the requisites for the
application of res judicata are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on
the merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical interests, subject matter and
cause of action, which has been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res judicata, which finds
application in generally all cases and proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its
agent to expropriate private property.
Eminent Domain can reach every form of property which the State might need for public
use whenever they need it.
While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State to exercise
eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case.
In Republic vs De Knecht, the Court ruled that the power of the State or its agent to
exercise eminent domain is not diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment

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over the property to be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the parties.  
The State or its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to expropriate
the same property, once all legal requirements are complied with.

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