The Moral Economy of the Peasant REBELLION AND SUBSISTENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA James C. Scott New Haven and London, Yale University PressCopyight © 1976 y Yale Uae Aig sod “histo ay nace eprediced wel or npc Bsn fy Te beyond tht copy pete Setins 107 and 108 ce US. Cops Tad cpt hy wes rep re} without wien permis om Irmo dard bck aml (30021909 japerboan Designed by Joba 0. CeCe neo Bases Roman pe Prien the ‘nied Sates Armen rpc bye Cer a nnn Cuneo Bot eget eGo ry fers m1 20 19 18 For Mia, Aaron, and NoahContents Preface Invsodution 1 The Economics and Sociology ofthe Susnence Ethie EP sutvistence ‘Security in Peasant Choice and Values (J The Dissiaton of Rik sd Colona Change 4. The State as Claimant 5. The Depreson Rebeians 6 mpcatons for the Anas of Fapaitain Retprociy and Substtence a nice g Revolt, Survival, and Repression Trex 3% a na 67 193, m1Preface ‘This study of the basis of peasant poles and rebellion begins with Taweney’s metaphor describing “the postion ofthe rural population” as ‘that of a man standing permanently up to the neck in water, 50 that ‘even 4 ripple might drown him.” It places the critical problem of the peasant family—a secure subsitence—at the center of the study of peasant politics, where I beieve it belongs, Etry to show how the Fear of earth explains many otherwise anomalous technical, social, 2nd oral farrangements in peasant soci. The fact that subsitence-oriented peasants typically prefer to avoid ‘economic disaster rather than take risks to maximize their average in ‘ome has enormous implications forthe prahlem of exploitation, On the ‘basis ofthis prinipl, iis posible to deduce those systems of tenancy and taxation that are likely to have the most crushing impact on peasant life. The entical problem is not the average surplus extracted By elites and the sate, but rather whose income is ablized at the expense of ‘hom. The theory is examined in he light ofthe hstoral development ‘of agrarian society in Lower Burma and Vietnam. Both the commercial tation of agriculture and the growth of bureaueraue states produced ‘systems of tenaney and taxation that increasingly undermined the sabi inv of peasant income and provoked Rerce resistance, Two notable episodes of such resistance, the Saya San Rebelion in Burma and the Nghe-Tinh Soviets ia Viewam, are analyzed in some det Throughout the volume, I have taken pains to emphasize the moral Fines Kounses"und Grae af Teche er Pest grate” TH. Thee tea numberof katy operstonalprbims n appie is preicive nota Wha este pss ear not ceptable Rous peak Eo ‘ne fiare in fony crops Tsp it general et ihe. How mach ang) 3a th wh ey fe Ele ugar One apes at eye te ochthe beer shin ehnora dream boy ate more deg e 1B Sec eheman Sap Repo nthe Nort of ‘se tin lon ee wal pa cosonics oF THe suasisTeNcE ETHIE 9 content with @ lower return for subsistence production than to ‘choose the higher but riskier returns from cath production” ‘Phe most careful formulation of the principle of decision-making ine volved, however, that of Leonard Joy We might postulate that farmers willingness to innovate for an increase in long-run average net return fs subject to the condition that the risk of reducing the net returm in any one year not exceed some given value. Further, we might postulate that the degree of Fisk that farmers are willing to incur related to thie nearness, some sense, 10 “biological subsistence." . We thus have a Ihyporhesis that subainence farmers may resist innovation because it means departing from a system that b efficient in minimizing the ‘isk ofa catastrophe for one that signfcanty increases this rk." ven with the seaes traditional technique, asin Figure 1, there isan irreducible ekment of risk each year. The peisint who bis managed with this technique in the past will aot ordinarily exchange # for 3 Substantially more risky technique whose average returns may be much higher. What the peasant seeks, as Chayanov notes are those ops and cultivation technigues "which will give the highest and mov tale pay ‘ment for labor." Where these tin goals clash be wll ormally prefer the less risky crops and techniques if he is close to the margin. ‘\ hypothetical contrast ofthis kind illustrated in Figure 1, compar: ing the performance of technique N'to technique T. Techaique N (teative 10 erop, seed, manner of cultivation) fas & higher average return than technique T, and the farmer who used ie thirty years ru hing would have a higher average income. The trouble is that peasants ting technique N would rarely survive intact past year five to enjoy their bumper crops. In practice the years of poor yield might mean having to sell the land or acquiring costly debts and, fora tenant, they right mean dismissal in favor of another prospect who could pay the costs ofthe next crop. Technique N plunges a family into the subsistence triss zone not for one year but for eight years the probabsacy of going 1, Mi The Pn soon Foy Undeeopd Arean in 8 J. Leonard Joy, "Dagan, Peto, and Poe Formation" iy pp. 87 1p se a om he Pn i ot th peter oe tea rtm np in Ea Aa pt Bet Ne ordr with Nis over 8 percent whe the comparable igure for Tis es than 4 percent ‘ur hypotetcal example not far remove from the rel word of pessant choice. Ina attempt to apply the"safeyfre” principle othe Erne of technique inte Philippines, Roumaset developed four repre- Ure rt Jil oF reste fall lone baste needs, How do they make cg? In part, they may ughten dhir belts fusther oy eating only one meal es: day and switching to poorer Peasant belts have precious lle sack, however. apd if the cris an ‘extended one this ts not a viable strategy. Secon dyat the fail lel, there are a variety of subsistence atlernativeS wince my group under beheading “elPhelp.’ This may include petty wade wall crafs, see ater pump ch eum hecrap CF abewL Sansom, Te eon Ir sient (Cambrge Mas MT: Pen, 1970) che an ‘Th cons tobe mda touhac xc Wollasinmindwten he wrsee“Peshaptis recat when the pessan can no longer rely on seamed isn cote 0 ‘esc his ht shen seen eng ae teria oe oo erie 3 {taranee swale carmen cote wat har he pancho econo mca snd Poonostics oF THe SUBSISTENCE Fre 7 casual wage labor, or even migration ¥ For many Southeast Asian peas ants whose net yields (after rent and interest) are below subsistence, These “seTines” have suse become a regular and necessary part of the aiBea peda Fin is ar entire range of networks and institutions outside ‘Germmmediac tally which may, and often do, act as shock abworbers Jusing economic erges in peasant life. A man's hinsmie', his tends, BS village, a powerful patron, and even—thovgh#ately he sate, may “help ide Bis aver # difficult period of illness or crop Lalure, We will ‘Cxamine the performance and availability of these subsistence opionsin ‘much greater detail later. For our immediate purposes, however, iti Jmportancto note tha the more rial cach ofthese options is, che more resource-poor it tends to be. Sel-elp is perhaps the mos reliable Strategy itsemuch as it not cohtingenton someone clas sistance but, by the same token; itonly yickdewp whaea man an lay hinown hats on, “Kinsmen nossaaly Lee obliged ta do whae they can fora close relative in trouble, but they ean offer no more than the pool of resources a their command, ’As we move © reciprocity among friends and co the village, we move 1p socal units which may control more subsixence resources than Kinsmen and are ila part ofthe intimate wor!d of the peasantry where shared values and social controls combine to reinforce mutual asta, In most caves, however, 4 man cannot count with se mii@K Certainty oF for as much help from fellow villagers as he can from near relatives and close neighbors.” Patron-clien ies, a ubiquitous form of social insurance among South- cast Asan peasancs, represents yet another large step» sonal and often morilaistnee, particularly if the patron is nota villager. Whether & landowner, petty official, or uarier die patron is by deBnivon a man HOW in a poston to help his cei, Aldiough cients often do what they can to cast che relationship it ioral cerms—since their sheer bar- ‘gaining power is often minimal—patronage is more to be recommended for its resources than for is eabiicy "The las social unit the tate, i strangely in company. Ktisoften spinner ace nt ce pry os poor ne “I Tere re ge sitions he ely af paron-cen ex Fora dcion of ‘hsarancy ce Jus € Sty “Paton le Poka sd Pia Change in Sotho8 {TE MORAL ECONOMY OF THE PEASANT distinguished more by what it takes from peasants than what it gives, and its yocial distance from the peasantry, especially in the colonial era, ‘ets messured in light years" Nevertheless, both the traditional state— through regional granaries, pubic works employment paid im kind, Famine relieland the modera state, through employment, wellare, and relet, may help peasants survive, ‘The state's assistance, i i arives aval however, is hardly reliable Thi inverse relationship of reliability and resources presents the peasant, on the one hand, with a brother who would give him the shirt fT his back but is more likely than not be as destaute as he and, on the other hand, witha state which could more easily help buts fa les likely to recognize his need as its responsibilty * Given the choice, peasants ‘would probably prefer to meet their needs on ther own or ith the help Df reliable Kinstnen and villagers, but the choice may not be theirs ifthe protection afforded by their immediate cirle does not suffice. Teisalso evident that as soon asa peasant leans on bis kin or is patron, rather than on his own resources, he gives them @ reciprocal cai bi ‘own labor and resources, The kin and friends who bail him out will expect the sime consideration when they are in trouble and he has something to spare, In fact, they aid him, one might say, because theres a tacit consensus about reeiprocty, and their assistance is 28 good as ‘money im the bank against the time shen the situation is reversed, Similarly, ithe village context, the village norms which may assure a poor man patch of communal lind and fond also require him to provide labor when village officials or norables ell fr i The client who relies on a more powerful patron for protection is obliged, atthe sime time, to serve him aya loyal member of his entourage and to be at his ‘beck and call for many services The claims ofthe sate (axes, corvee, conscription) speak for themselves and itis questionable whe:her the peasant ever ses these claims asa repayment for services received (aie find order? peace? religious functions) tonite worse nro ehe (hues and wo for Sex among when Somers Mocron St nd Stat Ea ‘Fw thnce Coc Gaveray Swen tian Progra, 189) Renal Sh i eh pee ar dr rl move gas on aoc from tn cpa washer ie woe aged Imoveve tat he worageot gram wn undertaken syne nee of plc ee ‘erin tart afore fc on es oonosucs oF rie suasisrescr Prine *9 All ofthese institutions, then, have an ambivalent roe in peasant life They may provide vital social insurance agsinst atime of dearth, but they also make claims on a pessant’s resources claims which he may be strapped to meet. The ting, se, and sope oftheir contributions and claims to peasant resources are the he) t tha legitonacy—to thet lace in peasant ‘ales, How these claims and contributions are judged by peasants can, in turn, best be understood in terms of the subsistence ethic ex above Tue Disraseviow oF RE IN Prasat Society afer oni logical consequence ofthe cogil depen- ea, Goodies 2 eave prePeney for air om ih verge income Nov oly ds th sta ‘Fence halen conic sem bs hope sow ely it finds expresion in a vide arayof sca ples aicapes, and Sts in'fenane sey, Before deter these eonrete ptr Tovever itl acer shh bey te mplcaonq he gbeatonce hr he forthe reich af pentane the aah avd them Shi vor te ott of ce equ. torte subicence ei proves perspective rom which the typral pean ics he invale can ade upon hs resources by Tw vlogrs landowner or eials empl sbove a hat sch Ghims te cattle interno her absolute eel chan aetna fo they comple orca irpblom of sting above the webence Crs eve pls that ent percent oe crop fa goat Ske wo meee exponnereatance chan stent of BY percent ater partclanly poor yeas The pean ctcrion wl bet left afer Seti dam nine been met whether cvugh tomate fequirements rather than the level ofthe cams per se ‘Abe sak of laboring the ebony. gure? iste to ie sya dane yousaersom penn reams Line Areca ‘he typertenealsrop iain Figure whe hein a 90 un of tice gan represent substenc eel. Lines B and Crete the ipa two an aiferent Kin of cy peasant income heh tna be thought of a erpng foray of land reat or txt, Line B repress ie effet on pean subscace resources ofan unr Sig ne. aboe tox or renal aim Yar in yea ny Send ‘rey woof ree eared rm the net he cet on oma ‘owrces spy to mnntan the shape o he yl ne bt ower ‘Sony unite Iefiectom pasa ie kemasive he net eminng For Cpt punes wot oe but titer ties he sateee SS ne and for fut sucese yeas (08-21 feats below et3 ‘HY MORAL HCOKOMEY OF ZH PrASaN level. Qualtatively, such a fixed exaction world make it imposible For the peisant fami to maintain te already tenons postion and some Imajér and painfuladaptation would be necessary (for example, sellland, migrate, rent) The risks of agriculture, in thiscase, are stil fully borne bby the cultivator, but ata level which is increasingly insupportable. By contrast, the sate or landlord as stabilized its (his) income at the ‘expente of the peasant Line C represents the polar opposite of a fixed claim on peasant resources. Fach year, grain is exacted 50 thatthe peasant family is left five units above the subsitenc crs ine. On three occasions where the yield line drops below eighty-five, this implies an actual subidy of some Form to the peasant to raise bum to that level, Here the qualitative changes inthe character of peasant lfe are enormously reduced 25 the fubestence ris threshold is never reached, Infact, conceivable that the pessant might actually prefer to a situation without rents, nas much as he may be willing to pay a large income premium in order to reonontics oF Tir susstysce erie o _gvarantce himself subsidy in a bac year, The risks of agriculure, in this situation, are borne by the state or landlord, whose income fluc tates to steady the met resources left for the peasant household “The key clement for the peasant in judging the exactions that are an inevitable part of his life is whether they increase or reduce the chance of a disister This iv not necessarily klentical, by any means, with what ‘ight be considered the average extraction of surplus from the peas antey by elites The tual resources squeezed from the countryside under variable claim (C) that stabilizes peasant income are actually in this example, greater than with a xed levy (B). If we were to ese at a ‘andard of exploitation the average “take” of elites from peasants, then the sabilzing claim would qualify as the most explokatie, Given the tubsitence precipice along which the peasant treads, however, the ‘abilizng aim though it may end by taKing more) i les resented, stirs fess ferocious resistance, and is experienced as les "explotaive,”inas much as i avoids outcomes thst peasants fear mon. Tam proposing a fundamentally different concept of exploitation than is normally used—a definition that seems far move in accord with the major existential problems of peasant life, The usual procedure isto ask how much elites expropriate from the peasantry and to we the proportion of the product expropriated as 4 measure of the level of {exploitation This i quite in Keeping with both the Merxist notion of ftplus value and with common sense. But if we wish of ploitation that accords with peasant pereeptions, This definition is not {adequate There are radically different ways For elites to expropriste an average of, ay, 25 percent From pessant incomes. Although the peasant ‘may resent any sich clam, i isthe claim that most often threatens the Central elements of his subsistence arrangements, that most often ex: poses him to subsistence crises, that naturally perceived as the most exploitative, He asks how much is et before he asks how mich i taker; tne asks whether the agrarian system respects his basic needs as 3 con So there is no misunderstanding about the normative standing of my atgument, it should be clear that my analyse i essentially phe- romenological. Although I may have deduced the safery-frst logic ‘rom the material bass of peasant life the persuasiveness of my analysis depends ulumately on demonstrating thats lozicsureflected in pens dant values anf experience. It is not necessary for ty argument. nor would T necessity claicthat the peasants ei of relative equity i 10 be preferred on normative grovinds any other stantard of explo [Hoe 19 tach, the argument i jo 59 “ay inconsistent with & view that ‘would label this pessint notion of exploitation form of falsevi 2 TY MORAL ECONOMY OF THE FRASART consciousness, From an outside global view, after all, the contest in thich peasant needs arse i in part soil artifact presumably the } ulvator needs security largely because his land has been taken from | him and small elite controls mom scarce values. Be this ai may } & phenomenological approach has at least two advantages over purely datuctive tories of exploitation Beginning asi does withthe vals || of reat actors offers amore reliable guide wo behavior than abstract || andards which offer no conceptual ink beeen dhe theory of exploit ) ‘Steele ing ne ee See ine ene he ‘Rein on ve ey the ot ny ep ‘Riper nd be monluncrpengafecn saree iat rem egerens i hm hn of xin ma wll sae dilenein ena Rome oxo ad Serta mse iy ad ho one sap ee shot el dices font ne de iS ce wight dew eee of sin psa the umes abo imps at se chins on peat remuses cx on pf tet sie se 8 nla ca in tk ‘aug i ili win an soc ee ase tye eatery cote paca ofl sora hc mig so yr fa Net Te Sunsisrence as 4 Monat Cuan The peasants perspective asdigwn heres wery much in keeping with, “le moral economy ofthe poor” sc bas Appeared historialy i oes ‘tought omen stow ther ines pyehlgy andthe tage se ekg ch taco wed hve fy saree unas ech nd he neers From te Ue input oti co edo ele rey es ar {it consioene Caw tnscs “Ca Concosanen say eels Conant Suh in Manat Duda, wane Radney Lvagaane\Cambrge, Mose: MT. Pe HeONOMICS OF THE sUaSISTENCE ETC 3s contents! Atthe cote of popular protest movements of wan an rural) poor in eigtcenth- and ninetcenth-eenury Europe was nox so mich a ||‘ Facelli! i equality of wealth and landholding bu the more modest ‘dai of "right to subsiaence=a clam that became iacreaingy elt conscious ass inereanngly hreatened** Hs cents asus aa Simply that, hotever their el and poi ible, the peor had the nda rio sbnstence Heme, any chins ow peas bree or the sie nul ha no justine when it infetigal or =ulnstence nends hi sion took many forms and was of couse interpreted esta sehen tse, but in saris gues i provided the moral inition that fled coontless rebellions and jacques. The “de de ubsiance™ seas what gataniedl many of the poor in the French Revotons i a5 Ischind "tation pada” when the public seized grain and sold ata populity “determined jus price; was ako behind the “coin Inawimum” which ded the price of basie neces to wage levels” Tn England ie can equally be seen in bread riot and in the ibfated Speenharnland rei sytem The minimal formulation was that eles must ot iavade the subsitence reserve of poor people ts maxial formulation was tha elites hada postive moral obligation 0 the imaimenance needs of their subjects nine of darth 1 Titre BTiS che Maing of he gh Waking lan Che Vor viage Boake ed p28 A} mare cmp rsa tn othe igo sls roc te sad [SSS ng Fr i tr es SCE Tamer Otc Yr aopece Mey orga pte 19) "Ser fs Sap, Wh © Cab Peso Po pad es Yor onto ony md Rehwt 8 Rose, “Egheeah Conary Price Rine she feeb Stennett 3950, 188-9; and Fo Sop br a Me aan Chr Ty ang Sa ae em en tcp th a dluceron wold nen grec tin priate hry knew oat sca ne3 “Tie MORAL ECONOMY OF THY PEASANT Southeast Asian peasant alo, this ethos provided a standard of equity against which the moral performance of elites might be judged. Finally, the notion that, for those at che margin, an inscure poverty is far more painfol and explosive than poverty alone, receiver strong ‘confirmation from research linkinginsecurity to radicalism. In contexts as divergent as Cuba, the United States, England, and Germany, the ‘experience of economic insecurity, particubsly unemployment, predis: posed workers to militant poiica™ The comparative history of mine ‘worker protest in England and Germany is representative here. [9 England where miners were atthe mercy ofthe trade cycle and had no accident protection, labor was a tumultuous affair of “bargaining:by- ‘iot” and machine-breaking. In Germany, by contrast, where mine workers were employees of the state covered by an umbrella of pater nalist regulations insuring them medical benefits and employment security despite very low pay, protest was replaced by deferential and ‘submisive petitions For assistance ® Summarizing much of the research in this area, Leggett claims that "im all parts ofthe world, occupational [groups subject to great fictuations in income have traditionally thrown their support behind leftist parties" This evidence, though hardly ‘conclusive s suggestive. It invicats that the stabilization oF real incon for those close to subsistence may be a more powerful gol than achiev ing a higher average income; ic indicates that we may learn more about ‘the polities of peasants by asking not merely how poor they are but also how precarious thet livelihood i ‘Sarranion wth common advange” Rae Lorne ond Sci use (Berle ‘nL Anges Unvraty of Calfernis Pen 10) p. 354 Thott right Was wot “Te a sa atin iw ye xa IEE Iya tong ong te Nera Onde fe BD, pak ie tan Sela (hy Ya Dns foe eget (Ape Led, ate, an Cason Ronnge “The Lepiimaton of Protenc Compara {ne Sey fn Ea Hy Compara Sade Si a sy 3 (Apr 180), 5% Jn Lege Cas, ar nd alr (ew York Onord Uninet Pre, 2 Subsistence Security in Peasant Choice and Values We have seen how the narrowness of the peasants economic margin leads him to choose techniques that are safe even if they give aay something in average yickl. Socially as well the peasant in principle secks to transfer as much of his economic risk 28 posible to other instittions—to give income as ransom for safe. I subsistence security isa more active principle of peasant choice and values than maximizing average retuin, this fac shouldbe reflected in hole series of shared preferences, In four major atest—stratiication, lage reciprocity. tenancy, and (aration ashing what one would an- _isipate those prefcrences@ bea the basis of onierations Tattempe eo show that evidence of actual preferences & substi in accord with what one wold deductvely expect. The safetyfne concept thus helps unify a stuctare of real preferences which might otherwise sccm anomalous, While the evidence prusenied here is largely taken from Southeast Asi, Tbekeveitmay-be rebresentative of mary peasant Rist axD Sreariricaion If income were the active principle of occupational preference, it ‘would be sufficient to rank occupations by average incotne t obtain a Schedule of preferences If on the other hand, subsistence security were the determining factor, one would expect that increments in economic Security would be 25 important as increments in income in structuring preferences. Just such considerations, judging from the ethnographic Titerature on Southeast Asia, appear to account for many preferences which do not make sense in terms of income alone. TThe conventional hierarchy of status among the rural poor i usually sspallbalde, tenant, sage laborer. Theve are not, of course, mutually Exclusive categories, since iti common to find cultivators who simul- taneously own some land and farm adiional lanl a tenants, 28 well 8 veage lnborers who have a plo of their own. Yer, through much of Colonial and contemporary Southeast Asia, these categories have had octal reality in preferences and in status in the countryside despite the fact that the categories cook! and dit overlap considerably in terms of income. Marginal smallholders, for instance, were often poorer than tenants who coud rent large plots marginal tenants in turn, were often poorer in a good labor market than wage workers, The socal ticking: 356 "WP MORAL YONOMY OF tHP PRASANE power of this hierarchy—even when it seemed anomalous in income terme—ean be explained, I believe, by the sharp drop in security which cach of thew descending statuses ordinarily implied The key advantage of the smallholder was that he possessed, in his ‘own hands, the means of his subsistence. This access to subsistence, Unlike that of most tenants is not as contingent on the good will of another man, Although he may not do quite s0 well as a large-scale tenant ina given season, his claim tothe product ofthe land he hols is far stronger and therefore his subsistence generally more secure." The value of owning land lies in the owner's immunity from involuntary loss ff land oF its product"® Actual title, then, assumes significance on} insofar ast symbolizes a more secure access to the means of subsistence In portions of Tonkin, Upper Burma, and Java, some Forms of tenancy have traditionally been so secure that the social significance of legal tile ‘eas minimal. Where tenancy was less secure, the significance of owner- ship was consequently larger * Inthe commercializing economies of colonial Southeatt Asia, iaim to the product of the land hae another eritiel advantage. The direct consumption of Food crops inaulated peasant from the Huctuae tions of market prices. Aga, the smallholder or " right live shore frugally than a borer in 2 boom market, but hisliving was steadier, he preferred “the long-run stability of land derived income Compared with dhe uncertaintics of the labor market”® The wisdom of thiscourse was only too evident tothe peasantry of Southeast Asia in the Great Depression when the Vietnamese, Javanese, Burmese, and Filipino peasants who had been forced onto the labor market had to reqeat in disarray back to the subsistence econom" Similar considerations of subsistence security impel peasants generally to choose 1 bare subsistence as a tenant over wage labor. A tenant not only avoided the full impact of matket Muctuations but he often gained 1 Moerman, grees Chae and Pram Chir,» 98 2 Whee tnd poland cheap of cau the sol gnance of nership pe sc iay aft appetites paleo tape site of suo nd td atc or uber be vet or borer sar move sdrntageo stems of ene {Neer sha lowest Tempra of cl vendita ome ‘tranpn ht ibe tae rods hve ena be ee fa, "Sean, The Ronis of arg 190 {The bes acum of ts rv Elford Geers desaipon of the Jeane ini ae gh tn xi tn rage (Ger cual Ion Peasant choice ap vaLUrs Po access to the resources of the owner who hal an interest in his subsi= tence atleast until the crop was harvested, Insofar as tenancy involves link oa patron who will help in a cis t may be rationally preferred by thorecloe to subsietence over labor for cash at & higher average rate of return. In parts of Central Luzon, according to Takehashi, peasants «continued as tenants on small patches of land that returned them much less than wage labor only because of the economic insurance the land- lord provided. "So long as they remain tenants, they ean expect to borrow living expenses from their landlords, in other words, the minimum level of iveinood of tenants is ensured by landlords." James Anderson, discussing tenancy in Pangasinan, Central Luzon, explains the preference there For tenancy in identical term Even under the traditional tenancy system. - tenants are somewhacbetter off than agriculturallaborers. . . “Tenants under the traditional system sem ling fo pu up sh ss sjutcs fortis Compensating security. They may not ready give up these advantages without a significant gain in income which could compensate them Tor their loss of security In the Mekong Deits of Vietnam as well, where tenancy was les stable than in Pangasinan often included the same valuable fringe benefits Small tenants are not mich beter off than simple cools; the land they rent provides them only an average of 73 Piastes or 48% of their total resources, » But the great superiority of the small tenantover the coolieis his certainty of geting advances if he necds them. While the coolie docs not ingpre the confidence: of the ioneylende, the tenant fas an astured evedit source in his land lord... The ie of thesmall tenant isnot much mae rile than that of the coi, buh Bator protertd gaint the Backs miey.” (Colonial officials in Lower Burma, attempting to explain why the pref ference for tenancy prevailed despite a buoyant labor market in the 1920s, found that easy access to landlord credit was the motive. "But people wil seek to secure 2 tenancy because of the ability t0 borrow re 106), p15. Se abo Jorge Pron, "LandTevare and Lee of Livg ia Centr Sb" Stes eprerer 18) 308 1} Anderson, "Some Aipecs of Land ad Sc ina Fanganan Caan iyi Socal ira 10 ay. A) ph ne {Moin Stent por Sao 1898192, Selene Offer U. Ta Gx Rangoon:98 TW MORAL PoONOMY OF TH PEASANT ‘Ownership was prised over tenancy and tenancy over easal lar becaue, even though they might overlap in terls of income, each Fepresented s quantum leap inthe reliability of subsistence, Crs see Ty was, therefore, a more aive principle of ratifation inthe peat- fs ve than sncome. Disinaions en the categories of tenant and ithorer were, moreover, largely predicted on the tcurity of tenure oF vworkand the degre of sotal inrance the owner or employer cur tomar give Perhaps the best example anywhere of alabor system which depended tnadionally forts cofesion on sobastence guarantes was the oman! telatinship beeen landed and landlem cavern tnd. Thi aysem provided 4 xed annual payment in kind fo the landless clients of @ fees castor in return for thelr castespecfied reves, Is effect tras precy to punrantec 4 minimum suteence level tothe poorer {aes in an agrarian sytem fraught with risks As Scatlett Epstein note, Sntucbies were prepared t accept the ser of xed rand because t provided them with security even in bad yeart’> Since the fetarn to the lower cate are ii from yea to year, the profi of bumper crop arued almodt ently othe landowning dase Following 4 poor harve, however, the owner clivatorrhadl no more grain eat than did their weet dependents The exploaive festares of the system are obvious inaamuch as tix based ona cate monopoly of land and raafers mos i nota ofthe surplus beyond subnence need 0 the dominant cant socal tena, thought be explained by the fac that it gave rss subsistence guarantee to subordinate castes inal but the mow eststrophie arvesta Tle sume patern of socal choice hos among Javanese rural work ers. Van et Rolf bas reported that vanes. Inbores near Kei ol ns oe or of ac he noe rer he mppang) eve thou ened mote work, Beaute they “were seared felon pero of reaping ov ofa dente aroun of pad Ail forte ago reapers the tine of work and therefore the amount The they woul ge wat uncertain’ General aeitaalabor by ‘evernment of Barn, 12, 68 Se lee Ror on tees Seti Bon Dae Semon 193898, Seem Ofer Maung Moung Range: Covernen of ‘ir, 10) p 8, which note Some vores contents ry conor the ‘emer tence he poe ome Scat Ins in Rayman Pry Ths Seve tupac. Tac N50, pp BHO Buran 2H 10. GE Van der Ka, The Hirde of te aba Rn ete at fase A's he aia ace Pca ne oc can wasant CHOICY AND ALLS 30 the year or season with meals provided, though it pai lst, was prefera- ble fo daily wage labor without meals, a secure tenaney with taditional crise assistance was favored over unstable tenancy with impersonal lind- lords Just as the shepherd, the permanent farm laborer, or the domes- tieservantin rural Europe paid for hiselativesecurty with low wages," 0 also did subsistence guarantees come at a premium for Southeast ‘Asian peasants Where acapitalistlabor marker existed, one might even ‘measure the relative preference for security over income by the wage premium sacrificed for successively more secure situations, as employers ould take full economic advantage of the subsistence ethic. “Tine ecnerat role of security for the peasantry suggest that interpreta: of peasant polities based on their deprivation in income terme may vo do their circumstances justice, It implies, for example, that down- ‘wardly mobile peasants may resist mos biterly at those thresholds where they rsk losing much of their previous security. One such threshold ‘occurs atthe point where self-sufficient smallholders lose the land that gives them their fairly autonomous subsistence" “The means of subss: {ence pastes out of their hands and they face having to become more ot leas permanently dependent clients whose security s contingent on theit relations with those who have the resourees to help them."* AS the {Chin Sed Sais 9 doe by De Scala, ol 8, Indo Econ The ‘hua of Dual i Thay and Pay (The Hage! W. va Hoere 196 iPass con centr ip oti seiko chy Se acne by non wih os hs pons cea 12 Fer sbeperds ad pettanent arm Iorers ace JA De Rives ine ade of Andatsa, Tie Pup of he Sera (Cheapo. Univer of Chicago Pre 190) or mest se, for example ML. Thompson Boia Lande Sty mt Nira ‘Cnn tendon Routdge and Refan Po 16) 18 Te beyentencewasconmon la preclna Sone Assbutiwas ar ehemospatt tate the ned for pha protection rate than the aed or and Thy ixprenion we Occ amoreor lee sutewpnos acces equ, ‘eae ete the Freda Ines wok indepen Te eae in ate npn edn J by heft wore odie Fasc au in ong vile expres in prc by re Movement of Morh Central Joa” Bogen te Tol Lond Yeni 1204 {ir 7 ng sing er by WJ, Joo Fg Tomi,40 Tie MORAL ECONOMY OF THE PEASAITT landlman ratio worsened in colonial Southeast Asia, the land holding of an evergrowing proportion of the peasantry was inadequate for its Subsistence. The result might be termed a ‘ersis of dependence” involv ing a painful choice between an economically precarious independence and a mote secure situation of dependence,” "A second threshold—one far more characterise of such areas ax Lower Burma. and. Cochinchina where capitalist agriculture was sMronges-—occurs when the subvistence guarantees tithin dependency collapee, Atthis point, a landowning elites stripping away the lat more tr less feudal gutrantees shielding the peasanty from she ful impact of ‘market fluctuations, Here we can expect—and have seen historically—a ferocious resistance. Without secure tenancies, pre-harvest loans, lower rents in bad years, and help at times of sickness the peasant shoulders the full risk not only of erop yield fluctuations but of the labor and commodity markets as well As we shall see later, the impact of both ‘commercial agriculture and the growth of the sate was to steadily ‘esluce the reliability of subsistence guarantees to point where peasants had hardly any other alternative but resistance Risk Insomance ms TH Vincace Ifthe need fora guaranteed minimum is powerful motive in peasant life, one would expect to find institionalize patterns in peasant com= munities which provide for this need, And, in fact itis above ll within the vilage—in the patterns of sil control and reciprocity that ruc ture daly conduc-—shere the subsistence ethic finds socal expression. TThe principle which appears to unify a wide array of behavior thi “Al Vilage families wil be guaranteed a ruinimal subsience niche insofar af the resources controlled by villagers make this possible.” Village egalitarianism in thie sens is conservative not radical it claims that all should have a plac, a living, not that all should be equal “The socal strength ofthis ethic, its protective power forthe village poor, vatied from village to village and from region to region. Iwas, on balance, strongest in areas where traditional vilage forms were well developed and not shattered by colonialism—Tonkin, Annam, Java, Upper Burmi—and weakest in more recently setled pioncer areas like Lower Burma and Cochinehina. This variation is instructive, however, foritisin precisely those areas where the village is most autonomous and land and consnsinal economic rights which made h posible forthe poorest Wo eke it a Inaepeodnt ing ov dsapening see Mare Stach Fam ur ory tn Ey on ‘un Chaar, rane fer Soodhemer(Bekcey. Univerky of Caio Pre Tlammond and Barbra Hand, Ph Page Latins, 32 New York Heper Torboks 190) peasant CHOICE AND VALS “ cohesive that subsistence guarantees are strongest. Given control over their local affairs, then, peasants choose wo create an institution that normally insures the weakest against ruin by making certain demands on better off villagers ‘An understanding of the informal social guarantees of village life is crucial to our argument because, as they are sustained by local opinion, they reprerent something of living normative model of equity and instce. They represent the peasant wew of decent rocal reltions. Em boeing the right ofall to a subsistence niche and the pooling of risks, they are standards of moral jidgment which will reappear later inthe peasant view of the state and of landlords. Given a choice, the peasant Preferred system of tenancy or dependency in which the landlord! patron protected his tenanlcient against ruin in bad years and an Dffcaldom which, at the very leat, made allowances ia periods of These elite should, ieally, assume a protective role akin to __ village patterns of sharing, To the extent thatthe peasant could actually Structure his relations with landowners and with the state, we shall see that he did move the relationship inthis direction. Few village studies of Southeast Asa fall to remark on the informal socal controls which aet to provide Fr the minimal needs ofthe village poor." "The postion of the betterof appears to be legitimized only to the extent that ther resources are employed in ways which meet the Droadly defined welfare needs of villagers: Most sides repeatedly em haste the informal soil controls which end either to redistribute the frcalth orto impose specific obligations on is owners. The prosaic even Danal, character of these socal controls belies their importance. Well todo villagers avoid malicious gossip only atthe price ofan exaggerated {generosity They ate expected to sponsor more conspicuously ‘celebrations at weddings to show greater charity to kin and neig to sponsor local religious activity and to take on more dependents and employees than the average household. The generosity enjoined on the eh is not without its compensations. It redounds to their growing prestige and serves to surround them with a grateful clientele which helps validate their postion in the community In adeiion, it repre 16, See for nape, Pierre Gourou Fas ofthe Tn Dal, vk 7 Witla and Cormne Nyuegper Tage uae are Pip, Sx Care, Sete New Wk on Wie 1, hp: Gi ay Pen J ‘York Joa Wey, 183); Rote RJ gam an oc Rat Cra fo (Neu ove We erty Stet Sais Crt Repo Sr 88“ "THE MORAL ECONOMY OF THE PEASANT sents st of socal debts which can be converted into goods and services ited be What is notable is that the normative order of the village imposes certain standards of performance on is better-off members: There i particular rule of reaiprocty—a set of moral expectation—wbich Applies to their exchanges with other villagers, Whether or not the ‘wealthy actly live up to these minimal moral requirements of reci= prociy is another question, but there can be lite doubt that they exist Their normative characteris apparent inthe reaction provoked by their Violation, Ta village Thailand, for example A farmer with money is in a position to exert pressure on many ther farmers. He isthe pha (big man] in the plujay-phunay) [big ‘man-lite man) relationship. Ie is to him that others must often ura inorder tobortow and torent tools to obtain cash loans and land to farm. Once the transaction & made, the debtor is obligated in many small ways throughout the year. However, wealth without the pro: per behavior results in contempt and malicious gosip, and receives ‘nly token respect in the poor farmer's moment of need.!™ A wealthy man who presses his tactical advantage does so atthe cost of his reputation and moral standing in the community. The same reaction ‘eas noted by Fith in hi study of « Malay fishing village, TThese two features (small and ephemeral differences in wealth), combined with the practice of charity enjoined on the rich, probably ‘acount t0 1 considerable extent for the absence of any marked feeling of resentment towards the wealthy on the part ofthe poorer lements inthe community... . Where resentment and ertcsm fo enter is when the rich man does not show himself generous, ‘when “his liver is thin,” when he does not practice arity 0 the ‘poor, build wayside shelters, or prayer houses, of entertain liber all. Where such social controls survived with some vigor in the colonial period they tended to block the growth of sharp dass cleavage within the village. Ia East and Gentral Java this has meant villages of "jus tnoughs” and “notaquite-enoughs” in which a Byzantine maze of land, 16, Howard eva Kalman, Bagh 4 Conmuny Sad Thane Mongrap of ‘he action f Stam Secs Nelo Locust Vale Ni} | pst, O80 P38 1a. Raymond rth, Moy Forme Ther Pn ron (London Role se Aegan Pa 86 p25 rasan cnoies AND VALS. 8 sharecropping, and labor rights have tended, until recently, ro provide villagers a minimal niche, albet at declining levels of weilace or al “The crisis value of such leveling pressures is most dramatically evident fora faminestricken village in Tonkin where Gourou reported that only the equal distribution of hunger throughout the commune prevented anyone from starving. Guarantees were less ironclad elvewhere, but They generally helped “poor families to manage through periods of dlc." ‘Occasionally, where the communitarian tradition was strongest, most, sotabiy in Tonkin, Annam, and Java, the subsistence ethic took the Foren of village rights overland, An average of roughly 25 pereent of the land io Tonkin and Annim was communal land, and in Quang Tri and Quang Binh provinces the figure was over 80 percent of paddy land. Some of this nd was alloted more or lesson the basi of need to poor villagers The rent rom communal land was deployed in part to help the | poor pay taxes and to support noncultivating widows and orphans Flsewhere, rights to culate local wasteland within the vilage domain, igazing rights gleaning rights, and the customary rule that no outside tenants of laborers be engaged if a needy villager could be found, all served the same end of enabling the village poor to scrape by. Village redistribution worked unevenly and, even atitsbest, produced no egalitarian utopia. We may suppose that there was always some tension in the village between the betteroff whe hoped to minimize their obligations and the poor who had most to gain from communal social guarantees. The poor, for their part, got "a place,” not an equal income, and rust have suffered a loss of status as a result of theit permanent dependence, Nevertheles, this pattern did represent the ‘minimal moral requirements of village mutuality It worked through the fupport or aciueacence of mos villagers and, above alin normal times ieassured the “survival of the weakest.” What moral solidarity the village 20, Geer, dpa tin chap, 3. For the argue ha he pate as sented proteins lant Mg Lyon, Bass of Coir tm Real Jove, Research eonopraphNas here Uninet of Caforeis Center er South a Soahen Bein the numer of Java” Par Fiapint 02 (September 189), 1-17 I" Govreu, Pn of he Fenn Dp. 60. BE Sul ty Peso Styne, p13, BS Yoo Henry enone agree de nda a Government Ginéae de“ {ME MORAL BCONOMY OF THE PEASANT possessed ar illage was in fact based ultimately on its capacity to protect, fn feed its inhabitants. So long ay village membership was valsablein a pinch, the “te tradition” of village norms and customs would com mand a broad acceptance. Risk aN TENANCY AND SHARHCROPPING ‘Virtually everywhere in lowland Southeast Asa the colonial introduce tion of captalit forms of landosenership, coupled with population trowth, fostered the development ofs large css of tenants and share roppets whose livelihood was contingent on their arrangements with a Tandowner. Village sharing and cassal wage labor were not unimportant for members of this class, but their subsistence security or insecurity derived largely from the sytem of land tenure under which they culti- vated The sme moral criteria which suffused village redistributive norms, the sime emphasis on subsistence security, may be used as a basis for evaluating tenancy arrangements. Implictly, the peasant would ask, “Does thisinstitutionsafeguard my minimal social rights; does it provide sme with a living regardless of what the and may yield this season?” TO the extent that itd, we would expect the institution of Lindow nership to retain at least 4 modicum of legkimacy though it might claim large share of the harvest To the extent tht it Failed to guarantee even the ‘minimal needs ofculivators, we would expect landlords to lose whatever ‘moral caim to legitimacy they might once fave bad, Land tenure systems can be located along a continuum according 10 how they distribute the risk of Nuctuating yields between the landowner and cultivator, In Table | three simplified systems of tenure are ranked along auch a continuum for purposes of illustration, The continuum portrays the extent to which a tenure system insulates the culator from crop loses that will ruin him, Toward the “A” end of the con ‘inuum, the landlord protects the tenant living, while at the °C" end, the tenant, in effec, guarantees the income of the landlord, come what may. Peasnts, under most circumstances, have naturally preferred ten lres that provide subsistence criss insurance. This preference should bbe most strongly present where plots are smal, yields highly variable peasants poor, and where few akernative subsistence opportunities exist, Ieisweaker where large tenancies, stable yields, well-off peasantry. and ‘ample outside employment opportunities greatly reduce the likelihood ‘of ruin. The conditions of tenancy in colonial Southeast Asia have far more closely approximated the first set of conditions The relative legitimacy of tenure systems that embody subsistence guarantees would spring from the fact that the culivator's needs are PEASANT CHOICE AND VALUES 6 Table 1, Distribution of Risk in Tenancy Sytes a o 6 eg. Traditional Equal shares fg. Fined vent (eudal systems of shavecropping tenancy CCultistors mini! Caivators return Culivator assumes esr xed and xed proportion of rk-andprofeof sarantced ep ncerprse Landowner amumes —Landowner'sreturna Landowners return fixed proportion of Sxed-and guaranteed Soe taken as the frst legkimate claim on the harvest. Such arrangements protect his livelihood and sift the risk ofthe enterprise ro the shoulders Of the otsner who is normally better able to absorb it, A full subsistence fuarantee must, of course, go beyond the tenant’ prior claim to the top: for what if the roca erop will not supply his minimal need? Here the subsistence guarantee involvesa subsidy to carry the tenant chrough disastrous season. Thus, complete subsistence criss insurance implies a personal commitment ofthe landovener to the minimum welfare needs Sf hie tenant, The terms “patron” and “patronage” in thei classical use ‘become applicable here inasmuch as the relationship is uhimately fo cused upon the landowner's responsibility for the tenant and bis family as consumers rather than upon an impersonal economic bargain. The beneficiary of these services ix often more than a mere tenant; he it usually a “dient” Ged to his landlord by personal deference and a senge of obligation. Elements of the patron-client bond are evident in most traditional tenaney systems in Southeast Asi, but they were probably beat represented in the late nineteenth-century hacienda systetn in the Philippines” 25 Into noe primary on he pois or dg et ‘eran’ inal nee good years Insrpos rae ere the sen maybe sR“6 {VIE MORAL HCONOMY OF THE PEASANT tn beeping with the safety. principe, the fst thing a peas sould want aw about tenaney sytem is what wil foe hi ina Tun yen. The treonal sytem, arsng tral dase, wil port tim: 50-80 sharecropping may or may no support him. Athough the terunt a landowner uly have the rik of ht Auetuations there {eno guarantee that 30 percent of he yield any given sean will meet his base requirements The abl "shrecropping” or xed rent” are often onl indifferent guides othe actual enc) relation. The traditional “kasama” tenancy System in Phlppine ie eativton, for example, nominally describes 30-30 sharecopping In prac, however, in some areah "AR Owner, parcualy miu owner obliged in manner of speaking, to Reps tent when he hy able™ while in other regions no merey shown. The key the aal content of the telaionshipe—theaetal stern of reiproity—av noi formal desrptve term Shareerop- Pers who can count oninterexefre food loa prio to harvest who are lowed more than their nominal share ofthe eon aad yea, who get help in eve of ines, who enjoy perpetual tenure, and who can count on ptt favors fom the landowner havea substataly stronger subs {ence imurance than ove would infer from the Usual division of the hed rente—in cath or in Kid—woul, in safety-fist terms be the most onerous. The ample of copied Nuctatons ae elected in Tutte tenants come wie the shaecropping ser ais to rent there ino aves the ised ent sytem demas is iexore Uieducevenif note single stale matures, A simple hypothetical ease wil trate what happen mgood and bal years under both sates Gee Table Tnthisexumple shares ae vided 300d the Bx ent setat haf the yield im an average year, Let us asume that 40 baskets of Fee are the minimal subsinence acer of a cltvators fail. In an erage year both stems yield the tenant D0 baskets of He, pal Inargn over base eed fn a bumper yea, ofcourse, the tenant does tell undes both sytem, but exceptionally well under fixed rent Let ‘i found In Bene |. Keke, "estan Unter w the Huk Revi a he Papper tn St 9 agus) 64-21 food thre inno surplus Seen there an enable rage lw forte wach hep Mharssu plots phoned of tonid hte Gone Kind wear of cee ‘lobipuion hat he avoids ath pe Final ofcurn patna nore sme ‘ahh spl anni pgs goal af which are throws imo the each int poor yet he Sang ae peal eager PEASANT CHOICE AND VALUES a Table 2. Comparison of Crop Division under ‘Sharecropping and Fixed Rent 30-50 Shararopping Vie 100" 200 50 Landlords share ‘0 100 25 Sharecroppers share 0 100 Po ike (fed at 50% of average yr) viet 100200 50 Landlords rent ‘30 ‘30 30 Tenants retur = 150 °, the yield under fived-rent fall below 99, however, and every subsequent basket lost comes out of the tenants subsistence needs. Ina poor season, ‘hen the total rel is only 50 baskets, che tenants left with absolutely nothing, while he must deliver to the Landowner, who is probably well off, the baskets of rie that would otherwise feed bs family. While fixed rent may maximize a tenant’ profit, it also minimizes hs security; tsa Felentless claim that takes no heed of bis fundamental needs" ‘There is ample evidence that peasants in many parts of lowland Southeast Asia judged the fairness of tenure systems according to how reliable they were in subsistence terms, The very measure of land in Vietnam, the mau, was fied not as a unit of area but as a constant product; thus the mau was smaller in Tonkin, where land was more fertile and larger forthe poorer soils of Annam. Vietnamese measured land in subsitence unite much a4 the Irish would speak of a farm of tree cows co indicate its fodder capacity! Ina tenancy arrangement, similarly, man fist asked what his pile of rice would look like ater the crop was divided, not what the landoneners cut might be, Inquiries into tenancy in Lower Burma in the 1920s showed that cukivators regarded i as reasonable to pay a higher perce share of their yield to the ‘owner where the land was more fertile or where they could cultivate larger plots In either case, the landowner could take a larger share and they would sll end the season with an ample subsintence ration. On poor lands, with high production costs, they might regard even a smaller percentage as insupportable. And, of course, ina bad year they expected ‘SU Nf Vinh Lng Borde asl, chap] or acnparate em ia cadona sui etd ea ce ecu. Pg oa "SE Rp ny oth Codon aol Toad Ler T. Coupe, Andina Ci Semce tangon: Superinendent of Coveratem Pring. 12, pi renter rere van Hie Cnr oot8 {Hr MORAL HeONONEY OF THF PrASaITE leniency, Vietnamese landlords also received an expanding share of t ‘top on more fertile lands Ie docs not follow, therefore, that a lan ford who takes half the eropis regarded as 10 percent more exploitative than the landlord who takes 40 percent. The reverse may be thecase and the major criterion, as always, i how much ilefton the tenants thresh ing floor when rent and production costs are pad, While the landlords share and what remains for the tenant are hardly unrelated, the later tannot be dircety inferred from the former ‘Where tenants had sufficient bargaining strength, the conditions of shareeropping tended to approximate their view of what was tolerable Heney reports that customary sharecropping terms in Tonkin were, by custom, waived when they threatened the sharecropper's subsistence Mock: “the owner leaves the entre harvest tothe thatecropper in the fevent of a poor harvest!"** Farly rubber. sharestapping_ practices reflected the same concern forthe subsistence claim ofthe share tenant Under the bagi dua (roughly, ‘partners’ or "halfshares’) system in Indonesia, che taper got less than half the proceeds when the price of laeex was high and a good deal more than half when the price was low.?> The owner thus assuined the bulk of market risks while che tapper’s income vas steadied, Generally, tenants could count more on such protection where landlord and cukivator were linked by kinship or lived Inthe same village or where a labor shortage made ic prudent to con rider their wishes. Where the tie ran against the tenant, he was more likely to resist both the switch from sharecropping to ixed-rent tenancy and the denial of the special consideration once shown him in hare The importance of subsistence concerns to landlord-tenant relation- ships is remarkably lustated in Luzon schere the Philippine govern tment has recently attempted to transform rice sharecrappers into fixed-rent tenants” In an effort to make the switch attractive, rents were to be fixed at a figure that corresponded to one-quarter of the average net ried after subtracting seed, harvesting, threshing, loading, hauling, and milling costs) prior to the date of the change. Sharectop: ping rents had been one-half ofthe gross harvest, with the landlord and tenant typically spliting production costs 50-50. Under the new system the tenant could thus expect to realize roughly double his previous 55: Nap ih Lng fo he atin, ha 2. 5 Boeke Te Scns he Nos nto: ony, p 1. Se Fre aes ‘os Van Ss Rous Retion bra Rete Cra f ao, 3S 3. Sc for example, Takannn, Lnd ond Pana marl Fay, 78 7, See the oh te line Sil Rvs, 01-2 January Ape 197, PASAT CHOICE AND VALUES ° income in an average year and, with the wse of new sce strains, perhaps ‘more than that Despite the considerable gain inaverageincome that the rnew system promised, many peasants were reluctant to switch. The reatons for thie reluctance were the new subsistence risks inherent in tenancy reform. First, there was the risk ofa xed rent alter a meager ‘op. For while under share tenancy he paid a percentage of whatever he managed to reap ina particular yeur, good or bud, unde leasehold fhe must pay the same atgount whether the harvest is abundant of ro, and what he eannoe pay at harvest time wil accrue ax deb to be pd at the next crop harvest" While the tenant might do far beter in a good year, the new leaschold arrangements shielded him less against disaster Second, and most important, leasehold frequently meant the end of a wide array of landlord services that were criteal to tenants’ subsistence security. These include! the landlord's share of production costs, lve interest production wns, food leans, help in time of illnes, acces to bamboo, wood, and water from the owner’ holding, and the Fight to plant hillside and vegetable crops. On the one hand, the tenant could hoot leasehold witha low, egal ent and greater autonomy but atthe oat of most previous landlord services and an unvarying charge on his harvest. On the other hand, he could remain a sharecropper paying 2 high, nonleyal rene which nevertheless varied with his yield and could ‘expect a continuation of landlord eredit and assistance” The options ‘were agonizing for peasants and many preferred to remain sharecrop- pers or to sign “compromise esses" which retained much ofthe security Of the old system. Actual paterns of choice, moreover, rfleced the ‘ubsistence concerns of tenants. Those moving to leasehold were pre tisely thowe for tshom the shift was least threatening: they farmed in areas where yields were steadiest, they rented larger and more profitable tenancies which reduced their need for credit, they tended alraody co Ihave landlords who seere strict and who granted them few customary 8 Bian Fopen, "Betwen the Lord and dhe Law, Tenant! Dilemmas Philp sign iS aay pa ah” TS profs fe highyieling ain der the Bed renter orth rear hey Isc aad in ect tog gn yeights, and they were more likely 1o have outside employment 10 fall tack upon, For these tenants the risks were minimized. Sharecroppers ‘with small plots, variable yields, no savings or steady outside employ- ‘ment, and lenient landlords, by contrast, had most to lose in terms of subsistence security and were mort reluctant to change, As one tenant explained, “I will hve to pay higher rent all my'life (under sharecrop- ping] but I can at least get food t0 live on now."** ‘Both the patternsof ehoice and the vales peasints brought to bear on that choice betray a constant preoccupation with subsistence risks, The ‘overriding goal was security” and “food and money for subsistence, ‘When leasehold involved no greater risks twas naturally very attractive, but where it threatened to undereut the existing subistence guarantees ‘and were, dangerous (of share tenaney, its potential rewards seeme gamble, Thete is some independent support for this interpretation from a recent opinion survey of cultivators in the same province. The results ‘tggest that there is a shared normative conception among tenants of ‘what constitutes a "good landlord” and thatthe provision of minimum welfare needs isa central part of this conception. When asked what ‘qualities the "good landlord?” should have, respondents said they would expect him to help with production costs, provide “fringe benefits,” and supply liberal crest The importance of production expenses is obvious in Tight of the inability of the typical tenant to pay for such inputs himself. ‘The term “fringe benefits” however, is something of a mis- nome, given the critical nature of such services. Included in this cate- ory were medicine snd doctor bill, free howsing and house lot, & ubsistence food ration (anions, aba, oF hugnis, and pre-threshing ee allowances (gad). Finally, share tenants demanded “credit,” inelud- ing lenient terms following a poor harvest. Taken together, fringe bene fis and credit represent the belief that share tenaney should provide a ‘guaranteed food supply and make allowances for the tenants meeds and pacity 0 pay in any given Year. Subsistence preoccupations are alo fefleced inthe major complaint against landlords and oversers (@ataala): namely that they were often too suit, enforcing the contract terms regardless of the yield or the difcalties of the cukivator. ‘The standard moral expectation is nowhere more clearly expressed than in this statement by a tenant in that area: “A man of bis landlords Converts Mueva Es PliippineSegia! aces 201-8 Jonny N78, 37 means was supposed to loan his tenants tice and help when times were Ihard, Thats part of being a landlrd."* A laallord who fais t0 honor bis ‘obligations becomes a"bad” landlord. Solong a the failure isan folate ‘ase, this judgment reflects only on the legitimacy of that particular landlord, Once the Faure becomes general, however, the collective legitimacy of landlords as a class may be called into question. "If share cropping arrangements are such that subsistence isassured, then it is seen 235 good system, For the major complaint about share tenancy i not the Gependency which i implies, but that often the share is insufficient 10 rect subsistence needs ** ‘The control of land became, in colonial Southeast Asia, the basis of rural power. Our knowledge of the priorities and needs of peasant culivators suggests that they had criteria of performance by which t0 judge the legitimacy of landed power and of those who exercised it Landlords were acceptable tothe extent that they acted as patrons—t0 the extent, tht is, that they used their surplus to provide crisis subs tence insurance to their clients. The peasant held a set of concrete role ‘expectations about the legitimate use of economic power, as expressed by PicRivers with reference to the Spanish peasant’ view of patton- age The resentment aims not so snuch at the existence of economic inequality asthe failure ofthe rich man to earefor those who are Tess fortunate: at his lack of chatty. Ie is not s0 much the system hich is wrong, itis the rich who are evil... . Patronage is good ‘when the patron is good, but like the friendship upon which ic bused, it has two faces. 1 can ether confirm the superiority of the senorito ort ean be exploited by the rich man to gain 2 nefarious ‘advantage over poor people. It covers a range of relationships from woble protection of dependents in accordance with the moral ol. ilarity of the pueblo tothe scurrilous coercions ofthe later period of cacipomo, The sytem‘, earl, mb to Be judged goad infer asi i aes 10-50 hectares 4 ” Over 50 hectares os 25 430 From province to province the figures varied greatly; in the more re- cently settled areas auch as Bac Liew atthe ip of Cochinchina ownership, ‘eas even more skewed, while in older areas such as My Tho in centeal Cochinchina there were proportionally more smallholders. Despite the 51, Alenander Woodside, Conmaniy and Reson Modem Vimon, (New Yor Meagher iti 1976) 978 DISTRIBUTION OF RISK AND COLONIAL CHANCE nm variation, nothing could mask the fat that the socal fabric of Gochin- china Was polarized by a mass of landless facing a powerful group of Tnngeholders some 8,00(' strong ‘TTeve were not more than 500 such grate and in Annam there were Fewer than 100. sm was never the hellmark of Delta landlords but, when labor vas ail scarce and the frontier al open, elements of paternalism were ‘ot precluded. Descriptions of cass relationships in this period refer to the “quasi-feudal authority” exercised by the large landoveners who then and of the “protection” which they sto their dependents." They group on ther estates numerous Families of tenants who cultivate the land in lots from 5-20 hectares ‘These tenants as well as any small owners for whom they are rmoneylenders,constivate a veritable clientele of theirs" We find older landlords recalling nostagically the days when, in retusn for deference, tenants were assisted at births and funerals, and given loans when they were in need.* Ie would hardly do to exaggerate the liberality of land lords, who from the beginning were speculators, But iti probably accurate to conclude, ax Brocheux does, that “The doctor-landlord who tives assistance and distributes medicines free, the den chu who lowers Fents on account of a bad harvest, one who adopts the children of humane landlords “were ean were ne rave °°" OF coutve 10 ety fot rare” ie to imply that they were not typical either, ‘One key test ofan agrarian system For the tenant, as we have seen is what happens when the harvest fais, While the tenancy contract itself lino entitle the fasion (enant) €0 any reduction in rent in such circumstances, there is some evidence that until atleast the 1920s the landlord found tin hie interew to meet the minimum needs of his cultivators "It is common practice (courant et effen! forthe landlord to take from his tenants whatever it left over above that which i necessary for their family subsistence? ™ The explokativeness of a sytem that transfers the entire surplus above subsistence to the landowner is per featly evident Nonetheless, the tenants basic needs did atleast const 5 Pal Bere Le Prine onoige deci (Pai: Nouveles Eto anes x Goto thon dep 284 5. Henry Eri pr, p. £7 See Broce, “Grande proprietie”p.6, hotter ou un em aes le 36" Sansom. Te ron age p29. ‘ele eon” Jean Chevseaun Traitn tin a PaaS 8 Brochevn “Grand propretares ph