CRIMINAL LAW 2

MODULE
May 3, 2020

Prepared by: Atty. Jelyne S. Sunga-Guadalupe

LESSON/TOPIC: ARSON, MALICIOUS MISCHIEF AND ABSOLUTORY

CAUSES ON CRIME AGAINST PROPERTY

Learning Target(s) :

1. Master the elements of the crimes of arson and malicious mischief;

and
2. Read jurisprudence related to the above-mentioned crimes

I. ARSON

The confusion surrounding arson has been confounded by the dearth of

annotation on this part of our penal law. Certainly, the law on arson is one
of the least commented in this jurisdiction. For the guidance of the bench
and bar, a brief legislative history of the body of laws on arson is in order.

Question No. 1: Read and digest the case of Buebos, et al., v.

People, G.R. No. 163938, March 28, 2008 to learn more about the history
of the crime of arson in the Philippines. Your digest should particularly
highlight the evolution of the crime of arson.

Buebos, et al., v. People, G.R. No. 163938

FACTS:
Adelina Borbe was in her house watching over her sick child. She
heard some nose, got up and saw the petitioners congregating in front of
her hut. When she went out, she saw the roof of her hut on fire. Instead of
helping her, petitioners fled. RTC found them guilty beyond reasonable
doubt and sentenced them to to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging
from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal as maximum; and to pay the cost. CA reduced the penalty, the
CA opined that the accused could only be convicted of simple arson,
punishable by prision mayor, and not for burning of an inhabited house,
which is punishable by imprisonment ranging from reclusion temporal to
reclusion perpetua. According to the appellate court, the information failed
to allege with specificity the actual crime committed. Hence, the accused
should be found liable only for arson in its simple form.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are liable for simple arson or for arson of an
inhabited house which merits a penalty of up to reclusion perpetua.

RULING:
Previously, arson was defined and penalized under nine different
articles of the Revised Penal Code: Article 320 (destructive arson), Article
321 (other forms of arson), Article 322 (cases of arson not included in the
preceding articles), Article 323 (arson of property of small value), Article
324 (crimes involving destruction), Article 325 (burning one's own property
to commit arson), Article 326 (setting fire to property exclusively owned by
the offender, Article 326-a (in cases where death resulted as a
consequence of arson), and Article 326-b (prima facie evidence of arson).

On March 7, 1979, citing certain inadequacies that impede the

successful enforcement and prosecution of arsonists, then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree (P.D) No. 1613. P.D. 1613
supplanted the penal code provisions on arson.

On November 11, 1980, the law on arson was again revisited via P.D.
No. 1744. The new law expanded the definition of destructive arson by
way of reinstating Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code. The amendatory
legislation also paved the way for the reimposition of the capital
punishment on destructive arsonists. When Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659
(An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes) was
passed on December 13, 1993, Article 320 again underwent a revision.
Irrespective of the application of the qualifying circumstances, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is
perpetrated or committed by two (2) or more persons or by a group of
persons, regardless of whether their purpose is merely to burn or destroy
the building or the burning merely constitutes an overt act in the
commission or another violation of law.

The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any
person who shall burn:

1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks

factory, ordinance, storehouse, archives or general museum of the
Government.
2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or
explosive materials.

If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized

under this Article, death results, the mandatory penalty of death shall be
imposed.
Of course, with the repeal of the Death Penalty Law on June 24, 2006
through R.A. No. 9346, arson is no longer a capital offense.

In People v. Soriano, the accused was found guilty of destructive

arson, then a capital offense. On automatic review, the Court held that he
should be held liable only for simple arson.

Now, to the penalty. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the

maximum of the indeterminate penalty should range from six (6) years and
one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Considering that no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the
penalty should be imposed in its medium period [eight (8) years and one
(1) day to ten (10) years]. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence is
prision correctional, which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day
to six (6) years, to be imposed in any of its periods.

The CA sentence is in accord with law and jurisprudence. We sustain

it. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed judgment is
AFFIRMED in full. SO ORDERED.
Question No. 2: Distinguish simple arson from destructive arson. Give
the elements of each crime. Support your answer with the ruling in the
case of Buebos, et al., v. People, G.R. No. 163938, March 28, 2008 What
laws penalize these two distinct crimes?

The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson

by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The
acts committed under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended)
constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for
being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of
decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. On the other
hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes
with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes
with a lesser penalty.

In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less

significant social, economic, political and national security implications than
Destructive Arson. Destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC, on the
other hand, contemplates the burning of buildings and edifices (People v.
Soriano, G.R. No. 142565, July 29, 2003). However, acts falling under
Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson
depending on the qualifying circumstances present.

The elements for Simple Arson are 1.) Burning or setting fire to the
property of another; and 2.) Setting fire to his own property under
circumstances which expose to danger the life or property of another
Question No. 3: Read and digest the case of People v. Malngan, G. R. No.
170470, September 26, 2006. What is the crime committed if an act
resulted to both burning and death?

People v. Malngan, G. R. No. 170470

FACTS:
January 2, 2001 when the witness and his tanods saw the accused-
appellant, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto Separa, Sr., hurriedly
leaving the house of her employer. She was seen to have boarded a
pedicab which was driven by a person later identified as Rolando Gruta.
Thirty minutes later, at around 5:15 a.m. Barangay Chairman Bernardos
group later discovered that a fire gutted the house of the employer of the
housemaid. When Barangay Chairman Bernardo returned to the Barangay
Hall, he received a report from pedicab driver Rolando Gruta, who was also
a tanod, that shortly before the occurrence of the fire, he saw accused-
appellant coming out of the house. Barangay Chairman Bernardo, Rolando
Gruta and the other tanods proceeded to Balasan Street and found the
accused-appellant. Mercedita Mendoza, neighbor of Roberto Separa, Sr.
and whose house was also burned, identified the woman as accused-
appellant, a disposable lighter was found inside accused-appellant’s bag.
Thereafter, accused-appellant EDNA confessed to Barangay Chairman
Bernardo in the presence of multitudes of angry residents outside the
Barangay Hall that she set her employers house on fire because she had
not been paid her salary for about a year and that she wanted to go home
to her province but her employer told her to just ride a broomstick in going
home. Accused-appellant was then turned over to arson investigators
headed by S[F]O4 Danilo Talusan, who brought her to the San Lazaro Fire
Station in Sta. Cruz, Manila where she was further investigated and then
detained. When Mercedita Mendoza went to the San Lazaro Fire Station to
give her sworn statement, she had the opportunity to ask accused-
appellant at the latters detention cell why she did the burning of her
employers house and accused-appellant replied that she set the house on
fire because when she asked permission to go home to her province, the
wife of her employer shouted at her and when Mercedita Mendoza asked
accused-appellant how she burned the house, accused-appellant EDNA told
her that she crumpled newspapers, lighted them with a disposable lighter
and threw them on top of the table inside the house.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime of murder/homicide is absorbed in arson.

RULING:
THERE IS NO COMPLEX CRIME OF ARSON WITH (MULTIPLE)
HOMECIDE.

Accordingly, in cases where both burning and death occur, in order

to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated - whether arson,
murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the
main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of
the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of
arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed;
(b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person
who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means
to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if
the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender
has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the
killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed -
homicide/murder and arson.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 2

September 2005, in CA G.R. CR HC No. 01139, is hereby AFFIRMED insofar
as the conviction of accused-appellant EDNA MALNGAN Y MAYO is
concerned. The sentence to be imposed and the amount of damages to be
awarded, however, are MODIFIED. In accordance with Sec. 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 1613, accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to
RECLUSION PERPETUA. Accused-appellant is hereby ordered to pay the
heirs of each of the victims P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.
Question No. 4: What are the stages of the commission of the crime of
arson? Support your answer with jurisprudence.

The stages are Frustrated and Consummated Arson.

In the case of The States vs. Guilgan, G.R. No. L-14128 December
10, 1918, the Court ruled that the crime is classified only as frustrated
arson, inasmuch as the defendant performed all the acts conceive to the
burning of said house, but nevertheless., owing to causes independent of
his will, the criminal act which he intended was not produced. The offense
committed cannot be classified as consummated arson by the burning of
said inhabited house, for the reason that no part of the building had yet
commenced to burn, although, as the piece of sack and the rag, soaked in
kerosene oil, had been placed near partition of the entresol, the partition
might have started to burn, had the fire not been put out on time.

II. MALICIOUS MISCHIEF

Question No. 5.: What is the law punishing the crime of malicious
mischief?

Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code punishes crime of malicious

mischief.

Question NO. 6: What are the elements of malicious mischief?

The elements of malicious mischief are the following:

1. Offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another;

2. Such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving

destruction; and

3. Act of damaging another’s property be committed merely for the

sake of damaging it.
Question No. 7: Read and digest the case of Biaban v. Del Rosario, A.M.
No. 1349-CFI (Resolution), [January 5, 1978], 171 PHIL 1-2

Biaban v. Del Rosario, A.M. No. 1349-CFI (Resolution),

[January 5, 1978]

FACTS:
A complaint stemmed from the dismissal of the case of Malicious
Mischief instituted by complainant against Bibiana P. Bautista, her husband
Longinos Bautista, and their four sons, Ely, Godofredo, Eduardo and
Reynaldo. This case was filed first before the Municipal Court of New
Washington, Aklan. After trial, the municipal court dismissed the case
against Bibiana P. Bautista on the ground that she was exempt from
criminal liability being the sister of the complainant, while all the remaining
accused were convicted and sentenced to suffer twenty (20) days of
imprisonment and to indemnify Coronacion Pastrana in the sum of Fifty
Pesos (P50.00). On appeal, the Court of First Instance, presided over by
respondent Judge, acquitted all the accused on the basis of its findings that
damage, if any, was not inflicted due to hate, revenge or other evil motive.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Judge was bias in acquitting all the
accused in a criminal case for malicious mischief.

RULING:
It was found established by the evidence that the cutting down of the
star apple tree and the damage on the vegetable plants were apparently
caused by the transfer, by Bibiana Bautista, of the house of her son,
Godofredo Bautista, to the portion of the land which belonged to her. It
was found, therefore, that no malice attended the aforementioned action
of Bibiana. Indeed, if there is no malice in causing the damage to the
property, there is no crime of malicious mischief, and the obligation to
repair the damage is only civil. As correctly found by the Judicial
Consultant, there is no showing from the record that respondent Judge
acted with bias or partiality in the adjudication of the afore-mentioned
case.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this case is DISMISSED.

Question No. 8: Read and digest the case of Valeroso v. People, G.R.
No. 149718. September 29, 2003

Valeroso v. People, G.R. No. 149718.

September 29, 2003

FACTS:
The petitioner was a former barangay captain of Balon Anito,
Balanga, Bataan. On August 21, 1996, the Philippine National Bank (PNB)
hired the petitioner as caretaker of its lot situated in Porto del Sol
Subdivision, Balon Anito, Balanga, Bataan. Consequently, the petitioner
put up on the said lot a sign which reads "No Trespassing, PNB Property"
to ward off squatters. Sometime in April 1997, despite the sign, Mrs. Julita
Castillo, believing that the said lot was owned by her grandparents,
constructed a nipa hut thereon. She spent P12,350 for the hut's
construction.

On June 5, 1997, the petitioner, together with Jorge Valeroso,

Fernando Operario, Peter Morales and Rolando de Guzman, tore down and
demolished Mrs. Castillo's hut. She thus filed with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Bataan a criminal complaint for malicious mischief against the
petitioner and his cohorts.

MTC ruled in favor of Castillo. RTC and CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Valeroso committed Malicious Mischief.

RULING:
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, all the foregoing elements of
malicious mischief are present in the case. First, he admits that he
deliberately demolished the nipa hut of Mrs. Castillo. Second, the
demolition does not constitute arson or any other crime involving
destruction. Third, as correctly found by the CA.

Petitioner was not justified in summarily and extrajudicially

demolishing private complainant's structure. As it is, petitioner
 proceeded not so much to safeguard the lot as it is to give vent to his
anger and disgust over Castillo's disregard of the "no trespassing"
sign he placed thereon. Indeed, his act of summarily demolishing
the house smacks of his pleasure in causing damage to it (United
States vs. Gerale, 4 Phil. 218).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack

of merit. The assailed Decision dated September 7, 2001, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23672 is AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.

II. EXEMPTION FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN CRIMES AGAINST

PROPERTY

Question No. 9: What is the rule enshrined in Article 332 of the Revised
Penal Code?

Article 332 only applies to the felonies of theft, malicious mischief

and swindling. No criminal liability, but only civil liability shall result from
the commission of said offenses. The reason for this is that the law
recognizes the presumed co-ownership of the property between the
offender and the offended party. However, if the crimes that are included
in Article 332 are perpetrated with another crime such as estafa, extension
will not be applied.

Question No. 10: For purposes of the aforementioned provision, is the

relationship by affinity created between the husband and the blood
relatives of his wife (as well as between the wife and the blood relatives of
her husband) dissolved by the death of one spouse, thus ending the
marriage which created such relationship by affinity?

No, it is not. According to the Supreme Court in the case of

Carungcong vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 181409, they adapted
the continuing affinity view for the purposes of interpreting Article 332(1)
of the Revised Penal Code. They hold that the relationship by affinity
created between the surviving spouse and the blood relatives of the
deceased spouse survives the death of either party to the marriage which
created the affinity.
Question No. 11: Does the beneficial application of Article 332 cover the
complex crime of estafa thru falsification?

Estafa should not be complexed with any other crime in order for
exemption to operate. A complex crime will also be treated as one and will
be subject to a single criminal prosecution. The exception only applies to a
complex crime and not a crime of simple estafa. As mentioned under
Article 332 the law only applies to the felonies of theft, malicious mischief
and swindling. However, if the crimes that are included in Article 332 are
perpetrated with another crime such as estafa, extension will not be
applied. A person still has a criminal liability regardless of his relationship
to the offended party.

Question No. 12: Read and digest EXHAUSTIVELY the case of

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE CARUNGCONG,
represented by MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, as Administratrix, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM SATO, G.R. No. 181409, February 11,
2010.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF MANOLITA GONZALES VDA. DE

CARUNGCONG, represented by MEDIATRIX CARUNGCONG, as
Administratrix, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and WILLIAM
SATO, G.R. No. 181409
February 11, 2010.

FACTS:
Mediatrix Carungcong on behalf of her deceased mother, Manolita
Gonzales vda. De Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit for estafa against
her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national. It was alleged that
the said accused feloniously induced Manolita Gonzales, the owner of the
estate and herein deceased, to sign and thumb mark a special power of
attorney (convincing her that she was signing a document about her taxes)
which authorized the sale, assignment, transfer and disposition of the
latter’s properties. In relation to this, the accused moved for the dismissal
of the case.
 As a defense against his arrant prosecution, the accused cited Art
332 of the Revised Penal Code. He argues that he falls under the
enumeration of those relatives who shall be exempted from criminal
prosecution. Being a relative by affinity, he cannot be held liable for the
crime of estafa as stated in the law. He further counters that the same law
makes no distinction that the relationship may not be invoked in case of
death of spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, the
death of his spouse dissolved their marriage but did not, on the other
hand, dissolve the mother in-law and son-law relationship between Sato
and his wife’s mother, Manolita. He then cannot be removed from the
protective mantle of Art 332.

ISSUE:
Whether or not William should be exempt from criminal liability for
reason of his relationship to Manolita under Art 332.

RULING:
No he is not exempt from criminal liability.