VOL.
454, MARCH 31, 2005 541 the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005. *
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE
NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA, HONORATO B.
CATINDIG, petitioner.
Parents and Children;  Adoption; Names;  It is both
of personal as well as public interest that every person
must have a name.—For all practical and legal
purposes, a man’s name is the designation by which
he is known and called in the community in which he
lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or
combination of words by which a person is
distinguished from other individuals and, also, as the
label or appellation which he bears for the
convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in
speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of personal
as well as public interest that every person must have
a name.
Same;  Same; Same;  The name of an individual
has two parts—the given or proper name and the
surname or family name; The given name may be
freely selected by the parents for the child, but the
surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law.—
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given
or proper name and (2) the surname or family
name. The given or proper name is that which is given
to the individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish
him from other individuals. The surname or family
name is that which identifies the family to which he
belongs and is continued from parent to child. The
given name may be freely selected by the parents for
is fixed by law.
Same;  Same; Same;  Words and
Phrases;  Adoption is defined as the process of making
a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess
in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child;
The modern trend is to consider adoption not merely
as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child
with a legitimate status.—Adoption is defined as the
process of making a child, whether related or not to
the adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to
a legitimate child. It is a
_______________
*
 THIRD DIVISION.
542
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
ANNOTATED
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia
juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates
between two persons a relationship similar to that
which results from legitimate paternity and
filiation. The modern trend is to consider adoption not
merely as an act to establish a relationship of
paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows
the child with a legitimate status. This was, indeed,
confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State
Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child
initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle
that adoption is impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared
to favor the adopted child. Republic Act No. 8552,
otherwise known as the “Domestic Adoption Act of
1998,” secures these rights and privileges for the
adopted.
Same;  Same; Same;  An adopted child is entitled
to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the right
to bear the surname of her father and her mother.—
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it
follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear
the surname of her father and her mother, as
discussed above. This is consistent with the intention
of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino
custom that the initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the
father.
Same;  Same; Same;  Statutory
Construction;  Adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the
beneficent purposes of adoption.—It is a settled rule
that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary,
should be liberally construed to carry out the
beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and
welfare of the adopted child are of primary and
paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill
these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Article 10 of the Civil
Code which presumes in the interpretation of
application of law that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail was intended to strengthen
the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice
which may apparently be authorized by some way of
interpreting the law.— Art. 10 of the New Civil Code
provides that: “In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the law-
543
VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 543
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia
making body intended right and justice to prevail.”
This provision, according to the Code Commission, “is
necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right
and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will
strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an
injustice which may apparently be authorized by some
way of interpreting the law.”
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Since there is no law
prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father to use, as middle name her mother’s surname,
the Court finds no reason why she should not be
allowed to do so.—Hence, since there is no law
prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural
father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her
mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should
not be allowed to do so.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Br.
13.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Catindig, Tiongco & Nibungco for petitioner.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her
natural father, use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name? This is the issue
raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig,
herein petitioner, filed a petition  to adopt his
1
minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994;  that her2
mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie
has been using her mother’s middle name and
surname; and that he is now a widower and
qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed
that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be
changed to
_______________
 Rollo at pp. 34-36.
1
 Annex “C”, Id., at p. 33.
2
544
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia
“Garcia,” her mother’s surname, and that her
surname “Garcia” be changed to “Catindig,” his
surname.
On March 23, 2001,  the trial court rendered the
3 name.
assailed Decision granting the adoption, thus:
“After a careful consideration of the evidence
presented by the petitioner, and in the absence of any
opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the
petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of
the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive
parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain,
care for and educate the child to be adopted; that the
grant of this petition would redound to the best
interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the
petitioner’s care and custody of the child since her
birth up to the present constitute more than enough
compliance with the requirement of Article 35 of
Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious,
the same is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of
obedience and maintenance with respect to her
natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth
be the petitioner’s legitimate child and legal heir.
Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the
Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE
NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be
entered in the Local Civil Registrar concerned pursuant
to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National
Statistics Office for record purposes.
SO ORDERED.” 4
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for
clarification and/or reconsideration  praying that
5
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname
of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle
_______________
 Annex “F”, Id., at pp. 41-43.
3
 Rollo at pp. 42-43.
4
 Annex “G”, Id., at pp. 44-48.
5
545
VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 545
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga
 Garcia
On May 28, 2001,  the trial court denied
6 remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus,
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding
that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an
adopted child to use the surname of his biological
mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of
whether an illegitimate child may use the
surname of her mother as her middle name when
she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in
depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a
consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no
law prohibiting an adopted child from having a
middle name in case there is only one adopting
parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to
have as middle name the surname of the mother;
(3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name
of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and
best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right
to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5)
permitting Stephanie to use the middle name
“Garcia” (her mother’s surname) avoids the
stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued
use of “Garcia” as her middle name is not
opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that
Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her
middle name, the surname of her natural mother
for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain
Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother
because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she
to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in
the future, her relationship or proof of that
relationship with her natural mother should be
maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting
Stephanie to use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name. What the law does
not prohibit, it allows.
_______________
 Annex “H”, Id., at p. 49.
6
546
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a
middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of
the mother. This custom has been recognized by
the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family
Law Committees agreed that “the initial or
surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that the
second name, if any, will be before the surname
of the mother.” 7
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law—
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name
is the designation by which he is known and called
in the community in which he lives and is best
known. It is defined as the word or combination of Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code
words by which a person is distinguished from provides the substantive rules which regulate the
other individuals and, also, as the label or use of surname  of an individual whatever may be
10

appellation which he bears for the convenience of his status in life, i.e., whether he may be
the world at large addressing him, or in speaking legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a
of or dealing with him.  It is both of personal as
8
married woman or a previously married woman,
well as public interest that every person must or a widow, thus:
have a name. “Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) principally use the surname of the father.
the given or proper name and (2) the surname or Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear
family name. The given or proper name is that the surname of the adopter.
xxx
which is given to the individual at birth or at
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree
baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use
The surname or family name is that which the surname of the father.
identifies the family to which he belongs and is Art. 370. A married woman may use:
continued from parent to child. The given name
may be freely selected by the parents for the 1. (1)Her maiden first name and surname and add
child, but the surname to which the child is her husband’s surname, or
entitled is fixed by law. 9
2. (2)Her maiden first name and her
_______________ husband’s surname or
3. (3)Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word
7
 Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family indicating that she is his wife, such as ‘Mrs.’
Law Committees, August 10, 1985, p. 8.
8
 Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, G.R. No.
97906, May 21, 1992, 209 SCRA 189, citing 38 Am. Jur., Name Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the
594-595. wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden
9
 Republic vs. Hon. Hernandez, et al., G.R. No. 117209, name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she
February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 509, citing Tolentino, A.M., Civil may resume her maiden name and surname. However,
Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. she may choose to continue employing her former
I, 1993 ed., 672.
husband’s surname, unless:
547
VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 547 1. (1)The court decrees otherwise, or
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga 2. (2)She or the former husband is married again
to another person.
Garcia
 Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted,
the wife shall continue using her name
and surname employed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased
husband’s surname as though he were still living,
in accordance with Article 370.
_______________
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra.
10
548
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames,
the younger person shall be obliged to use such
additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names
and surnames between ascendants and descendants,
the word ‘Junior’ can be used only by a son. Grandsons
and other direct male descendants shall either:
1. (1)Add a middle name or the mother's
surname, or
2. (2)Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
x x x”
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name—
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no
law regulating the use of a middle name. Even
Article 176  of the Family Code, as amended by
11
Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as “An
Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The
Surname Of Their Father,” is silent as to what
middle name a child may use.
The middle name or the mother’s surname is
only considered in Article 375(1), quoted above, in
case there is identity of names and surnames
between ascendants and descendants, in which
case, the middle name or the mother’s surname
shall be added.
_______________
11
 “Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and
shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall
be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However,
illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their
filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through
the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the
right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove
non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate
child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate
child.”
549
VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 549
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what
middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365
of the Civil Code merely provides that “an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter.” Also, Article 189 of the Family Code,
enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is
likewise silent on the matter, thus:
“(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall
be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights
and obligations arising from the relationship of parent
and child, including the right of the adopted to use
the surname of the adopters;
x x x”
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the
members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees that drafted the Family
Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the
surname of the child’s mother as his middle
name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the
members approved the suggestion that the initial
or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father, thus:
“Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference
between the use by the wife of the surname and that
of the child because the father’s surname
indicates the family to which he belongs, for
which reason he would insist on the use of the
father’s surname by the child but that, if he
wants to, the child may also use the surname of
the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses
to use the surname of the mother, how will his name
be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him
but that his point is that it should be mandatory
that the child uses the surname of the father
and permissive in the case of the surname of the
mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa’s point
is covered by the present Article 364, which reads:
550
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the
surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change
through no choice of the person himself precisely
because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the
following example: Alfonso Ponce Enrile’s correct
surname is Ponce since the mother’s surname is Enrile
but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose
Gutierrez David’s family name is Gutierrez and his
mother’s surname is David but they all call him Justice
David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed
Article (12) be modified to the effect that it shall
be mandatory on the child to use the surname of
the father but he may use the surname of the
mother by way of an initial or a middle
name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this
for inclusion in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since
in the proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating
the rights of legitimate children so that the details can
be covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the
simplification suggested by Justice Caguioa that the
surname of the father should always be last because
there are so many traditions like the American
tradition where they like to use their second given
name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by
the Chinese wherein they even include the Clan name.
xxx
 Justice Puno suggested that they agree in
principle that in the Chapter on the Use of
Surnames, they should say that initial or
surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that the
second name, if any, will be before the surname
of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is
really the Filipino way. The Committee approved
the suggestion.”  (Emphasis supplied)
12
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides
that “the adopted shall bear the surname of the
adopters.”  Again, it is
13
_______________
 Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family
12
law Committees, August 10, 1985, pp. 16-18.
 Article 365 of the New Civil Code.
13
551
VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia
silent whether he can use a middle name. What it
only expressly allows, as a matter of right and
obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname
of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of
adoption. 14
The Underlying Intent of Adoption
Is In Favor of the Adopted Child—
Adoption is defined as the process of making a
child, whether related or not to the adopter,
possess in general, the rights accorded to a
legitimate child.  It is a juridical act, a proceeding
15
in rem which creates between two persons a
relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation.  The modern16
trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act
to establish a relationship of paternity and
filiation, but also as an act which endows the child
with a legitimate status.  This was, indeed,
17
confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as
a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of
the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted
the principle that adoption is impressed with
social and moral responsibility, and that its
underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted
child.  Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as
18
the “Domestic Adoption Act of 1998,”  secures 19
these rights
_______________
551 14
 Republic vs. Hon. Hernandez, et al., supra; Republic vs.
Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra.
15
 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Vol. I,
Fifteenth Edition, 2002, p. 685.
16
 Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated,
1989 Edition, p. 272-273, citing 4 Valverde, 473.
17
 Paras, supra, citing Prasnick vs. Republic, 98 Phil. 665.
18
 Lahom vs. Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003, 406
SCRA 135, citing United Nation General Assembly/44/49 (1989).
19
 “Sec. 17. Legitimacy.—The adoptee shall be considered
the legitimate son/daughter of the adopter(s) for all intents and
purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and obligations
provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them
without discrimina
552
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia
and privileges for the adopted. 20
One of the effects of adoption is that the
adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to
Article 189  of the Family Code and Section
21
17  Article V of RA 8552.
22 23
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her
adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all
the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the
right to bear the surname of her father and her
mother, as discussed above. This is consistent
with the intention of the members of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees as earlier
discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the
initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties,
Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s
surname (Garcia) as her middle name will
maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted
that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section
18 , Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption)
24
provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir
of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can
well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her
natural mother in the future.
_______________
tion of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love,
guidance and support in keeping with the means of the family.”
Id.
20
 “Art. 189. (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be
21
deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall
acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the
adopted to use the surname of the adopters;”
22
Supra.
23
 Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
24
 “Sec. 18. Succession.—In legal and intestate succession,
the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of
succession without distinction from legitimate filiation.
However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left
a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.”
553
VOL. 454, MARCH 31, 2005 553
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her
mother are living together in the house built by
petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose,
Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their
needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her
mother and father. She calls them “Mama” and
“Papa.” Indeed, they are one normal happy
family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her
mother’s surname as her middle name will not
only sustain her continued loving relationship with
her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of
her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of Adoption
Statutes In Favor Of Adoption—
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being
humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of
adoption.  The interests and welfare of the
25
adopted child are of primary and paramount
consideration,  hence,
26
every reasonable mother’s surname, we find no reason why she
intendment should be sustained to promote and should not be allowed to do so.
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
the law. 27
assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that Stephanie should be allowed to use her
that: mother’s surname “GARCIA” as her middle name.
“In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of Let the corresponding entry of her correct and
laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended complete name be entered in the decree of
right and justice to prevail.” adoption.
This provision, according to the Code Commission, SO ORDERED.
“is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor      Panganiban (Chairman), Corona, Carpio-
of right and justice when the law is doubtful or Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur.
obscure. It will strengthen Petition granted.
_______________
Notes.—A person may be known by several
25
 Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. aliases, irrespective of his knowledge or consent
No. 92326, January 24, 1992, 205 SCRA 356, citing 2 Am. Jur. to the use thereof. (People vs. Bergonio, Jr., 340
2d, Adoption, 865. SCRA 269 [2000])
26
 Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., Id.,
citing 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Adoption, 910.
Since the use of initials, instead of a given
27
 Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., Id., name, before a surname, has become a practice,
citing Bobanovic, et al. vs. Montes, etc., et al., 142 SCRA the necessity that these initials be all given and
485 (1986). correctly given in court proceedings has become
554 of importance in every case, and in many,
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED absolutely essential to a correct designation of the
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga person intended—a middle name is very
Garcia important or even decisive in a case in which the
the determination of the courts to avoid an issue is as between two persons who have the
injustice which may apparently be authorized by same first name and surname, did the act
some way of interpreting the law.” 28
complained of, or is injured or sued or the like.
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting (United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Ramos, 415
an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, SCRA 596 [2003])
like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her
——o0o——
_______________

Paras, supra, p. 91.

28

555

VOL. 205, JANUARY 24, 1992 337

Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights G.R. No. 57062. January 24, 1992. *

reserved. MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL.,

petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO
MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and PAULINA
MARIATEGUI, respondents.
Remedial Law;  Civil Procedure;  Complaint;  The
Court of Appeals correctly adopted the settled rule
that the nature of an action filed in court is
determined by the facts alleged in the complaint
constituting the cause of action.—A perusal of the
entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows
that the action is principally one of partition. The
allegation with respect to the status of the private
respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their
rights in the estate of the deceased. Hence, the Court
of Appeals correctly adopted the settled rule that the
nature of an action filed in court is determined by the
facts alleged in the complaint constituting the cause of
action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). It
has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the
proper one which may be granted under the law, it
does not characterize or determine the nature of
plaintiffs' action, and the relief to which plaintiff is
entitled based on the facts alleged by him in his
complaint, although it is not the relief demanded, is
what determines the nature of the action (1 Moran, p.
127, 1979 ed., citing Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77
Phil. 120).
 Same;  Evidence;  Disputable presumption; Once a
man and woman have lived as husband and wife and
such relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the
presumption of their being married must be admitted
as a fact.—Courts look upon the presumption of
marriage with great favor as it is founded on the
following rationale: "The basis of human society
throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract,
but it is a new relation, an institution in the
maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence
special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason
is that such is the common order of society and if the
parties were not what they thus hold themselves out
as being, they would be living in the constant violation
of decency and of law x x x." (Adong vs. Cheong Seng
Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in Alavado vs. City
Government of Taclo-
_______________
 THIRD DIVISION.
*
338
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
ban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]). So much so that once
a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife
and such relationship is not denied nor contradicted,
the presumption of their being married must be
admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of
Tacloban, supra).
Civil Law; Family Code;  Filiation;  Art. 172 of the
Family Code provides that filiation of legitimate
children may be established by the record of birth
appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by
the open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child.—Article 172 of the said Code provides
that the filiation of legitimate children may be
established by the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment or by the open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child. Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation
of the private respondents. Jacinto's birth certificate is
a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again,
no evidence which tends to disprove facts contained
therein was adduced before the lower court. In the
case of the two other private respondents, Julian and
Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence any
of the documents required by Article 172 but they
continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo
Mariategui in the same manner as their brother
Jacinto.
Same;  Same; Prescription; Prescription of an
action for partition does not lie except when the co-
ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner.—In
view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion
than that private respondents are legitimate children
and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time
limitation prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action
for recognition is inapplicable to this case. Corollarily,
prescription does not run against private respondents
with respect to the filing of the action for partition so
long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is
invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated
the co-ownership. In other words, prescription of an
action for partition does not lie except when the co-
ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del
Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55
[1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532
[1982]). Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire
by prescription the share of the other co-owners
absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly
communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De
Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action
to demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be
barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA 55
[1987]). On the other hand, an action for partition may
be seen to be at once an action for declaration of
coownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the property involved (Roque
vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
339
VOL. 205, JANUARY 24, 1992
Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
Same;  Same; Wills and
Succession; Repudiation; Petitioners' registration of
the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate
as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership.—
Petitioners' registration of the properties in their
names in 1971 did not operate as a valid repudiation
of the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157
SCRA 455, 461-462 [1988]), the Court held:
"Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of
co-ownership, must have been preceded by
repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of
repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1)
a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an
act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other
coowners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and
conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
of the property for the period required by law." x x x "It
is true that registration under the Torrens system is
constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been our
holding that the Torrens title does not furnish shield
for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the
act of registration is equivalent to notice of
repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding
the long-standing rule that registration operates as a
universal notice of title." Inasmuch as petitioners
registered the properties in their names in fraud of
their co-heirs prescription can only be deemed to have
commenced from the time private respondents
discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille
vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription
definitely may not be invoked by petitioners because
private respondents commenced the instant action
barely two months after learning that petitioners had
339 registered in their names the lots involved.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision of
the Court of Appeals. Asuncion, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.
     Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law
Office for the heirs of the late Maria del Rosario
Mariategui.
     Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Law Firm for private
respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision  of the Court of Appeals dated December
**
24,1980 in CA-G.R. No.
_______________
  Penned by Associate Justice Elias B. Asuncion, concurred
**
by Sison, P.V. and Censon, JJ.
340
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al. vs. Maria
del Rosario Mariategui, et al.," reversing the
judgment of the then Court of First Instancce of
Rizal, Branch VIII  at Pasig, Metro Manila. The
***
undisputed facts are as follows:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26,
1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 8).
During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted
three (3) marriages. With his first wife, Eusebia
Montellano, who died on November 8,1904, he
begot four (4) children, namely: Baldomera, Maria
del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died
and was survived by her children named Antero,
Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and
Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo also died
and left a son named Ruperto. With his second
wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter
named Cresenciana who was born on May 8,1910
(Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36).
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's
third wife) got married sometime in 1930. They
had three children, namely: Jacinto, born on July 3,
1929, Julian, born on February 16, 1931 and
Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco
Mariategui died in 1941 (Rollo, Ibid).
At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left
certain properties which he acquired when he was
still unmarried (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp.
116; 4). These properties are described in the
complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of
the Muntinglupa Estate (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 39).
On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by
his first and second marriages, namely, Maria del
Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed
Mariategui and Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria,
Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed
Espina, executed a deed of extrajudicial partition
whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot
No. 163 of the Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, Lot
No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary registration
proceedings filed by the adjudicatees under Act
No. 496, and the land registration court issued a
decree ordering the registration of the lot. Thus,
on April 1, 1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in the
name of the above-mentioned heirs.
Subsequently, the registered owners caused the
subdivision of the
_______________
 Presided by Judge Serafin E. Camilon.
***
341
VOL. 205, JANUARY 24, 1992 341
Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
said lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-H, for which
separate transfer certificates of title were issued
to the respective parties (Rollo, ibid).
On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third
marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Julian and
Paulina) filed with the lower court an amended
complaint claiming that Lot No. 163 together with
Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by their
common father, Lupo Mariategui, and that, with
the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs,
they (children of the third marriage) were
deprived of their respective shares in the lots.
Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of their
deceased father and annulment of the deed of
extrajudicial partition dated December 2, 1967
(Petition, Rollo, p. 10). Cresencia Mariategui Abas,
Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel Santos
were impleaded in the complaint as unwilling
defendants as they would not like to join the suit
as plaintiffs although they acknowledged the
status and rights of the plaintiffs and agreed to
the partition of the parcels of land as well as the
accounting of their fruits (Ibid., Rollo, p. 8; Record
on Appeal, p. 4).
The defendants (now petitioners) filed an
answer with counterclaim (Amended Record on
Appeal, p. 13). Thereafter, they filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action
and prescription. They specifically contended that
the complaint was one for recognition of natural
children. On August 14, 1974, the motion to
dismiss was denied by the trial court, in an order
the dispositive portion of which reads:
"It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles
278 and 285 of the Civil Code cited by counsel for the
defendants are of erroneous application to this case.
The motion to dismiss is therefore denied for lack of
merit.
"SO ORDERED." (Ibid, p. 37).
However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as
well as petitioners' counterclaim were dismissed
by the trial court, in its decision stating thus:
"The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the
acknowledgment or recognition of their continuous
enjoyment and possession of status of children of their
supposed father. The evidence fails to sustain either
premise, and it is clear that this action cannot be
342
342 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
sustained. (Ibid, Rollo, pp. 67-68)
The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals on the ground that the trial court
committed an error "x x x in not finding that the
parents of the appellants, Lupo Mariategui and
Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully married, and in
holding (that) they (appellants) are not legitimate
children of their said parents, thereby divesting
them of their inheritance x x x." (Rollo, pp. 14-15).
On December 24,1980, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision declaring all the children and
descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including
appellants Jacinto, Julian and Paulina (children of
the third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in
the estate of Lupo Mariategui; directing the
adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real
properties who eventually acquired transfer
certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds of
reconveyance in favor, and for the shares, of
Jacinto, Julian and Paulina provided rights of
innocent third persons are not prejudiced
otherwise the said adjudicatees shall reimburse
the said heirs the fair market value of their
shares; and directing all the parties to submit to
the lower court a project of partition in the net
estate of Lupo Mariategui after payment of taxes,
other government charges and outstanding legal
obligations.
The defendants-appellees filed a motion for
reconsideration of said decision but it was denied
for lack of merit. Hence, this petition which was
given due course by the court on December 7,
1981.
The petitioners submit to the Court the
following issues: (a) whether or not prescription
barred private respondents' right to demand the
partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui, and (b)
whether or not the private respondents, who
belatedly filed the action for recognition, were
able to prove their successional rights over said
estate. The resolution of these issues hinges,
however, on the resolution of the preliminary
matter, i.e., the nature of the complaint filed by
the private respondents.
The complaint alleged, among other things,
that "plaintiffs are the children of the deceased
spouses Lupo Mariategui x x x and Felipa
Velasco"; that "during his lifetime, Lupo
Mariategui had repeatedly acknowledged and
confirmed plaintiffs as his children and the latter,
in turn, have continuously enjoyed such
343
VOL. 205, JANUARY 24, 1992
Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
status since their birth"; and "on the basis of their
relationship to the deceased Lupo Mariategui and
in accordance with the law on intestate
succession, plaintiffs are entitled to inherit shares
in the foregoing estate (Record on Appeal, pp. 5 &
6). It prayed, among others, that plaintiffs be
declared as children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui
and adjudication in favor of plaintiffs their lawful
shares in the estate of the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).
A perusal of the entire allegations of the
complaint, however, shows that the action is
principally one of partition. The allegation with
respect to the status of the private respondents
was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in
the estate of the deceased. Hence, the Court of
Appeals correctly adopted the settled rule that the
nature of an action filed in court is determined by
the facts alleged in the complaint constituting the
cause of action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA
282 [1988]).
It has been held that, if the relief demanded is
not the proper one which may be granted under
the law, it does not characterize or determine the
nature of plaintiffs' action, and the relief to which
plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by
him in his complaint, although it is not the relief
demanded, is what determines the nature of the
action (1 Moran, p. 127,1979 ed., citing Baguioro
vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).
With respect to the legal basis of private
343 respondents' demand for partition of the estate of
Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held
that the private respondents are legitimate
children of the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were
alleged to have been lawfully married in or about
1930. This fact is based on the declaration
communicated by Lupo Mariategui to Jacinto who
testified that "when (his) father was still living, he
was able to mention to (him) that he and (his)
mother were able to get married before a Justice
of the Peace of Taguig, Rizal." The spouses
deported themselves as husband and wife, and
were known in the community to be such.
Although no marriage certificate was introduced
to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to
controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact
that no record of the marriage exists does not
invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for
its validity are present (People vs. Borromeo, 133
SCRA 106 [1984]).
344
344 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be
presumed to have taken place between Lupo and
Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a
woman, deporting themselves as husband and
wife, have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock,
there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and
board is legitimate; and that things have
happened according to the ordinary course of
nature and the ordinary habits of life (Section 5
(z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court; Corpus v.
Corpus, 85 SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v.
Workmen's Compensation, 85 SCRA
502 [1978]; Alavado v. City Gov't. of
Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes v. Court of
Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 [1985]).
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage
with great favor as it is founded on the following
rationale:
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized
world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is
not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is
deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of
the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are
presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption
or evidence special to that case, to be in fact married.
The reason is that such is the common order of society
and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the
constant violation of decency and of law x x x." (Adong
vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted
in Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA
230 [1985]).
So much so that once a man and a woman have
lived as husband and wife and such relationship is
not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of
their being married must be admitted as a fact
(Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, supra).
The Civil Code provides for the manner under
which legitimate filiation may be proven.
However, considering the effectivity of the Family
Code of the Philippines, the case at bar must be
decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set
of rules because the parties have been overtaken
by events, to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco
vs. Court of Appeals, G.R No 76873, October 26,
1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code,
there are only two classes of children—legitimate
and illegitimate. The fine distinctions among
various types of ille-
345
VOL. 205, JANUARY 24, 1992
Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
gitimate children have been eliminated (Castro vs.
Court of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]).
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the
filiation of legitimate children may be established
by the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment or by the open and
continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child. Evidence on record proves the
legitimate filiation of the private respondents.
Jacinto's birth certificate is a record of birth
referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence
which tends to disprove facts contained therein
was adduced before the lower court. In the case of
the two other private respondents, Julian and
Paulina, they may not have presented in evidence
any of the documents required by Article 172 but
they continuously enjoyed the status of children of
Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as their
brother Jacinto.
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies
to be inconsequential and lacking in substance as
to certain dates and names of relatives with whom
their family resided, these are but minor details.
The nagging fact is that for a considerable length
of time and despite the death of Felipa in 1941,
the private respondents and Lupo lived together
until Lupo's death in 1953. It should be noted that
even the trial court mentioned in its decision the
admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana
Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners herein,
that "x x x Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui
345 ay pawang mga kapatid ko sa ama x x x" (Exh. M,
Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other
conclusion than that private respondents are
legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui
and therefore, the time limitation prescribed in
Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is
inapplicable to this case. Corollarily, prescription
does not run against private respondents with
respect to the filing of the action for partition so
long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is
invoked, have not expressly or impliedly
repudiated the coownership. In other words,
prescription of an action for partition does not lie
except when the co-ownership is properly
repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 [1987]
citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by
prescription
346
346 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
the share of the other co-owners absent a clear
repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated
to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148
SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to
demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be
barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA
55 [1987]). On the other hand, an action for
partition may be seen to be at once an action for
declaration of co-ownership and for segregation
and conveyance of a determinate portion of the
property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA
118 [1988]).
Petitioners contend that they have repudiated
the co-ownership when they executed the
extrajudicial partition excluding the private
respondents and registered the properties in their
own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20). However,
no valid repudiation was made by petitioners to
the prejudice of private respondents. Assuming
petitioners' registration of the subject lot in 1971
was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership,
prescription had not yet set in when private
respondents filed in 1973 the present action for
partition (Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA 552 [1990]).
In their complaint, private respondents averred
that in spite of their demands, petitioners, except
the unwilling defendants in the lower court, failed
and refused to acknowledge and convey their
lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record
on Appeal, p. 6). This allegation, though denied by
the petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was
never successfully refuted by them. Put
differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed
knowledge of their relationship to private
respondents who are therefore their co-heirs,
petitioners fraudulently withheld private
respondent's share in the estate of Lupo
Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since
1962, he had been inquiring from petitioner Maria
del Rosario about their (respondents) share in the
property left by their deceased father and had
been assured by the latter (Maria del Rosario) not
to worry because they will get some shares. As a
matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto
constructed a house where he now resides on Lot
No. 163 without any complaint from petitioners.
Petitioners' registration of the properties in
their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid
repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs.
Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462 [1988]),
the Court held:
347
VOL. 205, JANUARY 24, 1992 347
Mariategui vs. Court of Appeals
"Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of
co-ownership, must have been preceded by
repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of
repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1)
a coowner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an
act of repudiation is clearly made known to the other
co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear and
conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
of the property for the period required by law."
x x x      x x x      x x x
"It is true that registration under the Torrens system
is constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been
our holding that the Torrens title does not furnish
shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that
the act of registration is equivalent to notice of
repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding
the long-standing rule that registration operates as a
universal notice of title."
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties
in their names in fraud of their co-heirs
prescription can only be deemed to have
commenced from the time private respondents
discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation
(Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra). Hence,
prescription definitely may not be invoked by
petitioners because private respondents
commenced the instant action barely two months
after learning that petitioners had registered in
their names the lots involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
     Gutierrez,
Jr. (Chairman), Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Romero,
JJ., concur.
Petition denied; decision affirmed.
Note.—The status of an illegitimate natural
child is no longer recognized under the Family
Code. (People vs. Rafanan, 182 SCRA 811.)

——o0o——

348
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.

VOL. 21, SEPTEMBER 29, 1967
Santos, Jr. vs. Republic
No. L-22523. September 29, 1967.
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF THE
MINOR,EDWIN VILLA Y MENDOZA.LUIS E.
SANTOS,JR.and EDIPOLA V. SANTOS, petitioners-
appellants vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
oppositor-appellee.
Civil law; Adoption;  Relatives by blood or affinity
are not prohibited from adopting another.—There is no
provision in the law prohibiting relatives, by blood or
by affinity, from adopting one another. To say that
adoption should not be allowed when the adopter and
the adopted are related to each other, except in those
cases enumerated in Article 338 of the Civil Code, is to
preclude adoption among relatives, no matter how far
removed or in whatever degree that relationship might
be, which is not the policy of the law.
Same;  Interest and welfare of child to be adopted
should be paramount consideration.—The interest and
welfare of the child to be adopted should be of
paramount consideration. Adoption statutes, being
humane and salutary and designed to provide homes,
care and education for unfortunate children, should be
construed so as to encourage the adoption of such
children by persons who can properly rear and educate
them.
Same;  Elder sister may adopt a younger brother.
—The fact that the adoption in this case will result in
dual relationship between the parties, that the
adopted brother will also be the son of the adopting
elder sister, should not prevent the adoption. One is by
nature, while the other is by fiction of law.
Same;  Same; Relationship established by
adoption is limited to adopting parents.—The
379 relationship established by the adoption is limited to
the adopting parents and does not extend to their
other relatives, except as expressly provided by law.
Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a
relative of the ascendants and collaterals of the
adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children which
they may have after the adoption, except that the law
imposes certain impediments to marriage by reason of
adoption. Neither are the children of the adopted
considered as descendants of the adopter.
APPEAL from a decision of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Manila. Juliano-
Agrava, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     A. E. Dacanay for petitioners-appellants.
     Solicitor General for oppositor-appellee.
ANGELES, J.:
An appeal from the decision of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court, in Special Proceeding
No. 0001, dismissing the petition instituted by the
spouses Luis R.
380
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos, Jr. vs. Republic
Santos, Jr. and Edipola V. Santos for the adoption
of the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza.
 The issue before Us is, whether or not an elder
sister may adopt a younger brother. The trial
court dismissed the petition reasoning thus:
“A critical consideration in this case is the fact that the
parents of the minor to be adopted are also the
parents of the petitioner-wife. The minor, therefore, is
the latter’s legitimate brother.
“In this proceeding, the adoption will result in an
incongruous situation where the minor Edwin Villa, a
legitimate brother of the petitioner-wife, will also be
her son. In the opinion of the court, that incongruity,
not neutralized by other circumstances absent herein,
should prevent the adoption.”
The petitioners moved to reconsider the decision
but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal.
The facts are not disputed.
The above-named spouses filed the petition
before the court a quo on January 8, 1963, praying
that the minor Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old,
be declared their (petitioner’s) son by adoption.
Evidence was presented that the order setting the
case for hearing has been duly published, Exhibit
A. There having been no opposition registered to
the petition, the petitioners were permitted to
adduce their evidence.
It was established that the petitioners are both
32 years of age, Filipinos, residing in the City of
Manila. They were married in 1957 and have
maintained a conjugal home of their own. They do
not have a child of their own blood. Neither
spouse has any legitimate, legitimated,
illegitimate, acknowledged natural child, or
natural child by legal fiction, nor has any one of
them been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude. Edwin Villa y Mendoza, 4 years old, is a
child of Francisco Villa and Florencia Mendoza who
are the common parents of the petitioner-wife
Edipola Villa Santos and the minor. Luis E. Santos,
Jr., is a lawyer, with business interests in a textile
development enterprise and the IBA electric plant,
and is the general manager of Medry, Inc. and the
secretary-treasurer of Bearen Enterprises. His
income is approximately P600.00 a month. His co-
petitioner-wife
381
VOL. 21, SEPTEMBER 29, 1967 381
Santos, Jr. vs. Republic
is a nurse by profession, with an average monthly
earning of about P300.00.
It was also shown that Edwin Villa y Mendoza
was born on May 22, 1958, Exhibit C. He was a
sickly child since birth. Due to the child’s
impairing health, his parents entrusted him to the
petitioners who reared and brought him up for the
years thereafter, and as a result, there developed
between the petitioners and the child, a deep and
profound love for each other. The natural parents
of the minor testified that they have voluntarily
given their consent to the adoption of their son by
the petitioners, and submitted their written
consent and conformity to the adoption, and that
they fully understand the legal consequences of
the adoption of their child by the petitioners.
We are not aware of any provision in the law,
and none has been pointed to Us by the Solicitor
General who argues for the State in this case, that
relatives, by blood or by affinity, are prohibited
from adopting one another. The only objection
raised is the alleged “incongruity” that will result
in the relation of the petitioner-wife and the
adopted, in the circumstance that the adopted
who is the legitimate brother of the adopter, will
also be her son by adoption. The theory is,
therefore, advanced that adoption among people
who are related by nature should not be allowed,
in order that dual relationship should not result,
reliance being made upon the views expressed by
this Court in McGee vs. Republic, L-5387, April 29,
1954, 94 Phil. 820.
In that case, an American citizen, Clyde E.
McGee, married to a Filipina by whom he had one
child, instituted a proceeding for the adoption of
two minor children of the wife had by her first
husband. The lower court granted the petition of
McGee to adopt his two minor step-children. On
appeal by the State. We reversed the decision. We
said:
‘The purpose of adoption is to establish a relationship
of paternity and filiation where none existed before.
Where therefore the relationship of parent and child
already exists whether by blood or by affinity as in the
case of illegitimate and stepchildren, it would be
unnecessary and superfluous to establish
382
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos, Jr. vs. Republic
and superimpose another relationship of parent and
child through adoption. Consequently, an express
authorization of law like article 338 is necessary, if not
to render it proper and legal, at least, to remove any
and all doubt on the subject matter. Under this view,
article 338 may not be regarded as a surplusage. That
may have been the reason why in the old Code of Civil
Procedure, particularly its provisions regarding
adoption, authority to adopt a step-child by a step-
father was provided in section 766 notwithstanding the
general authorization in section 765 extended to any
inhabitant of the Philippines to adopt a minor child.
The same argument of surplusage could plausibly have
been advanced as regards section 766, that is to say,
section 766 was unnecessary and superfluous because
without it a step-father could adopt a minor step-child
anyway. However, the inserting of section 766 was not
entirely without reason. It seems to be an established
principle in American jurisprudence that a person may
not adopt his own relative, the reason being that it is
unnecessary to establish a relationship where such
already exists (the same philosophy underlying our
codal provisions on adoption). So some states have
special laws authorizing the adoption of relatives such
as a grandfather adopting a grandchild and a father
adopting his illegitimate or natural child.”
Notwithstanding the views thus expressed, a
study of American precedents would reveal that
there is a variance in the decisions of the courts in
different jurisdictions regarding the matter of
adoption of relatives. It cannot be stated as a
general proposition that the adoption of a blood
relative is contrary to the policy of the law, for in
many states of the Union, no restriction of that
sort is contained in the statutes authorizing
adoption, although laws of other jurisdiction
expressly provide that adoption may not take
place within persons within a certain degree of
relationship (1 Am. Tur. 628629). Courts in some
states hold that in the absence of express
statutory restriction, a blood relationship between
the parties is not a legal impediment to the
adoption of one by the other, and there may be a
valid adoption where the relation of parent and
child already exists by nature (2 Am. Jur. 2d 869).
Principles vary according to the particular
adoption statute of a state under which any given
case is considered. It would seem that in those
states originally influenced by the civil law
countries where adoption originated, the rules are
liberally
383
VOL. 21, SEPTEMBER 29, 1967
Santos, Jr. vs. Republic
construed, while in other states where common
law principles predominate, adoption laws are
more strictly applied because they are regarded
to be in derogation of the common law.
Article 335 of the Civil Code enumerates those
persons who may not adopt, and it has been
shown that petitioners-appellants herein are not
among those prohibited from adopting. Article 339
of the same code names those who cannot be
adopted, and the minor child whose adoption is
under consideration, is not one of those excluded
by the law. Article 338, on the other hand, allows
the adoption of a natural child by the natural
father or mother, of other illegitimate children by
their father or mother, and of a step-child by the
step-father or stepmother. This last article is, of
course, necessary to remove all doubts that
adoption is not prohibited even in these cases
where there already exist a relationship of parent
and child between them by nature. To say that
adoption should not be allowed when the adopter
and the adopted are related to each other, except
in these cases enumerated in Article 338, is to
preclude adoption among relatives no matter how
far removed or in whatever degree that
relationship might be, which in our opinion is not
the policy of the law. The interest and welfare of
the child to be adopted should be of paramount
consideration. Adoption statutes, being humane
and salutary, and designed to provide homes,
care and education for unfortunate children,
383 should be construed so as to encourage the
adoption of such children by person who can
properly rear and educate them (In re Havsgord’s
Estate, 34 S.D. 131, 147 N.W. 378).
With respect to the objection that the adoption
in this particular case will result in a dual
relationship between the parties, that the adopted
brother will also be the son of the adopting elder
sister, that fact alone should not prevent the
adoption. One is by nature, while the other is by
fiction of law. The relationship established by the
adoption is limited to the adopting parents and
does not extend to their other relatives, except as
expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted
child cannot be considered as a relative of the
ascendants and collaterals of the adopt-
384
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ramirez vs. Ramirez
ing parents, nor of the legitimate children which
they may have after the adoption except that the
law imposes certain impediments to marriage by © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the reserved.
adopted considered as descendants of the
adopter (Tolentino, Civil Code, Vol. I, 1960 Ed., p.
652, citing 1 Oyuelos 284; Perez, Gonzales and
Castan; 4-11 Enneccerus, Kipp & Wolff 177;
Munoz, p. 104). So even considered in relation to
the rules on succession which are in pari
materia, the adoption under consideration would
not be objectionable on the ground alone of the
resulting relationship between the adopter and
the adopted. Similar dual relationships also result
under our law on marriage when persons who are
already related, by blood or by affinity, marry
each other. But as long as the relationship is not
within the degrees prohibited by law, such
marriages, are allowed notwithstanding the
resulting dual relationship. And as We do not find
any provision in the law that expressly prohibits
adoption among relatives, they ought not to be
prevented. For all the foregoing considerations,
the decision appealed from is set aside, and the
petition for the adoption of the subject minor,
granted. No pronouncement as to costs.
     Concepcion, C.J., Reyes,
J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Fernando.
JJ., concur.
Decision set aside and petition for adoption
granted.

______________
 plaintiff's own adulterous act of infidelity as
defense against her claim for support and in
not exempting him from the obligation to give
such support? The obligation to support shall
cease "when the recipient has committed some
act which gives rise to disinheritance" (Article
303, new Civil Code). A spouse may be
disinherited when "she has given cause for
legal separation" (Article 921 [4], supra). One of
the causes for legal separation is "adultery on
the part of the wife and concubinage on the
part of the husband" (Article 97, supra), as
defined in the Penal Code. If the plaintiff was
the only one who committed adultery,
defendant's theory would be correct. In the
instant case defendant is still bound to support
his wife because (1) plaintiff and defendant
were guilty of infidelity, but before the filing of
the action defendant had pardoned plaintiff's
unfaithfulness; (2) the law on support (Title IX,
Book I, Articles 290-304, Civil Code) contains no
provision squarely applicable to the present
case in which both parties had committed
[No. L-10028. May 23, 1958]
infidelity; neither is there a provision to the
HIPOLITA ALMACEN, plaintiff and
effect that when both spouses committed
appellee, vs. TEODORO N. BALTAZAR, defendant
marital offenses against one another, one can
and appellant.
no longer ask support from the other; and (3)
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First
there is the general principle that when two
Instance of Manila ordering appellant to pay
persons acted in bad faith, they should be
appellee a monthly support of P50.00 beginning
considered as having acted in good faith, which
August 1955. The case was directly appealed to
principle may be applied to the present case to
this Court because the appellant raises purely
the effect that plaintiff and defendant being
questions of law. Did the court err in not taking
in pari delicto, the latter cannot claim the
 adultery of the former as defense to evade the
obligation to give her support. Did the court err
in finding that the evidence on record was
sufficient to establish a condonation of
plaintiff's adulterous act and reconciliation
between plaintiff and defendant? The plaintiff's
testimony and documentary evidence showing
that the defendant had given money to plaintiff
on several occasions through third persons are
sufficient to show condonation or reconciliation.
The act of giving money to an erring wife and
the fact that no action was taken against her
before the courts of justice are sufficient to
establish forgiveness amounting to
condonation, for "condonation is the
forgiveness of one of the married parties of an
offense which he knows
1148
the other has committed against the other."
(Words & Phrases, 8A, pp. 19-20.) At any rate,
pardon or condonation does not require sexual
intercourse and it may be express or implied.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with
costs against the defendant. Endencia, J.,
ponente.
___________
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
G.R. No. 182894. April 22, 2014.*
FE FLORO VALINO, petitioner, vs. ROSARIO D.
ADRIANO, FLORANTE D. ADRIANO, RUBEN D.
ADRIANO, MARIA TERESA ADRIANO ONGOCO,
VICTORIA ADRIANO BAYONA, and LEAH
ANTONETTE D. ADRIANO, respondents.
Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations; Funerals;
It is undeniable that the law simply confines the right
and duty to make funeral arrangements to the
members of the family to the exclusion of one’s
common law partner.—It is undeniable that the law
simply
1
_______________ 
* EN BANC.
2confines the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to the members of the family to the
exclusion of one’s common law partner. In Tomas
Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, 185 SCRA 425 (1990), a petition
for habeas corpus  was filed by the brothers and sisters
of the late Vitaliana Vargas against her lover, Tomas
Eugenio, Sr., alleging that the latter forcibly took her
and confined her in his residence. It appearing that she
already died of heart failure due to toxemia of
pregnancy, Tomas Eugenio, Sr. sought the dismissal of
the petition for lack of jurisdiction and claimed the
right to bury the deceased, as the common-law
husband.
Same; Same; Same; The right and  duty to make
funeral arrangements, like any other right,  will not be
considered as having been waived or renounced,
except upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct
indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end.—It
is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the
surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she
was living separately from her husband and was in the
United States when he died has no controlling
significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect, waived
or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and
duty to make arrangements for the funeral of her
deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to
make funeral arrangements, like any other right, will
not be considered as having been waived or
renounced, except upon clear and satisfactory
proof of conduct indicative of a free and
voluntary intent to that end. While there was
disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and
their children when he was still alive, the Court also
recognizes that human compassion, more often than
not, opens the door to mercy and forgiveness once a
family member joins his Creator. Notably, it is an
undisputed fact that the respondents wasted no time
in making frantic pleas to Valino for the delay of the
interment for a few days so they could attend the
service and view the remains of the deceased. As soon
as they came to know about Atty. Adriano’s death in
the morning of December 19, 1992 (December 20,
1992 in the Philippines), the respondents immediately
contacted Valino and the Arlington Memorial Chapel to
express their request, but to no avail.
Same; Same; Same; Considering the ambiguity as
to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the law that
supplies the presumption as to his intent. No
presumption can be said to have been created in
3Valino’s favor, solely on account of a long-time
relationship with Atty. Adriano.—Valino insists that the
expressed wishes of the deceased should nevertheless
prevail pursuant to Article 307 of the Civil Code.
Valino’s own testimony that it was Atty. Adriano’s wish
to be buried in their family plot is being relied upon
heavily. It should be noted, however, that other than
Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried at
the Manila Memorial Park, no other evidence was
presented to corroborate such claim. Considering that
Rosario equally claims that Atty. Adriano wished to be
buried in the Adriano family plot in Novaliches, it
becomes apparent that the supposed burial wish of
Atty. Adriano was unclear and undefinite. Considering
this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it
is the law that supplies the presumption as to his
intent. No presumption can be said to have been
created in Valino’s favor, solely on account of a long-
time relationship with Atty. Adriano.
Same; Same; Same;  Should there be any doubt as
to the true intent of the deceased, the law favors the
legitimate family.—It cannot be surmised that just
because Rosario was unavailable to bury her husband
when she died, he had already renounced her right to
do so. Verily, in the same vein that the right and duty
to make funeral arrangements will not be considered
as having been waived or renounced, the right to
deprive a legitimate spouse of her legal right to bury
the remains of her deceased husband should not be
readily presumed to have been exercised, except upon
clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a
free and voluntary intent of the deceased to that
end. Should there be any doubt as to the true
intent of the deceased, the law favors the
legitimate family. Here, Rosario’s keenness to
exercise the rights and obligations accorded to the
legal wife was even bolstered by the fact that she was
joined by the children in this case.
Same; Same; Same; It is generally recognized
that any inferences as to the wishes of the deceased
should be established by some form of testamentary
disposition.—Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that
Atty. Adriano truly wished to be buried in the Valino
family plot at the Manila Memorial Park, the result
remains the same. Article 307 of the Civil Code
provides: Art. 307. The funeral shall be in
accordance with the expressed wishes of the
deceased. In the absence of such expression, his
religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the
funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the
4funeral shall be decided upon by the person
obliged to make arrangements for the same, after
consulting the other members of the family. From its
terms, it is apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to
prescribe the “form of the funeral rites” that should
govern in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly
explained earlier, the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements reside in the persons specified in Article
305 in relation to Article 199 of the Family Code. Even
if Article 307 were to be interpreted to include the
place of burial among those on which the wishes of the
deceased shall be followed, Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino), an eminent authority on civil
law, commented that it is generally recognized that
any inferences as to the wishes of the deceased
should be established by some form of
testamentary disposition. As Article 307 itself
provides, the wishes of the deceased must
be expressly provided. It cannot be inferred lightly,
such as from the circumstance that Atty. Adriano spent
his last remaining days with Valino. It bears stressing
once more that other than Valino’s claim that Atty.
Adriano wished to be buried at the Valino family plot,
no other evidence was presented to corroborate it.
Same; Same; Same; It is generally recognized that
the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce of
man.—It is generally recognized that the corpse of an
individual is outside the commerce of man. However,
the law recognizes that a certain right of possession
over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent
burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third
persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This
quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those
obligated by law to bury their dead, also authorizes
them to take possession of the dead body for purposes
of burial to have it remain in its final resting place, or
to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory
of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This
is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons
having this right may recover the corpse from third
persons. 
LEONEN, J., Dissenting Opinion: 
Civil Law; Persons and Family Relations; Funerals;
View that Article 305 of the Civil Code should only be
considered when,  first, the deceased left no explicit
instructions on how he wishes to be interred,
and  second, when none among the deceased’s
surviving relations are willing to make the funeral
arrangements and a conflict
5arises.—I am of the opinion that Article 305
should only be considered when, first, the deceased
left no explicit instructions on how he wishes to be
interred, and second, when none among the
deceased’s surviving relations are willing to make the
funeral arrangements and a conflict arises. In these
situations, the conflict must be settled according to the
order of preference stated in Article 199. In any other
case, it should be the express wishes of the deceased
which should take precedence.
Same; Same; Same; View that Article 307 of the
Civil Code should be interpreted to mean that the right
to determine one’s funeral, including the right to
determine  how and  where  one wishes to be buried,
remains with the deceased, and it is only in the
absence of his express wishes, or in the absence of his
religious beliefs and affiliations, or if there is doubt as
to his wishes, that other persons may assume the right
to decide the funeral arrangements.—It is
the ponencia’s opinion that the wishes of the deceased
contemplated in Article 307 only governs the “form of
the funeral” and that the duty and, more specifically,
the right  to make arrangements for the funeral
remains with the persons specified in Article 305 in
relation to Article 199. It is my submission, however,
that Article 307 should be interpreted to mean that the
right to determine one’s funeral, including the right to
determine how  and where  one wishes to be buried,
remains with the deceased, and it is only in the
absence of his express wishes, or in the absence of his
religious beliefs and affiliations, or if there is doubt as
to his wishes, that other persons may assume the right
to decide the funeral arrangements. This right, like
other rights pointed out by the ponencia, must not be
considered waived or renounced except upon clear
and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free
and voluntary intent to that end. There is neither
indication nor have there been any allegations that
Atty. Adriano did not freely and voluntarily relay his
last wishes to his common-law wife, petitioner Fe. Atty.
Adriano, therefore, did not waive his  right to
determine where he should be buried, in favor of the
persons indicated in Article 305 in relation to Article
199.
Same; Same; Same; View that part of life is the
ability to control how one wishes to be memorialized,
and such right should remain with the deceased. It is
only when the deceased has not left any express
instructions that the right is given to the persons
specified under the law.—It is unfortunate that
the ponencia would rather uphold the
6wishes of his estranged family rather than give
the deceased his final request. Part of life is the ability
to control how one wishes to be memorialized, and
such right should remain with the deceased. It is only
when the deceased has not left any express
instructions that the right is given to the persons
specified under the law. 
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Pizarras & Associates Law Office for petitioner.
  Ching, Mendoza, Quilas and Associates Law
Firm for respondents. 
MENDOZA, J.:
Challenged in this petition is the October 2,
2006 Decision[1] and the May 9, 2008
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-
G.R. CV No. 61613, which reversed the October 1,
1998 Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 77, Quezon City (RTC) which ruled that
petitioner Fe Floro Valino (Valino) was entitled to
the remains of the decedent.
The Facts
Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano), a partner
in the Pelaez Adriano and Gregorio Law Office,
married respondent Rosario Adriano (Rosario) on
November 15, 1955. The couple had two (2) sons,
Florante and Ruben Adriano; three (3) daughters,
Rosario, Victoria and Maria Teresa; and one (1)
adopted daughter, Leah Antonette.
_______________
 
 [1] Rollo, pp. 36-46; Penned by Associate Justice Vicente Q.
Roxas with Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and
Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., concurring.
[2] Id., at p. 65.
[3] Id., at pp. 127-131.
7
The marriage of Atty. Adriano and Rosario,
however, turned sour and they were eventually
separated-in-fact. Years later, Atty. Adriano
courted Valino, one of his clients, until they
decided to live together as husband and wife.
Despite such arrangement, he continued to
provide financial support to Rosario and their
children (respondents).
In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute
emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the
United States spending Christmas with her
children. As none of the family members was
around, Valino took it upon herself to shoulder the
funeral and burial expenses for Atty.
Adriano. When Rosario learned about the death of
her husband, she immediately called Valino and
requested that she delay the interment for a few
days but her request was not heeded. The
remains of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the
mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila
Memorial Park. Respondents were not able to
attend the interment.
Claiming that they were deprived of the chance
to view the remains of Atty. Adriano before he
was buried and that his burial at the Manila
Memorial Park was contrary to his wishes,
respondents commenced suit against Valino
praying that they be indemnified for actual, moral
and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and
that the remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and
transferred to the family plot at the Holy Cross
Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.
In her defense, Valino countered that Rosario
and Atty. Adriano had been separated for more
than twenty (20) years before he courted her.
Valino claimed that throughout the time they were
together, he had introduced her to his friends and
associates as his wife. Although they were living
together, Valino admitted that he never forgot his
obligation to support the respondents. She
contended that, unlike Rosario, she took good
care of Atty. Adriano and paid for all his medical
expenses when he got seriously ill. She also
claimed that despite knowing that Atty. Adriano
was in a coma and dying, Rosario still left for the
United States. According to Valino, it
8was Atty. Adriano’s last wish that his remains be
interred in the Valino family mausoleum at the
Manila Memorial Park.
Valino further claimed that she had suffered
damages as result of the suit brought by
respondents. Thus, she prayed that she be
awarded moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.
Decision of the RTC
The RTC dismissed the complaint of
respondents for lack of merit as well as the
counterclaim of Valino after it found them to have
not been sufficiently proven.
The RTC opined that because Valino lived with
Atty. Adriano for a very long time, she knew very
well that it was his wish to be buried at the Manila
Memorial Park. Taking into consideration the fact
that Rosario left for the United States at the time
that he was fighting his illness, the trial court
concluded that Rosario did not show love and care
for him. Considering also that it was Valino who
performed all the duties and responsibilities of a
wife, the RTC wrote that it could be reasonably
presumed that he wished to be buried in the
Valino family mausoleum.[4]
In disposing of the case, the RTC noted that the
exhumation and the transfer of the body of Atty.
Adriano to the Adriano family plot at the Holy
Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon
City, would not serve any useful purpose and so
he should be spared and respected.[5]
Decision of the CA
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the
RTC decision and directed Valino to have the
remains of Atty. Adriano exhumed at the expense
of respondents. It likewise directed
_______________  the persons who have the right and duty to make
[4] Id., at pp. 129-130.
[5] Id., at p. 131.
9respondents, at their expense, to transfer,
transport and inter the remains of the decedent in
the family plot at the Holy Cross Memorial Park in
Novaliches, Quezon City.
In reaching said determination, the CA
explained that Rosario, being the legal wife, was
entitled to the custody of the remains of her
deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of the New
Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family
Code, it was the considered view of the appellate
court that the law gave the surviving spouse not
only the duty but also the right to make
arrangements for the funeral of her husband. For
the CA, Rosario was still entitled to such right on
the ground of her subsisting marriage with Atty.
Adriano at the time of the latter’s death,
notwithstanding their 30-year separation in fact.
Like the RTC, however, the CA did not award
damages in favor of respondents due to the good
intentions shown by Valino in giving the deceased
a decent burial when the wife and the family were
in the United States. All other claims for damages
were similarly dismissed.
The Sole Issue
The lone legal issue in this petition is who
between Rosario and Valino is entitled to the
remains of Atty. Adriano.
The Court’s Ruling
Article 305 of the Civil Code, in relation to what
is now Article 199[6] of the Family Code, specifies
funeral arrangements for the deceased. Thus:
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make
arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in
accor-
_______________
[6] Formerly Article 294(a) of the New Civil Code.
10dance with the order established for support, under
Article 294. In case of descendants of the same
degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be
preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall
have a better right. [Emphases supplied]
 Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are
obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon
the following persons in the order herein provided:
(1)      The spouse;
(2)      The descendants in the nearest
degree;
(3)      The ascendants in the nearest
degree; and
(4)      The brothers and sisters. (294a)
[Emphasis supplied]
 
Further, Article 308 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained,
interred, disposed of or exhumed without the
consent of the persons mentioned in Articles 294 and
305. [Emphases supplied]
In this connection, Section 1103 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides:
Section 1103. Persons charged with the  duty  of
burial.—The immediate duty of burying the body of a
deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for
the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons
herein below specified:
(a) If the deceased was a
married man or woman, the
duty of the burial shall devolve
upon the surviving spouse if he
or she possesses sufficient
means to pay the necessary
expenses;
x x x x. [Emphases supplied]
11
From the aforecited provisions, it is undeniable
that the law simply confines the right and duty to
make funeral arrangements to the members of
the family to the exclusion of one’s common law
partner. In Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez,[7] a
petition for habeas corpus was filed by the
brothers and sisters of the late Vitaliana Vargas
against her lover, Tomas Eugenio, Sr., alleging
that the latter forcibly took her and confined her
in his residence. It appearing that she already
died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy,
Tomas Eugenio, Sr. sought the dismissal of the
petition for lack of jurisdiction and claimed the
right to bury the deceased, as the common-law
husband.
In its decision, the Court resolved that the trial
court continued to have jurisdiction over the case
notwithstanding the death of Vitaliana Vargas. As
to the claim of Tomas Eugenio, Sr. that he should
be considered a “spouse” having the right and
duty to make funeral arrangements for his
common-law wife, the Court ruled:
x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize
common law marriages. A man and woman not
legally married who cohabit for many years as
husband and wife, who represent themselves to the
public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be
husband and wife in the community where they live
may be considered legally married in common law
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside
the fact that such relationships are present in our
society, and that they produce a community of
properties and interests which is governed by law,
authority exists in case law to the effect that such form
of co-ownership requires that the man and woman
living together must not in any way be incapacitated
to contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has
a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal
impediment which disquali-
_______________
[7] 263 Phil. 1149; 185 SCRA 425 (1990).
12fied him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.
In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr. Justice
Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support
of Surviving Spouse and Children During Liquidation of
Inventoried Property) stated: “Be it noted, however,
that with respect to ‘spouse,’ the same must be
the legitimate ‘spouse’ (not common-law spouses).”
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code, the term “spouse” embraces common law
relation for purposes of exemption from criminal
liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses.
The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction
between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by
a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband
and wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to
the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the
provisions of the Civil Code, unless expressly providing
to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to
a “spouse” contemplate a lawfully wedded
spouse. Petitioner vis-à-vis Vitaliana was not a
lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not
legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.
[8] [Emphases supplied]
As applied to this case, it is clear that the law
gives the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving
legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was
living separately from her husband and was in the
United States when he died has no controlling
significance. To say that Rosario had, in effect,
waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her
right and duty to make arrangements for the
funeral of her deceased husband is baseless.
The right and duty to make funeral
arrangements, like any other right, will not be
considered as having been waived or
renounced, except upon clear and
satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a
free and voluntary
_______________
[8] Id., at pp. 1158-1159; p. 435.
13intent to that end.[9] While there was
disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario
and their children when he was still alive, the
Court also recognizes that human compassion,
more often than not, opens the door to mercy and
forgiveness once a family member joins his
Creator. Notably, it is an undisputed fact that the
respondents wasted no time in making frantic
pleas to Valino for the delay of the interment for a
few days so they could attend the service and
view the remains of the deceased. As soon as
they came to know about Atty. Adriano’s death in
the morning of December 19, 1992 (December
20, 1992 in the Philippines), the respondents
immediately contacted Valino and the Arlington
Memorial Chapel to express their request, but to
no avail.
 Valino insists that the expressed wishes of the
deceased should nevertheless prevail pursuant to
Article 307 of the Civil Code. Valino’s own
testimony that it was Atty. Adriano’s wish to be
buried in their family plot is being relied upon
heavily. It should be noted, however, that other
than Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be
buried at the Manila Memorial Park, no other
evidence was presented to corroborate such
claim. Considering that Rosario equally claims
that Atty. Adriano wished to be buried in the
Adriano family plot in Novaliches, it becomes
apparent that the supposed burial wish of Atty.
Adriano was unclear and undefinite. Considering
this ambiguity as to the true wishes of the
deceased, it is the law that supplies the
presumption as to his intent. No presumption can
be said to have been created in Valino’s
_______________
[9] See Marawi Marantao General Hospital, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 402 Phil. 356, 369; 349 SCRA 321, 330-331 (2001).
See also Thomson v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 761, 778; 298
SCRA 280, 294 (1998); Gatchalian v. Delim, G.R. No. 56487,
October 21, 1991, 203 SCRA 126, 132; Yepes v. Samar Express
Transit, 123 Phil. 948, 949; 17 SCRA 91, 93 (1966); Andres v.
The Crown Life Insurance Co., 102 Phil. 919, 924 (1958); Lang
v. Acting Provincial Sheriff of Surigao, 93 Phil. 661, 669 (1953);
and Fernandez v. Sebido, 70 Phil. 151, 159 (1940).
14favor, solely on account of a long-time
relationship with Atty. Adriano.
Moreover, it cannot be surmised that just
because Rosario was unavailable to bury her
husband when he died, she had already
renounced her right to do so. Verily, in the same
vein that the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements will not be considered as having
been waived or renounced, the right to deprive a
legitimate spouse of her legal right to bury the
remains of her deceased husband should not be
readily presumed to have been exercised, except
upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct
indicative of a free and voluntary intent of the
deceased to that end. Should there be any
doubt as to the true intent of the deceased,
the law favors the legitimate family. Here,
Rosario’s keenness to exercise the rights and
obligations accorded to the legal wife was even
bolstered by the fact that she was joined by the
children in this case.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Atty.
Adriano truly wished to be buried in the Valino
family plot at the Manila Memorial Park, the result
remains the same. Article 307 of the Civil Code
provides:
Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance
with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the
absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or
affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of
doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon
by the person obliged to make arrangements for the
same, after consulting the other members of the
family.
From its terms, it is apparent that Article 307
simply seeks to prescribe the “form of the funeral
rites” that should govern in the burial of the
deceased. As thoroughly explained earlier, the
right and duty to make funeral arrangements
reside in the persons specified in Article 305 in
relation to Article 199 of the Family Code. Even if
Article 307 were to be interpreted to include the
place of burial among those on which the
15wishes of the deceased shall be followed, Dr.
Arturo M. Tolentino (Dr. Tolentino), an eminent
authority on civil law, commented that it
is generally recognized that any inferences
as to the wishes of the deceased should be
established by some form of testamentary
disposition.[10] As Article 307 itself provides, the
wishes of the deceased must
be expressly provided. It cannot be inferred
lightly, such as from the circumstance that Atty.
Adriano spent his last remaining days with Valino.
It bears stressing once more that other than
Valino’s claim that Atty. Adriano wished to be
buried at the Valino family plot, no other evidence
was presented to corroborate it.
At any rate, it should be remembered that
the wishes of the decedent with respect to his
funeral are not absolute. As Dr. Tolentino further
wrote:
The dispositions or wishes of the deceased in
relation to his funeral, must not be contrary to law.
They must not violate the legal and reglamentary
provisions concerning funerals and the
disposition of the remains, whether as regards the
time and manner of disposition, or the place of
burial, or the ceremony to be observed.
[11] [Emphases supplied]   her intentions may have been very commendable. The
In this case, the wishes of the deceased with
respect to his funeral are limited by Article
305 of the Civil Code in relation to Article
199 of the Family Code, and subject the same to
those charged with the right and duty to make the
proper
_______________
[10] TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. I, p.
657, citing Sheeban v. Commercial Travelers, 283
Mass. 543, 186 N.E. 627; Lindh v. Great Northern, 99
Minn. 408, 109 N.W. 823; Kyles v. Southern Ry Co.,
147 N.C. 394, 61 S.E. 278.
[11] TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. I, p.
657, citing Sacred Heart of Jesus v. Soklowski, 159
Minn. 331, 199 N.W. 81; Wilson v. Read, 74 N.H. 322,
68 Atl. 37; Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 20 Pa. 313, 56 Atl.
878.
16arrangements to bury the remains of their
loved-one. As aptly explained by the appellate
court in its disquisition:
The testimony of defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino
that it was the oral wish of Atty. Adriano Adriano that
he be interred at the Floro family’s mausoleum at the
Manila Memorial Park, must bend to the provisions of
the law. Even assuming arguendo that it was the
express wish of the deceased to be interred at the
Manila Memorial Park, still, the law grants the duty and
the right to decide what to do with the remains to the
wife, in this case, plaintiff-appellant Rosario D.
Adriano, as the surviving spouse, and not to
defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino, who is not even in
the list of those legally preferred, despite the fact that
law does not even consider the emotional fact that
husband and wife had, in this case at bench, been
separated-in-fact and had been living apart for more
than 30 years.[12]  be unkind to assess actual or moral damages
As for Valino’s contention that there is no point
in exhuming and transferring the remains of Atty.
Adriano, it should be said that the burial of his
remains in a place other than the Adriano family
plot in Novaliches runs counter to the wishes of
his family. It does not only violate their right
provided by law, but it also disrespects the family
because the remains of the patriarch are buried in
the family plot of his live-in partner.
It is generally recognized that the corpse of an
individual is outside the commerce of man.
However, the law recognizes that a certain right of
possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose
of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the
intrusion by third persons who have no legitimate
interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out
of the duty of those obligated by law to bury their
dead, also authorizes them to take possession of
the dead body for purposes of burial to have
_______________
[12] Rollo, p. 43.
17it remain in its final resting place, or to even
transfer it to a proper place where the memory of
the dead may receive the respect of the
living. This is a family right. There can be no
doubt that persons having this right may recover
the corpse from third persons.[13]
All this notwithstanding, the Court finds
laudable the acts of Valino in taking care of Atty.
Adriano during his final moments and giving him a
proper burial. For her sacrifices, it would indeed
against her. As aptly explained by the CA:
The trial court found that there was good faith on
the part of defendant-appellee Fe Floro Valino, who,
having lived with Atty. Adriano after he was separated
in fact from his wife, lovingly and caringly took care of
the well-being of Atty. Adriano Adriano while he was
alive and even took care of his remains when he had
died.
On the issue of damages, plaintiffs-appellants are
not entitled to actual damages. Defendant-appellee Fe
Floro Valino had all the good intentions in giving the
remains of Atty. Adriano a decent burial when the wife
and family were all in the United States and could not
attend to his burial. Actual damages are those
awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss
or injury sustained. To be recoverable, they must not
only be capable of proof but must actually be proven
with a reasonable degree of certainty. In this case at
bench, there was no iota of evidence presented to
justify award of actual damages.
Plaintiffs-appellants are not also entitled to moral
and exemplary damages. Moral damages may be
recovered only if the plaintiff is able to satisfactorily
prove the existence of the factual basis for the
damages and its causal connection with the acts
complained of because moral damages although
incapable of pecuniary estimation are designed not to
impose a penalty but to compen-
_______________
13 
TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. I, p. 654, citing 1-I
Enneccerus, Kipp & Wolff 548 fn; 1 Valverde 239-240 fn.
18sate for injury sustained and actual damages
suffered. No injury was caused to plaintiffs-appellants,
nor was any intended by anyone in this case.
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, may only be
awarded if claimant is able to establish his right to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages. Unfortunately, neither of the requirements
to sustain an award for either of these damages would
appear to have been adequately established by
plaintiffs-appellants.
As regards the award of attorney’s fees, it is an
accepted doctrine that the award thereof as an item of
damages is the exception rather than the rule, and
counsel’s fees are not to be awarded every time a
party wins a suit. The power of the court to award
attorney’s fees under Article 2208 of the New Civil
Code demands factual, legal and equitable
justification, without which the award is a conclusion
without a premise, its basis being improperly left to
speculation and conjecture. In this case, we have
searched but found nothing in plaintiffs-appellants’ suit
that justifies the award of attorney’s fees. [14]  the ponencia in denying this petition.
Finally, it should be said that controversies as
to who should make arrangements for the funeral
of a deceased have often aggravated the
bereavement of the family and disturbed the
proper solemnity which should prevail at every
funeral. It is for the purpose of preventing such
controversies that the Code Commission saw it
best to include the provisions on “Funerals.”[15]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De
Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo,
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes and Perlas-Bernabe,
JJ., concur.
_______________
[14] Id., at pp. 43-45.
[15] Report of the Code Commission, p. 49.
19
Abad, J., I join Justice Leonen’s Dissent.
Leonen, J., I dissent. See Separate Opinion.
DISSENTING OPINION
 
LEONEN, J.:
We will all die. But what may matter to many of
us is how we live and how our life is kept in the
memories of those we leave behind. This case is
not about whether a common-law wife has more
rights over the corpse of the husband than the
latter’s estranged legal spouse. This case is about
which between them knows his wishes.
Therefore, I respectfully disagree with
I vote to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated October 2, 2006 in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
61613, which directs petitioner Fe to have the
remains of Atty. Lope Adriano exhumed, and
orders respondents to transfer, transport, and
inter, at their expense, the remains of the
decedent from Manila Memorial Park to the family
plot in Holy Cross Memorial Park in Novaliches,
Quezon City. I vote to sustain the decision dated
October 1, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 77 in Civil Case No. Q-93-
15288, dismissing respondents’ complaint for
damages.
 I disagree with the position that in the
determination of how Atty. Adriano should be
buried, “the law gives the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the
surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano,” [1] in
accordance with Article 305[2] of the Civil Code in
relation to Article 199[3] of the Family Code.
 
[1] Ponencia, p. 12.
[2] Article 305. The duty and the right to make
arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be
in accordance with the order
_______________
[1] Ponencia, p. 12.
[2] Article 305. The duty and the right to make
arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in
accordance with the order
20
 I am of the opinion that Article 305 should only
be considered when, first, the deceased left no
explicit instructions on how he wishes to be
interred, and second, when none among the
deceased’s surviving relations are willing to make
the funeral arrangements and a conflict arises. In
these situations, the conflict must be settled
according to the order of preference stated in
Article 199. In any other case, it should be the
express wishes of the deceased which should take
precedence.
This view, in fact, is embodied in Article 307 of
the Civil Code, which states:
Article 307. The funeral shall be in accordance
with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In
the absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or
affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of
doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon
by the person obliged to make arrangements for the
same, after consulting the other members of the
family. (Emphasis supplied) 
It is the ponencia’s opinion that the wishes of
the deceased contemplated in Article 307 only
governs the “form of the funeral” and that the
duty and, more specifically, the right to make
arrangements for the funeral remains with the
persons specified in Article 305 in relation to
Article 199. It is my submission, however, that
Article 307 should be interpreted
_______________
 established for support, under Article 294. In case of
descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the
oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal
shall have a better right.
[3] Article 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged
to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following
persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (294a)
21to mean that the right to determine one’s
funeral, including the right to
determine how and where one wishes to be
buried, remains with the deceased, and it is only
in the absence of his express wishes, or in the
absence of his religious beliefs and affiliations, or
if there is doubt as to his wishes, that other
persons may assume the right to decide the
funeral arrangements.
 This right, like other rights pointed out by
the ponencia,[4] must not be considered waived or
renounced except upon clear and satisfactory
proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary
intent to that end. There is neither indication nor
have there been any allegations that Atty. Adriano
did not freely and voluntarily relay his last wishes
to his common-law wife, petitioner Fe. Atty.
Adriano, therefore, did not waive his right to
determine where he should be buried, in favor of
the persons indicated in Article 305 in relation to
Article 199.
Accordingly, it was improper to cite in
the ponencia Tomas Eugenio, Sr. v. Judge Velez.
[5] In Eugenio, Tomas Eugenio, Sr. claimed the
right to bury his common-law wife, arguing that
he should be considered a “spouse” under Article
305 in relation to Article 199. The assertion led
this court to expound on the interpretation of
Article 305 in relation to Article 199 and conclude
that:
x x x. Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize
common law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as husband and
wife, who represent themselves to the public as
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband
and wife in the community where they live may be
considered legally “married” in common law
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside
the fact that such relationships are present in our
_______________
[4] Ponencia, pp. 12-13.
[5] 263 Phil. 1149; 185 SCRA 425 (1990) [Per J. Padilla, En Banc].
22society, and that they produce a community of
properties and interests which is governed by law,
authority exists in case law to the effect that such form
of co-ownership requires that the man and woman
living together must not in any way be incapacitated
to contract marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has
a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal
impediment which disqualified him from even legally
marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the
Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of
the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse and
Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property)
stated: “Be it noted however that with respect to
‘spouse’, the same must be the legitimate ‘spouse’
(not common-law spouses…).”
There is a view that under Article 332 of the
Revised Penal Code, the term “spouse” embraces
common law relation for purposes of exemption from
criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and
malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by
spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no
distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is
sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another
who are husband and wife de facto.  But this view
cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We
hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless
expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144,
when referring to a “spouse” contemplate a lawfully
wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis  Vitaliana was not a
lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not
legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime. [6]
 
In the present case, petitioner Fe has not
asserted that she be considered a “spouse” under
Article 305 in relation to Article 199 with the right
and the duty to make funeral arrangements for
Atty. Adriano. What she asserts is that she was
Atty. Adriano’s constant companion for a long
time who was constantly by his side, showing him
the love and devotion as a wife would have, who
took care of him in his final moments
_______________
[6] Id., at pp. 1159-1160; p. 435. See also ponencia, pp. 11-
12.
23and gave him a proper burial. As such, there is a
presumption that she would be in the best
position to relay his final wishes.
The trial court in its decision dated October 1,
1998 reached the same conclusion, thus:
Atty. Lope Adriano’s wish was established at
the trial and shown in the following testimony of
the defendant, to wit:
“ATTY. PIZARRAS:
Madam witness, what was the wish
of Atty. Lope Adriano regarding
his burial?
WITNESS:
He wanted to be buried at Manila
Memorial.
Q:       Why do you say that?
A:       We have discussed it long
before.
Q:       When did you first discuss
this?
A:       The first time we went to
Manila Memorial. He wanted that his
lawn type lot be upgraded to estate
type. He doesn’t want that people will
step on his grave.
Q:       What happened to this
request if his lawn type lot to be
upgraded to estate type?
A:       It did not take long. I had it
upgraded.” (TSN, May 7, 1997, pp. 4-
5; underscoring supplied)
This crucial fact remained unrefuted.
Moreover, considering the very, very long time
that the defendant and the deceased lived like
husband and wife prior to his death, it can be
reasonably assumed that it is the defendant who
really knows the wishes of the deceased. And it
appears that it was the express wish of the
deceased that he be interred at the Manila
Memorial Park.[7]
_______________
[7] Rollo, p. 129.
24The ponencia also noted there was
“animosity” between Atty. Adriano and
respondents when he was still alive. He and his
legal spouse, respondent Rosario, have been
separated-in-fact for more than thirty (30) years,
and he has not been in contact with his children,
the other respondents, for about the same period
of time. They did not even visit him when he fell ill
and was on his deathbed; it was only after he died
that they came, asserting their rights to his
remains.
It is unfortunate that the ponencia would rather
uphold the wishes of his estranged family rather
than give the deceased his final request. Part of
life is the ability to control how one wishes to be the claim for funeral benefits under P.D. No. 626,
memorialized, and such right should remain with as amended, which was filed after the lapse of 10
the deceased. It is only when the deceased has years by the therein petitioner who had earlier
not left any express instructions that the right is filed a claim for death benefits,
given to the persons specified under the law. had not prescribed. (Mesa vs. Social Security
Given the circumstances, the remains of Atty. System, 584 SCRA 183 [2009])
Adriano should remain in the Floro family ——o0o——
mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park.
 
The law reaches into much of our lives while we
 
live. It constitutes and frames most of our actions.
But at the same time, the law also grants us the © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
autonomy or the space to define who we are.
Upon our death, the law does not cease to respect
our earned autonomy. Rather, it gives space for
us to speak through the agency of she who may
have sat at our bedside as we suffered through a
lingering illness.
I am of the view that it is that love and caring
which should be rewarded with the honor of
putting us in that place where we mark our
physical presence for the last time and where we
will be eternally remembered.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition should
be GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 61613, reversing the
October 1, 1998 decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 77, Quezon City, must be SET
ASIDE.
Petition denied. 
25
Note.—In Buena Obra v. SSS (401 SCRA 206
[2003]), the Supreme Court, speaking through
then Associate, now Chief Justice Puno, held that

VOL. 242, MARCH 16, 1995
Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 113054. March 16, 1995. *
LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., petitioner-
appellant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES
LEOPOLDO and OFELIA BEDIA, respondents-
appellees.
Civil Law;  Family Code;  Parent and Child;  The
right of custody accorded to parents springs from the
exercise of parental authority.—The right of custody
accorded to parents springs from the exercise of
parental authority. Parental authority or patria
potestas in Roman Law is the juridical institution
whereby parents rightfully assume control and
protection of their unemancipated children to the
extent required by the latter’s needs. It is a mass of
rights and obligations which the law grants to parents
for the purpose of the children’s physical preservation
and development, as well as the cultivation of their
intellect and the education of their heart and senses.
As regards parental authority, “there is no power, but
a task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no
sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of the
minor.”
Same;  Same; Same;  Parental authority and
responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized
by law.—Parental authority and responsibility are
inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced
except in cases authorized by law. The right attached
to parental authority, being purely personal, the law
allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of
adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children’s
home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts
the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or
407 godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the
same.
Same;  Same; Same;  The father and mother,
being the natural guardians of unemancipated
children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in
their custody and company.—The father and mother,
being the natural guardians of unemancipated
children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in
their custody and company. The child’s welfare is
always the paramount consideration in all questions
concerning his care and custody.
_______________
 THIRD DIVISION.
*
408
408 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of
Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals Appeals.
Same;  Same; Same;  Only in case of the parents’
death, absence or unsuitability may substitute
parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent.—The law vests on the father and mother
joint parental authority over the persons of their
common children. In case of absence or death of
either parent, the parent present shall continue
exercising parental authority. Only in case of the
parents’ death, absence or unsuitability may substitute
parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent.
Same;  Same; Same;  Private respondents’
demonstrated love and affection for the boy,
notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred
over the grandparents.—We find the aforementioned
considerations insufficient to defeat petitioner’s
parental authority and the concomitant right to have
custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly
since he has not been shown to be an unsuitable and
unfit parent. Private respondents’ demonstrated love
and affection for the boy, notwithstanding, the
legitimate father is still preferred over the
grandparents. The latter’s wealth is not a deciding
factor, particularly because there is no proof that at
the present time, petitioner is in no position to support
the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide
financial support for his minor son from birth up to
over three years when he took the boy from his in-laws
without permission, should not be sufficient reason to
strip him of his permanent right to the child’s custody.
While petitioner’s previous inattention is inexcusable
and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be
construed as abandonment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Elam Law Offices for petitioner.
     Manuel S. Gemarino for private respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
In this petition for review, we are asked to
overturn the decision of the Court of
Appeals  granting custody of six-year old
1
_______________
1
 CA-GR CV No. 30563, “In the matter of petition for care,
custody and control of minor Leouel Santos, Jr., spouses
Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia, petitioners-appellees, v. Leouel
Santos, Sr., respondent-appellant,” Rollo, p. 21.
409
VOL. 242, MARCH 16, 1995 409
Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals
Leouel Santos, Jr. to his maternal grandparents
and not to his father, Santos, Sr. What is sought is
a decision which should definitively settle the
matter of the care, custody and control of the boy.
Happily, unlike King Solomon, we need not
merely rely on a “wise and understanding heart,”
for there is man’s law to guide us and that is, the
Family Code.
The antecedent facts giving rise to the case at
bench are as follows:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army
lieutenant, and Julia Bedia, a nurse by profession,
were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union
begot only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was
born July 18, 1987.
From the time the boy was released from the
hospital until sometime thereafter, he had been in
the care and custody of his maternal
grandparents, private respondents herein,
Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel,
Jr. in the temporary custody of the latter’s
parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The latter
alleged that they paid for all the hospital bills, as
well as the subsequent support of the boy
because petitioner could not afford to do so.
The boy’s mother, Julia-Bedia-Santos, left for
the United States in May 1988 to work. Petitioner
alleged that he is not aware of her whereabouts
and his efforts to locate her in the United States
proved futile. Private respondents claim that
although abroad, their daughter Julia had been
sending financial support to them for her son.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his
two brothers, visited the Bedia household, where
three-year old Leouel, Jr. was staying. Private
respondents contend that through deceit and
false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and
clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown
in Bacong, Negros Oriental.
The spouses Bedia then filed a “Petition for
Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel
Santos, Jr.,” before the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent. 2
_______________
 Spec. Proc. No. 4588, Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City,
2
Branch 29, Judge Ricardo P. Galvez, presiding.
410
410 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals
After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the
trial court issued an order on the same day
awarding custody of the child Leouel Santos, Jr. to
his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. 3
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of
Appeals.  In its decision dated April 30, 1992,
4
respondent appellate court affirmed the trial
court’s order.  His motion for reconsideration
5
having been denied,  petitioner now brings the
6
instant petition for review for a reversal of the
appellate court’s decision.
The Court of Appeals erred, according to
petitioner, in awarding custody of the boy to his
grandparents and not to himself. He contends that
since private respondents have failed to show that
petitioner is an unfit and unsuitable father,
substitute parental authority granted to the boy’s
grandparents under Art. 214 of the Family Code is
inappropriate.
 Petitioner adds that the reasons relied upon by
the private respondents in having custody over
the boy, are flimsy and insufficient to deprive him
of his natural and legal right to have custody.
On the other hand, private respondents aver
that they can provide an air-conditioned room for
the boy and that petitioner would not be in a
position to take care of his son since he has to be
assigned to different places. They also allege that
the petitioner did not give a single centavo for the
boy’s support and maintenance. When the boy
was about to be released from the hospital, they
were the ones who paid the fees because their
daughter and petitioner had no money. Besides,
Julia Bedia-Santos, their daughter, had entrusted
the boy to them before she left for the United
States. Furthermore, petitioner’s use of trickery
and deceit in abducting the child in 1990, after
being hospitably treated by private respondents,
does not speak well of his fitness and suitability as
a parent.
The Bedias argue that although the law
recognizes the right of a parent to his child’s
custody, ultimately the primary consider-
_______________
3
 Rollo, p. 50.
4
 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 30563.
5
 Penned by Justice Serafin V.C. Guingona, with Justices
Vicente V. Mendoza and Jaime M. Lantin, concurring; Rollo, p.
21.
6
 Resolution dated November 16, 1993, Rollo, p. 34.
411
VOL. 242, MARCH 16, 1995
Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals
ation is what is best for the happiness and welfare
of the latter. As maternal grandparents who have
amply demonstrated their love and affection for
the boy since his infancy, they claim to be in the
best position to promote the child’s welfare.
The issue to be resolved here boils down to who
should properly be awarded custody of the minor
Leouel Santos, Jr.
The right of custody accorded to parents
springs from the exercise of parental authority.
Parental authority or patria potestas in Roman
Law is the juridical institution whereby parents
rightfully assume control and protection of their
unemancipated children to the extent required by
the latter’s needs.  It is a mass of rights and
7
obligations which the law grants to parents for the
purpose of the children’s physical preservation
and development, as well as the cultivation of
their intellect and the education of their heart and
senses.  As regards parental authority, “there is no
8
power, but a task; no complex of rights, but a sum
of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the
welfare of the minor.” 9
Parental authority and responsibility are
inalienable and may not be transferred or
renounced except in cases authorized by
law.  The right attached to parental authority,
10
being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children’s home
or an orphan institution.  When a parent entrusts
11
411 the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend
or godfather, even in a document, what is given is substitute parental authority be exercised by the
merely temporary custody and it does not surviving grandparent.  The situation obtaining in
18

constitute a renunciation of parental the case at bench is one where the mother of the
authority.  Even if a definite renunciation is
12
minor Santos, Jr., is working in the United States
manifest, the law still disallows the same. 13
while the father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is present.
Not only are they physically apart but are also
_______________ emotionally separated. There has been no decree
7
 Puig Peña, cited in I J. REYES AND R. PUNO, AN OUTLINE OF of legal separation and petitioner’s attempt to
THE PHILIPPINE CIVIL LAW, 295 (4th ed., 1964). obtain an annulment of the marriage on the
8
 Reyes v. Alvarez, 8 Phil. 732; 2 Manresa 21; cited in I A. ground of psychological incapacity of his wife has
TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILS., COMMENTARIES AND failed. 19

JURISPRUDENCE 604 (1990 ed.).

9
 Puig Peña cited in Reyes and Puno, supra at note 7. Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial
10
 Family Code, Arts. 210, 223 and 224. court and the appellate court to award custody of
11
 Family Code, Arts. 222-224; Act No. 3094. his minor son to his parents-in-law, the Bedia
 Celis v. Cafuir, 86 Phil. 555; De La Cruz v. Lim Chai Lay
spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the
12

(CA) GR 14080-R, August 15, 1955; Bacayo v. Calum, (CA) O.G.

8607. Family Code, substitute parental authority of the
13
 Family Code, Art. 210, taken from Art. 313 of the Civil grandparents is proper only when both parents
Code. are dead, absent or unsuitable. Petitioner’s
412
unfitness, according to him, has not been
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED successfully shown by private respondents.
Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals held that although there is
The father and mother, being the natural no evidence to show that petitioner (Santos, Sr.) is
guardians of unemancipated children, are duty- “depraved, a habitual
bound and entitled to keep them in their custody
and company.  The child’s welfare is always the
14 _______________
paramount consideration in all questions
 Family Code, Art. 209 and 211; Aldecoa v. Hongkong and
14

concerning his care and custody. 15

Shanghai Bank, 30 Phil. 228 cited in A. Tolentino, supra at p.
The law vests on the father and mother joint 618.
parental authority over the persons of their  Art. 8, Pres. Decree No. 603, Child and Youth Welfare
15

common children.  In case of absence or death of

16
Code; Cervantes v. Fajardo, G.R. No. 79955, January 27,
1989, 169 SCRA 575; Unson v. Navarro, L-52242, November 17,
either parent, the parent present shall continue 1980, 101 SCRA 182.
exercising parental authority.  Only in case of the
17
 Family Code, Art. 211.
16

parents’ death, absence or unsuitability may  Family Code, Art. 212.

17

 Family Code, Art. 214.

18
  On January 4, 1995, the Court en banc, denied Leouel
19
Santos, Sr.’s petition for review where he sought to have his
marriage to Julia Bedia-Santos annulled on the ground of
psychological incapacity. Leouel Santos v. Hon. Court of
Appeals and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos, G.R. No. 112019.
413
VOL. 242, MARCH 16, 1995
Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals
drunkard or poor, he may nevertheless be
considered, as he is in fact so considered, to be
unsuitable to be allowed to have custody of minor
Leouel Santos, Jr.” 20
The respondent appellate court, in affirming the
trial court’s order of October 8, 1990, adopted as
its own the latter’s observations, to wit:
“From the evidence adduced, this Court is of the
opinion that it is to be (sic) best interest of the minor
Leouel Santos, Jr. that he be placed under the care,
custody, and control of his maternal grandparents, the
petitioners herein. The petitioners have amply
demonstrated their love and devotion to their
grandson while the natural father, respondent herein,
has shown little interest in his welfare as reflected by
his conduct in the past. Moreover, the fact that
petitioners are well-off financially, should be carefully
considered in awarding to them the custody of the
minor herein, lest the breaking of such ties with his
maternal grandparents might deprive the boy of an
eventual college education and other material
advantages (Consaul vs. Consaul, 63 N.Y.S. 688)
Respondent had never given any previous financial
support to his son, while, upon the other hand, the
latter receives so much bounty from his maternal
grandparents and his mother as well, who is now
gainfully employed in the United States. Moreover, the
fact that respondent, as a military personnel who has
to shuttle from one assignment to another, and, in
these troubled times, may have pressing and
compelling military duties which may prevent him
from attending to his son at times when the latter
needs him most, militates strongly against said
413 respondent. Additionally, the child is sickly and
asthmatic and needs the loving and tender care of
those who can provide for it.” 21
We find the aforementioned considerations
insufficient to defeat petitioner’s parental
authority and the concomitant right to have
custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.,
particularly since he has not been shown to be an
unsuitable and unfit parent. Private respondents’
demonstrated love and affection for the boy,
notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still
preferred over the grandparents.  The latter’s
22
wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly
because there is no proof that at the present time,
_______________
 Rollo, p. 29.
20
 Rollo, pp. 31-32.
21
 Bacayo v. Calum, (CA) 53 O.G. 8607.
22
414
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals
petitioner is in no position to support the boy. The
fact that he was unable to provide financial
support for his minor son from birth up to over
three years when he took the boy from his in-laws
without permission, should not be sufficient
reason to strip him of his permanent right to the
child’s custody. While petitioner’s previous
inattention is inexcusable and merits only the
severest criticism, it cannot be construed as
abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable
decision against him and his efforts to keep his
only child in his custody may be regarded as
serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To
award him custody would help enhance the bond
between parent and son. It would also give the
father a chance to prove his love for his son and
for the son to experience the warmth and support
which a father can give.
His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing
him custody over the body. So many men in
uniform who are assigned to different parts of the
country in the service of the nation, are still the
natural guardians of their children. It is not just to
deprive our soldiers of authority, care and custody
over their children merely because of the normal
consequences of their duties and assignments,
such as temporary separation from their families.
Petitioner’s employment of trickery in spiriting
away his boy from his in-laws, though
unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest
custody from him.
Private respondents’ attachment to the young
boy whom they have reared for the past three
years is understandable. Still and all, the law
considers the natural love of a parent to outweigh
that of the grandparents, such that only when the
parent present is shown to be unfit or unsuitable
may the grandparents exercise substitute
parental authority, a fact which has not been
proven here.
The strong bonds of love and affection
possessed by private respondents as
grandparents should not be seen as incompatible
with petitioner’s right to custody over the child as
a father. Moreover, who is to say whether the
petitioner’s financial standing may improve in the
future?
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated
April 30, 1992 as well as its Resolution dated
November 13, 1992 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Custody over the minor Leouel Santos
Jr. is awarded to his legitimate father, herein
petitioner Leouel Santos,
415
VOL. 242, MARCH 16, 1995 415
Montejo vs. Commission on Elections
Sr.
SO ORDERED.
     Feliciano (Chairman), Melo, Vitug and Fran
cisco, JJ., concur.
Petition granted.
Note.—The Supreme Court gives effect to the
policy of the Civil Code and the Family Code to
liberalize the rule on the investigation of the
paternity of illegitimate children. (Mendoza vs.
Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 675 [1991])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.
 G.R. No. 182353. June 29, 2010.*
ST. JOSEPH’S COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI,
SFIC, and ROSALINDA TABUGO, petitioners, vs.
JAYSON MIRANDA, represented by his father,
RODOLFO S. MIRANDA, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by
the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree
of respect and conclusive between the parties;
Exceptions.—Jurisprudence dictates that factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by
the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree
of respect and are considered conclusive between the
parties. A review of such findings by this Court is not
_______________ 
* SECOND DIVISION.

254

254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 St. Joseph's College vs. Miranda
warranted except for highly meritorious
circumstances when: (1) the findings of a trial court
are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (2) a lower court’s inference from its
factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts; (4) the findings of the appellate
court go beyond the issues of the case, or fail to notice
certain relevant facts which, if properly considered,
will justify a different conclusion; (5) there is a
misappreciation of facts; (6) the findings of fact are
conclusions without mention of the specific evidence
on which they are based, are premised on the absence
of evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on
record. None of the foregoing exceptions which would
warrant a reversal of the assailed decision obtains in
this instance.
Civil Law; Negligence; Petitioners were negligent
by failing to exercise the higher degree of care,
caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its
administrators and teachers.—As found by both lower
courts, the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was the
concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the
foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct
of the science experiment. Petitioners were negligent
by failing to exercise the higher degree of care,
caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its
administrators and teachers.
Same; Same; The mishap which happened during
the science experiment was foreseeable by the school,
its officials and teachers.—In marked contrast, both
the lower courts similarly concluded that the mishap
which happened during the science experiment was
foreseeable by the school, its officials and teachers.
This neglect in preventing a foreseeable injury and
damage equates to neglect in exercising the utmost
degree of diligence required of schools, its
administrators and teachers, and, ultimately, was the
proximate cause of the damage and injury to Jayson.
As we have held in St. Mary’s, “for petitioner [St.
Mary’s Academy] to be liable, there must be a finding
that the act or omission considered as negligent was
the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have a causal connection to the
accident.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of
the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
255
VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 255
St. Joseph's College vs. Miranda
  Josefina M. Buenaseda for petitioners.
  Gerald G. Prieto for respondent.
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to
set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68367, which affirmed in
toto the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 221, Quezon City, in Civil Case No.
Q-95-22889.
The facts, as found by the CA, follow:
“On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the
afternoon inside St. Joseph College’s [SJC’s]
premises, the class to which [respondent Jayson
Val Miranda] belonged was conducting a science
experiment about fusion of sulphur powder and
iron fillings under the tutelage of [petitioner]
Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the subject teacher
and employee of [petitioner] SJC. The adviser of
[Jayson’s] class is x x x Estefania Abdan.
Tabugo left her class while it was doing the
experiment without having adequately secured it
from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the
middle of the experiment, [Jayson], who was the
assistant leader of one of the class groups,
checked the result of the experiment by looking
into the test tube with magnifying glass. The test
tube was being held by one of his group mates
who moved it close and towards the eye of
[Jayson]. At that instance, the compound in the
test tube spurted out and several particles of
which hit [Jayson’s] eye and the different parts of
the bodies of some of his group mates. As a result
thereof, [Jayson’s] eyes were chemically burned,
particularly his left eye, for which he had to
undergo surgery and had to spend for his
medication. Upon filing of this case [in] the lower
court, [Jayson’s] wound had not completely healed
and still had to undergo another surgery.
_______________
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon, with
Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (now a member of this
Court) and Ramon A. Garcia, concurring; Rollo, pp. 49-60.
[2] Penned by Judge Noel G. Tijam (now an Associate Justice
of the CA); Rollo, pp. 73-88.
256
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
St. Joseph's College vs. Miranda
Upon learning of the incident and because of
the need for finances, [Jayson’s] mother, who was
working abroad, had to rush back home for which
she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had to
forego her salary from November 23, 1994 to
December 26, 1994, in the amount of at
least P40,000.00.
Then, too, [Jayson] and his parents suffered
sleepless nights, mental anguish and wounded
feelings as a result of his injury due to
[petitioners’] fault and failure to exercise the
degree of care and diligence incumbent upon
each one of them. Thus, they should be held liable
for moral damages. Also, [Jayson] sent a demand
letter to [petitioners] for the payment of his
medical expenses as well as other expenses
incidental thereto, which the latter failed to heed.
Hence, [Jayson] was constrained to file the
complaint for damages. [Petitioners], therefore,
should likewise compensate [Jayson] for litigation
expenses, including attorney’s fees.
On the other hand, [petitioners SJC, Sr.
Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, and Tabugo] alleged that
[Jayson] was a grade six pupil of SJC in the school
year 1994-1995. On November 17, 1994, at about
1:30 in the afternoon, the class to which [Jayson]
belong[s] was conducting a science experiment
under the guidance and supervision of Tabugo,
the class science teacher, about fusion of sulphur
powder and iron fillings by combining these
elements in a test tube and heating the same.
Before the science experiment was conducted,
[Jayson] and his classmates were given strict
instructions to follow the written procedure for the
experiment and not to look into the test tube until
the heated compound had cooled off. [Jayson],
however, a person of sufficient age and discretion
and completely capable of understanding the
English language and the instructions of his
teacher, without waiting for the heated compound
to cool off, as required in the written procedure for
the experiment and as repeatedly explained by
the teacher, violated such instructions and took a
magnifying glass and looked at the compound,
which at that moment spurted out of the test
tube, a small particle hitting one of [Jayson’s]
eyes.
Jayson was rushed by the school employees to
the school clinic and thereafter transferred to St.
Luke’s Medical Center for treatment. At the
hospital, when Tabago visited [Jayson], the latter
cried and apologized to his teacher for violating
her instructions not to look into the test tube until
the compound had cooled off.
257
VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 257
St. Joseph's College vs. Miranda
After the treatment, [Jayson] was pronounced
ready for discharge and an eye test showed that
his vision had not been impaired or affected. In
order to avoid additional hospital charges due to
the delay in [Jayson’s] discharge, Rodolfo S.
Miranda, [Jayson’s] father, requested SJC to
advance the amount of P26,176.35 representing
[Jayson’s] hospital bill until his wife could arrive
from abroad and pay back the money. SJC
acceded to the request.
On December 6, 1994, however, the parents of
[Jayson], through counsel, wrote SJC a letter
demanding that it should shoulder all the medical
expenses of [Jayson] that had been incurred and
will be incurred further arising from the accident
caused by the science experiment. In a letter
dated December 14, 1994, the counsel for SJC,
represented by Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC,
explained that the school cannot accede to the
demand because “the accident occurred by
reason of [Jayson’s] failure to comply with the
written procedure for the experiment and his
teacher’s repeated warnings and instruction that
no student must face, much less look into, the
opening of the test tube until the heated
compound has cooled.”[3]
Since SJC did not accede to the demand,
Rodolfo, Jayson’s father, on Jayson’s behalf, sued
petitioners for damages.
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment, to wit:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered in favor of [Jayson] and against
[petitioners]. This Court orders and holds the
[petitioners] joint[ly] and solidarily liable to pay
[Jayson] the following amount:
1. To pay [Jayson] the amount of P77,338.25
as actual damages; However, [Jayson] is ordered
to reimburse [petitioner] St. Joseph College the
amount of P26,176.36 representing the advances
given to pay [Jayson’s] initial hospital expenses or
in the alternative to deduct said amount
of P26,176.36 from the P77,338.25 actual
damages herein awarded by way of legal
compensation;
2. To pay [Jayson] the sum of P50,000.00 as
mitigated moral  damages;
_______________
[3] Rollo, pp. 50-52.
258
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
St. Joseph's College vs. Miranda
3. To pay [Jayson] the sum of P30,000.00 as
reasonable attorney’s fees;
4. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.”[4]
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA.
However, as previously adverted to, the CA
affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC, thus:
“WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
assailed decision of the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 221 dated September 6, 2000 is
hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against
[petitioners].”[5]
Undaunted, petitioners appealed
by certiorari to this Court, adamant that the CA
grievously erred, thus:
I.        THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF JAYSON’S INJURY WAS HIS OWN ACT OF
LOOKING AT THE HEATED TEST TUBE BEFORE THE
COMPOUND HAD COOLED IN COMPLETE
DISREGARD OF INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN PRIOR TO
THE EXPERIMENT.
II.      THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO
APPRECIATE THAT, IN LIGHT OF THE RULING IN
THE CASE OF ST. MARY’S COLLEGE V. WILLIAM
CARPITANOS, x x x JAYSON’S CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE OF PEEKING INTO THE TEST TUBE
WAS IN FACT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS
INJURY FOR WHICH THE PETITIONERS SHOULD
NOT BE HELD LIABLE.
III.     THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF ACTUAL
DAMAGES DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF TO
SUPPORT THE SAME.
IV.     THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED
IN AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES TO [JAYSON].
_______________
[4] Id., at p. 87.
[5] Id., at p. 59.
259
VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 259
St. Joseph's College vs. Miranda
V.       THE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S
FEES TO [JAYSON].
VI.     THE LOWER COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED
IN DENYING THE PETITIONERS’ COUNTERCLAIM.[6]
We find no reason to depart from the uniform
rulings of the lower courts that petitioners were
“negligent since they all failed to exercise the
required reasonable care, prudence, caution and
foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the
students.”
 Jurisprudence dictates that factual findings of
the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
appellate court, are accorded the highest degree
of respect and are considered conclusive between
the parties.[7] A review of such findings by this
Court is not warranted except for highly
meritorious circumstances when: (1) the findings
of a trial court are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) a lower
court’s inference from its factual findings is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
there is grave abuse of discretion in the
appreciation of facts; (4) the findings of the
appellate court go beyond the issues of the case,
or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion; (5) there is a misappreciation of facts;
(6) the findings of fact are conclusions without
mention of the specific evidence on which they
are based, are premised on the absence of
evidence, or are contradicted by evidence on
record.[8] None of the foregoing exceptions which
would warrant a reversal of the assailed decision
obtains in this instance.
_______________
[6] Id., at p. 17.
[7] Titan Construction Corporation v. Uni-Field Enterprises,
Inc., G.R. No. 153874, March 1, 2007, 517 SCRA 180,
186; Sigaya v. Mayuga, G.R. No. 143254, August 18, 2005, 467
SCRA 341, 353.
[8] Ilao-Quianay v. Mapile, G.R. No. 154087, October 25,
2005, 474 SCRA 246, 253; see Child Learning Center, Inc. v.
Tagorio, G.R. No. 150920, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 236,
241-242.
260
260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
St. Joseph's College vs. Miranda
Yet, petitioners maintain that the proximate
cause of Jayson’s injury was his own negligence in
disregarding the instructions given by Tabugo
prior to the experiment and peeking into the test
tube. Petitioners invoke our ruling in St. Mary’s
Academy v. Carpitanos[9] which absolved St.
Mary’s Academy from liability for the untimely
death of its student during a school sanctioned
activity, declaring that “the negligence of
petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote
cause of the accident.”
We are not convinced.
Contrary to petitioners’ assertions, the lower
courts’ conclusions are borne out by the records
of this case. Both courts correctly concluded that
the immediate and proximate cause of the
accident which caused injury to Jayson was the
sudden and unexpected explosion of the
chemicals, independent of any intervening cause.
The assailed Decision of the CA quotes with favor
the RTC decision, thus:
 
“In this case, [petitioners] failed to show that the
negligence of [Jayson] was the proximate cause of the
latter’s injury. We find that the immediate cause of the
accident was not the negligence of [Jayson] when he
curiously looked into the test tube when the chemicals
suddenly exploded which caused his injury, but the
sudden and unexpected explosion of the chemicals
independent of any intervening cause. [Petitioners]
could have prevented the mishap if they exercised a
higher degree of care, caution and foresight. The
court a quo correctly ruled that:
“All of the [petitioners] are equally at fault and are
liable for negligence because all of them are
responsible for exercising the required reasonable
care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or
avoid injuries to the students. The individual
[petitioners] are persons charged with the teaching
and vigilance over their students as well as the
supervision and ensuring of their well-being. Based on
the facts presented before this Court, these
[petitioners] were remiss in their responsibilities and
lacking in the degree of vigilance expected of them.
_______________
[9] G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002, 376 SCRA 473, 479.
 
261
VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010
St. Joseph's College vs. Miranda
[Petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo was
inside the classroom when the class undertook the
science experiment although [Jayson] insisted that
said [petitioner] left the classroom. No evidence,
however, was presented to establish that [petitioner]
Tabugo was inside the classroom for the whole
duration of the experiment. It was unnatural in the
ordinary course of events that [Jayson] was brought to
the school clinic for immediate treatment not by
[petitioner] subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo but by
somebody else. The Court is inclined to believe that
[petitioner] subject teacher Tabugo was not inside the
classroom at the time the accident happened. The
Court is also perplexed why none of the other students
(who were eyewitnesses to the incident) testified in
Court to corroborate the story of the [petitioners]. The
Court, however, understands that these other students
cannot testify for [Jayson] because [Jayson] is no
longer enrolled in said school and testifying for
[Jayson] would incur the ire of school authorities.
Estefania Abdan is equally at fault as the subject
adviser or teacher in charge because she exercised
control and supervision over [petitioner] Tabugo and
the students themselves. It was her obligation to
insure that nothing would go wrong and that the
science experiment would be conducted safely and
without any harm or injury to the students. [Petitioner]
Sr. Josephini Ambatali is likewise culpable under the
doctrine of command responsibility because the other
individual [petitioners] were under her direct control
and supervision. The negligent acts of the other
individual [petitioners] were done within the scope of
their assigned tasks.
xxxx
261
“The defense of due diligence of a good father of a
family raised by [petitioner] St. Joseph College will not
exculpate it from liability because it has been shown
that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the
supervision of its teachers (despite an apparent rigid
screening process for hiring) and in the maintenance
of what should have been a safe and secured
environment for conducting dangerous experiments.
[Petitioner] school is still liable for the wrongful acts of
the teachers and employees because it had full
information on the nature of dangerous science
experiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert
damage and injury to students. The fact that there has
never been any accident in the past during the
conduct of science ex-
262
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
 St. Joseph's College vs. Miranda
periments is not a justification to be complacent in just
preserving the status quo and do away with creative
foresight to install safety measures to protect the
students. Schools should not simply install safety
reminders and distribute safety instructional manuals.
More importantly, schools should provide protective
gears and devices to shield students from expected
risks and anticipated dangers.
“Ordinarily, the liability of teachers does not extend
to the school or university itself, although an
educational institution may be held liable under the
principle of RESPONDENT SUPERIOR. It has also been
held that the liability of the employer for the [tortuous]
acts or negligence of its employees is primary and
solidary, direct and immediate and not conditioned
upon the insolvency of or prior recourse against the
negligent employee.”[10]
 
Under the foregoing circumstances, we are
hard pressed to disturb the findings of the RTC,
which the CA affirmed.
Nonetheless, petitioners make much of the fact
that Tabugo specifically instructed her students,
including Jayson, at the start of the experiment,
not to look into the heated test tube before the
compound had cooled off. Petitioners would
allocate all liability and place all blame for the
accident on a twelve (12)-year-old student, herein
respondent Jayson.
We disagree.
As found by both lower courts, the proximate
cause of Jayson’s injury was the concurrent failure
of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable mishap
that occurred during the conduct of the science
experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing
to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and
foresight incumbent upon the school, its
administrators and teachers.
Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, bestows special
parental authority on the following persons with
the corresponding obligation, thus:
_______________
[10] Rollo, pp. 54-56.
263
VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010 263
St. Joseph's College vs. Miranda
“Art. 218. The school, its administrators and
teachers, or the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child care shall have special parental
authority and responsibility over the minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or
custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all
authorized activities whether inside or outside the
premises of the school, entity or institution.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
xxxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of
arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students or apprentices, so
long as they remain in their custody.”
 Petitioners’ negligence and failure to exercise
the requisite degree of care and caution is
demonstrated by the following:
1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative
steps to avert damage and injury to its students
although it had full information on the nature of
dangerous science experiments conducted by the
students during class;
2. Petitioner school did not install safety
measures to protect the students who conduct
experiments in class;
3. Petitioner school did not provide protective
gears and devices, specifically goggles, to shield
students from expected risks and dangers; and
4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the
classroom the whole time her class conducted the
experiment, specifically, when the accident
involving Jayson occurred. In any event, the size
of the class—fifty (50) students—conducting the
experiment is difficult to monitor.
Moreover, petitioners cannot simply deflect
their negligence and liability by insisting that
petitioner Tabugo gave specific instructions to her
science class not to look directly into the heated
compound. Neither does our ruling in St.
Mary’s preclude their liability in this case.
264
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
St. Joseph's College vs. Miranda
Unfortunately for petitioners, St. Mary’s is not
in point. In that case, respondents thereat
admitted the documentary exhibits establishing
that the cause of the accident was a mechanical
defect and not the recklessness of the minor,
James Daniel II, in driving the jeep. We held, thus:
“Significantly, respondents did not present any
evidence to show that the proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence of the school
authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel
II. x x x.
Further, there was no evidence that petitioner
school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive
the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was
Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva, who had possession and control of the
jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed
James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the
time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether
caused by the negligence of the minor driver or
mechanical detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s
parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St.
Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the
accident. Between the remote cause and the
injury, there intervened the negligence of the
minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep.”[11]
In marked contrast, both the lower courts
similarly concluded that the mishap which
happened during the science experiment was
foreseeable by the school, its officials and
teachers. This neglect in preventing a foreseeable
injury and damage equates to neglect in
exercising the utmost degree of diligence required
of schools, its administrators and teachers, and,
ultimately, was the proximate cause of the
damage and injury to Jayson. As we have held
in St. Mary’s, “for petitioner [St. Mary’s Academy]
to be liable, there must be a finding that the act
or omission considered as negligent was the
proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have a causal connection to the
accident.”[12]
_______________
[11] St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos, supra note 9, at p.
479.
[12] Id., at p. 478, citing Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 199, 208; 300 SCRA 20, 31 (1998).
265
VOL. 622, JUNE 29, 2010
St. Joseph's College vs. Miranda
As regards the contributory negligence of
Jayson, we see no need to disturb the lower
courts’ identical rulings thereon:
“As earlier discussed, the proximate cause of
[Jayson’s] injury was the explosion of the heated
compound independent of any efficient
intervening cause. The negligence on the part of
[petitioner] Tabugo in not making sure that the
science experiment was correctly conducted was
the proximate cause or reason why the heated
compound exploded and injured not only [Jayson]
but his classmates as well. However, [Jayson] is
partly responsible for his own injury, hence, he
should not be entitled to recover damages in full
but must likewise bear the consequences of his
own negligence. [Petitioners], therefore, should be
held liable only for the damages actually caused
by their negligence.”[13]
Lastly, given our foregoing ruling, we likewise
affirm the lower courts’ award of actual and moral
damages, and grant of attorney’s fees. The denial
of petitioners’ counterclaim is also in order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
68367 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Peralta,
Abad and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment affirmed.
265
Note.—Negligence is defined as the failure to
exercise the standard of care that a reasonably
prudent person would have exercised in a similar
situation. (Janssen Pharmaceutica vs. Silayro, 546
SCRA 628 [2008])
——o0o——
_______________
[13] Rollo, p. 58.
 
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
reserved.

82 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 111180. November 16, 1995. * habeas corpus.
DAISIE T. DAVID, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, RAMON R. VILLAR, respondents.
Habeas Corpus;  Parent and Child; Custody; While
it is true that the determination of the right to the
custody of minor children is relevant in cases where
the parents, who are married to each other, are for
some reason separated from each other, it does not
follow that it cannot arise in any other situation.—It is
indeed true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that the
determination of the right to the custody of minor
children is relevant in cases where the parents, who
are married to each other, are for some reason
separated from each other. It does not follow,
however, that it cannot arise in any other situation. For
example, in the case of Salvaña v. Gaela, it was held
that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy to
enable parents to regain the custody of a minor
daughter even though the latter be in the custody of a
third person of her free will because the parents were
compelling her to marry a man against her will.
Same;  Same; Same;  Family Code; Illegitimate
Children; Where the mother of an illegitimate child has
been deprived of her rightful custody by the child’s
father, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus.—In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an
illegitimate child since at the time of his conception,
his father, private respondent Ramon R. Villar, was
married to another woman other than the child’s
mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family
Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of
his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a
consequence of such authority, is entitled to have
custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner has been
deprived of her rightful custody of her child by private
respondent, she is entitled to issuance of the writ of
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Same;  Support; The
fact that the father of an illegitimate child has
recognized the minor child may be a ground for
ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for
giving him custody of the child.—The fact that private
respondent has recognized the minor child may be a
ground for ordering him to give support to the latter,
but not for giving him custody of the child. Under Art.
213 of the Family Code, “no child under seven years of
age shall be
_________________
 SECOND DIVISION.
*
83
 VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995 83 purpose, the grant of support in this case is justified by
David vs. Court of Appeals the fact that private respondent has expressed
willingness to support the minor child. The order for
separated from the mother unless the court finds
payment of allowance need not be conditioned on the
compelling reasons to order otherwise.”
grant to him of custody of the child. Under Art. 204 of
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Same;  Same; That
the Family Code, a person obliged to give support can
the mother receives help from her parents and sister
fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance
for the support of her three children is not a point
fixed by the court or by receiving and maintaining in
against her—cooperation, compassion, love and
the family dwelling the person who is entitled to
concern for every member of the family are
support unless, in the latter case, there is “a moral or
characteristics of the close family ties that bind the
legal obstacle thereto.”
Filipino family and have made it what it is.—Nor is the
fact that private respondent is well-off a reason for
depriving petitioner of the custody of her children,
PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of
especially considering that she has been able to rear Appeals.
and support them on her own since they were born.
Petitioner is a market vendor earning from P2,000 to The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
P3,000 per month in 1993 when the RTC decision was      Orlando R. Pangilinan for petitioner.
rendered. She augments her income by working as      Danilo G. Pineda for private respondent.
secretary at the Computer System Specialist, Inc. 84
earning a monthly income of P4,500.00. She has an 84 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
arrangement with her employer so that she can David vs. Court of Appeals
personally attend to her children. She works up to 8:00
o’clock in the evening to make up for time lost during MENDOZA, J.:
the day. That she receives help from her parents and
sister for the support of the three children is not a Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of
point against her. Cooperation, compassion, love and private respondent Ramon R. Villar, a
concern for every member of the family are
businessman in Angeles City. Private respondent
characteristics of the close family ties that bind the
Filipino family and have made it what it is. is a married man and the father of four children,
Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Same;  Same; Actions;  all grown-up. After a while, the relationship
Pleadings and Practice; Although the question of between petitioner and private respondent
support is proper in a proceeding for that purpose, the developed into an intimate one, as a result of
grant of support in a petition for habeas corpus is which a son, Christopher J., was born on March 9,
justified where the respondent has expressed 1985 to them. Christopher J. was followed by two
willingness to support the minor child.—Although the
question of support is proper in a proceeding for that
more children, both girls, namely Christine, born
on June 9, 1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private
respondent’s wife when Daisie took Christopher J.
to Villar’s house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City
sometime in 1986 and introduced him to Villar’s
legal wife.
After this, the children of Daisie were freely
brought by Villar to his house as they were
eventually accepted by his legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to
allow Christopher J., then six years of age, to go
with his family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but
after the trip, Villar refused to give back the child.
Villar said he had enrolled Christopher J. at the
Holy Family Academy for the next school year.
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for
habeas corpus on behalf of Christopher J.
After hearing, the Regional Trial Court, Branch
58 at Angeles City, rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the
respondent:
1. 1.the rightful custody of the minor Christopher J.
T. David is hereby given to the natural mother,
the herein petitioner Daisie T. David;
2. 2.respondent is hereby ordered to give a
temporary support of P3,000.00 a month to the
subject minor Christopher J. T. David, Christine
David and Cathy Mae David to take effect upon
the finality of this decision; and
3. 3.to pay the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.
85
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995 85
David vs. Court of Appeals
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding:
We agree with the respondent-appellant’s view that
this is not proper in a habeas corpus case.
Law and jurisprudence wherein the question of
custody of a minor child may be decided in a habeas
corpus case contemplate a situation where the parents
are married to each other but are separated. This is so
because under the Family Code, the father and mother
have joint parental authority over their legitimate
children and in case of separation of the parents there
is need to determine rightful custody of their children.
The same does not hold true in an adulterous
relationship, as in the case at bar, the child born out of
such a relationship is under the parental authority of
the mother by express provision of the law. Hence, the
question of custody and support should be brought in
a case singularly filed for the purpose. In point of fact,
this is more advisable in the case at bar because the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the other
minor children of the petitioner-appellee and
respondent-appellant and, therefore, cannot properly
provide for their support.
Admittedly, respondent-appellant is financially well-
off, he being a very rich businessman; whereas,
petitioner-appellee depends upon her sisters and
parents for support. In fact, he financially supported
petitioner-appellee and her three minor children. It is,
therefore, for the best interest of Christopher J. that he
should temporarily remain under the custody of
respondent-appellant until the issue on custody and
support shall have been determined in a proper case.
 WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby
SET ASIDE, and a NEW ONE ENTERED dismissing the
petition for habeas corpus in Special Proceeding No.
4489.
Daisie in turn filed this petition for review of the
appellate court’s decision.
Rule 102, §1 of the Rules of Court provides that
“the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which
the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto.”
It is indeed true, as the Court of Appeals
observed, that the determination of the right to
the custody of minor children is relevant in cases
where the parents, who are married to each other,
are for some reason separated from each other. It
does not
86
86 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
David vs. Court of Appeals
follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other
situation. For example, in the case of Salvaña v.
Gaela,  it was held that the writ of habeas corpus
1
is the proper remedy to enable parents to regain
the custody of a minor daughter even though the
latter be in the custody of a third person of her
free will because the parents were compelling her
to marry a man against her will.
In the case at bar, Christopher J. is an
illegitimate child since at the time of his
conception, his father, private respondent Ramon
R. Villar, was married to another woman other
than the child’s mother. As such, pursuant to Art.
176 of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the
parental authority of his mother, the herein
petitioner, who, as a consequence of such
authority, is entitled to have custody of
him.  Since, admittedly, petitioner has been
2
deprived of her rightful custody of her child by
private respondent, she is entitled to issuance of
the writ of habeas corpus.
Indeed, Rule 102, §1 makes no distinction
between the case of a mother who is separated
from her husband and is entitled to the custody of
her child and that of a mother of an illegitimate
child who, by law, is vested with sole parental
authority, but is deprived of her rightful custody of
her child.
The fact that private respondent has
recognized the minor child may be a ground for
ordering him to give support to the latter, but not
for giving him custody of the child. Under Art. 213
of the Family Code, “no child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.” 3
________________
1
 55 Phil. 680 (1931).
2
 Family Code, Art. 220 provides that “The parents and those
exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their
unemancipated children or wards the following rights and
duties: (1) To keep them in their company, . . . .
3
 Art. 363 of the Civil Code originally provided that “no
mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of
age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such
measure.” This was changed by the Child and Youth Welfare The Regional Trial Court ordered private
Code (P.D. No. 603), §17 of which provided that “in case of
separation of his parents, no child under five years of
respondent to give temporary support to
87 petitioner in the amount of P3,000.00 a month,
VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995 87 pending the filing of an action for support, after
David vs. Court of Appeals finding that private respondent did not give any
support to his three children by Daisie, except the
Nor is the fact that private respondent is well-off a
meager amount of P500.00 a week which he
reason for depriving petitioner of the custody of
stopped giving them on June 23, 1992. He is a rich
her children, especially considering that she has
man who professes love for his children. In fact he
been able to rear and support them on her own
filed a motion for the execution of the decision of
since they were born. Petitioner is a market
the Court of Appeals, alleging that he had
vendor earning from P2,000 to P3,000 per month
observed his son “to be physically weak and pale
in 1993 when the RTC decision was rendered. She
because of malnutrition and deprivation of the
augments her income by working as secretary at
luxury and amenities he was accustomed to when
the Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning a
in the former custody of the respondent.” He
monthly income of P4,500.00. She has an
prayed that he be given the custody of the child
arrangement with her employer so that she can
so that he can provide him with the “proper care
personally attend to her children. She works up to
and education.”
8:00 o’clock in the evening to make up for time
Although the question of support is proper in a
lost during the day. That she receives help from
proceeding for that purpose, the grant of support
her parents and sister for the support of the three
in this case is justified by the
children is not a point against her. Cooperation,
compassion, love and concern for every member ________________
of the family are characteristics of the close family
ties that bind the Filipino family and have made it age shall be separated from his mother, unless the court
what it is. finds compelling reason to do so.” The Family Code, Art. 213
thus restores the original provision of the Civil Code.
Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a 88
life of affluence that private respondent promises 88 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
if the child lives with him. It is enough, however,
David vs. Court of Appeals
that petitioner is earning a decent living and is
fact that private respondent has expressed
able to support her children according to her
willingness to support the minor child. The order
means.
for payment of allowance need not be conditioned
on the grant to him of custody of the child. Under
Art. 204 of the Family Code, a person obliged to      Francisco, J., On leave.
give support can fulfill his obligation either by Judgment reversed, respondent Ramon R. Villar
paying the allowance fixed by the court or by ordered to deliver custody of the minor child to
receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling petitioner.
the person who is entitled to support unless, in Notes.—An unrecognized spurious child has no
the latter case, there is “a moral or legal obstacle rights from his parents or to their estate. (Ilano
thereto.” vs. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 242 [1994])
In the case at bar, as has already been pointed 89
out, Christopher J., being less than seven years of VOL. 250, NOVEMBER 16, 1995 89
age at least at the time the case was decided by David vs. Court of Appeals
the RTC, cannot be taken from the mother’s The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of
custody. Even now that the child is over seven illegal confinement by which any person is
years of age, the mother’s custody over him will deprived of his liberty. (Ordoñez vs. Vinarao, 239
have to be upheld because the child categorically SCRA 114 [1994])
expressed preference to live with his mother.
Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, courts must ——o0o——
respect the “choice of the child over seven years
of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit” and here 90
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights
it has not been shown that the mother is in any
reserved.
way unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if
private respondent loves his child, he should not
condition the grant of support for him on the
award of his custody to him (private respondent).
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and private respondent is
ORDERED to deliver the minor Christopher J. T.
David to the custody of his mother, the herein
petitioner, and to give him temporary support in
the amount of P3,000.00, pending the fixing of the
amount of support in an appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
     Narvasa (C.J.,
Chairman), Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.
 VOL. 440, OCTOBER 18, 2004 455
Briones vs. Miguel
G.R. No. 156343. October 18, 2004. *

JOEY D. BRIONES, petitioner, vs. MARICEL P.

MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL, and LORETA P.
MIGUEL, respondents.
Family Code; Illegitimate Child;  Parental
Authority; Illegitimate children shall be under the
parental authority of the mother, regardless of
whether the father admits paternity.—Having been
born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an
illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta.
Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines
explicitly provides that “illegitimate children shall use
the surname and shall be under the parental authority
of their

_______________

 THIRD DIVISION.
*

456
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Briones vs. Miguel
mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code.” This is the rule regardless
of whether the father admits paternity.
Same;  Same; Same;  The fine distinctions among
the various types of illegitimate children have been
eliminated in the Family Code.—The fine distinctions
among the various types of illegitimate children have
been eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are
only two classes of children—legitimate (and those
who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of
legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children
conceived and born outside a valid marriage are
illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate
status.
Same;  Same; Same;  The recognition of an
illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for
ordering the latter to give support to, but not custody
of the child.—The recognition of an illegitimate child by
the father could be a ground for ordering the latter to
give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law
explicitly confers to the mother sole parental authority
over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she
defaults can the father assume custody and authority
over the minor. Of course, the putative father may
adopt his own illegitimate child; in such a case, the
child shall be considered a legitimate child of the
adoptive parent.
Same;  Same; Same;  Only the most compelling of
reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness to exercise
sole parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of
parental authority and the award of custody to
someone else.—Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the
Family Code is the caveat that, generally, no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, except when the court finds cause to order
otherwise. Only the most compelling of reasons, such
as the mother’s unfitness to exercise sole parental
authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental
authority and the award of custody to someone else. In
the past, the following grounds have been considered
ample justification to deprive a mother of custody and
parental authority: neglect or abandonment,
unemployment, immorality, habitual drunkenness,
drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity,
and affliction with a communicable disease.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
457
VOL. 440, OCTOBER 18, 2004 457
Briones vs. Miguel
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Manuel T. Molina for petitioner.
     Joaquin L. De Los Santos for respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An illegitimate child is under the sole parental
authority of the mother. In the exercise of that
authority, she is entitled to keep the child in her
company. The Court will not deprive her of
custody, absent any imperative cause showing
her unfitness to exercise such authority and care.
The Case
The Petition for Review  before the Court seeks to
1
reverse and set aside the August 28, 2002
Decision  and
2
the December 11, 2002
Resolution  of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP
3
No. 69400.  The dispositive portion of the assailed
4
Decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Respondent Loreta P. Miguel shall have custody over
the child Michael Kevin Pineda until he reaches ten
(10) years of age. Once the said child is beyond ten
(10) years of age, the Court allows him to choose
which parent he prefers to live with pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 99 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended. The petitioner, Joey D. Briones, shall help
support the child, shall have visitorial rights at least
once a week, and may take the child out upon the Miguel. He was born in Japan on September 17, 1996
written consent of the mother. as evidenced by his Birth Certificate. The respondent
Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national
_______________ and is presently residing in Japan.
“The petitioner further alleges that on November 4,
 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; Rollo, pp. 7-21.
1
1998 he caused the minor child to be brought to the
 Penned by Justice Amelita G. Tolentino (member), with the
2

concurrence of Justices Ruben T. Reyes (Division chairman) and Philippines so that he could take care of him and send
Renato C. Dacudao (member); Id., pp. 23-30. him to school. In the school year 2000-2001, the
 Annex “B” of the Petition; Rollo, p. 31.
3 petitioner enrolled him at the nursery school of
 On April 25, 2002, petitioner filed an Amended Petition
4
Blessed Angels L.A. School, Inc. in Caloocan City,
additionally impleading Loreta P. Miguel, the minor’s mother, as where he finished the nursery course.
one of the respondents. “According to the petitioner, his parents, who are
458
both retired and receiving monthly pensions, assisted
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED him in taking care of the child.
Briones vs. Miguel “On May 2, 2001, respondents Maricel P. Miguel and
“Acting on the petitioner’s ‘Urgent Motion for a Hold Francisca P. Miguel came to the house of the petitioner
Departure Order’, and finding it to be without merit, in Caloocan City on the
the same is DENIED.” 5

The challenged Resolution denied reconsideration. _______________

The Facts 5
 CA Decision, p. 7; Id., p. 29.
The CA summarized the antecedents of the case 459
in this wise: VOL. 440, OCTOBER 18, 2004 459
“On March 5, 2002, petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Briones vs. Miguel
Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents
pretext that they were visiting the minor child and
Maricel Pineda Miguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to
requested that they be allowed to bring the said child
obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda.
for recreation at the SM Department store. They
“On April 25, 2002, the petitioner filed an Amended
promised him that they will bring him back in the
Petition to include Loreta P. Miguel, the mother of the
afternoon, to which the petitioner agreed. However,
minor, as one of the respondents.
the respondents did not bring him back as promised by
“A Writ of Habeas Corpus was issued by this Court
them.
on March 11, 2002 ordering the respondents to
“The petitioner went several times to respondent
produce before this Court the living body of the minor
Maricel P. Miguel at Tanza, Tuguegarao City but he
Michael Kevin Pineda on March 21, 2002 at 2:00
was informed that the child is with the latter’s mother
o’clock in the afternoon.
at Batal Heights, Santiago City. When he went there,
“The petitioner alleges that the minor Michael Kevin
Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P.
respondent Francisca P. Miguel told him that Michael
Kevin Pineda is with her daughter at Tuguegarao City.
“He sought the assistance of the police and the
Department of Social Welfare to locate his son and to
bring him back to him, but all his efforts were futile.
“Hence, he was constrained to file a Petition
for Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City which was docketed as SPC No. 2711.
However, the said case was withdrawn ex-parte.
“The petitioner prays that the custody of his son
Michael Kevin Pineda be given to him as his biological
father and [as] he has demonstrated his capability to
support and educate him.
“On May 6, 2002, the respondents filed their
Comment, in compliance with the May 2, 2002
Resolution of this Court.
“In their Comment, the respondent Loreta P. Miguel
denies the allegation of the petitioner that he was the
one who brought their child to the Philippines and
stated that she was the one who brought him here
pursuant to their agreement.
“Respondent Loreta P. Miguel likewise denies
petitioner’s allegation that respondents Maricel P.
Miguel and Francisca P. Miguel were the ones who took
the child from the petitioner or the latter’s parents.
She averred that she was the one who took Michael
Kevin Pineda from the petitioner when she returned to
the Philippines and that the latter readily agreed and
consented.
“Respondent Loreta P. Miguel alleges that
sometime in October 2001, the petitioner was
deported from Japan under the assumed name of
Renato Juanzon when he was found to have violated or
committed an infraction of the laws of Japan. She
further stated that since the time the petitioner arrived
in the Philippines, he has not been gainfully employed.
The custody of the child, according to respondent
Loreta P. Miguel was entrusted to petitioner’s parents
while they were both working in Japan. She added that
even before
460
460 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Briones vs. Miguel
the custody of the child was given to the petitioner’s
parents, she has already been living separately from
the petitioner in Japan because the latter was allegedly
maintaining an illicit affair with another woman until
his deportation.
“She likewise stated in her Comment that her
marriage to a Japanese national is for the purpose of
availing of the privileges of staying temporarily in
Japan to pursue her work so she could be able to send
money regularly to her son in the Philippines. She
further stated that she has no intention of staying
permanently in Japan as she has been returning to the
Philippines every six (6) months or as often as she
could.
“Respondent Loreta P. Miguel prays that the
custody of her minor child be given to her and invokes
Article 213, Paragraph 2 of the Family Code and Article
363 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.”
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Applying Article 213 (paragraph 2) of the Family
Code, the CA awarded the custody of Michael
Kevin Pineda Miguel to his mother, Respondent
Loreta P. Miguel. While acknowledging that
petitioner truly loved and cared for his son and
considering the trouble and expense he had spent
in instituting the legal action for custody, it
nevertheless found no compelling reason to
separate the minor from his mother. Petitioner,
however, was granted visitorial rights.
Hence, this Petition. 6
Issue
In his Memorandum, petitioner formulated the
“ultimate” issue as follows: “x x x [w]hether or not
[he], as the natural
_______________
6
 The case was deemed submitted for decision on August 4,
2003, upon this Court’s receipt of respondents’ Memorandum,
signed by Atty. Joaquin L. de los Santos. Petitioner’s
Memorandum, signed by Atty. Manuel T. Molina, was received
by this Court on July 8, 2003.
461
VOL. 440, OCTOBER 18, 2004
Briones vs. Miguel
father, may be denied the custody and parental
care of his own child in the absence of the mother
who is away.” 7
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit. However, the assailed
Decision should be modified in regard to its
erroneous application of Section 6 of Rule 99 of
the Rules of Court.
Sole Issue
Who Should Have Custody of the Child?
Petitioner concedes that Respondent Loreta has
preferential right over their minor child. He insists,
however, that custody should be awarded to him
whenever she leaves for Japan and during the
period that she stays there. In other words, he
wants joint custody over the minor, such that the
mother would have custody when she is in the
country. But when she is abroad, he—as the
biological father—should have custody.
According to petitioner, Loreta is not always in
the country. When she is abroad, she cannot take
care of their child. The undeniable fact, he adds, is
that she lives most of the time in Japan, as
evidenced by her Special Power of Attorney dated
May 28, 2001,  granting to her sister temporary
8
custody over the minor.
At present, however, the child is already with
his mother in Japan, where he is studying,  thus 9
rendering petitioner’s argument moot. While the
Petition for Habeas Corpus was pending before
461 the CA, petitioner filed on July 30, 2002, an
“Urgent Motion for a Hold Departure
Order,”  alleging therein that respondents were
10
preparing the travel papers of
_______________
7
 Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 5; Rollo, p. 55.
8
 Special Power of Attorney; CA Rollo, p. 29.
9
 See Memorandum for respondents, p. 2; Rollo, p. 66.
10
 CA Rollo, pp. 111-113.
462
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Briones vs. Miguel
the minor so the child could join his mother and
her Japanese husband. The CA denied the Motion
for lack of merit. 11
Having been born outside a valid marriage, the
minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner
and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family
Code of the Philippines  explicitly provides that
12
“illegitimate children shall use the surname and
shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code.” This is the rule
regardless of whether the father admits
paternity. 13
Previously, under the provisions of the Civil
Code, illegitimate children were generally
classified into two groups: (1) natural, whether
actual or by legal fiction; and (2) spurious,
whether incestuous, adulterous or illicit.  A natural
14
child is one born outside a lawful wedlock of
parents who, at the time of conception of the
child, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other.  On the other hand, a spurious
15
child is one born of parents who, at the time of
conception, were disqualified to marry each other
on account of certain legal impediments. 16
Parental authority over recognized natural
children who were under the age of majority was
vested in the father or the mother recognizing
them.  If both acknowledge the child, authority
17
was to be exercised by the one to whom it was
awarded by the courts; if it was awarded to both,
the rule as
_______________
 See CA Decision, p. 29; Rollo, p. 107.
11
 Executive Order No. 209 dated July 6, 1987, effective
12
August 3, 1988.
 Mossesgeld v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 464, 468,
13
December 23, 1998.
 Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439, 448, March 19,
14
1985.
 Article 269, New Civil Code.
15
 See Article 269 in relation to Article 287, Ibid. See
16
also Reyes v. Court of Appeals, supra.
 Article 311, New Civil Code.
17
463
VOL. 440, OCTOBER 18, 2004 463
Briones vs. Miguel
to legitimate children applied. In other words, in
the latter case, parental authority resided jointly
in the father and the mother. 18
The fine distinctions among the various types of
illegitimate children have been eliminated in the
Family Code.  Now, there are only two classes of
19
children—legitimate (and those who, like the
legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate
children) and illegitimate. All children conceived
and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate,
unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. 20
Article 54 of the Code provides these
exceptions: “Children conceived or born before
the judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of
the marriage under Article 36 has become final
and executory shall be considered legitimate.
Children conceived or born of the subsequent
marriage under Article 53 shall likewise be
legitimate.”
Under Article 176 of the Family Code, all
illegitimate children are generally placed under
one category, without any distinction
between natural and spurious.  The concept of
21
“natural child” is important only for purposes of
legitimation.  Without the subsequent marriage, a
22
natural child remains an illegitimate child.
Obviously, Michael is a natural (“illegitimate,’’
under the Family Code) child, as there is nothing
in the records showing that his parents were
suffering from a legal impediment to marry at the
time of his birth. Both acknowledge that Michael is
their son. As earlier explained and pursuant to
Article 176,
_______________
18
 Garcia v. Pongan, 89 Phil. 797, August 31, 1951.
19
 Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines
Annotated (15th ed., 2002), Vol. I, p. 645 (citing Castro v. Court
of Appeals, 173 SCRA 656, May 31, 1989).
20
 Article 165, Family Code.
21
 See Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA 561, March 25,
1992.
22
 See Article 177, Family Code.
464
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Briones vs. Miguel
parental authority over him resides in his mother,
Respondent Loreta, notwithstanding his father’s
recognition of him.
David v. Court of Appeals  held that the23
recognition of an illegitimate child by the father
could be a ground for ordering the latter to give
support to, but not custody of, the child. The law
explicitly confers to the mother sole parental
authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that
only if she defaults can the father assume custody
and authority over the minor. Of course, the
putative father may adopt his own illegitimate
child;  in such a case, the child shall be
24
considered a legitimate child of the adoptive
parent. 25
There is thus no question that Respondent
Loreta, being the mother of and having sole
parental authority over the minor, is entitled to
have custody of him.  She has the right to keep
26
him in her company.  She cannot be deprived of
27
that right,  and she may not even renounce or
28
transfer it “except in the cases authorized by
law.” 29
Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family
Code is the caveat that, generally, no child under
seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, except when the court finds cause to
order otherwise.
Only the most compelling of reasons, such as
the mother’s unfitness to exercise sole parental
authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental
authority and the award of custody to
_______________
23
 250 SCRA 82, 86, November 16, 1995.
24
 See Article 185, Family Code.
25
 Mossesgeld v. Court of Appeals, supra.
26
 David v. Court of Appeals, note 23.
27
 Article 220, Family Code.
28
 See Ibanez de Aldecoa v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank, 30
Phil. 228, 238, March 23, 1915.
29
 Article 210, Family Code. The law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and
surrender to a children’s home or an orphanage; Sagala-Eslao
v. Court of Appeals, 334 Phil. 286, 293; 266 SCRA 317, 323,
January 16, 1997.
465
 VOL. 440, OCTOBER 18, 2004
Briones vs. Miguel
someone else.  In the past, the following grounds
30
have been considered ample justification to
deprive a mother of custody and parental
authority: neglect or
abandonment,  unemployment,
31
immorality,  habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
32
maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction
with a communicable disease.
Bearing in mind the welfare and the best
interest of the minor as the controlling factor,  we
hold that the CA did not err in awarding care,
custody, and control of the child to Respondent
Loreta. There is no showing at all that she is unfit
to take charge of him.
We likewise affirm the visitorial right granted by
the CA to petitioner. In Silva v. Court of
Appeals,  the Court sustained the visitorial right of
34
an illegitimate father over his children in view of
the constitutionally protected inherent and
natural right of parents over their children.  Even
when the parents are estranged and their
affection for each other is lost, their attachment to
and feeling for their offspring remain unchanged.
Neither the law nor the courts allow this affinity to
suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent threat
to the wellbeing of the child.
_______________
 Perez v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 661, 668, March 29,
30
1996; Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson, et al., 133 Phil. 884, 895; 24
SCRA 837, 847, August 30, 1968.
465  Medina v. Makabali, 27 SCRA 502, March 28, 1969.
31
 Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, 312 Phil. 431; 242 SCRA 362,
32
March 15, 1995; Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA 575, January
27, 1989; Unson III v. Navarro, 101 SCRA 183, November 17,
1980.
 Child welfare as an overriding consideration in custodial
33
award has been shown in several cases decided by the
Supreme Court: Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, supra; Cervantes
v. Fajardo, supra; Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 137
SCRA 7, June 18, 1985; Unson III v. Navarro, supra; Medina v.
Makabali, supra; Lozano v. Martinez, et al., 36 Phil. 976,
October 10, 1917.
 275 SCRA 604, 609, July 17, 1997; see also Bondagjy v.
34
Bondagjy, 371 SCRA 642, 653, December 7, 2001.
 Article II, Section 12, 1987 Constitution.
35
33
466
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Briones vs. Miguel
However, the CA erroneously applied Section 6 of
Rule 99 of the Rules of Court. This provision
contemplates a situation in which the parents of
the minor are married to each other, but are
separated either by virtue of a decree of legal
separation or because they are living separately
35
de facto. In the present case, it has been
established that petitioner and Respondent Loreta
were never married. Hence, that portion of the CA
Decision allowing the child to choose which parent
to live with is deleted, but without disregarding
the obligation of petitioner to support the child.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the
assailed Decision AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the disposition allowing the
child, upon reaching ten (10) years of age, to
choose which parent to live with is DELETED for
lack of legal basis. Costs against petitioner.
 SO ORDERED.
     Sandoval-Gutierrez and Corona, JJ., concur.
     Carpio-Morales, J., On Leave.
Petition denied, assailed decision affirmed with
modification.
Note.—The due recognition of illegitimate
children in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgement of the child, and no further
court action is required, but where a claim for
recognition is predicated on other evidence
merely tending to prove paternity, judicial action
within the applicable statute of limitations is
essential in order to establish the child’s
acknowledgment. (De Jesus vs. Estate of
Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon, 366 SCRA
499 [2001])

——o0o——

467
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reserved.

VOL. 376, FEBRUARY 6, 2002 473

St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos
G.R. No. 143363. February 6, 2002. *
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY, petitioner, vs. WILLIAM
CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA
DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and
VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Schools and Universities;  Persons and Institutions
With Special Parental Authority Over Minor Children;
The special parental authority and responsibility
applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or
outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution.—Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the
following shall have special parental authority over a
minor child while under their supervision, instruction or
custody: (1) the school, its administrators and
teachers; or (2) the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child care. This special parental authority
and responsibility applies to all authorized activities,
whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution. Thus, such authority and
responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and
other affairs of the pupils and students outside the
school premises whenever authorized by the school or
its teachers. Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if
the person under custody is a minor, those exercising
special parental authority are principally and solidarily
liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of
the unemancipated minor under their supervision,
instruction, or custody.
Same;  Same; For a school to be liable, there must
be a finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury
caused because the negligence must have a causal
connection to the accident.—For petitioner to be liable,
there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of
the injury caused because the negligence must have a
causal connection to the accident. “In order that there
may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be
shown that the ‘injury for which recovery is sought
must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong
done; the connection between the negligence and the
injury must be a direct and natural sequence of
events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes.’ In
other words, the negligence must be the proximate
cause of the injury. For, ‘negligence, no matter in what
it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is
the proximate cause of the injury complained of.’ And
‘the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which,
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
_______________
 FIRST DIVISION.
*
474
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.’
”
Same;  Same; Words and Phrases;  The proximate
cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.—Liability for
the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the
minor driver or mechanical detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the
minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner
St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the
accident. Between the remote cause and the injury,
there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents
or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep. “The proximate cause of an injury is that cause,
which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have
occurred.”
Quasi-Delicts;  Torts;  Motor Vehicles;  The
registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for
public service, would primarily be responsible to the
public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter
while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or
streets.—Incidentally, there was no question that the
registered owner of the vehicle was respondent
Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted this
fact. We have held that the registered owner of any
vehicle, even if not used for public service, would
primarily be responsible to the public or to third
persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle
was being driven on the highways or streets.” Hence,
with the overwhelming evidence presented by
petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the
accident occurred because of the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school,
but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be
held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of
the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Padilla Law Office for petitioner.
     Peter Y. Co for respondents Daniel and
Villanueva.
     Feliciano M. Maraon for respondents
Carpitanos.
475
VOL. 376, FEBRUARY 6, 2002 475
St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos
PARDO, J.:
The case is an appeal via certiorari from the
decision  of the Court of Appeals as well as the
1
resolution denying reconsideration, holding
petitioner liable for damages arising from an
accident that resulted in the death of a student
who had joined a campaign to visit the public
schools in Dipolog City to solicit enrollment.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:
“Claiming damages for the death of their only son,
Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos and
Lucia Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against
James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and
Guada Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva
and St. Mary’s Academy before the Regional Trial
Court of Dipolog City.
“On 20 February 1997, Branch 6 of the Regional
Trial Court of Dipolog City rendered its decision the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
“ ‘WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment
is hereby rendered in the following manner:
1. 1.Defendant St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City,
is hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs William
Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos, the following
sums of money:
 1. a.FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) being in order as earlier discussed in this
indemnity for the loss of life of Sherwin S. decision, is hereby DISMISSED.
Carpitanos; IT IS SO ORDERED.’ ”
2. b.FORTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P40,000.00) actual damages incurred by (Decision, pp. 32-33; Records, pp. 205-206).”
plaintiffs for burial and related expenses; “From the records it appears that from 13 to 20
3. c.TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) for February 1995, defendant-appellant St. Mary’s
attorney’s fees; Academy of Dipolog City conducted an enrollment
4. d.FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the
(P500,000.00) for moral damages; and to pay enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools
costs. from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a
student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos
_______________ was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on
the fateful day, Sherwin, along with other high school
 In CA-G.R. CV No. 56728, promulgated on February 29,
1
students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by
2000, Reyes, Jr., J., ponente, Martin, Jr. and Brawner, JJ.,
concurring.
defendant Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan
476 Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep
was driven by James Daniel II then 15 years old and a
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove
St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep
turned turtle.
1. 2.Their liability being only subsidiary, “Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries
defendants James Daniel, Sr. and Guada Daniel he sustained from the accident.” 2

are hereby ordered to pay herein plaintiffs the In due time, petitioner St. Mary’s Academy
amount of damages above-stated in the event appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. 3

of insolvency of principal obligor St. Mary’s
Academy of Dipolog City;
2. 3.Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at
the time of the commission of the tort and who
was under special parental authority of
On February 29, 2000, the Court of Appeals
promulgated a decision reducing the actual
damages to P25,000.00 but otherwise affirming
the decision a quo in toto. 4

defendant St. Mary’s Academy, is ABSOLVED

_______________
from paying the above-stated damages, same
being adjudged against de-fendants St. Mary’s  Rollo, pp. 53-55.
2

Academy, and subsidiarily, against his parents;  Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 56728.
3

3. 4.Defendant Vivencio Villanueva is hereby  Petition, Annex “A”, Rollo, pp. 52-70.
4

ABSOLVED of any liability. His counterclaim not 477

 VOL. 376, FEBRUARY 6, 2002
St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos
On February 29, 2000, petitioner St. Mary’s
Academy filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision. However, on May 22, 2000, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion. 5 8
Hence, this appeal. 6 under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily
The Issues
1. 1)Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding
the petitioner liable for damages for the death
of Sherwin Carpitanos.
2. 2)Whether the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the award of moral damages against
the petitioner.
The Court’s Ruling
We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals held petitioner St. Mary’s
Academy liable for the death of Sherwin
Carpitanos under Articles 218  and 219  of the
7 8
Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was
negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not
having a teacher accompany the minor students
in the jeep.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the
following shall have special parental authority
over a minor child while under their
_______________
 Petition, Annex “B”, Rollo, pp. 72-73.
5
 Petition filed on July 17, 2000, Rollo, pp. 9-48. On July 16,
6 omissions of the unemancipated minor under their
2001, we gave due course to the petition, Rollo, pp. 202-203.
477 7
 Article 218. The School, its administrators and teachers, or
the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall
have special parental authority and responsibility over the
minor child while under their supervision, instruction or
custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all
authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of
the school, entity or institution.
 Article 219. Those given the authority and responsibility
liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the
persons exercising substitute parental authority over said
minor shall be subsidiarily liable. The respective liabilities of
those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it
is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required
under the particular circumstances.
478
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos
supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school,
its administrators and teachers; or (2) the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child
care. This special parental authority and
responsibility applies to all authorized activities,
whether inside or outside the premises of the
school, entity or institution. Thus, such authority
and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions
and other affairs of the pupils and students
outside the school premises whenever authorized
by the school or its teachers. 9
Under Article 219 of the Family Code, if the
person under custody is a minor, those exercising
special parental authority are principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or
supervision, instruction, or custody. 10
 However, for petitioner to be liable, there must
be a finding that the act or omission considered as
negligent was the proximate cause of the injury
caused because the negligence, must have a
causal connection to the accident. 11
“In order that there may be a recovery for an injury,
however, it must be shown that the ‘injury for which
recovery is sought must be the legitimate
consequence of the wrong done; the connection
between the negligence and the injury must be a
direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by
intervening efficient causes.’ In other words, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury.
For, ‘negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot
create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause
of the injury complained of.’ And ‘the proximate cause
of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without
which the result would not have occurred.’ ” 12
_______________
 Handbook On The Family Code Of The Philippines, Alicia V.
9 detachment of the steering wheel guide that
Sempio-Diy (1997), p. 344.
 The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, Rufus B.
10
Rodriguez (1990), p. 505.
 Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil.
11
199, 208; 300 SCRA 20 [1998].
 Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 872, 886; 282 SCRA
12
188 [1997].
479
VOL. 376, FEBRUARY 6, 2002
St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos
In this case, the respondents failed to show that
the negligence of petitioner was the proximate
cause of the death of the victim.
Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva
admitted that the immediate cause of the
accident was not the negligence of petitioner or
the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep.
In their comment to the petition, respondents
Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted the
documentary exhibits establishing that the cause
of the accident was the detachment of the
steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the
cause of the accident was not the recklessness of
James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in the
jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents,
including the spouses Carpitanos, parents of the
deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the
report and testimony of the traffic investigator
who stated that the cause of the accident was the
caused the jeep to turn turtle.
Significantly, respondents did not present any
evidence to show that the proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence of the school
authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel
II. Hence, the respondents’ reliance on Article 219
479 of the Family Code that “those given the authority
and responsibility under the preceding Article
shall be principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by acts or omissions of the
unemancipated minor” was unfounded.
 Further, there was no evidence that petitioner
school allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive
the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was
Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva, who had possession and control of the
jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed
James Daniel II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the
time of the accident.
Hence, liability for the accident, whether
caused by the negligence of the minor driver or
mechanical detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s
parents primarily. The negligence of petitioner St.
Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the
accident. Between the remote cause and the
injury, there intervened the negligence of the
minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep.
480
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos
“The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which,
in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.”13
Considering that the negligence of the minor
driver or the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva
was an event over which petitioner St. Mary’s
Academy had no control, and which was the
proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may
not be held liable for the death resulting from
such accident.
Consequently, we find that petitioner likewise
cannot be held liable for moral damages in the
amount of P500,000.00 awarded by the trial court
and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Though incapable of pecuniary computation,
moral damages may be recovered if they are the
proximate result of defendant’s wrongful act or
omission.  In this case, the proximate cause of the
14
accident was not attributable to petitioner.
For the reason that petitioner was not directly
liable for the accident, the decision of the Court of
Appeals ordering petitioner to pay death
indemnity to respondent Carpitanos must be
deleted. Moreover, the grant of attorney’s fees as
part of damages is the exception rather than the
rule.  The power of the court to award attorney’s
15
fees under Article 2208 of the Civil Code demands
factual, legal and equitable justification.  Thus, 16
the grant of attorney’s fees against the petitioner
is likewise deleted.
Incidentally, there was no question that the
registered owner of the vehicle was respondent
Villanueva. He never denied and in fact admitted
this fact. We have held that the registered owner
of any
_______________
13
 Ford Philippines v. Citibank, G.R. No. 128604, January 29,
2001; 350 SCRA 446; Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of
Appeals, 326 SCRA 641, 659 [2000]; Bataclan v. Medina, 102
Phil. 181, 186 [1957].
14
 Article 2217 of the Civil Code.
15
 Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 340 Phil. 98, 111; 273 SCRA 562 [1997].
  Morales v. Court of Appeals, 340 Phil. 397, 422; 274 SCRA
16
282 [1997].
481
VOL. 376, FEBRUARY 6, 2002
St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos
vehicle, even if not used for public service, would
primarily be responsible to the public or to third
persons for injuries caused the latter while the
vehicle was being driven on the highways or
streets.”  Hence, with the overwhelming evidence
17
presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel
spouses that the accident occurred because of the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner
of the vehicle who shall be held responsible for
damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS
ASIDE the de cision of the Court of Appeals  and 18
that of the trial court.  The Court remands the
19
case to the trial court for determination of the
liability of defendants, excluding petitioner St.
Mary’s Academy, Dipolog City.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
     Davide, Jr. (C.J.,
Chairman), Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.
     Puno, J., In the result.
Judgment reversed and set aside. Case
remanded to trial court for determination of
liability of defendants.
Notes.—A rent-a-car company is not liable for
damages based on quasi-delict for fault or
negligence of the car lessee in driving the motor
481
vehicle. (FGU Insurance Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 287 SCRA 718 [1998])
A party who asserts that another person, by
violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic
Code, contributed to the collision
_______________
 Aguilar Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank, G.R. No. 128705,
17
June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA 395; Erezo v. Jepte, 102 Phil. 103, 107
[1957].
 CA-G.R. No. CV No. 56728.
18
 In Civil Case No. 4924.
19
482
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Mendezona vs. Ozamiz
of vehicles, has the burden of showing a causal
connection between the injury received and the
alleged violation, i.e., that the violation of the
statute was the proximate or legal cause of the
injury or that it substantially contributed thereto—
negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of
violation of law, like any other negligence, is
without legal consequence unless it is a
contributing cause of the injury. (Sanitary Steam
Laundry, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA
20 [1998])
Accident and negligence are intrinsically
contradictory—one cannot exist with the other.
(Jarco Marketing Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, 321 SCRA 375 [1999])
 The mere fact that an employee was using a
service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident
is not of itself sufficient to charge his employer
with liability for the negligent operation of said
vehicle unless it appears that he was operating
the vehicle within the course or scope of his
employment. (Castilex Industrial Corporation vs.
Vasquez, Jr., 321 SCRA 393 [1999])

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