Burma

Twisted Road to Where ?

Analysis of political developments in a new century - Bo A. Olson, Burma Center
Burma

Twisted Road to Where ?

Analysis of political developments in a new century

Over the last decades several important things have happened in

Burma/Myanmar. This is the second part of a trilogy covering recent
political developments.
It is an updated and expanded edition of a paper initially presented by
the author at a lecture in Paris, France, 26 February 2004.

Bo A. Olson
Burma Center International
This edition published by Clay Creek Cabin 2020
Copyright by the author 2004 and 2020
ISBN 978-91-519-5331-1
Graphics by Design Plus
Cover photo by the author showing a common rural transport in central Burma/Myanmar
Contents Preface

1 The May 1990 elections

Broken Promises or a Failure in Communication

2 Parliamentary Election or Referendum on Constitution?

3 The National Convention

4 The Road Map

5 The Draft Constitution

6 Free and Fair Elections

About the Author

About the Trilogy
Contacts
Preface
In August 2003, the Government of Myanmar1 presented it´s Roadmap
to Democracy. The plan, featuring seven steps, was instantly received
with a great deal of scepticism in the West, the part of the world which
spearheaded economic sanctions against the military regime. It seemed
however that an increasing number of seasoned Burma watchers were
prepared to give the initiative a fair chance.

1
The Union of Burma changed its official name
to The Union of Myanmar 1989
The May 1990 elections
Broken Promises or a Failure in Communication
Background to the Burma was quite a prosperous country at the time of independence
from the British 1948 but after a few years of rather shaky democracy
May 1990 elections and ethnic confrontations, General Ne Win took over in a military coup
1962. As a dictator leading a one-party government, he had managed to
run the country into virtual bankruptcy by the late 1980´s.
There was a wealthy military elite, but the majority of the population
were extremely poor. The people were not happy with the situation but
were scared of repercussions if they protested openly and the military
hit hard when necessary. Also, Ne Win let the rural farmers keep just
enough produce to feed themselves and a little for trade necessities,
while the urban dwellers were allowed to profit on the lucrative open
black market. The general feeling was just to struggle on; better that
than being jailed, or worse, simply for protesting.

The odd open protests which had occurred had usually been staged by
students from the country´s universities and this is also what happened
in 1987. In the autumn some additional laws were introduced making
it even more difficult for farmers as well as private entrepreneurs.
Shortly afterwards, on 5 September, the real shock came when some
well used bank notes were declared void without any compensation.
Naturally protests erupted against the government´s economic policies
and traditionally they were spearheaded by students. In Spring 1988 the
protests had expanded and on 12 March, a student was shot dead and
154 students were arrested.
On 18 March, when 41 detainees suffocated in a police van, the
atmosphere amongst the protesters had become more difficult for the

2
BSPP - Ne Win´s Burma Social Programme
Party (the only legal party since 1962)
3
Tatmadaw - Burmese armed forces
4
Maung Maung Myoe, Asia Research
Institute Working Paper No 95
authorities, even though the news was strictly censored and not released
until July, four months later. The protests now included several groups
from the community wanting to show support for the students. The
public demands included an end to military dictatorship and the
introduction of a democratic system.
Obviously the ruling BSPP2 was shaken by the protests and tried to
boost its public image with a number of measures. At an emergency
party congress 23 July, the dictator Ne Win surprised everyone by sug-
gesting the possibility of holding a national referendum for the reintro-
duction of a multiparty system in the country. The Tatmadaw3 declared
it would ”dutifully carry out all the assignments for successful comple-
tion of the referendum” but Ne Win´s suggestion was ”rejected outright
by the congress delegates”4 .
Following the rejection, Party Chairman General Ne Win and President
U San Yu resigned their respective positions and the retired Brigadier
General Sein Lwin became the new Party Chairman as well as Presi-
dent. Sein Lwin, also known as “the Butcher of Yangon” for his brutal
suppression of various student protests in the capital, was even more
hated than Ne Win by the people who did not accept his appointment.
The result was fresh demonstrations taking place at the end of July,
mostly in Yangon. This caused Sein Lwin to declare martial law and he
also ordered the security forces to shoot at the demonstrators.
8.8.88 became the symbolic date for the massacre in Yangon. Hundreds
of thousands of demonstrators took to the Yangon streets displaying

5
Shinglees - sharply filed bicycle spokes fired
through handmade catapults
6 publicised the request on television and promised to help hold free and
The figure 3000 dead protesters initially
reported by eye witnesses is not reliable
as many were reported more than once by
different sources and some of the dead were
reported under different names.
7
Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and Politics
of Ethnicity, 2nd edition,
(London: Zed Books Ltd, 1999)
banners with anti-government slogans, some armed with sticks and
shinglees5 . They were met by bullets and bayonets. Scores of
demonstrators were killed and injured, although the statistics produced
by the protesters may be somewhat exaggerated.6
Sein Lwin stayed in power just three weeks and was replaced on 12
August by Dr Maung Maung, a civilian who lifted the martial law and
ordered the Tatmadaw to return to their barracks. He also gave people
some opportunities to express their opposition regarding the
governance. But now the situation in the country had already
deteriorated to an extent that people refused to accept anything other
than a complete transfer to a civilian government.
It is obvious that the Military Regime was extremely worried and,
according to various sources, an inner circle meeting regarding the acute
situation is reported to have been held at Ne Win´s residence 23 August.
However, the anti-government demonstrations became increasingly vio-
lent and the BSPP leadership began to panic. The party congress held
on 10 September proposed cancelling the suggested referendum and
instead, hold multi-party general elections.7
Thus, on 12 September General Saw Maung, then Chief-of-Staff,
fair multi-party general elections.
Parliamentary Election or
Referendum on Constitution?

8 elections “the Tatmadaw will then hand over State power to the party
NCGUB - National Coalition Government of
the Union of Burma. A self-appointed alter-
native government consisting of representa-
tives elected in 1990
9
Published 1996 and based on Clements´
interviews with Suu Kyi between October
1995 and June 1996
10
National League for Democracy. Largest
opposition party, led by Aung San Suu Kyi
11
British Broadcasting Corporation with exten-
sive coverage from Burma in Burmese
12
AsiaWeek 21 July 1989
The population went to the polls 27 May but the circumstances surroun-
ding these 1990 elections were extremely complex. Afterwards, almost
everyone in the Burmese exile community, including of course the
NCGUB8, insisted that it was to elect proper MPs. In The Voice of Hope
- a conversation between Aung San Suu Kyi and Alan Clements9 , it is
clear that NLD10 wanted to convince the world that the elections were
intended as parliamentary ones but that the military regime went back
on its promise when the NLD landslide victory became clear.
The question of elections was first publicized when Burma’s Chief of
Intelligence, General Khin Nyunt, at a meeting with foreign military
attachés 22 September 1988, was reported to have said that after the
which wins.” This became the only interpretation the opposition
accepted and, accordingly, its supporters in the West as well. However,
what Khin Nyunt in fact said, according to the BBC Monitoring Service
Report of his remarks, was that the Tatmadaw would then SYSTEMA-
TICALLY hand over State power.11
Khin Nyunt´s actual remark implied a process and not a direct hand-
over. Aung San Suu Kyi was actually aware of this when she, in an
interview complained to AsiaWeek´s correspondent Dominic Faulder
that “whoever is elected will first have to draw up a constitution that
will have to be adopted before the transfer of power. They haven’t said
how the constitution will be adopted. It could be through a referendum,
but that could be months and months, if not years.”12
When the former Dictator, General Ne Win, had abdicated and the mili-

13
State Law and Order Restoration Council
14
Saw Maungs collected speeches, Volume II,
published October 1990
15
Working People´s Daily 13 April 1990
tary based BSPP had been replaced by the likewise military controlled
SLORC13 in September 1988, the 1974 constitution was suspended.
General Saw Maung, the SLORC Chairman at the time, may have ad-
ded to the confusion when he shortly after his appointment promised
multi-party elections. Obviously, he was pressed into doing something
to prevent further mass protests like the bloody uprising in Autumn
1988. The hated Dictator since the Military Coup 1962, General Ne
Win, had at least officially resigned but it had not lessened public
demands for democratization and neither had a couple of subsequent
shifts in the Military leadership. Thus, Saw Maung, in what seemed
like desperation, just promised that elections were to be held in general
terms without realising that the country lacked a constitution.
On 9 January 1990, Saw Maung talked about forming a government
“according to law”14 . At that time, he must have meant according to
the new Constitution. This is also exactly what Lt Gen Khin Nyunt
meant when he 12 April 1990 told officials in Rangoon that the SLORC
would carry out State responsibilities “while the constitution is being
drafted” and that SLORC would continue to do so “even after the elec-
tions until a strong government has been formed”15 .
After that, on 9 May 1990, even Saw Maung made it crystal clear that
the SLORC would remain in power until the new constitution came into
force. Foreign journalists who came to Rangoon to cover the elections
were also informed by the State Electoral Commission about this.
Thus, several foreign media reported prior to the election 27 May 1990
that there would be no transfer of power until the Constitution had been
approved by a national referendum, and thus stated, after which fresh
elections would be held.

Some observers believe that the military regime (SLORC) changed their
minds when they published the new Electoral Law 31 May 1989. The
junta had by then realized that there just had to be a constitution in force
before power was transferred and that it would, for a number of reasons,
be far too risky just to allow the winners of the election to take power
right away. Naturally, the top generals worried about what was going to
happen to them if the people wanted revenge.
The general public, however, had by then accepted the election promise
as a door opener to true democracy and their belief was strengthened
for every day that passed. Even if opposition leaders like Aung San Suu
Kyi knew the true circumstances, she did nothing to stop the somewhat
faulty general euphoria.
The National Convention
 So, the election on 27 May 1990 was held as planned but in fact not for
Parliament, but for the public to elect delegates to a National
Convention which, in turn, would produce a new constitution on which
proper parliamentary elections could be based. Naturally, when the
opposition´s landslide victory became known 1 June 1990; the NLD
winning 392 seats out of 485, they ignored the actual reasons for the
election and were angry at being refused an immediate takeover of
Parliament.16
It actually took the Military Government the better part of a month
before they announced the official election result, and by then the
opposition had become extremely irritated. The NLD proposed to the
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) holding ”frank
and sincere discussions with good faith and with the object of national
reconciliation” but the Military Regime did not reply to the NLD
proposal ”in any way”.17

Thus not being allowed to take on what they considered their lawful
right to establish a Parliament, and having had no response from the
SLORC; the NLD on 28 to 29 July 1990 assembled a meeting at the
Gandhi Hall in Rangoon with the purpose of ”discussing matters
16
concerning wellbeing of the nation, State affairs and convening of the
Pyithu Hluttaw - Burmas Parliament Pyithu Hluttaw”.
17 In the resulting declaration, unanimously adopted, the NLD members
Ghandi Hall Declaration 3rd paragraph
18 elected to the Parliament called on SLORC to convene the Pyithu Hlut-
The Ghandi Hall Declaration, 29 July 1990 taw during September 1990.18
 This author is convinced that, despite their natural disappointment, if
the NLD had acted smartly and respectfully towards the military
immediately the landslide victory became known, they could have
gained tremendous ground towards a peaceful democratization process.
Instead, they chose confrontation which, of course, led nowhere, apart
from leaving the military establishment to dig themselves even deeper
down in their trenches.

This resulted in renewed mass arrests of politicians and other protes-

ters which drove many political opponents underground or into exile.
Among these were a handful of MPs elect, mostly NLD members, who
decided to leave Rangoon and, with the assistance of the KNU as well
as moral support from other MPs, establish an alternative Government
at the KNU headquarters in Manerplaw.19

The NLD expected no doubt much stronger and more concrete support
from the West than actually materialized. When NLD realized that their
demands for immediate takeover were just not going to happen, and
support from the West was in word only, it was too late to establish a
solid platform at the following National Convention with the purpose of
drafting a new constitution. The SLORC finally called a constitutional
convention in 1993, but it was suspended in 1996 when Aung San Suu
19 Kyi and her NLD colleagues walked out in a huff boycotting it as they
KNU - Karen National Union considered it ”un-democratic”.
The Road Map

20
NCGUB - National Coalition Government of
the Union of Burma (MPs elected 1990)
National Council of the Union of Burma
NCUB - National Council of the Union of
Burma (apart from the NCGUB including
representatives from ethnic minorities as
well as students and religious groups)
You may think what you want about the military regime and their views
on democracy, but one thing is clear; they have certainly been consis-
tent.
In August 2003, the Government of Myanmar presented it´s Roadmap
to Democracy. The plan, featuring seven steps, or phases, was instantly
received with a great deal of scepticism in the West - the part of the
world which spearheaded economic sanctions against the military
regime. Although many were sceptic to the initiative, it seemed howe-
ver that an increasing number of seasoned Burma watchers were
prepared to give the initiative a fair chance.
On 11-12 October 2003 the world’s largest gathering of Burmese
democracy activists in exile took place at Fort Wayne, Indiana. At that
time the International Campaign for Democracy in Burma (ICDB)
was introduced with the purpose to ”build a broad-based coalition of
grassroots and institutional support for freedom in Burma”. It was to
inform ordinary citizens, international media and policymakers about
the Road Map and Burma´s political, social and economic crisis. In
addition it was to organize international support for Aung San Suu Kyi
and freedom in Burma under the leadership of the NCGUB and the
NCUB. Perhaps if the West at that time had shown a little more interest
in cooperation, there might just have been a break in this stagnating
process.20
The ICDB lost some of its credibility when the Free Burma Coalition,
led by the prominent activist Maung Zarni, was not allowed to partici-
pate. Zarni had publicly expressed growing disillusionment with Aung
 San Suu Kyis leadership and her policy of sanctions and boycotts. He
also challenged what he saw as the ”self-serving ways” of many of his
former fellow activists in the democracy movement in general. Thus,
he claimed that economic sanctions and political pressure by Western
countries on Burma was counter-productive and futile as long as China,
India, Thailand and other Asian countries continued to do business with
and politically support the ruling regime.21

The First Step was to reassemble the National Convention, suspended

since 1996. This constitutional convention was called in again 2004 but
then without the NLD by their own choice and thus missing the oppor-
tunity to participate in drafting of the new constitution.
Once more an opportunity was wasted as Khin Nyunt, then Prime
Minister and the architect of the Roadmap, and probably the one man
among the Generals with the most understanding of western ways of
thinking, was replaced in September 2004 together with several of his
associates. Obviously the more liberal way, which Khin Nyunt stood
for, did not go down very well among the junta hardliners. The actual
process once again came to a halt, but even so, the regime stuck to its
Roadmap.

The Second Step was to implement, step by step, the tasks required for
the founding of a democratic system based on the National Convention;
the Third Step being to draft a constitution based on the general con-
21 cepts and detailed principles advocated by the National Convention. As
U.S. Campaign for Burma 2003 the majority of the opposition chose not to participate in the work with
 11
the National Convention on the new constitution, the government draft
went through virtually without any serious resistance.

On 9 February 2008 SPDC announced the public referendum to be held

on 10 May, as the Fourth Step of the Roadmap. The full text of the
proposed 2008 constitution to vote ”yes” or ”no” on was released by
SPDC on 9 April 2008 and was actually not much different from the
”principles” released by the Ministry of Information in August 2007,
one month ahead of the National Convention´s formal completion of its
work. Burma/Myanmar had now been without a constitution for twenty
years.
The Draft Constitution
 The SLORC draft constitution which the Burmese voters were asked
to endorse or reject in the May 2008 referendum drew many reactions
from people both inside and outside the country. Most critics looked at
the referendum as a way to ”legitimize a continuing military rule” and
establish a ”toothless parliament”.

As expected, the draft spelled out the exact powers of the Military, such
as their guaranteed 25 percent of the seats in both the upper and lower
houses chosen by the Commander in Chief of the Tatmadaw (110
of 440 in lower and 56 of 224 seats in upper house). The Commander
in Chief was also granted the power to select the President and two
Vice Presidents. The draft also made it clear that ”the Tatmadaw had
the right to independently administer all affairs concerning the armed
forces”.

Many calls for a boycott of the whole procedure came from, primarily,
NLD and leaders of ethnic and other opposition groups. Leaders of the
NLD worried that if they endorsed the constitution ”people in Burma
would object and go their own way”. The draft also effectively stopped
Aung San Suu Kyi from a leading position as she was the widow after
and mother of foreign citizens.22

Ethnic nationalities had all reason to worry as their wish to obtain auto-
22
Myanmar Constitution nomy would be hindered by the military leaders.
As far as the general public on the streets were concerned, there was
 a certain feeling that this might just be a step towards democracy thus
ending a very long process.

At the last moment, most civilized potential democracies would no

doubt have postponed the referendum as only days before, 2 May, the
tropical cyclone Nargis building up in the Bay of Bengal made landfall
in the southern Irrawaddy delta. It became one of the biggest disasters
in the country´s modern history leaving behind at least 138000 dead and
missing people in Burma and a devastated region. Regardless of calls
for postponement, SLORC decided to carry on with the referendum on
10 May as planned.23

23
Nargis. Report by
Burma Center International
The Fifth Step:
Free and Fair Elections
The Fifth Step on the road map was to ”hold free and fair elections”
for the formation of the required national legislative bodies and the
first of five election laws was announced in March 2010; the Union
Election Commission Law, stating that the military government was to
”appoint all members of the commission and have a final say over the
election results”.
A second law banned anyone serving a prison term from belonging to a
political party which made over 2000 political prisoners unable to parti-
cipate. The Political Parties Registration Law also barred members of
religious orders and insurgent groups (as defined by the State) as well as
foreigners from joining political parties.
The new election laws were internationally described as a ”farce” and
a ”mockery” but otherwise the West seemed at that time to have given
up on Myanmar and merely waited on the election results. The British
Government wanted to show strong support for Aung San Suu Kyi, but
could not decide what to do next as the NLD by this time had been
dissolved as a political party.
The G8 Summit on 26 June 2010 managed however to coax Russia into
agreeing to this pronouncement: ”We urge the Government of Myan-
mar to take the steps necessary to allow for free and fair elections. Full
and inclusive democratic participation is essential to this. We urge the
Government to release without delay all political prisoners, including
Aung San Suu Kyi, and engage the democratic opposition and represen-
tatives of ethnic groups in a substantive dialogue on the way forward to
national reconciliation.”

24
USDA - Union Solidarity and Development
Association (Military´s political body before
the elections)
Although this statement was merely a ”play for the galleries” to
morally support the rapidly growing Burmese exiled community it was
unlikely to have any noticeable effect on either the Myanmar regime
nor the elections.
As scheduled, general elections in Myanmar were held 7 November
2010, based on the constitution which had been approved in the refe-
rendum two years earlier, and the final results were announced by the
Myanmar Union Election Commission on 17 November.
As the NLD had boycotted the elections the results became a great
victory for the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), a
successor to the government´s mass organisation USDA and which won
80 percent of the seats contested in both houses.24
In April 2012 by-elections were held as, according to the constitution,
members elected to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Parliament) were auto-
matically disqualified from taking seats if they had accepted appoint-
ments to an executive or judicial body as for example the Myanmar
Cabinet. These by-elections filled 48 such vacancies as well as those
left by resignations and deaths.
The Sixth Step on the Road map was to convene the meeting of elected
representative to the Hluttaw and the Seventh Step was for the leaders,
government and authoritative bodies elected by the Hluttaw to ”conti-
nue with the task of constructing a new democratic state”.
 The next general election in Myanmar was 8 November 2015. These
were the first which could be described as democratic and NLD, led by
Aung San Suu Kyi, won a sweeping victory, taking 86 percent of the
seats in both houses. Only 67 percent was needed to outvote the mili-
tary and for the pro-military bloc in the electoral college, to chose both
president and vice-presidents.

As Aung San Suu Kyi was constitutionally barred from the presidency,
she became the de facto head of government when she appointed herself
to the new position of State Counsellor of Myanmar or as she herself
25
Reuters 5 Nov 2015 explained it: ”Above the president”.25

There is no doubt that Aung San Suu Kyi still was extremely popular
among a large part of the population, mostly as a symbol for a growing
Additional sources: hope so many citizens had been denied for so long. At the same time a
great burden rested on her shoulders and she had no easy path to follow.
Derek Tonkin - The 1990 Elections in
Myanmar: Broken Promises or a Failure of
The next few years would show if she had grown with the position or
Communication? was still just an icon...
Dr Maung Aung Myoe - A Historical Over-
view of Political Transition in Myanmar since
1988

Burma Center Interviews with representati-

ves for NCGUB, NCUB, KNU, in Manerplaw,
NLD in Rangoon and with the Myanmar Am-
bassador to UK in London and Stockholm
About the Author
About the Trilogy
Burmas development from
Military Dictatorship towards
a democratic nation
Bo A.Olson is an antropologist, writer and photographer who has reported from
Burma/Myanmar since his first visit in the late 1970´s. After that he has travelled
widely in the country several times and spent a total of almost three years among
Ethnic Peoples in their regions.
1983-84 he represented the Karen National Union in international lobbying;
1985-87 the National Democratic Front, and 1988-90 the Democratic Alliance of
Burma. Finally, in February 1991, he was appointed the Official Representative for the
National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma to Sweden until 1993 when he
became the Director of Burma Center, an independent voluntary foundation for
objective research and information.
Mr Olson is now living in Stockholm, Sweden, where he was the editor of the
Fria Burma (Free Burma) Swedish language newsletter for 17 years. He is the author of
Burma-the Elusive Peacock as well as co-author of several other books and reports.
Part One:
Burma: To every thing there is a season...
Analysis of a brutal regime versus an ailing democratzation process
Paper presented to the Research Conference on Burma,
University of Stockholm, September 1999
ISBN 91-974357-0-8
Part Two:
Burma: Twisted Road to Where?
Analysis of political developments in a new century
First published 2004, this second edition published 2020
Part Three:
Burma: What Price Democracy?
Malevolent Metamorphose to a Humane Future
To be published in June 2020
Contacts:
burmacenter@gmail.com
claycreekcabin@gmail.com