jourmalof rSeview, aval of Pragmatics 22 (195) 328-373 Toward a pragmatics of emotive communication” ‘Claudia Caffi®, Richard W. Jann * Dinesrintento ds Science Glotoemmologietie, Universit i Gener, V Department of Kags i Ball 4, 1-16028 Gera, Healy EW, University of Coline, Geoaewatdctrafie 2, D-S033 Calerne,. Abstract The task of developing a unified pragmatics of emotive communication poses many initer- esting challeages for future research. This paper outlines some areas ix which more work comld he done to help coordinate present linguistic research. After briefly reviewing: same Pioneering historical work oa Language ancl affect, the paper elbcusse's the Lollowing concept, all of which seer to be i need af further clurification: ‘emotive markednese ud ‘emotive meaning”. “involvenrent degice of emotive divergence’. “abjects of emotive choice’, “loci oF ler vs, inmerdicinis", Competing categories of emotive devices in cur- Feat shudics of language and affect are reviewed, and 2 simplified framework ix proposal, evaluation devices. (2) prasimity devices, (3) specificity devices, (4) evi- dentiality devises, (5) volitionality devices. and (6) quantity devices. It ix argwcd that only swith consensual eategories and objects of analysis can investigatirs stant focusing on, and comparing findings about, emotive lingwistic phenomena from a unified point ef view. Finally. some distinctions between potential perspectives. units, and fe af emotive amalysis we proposed, and the paper concludes with a call for increased discussion of how research on Language and affect might be better coosdinated in the future. introduction: Metatheoretical views from a furry periphery® Presently, a manne of linguist data on Tanguage and affect is being cal- lected in pragmatics that cannot be fully compared or interpreted due to the lack of a unified, averridling conceptual framework, If we look at the growing body of liter- alure on language and affect, i is difficull to discem a consensual theory, a consen- sual object of investigation, or a consensual analytical methodalogy, Investigators We would lke to express our thanks te Hon Amel and Klaus Holker for their valuable comments 50 the line af reasnaing paescated i thi paper, nd free them. al tke waite inc. roe any responsibility foe deficits an the Final product, Pants of the paper are adapled fram a fecthceming book by Richard W. Janney entitled Speech wad Agfrcr; Ermonive User af Emglh © Siankicwice (1964; 267) used the expression “hucey periphery” w refer wo dhe eo man’s land of ‘emetive language, His original statement was: “L see no reason... why wee should be reluctant ty aclmnit the existence of « fuzzy periphery 378-2 16GAM/SH7.00 © 1994 Elsevier Science BAY. AIL rights reser SSDI 0778.2166194 0040-1526 © Calf. 8, Janney ¢ Journal of Pragmatics 22 (594) presently seem to be proceeding in an aif Je manner operatin sometimes very different assumptions, producing findings that are interesting ow an individual basis, but which cannot be fully accounted for from a unified point of view, Yet, if there is anything that we cam be intuitively sure of as us s our awareness. deeply rooted in our everyday experience as communicators, that ngs and language are intimately imerconnected in speech and writing. In this paper, we would like to: make some modest suggestions about hew linguists working in this area might igating affective feutures of language from a more unified, systematic, pragmatic point of view, We do not presume to be able here to fully answer all of the ietathcoretical and methodolog- ical questions potentially raised by our suggestions. bul we do believe that it is important to elraw utlention to the lick of coonination in current research. and Us suggest the feasibility, at least, of bringing order to this endeavor. ‘The complexity of the interface between language, people, and affect is implicit in the observation that; (1) we ean all express teelings that we have, (2) we can all have feelings that we do not express, and (3) we can all express feelings that we do mot have, or feelings that we think our partners might expect or wish us to have, oF foclings that it might simply be felicitous to have in a given situation for particular reasons, In short, we all scem to be capable of produsing, modifying, and modu lating linguistic and other expressions of affect more or less at will, in very subtle sways. in onder to ft the personal and interpersonal exigencies of different occasions: and we arc capable of negotiating agreement about the intersubjective significance bf our expressions of affect. In this broad sense, at least, the expression of feelin and attitudes in language does not seem to he that much different from the expres- sion of ideas: both processes are cognitively mediated ~ if perhaps in different way: to different extents. and to different purposes (ef. Amdt and Janney. 1991), But how da we do this? On the basis of what type of linguistic knowledge, ot ‘what type of broader underlying pragmatic capacity’? Is the ability 10 produce and interpret expressions of affect in speech and writing footed in knowledge of some: hitherto underesplored “emotive subcode” within the code of language, as suggested by Stankiewicz (1964), Volek (1987), and others? Is it rooted in knowlede of bith- erto only parlly investigated wses of the affective ‘tools’, ‘devices’, ar “resources” of language, as suggested by Irvine (1982), Labow (1984), Ochs (1986), and Ochs and Schieffelin (1989)? Or is it perhaps rooted in knowledge of a much wider, meta- communicational pragmatic nature, for which we presently have only dim. metaphors, us suggested by Watzlawick et al. (1967), Friedrich (1986), Arndt and Janney (1987), and a few others? Behind questions like these, there are naturally some even more basic metaprag- matic questions (cf. Caffi, 199%), Por example, how far do preset pragma ceptual frameworks, descriptive approaches, and analytical procedures actually go in accounting for this complex, if apparently effortless, everyday ability? Is a unified investigation of language, affect, and human interaction even within the present scope of linguistics’? Is a new, even more integrative, interdisciphnary effort perhaps called for? For lack of space, these questions will renin only inplicit in the fol- Jowing discussion. Instead, we will have the following, more restricted, aims: first, Wg on the basis of ic oom© Cafft, RW. Fanaey / Fournal af Progoasion at 1094) 325 will review some old and new approaches to language and affect that seem to be ‘of potential interest in developing what we would like (o call “a pragmaties af emo: tive communication’; second, we will discuss some congeptual and methodological constraints on current research on language and affect, pointing out some underlying linguistic issues at stake in this research: and third, we will present a rough sketch of same concepiual distinctions that we feel could be helpful in upprouching emotive ommunication from a unified, praginatic point of view. The paper is not program. matic in spirit, but exploratory. ‘That is, it is not an atlempl lo impose our own skeichy, preliminary ideas about various problems that seem (to us) te ned to be sealt with in present studies of language and affect on others working in this area, but rather an attempt to clear ground for further discussion, in the hope of eacourag, ing suggestions about how studies of language and affect might be better coordinated in the fature Fd, Some preliminary de FAA, The emotive capacity One of our underlying. assumptions will be that all competent native speakers of a given language possess what might metaphorically be called an “emotive eapacity* that is, certain basic, conventional, learned. alfective-relational con tive skills that help them interact smoothly, negotiate potential interpersonal conflicts, and reach different ends in specch, These skills are related-t performances of linguistic and other activities that broadly can be intespreted 9s “signs of affect’, or as indi of speakers’ feelings, attitudes, or relational orientations toward. their topics. their Partners, andor their own acts of communication in different situations. Successful mmeraction depends to a certain extent on a mastery of these conventional skills. We ‘will assume that explaining what the emotive capacity is, where it comes from, and how it is used to reach different ends in linguistic interaction, ane fitting goals of Pragmatic researct 1.1.2, The notion of affect ‘The decision to focus an language and affect implies some hody of waderlying assumptions abaut what “affect” is to hegin with. The great diversity of phenomena sudied under the subri¢ of affect in different branches af science underscores the truism that affect means many things to many people — mot enly aeruss disciplines but abo within disciplines, among different investigators. Like ather terms used in science, the term ‘affect is a figure af speech, a metaphor, which, reified by scien- ific practice. enables us to approach certain ranges of conceptualized phenomena as independent objects of study. and define certain other ranges of phenomena as heyond the scope of investigation (ef, Sarbin, 1986; $7), Western psychologists commonly distinguish between fectings. a broad, complex class of subjective personal sensations or stales of inner physiological arousal (ef. Besnicr, 1990: 421); emovions, a restricted subset of empirically inve nomena within this general class that are relatively (ransitory, of a cert and are attached to, a triggered hy, particular ebjects, ideas, or ouler incentivea3 C. Cat RW Samer # Journ af Pragmaaties 22 (980) 525-878 events (ef. Kagan, 1978: 16-17); moads, which are said to be of longer duratien than emotions, and not necessarily attached te specific inner slates or definite objects (ef. Davidson, 1984: 321); and attitudes, or transitory fecting states with partly uncontrollable subconscious psychobiological components and partly controllable expressive components, which are said to-be instrumental in maintaining social and psychological equilibrium and adapting to different situations (ef. Plutehik and Kellerman, 1980: 30). ‘The term ‘affect’ is usually reserved for feeling states that are ascribed to others ‘on the basis of their observable behavior in different situations (ef. Besnier, 1990: 421), In cognitive psychology. notions of affeet range from *hot’ to “cold” extremes (cf. Mandler, 1990; 21), At the houer end, ‘alfect” is used almost synonymously with emotion, as defined above. At the cooler end, it ix used w refer simply to human preferences, attitudes, or likes and dislikes. and to adaptive choices related to these (cf, Mandler, 1990; 21-22}. This latter perspective. which is incidentally of great potential interest for pragmatics, sees affect as a state of interpretive action and arousal that results from goal-directed cognitive appraisals. of perceptions of ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ processes in different contents (cf, Lazarus, 1982: 1024: Lewis et al., 1984: 271), In Tinguisties, on the other hand, the te coltcn used simply as a broad synonym for ‘feeling’, and is regarded as subsuming not only traditional pyycholog- ical notions of emotion, mood, and attitude, but also notions of character and per- sonality, and notions related to interactional Linguistic phenomena such as masking. hedging, undercutting, and so forth (ef. Irvine, 1982: 32: Ochs, 1986: 254; Ochs and Schieffelin, 1989: 7), In the following pages, in keeping with standard linguis~ tie usage, we will use the term ‘affect’ in this latter, broader sense — apologizing to psychologists in advance for blurring important theoretical distinctions — as an over Fiding, generic term for linguistically expressed feelings, attitudes, and relational dis- positions of all types (cf. Ochs, 1989). 1.13. Emotive communication We would like to suggest that pragmatics should focus broadly om what Marty (1908), at the (um of the century. called emotive communication: the intentional, strategic signalling of affective information in speech and writing (e.g. evaluative dispositions, evidential commitments, volitional stances, relational orientations, degrees of emphasis, etc.) in order to influence partners’ imterpretations of situations and reach different goals, Marty contrasted the notion of “emotive communication’ to the notion of “emotional communication”, which he regaled as a type of sponta ncous, unintentional leakage or bursting out of emotion in speech (cf. Amdt and Js ney, 1991). According to Many, emotive conumunication influences partners’ inter- pretations of situations by suggesting what he called “states of affairs that coincide with one’s own declared feelings and desires in the widest sense” (*Zustanden, dic dem kundgegebenen eigenen Fahlen und Wollen im weitesten Sinne entsprechen™) (1908: 364). Mary's wording is important here, because it underscores the notion that emotive communication, by this definition, has no automatic or necessary rela- tion to “real” inner affective states. Rather, it is related to self-presemation, and it isA of Prognwanies 22 (10H) § inbercally strategic, persuasive, interactional, and other-directed by its very nature (cf. Parrel, 1984; S83; Robinson, 1986: 659; Amdt and Janney, 1991; 526-532). Emotive communication, thus viewed, is hence less a personal psychological phe- nomengn than an interpersonal social ane. This aligns Marty's (1908) idea of “eme- five utterances’ conceptually with Bally's (1908) and Sapir’s (1927) notions of “social emotional displays’, Bahler's (19:34) idea of ‘relational traffic signals’, and Black"s (1949) notion of “persuasive employments of affect’, ‘We could say that the function of emotive communication, in Bubler's terms, essentially appellative: emotive uses of language impose at kind of “communicaliv valence’ (hunmmmaitative Valen) on the situation, influencing partners” perceptions of what literally is communicated at the ideational level (cf. Biihler, 1934: 31), riction, we tend { perceive others ax “opening up” or “closing down being responsive or reticent, making sigas af approach of withdrawal; we perceive their relative strength or weakness, their fuller or lesser presence, their attentiveness or disinterest tet. Frijda, 1982: 113), All such perceptions are raoted in, and depend on, emotive displays. The prerequisite for interpreting emotive activities, according to Frijda. is often merely only the ability w view a piece af linguistic or ater behay ior as “the possible: starting-point af ats own continuation” (1982: 112). Ie is the capacity. for example, to view ‘positive’ behavior as a possible staring point for agreement ar cooperativeness, ‘negative’ behavior as a possible starting point for chsagreement or cenilici, “confident” behavior as a possilsle starting point for self ssertiveness or determination, “uncertain” behavior as a possible starting point for compromise or resignation, and so ferth, In all cases, the interpretation of cmotive activities involves an appreciation of interpersonal relations and self-present 112), In this sense, following Buhler's (1934) of the appellative function, emotive communication seems to be more closely related to notions of dramatic performance (role performance) and chctarie (persuasion) than vily def, Amdt and Janney, 1991), to traditional notions of emotional express 2. Historical notes on lunguage and affect A reasonable first step toward developing a unified pragmaties of emotive com- munication, we wauld like ta suggest, is to reflect on the history of similar endeav ‘ors in the past, and see what lessons can be drawn from these. ‘Throughout the his- tory of linguistic thought, we can find an unstable balance between the necessity of abstraction and the necessity of not losing sight of living language. Emotive com- munication inherently belongs 10 the k bewween language and affect wary ac ter, Solutions to the problem of the relation arding to the roles assigned to these two com- peting needs, The problem of the relation itself, however, has always been present in — present, and y Uneorelical reflections on languags collen somehow repressed, due io the difficulty of solving it ina fully satisfactory way, It figures, for example, in Sublime’s (Pseudo-Longinus) nG0eg (Ist century A.D.), and in the semiotics of pas- sions of the 70's (ef. Greimas, 1983; Parret, 1986; Fabbri and Peazini, 1987), in the actos sigmatus (a> apposed to the acttes exercitts} of medieval scholastic philosophy.530 ©. RW samme Foun of Pragmatics 22 (19981 325-373 and in the entangled problem of connotation (for 4 good hit ion, see Garza-Cuardn, 1411}, If we look for thearies that explicitly make the linguistic expression of affect a central concem, however, the list of possible candidates becomes shorter; we can find significant farerumners nat only in linguistics, but als0-in rhetorie, philosophy of language. and linguistic stylistics. In panicular. Aristotle's rhetoric, Marty’s philes ophy of language, Bally’s linguistic stylistics, and Prague funetionalism offer pre- cious insights. Each of these approaches is famous, and at the same time extremely complex, making any altempt to explain the many subtle diffeeences between their merlying views of language and affect potentially a subject of volumes of phile logical and exegetical analysis. Here. we will simply mention, in a very cursory way. some reasons for their relevance. rical survey on conn 2.1, Rhetoric: Aristotle and the argumentative perspective Tf pragmatics — envisioned here as dealing with the whole reality of communica- tion, including its emative aspects could choose a prestigious ancestor, it should be ancient shetorie. Aristolle’s Rhetoric can be seen as a metapragmatic treatise on the construction of the shared knowledge necessary for effective emotive communica- tion. Starting from what today would be regarded as a social psychological perspee- uve, Aristotle analyzes differcat kinds of argumentation which must fit different types of audiences. In Rheforie |, (A), 3, 1358b, perhaps an original source of the recurring semiotic triads in philosophy and linguistics throughout the apes, Aristotle states that discourse is comprised of three fundamental clements topic, and the hearer. In the present century, Aristotle’s rhetoric of persuasive discourse has been pursued in Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteea’s Pratt’ de Uargementation!. La newvelle shétovique (1958), a work af great potential interest for pragmatics, which facuses on complex emotive strategies stemming from speakers” continuous efforts to adapt to their addressees. Interestingly. some basic aspects of Giles and Cuuplands (1991; 6001 ‘accommodation theory” are anticipated by. and subtly analyzed in, the Traité. The main problem dealt with by Perelman and Olbrechts. Tyteea is how speakers build up a consensus, ora “communion of minds’. with addressees through the strength of their argumenis, and by the capacity of these w trigger the addressees* emotive participation. What makes the classical rhetorical perspective a refined precedent of cm prag- nly its strong inlersubjective erientation. emotive activities are regarded as semiotic phenomena with com ‘ative potential, regardless of whether they are “sincere” or nei, andl regardless of which mode (verbal, prosodic. or kinesic} they arc performed in, lt could be claimed, im fact, that emotive uses of language have been studied throughout most of Western intellectual history as ‘rhetorical techniques’, Rhetor- J communication and emotive communication share seme crucial feulures: both rigger a surplus de sense, both presuppose shared knowledge on the speaker's and hearer’s parts. and both rely on the hearer’s conperation and willingness to under-©. Cui, 8. Fanny | eaurnal of Priaganaties 22 (1) 525-328 au take the inferen Lneir literal ones. One interesting goal for a pragmatics of emotive communication would be 1 begin allempting te account for emotive thetorieal techniques front a new, mone sys« tematic, unified. point of view. This would require, among other things, rethinking, and reinierpreting many important rheturicul insights of the past, and perhaps re-cvaluating some modem contributions in this ares such as Lausberg’s (1960) and Perelman and Olbreehis-Tytera’s (1958). Helpful recent research in this direction thas been done by Martara-Garavelli (1988). al steps necessary 10 give utterances intended meanings beyond 2.2. Philosophy of language: Amon Marty Anton Marty's (1908) discussion of emotive duplermgen, al the lum of the century, may be regarded as an important pioneering philosophical contribution later linguistic studies of emotive communication. To Marty, as said earlier (see section 1.3). we owe the insight that we must find distinguish between emetionul (cathartic, expressive) and cmiive Cinstigative, appellative) affective uses of speech: before we can begin to investigate language and affect rom a systematic pragmatic point of view. In the present connection, Marty's main contribution was his discus- sion of what he called *interest~demanding’ Gntercssekeisclende) utterances: that is, utterances signaling monientary evaluative stances er volitional states, which are performed by speakers te strategically puide partners’ attention and influence their behavior. For this category, he invented the term “emotive utteranees’, apologet cally adding that "One must excuse the new term on the grounds that in present lin- guislic usage, no better term for the whole class is available, as words like “provi. mation’, “request”. “wish”, ‘command’, ete. all have narrower meaning” (Man. nischuldige den newen Terminus damit, da im bisherigen Sprachgcbrauch cin fie dic ganze Klasse passender nicht vorhanden ist, da die Namen: Ausrufung, Frage, Wunsch, Belehisalz usw, alle einen engeren Bedeutungsumfang haben”) (1908 275}, Later, Biihler (1934) integrated Marty's distinction between emotional and notive uses of language inte his notions of the Avetdruck and Appell functions of language. p to Marty. emative communication is rooted in the relationship between cit forms of linguistic expression and their poteatial implicit significance for ers. Many noted that speakers habitually modify explicit forms of linguistic expression in order 10 emotively “eolor’ thent and stecr interpretations of their eit, imended significance (1908; 524ff). The linguistic activities involved in emative communication, he said, are not cathartic in nature, but intentional. infor mative (Wineifiung), persuasive (Mherceuguag), anclior coercive (Beeinflusswag). An utterance, he argued, is like a stenograph or a rough sketch of an idea: while the basic conceptual coordinates for interpecting it are provided by the linguistic code, 2 Mary's philosophy was mach meee linguistically orerted, Fo exaenpl is evened bythe Lie of Marty's majar wok, # aad Spr ipbitacyrlie (1908), than his friend Brentano". sachenigen cue Grendegany der allgerteine©. Caf. 8, da 1 Sora of Pragmatics 22 (5908) 325-875 the task of filling the utterance into 1 meaningful cognitive-emotive whole is left largely up to the iaterprerer (1908: 145), In interpreting an ullerance, he said, the partner must assign relative importance to the concepts refered 10, and must reco struct mast of the implicit relations between these concepls and the speaker, the topic. and the context in which the utterance is made. Inferences about such innplicit relations are influenced, in part, he maintained, by the form of the ullerance. He con. cluded that the potential emotive interpretations of utterances are restricted by the perspectives om events that the utterances explicitly sketch out In Marty's view. although nations like, far example. “You must do x", ‘I want you to da x’. it would be nice if you diel x°, “PIL be unhappy if you don't do s°, Would you like (a do x2", ete., may all perhaps potentially be in mind at the moment that a speaker makes an utterance meant to express a general idea like ‘do x’, the stenagraphic: nature of utterances themselves requires speakers 10 select only one yersion. Insofar as only one version can be uttered explicitly. the others rentain implicit, Marty claimed that for this reason, itis constantly necessary for speakers to reduce complex thoughts into simplified, explicit verbal sketches on the one hand; and by the reverse logic, it is constantly necessary for partners to ‘expand simplified verbal sketches into complex thoughts on the ether, From this, he concluded that the literal infermation that passes back and forth duris is thurs inevitably abways only a small, selective percentage of what potcatially may he “meant” by the speaker, and what potentially may be “umferstood” by the partner (1808: 168)." Emotive expressions, he said further, can be distinguished ints two main subs classes: (1) those related broadly 10 evaluation, ¢.g., expressions af acceptance or rejection, agreement ar denial, like ar dislike, e 12) thove refated te what he termed interest, e.g. expressions of wishes, desires, and feclings sclated to these (1X18; 276)" He regarded this second category as linguistically more complex than the first one, In sections 3. 4 and 5, in which we discuss the eatego. rization ef emotive communicative activities in psychology and linguistics, we will see that Marty seems to have been quite correct. His category af fareresse- heischende Augeruagen scems to have certain similarities with the psycholinguisti notion of the motivational ‘potency’ of ullerunces (see section 4}, and with notiens of Linguistic “involvement” (sec section 4), both of which ane associated with a multitude of linguistic activities, A pragmatics of emotive communication ean searcely ignore Marty's contribution to later distinctions in Biililer’s Sprachiltcorie.® Many woul nor have subscribed 19 che view of languape as @ comcuit af me © Many's sub-class of evaluative phenomena corespinls rughly wat pyc POSTIVE an neqalive atides and their imensity. His sub-class of inlersat-telsted phonowsna com respenuls mughly with psycholnpacal soncepts of individual conatiees ar motivation and ils argent. > Th a review of Masty (!MIS), Buber remarked that whereas Wand concentrated on language raainly Word. be referential lunctiea), Marty dealt with che Aundrack (ermational) and Appell qemative) functions, but ignored aspeces of Language related © Drarscelbaneg nil concepts usieuck \emphasizing emotional expressivity), and Flasserl, in bis stro opposition© Caffi. 8. Fanuey | Fournal of Pragmories 22 (I) SES 378 oo nd to the Prague School notion of the expressive-emotive functinn (see sec tivn 2.4} 23. Linguistic srvfisties: Charles Bally Charles Hally’s linguistic stylistics is also of special interest: nat only for pra matic approaches ta emotive communication in particular, but also for pragmatics tort court, because “style" (understood ay expressivity in Bally's approach). is regarded not simply as an auxiliary or accompanying feature of the Linguistic sys tem, but as a constitutive ane, Style, as defined by Bally, makes it possible to establish a link between affect as a psychological category, and grammar (under- oil ina road sense as alsa including dhe prosodic resources of linguaped as a social category, Bally's stylist ary linguistic relevance mainly because, in it, affective values are embeuded in the linguistic system itself, and nol simply added to, or superimposed on, the Hinguistie system. As is well-known, Bally's stylistics is a stylisties of Ia and Spitzer's, for example, are stylistics of as follows: © (while Vossler's rary texts), Bally defines stylisties ‘Stylistics studies the expressive Facts of language feom the viewpoint of their affective content, in other words, the expression of f oh Ian- guage and the action of language on feelings” (La stylistique lew faite expression du langage organisé au point de vue de leur contenu affectil, e"est- a-dire l'expression des faits de la sensibilité par le langage et Faction des faits de langage sur Ta sensibilité") (1970: 16 [1909)}, Following Bally. two abstract fun- damental tendencies, or modes of communication, are dialectically at wark in the intellectial moue (the mode pur) and the affective mode (the mode at véeu), These two modes dé not constitute a true dichotomy, but are rather ideal poles of 2 continuum: message. that is, will be more eriented teward one of them or the other. ‘The intellectual, logical mode is, above all, an abstract possi- bility which offers the identifying term: that is, the nouteal choise — for example, in a series of affective synonyms representing possible choices for the speaker (and not only words, but also whole sentences and expressions) — against which the expressive choice can be detected, compared, and evaluated. There is a con Kingous silent process of comparison at work in camawnication: “Words are andersiead aml felr only through a continuous and unconscious co among them in our mind” (*les mots ne sont compris ot sentis que par une com Paraison incessanle el inconsciente qui se fait entre eux dans notre cerveau™) 41970: 22 [1909], In Bally's view, there are Iwo main types of affective features: first, natural affoe Nive features (curaciéres affecifs natarels). which are connected with notions of intensity, evaluation, and beauty (1970; 300, 1701, [IMI9[: and second, evocative effects (effets par Cvocution), which are connected with the capacity of linguistic choices to evoke “the miliew where their employment is most natural” (“les milicux it leur emploi est le plus naturel) (1970; 30 [L909], While natural affective few tures af language are implicitly centered en the speaker. he says {partly prefiguring Inter notions of the ‘expressive function’), evocative effects are centered mainly on nparisonuae ©. Cats, Janne Journal af Prgasaries 22 F998) the addressee (of. Segee, 1985; 314), and are related to “subcodes” and registers of anguage that project different lacit definitions of the partners” sneial status, profes sional affiliations, respective cultural levels, and so forth. Rally further distinguished between two types ef formal expressive processes Iprocédés formelsy and linguistic features connected with these: first, what he calls “direct” processes, which imvolve lexical choices: and second, “indireet” processes, which involve prosodic and syntactic choices that go beyond single words (1970: 250, [1909]). Bally's exemplifications of these two types of expressive processes, m! their formal features deserve careful attention in madern pragmatics. There is net cnough room in these sketchy notes to fully discuss Bally’s contribution to the understanding of affective aspects of language, but it is worth emphasizing that Bally's approach is not restricted t0 Uke lesion, His notion of modality is: the analysis af sentences is an important step that clears the way for the representation of ways in which speakers’ subjective attitudes ame formally embedded in sentences.” According to Bally, a sentence is comprised af a anadus (similar to the madera notion ef madality) and a dict: (similar to the notion of propasitional content). The modes, which is expressed by verbs of propositional attitude like “think”, “rejoice”, “hope”, ete.. is the heart of the sentence ("eest lame de la phrase”) {1485+ 36 [1925]), and represents the speaker's attitude toward the propositional content, or the dicta, in Bally's terms, in its active, operative mode. The link between the intellectual and emotive modes. rediscovered within the theoretical init “sentence’ (see section 7.7.2), finds its formal abstract representation here. Starling from this conception, Bally develops a refined analysis of different types of dislocation (fa phrase xéymentée), which, in many respects, anticipates both the Prague studies of the thematic progression of texts in theme-rheme, and moder Iyses of right- andl lefl-distoc: ion. © While thet are cenain similaritaes Retween Bally's ‘muburalfevucative™ distinetion, Many": “emo. Hionsaemutve™ distinction, and Bubler's “expressive/sppellative™ distinction, i abl Be a distake 10 assume thai these notion ary all synonymous, Bally's discussioe iss it a sense. snore linguistically osented than those of Marty and Bubler, Rather diam sliscussing differemt rwasnas or payeholorial motivations for making linguistic choices, that is, Bally is pointing ue rae different basic pe of inguistic stylistic choice; his “natural” affective Features are relaied mainly ts nmmastulistic eiaices, ot shows willian a given seyle ar register berncen dlffexent Li form tokens and afeangewieate: ad his ‘evocative’ features are related mainly 10 eestuliie ebunees, o¢ choices between dillerent styles oe episters of speccl per se fel. Adndl and Fanney, LUST) Notions somehow clewe tw [ally's more explicit potion swadality cam be Fane in dhe Following fefinitions: “tte iniclecual subscription wan net ean fe accompanied by x more less Lively sy fut larward Uuut set” ¢-T'asentinsens imelloctae! que news danons ian act pet Eee accompa une gympathie plus ou moins vive pour Cet sete") CHRMol, 1922: 58); “Every seneave of calle quia language. ie compere oF be distinct elements: the ddew and ie presenassion . There is also 2 fecling which accorapunies the experioace ancl which is expressed at the same time as dhe expert affecrive presentation” ("Toute phrase du langage courant. refers dows Elements ‘on distinets: Mile et I presentation de celle ce. Iy a aussi un sentiment qui accompanies t'expe- we ot que be sujet extériise en meme toms guste . C'est la presentation afietive”| (Caray W907 Up©. Cafl RW Fane § deren of Peargouaies 22 (298M) 328-378 us y's importance for a pragmaties of emotive communication resis finally in the ‘fuet that he restores the crucial sole of emotive expression in language: and he goes assigning affective language, the made uécw. supremacy with respect 10 intellectual Language. Whenever we speak. he says, we are called upon lo chowse the st effective ways of expressing our ideas and feelings: and our feclings come frst. In saying this, Bally completely subverts de Saussure’s dichotomy betwe Jangne and parole, The subversion, however, was never made explicit in Bally's works, where we find nothing hut words af devoted assent to the staster whose notes he, together with Sechehaye, so carefully callected and edited into the Cours (1916). Pechaps this explains divergent, often critical, interpretations of Bally's viewpoints Tater (¢f, Stankiewicg, 194; Braselmann, 1982; Chiss, (987). Without entering into tical discussion here, i! may suffice Wo quote a touching passage, which has U flavor of a confession: “[afler acknowledging the Savssure’s importance for his work] Nevertheless, this incomparable master did mot particularly chwelll an the ques: Sons which | Tater came 1 love, | mean the questions conceming expressive Lin guage. the vehicle of affective thought" (*“Toutefois ce maitre incomparable ne s'est Pas attandé spécialement aux questions gui m'ont passion’ plus tard, celles nolum- ent qui concernent Ic langage expressif, véhicule de la pensée affective’) (foul de Geneve, 10 April, 1957, quoted in Hellman, 1988: 10%, Onee we recognize the tnic significance of affect in Bally"s stylistics, which has nathing to do with the whimsical expression of idiosyneratic emotionality or int ‘Gonality, but rather comes very close to the Latin gfficere (to affect, to do something. to something, to influence something or someone), it becames possible to share Braselmann’s (1982) and Wunderli’s (1998) conclusion that it is reductive to sec Bally's works “merely” as studics of expressive language, His wsgarch, beyond being stylistic. is, im fuct, eminently pragmatic: it is centered on the active social sharacier af language. viewed as “the tendency by which speech is moved to serve action” (“la tendance qui pousse la parole & servir action") (1965: 1k [1925]). The social nature of affective language is never blurred in Bally’s research: “one exn show what one is thinking and fecling only through expressive meuns which understandable te others” Con ne peut montrer ce qu’en pense ct ce qv'an se imide que par des moyens dexpression que les autres peuvent comprendre™) (1970: 6-7 [1909)), Bally's wark paves the way for models of linguistic communication based on intersubjectivity, such as those develaped by Benveniste and Bachtin later in the century, and makes him, as Wunderli (1990: 385) says. “one of the ieaportant forenaimers of modem pragmatics” (einer der wichtigen Vorlivfer der heutigen Pragmatik”), 24, Linguisties: Prague functionalisem ally, important conttibutions to the study of language and aff come for several decades from the Prague School, which has dealt with the aff functions of Language sinee the very beginning (cf. Danes, 1989). The second third statements of the thind thesis of the Prague Linguistic Circle (1929), for exum- ple, are directly concemed with this issue, Mter distinguishing conceptually betweenwe Cath RAV, Leamey & Jounal of Peagmati aay 428. 378 anal “ma Mary's earl the write jested” speech (ina munner, incidentally, that is reminiscent of ¢ distinction between inner and outer manifestations of language).” ion of language are ms. Both these fea tures either interpenetrate or one of them prevails aver the other” (1924: 88). In the Prague functionalist view, “imtellectual’ speech is always socially on the other hand, may be itself an outlet of the 's emotion (Marty's emotional function Buhler’s Ausdrnck function may also have a social orientation: for example, when it aims at causing emotions inthe hearer (Aristotle's persuasive goal, Marty"s emotive function Bubler's Appel! Function). Among works in the Prague funetion 1 tradition that are particularly relewant for madem studies of language and affect, st least Mathesius’s studies of linguistic means of reinforcement (Verstartung) and emphasis (Faphase) have 10 be aen- Honed, Mathesins' (1964) distinetion between reinforcement and emphasis may be surmmarized as follows: whereas reinforcement is mainly a lexical matter, involving choices of graded suffixes, marked lexemes, shang. and so furth, emphasis is mainly a1 matter of syntax and prosody, and involves choices in sentences in which the par ar Sarsniclidie 2 jon express the emphatic orientation of the speaker to the content (emphatische Einstetting des Sprechenden sun Satcieiaity (1964: 430), Roman Jakobson, who was a protagonist of Prague funetionalism from the outset, includes. within his widely-known six funetions of language, a function called the expressive or emotive’ function, which is speaker-cemered, and is bused on the expressive (dusertek) function in Biihler's (1934) Organeu-made. In Jakobson's words, this funetion “aims at a direct expression af the speaker's attitude toward what he is speaking about .. The emotive function, laid hare in the interjections, fs vors to some extent all our utterinees, on their phonic. grammatical, and lexical level” (akobson, 1960: 354). In hindsight, it is rather unfortunate that Jakobson combined Marty's (and, t0 a lesser extent, Buibler’s) clear distinction between the emotional and emotive functions of language inte a single funetion in his model. Nevertheless, Jukehson makes explicit reference to Marty's cantribution, pointing, out the informational capacity of emotive elements of messages, and stressing, the systematic — and nat yet adequately studied — charscter of this capacity. In this akubson offers the famous example of the forty different imerpretable s communicated by the phrase “This evening’ in Stanistavskij's Mascow tne, and understowd by’ the side After Jakobsan, working within a much narrawer concepts! framework, Stan- jewiee (1984) repeatedly emphasives the systematic character of expressive devices in language. Stanckiewic? aims at restoring the primacy of engnitive aspects of affee tive linguistic farms, narrowing the range of affective phenomena potentially relevant ta linguistics t0 features such as expressive phonemes, expressive derivation, suffixes, and so forth, According to Stunckiewiez, “BUbler did not always draw a clear distine- ©The Hack that Marty ta influence for mnany years in Prag ec oe the Prague Sehol,B.RW, Sensis t Sememe of Prongmaatier 22 (795) 325 47H x tion between emotive phenomena which are contextually conditioned and emotive Features which are embedded in the code” (196d: 266). Here again. it could be argued, we find a certain lack of clarity with respect to differences between the expressive (subjective, personal) and emotive (intersubjective, interpersonal) functions of signs of affeet in speech, Stanckiewice himself seems to have recognized the problem: of the failing interpersonal orientation of a strictly code-eentered approach: “practically -every word can be endowed with emotive connotations if it is placed in an appropri social situation of verbal comtest™ (196: 342). The history of concepls of ‘expressiv= ity’ and “emotivity” in the Prague functionalist approach has been dealt with in detail recently by Volek (1987). Finally, it remains to be said that, over the years raised m affect, © the Prague Schoo! linguists have ny important foundational questions about relations between La ame of which are still waiting for adequate answers, One problem that espe- cially needs wo be addressed — which is related to the concept of “markedness’ as first defined in Prague phonology, and is purentially very important for studies of emo- tive communication (ef. Hiibler, L987, and see section 6 below) ~ is! from wh must we Begin in order te detect, and make inferences about, “emotive connotations in the first place’? As Bally said, two opposing tendencies appear to be operative in expressivity (ex sendances upposées de Meapressiviteé): expectation (aitenie) and surprise Ue surprise) (1965: 69 [1932)). ‘The erucial point generally seems to be the divergent chnice from same type af expectation, We will go intu this matter in more 1 section b. 3, Psychological dimensions of affect Another step toward developing a unified pragmatics of emotive communication in auklition, that is, to reconstructing the history of related endeavors in the past would be to start working om developing systematic concepts about the underlying nature of what Black (1948), Richards (1948), Stevenson (1948), Alston (1967), and others carlier in the century called “emotive meaning’, Sul. The issue of ‘emotive meaning ‘The issue of how cmotive activities function as substitutes for what they ‘mean’, denote’, “signify”, or “index” has important implications for studies of emotive com- munication (cf. Ogden and Richards, 1923; Black, 1949), Reganlless of how we ulli- mately analyze emotive linguistic phenomena, initially, we depend, to a greater extent than we perhaps like to admit, on signs oy and abmwt their potential meanings and interpretations in differen situa- lions, We need such assumptions in order te designate canceptualized ‘emotive activities’ as objects of analysis in the first place (ef. Janney, 1981; Amat and Jan- ney, 1987: 1520), The decision to study emotive conimunication fron) a pragmatic perspective implies underlying interpretive assumptions (or biases) of some kind Trom the very outset, and these should be stated explicitly in advance,iff RW, dane # Forms ef Peagauatics 22 (F414 328. 378 mainly to “the lack of a consistent and coherent theory of "emotive meaning’ "; rol ill lack linguistically useful theories of emotive meaning (el. Volek. 1987: 249), As a comsequence. linguists studying emotive communi Kimes forced to adopt (or a i ive categories derived trom Westen psy- shological notions of i “basic dimensions of affect’ tcf. Brown Gilman, 1960; Wiener and Mehrabian, 1968: Dittmann, 1972; Arndt and J 1983; Brown and Levinson, 1987; Danes, this issue), Gaps between psychological und linguistic approaches to affect, however, presenily make it difficult to imagine directly teansfcrring concepts from psycholary into linguistics: without first considering their compatibility, descriptive adequacy and explanatory power in the linguistic contest. Psychological studies olten de ant take language and imteraction fully into consideration: and linguistic studies, on the other hand, offen shy away from psychology. Although potentially useful models of emotive meaning were devised many years aga in psycholinguistics {cf. Osgood et al, 1957; Davitz, 1964, etc.) there: has not yet been much apparent interest in incor Porating these into current studies of emotive communication. As a result, the work of many linguists who presenily are most actively addressing issues related to lan guage and affect lends (o remain psychologically rather uninlormed. we 4.2, “Dimensions of affeet’ in psychology In psychology, there is a tradition of tripartite distinctions between metaphocical basic dimensions of affect” reaching back to about the tum of the century (ef. Galleis, this issue) (see Table 1. The term “dimension’ was first used in connection with affect in saudies of mood in the 1950's (cf, Nowlis and Nowlis, 1956). It was originally a means of suggesting that affective states arc not static, stable mental ‘things’ (e-p., fixed ‘qualities, traits, of characteristics of mind), but dynamic, gradient mental processes that must be represented and measured on variable, morefless scales (cf. Osgond et al, 1957), Wester psychologists tend to agree about three broad hasie dimensions afaflise- live experience: (1) a posilive or negative evaluative dimension, (2) a pawer, control, ox potency dimension, and (3) an activity, arousal or intensity dimension (see Table 1}. The psychological view. at the most reduced level, is that people typically respond fectively to objects of appraisal” (if and when they respond) mainly hy feeling pus- inively or negatively evaluatively inclined toward them, and by feeling in some sense either in control of them or not in control ef them: and these affective orientations tend 10 vary in intensity or strength. The resilience of psychological distinctions such as these for the past several decades seems (o argue in favor of using celated dimen- sions, at least, for comparing assumptions about emotive meaning in linguistics." © "The inc of objects of emotive appraisal is Oral itt in ne Osgoad et abs (1997) extegories lf enaluatinn, patenry, am Table I. as thew have bees tbe most widely recognized yryelaoling have been cahject 40 the moss 1 ues usenl argue Ue Lis in sms in ment decades. aedSirarne af Pragmatics 22 (20884 $25 $79 ua Authors Cal Peneney (HOD etivity Wunde §1919) (4+) relaxation (HF arousal Osgun! et ul. (08 Lal potency (lot activity Leary 1857) (sy doeninuimce Goupn (1957) 4) alfiinton Lay power Brown aad Gilrein (E964 ¢4/- solidarity [21+ power Davite 196) Ley siremgth HEL enviny Avenll (19751 peomtral (Hi) imensity Russell (1978) [etpugressiveness (4° invensiny Amal ae Janey (1983) Gelepeporneames: (440) euu-involosment Duly ct al (1983) (4t-ycomtra (HO) imensay Amdt and Jancey (1987) ¢a/-pattext [elepascertiversss (4/5 inten Russ (1991) ef) pleasure Cet dominance (HO) arousal dor aff lor ponwerd {oe activity) 4. Emotive categories in linguistics An important question that naturally ae such as those repres jes int connection with psycho ented in Table 1 is whether they might be useful as underlying interpretive categories for a pragmatics of emotive communication. It would seem that their usefulness depends on the degree of fit that can he established between them and present linguistic cmotive categories, Are psycholagical and lin- motive categories compatible? The issue of degree of fit Is relevant for three first, naturally, because it invites us to consider where present linguistic findings fit inte the vast body of findings about emotive phenamena in other branches of science (ef. Buck, Guallois, this issue); second, because it invites us 10 consider the extent to which linguists presently agree about the underlying nature of emotive phenomena per se (cl. Danes, 1989, and this issue}; and third, because it invites us ta consider the extemt to which linguists aire presently focusing on the same or at east reluked - phenomena as objects of investigation, The presen section addresses these isxu Table 2 lists sume categories that have been used in resent decades in linguistic studies of cmotive communication, The terms are organized according. 1a Ospondd et al.’s (1957) original psycholinguistic catevories (evaluation, potency, and activity in onder to facilitate a comparison of notions of affect im linguistics and psychology. Assuming that at least some degree of conceptual fit hetween linguistic and psycho- Jogical categories is desirable if we wish w argue thal “Ihe emotive capacity’, how. ever we ullimately define it, is psychologically tin addition to socially and lingui cally) grounded, what is the prescit situation in linguistics?sb C. Cag BM donne dort of Pring Table 2 Linguistic emi ies Authors (4-1 Evaluation Labo! aed Waletehy iresry ris (972) Garpers (19771 keys e 119895 Iron 108 atded te Labow (2980 ri9Kay (leas (18855 affee1 spesificrs Schiffrin (1947) Hubler 11987) Voted. (1987 evaluative cxciiness (4) Potency alfeet Seys 622 (JMS 28 fab) Astiiny imensitiens intensifying keys Invalvemeniietachricnt etipliatic particles focus: indices a lingmistie disane frum visicrete er focus: sndices ul lemon imeenest in, Identifiestion with. the loge, the nocd of the pannes, ar the teraction ill iscance’ fram the Ppa: ooemenstrens” a sition” with repost Torte messase Focus: indices of anid 5 involvement “otatimnt” or ‘detacfumient™ vis. 3vis the spect at Focus indices of a emotive alentification ‘with the speech act comphasizers ad a tiewlarirers emphatic particles afte imensatiers©. Cagh. RW Laumey { Foarnad of Pragmatics 28 (1904) 325 373 HI Table 2 teen Aiba: Faircemgh (18%) Biker an 19K) negan ‘Delos and Schibetelia 11989) Wowk (1980) Ketel and Basel Besnier (195) 6416) Evalations fr} Potency aflect maximizers seance markers foot mathers evblentiality markers focus’ ingices uf fees: inioes of pusitive or negative certainty ar doubt affect allcct keys allect specifiers affect intensifiers mtonsty of alae “eommitmnge the Pelle? sate, ete expressed by the slterance involvement topical invavement fivcus: indi weakare ‘orietations ts the eopie weractional involverea" fics indices of weak/sreng. atentional coricrilation to the speech ‘uation anclloe the porucipante positiveficgative allect “directionality” of affect imensity of allact sous: indices af ‘self vi ‘aside focus of a messageMz ©. Coffi RW, drmey tourna af Pragmatics 22 (2904) 828-573 “Table 2 (oon Aunors tf Eval fey Poxemey. GHA) Activity Lae (198, Personalization’ af affect tecust siices of essere i londisanice Ammlt aud Janoey (1991) valvc-ladenmness asverivencss inaensiny focus: iices of alrong orunecrainty weak atloctine avolve able 2 shows that there are currently many competing emotive categories in line guistics, and these da not always refer to exactly the sume ‘things’ (cl. Besnier, this issue}. This lack of consensus al the categorical level, it can be assumed, reflects a comesponding lack of consensus at the epistemological [evel. Which broad! care- gories of phenomena are currently being studied, and how are these being conceptu- alized and labeled for analytical purposes (see. section 7)? Inguists presently appear Lo distinguish most clearly between emotiv related to the psycholinguistic dimensions of “evaluation” and ‘activity’ in Table 1 that is, between (1) cufegories related to ‘positiveluegative’ oriemations. e.g. notions of ‘alfect specifying keys’ (Hymes, 1972; Gumpers, 1977), “loaded terms” (irvine, 1982), “affect specifiers’ (Ochs, 1986: Ochs and Sehieffelin, 1989), ‘evalu ative excilizers’ (Wolek, 1987), "pasitivefnegative affect markers’ (Biber und Fine- gan, 1989; Besaier, 1990), ‘value-ladenness choices’ (Amdt and Janney, 1991), ete. and (2) categories related to ‘morelless" intense wrientations, &.g... notions of “inten- sifiers’ (Labow and Waletzky, 1967), ‘affect intensifying keys” (Hymes, 1972: Gumperz, 1978), *emphuitic particles’ (Chafe, 1982: Irvine, 1982), ‘intensity maxi- mizers and minimizers’ (Labow, 1984), ‘affect imensifiers” (Ochs, 1986: Ochs and Schieffelin, 1989). ‘unspecific excitizers and intensifiers’ (Valek, 1987). ‘affect auisimizers and minimizers’ (Fairclough, 1988), ‘the intensity of affect” (Vowk, 1989; Bester. 1990; Amdt and Janney. 1991), ete. With respect te the “potency” dimension, however, which is the central psychalin- guistic motivational category in ‘Table 1,"" there seems 10 be less agreement, Here. 2 variety of phenomena are presently being studied, and it is not clear whether all of them can, oF even should, be included within a single category. From a psychologi- cal standpoint, at any rate, it can he said that most of these phenomena ure refatedl in some sense to approach and avoidance behavior. Leaving current Enguistic notions of fnvolvemens temporarily out of consideration (see section 5), we can outline four broad linguistic categories that are commonly associated with the “potency” 4 categories \Acconting to Wolek (1987; 249), “ihe motivational sructure eP emotive signs appears as a eacial nce their semamice is nat based on representation, ut fatter on dine assiciatieCaffe, BW Fanner donna of Prag oa) 405-322 38 sion: (1) categries related! tr “nearifiar’ orientations, eg., notions of the “di ing? of language fram concrete events (Chafe, 19) the truth of the propasition conveyed (Ochs, 1986), the speaker's ‘position’ with respect la the message (Schiffrin, 1987), the speaker's degree of “personal distance’ Tram the message (Lutz, (900), the “directionality” of affect (Besnice, 1990), ete: (2) categories related te “clearivagne” orientations, ¢.2.. notions of ‘clearivapue” signals n, 1968), vs. “fuszy” uses of words (G, Lakoll, 1972), “panticulizers’ (Wolek, 1987), linguistic “specificity” phenomena (Amdt and Janr 1891) et. ries related 10 “confidentidoubipidl’ orientations, ©.g.. notions live ‘commitment’ ta the iiwasage (Schrffnn, 1987; Katriel and Dascul. 1989), “modality markers’ (Chafe and Nichols, 1986), ‘evidential cer- doubt markers’ (Biber and Finegan, 1989), ete. and (4) categories related ta 'selPassertivelunassertive’ orienurtians, ¢g., notions of “pobtcaess principles’ (Leech, 1983}, ‘supportive strategies’ (Amdt and Jaaney, 1985), ‘incirectness’ (Blum-Kulka. 1987}, “face saving suategies’ (Brown and Levineoa, 1987), “rela- ane Ue speaker's ‘distance’ from Sonal work” (Watts, 1989), “self” ¥s. “outside” focus of the message (Besnier, 1990), fistic assertiveness’ (Amdt and Janney. 1991), and so forth. In Table 3, the categuries above are compared with the psychological calegorics discussed earlier. Are they finally compatible? The answer to this question seems to be a qualified ‘yes’, but only in a general sease, In order to analyce spe instances of emotive communication in terms of culegories such ax those listed in able 3, a pragmatics of emotive communication scems to need various conceptual and methodological bridges: first, tram a linguistic standpoint investigators need to agree: in principle about how ‘emotively $j contrasts are recognized as such in natural discourse (s on h); second, emotive categeries like ‘po ative’, “neur/far’, ‘clear/vague", ‘confidenydoublful’. “self assertive/unassertive’, ‘moreless intense”, etc.. need to be connected cific types of linguistic choices (see section 7); and third concer from a pragmatic paint af view — a systematic fuistic emotive choices and their inferred objects and objectives must be devised (see section 8), Although each of these problems is naturally too complex to be ade- quately discussed in a paper of this length. later, we will make some modest prelim inary suggestions about how these might be addressed. But before doing this, we would like io briefly discuss the present status of the central notioa of ‘involvement in linguistics, 5. Involvement: An entangled notion As said in the preceding seetion, the lack of agreement in linguistics about emo- tive categories is particularly evident in the middle column of Table 2. in the cute~ gories associated with the psycholinguistic motivational notion of “poteacy’ ¢ef, Osgond et al. 1957). 1 we look more closely at this middle column, we notice one term that has been used sn offen in pragmatics in connection with emotive comewni- cation that it deserves special consideration: the term ‘invalvement’, Here, we will3a C. Cath ME deamey Journal of Peagmanics 22 (2904) 325 Table 3 A. commparivon of psychological and linpuisine emenive care Pseeinfogical Evaluation Poterey Activity powerfull aroused! Main woateasts Lunpowerfel ‘uname ——1 Lingaisic Evaluation Proximity Specificity Evierialny Main positive? cleanfvague confer) assertive) morelless ont negative doubt umassetive ate present 4 sketehy overview of some Cure notions of involvement in pragmatic: making no claim fo completeness, and attempt to clarify a few basic distinctions. ‘The discussion will focus on: (a) what involvement is; (bl what involvement is opposed toy and (c) what linguistic units are pertinent te different studies of involvement. Su. The notion of involvement The folk-psychological notion of “involvement” is somet as a sort of bridging category between the broad psychological cate! in section 3, and the narrower linguistic ones discussed in seetion 4, Involves somes from the Latin iavolvere (in + volvere), meaning literally “to roll", “to-wrap up’, Still present in ils etimology. is the idea of movement, with the mildly negative sonnotation of danger of potential entanglement. Understood in this sense, the term nicely encapsulates the idea that g involved’ in the dynamics of human emo- live communication can be a ‘risky move’,'? Unlike traditional linguistic notions of expressive language’, “expressive derivations’, and so forth (see the discussion of Jakobson and Stankiewiez in section 2.4), which temd, in their code-centeredness, To presuppose “a person not ina WITH, as Goffman (1981: 78) puts it, the folk- psychological notion of “involvement” suggests immediately that emotive communi- cation has an interpersonal relational dimension, Here it is worth mentioning that in well-known psychiatric research, the parameter of “involvement” fas been used to Un the Compaer Fuldion of the Qyond English Dictionary (1971), “invatved’ is paraphrased by “hnplscated entangled), engaged, and the substantive “involvement” x paraphrased by entangled condition .. coenphcated sate of allsirs, imbemplio’ smbarascnenCuff, RW Fone Me assess “expressed emo and Leff, 1976)! 5.2. Linguistic definitions of invofvement In Tinguistic Titerature, we find that the term “involvement’ is used an widely dif ferent ways: for example, (1) with reference to speakers’ daner states as precon tions of interaction: “unlike commitment, involvenent is not a social bul a mental suite and as such, it is not nule-governed” (cf. Katriel and Dascal, 1989: 291); (2) with reference to speakers’ emonve identifications witli saeech acts, asa sort of addi or complement to the Giricean sincerity condition (cf, Hubler, W87: 371%; (3) reference to sex of lingitsite techniques atu! strategies ax “conventionalized Ways of establistting rapport” (ef. Tannea, 1984; 30); “conversation, like literature, seeks primarily to MOVE an audience by means of involvement” (ef. Tannen, 1984 (4) with reference to overatt rhetorical effects, o senses of vividness evoked by the strategic use of narratives, reported specch, imagery, and so an (cf, Tannen, 1980), (3) with reference to speakers” cognitive avientutans to shared discourse fopice (cf. Kateiel andl Dascal (1987; 285) on ‘topical involvement’), which, in some other approaches, are associated with notions of saliency and fore- and bac grounded information in thematic organization: and finally (6) with reference: to metwnessages of rapport, successful communication, shared feelings, etc., as means of enhancing social cohesion (ef, Tannen, 1989: 13). Tn the fist above, we could say that there isa movement from an individual psy chological orientation to an interpersonal social orientation, via a rheroricut-stylisti orientation, Clearly, these three orientations call for differem theeretical standpoints, ry on different assumptions, and refer 1 different designated realities (cf. Caf 1992), Echoing Besnier (this issue! we can say that linguistic notions of inval ment are presently heterogencmes. Involvement is a pre-theoretical, intuitive, rather vague, unfocused notion, which has not yet been employed in a technival way, and whose present usc, even within individual frameworks, is inconsistent, As is shown above, the term is used variously to refer to precondisions (inner states), wechoriques (rhetorical-stylistic stratepies), wessuges (messiges of rapport, shared feelings), and effects (he, result of ‘happy? or ‘cohesive’ interaction) ef communication, Deborah Tannen alone uses it in three different senses (see abuve) In view of this, il seems reasonable to ask which uses af “involvement” are most helpful from a pragmatic standpoint, As to the usefulness of employing “involve- if ta refer to emotive cechiriques. we have alrearty pointed aut the difficulty of pling to distinguish elearly between emotive features of language assumed to be emberded in the cude and features that are contextually or cotextually condi tioned (cf. also Stankiewiez, 1M: 264), The root of this prablem is simply that in We are indebted! 10 Giuseppe Cait, Dipartimento di Psichiaicia, Universiti 4,©. Calf, BW Janey ! Journal af Pragmatics 22 (84) 4 Table 4 ‘Token feyunes, smo 1 and segaecs of ewative markedness Taken feature Eintive eatery “Less! ao = = a + Mare! Icooiext: buying a seatermelon! Movphological Evaluation This ome"s gues! one's better This eme’s hest ehoices (positive) Ieootext: describing 2 polities] Lenical vation He's comentive He's reactionary — Hes fyscstie substan [cones immaduving susmeone] Teams of aikdress Proximity (social) Tal ky you ts Td like you tod like you to meee Dr, Jones eet Rube Joses meet Fish Tcontent sorimeating on a proyxial] Choices of Prosimity (spatial) The idea is Tha ade is slotermmners interesting Interesting Ieomtext: ashing someone whi has just iste an il aequaimance alma the ‘consirion af she aeyuaimmarcs) Choioes af verb Prsiminy How did she feel?" Haw dees she feel? Haw is she Foaling” temsedaspoct Lismporat) [eunteat: asking for help ina group! Choices of Specthicity Can anyone help Cun someone help Cam you bes ne proses me? me Isai ke 3 specific persae) [eomtent: responding to a request tre ans ‘pinian| Choisy af modal Mavdality Thpe it will turn Eso el arn Teme it will tam verhs esmifulerer) fat wel ‘out ell ‘out well [eontext: sugoesting it's une to leave Choices af agent? Volitinality ‘Bo yes think a's Should we leave [want to leave now bgcut sane solEasertiueness) Une wo Leave ew? contest: commenting om a now: dress] Sound duration — Quansiny Hs nice Ireanee We nissce loontext: calling the dog) Prowowie stress Quantity came sume COME looniext: replying to a repeated reyuess] Lexical repetition Quantity OKT OR OK, Tdi OK OK OK. TU so itt356 c j RW, Jamey | wah of Progmaricy 22 (LK) $25.37 Bressler and Merlini Barbaresi, 1994), the emotional lexicon (cf. Lutz, 1982; Jeter son, 1984), lexical substitutions, and sa forth, it potentially includes all discourse activities that can be interpreted ax indices of pleasure or displeasure, agreement or disagreement, like or dislike, and so forth, c.g.: smiling vs, frowning facial expres- sions, friendly vs, hostile voice qualities, choices of emotion terms, evaluative veca- lives, diminutives, gradable evaluative adjectives, evaluative preiicative adjectives, ve pairs, valence verbs, evaluative viewpoint adverbs, adverhs of annet. and various types af stylistic substitutions. 7.2. Prawimity devices Jeentrat distinction: nearlfar[ ‘This eategory potentially includes all types of verhal and nonverbal choives that vary metaphorical ‘distances’ between speakers and topics. lopics and partners and/or speakers and pariners in discourse space or time (ef. 1 1983; S4tfa see also section 8.31. Proximity is essentially a subjectively experienced spalioiem- poral dimension of linguistic emotive experience. One reason fir varying distances in discourse, it is sometimes said, is te identify with (approach) or mitigate (avoid) the porential effects of expressed messages (ef. Fraser, 198%; Haverkate, 1992). Proximity phenomena are generally discussed in connection with notions of decisis: e.g. "person deixis’, “place denis’, “time deixis’, “social deixis’, “emphatic deixis’, and so forth (ef. Fillmoee, 1975: Lyons, 1977: 6671: Levinson, 1983: S4if.; Haverkate, 199), The matin categories of proximity phenomena are: (1} spa Hal provimity markers, which regulate metaphorical distances between ‘inner’ and “outer” events (demonstratives: This/That is a good idea), or between events near at hand versus cvenis at a distance (Sec here/there!}; (2) :emparal proximity markers. which regulate metaphorical distances belween ‘aow" and ‘then’ events (present vs olher tenses: | amiwas very sorry 1 said it}, ar between “immediate” and ‘nonimme- diate” events (simple vs. progressive aspect: How are you doingida you da); (3) social proximity markers, which regulate metaphorical social or interpersonal is~ tances (lems of adress: I'd like you to meet Bob/Dr. Robert Adams}; and (4) selective order pravintity markers (often discussed in the literature under terms such ay ‘ocer af reference’, ‘foregraunding’, “topicalization’, “given vs. new inform tion’ “lelytight dislocation’, cte.), which regulate distances between concepts in dis- course, 6.2.5 initial referent versus subsequent referents (Judy was there, and Tom and Janet), agent status versus object status (Steffi beat Martina vs, Martina lost 10 Steffi}, adjacent referents versus nonadjacent referents, active versus passive con- structions. etc. (cf Li, 1976: Liand Thompson, 1976; Gundel, 1977; Hopper, 1979: Givda, 1984; Prince, 1981, (988: Horn, 1991), We will return to this important cat- of emotive devices in section % inson, icity devices jeentral distinction: elearivague] gory potentially includes all choices of words, parts of specch, word organization pattcens, conversational techniques, and/or discourse strategies that vary the inferred particularity. clarity. or “pointedness’ of references to topes, parts(m4) 38-373 387 C. Caf, RW. Janney Journal uf Prazouatie of topics, the speaker's self, or partners in discourse. It also includes choices that Tocus more narrowly or broadly on referents. Specificity can be regartied here as the extent to which conceptualized object of communication is referred to directly “by name’, so 10 speak, as opposed to only implied, suggested, alluded 0, generalized. genericized, or utherwise hedged or indircetly hinted at Specificity phenomena include choices of particular versus generic referents (e.g. definite vs. indefinite articles: I left myta hook in your office), ‘whole’ referents ver~ sus purts of referents (c.g., The dinner/salad was great}, one’s self versus hedged selves (¢.g., VOne doubt(s) if that's night), particular vs, habitual actions (viewpoint adverbs: I [generally] agree with that), particularized others versus generalized others (definite vs, indefinite pronouns: Can you/someone help me?), particular vs. general rel | like that/things like that), and various rhetorical beevity, amplification, and substitution techniques. 7A. Kvidentialiry devices (eentral distinction: confidentidoubrpiel] This category potentially includes all choices that regulate the inferrable reliabil- _coreciness, authority, validity, or truth value of what is expressed (cf. Chafe anc '98G). It is one of the most ideationally oriented emotive categories, which explains why il has been given relatively much attention in linguistics in comparison with some other categories of emotive phenomena. The uses of evideatiality devices that are of main interest in an emotive approach are those that suggest attitudes of confidence or doubtiulness with respect lo expressed information c.g. judgement: ‘That is/might be right) or intentions (.g., prediction: I will/could come lomorrow: Often discussed in the literature under notions of “hedging” (G. Lakoff, 1972: Brown and Levinson, 1987), ‘commitment’ to the proposition (Lyons. 1977: Schiffrin, 1987), “evidentiality” (Chafe, 1986: Biber and Finegan, 1989; Haviland, 1989), and “identification” with the topic (Tannen, 1989), this category includes var- ious epistemic modality phenom uses of evidential modal auxiliaries (may/might), objective vs. subjective epistemic verbs (know/believe), li (is!seems), parenthetical verbs, and moval sverbs (obviously/possibly passes signs of certainly vs. doubt, things “known” vs. things “thought”, and things that “are’ vs. things that “seem”, Modality can also be inferred from kinesie activities: (shoulder shrugs, puzcled or doubtful facial expressions), from intonation (falling pitch curves). and from various types of extended discourse strategies. isi 7.5, Volitionality devices [cenwal distinction: self-assertive vs. naassertive} This category potentially includes all speech chwices, sentence framing tech- niques, and discourse strategies used to vary levels of inferred self-identification or self-ussertiveness vis--vis partners, and all choices used to cast selves or partners in active versus passive discourse roles. The sludy of interpersonal volitionality phe- nomena is one of the central pursuits ef modem Westem politeness research (cf. Blum-Kulka, 1987; Brown and Levinson, 1987; Janney and Amdt, 1993). Self- assertiveness is indexed in discourse, far example, by choives of self vs. other pro-aH “af, RW. Jarier | Journal of Pragsaticr 22 (4988) 72573 noun agents (Ido you want lo leave). active vs. passive waive (Wit was decided thar we won'l go}, declurative ws. interrogative vs, imperative mood (1 want/can T havelgive me the book), and assertive negation (You're not going), and by some forms of inversion (Right you aie/you're right), sell-oriented appellative techniques (Did T apree? No, | said Cnright agree) and partner-orieated appellative techniques (You'll think I'm crazy. hut I said yes) 7.8. Quantity devices {central distinetion moretless) This category potentially includes all intensifying and deimensifying, speech choices (ct. Labor, 1984): that is, all choices of quantity. degree, measure, duration, of amount ofa given speech phenomenon. Following Volek (1987), quantity can. be of almost any nable kind: intensity of activity. length of performance, quantity of an object, intensity of an adverb, Quantity phenomena include phonalogical clongations (It's expected prosodic stress or loudness (I'm maNOT excited), Werrogalive pronouns as intensifiers (What a day!), emphasizing adjectives (It was a realfcompleteltotal catastraphe). adverbs of degree (I'm hardly!very/ absolutely happy about it), and stylistic choices such ax repetition (We're happy. really happy. that you came) and intensifying appellative techniques (NO! Did she really say that”), 7-7. Analviical approaches: Some haste distinctions In order to develop a unified, systematic investigation of emotive devices su those listed above, we need some bisic distinctions about possible analyti approaches. Some potentially useful distinctions hetween different possible perspec lives. units, and faci of analysis are summarized in the following paragraphs in a 7.7.1. Perspective of analysis Emotive communication, we might say. can be stuched from two different general perspectives: (1) a8 4 process: from this perspective, emotive communication is viewed as an interactive achievement (cf. Seling, 1984, and this issue), and the use of emo- live devices in conversation is considered a crucial parameter in assessi ferent types and/or degrees of emotive involvement in interaction, From this per: spective, which is eminently dialogical, the significance of emotive signals is regarded as a matter of negotiation between the participants. 42) as a product: from this perspective, discourse, text. or interaction are viewed as ‘givens’, or as data, When this perspective is adopted, the emotive profile af dis: Course appears as a quality, and typically becomes of interest for stylisties, We could call the former perspective ‘dynamic’, and the latter “slatic’; the former perspective deals with discourse ag an ongoing process, aad the latter deals with it as an outcome or a result; the farmer, we could say, deals with éragciations, the latter ‘with énoneés. An example of the difference hetween the two perspectives is perhaps© Cath. RW. Sanney S Soumnat of Pragmatics 2 4084) 328-358 150 that between the chetorival notion of “mph ‘emphatic speech style” Selting’s (this issue} not 7.7.2, Units of analysis It is useful to keep the problem of perspectives of analysis distinct from the prab- lem of waite of unalysis. Possible units of emotive analysis could be, for ex uth While shorter units of analysis (utterance, speech-act) might seem 10 be better approached from a static perspective. and Innger ames (turn, discourse, text) might seem to by beller approached from a dynamic perspective, this must not agcessarily be the cise. In fact, emotive phenomena at the utterance level can be studied us belonging to dynamic, interactinnal processes, and conversely, phenomena at the discourse level can be studied as static da "af results, The choice of the unit of analysis is obviously linked to a different theoretical framework. At any rat depending an which type of unit is selected as relevant tn study, the arsilysis of emo- tive phenomena will tend to be centered at either the micro- of macvo-level: and it should be mentioned that there: are alsa various emotive deviees between the micro and macra-levels: for example, cohesion phenomena such as “empathetic anaphora (cf, Conte, 1993), ance, the speech-ael, the tum, the streteh of discourse, the: tex a. “piven Loci af analysis The study of emative devices must further focus on units of analysis in relation to mmunication, In current research, cmative communication is interpreted as having mainly the following Jori, any of which could serve as a starting point for pragmatic analysis (see also section 8): (1) the spewker: e.g... in studies of formal phenomena such as emphatic particles ( just’, “really") andl distancing devices (indirect speceh acts, agentless passive, medal verbs, hedging), and in studies of content-related phenomena such as ego focused discourse, self-divelosures. references to personal experiences and feel ings, ete (2) the addressee: e-g., in studies of mitigating strategic ventive and therapeutic), backchannels, and so forth; (3) the comtenr: e.g., in studies, at the local ullerance level. of marked lexemes, ward-order, altitudinal operators on propositional content (evidentials, medal adverbs, evaluative expressions}, ¢tc.. and in studies, al the global discaurs level, of phenomena related to textual consteuetion, such as anaphora, th matic organization, topic repetition, topic shifts, digressions, code-switching, ete supportive moves (pre (4) discourse management: &g., in studies of quantitative phenomena such as the number of tuens held: and in studics of qualitative phenomena such as interrup- tions, overlaps, hesitation phenomena, silences, el It should be aeted that choice of the focus of analysis is not essentially a matter of exclusion, but a matter of creating, a focused object, The use of the first person pro- noun can, for example, from a stylistic standpoint, be analyzed with respect to dif- ferem faci. ¢ the speaker, the addressee, the text.ranmatice 2? £004) 325373 Ha © Calf AW, Kamer | onal of F.7-4. Perm ane content ‘There is also ane final analytical distinction that crasscuts the three distinctions Just mentioned: this is the distinetion hetween form and content, Inv the same. over simplified fashion as above, we can add that emotive choices can he analyzed from ‘either a formal viewpoint (c.g.. repetitions, rhetorical devices, ete.) or a conterruti one (e.g. disclosures, personal topics. sudden dignessions, topi distinction, incidentally. is paralleled in rhetorie by the distinetion betwee of speceh’ and “figures of thought’ 8, Objects and objectives of emotive choices In the previous section, seven broad categories of linguistic devives which have a bearing on emotive communication were listed: and others might have been men- joned, It is easy to see that these devices cover a wide range af heterogeneous phe- nomena, all of which are in need of pragmatic investigation which clarifies their roles in emotive communication, and which takes the different perspectives, units, and Jocf of analysis referred to in section 7.7 into account Tn order to start devising a systematic interpretive account of cmotivity in lan guage (a8 opposed to simply 4 description of isolated emotive contrasts), il is neces sary 10 pasit objects of emotive choice. Emotive choices canna be analyzed without reference to their inferred objects ane objectives. Actually. the very fact that they have objects and objectives is what distinguished them conceptually from spor neous, cathartic emotional displays (see Marty's Entladwng, section 2.2), and it is precisely this that makes the analysis of their different forms and strategic funetions in speech relevant from a pragmatic point of view BLL. The discourse tlad again: Buililer's objects As said earlier, Biihler's Orgavion Mose! of language functions provides a means of identifying three broad ranges of potential objects of emotive choice: the speaker, the hearer, and the content. Following Buhler, these three elements may be regarded as constitutive of discourse. The Joct of emotive communication inductively distin~ guished in section 7.7.3 can be redefined at a more abstract level within such a mudel, and it is possible to connect different types of emotive devices with them. 8.1.1, Eoentive choices and foregraunded discaurse relations For each category of emotive devices listed in section 7_an abstract represent can be imagined, in which each of Bihler’s three constitutive elements stands in a different relation with respect ta the other twa, according to the privileged direetion of the relation at issue; ie. acconling w which combination of elements is fore- grounded or backgrounded, This makes it possible to distinguish different discourse. relational Gestalten, For example, in connection with evaluation, specificity. and evidentialily markers, the speaker—content relation tends to be foregrunded, while the speaker-partner relation tends to be backgrounded. In connection with volition-RW denwey ! Journal of Priggmaies 22 4 Pom) 36 ality markers. the speaker-hearer relation tends w be back: devices tend to erosscul the other ea which aspects of the speech act: the propositior of utterance itself, Finally. and significantly, proximity markers cun signal distance ‘with respect either to what is said or to the addressee. Hence, in connection with Proximity markers, both the speaker-content relation and the speaker-hearer rei can be foregrounded. rounded. Quantity ed to expressive choices, ¢ directed toward an intensification whose seape cun include different content, the illacutionary force, or the act 8.1.2, Emotive choices and foregroanded loci of interest The focus of emotive chaices can also be seen fram the viewpoint af which needs and requirements of whieh of Bithler's constitutive elements implicitly stand in the foreground. This concept can be extended to characterize different general emotive communicative styles (ef, Barisch, 1991a,b), in which content-related cniutive choices arc scen mainly as reflecting the needs or requirement of the foregrounded focirs of interest: the speaker's, the hearer’s, or that of the content itself. Emotive choices, that is, can be predominantly speaker-centered, hearer-cemered, or content= centered (@) spraker-centered: In speaker-centered discourse, the speaker's (real or pro- jected) personal feelings, attitudes, or desires stand implicitly in the foreground, and the speaker tends to determine the emotive profiles of communicative events, Here, the relevant strategies involve emotive self-disclosures (emotive Kundgahe), or the intentional “declaring” or “making known" of personal affective information for dit Ferent purposes (cf. Kainz, 1941; 188: Fichler, 1990), The topics chosen tend to he of immediate interest or importance ta the speaker. who places her. ar himsell’ clearly in the actor role, Some related linguistic and rhetorical phenomena are auto- biographical navratives, self-disclosures, and different kinds of emphasis, (i) hearer-centered: In bearer-centered discourse, the partner's well-being sands implicitly in the foreground, and the partner's inferred needs or requirements tend to determine the emotive profiles of communicative events, The relevant strate gics here, from the speaker's standpaint, mainly invalve displays of low assertive- ness, and displays of positive evaluation ef the partner and/ar of topics or parts of topics inferred 40 be positively evaluated by the partner: also. proximity strategies are used that place the partner in the actor role and in close connection tw positively. evaluated topics, Some related linguistic and rhetorical phenomena inelude feedback requests, supportive back-channel activity, loor-yielding, pasitive fave-saving tech- niques, mitigating stratcgics, and “attuning? strategies. (HI) content-cemered: In content-centered discourse, content requirements stand implicitly in the foreground, and the topic tends to determine the course of conver- sational events and the selection of register. The relevant emotive strategies here are mainly ransactional, and are focused on the anticipated reactions of the partner to the content expressed; the partner's anticipated reaetions influence the local and global thematic and argumentative structure of the speaker's discourse. Same related. linguistic and rhetorical phenomena include choices of content organization and presentation (c.g, buckgrounding/foregrounding, theme/theme progression, et.),Bat © Calli. 8. Sanne louenal af Pragaiaries 22 (Nes) 525. 475 choices of types of argumentation (¢g., use of examples, narratives, reported speech), shifts in formality, and, a & micro-level, choices of evaluation, speeiicity, and evidentialily markers, cte. At may be observed that the distinctions above potentially supply criteria for indi- viduating text lypes. und could conceivably be used in text-typology rescarch (cf, Scturéder, 191) to take emotive features beyond Jakobson’s original functions into account, In some cases, emotive features alone might suffice to individuate certai (ypes of texts, For instance, the general emotive profile of eategary (1) could perhaps be used to characterize ‘narcissistic’ texts. e.g., confessions. preliminary phases of doctor-patient interactions, memoirs, diaries. etc.: the emotive profile of category (2) might help characterize “altruistic-supportive’ teas, e.g.. certain therapeutic inlerachions, interviews, consultations, ete.: and the emotive profile of category (3) may help to characterize certain types of persuasive and/or informational-scicntitic tents, Hi may also be observed that within a given 1ext-type some parts or sections, codified in rhetorical stylistic tradition, typically facus on dif ferent Jori, Far example, in scientific texts, there tend te be speaker-centered parts, eg. opening declarations of aims, goals, desires, and various kinds of captusio benevolentiae; and hearer-ventered parts, ¢.g.. closing statements expressing hopes, reliance on hearer-reader henevelence, and so forth. Even in texts where emotive strategies are perhaps not usually expected, such as in scicatifie texts, there are con+ ventional ways of conciliaing Ju voir des faits et la voix du carur (cf. Caffi, 19911, enhancing impressions of seientific detachment, while at the same time meeting per- sonal needs for self-expression and self-promotion, The voices of scientific expres: sion vary across disciplines and cultures. S2Iamedicuey: Wien rand Mehrabian's objects Interpretations of most of the categories of emotive devices listed in section 7 have already been studied in a systematic, cmpicical fashion by two American social psychologists, Alben Wiener and Morton Mehrabian. Their stimulating book Lan- guage Within Langnage: Immedtacy, a Channel in Verbal Communication (19681 represents an interesting exception to the trend of much social psychological research during the 1960's and the carly 1970's, which concentrated on emotive communication mainly in nonverbal channels.” Wiener and Mchrabian define their might be noied i passing that in Jakolam’s Gefinitive of the expressive-croeive flnction 3 well 2 in Mathesius” definition af emphasis (see section 2.4), emotive choices aee viewexl x being centered aaruund Stcinbutt. am ate equated with speaker's atbtodes towasd “whl they are speaking about Bano live choices in these classe Tunetionalist smodets, Uh és, are mainly coatent-contered. . ‘work of Roper Brown ane! his eollespues in the ead 186s fe... Howe and Gilman, 16H on pronouns of solidarity: Brown and Fant, 1961, 00 tors ol address, etc}, But nevertheless, as Amdt anu Isneey (1987) pest kat, a aco ‘communication needs to py equal attention te verbal, sancrbsl vocal, and kinesie aspocts of cover~ ution. Verbal and nonverbal features of speech complement, and more imponantly. oltce muaify Another exceptive lo thi treme was the fare e acvowal of emotive© Caffi, RW. Sauney Jewel af Progmmotice 22 (Peas) 325 478 ut of Proge central netiog of “immediacy” as “the relationship berween the speaker objects he communicates abwul, the addressee ef his com nication itself (1968: 3), Theie main conc reflect changes im the degree of separat ta these three ehjects (196R; 23) In Wiener and Mehrabian’s experiments, varfations in verbal “degrees of separa. tion” between speakers and objects were associated by untrained raters in experi- imental groups with pusitive and negative affect. A high consensus searing of difter- cnt degrees of verbal immediacy was obtained by these raters. In the experiments, immediacy was basically studied ex-negedive: that is, what raters actually detected and measured were nonimmediate communications. In Wiener and Mehrabian"s approach, the term “nonimmediacy” refers ta “any indication of separation, noniden- lily. attenuation of directness, or ehange in intensity of interaction among the com- municator, the addressee, the object of communication, or the cammenication” (1968: 32). The primary nonimmediaey categories are the following: (1) spatioten= poral categories, eg, demunstratives, adverbials denoting, spatial distance, uses of lenses where the relation between interactants is temporally displaced either into the past or inte the future: (2) denoutive specifiety categories, eg. over-inclusive ref erence (A: “How was the pany?” B: “Everything was wonderful! "): (3) agent action-object categories, e.g. the passivity category “for instances in which te sub- Jeet or the object or both are literally stated as being acted upon or driven to act by external forces” (1968: 93); and finally, x category which the authors label (4) qual ification and objectification, which includes mainly uses of modal adverbs amd modal eperators by which, according to the aulhors. “the communicator, through his qualification, indicates the possibility that his statements may wot be consensually shared” (1968: Od) Although Wiener und Mebrablan did not use their desi addressee, communication) to distinguish systematically between their linguistic examples, il is important in the present connection to stress the high degree of fit hetween their categories of nonimimediacy phenomena and the categories of emotive devices listed in section 7."* Wiener and Mehrabian’s experimental findings clearly suggest that (non}immediate linguistic choices ane one impertanl basis, a least, from which addressees begin making interpretive inferences about communicators’ affec: tive experience. Emotive choices ate learned, bul nol taught explicitly: nevertheless, as Wiener and Melurabian show, “they are ... responded to consistently by the mem: bers of 1 group” (1968: 2K). This strongly supports the hypothesis, expressed at the beginning of the paper (see section 1.1}, that speakers are endowed with a highly mid thee calion. ur the commu- Tis “the analysis of verbal forms which 2 or nnidemity af a speaker” with respect nated objects (lopix. each other's effests, lendi praginaties o complex inlerpeetive inferences, This faci deserves more attention in Te may he noced thar Wiener and Mehrabian"s “spatio-temporal” satepory is party similar wr the y discussed in section 7. their “dentative specificity” category is panly similar 10 the py their “agent action-object’ carspory is pay similar to the solitianelity category. and tbcit “qualification and obycetibesteon” eakegory is partly similar ko the evidentialiry category Vicncr andl Melrubia's categories, hawewer, da pat correspond with these eehces on all counts,Bet ce af RW, Jaw down of Pragmatics 22 (J988) 52 a8 refined, expressive and interpretive emotive cupacity that needs to be accounted for in pragmatics."' Wiener und Mehrabian’s work 1 contribution to the cxperimeatal, empirical clarification of how lingu are interpreted sys lematicully from an emotive point of view. 83. The deictic sriad Prom the preceding remarks, and from the earlier discussion, it seems that ‘ise tances’ in general, in the broadest sense, are af considerate importance in emotive communication, Now. before concluding the paper, we would like to consider the implications of this abservation a bit more closely, Linguistieally, as we said, dis- lance seems to be regulated by different kinds of deictie proximity devices. or neurifar” markers (see section 7.2), which are all related in some way or other to what might be regarded as the “egocentric ortentation’ of the act of utterance, The Proximity category henec appears to be basic, inasmuch as it constitutes a sort of bridging category between indexicality and emotivity. That is, speakers’ “near/far altitudes arc inferred on the basis of their choices of particular deictic referenc REA Oute Let us dwell a bit on the zero-point of the deictic reference in such cases. In every act of utterance, according. to Bubler (1934), the speaker is the dvictie onige, or the deietic source af the system of spatiotemporal coordinates called into being by the utterance. Biibler calls this system the Zeigfeld, adding that the Zeigfeld can either be the real perceptual space shared by the partners, or an imagined perceptual space The sume chrono- or topodeletic cues can he used to make reference to a real Peigfeld (eg, “W's bere in the drawer") uF to an imagined Letgfeld te.g., “Hee you will turn to the left"), The former phenomenon is Buhler's demansiratio ad ocnlos: the later phenomenon is Bubler’s Deixis am Phantasma, where the speaker tacitly uides the hearer’s imagination (Phuntasfestewerung) (ef. Come, 1988). in a sense inviting the hearer to join hin ar ker, through an act ef conceptual transposition (Versersung), in an imagined space. It could be hypothesized that, in addition to Biihler’s classic phantasmatic deixis, which evokes an intersubjectively shared, imagined, extemal world or “outer space there iva second kind of phantasmatic transposition: this is the Versetzing from dif- Terent metaphorical "places’ in what we might call “inner space”. where the speaker’s Self or pasition within his or her own inner affective world becomes the deictic origo, the zero point of the act of reference, and objects of emotive communication are represented as being deargr to, of farther from, the speaker in this inner world. Versetsungen toward or away from the ‘self space (one’s feelings Fantasies, aminudes, wishes, cte,) are sometimes implied by emotive uses of demon stratives. Por instance, if speaker uses an utterance like “Those people who say X lersies “ner” deixis I worth noticing, incisbenally, that Wiener and Mehrabian speak of “variations”. which is a mane objectively detowable concept than dhe notion sf ‘choices’, amd ome witich fas very well inco the iater- tive category of emative “cocextual cimtrasis” inrechuced in sextion 4rey F Jouraal af Prasgmuaties 2 (19948) 325-373 365 tw refer (© people in the same room, there is poteritially a discrepancy herween the outer and the inner Zefgfeld: that is, what is near outwardly (the people physically in the room with the speaker who say +}, seems to be far away inwardly (those people}. If the hearer is to interpret such an ullerance correctly, he or she must infer. for exane ple, that: (1) a metapharical Versetzwig trem the speaker's and hearer’s shared ‘outer world’ to the speaker's private “inner world” has occurred; (2) the 2¢r0 point of deic- fig reference is now in the speaker’s emotional space: and (3) some type af comple~ mentary symmetrical Versecuny on the hearer's purt is necessary if che or he wishes te keep attuned with the speaker and correctly understand the speaker's uttcrance. From such examples, we ean conclude: that the so-called ‘inner world” js not only something that we typically refer to in selfdisclosures, when we explicitly talk about our Ieehngs or attitudes; it ean alsa be the deictic Frame from which we refer to objects in a shared communicative setting. ‘Throughout this paper, cmotive devices have been associated indirectly with att tudes, One of the basic action tendencies connected wit tive atti- tudes, and the starting point of much emotive communication, is the tendency ta approach or withdraw [rom altitudinal objects: the tendency, in other words, 10 establish emotive operating distances (nearer/farther) with respect to things, We are ow in a position to make Prijda’s (1982: 112) statement about peaple’s cupacity to perceive euch other's approaching of withdrawing gestures (quoted in seetion 1.1.3) more precise. From a linguistic standpoint, cstablishing distance seems to be logi- valu ate things, commit ourselves (a things in different ways, or become more or less assertive with respect to things, that is, we must first point them oul; and in this ini- tial act of painting to things. we plot our metaphorical ‘positions’ or “distances’ with respect tw them, In this sense, proximity devices are fundamental features of cmotive communication: they enable us to shift the deietic ordge of utterances [rom points i outer perceptual space te points in inner subjective space, and they allow us to express subile variations of inner distance with respect to our topics, our partners, and aur awn acts of communication As said above, the linguistic devices (Le., chrono- and topo-deicties) for outer and inner deinis — the latter of which is sometimes referred tw as “empathetic deixis’ tc. Lyons, 1977; 677), ‘emotional deixis” (cf. R. LakofY, 1974), ar ‘impure deixis’ (cf. Lyons, 1981: 23211.) — are the same. This suggests thal there is a certain isomor- phism between the uter Zeigfeld and the inner Zejgfefd: 2 parallelism, that is, in the structuration of the intersubjectively share! extemal warld of social processes. and the subjective internal world of individual affective processes. which can also be partly shared by partners in linguistic interaction, While the sharing is almost a given in the farmer case, it seems to be a product of highly complex, empathic inferential processes in the latter.” cally and chronologically prior to all other entolive activities. Befere we can We anc not sure if the ature of the shift heswwen the so-called primary amcanings” of Weictie exp sions, e.g. locatives and demanstratives, and their derived. se-eafled “symbolic meanings" is metaphor veal. as os uswally said. I could fe argued that this shift is actually metonyinie, since sf of “the partBie © Catfi, RK Fonney | Jomenal af Prongmaaties 22 (S004) 328 47 89.2. Indesivaltey, egocentricity, and expressions af affect So far, the relation hetween indexicality, egocentricity. amd expressions of affect has not been fully clarified. Here it might suffice to recall that, aceording 10 Buhler (1934), the deictic center of an utterance act comprises three elemenls: Ue ege-fie- rane, These -here-now” coordinates of the uttcrance (cf, also Rammetveit 1974; Kamio, 1994), Many af Wiener and Mebralvian’s (1968) data (see section 8.2) tend 1a cluster about this defetic triad. Wiener and Mehrabian’s findings, as well as the findings of further research,” seem to confirm that linguistic choices related to. a row ego, nm Irie, or nem mane perspective in. an utterance (that is, a non-l, noa-here, or non-now perspective) arc systematically imerpreted as signs of distance, non immediaey, or nonidentity: in other words, as signs of some type of withdeawal or separation of the self from the attitudinal object of communication, Non ego choices often involve impersonal constructions, passive or generic references, uses of the inclusive ‘we’ instances of hedging, and uses ef manlal atlverbs that serve distan ing functions, New hic choices. on the other hand, tend to involve different kinds of indirect constructions and displacements, e.g., narratives af affective experience instead of direct expressions of affect, reported speech whose implicit message is ‘his has not happend to me, but to others", and so forth, And aon sine choices. end 10 invalve, for example, choices of the past tense, or the polite past in the Hulian imperferto), and hypothetiesl constructions that shift events into the future, The neain recurrent features of alll these emolive strategies are: (1) self de-responsabilization (as in the usc of evidentiality markers ta suggest uncer tainty), (2) deemphasis on the speaker or hearer as agents in connection with nega lively evaluated things, events, or concepts, and (3) distance or vagueness with respect to either the coment or the addressee of the ulterance (via markers of low proximity. low specificity, andjor low volitionality). 9. Conclusions and implications At the begianing of this paper, we mentioned the lack of courtination in present research on language and affect. and suggested that it is perhaps now time for lin- guists to begin cooperating in developing a more unified pragmatic approach to eme- live communication (see section 1). The conceptual foundations of a peagmatics of emotive communication, we suggested, can be reconstructed from earlier contnbu- tions of scholars such as Anstotie (330 ea, B.C.) im rhetoric, Marty (1908) in the phi losophy of Language, Bally (1909) in linguistic stylistics, Sapir (1927), the Prapwe Circle linguists (1929), Bilhler (1934), and others in linguistics, Oxpond ct al, (1957) instead of the whale’ type (ers peo tori: and Mohamed ard dhe mountain, afer all, 10 use Bubler's famous metapbor. are at these eases (ifTerent pans of} the same perso © averkate (1992) also uses the ariene ange of the atjoranice as the starting point for an esplanaties of owtigating sratepics del. Fraser, 1988), altbourh he does new quote Buber. We share the pair that wives related vo the eget hie nur con be stanegically emplogest for miniparion pusparses, but we dnt think thar a full aecouat of the nature of these usc Is yol been prowied inv pragmaaics,©. Coffi, RW. Fonaey 1 imal of Prvqgmaatics 22 (FOSS) 25 267 psycholinguistics, Watzlawick et al. (1967) in interactional psychology, Wiener and Mchrabian (1968) in social psycholagy. and many others. Regarded from a hi Torical point of view, il seems that present interest in language and affect is not sim- @ natural extension of a long line of rheteri- cal, stylistic, and Functional linguistic inquiry that has in fact never stopped, although it hus sometimes been reganied by linguists interested in other aspects af as rather outside the scope of the discipline. We suggested that the task of developing a unified pragmatics of emotive com- munication poses & mumber of interesting and challenging problems for future research. ‘Ihe issue of what cntative signs are indices of. and hew they operate as substitutes for what they stand for, needs to be dealt with ia mone detail (see section 3), Notions of emotive contrasts need to be further clarified te.g.. contrasts like pas itiveynegative, nearffar, clearvague, confidentdoubiful, sclf-assertivefunassertive, more/less intense, etc.) (see section 4), and a more adequate account of emotive marking is required, which specifies what emotive contrasts diverge with respect to, how they diverge. and what types of anticipatory schemata (e.z.. linguistic, contex- tual, cotextual, etc.) are involved in recognizing and interpreting them, Alba, tech niques for representing emotive contrasts need to be refined, su that the relevant con- trans alt with more systematically in future analyses (see section 6) With respect to the coordination of analytical approaches. we suggested that the issue of the many currently competing emotive categories in linguistics needs ta be resolved, so thal investigators can start facusing an, and comparing findings about the same types of phenomena from a unified point of view tsee section 4). In this connection. the slalus of the notion of ‘invelvement’ especially seems to require more thought; if this term is to be employed im the future in an analytically useful way, investigators will have to start agreeing about how te conceptualize it and how to define the Tinguistie units. pertinent lo investigating it (sce section 5), These is naturally go hand in hand with the problem of isolating categories of emotive devices for investigation (c.g. evaluation devices, proximity devices, specificity Uevives, evidentiality devices, volitionality devices, quantity devices, etc). Also, clearer distinctions between analytical approaches seem to be needed, including def nitions of potentially relevant perspectives (c.g., peocess oriented vs. product ori ented), units (e.g. utterance, speech-act, lum, discourse, text), and for? of analy Speaker, addressee, content, discourse management) (soe section 7). And nally, in order to develop systematic interpretive accounts of emotive communica- tien, we will need tv have clearer concepts about the possible objects and abjectives. of emotive choices in speech and writing (see section 8). From this sketchy list of s for further research, it appears that much indeed could be done if linguists were interested in developing a more unified approach to emotive communication The underlying implication of our discussion has been that the impetus for a more Unified approach could possibly come from a pragmatics of emotive communication focused on two interfaces that scem of central relevance in explaining the emotive capacity: first, the interface between idewtional and relational aspeets af emotive choices (the “what/how" imerface); and second, the interface between suibjective and