COVERAGE & POINTERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II  FINAL

EXAM
Date:  30 May 2015,  Thursday,  6:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m.
EXAM is in MCQ & ESSAY Form.
 
I. HABEAS CORPUS

Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all

armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when
the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the
Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight
hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a
report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of
the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety
requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours

following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with
its rules without need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by

any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision
thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the

Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on
military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to
function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall apply

only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in,
or directly connected with, invasion.

1
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, any
person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within
three days, otherwise he shall be released.

1.         What is a Writ of habeas corpus as distinguished

from the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus?

2.         What may be suspended the Writ or the Privilege?

The Privilege is suspended not the writ.

3.         In what cases may the Privilege of Writ of HC be

suspended?

The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is

based on two grounds to wit, “Invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it.”

4.         Who has the power to suspend the Privilege? The

President is entrusted the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus.

5.         How long can the Pres. suspend the Privilege? 60 days

6.         What is the duty of the Pres. after suspension of the

privilege or declaration of martial law?

7.         Can the Pres. set aside or ignore revocation of

suspension of the PWHC?

8.         What happens after 60 days of President’s

suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?

9.      Can the action of suspension of PWHC by the president

or congress be subject to review? YES, the SC may review, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the
factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of
the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof

10.    How soon should SC promulgate a decision after

a   petition for review is filed challenging the sufficiency or
factual basis of the suspension of the PWHC? Within 30 days
from its filing

2
 11.   What is the jurisprudence laid in 1949 Montenegro v.
Castaneda? 

Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ Habeas Corpus  as a

Political Question being a Prerogative by the President
In October 1950, Montenegro’s son was arrested by military agents. Three
days after the arrest, PP 210 was proclaimed suspending the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus. Montenegro then filed before the court to have
his son be set free for his arrest was w/o cause and that the said PP
should not be applied retroactively to his son for it would then constitute a
violation of the constitutional prohibition against bill of attainders.
Montenegro then filed a petition for the writ of habeas corpus demanding
the detainers to bring his son’s body and explain his detention. Castaňeda
et al argued that the court has no judicial authority over the matter
invoking the PP and the previous ruling in Barcelon vs Baker.
ISSUE: Whether or not Montenegro’s petition should be granted.
HELD: As ruled by the SC in the Barcelon case, Montenegro’s petition is
likewise denied. The constitutional authority of the President to suspend in
case of imminent danger of invasion, insurrection or rebellion under
Article 7 may not correctly be placed in doubt.

CRUZ:
In 1951, President Quirino based his suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus on “sedition” and “imminent danger of insurrection or
rebellion.” If he had not added the latter ground, which was listed in the
1935 charter, the Supreme Court would have, in Montenegro vs.
Castaneda, invalidated his proclamation.

Supposing, however that the suspension is based on the grounds

prescribed by the Constitution, will the Supreme Court have the
competence to ascertain the existence of such grounds for the purpose of
determining the validity of suspension?

Then Montenegro Case affirmed the doctrine announced in Barcelona vs.

Baker and held that the determination by the President of the Philippines
of the existence of any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution for
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus should be
conclusive upon the courts. The justification was that the President, with
all the intelligence sources available to him as commander-in-chief, was in
a better position than the Supreme Court to ascertain the real estate of
peace and order in the country.

3
 12.   In Lansang v Garcia 1971?   Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile 1983?
Return to Montenegro

CRUZ: The doctrine in the above case was subsequently abandoned

in Lansang vs. Garcia, where the Supreme Court declared that it
had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by President Marcos in
August 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground could be
established. Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive
evidence on this mater, including two closed-door sessions in which
relevant classified information was divulged by the government to
the members of the Court and three selected lawyers of the
petitioners. In the end, a unanimous Court, after satisfying itself
that there was actually a massive and systematic Communist-
oriented campaign to overthrow the Republic of the Philippines by
force, as claimed by the President, decided to uphold the
suspension.

13.   ILAGAN V ENRILE IN 1985?

FACTS:

 On May 10, 1985, Atty. Ilagan was arrested by the military on the
basis of a mission order allegedly issued by the Ministry of National
Defense. On the same day, Atty. Arellano, while visiting his
colleague at the detention camp, was also arrested. On May 13,
1985, upon hearing that he was also wanted, Atty. Risonar went to
the military camp to verify the report and was also arrested,
likewise on the basis of a mission order signed by then General
Echevarria. A petition for habeas corpus was then filed on behalf of
the three lawyers by the IBP, the Free Legal Assistance Group
(FLAG), and the Movement of Attorneys of Brotherhood, Integrity
and Nationalism (MABINI).
 The writ was issued on May 16, 1985, and in return the respondents
contended that the detainees were covered by a preventive
detention action issued against them on January 25, 1985; that the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended as to them;
and that courts lacked the authority to inquire into the cause and
validity of their detention. There was the further insinuation that the
detained lawyers were involved in subversive acts. For lack of
evidence linking to them to such acts, the SC ordered their
temporary release on the recognizance of their principal counsel,

4
 former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and retired Justice J.B.L
Reyes.
 The detainees were not released, however. On May 27, 1985,
respondents filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of the
Court’s order, reiterating its lack of jurisdiction because of the
suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, and declaring that,
while there was an order of the Court for the release of the
detainees, there was also a PDA directing their detention, which was
binding on the respondents.
 Then, on the following day, the respondents filed an urgent motion/
manifestation stating that an information for rebellion was filed on
May 27, 1985, against the detained attorneys before the RTC of
Davao and that a warrant of arrest has been issued against them;
hence, the petition should be dismissed for having become moot
and academic. The SC agreed with the military and granted the
motion, declaring as follows:

14.   MONCUPA V. ENRILE?

FACTS: Petitioner, together with others, was arrested and detained.

The next day, on the allegation that he was a staff member of NDF, a
Presidential Commitment Order was issued against him. It was
ascertained that the petitioner was not a member of any subversive
organization. Both investigators recommended the prosecution of the
petitioner only for illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession
of subversive documents. Petitioner’s motions for bail were denied by
the lower court. The petitioner was temporarily released from
detention. It is to be noted that attached to the petitioner’s temporary
release are restrictions imposed on him.

ISSUE: WON the instant petition has become moot and academic in
view of the petitioner’s temporary release.

HELD: The reservation of the military in the form of restrictions

attached to the temporary release of the petitioner constitutes
restraints on the liberty of Mr. Moncupa. Such restrictions limit the
freedom of movement of the petitioner. It is not physical restraint
alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus. The present
petition for habeas corpus has not become moot and academic. A
release that renders a petition for a writ of habeas corpus moot and
academic must be one which is free from involuntary restraints. Where
a person continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his
constitutional freedoms, where there is present a denial of due
process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but appear to
be unnecessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid

5
has, in the light of subsequent developments, become arbitrary, the
person concerned or those applying in his behalf may still avail
themselves of the privilege of the writ.

15.   WHAT IS  THE WRIT OF AMPARO?

The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any

person whose right to life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ
shall over extra-legal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof.

16.   WHAT’S HABEAS DATA?

Section 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is a remedy

available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence
of the aggrieved party.

Sec. 2. Who May File. - Any aggrieved party may file a petition for
the writ of habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:

(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party,

namely: the spouse, children and parents;

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the

aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph;

II.         RIGHTS OF ACCUSED IN CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS

The rights of the accused in the CRIMINAL DUE PROCESS or criminal

administration of justice may be divided into different stages or
phases. For each stage/phase, the accused is accorded several
constitutional, statutory and procedural rights and remedies.
 

1.    Rights of Accused BEFORE TRIAL

6
    Search and Seizure Warrants; Warrant of Arrest topics

See Q&A attached as Annex A

   Custodial Investigation Rights of Accused

See Q&A attached as Annex B

2.    Rights of Accused DURING TRIAL – see the Q&A I emailed

before

3.         Rights of Accused AFTER TRIAL – see attached lecture

notes on double jeopardy & cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment

A.     CONSTITUTIONAL  RIGHTS GENERALLY APPLICABLE TO

CRIMINAL ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies and

adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason
of poverty.

Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be

suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion, when the public
safety requires it.

Section 16.  All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of

their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

Section 22.  No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

 

B.     CONSTITUTIONAL  RIGHTS   BEFORE  TRIAL: ( ART. III

-  SECTIONS   2,  3,  12,  13,  14 )

Section  2.  The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the

7
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. 

Section 3.  x x x

2.  Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section

shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Section 12.

1)     Any person under investigation for the commission of an

offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
 
2)     No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him.
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.

 
3)     Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

 
4)     The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violations of this Section as well as compensation to the
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their
families.

Section 13.  All persons, except  those charged with offenses

punishable by reclusion perpetua  when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Section 14.

1)     (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense

without due process of law.
 

8
2)    (2)  In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

 C.     CONSTITUTIONAL  RIGHTS  DURING  TRIAL:   ( AR
T. III -  SECTIONS  14, 16, 17 )

Section 14.

1)     No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense

without due process of law.
 
2)     In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to
be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However,
after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly notified
and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Section 16.  All persons shall have the right to a speedy

disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial,
or administrative bodies. 

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against

himself.

D.     CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS  AFTER  TRIAL: ( ART.

III -  SECTIONS  19,  21 )

Section 19.

9
 1)     Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be
imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes, the Congress, hereafter provides for it. Any death
penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
 
2)     The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading
punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of
substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman
conditions shall be dealt with by law.

Section  21.  No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment

for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.
 

III.         STUDY DISCUSSION of ABOVE TOPICS in the

annotated books of Fr. Bernas and Justice Cruz.  

Nothing in the world can take the place of persistence.

Talent will not;  nothing is more common than unsuccessful men with talent.
Genius will not;  unrewarded genius is almost a proverb.
Education will not;  the world is full of educated derelicts.
 Persistence and determination are omnipotent.
The slogan  'press on'  has solved and always will solve the problems of the human race. 

 ~  Calvin Coolidge

10