Postcolonial - Identities Africa EDITED Hicmann. WERBNER & TERENCE RANGERCHAPTER 3 Postcolonialism, power and identity: local and global perspectives from Zaire | Filip De Boeck ‘After mote than a decade in a macistrom of aggravating politcal and economic exes, ——_ political and ad saa inn oreo ln we of Rar sy 1 abseree of a centralised state structure. Two waves of looting across the country in 1991 and 1993 have greatly contributed to ' the steep decline in the economy, accelerating dramatically over the past five years. ‘nthe fist part, I consider the ways of overcomng the hiatus between local political structares and the state, its crumbling autocratic control and dysfunctional economy, My ‘question ‘ Drawing } fon recent case mateal, I deal with the ambivalent political, ritual and symbolic exchange benveca national Zarean and Angolan) power brokers } and local rural traditional authorities, against the background of Zalrean~ : Angolan diamond-smuggling activites. In particular, 1 focus on the ‘ ambivalence in the ongoing dialogue and dialectics of power between , local and national poliieal actore My analysis covers theit dual argemente i of ident, their respective politics and poetics of mimesis and alert, it slso discloses theit - Ve yiuminates the tise of new strategies for socio-economic and cultural goals and confit resolutions, when the focus of economic and social interest is localised and problematised by a particular ethnic and/or informal economic grouping My conclusion, extapolating more broadly from my ethnographic case, theorises the disintegration of overarching politcal and administrative — —76 CRISIS, STATE DECAY AND IDENTITIES structures and state institutions and shows its impact op the local in interaction with the global. The interaction between the hintedlasd and the merchant and politcal capital is stil too often viewed as a one-way process, in which the sillageis passively experiences the imperative guze of the metropole. However, I contend that ia contemporary Zaire the mer- chant and political capital no longer fully controls emerging identities, IF representation, deeply affects CONCEPIS 25 ‘state’, citizenship and nationhood, or conventional state-society and anual oppositions. "The crisis of the African state, fallen vietim to the political instability and the capitalist banditry that it nurtured itself, mises questions about the vasious sources of resilience mitigating against total chaos or a Hobbes- jan ‘war of all against "Are social co-operation = Donal pores of cece) i> SaaS Sa ee tna * mebiaon cs a ee wc proce? I Forms of interaction between Jocal and (trans)national ‘power formations [My evidence comes from extensive feld research between 1987 and 1994 among the aLaund of the Upper Kwaango (region of Bandundu, zone of Kahemba) and in Kinshasa and Kikwit. The Lounda area of my feld research is situated along the Zaitean border with Angola, and extends ‘well into the Angolan province of Lunda Norte. Traditionally, the political ‘and ritual authority of the paramount Luunda titleholder, who resides in Zaite, extends over a lage territory (sgaand) on both sides of the bordes, including the strategically important diamond-mining town of Cafunfo (Kafunfu), a good two days’ walk from the Zairean Launda royal village. ‘aLiund from both Angola and Zaire cross the border almost dail, and play a prominent role in the Angolan-Zairean diamond traffic, dating from 1979/80. Throughout the 1980s, diamond traders travelled back and forth between Kinshasa, or diamond centres suck as Tskikapa ot Mbuji' POSTCOLONIALISM, POWER AND IDENTITY 7 Mayi, and the border town of Kahemba. From there, they sent goods to ‘Angola in exchange for diamonds from the Angolan Cafunfo mine and its neighbours! Diamonds were thus aequited directly from the mines, from individual diggers, or through middlemen (enaeer). The goods (sally i wax cloths, cigaretes, whisky, adios, batteries, sosp, sardines end dried salted fish) were caried across the border by groups of pindhars, who i worked on their own or in association with financially stronger traders ot 1 compli. Te import into Angola coincided with ite severe shoctage of consumer goods in the 1980s (Azam et al. 1993). Throughout the 1980s local trade roles were mainly the cartier, guide oF scout. Crossing the 1 ZaiceanAngolan borderline, which is offically closed, was (and stil is) a | ‘dangerous venture. Frequently, people were kiled by landmines or shot by Angolan government troops, fagpal (from EAPLA), who controll’ Cafunfo and most of the Lunda Norte province throughout the 1980s? Returning to Zaire was equally hazardous, not only because the export of diamonds was declared illegal by the Angolan MPLA, but also because, on he other | side, Zaicean soldiers paroled the bordedline, offically to defend Zairean | tersitory from MPLA attacks and arcest trespassing ‘Angolans’ (mostiy | local aLand, who attach lide importance to the bordetline ot to an \ Angolan or Zaireen national identity), but basically 0 loot returning diamond traders? Since the early 19908, che diamond trade has changed considerably. In December 1992, rejecting the outcome of the presidental elections, UNITA attacked the town of Cafonfo, which it had been shating with MPLA during the period of the peace teaty. UNITA thus gained control ‘over the diamond-mines, formerly a main source of income for the MPLA. During the following months, Cafunfo was attacked and bombed ex. tensively by the MPLA. In October of 1994, shortly before the sgning of ‘new peace treaty in Lusaks, the MPLA took control of Cafunfo again, while parallel digging acdvities along the Kwaango river remained under UNITA supervision. Under the UNITA occupation of Cafunfo, bacteting virtually came to an end. Since late 1992, the diamond trade has been moneised: all diamonds are paid for in dollars, hence creating a monetary economy that fanctions independently from, or has replaced, the ‘official’ Zairean and ‘Angolan money markets. The changed nature of the trade also stopped the export of Zairean goods into Angola, making the whole Zairean— Angolan diamond activity more sedentary. Under the UNITA occupation (of Cafonfo, Zaireans were allowed to settle in the mining sites slong the ‘Kewaango to dig up diamonds. As a consequence the pincers snd diamond traders (Lamang) have been joined by sumerous ‘children of Lunda (Gana Lande), penniless Zairean youngsters from all over southein Zaire and Kinshasa, who often walk hundreds of miles to try thet huck in Angola, In the first half of 1994, an estimated 23,000 to 30,000 Zreans8 CRISIS, STATE DECAY AND IDENTITIES ‘were permanently living in and around Cafunfo, digging diamonds under + the sharp control of UNITA, which saw to it that it recefved 4 large pperentage of all the diamonds thus produced, In this way, UNITA basically used cheap Zaitean labour to help sponsor its war. How do the local traditional Luunda authorities enter into all his? As ‘we know, MPLA continued to exert contol over Lunda Norte til late tgs. Conteary o some of the minor Chokwe, Launda and Shinji le- holder in the azea under the Luunda paramount’ conto, however, the later was never supportive of the MPLA. In the 1970s, the actual Lutinda tieholdes, not yet entaroned and sill ving in Angola, openly supported Roberto Holden's FNLA and, afer its disappearance from the Angolan politcal stage, started backing UNITA. When the MPLA killed one of his fors, and the fatue tlcholder himself got into trouble with the MPLA because of his UNITA sympathies, he moved across the border, setled in Zaire, and was enthroned in 1984" Since his enthronement, he has {grown into a song and powerful chief, capable not only of strengthening ttadional tes with other subregional tileholders and of assusing the unity of his tccritory, but aso able to'eneate contacts with the adminis: teuive and politcal scene on a regional and (tans)national level. Boent 1 In August 1993, UNITA, recognising the Zairean Lunda para- ‘mount titleholder’ «raditional authority over the Cafunfo area, calls on the latter in order to protect situally and ‘hide’ (ji) the mining town from MPLA air attacks. In keeping with traditional Launda notions that both harm and healing come from outside (see De Boeck 1993), the ‘piramount ttlcholder calls on three Yans ritual specialists and one Angolan Shinji healer and sends them to Angola in order to carry out the protective situals asked for by UNITA. After the situal of the performance the ‘Angolan representative of the Luunda paramount titleholder is flown to the UNITA headquarters in Huambo where he is thanked for his services bby Savimbi himselE Savimbi’s association with one of the main traditional authorities of the Lunda Norte province is subsequently used for propaganda through extensive coverage on UNITA radio. In the meantime, both the Launda commoners, the minor Luunda, Shinji, Chokwe and Suku tideholders as ‘well as members of the Launda royal lineage continue to be persecuted, crested, killed, eaped, tortared and deported by the local UNITA troops, ‘who suspect them of collaborating with MPLA. At the same time MPLA agents, known as ant-mutim (anti-terrorist), hide in Luunda villages bring- ing the risk of UNITA reprisals on the vilagers* Boent 2 In July 1991, Mwakahiiy$ a relative of the Launda titleholder, Ics his neighbour with an axe duting a drunken fight. The victim's relives demand restitution. Mwakahiiy, after having served his prison sentence,POSTCOLONIALISM, POWER AND IDENTITY 79 goes to dig diamonds in Cafunfo. In January 2994, Mwakabiiy digs up a 1 7f-cart stone, a most unusual find. With the help of some relatives, and unknown to the local UNITA officials, the stone is smuggled out of Angola. In Kahemba, the relatives sell the stone for a ridiculotsly low price to Joseph, a Lebanese diamond trader. The same day Joseph fies to Kinshasa where the diamond is transfected to a Lebanese associate of ‘wo men with fop functions in the Zairean army and the SNIP, the Zairean security force. These two men in turn ate associated with the son (son 1) of 4 most prominent member of Zaite’s politcal elite Soon word reaches the Cafunfo UNITA command that an exceptionally large diamond was sold in Kahemba. Mwakahiiy (who had no knowledge Of the sale and never received his share of the profits) is arrested by UNITA troops, who threaten to execute him if he does not share the profits, Since Mwakshily is a relative of the Luunda paramount chief, the latter intervenes and promises the UNITA officials that he will pay the sum asked for, on condition that Mwakahiiy is released. ‘The Luunda titleholder is also angered by the fact that Joseph did not pay him ‘money Of the land” (wilaang ja mave), asthe stone was dug up and the trarsaction took place in his tertitory. Two of the titeholder’s dignitaries are sent to Joseph to renegotiate the sale and obtain a higher price. Joseph, however, refuses to meet with the tileholder’s delegation, reportedly for fear that they might use sorcery on him. The delegation returns to the village ‘empty-handed, ‘Around that time Donatien, a pincbewr, arsives in the Lunds royal village. Donatien is an associate of a Kinshass-based diamond trader who is in turn associated with a highly ranked officer of the Zairean army, himself associated with another son (son 2) of the same prominent politician mentioned above. The Luunda titleholder asks Donatien to contact his partner in Kinshasa and see whether he might be able 10 exert pressure on Joseph. Donaticn’s intervention (by means of 2 radic-call in ‘Kahemba town, 25okm from the royal village) proves to be all too elficient: within weeks three land-cruisers arrive in the royal village, transporting, son 2, together with a lage following of bodyguards and members of the intelligence service. Fearing the tdeholder’s nocturnal powers, after having. spotted a snake in his compound, the visitors refuse to spend the night there, The following morning, the Luunda titleholder is put in one of the Jand-cruisers and transported to Kinshasa, after « brief stop in Kshemba ‘where Joseph is harassed. ‘in Kinshasa, the Luunda titleholder is promised an audience with a high-ranked official to discuss Mwakahily’s problem, Tlhree months late, hhowever, the audience has still not taken place, although he has managed to lobby successfully against one of his long-standing political exemies, the Kahemba commisaire de zone, who as a result is switched to another administrative zone. However, the Luanda titleholder’ hopes of a financialfo CRISIS, STATE DECAY AND IDENTITIES settlement dwindle. In practice, he is being held hostages while the two. sons and their atsociates each try t get the most out of the diamond ‘As in the UNITA cae, the Lunda paramount’ presence in Kinshase ‘was used for propaganda reasons 2s well: he was taken to meetings of the ‘monsonce and his appearance there was broadcast by the OZRT, the Zairean ‘may be remarked that some of my informants considered the whole event was used by the regime in order to contact the Luunda leaders and pave the way for the presidential elections in their “The two event illustrate how local actors are caught up in wider national and supranational politcal and economic events and power games 6G (GEBORALNERED However, to regurd these local grou larger forces imposed on them frm outside covers intricate processes that are actually going on. In reality, ‘The dialectics of power: the central state apparatus and traditional political symbolism The rere tour & Passbentcié), was patly structured around 2 whole reality of more deeply rooted ideological and symbolical referents that drew from a pool of precolonial metaphors and images pertaining tothe office of tditional sovereign paramount. Many pee ee leopard skin, the staff, the fywhis, the hniy nd pny eee pel el ered Smprrmieggtn 8 Yor Te ote especialy 3 "The inherent ambivalences of the father-image are adroitly used by the regime (Schatzberg 1988: 78fF). By means of a perverted interpretation | of the traditional ‘gift logic, in which debt becomes positive, offering a source of social cohesion, the notion of ‘gif’ (gifts from the “father of the nation’ to his children) creates a ‘debe’ and a dependence of the ‘people upon their leader. In 1991, for example, every university professor in Zaire received a Mitshubishi Galant from the president. By a skilful manipulation of the imagery of the chief as father or maternal uncle —POSTCOLONIALISM, POWER AND IDENTITY 81 ‘with its traditional implications of reciprocity and mutual exchange — theft, corruption, exploitaion and abuse of funds are thus constfucted into ‘gifts’ returned by the children of Zaire to their generous father By disconnecting the links berween established signifiers and what they stand for, basic relations and values are emptied of their original meaning and redefined. In the same way, the clement of coercion is covered up by reference to the sacred or divine nature of the president's rule, adding the notion of the ‘charismatic chief’ to the notions of the ‘strong chief” and the just chief” (see Balandier 1967: 207-8). The notions of the ‘strong chief” and the just chief” are largely covered by the paternal symbolism. About dhe fine aspect, the 1974 constitution clearly stated that ‘the chief hhas the plenitade of the exercise of power’ by virtue of his bei Iupet of the chanmat chiefs deat preter in the Teng to appest, for example, as Mobuta Moy, the divine king, an image which inspired some scholars to compare the nature of his rule to that of Lovis XIV (Gee Callghy 1984). [Afican popular conceptions of traditional rules commonly telat theie power to 4 plies of revelation and concealment of noctaral powers and fores. For example, the Launda king is believed to ‘eat some of bis sscendants and descendaate dicing his eathronement, thereby tliminating his own lifeeouree, and himself a lfe-source for future gentmtions (De Boeck 1994). The royal tileholder thus becomes his own ori, and as tuck he he athe ong of the uly of te troy ve he na fe Humes tat be 5 rr ‘GELATO Situated outside every form of Peper epretyor teal extnnge towel oud We onary Be cycle between origin and end, ascendants and descendants or birth and 2 charg cenimy ofthe toc ore, ant the casornasons Of sock as el in cesng fe Never {and a project wt a foes on the fate are of prior importance. {feiss MPR party eolopees hae ake seesed the pert of ctrl power in the president's rule (see Young and Turner 1985: 214~15), thereby. Suking seul chord concerning the suture of plc legacy hae is deeply embedded in the popula colecsve imagioaton? SHAGGSHGD& CRISIS, STATE DECAY AND IDENTITIES “The reinvention and perversion of traditional elements torback up and. touch up the violent realities of naked power have thus been (more oF less subtly) made use of to instil respect, awe, fear and subservience for ‘a personal coercive regime. Ar tha sta ting, di lnconpoitln OF edie "The recourse to suthenticity as a Tegicimating myth, a ja of ‘traditional’ symbolic features borrowed from long-standing precolonial power bases situated outside the core areas of support for the regime (Kongo, Kubs, Luba, Launda), were attempts to legitimate the regime's position vivir ‘these traditional centres, and to incorporate the rural hinterland into the state domain (Young and Turner 1985: 213) However, the recycling of the powerful traditional symbolism was not ‘meant to revive or promote traditional power-centres, but constituted an active attempt to abolish these chieftaincies as potential hearths of resist- ance. A 1973 law for the reform of chieftaincy transferred chiefs to other tress, and abolished customary tribunals aad traditional principles of hereditary investiture, In practice, the law amounted to an orchestrated latempt at abolishing traditional power structures. The repression of traditional chieftainey, so characteristic of the regime's policy in the mid- tgvos, was not confined to a stricdy political level, but was also ac companied by a repressive attitude towards the precolonial cultural hentage 4s a possible soutce of resistance against the regime. Ironically enough, the rears & Panthentaté thus inspired a policy that continued the line of ‘conduct of the Belgian authorities!” “Actually, the 1975 law for the reform of chiefiaincy meant a switch in the regime's policy. Under Belgian colonial rule, most chieftincies were kept under firm tutelage, with the exception of some traditional ‘states’ such as Luunda and Kuba, having a policy of indirect rule. The Belgian administration designated chiefs (cif: medail®) and actively intervened in customary criteria of succession. In the early postindependence years many of these local chiefs, considered collaborators of the Bula Matadi ‘were chased from their office, or became targets of revolutionary violence ‘during the rebellion period in 1964. At che same time, many chiefs de arto ‘consolidated their prestige of authority in the institutional and adminis- trative chaos that followed independence, In an attempt to depoliticse the country after the 1965 coup, Mobutu returned to office all the chiefs who had been deposed. The 1973 law put an end to this favourable attitude, in an attempt to incorporate the local colectvities into the administrative structure of the central state. ‘By 1976, the reform had proved a total failure. Most transferred chiefs { were allowed to return to their original collectvities, sustaining hereditary Principles (de Lannoy 1976). In 1982 the restoration of the chiefdom tO 5 Fes fall status led to a situation in which the state apparatus co-exist ia ‘various degrees of interdependence with traditional socio-political stucoPOSTCOLONIALISM, POWER AND IDENTITY 85, tures of varying degrees of coherence, power and autonomy.Some of the ‘more powerful fuer, such as the maui chies in the Kivu, the Kuba king and the Luunda maze? yaar, ia short thote chiefs granted a elative degree of autonomy by the Belgian administration, had altogether escaped the reform. In thei ease, the 1973 reform had only magginal effects, and the regime simply recognised them both as customary chiefs and. as administrative zone commissioners, a practice known 28 dédoubloment of canal Callaghy 1984: 379) From 1982 to 1990, the state atempted to lay is testoialadminsts- tion down on top of the existing traditional strictares without abolishing them, a ‘coverover strategy’, characterised by a minture of bargaining, ‘manipulation, co-operation, coercion and domination (Callaghy 1984), Important traditional chiefs (grands cbf contami) were lown Over to the presidential residence in Ghadoit, were invited to MPR party congresses, ar, afte 1990, politcal rales ofthe presidential maaan. Some of them were given presents and money, or cats and resdence inthe capital, and ‘many were knighted inthe "National Order of tke Leopard’ (One Naflona 4 Ligpard, Looked at from the outside, the cegime thus managed to give the impression that it had vertably extended its control over these major tmudtional political powercentres, which were bing manocuvred into the positon of signboards of the regime. Howeve, 28 I show, bargaining is 4 two-directional process and therefore ambivalent: the regime continues to perecive the tadtional authorities as potently threatening ‘The other end of the spectrum: issues of representation and self-representation in the state-society interaction In comparison with other regional chiefs, such as the Yaka sovereign Paramount ruler, recognised by the colonial authorities as the most important traditional ruler and main stabilising fictor in the Kwaango, the aLuund of the Upper Kwaango were completey ignored. From a tradi ‘ional point of view, though, the Luunda paramount titleholder’ status is senior to that of the Yaka paramount (sce Van Roy 1988). Numerically feeble, the political impact of this Luunda group was, however, ess great. Also, the Upper Kwaango was penetrated and administered later than the rest of the Kwaango, and the colonial authoritite considered the area of ‘20 economic value (See Adriaens 1952). After independence, this colonial policy was continued. The 1975 administrative reform diminished the importance of the Launda paramount even further. The reform failed, however, becaste the government mis- calculated the continuing impact of existing tracitional power relations in the organisation of the administrative units. This was also the case in the Launda paramount tdeholder’s area. Prom 1984 onwards, the latter has campsigned for an upgraded84 CRISIS, STATE DECAY AND IDENTITIES administrative status more suitably reflecting his traditional importance, ,_ ‘The paramount titleholder explored, hesitandly at frst and -vith more bravado later, the administrative networks on the level of the zone of Kahemba and beyond, through his immediate kinship ties with local government official, and late, through extended kinship tes, on a regional sad national level.” ‘Dung the 19805, the Luonda paramount tideholder from Kahembs, actively secking a close association withthe regime, conformed to its style to further his own agenda; for example, to obtain promotion to a higher administrative level, orto sete a fight with some of his opponents, The regime would manipulate traditional symbols of authority t0 legitimate its tule, and s0, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, traditional paramount chiefs like the Launda tileholder would pursue their own goals by integrating MPR symbols into the existing traditional discourse and practices of powee and authority. In this way, for example, the Luunda chief"s yearly mectings with all the local chiefs and kideholders of his terstory were outwardly transformed into MPR meetings. On these occasions, he would wear a leopard bonnct instead of the traditional beaded crown, 25 well as spectices resembling the presidents; underneath the traditional royal raffia- cloth, an abst, imprinted with MPR slogans; he wosld order the Zairean fiag ised in his courtyard; and he would address the gathesing in Lingala, the military and political fgua france (while all present were aLuund and many had not flly mastered Lingala), and incorporate idioms used by government officals in his speech "The Zairean authorities, on the other hand, were readily inclined t0 affiem the astociation with the Luunda chieftainey of Kahemba, since, after the débicle of the 1973 aw, they had tried to get che local populations fof former chiefdoms used to seeing their chief as an agent of the administration, eathe cntative of the ancestors and ea FFor example, during the Luunda paramount chief's enthronement in 198, former commitiaie d pexple Maka Yala, who became viee-governor of Bandundu in 1994, wore a chief's traditional dress while kneeling in front of the Lunda titleholder. In this way, both sides have actively collaborated with one another, in fan astociation that, at times, has taken on the form of a contest of representation, each conforming ~ both consciously and unconsciously ~ to the other’ style, cxeating an image of self that can be used and negotiated in the ongoing dialogue with the other. Underneath the con- tested collaborations luzk sometimes parallel, sometimes different and contradictory, aspirations, The tegime stays in close touch with thePOSTCOLONTALISM, POWER AND IDENTITY 83 Kahemba Laund atocricy in an stompt to strengthen ip gip on the hioerlnd, duce the Lauda cic cole to» purl amiss one (atleast il gp) and also, possi, o beable to check the recent suczes of some-aor of Lands natonaln and edi reve. HD :evival, although modest, Old suspicions, for the CONAKAT, the Lunda political party which was founded after the Second World War and headed by Moise Tshombe, lay at the basis of the violent Katanga secession, the Kivu invasion in 1967 and the Shaba wars in 1977 and 1978. In the case of the Kahemba Luunda chief, other elements, of a more strategic and economic nature, also explain the regime's interest in this ‘Lunda chieftaincy, Undoubtedly, a traditional authority widely recognised in a large part of the Angolan province of Lunda Norte holds an important potential for the Zairean regime, which may use and manipulate this traditional network to keep in contact with UNITA forces. The second reason, related to the regime's sympathies for UNITA, concems the key position of the Luunda chieftaincy in Angolan diamond trading, The commercialisation of diamonds from Angola has gradually become one of the regime's few remaining sources of money: Zaire has become a teal ‘gemocracy’. Increasingly, one of the problems faced by the regime towards the end of the 1980s and the eatly 990s was to ensure the control over the Lebanese, Greek and Indian cireuits buying the UNITA diamonds One can understand easly, therefore, why the regime would choose to keep in touch with a Luunda chief who might, if so desired, facilitate and = directly or indirectly — control this diamond importing, Only dimly aware of the detailed geo-poltico-cconomie background in ‘which he figures, the Launda titleholder in Kahemba has knowingly been stressing his cultural Luunda heritage, nevertheless. His aim, primarily, is to promote the cultural and ethaie revaluation of his area, which he thinks is not sufficiently recognised by the central government, but certainly also to attract the regime's attention by playing on the connotations that ‘Lunda’ has evoked in the capital ever since the days of the CONAKAT. Because of the Kahemba chief's initiative, the Luunda royal village there hhas become known as ‘the second macnuml” (coyal village), the frst musuamnd being that of the Lounds arasunt yuus ins Katange (40 whom the fegime’s administrative coverover strategy had never applied), The association between the Kahemba Luunda titleholder and the meaan? year was strengthened further when they met for the first time in Kinshasa in 1988. (On that occasion, mzant yaav endowed the Kahemba paramount tile.86 CRISIS, STATE DECAY AND IDENTITIES hholder with the ancestral kaolin and with a royal beaded grown, aa event which undoubtedly helped the latter to gain prestige in the eyes of the authorities. Luunda identity and the process of intercultural exchange ‘Traditional Luunda culture is marked by its openness and its capacity to absorb outside influences. The Launda cultural whole is made up of several clusters and, often contradictory, ritual and therapeutic subsystems, some ‘of which have their origin outside the Luunda cultaral order. The same capacity to incorporate outside influences has characterited the Luunda pati system. Lounda political administration is shaped by a system of itional succession and perpetual kinship, creating a political network Of tle which i defined in vers of red ese or fete conuanguiny It is the existence of this particular system which also explains the ‘enormous Luunda potential for conquest in the past. All political titles (Gncluding non-aLuund) are integrated into a vast genealogy that focuses fon the paramount tleholder. ‘The intricate web of political relations creates interdependencies and guarantees the continuity of the hierarchical political organisation and the ttibutary network, which reinforces the Launda identity of political rulers ‘The tributary dependence links the various layers of the smaller segmentary authority structures into one integrated whole and enables the traditional political authority at the top to draw non-aLaund into the system. In terms of the al uund's self-definition as politcal rulers and ‘lords’ (amaent), those non-aLuund are considered to be socially and politically inferior Situated at the periphery of the Luunda political power, they are never theless an essential part of it, for they make possible and conficm the aLuund’s auto-definition as ‘lords’. Many aspects of the traditional modes of socio-political and cultural interaction and exchange recur in the alauund’s interaction with the regime and the state. From the point of view of the Launda lords, the adoption and assimilation of the segime’s style, discourse and arguments, as described above, are not interpreted as a loss of identity; nor are they signs of subordination which turns them into a mere administeative extension of a larger national and supra-national system. On the contrary, the adopted symbols and markers referring to the regime are viewed a8 an alien symbolic surplus added to the traditional symbols of political axthor- ity, thereby empowering the ttleholder’s traditional basis of authority. In the sime way, the interest of the Zaitean regime ot of UNITA in the TLaunda chief is interpreted by the latter as an extra external dimension Of legitimacy, adding to the importance and stature of his role at grand bef conte. 1a tis interpretation the centre~petiphery relation is inversed.POSTCOLONIALISM, POWER AND IDENTITY 87 ‘As Event 5 makes clear, for example, the interaction between the cchiefaincy and the state may thus be interpreted in terms of an extension of the tributary network focusing on the paramount titleholder, Event 3 At the end of 1988, after considerable lobbying, the Luanda paramount titleholder was knighted ia the ‘National Order of the Leopard? (Crear de POrdre National du Ligpard), one of the highest distinctions under the Second Republic which places the recipient de fate above the law, for he enjoys the personal protection of the president. The chiefs decoration was confirmed when one of the court dignitaries returned from Kinshasa with theofficial document, caught in a fine wooden frame, and signed by the president himself. The document was handed over to the Launda ruler, represented for the oceasion by his tenior wife (moan? ‘mvaad!) and one of his younger brothers, himself holder of the important courtttle of mlop, dusing an elaborate courtyard ceremony that unfolded in front of the royal ancestral shrines. The way in which the ceremony unfolded closely followed the structure of the Luvnda ritual for the bringing in of a leopard skin, one of the tzaditional royal regalia. The leopard skin isa prestigious gift, given as tabute to the paramount ruler by lesser ttlholders and vassals. At the same time, he ceremony echoed vatious aspects typical of enthronement situl, such asthe spatial layout from east to west. During enthronement, the regalia ate always caried by 2 ritual specialist, cepresenting the mauen? yay, from the cart (where foo, the ancestral orgins and the muaaré year’s coust ace located) to the west, where they ate handed over to the chiefto-be- Facing east, the mauant maaadi and the male were seated on a rafia mma, the prerogative of imporant tlcholders. Drummer, lined up along the ancestral shrines, started beating the thythm of the masaongy, x oyal sword dance whichis the performed enactment of the paramount tide- holder's conquest of the terttory over which he rales, Other court dignitaries fired gunshots in the air with their muzzleloaders, while cnlookers uttered loud ululatons of joy. Preceded by a court digitary, two members of the royal linage walked wesrward through the entrance ste into the royal enclosure, while holding the famed ‘National Onder of the Leopard’, metonymicaly representing the leopard skin. They wete followed by the man who would present the gift o the titleholder (and who represented the government and, ultimately, Mobutu himself). The procession approached with the same slow and majestic pace that is stlopted by important tleholders oF by stual specialists duting enthrone- ‘ent ritual. Then the document was put down at the feet of the mawant ‘mveadi and subsequently anointed by one of the court’ ritual guardians ‘ith Iaolin and a herbal preparation chat would normally have been applied to the leopard skin. The same substances were alto applied tothe mips chest. Then the person who had transported the document from Kinshasa88 CRISIS, STATE DECAY AND IDENTITIES to the village, and who in that capacity represented the regime, briefly auddressed the mulopa. The latter responded by returning a gift (@ goat o its equivalent in money) to the speaker (osually the hunter of the leopard). ‘The staging of the ceremony cleasy brings out che ambivalences in the contest of representation between tae aational power-holders and the local Launda lords. The chief's decomation by the regime ~ a decoration which he had struggled so hard to get and which had requited considerable financial efforts on the part of the court ~ was reconstructed both ia terms of enthronement ritual and ic terms of the traditional tburary system, Restated in terms of the enthronement ritual, the handing over of the document mierored the handing over ofthe regalia during enthronement. Te-was indeed the only time that I have seen the paramount titleholder dance the musaangy, a dance he himself performs only duting his own enthronement. In his eyes, however, the dancing of the maiaangy was appropriate, for, in addition to his stual enthronement according to ancestral practice, the decoration signified his enthronement inthe regime's terms (and actually by Mobutu, here cquated to the sowant year, himself) Restated in the terms of the tibatary gift, however, the decoration became a tribute from the (subordinate’) state to the (paramount) title= holder, thus restructuring the elationship between the latte and the regime as a traditional relationship between paramount titleholder and subaltern, ‘The coutt indeed considered the decoration to be the expression of the fact that the Lunda chieftsiney was situated ‘in the middle of power’ (pukach ha vaant), a8 it was described teiumphanty. Finally, the ritual entrance of the leopard skin into the royal courtyard symbolically signified the subduing of the dangerous realm of the wild bush to the order of the village and the rule of the Luunda paramount chief. At the same time, the bringing in of the dangerous exterior, metonymically represented by the leopard skin, forties and empowers the interior, ie. the village and by exptnsion the whole Luunda teritory, of which the royal courtyard is the focal point. In this reconstruction, the relationship between the Lounda villages (inside or centee) and the state (outside oF periphery) is recast in terms of a relationship between cultural oder and wild nature. Local/global contacts, identity and the question, of authenticity In the contact with broader power getworks and in the face of events thae transcend the local level, the aluund, like many other ‘traditional’ local populations, live multiple differentiated identities. However, these are not experienced as contradictory or mutually exclusive categories. Oa the contrary, itis the attempt at combining these identities which for chePOSTCOLONIALISM, POWER AND IDENTITY 8 aLuund seems to provide a more ot less effective way of ‘The state, the war, the economic world-system (ia the Launda case ‘most clearly in connection to the diamond trade), these are all compelling realities. As such, they have a large impact on the aLuund’s lives and impose upon them the necessity to integrate into their own culture something of the institutional forms, symbols, styles, discourses and practices by means of which the dominant power structures define their relation to them and extend their control over them. The successful achievement of such cultural politics seems to be a prerequisite for the auund’s cultural and political survival. Success in this Geld is linked apparently to the capacity to objectify one's own culture by creating an appropriate ‘ethnic identity’ for outward use ina form that allows collective action in collaboration with or in opposition to broader political and economic networks. Against the creation of an objectified version of Luunda identity, the sLaund seem to suffer from a severe disadvantage. As described in Events 1 and 2, the Zairean regime and UNITA make ample use of the audiovisual ‘media to create.a Luunda identity which conforms to their-own goals. Unlike the Brazilian Kaiapo (Turner 1992), for example, the aLuund do ‘not have access to such powerful instruments to achieve the successful objectification and self-representation of their Lounda cultural identity. "Not do they have access to newspapers and other written medi, as people in Kinshasa have. However, aLund engage ia the contest of representation by using the means at their disposal. The image of the traditional chief is in itself already so powerful that the central state has used it extensively to legitimise its actions. Consequently, in interaction with the regime, the ‘Launda titleholder knowingly attempts to play up his persona as gratd cif ‘tuner and inflate his regional importance. At the same time, the image Of the chief also allows for a counter-objectificaton, enabling the alLuund to recast their relationship with the state in terms of txibutary relations. [As shown in Event 5, some of the sublleties of these Launda strategies are lost on the regime and ate therefore not very successful from an outsiders point of view, but to the aLuund themselves they seem ap- propriate and effective. The outcome of Event 2, for example, may be viewed as 2 failure: the contact that the Luunda court established with people close to the centre of national polities did not, in the end, lead to ‘an advantageous financial settlement, However, in the margin of this event, the Luunda titlcholder was capable of successfully lobbying against one Of hhis political foeses CRISIS, STATE DECAY AND IDENTITIES ‘This uses again the question that inthe Zairean context i loaded with mulplod alture has never been experienced as a seamless whole by the alstind fhemaclves, T must stese For centuries the lives of the aLawnd have involved contacts, sometimes brutal, with neghbouring groups, rich as the Chokwe of with total outsiders, such a slivers during the time of the Congo Independent State, of Belgian, Briish and Portuguese colonsing forces In that histodeal context, their dealings with UNITA rebels and the Zairen regime, of thet role in the diamond trade, ae in some respects contemporary prolongations of ‘older cultaal pattems of wade snd poliied contacts. Asin so many precolonia’ states throwghout Central ‘Kiriea an outsider is at the base ofthe Luunda politcal culture (se de Heusch 1973; Plein 1550). LEAST ASAOTTED jorrowing and appropriating of cultural practices and situals of ‘other groups (most clearly in the case of tradtional political symbols and therapeutic and ritual practices) isin itself a characteristic trait of tradi- tional Lunda culture and identity. Event 1, in which the Luunda titleholder calls on outside ritual specialists from neighbouring groups to carry out the protective rituals asked for by UNITA, provides 2 characteristic illustration of this mechanism. As illustrated in Event 3, the aLuund give form to these borrowed of external elements in terms of tibutary relations that are proper to theic own social organisation and their own culturally- determined categories and classifications. The Lunda assimilation of politcal, cultural and socio-economic rituals and practices of the dominant power centres resembles and unfolds acconling to the same logic of incorporation and assimilation that also characterises the older traditional Issues of identity and the breakdown of dichotomies ‘The Congo has long fascinated the Western imagination, from Contad’s Heart of Darkness (903) to de Villiess' SAS pulp Penigue au Zaire (0978),POSTCOLONIALISM, POWER AND IDENTITY gt 8 spectaculatly racist cocktail of exoticism, sex, violince,,intrigue and i beuayal. [a various gradations, Zaire’ appears in these works of fiction as 4 powerful negative image of the Westera Self, in which the West projects all its feats and fantasies. In the wake of the 1995 Ebola outbreak in ‘Kilcwt, for example, a leading Belgian newspaper chamcterised the vicos 4s symptomatic of wild and undomestiated county. The great dis crepancy between this topos, the Zaire of the imagination, and the topicality of the physical Zire, which is rendered invsile bythe strength of the imagined place, seems to go unnoticed by mot. Related tothe Western failure to reach beyond its Murred vision of Insgly Getiious Zale ip the development of x second form Of cataract, whichis becoming increasingly apparent inthe incapacty of auch of the academic discourse w grasp flly and make visible the changing celties in contemporary Zaire. Faced with worlds and interactions such a8 those deseribed above, one becomes acutely aware that itis futile to explain tome of the processes currently taking place in Zairean society by means of the standard vocabularies usually used by social and political scientists | and economists. This observation applies in dhe local and regional levels as well as the national level. Terms and conecpts sich as sate’, ‘ade ministration’, ‘government, “governability, ‘opposicon’, ‘democracy, ‘army, ‘national budgee, ‘citizenship’ aw’, “justice, cr even ‘education? tnd ‘health care’ no longer seem to apply to the realities usualy covered by those terms. | Why isa building called ‘national bank’, ‘university, state department, i ‘hospital or ‘school when the activities which take plice init eannot be i given standard meanings and reales usually covered by those words? In 4 January 1995, for example, Belgian newspapers teporea that the Zairean ‘ational bank’ total stock of foreign currency amounted to US$2,000 and | a handful of Swiss francs. Similaely, university professors today ean US$2 | 4 month, and most departments of Kinshass’s national university have ‘not bought books, or produced a single doctoral disertation, since the | Zaireansation in the early 19708. Why continue the social convention of refering to a banknote at ‘money’ when one is confronted daly withthe | fact chat itis just a worthless slip of paper? The withirawal (November | 1098) of the IMF and che World Bank from Zaire atest tothe fat that | Zaire today no longer partakes in the formal world economy. But what is | the ute of distinguishing between formal and informal or parallel | economies when the informal has become the common and the formal { has almost disappeared? \ For some years now, Zaite's ‘second economy’ (MacGafley 1991) has \ become the frst and victually only one. The wodd of modernity with ts tempting promises, embedded in a vision of an expansive capitalism in service of the nation-state, has become the fools paradise in which the Zairean nation is no longer capable of living, This was the feeling recendly oe ="92 CRISIS, STATE DECAY AND IDENTITIES voiced by the Zaitean star Pepe Kalle in one of bis songs:,"They went t0 Europe, bot had to land in the desert (hbind Pts habe! ma div). Foe Zaireas i has become a cliché to say that no economic model ca, $3 exphin how city like Kinshasa, with its estimated 4 milion inbabitans Survives (Gee Rapoport 1993). Por the pousepourars, eax-dsvers, shoe- Shiners,night-watchmen and stret vendors in the urban dtr who daily texperence in the fesh the contnsing deterioration of thee standards of living, and whose lives unfold in ene mire (Nland 1992), the common discourses of poiical and economic analysts ae therefore torally devoid ‘of sense. To them, Kincade has long since become Kiba poe, feferred 10 a8 Kewet Cit rive gauche or, more recent, Serie In Zaire today it if n0 longer possible to forger oF deny the Saussusian arbitrariness of the sign, or the faticity of the social fact. What Taussig has termed the ‘mimetic faculty’ (Taussig 1993) the capacity to pretend that one ives facts, not fctons, has ceased to operate in an adequate way. To put it differently, there is a strong sense fof what Baudrillard (1983) has termed the ‘precession of simulacra, thereby pointing out the changing relations oerween the signifying ‘real and the representational ‘imaginary, or the Iquidation of all referenials ‘The common links and paths of teansfer between signifier and signified, or between predicate and subject, have imploded or are subverted: the ‘aire ec a fare cemblnt have often taken over from realy. What poses fas true is actly false, the lie becomes truth. As a result, the boundaries between legal and illegal are continuously shifng, by the widespread mechanism of reversibility. For example, © nab the profits made in diamond transactions (Gee Event 2), the racket formed by the high- ranking army personnel and family membes of some of the leading politicians, ute the vocabulary of law and onder. Racketeers thus pose as Inw-sbiding members of government agencies created to investigate “dubious” diamond deals and fraudulent tnnsactions. In this way, the racketeer becomes the upholder of morality, whereas the owner oF buyer of the diamonds ~ suchas Me Joseph (Event 3), who, al things considered, had acquited the 17;-caat stone in a perfeciy normal transaction ~ is reconstructed in terms of a swindler (which, of course, he often is too). ‘The crisis of meaning that can be observed at all levels of Zairean society has profoundly alienating effects on doth macro- and microleves of societal life, equally affecting, for example, the ways im.which decisions ft the top are made, and dhe ways in which relations within such basi ‘social building blocks as the familial unit take shape. The breaking up of the doxic experience, the taken-for-granted quality of a wos that goesPOSTCOLONIALISM, POWER AND IDENTITY 93, without saying for those who experience, live in and belong to it, has indeed far-reaching consequences; it jeopatdises cohesive cultural systems and threatens cultural identities and habituses. Kozanga exika (to be without a place) Many popular songs bemoan the lack of a place to which one fully belongs’ (Aiqong erika), thereby indicating a deeply-fel ruprare with one's lived world (see Of relationships in urban contexts over the past decades. ‘he Zairean urban contert is undergoing a marked rurasation or (Gee also, Deviseh 1995). This process goes hand in hand with social barriers and an increasing polarisation and segregation of the spac, beeweca the commercial and “Europeas’ een of the city by the Belgians before 1960, and the endless ‘pesipheral city’, Fontaine 1970; Nzuzi 1992). Paradosicall, as ia the times of WE pre- colonial slave and ivory tade in which che aLuund were deeply involved, the ‘periphery’ has a che same time reguined centaliy inthe economic dynamics, As such, the rurlsation of the city, especialy in the ei, goes hand in hand withthe monetarisation of the traditional gift logic in some of Zaire rural areas, such a5 Kahemba; while an increasing number of people ~ the vast majority of Zaireans who do not have acess to diamond dollars ~ no longer participate in a fling system of commodity market exchange. Dolls, excessive spending and consumerism have become the major marker of success in the wodld of the diamond trade In the face of these changing Afican realtes, our standard frames of anulyss, suchas the casic dichotomy between rural and urban, no longet fir an increasingly ‘exotic’, complex and chaotic world that seems t0 announce the end of social life and the societal fabric ax most of us understand it. The same applies to che delineation we commonly make berween ‘state’ and ‘society. What, for example, is the usefulness of adequacy of such concepts as ‘sate’, or ‘democracy’ for an improved understanding of the manifold processes of collapse and change that have given shape to the Zairean realty as it presents itself today? As T argue in the next secdons, I believe that analysis of the central isues foregrounded in the Zairean exss ~ issues eonestning representation, identity, ethnicity, nationalism, violence, strategies of survival and resilience, the tole of the media, the norion of ctienship, and ch society — a0 longer benefits from an explanatory frame that presupposes the ‘tte The need is noe for more refined typologies of stae-ystems in Afica (Gee Chazan et a. 1992). Rather, we should focus, as T have tried to do94 cRtsts, STATE DECAY AND IDENTITIES above, on the interaction between local and global spheses of socio- politcal, economic and cultural interaction, and on the hinge-joinits between ‘traditional’ and ‘moder’ workls, concepts, beliefs and practices. This implies an explanstion of such processes of interaction, through an analysis ‘of cultural entities as forms, not only of hegemony and resistance, but also of adaptation, accommodation and collaboration, I search of new Zaiean identities Ao iportast observation in his haogeapiy is a much of the elt and poll struggle in Zaire today foes on contol over a polis of identity a see sepresenatio, which impos tt ts sel generted and seleconsucted. The changing coco-polla content eems to give tae to anew pole of deny (ee evict 1s) Toa lange extent the sues OF deney today eee Tound the queen of who reprsets whom, and o/for whom, Recouse te colonial and postcolonial retype tay be Ineiable in stuatons were iden ea ply, Who is suthon, who i mbject of repre ote Tn retin to the national an international cote the 19708 and spon oflered to modes of ens foZaieana. On the one hand thre ws the rctionhip with the West, the wodd of the former Began Colonie, our unc (te i), vcwed nares ems, The raton- Ship benscen ethers brother an ster’ cle sone of respect and ‘rapocty, Hens the motel ceted an abies spect of gh {he and eapeeutions on both sides (Devic 994; Nite Maken 19), ich cul! nd ony to tal dsilason ad appoint. The MPR, Ur the cues hand, ofeted at aerating paternal model n'a movement trey fom the colonial past che invioalie oneal uncle’ and Ns abled promis of modciniy, towards ‘nuheny, sold and ¢ few Zatean lensty defined by Mout, he Pater of the Nation" Ia the cay topos bots the avancla aod the peal hodel of efor tn broke town The 1991 looting of soperares, Wester compas tevturant and ier sbols of nary in Kissaeasigiied the sjecton Sr the undes word Devich 199479) At the same time, Mabuts tanouncement ofthe end of the Second Republic in N'Sel, Apel 19, toi the coming move towns nltbaryi, made offal te low of Srey Ua fad Tong mked the pteoaalematve. The 1991-92 Sever eatial conference (ONS). ned to “econ the people of ase wih themselves ab an ocal span had, herefoe eoneded wih a seach fer new Met ‘No longer idetiyng themselves av cin in slition co the fates or ste Slee in rcaton tthe uc growing number of Zaieas today seat being pictured as nue abet of despot regis oF easton and proacas eject fo the rls iponed ovr and shove Thr hens by te Wess, epesented bythe IMF and othr tealPOSTCOLONIALISM, POWER AND IDENTITY 95 organisations, The current politics of identity, usually stzessing. one’s independence and self-supporting qualities, is evidenced by the prolifezaion ‘of ‘popular’ painting, theatre and local newspapers as chronicles and commentaries on the urban contest (Gee Biaya 1989; de Villers 1992; Jewsiewicki 1989); by the proliferation of spisiual healing in uibaa, and to a lesser extent also ronal, contexts (Ndaywel 1995); by the (eemerging and (teinventng of ritual as exemplary enactment of co-operative soci ability, whether or not itis actually realised outside the time of the performance islf bya renewed stress on ethnic identity; by the emesgence Of new forms of reciprocity in church-connected grasstoots organisations dat play an increasing role in the promotion of peoples self-awareness (eee de Dotiodot 1994; Jewsiewicki et a. 1995); by actions such as the radio talon in the cits oF the city of Kikwit, where international radio- news (RFI, BBC, Canal Aftique, Afsique No. 1) is spelled out and ‘commented upon by the owners of smull porable radios on a blackboard inthe street while the whole neighbourhood contibutes batteries to keep the radio working as away of escaping interpretations snd representations imposed upon them from elsewhere. ague between the local and the global, or the rural and the urban, reveals a challenge for arguments identity ard issues of (self)tepresentation. It is the intricacy of the lexities and contradictions in the interaction between the postcolonial Sach complexities and fcate than is contemplated by the standard conceptualisations which proclaim a dichotomous relationship between politcal superstructares and local socio-political forms of organisation. ‘This relationship is usually analysed in terms of an antagonism, or @ binaty opposiion in terms of above and below. In the 1970s and 19808, the more clastical focus on the management of regime relations and the conduct of ‘high politics’, or politics from above, gradually shifted to the ‘frog’ perspecive of ‘politics from below’ of ‘deep politics’ (Bayart 1992; Chazan et al. 1992). Within this perspective, an earl, pathbreaking ‘work in the field of Aftican politcal studies was Weiss’ analysis of a ‘movement of rural revolution, executed hy a peasantry mahilised by a young politcal elite, and directed against the rapidly disintegrating Congolese cestral authority (Weiss 1967). The approach of Hyden (1980), ‘on the other hand, was seminal in that he showed how large parts of the ‘Tanzanian pessantry remained ‘uncaptused! by the postcolonial state and market. More recently, a group of scholars including Bayatt (1985) and ‘Mbembe (1988; 1992) have written the chronicle of the dynamics of the invention of African processes of democratisation ‘from below’. Ia the same vein, the essays in Jewsiewicki and Moniot (1988) deseribe popular Zairean responses to institutional power, and show the multilayered96 CRISIS, STATE DECAY AND IDENTITIES connections between the machinations of power and cultural patterns. In their exploration of the muliple socio-political spaces and cultural levee that shape the actoal Afican pial fel, these authors focus in partial fon forms of hybridisation’, ‘fsion’ and cultural innovation, However in the current context, tropes of the ‘above’ and the “below ‘become increasingly cost, for they seem to conceal more tan they reveal For example, whereas the approsch of Bayart and Mbembe has the advantage of dealing with the prods of the postcolonial state and stesss proces of a Ge Bag pe 12) fen (1993), referring 10 recent literature on state-society relations (such as Callaghy 1984; Migdal 1988; Rothchild and Chazan 1988), and Fatton (1992) cematk, the use of the state/society dichotomy is problematic because the (African) state is rarely the sole harbinger of power. At the same time, the public realm is = one iden 1992: 6). This applies to the Zaitean context all oo well. The shifting boundaries herween legality and ilegalty are susceptible to poliical pressures (MacGafey 1992" 247), ‘One of the problems i, however, what precisely does ilegaly mean in Zaire. The lines berween the ic, the illegal and the ilegimate are cxremely difficult to draw. Secondly its no longer cleat whether ‘legality is sil and wniguth dnd bythe nation-state, a8 MacGaffey contends (192) In the current situation, there i legality initiated by the state ~ in realy 4 smal political elite of dines (Gee Braeckmaa 1993) who form the personal cocreive regime's domestic strucate of repression’ (Fatton 1992: 2g). This egal bas apread Grom the ceatre wo broader layer of soc according t0 a dynamic which incresingly escapes the mechanisms of ftate contol 48 sich, and also involves an international network that Surpasses by fa the naGonal Zaiean ‘mafia’ that are active in the arms trade, the diamond and petol trafic, the lndering of narco-dolas and ‘other similar actives (6c als, Askin and Collin 1993). Oa the other band, one could say das, pardoxial wolawfuness,acogantabitaciness and ilegality ae he only cements that put an ineseasingly fiona ‘sate’ in fridence and condinve to make it viable. For most people, the state has belome the looting roliers nocturnal knock on the doos,‘wsning the bhoose upside down (ide mactumbela ng nde), os Kinshast's indi, 2 Lingala argot, powerfally pus it Purhermore as ltrted by Event 2, the sroctore of the rate i often reduced to competing factions who follow thee own pathways of accumulation’ (Geschlee and Konings 1995). Fortwo decades, the oppressive state has foroed itself into the spacesPOSTCOLONIALISM, POWER AND IDENTITY 97 Of survival of the common Zairois by meaas of corruption and repression (Fatton 1992: #3; Leslic 1993; MacGaffey 1988; Schatzberg 1988; Young and Turner 1985). Today, the increasingly blurred boundaries of the state apparatus provide people on the local urban and rural levels of society with the opportunity to penetrate ‘the black hole of power’ (Zartman 1995: 7). the spaces previously occupied hy the imploding etste and the regime. In Zaire today, everybody ‘works politics’ This naturally leads to the implosion of the classic hierarchical state-society picture and to the creation of a new dynamic ‘mode!’ of interaction, the contour of which is stil only vaguely outlined. It is a model of intersction between multiple, dlalecicaly interdependent, socio-political ind eultural spaces and groups, linked to one another in constantly shifting hierarchies that are defined by the personalistic strategies of the dinosaurs and of other actors on the local and the global level. These networks, although largely based on personal links, cannot exclusively be defined as political prebendalism and. patronage. According to the context, ‘patronage may take on very different connotations from those generally associated with sel interested exchanges; it may partake of the quality of “gift-giving” (in the Maussian sense of the term) and summon a level of trust unknown among utban clienteles? (Lemarchand 1988: 151). Lemarchand therefore opts for a clear distinction between patronage, tibute and prebend: ‘All three involve certain types of selfinterested exchange. Yet they each tend to develop within specific institutional frameworks and are sustained by radically different normative orientations’ (ibid). Yet, in practice, they often interact and interpenetrate each other in more or less complex ways, fact alto acknowledged by Lemarchand, : Its precisely this interaction of conceptual grids and normative orienta- tions that Tam interested in here. For example, the fact of being knighted in the ‘National Order of the Leopard? provides a protected status to the beneficiary, and allows the regime to supplant a relation of ‘traditional clientelism (the tributary relationship between the subordinate Luunda chief and the paramount Lounds mawant jaa) by a relationship of politcal [patronage in the ‘modern’ sense between the Luunda chief and the ‘sate On the other hand, receiving the ‘National Order of the Leopard” allows the Luunda aristocracy to redefine the transactions with the regime in tetms of tributary relations, thereby promoting a shift away from a postcolonial politcal patron-client relationship to a more familie form of clentelism which also enables a redefinition of the status differences between the two sides involved. ‘Tribute has always been one of the most important organisational ‘modes of the Luunda empire's architecture as well as a means of adapting its political organisation to the impact of economic globalisation and ‘expansion (Vansina 1990: 257; Vellut 1972) For the aLsund, the interaction described in Event 5 is understood as a way of introducing and handling.[= 98 CRISIS, STATE DECAY AND IDENTITIES tribute, and thus a Luunda morality of exchange, in the space of the | state, thereby redefining in totally different terms what appears a& Grs © | be a mere patron-client relationship in which the Luunda occupy the subordinate position. Rather than mere patronage, tributary relationships | imply ‘pots! economy of i achange a wala te making of | politcal felations that reinsrutionalise the personalised sphere. In the | Same way as tribe is sent tothe sop village and complementing ry | its are returned to ebutary chief (ee Bostin 197s: 4 Mir 19H 6) Sn the Tanunda royals’ and the regime's interaction is based on transmision. | and exchange (exemplified by the rerun gift of » goat in the ritual | Gesesbed in Event 5) subject to this difference that respective positions | Ching, “tbotary chief") are defined vaguely enough to shift according to the situation and the respective points of view. Within the Zairean context the concept of the state should consequently be problematised and redefined in terms of a great aumber of political strategies which cannot simply be described as forms of political ‘decay’ or pathological dys- functioning, but which aim at the creation of networks and spaces of contact, palaver, (asymmetic) exchange, solidarity and complicity, enabling the circulation of commodities, money and wealth in people. ‘Such a redefinition of the state, and of politics in general, as an | inventive mixture of capitalist, tibutary and kin-ordered modes of political | and economic production, also problemasses another aspect stressed in | ‘many contemporary analyses of the (Aftican) political scene: that of | contfiet and/or opposition. | (cee Callaghy 1984; Osumaka 1994) with the ‘weapons of the weak’. Often this antagonistic relation is analysed in currently fashionable ESSE ] «GF hegemony and counterhegemonie practices. [= tt. i Sea | ‘Mitchell in the 19508 and 1960s, or more recent historical approaches t0 ‘Aftican ethnicity, such as Amsclle (1990), Amselle and M’bokolo (1985) and Vail (1989) have illustrated, 1993: 3425 Bia fof power between the local and the global is therefore played out io uch more dynamic and complex ways, in which notions of interrition ply as important a role a8 elements of opposition. For example, the Launds chiefs discussed above use argumenss ofPOSTGOLONIALISM, POWER AND IDENTITY 99 identity and policies of presentation and (ethnic) self-repsesentation to - create an objectfied image of themselves for ourward use, namely to deal ‘with regional and national representatives of the administration and the regime. Although there is 2 subtle critique of the regime embedded in these Launda cultural politics, their basie attitude is not so much one of contest, resistance or conflice with the state. Rather, they try to use the ‘state, collaborate with it and invade its space in order to further, among ‘other things, their own politcal agenda, These local strategies of resilience are not only directed against the state or in opposition to the state, but are also ~ pethaps even in the first place ~ inspired by the desite or the necessity to transcend the constraints of the lueal level and to pariqpate in economic and political spheres that are under the influence or control Of the merchant and political capital Unéoubtedly, it is in this sense that one must understand the post- ‘1991 complaints (heard in the Zairean hinterland more often than in the capital) that everything was better before le démocrateaerived. Because the collapsng totalitarian Zairean state has failed to extend central control fully orer more traditional local power structures, ic has shaped an arena in which ‘tibutary’ interdependencies have been created, and in which there is room to manoeuvre, In the quotidian praxis of governance and polis, conflict and op- pposition against the state have therefore often been transformed into a specific mode of negotiation and compromise which can be referred t0 as Farrangement. As Zaireans like to say: fou iit par arranger. Local actors such as the Luunda aristocracy have access to thete spaces of negotiation and mediation; it provides them with a possibilty of striving for the cexistence of their version of démacratc, cast in terms of personalised, “feudal structures of decision-making, deliberation, sharing of power and distributing of wealth. Conclusion In this chapter T endeavour to expand our eultural metlogue in order to captae the ways in which peopl, individually and collectively, experience, undergo and try to make sense of the profound changes in social, cultural, politcal, economic and moral pattems that charateise the contemporary Zaitean realy, In particular, T deal with strategies of elience on the level of the socio-political body, ia the interaction between local and ‘more global spheres of political and economic interests. I show how, by developing these strategies, loal actors seck to overceme the contradictions and ruptures embedded in dichotomies (between open-closed, rural-urban, society and state) which, as T argue, ate themselves gradually breaking up and disolving. Tn one way or another, these strategies all focus on issues of identity.100 CRISIS, STATE DECAY AND IDENTITIES On all levels of society the existence of a (é@ensinyisperidens, bu at the same time Zaireans inventively search for “=r > emanates, repens impure of the sal comenteotnly saad oe Undcobe edly, i politcal, economic and cultural terms, the stractual circumstances of the Zaitean state and the society at large differ considerably from ‘recolonil polities and realities ‘On the one hand, recent Aficanst academic discourse has persaps focused too narrowly on the postcolonial simation. T have argued chat both the current Zairean crisis and the various tesponses to it are to some extent alto rooted in + mortl, social and symbolic matrix that reaches beyond the fractures inflicted by the postcolonial world and the myth of ‘modernity, and that also draws from precolonil sourees. Ia the fragmenta- tion and mulplicy of ‘urban’ and ‘cur’, or ‘modern’ and ‘waditional” ‘worlds, reales and values, people seem fo continue to make sense of theie world by inventing transitional spaces snd interconnecting strategies (On the other hand, people do deliberately turn their backs on the faseness of the nationalist myths and the various cepresentations that are imposed upon them. They also continue to refer, or have started to -efer again, to a coturl, moral, aesthetic and ethical framework informed by and rooted in (eiavented or reimagined) ‘tradition’. This move, however, should aot be mistaken for escapism into the past. Rather than Eeing crushed under the weight of tradition, or closiog themselves off from larger politcal and economic processes, they aim at opening up more oF less separate worlds to construct encompassing social identities. The LLaunda example of the construction of wider networks with reference to long-standing notions of a situalised tributary political economy conveys this point. As such, the Luunda case also illustates che fact tha, in its predicubilis, the current ‘reflexive celebration of hybrid marginaliy as Fesistance against state hegemony’ (Kaauft 1994: 406) does aot capeare the compleniies of the empzial reales ved by many in Zaie today. "To captare this dynam, vital (whether it be a protective seul sin Event 1, political tual asin Event 5, of in another context, therapeutic ritual in urban healing churches) presents a privileged dimension, for it ‘ot only offers the possibility of resistance, but also the opportuaiy to crete a space-time of negotiation, collaboration and accommodatca in Which sense can be made of che mullevelled contradictions of the postcolonial universe. As suc, citual and other cultural pracces of public performances play 2 crucial role as local and global vehicles to (e)prodace, contest, transform, deconstruct and adape t varying forms of authori ‘The ritual reproduction and eansformations that ean be witnessed in a ritual as described in Event 3 form part of a more encompassing ural praxis and identity which appears as an ultimate seen paradigm. As a form of resiliency it not only represents and seleets the exsis in ZairePOSTCOLONIALISM, POWER AND IDENTITY 101 bat it equally offers the possibility of generating an innovgtive response to the need for new, mediating identities and forms of governance and of political, moral and social authority Acknowledgements Sustained fed research was made possible thanks to grants from a vaiety of institutions. T would like to thank the Research Fund of the Catholic University of Leuven, the Belgian National Fund for Scientific Research (NFWO) and ‘Viaamse Leergangen’ for their financial support. T also thank the Afzican and Aftican-Amexcan Research Ceater ofthe University of California, San Diego, for inviting me to convene « focus research agioup on the Zaicas criss Gan Diego, May 1993) T especialy benesved from discussions with B. Jules-Rosette and T. K. Baya. Parts of this paper were also prescated at the EHESS (Pats, May 1954), the Aftican Studies Centre, Leyden (October 1994) and the. Centre dEmudes et de Recherches Intesationales (CER), Paris (December 1994). I thank LF. Bayat, R. Devish, S. Elis, P. Geschiere,E. Hopkins, Vansina and RP. Werbner for theit comments and rematks Notes 1. Another major diamond-mining ste, Losambo, is located some 4akm fom Cafunfo. Before independence, both mines were exploited by the Poreaguete DIAMANG company. Together these two mines covered 60 per cent ofthe ser Angolan diamond production. The other 4 per cent maaly derives from Dundo- Lakapa, cowards the east In recent years numerous “wild! mining sites have developed slong the Kwaango diver. 2 Tn 1981 and 1984 UNITA unsuceessfily tried to take Cafunfo and deve out the MPLA. 5. For shore while, with the introduction of the multiparty sytem in Zaire, Zaircans entering Angola, especially those suspected of havieg UDPS sympathies, vwere also tortured of led by the fighters of UNITA, who thercby took revenge for the fat that Zaize had earned its back on Mobuty, long-rtanding frend and ally of Savimbi and UNITA. ‘4 In this sense, the borderline is not only 2 cumbersome division between Angolan and Zairean aLaund it also offes the possibly of refuge from war or escape from state consol and repression. Even ip colonial times, aluund crossed the border iato Angola whenever the demands of the Belgan colonial administra tors confieted with their. In 1957, the Belgians therefore decided to regroup the popalation, a plan that never materialised. The Luunda royal court has been located in Zaire for the greater part of this century. At least for three generations of paramount tileholders, howeves, 2 parallel but subordinate royal court hss existed ‘athe Angolan side. Ta this wag, ee Launda paremouat ttleholie, whe residing in Zaire, has always been able to maintain his influence over Lunda Norte 1a scent yeats the politcal station has threatened fo create cleavage beoween the two royal cours, for the Angolan court had no choice but to eo-opemte with102 CRISIS, STATE DECAY AND IDENTITIES MPLA, Whea UNITA took contol of the ea, some Angolan mempers of the opal dan were arested and besten on suspicion of collaboration with the MPLA. In May tops, however, MPLA bombed the Angolan royal village as a reprisal for its Hinks with UNITA. {1 After the 1992 peace treaty signed between MPLA and UNITA in Portal, the MPLA troops were distrmed, anda shorclved period of UNITA/MPLA Cobabison sein. However, president Dos Santos ereated the arimatin forces, Sho would monitor the pee-lection period In reality, the ant-matin, trsined in ‘Spain were used to report on the aciviies of UNITA and theitZaiean following i places suchas Cafanfo, For UNTTA, thei presence was a violation of the teat nd hor led to a seaous confice berween UNITA and MPLA which ended the ‘ohubitadon in the damond-mining area. UNITA reportedly sabotaged the Cafunfo Shine and Kiled the MPLA-appoiated Filipino superintendent of the mine. “Apart from the ames of prominent public Sgures, I have changed or ‘omitted the names of the people involve. Tc may be observed that by transporting che Luonda king to Kinshasa and keeping him there, the regime replicated, probably without even realising, tditional patios of pawaship that were commonly applied st Luunda and other royal cours. Nexto the precolonial polis] hestage which inspired much ofthe polieal imagery of the Setond Republi, there is an undeniable colonisl hextage, fs, as Callaghy (2984) note, the image of the strong pessona,patiarchal and patimonial Saletts so 10 tome exten te product of colonial imagery, reflecting, for example, the patsimosialiem of King Leopold I 9. Tes no coincidence, for example, that che regime's deah-squads, which ‘opetsted in the streets of Kinshasa in 1991 and 1992, became known as es bibs, ‘he ow! being atociated with sorcery and witcheraf. When one tnes in to radio (roto, eof? pulsating heattbest, it becomes clear to what extent-the popular Collective imagination views the politician in powerful images of witchcraft and Cannibalism (€E also Geachiere 1995; Warnier 1993). At one point, the regime's ‘one es with Coaucescu also gave tise to 2 poptlar discourse on vampirism and the vampire state (for a compantive example, see White 1990 on the removal of boa fide by the Kenyan colocal sate). The blood symbolism was farther ‘enforced by rumours concerning the Prima Caria in the eatly 19908 The polieans hd high-ranking oficial said to be members of cis mysterious insiution which ‘rignsted in the MPR, were believed to conclude a blood pact during an esoteric sual. Nor Busta (ig7sb: 116), for example, reports chat some Luninda and Chokwe cult movements, which germinated fom precolonial mamgonr rituals, had cheit ‘enual beliefs in the resection of dead ancestor. These movements promised {leubverion of coloail rue following the resurrection and they evoked repression by the colonial administrtion in Katanga. 11 One of the tileholders poidcal fiends (a Lunds descendant chrough his morte) had namely been appointed 2s commis du peyple (representative oF the ‘eopl) representing the zone of Kahembs, and became president of the eeional Essembly of Bandundu province in 1990, and secretary of state in the 199t-s2 ‘atonal government of Ngwunt « Kati Bod (a Luunda from Shaba, with clove Sieh to the mraon! Jam's court, ad with a predominandy Luunda and Lunds related power bat). a, Teis widely sumed, interestingly enough thatthe ‘Father of the Nation’ has never known his own father As fathedess Father, he thus becomea both hisPOSTCOLONIALISM, POWER AND IDENTITY 103 ven and his country org thechy echoing she tdtonal symbol wth rep | {torte making of be fg du the eathtnerene eal : | 13. 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