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Case Study: Mexican Peso Crisis, 1994
Case Study: Mexican Peso Crisis, 1994
From 1954 to 1976, Mexico had maintained a fixed exchange rate of Ps12.50/$.
Even after the collapse of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system in
1971/73, Mexico was able to hold this fixed rate.
Although the Mexican economy experienced rapid growth during most of the
1970s, it was progressively undermined by fiscal mismanagement in the form of
large government borrowings (both home and abroad) which resulted in high
rates of inflation and growing external indebtedness. As the international
financial community’s concerns about Mexico grew, capital flight out of the
country intensified.
Difficulties continued for Mexico into the early 1980s. In the late 1970s, Mexico
had borrowed billions of U.S. dollars at extremely high interest rates in
anticipation of increased oil revenues. When the oil prices dropped sharply in the
early 1980s, Mexico’s oil revenues, and U.S. dollar revenues, plummeted as well.
In 1982, Mexico was forced to default on billions of dollars of loans to foreign
banks, mostly in the United States.
The lack of confidence in the ability of the Mexican economy to rebound from this
financial crisis led to high rates of inflation, a serious flight of capital out of the
country, and a dramatic decline in the value of the peso. By 1983, the yearly
inflation rate exceeded 110%. In the first six years of the 1980s, the value of the
Mexican peso fell from around Ps50/$ to more than Ps1,100/$.
The Mexican economy improved in the late 1980s and early 1990s. A series of
price and wage control agreements signed by the government, labor unions, and
private sector businesses in 1987 helped cut the inflation rate from 51 percent in
1988 to a low of 7 percent in 1994. Increased foreign trade and investment and a
large-scale privatization of the country's state-owned companies helped the
economy expand at a rate of more than 2.5 percent annually in the early 1990s.
As for the exchange rate regime, the peso was still being determined by a
managed floating arrangement. In 1993, the government introduced a new
Mexican Peso, whereby one new Peso would be equivalent to 1000 of the former
Mexican Pesos.
Between 1991 and 1993, more than $75 billion in foreign capital was funneled
into Mexico, making it the world's second-largest recipient of foreign investment
after China. The foreign capital which had flowed into Mexico in the early part of
the decade was largely “portfolio capital,” i.e., investment in stocks and bonds
rather than direct investment in plant and equipment. Unfortunately, this capital
contributed little to the real Mexican economy. In addition, the Mexican banking
system was beginning to show some serious weaknesses and as a
result, non-performing loans piled up in Mexican banks.
Thus, by late 1994, Mexico was again in trouble and the portfolio capital which
had flooded into the country earlier, left the as quickly as it arrived.
In response to the currency flight, and to relieve pressure on the peso, the
government devalued the peso slightly, from Ps3.1/$ to Ps3.5/$. However, they
decided to keep the currency band and to manage the currency within this band.
However this time, the speculation was not to be halted. While the Mexican
central bank had spent vast amounts of its reserves (by one estimate 85% of its
reserves) trying to support the peso, it was become clear that little could be done
to support the peso. On December 20, 1994, President Ernesto Zedillo expanded
the currency band's range, effectively devaluing the peso by 15%. When this did
not have the desired effect, he was forced, on December 22, 1994, to finally
abandon the government's long-standing commitment to a managed float within
a currency band, and allow the Mexican currency to float freely against the dollar.
By the end of March 1995, the currency had fallen to around Ps7.0/$; this
represented a depreciation of 100% in the currency.