Mission Command: the Big Picture

Jared Woislaw

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CDT Woislaw

06DEC2019

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Mission Command

Mission Command is “the Army’s approach to command and control that empowers

subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation”.1 Mission

command is how the Army approaches command and control that empowers the Army to

achieve it operational concept, unified land operations. Unified land operations consist of the

execution of offense, defense, stability operations, and a variety of other war related and

humanitarian tasks. For all intensive purposes mission command enables successful unified land

operations fulfilling the Army’s operational objectives. Command and control is essential to all

operations ranging from high school sports all the way to Task Force Ripper breaching Iraqi

obstacle belts in Operation Desert Storm. In this essay Mission Command will be examined

through three lenses. First, mission command will be established and explained through the

guiding principles and its connection to the command and control warfighting function. Second,

mission command will be analyzed through the historical examples of Secretary Jim Mattis in

the Gulf War and two BN CDRs at the battle of Aachen. Third, mission command will be

analyzed through my own personal lens; how I have used Mission Command in the past and how

I will incorporate Mission Command into my future as an Army officer.

In the words of General George S. Patton, “Never tell people how to do things. Tell them

what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity”.2 General Patton does an excellent job

1 FM 6-0 Mission Command

2 FM 6-0 Mission Command

surmising mission command in relation to it’s guiding principles. Mission command executed

properly empowers subordinate leaders in line with the commander's intent. FM 6-0, Mission

Command, lays out a frame-work consisting of seven principles that enables elements of

command and control. These principles are competence, mutual trust, shared understanding,

commander’s intent, mission orders, disciplined initiative, and risk acceptance.

These principles operate jointly with each other. For mutual trust to be shared between a

CDR and their subordinates that CDR must be viewed as tactically and technically competent.

Competency and mutual trust are the touchstones that hold the principles of mission command

together, mutual trust creates shared confidence between CDRs, subordinates and partner forces

that they can rely on each other in performing assigned tasks. Shared understanding is created by

effective dissemination of commander’s intent. Commander's intent is a concise mission

statement and endstate that enables shared understanding between the ranks. Commander’s intent

enables commanders at the highest operational level to enable the creation of mission orders all

the way to the smallest maneuver element. Commander's intent also enables disciplined initiative

in subordinate elements. Disciplined initiative is also coupled with risk acceptance to achieve a

goal inline with the desired end state of the commander's intent. These seven principles

combined effectively allow leaders at all echelons to effectively synchronize and converge all

elements of combat power. Luckily, throughout the course of the United States’ history leaders

such as Secretary Mattis, LTC Derrill Daniel and LTC John Corley of the 1st Infantry

Division(1ID), were able to effectively exercise mission command.

In August of 1990, a “young” Lt Col named Jim Mattis was commanding the 1st BN of

the 7th Marine REG(1/7). The same BN that just 48 years earlier under the command of Chesty

Puller emerged victorious in the fight on Guadalcanal. In August the Iraqi Army, under Saddam
Hussein invaded Kuwait. Promptly thousands of US armed forces personnel were deployed to

Saudi Arabia in support of Operation Desert Shield. By Mid-November the operation changed to

forcing Hussein out of Kuwait. A coalition was established to force the Iraqi Army out of

Kuwait, the 1st Marine Division was assigned to breach through Iraqi forward defensive lines

and breach two obstacle belts and minefields.3 At the tip of the spear sat Lt Col Mattis’ BN.

When Mattis received the mission he immediately went to work, in his own words “strangers

don’t fight well together”, he took his BN with all the add ons and immediately went to work on

a weekly training cycle, his staff would plan on Sunday and then maneuver in the desert for six

days, refine the plan then repeat.4 By doing this Mattis created mutual trust and supported a

shared understanding, this will be incremental when 1/7 IN moves against Saddam’s forces. He

took a group of “strangers” and turned them into a finely tuned machine of war.

The directions given by Mattis REG commander Col Fulford was to “use aggressive

initiative according to my intent”, this is an example of Mattis’ direct leader promoting

disciplined initiative.5 Col Fulford did not ask Mattis to hold at a certain phaseline and radio

back. He gave Mattis the latitude to act in accordance with what the men on the ground believed

the proper course of action was. The power Fulford passed to Mattis was then passed to Mattis

subordinates. The final example that will be drawn from Mattis time with the 1/7 comes in the

planning phase of the operation. Mattis received a visit from Fulford in which Fulford told him

to expect a 50% casualty rate, Mattis viewed this as unacceptable. The next morning (Christmas

Day), Mattis called in his fire support team. Mattis picked up the fires plan and ripped it in half.

He bluntly pointed at the map of the breach site and said “Inside that U, I want everything dead,

3 Mattis, West, Call Sign Chaos, Page (23)

4 Mattis, West, Call Sign Chaos, Page (25)
5 Mattis, West, Call Sign Chaos, Page (25)
including the earthworms”.6 Mattis effectively utilized commander’s intent, however informally

to great effect. The fire support team repositioned and allocated their fires to great effect.

Overall, instead of a 50% casualty rate Mattis 1/7 Marines suffered twelve wounded, zero KIA

out of 1,250 men. Mattis masterfully used commander's intent, shared understanding, and mutual

trust to synchronize and coverage all elements of combat power thus exercising COL Fulford’s

intent.

In the fall of 1944 Allied forces approached the Siegfried line which is colocated with the

well defended German city of Aachen. The Americans initially bypassed the city, but it quickly

became a threat to their rear element as they advanced beyond it. The 1st ID dispatched two

understrength IN BNs consisting of 2,000 soldiers to deal with the 4,000 German soldiers in the

city. Luckily for the Ameircan’s those two BNs were commanded by “two of the finest field-

grade commanders in the entire US Army”7. Between these two BN CDRs they had ten awards

for valor including four silver stars and one distinguished service cross. Tactically and

technically competent commanders are the basis of effective mission command, their ability to

operate and organize is directly tied to their competency. LTC Derrill and LTC Corley were two

of the most competent leaders in the theater at the time and that was the basis of their mission

command.

LTC Derrill and LTC Corley had to deal with a dire situation on the ground being vastly

outnumbered and forced to move quickly to contain the German forces. Derrill and Corley

decided to reconfigure the task organization to suit urban warfare as opposed to “fighting

through the hedgerows”. John C. McManus in Grunts, writes “the key was to to organize

platoons and companies into combined arms teams … tank and tank destroyers were assigned to

6 Mattis, West, Call Sign Chaos, Page (27)

7 McManus, Grunts, Page (107)
each company … artillery observers were to move forward as soon as ground was secured …

self propelled guns and anti tank guns also supported the rifleman”8. The, at the time, novel use

of joint maneuver elements and overwhelming fire allowed the outnumbered and attacking

Americans to overwhelmingly defeat the dug-in Germans. Derrill and Corley’s situation of being

outnumbered and attacking directly contradicts what Carl Von Clausewitz believes are the keys

to operational success. However, due to their competency and ability to use mission command

they were successful. Thanks to the assets supplied to Derrill and Corley their subordinate

leaders they had all of the resources available to defeat the Germans and make on the ground

decisions to destroy the German missions.

Derrill and Corley, taught a master class in empowering subordinates, they gave their

subordinates their intent of enveloping and destroying the German forces in the city. After

supplying their intent, Derrill and Corley then proceeded to give their subordinate leaders every

available asset to accomplish this mission. This allowed subordinate leaders to be able to call for

direct fire support and indirect fire support at their own discretion.9 Derrill and Corley through

competence built by experience, enabled disciplined initiative through commander's intent. This

allowed the leaders on the group to accept prudent risk and through the mutual trust built by their

teams, defeat the German garrison in Aachen. The same lessons Secretary Mattis and LTC

Derrill and Corley taught are applicable to both civilian and military applications. Most effective

organizations, sports teams, and command structures incorporate mission command based on the

guiding principles of FM 6-0.

For me, I learned a great deal about decentralized leadership and disciplined initiative

from my time playing rugby in high school. Rugby, as a fast paced, nonstop sport required

8 McManus, Grunts, Page (110)

9 McManus, Grunts, Page (112)
players to make snap second decisions based upon the developing situation. Players would have

to be on the same page as each other just based off body language or split-second voice or hand

signals. Rugby captains are generally regarded as on field coaches, therefore it is the captain’s

responsibility to understand the coaches intent, but also exercise his disciplined initiative. From

my time I recall one two distinct instances, one of effective mission command and one of

ineffective mission command. At a small stoppage in play I was on the field and my coach yelled

for me to initiate movement for a certain maneuver. Based upon what I saw I disagreed with the

action and acted differently. After the game my coach took me aside threatening to bench me if I

ever disobeyed him again. This incident made me scared of repercussions for doing my job. As

the on field leader I should be able to exercise disciplined initiative and did not want to accept

prudent risk for fear of repercussions. Two years later we had a different coach, a similar

situation arose. A few days after the game he sat down with me and we went through the entire

situation, he explained what he believed was the right move and what he saw. Afterwards, he

asked for my viewpoint and why I chose my course of action. He understands why I did not

listen to him, this built mutual trust between use. Greg told me “look I want you to be out there

creatively trying to solve problems, you know the game, the players, and you are the captain. We

chose you to make those calls because we trust your judgement”.

The apparent dichotomy between Greg and my earlier coach was clear. Greg enabled me

to exercise my own disciplined initiative and accept the risk that can come from a risky play. My

first coach however made me play scared and not want to take chances. The most apparent

difference was how different the atmosphere was when Greg was the coach. Greg would practice

with us everyday as opposed to being an observer, when he would make us run sprints he would
run with us. Greg personified building a cohesive team through mutual trust, we would play for

Greg just as much as we would play for each other.

When we were on the field myself and fellow teammates practiced disciplined initiative

and risk acceptance. We would spend hours drilling certain situations in practice and then when

those situations arose during the game we would instinctively know what to when we

encountered 3 on 2’s and 2 on 1s. This is all built around the background of competency, from

competency we were able to accept prudent risks such as throwing a long pass or kicking behind

the defensive line. Without knowing my teammates would catch that ball there is no way I would

make that pass. I practiced mission command without knowing what mission command was by

focusing on the people and processes that allowed me to lead my team to accomplish the

objectives of the game. Overall, rugby provided as an effective practicum for mission command

and exposure to leadership at a young age.

As a future IN LT I plan to draw upon the various historical and personal examples I

have outlined above. From the likes of Secretary Mattis I will draw upon his promotion of shared

understanding as well as masterful use of commanders intent. When I receive a mission I will

utilize by subject matter expert SLs to complete the plan in a similar manner to how Mattis

utilized his fire support team. I will ensure my subordinate leaders are conducting continuous

rehearsals on our battle drills so that when we take fire the response is automatic. Using Mattis’

example I will be able to increase the lethality of my PLT through mission command. In regards

to LTC Derrill and Corley I learned about disciplined initiative through their novel task

organization which was also accepting prudent risk. In a similar vein as a platoon leader I will

not be afraid to change the organization of my soldiers and attached troops to suit my mission,

even if it defies doctrine, accepting that prudent risk. From my past athletic experience I learned
the powerful truth of mutual trust, if your soldiers don't trust you, you have nothing. Greg

participated in every activity with us and enabled our disciplined initiative, this created a

powerful team built on trust. As a PL I will not be sitting off to the side watching my PLT. I will

be out there rucking and embracing the suck with them in order to build a cohesive team through

mutual trust and shared understanding.

In the US Army effective mission command increases lethality which is the most

important metric of the armed services. The aforementioned leaders increased the effectiveness

of their command structures to increase the lethality of their soldiers. As a leader in the Army I

will strive to practice effective mission command by incorporating the principles of mission

command based upon doctrine, personal experience, and self study.

Works Cited

FM 6-0 Mission Command

McManus, John C. Grunts: inside the American Infantry Combat Experience, World War

II through Iraq. New York: NAL Caliber, 2011.

Mattis, James N., and West, Francis J. Call Sign Chaos : Learning to Lead First edition. New

York: Random House, 2019.