(1)Arrest
National Police, that his Office received the request for
PEOPLE VS DE LEON  laboratory examination marked as Annex A; that together
This is an appeal from the April 4, 2008 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 01811 entitled People of the Philippines v. Rodante De Leon y Dela Rosa which affirmed the
December 20, 2005 Decision[2] in Criminal Case Nos. Q-03-122555-56 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 82 in Quezon City. The RTC found accused-appellant Rodante De Leon guilty of
violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The Facts
 The charges against appellant stemmed from the following Informations:
Criminal Case No. Q-03-122555
(Violation of Section 5 [Sale], Article II of RA 9165)
 That on or about the 9th day of November, 2003, in the Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, not being authorized by law, to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute of any
dangerous drug, did, then and there, wilfully and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver, transport,
distribute or act as broker in the said transaction zero point sixteen (0.16) gram of
methamphetamine hydrochloride a dangerous drug.
 Contrary to law.[3]
 Criminal Case No. Q-03-122556
(Violation of Section 11 [Possession], Article II of RA 9165)
 That on or about the 9th day of November, 2003, in the Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, not being authorized by law, to possess or use any dangerous drug, did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and control zero point eighteen
(0.18) gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
 Contrary to law.[4]
 On February 16, 2004, appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge against him.
After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued.
 
During the trial, the parties agreed to stipulate on the testimonies of Engr. Leonard Jabonillo, the
Forensic Chemist, and Police Officer 1 (PO1) Oliver Estrelles, the police investigator of these
cases. The prosecution thereafter presented PO2 Noel Magcalayo as its witness. The defense, on
the other hand, presented Rodante De Leon, the accused himself.
 
The trial court summarized the stipulation of Engr. Jabonillo, as follows:
 
x x x that he is a Forensic Chemist of the Philippine
with the said request was a plastic sachet marked as Exh. B
which contained two (2) plastic sachets marked as Exhibits
B-1 and B-2; that he conducted the requested laboratory
examination and, in connection therewith he submitted a
Chemistry Report marked as Exhibit C, the finding thereon
showing the specimen positive for Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride was marked as Exhibit C-1 and the signature
of said police officer was marked as Exhibit C-2; that he
then issued a Certification marked as Exhibits D and D-1
and thereafter turned over the specimen to the evidence
custodian x x x. (Order dated September 14, 2004). [5] 
Also, as regards PO1 Estrelles, the following was agreed
upon:
 x x x that he was the investigator of these cases and in
connection with the investigation conducted by him, he
received the evidence, namely: the Joint Affidavit of
Apprehension executed by PO2 Noel Magcalayo and PO2
Cesar Collado marked as Exhibit E and E-1; that likewise
prepared the request for examination marked as Exhibit A
and submitted the specimen to the Crime Laboratory and
receive the Chemistry Report marked as Exhibit C; that he
received the Pre-Operation Report marked as Exhibit E as
well as the buy bust money marked as Exhibits F and F-1,
that he prepared the letter request to the City Prosecutor
Office marked as Exhibit G; and that Exhibit A contains
superimposition of the date thereof. (Order dated
September 14, 2004).[6]
  The Prosecutions Version of Facts
 On November 9, 2003, at about 5 oclock in the afternoon,
a confidential informant arrived at the office of the Station
Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation Task Force at the
Novaliches Police Station in Quezon City and reported the
illegal activities of a person named Rodante De Leon.
 
Thereafter, Police Senior Inspector (P/SInsp.) Nilo Wong
formed a team for a buy-bust operation with PO2
Magcalayo as poseur-buyer and Senior Police Officer 3
(SPO3) Mario Concepcion, PO2 Fernando Salonga, PO2
Cesar Collado, PO2 Edmund Paculdar, and PO1 Emeterio
Mendoza as team members. A pre-operation report was
prepared. P/SInsp. Wong then handed to PO2 Magcalayo two (2) pieces of PhP 100 bills as buy-
bust money and on which PO2 Magcalayo wrote his initials NM.
 At around 6:30 p.m. in the evening, the team proceeded to Sarmiento St., Barangay Sta.
Monica, Novaliches, Quezon City, where the confidential informant introduced PO2 Magcalayo
to appellant as a buyer of shabu. PO2 Magcalayo then asked appellant if he had shabu and the
latter answered in the affirmative and asked him how much he would buy. PO2 Magcalayo
handed the money and, in return, appellant handed him one (1) plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance. He then scratched his head, which was the pre-arranged signal that the
transaction was consummated, and thereafter arrested appellant. He recovered the buy-bust
money from appellant as PO2 Collado approached them and handcuffed appellant. Upon frisking
appellant, PO2 Collado discovered another plastic sachet on the person of appellant.
 Afterwards, appellant was brought to the police station for investigation. PO2 Collado then
placed his initials on the sachet he found on appellant. The evidence was subsequently turned
over to the police investigator, PO1 Estrelles, who prepared a request for its laboratory
examination.
 PO2 Collado, PO1 Mendoza, PO2 Paculdar, and PO2 Magcalayo then brought the transparent
plastic sachets containing the white crystalline substance subject of the buy-bust operation to
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, Eastern Police District on St. Francis
Street, Mandaluyong City for examination. Engr. Jabonillo, a Forensic Chemical Officer,
conducted a qualitative examination on the specimens, which yielded positive results for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. He issued Chemistry Report No. D-1240-
2003 dated November 9, 2003, which showed the following results:
 
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets each containing white crystalline substance
having the following markings and recorded net weights:
 
A (NM) = 0.16 gm
B (CC) = 0.18 gm
xxxx
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of dangerous drugs.
 
xxxx
FINDINGS:
 Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave POSITIVE result to the
test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. x x x
 CONCLUSION:
 Specimen A and B contain Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. x x x
  Version of the Defense
On the other hand, appellant testified that, prior to his arrest, he was a police officer of Station 7,
Araneta, Cubao, Quezon City and had been connected with the PNP for 10 years. On November
9, 2003, at around 3 oclock in the afternoon, he went to Sarmiento St., Barangay  Sta. Monica,
Novaliches, Quezon City to look for a kumpadre  from whom he intended to borrow money when
policemen accosted him and poked their guns at him. The people around him ran, and as he was
the only one left on the scene, the policemen asked him to sit down. He told SPO3 Concepcion,
whom he knew, that he was a police officer but he was told to shut up and to explain his side at
the police station instead.
 Upon arrival at the police station in Novaliches, Quezon City, his wallet, with his I.D. and police
badge, were taken from him. PO2 Magcalayo told him that he had a fake police I.D. When
appellant tried to explain himself, PO2 Magcalayo allegedly kicked him saying, Hindi na uso ang
pulis, sundalo na ang nakaupo ngayon.
 The following night, he was presented on inquest during which he was charged with violation of
Secs. 5 and 11 of RA 9165. He denied all the charges against him claiming that the
alleged shabu marked as Exhibits B-1 and B-2 came from the arresting police officers. He did not
file a case against them, because he had no money and because he knew that he was not guilty.
On cross-examination, appellant further testified that he was a follow-up operative at the Station
Investigation Division of Police Station 7. He admitted that he was separated from the service
because he was absent without official leave due to a business problem he had to attend to. He
likewise said that he did not know his arresting officers, whom he saw then for the first time, and
that he was not familiar with RA 9165.
Ruling of the Trial Court
  After trial, the RTC convicted appellant. The dispositive portion of its Decision reads:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
 Re: Criminal Case NO. Q-03-122555, the Court finds accused RODANTE DE LEON y DELA
ROSA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00;
Re: Criminal Case NO. Q-03-122556, the Court finds accused RODANTE DE LEON y DELA
ROSA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and hereby sentences him
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to fifteen
(15) years and one (1) day as maximum and to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00;
[7]
 SO ORDERED.
  On appeal to the CA, appellant disputed the trial courts decision finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. He argued that the alleged buy-bust operation
conducted by the police officers was tainted with irregularities and that the prosecution failed to
prove the chain of custody of the evidence.
 Ruling of the Appellate Court
 On April 4, 2008, the CA affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The dispositive portion of its
Decision reads:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated 20
December 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 82 finding accused-appellant
Rodante De Leon y Dela Rosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. Q-03-
122555 for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00, and in Criminal
Case No. Q-03-122556 for violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to fifteen (15) years and one (1) day as
maximum and to pay a fine in the amount of P300,000.00, is AFFIRMED.
 
SO ORDERED.[8]
 
 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal of the decision of the CA.
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following errors:
 I.
 The trial court gravely erred in ignoring the fact that the prosecution failed to prove the chain of
custody of the alleged confiscated items from the accused-appellant.
 
II.
 The trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of the crimes charged despite
the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
   Our Ruling
 We sustain appellants conviction.
Guilt of Appellant Was Proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt
  Appellant assails his conviction by contending that the trial court failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. According to him, the trial court erroneously convicted him on the basis of the
evidence of the prosecution despite a question of the legality of the buy-bust operation. Further,
he asserts that the trial court relied on the disputable presumption of regularity in the
performance of the police function, despite the police officers violated the rule on chain of
custody of the alleged confiscated items.
 The contentions are unmeritorious.
 It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial court which are factual in nature and which
involve the credibility of witnesses are accorded with respect, when no glaring errors, gross
misapprehension of facts, and speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be
gathered from such findings.[9] The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to
decide the credibility of witnesses having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying during the trial.[10]
 After a thorough examination of the entire records of this case, this Court has failed to identify
any error committed by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence presented before it and
in the conclusion it reached.
 In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the Court has reiterated the
essential elements in People v. Pendatun, to wit: (1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited
drug to another; and (2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a prohibited drug.
[11]
 Therefore, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of the corpus delicti.[12] Corpus delicti is the
body or substance of the crime, and establishes the fact that a crime has actually been
committed. It has two elements, namely: (1) proof of the occurrence of a certain event; and (2)
some persons criminal responsibility for the act. [13]
In the instant case, the prosecution sufficiently established the elements of the crime. Appellant
sold and delivered the shabu for PhP 200 to PO2 Magcalayo posing as buyer; the said drug was
seized and identified as a prohibited drug and subsequently presented in evidence; there was
actual exchange of the marked money and contraband; and finally, appellant was fully aware
that he was selling and delivering a prohibited drug. In fact, PO2 Magcalayo testified, thus:
 
Q: Mr. Witness, on November 9, 2003, did you report for duty?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened when you reported for duty? A: NM, sir.

A: Our confidential informant personally appeared in our station and reporting to us the alleged Q: What [does] NM stand for?
drug pushing activity of Rodante De Leon.
A: Noel Magcalayo, sir.
Q: What time was that when this confidential informant arrived at your office?
Q: I am showing you these two (2) P100.00 bills, kindly examine the same whether you know
A: Around 5:00 p.m., sir. those P100.00 bills?

Q: What happened when this confidential informant relayed to you the information about this A: These are the buy bust money that we used in the operation, sir.
Rodante De Leon?
 x x x x
A: Our Chief sir, formed a team for possible buy bust operation.
 Q: What happened after you were given these buy bust money?
 
A: We proceeded to Sarmiento Street, Barangay Sta. Monica, Novaliches, Quezon City.
COURT:
Q: What time was that when you proceeded there?
Who formed?
A: At around 6:30 in the afternoon, sir.
A: P/Sr. Inspector Nilo Wong, your honor.
Q: What happened, Mr. Witness?
 
A: We were able to meet Rodante De Leon.
PROS. ANTERO:
Q: How did you meet this Rodante De Leon?
Who composed this team?
A: By the help of our confidential informant, sir.
A: Us, sir. SPO3 Mario Concepcion, PO2 Fernando Salonga, PO2 Cesar Collado, PO2 Edmund
Paculdar and PO1 Emeterio Mendoza, your Honor. Q: Can you tell this Hon. Court how you made a contact with this Rodante De Leon?

Q: What happened when this team was formed, Mr. Witness? A: We approached him and then our confidential informant introduced me to him as a buyer of
shabu.
A: We proceeded to Sarmiento Street, sir, for buy bust operation.
 
COURT:
COURT:
Were you among the team?
What?
A: Yes, your Honor.
A: I was introduced to him by the confidential informant as a buyer of shabu.
 
 
PROS. ANTERO:
PROS. ANTERO:
Prior to the dispatch to conduct that buy-bust operation, what happened, if any?
What happened thereafter?
A: We prepared the pre-operation report and our Chief handed to me the two (2) pieces of
P100.00 bills as buy bust money. A: He made transaction with us, sir.

Q: What did you do with that two (2) P100.00 bills? Q: What happened during the transaction?

A: Before we were dispatched, I put my initial on the buy-bust money. A: I asked him sir if he has shabu and then he answered yes and magkano.

Q: What initial? Q: What did he tell you, if any?

A: He asked me how much I would buy shabu.
Q: What did you tell, if any?
A: That was the time when I handed to him the money, sir.
Q: What happened when you handed the money to him?
A: In return, sir, he handed to me one (1) plastic sachet containing suspected shabu.
Q: One?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after he handed to you one plastic sachet?
A: I gave pre-arranged signal to my back-up and immediately effected the arrest, sir.
Q: What was the pre-arranged signal?
A: By scratching my head, sir.
Q: Scratching your head?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened when you made that pre-arranged signal?
A: I effected the arrest, sir, and confiscated the buy bust money from Rodante De Leon. [14]
  Evidently, all the elements of the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs were proved in the
instant case. The testimony cited above shows clearly that a sale occurred between appellant, as
the seller, and PO2 Magcalayo, as the buyer, for PhP 200 worth of shabu. In addition, the said
testimony illustrated the seizing of the prohibited drug and the exchange of the marked money.
As a matter of fact, the trial court, in disposing of the case, said:
x x x Set against this legal yardstick, the evidence adduced by the prosecution have sufficiently
established the elements aforesaid. The prosecution witnesses in the person of PO2 Noel
Magcalayo, the one who acted as the poseur buyer in the buy bust operation conducted by his
team, described in detail how the operation was commenced with the help of an informant, his
introduction to the accused, the ensuing negotiation and consummation of the sale of shabu
which ended up in the exchange of the item as well as the buy bust money. Accused was
positively identified as the seller thereof and the source of the plastic sachet which contained
crystalline substance later on determined after laboratory examination as positive for
methylamphetamine, a dangerous drug. Said evidence was presented in court and properly
identified as the subject of the buy bust and which was submitted for examination by the
Forensic Chemist. All told, all the elements aforementioned are hereby present. [15] x x x 
Further, the chain of custody was clearly established by the prosecution. It is elementary that, in
every prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the presentation of the drug as
evidence in court is material.[16] It is, therefore, essential that the identity of the prohibited drug
be established beyond doubt. What is more, the fact that the substance bought during the buy-
bust operation is the same substance offered in court should be established. The chain of
custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.[17]
To ensure that the chain of custody is established, the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA
9165 provide:
 SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
  (a)                The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph
shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police
station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in
case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
 A close examination of the law reveals that it admits of certain exceptions. Thus, contrary to the
assertions of appellant, Sec. 21 of the foregoing law need not be followed as an exact science.
Non-compliance with Sec. 21 does not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.[18] What is essential is the preservation of the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination
of the guilt or innocence of the accused.[19]
 In the instant case, there was substantial compliance with the law and the integrity of the drugs
seized from appellant was preserved. The chain of custody of the drugs subject matter of the
case was shown not to have been broken. The factual milieu of the case reveals that after PO2
Magcalayo seized and confiscated the dangerous drugs, as well as the marked money, appellant
was immediately arrested and brought to the police station for investigation, where the sachet of
suspected shabu was marked with NM.Immediately thereafter, the confiscated substance, with a
letter of request for examination, was submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination to
determine the presence of any dangerous drug. Per Chemistry Report No. D-1240-2003 dated
November 9, 2003, the specimen submitted contained methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug. The examination was conducted by one Engr. Jabonillo, a Forensic Chemical
Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, whose stipulated testimony clearly established the chain of
custody of the specimens he received. Thus, it is without a doubt that there was an unbroken
chain of custody of the illicit drug purchased from appellant.
Likewise, the prosecution was able to prove that appellant is guilty of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs with moral certainty. In the prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous
drugs, the following elements must be proved with moral certainty: (1) that the accused is in
possession of the object identified as a prohibited or regulatory drug; (2) that such possession is WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CAs Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01811 finding
not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. [20] appellant Rodante De Leon y Dela Rosa guilty of the crimes charged is AFFIRMED.

 Here, appellant was caught in actual possession of the prohibited drugs without showing any SO ORDERED.
proof that he was duly authorized by law to possess them. Having been caught in flagrante
delicto, there is prima facie evidence of animus possidendi on appellants part. As held by this
Court, the finding of a dangerous drug in the house or within the premises of the house of the
accused is prima facie  evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi and is enough to convict in
the absence of a satisfactory explanation.[21] In the case at bar, appellant failed to present any
evidence to rebut his animus possidendi of the shabu found in his pocket during the buy-bust
operation.

Buy-Bust Operation Was Valid

  Appellant further argues that the buy-bust operation was full of irregularities, rendering it
illegal. He notes that the Pre-Operation Report was full of discrepancies and that the Joint Sworn
Affidavit of Apprehension of PO2 Magcalayo and PO2 Collado failed to mention that they placed
their markings on the plastic sachets.

 The arguments are specious. Such irregularities cannot overturn the finding of the presence in
this case of the elements of violations of Secs. 5 and 11, Art. II of RA 9165.

 A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the
purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. [22] In
this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective method of
apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is
undertaken.[23]

In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that the buy-bust operation conducted by the
police officers, who made use of entrapment to capture appellant in the act of selling a
dangerous drug, was valid and legal. Moreover, the defense has failed to show any evidence of ill
motive on the part of the police officers. Even appellant himself declared that it was the first time
he met the police officers during his cross-examination. There was, therefore, no motive for the
police officers to frame up appellant.

Likewise, the identity of appellant as the person who sold the dangerous drugs to PO2 Magcalayo
and the one in possession of the shabu cannot be doubted anymore. Such positive identification
prevails over appellants defenses of denial and alibi. These defenses have been invariably viewed
by the Court with disfavor, for they can easily be concocted but difficult to prove, and they are
common and standard defense ploys in most prosecutions arising from violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act.[24]

Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse appellant of such a grave offense, the presumption
of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court with respect to
the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over appellants bare allegation. [25]

We, therefore, uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties
and find that the prosecution has discharged its burden of proving the guilt of appellant beyond
reasonable doubt.

 
(2) ARREST
G.R. No. 128587             March 16, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,  with magazine loaded with ammunitions, carrying the same along
vs.
HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Manila,
and LAWRENCE WANG Y CHEN, Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
On pure questions of law, petitioner People of the Philippines has directly come to this Court via
this petition for review on certiorari to nullify and set aside the Resolution 1 dated 13 March 1997
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, in Criminal Case Nos. 96-149990 to 96-149992,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Lawrence Wang y Chen, granting private respondent
Lawrence C. Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of the three (3) charges filed
against him, namely: (1) Criminal Case No. 96-149990 for Violation of Section 16, Article III in
relation to Section 2(e)(2), Article I of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act); (2)
Criminal Case No. 96-149991 for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms); and (3) Criminal Case No. 96-149992 for Violation of Comelec Resolution No. 2828 in
relation to R.A. No. 7166 (COMELEC Gun Ban).
The three (3) separate Informations filed against Lawrence C. Wang in the court of origin
respectively read:
Criminal Case No. 96-149990 (Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his
custody and control a bulk of white and yellowish crystalline substance known as SHABU
contained in thirty-two (32) transparent plastic bags weighing approximately 29.2941 kilograms,
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without the corresponding
license or prescription therefor.
Contrary to law.2
Criminal Case No. 96-149991 (Illegal Possession of Firearms):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his
custody and control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm, automatic pistol with one loaded magazine and
one AMT Cal. .380 9mm automatic backup pistol with magazine loaded with ammunitions
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
Contrary to law. 3
Criminal Case No. 96-149992 (Violation of Comelec Gun Ban):
That on or about the 17th day of May 1996, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and
control one (1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm automatic pistol with one loaded
magazine and one (1) AMT Cal. 380 9mm automatic backup pistol
Maria Orosa St., Ermita, Manila, which is a public place, on the date
which is covered by an election period, without first securing the
written permission or authority from the Commission on Elections, as
provided by the COMELEC Resolution 2828 in relation to Republic Act
7166.
Contrary to law. 4
During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all
the Informations and instead interposed a continuing objection to the
admissibility of the evidence obtained by the police operatives. Thus,
the trial court ordered that a plea of "Not Guilty" be entered for
him.5 Thereafter, joint trial of the three (3) consolidated cases
followed.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On 16 May 1996, at about 7:00 p.m., police operatives of the Public
Assistance and Reaction Against Crime of the Department of Interior
and Local Government, namely, Captain Margallo, Police Inspector
Cielito Coronel and SPO3 Reynaldo Cristobal, arrested SPO2 Vergel de
Dios, Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano, for unlawful possession
of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug popularly
known as shabu. In the course of the investigation of the three
arrested persons, Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and Joseph Junio were
identified as the source of the drug. An entrapment operation was
then set after the three were prevailed upon to call their source and
pretend to order another supply of shabu.
At around 11:00 p.m. that same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio
were arrested while they were about to hand over another bag of
shabu to SPO2 De Dios and company. Questioned, Redentor Teck and
Joseph Junio informed the police operatives that they were working
as talent manager and gymnast instructor, respectively, of Glamour
Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang. Redentor Teck and
Joseph Junio did not disclose their source of shabu but admitted that
they were working for Wang.6 They also disclosed that they knew of a
scheduled delivery of shabu early the following morning of 17 May
1996, and that their employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria
Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila. The police operatives decided to
look for Wang to shed light on the illegal drug activities of Redentor
Teck and Joseph Junio. Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and his men
then proceeded to Maria Orosa Apartment and placed the same
under surveillance.
Prosecution witness Police Inspector Cielito Coronel testified that at about 2:10 a.m. of 17 May
1996, Wang, who was described to the operatives by Teck, came out of the apartment and
walked towards a parked BMW car. On nearing the car, he (witness) together with Captain
Margallo and two other police officers approached Wang, introduced themselves to him as
police officers, asked his name and, upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang, immediately
frisked him and asked him to open the back compartment of the BMW car. 7 When frisked, there
was found inside the front right pocket of Wang and confiscated from him an unlicensed AMT
Cal. 380 9mm automatic Back-up Pistol loaded with ammunitions. At the same time, the other
members of the operatives searched the BMW car and found inside it were the following items:
(a) 32 transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance with a total weight of
29.2941 kilograms, which substance was later analyzed as positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, a regulated drug locally known as shabu; (b) cash in the amount of ₱650,000.00;
(c) one electronic and one mechanical scales; and (d) an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with
magazine. Then and there, Wang resisted the warrantless arrest and search. 8
On 6 December 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon motion, accused Wang was
granted 25 days from said date within which to file his intended Demurrer to Evidence. 9 On 19
December 1996, the prosecution filed a Manifestation 10 to the effect that it had rested its case
only in so far as the charge for Violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act in Criminal Case No. 96-
149990 is concerned, and not as regards the two cases for Illegal Possession of Firearms (Crim.
Case No. 96-149991) and Violation of the Comelec Gun Ban (Crim. Case No. 96-149992).
Accordingly, trial continued.
On 9 January 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence,11 praying for his acquittal and
the dismissal of the three (3) cases against him for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and
the inadmissibility of the prosecution’s evidence against him. Considering that the prosecution
has not yet filed its Opposition to the demurrer, Wang filed an Amplification 12 to his Demurrer of
Evidence on 20 January 1997. On 12 February 1997, the prosecution filed its Opposition 13 alleging
that the warrantless search was legal as an incident to the lawful arrest and that it has proven its
case, so it is now time for the defense to present its evidence.
On 13 March 1997, the respondent judge, the Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued the herein
assailed Resolution14 granting Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting him of all charges for
lack of evidence, thus:
WHEREFORE, the accused's undated Demurrer to Evidence is hereby granted; the accused is
acquitted of the charges against him for the crimes of Violation of Section 16, Article III of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, Illegal Possession of Firearms, and Violation of Comelec Gun Ban, for lack
of evidence; the 32 bags of shabu with a total weight of 29.2941 kilograms and the two
unlicensed pistols, one AMT Cal. .380 9mm and one Daewoo Cal. 9mm. are ordered confiscated
in favor of the government and the branch clerk is directed to turn over the 32 bags of shabu to
the Dangerous Drugs Board in Intramuros, Manila, and the two firearms to the Firearms and
Explosive Units, PNP, Camp Crame, Quezon City, for proper disposition, and the officer-in-charge
of PARAC, Department of Interior and Local Government, is ordered to return the confiscated
amount of P650,000.00 to the accused, and the confiscated BMW car to its registered owner,
David Lee. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition15 for review on certiorari by the People, submitting that the trial court erred -
I
XXX IN HOLDING THAT THE UNDISPUTED FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT CONSTITUTE
PROBABLE CAUSE WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF THE
CONSTITUTION, AND IN HOLDING THAT SUCH FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES NEITHER JUSTIFIED
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF ACCUSED'S VEHICLE AND THE SEIZURE OF THE CONTRABAND
THEREIN.
ll
XXX IN HOLDING, IN EFFECT, THAT A WARRANTLESS SEARCH IS CONSTITUTIONALLY ALLOWABLE
AND CAN ONLY BE VALID AS AN INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST.
lII
XXX IN DECLARING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE ACCUSED AND THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE
OF HIS HANDGUNS UNLAWFUL.
IV
XXX IN NOT DECLARING THE ACCUSED AS HAVING WAIVED, AS A RESULT OF HIS SUBMISSION
AND FAILURE TO PROTEST THE SEARCH AND HIS ARREST, HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND HIS OBJECTION TO THE ADMISSION OF THE
EVIDENCE SEIZED.
V
XXX IN NOT ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AND OFFERED BY THE PROSECUTION
AND IN NOT DENYING ACCUSED'S DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE.
In its Resolution16 of 9 July 1997, the Court, without giving due course to the petition, required
the public and private respondents to comment thereon within ten days from notice. Private
respondent Wang filed his comment17on 18 August 1997.
On 10 September 1997, the Court required the People to file a reply, 18 which the Office of the
Solicitor General did on 5 December 1997, after several extensions. 19
On 20 October 2004, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda, 20 which they did.
The case presents two main issues: (a) whether the prosecution may appeal the trial court’s
resolution granting Wang’s demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all the charges against
him without violating the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy; and (b) whether
there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this case despite the
absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant.
First off, it must be emphasized that the present case is an appeal filed directly with this Court via
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 in relation to Rule 41, Section 2, paragraph (c) of
the Rules of Court raising only pure questions of law, ordinary appeal by mere filing of a notice of
appeal not being allowed as a mode of appeal directly to this Court. Then, too, it bears stressing
that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process, it being merely a
statutory privilege which may be exercised only in the manner provided for by law (Velasco v.
Court of Appeals21). Although Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that
any party may appeal, the right of the People to appeal is, in the very same provision, expressly
made subject to the prohibition against putting the accused in double jeopardy. It also basic that
appeal in criminal cases throws the whole records of the case wide open for review by the
appellate court, that is why any appeal from a judgment of acquittal necessarily puts the accused
in double jeopardy. In effect, the very same Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, disallows appeal by the People from judgments of acquittal.
An order granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence is a resolution of the case on the merits,
and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further prosecution of the accused after an
acquittal would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. To this general rule,
however, the Court has previously made some exceptions.
The celebrated case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan22 presents one exception to the rule on double
jeopardy, which is, when the prosecution is denied due process of law:
No court whose Presiding Justice has received "orders or suggestions" from the very President
who by an amendatory decree (disclosed only at the hearing of oral arguments on November 8,
1984 on a petition challenging the referral of the Aquino-Galman murder cases to the
Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan instead of to a court martial, as mandatorily required by the
known P.D. 1850 at the time providing for exclusive jurisdiction of courts martial over criminal
offenses committed by military men) made it possible to refer the cases to the Sandiganbayan,
can be an impartial court, which is the very essence of due process of law. As the writer then
wrote, "jurisdiction over cases should be determined by law, and not by preselection of the
Executive, which could be much too easily transformed into a means of predetermining the
outcome of individual cases." This criminal collusion as to the handling and treatment of the
cases by public respondents at the secret Malacañang conference (and revealed only after fifteen
months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and
voided ab initio its verdict. This renders moot and irrelevant for now the extensive arguments of
respondents accused, particularly Generals Ver and Olivas and those categorized as accessories,
that there has been no evidence or witness suppressed against them, that the erroneous
conclusions of Olivas as police investigator do not make him an accessory of the crimes he
investigated and the appraisal and evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses presented and
suppressed. There will be time and opportunity to present all these arguments and
considerations at the remand and retrial of the cases herein ordered before a neutral and
impartial court.
The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand
unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They
would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice,
deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial
power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek
the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or
favor and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar
where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial
system is at stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal Ninoy had pleaded in vain
that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before
an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy, as the victim of the
"treacherous and vicious assassination" and the relatives and sovereign people as the aggrieved
parties plead once more for due process of law and a retrial before an impartial court with an
unbiased prosecutor. The Court is constrained to declare the sham trial a mock trial — the non-
trial of the century — and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void
ab initio.
1. No double jeopardy. — It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against
this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the
prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. As
the Court stressed in the 1985 case of People vs. Bocar,
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right
to due process is thereby violated.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are
ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-30026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan.
30, 1971]) which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the
fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is
void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370 [May 25, 19731, 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co.
vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49 SCRA 416 Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered
notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a "lawless thing, which can be treated as an
outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head" (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).
Respondent Judge's dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction,
the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa,
supra).
xxx xxx xxx
Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after
arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The
lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of
the prosecution to due process.
In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for
further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first
jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a
criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence. In point is the fairly recent case of
People v. Uy,23 which involved the trial court’s decision which granted the two separate
demurrers to evidence filed by the two accused therein, both with leave of court, resulting in
their acquittal of their respective charges of murder due to insufficiency of evidence. In resolving
the petition for certiorari filed directly with this Court, we had the occasion to explain:
The general rule in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is final and
unappealable. People v. Court of Appeals explains the rationale of this rule:
In our jurisdiction, the finality-of-acquittal doctrine as a safeguard against double jeopardy
faithfully adheres to the principle first enunciated in Kepner v. United States. In this case, verdicts
of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final and irreviewable. The cases of United States v.
Yam Tung Way, People v. Bringas, Gandicela v. Lutero, People v. Cabarles, People v. Bao, to name
a few, are illustrative cases. The fundamental philosophy behind the constitutional proscription
against double jeopardy is to afford the defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and
safeguard him from government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. As
succinctly observed in Green v. United States "(t)he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained
in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and
power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged
offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to
live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent, he may be found guilty." (Underscoring supplied)
The same rule applies in criminal cases where a demurrer to evidence is granted. As held in the
case of People v. Sandiganbayan:
The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution
had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence
adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt,
resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused."
Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for
to do so would be to place the accused in double-jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal,
the case ends there. (Italics in the original)
Like any other rule, however, the above-said rule is not absolute. By way of exception, a
judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court upon a clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting
the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering
the assailed judgment void. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Sanvicente v. People,24 the Court allowed the review of a decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
which reversed the accused’s acquittal upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with
leave of court, the CA ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
preventing the prosecution from establishing the due execution and authenticity of certain letter
marked therein as Exhibit "LL," which supposedly "positively identified therein petitioner as the
perpetrator of the crime charged." The Court, in a petition for certiorari, sustained the CA’s
power to review the order granting the demurrer to evidence, explaining thus:
Under Rule 119, Section 23 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the trial
court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to
evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. In resolving accused’s demurrer to
evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient
evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt.
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and
its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion.
Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal and any
further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy. This constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with
the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy. The
finality-of-acquittal rule was stressed thus in People v. Velasco:
The fundamental philosophy highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep
into the "humanity of the laws and in jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizens, when
brought in unequal contest with the State xxx. Thus Green expressed the concern that "(t)he
underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety
and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found
guilty."
It is axiomatic that on the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is
entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The
philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the
paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against
wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-of-acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts
of not guilty, is easy to understand: it is a need for "repose", a desire to know the exact extent of
one’s liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to
insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury’s leniency, will not be
found guilty in a subsequent proceeding.
Given the far-reaching scope of an accused’s right against double jeopardy, even an appeal based
on an alleged misappreciation of evidence will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy
will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its
case or where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an
erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate
that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very
power to dispense justice. (Emphasis supplied.)
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review dismissal orders of trial courts
granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in
jeopardy. Thus, when the order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an
original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not
violated.
Unfortunately, what petitioner People of the Philippines, through then Secretary of Justice
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. and then Solicitor General Silvestre H. Bello, III, filed with the Court in
the present case is an appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raising a
pure question of law, which is different from a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
In Madrigal Transport Inc. v. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, 25 we have enumerated the
distinction between the two remedies/actions, to wit:
Appeal and Certiorari Distinguished
Between an appeal and a petition for certiorari, there are substantial distinctions which shall be
explained below.
As to the Purpose. Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not
errors of judgment. In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained the simple reason for the
rule in this light:
"When a court exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it
of the jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed
by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a void
judgment. This cannot be allowed. The administration of justice would not survive such a rule.
Consequently, an error of judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction
is not correct[a]ble through the original civil action of certiorari."
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of certiorari cannot be
exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court
-- on the basis either of the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of
the decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over the
case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where the error is not one of
jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact -- a mistake of judgment -- appeal is the remedy.
As to the Manner of Filing. Over an appeal, the CA exercises its appellate jurisdiction and power
of review. Over a certiorari, the higher court uses its original jurisdiction in accordance with its
power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts. An appeal is thus a
continuation of the original suit, while a petition for certiorari is an original and independent
action that was not part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order
complained of. The parties to an appeal are the original parties to the action. In contrast, the
parties to a petition for certiorari are the aggrieved party (who thereby becomes the petitioner)
against the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, and the prevailing parties (the public and the
private respondents, respectively).
As to the Subject Matter. Only judgments or final orders and those that the Rules of Court so
declared are appealable. Since the issue is jurisdiction, an original action for certiorari may be
directed against an interlocutory order of the lower court prior to an appeal from the judgment;
or where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy or adequate remedy.
As to the Period of Filing. Ordinary appeals should be filed within fifteen days from the notice of
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant must
file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from the said notice of judgment
or final order. A petition for review should be filed and served within fifteen days from the notice
of denial of the decision, or of the petitioner’s timely filed motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In an appeal by certiorari, the petition should be filed also within fifteen days
from the notice of judgment or final order, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new
trial or motion for reconsideration.
On the other hand, a petition for certiorari should be filed not later than sixty days from the
notice of judgment, order, or resolution. If a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration
was timely filed, the period shall be counted from the denial of the motion.
As to the Need for a Motion for Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration is generally
required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari, in order to afford the tribunal an
opportunity to correct the alleged errors. Note also that this motion is a plain and adequate
remedy expressly available under the law. Such motion is not required before appealing a
judgment or final order.
Also in Madrigal, we stressed that the special civil action of certiorari and appeal are two
different remedies mutually exclusive; they are neither alternative nor successive. Where appeal
is available, certiorari will not prosper. In the dismissal of a criminal case upon demurrer to
evidence, appeal is not available as such an appeal will put the accused in double jeopardy.
Certiorari, however, is allowed.
For being the wrong remedy taken by petitioner People of the Philippines in this case, this
petition is outrightly dismissible. The Court cannot reverse the assailed dismissal order of the trial
court by appeal without violating private respondent’s right against double jeopardy.
Even assuming that the Court may treat an "appeal" as a special civil action of certiorari, which
definitely this Court has the power to do, when there is a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion committed by the lower court, the instant petition will nevertheless fail on the merits
as the succeeding discussion will show.
There are actually two (2) acts involved in this case, namely, the warrantless arrest and the
warrantless search. There is no question that warrantless search may be conducted as an
incident to a valid warrantless arrest. The law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a
search can be made; the process cannot be reversed.26 However, if there are valid reasons to
conduct lawful search and seizure which thereafter shows that the accused is currently
committing a crime, the accused may be lawfully arrested in flagrante delicto 27 without need for
a warrant of arrest.
Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the case at bar, the trial
court granted private respondent's demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of all the three
charges for lack of evidence, because the unlawful arrest resulted in the inadmissibility of the
evidence gathered from an invalid warrantless search. The trial court’s ratiocination is quoted as
follows:
The threshold issue raised by the accused in his Demurrer to Evidence is whether his warrantless
arrest and search were lawful as argued by the prosecution, or unlawful as asserted by the
defense.
Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace officer may arrest a person without
a warrant: (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it, and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while being
transferred from one confinement to another. None of these circumstances were present when
the accused was arrested. The accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and
was about to enter the parked BMW car when the police officers arrested and frisked him and
searched his car. The accused was not committing any visible offense at the time of his arrest.
Neither was there an indication that he was about to commit a crime or that he had just
committed an offense. The unlicensed AMT Cal.380 9mm Automatic Back-up Pistol that the
accused had in his possession was concealed inside the right front pocket of his pants. And the
handgun was bantam and slim in size that it would not give an outward indication of a concealed
gun if placed inside the pant's side pocket as was done by the accused. The arresting officers had
no information and knowledge that the accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun, nor did
they see him in possession thereof immediately prior to his arrest.
Ditto on the 32 bags of shabu and the other unlicensed Daewoo Cal. 9mm Pistol with magazine
that were found and seized from the car. The contraband items in the car were not in plain view.
The 32 bags of shabu were in the trunk compartment, and the Daewoo handgun was underneath
the driver’s seat of the car. The police officers had no information, or knowledge that the banned
articles were inside the car, or that the accused had placed them there. The police officers
searched the car on mere suspicion that there was shabu therein.
On this matter, pertinent portions of the testimonies of Police Inspector Cielito Coronel and SP03
Reynaldo are hereunder quoted:
POLICE INSPECTOR CIELITO CORONEL’S TESTIMONY
"PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: Direct-Examination
Q. Mr. Witness, what was your role or participation in this case?
A. I am one of those responsible for the arrest of the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Where did you make that arrest, Mr. Witness?
A. The apprehension was made in front of an apartment along Maria Orosa Street, Ermita,
Manila.
Q. What date was that when you arrested the accused?
A. It was on May 17, 1996, at about 2:10 a.m.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. What was the reason why you together with other policemen effected the arrest of the
accused?
A. We arrested him because of the information relayed to us by one of those whom we have
previously apprehended in connection with the delivery of shabu somewhere also in Ermita,
Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. When you established that he was somewhere at Maria Orosa, what did you do?
A. We waited for him.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. You yourself, Mr. Witness, where did you position yourself during that time?
A. I was inside a vehicle waiting for the accused to appear.
Q. What about your other companions where were they?
A. They were position in strategic places within the area.
Q. What happened when you and your companions were positioned in that place?
A. That was when the accused arrived.
Q. How many of your approached him.
A. Inspector Margallo, myself and two other operatives.
Q. What happened when you approached the accused, Mr. Witness?
A. We introduced ourselves as police officers and we frisked him and we asked him to open the
back compartment of his car.
Q. You said you frisked him, what was the result of that?
A. He was found in possession of one back-up pistol with one loaded magazine and likewise
when the compartment was opened several plastic bags containing white crystalline substance
suspected to be shabu (were found).
Q. What did you do when you found out Mr. Witness?
A. When the car was further search we later found another firearm, a Daewoo Pistol at the place
under the seat of the driver.
Q. Then what happened?
A. He was brought to our headquarters at Mandaluyong for further investigation.
Q. What about the suspected shabu that you recovered, what did you do with that?
A. The suspected shabu that we recovered were forwarded to the NBI for laboratory
examination.
Q. Did you come to know the results?
A. It was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. (TSN, pp. 3-8, November 15,
1996).
ATTY. LOZANO TO WITNESS: CROSS
Q. You arrested Joseph Junio and Redentor Teck for alleged transporting of shabu on May 16,
1996, at 11:00 p.m., is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. You asked Redentor Teck where he is employed, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx A. I was one of the arresting officers and investigator, Sir.

Q. Redentor Teck told you that he is a talent manager at the Glenmore Modeling Agency, is it xxx xxx xxx
not?
Q. What kind of specific offense did the accused allegedly do so that you arrested him, Mr.
A. Yes, Sir. Witness?

.Q. The Glenmore Modeling Agency is owned by Lawrence Wang, is it not? A. He was arrested on the basis of the recovered drugs in his possession placed inside his car.

A. I supposed, Sir. xxx xxx xxx

Q. And that is why immediately after Redentor Teck told you that he is an employee of the
Glenmore Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang, naturally, you and your companions look
for Lawrence Wang to shed light on the transporting of shabu by Redentor Teck and Joseph
Junio, is it not?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Thereafter, you spotted a person previously described by Redentor Teck as Lawrence Wang, is
it not?
Q. Mr. witness, you said that you recovered drug from the car of the accused, please tell us the
antecedent circumstances which led you to recover or confiscate these items?
A. Earlier in the evening about 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested one Redentor Teck and Joseph
Junio.
COURT: Where did you arrest these people?
A They were arrested in Metro Manila also.

A. Yes, Sir. COURT: The same date?

Q. While you were arresting Lawrence Wang, your companions at the same time searched the A. May 16, about 11:00 p.m. They were arrested and when they were investigated, Teck
BMW car described in your affidavit of arrest, is it not? mentioned the name of Lawrence Wang as his employer.

A. Yes, Sir. COURT: Why were these people, arrested?

xxx xxx xxx A. For violation of R.A. 6425.

Q. Lawrence Wang was not inside the BMW car while the same was searched, is it not? COURT: How were they arrested?

A. He was outside, Sir. A. They were arrested while in the act of transporting shabu or handling shabu to another
previously arrested person. It was a series of arrest.
Q. The driver of the car was inside the car when the arrest and search were made, is it not?
COURT: So, this involved a series of operation?
A. He was likewise outside, Sir.
A. Yes, Your Honor. About 11:00 p.m. of May 16, we arrested three (3) persons, SPO2 Vergel de
Q. Lawrence Wang did resist arrest and search is it not? Dios, a certain Arellano and a certain Rogelio Noble. When they were arrested they divulged the
name of the source.
A. Yes, Sir.
COURT: They were arrested for what, for possession?
Q. When you effected the arrest, there was no warrant of arrest, is it not?
A. Yes, Your Honor. For unlawful possession of shabu . Then they divulged to us the name of the
A. Yes, Sir. person from whom they get shabu.
Q. When the search was made on the BMW car, there was no search warrant, is it not? COURT: Whose name did they mention:
A. Yes, none, Sir. (TSN, pp. 3-12, November 15, 1996) A. One Alias Frank, who turned out to be Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio. We let them call
SPO3 REYNALDO CRISTOBAL’S TESTIMONY Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio thru the cellphone and pretend and to order another supply of
shabu.
PROSECUTOR TO WITNESS: DIRECT EXAMINATION
COURT: So there was an entrapment?
Q. What is you role or participation in this case?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: So, these two (2) were arrested?
A. While they were about to hand over another bag of shabu to Noble and company.
COURT: And these two reveals (revealed) some information to you as to the source of the shabu?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
COURT: What was the information?
A. Teck told us that he is an employee of Lawrence Wang.
COURT: What did you do when you were told about that?
A. They also told us that there was an ongoing delivery of shabu on that morning.
COURT: When?
A. Well, he was first arrested by Captain Margallo and Lt. Coronel while I was the one who
inspected and opened the compartment of the car and saw the shabu. (TSN, pp. 15-24,
December 16, 1996).
CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONING OF SPO3 CRISTOBAL BY THE COURT
COURT: From your testimony and that of Police Inspector Cielito Coronel, this Court has gathered
that prior to the arrest of the accused there were three (3) men that your team arrested. One of
whom is a police officer.
A: Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: And on the occasion of the arrest of these three men shabu were confiscated from
them?

A. Of that date early morning of May 17, 1996. A: Yes, Sir.

COURT: At what place? Q: And in the course of the investigation of these three men, you were able to discover that
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio were the source of the regulated drug that were confiscated
A. We asked them where we could find Lawrence Wang and Teck lead us to Maria Orosa from the three men that you have arrested?
Apartment where we conducted a stake out which lasted up to 2:00 a.m.
A: Yes, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, thru entrapment base[d] on your testimony you were able to apprehend also these two
COURT: What happened during the stake out? men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio?
A. When the person of the accused was identified to us, we saw him opening his car together A: Yes, Sir.
with his driver.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT: So, he was about to leave when you saw him?
Q: These two men, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio they were also investigated by your team?
A. Probably, Sir.
A: Yes, Sir.
COURT: What did you do?
Q: You were present while they were investigated?
A. We saw him opened his car and we have a suspicion that there was a shabu inside the
compartment of the car. A: I was the one whom investigated them.

xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

COURT: All right, when you saw the accused opened his car, what did you do?
A. We approached him.
COURT: What happened when you approached him?
A. We suspected the shabu inside the compartment of his car.
COURT: And this shabu that you saw inside the compartment of the car, what did you do with
that?
Q: Did you ask Redentor and Joseph the source of shabu that you confiscated from them at the
time of the (their) arrest?
A: Yes, Sir. They refuse to say the source, however, they told me that they were working for the
accused.
Q: You also testified that Redentor informed you that there was another delivery of shabu
scheduled that morning of (stop) was it May 16 or 17? The other delivery that is scheduled on?
A: On the 17th.

xxx xxx xxx

Q: Did he tell you who was to make the delivery?
A: No, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: At that time when you decided to look for the accused to ask him to shed light on the matter
concerning the arrest of these two employees in possession of shabu. Did you and did your team
suspect the accused as being involved in the transaction that lead (led) to the arrest of Redentor
and Joseph?
A: Yes, Sir. We suspected that he was the source of the shabu.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you saw the accused walking towards his car, did you know whether he was carrying a
gun?
A: No, Sir. It cannot be seen.
Q: It was concealed?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So, the only time that you and your team learned that he was in possession of the gun is when
he was bodily search?
A: Yes, Sir. That is the only time that I came to know about when Capt. Margallo handed to me
the gun.
Q: Other than walking towards his car, the accused was not doing anything else?
A: None, Sir.
Q: That would invite your suspicion or give indication that he was intending to do something
unlawful or illegal?
A: No, Sir.
Q: When you searched the car, did the accused protest or try to prevent your team from
searching his car?
A: No, Sir." (TSN pp. 3-16, Feb. 26, 1997)
Clearly therefore, the warrantless arrest of the accused and the search of his person and the car
were without probable cause and could not be licit. The arrest of the accused did not fall under
any of the exception to the requirements of warrantless arrests, (Sec. 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court)
and is therefore, unlawful and derogatory of his constitutional right of liberty. x x x
The trial court resolved the case on the basis of its findings that the arrest preceded the search,
and finding no basis to rule in favor of a lawful arrest, it ruled that the incidental search is
likewise unlawful. Any and all pieces of evidence acquired as a consequence thereof are
inadmissible in evidence. Thus, the trial court dismissed the case for lack of evidence.
Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however, now posits that "inasmuch as it
has been shown in the present case that the seizure without warrant of the regulated drugs and
unlicensed firearms in the accused’s possession had been validly made upon probable cause and
under exigent circumstances, then the warrantless arrest of the accused must necessarily have to
be regarded as having been made on the occasion of the commission of the crime in flagrante
delicto, and therefore constitutionally and statutorily permissible and lawful." 28In effect, the
People now contends that the warrantless search preceded the warrantless arrest. Since the case
falls under an exception to the general rule requiring search warrant prior to a valid search and
seizure, the police officers were justified in requiring the private respondent to open his BMW
car’s trunk to see if he was carrying illegal drugs.
The conflicting versions as to whether the arrest preceded the search or vice versa, is a matter of
credibility of evidence. It entails appreciation of evidence, which may be done in an appeal of a
criminal case because the entire case is thrown open for review, but not in the case of a petition
for certiorari where the factual findings of the trial court are binding upon the Court. Since a
dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal and reviewable
only by certiorari, the factual finding that the arrest preceded the search is conclusive upon this
Court. The only legal basis for this Court to possibly reverse and set aside the dismissal order of
the trial court upon demurrer to evidence would be if the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that there was no legal basis to lawfully effect a
warrantless arrest.
The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest
provide:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected:
(a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal
knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the author of a
crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section
5 to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.291awphi1.nét
The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not manifest any suspicious the continuing objection to the validity of the warrantless arrest made of record during the
behavior on the part of private respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the arraignment bolsters Wang’s claim that he resisted the warrantless arrest and search.
attention of the police. He was merely walking from the Maria Orosa Apartment and was about
to enter the parked BMW car when the police operatives arrested him, frisked and searched his We cannot close this ponencia without a word of caution: those who are supposed to enforce
person and commanded him to open the compartment of the car, which was later on found to the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is
be owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible offense then. Therefore, too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes once said, "I think it is less evil that some
there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not
settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the
in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute Constitution itself.34
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. 30 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.
Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is clearly SO ORDERED.
established from the testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on
the information that he was the employer of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio who were
previously arrested and charged for illegal transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did not even
categorically identify Wang to be their source of the shabu they were caught with in flagrante
delicto. Upon the duo’s declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early morning of
the following day, May 17, which is only a few hours thereafter, and that Wang may be found in
Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria Orosa Street, the arresting officers conducted "surveillance"
operation in front of said apartment, hoping to find a person which will match the description of
one Lawrence Wang, the employer of Teck and Junio. These circumstances do not sufficiently
establish the existence of probable cause based on personal knowledge as required in paragraph
(b) of Section 5.

And doubtless, the warrantless arrest does not fall under paragraph (c) of Section 5.

The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the warrantless arrest was
illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.

In People v. Aminnudin,31 the Court declared as inadmissible in evidence the marijuana found in

appellant’s possession during a search without a warrant, because it had been illegally seized, in
disregard of the Bill of Rights:

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a
crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was
doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication
that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became a suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the fugitive
finger that triggered his arrest. The identification of the informer was the probable cause as
determined by the officer (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and
immediately arrest him.

The People’s contention that Wang waived his right against unreasonable search and seizure has
no factual basis. While we agree in principle that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search,
however, based on the evidence on record, Wang resisted his arrest and the search on his person
and belongings.32 The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been
more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is
thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. 33Moreover,
(3) ARREST
G.R. No. 170180               November 23, 2007
ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ, Petitioner,  They thus approached him but the latter purportedly
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is not only ancient. It is
also zealously safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 1 Any
evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. Indeed, while the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public
welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the
constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance
to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. 2
On appeal is the Decision3 of the Court of Appeals dated 28 July 2005, affirming the Judgment 4 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Agoo, La Union dated 31 March 2004 finding petitioner
Arsenio Vergara Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11 of Republic Act
No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165)5 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to fifteen (15) years of
reclusion temporal medium as maximum and ordering him to pay a fine of ₱350,000.00. 6
I.
On 26 June 2003, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, par. 2(2) of R.A. No. 9165
in an Information7which reads:
That on or about the 17th day of March 2003, in the Municipality of Aringay, Province of La
Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, control and
custody dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper page, weighing more or
less twenty-five (25) grams, without first securing the necessary permit, license or prescription
from the proper government agency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued with the
prosecution presenting the three (3) barangay  tanods of San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union
namely, Rogelio Bautista (Bautista), Nestor Aratas (Aratas) and Eduardo Ordoño (Ordoño), who
arrested petitioner.
Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17
March 2003, he was conducting the routine patrol along
the National Highway in Barangay San Benito Norte,
Aringay, La Union together with Aratas and Ordoño when
they noticed petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-
bus. The tanods  observed that petitioner, who appeared
suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for something.
attempted to run away. They chased him, put him under
arrest and thereafter brought him to the house of
Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where he,
as averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open
his bag. Petitioner’s bag allegedly contained a pair of
denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried
marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It
was then that petitioner was taken to the police station for
further investigation.9
Aratas and Ordoño corroborated Bautista’s testimony on
most material points. On cross-examination, however,
Aratas admitted that he himself brought out the contents
of petitioner’s bag before petitioner was taken to the
house of Mercado.10 Nonetheless, he claimed that at
Mercado’s house, it was petitioner himself who brought
out the contents of his bag upon orders from Mercado. For
his part, Ordoño testified that it was he who was ordered
by Mercado to open petitioner’s bag and that it was then
that they saw the purported contents thereof. 11
The prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector
Valeriano Laya II (Laya), the forensic chemist who
conducted the examination of the marijuana allegedly
confiscated from petitioner. Laya maintained that the
specimen submitted to him for analysis, a sachet of the
substance weighing 23.10 grams and contained in a plastic
bag, tested positive of marijuana. He disclosed on cross-
examination, however, that he had knowledge neither of
how the marijuana was taken from petitioner nor of how
the said substance reached the police officers. Moreover,
he could not identify whose marking was on the inside of
the cellophane wrapping the marijuana leaves.12
The charges were denied by petitioner. As the defense’s
sole witness, he testified that at around 8:30 p.m. on 17
March 2003, he arrived in Aringay from his place in Curro-
oy, Santol, La Union. After alighting from the bus,
petitioner claimed that he went to the house of a friend to
drink water and then proceeded to walk to his brother’s
house. As he was walking, prosecution witness Ordoño, a
cousin of his brother’s wife, allegedly approached him and
asked where he was going. Petitioner replied that he was
going to his brother’s house. Ordoño then purportedly
requested to see the
contents of his bag and appellant acceded. It was at this point that Bautista and Aratas joined
them. After inspecting all the contents of his bag, petitioner testified that he was restrained by
the tanod and taken to the house of Mercado. It was Aratas who carried the bag until they
reached their destination.13
Petitioner maintained that at Mercado’s house, his bag was opened by the tanod and Mercado
himself. They took out an item wrapped in newspaper, which later turned out to be marijuana
leaves. Petitioner denied ownership thereof. He claimed to have been threatened with
imprisonment by his arrestors if he did not give the prohibited drugs to someone from the east
in order for them to apprehend such person. As petitioner declined, he was brought to the police
station and charged with the instant offense. Although petitioner divulged that it was he who
opened and took out the contents of his bag at his friend’s house, he averred that it was one of
the tanod who did so at Mercado’s house and that it was only there that they saw the marijuana
for the first time.14
e. replied that he was going to his brother'en proceeded to walk to his brother'w
Finding that the prosecution had proven petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC
rendered judgment against him and sentenced him to suffer indeterminate imprisonment
ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to fifteen (15)
years of reclusion temporal medium as maximum and ordered him to pay a fine of
₱350,000.00.15
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals.1âwphi1 On 28
July 2005, the appellate court affirmed the challenged decision. The Court of Appeals, finding no
cogent reason to overturn the presumption of regularity in favor of the barangay tanod in the
absence of evidence of ill-motive on their part, agreed with the trial court that there was
probable cause to arrest petitioner. It observed further:
That the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana is of no
moment. Such circumstance finds prominence only when the existence of the seized prohibited
drugs is denied. In this case, accused-appellant himself testified that the marijuana wrapped in a
newspaper was taken from his bag. The corpus delicti of the crime, i.e.[,] the existence of the
marijuana and his possession thereof, was amply proven by accused-appellant Valdez’s own
testimony.16
In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of the crime charged had
not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues, albeit for the first time on appeal, that
the warrantless arrest effected against him by the barangay tanod was unlawful and that the
warrantless search of his bag that followed was likewise contrary to law. Consequently, he
maintains, the marijuana leaves purportedly seized from him are inadmissible in evidence for
being the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are accorded great respect and weight, in the absence of any clear showing that
some facts and circumstances of weight or substance which could have affected the result of the
case have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied. 17
After meticulous examination of the records and evidence on hand, however, the Court finds and
so holds that a reversal of the decision a quo under review is in order.
II.
At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find any objection by petitioner to
the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and his active participation
in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. The legality of an arrest
affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person. 18 Petitioner’s warrantless arrest
therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.
However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to
ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful. The
search, conducted as it was without a warrant, is justified only if it were incidental to a lawful
arrest.19 Evaluating the evidence on record in its totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable
conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as well.
Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell, that after he was approached by the tanod and asked to show
the contents of his bag, he was simply herded without explanation and taken to the house of the
barangay captain. On their way there, it was Aratas who carried his bag. He denies ownership
over the contraband allegedly found in his bag and asserts that he saw it for the first time at the
barangay captain’s house.
Even casting aside petitioner’s version and basing the resolution of this case on the general
thrust of the prosecution evidence, the unlawfulness of petitioner’s arrest stands out just the
same.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions on which a
person may be arrested without a warrant, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
xxx
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not one of these
circumstances was obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By their own admission,
petitioner was not committing an offense at the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he appear
to be then committing an offense.20 The tanod did not have probable cause either to justify
petitioner’s warrantless arrest.
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements
must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act
is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 21 Here, petitioner’s act of
looking around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding his way to his
destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is
irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge the tanod with personal
knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to
engage in criminal activity. More importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run away but in
fact spoke with the barangay tanod  when they approached him.
Even taking the prosecution’s version generally as the truth, in line with our assumption from the
start, the conclusion will not be any different. It is not unreasonable to expect that petitioner,
walking the street at night, after being closely observed and then later tailed by three unknown
persons, would attempt to flee at their approach. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and
must not always be attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. 22 Of persuasion was the Michigan
Supreme Court when it ruled in People v. Shabaz 23 that "[f]light alone is not a reliable indicator of
guilt without other circumstances because flight alone is inherently ambiguous." Alone, and
under the circumstances of this case, petitioner’s flight lends itself just as easily to an innocent
explanation as it does to a nefarious one.
Moreover, as we pointed out in People v. Tudtud,24 "[t]he phrase ‘in his presence’ therein,
connot[es] penal knowledge on the part of the arresting officer. The right of the accused to be
secure against any unreasonable searches on and seizure of his own body and any deprivation of
his liberty being a most basic and fundamental one, the statute or rule that allows exception to
the requirement of a warrant of arrest is strictly construed. Its application cannot be extended
beyond the cases specifically provided by law."25
Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared dubious, cannot be
viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate his warrantless
arrest.26 If at all, the search most permissible for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing
backdrop of the case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion they have been harboring based
on petitioner’s behavior. However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio,27 must
precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the person’s outer clothing, and should be grounded
upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him. 28
Accordingly, petitioner’s waiver of his right to question his arrest notwithstanding, the marijuana
leaves allegedly taken during the search cannot be admitted in evidence against him as they
were seized during a warrantless search which was not lawful. 29 As we pronounced in People v.
Bacla-an —
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of
evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The following searches and seizures are
deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search of moving vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3)
customs searches (4) waiver or consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry Search) and
(6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered
legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible
warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and,
(3) arrests of escaped prisoners. 30
When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante delicto
committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit. Verily, it cannot therefore be
reasonably argued that the warrantless search conducted on petitioner was incidental to a lawful
arrest.
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that apart from the warrantless search
being incidental to his lawful arrest, petitioner had consented to the search. We are not
convinced. As we explained in Caballes v. Court of Appeals31 —
Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal
right which may be waived. The consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise
illegal detention and search, i.e., the consent is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given,
uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Hence, consent to a search is not to be lightly
inferred, but must be shown by clear and convincing evidence. The question whether a consent
to a search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person
giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2)
whether he was in a public or secluded location; (3) whether he objected to the search or
passively looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of
coercive police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be
found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning
took place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the
State which has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary
consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given. 32
In the case at bar, following the theory of the prosecution— albeit based on conflicting
testimonies on when petitioner’s bag was actually opened, it is apparent that petitioner was
already under the coercive control of the public officials who had custody of him when the
search of his bag was demanded. Moreover, the prosecution failed to prove any specific
statement as to how the consent was asked and how it was given, nor the specific words spoken
by petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." Even granting that petitioner admitted to opening
his bag when Ordoño asked to see its contents, his implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have
been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and
hence, is considered no consent at all within the contemplation of the constitutional
guarantee.33 As a result, petitioner’s lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount
to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and
seizure.34
III.
Notably, the inadmissibility in evidence of the seized marijuana leaves for being the fruit of an
unlawful search is not the lone cause that militates against the case of the prosecution. We
likewise find that it has failed to convincingly establish the identity of the marijuana leaves
purportedly taken from petitioner’s bag.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the following elements must concur:
(1) proof that the transaction took place; and (2) presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the
illicit drug as evidence.35 The existence of dangerous drugs is a condition sine qua non for
conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it being the very corpus delicti of the crime. 36
In a line of cases, we have ruled as fatal to the prosecution’s case its failure to prove that the
specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly seized from the
accused.37 There can be no crime of illegal possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts
persist on whether the item confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be
the prohibited drug.38 As we discussed in People v. Orteza39 , where we deemed the prosecution
to have failed in establishing all the elements necessary for conviction of appellant for illegal sale
of shabu –
First, there appears nothing in the record showing that police officers complied with the proper
procedure in the custody of seized drugs as specified in People v. Lim, i.e., any apprehending
team having initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure
or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the
accused, if there be any, and or his representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with the requirement
raises doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was
actually recovered from appellant. It negates the presumption that official duties have been
regularly performed by the police officers.
In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately
after the apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the standard
procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the origins of the marijuana.
Consequently, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the
corpus delicti.
The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom operatives failed to place
markings on the seized marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to observe the
procedure and take custody of the drug.
More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material inconsistencies with regard
to when and where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the
seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus
acquitted the accused due to the prosecution’s failure to indubitably show the identity of the
shabu.
In the case at bar, after the arrest of petitioner by the barangay tanod, the records only show
that he was taken to the house of the barangay captain and thereafter to the police station. The
Joint Affidavit40 executed by the tanod merely states that they confiscated the marijuana leaves
which they brought to the police station together with petitioner. Likewise, the Receipt 41 issued
by the Aringay Police Station merely acknowledged receipt of the suspected drugs supposedly
confiscated from petitioner.
Not only did the three tanod contradict each other on the matter of when petitioner’s bag was
opened, they also gave conflicting testimony on who actually opened the same. The prosecution,
despite these material inconsistencies, neglected to explain the discrepancies. Even more
damning to its cause was the admission by Laya, the forensic chemist, that he did not know how
the specimen was taken from petitioner, how it reached the police authorities or whose marking
was on the cellophane wrapping of the marijuana. The non-presentation, without justifiable
reason, of the police officers who conducted the inquest proceedings and marked the seized
drugs, if such was the case, is fatal to the case. Plainly, the prosecution neglected to establish the
crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized marijuana leaves from the time they were first
allegedly discovered until they were brought for examination by Laya.
The Court of Appeals found as irrelevant the failure of the prosecution to establish the chain of
custody over the seized marijuana as such "[f]inds prominence only when the existence of the
seized prohibited drug is denied."42We cannot agree.
To buttress its ratiocination, the appellate court narrowed on petitioner’s testimony that the
marijuana was taken from his bag, without taking the statement in full context. 43 Contrary to the
Court of Appeals’ findings, although petitioner testified that the marijuana was taken from his
bag, he consistently denied ownership thereof. 44Furthermore, it defies logic to require a denial of
ownership of the seized drugs before the principle of chain of custody comes into play.
The onus of proving culpability in criminal indictment falls upon the State. In conjunction with
this, law enforcers and public officers alike have the corollary duty to preserve the chain of
custody over the seized drugs. The chain of evidence is constructed by proper exhibit handling,
storage, labeling and recording, and must exist from the time the evidence is found until the time
it is offered in evidence. Each person who takes possession of the specimen is duty-bound to
detail how it was cared for, safeguarded and preserved while in his or her control to prevent
alteration or replacement while in custody. This guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be
used against an accused goes to the very heart of his fundamental rights.
The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty invoked by the prosecution and
relied upon by the courts a quo cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor
constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 45 Among the constitutional rights enjoyed by
an accused, the most primordial yet often disregarded is the presumption of innocence. This
elementary principle accords every accused the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the burden of proving the guilt of the accused rests
upon the prosecution.
Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated. Nevertheless, this
"[c]annot be used to advance the cause of the prosecution as its evidence must stand or fall on
its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
defense."46 Moreover, where the circumstances are shown to yield two or more inferences, one
inconsistent with the presumption of innocence and the other compatible with the finding of
guilt, the court must acquit the accused for the reason that the evidence does not satisfy the test
of moral certainty and is inadequate to support a judgment of conviction. 47
Drug addiction has been invariably denounced as "an especially vicious crime," 48 and "one of the
most pernicious evils that has ever crept into our society," 49 for those who become addicted to it
"not only slide into the ranks of the living dead, what is worse, they become a grave menace to
the safety of law-abiding members of society," 50whereas "peddlers of drugs are actually agents of
destruction."51 Indeed, the havoc created by the ruinous effects of prohibited drugs on the moral
fiber of society cannot be underscored enough. However, in the rightfully vigorous campaign of
the government to eradicate the hazards of drug use and drug trafficking, it cannot be permitted
to run roughshod over an accused’s right to be presumed innocent until proven to the contrary
and neither can it shirk from its corollary obligation to establish such guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to overcome the presumption of
innocence which petitioner enjoys. The failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the
offense beyond reasonable doubt must perforce result in petitioner’s exoneration from criminal
liability.

IV.

A final word. We find it fitting to take this occasion to remind the courts to exercise the highest
degree of diligence and prudence in deliberating upon the guilt of accused persons brought
before them, especially in light of the fundamental rights at stake. Here, we note that the courts
a quo neglected to give more serious consideration to certain material issues in the
determination of the merits of the case. We are not oblivious to the fact that in some instances,
law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract information or even harass
civilians. Accordingly, courts are duty-bound to be "[e]xtra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an
innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses." 52 In the
same vein, let this serve as an admonition to police officers and public officials alike to perform
their mandated duties with commitment to the highest degree of diligence, righteousness and
respect for the law.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez
is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to
cause the immediate release of petitioner, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another
cause; and to inform the Court of

the date of his release, or the reasons for his continued confinement, within ten (10) days from
notice. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
(4) ARREST
G.R. No. 101837 February 11, 1992
ROLITO GO y TAMBUNTING, petitioner,  investigation,4 alleging that the warrantless arrest of
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. BENJAMIN V. PELAYO, Presiding Judge, Branch 168,
Regional Trial Court, NCJR Pasig, M.M., and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
According to the findings of the San Juan Police in their Investigation Report, 1 on 2 July 1991,
Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P.
Guevarra St. Petitioner entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and started travelling in
the opposite or "wrong" direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts., petitioner's
and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Petitioner alighted from his car, walked over and
shot Maguan inside his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene. A security guard at
a nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner's car plate number. The police arrived
shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell and one round
of live ammunition for a 9 mm caliber pistol. Verification at the Land Transportation Office
showed that the car was registered to one Elsa Ang Go.
The following day, the police returned to the scene of the shooting to find out where the suspect
had come from; they were informed that petitioner had dined at Cravings Bake Shop shortly
before the shooting. The police obtained a facsimile or impression of the credit card used by
petitioner from the cashier of the bake shop. The security guard of the bake shop was shown a
picture of petitioner and he positively identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan.
Having established that the assailant was probably the petitioner, the police launched a manhunt
for petitioner.
On 8 July 1991, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news
reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The
police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at
that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman. That same day, the police promptly filed
a complaint for frustrated homicide 2 against petitioner with the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor")
informed petitioner, in the presence of his lawyers, that he could avail himself of his right to
preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner refused to execute any such waiver.
On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an information
could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot wound(s).
Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information for frustrated
homicide, filed an information for murder 3 before the Regional Trial Court. No bail was
recommended. At the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that no preliminary
investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute and sign a waiver of the
provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
In the afternoon of the same day, 11 July 1991, counsel for
petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus motion for
immediate release and proper preliminary
petitioner was unlawful and that no preliminary
investigation had been conducted before the information
was filed. Petitioner also prayed that he be released on
recognizance or on bail. Provincial Prosecutor Mauro
Castro, acting on the omnibus motion, wrote on the last
page of the motion itself that he interposed no objection
to petitioner being granted provisional liberty on a cash
bond of P100,000.00.
On 12 July 1991, petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion
for special raffle 5 in order to expedite action on the
Prosecutor's bail recommendation. The case was raffled to
the sala of respondent Judge, who, on the same date,
approved the cash bond 6 posted by petitioner and
ordered his release. 7 Petitioner was in fact released that
same day.
On 16 July 1991, the Prosecutor filed with the Regional
Trial Court a motion for leave to conduct preliminary
investigation8 and prayed that in the meantime all
proceedings in the court be suspended. He stated that
petitioner had filed before the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal an omnibus motion for immediate
release and preliminary investigation, which motion had
been granted by Provincial Prosecutor Mauro Castro, who
also agreed to recommend cash bail of P100,000.00. The
Prosecutor attached to the motion for leave a copy of
petitioner's omnibus motion of 11 July 1991.
Also on 16 July 1991, the trial court issued an
Order 9 granting leave to conduct preliminary investigation
and cancelling the arraignment set for 15 August 1991
until after the prosecution shall have concluded its
preliminary investigation.
On 17 July 1991, however, respondent Judge motu
proprio issued an Order, 10 embodying the following: (1)
the 12 July 1991 Order which granted bail was recalled;
petitioner was given 48 hours from receipt of the Order to
surrender himself; (2) the 16 July 1991 Order which
granted leave to the prosecutor to conduct preliminary
investigation was recalled and cancelled; (3) petitioner's
omnibus motion for immediate release and preliminary
investigation dated 11 July 1991 was treated as a petition
for bail and set for hearing on 23 July 1991.
On 19 July 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus  before the
Supreme Court assailing the 17 July 1991 Order, contending that the information was null and
void because no preliminary investigation had been previously conducted, in violation of his right
to due process. Petitioner also moved for suspension of all proceedings in the case pending
resolution by the Supreme Court of his petition; this motion was, however, denied by
respondent Judge.
On 23 July 1991, petitioner surrendered to the police.
By a Resolution dated 24 July 1991, this Court remanded the petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus to the Court of Appeals.
On 16 August 1991, respondent Judge issued an order in open court setting the arraignment of
petitioner on 23 August 1991.
On 19 August 1991, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion to restrain his
arraignment.
On 23 August 1991, respondent judge issued a Commitment Order directing the Provincial
Warden of Rizal to admit petitioner into his custody at the Rizal Provincial Jail. On the same date,
petitioner was arraigned. In view, however, of his refusal to enter a plea, the trial court entered
for him a plea of not guilty. The Trial court then set the criminal case for continuous hearings on
19, 24 and 26 September; on 2, 3, 11 and 17 October; and on 7, 8, 14, 15, 21 and 22 November
1991. 11
On 27 August 1991, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus  12 in the Court of Appeals. He
alleged that in view of public respondent's failure to join issues in the petition
for certiorari  earlier filed by him, after the lapse of more than a month, thus prolonging his
detention, he was entitled to be released on habeas corpus.
On 30 August 1991, the Court of Appeals issued the writ of habeas corpus.  13 The petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, on the one hand, and the petition for habeas
corpus, upon the other, were subsequently consolidated in the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, on 2 September 1991, issued a resolution denying petitioner's motion to
restrain his arraignment on the ground that that motion had become moot and academic.
On 19 September 1991, trial of the criminal case commenced and the prosecution presented its
first witness.
On 23 September 1991, the Court of Appeals rendered a consolidated decision 14 dismissing the
two (2) petitions, on the following grounds:
a. Petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was arrested and
charged had been "freshly committed." His identity had been established through investigation.
At the time he showed up at the police station, there had been an existing manhunt for him.
During the confrontation at the San Juan Police Station, one witness positively identified
petitioner as the culprit.
b. Petitioner's act of posting bail constituted waiver of any irregularity attending his arrest. He
waived his right to preliminary investigation by not invoking it properly and seasonably under the
Rules.
c. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it issued the 17 July 1991 Order because the
trial court had the inherent power to amend and control its processes so as to make them
conformable to law and justice.
d. Since there was a valid information for murder against petitioner and a valid commitment
order (issued by the trial judge after petitioner surrendered to the authorities whereby petitioner
was given to the custody of the Provincial Warden), the petition for habeas corpus could not be
granted.
On 3 October 1991, the prosecution presented three (3) more witnesses at the trial. Counsel for
petitioner also filed a "Withdrawal of Appearance" 15 with the trial court, with petitioner's
conformity.
On 4 October 1991, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari  was filed. On 14 October 1991,
the Court issued a Resolution directing respondent Judge to hold in abeyance the hearing of the
criminal case below until further orders from this Court.
In this Petition for Review, two (2) principal issues need to be addressed: first, whether or not a
lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of petitioner Go;
and second, whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation. We
consider these issues seriatim.
In respect of the first issue, the Solicitor General argues that under the facts of the case,
petitioner had been validly arrested without warrant. Since petitioner's identity as the gunman
who had shot Eldon Maguan on 2 July 1991 had been sufficiently established by police work,
petitioner was validly arrested six (6) days later at the San Juan Police Station. The Solicitor
General invokes Nazareno v. Station Commander, etc., et al., 16 one of the seven (7) cases
consolidated with In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil, etc., v. Ramos,
et al. 17 where a majority of the Court upheld a warrantees arrest as valid although effected
fourteen (14) days after the killing in connection with which Nazareno had been arrested.
Accordingly, in the view of the Solicitor General, the provisions of Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court were applicable and because petitioner had declined to waive the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, the Prosecutor was legally justified in filing the information for
murder even without preliminary investigation.
On the other hand, petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because
he went to the police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated.
Thus, petitioner argues, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time that he was
arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the
shooting of Maguan and accordingly none had the "personal knowledge" required for the
lawfulness of a warrantees arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest. Section 7,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary
investigation, could not apply in respect of petitioner.
The reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is, in the
circumstances of this case, misplaced. In Umil v.  Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court
sustained the legality of the warrantless arrests of petitioners made from one (1) to fourteen
days after the actual commission of the offenses, upon the ground that such offenses constituted
"continuing crimes." Those offenses were subversion, membership in an outlawed organization
like the New People's Army, etc. In the instant case, the offense for which petitioner was arrested
was murder, an offense which was obviously commenced and completed at one definite location
in time and space. No one had pretended that the fatal shooting of Maguan was a "continuing
crime."
Secondly, we do not believe that the warrantees "arrest" or detention of petitioner in the instant
case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
which provides as follows:
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceed against in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Petitioner's "arrest" took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting" officers
obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner had
allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected six (6) days after the shooting be
reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed" within
the meaning of Section 5(b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal
knowledge" of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The
information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to
take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in
petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." 18
It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the
meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112, which provides:
Sec. 7 When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. — When a person is lawfully arrested
without a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court the complaint or
information may be filed by the offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or
arresting office or person
However,  before the filing of such complaint or information, the person arrested may ask for a
preliminary investigation by a proper officer in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the
assistance of a lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of his
choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail  as provided in the corresponding rule
and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having been first conducted,
the accused may within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of the information, ask
for a preliminary investigation  with the same right to adduce evidence in his favor in the manner
prescribed in this Rule. (Emphasis supplied)
is also not applicable. Indeed, petitioner was not arrested at all. When he walked into San Juan
Police Station, accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the
police authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering" himself, in all probability to avoid
the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan or that he was otherwise guilty
of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the
latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether
there was probable cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan.
Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceed under the erroneous supposition that Section 7
of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. This was
substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should
have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since petitioner had not been
arrested, with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to
his appearing at the preliminary investigation.
Turning to the second issue of whether or not petitioner had waived his right to preliminary
investigation, we note that petitioner had from the very beginning demanded that a preliminary
investigation be conducted. As earlier pointed out, on the same day that the information for
murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court, petitioner filed with the Prosecutor an omnibus
motion for immediate release and preliminary investigation. The Solicitor General contends that
that omnibus motion should have been filed with the trial court and not with the Prosecutor, and
that the petitioner should accordingly be held to have waived his right to preliminary
investigation. We do not believe that waiver of petitioner's statutory right to preliminary
investigation may be predicated on such a slim basis. The preliminary investigation was to be
conducted by the Prosecutor, not by the Regional Trial Court. It is true that at the time of filing of
petitioner's omnibus motion, the information for murder had already been filed with the
Regional Trial Court: it is not clear from the record whether petitioner was aware of this fact at
the time his omnibus motion was actually filed with the Prosecutor. In Crespo v.  Mogul,  19 this
Court held:
The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether
a  prima facie  case exists to warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the
filing of the information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said
information sets in motion the criminal action against the accused in Court.  Should the fiscal find
it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must
be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be
submitted to the Court for appropriate action.While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi-
judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not,
once the case had already been brought to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should
be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. The only
qualification is that the action of the Court must not impair the substantial rights of the accused.,
or the right of the People to due process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case [such] as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in
the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. . . . 20 (Citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Nonetheless, since petitioner in his omnibus motion was asking for preliminary investigation and
not for a re-investigation (Crespo v. Mogul involved a re-investigation),  and since the Prosecutor
himself did file with the trial court, on the 5th day after filing the information for murder, a
motion for leave to conduct preliminary investigation (attaching to his motion a copy of
petitioner's omnibus motion), we conclude that petitioner's omnibus motion was in effect filed
with the trial court. What was crystal clear was that petitioner did ask for a preliminary
investigation on the very day that the information was filed without such preliminary
investigation, and that the trial court was five (5) days later apprised of the desire of the
petitioner for such preliminary investigation. Finally, the trial court did in fact grant the
Prosecutor's prayer for leave to conduct preliminary investigation. Thus, even on the (mistaken)
supposition apparently made by the Prosecutor that Section 7 of Rule 112 of the Revised Court
was applicable, the 5-day reglementary period in Section 7, Rule 112 must be held to have been
substantially complied with.
We believe and so hold that petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation.
While that right is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been
established by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. 21 The right to
have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal
offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not  a mere formal or
technical right; it is a substantive  right. The accused in a criminal trial is inevitably exposed to
prolonged anxiety, aggravation, humiliation, not to speak of expense; the right to an opportunity
to avoid a process painful to any one save, perhaps, to hardened criminals, is a valuable right. To
deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him the full measure of
his right to due process.
The question may be raised whether petitioner still retains his right to a preliminary investigation
in the instant case considering that he was already arraigned on 23 August 1991. The rule is that
the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it  before or at
the time of entering a plea  at arraignment. 22 In the instant case, petitioner Go had vigorously
insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his
arraignment, petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition
and mandamusprecisely asking for a preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial.
Again, in the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that by posting bail petitioner had
waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison,  23 we did hold that appellants
there had waived their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after their arrest,
they filed bail and proceeded to trial "without previously claiming that they did not have the
benefit of a preliminary investigation."  24 In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on
recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus
claimed his right to preliminary investigation before  respondent Judge approved the cash bond
posted by petitioner and ordered his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, we cannot reasonably
imply waiver of preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor
filed a motion in court asking for leave to conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly
recognized that petitioner's claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.
We would clarify, however, that contrary to petitioner's contention the failure to accord
preliminary investigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the
statutory process of criminal justice, did not impair the validity of the information for murder nor
affect the jurisdiction of the trial court. 25
It must also be recalled that the Prosecutor had actually agreed that petitioner was entitled to
bail. This was equivalent to an acknowledgment on the part of the Prosecutor that the evidence
of guilt then in his hands was not strong. Accordingly, we consider that the 17 July 1991 order of
respondent Judge recalling his own order granting bail and requiring petitioner to surrender
himself within forty-eight (48) hours from notice, was plainly arbitrary considering that no
evidence at all — and certainly no new or additional evidence — had been submitted to
respondent Judge that could have justified the recall of his order issued just five (5) days before.
It follows that petitioner was entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right.
The final question which the Court must face is this: how does the fact that, in the instant case,
trial on the merits has already commenced, the Prosecutor having already presented four (4)
witnesses, impact upon, firstly, petitioner's right to a preliminary investigation and, secondly,
petitioner's right to be released on bail? Does he continue to be entitled to have a preliminary
investigation conducted in respect of the charge against him? Does petitioner remain entitled to
be released on bail?
Turning first to the matter of preliminary investigation, we consider that petitioner remains
entitled to a preliminary investigation although trial on the merits has already began. Trial on the
merits should be suspended or held in abeyance and a preliminary investigation forthwith
accorded to petitioner. 26 It is true that the Prosecutor might, in view of the evidence that he may
at this time have on hand, conclude that probable cause exists; upon the other hand, the
Prosecutor conceivably could reach the conclusion that the evidence on hand does not warrant a
finding of probable cause. In any event, the constitutional point is that petitioner
was not accorded what he was entitled to by way of procedural due process. 27 Petitioner was
forced to undergo arraignment and literally pushed to trial without preliminary investigation,
with extraordinary haste, to the applause from the audience that filled the courtroom. If he
submitted to arraignment at trial, petitioner did so "kicking and screaming," in a manner of
speaking . During the proceedings held before the trial court on 23 August 1991, the date set for
arraignment of petitioner, and just before arraignment, counsel made very clear petitioner's
vigorous protest and objection to the arraignment precisely because of the denial of preliminary
investigation. 28 So energetic and determined were petitioner's counsel's protests and objections
that an obviously angered court and prosecutor dared him to withdraw or walkout, promising to
replace him with counsel de oficio. During the trial, before the prosecution called its first witness,
petitioner through counsel once again reiterated his objection to going to trial without
preliminary investigation: petitioner's counsel made of record his "continuing
objection." 29 Petitioner had promptly gone to the appellate court on certiorari  and prohibition to
challenge the lawfulness of the procedure he was being forced to undergo and the lawfulness of
his detention.30 If he did not walk out on the trial, and if he cross-examined the prosecution's
witnesses, it was because he was extremely loath to be represented by counsel de oficio selected
by the trial judge, and to run the risk of being held to have waived also his right to use what is
frequently the only test of truth in the judicial process.

In respect of the matter of bail, we similarly believe and so hold that petitioner remains entitled
to be released on bail as a matter of right. Should the evidence already of record concerning
petitioner's guilt be, in the reasonable belief of the Prosecutor, strong, the Prosecutor may move
in the trial court for cancellation of petitioner's bail. It would then be up to the trial court, after a
careful and objective assessment of the evidence on record, to grant or deny the motion for
cancellation of bail.

To reach any other conclusions here, that is, to hold that petitioner's rights to a preliminary
investigation and to bail were effectively obliterated by evidence subsequently admitted into the
record would be to legitimize the deprivation of due process and to permit the Government to
benefit from its own wrong or culpable omission and effectively to dilute important rights of
accused persons well-nigh to the vanishing point. It may be that to require the State to accord
petitioner his rights to a preliminary investigation and to bail at this point, could turn out
ultimately to be largely a ceremonial exercise. But the Court is not compelled to speculate. And,
in any case, it would not be idleceremony; rather, it would be a celebration by the State of the
rights and liberties of its own people and a re-affirmation of its obligation and determination to
respect those rights and liberties.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to GRANT the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Order of
the trial court dated 17 July 1991 is hereby SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED, and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 23 September 1991 hereby REVERSED.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor is hereby ORDERED to conduct forthwith a preliminary
investigation of the charge of murder against petitioner Go, and to complete such preliminary
investigation within a period of fifteen (15) days from commencement thereof. The trial on the
merits of the criminal case in the Regional Trial Court shall be SUSPENDED to await the
conclusion of the preliminary investigation.

Meantime, petitioner is hereby ORDERED released forthwith upon posting of a cash bail bond of
One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). This release shall be without prejudice to any
lawful order that the trial court may issue, should the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor move
for cancellation of bail at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation.

No pronouncement as to costs. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
(1) BAIL
[A.M. No. RTJ-03-1817. June 8, 2005]
P/SR. SUPT. ORLANDO M. MABUTAS, Regional Director, Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency,
Metro Manila Regional Office, complainant, vs. JUDGE NORMA C. PERELLO, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 276, Muntinlupa City, respondent.
[A.M. No. RTJ-04-1820. June 8, 2005]
CITY PROSECUTOR EDWARD M. TOGONONON, complainant, vs. JUDGE NORMA C.
PERELLO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Subject matters of the present administrative cases are two complaints against respondent Judge
Norma C. Perello, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 276) of Muntinlupa City.
Admin. Matter No. RTJ-03-1817
This case originated from a letter of Police Senior Supt. Orlando M. Mabutas, Regional Director of
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, Metro Manila Regional Office. P/Sr. Supt. Mabutas
complained of certain irregularities committed by respondent Judge in the grant of bail to
accused Aiza Chona Omadan in Criminal Case No. 03-265. Omadan was charged in an
Information, dated April 21, 2003, with Violation of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165, or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for the possession, custody and control of 57.78
grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), with no bail recommended.
P/Sr. Supt. Mabutass complaint was based on the memorandum submitted by Police Inspector
Darwin S. Butuyan, who stated in his report, as follows:
In the evening of May 5, 2003, a colleague notified him of a scheduled preliminary investigation
of Omadans case on the following day (May 6). When P/Insp. Butuyan, together with PO2
Saturnino Mayonte and PO2 Allan Lising, went to the Office of the City Prosecutor, Assistant City
Prosecutor (ACP) Florante E. Tuy merely asked them to sign the minutes of the preliminary
investigation. Omadan and her counsel were not around, and the police officers were not
furnished with a copy of Omadans counter-affidavit.
On May 8, 2003, someone handed P/Insp. Butuyan a subpoena for the arraignment of Omadan
on May 9, 2003. During the scheduled arraignment, they were surprised when ACP Vicente
Francisco called PO2 Mayonte to the witness stand. Apparently, Omadan filed a petition for bail
and it was being heard on the same day. PO2 Mayonte and PO2 Lising asked ACP Francisco for a
rescheduling of the hearing because they were not prepared to testify but the former declined,
saying that it is just a motion for bail. After PO2 Mayonte testified, PO2 Lising asked ACP
Francisco to present him as witness but again, the former declined since his testimony would
only be corroborative. ACP Francisco also presented two (2) barangay tanods.
On May 12, 2003, P/Insp. Butuyan went to deliver a
communiqu to ACP Francisco from P/Sr. Supt. Mabutas
requesting that in the event bail was granted, its
implementation be held in abeyance so that the police
authorities may file the necessary motion, and in order to
prevent Omadan from escaping. Since ACP Francisco was
not around, they went to Branch 276 to secure a copy of
the motion for bail. However, the police officers were
shocked to learn that Omadan has already been released
on a P1,000,000.00 bail on May 9, 2003, which was a
Friday. Court personnel also informed them that they
spent overtime work for the processing of the release
papers. They asked for a copy of the transcript of
stenographic notes of the hearing held on May 9, 2003,
but it was not available.
Respondent Judges Order dated May 9, 2003, granting
Omadans petition for bail, reads in part:
Clearly, the evidence of guilt is not very strong for the
denial of the bail. It was not proven that the object that
SPO1 Mayonte allegedly saw wrapped in a tissue paper
was indeed methamphetamine hydrochloride. He is not
very sure if the specimen was in fact subjected to an
analysis to determine what it was. There is also no
specifying the quantity of the item.
There also seem to be an irregularity in the service of the
search warrant for it was NOT witnessed by two
disinterested persons. Admittedly two Barangay Tanods
were brought to the residence of accused, but they never
witnessed the search because when they arrived the
search had already been completed. The wife of the owner
of the residence was allegedly found in the house but she
was not made to go with the searching team to witness
the search. An evaluation of the record of the search, it
appears also the search warrant, showed some material
defect, because no witness who appeared to have
personal knowledge of the illegal activities of the accused
and husband, executed an Affidavit before the officer who
issued the search warrant. In fact the searching questions
were conducted on the applicant but not on the
confidential informant, who alone had the personal
knowledge of the alleged illegal activities in the vicinity. No
deposition was taken of the applicant. Only the applying
officers executed an affidavit, yet had no personal
knowledge of the crime as they were only told by his
confidential informant. No copy of the deposition is
attached to the application. Although this court has no
jurisdiction to hear the MOTION TO QUASH the search
warrant however this fact are [sic] taken into
consideration for the petition to bail if only to show the
strength or weakness of the prosecution evidence, to ascertain if Prosecution have [sic] a witness
who has personal knowledge of the alleged illegal activities of the accused in her home. There is
none. Even the Barangay policemen Arturo Villarin, cannot tell with certainty if drugs were
indeed found in the residence of the accused.
Bail is therefore allowed in the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00) which accused
AIZA CHONA OMADAN may post in cash, by property or thru a reputable bonding company, and
under the additional condition that her counsel, Atty. GENE CASTILLO QUILAS guarantees her
appearance in court whenever so required.
It is SO ORDERED.[1]
Admin. Matter No. RTJ-04-1820
This case proceeded from a letter of Prosecutor Edward M. Togononon of Muntinlupa City,
accusing respondent Judge of partiality, serious misconduct in office and gross ignorance of the
law, concerning the latters grant of bail in four criminal cases for Violations of R.A. No. 9165
pending before her.
In Criminal Case No. 03-065,  entitled, People of the Philippines vs. Rosemarie Pascual y Mozo @
Rosema, for Violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, accused Pascual was charged with selling,
trading, delivering and giving away to another 0.20 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
(shabu), with no bail recommended.[2] Pascual filed, on February 5, 2003, a motion for bail on the
grounds that the quantity of shabu  involved is minimal and the imposable penalty is likewise
minimal in degree; and that she is nine months pregnant and due to give birth anytime. [3]
On the day of arraignment, February 7, 2003, respondent Judge issued an order granting
Pascuals motion for bail without hearing, which reads:
The MOTION FOR BAIL filed by Accused through counsel is granted on the reason cited thereat.
Accordingly, Accused ROSEMARIE PASCUAL Y MOZO may post her bail in the amount
of P200,000.00 in cash or thru a reputable bonding company, or by property bond for her
provisional liberty.
It is SO ORDERED.[4]
ACP Francisco filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that since the crime charged against
Pascual is a capital offense, bail is not allowed as a matter of right, and a hearing is indispensable.
Respondent Judge denied the motion in her Order dated March 12, 2003, which reads, in part:
...
This Court is immediately appalled and shocked by the thirst for blood of these officials, were
selling shabu in the quantity of 0.20 gram, they would put the accused to DEATH. It seems that,
to these officials LIFE IMPRISONMENT and DEATH is the only solution to this problem, without
considering the intended provision of the law, and the possible dislocation that the death of the
accused will cause to his family and even to society itself. The prosecution and some City Officials
have distorted the provision of the law by considering shabu as a dangerous drug, in the category
of opium puppy (sic) or morphine. They cannot be more wrong!
In the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol,
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride is NEVER considered as dangerous drugs to come under the
provision of the first paragraph of Sec. 5, Republic Act No. 9165. The definition of dangerous
drugs under Sec. 3, letter J of the said law, specifies those considered as dangerous drugs.
Instead Methamphetamine Hydrochloride is considered as a controlled precursor or essential
chemical, which is found and listed in No. 7, LIST OF SUBSTANCES in SCHEDULE NO. 111 of the
1971 United Nations Single Convention on Psychotropic Substances. Therefore,
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride is a chemical substance or psychotropic substance and NOT a
dangerous drug.!
Since the quantity is very much less than a gram of this essential chemical, is punishable with
imprisonment of only 12 years, as paragraph 2 of Sec. 5, R.A. 9165 provides. There is no law,
statute, or jurisprudence that classifies 12 years imprisonment as a capital punishment, and non-
bailable. Only bloodsuckers who thirst for blood will consider death for these offenders for this
kind of offense!
Prosecution will probably argue that this drug is considered dangerous under Sec. 11, R.A. 9165,
but this section does not define what are dangerous drugs, and the term is used generally to
encompass all drugs. Still, this section only shows that for possession of certain quantities of
shabu, is punishable with 12 years imprisonment only, NEVER DEATH!
This Court has no quarrel with the Prosecutors if the drugs accused is pushing or found in the
custody of accused are of large volume, for then they would really deserve to DIE! Then be richer
by several millions, and foster a society of drug abusers yet! But this Court cannot agree with
Prosecutors when the quantity that is peddled is not even enough to put body and soul together
of accused. Foisting death on these kind of offenders, is death itself to him who imposes such a
penalty! This court cannot be that unjust and unfeeling, specially as the law itself does not so
allow!
The prosecutors are also reminded that the grant of bail to all offenses is constitutionally
guaranteed. Even those punishable with death or capital offenses, only the EXCEPTIONS! It is
never the rule.
...
Perhaps if these questioning individuals will provide employment to their constituents, the latter
will not engage in this kind of trade to survive. [5]
In Criminal Case No. 03-082,  entitled, People of the Philippines vs. Rolando Uy y Manata @ Nono,
for Violation of Section 5, paragraph 1 of R.A. No. 9165, accused Uy was charged with selling,
trading, delivering and giving away to Philippine National Police (PNP) operatives after a buy-bust
operation 0.12 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu). ACP Romeo B. Senson
recommended no bail. Uy filed a petition for bail cum motion to suppress prosecution evidence
on February 18, 2003, alleging, among others, that the arrest was illegal as no buy-bust operation
happened, and the shabu confiscated was planted on him. Without hearing, respondent Judge
granted Uys petition for bail since the quantity of drug allegedly pushed is only 0.12 grams [6] Uy
was released on a P200,000.00 bail. The motion for reconsideration filed by ACP Francisco
remains unresolved.
The antecedents of Criminal Case No. 03-265 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Aiza Chona
Omadan y Chua and John Doe, for Violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, are set forth and dealt
with in Admin. Matter No. RTJ-03-1817.
In Criminal Case No. 03-288 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Mary Jane Regencia y Mozo @
Grace, for Violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, accused Regencia was charged with selling,
delivering, trading and giving away to another 0.07 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
(shabu). Respondent Judge likewise granted Regencias motion for bail without hearing, on the
ground that the quantity of shabu involved is minimal and the imposable penalty is also minimal.
[7]
Respondent Judge was required to comment on these two complaints.
In Admin. Matter No. RTJ-03-1817, respondent Judge contends that P/Sr. Supt. Mabutass charges
against her are baseless; that the preliminary investigation conducted on Omadans case was
outside her jurisdiction; that she did not have any hand or influence in ACP Franciscos handling of
the hearing on the petition for bail as it is within the latters control and supervision; that she
denies that there was undue haste in the grant of bail in Omadans favor; and that bail was
granted because the prosecutions evidence of Omadans guilt was not strong. [8]
In Admin. Matter No. RTJ-04-1820, respondent Judge explains that she did not conduct any
hearings on the motions/petitions for bail filed in the criminal cases subject of the complaint
because the crimes charged are not capital offenses as the quantity of shabu involved therein
was minimal. Criminal Case Nos. 03-065, 03-082, and 03-288 all involve selling of less than 5
grams of shabu.  Respondent Judge believes that under R.A. No. 9165, shabu is not a dangerous
drug but merely a controlled precursor, in which the selling of less than 5 grams is punishable
only with imprisonment of 12 years to 20 years. Such being the case, respondent Judge maintains
that bail is a matter of right and a hearing is not required. [9]
The two complaints were consolidated and referred to Court of Appeals Associate Justice Jose C.
Reyes, Jr. for investigation, report, and recommendation.
After due proceedings, the Investigating Justice submitted his Report and Recommendation, with
the following findings and conclusion:
The charges arose out of the same set of facts and are interrelated and will be discussed
together.
Before proceeding further, the investigating justice will first dispose respondent judges assertion
that the complaints should be dismissed outright claiming that where sufficient judicial remedy
exists, the filing of administrative complaint is not the proper remedy to correct actions of a
judge citing the case of Barbers vs. Laguio, Jr. (351 SCRA 606 [2001])
Anent the charge of partiality and serious misconduct, the investigating justice notes that these
particular charges were not touched upon in the testimony of any of the witnesses presented by
the complainants. Therefore, the investigating justice finds that no evidence as to partiality nor
serious misconduct exists and these charges should be dismissed for lack of evidence.
The investigating justice will now therefore tackle only the charge of gross ignorance of the law
against respondent judge.
A close scrutiny of the said Barbers case shows that it is not applicable in the present
administrative complaints because in the said case it was clear that complainants-petitioners
were not merely concerned with the alleged act of the judge of rendering an unjust judgment but
was also seeking the reversal of the judgment of acquittal. They had even filed an appeal from
the judgment therein of respondent judge. Thus, the Supreme Court held:
It has been held that the pendency of an appeal from a questioned judgment renders the filing of
administrative charges premature. Where a sufficient judicial remedy exists, the filing of an
administrative complaint is not the proper remedy to correct the actions of a judge.
In the present administrative complaints, it was not shown that an appeal or any other
proceeding had been filed to reverse the respondent judges orders granting bail. It had not been
shown that the present administrative complaints had any purpose other then seeking
administrative sanctions against respondent judge.
Turning now to the merits of the administrative complaints, the primordial issue is: Whether or
not there is an ambiguity in the law as to the classification of methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Under Section 3(x) of the R.A. No. 9165 the substance was defined as:
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or commonly known as Shabu, Ice, Meth, or by its any other
name. Refers to the drug having such chemical composition, including any of its isomers or
derivatives in any form.
It can be noted that nothing in this provision indicates the classification of the substance either
as a dangerous or regulated drug.
It is respondent judges position that shabu is not expressly classified as a dangerous drug under
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 and should therefore be considered merely as a chemical precursor, to
wit:
...
For clarity, the UN Single Convention was referred to in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to
the definitions of dangerous drugs and controlled precursors, to wit:
(h) Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. Include those listed in Tables I and II of the
1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances as
enumerated in the attached annex, which is an integral part of this Act.
...
(j) Dangerous Drugs. Include those listed in the Schedules annexed to the 1961 Single Convention
on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol, and in the Schedules annexed to the 1971
Single Convention on Psychotropic Substances as enumerated in the attached annex which is an
integral part of this Act.
It should be noted, however, that by the plain wordings of R.A. No. 9165 dangerous drugs are not
limited to those substances listed in the schedules attached to the 1961 United Nations Single
Convention on Narcotic Drugs because of the use of the word include. That is, there are other
substances which may be considered dangerous drugs even if not listed in the above-mentioned
schedules.
It is also worth noting that under Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
was specifically mentioned as a dangerous drug, to wit:
...
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu;
...
It is clear, therefore, that the lawmakers intended to classify Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
or shabu as a dangerous drug. Moreover, it would be absurd to consider methamphetamine
hydrochloride a dangerous drug under Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 and merely a precursor under
Section 5 of the same law.
In fine, there is no question that methamphetamine hydrochloride is classified as a dangerous
drug.
Having made the foregoing findings, the next issue that calls for resolution is the penalty
imposable to the criminal cases under consideration. This is necessary in order to determine if
the accused are entitled to bail. Under Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, an
accused shall be entitled to bail as a matter of right unless charged with an offense punishable
with a capital penalty.
The Court notes that the criminal cases under consideration can be grouped into two (2): A)
Crim. Case No. 03-065 (against Rosemarie Pascual, Crim. Case No. 03-082 (against Rolando Uy),
and Crim. Case No. 03-288 (against Mary Jane Regencia), which involve selling, trading, delivering
or giving away Methamphetamine Hydrochloride; and B) Crim. Case No. 03-265 (against Aiza
Chona Omadan) which involve possession of the said substance.
The investigating justice would first discuss Crim. Case No. 03-265 where the accused was
charged with possession of 57.78 grams of Methemphetamine Hydrochloride. Section 11 of R.A.
No. 9165 provides that the penalty imposable is life imprisonment to death. Therefore, in the
Crim. Case No. 03-265 accused therein is not entitled to bail as a matter of right. Rightly so, a
hearing was conducted before the bail was granted.
The investigating justice, after a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the
complainants, opines that there is insufficient evidence to support the allegation that bail was
hastily granted to accused Aiza Chona Omadan. Therefore, the charge of gross ignorance in
relation to this case should be dismissed for lack of factual basis.
The investigating justice will now tackle the other set of cases (Crim. Case No. 03-065; Crim. Case
No. 03-082; Crim. Case No. 03-288). Under the law, these are punishable with penalty ranging
from life imprisonment to death. Pertinent portions of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 reads:
...
As held in Managuelod vs. Paclibon, et al. (A.M. No. RTJ-02-1726, March 29, 2004).
It is imperative that judges be conversant with basic legal principles and possess sufficient
proficiency in the law. In offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death, the accused has no
right to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong. Respondent Judge Go should have known the
procedure to be followed when a motion for admission to bail is filed by the accused. Extreme
care, not to mention the highest sense of personal integrity, is required of him in granting bail,
specially in case where bail is not a matter of right. The fact that the provincial prosecutor
interposed no objection to the application for bail by the accused did not relieve respondent
judge of the duty to set the motion for bail for hearing. A hearing is of utmost necessity because
certain guidelines in fixing bail (the nature of the crime, character and reputation of the accused,
weight of evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial, among
other things) call for the presentation of evidence. It was impossible for respondent judge to
determine the application of these guidelines in an ex-parte determination of the propriety of
Palacols motion for bail. Thus, for his failure to conduct any hearing on the application for bail,
we hold respondent Judge Go guilty of gross ignorance of the law justifying the imposition of the
severest disciplinary sanction on him. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear, therefore, that as to said criminal cases the accused were likewise not entitled to bail
as a matter of right, hence, a hearing for the grant of bail should have been conducted. However,
in this last instance, no such hearing was conducted.
In fine, respondent judge erred in granting bail to the accused in Crim. Case No. 03-065, Crim.
Case No. 03-082, and Crim. Case No. 03-288 without hearing because the crime charge carries
with it capital penalty.
As to Crim. Case No. 03-065, Crim. Case No. 03-082, and Crim. Case No. 03-288, the next issue to
be resolved is: whether or not the mistake amounted to gross ignorance of the law which would
justify an administrative sanction against respondent judge.
Respondent judge, naturally, argued that she cannot be held liable asserting that to be held
guilty of gross ignorance, the error must have been gross, deliberate and malicious (Rollo, RTJ-
04-1820, p. 74) and in absence of fraud, dishonesty, or corruption that judge cannot be held
liable (Rollo, RTJ-04-1820, p. 75).
However, the Supreme Court does not always require the presence of malice to find erring
judges liable for gross ignorance.
In the above-cited Managuelod case the Supreme Court held that failure to hold a hearing before
granting bail in crimes involving capital punishment constitutes gross ignorance of the law, thus:
. . . Thus, for his failure to conduct any hearing on the application for bail, we hold respondent
Judge Go guilty of gross ignorance of the law justifying the imposition of the severest disciplinary
sanction on him.
The same should hold true in the present administrative cases considering that the criminal cases
involved drugs, a major problem of the country today.
In conclusion, the investigating justice finds respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law
in relation to the granting of bail without hearing in Crim. Case Nos. 03-065, 03-082 and 03-288
and exonerate her as to the charge in relation to Criminal Case No. 03-265.
...
The next issue then is the penalty imposable on respondent judge. In Mupas vs. Espanol (A.M.
No. RTJ-04-185014, July 14, 2004) the Supreme Court enumerated the proper penalty for gross
negligence (sic), thus:
Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC amending Rule 140 of the Rules of Court on the
Discipline of Justices and Judges, which took effect on October 1, 2001, gross ignorance of the
law is classified as a serious charge which carries with it a penalty of either dismissal from
service, suspension or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.[10]
Based on the foregoing, the Investigating Justice made the following recommendation:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that respondent Judge
Norma C. Perello be DISMISSED on the ground of gross ignorance of law in relation to the grant
of bail in Criminal Case No. 03-065, Criminal Case No. 03-082, Criminal Case No. 03-288. [11]
The issue in these administrative cases is whether respondent Judge may be administratively
held liable for the grant of bail in the particular criminal cases subject of the complaints. As
earlier stated, the criminal cases subject of the present administrative complaints all involve
violations of R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Admin. Matter No. RTJ-03-1817 particularly relates to Criminal Case No. 03-265 (People of the
Philippines vs. Aiza Chona Omadan), involving the possession, custody, and control of 57.78
grams of shabu, punishable under Section 11 thereof, which reads:
SEC. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs.--  The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine
ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00)
shall be imposed upon any person, who unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous
drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
...
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu; (Emphasis supplied)
...
Under the foregoing provision, possession of 50 grams or more of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu is punishable by life imprisonment to death; hence, a capital offense.
[12]
 As such, bail becomes a matter of discretion. In this regard, Rule 114, Sec. 7 of the Rules of
Court states:
No person charged with the capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the
stage of the criminal prosecution.
This provision is based on Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law.  The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.  Excessive bail shall not be required.
The matter of determining whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion
that remains with the judge.[13]  Such discretion must be sound and exercised within reasonable
bounds.[14]
Under the present rules, a hearing on an application for bail is mandatory. [15]  Whether bail is a
matter of right or of discretion, the prosecutor should be given reasonable notice of hearing, or
at least his recommendation on the matter must be sought.  In case an application for bail is
filed, the judge is entrusted to observe the following duties:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing
of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation;
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused
is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion;
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution; and
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail
bond. Otherwise the bail should be denied.[16]
Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the courts order
granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. A
summary is defined as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or
statement. Based on the summary of evidence, the judge formulates his own conclusion on
whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. [17]
In this case, respondent Judge complied with the foregoing duties. A hearing was held on the
petition; the prosecution was given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of its
stance; respondent Judge based her findings on the prosecutions evidence, namely, the
testimonies of P02 Saturnino Mayonte and Arturo Villarin; respondent Judges Order dated May
9, 2003 granting the accuseds petition for bail contained a summary of the prosecutions
evidence; and since it was her conclusion that the evidence of accused Omadans guilt is not
strong, the petition for bail was granted.[18] Respondent Judge did not violate procedural
requirements. Records show that respondent Judge afforded the prosecution ample opportunity
to present all the evidence it had and there was no protest from the prosecution that it had been
deprived of its right to present against the accused. Thus, the Court does not find any irregularity
in the grant of bail in Criminal Case No. 03-265  that would render respondent Judge
administratively liable.
It is noted that the other circumstances, complained of in this case, do not relate solely to
respondent Judges acts, but to the prosecutions conduct in handling the case. Thus, P/Insp.
Darwin S. Butuyan stated in his report that there is something wrong in the procedures and
circumstances adopted by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City and Branch 276,
RTC, Muntinlupa City in handling the case leading to the granting of bail to accused Aiza Chona
Omadan y Chua.[19]
The Court recognizes that the manner in which the strength of an accuseds guilt is proven still
primarily rests on the prosecution. The prosecutor has the right to control the quantum of
evidence and the order of presentation of the witnesses, in support of the denial of bail. After all,
all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. [20] It
was the prosecutions judgment to limit the presentation of evidence to two witnesses, as it felt
that the testimonies of the other witnesses would be merely corroborative. It is beyond
respondent Judges authority to compel the public prosecutor to exercise its discretion in a way
respondent Judge deems fit, so long as such exercise of discretion will not defeat the purpose for
which the hearing was held, i.e., to  determine whether strong evidence of guilt exists such that
the accused may not be entitled to bail.
In any event, the complainant in this case had also filed a letter-complaint with the Department
of Justice against the concerned public prosecutors. [21] Such matter is best left handled by the
Department, and the Court will not interfere on the matter.
Admin. Matter No. RTJ-04-1820, however, portrays an entirely different picture.
In this case, respondent Judge granted bail in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-065, 03-082, and 03-
288 without the requisite hearing. In so doing, it was respondent Judges defense that under R.A.
No. 9165, shabu  is not a dangerous drug but merely a controlled precursor, in which the selling
of less than 5 grams is punishable only with imprisonment of 12 years to 20 years, and as such,
bail is a matter of right and a hearing is not required. Respondent Judge argued that:
In determining whether methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is indeed classified as a
dangerous drug under the said Republic Act, undersigned exhaustively studied the provision of
this law and found that in Letter H, Art. 1, Section 3: Definition of Terms, Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride is listed in Table II, No. 12 of the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which list is attached annex, an integral part of this
Act, Methamphetamine and is listed as a CONTROLLED PRECURSOR or ESSENTIAL CHEMICAL.
This is more imperatively classified as a chemical, in Letter X of the Definition, Sec. 3, Art. 1,
where shabu is considered as such chemical. Therefore, under the definition by law itself, shabu
or methamphetamine hydrochloride is classified as a controlled precursor or essential chemical.
The definition of what are considered as DANGEROUS DRUGS, is (sic) those in Letter J, Sec. 3, Art.
1 of R.A. 9165, listed in 1961 Singled Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972
Protocol, which list is again an integral part of this Act. Methamphetamine is NOT one of the
enumerations of dangerous drugs. Therefore, the selling or trading of this substance in a quantity
less than a gram is punishable with an imprisonment of only twelve (12) years as provided by the
second paragraph of Section 5, Article II, is not on capital offense punishable with death or life
imprisonment, is bailable.
not even go beyond the four corners of R.A. No. 9165 to see respondent Judges palpable error in
the application of the law.
Respondent Judge need not exhaustively study R.A. No. 9165, as she asserted, to determine the
nature of methamphetamine hydrochloride. A plain reading of the law would immediately show
that methamphetamine hydrochloride is a dangerous drug and not a controlled precursor. If only
respondent Judge prudently went over the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9165, particularly
Section 3, items (h) and (j), and properly made the corresponding reference to the schedules and
tables annexed thereto, she would have easily ascertained that methamphetamine
hydrochloride is listed in the 1971 UN Single Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which are
considered dangerous drugs. It is not listed in the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, as respondent Judge stated.[23]
Dangerous Drugs are defined by Section 3, paragraph (j) of R.A. No. 9165, as including those in
the Schedules listed annexed to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by
the 1972 Protocol, and in the Schedules annexed to the 1971 UN Single Convention on
Psychotropic Substances, which were made an integral part of R.A. No. 9165.
Under the foregoing section, dangerous drugs are classified into: (1) narcotic drugs, as listed in
the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, as amended by the 1972 Protocol; and
(2) psychotropic substances, as listed in the 1971 UN Single Convention on Psychotropic
Substances.
For purposes of this case, the list of substances in Schedule II of the 1971 UN Single Convention
of Psychotropic Substances is hereby reproduced, to wit:
LIST OF SUBSTANCES IN SCHEDULE II
1. AMFETAMINE (AMPHETAMINE)
2. DEXAMFETAMINE (DEXAMPHETAMINE)
3. FENETYLLINE DRONABINOL
4. LEVAMFETAMINE

Section 11, Art. II, of the same Act, treats of POSSESSION NOT SELLING, where possession of this 5. LEVOMETHAMPHETAMINE
substance is considered as a capital offense, punishable with death or life imprisonment, only if
6. MECLOQUALONE
the accused is in possession of it in the quantity of 50 GRAMS (50 grams), irrespective of the
purity of the substance. It becomes a capital offense only if it is in the quantity of fifty grams (50 7. METAMFETAMINE
GRAMS) under No. 5 of Section 11, Art. II. Corollarilly, if it is less than this quantity, possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride is NOT punishable with a capital penalty, hence, bailable! To (METHAMPHETAMINE)
stress POSSESSION of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride is considered as capital offense
8. METAMFETAMINE RACEMATE
punishable with capital penalty if the quantity is 50 GRAMS (50 GRAMS), (Sec. 11, Art. II) while
PUSHING of methamphetamine hydrochloride (Paragraph 2, Sec. 5) to be punishable with capital 9. METHAQUALONE
penalty must be in the quantity of FIVE GRAMS (5 GRAMS), (Guidelines for RA 9165). [22]
10 METHYLPHE NIDATE
To justify her granting bail in the three criminal cases, respondent Judge insists that she did so .
because of her belief that methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is merely a precursor and
therefore the sale thereof is not a capital offense. This opinion is blatantly erroneous. One need
 11 PHENCYCLIDINE (PCP) 9 NOREPHEDRINE 9. TOLUENE
. .

12 PHENMETRAZINE 10 1-PHENYL-2-PROPANONE
. .

13 SECOBARBITAL 11 PIPERONAL
. .

14 DRONABINOL (delta-9-tetrahydro-cannabinol and its stereochemical variants) 12 POTASSIUM PERMANGANATE

. .

15 ZIPEPROL 13 PSEUDOEPHEDRINE
. .

16 2C-B (4-bromo-2,5-dimethoxyphenethylamine) 14 SAFROLE

. .

It clearly shows that methamphetamine is a psychotropic substance, or a dangerous drug. It readily reveals that methamphetamine is not one of those listed as controlled precursor or
essential chemical.
On the other hand, under Section 3, paragraph (h) of R.A. No. 9165, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, refer to those listed in Tables I and II of the 1988 UN Convention Against Given the foregoing, methamphetamine hydrochloride is a dangerous drug, and not a controlled
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which were likewise made integral precursor or essential chemical. That methamphetamine and not methamphetamine
part of R.A. No. 9165, to wit: hydrochloride is the term specifically listed in Schedule II of the 1971 UN Single Convention of
Psychotropic Substances does not detract from the fact that it is a dangerous drug. Section 3,
TABLE I TABLE II paragraph (x) of R.A. No. 9165, states that methamphetamine hydrochloride is a drug having
1 ACETIC ANHYDRIDE 1. ACETONE such chemical composition, including any of its isomers or derivatives in any form.
. This is further strongly manifest in Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, wherein it is specifically provided
that the possession of dangerous drugs, such as methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, is
2 N-ACETYLANTHRANILIC ACID 2. ANTHRANILIC ACID
. punishable with life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00), if the quantity thereof is 50 grams or
3 EPHEDRIN 3. ETHYL ETHER more. It would be absurd, to say the least, that Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 would qualify
. methamphetamine hydrochloride as a dangerous drug, while Section 5 of the same law,
penalizing the sale thereof, would treat it as a controlled precursor.
4 ERGOMETRINE 4. HYDROCHLORIC ACID
. Had respondent Judge been more circumspect in going over the pertinent provisions of R.A. No.
9165, she would certainly arrive at the same conclusion. It does not even take an interpretation
5 ERGOTAMINE 5. METHYL ETHYL KETONE of the law but a plain and simple reading thereof. Furthermore, had respondent judge kept
. herself abreast of jurisprudence and decisions of the Court, [24] she would have been apprised that
in all the hundreds and hundreds of cases[25] decided by the Court, methamphetamine
6 ISOSAFROLE 6. PHENYLACETIC ACID
hydrochloride or shabu had always been considered as a dangerous drug.
.
Given that methamphetamine hydrochloride is a dangerous drug, the applicable provision in
7 LYSERGIC ACID 7. PIPERIDINE
Criminal Case Nos. 03-065, 03-082, and 03-288 subject of Admin. Matter No. RTJ-04-1820, is
.
Section 5, paragraph 1 of R.A. No. 9165, which reads:
8 3,4-METHYLENEDIOXYPHENYL-2 PROPANONE 8. SULPHURIC ACID
SECTION 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation
.
of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten
million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law,
shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit
or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the
quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
Regardless of quantity, the sale, trade, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and
transportation of shabu is punishable by life imprisonment to death. Being a capital offense, it is
incumbent upon respondent Judge to hold a hearing on the petitions/motions for bail filed by the
accused therein to determine whether evidence of guilt is strong. To grant an application for bail
and fix the amount thereof without a hearing duly called for the purpose of determining whether
the evidence of guilt is strong constitutes gross ignorance or incompetence whose grossness
cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or excusable negligence. [26]
In Gallardo vs. Tabamo,[27] the Court rejected the defense that the judges failure to apply the
clear provisions of the law is merely an error of judgment, and the judge was held
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law where the applicable legal provisions are
crystal clear and need no interpretation.
Moreover, such gross ignorance of law is in violation of Rule 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
which states that a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.
The indispensable nature of a bail hearing in petitions for bail has always been ardently and
indefatigably stressed by the Court. The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be faithful to
the law and maintain professional competence. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant
with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative doctrines. He should strive
for excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the personification of
justice and the Rule of Law.[28]
Although judges cannot be held to account or answer criminally, civilly or administratively for
every erroneous judgment or decision rendered by him in good faith, it is imperative that they
should have basic knowledge of the law.[29]
Even if a judge acted in good faith but his ignorance is so gross, he should be held
administratively liable.[30]
Under Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, which took effect on
October 1, 2001, gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge and is now
punishable with severe sanctions, to wit:
Sec. 11. Sanctions. A.  If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.  Provided, however, that the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits.
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In this case, the Investigating Justice recommended that respondent Judge be dismissed from the
service. The Court finds such penalty to be too harsh. In similar cases, [31] the Court imposed a fine
on the respondents therein for gross ignorance of the law for having granted bail to the accused
without notice and hearing. However, the Court takes judicial notice that this is not the first time
that respondent Judge was administratively fined. In A.M. No. RTJ-02-1686,[32] a fine of P5,000.00
and a reprimand was imposed on respondent Judge for dereliction of duty for her failure to act
on Civil Case No. 9-138 for three years. In A.M. No. RTJ-04-1846,[33] respondent Judge was held
administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and oppression for the
delay of almost nine (9) months in the transmittal of the records of Civil Case No. 01-268 to the
Court of Appeals, and was fined P20,000.00. Thus, the Court is imposing a penalty more severe
than a fine. Suspension from office for six (6) months in Admin. Matter No. RTJ-04-1820,
excluding Criminal Case No. 03-265  (People of the Philippines vs. Aiza Chona Omadan), is
sufficient and reasonable.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) also notes, in its Memorandum dated November 22,
2002, that respondent Judge caused the release from the National Bilibid Prison of several
persons convicted of violation of the drugs law by granting the petitions for habeas corpus filed
in her court, i.e., Spl. Proc. Nos. 02-002, 02-008, 02-10, 98-023 and 98-048. The OCA further
stated that in Spl. Proc. Nos. 98-023 and 98-048, respondent Judge granted the petitions without
determining the veracity of the allegations therein; without any material evidence in support of
her findings and conclusion; and that at the time the petitions were granted, an appeal from the
convictions in these two cases is pending before the Court (G. R. Nos. 131622-23). Thus, the OCA
recommends that an investigation, report, and recommendation on these two cases be made,
and that it be authorized to conduct an audit on all the petitions for habeas corpus in all the
courts of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City from 1998 to the present. [34]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) In Admin. Matter No. RTJ-03-1817, DISMISSING the complaint against respondent Judge; and,
(2) In Admin. Matter No. RTJ-04-1820, finding respondent Judge Norma C. Perello, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 276) of Muntinlupa City GUILTY of gross ignorance of
law, and she is hereby SUSPENDED for Six (6) Months, with warning that a repetition of similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.
AS TO OTHER MATTERS:
(a) The Court ORDERS the Office of the Court Administrator to initiate the appropriate complaint
for grave misconduct and/or gross ignorance of the law against respondent Judge, insofar as Spl.
Proc. Nos. 02-002, 02-008, 02-10, 98-023 and 98-048 are concerned; and to conduct preliminary
investigation and submit report thereon within ninety (90) days from notice hereof.
(b) The Office of the Court Administrator is AUTHORIZED to conduct an audit and submit a report
within ninety (90) days from notice hereof, on all the petitions for habeas corpus in all the courts
of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City from 1998 to present.
SO ORDERED.
(2) BAIL
G.R. No. 189122               March 17, 2010
LEVISTE,  vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
CORONA, J.:
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to guarantee
his appearance before any court as may be required, 1 is the answer of the criminal justice system
to a vexing question: what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven,
in the "dubious interval," often years long, between arrest and final adjudication? 2 Bail acts as a
reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in pretrial liberty and
society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial. 3
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically
begin serving time immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to bail. 4 An accused not
released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal and
proper. An erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to
society he has never owed.5 Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the
accused’s interest in bail pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review, opportunity
to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance of potential hardships of prison. 6 On the other hand,
society has a compelling interest in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an individual who is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime serious enough to warrant prison time. 7 Other
recognized societal interests in the denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention of the
accused’s flight from court custody, the protection of the community from potential danger and
the avoidance of delay in punishment. 8 Under what circumstances an accused may obtain bail
pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the interests of society and those of the
accused.9
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to
those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be
guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be
exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the
accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court. 10
The Facts
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and
one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.11
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.12 Pending appeal, he filed an urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition,
and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. 13 It invoked the bedrock principle in
the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal
should be exercised "with grave caution and only for
strong reasons." Citing well-established jurisprudence, it
ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged
detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the
prison facility. It found that petitioner
… failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such
gravity that his continued confinement during trial will
permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. x x
x Notably, the physical condition of [petitioner] does not
prevent him from seeking medical attention while
confined in prison, though he clearly preferred to be
attended by his personal physician.14
For purposes of determining whether petitioner’s
application for bail could be allowed pending appeal, the
Court of Appeals also considered the fact of petitioner’s
conviction. It made a preliminary evaluation of petitioner’s
case and made a prima facie determination that there was
no reason substantial enough to overturn the evidence of
petitioner’s guilt.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.15
Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the
denial of his application for bail, considering that none of
the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was
present. Petitioner’s theory is that, where the penalty
imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not
more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in
the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be
granted to an appellant pending appeal.
The Issue
The question presented to the Court is this: in an
application for bail pending appeal by an appellant
sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment
for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of
the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should
automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court?
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The application for
bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal,
provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the
decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-
bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate
court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional
liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the
bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the
conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application for bail by an appellant
sentenced by the Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more than six years’ imprisonment should
automatically be granted.
Petitioner’s stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive
rules.
Basic Procedural Concerns Forbid Grant of Petition
Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail
the denial by the Court of Appeals of his urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal.
While the said remedy may be resorted to challenge an interlocutory order, such remedy is
proper only where the interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 16
Other than the sweeping averment that "[t]he Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal despite the fact that none of
the conditions to justify the denial thereof under Rule 114, Section 5 [is] present, much less
proven by the prosecution,"17 however, petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of
Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court
of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances
enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore,
petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals committed a grave error and prejudged the appeal
by denying his application for bail on the ground that the evidence that he committed a capital
offense was strong.
We disagree.
It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without or in excess of
its jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly
declared to be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a
case such as this where the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature
of the offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate
court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioner’s urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal.
Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied petitioner’s application for bail pending appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not
simply an error in judgment but it is such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which
is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. 18 Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of
discretion must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility.19 It must be so patent and gross as to amount to evasion
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in
contemplation of the law. In other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a
clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion. 20
Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail pending appeal, the Court of
Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously and whimsically. No capriciousness or arbitrariness in
the exercise of discretion was ever imputed to the appellate court. Nor could any such
implication or imputation be inferred. As observed earlier, the Court of Appeals exercised grave
caution in the exercise of its discretion. The denial of petitioner’s application for bail pending
appeal was not unreasonable but was the result of a thorough assessment of petitioner’s claim of
ill health. By making a preliminary appraisal of the merits of the case for the purpose of granting
bail, the court also determined whether the appeal was frivolous or not, or whether it raised a
substantial question. The appellate court did not exercise its discretion in a careless manner but
followed doctrinal rulings of this Court.
At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeal’s erroneous application and interpretation
of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. However, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not
be issued to cure errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact. 21 In this
connection, Lee v. People22 is apropos:
… Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or
exceeded its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct. Its questioned acts
would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors
of procedure or mistakes in the court’s findings and conclusions. An interlocutory order may be
assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns
upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing
interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not only delay the
administration of justice but will also unduly burden the courts. 23 (emphasis supplied)
Wording of Third Paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 Contradicts Petitioner’s Interpretation
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed
on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals
with the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism,
habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his
bail without a valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or
conditional pardon; circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue
risk of committing another crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar
circumstances) not present. The second scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of
the said circumstances.
The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the commentary of
retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in remedial law:
Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in
the following rules:
x x x           x x x          x x x
e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6
years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or
any other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6
years but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other
similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x
x24 (emphasis supplied)
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is of the
same thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a
matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied.25 (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate
court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be
denied even if the bail-negating26 circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are
absent. In other words, the appellate court’s denial of bail pending appeal where none of the
said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent
discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact
exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal.
Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will
thereby be committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be
viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the
appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise
sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and
(2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first
scenario allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114,
including the demands of equity and justice;27 on the basis thereof, it may either allow or
disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellant’s case falls within the second scenario, the appellate court’s
stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination
of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of
bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny
or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not
automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the
less stringent sound discretion approach.
Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different situations that
are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists on a
simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes the
established policy governing the grant of bail pending appeal.
In particular, a careful reading of petitioner’s arguments reveals that it interprets the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty imposed by the trial
court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. For petitioner, in such a situation,
the grant of bail pending appeal is always subject to limited discretion, that is, one restricted to
the determination of whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances exists. The
implication of this position is that, if any such circumstance is present, then bail will be denied.
Otherwise, bail will be granted pending appeal.
Petitioner’s theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body whose
authority is limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts its "discretion" into merely filling
out the checklist of circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances
where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment
exceeding six years. In short, petitioner’s interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the
appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular factual issue — whether any of the five
bail-negating circumstances is present.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as "choice."28 Choice occurs where, between "two
alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options)," there is "more than one possible
outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker." 29 On the other hand, the
establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion. 30 Thus, by severely
clipping the appellate court’s discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body
in applications for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial
court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioner’s theory effectively
renders nugatory the provision that "upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail
is discretionary."
The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this case) to rule on
applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily involve the exercise of judgment on the
part of the court. The court must be allowed reasonable latitude to express its own view of the
case, its appreciation of the facts and its understanding of the applicable law on the matter. 31 In
view of the grave caution required of it, the court should consider whether or not, under all
circumstances, the accused will be present to abide by his punishment if his conviction is
affirmed.32 It should also give due regard to any other pertinent matters beyond the record of the
particular case, such as the record, character and reputation of the applicant, 33 among other
things. More importantly, the discretion to determine allowance or disallowance of bail pending
appeal necessarily includes, at the very least, an initial determination that the appeal is not
frivolous but raises a substantial question of law or fact which must be determined by the
appellate court.34 In other words, a threshold requirement for the grant of bail is a showing that
the appeal is not pro forma and merely intended for delay but presents a fairly debatable
issue.35 This must be so; otherwise, the appellate courts will be deluged with frivolous and time-
wasting appeals made for the purpose of taking advantage of a lenient attitude on bail pending
appeal. Even more significantly, this comports with the very strong presumption on appeal that
the lower court’s exercise of discretionary power was sound, 36 specially since the rules on
criminal procedure require that no judgment shall be reversed or modified by the Court of
Appeals except for substantial error.37
Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the bail-negating circumstances to those
expressly mentioned, petitioner applies the expressio unius est exclusio alterius 38 rule in
statutory construction. However, the very language of the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114
contradicts the idea that the enumeration of the five situations therein was meant to be
exclusive. The provision categorically refers to "the following or other similar circumstances."
Hence, under the rules, similarly relevant situations other than those listed in the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 may be considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail pending
appeal.
Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or
senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result from adopting petitioner’s interpretation
that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail
ought to be granted if none of the listed bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail
pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will
be more lenient than in cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years. While denial
or revocation of bail in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years’ imprisonment
must be made only if any of the five bail-negating conditions is present, bail pending appeal in
cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years imprisonment may be denied even
without those conditions.
Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that bail pending appeal be more
accessible to those convicted of serious offenses, compared to those convicted of less serious
crimes?
Petitioner’s Theory Deviates from History And Evolution of Rule on Bail Pending Appeal
Petitioner’s interpretation deviates from, even radically alters, the history and evolution of the
provisions on bail pending appeal.
The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under Sections 3 to 6, Rule 110 of the 1940
Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First Instance. — After
judgment by a municipal judge and before conviction by the Court of First Instance, the
defendant shall be admitted to bail as of right.
Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the Court of First Instance. — After conviction by
the Court of First Instance, defendant may, upon application, be bailed at the discretion of the
court.
Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. — A capital offense, as the term is used in this rule, is an offense
which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the application to
be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.
Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable. — No person in custody for the commission of a capital
offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules
of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were modified in
1988 to read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody, shall before final conviction be
entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense
which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. — A capital offense, as the term is used in this Rules, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death. (emphasis supplied)
The significance of the above changes was clarified in Administrative Circular No. 2-92 dated
January 20, 1992 as follows:
The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down in Section 3 of Rule
114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody, shall before final conviction, be
entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense
which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right
even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of
his guilt of the offense charged is strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as pending cases
before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following policies concerning the
effectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:
1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law existing at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by a penalty lower than
reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense
charged or of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, he may be
allowed to remain free on his original bail pending the resolution of his appeal, unless the proper
court directs otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, as amended;
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the
time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion
perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than
that charged in the complaint or information, the same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph
shall be applied;
3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the
time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion
perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense charged,
his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be placed in confinement pending resolution of
his appeal.
As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now pending appeal
before his Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty, the following rules are laid
down:
1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within ten (10) days from notice
to the court of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall inform this Court of the fact of surrender,
after which, the cancellation of the bond shall be ordered by this Court;
2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National Bureau of Prisons thru the
Philippine National Police as the accused shall remain under confinement pending resolution of
his appeal;
3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period of ten (10) days, his
bond shall be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by this Court. The appeal taken by
the accused shall also be dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court as he
shall be deemed to have jumped his bail. (emphasis supplied)
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16,
1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as follows:
SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. — All persons in custody shall: (a) before or after conviction by
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of
right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law of this Rule.
(3a)
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may
admit the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the
same bail bond during the period of appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than twenty
(20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon
a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, under conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released
on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit
another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with
notice to the adverse party. (n)
SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. — A capital offense, as the term is used in these Rules, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, maybe punished with death. (4)
SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (emphasis supplied)
The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to Rule 114 were thereafter
amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as they do now.
The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more restrictive
approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that
is, bail pending appeal should be allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only for
strong reasons.
The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a non-capital offense
by the Court of First Instance (predecessor of the Regional Trial Court) discretionary. The 1988
amendments made applications for bail pending appeal favorable to the appellant-applicant. Bail
before final conviction in trial courts for non-capital offenses or offenses not punishable by
reclusion perpetua was a matter of right, meaning, admission to bail was a matter of right at any
stage of the action where the charge was not for a capital offense or was not punished by
reclusion perpetua.39
The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail pending appeal (of a
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment) discretionary. Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid down more
stringent rules on the matter of post-conviction grant of bail.
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly identifying which court
has authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal under certain conditions and in
particular situations. More importantly, it reiterated the "tough on bail pending appeal"
configuration of Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988
Rules on Criminal Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before final
conviction.40 Under the present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the Regional
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Indeed, pursuant to the "tough on bail pending appeal" policy, the presence of bail-negating
conditions mandates the denial or revocation of bail pending appeal such that those
circumstances are deemed to be as grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited.
Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail pending appeal?
What is more in conformity with an ex abundante cautelam view of bail pending appeal? Is it a
rule which favors the automatic grant of bail in the absence of any of the circumstances under
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114? Or is it a rule that authorizes the denial of bail after
due consideration of all relevant circumstances, even if none of the circumstances under the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present?
The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending appeal
parallels the approach adopted in the United States where our original constitutional and
procedural provisions on bail emanated.41 While this is of course not to be followed blindly, it
nonetheless shows that our treatment of bail pending appeal is no different from that in other
democratic societies.
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail pending
appeal is anchored on the principle that judicial discretion — particularly with respect to
extending bail — should be exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for strong
reasons.42 In fact, it has even been pointed out that "grave caution that must attend the exercise
of judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and exemplified in
Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section 5." 43
Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:
The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be
granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore,
where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit
to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be
relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in
the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of
ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to
attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction. 44 (emphasis supplied)
As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying thereon, the Court
declared in Yap v. Court of Appeals45 (promulgated in 2001 when the present rules were already
effective), that denial of bail pending appeal is "a matter of wise discretion."
A Final Word
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the
constitutional right to bail ends.46 From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.
At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for
strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance
of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial
disposition finds strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language
of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial court’s initial
determination that the accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail
despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially
germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial court
and appellate review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison
sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions.
Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals
which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court processes.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on the merits, the appeal of
petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, with dispatch.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
(3) BAIL
A.M. No. RTJ-03-1751               June 10, 2003
COMMISSIONER ANDREA D. DOMINGO, Complainant,  within ten days from notice if they are willing to submit
vs.
EXECUTIVE JUDGE ERNESTO P. PAGAYATAN, RTC, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated December 7, 2001 filed with the Office of the Court Administrator,
Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo of the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) charged Executive Judge
Ernesto P. Pagayatan of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro (Branch 46)
with Gross Ignorance of the Law relative to Criminal Case No. R-5075  for Estafa, entitled People
of the Philippines vs. Ernesto M. Peñaflorida.
Complainant alleged: On September 14, 2001, the Bureau of Immigration (BOI) Board of
Commissioners (BOC) issued Summary Deportation Order (SDO) No. ADD-2001-057 against
Ernesto M. Peñaflorida, a U.S. citizen, after finding that he is an overstaying and undocumented
alien, in violation of Section 37(a)(7) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. Peñaflorida is also a fugitive from justice since he stands
indicted in the United States for health care fraud which resulted in more than $1,376,000.00
losses to the U.S. Federal Government. No appeal was filed with the Office of the President. The
SDO became final and executory on October 15, 2001. On the same date, respondent issued a
Notice of Arraignment requiring the production of Peñaflorida on November 19 and 20, 2001. On
the scheduled hearing of November 19, 2001, respondent denied the P40,000.00 bail
recommended by the Provincial Prosecutor for the provisional release of the accused on the
ground that the crime Peñaflorida was charged with involved large scale estafa, a non-bailable
offense. Respondent ordered the commitment of Peñaflorida to the Provincial Jail in Magbay,
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. However, later on that same day, the BOI received information
that respondent had allowed the release from detention of Peñaflorida, who is an alien federal
fugitive, without the interdepartmental courtesy of affording prior notice to the BOI of such
action. She is appalled not only by the respondent’s employment of legal subterfuges in ordering
the release of Peñaflorida whose Summary Deportation Order had already become final and
executory, but also by the respondent’s bad faith in deceiving them into surrendering the
custody of an undesirable alien federal fugitive to the Provincial Jail at Magbay, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro.1
In his Comment, dated March 22, 2002, respondent explained: On November 20, 2001,
Peñaflorida filed an urgent motion to fix bail. When the prosecution and the defense jointly
manifested that it would be fair and just if the court would fix the bail bond for the provisional
release of the accused Peñaflorida at P250,000.00, he granted the motion to fix bail on
November 21, 2001; and, at the time he issued the Order fixing the bail bond of the accused at
P250,000.00, he was not aware that a deportation order had already been issued by the BOI
against the latter.2
In a Resolution dated January 15, 2003, the Court re-
docketed the administrative complaint as a regular
administrative matter and required the parties to manifest
the case for decision based on the pleadings filed by the
parties.3
In compliance, the complainant and the respondent
manifested their willingness to submit the case on the
basis of the pleadings.4 In addition to his manifestation,
however, respondent averred: Upon learning that an order
of deportation was issued against Peñaflorida, he ordered
the cancellation of the bail bond posted by Peñaflorida
and issued a warrant for the latter’s arrest on April 26,
2002; and that Peñaflorida voluntarily surrendered himself
on October 24, 2002 and is presently detained at the
Provincial Jail of Occidental Mindoro. 5
In its Evaluation Report, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) recommends to the Court that
respondent be fined P5,000.00 for Gross Ignorance of the
Law, reasoning that:
After going over the records of the case, it is very evident
that respondent Judge acted with undue haste in issuing
the order granting bail considering the fact that in his
earlier Order dated November 19, 2001, he did not grant a
bail of P40,000.00 which the Provincial Prosecutor had
previously recommended for the provisional release of the
accused. His denial was based on the ground that the case
filed against the accused could be considered large-scale
Estafa, an unbailable offense. Respondent Judge should
not have granted bail simply on the lack of readiness on
the part of the prosecution to present any witness to
prove that the evidence of guilt of the accused was strong
but should have endeavored to determine the existence of
such evidence.
Under the present rules, a hearing is required before
granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion.
The prosecution must always be given an opportunity to
present within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it
may desire to introduce before the Court may resolve the
motion for bail. If the prosecution refuses to adduce
evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion
for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a
hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions.
Moreover, since the accused was accompanied by the personnel of the Bureau of Immigration
when brought to the RTC, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, for his arraignment in
Criminal Case No. R-5075 respondent Judge could have easily verified from his escort if the
former was being detained for other crimes aside from the one where he was being arraigned in
respondent’s sala. Had he done so, respondent could have been informed outright by the B.I.
personnel escort that the accused had already been the subject of a Summary Deportation Order
and, thus, he could have deferred action on the latter’s (accused) Motion to Fix Bail and afforded
the Bureau of Immigration the chance and opportunity to interpose their objection to the grant
thereof.6 (Citations omitted).
The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Under the rules on bail, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or
discretion.7 A hearing is indispensable for the court to ask searching questions from which it may
infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused, in cases where
the offense is punishable by death, reclusion perpetua  or life imprisonment.8 After hearing, the
court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution and based thereon, the judge should then formulate his own conclusion as to
whether the evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the guilt of the
accused.9 Otherwise, the order granting or denying the application for bail may be invalidated
because the summary of evidence for the prosecution which contains the judge’s evaluation of
the evidence may be considered as an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution
and the defense.10
The herein respondent granted bail to the accused Peñaflorida without conducting a hearing
despite his earlier pronouncement in the Order dated November 19, 2001 denying bail as he
considered the crime the accused Peñaflorida was charged with to be a non-bailable offense. The
manifestation of the prosecutor that he is not ready to present any witness to prove that the
prosecution’s evidence against the accused is strong, is never a basis for the outright grant of bail
without a preliminary hearing on the matter.11 A hearing is required even when the prosecution
refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an objection to the motion for bail. 12
The joint manifestation of the prosecution and the defense that it would be fair and just if the
court would fix the bail bond for the provisional release of the accused at P250,000.00 does not
justify the granting of bail without a hearing in a case involving a non-bailable offense. A hearing
is necessary for the court to take into consideration the guidelines in fixing the amount of
bail13 set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 9. Amount of bail; guidelines.  - The judge who issued the warrant or granted the
application shall fix a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited to the
following factors:
(a) Financial liability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstance of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail. Excessive bail shall not be required."
Needless to stress, judicial discretion is the domain of the judge and the duty to exercise
discretion cannot be reposed upon the will or whim of the prosecution or the defense.
Respondent should have ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong and
endeavored to determine the propriety of the amount of bail recommended. To do away with
the requisite bail hearing "is to dispense with this time-tested safeguard against
arbitrariness."14 It must always be remembered that imperative justice requires the proper
observance of indispensable technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper dispensation. 15
There is no evidence of malice or bad faith on the part of respondent when he granted bail to
Peñaflorida. Complainant failed to prove that respondent had prior knowledge of the existence
of a deportation order or that the latter was informed by the BOl of the deportation order dated
September 14, 2001. The deportation order became final only on October 15, 2001. Prior
thereto, respondent issued on September 18, 2001 a hold-departure order against Peñaflorida.
Respondent directed the BOI not to allow Peñaflorida from leaving the country since a warrant
for his arrest was already issued by the court. 16 On October 15, 2001, the Notice of Arraignment
in Criminal Case No. R-5075 was served to Peñaflorida through the BOI. 17 In the hearing of
November 19, 2001, the personnel of the BOI escorted Peñaflorida by reason of the warrant of
arrest and hold departure order issued by the court. 18
From these facts, we cannot simply conclude that respondent had prior knowledge of the
deportation order and maliciously thwarted its effect by granting bail to Peñaflorida. However,
respondent cannot escape administrative liability by invoking unawareness of the deportation
order. Absent evidence of malice, respondent’s lack of knowledge of the deportation order will
only free him from administrative liability for gross misconduct but not for gross ignorance of the
law for disregarding the rules on bail.1âwphi1
The Court has held that a judge cannot be held administratively liable for an erroneous ruling on
first impression, and malice cannot be inferred from his having rendered a decision rectifying an
earlier impression without proof beyond doubt of a conscious and deliberate intent on his part to
commit an injustice by such acts.20 Nonetheless, so basic and fundamental is it to conduct a
hearing in connection with the grant of bail that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any
member of the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof. 21 Having accepted the
exalted position of a judge, respondent owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in
the law. When a judge displays utter lack of familiarity with the basic rules of law, he erodes the
public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. 22 Ignorance of the law excuses no one -
certainly not a judge.23
Respondent’s explanations that he ordered the cancellation of the bail bend posted by the
accused Peñaflorida and issued a warrant for the latter’s arrest on April 26, 2002 upon learning
that an order of deportation was issued against the latter; 24 that accused Peñaflorida voluntarily
surrendered himself on October 24, 2002 and that he is presently detained at the Provincial Jail
of Occidental Mindoro,25 cannot serve to exonerate him or even mitigate the penalty due him.
Significantly, the order of revocation was made only on April 26, 2002, or five months after the
issuance of the erroneous Order of November 21, 2001 which was sought to be corrected. It is
unfathomable that respondent realized his fallacious granting of bail only after he filed his
Comment herein dated March 22, 2002. The Order of April 26, 2002 is but a futile attempt to
evade respondent’s administrative liability which had already attached five months before when
he granted bail without the required hearing. Fundamental knowledge of the law and a
reasonable understanding of recent jurisprudence ought to have guarded respondent against the
precipitate and unjustified granting of bail or should have at least prompted him to invalidate the
same immediately thereafter, 26not five months later after a complaint against him had been filed
by BOl Commissioner Domingo.

As to the recommended penalty by the OCA, the amount of P5,000.00 appears to be

commensurate with respondent’s infraction which amounts to gross ignorance of law. Under
Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC amending Rule 140 of the Rules of Court on the Discipline of
Justices and Judges, which took effect on October 1, 2001, gross ignorance of the law is classified
as a serious charge which carries with it a penalty of either dismissal from service, suspension or
a fine of more then P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00. However, considering that malice
or bad faith on the part of respondent has not been established by the complainant, and, in the
absence of a showing that respondent had earlier been found to have committed an
administrative offense,27 the Court deems it just and reasonable to impose upon respondent a
fine of P5,000.00.

WHEREFORE, respondent Executive Judge Ernesto P. Pagayatan of the Regional Trial Court of San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro (Branch 46) is found guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and is hereby
FINED the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). He is further STERNLY WARNED that the
commission of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely by this Court.

SO ORDERED.
(4) BAIL
TRINIDAD O. LACHICA, A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609
- versus -
JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS,
.September 20, 2005
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:
In an Affidavit dated October 2, 2003,[1] Trinidad O. Lachica charged Judge Rosabella M. Tormis of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Cebu City, Branch IV, with Abuse of Authority relative to
Criminal Cases Nos. 57220-R to 57223-R.[2] Complainant alleged that since the filing of the
information, accused Domugho has remained at large. Thus, the cases were ordered
archived[3] but an alias warrant of arrest[4] was issued by respondent judge on January 14, 2000.
On July 2, 2003, Domugho was apprehended by PO3 Epifanio G. Sanjorjo at around 8:45 p.m. and
was brought to the police station for booking and custody at 9:30 p.m. [5]
However, on July 3, 2003, at around 8:30 a.m., complainant was surprised to receive a call from
the accused informing her that she was released from confinement on July 2, 2003 at 10:00 p.m.
Complainant inquired from the police station if an Order of Release was issued by the court, but
she was informed that the accused was released because the respondent judge called the police
station and told the desk officer that the accused had posted a cash bail bond and may already
be released.
 Complainant checked the case records but the expediente contained no copy of the release
order. It was only at 1:00 p.m. that she was shown a copy thereof. Meanwhile, the case records
could not be located. It was only on 4:30 p.m. of July 3, 2003 that the same was found.
 The police blotter showed no entry that an order of release was received by the police. Only a
notation that the accused had put up a cash bail bond was entered therein.
Complainant also averred that it was improper for the respondent judge to receive the cash bail
bond as the function belongs exclusively to the Office of the Clerk of Court. She claimed that
respondent judge committed an act of impropriety when she called the police station to verbally
order the release of the accused. She claimed that it was irregular that no copy of the release
order was found in the expediente in the morning of July 3, 2003 considering that it was
supposedly issued on July 2, 2003.
  In her Comment[6] dated December 3, 2003 respondent judge denied the charges of
complainant. She maintained that on July 2, 2003 at 7:00 p.m., she issued the Order of Release
after the accused posted a cash bond. She claimed that the accused was released by virtue of the
Order of Release and not on the basis of her alleged telephone call to the police station.
 On August 2, 2004, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Executive Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Cebu City for investigation, report and recommendation. [7]
 The investigating judge submitted a Report [8] dated
November 18, 2004 recommending that respondent judge
be fined in the amount of P20,000.00 or suspended for
three (3) months based on the following findings:
 1. The accused was arrested at 8:45 in the evening of July
2, 200[4], was booked at the Waterfront Police Station at
9:00 p.m., and released without a Release Order at 10:00
that same night.
 2. The arresting officer and the accused never appeared
before the respondent judge on the night of July 2, 200[4],
as claimed by respondent judge. The accused was arrested
at 8:45 p.m., after her classes at Southwestern University.
She could not have appeared before respondent judge
prior to her arrest since she was in school. Had it been true
that the arresting officer appeared before the judge that
night, it would have been highly improbable for the
arresting officer not to have asked for a copy of the
Release Order.
 3. No one saw the Release Order on July 2, 200[4], except
the respondent judge, as per testimony of the complainant
and Helen Mongoya, and as shown by the police blotter,
and the affidavit of the arresting officer claiming that they
were reprimanded by their Chief because they released
the accused without a Release Order.
4. The accused was released without the Release Order,
and only upon the telephone call of respondent judge.
 5. The Release Order was never issued on the night of July
2, 200[4]. No judge in his right mind would issue a Release
Order without the record of the case, more so if the case
had been archived.
 5. The Release Order appeared only in the afternoon of
July 3, 200[4].
 6. The record of the case was found by court aide, Juan
Aos, in the bodega of MTCC, Branch 4, together with the
records of other archived cases, at about 4:30 in the
afternoon of July 3, 200[4].
 7. Respondent judge was in Manila early morning of July
3, 200[4].
 8. It was physically impossible for the respondent judge to
have signed the Release Order before 1:00 p.m. of July 3,
200[4], since she was in Manila. Questions may be raised
whether the Receipt for the Cash Bond and the Release Order were signed by a person other than
the respondent judge. As can be gleaned from the record, the signature appearing on the Receipt
for the Cash Bond, the Release Order and the signature of the respondent judge on her Comment
dated December 10, 2003, do not appear to be signed by the same person.
 9. Respondent judge authenticated the Release Order during the Investigation proper as the
Release Order she issued on July 2, 2003.[9]
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) agreed with the findings of the investigating judge but
recommended that respondent judge be suspended for three (3) months. [10]
 We agree with the findings of the investigating judge and the OCA except for the recommended
penalty.
 During the investigation, it was established that the accused was arrested on July 2, 2003 at 8:45
p.m. and was brought directly to the Waterfront Police Station where she was booked at 9:00
p.m. At about 10:00 p.m. the accused was set free without a release order. [11]
 Respondent judge, however, claimed that she issued the Order of Release on July 2, 2003 at
around 7:00 p.m. after the accused and her counsel, together with the arresting officer, came to
her office and posted a cash bond. It was by virtue of this order that the accused was released.
 A circumspect scrutiny of the testimonies given by respondent judge reveals that she made
several untruthful statements possibly with the intent to mislead the Court.
 It was improbable that, as claimed by respondent judge, she issued the Order of Release on July
2, 2003 at around 7:00 p.m. considering that the accused was apprehended at 8:45 p.m. The
complainant and the arresting officer, as well as the entry in the police blotter all declared that
the arrest was made at 8:45 p.m. and not earlier. Verily, respondent judge could not have issued
the release order at around 7:00 p.m. as the accused has not yet been arrested at that time.
 She also insisted that on July 2, 2003, the accused and her counsel, and the arresting officer
went to her office and posted a bond whereupon she issued the Order of Release. However, this
is belied by the testimonies of the arresting officer and the complainant who both claimed that
the accused was brought directly to the police station after the arrest. We agree with the
observation of the OCA that, it would be impossible for complainant or the arresting officer not
to have mentioned anything regarding this incident if the same actually transpired. Likewise, as
pointed out by the investigating judge, it is highly improbable for the arresting officer not to have
demanded a copy of the release order if he really appeared before the respondent.
 Incidentally, the arresting officer denied receiving any order of release from respondent judge
on July 2, 2003. In fact, he claimed that they were reprimanded by their commanding officer for
releasing from their custody the person of the accused without any accompanying court order.
The following day, July 3, 2003, he went to the court to secure a copy of the said order.
 Respondent judge also averred that the Order of Release was received by SP01 James Estrera,
which receipt was duly noted in the police blotter. An examination of the records, however,
discloses that what SPO1 Estrera received was only a copy of the Receipt of the Cash Bail Bond
dated July 2, 2003 and not the Order of Release. In fact, there was no mention of a release order
in the police blotter.[12]
 
It is also undisputed that respondent judge personally received the cash bail bond for the
accused. For this act alone, respondent is already administratively liable. Section 14, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure specifies the persons with whom a cash bail bond may
be deposited, namely: the collector of internal revenue or the provincial, city or municipal
treasurer. A judge is not authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail nor should such cash be
kept in his office.
The respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct for having abused her judicial authority when
she personally accepted the cash bail bond of the accused and for deliberately making untruthful
statements in her comment and during the investigation of the instant administrative case with
intent to mislead this Court.
 The foregoing acts not only seriously undermine and adversely reflect on the honesty and
integrity of respondent judge as an officer of the court; they also betray a character flaw which
speaks ill of her person. Making false representations is a vice which no judge should imbibe. As
the judge is the visible representation of the law, and more importantly justice, he must
therefore, be the first to abide by the law and weave an example for the others to follow. [13]
In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. [14] Respondent
must bear in mind that the exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. [15] When the judge
himself becomes the transgressor of the law which he is sworn to apply, he places his office in
disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and impairs public confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary itself.[16]
 Misconduct is defined as any unlawful conduct of a person concerned in the administration of
justice prejudicial to the rights of parties or to the right determination of the cause. It generally
means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose.[17] To justify the taking of drastic disciplinary action, as is what is sought by
complainant in this case, the law requires that the error or mistake must be gross or patent,
malicious, deliberate or in bad faith.[18]
 It need not be overemphasized that in receiving the cash bond respondent judge ran afoul with
Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Indeed, in the case of Office of the Court
Administrator v. Fernandez,[19] the Court held that:
 The rules specify the persons with whom a cash bail bond may be deposited namely: the
collector of internal revenue, or the provincial, city or municipal treasurer. Section 14 of Rule 114
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective December 1, 2000) provides:
SEC. 14. Deposit of Cash as bail  The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in
cash with the nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city or municipal treasurer the
amount of the bail fixed by the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or
filed the case. Upon submission of a proper certificate of deposit and of a written undertaking
showing compliance with the requirements of section 2 of this Rule, the accused shall be
discharged from custody. The money deposited shall be considered as bail and applied to the
payment of fine and costs while the excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to
whoever made the deposit.
 A judge is not one of those authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail, nor should such
cash be kept in the office of the judge.

  Gross misconduct under Section 8(3), Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, is
classified as a serious offense punishable by any of the sanctions enumerated in Section 11 of the
same Rule which provides that:

 SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following
sanctions may be imposed:

 1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine,
and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

 2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not
exceeding six (6) months; or

 3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

This is not the first time that respondent judge was sanctioned by this Court. It appears that aside
from this case, respondent judge has been administratively charged eight(8) other times.[20] Of
these cases three (3) have been dismissed. [21]

On April 27, 2004 in Administrative Matter No. MTJ-00-1337,[22] the Court found respondent
guilty of improper conduct for trying to influence the course of litigation in Criminal Case No.
99796-12 and was accordingly reprimanded. She was also admonished for conduct unbecoming
of a judge.

 On December 17, 2004, respondent was fined in the amount of P5,000.00 in Administrative
Matters Nos. 04-7-373-RTC[23] and 04-7-374-RTC,[24] for gross violation of Section 17, Rule 114, for
having approved the bail of an accused in Criminal Cases Nos. CEB-BRL-783 and 922 pending
before the RTC, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu, absent showing of unavailability of all RTC judges in Cebu
City.

 On March 16, 2005, respondent judge was admonished in Administrative Matter No. 04-1554-
MTJ and reminded to be more circumspect in granting postponements.

 Clearly, being chastised thrice has not reformed respondent. For the foregoing considerations,
we find that the penalties recommended by the investigating judge and the OCA are not
commensurate to respondent judges misconduct which is aggravated by her past misdeeds.
Respondent judges infraction merits suspension from the service for six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Cebu City,
Branch IV, is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDEDfrom office for six (6) months
without salary and other benefits and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
(5) BAIL Subsequently, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit dated
February 21, 2001. The other respondents likewise filed
[G.R. No. 148468. January 28, 2003] their respective counter-affidavits. The Office of the
ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF THE Ombudsman conducted a preliminary investigation of the
PHILIPPINES, and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL LEANDRO complaints and on April 4, 2001, issued a joint resolution
MENDOZA, respondents. recommending, inter alia, that Joseph Estrada, petitioner
and several others be charged with the criminal offense of
[G.R. No. 148769. January 28, 2003] plunder.

EDWARD S. SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman filed with the
PHILIPPINES, respondents. Sandiganbayan several Informations against former
President Estrada, who earlier had resigned from his post
[G.R. No. 149116. January 28, 2003] as President of the Republic of the Philippines. One of
EDWARD S. SERAPIO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) and these Informations, docketed as Criminal Case No. 26558,
charged Joseph Estrada with plunder. On April 18, 2001,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
the Ombudsman filed an amended Information in said
DECISION case charging Estrada and several co-accused, including
petitioner, with said crime. No bail was recommended for
CALLEJO, SR., J.: the provisional release of all the accused, including
petitioner. The case was raffled to a special division which
Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner Edward Serapio, assailing the
was subsequently created by the Supreme Court. The
resolutions of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail, motion for a
amended Information reads:
reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal
Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is one of the accused together with former That during the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001,
President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose Jinggoy P. Estrada and several others. in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A
The records show that petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel
PUBLIC OFFICER, BEING THEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE
of the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit foundation established in February
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
2000 ostensibly for the purpose of providing educational opportunities for the poor and
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-
underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students, and support to research and advance
accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES
studies of young Muslim educators and scientists.
BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
Sometime in April 2000, petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received on its behalf a SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING
donation in the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION,
Luis Chavit Singson through the latters assistant Mrs. Yolanda Ricaforte. Petitioner received the AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION OR
donation and turned over the said amount to the Foundations treasurer who later deposited it in INFLUENCE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
the Foundations account with the Equitable PCI Bank. criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the
In the latter part of the year 2000, Gov. Singson publicly accused then President Joseph E. Estrada aggregate amount OR TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION
and his cohorts of engaging in several illegal activities, including its operation on the illegal NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR
numbers game known as jueteng. This triggered the filing with the Office of the Ombudsman of THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
several criminal complaints against Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner, together with SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P4,097,804,173.17], more or
other persons. Among such complaints were: Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption, versus less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1754; Graft THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF
Free Philippines Foundation, Inc., versus Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Edward Serapio, et al., docketed THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE
as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1755; and Leonardo De Vera, Romeo T. Capulong and Dennis B. PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series
Funa, versus Joseph Estrada, Yolanda Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, Raul De Guzman, Danilo Reyes of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR
and Mila Reforma, docketed as OMB Crim. Case No. 0-00-1757. MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE
AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE
OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR
ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE
ATONG ANG, Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit public fund in the amount of ONE
HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of the
TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS [P200,000,000.00]) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused
Charlie Atong Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy,
and Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES;
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE, 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS,
and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE
BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO
MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDERED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY
CENTAVOS [P1,102,965,607.50] AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX
HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS [P744,612,450.00],
RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OR MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
[P1,847,578,057.50]; AND BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES OF
SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS [189,700,000.00] MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH
BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME JOSE
VELARDE;
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES,
KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS [P3,233,104,173.17] AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT
NAME JOSE VELARDE AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
On April 5, 2001, petitioner obtained a copy of the Ombudsmans Joint Resolution finding
probable cause against him for plunder. The next day, April 6, 2001, he filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Reinvestigation. [2] Petitioner likewise filed
on said date, this time with the Sandiganbayan, an Urgent Omnibus Motion: (a) To Hold in
Abeyance the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Further Proceedings; (b) To Conduct a
Determination of Probable Cause; (c) For Leave to File Accuseds Motion for Reconsideration
and/or Reinvestigation; and (d) To Direct the Ombudsman to Conduct a Reinvestigation of the
Charges against accused Edward Serapio.[3]
On April 10, 2001, the Ombudsman issued an order denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration and/or reinvestigation on the ground of lack of jurisdiction since the amended
Information charging petitioner with plunder had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. [4]
In a parallel development, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on April 25, 2001 in Criminal
Case No. 26558 finding probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants of arrest for the
accused, including petitioner. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order on the same date
for the arrest of petitioner.[5] When apprised of said order, petitioner voluntarily surrendered at
9:45 p.m. on the same day to Philippine National Police Chief Gen. Leandro Mendoza. Petitioner
has since been detained at Camp Crame for said charge.
The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including petitioner, in Criminal Case No.
26558 on June 27, 2001. In the meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail which was set for hearing on May 4, 2001. [6] For his
part, petitioners co-accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed on April 20, 2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus
Motion alleging that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right.
During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioners Urgent Petition for Bail, the prosecution moved
for the resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier than the June 27, 2001
schedule. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the prosecution and issued an
order declaring that the petition for bail can and should be heard before petitioners arraignment
on June 27, 2001 and even before the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 filed their
respective petitions for bail. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the reception of
evidence on petitioners petition for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001.
On May 17, 2001, four days before the hearing on petitioners petition for bail, the Ombudsman
filed an urgent motion for early arraignment of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner
and a motion for joint bail hearings of Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner. The
following day, petitioner filed a manifestation questioning the propriety of including Joseph
Estrada and Jinggoy Estrada in the hearing on his (petitioners) petition for bail.
The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution on May 18, 2001 resetting the hearings on petitioners
petition for bail to June 18 to 28, 2001 to enable the court to resolve the prosecutions pending
motions as well as petitioners motion that his petition for bail be heard as early as possible,
which motion the prosecution opposed.
On May 31, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners April 6, 2001
Urgent Omnibus Motion. The court ruled that the issues posed by petitioner had already been
resolved in its April 25, 2001 Resolution finding probable cause to hold petitioner and his co-
accused for trial.[7] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said May 31, 2001
Resolution.
On June 1, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the attendance of petitioner as
well as all the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 during the hearings on the petitions for
bail under pain of waiver of cross-examination. The Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent powers to
proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determines best conducive to orderly
proceedings and speedy termination of the case, directed the other accused to participate in the
said bail hearing considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court,
whatever evidence is adduced during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically
reproduced at the trial.[8]
However, instead of proceeding with the bail hearing set by it on June 18, 2001, the
Sandiganbayan issued an Order on June 15, 2001 canceling the said bail hearing due to pending
incidents yet to be resolved and reset anew the hearing to June 26, 2001. [9]
On the eve of said hearing, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration of its May 31, 2001 Resolution. The bail hearing on June 26, 2001 did not again
proceed because on said date petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the
amended Information on the grounds that as against him, the amended Information does not
allege a combination or series of overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder; as against him,
the amended Information does not allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy; the money alleged in paragraph (a) of the amended Information
to have been illegally received or collected does not constitute ill-gotten wealth as defined in
Section 1(d) of Republic Act No. 7080; and the amended Information charges him of bribery and
illegal gambling.[10] By way of riposte, the prosecution objected to the holding of bail hearing until
petitioner agreed to withdraw his motion to quash. The prosecution contended that petitioners
motion to quash the amended Information was antithetical to his petition for bail.
The Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment of accused and the hearing on the petition for bail of
petitioner in Criminal Case No. 26558 for July 10, 2001 to enable it to resolve the pending
incidents and the motion to quash of petitioner. However, even before the Sandiganbayan could
resolve the pending motions of petitioner and the prosecution, petitioner filed with this Court on
June 29, 2001 a Petition for Habeas Corpus and Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 148468, praying
that the Court declare void the questioned orders, resolutions and actions of the Sandiganbayan
on his claim that he was thereby effectively denied of his right to due process. Petitioner likewise
prayed for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus; that the People be declared to have waived
their right to present evidence in opposition to his petition for bail; and, premised on the failure
of the People to adduce strong evidence of petitioners guilt of plunder, that he be granted
provisional liberty on bail after due proceedings. [11]
Meanwhile, on June 28, 2001, Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion
praying that said court resolve his motion to fix his bail.
On July 9, 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners motion to quash the
amended Information. Petitioner, through counsel, received on said date a copy of said
resolution.[12] The motion to fix bail filed by Jose Jinggoy Estrada was also resolved by the
Sandiganbayan.
On July 10, 2001, just before his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 26558, petitioner manifested
to the Sandiganbayan that he was going to file a motion for reconsideration of the July 9, 2001
Resolution denying his motion to quash and for the deferment of his arraignment. The
Sandiganbayan, however, declared that there was no provision in the Rules of Court or in the
Sandiganbayans rules granting the right to petitioner to file a motion for the reconsideration of
an interlocutory order issued by it and ordered petitioner to orally argue his motion for
reconsideration. When petitioner refused, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with his
arraignment. Petitioner refused to plead, impelling the court to enter a plea of not guilty for him.
On July 20, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
148769, alleging that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its July 9, 2001
Resolution denying his motion to quash, notwithstanding the fact that material inculpatory
allegations of the amended Information against him do not constitute the crime of plunder; and
that he is charged, under the said amended Information, for more than one offense. Jose Jinggoy
Estrada likewise filed petition for certiorari with the Court docketed as G.R. No. 148965 for the
nullification of a resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to fix bail.
On August 9, 2001, petitioner filed with the Court another Petition for Certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 149116, assailing the Sandiganbayans Resolution dated 31 May 2001 which denied his
April 6, 2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion and its June 25, 2001 Resolution denying his motion for
reconsideration of its May 31, 2001 Resolution.
Re: G.R. No. 148769
Petitioner avers that:
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN DENYING PETITIONER
SERAPIOS MOTION TO QUASH NOTWITHSTANDING THAT
I
THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE AMENDED INFORMATION AS AGAINST PETITIONER SERAPIO DO NOT
CONSTITUTE THE CRIME OF PLUNDER.
A. The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio, does not allege a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder.
B. The Amended Information, as against petitioner Serapio, does not allege a pattern of criminal
acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
C. The money described in paragraph (a) of the Amended Information and alleged to have been
illegally received or collected does not constitute ill-gotten wealth as defined in Section 1(d),
Republic Act No. 7080, as amended.
II
THE AMENDED INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE.[13]
Petitioner asserts that, on the face of the amended Information, he is charged with plunder only
in paragraph (a) which reads:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE
AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE
OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR
ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connivance with co-accused CHARLIE
ATONG ANG, Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING; [14]
Petitioner asserts that there is no allegation in paragraph (a) of the amended Information of a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts constituting plunder as described in Section 1(d) of
R.A. 7080 as amended. Neither does the amended Information allege a pattern of criminal
acts. He avers that his single act of toleration or protection of illegal gambling impelled by a
single criminal resolution does not constitute the requisite combination or series of acts for
plunder. He further claims that the consideration consisting of gifts, percentages or kickbacks in
furtherance of said resolution turned over to and received by former President Joseph E. Estrada
on several occasions does not cure the defect in the amended information. Petitioner insists that
on the face of the amended Information he is charged only with bribery or illegal gambling and
not of plunder.
Petitioner argues that the P540 million which forms part of the P4,097,804,173.17 amassed by
former President Joseph E. Estrada in confabulation with his co-accused is not ill-gotten wealth as
defined in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080.
We do not agree with petitioner. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states
the name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.
When the offense was committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the
complaint or information.[15]
The acts or omissions complained or must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable
the court to know the proper judgment. The Information must allege clearly and accurately the
elements of the crime charged. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included
therein must be determined by reference to the definition and elements of the specific
crimes. The purpose of the requirement of alleging all the elements of the crime in the
Information is to inform an accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable
him to suitably prepare for his defense.[16] Another purpose is to enable accused, if found guilty,
to plead his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. [17] The use of
derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense charged is sufficient.
[18]
In this case, the amended Information specifically alleges that all the accused, including
petitioner, connived and conspired with former President Joseph E. Estrada to commit plunder
through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts or similar schemes or
means. And in paragraph (a) of the amended Information, petitioner and his co-accused are
charged with receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances money in the
aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00. In Jose Jinggoy Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (Third
Division), et al.,[19] we held that the word series is synonymous with the clause on several
instances; it refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in Section 1(d) of
the law. We further held that the word combination contemplates the commission of at least any
two different predicate acts in any of the said items. We ruled that plainly, subparagraph (a) of
the amended information charges accused therein, including petitioner, with plunder committed
by a series of the same predicate act under Section 1(d)(2) of the law and that:
x x x Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on several instances, money from
illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling, and expressly
names petitioner as one of those who conspired with former President Estrada in committing the
offense. This predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the enumeration
in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080. x x x.[20]
It is not necessary to allege in the amended Information a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy because as Section 3 of R.A. 7080
specifically provides, the same is evidentiary and the general rule is that matters of evidence
need not be alleged in the Information. [21]
The Court also ruled in Jose Jinggoy Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan[22] that the aggregate amount
of P4,097,804,173.17 inclusive of the P545 million alleged in paragraph (a) of the amended
information is ill-gotten wealth as contemplated in Section 1, paragraph 1(d) of Republic Act
7080, as amended, and that all the accused in paragraph (a) to (d) of the amended information
conspired and confederated with former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of P4,097,804,173.17.
Under the amended Information, all the accused, including petitioner, are charged of having
conspired and confabulated together in committing plunder. When two or more persons
conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of others. In contemplation of law,
the act of the conspirator is the act of each of them.[23] Conspirators are one man, they breathe
one breath, they speak one voice, they wield one arm and the law says that the acts, words and
declarations of each, while in the pursuit of the common design, are the acts, words and
declarations of all.[24]
Petitioner asserts that he is charged under the amended Information of bribery and illegal
gambling and others. The Sandiganbayan, for its part, held that petitioner is not charged with the
predicate acts of bribery and illegal gambling but is charged only with one crime that of plunder:
THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE INFORMATION
CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE
According to the accused Estradas and Edward Serapio the information charges more than one
offense, namely, bribery (Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code), malversation of public funds or
property (Article 217, Revised Penal Code) and violations of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act (RA No.
3019) and Section 7(d) of RA 6713.
This contention is patently unmeritorious. The acts alleged in the information are not charged as
separate offenses but as predicate acts of the crime of plunder.
It should be stressed that the Anti-Plunder law specifically Section 1(d) thereof does not make
any express reference to any specific provision of laws, other than R.A. No. 7080, as amended,
which coincidentally may penalize as a separate crime any of the overt or criminal acts
enumerated therein. The said acts which form part of the combination or series of act are
described in their generic sense.Thus, aside from malversation of public funds, the law also uses
the generic terms misappropriation, conversion or misuse of said fund. The fact that the acts
involved may likewise be penalized under other laws is incidental. The said acts are mentioned
only as predicate acts of the crime of plunder and the allegations relative thereto are not to be
taken or to be understood as allegations charging separate criminal offenses punished under the
Revised Penal Code, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees.[25]
This Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan. It is clear on the face of the amended Information
that petitioner and his co-accused are charged only with one crime of plunder and not with the
predicate acts or crimes of plunder. It bears stressing that the predicate acts merely constitute
acts of plunder and are not crimes separate and independent of the crime of plunder.Resultantly
then, the petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 149116
Petitioner assails the May 31, 2001 Joint Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his April 4,
2001 Urgent Omnibus Motion contending that:
GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION
THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN SUMMARILY DENYING
PETITIONER SERAPIOS URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (RE:
RESOLUTION DATED 31 MAY 2001), NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE OMBUDSMAN HAD TOTALLY
DISREGARDED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND COMMITTED GRAVE AND MANIFEST ERRORS OF
LAW SERIOUSLY PREJUDICIAL TO THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF PETITIONER SERAPIO, AND
THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT AN INDICTMENT FOR PLUNDER AS AGAINST
PETITIONER SERAPIO.[26]
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his
omnibus motion to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant for his arrest as well as the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 26558; to conduct a determination of probable cause; and to
direct the Ombudsman to conduct a reinvestigation of the charges him. Petitioner asseverates
that the Ombudsman had totally disregarded exculpatory evidence and committed grave abuse
of discretion in charging him with plunder. He further argues that there exists no probable cause
to support an indictment for plunder as against him. [27]
Petitioner points out that the joint resolution of the Ombudsman does not even mention him in
relation to the collection and receipt of jueteng money which started in 1998[28] and that the
Ombudsman inexplicably arrived at the conclusion that the Erap Muslim Youth Foundation was a
money laundering front organization put up by Joseph Estrada, assisted by petitioner, even
though the latter presented evidence that said Foundation is a bona fide and legitimate private
foundation.[29] More importantly, he claims, said joint resolution does not indicate that he knew
that the P200 million he received for the Foundation came from jueteng.[30]
Petitioner insists that he cannot be charged with plunder since: (1) the P200 million he received
does not constitute ill-gotten wealth as defined in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080; [31] (2) there is no
evidence linking him to the collection and receipt of jueteng money;[32] (3) there was no showing
that petitioner participated in a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme
or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, or that his act of receiving
the P200 million constitutes an overt criminal act of plunder. [33]
Petitioner argues further that his motion for reinvestigation is premised on the absolute lack of
evidence to support a finding of probable cause for plunder as against him, [34] and hence he
should be spared from the inconvenience, burden and expense of a public trial. [35]
Petitioner also avers that the discretion of government prosecutors is not beyond judicial
scrutiny. He asserts that while this Court does not ordinarily look into the existence of probable
cause to charge a person for an offense in a given case, it may do so in exceptional
circumstances, which are present in this case: (1) to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused; (2) for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid
oppression; (3) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; and (4) where
the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance. [36] Petitioner claims
that he raised proper grounds for a reinvestigation by asserting that in issuing the questioned
joint resolution, the Ombudsman disregarded evidence exculpating petitioner from the charge of
plunder and committed errors of law or irregularities which have been prejudicial to his interest.
[37]
 He also states that during the joint preliminary investigations for the various charges against
Joseph Estrada and his associates, of which the plunder charge was only one of the eight charges
against Estrada et al., he was not furnished with copies of the other complaints nor given the
opportunity to refute the evidence presented in relation to the other seven cases, even though
the evidence presented therein were also used against him, although he was only charged in the
plunder case.[38]
The People maintain that the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners omnibus motion. They assert that since the Ombudsman found probable cause to
charge petitioner with the crime of plunder, the Sandiganbayan is bound to assume jurisdiction
over the case and to proceed to try the same. They further argue that a finding of probable cause
is merely preliminary and prefatory of the eventual determination of guilt or innocence of the
accused, and that petitioner still has the chance to interpose his defenses in a full blown trial
where his guilt or innocence may finally be determined. [39]
The People also point out that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioners omnibus motion asking for, among others, a reinvestigation by the
Ombudsman, because his motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans joint resolution did
not raise the grounds of either newly discovered evidence, or errors of law or irregularities,
which under Republic Act No. 6770 are the only grounds upon which a motion for
reconsideration may be filed.[40]
The People likewise insist that there exists probable cause to charge petitioner with plunder as a
co-conspirator of Joseph Estrada.[41]
This Court does not agree with petitioner.
Case law has it that the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsmans discretion in the conduct
of preliminary investigations. Thus, in Raro vs. Sandiganbayan[42], the Court ruled:
x x x. In the performance of his task to determine probable cause, the Ombudsmans discretion is
paramount. Thus, in Camanag vs. Guerrero, this Court said:
x x x. (S)uffice it to state that this Court has adopted a policy of non-interference in the conduct
of preliminary investigations, and leaves to the investigating prosecutor sufficient latitude of
discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will
establish probable cause for filing of information against the supposed offender.
In Cruz, Jr. vs. People,[43] the Court ruled thus:
Furthermore, the Ombudsmans findings are essentially factual in nature. Accordingly, in assailing
said findings on the contention that the Ombudsman committed a grave abuse of discretion in
holding that petitioner is liable for estafa through falsification of public documents, petitioner is
clearly raising questions of fact here. His arguments are anchored on the propriety or error in the
Ombudsmans appreciation of facts. Petitioner cannot be unaware that the Supreme Court is not
a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither
question of fact nor even of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Insofar as the third issue is concerned, we find that no
grave abuse of discretion has been committed by respondents which would warrant the granting
of the writ of certiorari.
Petitioner is burdened to allege and establish that the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman for
that matter committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing their resolution and joint resolution,
respectively. Petitioner failed to discharge his burden. Indeed, the Court finds no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman in finding probable cause
against petitioner for plunder. Neither did the Sandiganbayan abuse its discretion in denying
petitioners motion for reinvestigation of the charges against him in the amendedInformation. In
its Resolution of April 25, 2001, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the finding of the Ombudsman that
probable cause exists against petitioner and his co-accused for the crime of plunder, thus:
In the light of the foregoing and considering the allegations of the Amended Information dated
18 April 2001 charging the accused with the offense of PLUNDER and examining carefully the
evidence submitted in support thereof consisting of the affidavits and sworn statements and
testimonies of prosecution witnesses and several other pieces of documentary evidence, as well
as the respective counter-affidavits of accused former President Joseph Estrada dated March 20,
2001, Jose Jinggoy Pimentel Estrada dated February 20, 2001, Yolanda T. Ricaforte dated January
21, 2001 and Edward S. Serapio dated February 21, 2001, the Court finds and so holds that
probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify issuance of warrants of arrest of
accused former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estrada, Charlie Atong
Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, John Doe. a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or
Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a Delia Rajas. [44]
Likewise, in its Resolution dated May 31, 2001 of petitioners omnibus motion, the Sandiganbayan
noted that a preliminary investigation was fully conducted in accordance with Rule II,
Administrative Order No. 7 of the Office of the Ombudsman, pursuant to Sections 18, 23 and 27
of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989); and that all the basic complaints and
evidence in support thereof were served upon all the accused. [45] It was in light of such findings
that the Sandiganbayan held that there was no basis for the allegation that accused therein
(including petitioner) were deprived of the right to seek a reconsideration of the Ombudsmans
Resolution dated April 4, 2001 finding probable cause to charge them with plunder after the
conduct of preliminary investigation in connection therewith. In addition, the Sandiganbayan
pointed out that petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsmans resolution, but
failed to show in his motion that there were newly discovered evidence, or that the preliminary
investigation was tainted by errors of law or irregularities, which are the only grounds for which a
reconsideration of the Ombudsmans resolution may be granted. [46]
It bears stressing that the right to a preliminary investigation is not a constitutional right, but is
merely a right conferred by statute. [47] The absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair
the validity of the Information or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect
the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the Information.
[48]
 If the lack of a preliminary investigation does not render the Information invalid nor affect the
jurisdiction of the court over the case, with more reason can it be said that the denial of a motion
for reinvestigation cannot invalidate the Information or oust the court of its jurisdiction over the
case. Neither can it be said that petitioner had been deprived of due process. He was afforded
the opportunity to refute the charges against him during the preliminary investigation.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is merely to determine whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the person accused of the crime
is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. [49] As the Court held in Webb vs. De
Leon, [a] finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than
not a crime has been committed and was committed by the suspect. Probable cause need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. [50]
Absent any showing of arbitrariness on the part of the prosecutor or any other officer authorized
to conduct preliminary investigation, courts as a rule must defer to said officers finding and
determination of probable cause, since the determination of the existence of probable cause is
the function of the prosecutor.[51] The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan that petitioner failed
to establish that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman was tainted with
irregularity or that its findings stated in the joint resolution dated April 4, 2001 are not supported
by the facts, and that a reinvestigation was necessary.
Certiorari will not lie to invalidate the Sandiganbayans resolution denying petitioners motion for
reinvestigation since there is nothing to substantiate petitioners claim that it gravely abused its
discretion in ruling that there was no need to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. [52]
The ruling in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals[53] that an accused shall not be deemed to have
waived his right to ask for a preliminary investigation after he had been arraigned over his
objection and despite his insistence on the conduct of said investigation prior to trial on the
merits does not apply in the instant case because petitioner merely prayed for
a reinvestigationon the ground of a newly-discovered evidence. Irrefragably, a preliminary
investigation had been conducted by the Ombudsman prior to the filing of the amended
Information, and that petitioner had participated therein by filing his counter-
affidavit. Furthermore, the Sandiganbayan had already denied his motion for reinvestigation as
well as his motion for reconsideration thereon prior to his arraignment. [54] In sum then, the
petition is dismissed.
Re: G.R. No. 148468
As synthesized by the Court from the petition and the pleadings of the parties, the issues for
resolution are: (1) Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his
petition for bail may be conducted; (2) Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash the
amended Information during the pendency of his petition for bail; (3) Whether a joint hearing of
the petition for bail of petitioner and those of the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 is
mandatory; (4) Whether the People waived their right to adduce evidence in opposition to the
petition for bail of petitioner and failed to adduce strong evidence of guilt of petitioner for the
crime charged; and (5) Whether petitioner was deprived of his right to due process in Criminal
Case No. 26558 and should thus be released from detention via a writ of habeas corpus.
On the first issue, petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it deferred the hearing of his petition
for bail to July 10, 2001, arraigned him on said date and entered a plea of not guilty for him when
he refused to be arraigned. He insists that the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, does
not require that he be arraigned first prior to the conduct of bail hearings since the latter can
stand alone and must, of necessity, be heard immediately. [55] Petitioner maintains that his
arraignment before the bail hearings are set is not necessary since he would not plead guilty to
the offense charged, as is evident in his earlier statements insisting on his innocence during the
Senate investigation of the jueteng scandal and the preliminary investigation before the
Ombudsman.[56] Neither would the prosecution be prejudiced even if it would present all its
evidence before his arraignment because, under the Revised Penal Code, a voluntary confession
of guilt is mitigating only if made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution, [57] and
petitioner admitted that he cannot repudiate the evidence or proceedings taken during the bail
hearings because Rule 114, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that
evidence present during bail hearings are automatically reproduced during the trial. [58] Petitioner
likewise assures the prosecution that he is willing to be arraigned prior to the posting of a bail
bond should he be granted bail.[59]
The People insist that arraignment is necessary before bail hearings may be commenced,
because it is only upon arraignment that the issues are joined. The People stress that it is only
when an accused pleads not guilty may he file a petition for bail and if he pleads guilty to the
charge, there would be no more need for him to file said petition. Moreover, since it is during
arraignment that the accused is first informed of the precise charge against him, he must be
arraigned prior to the bail hearings to prevent him from later assailing the validity of the bail
hearings on the ground that he was not properly informed of the charge against him, especially
considering that, under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence presented
during such proceedings are considered automatically reproduced at the trial. [60] Likewise, the
arraignment of accused prior to bail hearings diminishes the possibility of an accuseds flight from
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because trial in absentia may be had only if an accused
escapes after he has been arraigned.[61] The People also contend that the conduct of bail hearings
prior to arraignment would extend to an accused the undeserved privilege of being appraised of
the prosecutions evidence before he pleads guilty for purposes of penalty reduction. [62]
Although petitioner had already been arraigned on July 10, 2001 and a plea of not guilty had
been entered by the Sandiganbayan on his behalf, thereby rendering the issue as to whether an
arraignment is necessary before the conduct of bail hearings in petitioners case moot, the Court
takes this opportunity to discuss the controlling precepts thereon pursuant to its symbolic
function of educating the bench and bar.[63]
The contention of petitioner is well-taken. The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to
the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as
he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. [64] An accused need not
wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail.
In Lavides vs. Court of Appeals, [65] this Court ruled on the issue of whether an accused must first
be arraigned before he may be granted bail. Lavides involved an accused charged with violation
of Section 5(b) Republic Act No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act), an offense punishable by reclusion temporal in its medium
period to reclusion perpetua. The accused therein assailed, inter alia, the trial courts imposition
of the condition that he should first be arraigned before he is allowed to post bail.We held
therein that in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise
the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. [66]
However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to mean that the hearing on a
petition for bail should at all times precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person
deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as
he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or information is filed against him. [67]The
Courts pronouncement in Lavides should be understood in light of the fact that the accused in
said case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash the informations filed against
him. Hence, we explained therein that to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his
arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a
motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be
resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so
that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. This would undermine his
constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint or Information sufficient
to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. [68]
It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on
his application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be
granted bail even prior to arraignment. The ruling in Lavides  also implies that an application for
bail in a case involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua  to death may also be heard
even before an accused is arraigned. Further, if the court finds in such case that the accused is
entitled to bail because the evidence against him is not strong, he may be granted provisional
liberty even prior to arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be authorized under the
circumstances. In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the
hearing of his petition for bail.
With respect to the second issue of whether petitioner may file a motion to quash during the
pendency of his petition for bail, petitioner maintains that a motion to quash and a petition for
bail are not inconsistent, and may proceed independently of each other. While he agrees with
the prosecution that a motion to quash may in some instances result in the termination of the
criminal proceedings and in the release of the accused therein, thus rendering the petition for
bail moot and academic, he opines that such is not always the case; hence, an accused in
detention cannot be forced to speculate on the outcome of a motion to quash and decide
whether or not to file a petition for bail or to withdraw one that has been filed. [69] He also insists
that the grant of a motion to quash does not automatically result in the discharge of an accused
from detention nor render moot an application for bail under Rule 117, Section 5 of the Revised
Rules of Court.[70]
The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists between an application of an accused for bail
and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in the
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any
court as required under the conditions set forth under the Rules of Court. [71] Its purpose is to
obtain the provisional liberty of a person charged with an offense until his conviction while at the
same time securing his appearance at the trial.[72] As stated earlier, a person may apply for bail
from the moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender.
[73]
On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an accused assails
the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in
point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information. [74] An accused may
file a motion to quash the Information, as a general rule, before arraignment. [75]
These two reliefs have objectives which are not necessarily antithetical to each other. Certainly,
the right of an accused right to seek provisional liberty when charged with an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua  or life imprisonment, or when charged with an offense
punishable by such penalties but after due hearing, evidence of his guilt is found not to be strong,
does not preclude his right to assail the validity of the Information charging him with such
offense. It must be conceded, however, that if a motion to quash a criminal complaint or
Information on the ground that the same does not charge any offense is granted and the case is
dismissed and the accused is ordered released, the petition for bail of an accused may become
moot and academic.
We now resolve the issue of whether or not it is mandatory that the hearings on the petitions for
bail of petitioner and accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada in Criminal Case No. 26558 and the trial of the
said case as against former President Joseph E. Estrada be heard jointly.
Petitioner argues that the conduct of joint bail hearings would negate his right to have his
petition for bail resolved in a summary proceeding since said hearings might be converted into a
full blown trial on the merits by the prosecution. [76]
For their part, the People claim that joint bail hearings will save the court from having to hear the
same witnesses and the parties from presenting the same evidence where it would allow
separate bail hearings for the accused who are charged as co-conspirators in the crime of
plunder.[77]
In issuing its June 1, 2001 Order directing all accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 to participate in
the bail hearings, the Sandiganbayan explained that the directive was made was in the interest of
the speedy disposition of the case. It stated:
x x x The obvious fact is, if the rest of the accused other than the accused Serapio were to be
excused from participating in the hearing on the motion for bail of accused Serapio, under the
pretext that the same does not concern them and that they will participate in any hearing where
evidence is presented by the prosecution only if and when they will already have filed their
petitions for bail, or should they decide not to file any, that they will participate only during the
trial proper itself, then everybody will be faced with the daunting prospects of having to go
through the process of introducing the same witness and pieces of evidence two times, three
times or four times, as many times as there are petitions for bail filed. Obviously, such procedure
is not conducive to the speedy termination of a case. Neither can such procedure be
characterized as an orderly proceeding. [78]
There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the
Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more petitions for bail filed by different accused
or that a petition for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of the case against
the other accused. The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two or more
petitions for bail filed by two different accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly
with the trial against another accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown, the
Court will not interfere with the exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its discretion.
It may be underscored that in the exercise of its discretion, the Sandiganbayan must take into
account not only the convenience of the State, including the prosecution, but also that of the
accused and the witnesses of both the prosecution and the accused and the right of accused to a
speedy trial. The Sandiganbayan must also consider the complexities of the cases and of the
factual and legal issues involving petitioner and the other accused. After all, if this Court may
echo the observation of the United States Supreme Court, the State has a stake, with every
citizen, in his being afforded our historic individual protections, including those surrounding
criminal prosecutions. About them, this Court dares not become careless or complacent when
that fashion has become rampant over the earth. [79]
It must be borne in mind that in Ocampo vs. Bernabe,[80] this Court held that in a petition for bail
hearing, the court is to conduct only a summary hearing, meaning such brief and speedy method
of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the
purpose of the hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for purposes of
bail. The court does not try the merits or enter into any inquiry as to the weight that ought to be
given to the evidence against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on
what further evidence may be offered therein. It may confine itself to receiving such evidence as
has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the examination and
cross-examination of witnesses, and reducing to a reasonable minimum the amount of
corroboration particularly on details that are not essential to the purpose of the hearing.
A joint hearing of two separate petitions for bail by two accused will of course avoid duplication
of time and effort of both the prosecution and the courts and minimizes the prejudice to the
accused, especially so if both movants for bail are charged of having conspired in the commission
of the same crime and the prosecution adduces essentially the same evident against
them. However, in the cases at bar, the joinder of the hearings of the petition for bail of
petitioner with the trial of the case against former President Joseph E. Estrada is an entirely
different matter. For, with the participation of the former president in the hearing of petitioners
petition for bail, the proceeding assumes a completely different dimension. The proceedings will
no longer be summary. As against former President Joseph E. Estrada, the proceedings will be a
full-blown trial which is antithetical to the nature of a bail hearing. Moreover, following our
ruling in Jose Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, supra where we stated that Jose Jinggoy Estrada can
only be charged with conspiracy to commit the acts alleged in sub-paragraph (a) of the amended
Information since it is not clear from the latter if the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) thereof
conspired with each other to assist Joseph Estrada to amass ill-gotten wealth, we hold that
petitioner can only be charged with having conspired with the other co-accused named in sub-
paragraph (a) by receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances, money x x x
from illegal gambling, x x x in consideration of toleration or protection of illegal gambling.
[81]
 Thus, with respect to petitioner, all that the prosecution needs to adduce to prove that the
evidence against him for the charge of plunder is strong are those related to the alleged receipt
or collection of money from illegal gambling as described in sub-paragraph (a) of the amended
Information. With the joinder of the hearing of petitioners petition for bail and the trial of the
former President, the latter will have the right to cross-examine intensively and extensively the
witnesses for the prosecution in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner. If petitioner will
adduce evidence in support of his petition after the prosecution shall have concluded its
evidence, the former President may insist on cross-examining petitioner and his witnesses. The
joinder of the hearing of petitioners bail petition with the trial of former President Joseph E.
Estrada will be prejudicial to petitioner as it will unduly delay the determination of the issue of
the right of petitioner to obtain provisional liberty and seek relief from this Court if his petition is
denied by the respondent court. The indispensability of the speedy resolution of an application
for bail was succinctly explained by Cooley in his treatise Constitutional Limitations,  thus:
For, if there were any mode short of confinement which would with reasonable certainty insure
the attendance of the accused to answer the accusation, it would not be justifiable to inflict upon
him that indignity, when the effect is to subject him in a greater or lesser degree, to the
punishment of a guilty person, while as yet it is not determined that he has not committed any
crime.[82]
While the Sandiganbayan, as the court trying Criminal Case No. 26558, is empowered to proceed
with the trial of the case in the manner it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and
speedy termination of the case,[83] the Court finds that it gravely abused its discretion in ordering
that the petition for bail of petitioner and the trial of former President Joseph E. Estrada be held
jointly. It bears stressing that the Sandiganbayan itself acknowledged in its May 4, 2001 Order
the pre-eminent position and superiority of the rights of [petitioner] to have the matter of his
provisional liberty resolved without unnecessary delay, [84] only to make a volte face and declare
that after all the hearing of petition for bail of petitioner and Jose Jinggoy Estrada and the trial as
against former President Joseph E. Estrada should be held simultaneously. In ordering that
petitioners petition for bail to be heard jointly with the trial of the case against his co-accused
former President Joseph E. Estrada, the Sandiganbayan in effect allowed further and unnecessary
delay in the resolution thereof to the prejudice of petitioner.In fine then, the Sandiganbayan
committed a grave abuse of its discretion in ordering a simultaneous hearing of petitioners
petition for bail with the trial of the case against former President Joseph E. Estrada on its merits.
With respect to petitioners allegations that the prosecution tried to delay the bail hearings by
filing dilatory motions, the People aver that it is petitioner and his co-accused who caused the
delay in the trial of Criminal Case No. 26558 by their filing of numerous manifestations and
pleadings with the Sandiganbayan. [85] They assert that they filed the motion for joint bail hearing
and motion for earlier arraignment around the original schedule for the bail hearings which was
on May 21-25, 2001.[86]
They argue further that bail is not a matter of right in capital offenses. [87] In support thereof, they
cite Article III, Sec 13 of the Constitution, which states that
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. [88]
The People also cited Rule 114, Secs. 7 and 4 of the Revised Rules of Court which provide:
Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable.No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonement, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
Sec. 4. Bail, a matter of right, exception.All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a
matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this
Rule x x x (b) and before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. [89]
Irrefragably, a person charged with a capital offense is not absolutely denied the opportunity to
obtain provisional liberty on bail pending the judgment of his case. However, as to such person,
bail is not a matter of right but is discretionary upon the court. [90] Had the rule been otherwise,
the Rules would not have provided for an application for bail by a person charged with a capital
offense under Rule 114, Section 8 which states:
Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a
person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of
guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing shall  be considered automatically
reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court may recall any witness for
additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to
testify.[91]
Under the foregoing provision, there must be a showing that the evidence of guilt against a
person charged with a capital offense is not strong for the court to grant him bail. Thus, upon an
application for bail by the person charged with a capital offense, a hearing thereon must be
conducted, where the prosecution must be accorded an opportunity to discharge its burden of
proving that the evidence of guilt against an accused is strong. [92] The prosecution shall be
accorded the opportunity to present all the evidence it may deems necessary for this purpose.
[93]
When it is satisfactorily demonstrated that the evidence of guilt is strong, it is the courts duty
to deny the application for bail. However, when the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes
a matter of right.[94]
In this case, petitioner is not entitled to bail as a matter of right at this stage of the
proceedings. Petitioners claim that the prosecution had refused to present evidence to prove his
guilt for purposes of his bail application and that the Sandiganbayan has refused to grant a
hearing thereon is not borne by the records. The prosecution did not waive, expressly or even
impliedly, its right to adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner. It must
be noted that the Sandiganbayan had already scheduled the hearing dates for petitioners
application for bail but the same were reset due to pending incidents raised in several motions
filed by the parties, which incidents had to be resolved by the court prior to the bail hearings.The
bail hearing was eventually scheduled by the Sandiganbayan on July 10, 2001 but the hearing did
not push through due to the filing of this petition on June 29, 2001.
The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioners application for bail is therefore not imputable
solely to the Sandiganbayan or to the prosecution. Petitioner is also partly to blame therefor, as
is evident from the following list of motions filed by him and by the prosecution:
Motions filed by petitioner:
         Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 6, 2001, for (1) leave to file motion for
reconsideration/reinvestigation and to direct ombudsman to conduct reinvestigation; (2) conduct
a determination of probable cause as would suggest the issuance of house arrest; (3) hold in
abeyance the issuance of warrant of arrest and other proceedings pending determination of
probable cause;
         Motion for Early Resolution, dated May 24, 2001;
         Urgent Motion to Hold in Abeyance Implementation or Service of Warrant of Arrest for
Immediate Grant of bail or For Release on Recognizance, dated April 25, 2001;
         Urgent Motion to allow Accused Serapio to Vote at Obando, Bulacan,  dated May 11, 2001;
         Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,  dated May 22, 2001, praying for Resolution of May 18,
2001 be set aside and bail hearings be set at the earliest possible time;
         Urgent Motion for Immediate Release on Bail or Recognizance, dated May 27, 2001;
         Motion for Reconsideration of denial of Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated June 13, 2001,
praying that he be allowed to file a Motion for Reinvestigation; and
[95]
         Motion to Quash, dated June 26, 2001.
Motions filed by the prosecution:
         Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May 8, 2001;[96]
         Motion for Joint Bail Hearings of Accused Joseph Estrada, Jose Jinggoy Estrada and Edward
Serapio, dated May 8, 2001;[97]
         Opposition to the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Omnibus Motion to Adjust Earlier
Arraignment, dated May 25, 2001;[98] and
         Omnibus Motion for Examination, Testimony and Transcription in Filipino, dated June 19,
2001.[99]
The other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558 also contributed to the aforesaid delay by their
filing of the following motions:
         Motion to Quash or Suspend, dated April 24, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 7080 and praying that the Amended Information be quashed;
         Very Urgent Omnibus Motion, dated April 30, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, praying that he
be (1) excluded from the Amended Information for lack of probable cause; (2) released from
custody; or in the alternative, (3) be allowed to post bail;
         Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Place on House Arrest, dated April 25, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be placed on house arrest during the pendency of the case;
         Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May 2, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada;
         Supplemental Position Paper [re: House Arrest], dated May 2, 2001, filed by Joseph and
Jinggoy Estrada;
         Omnibus Motion, dated May 7, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada, praying by reinvestigation of
the case by the Ombudsman or the outright dismissal of the case;
         Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Extension,  dated May 2, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada,
requesting for five (5) within which to respond to the Opposition to Motion to Quash in view of
the holidays and election-related distractions;
         Opposition to Urgent Motion for Earlier Arraignment, dated May 10, 2001, filed by Joseph
Estrada;
         Omnibus Manifestation on voting and custodial arrangement, dated May 11, 2001, filed by
Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they be placed on house arrest;
         Manifestation regarding house arrest, dated May 6, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada;
         Summation regarding house arrest, dated May 23, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada;
         Urgent Manifestation & Motion, dated May 6, 2001 filed by Jinggoy Estrada;
         Manifestation, dated May 28, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, praying that they
be allowed to be confined in Tanay;
         Motion to charge as Accused Luis Chavit Singson, filed by Joseph Estrada;
         Omnibus Motion, dated June 11, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, seeking
reconsideration of denial of requests for house arrest, for detention in Tanay or Camp Crame;
motion for inhibition of Justice Badoy;
         Urgent Motion to Allow Accused to Clear His Desk as Mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila,
dated June 28, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada;
         Motion for Reconsideration, dated June 9, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada,
praying that the resolution compelling them to be present at petitioner Serapios hearing for bail
be reconsidered;
         Motion to Quash, dated June 7, 2001, filed by Joseph Estrada;
         Still Another Manifestation, dated June 14, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada stating
that Bishop Teodoro Bacani favors their house arrest;
         Manifestation, dated June 15, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy Estrada, waiving their right
to be present at the June 18 and 21, 2001 bail hearings and reserving their right to trial with
assessors;
         Omnibus Motion for Instructions: 30-Day House Arrest; Production, Inspection and Copying
of Documents; and Possible Trial with Assessors, dated June 19, 2001, filed by Joseph and Jinggoy
Estrada;
         Urgent Motion for Additional Time to Wind Up Affairs, dated June 20, 2001, filed by Jinggoy
Estrada;
         Manifestation, dated June 22, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, asking for free dates for
parties, claiming that denial of bail is cruel and inhuman, reiterating request for gag order of
prosecution witnesses, availing of production, inspection and copying of documents, requesting
for status of alias case; and
         Compliance, dated June 25, 2001, filed by Jinggoy Estrada, requesting for permission to
attend some municipal affairs in San Juan, Metro Manila. [100]
Furthermore, the Court has previously ruled that even in cases where the prosecution refuses to
adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail by an accused charged with a capital
offense, the trial court is still under duty to conduct a hearing on said application. [101] The
rationale for such requirement was explained in Narciso vs. Sta. Romana-Cruz (supra),
citing Basco vs. Rapatalo:[102]
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not
the evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This
discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is
submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the
evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced
before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the
evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination
and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. [103]
Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention until the Sandiganbayan conducts a
hearing of his application for bail and resolve the same in his favor. Even then, there must first be
a finding that the evidence against petitioner is not strong before he may be granted bail.
Anent the issue of the propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus for petitioner, he
contends that he is entitled to the issuance of said writ because the State, through the
prosecutions refusal to present evidence and by the Sandiganbayans refusal to grant a bail
hearing, has failed to discharge its burden of proving that as against him, evidence of guilt for the
capital offense of plunder is strong. Petitioner contends that the prosecution launched a
seemingly endless barrage of obstructive and dilatory moves to prevent the conduct of bail
hearings. Specifically, the prosecution moved for petitioners arraignment before the
commencement of bail hearings and insisted on joint bail hearings for petitioner, Joseph Estrada
and Jinggoy Estrada despite the fact that it was only petitioner who asked for a bail hearing;
manifested that it would present its evidence as if it is the presentation of the evidence in chief,
meaning that the bail hearings would be concluded only after the prosecution presented its
entire case upon the accused; and argued that petitioners motion to quash and his petition for
bail are inconsistent, and therefore, petitioner should choose to pursue only one of these two
remedies.[104] He further claims that the Sandiganbayan, through its questioned orders and
resolutions postponing the bail hearings effectively denied him of his right to bail and to due
process of law.[105]
Petitioner also maintains that the issuance by the Sandiganbayan of new orders canceling the
bail hearings which it had earlier set did not render moot and academic the petition for issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus, since said orders have resulted in a continuing deprivation of
petitioners right to bail.[106] He argues further that the fact that he was arrested and is detained
pursuant to valid process does not by itself negate the efficacy of the remedy of habeas
corpus. In support of his contention, petitioner cites Moncupa vs. Enrile,[107] where the Court held
that habeas corpus extends to instances where the detention, while valid from its inception, has
later become arbitrary.[108]
However, the People insist that habeas corpus is not proper because petitioner was arrested
pursuant to the amended information which was earlier filed in court, [109] the warrant of arrest
issuant pursuant thereto was valid, and petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the authorities. [110]
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty in custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which
jurisdiction to do so.[111] In exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus  may be granted by the
courts even when the person concerned is detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary
surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as the fundamental instrument for safeguarding
individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action due to its ability to cut through
barriers of form and procedural mazes.[112] Thus, in previous cases, we issued the writ where the
deprivation of liberty, while initially valid under the law, had later become invalid, [113] andeven
though the persons praying for its issuance were not completely deprived of their liberty. [114]
The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of petitioner. The
general rule that habeas corpus does not lie where the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to
issue the same[115] applies, because petitioner is under detention pursuant to the order of arrest
issued by the Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001 after the filing by the Ombudsman of the
amended information for plunder against petitioner and his co-accused. Petitioner had in fact
voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities on April 25, 2001 upon learning that a warrant
for his arrest had been issued.
The ruling in Moncupa vs. Enrile[116] that habeas corpus will lie where the deprivation of liberty
which was initially valid has become arbitrary in view of subsequent developments finds no
application in the present case because the hearing on petitioners application for bail has yet to
commence. As stated earlier, the delay in the hearing of petitioners petition for bail cannot be
pinned solely on the Sandiganbayan or on the prosecution for that matter. Petitioner himself is
partly to be blamed. Moreover, a petition for habeas corpus is not the appropriate remedy for
asserting ones right to bail.[117] It cannot be availed of where accused is entitled to bail not as a
matter of right but on the discretion of the court and the latter has not abused such discretion in
refusing to grant bail,[118] or has not even exercised said discretion. The proper recourse is to file
an application for bail with the court where the criminal case is pending and to allow hearings
thereon to proceed.
The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be unjustified but would also preempt
the Sandiganbayans resolution of the pending application for bail of petitioner. The recourse of
petitioner is to forthwith proceed with the hearing on his application for bail.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. In G.R. No. 148769 and G.R. No. 149116, the petitions are DISMISSED. The resolutions of
respondent Sandiganbayan subject of said petitions are AFFIRMED; and
2. In G.R. No. 148468, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The resolution of respondent
Sandiganbayan, Annex L of the petition, ordering a joint hearing of petitioners petition for bail
and the trial of Criminal Case No. 26558 as against former President Joseph E. Estrada is SET
ASIDE; the arraignment of petitioner on July 10, 2001 is also SET ASIDE.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.