Non-Establishment of Religion
Aglipay vs Ruiz:
Facts:
Gregorio Aglipay of the Philippine First Independent Church filed a
writ of prohibition barring the Director of Posts from issuing
commemorative stamps for the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress held in Manila, Philippines.
It was alleged by the petitioner that the issuance of said post is
unconstitutional as it is an act favoring of the Roman Catholic
Church.
Issue:
W/N the assailed issuance is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
No. Assailed act is not unconstitutional. The assailed act was not
done in the advantage of the Roman Catholic Church but for the
advantage of the Government. It does not authorize an
appropriation of public funds to the Catholic Church nor does the
religion derive any money from the proceeds of the stamp sales. The
issuance of the stamps was merely for the purpose of taking
advantage of an event that was considered as of an international
importance to publicize the Philippines.
Moreover, the Court stressed that ‘Religious freedom, as a
constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs’.
Garces vs. Estenzo
Facts:
In line of festival celebrations, the barangay council of Valencia,
Ormoc City issued resolutions 5 and 6 authorizing the purchase of a
wooden statue of San Vicente Ferrer using donations and ticket
proceeds as well as assigning the custody of said statue to the
barangay chairman. Statue was temporarily displayed in the
Valencia church. Controversy arose when parish priest Osmena
refused to hand over the statue to the barangay council arguing
that church funds were used for the purchase of the statue.
In response, the barangay council issued resolutions 10 and 12
authorizing a replevin suit as well as assigning the barangay
chairman Veloso to represent the council.
Father Osmena was forced to hand over the statue and he filed a
case arguing that the resolutions mentioned are unconstitutional.
Where no law shall be passed for the establishment of a religion and
that no public money shall be appropriated to a religion.
Issue:
W/N the Assailed Resolutions are unconstitutional.
Ruling:
No. The assailed resolutions are not unconstitutional. Not every
governmental expenditure involving some religious tint is violative
of the separation of church and state. In addition, no public money
was used for the purchase of the statue. The purchase came from
private donations and ticket proceeds.
The image was also purchased in connection of a barrio fiesta – and
not for the favoring of one religion. If the celebration of a barrio
fiesta is not unconstitutional, then any activity relating to such must
not be barred.
Lastly, the purpose of putting the image in the custody of a layman
is to avoid the suspicion that the purchase was made in favor of the
church. So that it may be accessed and borrowed by all members of
the community desiring to worship the image.
Board of Education vs. Allen
Facts:
Assailed is a law in the state of New York requiring public school
authorities to lend books free of charge to any student from Grade
7-12, both from public and private school.
James Allen initiated a case against, Board of Education of Central
District 1 for failing to apply the said law to students belonging to
parochial schools. New York Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Allen
stating that the purpose of the law is for all students and that the
books to be lent shall be approved by public education authorities
and said book are secular in nature.
Unsatisfied with the decision, the Board of Education comes before
this court arguing that the assailed law is in violation of the
constitution’s non-establishment clause.
Issue:
W/N the assailed law is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
No. The law is not unconstitutional. Though the federal constitution
bars laws which benefits one religion, it does not bar laws which are
for the benefit of all regardless of their religion. However, it is
difficult to distinguish whether a law is for the benefit of one religion
or not. In this case, the court adopted the test adopted in Everson
vs. Education Board. That the law must have a secular purpose and
a primary effect that does not advance one religion nor inhibit it.
Applying the test, the main purpose of the law is to further
educational opportunities available to the young. The law merely
makes available to all children the benefits of a general program to
lend books free of charge. Books are merely lent to children and the
said books remains as property of the state. Thus, no funds nor
books were provided to parochial churches and the financial benefit
is to parents and their children.
Lemon vs. Kurtzman
Facts:
Assailed is the state laws of Rhode Island and Pennsylvania allowing
state aid to teachers of non-public schools teaching secular subjects
consistent with the respective states’ public-school curriculum
Citizens from both states question the constitutionality of said laws
arguing that they are inconsistent with the dictates of the non-
establishment clause of the federal constitution. They argue that the
statute support mainly parochial schools as non-public schools in
these states are virtually parochial schools. Rhode Island’s court
found their statute as unconstitutional while Pennsylvania’s court to ensure that there is no unnecessary injection of religion into
ruled otherwise. secular topics would require the government to become excessively
involved in the nuances of religious education. The same danger
Appeals are now being raised in this court questioning the
holds true for the Pennsylvania statute, which additionally provides
constitutionality of both statues.
state funding directly to a church-related organization. Government
Issue: financial involvement in such institutions inevitably leads to “an
intimate and continuing relationship” between church and state.
W/N the statutes mentioned are violative of the non-establishment The Court also noted the potential political implications of public
clause of the constitution. funding, as there is a risk of religious issues becoming politically
Ruling: divisive.

Yes. The statutes assailed are unconstitutional. In previous cases, Tilton vs. Richardson
the court came up with three tests to determine if a statute is
Facts:
consistent with the dictates of the non-establishment clause. The
following are: Higher Education Act of 1963 authorizes federal grant and loans for
institutions of higher education for the construction of facilities.
a) That the statute has a secular legislative;
Appellants, who are citizens and taxpayers of the state of
b) That the principal or primary effect does not advance not
Connecticut argued that the act is violative of non-establishment
inhibit a religion; and
clause arguing that religious colleges were given funds for the
c) That the statute does not foster an excessive government
construction of facilities. Federal Court has sustained the
entanglement with religion.
constitutionality of the Act. Aggrieved, Appellants now appeal to the
Applying the three tests in the case, the statute’s purpose is SC praying for a reversal.
consistent with the first test. Its intention is to elevate the quality of
Issue:
secular education in all schools. This is further by the fact that the
law only supports a school’s secular education functions. And in W/N the Higher Education Act of 1963 is violative of non-
previous cases, the court has already arrived to the conclusion that establishment clause.
secular and religious instruction in parochial schools are distinct in
Ruling:
separable. As for the second test, the court did not decide.
No. The assailed act is not unconstitutional. Previous cases have
As for the 3rd test the statute fails. The statutes involve an excessive
already determined tests which determine if a statute is in violation
entanglement between state and religion. In the Rhode Island
of the concerned clause. These are:
program, the amount of oversight of teachers and curricula required
a) That the statute has a secular legislative purpose;
b) That the principal or primary effect does not advance not inhibit a
religion; and
c) That the statute does not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion.
Applying the tests to the case, the statute is not in violation the
abovementioned tests. For the first test, the purpose of the statute
is to assist universities to accommodate the rising number of youths
who aspire for a higher education. This is a legitimate secular
purpose. For the second test, the statute specifically stated that it is
limited to funding facilities for a secular purpose. Here, the facilities
funded in said universities are 2 libraries, a speech facility, a science
facility and a music and arts building. None of said facilities can be
used for the advancement nor the inhibition of a religion. However,
court held that only the 20-year limitation portion of the Act
violated the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. The Court
invalidated the 20-year clause, arguing that subsidizing the
construction of facilities used for non-secular purposes would have
the effect of advancing religion. This does not mean that the statute
must be struck down. Statutory construction said that a statute
must be preserved instead of being destroyed. Only the defective
provision should be struck down instead. Lastly, for the third test,
the court noted that college students were less susceptible to
religious indoctrination, that the aid was of "nonideological
character," and that one-time grants did not require constant state
surveillance.
County of Allegheny vs. ACLU
Facts:
Two public-sponsored holiday displays in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
were challenged by the American Civil Liberties Union. The first
display involved a Christian nativity scene inside the Allegheny
County Courthouse. The second display was a large Chanukah
menorah, erected each year by the Chabad Jewish organization,
outside the City-County building. The ACLU claimed the displays
constituted state endorsement of religion. This case was decided
together with Chabad v. ACLU and City of Pittsburgh v. ACLU of
Greater Pittsburgh.
Issue:
Did the public displays violate the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment?
Ruling:
The Court held that the crèche placed in the courthouse violated the
Establishment Clause because it appeared to officially endorse
Christianity, but the display containing the menorah and Christmas
tree, together with the sign proclaiming a salute to liberty, did not
violate the constitution. Regarding the crèche, the Court found that
the inscription above the manger endorsed a patently Christian
message because it proclaimed glory to God for the birth of Jesus
Christ, and there was nothing surrounding the crèche that detracted
from its purely religious message. While the Court noted in Lynch v.
Donnelly that the government may acknowledge Christmas as a
cultural phenomenon, the Court concluded in this case that the
government may not suggest that people praise God for the birth of
Jesus. Thus the crèche constituted government endorsement of
religion in violation of the First Amendment. In contrast, the Court
held that the menorah and the Christmas tree with the sign saluting
liberty conveyed a message of pluralism and freedom of belief
during the holiday season, which could not be reasonably
interpreted as an endorsement of any religion in particular.
Therefore, the tree and menorah did not violate the Establishment
Clause.
Zobrest vs. Catalina Foothills School District
Facts:
James Zobrest was deaf since birth. He attended public school
through the eighth grade where the local school board provided a
sign-language interpreter. Zobrest's parents elected to send their
son to a Roman Catholic high school and requested that the local
school board continue to provide their son with a sign-language
interpreter. The school board denied the request on constitutional
grounds. The Zobrests then filed suit, alleging that the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment required the school district to provide the
interpreter and that the Establishment Clause did not bar such relief.
The District Court granted the school district summary judgment on
the ground that the interpreter would act as a conduit for the child's
religious inculcation, thereby promoting his religious development
at government expense in violation of the Establishment Clause. The
Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issue:
May a school district decline to provide an interpreter to a deaf child
based on the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?
Ruling:
the Court held that the Establishment Clause did not bar the school
district from providing the requested interpreter. Chief Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that, because the IDEA creates no financial
incentive for parents to choose a sectarian school, the presence of
an interpreter is not linked to the state and is the result of the
private decision of individual's parents. "The service at issue in this
case is part of a general government program that distributes
benefits neutrally to any child qualifying as 'handicapped' under the
IDEA, without regard to the 'sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-
nonpublic nature' of the school the child attends," wrote Chief
Justice Rehnquist.
Capitol Square Advisory Board vs. Pinette
Facts:
In 1993, the Ku Klux Klan organization attempted to place an
unattended cross on Capitol Square, the state-house plaza in
Columbus, Ohio, during the 1993 Christmas season. Ohio law makes
Capitol Square a forum for discussion of public questions and for
public activities, and gives the Advisory Board responsibility for
regulating access to the square. The Board denied the application of
the Ku Klux Klan to erect the cross on Establishment Clause grounds
Issue:
Was the KKK's right to free speech violated when their application to
erect a cross on a state-owned plaza was denied?
Ruling:
Justice Antonin Scalia delivered the majority opinion of the court on
June 22, 1995. He was joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy, Justice
Stephen Breyer, and Chief Justice William Rehnquist. The court held
that:
  Private religious speech is protected under the free speech
clause of the First Amendment
 Although the state has the right to make content-based
restrictions on speech, the board's denial of the Klan's
application to display the cross on the statehouse square
was not justified on the grounds of the establishment
clause.
Traditionally, the square had been recognized as a public forum by
the general population and because the display of religion was
purely private it could not violate the Establishment Clause. The
Advisory Board was still responsible for the content displayed on the
square, but they could not intentionally block a religious display
from being set up.
Islamic Da’wah vs Executive Secretary
Facts:
Petitioner IDCP, a corporation that operates under DSWD, is a non-
governmental organization that extends voluntary services to the
Filipino people, especially to Muslim communities. Among the
functions petitioner carries out is to conduct seminars, orient
manufacturers on halal food and issue halal certifications to
qualified products and manufacturers. On October 26, 2001,
respondent Office of the Executive Secretary issued EO 46 5 creating
the Philippine Halal Certification Scheme and designating
respondent Office on Muslim Affairs (OMA) to oversee its
implementation. Under the EO, respondent OMA has the exclusive
authority to issue halal certificates and perform other related
regulatory activities. Petitioner contends that the subject EO violates
the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State
and that it is unconstitutional for the government to formulate
policies and guidelines on the halal certification scheme because
said scheme is a function only religious organizations, entity or
scholars can lawfully and validly perform for the Muslims.
Issue:
Whether the EO is violates the constitutional provision as to
freedom of religion
Ruling:
No. In granting the petition, the Supreme Court ruled that freedom
of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of the
fundamental law and it has consistently affirmed this preferred
status. Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a
religious function because the standards used are drawn from the
Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the OMA the exclusive power to
classify food products as halal, Executive Order 46 encroached on
the religious freedom of Muslim organizations like herein petitioner
to interpret for Filipino Muslims what food products are fit for
Muslim consumption. Also, by arrogating to itself the task of issuing
halal certifications, the State has in effect forced Muslims to accept
its own interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food.
The Court further ruled that only the prevention of an immediate
and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can
justify the infringement of religious freedom. In the case at bar, the
Court found no compelling justification for the government to
deprive Muslim organizations, like herein petitioner, of their
religious right to classify a product as halal, even on the premise
that the health of Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by
assigning to OMA the exclusive power to issue halal certificates.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the
security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement
of religious freedom. If the government fails to show the seriousness
and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally
unacceptable. In a society with a democratic framework like ours,
the State must minimize its interference with the affairs of its
citizens and instead allow them to exercise reasonable freedom of
personal and religious activity. In the case at bar, we find no
compelling justification for the government to deprive Muslim
organizations, like herein petitioner, of their religious right to
classify a product as halal, even on the premise that the health of
Muslim Filipinos can be effectively protected by assigning to OMA
the exclusive power to issue halal certifications. The protection and
promotion of the Muslim Filipinos' right to health are already
provided for in existing laws and ministered to by government
agencies charged with ensuring that food products released in the
market are fit for human consumption, properly labeled and safe.
Unlike EO 46, these laws do not encroach on the religious freedom
of Muslims.
RE: Valenciano
Facts:
This controversy originated from a series of letters written by
Valenciano and addressed to the Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
reporting that the basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City had
been converted into a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with
Catholic religious icons and other instrument for religious activities.
He believe that such practice violated the constitutional provisions
on the separation of Church and State and the constitutional
prohibition against the appropriation of public money and property
for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or any other system
of religion. He further averred that the holding of masses at the
basement of Hall of Justice showed that it tended to favor the
Catholic litigants; that the rehearsals and other activities caused
great disturbance to the employees; and that court functions are
affected due to the masses that is being held from 12:00 to 1:15 in
the afternoon.
Issue:
Whether or not the holding of masses at the basement of the
Quezon City Hall of Justice violates the constitutional principle of
separation of Church and State as well as the constitutional
prohibition against appropriation of public money or property for
the benefit of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution
or system of religion.
Ruling:
The present controversy did not involve a national or local law in
conflict with the Free Exercise Clause. Valenciano was merely
questioning the propriety of holding religious masses at the
basement of the QC Hall of Justice.
By allowing the holding of masses, the Court could not be said to
have established Roman Catholicism as an official religion or to have
endorsed the same. It also allowed other religious denominations to
practice their religion within the courthouses.
Thus, the holding of religious rituals at the Halls of Justice does not
amount to a union of Church and State. While the Church and State
are separate, the latter still recognizes the inherent right of the
people to have some form of belief system. Such is enshrined in our
Constitution.
Besides, allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle
of separation of Church and State.
In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion,
the State adopts a policy of accommodation - a recognition of the
reality that some governmental measures may not be imposed on a
certain portion of the population for the reason that these measures
are contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that
the exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the
attempt of the State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an
unconstitutional encroachment.
There is in this case, merely an accommodation.
First, there is no law, ordinance or circular issued by any duly
constitutive authorities expressly mandating that judicial employees
attend the mass.
Second, when judiciary employees attend the masses to profess
their faith, it is at their own initiative and on their own free will.
Third, no government funds are being spent because the lighting
and airconditioning continue to be operational even if there are no
religious rituals being observed.
Fourth, the basement has neither been converted into a Roman
Catholic Chapel not has it been permanently appropriated for the
exclusive use of the faithful.
Fifth, the allowance of religious masses has not prejudiced other
religions.
Free Exercise of Religion
Victoriano vs. Elizalde
Facts:
Victoriano was an employee of the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. As
such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde Rope Workers’
Union which had a closed shop agreement with the Company that
membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of
employment for all its permanent employees.
Prior to its amendment, Section 4(a)(4) of Republic Act No. 875
allows the employer to require as a condition of employment
membership in a labor organization, if such organization is the
representative of the employees. However, the provision was later
amended by the enactment of Republic Act No. 3350, which reads:
… “but such agreement shall not cover members of any religious
sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor
organization”.
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its
members with any labor organization, Victoriano presented his
resignation to the Union. In turn, the Union asked the Company to
dismiss Victoriano from the service in view of the fact that he was
resigning from the Union as a member. This prompted Victoriano to
file an action to enjoin the Company and the Union from dismissing
him. The Union assails the constitutionality of RA No. 3350,
contending that it infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful
associations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
Issue:
Whether or not RA No. 3550 is unconstitutional for infringing on the
fundamental freedom to form associations.
Ruling:
“RA No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and
coverage of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to
any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with
any labor organization. What the exception provides, therefore, is
that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced
to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop
agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop
agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused
employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that
they are not members of the collective bargaining union. It is clear,
therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the
constitutional provision on freedom of association, upholds and
reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects
from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the
liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor
unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of
said religious sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can
do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to
sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join;
neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may
the employer or labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No.
3350, therefore, does not violate the constitutional provision on
freedom of association.”
Cantwell vs Connecticut
Facts:
Newton Cantwell and his sons, Jehovah's Witnesses, were
proselytizing a predominantly Catholic neighborhood in Connecticut.
They were travelling door-to-door and approaching people on the
street. Two pedestrians reacted angrily to an anti-Catholic message.
Cantwell and his sons were arrested and charged with: (1) violation
of a Connecticut statute requiring solicitors to obtain a certificate
before soliciting funds from the public, and (2) inciting a common-
law breach of the peace.
Issue:
Did the Cantwells’ convictions violate the First Amendment?
Ruling:
In a unanimous decision, the Court held the Cantwells’ actions were
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Writing for the
Court, Justice Owen Roberts reasoned that while general regulations
on solicitation were legitimate, restrictions based on religious
grounds were not. Because the statute allowed local officials to
determine which causes were religious and which ones were not, it
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court also held
that while the maintenance of public order was a valid state
interest, it could not be used to justify the suppression of "free
communication of views." The Cantwells' message, while offensive
to many, did not threaten "bodily harm" and was protected religious
speech.
US vs. Ballard
Facts:
Guy W. Ballard, his wife Edna W. Ballard, and their son Donald
Ballard (defendants) were indicted and convicted by the United
States government for using, and conspiring to use, the mails to
defraud. The indictment charged a scheme to defraud by organizing
and promoting the “I Am” religious movement through the mail. The
Ballards solicited funds and membership in the I Am movement by
making false claims about their supernatural abilities to heal
ailments and diseases. The indictment also alleged that the Ballards
knew these statements were false. At trial, the district court refused
to submit to the jury any questions regarding the truth or falsity of
the religious beliefs or doctrines of the Ballards. Rather, the jury was
instructed to convict the Ballards if it found they did not have a
sincere belief in their religious doctrines. The Ballards were
convicted, but the court of appeals reversed. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issue:
Is Respondent being unconstitutionally persecuted for his religious
beliefs?
Ruling
According to the majority, the First Amendment does not allow
courts to be the arbiters of the truth or falsity of someone’s religious
beliefs. As Justice William O. Douglas explained:
The religious views espoused by respondents might seem
incredible, if not preposterous, to most people. But if those
doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with
finding their truth or falsity, then the same can be done with
the religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers of fact
undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain. The
First Amendment does not select any one group or any one
type of religion for preferred treatment. It puts them all in
that position.
In reaching its decision, the majority emphasized that the Founding
Fathers were acutely aware of the “extreme views of religious
groups” and the “violence of disagreement among them.”
Accordingly, in drafting the First Amendment, they “envisaged the
widest possible toleration of conflicting views.”
American Bible Society vs City of Manila
Facts:
Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious,
missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the
Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in
November, 1898. The defendant appellee is a municipal corporation
with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila.
During the course of its ministry, plaintiff sold bibles and other
religious materials at a very minimal profit.
On May 29 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila
informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general
merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with
the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of
Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028
and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the
corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise
covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter
of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45 (Annex A).
Plaintiff now questions the imposition of such fees.
Issue:
Whether or not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid
(contention: it restrains the free exercise and enjoyment of the
religious profession and worship of appellant).
Ruling:
Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides
that:
It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be
considered unconstitutional, however inapplicable to said business,
trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the
City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is
powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society.

(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. The
provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, which
carries with it the right to disseminate religious information.

It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles
and other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit
higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that
appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said
"merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court believe that the
provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended,
cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its
free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship
as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.

With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not

find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right
granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious
practices.