The Magazine of Conflict Simulation © Ar Director! Co-Bdlior Redmond A. Simonsen Ecitor/Publicnor dames F. Dunnigan Edicnat Stephen Batre, M. Elston Cilla, Frank Days, 836 Face, Deri Gasdmen, Bava C. shy, Neholss aon, Alber & Nor, Stapran'. Patron Sd Sackaon, liom Sullvan, Jahn Young, Kevin dicker Gone Production’ Kern Mah, Mand Wikuins, Marsha Floor, A Zea" eminrve Carol azatali, Erstin Ancorson, Roger A. Bicewosd, Mawgaret Sree, Robert CChampar Linda Cobo, Batic Crow, Margaret M.Div; Mchast Bevis: Bip Foeama’, Cx iasabann, Eagesn Jahres, Augustin Lind "John McGrath Unda Mosca, Bragel Murphy, ‘Ave Rox, geet Mt Scot Josegt M. Shean. Kathy Tena, Saat Zio Gare Evalution and Asnareh Assance: arin Cana, Essrad. Curran, One DeMite Stove Kuki Stem List Lad Natori’ Senge Pie, cho Thonsaon, Thome Yer ning Eeitor ane Founder: Chissooher Wesree Pring: Roos Cle, le, Callge Port, MY. Prsvors John Birk! nang: Apats Oia Coleg Po, NY. Ow ug SANs ersten gee Sy Sexe saat ween amare gage oe eS eae a ee ae patra ihe maracta marae en cas ee amen manana sees seer ch cn tein sees eeriaces elites sain manned owes we sieeaer a Caer om pian of pba acreteemeny SP peter oor 21 font, owner tena 79 orevent iegyewert wiloosna. Sveusorants am aopsetad oo ubicsions reseed ona Horotensvetothe sonal esol te wow ora the ‘Atatarents of Pi procure backed ny guasantencrectorcah fetus promot return of specu 8 tapers Seas ot Nepean eatpeduct sarge in vara DESTRUCTION OF ARMY GROUP CENTER The Soviet Summer Offensive, 1944 Albert A. Nofi 18 REO STAR/WHITE STAR Warsaw Pact and NATO Forces in the 1970's Stephen B. Patrick Simulation: x49 Bing DESTRUCTION OF AV) army Group cenrer 4-4 |The Soviet Summor Ottonsive, 1944 Jamas F, Dunnigan Redmond A. Sinansen OUTGOING MAIL The Editors 2 SACKSON ON GAMES ‘Sid Sackson * PASS IN REVIEW Albert A. Nofi 2 FEEDBACK SIMULATIONS PUBLICATIONS, INC. 4 East 73:0 Street, New York, N'Y, 10010 Tolaphona: (212) 673-4103 Vox Populi, Vox Dei 46 ‘ST 36 / ENCLOSURES 1. DAGC Game Map 2.DAGC Playing Pisces B.DAGC Rulee Folder 4. Foodback Response Card 5. SPI Order Form & Special SET PA otter 7. Business Reply Envelope Outgoing Mail starting with this issu9 welll make uso of ts apabsty to get the feedtack results 10 you In S@T34 wo asked some questions to double ‘heck the ratings you gave past issues and featuses none istues. We found that, al but one instance, these “late” ratings wore almost identical iwihin 8% 0f he orginal ones. The lone exception was theartice on the Franco Prusson War in issue 31. Yeu ted | “Outgoing Mol i, primariy, @ response to sonsiderabi highes up Wo 704 teem 88%) Ihe heebringites wi intone. “Ouprg Mak” Sor ta aroun We oe sa let wheres know whats going on eg ne ete ey sues part o SSA Wht were dong end wher wepten t daar 3X 10 the rolesse of We game, Fran fis deacti affectsstbscrbes."Cotgoing Mer” : oe ene ee are itso, Mee sgnitcantparl af a faature’s populay has 12 econ time aroun, We can atribate part oF Prussion War As with all of out tatings, 9 topics tobe coverevare provided by revgerttersas G9 with how “popular” that parteuler subject ‘There's quite @ lot of good news this issue Algo sone nows of cusstanasie valve. Watt faxo tinge one at @ time, in no. pariculer cider Asa change of pace welll sart with the games an @ 19 scale. The remuls af@ snow" Feedback Rosults, net ‘ssue 36 a5 well” One of the advantages of having our own computer is that we can process the feeaback cares much faster, 59, COMING IN OUR NEXT ISSUE: The gome wil be Scrimmage, 2 man-to-man level qarne of fooibal inthe form of 2 wargame. Aricies or (on the Bat of the Bulge end the Bette of Coporetto (1917). Plas sur regular festures, IS at the moment, The gome seers to Mave generated additional interest There was another set of questions which Btoduced some very interesting results, ard Feaations You were asked to rte 28 proposes Tor isu 3, Out for below. The rosulls caused US W atta Hew Boley for choosing whet gemes we. wal ublish. The new policy cen by seen inaction In Feedbost questions 20 to 52 of this seve leonorusd on page £2Rifle&Saber Tactical Combat, 1850-1900 With the alle and the saber. the nineteenth of aes From’ significant wars. of this antury indivdugl soldier dominated the patio’ Sovonteon seenevies depict encage- bettioield, Napoleon hac employed armies ments at Bul Run, Snioh, and. Gettysburg sss carmonclodder, The soldier would again (at the Armarican Civl Wat), the bates of Senighie he wenchesotine Great War Bus, Worth ang Mars-La-Tours (ef the Franco: for the second halt of the TeIh century, Prussian tar, and ethar actons Irom the Uniquely, battas were contested by Woops oor Wars, tha Sepoy Mutiny in India, the who cavlieg the aciswe weapon as thor Spanish-Ammariesn, aad the Fusso-Turkish personal arms. Wars. Fille and Saber is a tecical simulation B9sed on Grenadtertanother SSG) Rife and compenrleval of watfarein "theagaof tne Saberemoioysa smpar, morsreiined game file." roughly {om 1880 to. 1000, The Sysiam {0 emulate tne more camplox ond period was matked by 8. tremendous — deadlior rature of 18ty oontuly warlee, A Frorease in the Trepomer af infer units 22" x 28" woeolor mapsrest of various ‘nich far outsvigped advances in tacties terain is fought over oy ciecut uns Filand Sabersimulatestativs of portions representing "muzzle and” breech loading ‘+ Morate rules © Weapons characteristics 1°17 Scenarios a Infenuy ond artery, mounted rifles, cae airy, and. oaly macnine-gun_ units, The Bete factor of comoat morale, 93 vl a5 fire. and. shock combat, vmproved. pos sions. ond enirenching, and the differing movement capabilites and weapea vulret= abies of units are deta in rules U8 16 te natuta of warfare waged with tle Bee saber Histoneel commentaries. onthe Scenaries along with suggestions on haw avers may “Tactor” and eteste sadiional scenario games is aso Induced. fille sad Saber 1s available tboxed) om Simulations Publications for $609.Lee vs. Grant, 1864 Wilderness Campaign hidden movement and reconnaissance «Commend control rules» Scanario and Campsign Games Abraham Lincoln believed he had ‘icaly ‘oated the man who would deat Rebert E Lee Ulysses Grant, har of Vicksburg, was appotted to supterna command of tho Union "Armies A decisve fugu was exnsoted of the unerihodex Union genera inthe campargn of 1884, Qn May 4, 1664, Giants Acmy of the Patoman orosed the Rabel pie’ ine oh the Rapidan fiver in northern Virginia. Giant hoped to match clear ofthe Virgins ‘wlggeness region. before joing battle ‘gains Lee nest Richmond. Unfortunatly for Grant, Lee marched N's bady out numbeted’ Army of -Narthorn. Virginia iret across Grant's path into the heavy woods ‘south of Chancelersvile, The ‘cvasion at ther fist encounter. Angwn as the Bato of he Whiderness, ntiated some of the mas bittar fighting af the Civil War. The Witierness Campaign sinvdates the ensuing conte: of Law ane Grant through Jui, TEA. The 22"228" twocelor map Shee! gepes tre king-ground in northern Viginia. Usizing the basic design formu lated for The Franco-Prussian War includ ing combat unit reduction, rail moverront, fand tmited inteligence, "The Wilderness Campaign features sew eonoeste 12 onay the important rola of cavalry Faconaissanca, tho effsctve leadership, the casualty cost of sustainos attacks, tre Union advantage of river and see anspor, ‘and the complex suaaly networks on which Doth armios were forced t9 depend, Two hetonea scones hide tho can paign. The fest sesnaro begins the gare fn May 5, and covers the petiod doting which she aotuatbatilas at the Wikomness, Spotsyivana. and Cold Harbor were {cught. Tha second scenario, begianing June, continues the action Tam Cols Harber to th sige of Petersburg where both aims remained until the following Apel whan Lea was Tapped at Aap. Imation, The game scale Wenslates each Game: Turn into wo days. Hoxes represent four and one hall mies distance. aoe. Alo inctuded are saveral “wnat f” SB tons which widen players’ game options and whan ate Usetul ‘or aehiauing Say balance beween two unequal opponents The Wilderness Campaign simulates the Confedersie crisis oF 1864. Lae. never fo.gh bare Grant rawr raneaid. The Vitaemess Compeign 's avalable (eoxedi torn Simulations Pubicstions for $500.Oe RS Ee rf 13 ai Peasy acuity 4by Albert A. Nofi By whatever measure apatod, tho Russo- German War was conducted on a scale unpiecedenred ‘in hstery. Millions of men SuUggied wih press ferecty ever hundocs fof tousands of sauate miles fo naa’y four full ‘years, causing tens of rillons of casualties ‘nd unepencanie eterna. Wall nto 7942 tho Germans seemed virtually unstoppable as thoy ‘oiled soross the vast expenses of European Fuso Buty ata I92du wes the Soviets we were unstoapable How has this tanstion coma to pass? Ta a reat extent «twas the fest ot a daclie in Geiman cffonsive. and defensive capabitty linked to a simultaneous risa in corsearaots Fussion ables, But beyond that atthe events br Belorussian tho summer of 134e ‘eh resulted in the destrction af an entire German army group, oss whieh epule not be replaced and which foretold the fina! collapse of tho Neal Emare, THE EAST, JUNE 1984 AL the once’ ot summer in 1984, after the full ets of nee Turcy combat the Soviet armies. ad everywhere (pustod ack Carmen invecers, rogsinig. mst ct the territories lost during the great Gorman foffersives. of 1941 and) 1842. Except ter portone of Belorussa, all ofthe Soviet Union fas it existed in 1938) had been berated BALTIC SEA EAST PRUSSIA Warsaw & Sf Povann S o0e% 8 PAPET MARSHES A Kiow Soviet formations ate shown in italic type. proximate area where @ German division was destroyed. ‘Aumy Boundary Aumy Group Boundary —o0— The Destruction of Army Group Center 22 June to 23 July 1944 “This map shows the advance of the Soviet ‘aumies andthe gradual stategration ofthe Gorman Army Group Center through the destruction of divisions, The most se¥ous emege wos done during tho fest two ‘weeks of the Soviet sdvance, Indeed, ‘within the Tirst_ week, fitoon Gorman visions were destroyed. By 10 July, Army Group Center ha virtually teased Yo exist, although the arval of rainforoamants for ‘ther suetors permitted the formation of ‘some sort of font. By 23 July, the flow of Feinforcements totaled six aimored dv sions and fourtean other ‘division sized formations. It was these forors, plus the remnants of Army Group Conter and the increasing exhaustion of the. Russians ‘whien eventually brought the Soviets to 2 Flt. But during August, si addtional ‘atmoced formptions and over a dozen rove Hfantry divisions wero also committed to ‘ctionNevertholoss, although conskdoraly redueee, the Noa Empig stl convoled vast region the East. ine Eastern Front wound its Serpentine way ove” 2,700 kiometers ory ‘Narva, on the Gulf of Finland, to Odessa on the Black Sea. The most prominent Feature of hs lengthy tront was tte German salient core trolling 260,000 "square les of “western Bojorussia, Red by 700,000 man in 45 German and Hungaran dvisions and brigades. and Gomprisng the command of Army Group Conter The front of Army Group Centar extandoctin 2 sweening curve 1000 Klometers tram the cy I Poloisk on the Dving River ma souther'y ‘nd westerly ciection to the chy @t Kav on the Sournern tinges of the Pripet Marshes Army Croup Carter owas hardy. capable ct holding the oxtonsve rontacsigned tof. Each of the dhisions on the front was Torced to cover 24 biloreters, roughy three or tour nes te oficaly accepted ooumum. Virwaty allthe forces in the amy group were assignec {a front ine city, withthe exeaption af some socuniy unis and Hungarian divisions, wch wore gan the tak of keeping the parisons ‘heck. Except for purely leva eserves the only reserves avaiable to the army rou were a coups of low order infantry cisions. Only thr of the divisions wth the amy group were tully suite tor mobile, armored operators and these wate loceted very rear or on the from, rather then being eld in recor. Ia some Sectars, there were fewer than 10) ‘nfentiymen par kiometer of ‘ont. Overall there ware. aporoximately 16000 pisses of antler, neavy mortars and rocket launchers. 400 tanks and assault guns; and around. 700 areralt The ates held by the army group wae not inheranty ursultod 10 an offoctwe defensive Cparalion. given sufficient cuantives of man and equipment Indegs, mary a1oas within the Boundarie of Army Group Center were havi forested, and 2 series of riers. ran 3 north-south diecton, lending thormsoWves 10 uso by the dafanse. in the south, the Pripot Marshes presented both favoraale amc untavorable aspects. The vary existonea ofthe marshes preciudeo any szeable Sovet thrust from that diecton. At the same time, the rcroasingly marshy ground as onoaparcachea the Paige! made conswuston of -fecive sefenses ciffeul In gortions of the area, the Torain was essontiahy neutral, Whore. the ‘grovrd was nethefeested nor marshy, wae ‘gorerally lat ahd featureless, not pariculary Tavering the establishment oF the incrlockang stansive Systems greatly favored by the Germans. Adeing all factors: the shortage of ‘manpower and equipment, tha partial unsut ability af the terrain and the inherent Unfavorable configuration of a sallem, Army Group Canter wes decdeay incapable of resisting a large seala offensive in una of 1844, Bur that wos exactly what it woule have 9 45 PLANS AND PREPARATIONS ‘The Soviets svum to ave docided to eliminate te salient occupied by Aimy Group Center some time in eary May of 1344. Dung the middle oF May, Marshals Zbukev, Vasivesty and Aptonay initiates the planning for persion Bagration, which would require 3° estimated 60 days {0 eliminate the German “alant and push the Wort back 250 kiometars By the onc of May, plans hae boon rethe lly developed. mosified by the suggestions of the paruiipating Fronts, and approved by Stain Bobruisk Bobruisk, one of Hitler's "Torified loca ite, lay in the southeastern corner of the GGorrran salient, some a5 Kilometers from the Front. Assined to the defense of the city. yeas XXXV Corps, with. six Infantry isions sung out along 8) kllometers oF front Immediately south of XXXV Compe was XL] Panzer Corp, with three infantry {sions stung out aléng 40 kferneters. In Feserve inthe ates wat 20In Parzst Dhvsion. “All ot these formations ware under General Jordan's Ninth Army. ‘Tho fixed defenses of Bobrusk constituted ‘two successive alts immediately outside the city. Supported by minefields, those hhad bees constructed by the slave labor of thousands of Russian ‘cilans. The city Iigol had boen converted into @ sort of foress, with piloxes and of tank tumets scattered about. Covering the city to the east wore two successive systems. of ‘wonches, each cansttung fve or si ines of earthworks. The systems were. sup: ported by forttied vilsges, more tank {urtets and pilboxes, ard so forth. The Hist luench system was to 8 depth of eight klometois from the front and the second ‘was between twelve and thirty kilometers Behind thet, or setween twenty and thirty lometers ‘east of Bobruisk. The wo defense systems covered the city from an fesstosn atack and extended some. 100 kklometers. But they offered title or no protection against attacks from the nodth- fener, partculary, the southern flanks. The Soviets stacked Bobrick precisely In the. aroas ‘hero the Germans were least able to cope with them: on the ontem and sauthern flanke of the ‘dsfenses, with powerful strikes sgsinst the ‘avo most northerly divisions “of OX Corps and tio most southery divisions of XLI Pazar Coras. In order 10 accomplish the task, the toons of Fist Belorussian Front, under Marshal: Rokossovsk), ste ‘vided into several assault groups end support groups. ‘At 0600 on 24 June, troops went forward ‘supported by smell bodies of tanks. ond faseaut guns, ond with engineers to asiet in Clearing) the extensive. minefields. Al support wes. considerable. Over 2.000, ‘ordes ware flown on the fit day alone ‘despite unfevorabie weather By 7900, Russien units nad penetrated up Kilometers in some sectors and were bbaginning to commit large tank formations Thoea moves forward rapidly, and by nightfall had advanced twelve to flteen ‘lometersin tho southern sector on a front of thirty klometere in the north, facing the tip. of the extensive German. defense system, things ‘moved more slowly But some golns were made. On 25 June, 9 eavelr-mechenized group \yes pushed through the remnants of XU Panzer Corps in 8 gonarally northyosteriy deeetion in an effort to cut Bobrusk off from the west. Advancing 70 tlometers In ‘wa days, these forces euberantiay eu the city off. Meanwhile, the Savi northern forces rosumed the attack end began to ‘make significant gains. By 27 June, entry ‘lerents had inked up west of Bobvvisk, ‘sealing the remnants of XXXV Corps and XL Panzer Corps into » pocket some 25 by 0 kilometers. On the night of 27-28 June, XXXV Cons: tempted a breakout northvarcs towards Fourth Army, only to rset solid Soviet resistance. Farce fighting taged for some time, but, before midnight on 28-29 June, the” Getmans, including the coms ‘commander, began to surrender. However, ‘some units’ did sucoved In forcing the Beresina and gaining the doubul securty fof Bobruisk proper Bobvuisk wes. held by about 10,000 men plus the remains of ix infentry dhisions, the srmoved. division, an antkaiteraft ‘isin, and numerous support termatons. General Hamann, commanding the chy, attempted to. organize. this mass of humanity inca fighting force but hed onty margin success. Nevertheless, 2 hasty organized Sovet tank atiock unaupperted by infanty was beaten off on the evening of 27 June. The next day the Germans fel hack in some areas on the north. and northwest of the city in prepeartion for a breakout attackin those sectors. Very ery on 79 June, a8 the Soviets moved 10 Occupy the evacuated areas, the Germans Taunched thelr attack, 2 disorganized, pooriy coordinated afi, which monagod fo gain some ground but was soon braxen up by Soviet artilery and mortar fire. The Germans, growing increasingly desperate, ttled several more such hasty attacks, each ‘ima baing beaten off with inraasing ease by Soviot firepower. Meanwtilo, the Soviets prepared their own atack ‘810400 07 28 June, the Red Army attacked in force. Street fighting began in earnest. Gathering thelr last organized forees, the Germans launched 8000 men against the northern portion of the encirclement at 0800. After ‘wo desperate assauhs were Boats of he third tet af breaching ‘the Sovet toes succeeded. Thousende puniesticken German troops attempted to force their wey through the gap under 9 ‘murderous Russian crossre. Those, who ‘managed to get through found yet another Soviet tne further on, making the whole effort frutlss, (A not unfkety event in wr, 4 essontaly fruitess undertaking | By 100007 29 ‘June, the Red Army wes mopping up the German remnants ond rooting out suicidal snipers. In six days the Germans sutfered £0,000 kilee, 23,700 prisoners, and uncounted missing, Soviet booty incided 1,300 guns, 215 tanks and aesault guns, sn oar) 1200 motor vehicles. The fortified locality of Bobruisc nad cost Germany neary 803% ff Ninth Army. But the loss in manpowe: fand equipment was in some ways. less important than wat tho reaization tt, for the fist time in the long wer in Russa, Soviet tactics and operational procedures had proven superior 10 the German ones. Indeed, when Sever voope went into the ‘atack on 24 June, thoy di sain an almost perfect copy of German bitakrieg tactics ‘Beorclcgd in the gary years of the wer. The ppane-sticken mobs of troops, the inability of the Germans to do litle more than slow Up the Soviet advance, and the terble telization thatthe Red Ary was es sha ‘8 the German Army, wereal indications of ‘the dectne of Gorman arms.The Soviat pian wag. sknple one. Two groups of fronts, one uncer Zhukov and the other under Vaslovsky, wera te aunes acoarenated Series of atiscks ovel an extended front gaint the conta. portion of the salen, both teoretieally and infact the weakest sector of ‘any salient Vaslessky, commanding Fist Bakio and Third Belorussian Fronts, was %0 Suike at Vilebsk in the novth of the salent While Zrukev, with Seound and Fret Belo: russian Fronts, wos ta atike towaras Bobs, in the soutmern par of the German bulge. The tye attacking gtouns would then converge On Minsk, vitally in the center af the salen, Fawing in ne process cestroyed the German Theo Panzer and Fourth Arms, and nearly haifof the Ninth Army. [is this account Sovet Miltary formations wal be printed ia ais (2 ‘void confusion | After having taker Mingk, ie combined forces at 2nukaw and Vesievsxy were fo push westwards unl thw order to halt was gin Preparations for the offensive ware detaied but not based on the whims and tareies ofthe higher ranking oarnars. As the pian svotved, tho commende’s of the particpating ‘ronts, arming, co‘, and dhasions were eonavitad ‘The actus! sttacking corps ard vivsars wore petmitied to Uralt thee own plane within tne contin of a general disetve from higher up This permitted considerable flackaity to. the vereds ermy commanders and aleo fostered Considerable enthusiasm among. the ervcl- pating troops. Having had a hand inthe ‘coming operation, they wore better able to Understand thor ale in Material preparations for the etfensive were staggering About 1,200,000 men were Iinmeclacey eveiable wien the offensive wae launched, er tote ot2:500.000 Fane nclides reserves and supped troops. Between 4000 ‘and 5.200 torke and other sitar AFV and ‘Seproximately 31,000 pieces of artery, heavy ‘marars and rockst launchers wore avaiable for tne ffansive, To provide air supoer were ‘bout 6000 everett. The logistical preparations for the offensive ‘ware not stinted, Some 75,000 carloads were Fequies ve bring vp troops and equipment for the eperation. Courting mater! canted with tizcking formations, supphes. stocks ed in Forward conots, and sicckples. available ot forward raiheads, the Yoous particpating hed 30 days rations, 20'rofle af fuel and tive ‘esupplies ef ammunition. To backup this rmuniicence, stil more Mmountsing 3! supeles were avaiable n rear area depots, To ciate the movernert of supples ane munitions, fly 48,000 ‘tucks were avaiabio tothe’ four atizcking fronts, mony of thom Amencen vetieles mace avalable by the. Landtease Het Maca preparations reflected the sols Of the operation and 250,000 hospital beds were mage ready Tho Soviets hod tow qusims seeut the operation which they se fo" 22 June 1844, the thi anniversary af the Nazi iovasion, That confidence had three roots their knowiecge {thatthe skil of the Sovie: solar was neatiy equal (0 that of the German; ther significant rmateral superiority; and their possession ot the initinve As things turned out, the Germans could nox hava better cooperaieg in heloing the Soviets attain marked success German preparations for the Soviet offensive might be termed non-exstont They were net fsxpecting @ Soviet offensive against Ady Grove Center, tut rather assured that the Sovets would ty conclusions in the area between the Carpathians andthe -Priget Marshes, south-west of Army Group Center. Tete were a number of goad reesens for ths, ‘ot the least of whieh was thot his was the a fram which Miler expected 0 Soviet attack. But, Beyond ths. she Germans might have attempted 29 offensive trom tha Car. pathian Pripet Mashos area to the Bate had the situation been reversed. A Grive of about £00 biomaters would gut the Soviet armies on tha Baltc, curing Belorusais and the. Baltic States olf from the rest of the Naz) Empire, anc, with those regions. rom neatly 79 Glusions ot Army Group Center and Arrny Group Novem Iti sgniieant that OKW and OkHHrespecively Geiman Armed Forces te Hilers! and German Army Suareme Head quarters, the later having as sls sole respon Sli the congue: of operations in tne Fast beloved that this wes a logeal slep for the Russiers. German imaligence seamed te confirm this wove. Only 8 tow ottcars raised ‘bections to tne plan but were ignored, (twas later put abou that Zeit, de head of OXH, and Guserian, nis suceessor etter the Army Group Center'dssster, oolong sn te group, but al the evidence points the other way) Later, of outs. the entire blame would be fad (on ils. This Pataly eppeers to be the cass, German Defensive Techniques > and Soviet Offensive Tactics By mid-1944, the Germans and Russione had reached @ sort of impass In technlaue: Doth sides wore more oF less of oqual si, ‘offensively and defensively. The Bolor ‘ian operation marked the first time thet Soviet tactics proved tromselves superior a German tactios in ery general way. tle therefore of some Imeortance to. under: Stand where both armies stood tactically the Summer of 1844, German defensive tactics were extremely floxlble. The bese os wee fo cover a front whom aceauese number tone capitalize on the defensive qualities of the tarran, mako freo use of the constuction mates prove rterckng tales fre in mobile reanrve forces for. local ‘courteractacks, and ba willag to Yleo up ‘ground without a fight If terrain with ‘superior defensive qualities was avaliable, ‘to frasvata a very strong enomy How. ‘Al‘of this was fine, on poper. But by June 1844, some problems had come up, Formations defending Army Group Gen: ‘ors front were not always able to establish the sort of defensive line favored by the Germans, They were short of menpower, the terrain was fraquently unsuitable: construction materals wore Inadequate: ‘and Hitler vlowed with deepest euspicion ‘any retrogrede movoments. As result, the Germans made do and established the best defensive system they could “Th extome length of the font prevented any possbity of hekng the ee ke Strength The bk of the front wos hed by Eval (ess manning defense points and Eavering the remaincar of the front wth Song pavolz In those srs, where exttome fortfiations existed, around Veebsk, Orsha and Bebrsk the canaty of ‘voops ieresed markedly OF ourse, 1B left enormous atetches of tha ont io be hai by al pokes of ope nity ‘a be able to resist any Soviet aggresive moves mete poweria then paso, How ‘ver, ven thet Ary Group Carter wos {eared to stand, thee woe probobly 40 bebtar olton [Much of the train was fey wel sulted to ‘afensive action, particularly where forests ‘and rivers provided some measure of cover, But large parts of the area to be defended lacked uch cover. Whether forested of ot, the terrain was fairly flat end featureless, either being ensertioly neutral ‘Factual favoring offensive operations. In the southern sector of the aa, the Pripet Marshes offered acre protection from larga scale Soviat operations but not fenough to prevent the Gormens. from Worrvng about threats trom thet stao. Whi tha marshes ‘could. impede the movernent of sipificant mechanized for. ‘rations, they affecad tite abatacl fo ight forces and caveky. Arees in the vicinity of the marshes also bud very high wator {able which proventad the construction of eeniy dug emplacements, Where extensive. defenslve proparations had been made, the Germene made ‘maximum usa oftheir ail attempting to feablch subetantl positions within the. Framework. of theie Ieitations, This was important, for the German were operating ‘under severa handicaps, oven having set a3id¢ their inadecuats manpower By 1944, concrate was in short supply in the Nazi Empire and many ofthe postions In Army Group Center wora constructed of ‘earth, ocal rock andsimber. Such positions ‘ware'not as effective ex concrete ones, ‘although in wintor tha difference was not Important. There seems to have boon Considerable good use made, of existing structures, paniculely factories, vileges land farmhouses. These were often s0 sold that they fulfled any fortification engHaving decided, whether through protessionsl Galbetation or dictatorial ogee, thal te Soviets ware going to attack ine Carpathian” PripetMarstes region, the Germans. pro- edad 10 reinforce the formations. charged sin the stone ot inst region. 1 Us wa, Army Group Naein Ukraine, 3nd, to 2 lessor fant, Army Group South Ukraine, were booted up with fuly ‘titeen panzer “and Paneorgronadier “divisions. Many of these formations came from Aimy Group Center, leaving thet considerable formation without {any proper reserve able To undertake mobile eperations ‘The Garman error was e common one found sepestealy in miliary history. an attempt 10 assess tho intentions of the enemy thraugh an Understanding of your awn stendara proce. dures The Soviets had’ the sanabihty to Undertake an operauon suc" as OKW and Oki enwsioned, but the intention was purely German. The ee Army operated. with inereasing skill and metioulGus preparations as ‘he war went on. aut usually without striking billanoe. Che commentator pu apy wher hhe noted that the Geran high comsana trom consistently underestimating tne Russians Completey went the other way to GroRly fverestimaung them fs for Army Group Cem itso, under Fk Marshal Busch (nether @ partculetly inspired nor a particulary inospable general. there could be no adequate preparetions for a fffensive. Trey weran't expecting one. Never theless, thre were poosle who locked at ‘he ‘bomy sie of sings. Evan assuming that the otal German assessent of the stuation was correct, the posilon of Army Group Center wes fot teas let was far too thinly $retened and was watyslly devoid of reserves, Tha Sovets had beer ‘conducting. tmited attacks agninst varus pars of the ary grou Since the ron had stabilzed in December of 1645. These sttacks nad frequently anes the resources of the aetenciag units even wien, a5 during the late winter of 1948-1944 ‘hare were moblia reserves evalenie If Buseh had a completely free hend in the ‘operation of his ‘orcs, the most resonable thing to have Gone would have been {0 fe back fo one of several move easily detencec lines. Uurately, ss could nave been coupled with an evacuation of army Group North, i fhe Sale States. Such a move woul have ‘conaidelabiy Feducad the front of Army Group Center and totaly treed the treops 9 Aun Group North "number of higher ranking ctfiogis made progassls such as this prior 10 the Sovet offensive (Busch was apecitally forbidden (0 Undertake he tind ot mth eranal) Hitler Cleary bears responsiility forthe “no poicy which was To keep Army Group exposed and result ia ng destructor Fier felt nat the release of troops would have hci no significant result as much as Soviet ‘roops would algo have been released Dy 2 shortening of the German front. Needless 13 Say, his advisors efforts to point out that the Gerrans (wth a tightty eld front! were ikely tobeat off ny nursber of Russiene incetintaly ‘iors futile The voaaor Tor the were complex, having 10 do with Hiter's incressing megalo ‘mania, his deteriorating meniaconatien, and the considerable psychological “jump” whien rnehad on the protessonals dusing 18049041 Hite's “na retreat” policy undoubtedly was a Significant factor inthe ealspea of Army Group ‘Center, Not only wore lege scale, sltategic retreats arohtted, bul so ware local, purely lacica ones, Thus, Thins Panzer Army ‘wished to reduce one portion of its font trom peut 189 kflometers to about 110. This would have permitieg the aft 10 establish 3 detense fine on more favorable terrain ana would Nave ‘reed seva'a units 10 form a small byt mabe reserve. Doctrinal, this was perfecty reason- able. But "no revvat” meant not under any icumstancss. The adjustment of the Tront wes not mace Hitler futher complicated the operation of the 4imy group by ordering that the cites of Grsha." Vitebsk, Moglov, and Bopruise be Converted into orited lacshties.” prepared for “heagenog” etense and strongly art soned. These “orifiedlocalues” were 10 be Feld at al costs, The assurmatian was thet thoy would impecte the Sowet advance. ‘This poly {ied up sevan divisions ang huge amounts of ‘materel wath no vsble basalts Such 9 policy had more or fess "worked" in the winter of 1942, but at thas ume the Sewitslnckes ‘mobility and wisdor to aver! such peces and wate incined, indeed forced, to attack them. Furthermore, during. ye. T9s1-1942 Soviet Winter Offersive, the Germans hed @ ‘sgnificent mobie resurve well dopioyed be hind the front. In June of 1944, eithough & neers technicel dreams, but were not ‘always avallable when such a structure was ‘heoded, There seam to hava boon some. orirable io rae of tres om ‘anks, an interesting stop-gip messure but inno way comparable tothe sort of erilory ouitons the Gerrans needed. Having dona the best they could undor the cimatencot, tho Gurnant eveiad Se Soviets, antcioting bloody, unsiiul frontal sesauk. Tho Russians dd rot ‘cooperate. ‘The Seviet, back In the days of “41, 42 ‘and evan "43, bad made frequent Usa of ‘rontalaseauita. Lacking tata finesse and the offices to instil K, the Red Army wae foreed, in the early veers of the war, to depend upon costy frontl assaults, often ‘unsupported by artery. Results could be (900d given edequste supply of manpower nd a willingness to expend it. But the Russiane were fully aware of the inherent Wostafulnses of the technique end were Conscious of superior methocs. By June of 1944, thos eupario; method were going ta be ted on 8 large ecole, To. begin with, the Russione hit the Germans where choy weren't, the major Blows eimost all faling on poorly hed portions of the German font, But before fhe troops went forward, there was 8 Jengthy anc considerable atilery bombard ‘ment reaching far inside the Germ tines land conducted with remarkable ski, Thus, the artlery shifted reerwards in sudden jumps, causing the Germans to think thet ‘he Aussion assault foress would soon be ‘upon them. Abendoring thelr dugouns and ‘bomb shelters, the Garman Infantry took to the tenches.. Their only reserves began moving up, only to tnd the erage Totuming. Meanwhile, Soviet fight bombers took advantage of thi superiority and worked over the Germen aniery postions andi reserves. and jet about anything sew that offared iteot ae target. The actlory and alr bombardmant interferad with, end to some extent Saute zed, Geman commento te tema, fouling up commend channels, tee rection, mevement of ressrves and. the ‘Operations of anti-tank troops, Only then dd the infantry move out. ‘The Russian infantry wes, forthe frst ie, Used on a very large sca'8 with » sil equal tothat of the Germans in thelr heyday. The Infantry went into the stack supported by ‘T34 and KY tanks, The tank, organized in special Infantry support brigadeo, helped the infantry overcome major obstacles with ‘minimum losses and provided a degree of ‘motortzation, The troops Fequerty rode Into bette mourted on the vehicles. Srosd frontal snaoa wor voli. whnevr Dol, with ra ooe concen oh Erle! postions parte Moa notong Tha tc cts ne race Oy orb! re on Wt Ifa andengress cont sppoed tanks, light artillery, and aircraft. oi Tho basic Soviet ides was for the infaney-tank aseaut troops 10 pierce the Garman front, asning postione favoreble for the operstion of mobile forces, With Buch penetrations mada, tha exploitation oroas would pese through ina fai copy of lessic bitkrteg tactics, The exploitation forces were cf two sors: armoredunits and. ‘avally-mechenized formetions, The lator i some ol te best wo dng 0 ‘campnign, Being combined sims forces AEV, Notse cavelry, end mechanized Infantry. Neither the armored nor he cavaley:machanized formations were, committed tathe batt untl after the intl enetiations had been mado, thus Keeping them frash for their primery mission, During theactuslexlatsepaod Fed Army troops sears to Fave operated in ‘he same tree-whiseling, aggressive fashion ‘whieh characterized German mobile oper- tions in the early years of the war, ‘The Germans tad proven 10 be good teachers.10 “Figures don't lie...." Serious students of itary affairs not infrequeetly encounter, in their research, ‘widely divergent sets of figutes for the Samo'subject. Often the differences do net really exist. The figures. merely reflect ‘tforert. ‘bases of information. One ‘Sormmentary ight note 30,000 tps at battle and another 38,000. The solution to the paradox may be found inthe fect that ‘3,000 wore present on the calls But only 30,000 available for combat. One important ‘ontibution of itary Nstrian i to cleat avny such technieal exors. Sirdady, the Serious student’ must, cope with the Provera “fog of war" which results In {he opponents sach having 2 particular view ofthe situation lkay tobe at variance With “objective” reafty. Problems of this Sort are rooted in subjectivity, the different \waye. in which opponents’ percelve the ‘Stuation, Then thera are the store which Fesult from inexcusable careloasness. The ‘ost frequent perpetrators of euch 30 retires general who rely t00 hesvily on thet memories. This sort of error fuels contro: versy, usualy among other reied generale ‘who “remember a differenty,” bat these ‘re vaualy the most easly reschved. Finally, there comes the most serious problem of aly that of utter falafieston of information, When studying the Russo.German Wer, ail ‘theae problems wil be encountered in ne way or another [At various placas in the main body of thie farisle. Tgures have been quoted for {varything from the. rumbor of divésione vale to the rior of machine gure ‘captured. Usually those figures have Boon qualified in some way, such a6. with "almost." The reason forthe is si the West, of course, it i fashionable. 10 ‘assume thet the Fussians are kas and the Germans honest. This would hardly seem tobe an honest evaluation ofthe situation. In the final-anaiysis the best conclusion possi is that there area good many ars frboth camps. Indeed, the fare somatimes seem to be in charge of things. The Germans. Figutes quoted for the Germars aro complicated by the fact that many of their raoords woro during the offensive ial. (A British soldier once commented that one of the most otable things about a modern batted is ‘the emount of paper litering @.) Further compleating matters is the: problem of ‘who happens to be doing the counting, whan he did it, and who or what he was counting, ‘The fgure given in this article for the stongth of Army Group Canter is almost 3 compromise bstwoen a” Soviet high estimate of over 1,000,009 men anda ologists’ low of 400,000, but tually [6 from @ completely indeperident ‘and more reliable Soures. tf ether altoma- five figure had been the tue figure, tho ‘couree of vents would have been far ‘erent. Soviet figures are based on the ‘Spparenity offal policy of overestimation ‘whieh gives the. Germans 6,000,000 or so ‘men on the front at any one time, nearly ‘ice the all-sime high. The Garman figure is designed to assuage the marta pride of ‘ging German veterane: thay wore not Getested Ina. fair fight but. merely ‘verwhelmed with bodies. Figures for the number of aircraft assigned 10 Army Group Center's Sith Ait Feet 270 abo very complex, bur Mkaly 0 be the rast ‘of honest error. They range from a fow of shout toa hgh of 7, The Garman A Force aoeme to have had about 40 fighter fareramt assigned to operations. on. the ‘morning of the Soviet offensive, out of a {wish of some Z00dd avalabie. The balance, some £00 aircraft, was made up of Bombers, reconnalssance ‘craft, tans: ‘ports, observation planes and so on. We could goon, nating the divergent figure for tanks and atilery and prisone’s: but these "amples wil “suttce for the The Soviets. Figures avaiable on tho Soviet forces show 8. diversity which is, if ething, greater than that ‘shown, by German figures. Nevertheless some interesting conclusions are posable Excluding the obviously wild and iat stimatos, the Fusions seen to have ‘massed 1,200,000 man for tho operation backed by another 1,000,000 reserves and Support troops. Thie represents same 38% of the coral avaiable Svat forese (a festmated by the German intelligence ‘agency, Foreign Armiss East, for 3D June 1844) and fully 87% of the toons acivally fon the font, Soviet sources’ seem 10 confer this in several ways. For example, Miltary Strategy, by. Marshal V.0 Sokolowsey, Indicates that manpower ‘commitments to the Belorussian operation ‘wore 208% greater ian those of te 1841 Moscow counter offensive. Inasmuch 20 Fis figures extend into. mid-August they tend 10 confirm the stvength Incleated. kis unfortunate that similar confirmation can not be obtained for the number of ‘tanks available in the operation: estimates range trom 4000 to 6,200, the relatively ‘small differenoo lending credanco. 10 the idea that these figures result from different ‘bases of calculation. The number of pleco of antlery, Including heavy mortars and possibly reckot launchers, vais from a low ‘of about 24,000 to @ high of 31,000. Aga, these figures may be based on difring sels of clculoions and each may. be Cortwct in its Way. For the number of siteratt variable figures se aleo avalable. Thaso run trom 4,800 to 71000. But closer examination reveals thet, inthe case ofthe higher igure, 1,000 heavy Pborbore ara Inekcad. Ths loaves 8 ran Df 4.500 to 6,000 and again may be result of a differing beso of calculation. Asan be seen io most cases, tho figures ‘avaliable are reasonable but diverge du *0 honest or, most Wksly as a result of dffferent ways of ealeulating and evaluating {the information avail, Ina. for Instances, of course, we find. rclevious figures which prove’ 12 be utter fasit- cations. large mobile reserve was evallatle, i was ll in the wrong place. When the offensive came, unstoppable. would be THE ANTAGONISTS AT MIO-WAR. Inthe first year of the Russa-German Wer, the German armies were neatly everywhere victor tious. Only through a prodigicus effort — and ‘ced by the increasng exheustion of te Gormand and the onsat Bf winter — wore (Me Soviets able to dive the Germans back from the gales af Moscow, In tne process, visually the tire prewar Red Ary was des'ayed. A ‘ew ane began to emerge on the ruins cf the ‘1d. 8 woule be impose Be to discuss neuen ‘a abbreviated form the orgarizaign, easio- Infantry Division, EQ erzas2mn ce 2451 ma | Begmn Teseue imc | SNS A tims Ste Te fe 121504 gine hur pane 441HD ca S10 {201 bree 45 MT —| eee 78) Be «e001 GERMAN INFANTRY DIVISION — The ‘Sra ut oor ponana Siete toa‘ment, and techriques of bath the German and. Sevict armies dure World War i or we uace ‘evolution during the conflet. Nor would this. be necessary, as iC Fas been done olsownere™ The tundmental cause of the collaso of the Fed Army curing the ital German oreiaught ‘was corrected nether with the potential ct the individual Soviet fighting man Mor with Nis ‘ocuipment, but rather with hs leadership. The Rec Army, in.tune ot 19, wos oficered by & great many medocries,‘pariculgly 19. the Figher levels. Besween "S37 end 1938, Stain, + For atu! deausin of bon ¢ Gorman nd Sot sero nthe 181-1065 cone, aoe the SOT Ince P2825, end #2 for sppareriy_no_reas00 other than, an cuts ch psn hat “iquidatos™” or imptoned futy 42% of the olfeer corps of {he Red krmy. "Thome otfees ve omained ‘were price ly of lower rank, From the ark Df colone and abe, the survivors wee ether Soimive romani" ries of Stan ar nia "cava Cree” — she officer who hee ampargaed wr hie crig ta Ci Wat ot WGretB21. In this faghien pevtned the pineipalieker 3th fod Army. Won vat Semen Tati nal be eae er ad Sycophonts vino would bo in command Te Soviet armies would toce eatatophe every wwnere Fora, Sin wae nt espe y ‘ansocal it aster staring min the face ews conse af change. Tre impnsoned sices were ralirad To the aimigs by the thousands. Many office's parteipatng in the Aetense of Moscow in iste 1941 ware ‘ipe encod pro-war loaders Rowhy ‘reed from praon oamag. (Stein 989 retake’ from Interfering wth the conduct of operations after having muddled things gay io tho war) But ‘even then the Reo Atmny had token such 9 beating es to have ceased to exist The Sowers thee uncertook 9 edi ous ge they endrly rebuit their array while Ine. greatest war in history raged about them The lundarnental problem fcing the Soviets ia lato 1841 wassimato, The pre-war regular amy Fad been ‘tually destroyed im combat. Tho supply of officars was decimeted through Combination of burtle and purges. In crder to Centinue the fight, the mere waditonal, and fdmitedy supeor techniques, hae 10° be Belorussia PAPER ve Mash and ges wth Fe ah= =e Wace Tale — ovr Atmy Group Center 2000 Boundaries = = = Approximate From, 22 une 1944 Large sectors of the Army Group Center area wore ether forested or marshy. The former tended to favor the defense, although in some areas the forests were lust not where they were needad. Marshy {reas were. a mixed blessing, preventing the ‘operation of large Soviet forces but boing essentially unfavorable to extensive defen. Sve preparations. Of particular importance reine ‘several rivers offeting, sarigus Sbetsclas ‘fo. aa attacker if adequataly efended. Any of these vers would, of course, have offered a more easily Gefended, shorter line for tho. Goren than the ove they actually hell. At various ‘umes, most were proposed as alternative etensive lines, natably the Berezina Losing mast of thair troops an tho Trent, the Gormans were unable to utile the advantages of the fuer system duting thelr retreat. In arees,not covered by forests oF ‘swamps, the terain wes generally ft and featureless, not particularly conducive to defensive operations and ‘ften advorta- ‘geous to the employment ef large mobile Offensive forces. u2 abandoned. Otice's’ vaining ograms, for xara, wore no longer raced Yur ou vweilrounded ces but rather, ren” who were seecalists ono thing, ike infamy {Police or anita teahwiaues ote esau. By abolishing corps headquarters a8 ap inlermadiary command vel between divsons fang armies, the Soviets economized on theory ba at seme cst in. aficency Meanwhile, fo hap Stave off tsa actor, the ‘ast, morsasingly nettatie manpower ree Sources ofthe Seuet Union wore dam spon 5 the Soviet poopie recognized the nature of their ory In 1942 he Red Army that portion of tha oft arm whion yet oxsted an ‘hat portion of the few which managed to. suvive the he'd Itaining ground oF combat! wes oscar ng increasing aif The cers trained none ‘Smpe specially soon became cuite expert st it By ae 1992, the Red Army was capstio of halting 9 German offensive, sthough at crest cost It was also caggdte of launching Successful large scale otlensies of sis om agar at reat cost. By 1843 a Red Army wos becoming exoert in defense and Maz begun to {et the upper Pare in oMense. Unt for unity nd eertaniy wan forrman, twas sti not equal to the Germans. In 1964, ‘he Germans began {oleae the ability 0 cetera themes ae the Someta became move sifu at aonchirg woincooidnaied olensives. Meer, ne Srecomen rmeascres of 1947-1940 had begun ‘oper of? Therew officers, many drawn trom the meragetal ranks of Soviet musty, had nocessorily become. very skilful ?m the process, tousenes had sled In 194%, the Shorcoge of tarred ofticers hed eased sutt Bremty to permit the renattuton ofthe comps “hus, by the summa of 1944, tho Red Army, ready cuparirin moter, began 0 approach thestardares oF the Gorman Amy nthe ais of is convrand and stot porvonnal The Gerrans were sit technesly superior in the conduct of operations and ‘remendousty ‘uporer in she conduct of small unt actions. Buln Sowa haz develo ecrices ard skis of thei vn wich, parhaps ot 30 ertcert na tnoso of re Gonrans worked As for the Germans, there were ony to ‘oss ites, given the fine conciton cf ther Bes in 1381, Ther aficvrcy vould ees famain at a high level oF gocine To have imoroved would have required an irposste effort. Under three years of continuous pressure, with meresting committmants ‘round the Finges of the Novi Empre, and wth an increasingly nechorent.leudorsap, the Searvan Remy Soeined ‘The principe cause of he dotinein the qty ‘and performeree ofthe Geran arias 8 of ours, the enormous lose. eufered in combat, prmsniy on the Russian Front, The rest serous Tossen wore among foaderahip Barsonnet, porvularly junior ofcers and Fan-cemmissoned otieers Even atthe vey Ena at the war, higho ranking German otcors fetsinad 8 signifeant technical edge over thle Sewer courterpers. Set attiten had tn serous gaps in the rants of sauad,gletoun ara ‘Sompany leaders. These wera tha peen's most eonssary tothe concuct of succesahd, sled Spain's. 8 faroer sericus oss. was that incurtea by the rontine monty. AS he er ‘wert on, the. tng gan the. average intentryman decined ‘both in aulity. ond entity Eventaty reeps were rushod nto ombat withthe aarest mrvmursf traning. f-serse, ese two provioms Were Prk@. AS Ihe supe of siles Smal unt anders eed vo, Ihe losses araong the tine Ment Inctessod Partisan Activity and German Rail Transport Combet — was a particulary vicious aspect ‘of World War Il. Russia was the theater in which partisan activity was moet wide spread and rmost successful ‘The Soviet partisan movement ad its Gfigins in the swift. German advances sung 1841 and 1942. fled Army unit, Iaolated but stil cohesive, carried on the ight rather than surtonder. There were 8 ‘umber of good roasons for this, not the least of which was the fact that Stain ‘eonsideced POWs traitors, A further incon va was tno teatront acootced POWs By ‘the Gerrans, when they bothered to take any] These forces constituted the core {around which the panisen movement was built, Hiding in the considerable forests and matshiands of German-occupied Rusti, the Rod Army formations gradually ‘gathered to themselves large numbére of easants,elthar through fercile recruting ©, a6 the German ratioraities poly became clearar, through voluntary enlist ‘ment. The partisans were further supported by additonal forces and equipment inf tVated through the tenuous front lines oF ‘dropped by parachute. As the partisans ‘grew in svength, they became bolder. By mid-1944, the partisan movement was making serious inroads into. German Strength, €8 Uo9pe and equipment were ‘verted to control partisan activites. Using fractional guetila tactics, the patisare, wal-eqvippsd, walh motivated and coordi. ‘tnd by 8 central agency in Moscow, tied Up tons of thoveande of woops, mace the snvire Gorman rear area unsafe, and tected a large portion of their considers- fable energies towards disrupting German fines of communication and sepply. Like moet Workd War I armies, the Garman ‘Arey relied eaviy on ra transport for its “Supplies, reinforcements and general com rmanicatons. Partisan activity was. never likely. to cause total destruction of 3 nificant portion of the sell net, roling Steck & supporting irstaltios to bing {ail ratfic to a hak, but the partisans cout inortupt traffic at eritical times, BY ‘mid-T944, an" increas in partaan atiacks ‘cathe ral net wore certain indication of a coming Soviet offensive. Tho offoncive against Atmy Group Genter was 10 ‘exception to this ule. In the 24 hours prior to 22 June 1944, ‘panisans, under ‘General Ponomaranko, ‘Succeeded In executing some. 10/500 ‘demolitons inthe baliwick of "eichaver- fehradrekion Mira (AVE Mira tha 0 ‘agency covering the ars. Army Grou Cater: Guan al person! nd ‘security forces prevented 2 furthor 3,500 demottions, (on nes Inking Second ‘and Fourth Armies alone, some. 6,000 emalivons wore etiempted.} Soma idea of the scale of this operation mey be gained by noting thet in May, successful demot- tions in RVD Minsk totalled about 15,000, sth a further 7,000 unevecessful stomps, ‘Thus, the 14,000 demoktons attempted on. 20:21 June represent e relative increase of neatly 2.600% ‘The materiel demago caused by these demolitions Is dificant 10 assess, Mile of tiack, scores of installations and alot of {ling stock wore damaged or cestroyed. ‘The partisans claimed to have derailed 147 «rains, hhough this dlputed by German soureas. Tho German records indicate thet in the tast eight days of June, 96 Tocomotives and 1,860 wagons Wor Tost, ‘Any way ore looks at it his represents a sesious loss in rolling stock. Beyond that, however, every double-tracked tne in RVD ‘Minsk ahd newey all singlo‘tacked lines wore cut, Damaged track Ie relive sony torepoir, but evan so trequired 24 hous to get most of the dovble.trcked Bree ‘working agains and as much as 48hours for the singletracked lines. The realy crtical {losses were in irstallatons: bridges, cound routes, water tanks, witches and go forth. In.some instances domeges were not made good for nearly twa weeks. Further ‘complicating the repair problem was the Luntaiabity of the Ukranten ral personne! In German service. Mon of these people were actually patiode Russans doing the Best to substage the German woretfort Many were partisans, They also impeded ‘pal: operations, forcing the Germans t0 rng in more reliabe porsonnel from other ats of tho Reich. ‘An examinaton of German records for RVD Minsk teveals oniy 3 shoht drop in waffle during June when compared to previous this drop oceurtod almost enrely during ‘the act oight days of June, i soon looms a8 the equivalent of 443% decline. Neverthe- Jess, the Gaimane wore able 30 ofect {Pairs cLicky, the naed to operate under Bressure acting ae a spur 10 te: effors Traffic in RVD Minek rose signiicanty during July, at a time when the aoe contaled by the agency was condnualy sninking a6 a result of Sovet eons, ‘How iotiventiol were the panicers in halting to peve the way for the Soviet offensive? This fs difcu to deternne, ‘Alone, the partcan raige could nt have had any significant, lasting influence on ‘operstions, Thay caused considereblo dis. ‘organization in the Gorman teat and undoubtedly disrupted the flow of mon tions and telsforcements, euch ae. ey Interestingly enciigh, however Hh German sources. indicate tl cent of the damage done, they cwell on tho speed with which repairs were imple. ‘mented rather than onthe smourt_of upton the raids acwally caused. Our Dest estimate would ba thet the periane disrupted, if only temporatiy, the flow of men) and materiel, and caused German fronting units 10 be apprehensive about the security of their resrarea. In sum, tho partisans_made a contrbution 10. the ‘success ofthe etfensivs, but we are unable to determine the magnitude of thet contibution,Newer offcars ha to resort increasingly to 2 ap a youre atiude The ea 10 evn year: loses mang, leadership. personne! ‘Rna'so the cycle eornueg. Funher comple ning. the prablor, was the tence of Socal site xgarizations, auch oa the SS, the Luftwaffe ane alee, and seh apeci ‘ular army formadoraas the Greve Doutech land The manpower and eclpment cor fumed by cuen poltealymotustad, private faimies represented. 2 eovore dain an ine ineressingy slender tesoutees ot Germany Men soho ight wol have cuaifiog 8 gatoon or aver compary lecoers i" repuar ra Siastons were being wasted as spe solde's inthe eile formstions, where absuely igh Starcords preva) Nor was ‘he cian manpower and equipment compensated for by any matted wncrente combat powe The ait Tormauane were somewat, baer Somat than the regu, our ne. more Slictve than the raglrs could be ith ft fans and copicusly suppiad equipment, The polteal conederatorainferet i teainng ond Gticeing the so-calad alte ound combat omants culo often outed ihe creton of tamed, pooled. oversequprec riases of "upernen wht iced noroinatay heby tosses. The handlul of such formations wc proved of eansgerabe vale eo aot cope ‘ale 1 he enormous drain in manpower ard ‘equipment. To be sure, the Soviets mernealves ‘esijnated certain “ormaions “ate” wiih se ‘ie Guards. The dierence “between the German and Soviet practions day in ne ct that the. Soviet formavons “erginated a5 Tegular ling formations which har perteuety disinguished themsalves in combat. And the Soviets could bottar afford the manpower sng ‘equipment dean, ‘There was yet ancther aspect of the poor ‘manpower management of the German Army: that of higher ranking offices. The Ofer coreg of the German Aimy was one of the finest in tors of technical ail and profes: sional knowiedge during World War Il However twas amore a0 totaly sJbserviont tothe wil of iter sre his Naal pay. Far 100 Tew of the German officers opposed Hitles nse fo power Inceed, the Mighest ranking personnel actively aided tm, Very few ‘Opposed his seromes at world conquest, and thase fer reasons which hae nathing te do with ‘otal considerstons. By 1844, Hiller had ‘early total psychological ascendancy over the officers of his army. Too lata were ‘he plots {and conspiacies imost motivated not by the ronsirous nature of the Naz Stata but rather Gy the fact that Miter was losing the wet. By n= doutie Tracker Lines = Single Tracked Lines Approximate Rusto- == German Front, 22 une 194d rox Boundaries of Army Group Center (SERENE AVD Minsk Boundary RVD Minsk: The Rail Net in Army Group Center YD Minsk regulated ral communications Ih Belovussia. This was substentilly the ‘area covered by Aimy Group Center. The ‘map actualy covers slightly more area then RVD Minsk, particularly in its western portions ‘mid-1944 Hair’s contol over the officer corps was completa. The ofticers had meekly submited 10 the Nasi yoke in oder te be parmitied rea:mament and 9 war of songuest Which, in its fest yaars, Seamed. totaly ‘lctorious. in 1946, they found themselvor no longer able or in many cates, wing 10 ‘veithrow that yore, Signiteantiy few active enero officers participated in the forlorn ope I the “July Por” aganst Hier Masrwnle, Hir’s ascendancy permittac him to replace ‘capable but unreliaie clticers with man more ‘amenable to hi wal Mer who. ke Manstln, Bobeved they new more abouttiow to conduct a campaign chan Hitler, were. sacked ond Tusticatec. Their roplacaments often were politically reliable man of ‘considerably loss fatent Untimotoy, he dectine in German ans dusing the war may be irked {0 hwo factors Fst te sncredibiy poor manegement of tre avaieole ‘munpewar resources Sasond, the increaseig ‘kil and deterrension of Germany's enemies, chi ameng them the Soviets The oki canes from the hardest 27001 Of al — combat wt the Germans themselves. The Soviet doter- rmination came from tha ineoasing erminahy Of the Naat State as the confict wore on THE COLLAPSE OF ARMY GROUP CENTER. The Soviet attack on Army Group Comet wes not an isolated evont on’ the Easiem Foe Planning at ine highest lvess Rag envisioned it ascniy one ofa sores of bows tobe davered ‘againat the Geimans Detwoos migeJune and ‘ig-August of 1944, abe Ihe most powerful ‘3rd: mest Important Blow. Gn’ 16 June 1944, Marshal Konev's First Uaranian ‘Front had launched an offensive against southem Poland Just below the southern lank of Army Group Canter On 8 June the Leningrad Front hed lnurened ‘an offensive whch ‘would soon ‘knock Finland out the war. These oHfensives set the stage forthe main operation, the attace fn Army Group Center by four fronts, The offensive against the Gouri salent would be followed by subsidiary opersuons on both flanks even betore the attacking fronts Would reach ther objectives, ‘The destnction of Aimy Group Canter may be tld quickly, for, although at encompassed hoary’ marth of actnty, the greater part of the fighting was purely toar-guard action as the Soviets pursued the browen fragments of tho German armies westward Between the stabilization of the front in the ‘Army Group Cente: sactor i lata Dessamer of BtZand tie aunering of she Soviet offensive in mic-June, the fed Army hed managed to Sere and hold several bndgeheads in the man salient, These would 65 Used t9'9008 ctfect during the offensive, The fat sector to foe! the full impact of the Russian ares was that around Vitabek, one of Hides “eri ocalies" Aft’ brot but Powerful arllery ene aetal bombarcment the Soviet armies. stacked and amost imme: lately broke through tre German defense on ‘ther side of the ety. Vite some formations moved to cut Vitebsk off from the rest of the German armies, other forces pushed rapialy westward 10 ¢xpr hair Grankthrough, Mea” \whis, a hugh socter ofthe lront alow Vite ‘collepsed under prassue and sil more Soviet ‘armies powed into the Germen salient. Wictin five cays, Valcosk was islated, surrounded ‘and reduced — ferocious German counter: attacks not withstanding, So parshed seven divisions, 13“4 (01 24.lune, the Soviets attacked the southern face ofthe salent, aganst Boarusk Fling’ on ‘0 short sectors of front, one netth and 946 south of Bobrusk, the Soviets, ma single day, olowed up a successful artery barrage oy porevating five to ten Kiometas imo ve {Gorrran pasiton on 2 tity mile rant. Wutaln thee days, the peretraton had reached 8 kilometers fn some ateas, and wo Gorman ores in Bobruisk were seoated trom the rest fof the German army. By 29 Jute, Bebrust had Tallon itn Incred te losses Incurted on Both ‘ides, Fight ainsone has pensred Wie te Fist Baltic and Fist Bolorussian Fronts were attacking on the fanks of Army Group Center agarrst Bobruisk and Vitoose, respectively, the Second and Third Belorussian Fronts broke the face of the German Saige and themsolves began 19 push westward Third Belorssenn Front Brushed aside Vaor- ‘ous German resistance, destioved seven Sivsiors ‘and Outfanked 9nd ‘solatee. the “rortted locality” of Oreha, Simiay, Second Belorussian Front moved forward and in five ‘ays had token the "Yorthed.tocalty” of Mogiley and severs! portant towns, shoving ele over thy omer ins German it Dunn the Fist shase of the Soviet stack, ‘om 22 through 28 lune, ove 100,000 German Troops had! beer lied ard weary 49,000 taken Drsoer. Among the casualties was Marsa Busch, sacked by Hier and replacod. by Mode a talented. bet sychophantic offoar Gorman reinforcements, committed in. 3 Piecerneal fashion as they became available, ‘wars evorywhere unguccossful in hating the Ped Atrmy. Consumed in comoat, they Were Unable £0 estabisn @ defersive tine on the Berozina. Gorman Fourth Arrry, covering the face of the salant, Nad almost d60n arin bbted. Sigriticant porvong of Ninte Army ang Tid Pazar Army nad boen badly handed Through wemendous efforss, the Germans rranaged to-colect enough ferses to launch 8 italy, Normandy, Russia ‘June of 1944 was a perticulary eventful momthinthe Second World Wat,On-4. June, Aled armies liberated Rome; on 8 une, Allied armies gained » lodgement-in anon 2 une, the Sovet Normandy and tay wey ‘rom the Eastern Front, thus preventing the Gerrans from stopping tha Soviet offensive equine: Army Group Center. ‘An examination of Garman recone would ‘seem to fndicate that this harly the case, ‘The deployment of 48 German panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions, [neaty, But not ‘uit, all such formatione available to the completely stripped awey all his mobile fast ‘Meee th hrs In Arey. 1nd South Ukraine when into combat piecemeal, arriving in dribs and drabs. At best, such an eventuelity would cee ane eras Sat wa ha rg orien Sroibiguescemniuecnrntnegt ‘ote crore. ‘ave ave begun anita writ eo Mee eroneceted oy tw acu tow ot inefocarr which dovecped att to Seeiatoog Ietacrtan ena i| = ma have "turned out herent and they dnt series of ferocious, but uncgorcinaled and ‘small scale courieratiacks on 23 and 20 June Inan offon te crow the Russians back across the Berosina. Although ne Soviets seer 10 have last neaviyin these actions, they we far batter abo to afora the losses. socauso of tho oor condition of the German forces, the bitecks were probably 8 waste of time, ‘quiprnant ad, especialy. mangower. Tho Soviots kot pushing forward, pausing under the German exumterstiacks. Indeed, there were stay German formations loose in the Seve wear 2s the spebirwad units shod ‘west These German formations were mestly Unis whch had escapad the pockals. st Bobruige and Viteosk_ As the Soviets pushod ‘westwards, the Getmsr positon Began 10 90 fe peces. The remains of Fourth Airy ans [partons of Ninth Aemy flded in on the atea of Minse. Soviet forces oerated Minsk an 3 uly and closed an enormous packst just eas of the ity with fully 100,060 mer inside. By 11 July, the pockot wos lquiested Betweon 28 June and 4 July, the pursu estiod of the offensive, tha Soars poretated 93 ‘much as 500 Kilomtars ona fant nearly 400 kilometers wade, puting off a bfizkneg with a vengeance on tha formar masters of the ar [Attor the enormous lossas of the pened 22 ure through 4 July 1944, anc the vemendous losses of Vitbsi, Bobrusi, Minsk and a score tether places, the Germans naranger Rac the ‘means 19 adaquately resist or sven ster, 2he Fed Aimy cttoncive, Such reserves a8 had oxisled nad been fritored away in sensoloss counterattacks in fulfilment of Hiler's orders te sland fast. Lacking the Treedorn oF moral courage to order a large scala withdrawal, the German generals watchod the Russians cver run Belorussian Tess than thos weeks, The fina ghase of the Soviet offensive, from 5 1023 July, was essentially one of pursit, ith Felatively Itle hard fighting. Gradvaly, ‘rough 3 combination of exhaustion and the anival of German rertorcoments trom cine fronts, the Sowe! deve wounc down’ On 73 July, the Red Atry more or less halted on the line proposed by mary German officers as the idea! rear defense line Between 22 June and 24 ly 1968, the Germans suffered. nearly 406,000 dead and some. 160,000 prsouers. Neaty 30 divisors had been destroyed. The Germans had lost 630 ‘arcralt, 200 tanks and assault guns, neatly 16,000 pocas of aor, ova 20,000 mach na (uns and nary 60,000 vehicles. The front was Substaatialy a8 1 had boon ir June of 194% CONCLUSIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS In_many ways the suocess of the Soviet coensiva in Belorussia une of T4 was @ foregone conclusion. Given the matonat supetioty of ine Red Army and he Tact Mat ‘the Gomare wore dariod operational Taxi. Ty. ncieut te s9e how the operation could fave reed any dilfeerty. Nevertheless, wos precisely this operation which, in a umber oF ways, dacided the future course of the war. Although the 30 drasions lost during the Soviet offensie were almast immectately nore than replaced 2 the muster ros ef the ‘German Army, tho losses were rot Eo much in formations a fi cate, Fore fst Ue inthe war, entire units were surtendaring, Fly 22 Givgioral and corps conmnandors and senior Sts offices were taken by the Fussars neredbly valuable cagte pelsonve, were he iru ess Hier and his minions coule create SOOVER ARMY GROUP CENTER: The Air War in the East The Russian Summer 1944 offensive represented the culrination of three years Gf development forthe Russian Alr Forees, For the frst time on the Rustin front, the ‘Gocrans wore unable 1 use thelr at power to halp repulse the Russians. This time, i twas the Russians who controled tha ski, ‘This control was instrumental inmaking the Russon summer offensive the grost victory The Russian Air Force, which seized ‘supeconty in 1944, had boon bult up Balnstakingly rom the runs of the pre-war Airforce. In 1941, much of the Pussian Alt Force fad boon deatroyed on the ground, and the part which survived was no mateh {or the Germans. By tho ond of 1942, however, the Russians wore sartng 1 even ‘thingsup. Russian factories, hidden beyond ‘the Uras, wore producing large numbers of ‘rerat which, although not always es good ‘as their German opponents, were adequate to Russian needs. By 194, the Russians were producing 355aircratie month, al of ‘which could be Used against the Germans, ‘while the German output of 3.382 planes had to be divided among several fronts. ‘Added tothe Russian total were Lend-Lease areca ult in America and Britain. Those fireraft added 10% t0 the total Russian Suength. By June 1944, Soviet air suencth fnumbored some 13400 aircraft opposing 2,085 German aicraft in the East. ‘To sustain an ir force of this size, the Rus: sang had to muke many adaptations and ‘changes In thelr al force. The Russian Ale Force wasanaimost purely tteves force. ts primary mission was to assist the Rea Army, father than to destroy the enemy's means ‘and wil to resist. Thus, the Russians locked {lowts of four-engined bombers such as the ‘Americane and” Briich poecaseed. The Conditions of air fighting on the Russian Front forced the Germans to-use thelr ait force in the same manne, often to aid and ‘supply beleagured units ‘One of the reasons the Russians were able 10 produce large numbers of avoaft was ‘hat Russian aireatt ware eltively pele tive, lacking such features as armor, sof seahing fue tank, ful instrumentation, ‘and until late in the war, radios. These features wore al prosont in Germen aicrat ‘The Russian pilots wore also often sketchlly trained, the average pilot having oniy six years ofeducation,comparedto 14 years for {ha average American aviator. This, counied withthe superiority ofthe German sirpanes, edt heavy Russi losses, o pattern which Gontioued thoughout the. war. Of the £37,000 llyusnin. Sturmaviks produces, between 60 and 60% were destroyed. 5) 1964, however, the quofty of Russian sreret and plots hod both improved. The Russien Guords ir regiments were very ttective fighting forees, usualy equipped (with Lo-7 or American but P29 Fahers. “The Guard regiments hed developed theie tactical skill unti they were almost ne equal ‘of te Germans. Thenon-Guarde regiments, although lacking finesse, were sail much betior than they had besn in 1841-2. The ‘ground attack units, equipped with heavily Brmored 11-2. Sturmaviks, were Very effective, atacking German ‘troops, expe fialy armor, ot tree-top level. Large numbers of twin-engined bombers. were Used to stike valhoads and. communica tions. Ono of the mare stlectve bomber three years of bitter yet very instructive ‘experience, was a formidable adversary. By June 1944, the Gorman Ait Force was slowly but surely clsintagrating. The Aled forces in Western Europe were opposing SDR of the Lafwate, whi thos In rm Europe tied down 18%. Aled feplacement aircratt and had limited ‘avilable fuel resources. The D-Day invasion fed strained tho Germans to the bresking Point. The quality of German aircraft was {uite good, although that of thoi plots ‘was decining. Despite these handicaps, the Germans had sways been able > prevent the Russions from gaining a decisive rmeesure of at superiority. Unit 22nd June. (Ofte German srcrftin Russia, 465 werein {he First and Fifth Air Fleets, which had been deployed in the north to. confront the Russian offensive thee, In the south was ‘he Fourth Air Feet of B48 aircraft, Which wes siso. charged with defending the Fumanien oll fields egainst American bombers, end had. beon “covering the German operations in the Crimes. Supporting Army Group Center was the ‘Sixth Al Foot, with 778 aircraft. OF thesa, 200 were fighters and fighter-bombers, 136, ‘were reconnalsance aircraft, 30 wore bight famers, 4 wee abt DorBers, end 370 ined bombers. This fore epresentad 80% of the twin-engined bomber strength on the Russian front. ‘was potent force, as evidenced by aratd on tho, Russian airfield” at" Poltava. wich destroyed 5 All atcraft on the ground in the early morning of 22 June. The fighters, ‘however, were inadequate tothe detenso of the vast German frat. Half were usualy fempioyed on ground stack dues and 60 fighters had recertly been sent back to dofond Gorman targa, “The nial attack by the bulltup Russian Air Force was too much for the: Germana to handle In 1943, the Germans hedbesn able to fight the Fussians to # standstil over Kursk, but this time the Russians controfod the ai. Ther fighters succeeded in keeping, the German interceptors away from thei: Dbornbors, who attscked German units snd thelr ies ot communication. The 18th Panzergrenadier clvaion wes attacked. by hundreds of /1-2m? Sturmavike and lost ‘any ofits vehicles in tho frst Roure of the Russian attack. The Russian air ‘superiority also preventad the Germans {rom using their ground ettack eteraf 38, “tying arly.” slowing down Russian attacks and supporting German units as they fed done inthe past. German feconnaissance pianos were unablo. to penetrate the Russian “fightsis. to got formation on the advancing Ruan columns, often laaving the German com. ‘mad ignorant es to Russion positone. The ‘mestimmediate German nood was for more fightecbombers, and 40 of these were transferred from Germany and another 40 shifteg month from Rumania. Even ths transfer was not enough (0 rectify matters, 180 85 more FW-180 fighter-bombers were ‘akon from the haan Wont, removing the last sting force in that theatre. A further 70 were warsfered from Southern Russi ‘and, 50 desparate did the Germans 620 theit edi for more fighter-bombers, that 0 wre Uarsforred from the Normandy fighting. Due 10 the Gorman intonor lines oF communications, these 270 fighter ‘bombers, mainly FW-190s, were deplovedin Russia by the end of June. ‘The German alr efforts were further hampered by the Russian capture of the important sir bases at Mogilev, Vitebsk, and Boortusk. Several mes during the Russian _acvance, Germanair units narrowly escaped being overrun. The new German Units destroyed hundreds of Russian eiteraf, ‘more than the Gormans lost. The Germans ‘then stripped the rest of the front for aura 90 weakening the foe forces in Flumania that large American bomber ra ‘were nercento oy fewer than 25 igor. Yetby te ont of Jy, dept the me uanefers of array, the German Air Forces facing the Russians numbored 200 aicrat {ewer than on 22 June, The German Air Fores on tho Russian Front could boraly holds ove. No longer would it influence the course of great battles or entire coffensives, for thore woud always be overwhelming numbers of Russian aicratt of qualty adequate to prevent thet. Nor ‘would the Gormane be able to supply their isolated troops from the ai, #8 trey had _aterpted at Staingred and, with ‘moo ‘success n the Crimee, Even by massing all ‘theirer powar in one sector, a tactic which had gained them ait suporiotty at Kursk in 1949, te Germans could stil not defeat the Russians, The summer of 1944 saw not only ‘the destruction of Army Group Canter, but ‘also thet of the Sixth Air Fest and German ‘air power inthe East. More importanty, i Hraldod the birth of the new Russian Ai Foree much 98 Stalingrad hod seen the beginnings of a oow Russian Any. 516 Hider Military Commander Ices bee tional in ome ck To some sxtant the chatge i tun tht Ficeenegatetyituancad ie conduct of the wnt Ha raion fo rnsorale rarorade ‘movers ip the aca of Bitbayond nt Ra vy bponat nate beyond rena vey Porn fonts ‘that many of Germany's tnumphs, indeod ‘mast of them, were accomplished precisely zante aavoe af te aren pote. Sloat itary oodrs. inthe Thiet, ght fear Hider came 10 power the. Geman duny ‘teed, 00 tarot objacdons to hm. German mitary (sors abcd en profesional grounds tear oseapalon ofS Rhindand othe Anashiuse, the annexation of the Sudeteien, tothe ospation of the ‘up el Crechosovakia, to be invation of Pound, vo he, noe forth Imnion of France’ nd tata lar or the fon of usta, Each tino, tno? objectors wore tniamced thier tion borg SUparor Sw profess krowedve Fe corals And tus rt forget a tho German Army tases ro bjeosoon To Hisar para’ on mor! grows Thay actly bod el bere adught war, but War oa" sina an paca oF thrown hecang. Hier’ plone wen ageing tae Setentena opine sha 0 wane cue trreugh to ae 194, Hae proved Mant n resi every Inca. Tie would Rady tem 1 hove base rcomerdeten ryene oe to the state ate of the Gorman “Gecora ‘Stat Fiter wie magelomania and other inadequsci, toma to. hove ropicy developed” & ontamot for fa ‘protemloral edie Wi cana ook att anata way. OF the Seo he our mejor boigeront powers Inve. European conflt of 436-34, Ahr Roose Church and Stalin, ony Chute asain tary man, Stan fod onset miteryexporence from {he Bueaan Gh Wor Hear ha Bean 8 Ienoe: three: classes: fll strength Or Cessi. reduced strength or Cis, and caste 1 Clas Appronimately ene fall of the divsons ave Class |, one fourth Class Il, 3nd ‘ne fourth less), “Aoparenty 3 the Soviet Unt outside tre USSR are Class | The recent ft wath. China has resulted in 8 cumber of {lass 1 dywsions boing twansterea liam Eure ean USSR 16 Aseie USSR. The protien 18 further compicetes by the fat Tat not all the ‘lass Ute are up tl strength, ever in East Gecmory, and Class It dviions are not Intended fob at full strength exoat io ane of a2 USAREUR — The Paper Tiger Despite all the tak about army capsbilties, ‘the eal issue lies in whet ean ba done with ‘equloment. Every amy hes problems. The BAOR is faced with constant domestic Dressure to bring equipment home to cut Costs. The Germans have @ recuirent fnfistment problem (they have cut the teaftee's tour down toa yout. The Soviets have to draw off good oops to man the Chinese border. OF principal concorn to the O'S. the status of USAREUR, The hard fact that USAREUR would have a tough 9 of i tthe balloon went up now. USAREUR has cuffered from the Vietnam ‘war in virtually every possible wey. OF Course, the Aemy can cite statistics thet 3 USAREUR is as capable as ever. But the statistics ore a part of the game itself. Quorterly ‘supposed to reflect ‘eadine fora report in order to make the Unita least on paper, as good as posse. Department of the Army may De fooled but the troops eren't ‘Manpower hes been 2 major problem. The ‘only! people who could be expected 10 Serve 9 ful cour in Europe were draftees, Atto their taining, they didn’t heve much mote then a year to a year ahd a half 10 ‘oeket aureher ana other systems non Ghvalopment Usual heleopters cary © embinatin of thee, hah none cafes ait tem — et Antaircratt defenses agin bang emohs- es, ‘potcuary et Blow ok At Bsttaion lovl "5 the “Redeye a fret fereraten weapon, shower Feld, wih @ on ln ah dt shar ‘fasion vel nd boon see's my thc Vaan Gud moutied version of he Ar Force waspan. Itfves dom shot ot rates of ether 10D {3000 rounds per mite, 9 range of 8 iemeters The. Choparet en Army ‘caption ol the Naw Stanuinde It frat seeing resto wh 8 venge of 78 lometars TANKS — Two of the proposed develop: ments of the MBT 7O/XMB0G project are tunigue in miltery development ro date, The first t= tho variable aight suspenlon system. fan ordinary tank's gun is traditional position in the turet, there is left sticking out of a pretty: ‘must be room for he engine and the rast of the crew, 80 the tank may be lowered only 0 far. Honee, thare are ground clearrica robiems. In order to beat tho height Problem, various systems have be9 Wed The eridsh have their drivers In 8 rocking position. That reduces some of the. hull Fight. ‘Tho French crosiod tho AMIX13 ‘with an oscllting tuner. Sima, the U.S. hed a prototype sirborne tank, tbe 82, with» left wret(a pariscape wes used 10 see over the turret). The Swedish STRV- 103 has no turret, The guns located almost atthe top of whore the turet woulabe. The fntire vehicle must be moved in order to fadjust the gun (except for minor defecvon ‘hanges from the gunna. The U.S. opted {or crew comfort and hes the tallest tank fae World Wor I. Aside from the dramatic V2, arora Tete witte efits, the Germans hed tbeb Panzarfoust end ihe ‘7OIXWAGOS tod to solve this with a system that would raise or lower self as necas- Alles, thelr bazooka. In addition, other sary. In the "Up" positon it looked tke the racket systems were in use for atilery. All ‘pical systom with rood. wheels ef support rollers. Bown, I looked CChiety suspension. It could move when Cf tase wore osantily fre Might melee, without any guidance system to speak of The development of small unit nels with ‘wes down but there weant much ground & lable guldance system hasbeen one of Clgrance, With the system, © tank could the breakthroughs of racent years. These gelberind cover wih tesispension down sibs are primaly antcark mice, Etta ttle protector when tweruspom though come, such a Shilelagh, can bs sion was uD. Usestfor other things. The guscance system {or those missles i athe wie or & Tat The ane gun cree we he Hina am a ato hea Tw second major innovaton of the MBT/ Europeans have adopted the wre guidance vets project. Bocause has some fave, system aoe! (tay, though tha U.S, has IPhas auted seme controversy. Ie Soamanad with eth gucane sare corwentional round is supposed to bo (se SMALL UNIT Ml fccucate up to 800 maters. Wien the shor Essential, wire guidance, vs ISSILES chan). ‘ts are, barrel ard wide bore, doesr't get much implios, invowes tha. missie reeling of @ spin andis fatty inaccurate even under that spool of fine wire as It flex. CorrecLone 10 ange: The Shilelagh missio, on the othar its course ae sant from the lguroher to the hand, ca can be put under control, if you are goed, ahr it hat gone about 600 moter. Hey {take more thon 800 meters. Once you have sight, however, tie very accurate ince ‘you ate guiding its tight to the target. The ‘problem lies in the uncovered area between ‘here the conventional round i no tonger affective and the missles. Ths s the area ‘the Soviets plan to attack. They expect fank vs. tank eneagement st eound 1000 of meters orless. They can hardly be unawere be contolled at cosa ranges. It Missile by Means of the wire Presumably a aii Battlefield of the future wl have as much ‘wira from these missies se there wes barbed wire in no-man’s land in World War I. The controls for wie guided nseioe fal ino two major groups, The less accurate is the: firing the missle Neraly fles it to the ‘target, Itobviously requires more practice to fly this systom than others. Command Line ‘Sight isthe other conventional system. “Jy stick” system whereby the parson is systom all the operator hes to do is StAmetca’s deste to push tat amge ost Am Ns eahing device (ir fo the sight to 100% Sumer Sree he Sees on guid te target The mane acing Doratin helrtneoy, toytusifeve some on signals (over ine wre) from tne ‘blans on how to avoid geting cought out st the longer range. Thus, U: ‘vulnerable at the lows: ranger st which the Russians plan to fight. The fect thet the projected MEQA3 wal rtutn to the conven ‘onal cannon, rather than tha gunvlauncher ‘hats on the MGOA2, may inleate thatthe ‘Arty, 109, % having second thoughts, MISSILES — Misllos represent an old ‘concept further refined. It was clear that misses would bo important even during Inc xc cure fae 80 that it goos whore ovis vibich the pointes. The misao ane snus back fo the leuncher by means of fares or other heat eriting ‘Soviers TNs "Teedback”™ Joop, using 8 computer device. in. the launcher, soon has the missle fying down the “ine of sight” towards the target All the operetor need do sin at the arpa ‘Al she missileeuncher coral system fos to dais function property. A ot depends an the "back box” 2526 Tank Battalion Augmentation Unit“ Augmentation ond “Reinforcement Cre of the less obvious dovelopments of 20th contury warfare iy the. inreodng importance of being able to reorgeize Combat units quickly to meet char sUatons, Fret developed towards tho @f Worl War! end thon selected during Wertd War i, the concept i now Used guite diferenty by NATO. and. Warsaw forces. NATO foress cand 20 “aug: ment” its (auch es the US tank battalion is augmented by an mianiry comaany 1h the diagram tothe ight. A tank company ie Iostin she process. This sa "pure" for ot the crigina concept. Warsaw Pact forces reinforce.” A USSR tank Bainion would have added ti srlery Satallon and ‘most of an nfaney bation, This ators {he "otar" of to concept. NATO forces folow the “sift” Ono war wl al which aboroach works Beet. y Genk au Fheroment Bee Medium ou Tee ‘armores 19 5 Porm tat Recon 8 ~ Verles Tank 5 Recover ven” Teves 3 = 03 hoy) acica 143 a1 Morar, vy ‘ = Howiase = = wieder Hii, Use Augen i Team’ Th ath TBD 7 — 2 ca = = = ‘ 1 = 1 5 7 sR moe 58 — = = = ae leona fom page 20) United States Army, Euroge: USAREUR the ‘army acronym isthe controling body fer the Ground comest Torees in Europe, The Amare lean forces are located in tha former Amerean Zone of Geeuaaton as weil asm the former Fronch Zone This comprses most. of the south of Germany incaging that part west of the Rhine and sovih ofthe Motel. Stavoned in this sector is the Seventh aimy, conssting of ‘we. eores, VCore and Vi" Compa. Thay control 9t6tal of four and one thid dvsont plus two atmmored cavaly regiment. At resent there atatwo armored sions, tho ist S5td-3d, and wo mfantry do sions, the Sed anc Btn. Thedth unique as 9 dvsion in tate has 8 fly areorne brigade the Tot brigacel and ar ‘Grusually large tank strengtn in ts otMer two brigades ive battakons). OF the Ist Infantry Division, swo brigades and aupoort oss axe In the continental Late States (CONUS). In The event of war, thase two brigades would be flown over to Europe 10 Jon the two antilry battenes ang one orgade now stationed F Gesmany. They would pick uo eouipment stackpied in USAREUR 2rd matrtained by the European-ststiones brigade The 3rd Armorec Cavalry Regiment i also estrarked for Immediate deployment to Europe. In tis way, the U'S- co" aim thet thas fve Buisions and tree armored cavalry cogiran in NATO, swine ving the expense oF the equivaent of fone division in Europe, Poricdicaly the two brigades of the_lst Infantry go 1c Europe tor maneuvers. This ‘operation's calad Reforger and was iis sihen tte 240h Intontry Grsion wag the unit feoudng the sing brgade to USAREUA Folergor ia 2 modern version of Big Lit, te ‘opetation which siifed the enue 2nd ‘Arm ‘re Division to USAREUA inte early 1950's, ‘At that time, the U.S. had fiva divisions and three regiments in USAREUR. The 270 Armored tin CONUS) was ase earmarked for USAREUA. In fect, USAREUR hes last 9 vision. However, Refager 's intends to keep NATO nappy by Gemonstvating. how quickly the U.S. can shift two brigades to Europe British Army of the Ahing BOR: The BARS Tested in ne 0 Bratch rone of oseupaion in rorhern West Germany with headquarters at Mencnen-Gladbsch. It organized under on corps with three divisors. Eech division has ‘wo brigades, Two of the divisions have one armored brigade ana ane mecranized Brigade, ‘The thc has twa mechanized bigades. An armored brigada has thao maneuver bata lene. two armored nattalions and one mechanized battalion. The mechafioed br ‘gado has three recharized bataions and only he. aimored. alison. In acai, Beka ‘artaine.a” bogasa” n BernWtachnicaly std Armored Personnel Carriers Vehicle Country Yoor HT wi967 ussR 1967 152 BTRSOP USSR’ 1965) 200 ‘TRO USSR 1965 | 229 [BTRGOP/EOPC)|/USSA 19641) 2.29) MUSMITSAT US 1969 2.20 Fvas2 UK 1964188 Serene UK 1953246 SPZMetier Gee 1971-286, P2123 Ger 1960182 This table presents the curreny avaiable ‘armored parsornal carts of the picid NATO powers ond the. Soviet” Uncn, ‘Abbrevtions 70 os on page 28 except: TiW, ineiates better the vehicle Arockad or wheeled; Crow, number of man Fequred tO run the venice; Pass, the number of eseengers the vehicle may {APC's) Spd Range Gun TW Crew Pass 30 76 OT) 3B <2 200 14 TTT % 50 M5 W 2 10 We @ % - T 1 1 RO = NT? I) nm mo - W 2 1 OL Leo wT sO TCT erry in edition to tho crew. Tha yoor (5 that of introduction, The US MISA hes ‘maximum range of 480 klometers. Al sees ‘vehicles exept the SPZ-12:3 also mount 8 machine gun; the MIS/MI13A1 carries, 50 wiespon; the Bish Seracen 330 ‘weapon; and ai others mount @ 7.62mm. YS German norurran sarang tmThe Eye of the Tank ‘The conventions chars on tanks ft such data‘ soood round pressure, pe ot isrmanton, armor thickness, ond sa forth fetch ana eave ate, een ? may sig most ‘mpotant pee fequementon 8 enh Wo tankcan survive 3 drect ht om an ermor. deteting round res wom an enemy tanks train gun. HEAT she can Kil anaore Ceuhia the range. in which they can dotonta th Shaped charges. Al ogeen tives fave sound ike HEAT. Thaefoe, diror kes ely ony sell agorst ight weopane, suchas tha 20nm eernon cerned by many recon vehicws, From 0mm up, a irect hit means sure destruction fxcept obvious at sxtieme tangesl Not ony enor, bt erosive coven, 25 ws amon cant. Te ote nk ‘ualable, the Leopard, dove 85 kph onthe ‘oad, and coniceably les off he roo. At Inaée ot 9 lore ormore sh soe ree naphile tactor In txma of Sveave ction apa ay resacnably eked onomy tank crew. Ase result, te ciel tenet of ‘modern tank combot theory fe That who" ver con scoro the fist sec hit wil win [though speed in. geting off the frst found important its accuracy eich ik the tly important loment, and tht ‘euies sighing and rangefincng acti image Gyroare aan are seem em" At present there oe e rumba of Srptoms avale for farge nding, run tage grt rom Simpy ue Sephistcalon. (see, TANKS. chat. The ‘most bests ayeten a eyedaht, whch wor {eee throughout Wore Wer It-The Soviets entinued 10 oe ut he inoducton of {ie T.82. Since moat of the Wersaw Post fore nave nathg newer than the Tt {hiss the syatem tbey oe forced fo use. ‘is syst pence on Ho abilty of the tank commoner 0 ertmate dances, waht in not oni» roe bt one ‘ht must be eonstarty proceed es wel ‘As arostof tis stom, the Sviets yt0 ‘engage targa at as then 1,000 meters ax ‘Stimaon becomes progresehely more Gitte 36. tance inetooses," Conse: qunty, the Sovwte must presuppone {trond mila, and then avs ange on {he bes of where the Tut round suck, retive tothe target (Burst on Teget or {OT in tho US ares forcash ths igh rule vey ound ahr dn, tetng the range ight the second ime car fo ay afcut os geting Fight che fist time, Sines no tank can be ure of geting eff 3 second round, ean extemey week system of rangetncing ‘The next most primitive system of ranga- finding & the ranging machinegun, Tris 6 the system the British stil us oo thet Chieftain, the newest tank they novo. The ‘machinogun fires tracors at the target, and Wen they srke the target, te cange is Seterming. This system hos several wook esses. it, the machinegun elmiotes te slr of surprise. Second, racers are dificult to s9e.tn daylight. Thirg, 3 tachinagun con fre 08 far oe 2 tank's sma gun. Ofentines the acer ove that Wiibity evan before reaching te tu ‘ange. Consequonty, ‘wen ‘using. the Sater the crew olen foved fat back ‘oh the estimated range or second 0und Ssustmane (B01) syste, [At the bottom end of the apc ranging Sedpmant te Sa re That used by the gunner tie a baste ‘aha anh ‘mabe thot the eee 6 Getigned to componaate forthe pertcler hareterisice ofthe round: The faster the ‘ound the ora waectry ahd the lest [Sap cause i Troh te tk. 2 drec fre weapon, in that sea what ‘shoots at, she ound half dons nat fy Straight line to the. target. Tt is an tementary principle of physics that gravity ‘tars (0 pull the projctle downward rom {hermomant ts fred. There ae two ways ity of a patticulr round ie constant, the angle of fring must be elevated, This angie ‘of elevation above the ling of sight is cated the super-levation. The sted rece is used, for example, on tha M861 Sherden for the conventions! ound, This same reticle ts algo. found ‘on tha T-62, The stale roi i rletvely easy t0 use, For flank shots, the gun Clovation is adjusted und the ence of the target ft exactly Between the two outer fines. For head on targets, the sight 6 adjusted so that the sides of the target fit Between one side of the roticle and the center tine. If the target Is at a diferent ‘angle, you have to. “guosstmete” 3 it, ‘A more sophisticated system ie the Ssterascopie rengefinder. This requires two periscopes set some distance apart, usualy ‘on either side of the turret. Tha Inages aro Luansterred to 2 binocular arangement on the range fide. Ths ystems operated by ‘he tank commander. On the American versions, one vaticle hes a °V" pattern of Yertcal lines, sometimes. referred 10.98 “tying geese.” When ranging, these “geese” appear to move. The 20ge kab Is tamed unt the lowost of those. vertical lines appears to be at the same range ss tho target. Simutiangousl, @ linkage systom feeds the range into 9 computer which, in tum, is. programmed to allow forthe characteristics of the round bing fred. ‘When the range is fed in, the computer adjusts the tube for the necessary super: vation. When the computer is sod, 9 Non-balictic reticle is used. This same ‘ticle is used for al rounds, since the computer adusts for the characteristics of ‘each round. The problem with the storeo: ‘scopic rangefinder is that Itrequires a cpt ‘perception to operate and few peop have spod dept petcapion, stergorcopic rangefinder is ono of the ‘eatiost true Tange. finders. twos. fst ‘devoioped for the Panther I for use in the ‘Schmall turret. OF course, the Panthar ff ‘never went Inta production. It was. lator used by the United States, particularly on the MA Parton and N48 fara AI and A2 ‘of that series). iis currently in use on tho Leopard. The Germans have 8. unique system on the Leopard, itis capable of both ‘lerecscapie mode and coincidence rode (see below. The stereoscopic mode's used during periods of timlsd vil, and eh Visblity. Because of tho problem. with Septh perception, the Gormans plant have a minimum of one tank commander per platoon capable of using the sterao- ‘scopic mode, He wil hen report the range {0 tho vost of tho plateon The coincidence cangetinder is th system ‘urieny employed on: the. MBAS ih Vietnam and the M60 an MEDAT tanks. it fas the ‘same requlcmont. of tha wo peracopie davies, ploced on cine side ot {ho turret os with ihe stereoacopie system, However, it has only one wth both mages appearing smuttaneously. The rangefinder mewes ome of the tages, Pot Unt @ single lens retex carer, unt fie ‘2h top of the cher, thot In eaincrence, ‘Therange tothe target f than correct. The roblom with the eomecdence range finder s that It needs a goed ded! of ight 70 ihuminate the moving vai. Whon te target obscured by fog or ot down ot dist, is herd to range Farther, sight ‘or in bringing the imoges io coin ‘ance wil make 50 o 100 meter ence fange, ‘That means. 3. probable mia 1 Yequtes a sharp eyes 10 be sure the imooos stein coincidence the fret time, wathout backing off and rearranging 1250 far proposed for the MBT70/XMB03 has been felled os 3 universal sohition to ranging problems. It ‘would certainly minimise the impact of hhuman error. ‘The gunner of tank com- ‘mander would put the eross-hare on the {argat and press a button. A bea” of laser Hight would be bounces of the target and picked up by sengore.on ether side of the {ank turet. The Dopple’ effect would then bbe used 10 alevate the ranga much ae In ‘radar, which uses radio wales, end sone, which uses sound waves. The Leoperd ft and the MBOA3 wil have the lager Fangefinder. In addition, i wil probably bo ‘ta-fated to the Chieftain’ and 7-62, Beiter rangefinders offset, to same extont, the Ieroads made by ani-tank weapons, since they permit tanks to engage targets st 5, and also since they ive 328 Tank Comparison Chart Vehicle County WT Serre es. —_ hen ae _ ae = ees MeO/MBQAT US 48.00 eS Se 62 ussR (385 Chistain UK 23 MBT7 — US/Ger 83.0 ‘This table prosonts a comparison of sovoral gun, which would increasa its height to notable World War I tanks with current sbout 276m. Abbreviteione: WT, waight NATO and Soviet vehicles and the pro- in tone; H7, height jected MBT 70. The Pz V G, Pz Vi Ba MAAS are, respoctively the Panther, Konig- maximum distance vehicle may travel 0” a Sod ‘ange Gun Sigh Ammo iPr 268 « 200 % none ost 310 “6 ” 6 roe 7 oss 3.08 = 10 cE none tor 282 6 00 105 secon 60 096 20 2 2 % nore 105 328 a 00 105 ain 6 07 30 a 830 12 od 13078 2m o a 2% none 8 om 218 0 co 18 waa a oat 275 0 m0 0 Rema 090 200 n a 120 lose 2 ? meters, Spd, road speed in Glometers. per hour, Range, tiger, and Sherman’ of World War li ono load of fuel, i Klometars; Gun, main Ag.mg. ranging machinegun; Stor. stereo- ‘vintage, as isthe T34/85, One model ofthe wreepon cari i milimeters (the TE2mra scope’ com, comncidenee, siad, stadia MBT 70 is projected to mount 2 162mm weapon of the MEQA2 also fires missiles); reticleUnder occupations, a does each of the four Dowers, Much ofthe BAOR is under attack at homme since there ison economy ctive on. Just ‘2 the US Congress debates cutting down or Inaiaining tg strength in Eurepe, so does Breain, Bitar hae some ofits best oops in fhe HAOR. but the problems. in. Nerther Irpard have competed diversion of some ‘vooee trom the BADR Federa! Ropubls of Germany: Wost Gorrany hag, at present, slevan civisiors organized under three cords. Thtee of the civsions are panzer divisions, one a mountain cision, one ‘arborne divisan anc tha. rornavng abe panzergrenadier o mechanized diisons, The visions each have three brigades, The ‘rmered divisions contain two armen Datial ons ‘Srone mechorized battalion The reve Ser80 is Tound in the mochsr zed brigades. In coneral tgrms, the Botalion organization is simian 10 tha United Staessystem, tnovgh ther ara vat- Tetione (partielacly the praserice of antreane unite in the maneuver battalions). Ag. soled clsewhere, the Germans have retained speci fniane vohiles their Inventory. 2 63ry ‘over from the panzerager unis of the Second Worls War TECHNOLOGY Technology is constanty assuming roster importance in warfare, No longer cara elder Ive off the land, sustaining himeall with fer ‘sik, The armas facing wach ther now in Europe are far eemoved from the armies which fought in World. War Il. The degees of sopristiction n wesponry and equipment has ingraased more in the past (wentysive yaars than in the preceding 2.500 years. With the technology Rave come ew tects. Mechaniation: The most dramatic changes have occurred in the aren ct mechanization, tral is, making weapons solt-propaled. hh sore fields lailory, for example, mectaniz, Bion is realy the only major development ‘since Werld War Il. Altiough slow to sdopt it inviaty, he US Army is now more mechonized than ahy other power incuaing Germany. The armored and mech bataFons ste des cned 50 at everyihing 8 on whaols or tracks. Although most people think of Wors War 25 ‘a war of mecharization, tanks were actualy the only fully mecrarized ebsmant. Only in fecent years have erties become extensively echanaed. Mechanization, particulary of the infantry, breeds new tactes Gs do all wochnologieal changes). As a rasult o| mechanization, the infantry no longer must sismount whenever it gots wrnin earshot of the enemy. Modern Recharized tactics, 23 delineated by both ‘Sex, cll for keoping the fantry mounted 35, tong us possible, There are two reasons for hs) Most obwous 18 that the atmor of the personnel carrie affords bette protection than ‘Gous the surrounding terrain. Equally imocr- What Is Defilade? Datiede 's 2 word with a purdy miliary ‘eeoring I dates trom the days of fortis Then he ginal eee, ens to ‘conaiuct a foretestion to protect the ines {rom frontal or enflede tank) feos. Inthe UIE’ Army, tte commonly sssceatod with ‘tank tation. Bacave of thet Buk, tans ara ‘any targets. Therefore, tank commanders Uy to take advantago of teriin to protect ‘the tank tank wrich in ul oartace has ies hol bolow tho crest of hil or sina land feature but tural exposed, A sank inv turet defied hos both the bull and {reo protaetd by the land feature n this lnstance wil have to move feta. hull aflode to open Ine. {hat only that part of ther body above the name teg lover the shirt pocket) Is supposed to be seen. Iti simply a safety factor. Other, less technically proper uses Cf the ten ate also found and the term ‘often, used ag a synonym for. what politicians cal "keeping a low prole.” Tank vs, Anti-Tank and Konigstiger of World War Il it can be seen that operating range hes. increased, Guns are bigger, and there. ls ranging Equipment of some sophistication, The Importance of these i not as great 35 ‘changes in other fle (such a i increase in the firepower of the infantry or the development of airmobiéty or small unit misies). The tera, using World War I MAASEB Sherman tanks. (admittedly up- ‘gunred), wore more than able to hold their ‘wn ageinst new Soviet 1-54 tanks. Contain, modern tanks would have the ledge of Word War Il tanks In long, Reavy Combat, but there would be no immediate domination. Aritank weaponry's development, on the ‘other hand, hes progressed. At present, ‘only the USSR and West Germany hove ‘Vohiles designed specticely to fight other {anks, The Soviets have used the Germen ‘design of World Wer Il'n developing ett ‘curont line, consisting of tho ASL ‘ASUST. Thoy are turtetaes vehicles with ‘Emm and Emm guns, respectively. The Gormana developad a simiiar vehicle inthe dagdpanzer Kanone JPZ 45, It sihouette is vaguely like the Works War I! Hetzer. It rmounis a 80mm gun taken from tho U.S. MAa7 series and fires HEAT and HEP ammunition over a range of 2000 meters. NATO. has emphasized mise develop ‘ment. The United States fies replaced the 35" rocket launcher with LAW/ (Light ‘Ansi-Tark Weapan) and introduces TOW ‘Tube Launched, Optically Trecked Weap- ‘on} to replace tho 106mm recoilese rifle. OF the vehicular mounted! anti-tank. miles, TOW carted on the smalls: vehicle = {he quarter ton ‘ruck, The Gemers ae ‘opiecing the old Panzerfaust with Cobre {for the individual soldier ard are using the French/German designed HOT (haut eub- sonique Optiquement teleguide tre un Tube) ond MILAN (fase fofactry Loget AMicharl, addition, the Germans have bean using the French SST Thay ‘modified the JPZ 4.5 chasele 10 crease the Jegdponter Rekete M1966. This vehicle ts The same asthe JPZ45 but without amin ‘un. Originally It mounted the $8.11 on {op. Now it caries HOT. With the SS-T1, the M-1966 has a range of 3,200 mates ‘The Soviets, for ther par, have a range of ‘anti-tank ristils. Thoie NATO names are Segger, Snepper (Soviet narve: Shmafh and: Swatter. Al ore vehicular-mounted ‘Aside from the JPZ 45 chassis {95 usod in ‘the M-1966), all the NATO. powers have ‘modified exisng eer thelr fantrtank missles, most commonly. using ‘an armored personnal carrer, or sometines 2 larger vehicle. cw eo i fos wy fea tet as fale. fa aa meee ae Sceeaacoras agentes Gnomes poe es eee cen, ae wasnt ata eees Rerats toe ni aueee ease caer rete Hier ee eran poss Cumann Hee Cae on si mee = Seed tem cir Ee Reem ore Sac nt TA au net eee Ser ees oe St laraaterta! Shee year eee eee Sn eames Seas ie ceria eerie oe ana ea anare Pcia bye tara iene siaes Suomen nSneas POY ae Sec Soe res Sacer 2930 Airmobitity Airbity i ha “gf” of Vietnam, W hed thon ready tated In tho States but the octine ves actualy retnes in Viton fe norowes! sone, consists of ang an infancy force, via halcoprers, eer Sonina enemy ines or 0 renforce irenay ttoops, The helepta’ has” changed tho face of war Ih many ways. I tse for rocennalessncs and other ‘ritonal cav= tiry mesione dcuseed eoawere, Made. oo va alcopter is unquestionably the Toason why more hues were not Jost in Vena, ‘Airmotliy slows operation in othonwio inaecoasbe ass, such a8 hngles or the enemy reer permitssesout oF Why chlestve natoad ot hota tobe cnpesed abject, ng tobe expose {ottewile moving tonord te objective. Gan be Used ac tts for surpin, This Ios Is essy overocked. Because of tis Spee semen, onary lstening posts and ont outposs lose some of tek alu, Seforo the LF can report sting, hreleopier can be aver the enemy's main Dositon. On the. aaveree sce’ fe tho vulnerability of holcopters 10 enemy [lound fe as can be arested Dy the Tose focorde in ViemamHelconer ate iso Init in tama af he: amount of ep. tment they can bring in. They ean’ V6 taka {nt ealtpropaled snl. econ, they ‘are hincered by adverse weather more thal round (orcon, Aside from the utlity helicopters. 10 transport the men, the Naicopler gunship anceps 7 esa nal aagnct fo aur ‘wero. The base of he they brig bohind remy has cannat be Guoicated oy riley oF fied wing avcraft A further ‘armed and capable of taking some targets by themselves Muchiamede of the hefcopter causing the ‘death of the tank, Certainly the random: 16S ofthe Stukatankcbusting days is over The Cobra ond is successors have ermee defeating weapons, such as the $5.11 and TOW. By vsing “nap of the earth” fying techniques, @ belcopter could stay below {tee top level unt it got close toa tank an then "aprine” the lstanea to get off» shot at close range. tis probable that he debete ‘willbe @ nevor-onding one about whether (Or not the tank can withstand the helicopter ina: medium or high intensity wer. fn tring charac of srcbla ‘operations fs the uniaue planning system fequired. Planning 3 in. inverse order, ‘working back from how the objective wil be unken and organized through the landing. tha. then he movant an ana inaly {o the loading pian. Armobil landings aro ‘conducted in two phases. The fst, the ‘ssault echelon, contains those elements necessary 10 eccomolish the iil combat mission. The second echelon provides the ims necessary te conus the operation, such US armebie mine on manowers mn Wet Semen ‘The real impor of simoblty Nes iy its ‘Bossible spplication to warfare other than erie, I as done welin that sort of tow Imensity war, but fis the figher levels Which cause ‘concern. ‘That the Soviets have not attempted t0 Keep paca withthe. US in thie area indicates that they have oubts about diferent halcopter spotice- ‘ions. Whether the heicopiar can realy perform @ worthwhile combat mission i sil an open question. To try to prawde some of the answers, when the Ary. Drought the 1st Cavalry Division /Airmobe) back fom Vetnam, they recegarized it end redesignated it 1st Cavaly Olvsion (Th cap). {Tricap is Goraral Westnoralend's fe, It is_8 contraction of “triple capability.) The Tiicap division wil have lives brigades, as is normal, but one brigade Wil be an armored brigede, the second an aitmoblle brigace, and the 1st ap ir combat cavalry brigade (ACC), Highly experimental, 1 will not only ty 20 ‘newer the questions on feasibility, But aloo ‘develop tactic fr thie combination. It may, bo thet a division ' too large for the concept, £09 tap brigade may be made ‘tandord forall dlveione to augment thet ‘existing makeup. Much of the succes of this experiment doperds on future helicopter development For example, the UTTAS (Utlty Tactial Transport Aircraft System) progrom is signed to replace the UH-1B (Huey) (as Wwoll as the other UH-1 helicopters) with a helicopter specifically designed £0 lift infantry squads in an sosault mission. 19 addition, @ strong attack hebcopter is fssentil for the ACC brigade. The pro- osed organization of tho AGC brigade ‘als for heavy and fight attack helicopters. At present we have only the AH-1G Cobya, ‘The heavy attack hlcopter was to have been the AH-BBA Cheyanne, I'would hays put outan incrediow emount offre, it was fo have a 3Omm cannon; 4Omm grenade fauncher/mini-gun eyeiom: separate rit ‘Gun aystem; two TOW pods: and two 2.75 ocket launchers, It was also to have 2 ‘operating radius of 2.500 miles. When the XW80G tank was killed, the Army sew the hhandwting on the wall Cheyenne, 109, a5 costing slot of money with no end in “They held vials piting the Cheyenne ‘against the Blackhawk and King Cobra ond Concluded that Cheyanne wasn’t what ciey ‘wantad, End of project. tant, however, is thot once the infantry is on the around, the advance slows to 2 walking face. The more quickly the anatnyis over-rn, {he more auickly the army is oul From uncer hostile fra. Consequently, amies ty to Keep ther personnel mounted unti it becomes absolutely necessary to dlemaune The Warsave Pact is considerably less ‘machenized than NATO. For example, tho Soviets fave no self-propelies artilery instead, il #9 all towed. This is curious, cconsdwring how popular acilery iin The Cae taee 2 The Nuclear Battlefield In "pure" ground strength the NATO fercesare out numborad, The Soviets have 4 divigions (650,000 mon, 10,000 tanks) 20 24 divstons, (180,000 men, 6,000 tank). Io ‘2édiion, the Soviet Union also. hee its the Soviets have 2,700 ohis 1.500 more for thei: Wareaw Pact allos. Thore one ares, however, in which NATO has. s_ cleat Given the sbove deta, the Soviets uly expect a "conventionat” defeat of NATO. (ground foroee to turn Into @ ruciaer wor, For this reason they plan to make it nuclear ‘rom the beginning soto diminish a3 muah 28 posable tha NATO mclesr superity, ‘Ono must remember thatthe “nuclear war"? ‘we speak of here isa tactical” one and not {the massive “doomsday'" holocaust that ‘would arise fromthe use of strategie ‘nuclear weapons. Most of the clear ‘warheads avaiable to NATO and Sovet forces are quite smalin yild (no more than 2 few hundred Kiotone at most, Even 20, these woapors, fal used, could turn much ‘of Europe into burned out and somewhat radiooctive wasteland. Being “tactical” ‘weapons, thoy areas “clean” 20 posse, Assuming tht units stayed well apread out, itis quitikly that tho troops would aut fewer caeualltes than the focal chtane. Both armies. are carafuly tine to deal with tha otfecte of ucieor Wespons; hapless nearby ciikans ra ot Both NATO and Soviet planners fool thet the armies could survive @ “pucl exchange” and sil be able to ight. That ‘one doetrine that, hopeful, wil never be ut to the test.LUSS®. By contest, al ihe artery ot divisional leven USAREUH is sell-propelled (wrth the sxcoption of the bth Battalion, 81st Infancy, “inien has towed hovers supporting” the airborne brigade of the Bth Infantry Divisio AS a result, America Mas sell-propelled aria ranging tom the 10mm Powe” tothe 8 inch {gun capable of tring nuclear projectiee Briain has only one ea-propaied pice, the 105mm Abbot, end the Germans hove name. Both, however, have American aril, 0_sll propelled oiliery & wel-cstibuted dough Sut NATO, ‘Mozorized troop anspor hes been universally ‘costed, usualy in the form of a tacked Vehicle shhoveh several of tne alder vehicles ate wheeled. Tne US veiee on the M113, 8 ‘elable workhorse The West Germans have had the SP2 123 anc ave replacing with the 'SPZ @eut Marder. Britain has twa types, One EE the wacked FV 432. The ether is te alder, ‘whesied Saracen. The Sovats use the tracted BYR-80 os wol a6 the wheeled STF-60. Fight ow 60% of Sowet infantry are using the fewoe M-1987s. By 1676, 1009% wil be Using the more modern vehicle These personnel carriers have much in common. They all can carry some armor This ign contrast ta Wot War when much of the anspor of combat toons was done in ‘yucks, Hat all All ho now eaters except Iho ‘Marder can swam (with ony afew einutes for Preparation). inthe olger eerie, nfentry Sither rust denount to fight, who ‘mounted, mast expose themeeives fo enamy, fra ia otcer 10 Tight The ewer carters, however, such as. the Mordor and M-198), have Fritg gers which Tomes am the ost aed telsopers curemiy In the US inventory, with their ‘official names (out UH-1 choppers a all US Helicopters and their Armament weapon type name weight sp00d ystems UH-B Woqos 3.0 144 Ms & N21 uaa oqusie! 400 100) M1 M29 HIG Cobre a3 29 xm, 421, eTow OHA’ ‘Cayuse ua 1) Mae M27 0-58 Kiowa 13 133 3 8 MZ7 known unoffiialy 26 "Hueys", weight in tons, speed in mies per hour and weepon systems mounted. Helicopter Weapons Systems ‘There are currently ten regular or exper ‘mental heicopter weapon ystems In te ‘American inventory. These 90 "modua ized packages of from ona. t0 several Steet wep ae pe wre ‘Toe present rogular weapons systems Uso aro th MEH, Why ond. ‘The MS comprises 2 specially mountad M75 dornn grenade launcher with 3 aupely ‘Of 316 rounds. This can fre 290 rounds per Iminute lpm) and bas a maximum renge of 17800 motors. ‘The MB sistem comprises 9 spocially ‘mounted XM 128 40mm grenade launcher, ‘with 156 rounds, arate of fr of 300 to 480 USA OFL6A ooteaton hekcopte om and a range of 1,500 metors. ‘The M76 system is far more compen. it ‘comprises @ pak of MED 7.6amm machine ‘guns, with 6.00 rounds of ammunition, 2 ‘ate of fire of 2000-2800 rom and 3 rang ‘of 1,000 motes, pis 3 paF of NSB 2.75" rocket launcter pods with 18 rockets which ‘can be fred in 6 seconds to 8 range of 3.000 moter, The M21 system comprises. two MI 7.82mm miriguris with 600 rounds and rate of fie of 4800 7pm, with @ maxionure ange of 1,000 meters and a pair of S188 2.75" rocket pods as in the MIS system. ‘The #223 system mounts 2 pair of MEDD 7.82mm machlre guns with 60D rounds of ammunition, arate of fre of fom 860 to {600 rom and 2 range of 1,000 mers, “The exporimental systems are mote inter: ‘esting, comprising the XMIGET, xM28/ XMBBET, XMIZ7ET, XANES ard XMI97. The XMIBEI te. one specially mounted (M134 7.62mm minigun with 1500 rounes and arate of fire acjustable at eter 2.000 14,000 rpm, with a range of 1,000 meters. The XMB7ET Ie the same but with provisions for 2,000 rounds of ammunition. ‘The XM2IXMRBEY system comprises two XM134_7.62mm miniguns with 4,000 rounds of ammunition voch, an adjustable rate of fie of 2,000 oF 4000 ram and 3 range of 1,000 meters and two. XM129 4domm grenade launchers with 300 rounds, ‘The XM188 anc die XMI97 are both light automatic cannon, the formar 2 SOinen and the latter 220m piace. Vrwally nothing i avalable on the characteristce r function ing of those two systems. 31permit ste Woops to delvar fire white protected by the carer. This allows she cares to move hough light resstanoe. while. elurring tre ‘and without havieg to dimount. Reconnaissance: In 9 highly motte w reconnaissance is crucial, Unger medern doctrina, reconnaissance oeeurs nto haces: helicopters and ground vehicles. The Givisional cavairy squadicn now has an sitcavally oop attschea solay for recon aissance. Arr recon isiimitad since helicopters fare conspicucus. On the other hand, velit from the air '3 usually much beter ‘han vsioity from the ground, Unika porsonnel cries, whesied vehicles re ore common ther tacked vohicles Toon work. Only the US uses vacks to any great ‘extent. The Germans ere developing a wheeled ‘scout ear. With the exception of the BT-78, The Soviets Mave ony wheeled recon vericies, (Sut In fact, the PT-76's rated a ight tank. Tanks are ust beginning wo evolve a6 an area of fe00n development. ‘Anis have akways had a sel-contrecictary ‘aittuda towards recon vehicles Shou ‘hey have suticiant punch to knock out 3 tank? Ie recon's sole function 19 "snogg and scoot?” Ag itcurrenty stanes, the USSR, the US, and Britain all have. recon” vehicles cenabie. cf knocking out an enemy tank. {These heowy farmed recon vehicis car also be considered flighty armored recon tons.) Tho Soviet T-76 has already been mentioned. Tha US has the M-E51 Sheratan wth ts combination Guivlaunchar. This weil, whl 100 Tight to vwitrstand dreet enemy tank fre, can fra both the conventional HEAT round and. th Shilelagn ‘missile. The British have the Scorpion whichis sige t0 the Shevdan. 79 ‘fomiss these vehicles beceuse of thet light farmer may bo short-sighted. No tank cat withstands drect hit fom an armor-defeating Fund withia the sevmal range of tank versus tank engagemorts. The first tar tit will win. A Jightskinned recon tank has as mucn chance 1 fire as does 2 heavy tark. Some authorities therefore fee! that the Sheridan may be the protoiyoe for future Tanks TANKS. . The line between tanks and armored recon vehicles 's somenhot unclear, 26 wae shown ‘octly above, Here, howevsr. we shel deat lull Pose vehicles wach ara clsary tanks {ne premier weapon of World War leas the tank: The victerlous powors, mindful of the feats he Germans ascompishee with rid-wer tak design, have hed a sutte but continual design race under way for twenty-"¥e years Each country hae ult its basic design through 8 sofes of develoamenis. These consist rimetly of up-gunning, up-armeringy ard Sreamining. Today's Main Battle Tank (MGT) ‘Seaver than the madium tank of Word War Ui and closer to the weight class of the Worle War Il'German heavy tank Tho medeen tanks, a8 9 result of the weight increasing develonrnants, Pave bean calles the “oinesaurs of the batiails.” The role of Aanks has changod eroally in fifty yeers. In ‘Worid War I tha soto function was "a Break through enemy Ines. In World War, they added mobilly and fluidity te the ‘front, permitting tha Infantry to meve foety. Mase {onk design emphasiaes antictank capably, Armor missions are just tke conventional infantyy missions: the abeclves, to stack, Gefend, and dey. These objectives are achieved primarily through knocking out ‘enemy tanks. To koop 2 tank in defilade means to take sdvantaga of cover. Most tank-to-tank engagements will occur between 800 and 2000 meters, about the same datanca as in World War Therefore, such projets es the MBT 70 XM were scapped because the Amy ‘coud not convinge Congress that 4 milion Collar tan would be evter than an aleady ‘eveloned tank Hence, an exist tak design had 10 be pressed a lite tuner The Ma became the M26, then the M6, M27, Mai (AX through Ai and M89 (AT end A2 and potential A2 and AA). Simiery the Soviet T-Babecame the T-46, then the T-54, and naw the 7-2, NUCLEAR WEAPONS Tactical nuclear waspens were the major concara of tho “0's and “60's remember the ‘Atomic Cannan?) When it wes found thet these could be fired from the &” gua, ive change was recessary i the lower” level nuclear Weaponry. The strategic nuclear (weapons have becom more sophisticated, The dvision level weapons capable of nuctear delivery (8 and Honast Joan rocket) heve been around for years andl will prabaoly be stound 9 good deal longer. By contrast, the Smlest Soviet gun capae of ving nue weapons 1© the 208mm howitzer. Fhis 15 @ Towed gun apparent kopt at corps. love) lilustrstng the Soviet Army's general practice cof centtaization), A final factor in the tactics) ‘quciear weapons area is tne US's Atomic Demolition Munition {ADM This isan femplaceatia weanan. Its lugged rather than Cropped to’ ihe ‘target area and put in positon AS the name males, the ADK is ‘daly sured for extensive cratoring of roads ‘and channeling of wooss. Present assumptions are thet_any war in Ewope could well include tactical nuclear ‘weapons. Oddly, it's iso considered possine that there may fe nathing neavier than these ged. Present NATO doctrine clas Vat the US wil not be the fist to play them. This means that the US geaumes that Rss Wall Use ther fis, it sey ore emaloyed. This presents @ protiem for the US. Obviously tre ‘Americans ‘don't rat. nukoa allover the ‘countryside. Nuclear weapons are stored i NATO/Wersaw Pact Air Strength Comparison NATO ght Bombers © (Watt-engines) Fightsr/Groundaniack 1700 fetta let interceptors 70 (ure fighters) Recennalasance cy totale 3026 These figures af, of courss, approximate and fluctuate siriost daly. In ose of 3 iiss, the Warsow Pact would be able to (raw upon the large Fussin forces witin specin| locations, presurmabiy under hoavy guard. Inthe event of war, they Would be Taloased for use only on the orders of the President. This means that if war braaks out in Europe, the troops wil move up to the line ‘minus nuclear weapons. Once an enemy uses them, the US wall Immediate shia ts sock £0 the Tioops, That assures that the Soviets ‘won't knock out the US storage dumps frst Furthermore, this gresumes that batween the fest ime the enemy uses thom ard the tne tha the Amerears actually get to the combat area, the US wont have been 102 Dedly Datored to take edvantape of tow avalabilty AlRMOBILITY It tanks were the prime donnas of Word Wer 1, Vietnam as erated & rvs the Pelcopter Almaty has adkied 8 vertical dimension {0 ‘warts. Here the US unquestionably has @ big load. Taey have well-proven helicopters, tWalned personnal and tested mvitary dock ine Theta ig a consicerable gap in the quality of non-US heiconters. The US supoies i ali with heeopters. Sut the Soviets hove. rot Dursued this weenon as closely, They do nave Several lage Peicopter troop anspor, The Mid and M6 are their malnsaye, The Mis Gn catry ten saltors, he MILB batwaan 60 fand 80, The Mis cam also carry the ASU-E? fssault gun, a7 aid in planned helborne loncings."The Mi-# wil be replaced’ byt ME, which can carry twentyesight en, However, the Soviets have no attack halicopter, Complete simobilty oftas some advantoge over conventional airborne. operations Although helicopters are mare vulnerabte {0 ‘ground! fre than aro avers used t0 carry Batetroopers, proner use of "nap of the earth flying” techrques (saying a8 low to he ground as veguiation permite) mines thie Problem. The soldier in. a heicopter is not ‘exposes to Fre for ag long'2 te 89 8 sokor hanging from parachute shrouds, Heleopter Woops Gan be lances precaaly on target rather than strewn ovor the couritysios by # high vind fas occurred at Normandy\. Ths gives landed units he catty fr eonceratan ot ull fre power Warsow swussA Pact awerelt ‘0 a6 1500 co 80) 4% 200 7% 4580 0% the Soviet Union, many of which could be loployed ‘ozo forward ar bases in Nour. ‘Ameran einfarcerents, coming fom ‘overseas, would tako Tongar.Uses of Airpower ‘Sinco 199, tho use of airpower has great intuerced almost al of the worl itary Gompaigns. The als forces of NATO and tho Warsow Pact constitute much of their mitary strength. The side wich contro the oir can strike the enerny’s troops and supply ines at wil Its commanders can be Drovied with upeto-the-minute reccnnais: ean hit ‘Acide from the statogic bombers (which ‘cannot be dealt within depth in this study), there are many types of tactical arerati assigned to NATO and the Warsaw Pact: ‘ighters, wich ore sed %0 destroy enemy aicrtt; ghter-bombers, davby effective in that they may be used to stack ground Targets as wel ground attack arerat whose sole purpose land movernents. Although the type8 diverge, Whe end is singular: 0 gain ait superiority. ‘Tha American Arny has never had to ‘operate whata ithas not held wir superiority since 1842. Because it has rover been ‘subjected to air atacks in the pest, the {ested ot superiority. The West Germans. havo run exorcieea based on such an ‘sumption, Nevertheless, an oxaminston Of the svengths of the opposing ak forces shows that Ile possible that NATO rright lose contiot of the aif, especially the Russians get a surprise stike at NATO aiecralt onthe ground. ‘Such. strike, ‘gardless of who delivers i, can be deedly. ‘The 1967 Mid-East war and. numerous incidents during the second Wedd War strate this. Ge organization wich has. recognized this is the Royal Air Force. The RAP. intends 0 use. is inexpensive, ‘Subsonic attack sircaft against Warsaw ct overeat while s3l on the ground. The Brish beleve thet is esi to destroy an aerate whle it Is on the ground than to ‘oatroy ta fires back. Although ground attack aireraft may not be @ match for fghuors a he gh alludes at wie the fightors are dosigned 10. operate, the fighters lose much of thelr advantege i they cescend to the low alstudes. fe ‘quented by the ground attack planes. This [vee # sub-sonie plano a chance ogeinet a Supersonic one, Low-fiving ground stack planes also can fy under ‘radar (which cannot follow the curvature of the earth. ‘nemy tha noise of the bombs exploding. The Americars and the Russione ere incined ‘more towards ai-to-sir combat, although ‘both. also put_an emphasis on ground: I. The Russians are fnited in this by the Inablity ‘of most of their fighters to carry large amounts of bombs. The fighters are designed to destroy enemy eircratt wth ‘cannon and missles at speeds exceeding twice that of sound (Mach 2), and ot altitudes of up to 60,000 fect. it saeme, however, that most combats take place at lower altitudes, and the planes destroyed are hit by the cannon, rather ‘than by the missiles, ‘As. yall a8 trying to attain air superiority, ‘the’ opposing forces wil also attempt to attack ground targets other than sila. Sometimes troops, but more often supply roules wal be attacked fa an. aflerpt to imercict tha battefeld. These attacks ‘altiude, again, to ‘Americans have talked about aircraft datenses would prevent the enemy from doing the same thi, ‘The Americans, Brilsh, and Russians also hhave large strategic bombers, but they ‘would probably be emalayed in conjunc ton with interscontinental missles, ‘Tectical reconnaissance Is. an important mission, usualy carted out by fighters ‘canying cameras insteed of missles, NATO has’ the edge bere, ‘having better ‘equipment. NATO sort ae seo. alo 10 operate Satter in tad west! sn st ght hen ar the Warsaw Poet erat, Ths armory die 1. thot ota aay end avonos auiement which ako tnd 1 increase ‘ar wah ar cone One of th tar Drotara oro ses, stort Song {low below th ri Tha can be reverted co an extont by mounting tee” meen ser, euch ae usin Moron he agate Arce ECSI2T Not only can thw ergs ror plone spat both low ‘and igh fing Srariny, ty can ato warn and eck iy hy ant ery ‘Sera putongalygtosty de ear Gn thr ling thm on oxcolont rat ‘or rar homing. mielos Tho Russone intend to usp ther new MG-23, "Foxbat” aireraft for this purpose. ‘Several Foxbats will liter at high atitude, ‘along with 3 Moss. When the Moss picks Up lowrflving NATO planes, he psints ther tnd passes the data to the Foxbats, The Foxbats then fro their trge redar-homing ""snapdown missles, which go down efter the low flyer. The Foxbat can thus destroy ‘aieraft some $0,000 feet below it Of course a friendly radar plane could shvays tall the target plane that he ls boing painted, so ha can take ovesive ction. Or the fiendiy. cedar plene can. tigger some slectronic counter-messures to foul up the snepdown missle. The smell racars of the combet planes sre inadequate for auch faney missile work, Similar elocironic countermessures (ECM) ‘can be used to outwit enemy onttalreraft missiles, #8 American "Wild Weasel” Planes do over Vietnam. OF course, both Sides are trying to work out counters 10 these econter-measures. Al the start of 1973, the qualitative balance ‘of the NATO and Warsaw Pact a forces ‘changing. The Russians are acquiring an ‘liweather capablity thet they had prev: although they sil lack a sucessful fighter: bomber. If the Snapdown-amed Foxbat- ‘Moss team cannot counter low-flying Intruders, then the Warsaw Pact wall hve fo fight it-out with MiG-212, not an ‘optimum choles, sinca they arei-suited to Towriewel combst ‘The main prablom facing NATO Is that of doctrine, Needed tore. theo any new ‘equipment, perhaps, is 2 closrer under. ‘tending of how the next wer may. be feaght he NATO act wih tar ‘Generel duel. purpose and all-weather capa biity, can somotimes Warsaw Pact alt foward: ‘may not conte, For example, the now F-15 i aimpler than previous fighters, although not primitive, ‘An aipplane auch as the F-15 fs probably the ‘optimum fighter at the moment. Whather the NATO fightar-bombere will prove more c\ffective than cheaper ground attack 6 Craft such as the Brith Harr, which ie ‘capable of taking off vertically, or the heavier Buccaneer remains to be seen. should be noted, however, that whe thesa Ground attack pianes are often capsble of cetecing tresies a iow tl thoy ‘cannot be used as offensive al-supetiorty fighters, tho the F-4s of NATO. Performance figures. demonstrate that i YOu HRC aimest any ast on te cw {erms, bo it gross Foxbat or sell Hater, you stand a good chance of losing. Air fighting today's anyone's game, ond requires more kil theh ever BoforsUS NATO GE F4Phenom FWGR ‘aes10 ee tesa ne erry cee aan Ftp “o5a/660 4500 THE BALLOON GOES UP ‘wat in Europe cou bagi in many ways, but let'us consider ust one fn crder to give yOu some idea of the possbites, he scunar, stars lke hi, maligne fepor's. during the past three days lecicate ‘major troop buld-up along the East Gerrian ‘anc CuechrWest Goiman borders. Soviet unis fasve been reported leaving ther Barracks dung 190-1818. Ths reprint essentaly urevanged form the ong) ton and conn vomanetle aout ot The English Cid Wax eid by Jobe Tucker art Lesis'S. Wrst. Stackpole, 1972. 4595. 80 po, EPS), A collector of Mofly fowmative ste tn the TOAD TES! confiel mace by ard or the ‘Mombret The Salat Knot erste Bish sccm Shima aut. Welltustsie, wry detaleg ard fately volutle fr te mina eegaren oF ude of Severeanth Carty vanlte ODS RECEIVED Out of the Bie: US. Army Antone Ooeraions Ware arity Joes A Taston Purdie 9720p wi BET 21808. The Seas of Meira: Diy of @ (German) Fgntar ‘it by stones Stentoll Andra Sauter. 1311 Staten 250 e673, WSIAPS. Wh Wee Qvebecy Olver Warmer Caine 1972 Storing 285 fe 8790) 8/2513 Tho King Time: The Geman U Bose, 14-1918 y Elon A Gray. Senseo 1972 47.8 290 op. silane errata Yaak ofthe Won, 1275-1945 oy Pate Chomoorain ana eres ls Stackpole: 1078, Stave, 28 op 4S/29.Lastwar in $8720 weincuded a ria balance ‘Steuer 1971 pug 2 tow comments on wnt want on and wy. ve sence tht Vachon ‘gain he yea" The yar oe ll gsc rare itlennaton,t only beceuse mate Res hipconed 1272 wil probstly be forever remenborod ia the ‘Patras the“yesr of gown scours ‘hat we wl ever agsin tow $0 fot 8 sent 9 Dried of time, To ge yu andes of au gunn In tare consdee the Tolowinge in 9% our [Reomo von $1900, #1972 6660000 a 298% steresel in 1071 we brought an BCI naw Biossretons SO in OP twee 46 ty 207% mcrosea!, in 197" we spent S180) oF Siverusng in 1972 N woe sIeBID a A eres! Aig endol 1 wee en ee tog ‘Freamacing ting ebout ahs grow was at [Rae done ony ith money reeled for yeu {ortheporchanaot ou produc The'doats of ow tig was secompiahed ae qu intersting, (hat alow ie dears Fest there ie an income Statement. & rater Convertors aecounang doaurnes Ineome Statement for Yow ending 31 Decombar, 1872 Gromsales. : eero00 Seles deccunis ctu endorcte -.- 11000 NEESIES cces ees vesv sees 6,000 Cost of Goods Sots Iver, WAPI evs eceoce= 7,000 Burchaee, Maruti Asser sr Seip = 290,000, Be voc ecesoreeeses2 2.0 Invoneory zis ‘0.000 Costat Goads Sa. 1900 {Gros foal Prot. 5120 Other Onect Costs Posege ard Mal pick up... 2,000, Amorimatin oft «vnc 18900 ‘Amorizetan of Product" 8000 oyatng ara Coranisions 3,700 (Other Promaions vevneers s+ 2000 eam) Otter expenses: ‘Salariae (REO, Amin ete} 12,000, Comput opergan cose =. 18700 rand Typesatng a0 Rantord uals 31300 Office wotk feria ot=) 28,100 OF eed Copier supine. 28800 TNO esceyorcecneeeeses 18000 Other iesuip Baers, fe) 33.250, (2a 960) oR POSE, oso ooeoe ace esace cece ARNE ANNUAL REPORT to the Subscribers of Strategy & Tactics Magazine Some 2% of our sage cae ram subscipsone te S8T. Actusly, 20% a1 tha come fom sale Uretire Sita. 85 Serrautaaccaurted fr ebout ir of our ale, 2 waa tha casey 194 and 10 We sid 9 fea oF TSRLOD gare tresxing ‘ST qares sol 5 sutvenpton cones ar back isuesl "iscstanecus” fame veh. gem Sesgrav’ easpmant, Avon vil Yaya tor Panzer Origins. France 40 ard. Outer ‘Sura ee. aooouns fre than 6% oF cr income, [rere fom MOVES pls tro "rst loneous tf gasp te 10% four ncome We {ourd that tna was ot ot untoped "Paring Deronda out tote afl so we precenced to {ss wo vere goad at ring at gras on 8 swear ints anya sleet so (nthe expense site we id he two ages items tobe fveniory an flares. ventory meeaeed Sethe umber cf games inceensee We irrodbced 18 new games in 1872 ash of hese Inofessoa inventory Ab wo conned to pis ‘rote gmc, we aso hod to havo more AED. beopie, Designing the gars eet ake. ay hove manpower lezep! or lat Yourg and Shoe “ang over some 46% ct the cong, ba the "deveoarant” i, and wae Pore tha ho ‘oat manpower wae ede Mo"» prop Ye ‘eeded torun no sty 8 are orgmeaton, Cut hoa api groweg one. The grown somtined ‘wth erosead ane nasa cargraus coma tian Naw mnogas nary na ure to arm that ote before ase jos changed due to grow {ris rae tinge ough aap srs Gown te ro, We camo Ureugh itn prety gooe shape aed Poa ar hor ta athe" ouah etaye ung 1973. Our income Statemant snows » “oro” of STZ1E80- Untorunately the isnot tek of “prt that smeor could putts the bane It vat pled back io the Operation, in some Cates belotewmeven athe money. Teexpay {his "we present the folowing Statement? Funds Stntorort, yor ending 31 December, 1972 AY gues ore approximate, th 8 19% vahabl ‘Sours of funde NELPIOR ve oceee ces ceceeeceeeoeeee NSO Print Oabtineoase 470 ‘Accounts Payebleincroase sooo ployee Loans veces cere coceceons 22800 Defeved Slots a0 Wages cnc tore payabietnrcase 18000 Tota func vate eccee ss 2600 Apponion of fds: ivantor ner. 0 Inventor Maing ist ri4000 Product Rosearcrane teleors =... $0000 Ieereasn hy RaceNbleE even 10000 Iecreesein Equipment 300 Other septeaion. san Tots Acplcaons of Funds... 4... .271800 Netinciasn neath 2000 “This shows where we got the maney wit tie te grow in Wor. We dtunad gute 8 ot ot {onny irl By Raving lrger bas, ard. en ‘gotng beet tema forthe se uch 20,2 ys to aby teem Teor tow pina, We [ataed he hat smongtre SPl peop nd they Kokeg inquto ict of ash 01 of 2eapie who Tew got acy retan wage foun tht he ‘Sue sual ve on uch stress and, when they haa rage comaey ri be rave back { SPlin the fo oF dolerod talents fra monoy lowed us to ay fora Yethe ge Suversng program. 2s wel re huge "ROD" for we unched Gung 1872. And then, Goutal tte was ne inventory vue Bs Few eouipmant to be boueht and 20 on Firaly, hee isthe euastion of pot In 198, ‘nen we sured, wa chorgad 9600 8 Busing 1572, bed tat pie 2 98.00 rmantered 8 numberof snes how we ite "0 IBwree Sur pices, ane how ths mh oe pass we seld me of eae gare. Thais Sy rom, Fr ig?d: bosom real actor n ou costs Bot 5 the meentine there has be ion. Whe knew thet our cows were rang We comet he post" at infinisn te. us enon 19 and dsrcvmred se fetowing. Sines 1959 our costs have moronses 25% sachs of gener nisin. This moane ‘ht wo we geting ony $40 60 130 Pray for 5 46 gama sold today. Thus, ‘torn th one colar crac have sca ft the pice of eur gums 4, Te longer wo faint that pcs, the lest the savage to Jou Thvemay ter beasoovousasaeagheat, {naimesetrce ct busi jt are THe smo {poles for meroreraets wo make ibe gems ote te on 8 an exrtaig Wid We isn On smateg improtemerts in the box" we Sr vertu ut parte aye In am toi he Stapp of counters. We se 69 wong on 3 ‘meurted wosrd opel he wrt be ale 1080 {ewitoutresng tese Sut no mane neat ‘Wado, man ul sen owe tha ee” Ing ae we dart enange ror exam, Four fe eth Sat tha eo ts voor he roa” Be tn 108 dolor) wil probably bo”, (nein bit sce ring. do-Ouing 1972, me ‘aied out subserpdon price to #15 8 yest. The theory Behind tis wes they sings we ted Iesea buck ersmon ach eniptsn, wo might be ble toate the price Yo cov out onsen aul St naviesa be "hale coe” garners we ee sie efter now avartaneg alts setred fo bear this oot Bot tra tinal tae a atvar baborate corautar prota cated "Teareacton ‘nays bd nat go operational ett racy ‘ter han wand sou inthe vere Ieee’ we acide to tower the raves bac 10 erty were Obit 9 5b cn Mie"Wrare faking sa fewer 2ubs wih our Schering. Thus wae coming us oven Bortsng dolls for each aw subserbor ‘Witout the Tranncton Anal ra had no wa 1 proving thet ese people ese only hr fier would buy 9 ot of games So supe Be ‘estofhegooraton! Wal yeu contaun em a ak WYComic Art Conventions-18%; Wargaming leanne tm ge 2) Conventions 08%; Mitre Convention’-27% OUTGOING MAIL ‘This st consisted of thse game sles we were Planning to use for most 9 1973 ag of last ‘August (wien we were puting SA 8 Togetner) Based on these results we daciced to let you decide Ithrough the Feedback) wivch games wauld be pullshod. As you can See, we nad Tnced ck with our choices inthe S87 34 list. AN the games marked "To 3e Published” we had either already fished or were than working on whan nw gat the ST feedback arccessed. So we hd to ae ahead ‘wit those es. Our experience has boon that Bopulariy ina survey such as Te ore above No! ard and fast indicator oF he eventual popularity of @ game alter publication Obviously’ of course, re more popular tes fon the above survey wil almost certaniy ba better coivod than ine ower arkad ones. On ‘ines tiles we may wal take a beating: Mucker & Pik, Stormat and Senmrnage. On twa of those, however his may not be so. Muster & Pike's about 9 relatwely unknown pence — the Thirty Years War ere ete sixteenth to late Seventeenth conturigs). Ais, is one of Our ‘atorstyie tectcal series games. like Armagedtaon. I rothng else, Musket & Pike Wil abla poopie Yo find Out wnat was GOING Oi ins heretofore ignored peros. Senmmage 's another geme we expyct wil overcome resent player resstence. Altnough tha came ‘sa very veaiaie re-creation of haw football is played fon a" layar-to-piaver” fowl $ ako BTasonating "worgume” ine own ght, with many naw and interesting game mechanics, "Youll 500 for yoursell in Apr. And wel ing ‘out now night, 0° wong, we were about the game. Tre’ third game cl the oottom thrao, Sturman, got caughtin ine late'72 declire ok interest in the “Russian Front” Ths dectiiein tntarest continues ang it locks lke Sturm ‘ail be one of ine vitms. I's e sname, i's 2 rather good and realisie game of a combat fon the easter (om We asked a numberof other questions in S67 JH We asked now you fe" about oul ‘meduiar” approach t0 articles, Only 2% felt tha the whole des was wrong wifa only 105% felt thore were toa many mogu'es, On the ‘other Rand, 24% fet there shouks Be more of horn and 0% felt that thrgs were fine a they wore, You also sas that you slayes the games in S47 and average of 564 times. Go "pass in Reviow,” 73% of you felt thet the bret review ofthe Books, Gn the question et using war yeu of "bad" cok, 41% 3218. is ‘Shoula be done while 41% felt att should be done some of the zm. On usiig the "Power Poites" to doal wali gernas. other nan Diplomacy, 27% said yas, while 50% jel thet the should be done only sovasionaly ‘wth regard 10 attendance at “Yen conven lions, omy 1758 of you Rag ever attendad one, ‘OF wat 179%. the types attencea broke cown 185 follows, Scienee Fiction Conventions 27%, PROPOSED GAMES, AS RATED IN S87 35 FEEDBACK Soe yoke BE ant ebeereo and er ate nae ofo aea ete ae can ee SSE, SOON yea Se 1. Rod Ster/White Star an ‘ent, Finally, some 31% of you hed to send ae TEEMEEEMINER| Stones crs Ss anes Sate orgy toe one, i Be 2. Sage ins, a Fn] Sette Een 25 eaucbeteces et EiWars.ofilapolbon ‘586 ‘at least 5% were about orders of other toms, 5 fee Sam ois Bandy! pgm | Metln nlite oe 6. Caron ila Css TSEROULZAN| We rove now opel ons egos 2 = PT) ein he niente ee oa a ea a Siacetnes Ovlenetee (orate B0/ga uD am tose ‘on about two year's: Coservation of ins ® Lecal Geyer el Geta terse | Comes gS a te sa See ee ee teraroiconnea ESSN] Troe Tisai ee cee re Et a ane saan rast it nace en 18 assert a sr orchg! e S : a ae aca aie at 14 Breakout & Purouir th 538 "5" area usually hava a "minority" folowing, TE Nopoeenat ny rer sae | mos “ty itor mes i an We satin but el otf th surah ED ese cess ‘eee ast all botched up or apes to very few people. i8.tanapn pommeremmn| fy me ey a a = PORTE) Taassvion BCE ns ae eatatn Teese iasibes ine, reine ig 616 Finally. remember that these ratings are from 9 sore Psi | aa acp oe wee ee zveoe Tones) Sacet n Sates aes Sera eS MeL Een c coe good guide to the beter games, and a warning iicauwe pammcnceme| SUS 25, 90 Yaors Wat 2 saa There wate 2 number of questions in SET 35 2a marx ae a red mae SER eee a X mer a the “whet if?” versions about equally with (28. Scrimmage: Ter 372) 32% prefering the ‘‘standard” version most of ie aad oe Seam ae STATUS CODES: P ~ Published TaP = To Ge Published ? = Uncerain versions most of the time. 608 of you twouid sor net Se rs (8°) alaving pieces While 46%. peter the heavy peper for gare maps. ane 12% peafor theighter peer, aon care, 78% foe that sfotot sserariaeads consiteroiy to 8 game's Velue. 27% prefer step recuction oF writs wre 139% protar toial unit elirination ae for 60% ‘of you it Gopends an the game. 74% of you Spend mos! 6f you tne playing with tha game by yourselt. You havo ‘spartan average of 89060 each on aur goods in the ast six rroning. 41% preiar 9s many play ds a3 possible on the gare map wile further 14% ‘are not bothered by any of these things on the map. That makes 36% in favor of gay aids on ‘he map, Some play aids, however. were sot fereterred on the map. These were scenarios (59) and. setup mops (13%. The AT Director wil be guided by this when doing future games. Ona 3 scale the placement of Staring supe on the map got 444. So welt be careful with this ona. On the coer of the paper for a map, 62% felt it all depenced on the gare. Only 27% of you had reeewved any of our new game boxes. 816% of those that tic receive the boxes hed some wouble win stoning couniars in the Sexes, (More on that furtner on We asked how often people hae played certain games 67% hec played Baroda an average 51 4.99 times each, BD% ae playod Miner ior an average of 447 tins each, 72% nad layed armagerion an average of 369 nes ach. The quostion of “non war” games Showed Inat You nara Somewnet intrested (contred on page 40