Malaga vs Penachos
state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).
FACTS: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its
Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) caused the
publication in the November 25, 26 and 28, 1988 issues of the
Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a
Micro Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the
last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements was on
December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened
on December 12, 1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.
Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under the name of
BE Construction and Best Built Construction, respectively, submitted
their pre-qualification documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of
December 2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own PRE-C1
on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to
participate in the bidding as their documents were considered late.
On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the
Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC for their refusal without just
cause to accept them resulting to their non-inclusion in the list of
pre-qualified bidders. They sought to the resetting of the December
12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They also
asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the defendants
be directed not to award the project pending resolution of their
complaint.
On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining order
prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and award the
project. The defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on
the ground that the court is prohibited from issuing such order,
preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in
government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They
also contended that the preliminary injunction had become moot and
academic as it was served after the bidding had been awarded and
closed.
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and
denied the petition for preliminary injunction. It declared that the
building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an infrastructure
project of the government falling within the coverage of the subject
law.
ISSUE: Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality
subject to the provisions of PD 1818?
RULING: The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government
instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government,
not integrated within the department framework, vested with special
functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or
controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).
The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:
Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or operating
under a special charter, and vested by law with functions relating to
specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the
state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered
institution and is therefore covered by P.D. 1818.
There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government
instrumentality. First, it was created in pursuance of the integrated
fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program of the
government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second,
the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines shall also be the ex-
officio Treasurer of the state college with its accounts and expenses
to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized
representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National
Government are authorized to loan or transfer to it, upon request of
the president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment, or
supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared
without serious detriment to public service. Lastly, an additional
amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the
National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds
and maintenance of the state college would henceforth be included in
the General Appropriations Law.
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered
by the prohibition in the said decree as there are irregularities present
surrounding the transaction that justified the injunction issued as
regards to the bidding and the award of the project (citing the case of
Datiles vs. Sucaldito).
De la Llana vs Alba
FACTS:
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for
Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the
Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice
from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that
Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except
the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed
to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered
separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their
incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this character, it being
alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reorganization violate the security of tenure of
justices and judges as provided for under the Constitution.
RULING:
What is involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the
judges and justices from their services. What is important is the
validity of the abolition of their offices.
Well-settled is the rule that the abolition of an office does not
amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in
order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid
abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent
office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of
removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose
his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law,
the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board
In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled ―An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board‖ was enacted which gave broad powers
to the VRB to regulate and supervise the videogram industry. The
said law sought to minimize the economic effects of piracy. There
was a need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects
to the movie industry. The proliferation of videograms has
significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie
industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be
taxed. Section 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts
payable to the LGUs.
In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is
unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts,
is a rider and is not germane to the subject matter of the law.
2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an
administrative body, because the law allowed the VRB to deputize,
upon its discretion, other government agencies to assist the VRB in
enforcing the said PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1. The Constitutional requirement that ―every bill shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof‖ is
sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to
include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. In the
case at bar, the questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general object of
the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry through the
VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent
with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for
regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms
scattered throughout the PD.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB.
VRB is not being tasked to legislate. What was conferred to the VRB
was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in the execution,
enforcement, and implementation of the law. Besides, in the very
language of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such
assistance is for a ―fixed and limited period‖ with the deputized
agencies concerned being ―subject to the direction and control of the
[VRB].‖
US vs Ang Tang Ho
n July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed
and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the
Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act, under
extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG)
to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the
distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, in August 1919,
the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on
August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be
sold. On the other hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of
rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said
amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was
done on the 6thof August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged
for violation of the said EO. He was found guilty as charged and was
sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He
appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of
power to the Governor General.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor
General.
HELD: First of, Ang Tang Ho’s conviction must be reversed because
he committed the act prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he
cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime. Further, one cannot be
convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the
law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable
standard of guilt.
Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to
provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should
contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to
take the place of all others without the determination of the
insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise
of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without
which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be
complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative
branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment
of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so
that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but
which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the
ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
Ynot vs IAC
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of
carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A
which not only banned the movement of carabaos from
interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan
1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to
Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred
EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or
his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO
626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is
unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the
EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote general
welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates
due process. EO 626-A ctreated a presumption based on the
judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one area
to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would
ensue. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the
carabaos are being transferred before they can be confiscated. The
SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the
police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos
is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is
unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the
property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense
and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and
militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is,
finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken.
Marcos vs MAnglapuz
Facts: After Ferdinand Marcos was deposed from the presidency, he
and his family fled to Hawaii. Now in his deathbed, petitioners are
asking the court to order the respondents to issue their travel
documents and enjoin the implementation of the President’s decision
to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners contend under the
provision of the Bill of Rights that the President is without power to
impair their liberty of abode because only a court may do so ―within
the limits prescribed by law.‖ Nor, according to the petitioners, may
the President impair their right to travel because no law has
authorized her to do so.
Issue: Does the president have the power to bar the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines?
Ruling:The President has the obligation, under the Constitution to
protect the people, promote their welfare and advance national
interest.
This case calls for the exercise of the President’s power as protector
of the peace. The president is not only clothed with extraordinary
powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with day-to-day
problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic
tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.
The documented history of the efforts of the Marcoses and their
followers to destabilize the country bolsters the conclusion that their
return at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence
directed against the state and instigate more chaos.
The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from
taking preemptive actions against threats to its existence if, though
still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct
protection of the people is the essence of the duty of the
government.
The Supreme Court held that the President did not act arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion in determining the return of the
petitioners at the present time and under present circumstances poses
a serious threat to national interest and welfare prohibiting their
return to the Philippines. The petition is DISMISSED.
Carino vs CHR
On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila
did not attend work and decided to stage rallies in order to air
grievances. As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from
work for 90 days. The issue was then investigated, and on December
17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño ordered the dismissal from
the service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The
case was appealed to the Commission on Human Rights. In the
meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari
regarding the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the
case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a subpoena to
Secretary Cariño.
ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and
determine certain specific cases such as the alleged human rights
violation involving civil and political rights.
HELD: No. The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no
judicial power. It can only investigate all forms of human rights
violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and should
not try and decide on the merits and matters involved therein. The
CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with the trial.
LLDA vs CA
FACTS: The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was
created through Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia,
exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water
for any project or activity in or affecting the said region including
navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures,
fish corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The
municipalities in the Laguna Lake region interpreted its provisions to
mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the
exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal
waters.
ISSUE: Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and
its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishing privileges is
concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the
region?
HELD: LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter
of the LLDA prevails over the Local Government Code of 1991. The
said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law.
It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later
legislation which is a general law, cannot be construed to have
repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken as an exception
to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a
contrary conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of
police power for the purpose of protecting and developing the
Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code,
which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for
revenue purposes.
Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should
prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters
affecting Laguna de Bay.
Rizal Empire Insurance Corp vs NLRC
Facts: In August, 1977, herein private respondent Rogelio R. Coria
was hired by herein petitioner Rizal Empire Insurance Group as a
casual employee with a salary of P10.00 a day. On January 1, 1978, he
was made a regular employee, having been appointed as clerk-typist,
with a monthly salary of P300.00. Being a permanent employee, he
was furnished a copy of petitioner company's "General Information,
Office Behavior and Other Rules and Regulations." In the same year,
without change in his position-designation, he was transferred to the
Claims Department and his salary was increased to P450.00 a month.
In 1980, he was transferred to the Underwriting Department and his
salary was increased to P580.00 a month plus cost of living allowance,
until he was transferred to the Fire Department as filing clerk. In July,
1983, he was made an inspector of the Fire Division with a monthly
salary of P685.00 plus allowances and other benefits.
On October 15, 1983, private respondent Rogelio R. Coria was
dismissed from work, allegedly, on the grounds of tardiness and
unexcused absences. Accordingly, he filed a complaint with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE), and in a Decision
dated March 14, 1985 (Record, pp. 80-87), Labor Arbiter Teodorico
L. Ruiz reinstated him to his position with back wages. Petitioner
filed an appeal with the National labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) but, in a Resolution dated November 15, 1985 (Ibid, pp. 31-
32), the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the same had been
filed out of time. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing petitioner’s appeal on
a technicality.
Held: Rule VIII of the Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations
Commission on appeal, provides:
SECTION 1. (a) Appeal. — Decision or orders of a labor Arbiter
shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by
any or both of the parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt
of notice thereof.
SECTION 6. No extension of period. — No motion or request for
extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal shall be
entertained.
The record shows that the employer (petitioner herein) received a
copy of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on April 1, 1985. It filed a
Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum of Appeal on
April 11, 1985 and filed the Memorandum of Appeal on April 22,
1985. Pursuant to the "no extension policy" of the National Labor
Relations Commission, aforesaid motion for extension of time was
denied in its resolution dated November 15, 1985 and the appeal was
dismissed for having been filed out of time.
The Revised Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission are
clear and explicit and leave no room for interpretation. Moreover, it
is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative
regulations and policies enacted by administrative bodies to interpret
the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law,
and are entitled to great respect (Espanol v. Philippine Veterans
Administration, 137 SCRA 314 [1985]).
Under the above-quoted provisions of the Revised NLRC Rules, the
decision appealed from in this case has become final and executory
and can no longer be subject to appeal.
Even on the merits, the ruling of the Labor Arbiter appears to be
correct; the consistent promotions in rank and salary of the private
respondent indicate he must have been a highly efficient worker, who
should be retained despite occasional lapses in punctuality and
attendance. Perfection cannot after all be demanded.
WHEREFORE, this petition is DISMISSED.
Cruz vs Youngberg
FACTS:Petitioner Mauricio Cruz brought a petition before the Court
of First Instance of Manila for theissuance of a writ of mandatory
injunction against the respondent Director of the Bureau of Animal
Industry, Stanton Youngberg, requiring him to issue a permit for the
landing of tenlarge cattle imported by the petitioner and for the
slaughter thereof. Cruz attacked theconstitutionality of Act No. 3155,
which at present prohibits the importation of cattle fromforeign
countries into the Philippine Islands. He also asserted that the sole
purpose of theenactment was to prevent the introduction of cattle
diseases in the country. The respondent asserted that the petition did
not state facts sufficient to constitute a causeof action. The demurrer
was based on two reasons: (1) that if Act No. 3155 was
declaredunconstitutional and void, the petitioner would not be
entitled to the relief demandedbecause Act No. 3052 would
automatically become effective and would prohibit therespondent
from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act No. 3155 was
constitutionaland, therefore, valid. The CFI dismissed the complaint
because of petitioner’s failure to fileanother complaint. The petitioner
appealed to the Supreme Court. Youngberg contended that even if
Act No. 3155 be declared unconstitutional by the factalleged by the
petitioner in his complaint, still the petitioner can not be allowed to
importcattle from Australia for the reason that, while Act No. 3155
were declared unconstitutional,Act No. 3052 would automatically
become effective.
ISSUES:1.WON Act No. 3155 is unconstitutional2.WON the lower
court erred in not holding that the power given by Act No. 3155 to
theGovernor-General to suspend or not, at his discretion, the
prohibition provided in theact constitutes an unlawful delegation of
the legislative powers3.WON Act No. 3155 amended the Tariff Law
RULING: No. An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to
repeal former laws or parts of lawsby implication. The court will not
pass upon the constitutionality of statutes unless it isnecessary to do
so. Aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, Act 3155 is entirely
valid. The latter was passed by the Legislature to protect the cattle
industry of the countryand to prevent the introduction of cattle
diseases through importation of foreign cattle.It is now generally
recognized that the promotion of industries affecting the
publicwelfare and the development of the resources of the country
are objects within thescope of the police power. The Government of
the Philippine Islands has the right to theexercise of the sovereign
police power in the promotion of the general welfare and thepublic
interest. At the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there was
reasonablenecessity therefore and it cannot be said that the
Legislature exceeded its power inpassing the Act.
2. No. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to
make the law, whichnecessarily involves discretion as to what it shall
be, and conferring an authority ordiscretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. Thefirst cannot be
done; to the latter no valid objection can be made. There is no
unlawfuldelegation of legislative power in the case at bar.
Araneta vs Gatmaitan
Facts: The President issued E.O 22 - prohibiting the use of trawls in
San Miguel Bay, and the E.O 66 and 80 as amendments to EO 22, as
a response for the general clamor among the majority of people living
in the coastal towns of San Miguel Bay that the said resources of the
area are in danger of major depletion because of the effects of trawl
fishing. A group of Otter trawl operators filed a complaint for
injunction to restrain the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources from enforcing the said E.O. and to declare E.O 22 as null
and void.
Issue: W/N E.O 22, 60 and 80 were valid, for the issuance thereof
was not in the exercise of legislative powers unduly delegated to the
Pres.
Held:VALID! Congress provided under the Fisheries Act that a.) it is
unlawful to take or catch fry or fish eggs in the waters of the Phil and
b.) it authorizes Sec. of Agriculture and Nat. Resources to provide
regulations/ restrictions as may be deemed necessary. The Act was
complete in itself and leaves it to the Sec. to carry into effect its
legislative intent. The Pres. did nothing but show an anxious regard
for the welfare of the inhabitants and dispose of issues of gen.
concern w/c were in consonance and strict conformity with law.
Distinction bet:Delegation of Power to Legislate - involves
discretion of what law shall be
Execution of Law – authority or discretion as to its execution has to
be exercised under and in pursuance of law.
People vs Maceren
Facts:Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes,
Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged with having
violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.
It alleged that the five accused resorted to electro fishing in the
waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by using their own
motor banca, equipped with motor and electrocuting device locally
known as sensored with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip
or other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which
was attached to the dynamo direct and with the use of these devices
or equipments catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any
aquatic animals within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and prejudice
of the populace.
Sec. 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or
poisonous substance" in fishing.
Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an
obnoxious or poisonous substance in fishing with a fine of not more
than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand, and by
imprisonment for not less than six months or more than five years.
It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish
electro fishing. Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of
the Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative
Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224), prohibiting electro fishing in all
Philippine waters
On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,
upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of
Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro
fishing to fresh water fisheries (63 O.G. 9963).
Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters" found in
section 2, was changed by the amendatory order to read as follows:
"in fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes,
swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies of fresh water."
Issue: Whether or not Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing
Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1
Held: Yes. They exceeded their authority.
The rule-making power confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The
power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute
The Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing .As
electro fishing is not banned under that law. Hence, the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body
intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect
could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. Nowhere
in the said law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative
agents are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking
body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and
provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be
encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the
regulation should be germane to the defects and purposes of the law
and that it should conform to the standards that the law prescribes.
Bautista vs Juinio
FACTS: The constitutionality of Letter of Instruction (LOI) No.
869, a response to protracted oil crisis, banning the use of private
motor vehicles with H (heavy) and EH (extra heavy) plates on week-
ends and holidays, was assailed for being allegedly violative of the due
process and equal protection guarantees of the Constitution.
Petitioners also contends that Memorandum Circular No. 39 issued
by herein respondents imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the
vehicle and cancellation of license of owners of the above specified
vehicles found violating such LOI, is likewise unconstitutional, for
being violative of the doctrine of ―undue delegation of legislative
power.‖
Respondents denied the above allegations.
ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by
Memorandum Circular No. 39 is violative of certain constitutional
rights.
HELD: No, the disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate
response to a problem that presses urgently for solution, wherein its
reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus due process is not
ignored, much less infringed. The exercise of police power may cut
into the rights to liberty and property for the promotion of the
general welfare. Those adversely affected may invoke the equal
protection clause only if they can show a factual foundation for its
invalidity.
Moreover, since LOI No. 869 and MC No. 39 were adopted
pursuant to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code which
contains a specific provision as to penalties, the imposition of a fine
or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set
forth is valid with the exception of the impounding of a vehicle.
Maceda vs ERB
FACTS:Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict on August
1990, private respondents oil companies filed with the ERB their
respective applications on oil price increases. ERB then issued an
order granting a provisional increase of P1.42 per liter. Petitioner
Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition seeking to nullify said
increase.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decisions of the Energy Regulatory
Board should be subject to presidential review.
HELD:Pursuant to Section 8 of E.O. No. 172, while hearing is
indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering a
provisional increase subject to final disposition of whether or not to
make it permanent or to reduce or increase it further or to deny the
application. The provisional increase is akin to a temporary
restraining order, which are given ex-parte.
The Court further noted the Solicitor General’s comments that ―the
ERB is not averse to the idea of a presidential review of its decision,‖
except that there is no law at present authorizing the same. The
Court suggested that it will be under the scope of the legislative to
allow the presidential review of the decisions of the ERB since,
despite its being a quasi-judicial body, it is still ― an administrative
body under the Office of the President whose decisions should be
appealed to the President under the established principle of
exhaustion of administrative remedies,‖ especially on a matter as
transcendental as oil price increases which affect the lives of almost
all Filipinos.
Philippine Consumers Foundation vs DECS
Facts: The DECS, as recommended by the Task Force on Private
Higher Education and through respondent Secretary issued Dep
Order No. 37, a modification of a previous Department Order,
authorizing the 10% to 15% increase in school fees. Petitioner
opposed and alleged in a petition that said order was issued without
any legal basis arguing that authority of DECS to regulate school fees
does not always include the power to increase the same.
Sec. 57 (3) of BP Blg. 232 (The Education Act of 1982), vests the
DECS with the power to regulate the educational system; and Sec. 70
of the same act grants the DECS the power to issue rules which are
likewise necessary to discharge its functions and duties under the law.
The respondent Secretary maintains that the increase in tuition and
other school fees is urgent and necessary.
Issue: WON the fixing of school fees through department order by
DECS is a valid delegation of legislative power.
Held: Yes. Power granted to the educational department to regulate
the educational system includes the power to prescribe school fees.
In the absence of a statue stating otherwise, this power include the
power to prescribe school fees. No other government agency has
been vested with the authority to fix school fees and as such, the
power should be considered lodged with the DECS.
CIR vs CA
Tobacco. Fortune
A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed
to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. In
the same way that laws must have the benefit of public hearing, it is
generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must
be hearing.
It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is
merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further
than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than
what the law itself has already prescribed. When, upon the other
hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the
means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the
burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least
to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be
duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect
of law.
FACTS: Fortune Tobacco Corporation ("Fortune Tobacco") is
engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes. The
Philippine Patent Office issued to the corporation separate
certificates of trademarkregistration over "Champion," "Hope," and
"More" cigarettes. The initial position of the CIR was toclassify
'Champion,' 'Hope,' and 'More' as foreign brands since they were
listed in the World TobaccoDirectory as belonging to foreign
companies. However, Fortune Tobacco changed the names of
'Hope'to 'Hope Luxury ' and 'More' to 'Premium More,' thereby
removing the said brands from the foreignbrand category.RA No.
7654, was enacted and became effective on 03 July 1993. It amended
Section 142(c)(1) of theNIRC. About a month after the enactment
and two (2) days before the effectively of RA 7654,
RevenueMemorandum Circular No. 37-93 ("RMC 37-93")
Reclassification of Cigarettes Subject to Excise Tax, wasissued by the
BIR. Fortune Tobacco requested for a review, reconsideration and
recall of RMC 37-93. Therequest was denied on 29 July 1993. The
following day, or on 30 July 1993, the CIR assessed FortuneTobacco
for ad valorem tax deficiency amounting to P9, 598, 334. 00.On 03
August 1993, Fortune Tobacco filed a petition for review with the
CTA. The CTA upheld theposition of Fortune Tobacco and
adjudged RMC No. 37-93 as defective.ISSUE:Whether or not there is
a violation of the due process of law.RULING:A reading of RMC 37-
93, particularly considering the circumstances under which it has
been issued,convinces us that the circular cannot be viewed simply as
a corrective measure or merely as construingSection 142(c)(1) of the
NIRC, as amended, but has, in fact and most importantly, been made
in order toplace "Hope Luxury," "Premium More" and "Champion"
within the classification of locally manufacturedcigarettes bearing
foreign brands and to thereby have them covered by RA 7654.In so
doing, the BIR not simply interpreted the law; verily, it legislated
under its quasi-legislativeauthority. The due observance of the
requirements of notice, of hearing, and of publication should nothave
been then ignored. The Court is convinced that the hastily
promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen shortof a valid and effective
administrative issuance.
Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila vs BOT
Facts: Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a
domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are
grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs
within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible
to vehicular traffic. Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo
Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI, each being an operator
and grantee of such certificate of public convenience.
On 10 October 1977, Board of Transportation (BOT) issued
Memorandum Circular 77-42 which phases out old and dilapidated
taxis; refusing registration to taxi units within the National Capitol
Region having year models over 6 years old. Pursuant to the above
BOT circular, Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT)
issued Implementing Circular 52, dated 15 August 1980, instructing
the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of
BLT, all within the NCR, to implement said Circular, and formulating
a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for
registration as public conveyances. In accordance therewith, cabs of
model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of model
1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of model
1974, in 1981.
On 27 January 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT (Case
80-7553), seeking to nullify MC 77-42 or to stop its implementation;
to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years
of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which
were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are
roadworthy and fit for operation. On 16 February 1981, petitioners
filed before the BOT a ―Manifestation and Urgent Motion‖, praying
for an early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on 20
February 1981. On 28 November 1981, petitioners filed before the
same Board a ―Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or
Decide Main Petition‖ praying that the case be resolved or decided
not later than 10 December 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to
avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law for the
protection of their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-
out on 1 January 1982. Petitioners, through its President, allegedly
made personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the
records of the case could not be located. On 29 December 1981, the
present Petition was instituted.
The Supreme Court denied the writs prayed for and dismissed the
petition; without costs.
1. Rationale behind exercise of police power
The overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding
public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State,
in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to
promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general
welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort,
safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. The
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of
governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.
Us vs panlilio
Doctrine:
The orders, rules and regulations of an administrative officers or
body issued pursuant to a statute havethe force of law but are not
penal in nature and a violation of such orders is not a offense
punishable by law unless the statute expressly penalizes such
violation.
FACTS:In Feb. 1913, all of the carabaos belonging to accused,
Panlilio having been exposed to the dangerousand contagious disease
known as rinderpest, were, in accordance with an order of duly-
authorizedagent of the Director of Agriculture, duly quarantined in a
corral in the barrio of Masamat, Pampanga;that, on said place,
Panlilio, illegally and voluntarily and without being authorized so to
do, and whilethe quarantine against said carabaos was still in force,
permitted and ordered said carabaos to betaken from the corral in
which they were then quarantined and conducted from one place to
another;that by virtue of said orders of the accused, his servants and
agents took the said carabaos from thesaid corral and drove them
from one place to another for the purpose of working them.The
accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the
quarantining of animals sufferingfrom dangerous communicable or
contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40
withsubsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs of trial. The accused contendsthat the facts alleged in the
information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of
Act No. 1760
ISSUE:Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order
of the Bureau of Agriculture?
HELD:NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the
Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or madeunlawful, nor is there
provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 of
Act No.1760 provides that any person violating any of the provisions
of the Act shall, upon conviction, bepunished. However, the only
sections of the Act which prohibit acts and pronounce them as
unlawfulare Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of
them. A violation of the orders of theBureau of Agriculture, as
authorized by paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the
Act. Theorders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly
be said to have the force of law, arestatutes and particularly not penal
statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offenseunless
the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and
penalizes it. Nowhere inAct No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of
the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is suchviolation
punished in any way therein. However, the accused did violate Art.
581, par 2 of the PenalCode which punishes any person who violates
regulations or ordinances with reference to epidemicdisease among
animals.
Holy Spirit Homeowners vs Defensor
Facts :A number of presidential issuances prior to the passage of R.A.
No. 9207, authorized the creation anddevelopment of what is now
known as the National Government Center (NGC).On March 5,
1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No.
1826, reserving a parcelof land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City,
covering a little over 440 hectares as a national government site to
beknown as the NGC.On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon
Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the440
hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No.
1826 and authorizing instead thedisposition of the excluded portion
by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein.In view of the rapid
increase in population density in the portion excluded by
Proclamation No. 137 fromthe coverage of Proclamation No. 1826,
former President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on
September7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development of the
excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can
effectively become beneficiaries of the government’s socialized
housing program.On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. Petitioner Holy
SpiritHomeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners
association from the West Side of the NGC. It isrepresented by its
president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his
own personal capacity and onbehalf of the association. The instant
petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure,with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks toprevent
respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations
(IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207,otherwise known as the "National
Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of
2003."Issue :Whether or not in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A.
No. 9207, the Committee was not exercising judicial,quasi-judicial or
ministerial function and should be declared null and void for being
arbitrary, capricious andwhimsical.Held:Administrative agencies
possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial
oradministrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-
making power is the power to make rules andregulations which
results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the
granting statute and thedoctrine of non-delegability and separability
of powers.In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by an administrative agency, aparty need not
exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle,
however, applies only wherethe act of the administrative agency
concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and
notwhen the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-
legislative power.The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-
legislative power of the Committee expresslyauthorized by R.A. No.
9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR
issued by the Committeeis invalid on the ground that it is not
germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to
implement.Where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality
of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agencyin the
performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the same.Since the regular courts have
jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by
theCommittee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the
judicial course to assail its validity must follow thedoctrine of
hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals
and the Regional Trial Courts haveconcurrent jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
corpus andinjunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court
Ople vs Torres
Facts: Administrative Order No 308, otherwise known as ―Adoption
of a National Computerized Identification Reference System‖ was
issued by President Fidel Ramos on 12 December 1996. Senator Blas
Ople filed a petition to invalidate the said order for violating the right
to privacy. He contends that the order must be invalidated on two
constitutional grounds, (1) that it is a usurpation of the power to
legislate; and (2) that it intrudes the citizen’s right to privacy.
Issue: Whether or not Senator Ople has standing to maintain suit?
Decision: Petitioner, Senator Ople is a distinguished member of the
Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing
to bring suit raising the issue that the issue of Administrative Order
No 308 is a usurpation of legislative power. Ople’s concern that the
Executive branch not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of
Congress is understandable. The blurring demarcation line between
the power of legislature to make laws and the power of executive to
execute laws will disturb their delicate balance and cannot be allowed.
SSUE: DOES A.0 308 VIOLATE THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY?
SUPREME COURT:Yes. Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308
need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional
muster as an administrativelegislation because facially it violates the
right to privacy. A.O. 308 is sovague. The vagueness, the overbreadth
of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to
privacy in clear and presentdanger. There are no vital safeguards.A.O.
No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will
showthat it does not state whether encoding of data is limited to
biologicalinformation alone for identification purposes. In fact, the
SolicitorGeneral claims that the adoption of the Identification
ReferenceSystem will contribute to the "generation of population
data fordevelopment planning." 54 This is an admission that the
PopulationReference Number (PRN) will not be used solely for
identification butfor the generation of other data with remote relation
to the avowedpurposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness
of A.O. No. 308can give the government the roving authority to
store and retrieveinformation for a purpose other than the
identification of the individualthrough his PRN .The potential for
misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308cannot be
underplayed as the dissenters do. Pursuant to saidadministrative
order, an individual must present his PRN everytime hedeals with a
government agency to avail of basic services andsecurity. His
transactions with the government agency will necessarilybe recorded -
- whether it be in the computer or in the documentaryfile of the
agency. The individual's file may include his transactions forloan
availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and
liabilities,reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The
more frequentthe use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a
huge andformidable information base through the electronic linkage
of the files.The data may be gathered for gainful and useful
governmentpurposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of
personal informationconstitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a
temptation that may be toogreat for some of our authorities to
resist.We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be
limited to the name, address and other basic personal
informationabout the individual. Even that hospitable assumption
will not saveA.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for again said
order does nottell us in clear and categorical terms how these
information gatheredshall be handled. It does not provide who shall
control and access thedata, under what circumstances and for what
purpose. These factorsare essential to safeguard the privacy and
guaranty the integrity of theinformation. Well to note, the computer
linkage gives othergovernment agencies access to the information.
Yet, there are nocontrols to guard against leakage of information.
When the accesscode of the control programs of the particular
computer system isbroken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or
penalty, can make useof the data for whatever purpose, or worse,
manipulate the datastored within the system. It is plain and we hold
that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring thatpersonal information
which will be gathered about our people will onlybe processed for
unequivocally specified purposes. The lack of propersafeguards in
this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with theindividual's liberty
of abode and travel by enabling authorities to trackdown his
movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons toaccess
confidential information and circumvent the right against
selfincrimination; it may pave the way for "fishingexpeditions"
bygovernment authorities and evade the right against
unreasonablesearches and seizures. The possibilities of abuse and
misuse of the PRN,biometrics and computer technology are
accentuated when weconsider that the individual lacks control over
what can be read orplaced on his ID, much less verify the correctness
of the dataencoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of
Rights seeks toprevent.Excerpts from the concurring opinion of the
the possibilities of a law such as Administrative OrderNo. 308 in
making inroads into the private lives of the citizens, a virtualBig
Brother looking over our shoulders, that it must, without delay,
be"slain upon sight" before our society turns totalitarian with each of
us, amindless
No. 308 appears to be so extensively drawn thatcould, indeed, allow
unbridled options to become available to itimplementors beyond the
reasonable comfort of the citizens and of residents alike.RIGHT TO
PRIVACY RECOGNIZED UNDER THE
CONSTITUTIONHereunder are the provisions in the 1987
Constitution which recognize ourRight to Privacy :Section 3(1) of the
Bill of Rights:"Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall beinviolable except upon lawful order of the
court, or when public safety ororder requires otherwise as prescribed
by law."Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various
provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz: 34"Sec. 1. No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without dueprocess of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of thelaws. Sec. 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no searchwarrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
bedetermined personally by the judge after examination under oath
oraffirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
andparticularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
thingsto be seized.xxx xxx xxxSec. 6. The liberty of abode and of
changing the same within the limitsprescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of thecourt. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health, as may be provided bylaw.xxx xxx xxx.Sec. 8.
The right of the people, including those employed in the publicand
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposesnot contrary to law shall not be abridged.Sec. 17. No person
shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.Personal
Analysis:A.O. 308 was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court en banc forreasons above stated. It bears stressing that the
bulk of discussion in thecase focused more on the issue of
infringement of the right to privacy. Ascan be gleaned from A.O.
308, the provisions were so general that therewere no clear and vital
guidelines to safeguard the information stored inthe Identification
Card. Had President Fidel V. Ramos issued a morecomplete and
detailed guidelines providing for the metes and bounds of the ID
System, the decision could have been otherwise.Even the argument
of the respondents that rules and regulations wouldbe issued by the
committee later, the court still reject the same. The courtsaid.: The
rules and regulations to be drawn by the IACC cannot remedythis
fatal defect. Rules and regulations merely implement the policy of
thelaw or order. On its face, A.O. No. 308 gives the Inter-
AgencyCoordinating Committee (IACC) virtually unfettered
discretion todetermine the metes and bounds of the ID System.In
one press conference last month, Presidential Spokesperson
IgnacioBunye said that there is really no need to pass a law to push
through withthe plan of the National ID System. An executive
issuance by thePresident would suffice provided this time the said
order will now bedetailed, comprehensive and contains all the vital
safeguards. From hisstatement, it can be deduced therefrom that the
reservation andbacklash by the supreme court on the on the Ople
case (A.O 308) havebeen taken into consideration by Malacanang
PSDSA vs DE JESUS
Republic Act No. 9155, otherwise known as the ―Governance of
Basic Education Act 2001,‖ became a law on August 11, 2001, in
accordance with Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Under
Section 14 of the law, the DepEd Secretary is mandated to
―promulgate the implementing rules and regulations within ninety
(90) days after the approval of the Act, provided that the principle of
shared governance shall be fully implemented within two (2) years‖
after such approval.
On March 13, 2003, the PSDSA, the national organization of about
1,800 public school district supervisors of the DepEd, in behalf of its
officers and members, filed the instant petition for prohibition and
mandamus, alleging that:
I. THE ACT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION IN
REMOVING PETITIONERS’ ADMINISTRATIVE
SUPERVISION OVER ELEMENTARY SCHOOLS AND ITS
PRINCIPALS (SCHOOL HEADS) WITHIN HIS/HER
DISTRICT AND CONVERTING HIS/HER ADMINISTRATIVE
FUNCTION TO THAT OF PERFORMING STAFF FUNCTION
FOR THE DIVISION OFFICE PER SECTION 5.1 RULE V OF
THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF
REPUBLIC ACT 9155 (DEPED ORDER NO. 1, SERIES OF
2003) IS A GROSS VIOLATION OF REPUBLIC ACT 9155 –
THE GOVERNANCE OF BASIC EDUCATION ACT OF 2001.
II. THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATION OF
REPUBLIC ACT 9155 AS PROMULGATED UNDER DEPED
ORDER NO. 1, SERIES OF 2003 EXPANDED THE LAW AND
INCLUDED PROVISIONS WHICH ARE DIAMETRICALLY
OPPOSED TO THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF THE SUBJECT
LAW.
III. THE DOWNGRADING OF SALARY GRADE LEVEL OF
THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT SUPERVISOR OR THE
NEGLECT OR REFUSAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT TO UPGRADE THE SALARY GRADE
LEVEL OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS DISTRICT TO A
RESPECTABLE LEVEL OF SALARY GRADE HIGHER THAN
THAT OF THE PRINCIPALS – DESPITE CLEAR INTENTION
OF R.A. 9155 TO RETAIN THE POSITION OF PSDS IN THE
HIERARCHY OF ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGERS AND
OFFICERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION – IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL.
Issues:
1) Whether or not District Supervisor shall not exercise
administrative supervision over the Elementary School Principals
(ESPs) and Secondary School Principals (SSPs).
2) Whether or not Rule IV, Section 4.3; Rule V, Sections 5.1 and the
second paragraph of Section 5.2; and Rule VI, Section 6.2, paragraph
11 of Department of Education Order No. 1, Series of 2003 are
constitutional.
Rulings:
1) A plain reading of the law will show that the schools district
supervisors have no administrative supervision over the school heads;
their responsibility is limited to those enumerated in Section 7(D) of
R.A. No. 9155, to wit:
(1) Providing professional and instructional advice and support to the
school heads and teachers/facilitators of schools and learning centers
in the district or cluster thereof;
(2) Curricula supervision; and
(3) Performing such other functions as may be assigned by proper
authorities.
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention
of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This
rule is expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to
others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would
not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention
been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those
expressly mentioned.
2) The court reviewed the IRR and found that Section 4.3 of Rule IV,
and Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of Rule V are valid. The provisions merely
reiterate and implement the related provisions of R.A. No. 9155.
Under the law, a division superintendent has the authority and
responsibility to hire, place, and evaluate all division supervisors and
district supervisors as well as all employees in the division, both
teaching and non-teaching personnel, including school heads. A
school head is a person responsible for the administrative and
instructional supervision of the schools or cluster of schools. The
division superintendent, on the other hand, supervises the operation
of all public and private elementary, secondary, and integrated
schools and learning centers.
Syquia vs Board of Power
FACTS:
Ruiz, Enriquez and Moses filed 3 separate complaints with Board of
Power and Waterworks charging Syquia as administrator of the South
Syquia Apartments with the offense of selling electricity without
permit or franchise and alleging that Syquia billed them for their
electricity consumption in excess of the Meralco rates.
In her answer, Syquia questioned the jurisdiction of the Board, saying
that she is not engaged in the sale of electric power but merely passes
to the apartment tenants as the end-users their legitimate electric
current bills in accordance with their lease contracts.
ISSUE:
o Whether or not the Board has jurisdiction
HELD:
Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and adjudicating the complaints
filed by respondents against petitioner.
Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's
contractual relations with respondents-complainants as her tenants,
since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of
electricity without permit or franchise.
Respondents' complaints against being charged he additional cost of
electricity for common facilities used by the tenants (in addition to
those registered in their respective apartment meters) give rise to a
question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under
the applicable provisions of the Civil Code (not the Public Service
Act) and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no
jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction.
Respondent board in resolving the complaints against petitioner and
requiring her to absorb the additional rising costs of electricity
consumed for the common areas and elevator service even at a
resultant loss of P15,000.00 a year arrogated the judicial function. Its
orders were beyond its jurisdiction and must be set aside as null and
void.
Globe Wireless vs Public Service Commission
Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is
the rule that the jurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies
are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from
those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order
without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective.
A message addressed to Maria Diaz, Monte Esquina 30, Madrid, Spain, filed by private
respondent Antonio B.Arnaiz with the telegraph office of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Dumaguete City was transmitted tothe Bureau of
Telecommunications in Manila. It was forwarded to petitioner Globe Wireless Ltd.
fortransmission to Madrid. Petitioner sent the message to the American Cable and Radio
Corporation in New York, which, in turn, transmitted the same to
the Empresa Nacional de Telecommunicaciones in Madrid. Thelatter,
however, mislaid said message, resulting in its non-delivery to the addressee.
Arnaiz complained to the PSC and Globe was fined 200k.
"Sec. 5.The Public Service Commission
is hereby given jurisdiction over the
g r a n t e e o n l y w i t h r e s p e c t to the rates which the grantee may charge
the public subject to international commitments made or adheredto by the Republic of the
Philippines." (Emphasis supplied.) The act complained of consisted in
petitioner having allegedly failed to deliver the telegraphic message
of private respondent to the addressee in Madrid, Spain. Obviously, such imputed
negligence had nothingwhatsoever to do with the subject matter of the very limited
jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner.
Petitioner operated under a legistlative franchise and not a CPC.
Philippine Association of lawyers vs Agrava
FACTS:
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing
that he had scheduled an examination for the purpose of determining
who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the
Philippines Patent Office. According to the circular, members of the
Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific
and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. The
petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examination
sand is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines and who is in good standing is duly qualified to practice
before the Philippines Patent Office and that the respondent
Director’s holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his
jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.The respondent, in reply,
maintains the prosecution of patent cases ― does not involve entirely
or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific
and technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual practice so
as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the
examination can practice before the Patent office. Furthermore, he
stressed that for the long time he is holding tests, this is the first time
that his right has been questioned formally.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the
preparation and the prosecution of patent application, etc.,
constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such
appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants,
oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their
applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement
of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the
patent Office involves the interpretation and application of other
laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be
established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation
in court but also embraces all other matters connected with the law
and any work involving the determination by the legal mind of the
legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides
that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order
or decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the
Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific
knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not
to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists,
engineers or technical men, which is not the case.
Guevarra vs Comelec
FACTS:
Guevara was ordered by the COMELEC to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt for having published in the
newspaper an article which tended to interfere with and influence the
COMELEC awarding the contracts for the manufacture and supply
of ballot boxes; and which article likewise tended to degrade, bring
into disrepute, and undermine the exclusive constitutional function
of this Commission and its Chairman
Petitioner, filed a motion to quash on the following ground that the
Commission has no jurisdiction to punish as contempt the
publication of the alleged contemptuous article, as neither in the
Constitution nor in statutes is the Commission granted a power to so
punish the same.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC has the power and jurisdiction to
conduct contempt proceedings against Guevara in connection with
the publication of an article.
RULING:
Although the negotiation conducted by the Commission has resulted
in controversy between several dealers, that however merely refers to
a ministerial duty which the Commission has performed in its
administrative capacity. It only discharged a ministerial duty; it did
not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not
exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law,
for such power is inherently judicial in nature. As this Court has aptly
said: "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its
existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and
mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the administration of
justice". We are therefore persuaded to conclude that the
Commission on Elections has no power nor authority to submit
petitioner to contempt proceedings if its purpose is to discipline him
because of the publication of the article mentioned in the charge
under consideration.
Ang Tibay vs CIR
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a leather company
which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of
leather, Toribio caused the lay off of a number of his employees.
However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU) questioned the
validity of said lay off as it averred that the said employees laid off
were members of NLU while no members of the rival labor union
(National Worker’s Brotherhood) were laid off. NLU claims that
NWB is a company dominated union and Toribio was merely busting
NLU.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) where
Toribio and NWB won. Eventually, NLU went to the Supreme Court
invoking its right for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU. The Solicitor
General, arguing for the CIR, filed a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Union, Inc. is entitled to
a new trial.
HELD: Yes. The records show that the newly discovered evidence
or documents obtained by NLU, which they attached to their petition
with the SC, were evidence so inaccessible to them at the time of the
trial that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court
of Industrial Relations. Further, the attached documents and exhibits
are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission
would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the
judgment rendered (said newly obtained records include books of
business/inventory accounts by Ang Tibay which were not
previously accessible but already existing).
The SC also outlined that administrative bodies, like the CIR,
although not strictly bound by the Rules of Court must also make
sure that they comply to the requirements of due process. For
administrative bodies, due process can be complied with by
observing the following:
(1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his
case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision
with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly
attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion but the evidence must be ―substantial.‖ Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected.
(6) The administrative body or any of its judges, therefore, must
act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts
of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate
in arriving at a decision.
(7) The administrative body should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for
the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable
from the authority conferred upon it.
Secretary of Justice vs Lantion
Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging from tax
evasion to wire tapping to conspiracy to defraud the USA. Jimenez
was then wanted in the US. The US government, pursuant to the RP-
US extradition treaty requested to have Jimenez be extradited there.
Jimenez requested for a copy of the complaint against him as well as
the extradition request by the USA. The DOJ sec refused to provide
him copy thereof advising that it is still premature to give him so and
that it is not a preliminary investigation hence he is not entitled to
receive such copies. Jimenez sued the DOJ Sec and the lower court
ruled in favor of Jimenez.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jimenez is deprived of due process.
HELD: The SC affirmed the ruling of the lower court. The case
against Jimenez refer to an impending threat of deprivation of one’s
property or property right. No less is this true, but even more so in
the case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of
liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected
rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over
property, for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the
time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Abejo vs Dela Cruz
Abejo sold shares of stock of PocketBell to Telectronics. Telectronics
instructed the transfer of the stockes in their name in the corporate
books. The Bragas refused to do so alleging that they have pre-
emptive rights to the shares Abejo sold to Telectronics. Abejo sought
a complaint with the SEC. The Bragas filed for rescission of the sale
at the CFI
Issue: Whethere or Not SEC has primary jurisdiction
Held: SEC has primary jurisdiction. It is expressly provided for in its
charter.
The Court held that under the "sense-making and expeditious
doctrine of primary jurisdiction ..the courts cannot or will not
determine a controversy involving a question which is within the
jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered."|||
Bernardo vs Abalos
FACTS: Respondent Benjamin Abalos, Sr. was the mayor of
Mandaluyong City and his son,Benjamin Abalos Jr. was a candidate for city
mayor of the same city for the May 1998 elections.Petitioners herein interposed that
respondents conducted an all-expense-free affair at a resort inQuezon Province for
the Mandaluyong City public school teachers, registered voters of
the saidcity and who are members of the Board of
Election In specto rs the rein. T h e said affair wasalleged to
be staged as a political campaign for Abalos Jr., where his political
jingle was playedall throughout and his shirts being worn by some
participants. Moreover, Abalos Sr. also
madea n o f f e r a n d a p r o m i s e t h e n t o i n c r e a s e t h e
a l l o w a n c e s o f t h e t e a c h e r s . I n t h i s r e g a r d , petitio
ners filed a criminal complaint with the COMELEC against Abalos
Sr. and Abalos Jr. for vote-
buying, further alleging that the y consp ire d with thei r c
o-respondents in vio lating theOmnibus Election Code. Pursuant to the
recommendation of the Director of the Law Departmentof the COMELEC, the
COMELEC en banc dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence.Hence, this
petition for certiorari.ISSUE: Whether the petition before the
Supreme Court must be given due course without thepetitioners first
submitting a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC.HELD: NO.
The Court ruled that a petit ion for certio rari c an on ly
be resorted to if there is noappeal, or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the instantcase, it
was said that filing of the motion for reconsideration before the
COMELEC is the mostexpeditious and inexpensive recourse that
petitioners can avail of as it was intended to give theCOMELEC
an opp ortunity to co rrect the error imputed to it. As
the petitione rs then did notexhaust all the remedies available
to them at the COMELEC level, it was held that their instantpetition
is certainly premature. Significantly, they have not also raised any
plausible reason for their direct recourse to the Supreme Court. As such, the instant
petition was ruled to fail
Industrial Enterprises vs CA
Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by
the Bureau of Energy Development (BED), for the exploration of
two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. IEI asked the Ministry of Energy
for another to contract for the additional three coal blocks.
· IEI was advised that there is another coal operator, Marinduque
Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI and MMIC signed a
 Memorandum of Agreement on which IEI will assign all its rights
and interests to MMIC.
· IEI filed for rescission of the memorandum plus damages against the
MMIC and the Ministry of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the
RTC of Makati, alleging that MMIC started operating in the coal
blocks prior to finalization of the memorandum. IEI prayed for that
the rights for the operation be granted back.
· Philippine National Bank (PNB) pleaded as co-defendant because
they have mortgages in favor of MMIC. It was dismissed
· Oddly enough, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus is President of both IEI and
MMIC.
· RTC ordered the rescission of the memorandum and for the
reinstatement of the contract in favor of IEI.
· CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, stating that RTC has no
jurisdiction over the matter.
Issue: W/ON RTC has jurisdiction?
Held: No. While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what
appears to be an ordinary civil contract cognizable by a civil court,
the fact is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to be
rescinded is derived from a coal-operating contract and is inextricably
tied up with the right to develop coal-bearing lands and the
determination of whether or not the reversion of the coal operating
contract over the subject coal blocks to IEI would be in line with the
integrated national program for coal-development and with the
objective of rationalizing the country's over-all coal-supply-demand
balance, IEI's cause of action was not merely the rescission of a
contract but the reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal
blocks. Thus it was that in its Decision ordering the rescission of the
Agreement, the Trial Court, inter alia, declared the continued efficacy
of the coal-operating contract in IEI's favor and directed the BED to
give due course to IEI's application for three (3) IEI more coal
blocks. These are matters properly falling within the domain of the
BED.
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that
demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may
occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a
particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial
in character. However, if the case is such that its determination
requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper
administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions
of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an
administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the
courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a
court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a
claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which,
under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body, in such case the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view"
Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this
case since the question of what coal areas should be exploited and
developed and which entity should be granted coal operating
contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the
BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized
expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the
competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the
exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of mineral
resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial
determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even when
apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the
primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency.
GSIS V. CIVIL SERVICE (1991)
Salazar was an employee of GSIS. On 1986, she was terminated by
the newly appointed President and GM for the reason that her
position was coterminous being a Confidential Executive Assistant.
Salazar filed a motion for reconsideration at GSIS board of trustees
but was denied. Thereafter she filed a petition for reconsideration at
the Review Committee. The Review Committee referred her to the
the Merit System Promotion Board and the CSC.
The CSC ruled in favour of her and directed her reinstatement. GSIS
filed a motion for reconsideration.
Meanwhile, the Merit Board affirmed her termination. Salazar filed a
motion for reconsideration and alleged that the CSC has already
resolved her petition. In view of this, the Board se aside its Order.
GSIS filed an MR with the Board. The Board dismissed the MR
saying that CSC is a higher administrative appellate body than it.
GSIS appealed to the CSC but was denied.
Issue: Which body has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of
government officers in personnel matters?
Held: When the law bestows upon a government body the
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to
be presumed that such jurisdiction is exclusive unless it be proved
that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in
which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the
matter. Presidential Decree No. 1409 clearly provides that the Merit
Systems Board shall take cognizance of appeals from parties
aggrieved by decisions of appointing officers involving personnel
action. The Commission therefore cannot take original cognizance of
the cases specified under Section 5 of P.D. 1409.
In the case at bar, We note that the appeal of Salazar was endorsed
by the Review Committee created under Executive Order No. 17 to
both the Merit Systems Board and the Civil Service Commission. In
the absence of a decision from the Merit Systems Board, the
Commission cannot legally assume jurisdiction over the appeal.
Hence, its decision (Resolution No. 87230) in favor of Salazar dated
July 22, 1987 and all subsequent resolutions of the Commission in
this case are void. Likewise, the Order of the Board dated June 30,
1988, setting aside its previous order upholding the termination of
Salazar in deference to the Commission's final appellate jurisdiction
over the matter, is null and void. Jurisdiction is vested by law and is
not lost nor be legally transferred by voluntary surrender in favor of a
body not vested by law with such jurisdiction.|||
Paat vs CA
FACTS
The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was
seized by the DENR personnel while on its way to Bulacan because
the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest
product found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan,
CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and required the
owner to explain. Private respondents failed to submit required
explanation. The DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio
Baggayan sustained Layugan’s action for confiscation and ordered the
forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents brought the case to the
DENR Secretary. Pending appeal, private respondents filed a
replevin case before the RTC against petitioner Layugan and
Baggayan. RTC granted the same. Petitioners moved to dismiss the
case contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of
action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial
court denied their motion. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari. Petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally
entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under
administrative seizure proceedings.
ISSUE
Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of
the doctrine.
HELD
The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently
held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the
court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the
means of administrative processed afforded him. Hence, if a remedy
within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving
the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a
matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be
exhausted first before court’s judicial power can be sought. The
premature invocation of court’ intervention is fatal to one’s cause of
action.
The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon
by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial
settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is violation
of due process, (2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,
(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppels on the part
of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable
injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts
as an alter ego of the President bears the implied and assumed
approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would
amount to nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a
private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not
provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the
petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for
administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections 68-A of
OD 705, as amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of cause
of action in view of the private respondents’ failure to exhaust
administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action
by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and
consequently issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.
Valmonte vs Belmonte
Facts:Ricardo Valmonte wrote Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 4 June
1986, requesting to be "furnished with the list of names of
theopposition members of (the) BatasangPambansa who were able to
secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty (sic)of Mrs.Imelda
Marcos" and also to "be furnished with the certified true copies of
the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses inconnection
herewith shall be borne by" Valmonte, et. al. Due to serious legal
implications, President & General Manager FelicianoBelmonte, Jr.
referred the letter to the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS,
Meynardo A. Tiro. Tiro replied that it is his opinion"that a
confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who
borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIShas a duty
to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would
not be proper for the GSIS to breach thisconfidentiality unless so
ordered by the courts." On 20 June 1986, apparently not having yet
received the reply of the GovernmentService and Insurance System
(GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, Valmonte wrote Belmonte another
letter, saying that for failure toreceive a reply "(W)e are
now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary
within the premises to pursue our
desiredobjective in pursuance of public interest." On 26 June 1986, R
icardo Valmonte,Oswaldo Carbonell, Doy Del Castillo, Rolando Bart
olome, LeoObligar, Jun Gutierrez, Reynaldo Bagatsing, Jun "Ninoy"
Alba,Percy Lapid, Rommel Corro, and Rolando Fadul filed a special
civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke
theirright to information and pray that Belmonte be directed: (a) to
furnish Valmonte, et. al. the list of the names of the
BatasangPambansa membersbelonging to the UNIDO and PDP
Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the
February7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then
First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or (b) to furnish petitioners with
certifiedtrue copies of the documents evidencing their respective
loans; and/or (c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for
thesubject information.Issue:Whether Valmonte, et. al. are entitled as
citizens and taxpayers to inquire upon GSIS records on behest loans
given by the formerFirst Lady Imelda Marcos toBatasang Pambansa
members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban
politicalparties.Held:The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the
government and its employees and the administrator of various
insurance programsfor the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds
assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46of PD
1146, asamended (the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
1977),provide for annual appropriations to pay the
contributions,premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS
by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations which
theRepublic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay.
Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage
itsresources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the
pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the
reasonsthat prompted the revision of the old GSIS law(CA 186, as a
mended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarialsolve
ncy of the funds administered by the Systems [Second Whereas
Clause, PD1146.] Consequently, as Feliciano Belmontehimself
admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" It is
therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure thatthese
funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing
the benefits that accrue to the insured governmentemployees.
Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct
Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriatedfunds for the GSIS
and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the
GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degreeof fidelity and that
all its transactions were above board. In sum, the public nature of
the loanable funds of the GSIS and the publicoffice held by the
alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of
public interest and concern. Still, Belmontemaintains that a
confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers.
It is argued that a policy of confidentialityrestricts the indiscriminate
dissemination of information. Yet, Belmonte has failed to cite any
law granting the GSIS the privilegeof confidentiality as regards the
documents subject of the present petition. His position is apparently
based merely onconsiderations of policy. The judiciary does not settle
policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not
what thelaw should be. Under our system of government, policy
issues are within the domain of the political branches of the
government,and of the people themselves as the repository of all
State power
Mangubat vs OSmena
Tabao vs Lilagan
A water craft registered under the name M/L Hadija, from Bongao,
Tawi-tawi, was dockedat the port area of Tacloban C ity with
a load of a round 100 ton s of ta nbark. Due to
previou si r r e g u l a r a n d i l l e g a l s h i p m e n t s o f t a n b a
rk from Bongao, agents
o f t h e N a t i o n a l B u r e a u o f Investigation in Region 8
decided to verify the shipment’s accompanying documents as the
M/LHadija was unloadin g its ca rgo to its c onsignee, a
certain Ro bert Hernandez. The NBI agentsfound
the documents irregu la r and inc omplete, and
consequently they ordered the unloading of the cargo
stopped. The tanb ark, the boat M/L Hadija, and three
cargo truc ks were seized andimpounded.a criminal
compla int for vio lation of Section 68 (n ow Section 78)
of P.D. No. 705,
[1]
theForestry Reform Code of the Philippines (as amended), against
the captain and crew of the M/LHadija, Robert Hern andez
and some DENR perso nnel - Ba utista was a fo reste r
while
Dalimot w a s a C o m m u n i t y E n v i r o n m e n t a n d N a t u
ral Resources Officer (CENRO) DENR office i
n Tacloban City. Bautista and Dalimot were, thus, also charged with
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act,complain ant directed the seizure by
the DENR of the M/L Hadija, its cargo, a nd the
threet r u c k s p e n d i n g p r e l i m i n a r y i n v e s t i g a t i o n o
f the case.
D E N R t h u s t o o k p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e aforesaid items
with notice to the consignee Robert Hernandez and the NBI
Regional Director.Hernandez filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Leyte a case for replevin to recover the itemsseized by the
DENR. Herein respondent Judge Frisco T. Lilagan issued a writ
of replevin anddirected respondent Sheriff IV Leonardo V. Aguilar to
take possession of the items seized by theDENR and to deliver
them to Hernandez after the expiration of five days.
[4]
Respondent sheriff served a copy of the writ to the Philippine Coast
Guard station in Tacloban CityComplainant avers that replevin is not
available where the properties sought to be recoveredare involved
in criminal proceedings for illegal logging. He argues that respondent
judge shouldhave known of the ex isting jurisprudence o n
this issue, part icula rly since the y are sub ject tomandatory
judicial notice per Section 1, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of
Court.ISSUE: w/n civil courts have jurisdiction over this
case.H E L D : R e s p o n d e n t j u d g e ’ s a c t o f t a k i n g c o
g n i z a n c e o f t h e s u b j e c t r e p l e v i n s u i t c l e a r l y dem
onstrates ignorance of the law. He has fallen short of the standard set
forth in Canon 1, Rule1 . 0 1 o f t h e C o d e o f J u d i c i a l
Conduct, that a judge must be the embodiment
o f c o m p e t e n c e , integrity, and independence. To measure up
to this standard, judges are expected to keep abreastof all laws
and prevailing jurisprudence.
[20]
Judges are duty bound to have more than just
a cursory acquaintance with laws and ju risprudence.
Failu re to follow basic le gal c o mmandsconstitutes gross
ignorance of the law from which no one may be excused, not even a
judge.
[21]
Under Sectio n 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the
DENR secretary or his autho riz ed representatives may order
the confiscation of forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed,
or possessed or abandoned, including the conveyances used in the
commission of the offense
Arrow Transportation vs BOT
Petitioner Arrow and private respondent Sultan are both domestic
corporations. Petitioner is a holder of a Certificate of Public
Convenience to operate a public utility bus. Private respondent
applied for the issuance of a CPC to operate a similar service.
Without the required publication, public respondent Board granted a
provisional permit to operate. Petitioner moved for reconsideration
and cancellation of the provisional permit. Before resolution of the
motion, petitioner filed for herein petition arguing that there must be
publication before a provisional permit can be issued, with reference
made to PD 101, which authorized the Board to grant provisional
permits when warranted.
ISSUE
Whether or not the issuance of the provisional permit was
legal.
HELD
The Court held in the affirmative. For a provisional permit to
operate a public utility, an ex parte hearing would suffice. The decisive
consideration is the existence of public need. That was shown in this
case, respondent Board, on the basis of demonstrable data, being
satisfied of the pressing necessity for the grant of the provisional
permit sought.
KBMPBM vs Dominguez
Petitioners questopn the validity of the order of then Secretary of
Agriculture Hon. Carlos G. Dominguez which ordered: (1) the take-
over by the Department of Agriculture of the management of the
petitioner Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod Ng Mga Magtitinda ng
Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntilupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) pursuant
to the Department’s regulatory and supervisory powers under Section
8 of P.D. No. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order
No. 13, (2) the creation of a Management Committee which shall
assume the management of KBMBPM upon receipt of the order, (3)
the disbandment of the Board of Directors, and (4) the turn over of
all assets, properties and records of the KBMBPM the Management
Committee.
The exordium of said Order unerringly indicates that its
basis is the alleged petition of the general membership of the
KBMBPM requesting the Department for assistance in the removal
of the members of the Board of Directors who were not elected by
the general membership‖ of the cooperative and that the ongoing
financial and management audit of the Department of Agriculture
auditors shows that the management of the KBMBPM is not
operating that cooperative in accordance with P.D. 175, LOI 23, the
Circulars issued by DA/BACOD and the provisions and by-laws of
KBMBPM. It is also professed therein that the Order was issued by
the Department ―in the exercise of its regulatory and supervisory
powers under Section 8 of P.D. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of
Executive Order No. 113.
Issue:
whether or not the Order issued by the Secretary of
Agriculture is illegal
Held:
Regulation 34 of Letter of Implementation No. 23
(implementing P.D. No. 175) provides the procedure for the removal
of directors or officers of cooperatives, thus:
An elected officer, director or committee member may be removed
by a vote of majority of the members entitled to vote at an annual or
special general assembly. The person involved shall have an
opportunity to be heard.
 A substantially identical provision, found in Section 17,
Article III of the KBMBPM’s by-laws, reads:
Sec. 17. Removal of Directors and Committee Members. — Any elected
director or committee member may be removed from office for
cause by a majority vote of the members in good standing present at
the annual or special general assembly called for the purpose after
having been given the opportunity to be heard at the assembly.
Under the same article are found the requirements for the
holding of both the annual general assembly and a special general
assembly.
Indubitably then, there is an established procedure for the
removal of directors and officers of cooperatives. It is likewise
manifest that the right to due process is respected by the express
provision on the opportunity to be heard. But even without said
provision, petitioners cannot be deprived of that right.
The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent
Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto himself the power of the
members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the
petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under
Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 which grants him authority to supervise
and regulate all cooperatives. This section does not give him that
right.
An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly
granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise
thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond
what may to necessary for their just and reasonable execution.
Supervision and control include only the authority to: (a) act
directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or
regulation to a subordinate; (b) direct the performance of duty;
restrain the commission of acts; (c) review, approve, reverse or
modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; (d)
determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs;
and (e) prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs.
Specifically, administrative supervision is limited to the
authority of the department or its equivalent to: (1) generally
oversee the operations of such agencies and insure that they are
managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without
interference with day-to-day activities; (2) require the
submission of reports and cause the conduct of management
audit, performance evaluation and inspection to determine
compliance with policies, standards and guidelines of the
department; (3) take such action as may be necessary for the
proper performance of official functions, including rectification
of violations, abuses and other forms of mal-administration; (4)
review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but
may not increase or add to them.
The power to summarily disband the board of directors
may not be inferred from any of the foregoing as both P.D. No. 175
and the by-laws of the KBMBPM explicitly mandate the manner by
which directors and officers are to be removed. The Secretary should
have known better than to disregard these procedures and rely on a
mere petition by the general membership of the KBMBPM and an
on-going audit by Department of Agriculture auditors in exercising a
power which he does not have, expressly or impliedly. We cannot
concede to the proposition of the Office of the Solicitor General that
the Secretary’s power under paragraph (d), Section 8 of P.D. No. 175
above quoted to suspend the operation or cancel the registration of
any cooperative includes the ―milder authority of suspending officers
and calling for the election of new officers.‖ Firstly, neither
suspension nor cancellation includes the take-over and ouster of
incumbent directors and officers, otherwise the law itself would have
expressly so stated. Secondly, even granting that the law intended
such as postulated, there is the requirement of a hearing. None was
conducted.
NDC vs Hervila
Hervilla claims to be the rightful owner of a land in Polomolok
Cotabato being occupied by Dole Phils (NDC). He filed an ejectment
suit at the courts. While the case is pending in court, NDC was able
to get patents in the lots occupied, with the Bureau of Lands.
Issue: "May the Court in deciding a case involving recovery of
possession declare null and void title issued by an administrative body
or office during the pendency of such case? Specifically, is the Bureau
of Lands precluded, on the ground that the matter is subjudice, from
issuing a free patent during the pendency of a case in court for
recovery of possession?"|||
Held: he questions are answered in the negative. It is now well settled
that the administration and disposition of public lands are committed
by law to the Director of Lands primarily, and, ultimately, to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. 8 The jurisdiction of
the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the
respective rights of rival claimants to public lands 9 or to cases which
involve disposition and alienation of public lands. 10 The jurisdiction
of courts in possessory actions involving public lands is limited to the
determination of who has the actual, physical possession or
occupation of the land in question (in forcible entry cases, before
municipal courts) or, the better right of possession (in accion
publiciana in cases before Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial
Courts) Moreover, records do not show that private respondent
Wilfredo Hervilla ever filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the Director of Lands issuing free patent over the lands in
dispute in favor of petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. Neither did he
appeal said decision to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, nor did he appeal to the office of the President of the
Philippines. In short, Hervilla failed to exhaust administrative
remedies, a flaw which, to our mind, is fatal to a court review. The
decision of the Director of Lands has now become final. The Courts
may no longer interfere with such decision|||
Atlas vs Factoran
On February 9, 1972, Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development
Corporation registered the location of its "Master VII Fr." mining
claim with the Mining Recorder of Toledo City. On September 10,
1973, private respondent Asterio Buqueron registered the
declarations of location of his "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr."
mining claims with the same Mining Recorder. On October 15, 1973,
Atlas registered the declarations of location of its "Carmen I Fr." to
"Carmen V. Fr." with the same Mining Recorder. cdrep
Buqueron's "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." were surveyed and the
survey plans thereof were duly approved by the Director of Mines
and Geo Sciences. Notice of Buqueron's lease application was
published in the February 22 and 28, 1977 issues of the Evening
Post. cdll
During the said period of publication, petitioner filed an adverse
claim against private respondent's mining claims on the ground that
they allegedly overlapped its own mining claims.
||| The Director of Mines ruled in favour of Buqueron. Atlas
appealed to the Minister of Natural Resources. The Minister rendered
decision in Atlas’s favor. On Buqueron’s appeal to the Deputy
Executive Secretary, the Minister of Natural Resources was reversed
and the order of the Director of Mines was reinstated.
 Issue: (1) Whether or not private
respondent's appeal to the Office of the
President was time-barred;
(2) Whether or not there was a valid
location and discovery of the disputed
mining claims.
1) yes
2) It is apparent that the second issue as to whether or not there was
a valid location and discovery of the disputed mining claims is a
question of fact best left to the determination of the administrative
bodies charged with the implementation of the law they are entrusted
to enforce. As uniformly held by the Court, it is sufficient that
administrative findings of fact are supported by evidence, or
negatively stated, it is sufficient that findings of fact are not shown to
be unsupported by evidence. Substantial evidence is all that is needed
to support an administrative finding of fact, and substantial evidence
is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." (Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 69 Phil. 635, 642; Police Commission v. Lood, 127 SCRA
762 [1984]). prcd
In the case at bar, the record amply shows that the Director of Mines'
decision was supported by substantial evidence.
|Carpio vs ES
FACTS:
Petitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and member of the
Philippine Bar, filed this petition, questioning the constitutionality of
RA 6975 with a prayer for TRO.
RA 6875, entitled ―AN ACT ESTABLISHIGN THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,‖ allegedly
contravened Art. XVI, sec. 6 of the 1986 Constitution: ―The State
shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national
in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled
by a national police commission. The authority of local executives
over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.‖
ISSUEs:
o Whether or not RA 6975 is contrary to the Constitution
o Whether or not Sec. 12 RA 6975 constitutes an ―encroachment upon,
interference with, and an abdication by the President of, executive
control and commander-in-chief powers‖
HELD:
Power of Administrative Control
NAPOLCOM is under the Office of the President.
SC held that the President has control of all executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of control over the
executive branch of government extends over all executive officers
from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. In the landmark case of
Mondano vs. Silvosa, the power of control means ―the power of the
President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former with that of the latter.‖ It is said to be at
the very ―heart of the meaning of Chief Executive.‖
As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the
―Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency.‖ As the President cannot be
expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in
person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet
members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, ―all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts
of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and,
except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course
of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
Thus, ―the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him
over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority,
control the bureaus and other offices under their respective
jurisdictions in the executive department.‖
The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG
is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system
of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives
and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety
agencies.
Power of Executive Control
Sec. 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief
powers. It simply provides for the transition period or process during
which the national police would gradually assume the civilian
function of safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under this
instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war
powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the preponderant
view, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of
the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the
Commander-in-Chief provision ―represent only a part of the organic
duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in
nature.‖ His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent
with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that ―civilian
authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.‖
Heirs of Eugenia Roxas vs IAC
This involves the property of Spouses Roxas at Laguna. When spuses
died, the heirs of roxas sought operation of the reosrts, particularly
the restaurant at the resort. The corporation decided to take over the
management of the reastaurant. However, the MOT (permit to
operate the restaurant) was in the name of respondents still, and new
MOT was acquired by respondents.
With these principles in mind, and after a careful consideration of the
undisputed facts and the arguments of the parties, the Court finds
that the IAC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction.
Private respondents failed to establish a clear and present right to
continue operating the restaurant and liquor concession at the resort
considering that they, who were then incorporated and doing
business under HVABR, had NO license or authorization from the
MOT to operate the restaurant and liquor concession in the resort.
Without a license private respondents cannot legally continue to
operate the restaurant, therefore they cannot claim a right which
could be protected by a writ of preliminary injunction.
It is a recognized principle that courts of justice will generally not
interfere in executive and administrative matters which are addressed
to the sound discretion of government agencies, such as, the grant of
licenses, permits, leases, or the approval, rejection or revocation of
applications therefor [Manuel v. Villena, G.R. No. L-28218, February
27, 1971, 37 SCRA 745.] However, there is a limit to the deference
accorded by the courts to the actions of such agencies. Jurisprudence
is replete with cases wherein the Supreme Court expounded on the
exception to the general rule||| )
Industrial Power Sales vs Sinsuat
%ACTS&
Two invitations to bid were advertised by the Bureau of Supply
Coordination of the Department of General Services. The first called
for eightunits of truc for the use of the Bureau of
Telecommunications. The invitation to Bid as well as the re!uisition
itself contained a proviso limiting the offersto foreign made products
on a C"# basis, $ort of %anila. The second invitation to Bid
announced that both C"# $ort of %anila and #&B %anila
!uotationswould be accepted and made part of bid
re!uirements. 'mong the bidders were "ndustrial $ower Sales, "nc
("$S") and Delta %otor Corporation (Delta). The bids were
deliberated by the Committee on 'wardsand was awarded to "$S".
Delta protested the award to "$S" to the Bureau of
Telecommunications claiming that the offered by "$S" were
not
factory built,
as stipulated in the re!uisition and invitation to bid. The Director
ruled that the bidding has been made in strict compliance with
technicalspecifications and re!uirements stated by the Bureau of
Telecommunications.Delta*s ne+t move was to file with the &ffice
of the Secretary of General Services (Sinsuat). The latter informed the
'cting Director of Supply that theDepartment had already approved
Delta*s price, and categorically direct him to award to Delta the
purchase order of the eight with the leastpossible delay. This
notice was given notwithstanding all the Government agencies
concerned already agreed on the correctness of the award to "$S"
of Telecommunications, the Department of $ublic
Communications to which said Bureau of Telecommunications
pertains, the Bureau of Supply, which had direct supervision and
control of the bidding, and of course, the Committee on 'wards."$S"
appealed from the Secretary*s decision to award the purchase
contract Delta to the &ffice of the $resident as well as the &ffice of
the 'uditorGeneral. The appeal notwithstanding, the /etter-&rder in
favor of Delta was released. "$S" then filed with the C#" a petition
certiorari and mandamus,with application for preliminary and
mandatory in0unction. The verdict wen against "$S". #rom the
0udgment of the C#", "$S" appealed to the Court. Theplea made in
behalf of Secretary Sinsuat claims that "$S" had gone to Court
without first e+hausting all administrative remedies.
ISSUE&
or not there was an e+haustion of 'dministrative 1emedies.
HELD&
Certain universally accepted a+ioms govern 0udicial review through
the e+traordinary actions of
certiorari
or prohibition of determinations ofadministrative officers or
agencies2 first, that before said actions may be entertained in the
courts of 0ustice, it must be shown that all the
administrativeremedies prescribed by law or ordinance have
been e+hausted3 and second, that the administrative decision may
properly be annulled or set aside onlyupon a clear showing that
the administrative official or tribunal has acted without or in e+cess
of 0urisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
1
Thereare however e+ceptions to the principle as e+haustion
of administrative remedies, these being2 (4) where the issue is purely
a legal one, (5)where the controverted act is patently illegal or was
done without 0urisdiction or in e+cess of 0urisdiction3 (6) where the
respondent is a departmentsecretary whose acts as an
alter ego
of the $resident bear the latter7s implied or assumed approval,
unless actually disapproved3 or (8) where there arecircumstances
indicating the urgency of 0udicial intervention."n view of these
doctrines, there is no need for the e+haustion of administrative
remedies in the case at bar because Secretary Sinsuat indeed acted
withgrave abuse of discretion amounting to or e+cess of
0urisdiction.
NDC vs Collector of Customs
FACTS
The customs authorities found that the vessel carried on
board an unmanifested cargo consisting of one television set, and
respondent Collector of Customs sent a written notice to the
operator of the vessel and the latter answered stating that the
television set was not cargo and so was not required by law to be
manifested. The operator requested an investigation and hearing but
respondent finding the operator’s explanation not satisfactory
imposed on the vessel a fine of P5,000.00, ordering said fine to be
paid within 48 hours from receipt, with a threat that the vessel would
be denied clearance and a warrant of seizure would be issued if the
fine will not be paid.
NDC, as owner, and operator AV Rocha filed for special civil
action for certiorari before the CFI of Manila against the respondent.
Respondent contended that petitioners have not exhausted all
available administrative remedies, one of which is to appeal to the
Commissioner of Customs.
ISSUE
Whether or not the contention of respondent is correct.
HELD
The Court held in the negative. Respondent Collector
committed grave abuse of discretion because petitioner NDC was
not given an opportunity to prove that the television set involved is
not a cargo that needs to be manifested. Exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not required where the appeal to the administrative
superior is not a plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, as where it is undisputed that the respondent officer
has acted in utter disregard of the principle of due process.