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    Adorno Onsubjectandobject PDF

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    Xavier Ovídio

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    On Subject and Object “Tolead in with reflections about subject and abject ase the difeuky of stating what exacly the topic of discussion shouldbe, The terms are putenly equivocal, Thus “subject” tan refer the particular individual Sewell acto universal aributes of “consciousness in genera” in thea izvage of Kant’s Prolegomena The equivocation cannot be removed "Simply through terminolgial danfstion. Foe both meanings have rec ‘prowl ned of eachother one can hardy be comprchended without the other. No concept of the subject can have the clement of individual Ihumanity-—what Schelling called “egoity"™—separated. from it in thought without any reference tot, subect woul lose al significance ‘Conversely the particular human inividual as son a one reflects upon itunder the guise ofthe universality of ts concept which docs noe nify merely some particular being hi ef mune is alteady transformed neo universal, similar to what was expressed inthe idealist concept of the subject even the expression "particular person” requires the concept ‘of species simply inorder to be meaningful, The relation to that univer- sal sul inheres implicitly in proper names They designate someone who hassuehand such 3 name and no other, and someone” stands ellipticlly fora person.” On the ther hand, fone wanted to escape complications ‘ofthis lind by ying to define dhe two terms then one would falnto an 246 ‘carenwonps: enimieat MODELS = pora that attends the problematic of definition in modern philosophy Since Kant The concept of subject and objector rather what they refer toy have ina certain way priority overall defition. Defining means 35 ‘much a subjectively by means of «rigidly applied concep, capturing, something objective, no matter what i may bein itself. Hence the resis tance of subject and objet tothe ac of defining. The determination of ‘eit meanings requires tellection on the very thing the ac of defining trancates forthe sake of conceptual managetlty, Therefore it is adv thle o start by taking up the words "subjece” and “objet” suchas they {re handed down by th well-honed philosophic language, asa histor ‘al sediment: not of course, sticking fo such conventonalism but contin ‘ing further with aerial analysis, One coud begin with the allegedly nave, though already mediated, view that a knowing subject, whatever kind it may Be, stands confronting an object of knowledge, whatever kind itmay be The reflection, which in philosophical terminology goes by the rare of intent abligua is then a relating fom that ambiguous concept ‘of abject back to ano lss ambiguous concept of subject. A second reflec tion rele the frst, more dosely determining the vagueness for the she ofthe contents of the concep of subject and object, 2 “The separation of subject and objec is both eal and semblance Tue, because in the realm ofcogition it lends expresion tothe real separa tion the rivers ofthe human condition, the result of coercive his- torial proces untrue, becuse the historical separation most not be hypostsized, not magically transformed into an invariant. This contra- diction inthe separation of subject and object is imparted vo epsternl- ogy. Although as separated they cannot be thought away, the Yeb8os of the separation is manifested in ther being mutually mediated, object by subject and even emote and diferenly subject by objec. Az soon si fixed without mediation, the separation becomes ideology, its normal form, Mind then aerogatesto ise the status of being absolutly inde- pendent—ohich ti not minds claim to independence announces is tlsim to domination. Once racially separated from the objec subject redaces the abject tse subject swallows objec, forgetting how mich itis objet sll The image of » temporal or extatempor original state of blissful identity berween subject and objects romantic, however at times a wishful projection today jus a le Before the subject const tuted itself undifferentiatedness was the terror of the blind nexus of nature, was myth; it wasn their protest against his myth thatthe great religions had their truth content. Afterall, undifferentiatedness is not (On Subject and Object oar sity, forthe latter requires, even according ro Platonic dialect diverse entities of which it isthe unity, For those who experience the new hor ror of separation transigares the ol hororof chaos, and both are eter zal sameness The fear of gaping meaninglessness made one forget a feat that once was a les compelling that ofthe vengeful gods Epicurean materialism and the Christan “fear not” wanted to spre mankind. Tie ‘cannot be accomplished except through the subject. Were i guided insted of sublaed into a higher form, the result would be not merely 2 repression of consciousness but a regression to real barbarism. Fate the Complicity of myth with nator, somes from the otal plitalinmaru- tity of soley fom an age in which self-reflection had na yet opened its {yes in which subject didnot yet exe, Instead of conjuring the revurnof| ‘his age through collective praxis the captivating spel ofthe old und ferentatedness shouldbe obliterated, prolongation s mind’ identity consciousness, which repressvely makes its Other lik itself Were spec- ‘lation concerning the sate of reconaiatin allowed, then it would be Impossible to conceive that state as ether the undifferentiated unity of subject and objet or thei hostile antithesis: ater i would be the com ‘munication of what is differentiated. Only then would the concept of Communication, as an objective concep, come into ts own. The present ‘concept so shameful crust Betrays what is bette potential for Sgreemene between human beings and things—to the idea of imparting information between subjects according tothe exigencies of suljecive reason. In its proper place, even epistemologcally the relationship of subject and abject wouldlie in a peace achieved betwen human beings ‘well as erveen them andthe Other Peace isthe state offferentiation without domination, with the diferentated participating in each other 3 In epistemology, ‘subject is usally wndertood to mean the eranscen- dental subject According to idealist doctrine, it either constucts the ‘jective world out of an undifereniated material asin Kantor since Ficht,t engenders the worl itself. The ertique of idealism was noe the first to dacover that this transcendental subject, which consttates all conten of experienc, sin turn abstracted from living individual human beings. Ie is evident thatthe abstract concepr of she transcendental sub {et that the forms of thoght, thet unity, and the originary produc tity of consciousness, presupporespreciely what it promises 10 estab lish: acral, Iving indivsals. The idealist philosophies were aware of this point Indeed, Kent tried to develop a fundamental, coasttive nd hierarchic distinction between the transcendental and the empirical sub- aus ccaTcHWons:cnIvIcAL MODELS 2 ject in his chapter on the psychological paralogisms? His successors, however particularly Fiche and Hegel, bu alo Schopenhaver with sub- tlelines argumentation endeavored to deal withthe unavoidable prob- lem of circularity: Frequently they returned to the Ariotcian motive that wae comes firs for consciousners—here, che empirical subject is not che Fst in itself and that it postulates the transcendental subject at its condition or arigin. Even Hise!’ polemie aginst peychologim, replete with the distinction between genesis and validity, continues th mode of argumentation It x apologetic. The conditioned eta be justi fed as unconditioned, the derivative as primary. Here a topos of the centre Wester tradition x epeated, which holds hat only the Fistor 8 Nietache critically formulated it only something that has not evolved, canbe true* The ideological function of the thesis enor be overlooked “The more individuals are in effect degraded into functions within the soxietal totality as they are connected up othe system, the more the per ton pure and simple, a © principle = consoled and exalted with the aneibutes of ceative power absolute rule, and sprit. Nonetheless the question of the reality of the transcendental subject ‘weighs heavier than appears in i sublimation a pure spirit and, above all in the critical revocation of dealin In a certain sone, although de- lism would be the lst to admit i, che transcendental subject i move ‘eal havi fat more determines the el conduct of people and society than do those psychological individuals from whom the transcendental subject was abstracted and who have ite to say inthe word for ther part they have turned into appendages ofthe social machinery, ult mately into ideology. The living individual person, such ashe is con- strained to act and fr which he was even internally molded sa hora Deconomicus incarnate clsee to the tanseendental subject than the lv ing individual he must immediately take himself tobe, Tothisextentde- lst theory was realistic and ned nt fel embarrassed when proached for idealism by is opponents The doctrine of the transcendental subject faithfully discloses the precedence ofthe abstract rational relations that are abstracted from individils and their conditions and for which fexchange is the model. If the standard strutute of society i the exchange form, it rationality constitutes people: what they are for ‘themselves, what they think they ares secondary. They are deformed at ‘the outset by the mechanism that was then philosophically taneigored. Ino the transcendental. What is supposedly most obvious, the empirical subject, would actually have tobe considered as something not yet exis Ing’ from this aspect the transcendental subject is “constitutive” Allegedly the ovigin of all concrete objects, nite righ timelesnese 6 concretely objected, fully in keeping withthe Kantian doctrine ofthe ‘stable and immutable forms of transcendental consciousness Ite solidity On Subject and Object 9 andinarianc, which coding ro anscendentl hlnophy engenders abject oat est prescribe the relay the reece form ofthe relerion of human beings that ha objecvelyccsred in the cond tine of eet, The fee hare socal necessary semblance hi tory bas Boome the pie of what scoring tote concept woud ave ob the posters The pilsopieal problem of constation has en inverted int its miro age ye in ts inversion i expresses the truth about the Rito stage that hs been talned: truth Tobe sure that a send Copernican tun might theoretically negnte, Kcr flo hast positive momen: that the antscedent ory kesp elf and ite members alive. The putas indvdual ones the possbiity of fe trioecs othe univer proof of tis hough wich et a Stir ad to that tent sol elton. Though given roy rer the inal ot only fos Ba esis Rypoatnes nly one ede which incomprehensible except in relation othe eer Ser the given the shandalon of eam cam however not remove, Almonte asin and agin he are fat pone 4 The insight into the primacy of the abject doesnot restore the old inten tho recta, the slawish confidence in the external world existing precisely as ieappeate this sie of etigue an anthropological tate davai ofthe elf consciousness that frst crystallizes in the context of the elaionship leading from knowledge beck tothe ower The crude confrontation of subject and objec in naive realism is of course historically necessitated and cannot be dismissed by an ac of wil. But atthe same ime i isa product of false abstraction, already a piece of reification. Once this is Seen through, then a consciousness objected to itself and precisely as such dinected outward, vieually striking outward could no longer be ragged along without self-reflection. The turn tothe subject though from the outset intent omits primacy, des not simply disappear with its reson this revision ccc ot least ofall the subjective interest in {recdom, The primacy ofthe object means rather tha subject forts part fs objet in a qualitatively differnt, more radial sense than object, [ocnse object cannot be known exept through consciousness hence is also subject. What is known trough consciousness must bea something ‘mediation applies to something metiatd. But sbjet, she epitome al ‘mediation, the How, and neve a contrasted to he objet the What’ tha is postulated by every conceivable idea for 2 concep of subject. Potentially though not actully, objectivity can be conceived without 8 “subject but not likewise object without subjectivity. No matter how sub- 250 ‘caTeMWoRDS: carticat MODELS 2 jects define, she existent bing cannot be conjured away from it. if sub- ject snot something, and something” designates an iredcblyobjee- tive clement, then ts nothing stll-even a acts pur it nceds to reer to something that act. The primacy ofthe object is the intent oligua ofthe intento oblique, not the warmes-overintento recta the corte tive to the subjective reduction, not the denial of « subjective share Object also mediated but, according wo its own concept it not s0 "horoughly dependent upon subject as subject i dependent upon objec tivity Idealism ignored such difference and thereby coarsned an intel lectualization that functions as a disguise for abstraction But this occ. sions revision ofthe prevailing position toward the subject in tod sional theory, which exalts the subject in ideology and defames it in epistemological praxis If one wants to attain the objet however then its subjective determinations or qualities ae not tobe elitinated: precisely "hat would be contrary othe primacy of the objet. If subject as core ‘of object. then the subjective qualities in the alec are all the more an ‘objective moment. For abject becomes something at all ony through being determinate. Inthe determinations that seem merely tobe axed tot by the subject, the subj’ own objectivity comes to the fore: they areal borrowed from the objectivity ofthe intenio recta. Even acon ing to idealist doctrine the subjective determinations are not merely a sftechought they ar also always required by what isto be determined, and in this he primacy ofthe object asertsitsell Conversely, the sup posed pure objec, free of any add chowght or intuition i the very fefletion of abstract subjeciviy: only t makes the Other lke hse #hrough abstraction Unlike he indeterminate substrate of reductionism, ‘he object of undiminished experience i more objective than that sub strate The qualities che waditional critique of epistemology eradiated from che object and credited tothe subject are due in subjective expec «nce to the primacy ofthe objet the reign of intentio obliqua decewed shout this. Ts legacy devolved upon a crtagueof experience that tained its wn historical, and finally societal, conditionedness, For society 1s immanent to experience not an dio yévos. Only the societal elf-fle= tion of knowledge obtains that epistemological objectivity that esapes [znowlege so long sit obeys the societal coerconst work init and does ‘or thnk through them, Ciique of society is critique of knowledge, and 5 ‘The primacy ofthe object an be discussed legitimately only when that primacy—over the subject in the broadest sense ofthe termi some. (On Subject and Object ast ‘how determinable, dati, more shan the Kantian thing-n-tself asthe ‘waknown cause of phenomenal appearance* Despite Kant, to be sure, ven the thing-initelf bere a minimum of determinations simply by being distinguished from what is predicated bythe categories; one such determination of a negative kind, would be that of acausality. eis suf ‘Sent to establish an antithesis othe conventional view that agrees with subjetvism. The primacy ofthe object proves itself in that qualita tively alters the opinions of refed consciousness that are smoothly con- sistnt with subjecivism. Subjecivism does not affect naive realism at ‘thelevel of content but rather simply attempts to provide formal criteria forts validity. as confined by the Kantian formula of empiri realism ‘One argument forthe primacy ofthe object inded incompatible with Kane's doctrine of constitution that in the modern natural sciences ratio peers over the wall itself erect that it snatches snippet of wit does rot agree with its own ingrained categories. Such an expansion of vaio unsettle subjecivsm. But what determines the antecedent objet = distinc from its being trussed up by the subject, can be gasped in what for its pare determines the categorial apparatus by which the objects determined according tothe subjeevistschems, namely in the cond tionedness of what conditions the objet. The eategril determinations, Which acording to Kane frst bring about objectivity ae themlver Something posited and thus, sit were relly sre “merely subjective” The reductio ad hominem thas becomes the collapse of sntheopocen tam. The fact that man a consttuens i n turn man-made deen ‘hants the creationism of mind. But because the primacy ofthe object requires both reflection upon the subject and subjective reflection, sub- jectvty—aliferenty shan in the primitive materialism that actualy does noe permit dalectics—becomes a moment thats held fas. ‘ Since the Copernican turn what goes by the name of phenomenalism— thar nothing is known unless it goes through the knowing subjeet—hat joined with the cule of the mind Insight into the primacy of the object. revolutionize both of these views, What Hegel intended to maintain ‘within subjective brackets as the critical consequence of shattering them. The general assurance that innervation, insight cognitions are “only subjective” no longer helps as soon a subjecivity is seen through asa formof objec. Semblance ithe magia transformation ofthe sub ject inc the ground of sown determination, it positing 2 tue being ‘Subject itself must be brought sis abjeciity it stieringe must not be ‘banished from cognition. But phenomenalism’s semblance i a necessary a5 cATCHWORDS: cHITicAt MODELS 2 come tests to the virally ieesisuble nexus of deception that subject 1 false consiowsnets produce and likewise belongs ta The ideology of the subject i Founded in such iresistibiliy: The consciousness of 4 defect the awareness of the limits of eogntion—becomes a merit 5035 tomake the defect more bearable, Collective nati was at work But itcould nat have previled with rach stringency, could nor have brought forth the most powerfl philosophies fa truth though distorted. didnot underlie i What transcendental philosophy praised in creative subjec tivity is che subje’ own self-conealed imprisonment within itself The subject remains harnessed within everyting objecie it thinks, ike an srmored animal in its layers of carapace it vainly tres o shake lose: yet ‘enever occurred to those animal ovaunt thee cativiy as fredor, I ‘would be well task why human beings did so. Their meal eapivity is ‘aceedngly real. Their dependence a» cognitive subjects upon space, time and forms of thought marks thet dependence on the spcia The species finde its expression in these constient, which reno less valid for hat reason. Thea prion and society interpenetate. The universality and necessity of those forms, hei Kantian fare, is none other than what ‘unites human beings They needed this unity for sureoal” Capiity ‘was internalized: the individuals noless imprisoned within himself than hes within the universal within society Hence the interest in renter preting the cpsvity as feedom. The categoral captivity of individual Consciousness repeats the real captivity ofeach individual. Even the view ‘of consciousness that allowsit tose through that optivty is determined by dhe forms thas implanted inthe individu. Thee individual el -ap tivity enighe eke people cognizant oftheir societal cape: the pre ‘vention of his was and remains a apt interest forthe continuation of the status quo For the sake ofthe status quo philosophy had to overstep its bounds, wich hardly less necessity than that of the forms themselves. [eam was this ideological even before set about glorifying the world absolute Idea, The original compensation alresdy includes the pre~ ‘sumption that reality, exalted into a produc of the puatively ree sub ject in earn vindicates itself as fre 7 Identity thinking screen-image of the dominant dichotomy in the age of subjective impotence no longer poses a8 the absolsizaton ofthe nbyet Instead what taking shape ie a type of seemingly antisubjetvis c= cntifially objective idensity thinking, what is aed reductionism: the ‘arly Russel was calleda nore Ite the characteristic form of reed ‘consciousness at present, falee because of its lant and therefore al the (On Subject and Object 355 ‘more fatal subjetivism. The remainders molded according to the san- dard of subjective reason’ ordering principles and, being abrteae ec grea with the abstracines of hat rearon Reified consciousness which rstakenly takes itself for nature is naive: a historical formation and itself mediated through and through, it takes itself, speak with Husserl for an “ontological sphere of absolute origins" and takes the thing confronting it which tcf has russd up, forthe coveted mater Itsel” The ideal of depersonalzing knowledge forthe sake of ebjectivity retains nothing but the caput mortwum of objectivity. I the dialectical primacy of che objec is acknowledged, then she hyprbesis of an unve- flected practi scence ofthe objec sa residual determination after the subject has boen subtracted away ellipses. Subject is then no longer a subtacrible addendm to objectivity: With the removal of one oF i ‘sential moments objectivity i falbged, not punfed. The notion that sides the residual concept of objectivity has then, ite archetype in Something posited and man-made: by no means inthe idea ofthe in ‘itself for which t substitutes th puried object. Rather its che mod of the profr the remains onthe balance sheet afterall production costs have boon deducted. Profit, however, i subjective interest limited and reduced to the for of calculation, What counts forthe sober matter-of- facaness of profit thinking anything bu the matter? it disappear into the return it yields. Cognition, however, must be guided by what exchange has not maimed or—sine there i nothing lef unmaimed any ‘more—by what i conceled within the exchange proceses Object i 90 ‘more a sbjeclss resid than it is poited by subject. The two con- Aliting determinations fit together: the residue which science settles for as its truth, isa product ofits manipulative procedures thet are subjec sively organized To define what objec is would in turn be itself part of that organization. Objectivity can be made out solely by reflecting at ‘every historical and cognitive stage both upon what at that time i pre Sented as subject and objec as wall as upon their mediations. To this fentene abject infact “inBniely given as tas,” ae neo-Kantanisen taught? Attimes subject as unrestricted experience, will ome dser to bjt than the resid fered and cutie to suit the requirements of subjective reason, According its present, and polemical status inthe philosophy of history, unreduced subjectivity i capable of Functioning ‘more objectively than abjectivsic reductions. Not the last way al cog nition bewitched and spellbound is thatthe tadtonal epistemological ‘hess have turned their subject mater upside down: fir fou, and foul fs fair, The objective contents of individual experience are produced not ‘through the method of comparative generalization, but rather through ‘he desolution of what prevents that experiene—as itself bassd—from siving itself co the object without reservation, as Hegel said, with the 24 ccarenwoxs: exrcat MoDEts 2 {oom that wold relax the cognitive subject unt it eruly fades into ‘theobject with which tr akin by virtue fi own objective being. The ley position ofthe subject in cognition is experienc, not form: what fr Kant is formations esenilly deformation, The exertion of cognition s predominantly the destruction oft usual exertion, of wing violence “gaint the abject. Knowledge of the objec i brought loser by the at of the subject rending dhe vel t weaves about the abject Ica do this only when, passive without anxiety entruss itself tits own experience. In the places where subjective reason senses subjective contingency, the pri- racy ofthe objec shimmers through: that in the object which isnot 2 ruljesive addition. Subjec is dhe agent not the constituent, of objec thie has consequences for the relation between theory and practice as well. 8 Even after the second reflestion of the Copernican turn, there still ‘esis some trath to Kants most contestble thesis the distinction between the transcendental thing-in-iself and the constituted, con- cretly objective thing For then object woud finally be the nonidentica berated from the subjective spell and comprehensible through its own sellcriiqae—if objec is there a all and noe rather what Kant outlined swith the concept of idea” Such nonidentity would quite dosaly {approach the Kantian thing-in-itel although he insisted on the vanish ing point ofits coincidence with subject. Ir would be no reli ofa dsen chanted mundus intelli; rather it would be more real than the muna sensibis to the extent that Kant's Copernican ten abate from that nonidencty and therein ins is limit Yer acording to Kant objects something “posited” by the subject, the weave of forms ast by ‘thesubjece over the Something devoid of qualities finally the la that ‘unites the appssrances, which are disintegrated by their elation back ro ‘subj, into a concrete object. The atributes of necessity and universal ity Kane attaches othe emphaticconcep of law possess thing-ike soid- ity and are impenetzable jus like the societal word the living collide swith, That la hich according to Kan the subject prescribes to nature, the highest elevation of objectivity in his conception, is the perfect, expression of subject aswel as ofits self-alienation: atthe height of is formative pretension, the subject pases itself off as objet. But nonethe- less this again is paradoxically corect: in fat, subject i aleo objec i merely forges ait becomes autonomous forts, how and by what titel ‘sconstiuted Kant’ Copernican rur precisely expresses the objetifict- (On Subject and Object 255 tion ofthe subject, the rebty of reification. ts uth content is by no means an ontological one but, an the contrary, the historically amassed ‘lok betwen subjecand objec. The subject ers that block when it ‘lsims supremacy over the objet and thereby defrauds isl of Asin truth nonidentia, the obec distances ite farther from she subject the tore the subject “constitutes” the abject, The block agaist which the Kantian philosophy pounds ts head is tthe same ie proc ofthat philosophy. Subject se pure spontaneity, orignary apperseption,appar~ nly the absolutely dynamic principle is however by virtue of che ‘ismos from any material no less eed than the world of things consi- tured by the model of atural sence. For through the chorismos the ssserted abrolute spontaneity in itself ehough ot for Kant, shut ‘doves it is form that s supposed tobe the form of something whereas by it on conetittion cannot enter int interaction with any Some- ‘thing. es stark ceparation from the acti of individual subjects, where that activity must be devalued as being contingent snd psychological,

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