Common To Body and Soul-Asin - LXBH3OE2K5QWEQIH2BMKUQRAYI5KCF7N PDF

Common to Body and Soul
Brought to you by | UNAM

Authenticated | 132.248.9.8
Download Date | 3/9/13 9:36 AM
Common to Body and Soul
Philosophical Approaches
to Explaining Living Behaviour
in Greco-Roman Antiquity
Edited by
R.A.H. King
Waiter de Gruyter . Berlin' New York

@) Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines
of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the Library
of Congress.
ISBN-13: 978-3-11-018333-7
ISBN-10: 3-11-018333-1
Bibliographic itiformation published I!J Die Deulsche Bibliothek

Die Deutsche Bibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche
Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the
Internet at < http://dnb.ddb.de > .
© Copyright 2006 by Waiter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, 10785 Berlin.
All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book
may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without
permission in writing from the publisher.
Cover design: Christopher Schneider, Berlin.
Typeset using LaTeX: Thomas Brunotte, Munich.
Printing and binding: Hubert & Co. GmbH & Co. KG, GOttingen.
Printed in Germany.

Acknowledgments
This collection of essays owes its inception to a symposium held in Munich

8-lOth September 2003, whose purpose was to bring together scholars
working in the field to discuss some aspects of the philosophy of mind in
antiquity that may conveniently be subsumed under the rubric "common
to body and soul". All but one of the papers presented here were read,
in earlier versions, at the symposium, Thomas Johansen's piece being the
exception. None of them has appeared in its present form in print before.
The editor has translated Pierre-Marie Morel's and Thomas Buchheim's
papers into English.
Many people and institutions were instrumental in making the sympo-
sium possible; the editor would like to express his gratitude to the follow-
ing. The Fritz Thyssen Stiftung gave very generous financial support to
the symposium. The Gesellschaft fur antike Philosophie also supported
the undertaking. Ursula Steiner was most helpful in making the three
days at Kardinal Wendel Haus, where the symposium was held, very en-
joyable. Thomas Brunotte was of great assistance both at the symposium
itself, and also in preparing the book for publication. He is responsible
for the camera ready copy and the indexes to the volume. Its publication
has been subsidised by Lehrstuhl III (Thomas Buchheim), Philosophie
Department, LMU Munich. Sabine Vogt, who also took part in the sym-
posium, has been exemplary as editor at de Gruyter. Finally, the volume's
editor would like to thank most warmly all participants in the symposium
for their participation, and all contributors to this collection for their
contributions.
R. A. H. King / Munich, September 2005

Contents
Introduction (R. A. H. King) .......................................... 1
Parmenides on Thinking (Edward Hussey) ........................... 13
Parmenides on the Place of Mind (Roman Dilcher) .................. 31
Life Beyond the Stars:

Aristotle, Plato and Empedodes (Denis O'Brien) .................... 49
Plato's phaulon skemma:

On the Multifariousness of the Human Soul (Thomas Buchheim) ... 103
"Common to Soul and Body"

in the Parva Naturalia (Pierre-Marie Morel) ........................ 121
What's New in the De Sensu? The Place of the De Sensu

in Aristotle's Psychology (Thomas K. Johansen) .................... 140
Common to Body and Soul:

Peripatetic Approaches After Aristotle (Robert W. Sharples) ....... 165
Interaction of Body and Soul: What the Hellenistic

Philosophers Saw and Aristotle Avoided (Christof Rapp) ........... 187
Psychophysical Holism
in Stoicism and Epicureanism (Christopher Gill) ................... 209
Body and Soul in Galen (R. J. Hankinson) .......................... 232
Contributors ....................................................... 259
Index locorum ...................................................... 261
General Index ...................................................... 275

Introduction *
R.A.H. King
Greco-Roman antiquity provides a wide variety of models of the relations

between body and soul, and some of the most notable are associated with
the phrase "common to body and soul" . This phrase is a commonplace of
ancient philosophical psychology, that is the doctrines and investigations
of the soul (psyche), both human and in general. Versions of the phrase
occur in Plato, Aristotle, and finally in Plotinus. Epicureans, Stoics and
Galen were intimately concerned with problems connected conceptually, if
not linguistically, with things common to body and soul. The ten papers
collected here present a snapshot of current research by workers in the
field. No attempt has been made at a systematic coverage, for this would
require not merely more of a history of philosophical psychology than is at
present agreed on, but also more connections between ancient and modern
thought than may safely be taken for granted. For example, substantial
dualism cannot be understood independently of the doctrine of substance
in question. As will be seen, alternative points of view are presented in the
collection, and this introduction will not attempt a final adjudication. I
begin with a brief sketch of the options discussed, and then present them
in a little more detail.
Soul (psyche) is, roughly, what distinguishes living things from other
things. The importance of things common to body and soul lies in the
fact that neither in philosophical nor everyday encounters are we usually
faced with soul on its own. Body-soul couples, what they do and what
they undergo, are much more in evidence. To see that this is so, we have
only to consider the fundamental explananda of psychology - movement,
including action, and cognition, more especially perception. This is not to
suggest that there is no point in distinguishing between body and soul -
all of the thinkers considered here do so in a variety of ways.
Both what may be common to soul varies, as does what it means to be
common to body and soul. The subjects which may be common are states,
generally speaking, or more specifically functions. The whole life of the
embodied substance may be involved. In contrast, it is in fact remarkably
Many thanks to Thomas Buchheim for his comments on an earlier version.

2 R.A.H. King
difficult to present mental activity in the absence of body - as becomes

clear from the two papers which discuss such theories. Roman Dilcher's
view of Parmenides on thinking presents a transcendent intellect, whereas
Denis O'Brien's account discusses an early layer in Aristotle's thought
displaying bodiless gods living beyond the world.
One approach to the varieties of partnership between body and soul
envisaged by different theorists is through styles of explanation. From a
modern perspective, causal interaction is the most obvious way in which
things may be common to body and soul- here represented in antiquity by
materialist theories of the soul. They differ from modern versions in that
both aspects of the interaction only occur in the interacting whole. Body
and soul are not considered as separable substances, but as aspects of a
whole. Hellenistic philosophers are important representatives of this line
of thought, as shown by Christ of Rapp and Christopher Gill. Weaker ver-
sions of body soul partnership include co-variation as in Edward Hussey's
presentation of Parmenides.
A second group of theories insists on teleological explanation for living
things. Here, an important idea is that body is an instrument of the soul.
Such a teleological relation is to be found in the theories of both Aristotle
and Plato. In Plato, there are those things which can only be striven
for by body-soul composites, such as the good life. Such striving only
makes sense when there are active tendencies of the soul, which include
bodily aspects, which can be ordered in the right way. For Aristotle the
body is the organ of the soul, and so related to it as to a good or end.
In both Plato and Aristotle, this insistence on teleology leaves room for
much work interpreting what their positions actually imply for states and
actions common to body and soul.
In Parmenides either thought and perception are explained by the
mixture of the body (Edward Hussey) or thought transcends body and
so has nothing in common with it (Roman Dilcher). The first option cor-
responds to the view that Presocratics subscribe to a naIve materialism,
which holds that all there is, is in some way material; this is also the view
of Love and Soul to be found in Empedocles (Denis O'Brien). For Plato
the function of soul is to organise body, and corporeal life, in accordance
with the idea of the good; and so it is neither form nor body (Thomas
Buchheim). This is the purpose of his division of the soul into three active
tendencies. Galen adopts this theory, but quite reasonably concludes that
empirical investigation cannot establish if the soul is body or immaterial,
although it can discover the soul's locations and the material transmission
of its powers (R. J. Hankinson).

Introduction 3
Aristotle uses the rubric "common to body and soul" to describe a

particular department of his psychology, but quite how this department
is to be distinguished is not clear. Indeed he considers the option that
all affections of the soul fall under it, using emotion as an example for
something inseparably both psychic and corporeal (Christof Rapp). One
option for distinguishing things common to body and soul from other
psychic phenomena, is that in particular the physiological aspects come
to the fore - the functional organisation of body, whose changes perform
psychic activities (Pierre-Marie Morel). Or else while excluding merely
thought, the concentration is on the concrete activities which distinguish
the kinds of living things (Thomas Johansen). These subtleties are re-
flected in the range of stances adopted by Aristotle's successors, which
range from hylomorphism to materialism (Robert Sharples).
Both Stoics and Epicureans lay great weight on the fact that if soul
and body are to interact causally, then the former must be a body as well.
But this principle leaves a variety of ways open for the co-affectability
of body and soul to be understood (Christof Rapp). In this way vital
activities are performed by matter only when contained in the whole living
thing. In both cases this kind of explanation naturalises the soul, putting
it in the context both of human life as we are familiar with it, and of the
cosmos as a whole (Christopher Gill).
The phrase "common to body and soul" 1 refers to a central group of
problems in ancient philosophical psychology, including not merely inter-
action between soul and body, but parallelism and teleological or func-
tional relations. Furthermore it marks the point where philosophy and
more empirically minded approaches meet, including both those of Aris-
totle in Parva Naturalia and of medical writers. The present collection
shows how this phrase and problems that may be associated with it pro-
duced a wide variety of explanatory models and epistemic stances to the
relation between body and soul.
It is a small part of the philosophy of mind (as it is now known),
small but crucial. Indeed, the fertility of antiquity in conceptualising this
partnership between body and soul suggests that there is a valuable philo-
sophical resource to be drawn on here. Of course, caution is necessary: can
one simply import concepts from antiquity over the divide represented by
the philosophical revolution of the 17th century? For example, when the
physis in question is the ancient concept, what does physicalism mean?
To what extent can even continuity between modern and ancient theories
of mind be posited? Broadly speaking, the approaches to the soul consid-
In Greek it would appear to have been natural to refer to soul before body (thus
in Plato and Aristotle), so too in French, whereas in modern English and German
this is not the case.

4 R.A.H. King
ered here are naturalistic: the soul is seen in the context of nature, that
is to say, above all, in relation to change and its principles. Here as ev-
erywhere in the philosophical reception of antiquity care is needed when
applying what sound like modern categories to ancient thought: the fact
that for Aristotle or the Stoics the soul was part of nature, a natural prin-
ciple by no means gives it that status in the context of modern thought.
That this is the case is of course part of the heritage of Descartes and his
contemporaries.
This is true with things "common to body and soul" even avant la
lettre - in Parmenides, in all likelihood working before Heraclitus made
the soul a central concern for philosophers.2 The question is whether Par-
menides (in Diels Kranz 28 B 16) correlates mind (noos) with the mixture
(krasis) of the body. The two papers presented here answer the question
in radically different ways - Edward Hussey argues that mind is to be
seen as varying with the mixture, whereas Roman Dilcher presents Par-
menides as systematically committed to a mind that transcends all forms
of changing reality, thus contrasting starkly with bodily existence. These
two papers present classic views of the relation between mind and matter,
one denying any partnership, and the other affirming a correlation. These
are of course themes that accompany the philosophy of mind throughout
its history.
Hussey argues that Parmenides' theory of mind and thinking was also
a theory of sense-perception. Thus it is a "materialistic" theory of mind, as
is often thought characteristic of Presocratic thinking: The theory of Par-
menides was, in his view, an "inner model" theory, in which both thoughts
and objects of perception were materially-constituted "scale models" lo-
cated within the organ of thinking, the noos. In contrast, Dilcher's paper
presents the case for saying that Parmenides' theory of thinking makes
no claims about things common to body and soul: noos transcends space
and time. Thus Parmenides is claiming that mind is preponderant over
the mixture, that is the sensible world, as the division between Being and
Mortal opinion in his poem might lead one to think. There is thus no
mention of contents entering the mind through perception: it is cut off
from contact with the world of sense, and operates merely with its own
ingredients, while being loosely correlated with body. In this way, mind
explains the developing mentality of a human life.
The idea of a mixture of bodily elements (mixis or krasis), which we
meet in an early form in Parmenides, is crucial to Empedocles, and indeed
after him to Aristotle and other Perpatetics, the Stoics, and Galen in
different ways. Denis 0 'Brien argues for an identification of the daimones
in Empedocles with pieces of Love - again an example of Presocratic
2 See esp. Diels Kranz 22 B 23,45,67,115.

Introduction 5
materialism. Thus Empedocles himself is a part of Love bound to wander

by his adherence to strife. For Love is extended, and so visible to the mind,
and able to move through the cosmos. This view is supported by the fact
that fr. 11 has a complete list of elements including the daimones - and
only Love is missing from those listed in fr. 37. Furthermore, Aristotle asks
the same questions about Soul and Love in De Anima 1.4, namely whether
they are something above and beyond the bodily proportion; hence one
should conclude that for Empedocles, in Aristotle's view, Love and Soul
are identical. Aristotle cannot accept this ambiguity, which forms part of
Empedocles' unconscious materialism.
O'Brien argues further that there is a relic of Aristotle's early thought
preserved in his cosmology, namely the thought that outside the cosmsos
there are beings who have no body - these are related to Plato's "world
soul" , and, going further back, to Empedocles, specifically to his principle
Strife. Plato makes this move in order not to be forced to adopt a principle
of evil along the lines of Empedocles' Strife - the world soul replaces
Love as a cosmic principle, and is even beyond the cosmos, taking up
the place where Empedocles banishes Strife to, when Love has brought
the cosmos under her control. Thus Soul, or Love, reigns alone in Plato's
world. Aristotle's divine beings are not subject to time, or movement,
but located outside the heavens. In his mature theory these beings are
replaced, to some extent, by the prime mover.
Plato introduces the phrase "common to body and soul" only in a
very late dialogue, the Philebus 3 but the problems of how soul is involved
with body are a central topic from the Phaedo onwards. It is sometimes
said that Plato, at least from his middle period onwards (especially in the
Phaedo) treats body and soul as two separate things, and hence in this
loose sense as two substances. But this is far from clear. Does he really
think that living bodies are separate from the form of life - in that they
can exist without it? Surely the soul in providing life is an explanation of
the body's living. And as to the existence of the soul as a thing, it is hard
to conceive of the soul as a thing in the Platonic systems, insofar as it is
never a form. The well known image of the sea-god Glaucus towards the
end of the Republic (X 611d-612a5) embodies the difficulties Plato sees in
deciding what belongs to the soul itself, and what is mere accretion, due
to its life in the body like the sea-weed and shells encrusting the god from
his life in the sea.
3 Philebus 34a3-b8 - referred to by both Morel and Johansen in their papers as a

source of the phrase. Platonists are not as well represented in this collection as
would be desirable. For example, Plotinus in I1 [53] discusses the question what
"common to body and soul" means (ch. 9.16-20) and what it applies to, above all
perception (esp. chs. 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10).

6 R.A.H. King
In a way a very simplistic reading of the phrase "common to body

and soul" could be claimed for Plato - two independent things working
in common to perform a single function, above all sense-perception. For
example, talk of the soul using the body might suggest this view. 4 But
Plato's controversial, and often criticised doctrine of the "tripartition" of
the soul (as it is usually, and unhelpfully, known), into reason (logos),
desire (epithumia) and spiritedness (thumos) is also a doctrine of the
relation between body and soul, and so requires a much more subtle theory
of this relation. And, indeed, Thomas Buchheim suggests a radically new
interpretation of tripartition in the Republic: the soul has the function of
combining body and the intelligible world - and the point is that it can
only do this if it is neither one nor the other. Obviously, it is not body
for Plato; it is sometimes assumed that it is a form. But if one is able
to explain why the soul must be multifarious, much is to be gained by
reflecting on why it is not a form. Instead of being a fixed unity, the soul
is as it were an elastic composing factor, capable of producing different
combinations of body and form. The main point is that the soul can realise
the good only by ordering its internal tendencies and their actualisations
in such way that corresponds to the order in the cosmos.
A crucial resource in ancient explanations of the relation between body
and soul is the concept of the good, or of function in general. It is from this
perspective that Buchheim shows that the multifariousness of the soul in
Plato is necessary for it to be possible for the individual soul to arrange
itself in a good way. This would not be possible if there were a form of
the soul prescribing just what a soul has to be. So the thorny question of
the tripartition of the soul has to be seen in the context of the good, and
the possibility of the soul arriving at an organisation that corresponds to
that of the context of its embodiment. One can even see that embodiment
itself serves a purpose in that without it there would be no achievement in
arriving at the good arrangement. One of the most interesting features of
Buchheim's interpretation is his approach to thymos, which he sees in the
context of the Republic in particular as reason's goad or spur moving the
soul with ambition or indignation to follow the dictates of reason, rather
than being merely another set of more or less irrational desires.
The expression "common to body and soul" occurs, as already men-
tioned, in a wide range of contexts and in many philosophers but there is
also a philosophical project which has as its specific object those entities
describable by the phrase - Aristotle's so-called Parva Naturalia. It is
a feature of recent work on Aristotle's psychology that the treatises col-
lected under this unflattering title into a single work are considered to be
an integral part of the project. Two essays address this work and present
4 Alcibiades 129c-e.

Introduction 7
two poles of interpretation of Aristotle available at present, namely as to

whether mental activity, especially sense perception (aisthesis), involves
bodily change. Morel develops the idea that one has to see the way that
body and soul form both a unity and a duality, namely as a substantial
unity, which is formed by the duality of active and passive aspects, respec-
tively: soul and body. "Common to body and soul" refers to those pathe,
generally: states which involve both body and soul as Aristotelian causes.
There is no interaction between body and soul, rather form and matter
complement one another, above all as instrument and function. Aristotle
thinks that sensation is the clue to understanding a wide range of actions
as common to body and soul. The other activities of the living thing re-
late to the best activity of living things, and this can only be sensation
or a life lead in virtue of sensation as the central activity, which provides
the foundations of organic unity in the case of animals. Body and soul
form a functional unity, that of a system of activities, of which sensation
constitutes the teleological principle in animals.
Thomas Johansen, concentrating above all on De Sensu, places the
project of Parva Naturalia in a dialectical context; as he remarks, "com-
mon to body and soul" is used by Plato in connection with perception,
like Aristotle. So Aristotle in adopting the phrase may be aiming at es-
tablishing agreement with Platonists for his theses about the phenomena
common to body and soul. The De Sensu is a continuation of the "natu-
ral" (physikos) approach to embodied activities recommended by the De
Anima; but this does not mean that in De Sensu more attention is paid
to the physiological side of animals, in contrast to De Anima. There are
no new physiological changes in De Sensu, not mentioned in De Anima
to support the view of his theory of perception in which bodily changes
accompany perception. So the rubric common to body and soul merely
excludes thought from the Parva Naturalia: at least in some texts thought
seems to be "peculiar to the soul", a phrase which contrasts with "com-
mon to body and soul". So much for what the phrase "common to body
and soul" excludes; what does it include? On the one hand, apparently
everything that falls under the most general account of the soul given in
De Anima 11.1 as the primary actuality of a natural body equipped with
organs. On the other hand, the phrase broadens the remit beyond the
fundamental faculties of the soul to a variety of novel affections such as
memory and breathing. Here, Aristotle is particularly interested in those
affections that are widespread among animals.
The difficulties inherent in Aristotle's approach to the soul, but also
its productiveness appear in the way in which his successors adopted a
variety of positions, as Robert Sharples shows, within a broad Peripatetic
approach, ranging from hylomorphism to materialism. He begins his dis-

8 R.A.H. King
cussion of the Peripatetics with an argument showing that some contrasts

between body and soul are compatible with Aristotle's hylomorphism and
others are not. For example, body and soul can conflict if an organ of an
individual cannot fulfil its task, or if faculties of the soul conflict in a way
that impinges on the body. And activities may belong only to soul if they
have no bodily correlate (perhaps: thought), and solely to body only if it
is irrelevant whether the body is living or dead, for example, falling for
a heavy, solid object. While it may seem odd that soul, which is a form,
should use a material instrument, many passages in Aristotle himself li-
cense this picture; but the soul cannot consistently be identified with that
material instrument.
Turning to the followers of Aristotle themselves, he examines how the
topic of the use of the body by the soul as an instrument is treated in the
work of Theophrastus, Strato, pseudo-Aristotle On Breath, the pseudo-
Aristotle Problems, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and the pseudo-Alexander
Problems. Of course, the textual evidence determines our ability to form
judgements about the positions taken by these thinkers. For example,
whether Strato and the author of On Breath had a materialist theory
of the soul remains unclear. We might think that there is nothing more
characteristic of Aristotle than the distinction between form and matter,
and of soul and body, but Sharples shows how little Theophrastus was
concerned with these contrasts. Dualism seems the obvious way of un-
derstanding the occasional mentions of the soul in the pseudo-Aristotle
Problems. Like Aristotle, Alexander generally explains body using soul,
rather than vice versa. In the Problems which are wrongly ascribed to
this last thinker, a wide range of positions on the nature of the soul are
adopted ranging from Platonic dualism to a gross materialism. Generally
speaking, the very subtlety of Aristotle's analysis of the relation between
soul and body may explain why it was not maintained by the subsequent
Peripatetic tradition.
Christopher Gill's chapter discusses body-soul relationships in Stoic
and Epicurean Philosophy. Three main points of convergence of Epicurean
and Stoic theories emerge: 1. their focus on natural human life and devel-
opment between birth and death, including that of forms of sociability; 2.
the theories apply to all humans; 3. the view of the soul combines ethics,
physics and logic without any attempt to reduce e.g. ethics to physics. The
surprising thing, given their traditional enmity, is the way that Stoics and
Epicureans meet in what Gill calls their "substantial holism" . The theory
is an inclusive and integrated theory of reality ("substance"), a view of
body soul integration, itself integrated in turn in a view of the cosmos.
Such a theory contrasts for example with that of the Phaedo in which
there is meant to be a rigid difference in value and being between body

Introduction 9
and soul, emotions and mind, forms and particulars. For Epicureans and
Stoics, body and soul, mind and emotion are not contrasted in value -
rather they are states of a single entity in a world conceived of in the same
way. This holism is part of a larger conception of human nature: psycho-
logically too, humans are viewed holistically and not as combinations of
mind or reason and emotions or desires.
In the Stoic conception of the soul, different levels are unified, start-
ing from the basic tension (tenor, hexis) , via the physical, that is the
living, natural process up to the soul proper. These layers are "nested"
in one another - the higher ones building on the lower and controlling
their mode of operation. As Hierocles makes very clear, psychic processes
are inherently physical ones. Indeed, one can claim, as Gill does, that the
Stoics avoid the traditional divide between body and soul. So too for the
Epicureans: since soul is a kind of body, the psyche-body contrast is to be
given up in favour of a contrast between soul as a part of the whole and
the whole itself. All psychic functioning from life itself upwards depends
on the co-operation of body and soul. In common with the Stoics psycho-
logical functions are correlated with the body as a whole, also integrated,
again as in Stoicism, with a view of the constitution of the whole cosmos,
at least partially in that soul is a relatively complex form of structured
matter, and the characteristics of animals kinds and kinds of humans is
due to their specific mix of constituent soul atoms. The distinguishing
quality of life functions (movement, rest, heat) are to be explained by
reference to determinate kinds of atom. The soul is a blend of these kinds
of atom, which makes the animal capable of complex functions such as
sensation, but the person or animal is only to be explained as a system
of atoms, made possible by the nexus of atoms; this is not an explanation
by constituents, and thus is always psychological. So constituents never
play the role of quasi independent parts.
The Stoic-Epicurean view presupposes a form of explanatory physical-
ism in that all events are to be explained using physical ones: even complex
psychic properties are properties of physical things. Perhaps mental ex-
planation is possible alongside physical explanation, namely as part of a
unified, holistic account. For these theories, at least in Epicurus' view,
to work all that is required is that we ourselves, or the "developments",
that is the living things developed out of atoms, play an important role
in explanation, as opposed to the original natures of the atoms. The de-
veloped person is a cause of its own kind, and passes on this causality to
the constituent atoms and so makes a cohesive whole; conscious effort can
affect our make up, without making the conscious effort non-physical.
Christ of Rapp starts from the observation that the conception of
things common to body and soul was much broader in antiquity than

10 R.A.H. King
in modern times, and embraced co-operation, interaction and parallelism.

Action, perception and emotion offer the most obvious cases of things
common to body and soul, and Rapp focuses on emotion, showing the
way in which Epicureans and Stoics tackled the problem of interaction
between body and soul head on: only the bodily can act and be acted on,
and emotions are causal interactions of body and soul, while Aristotle cir-
cumvents the difficulty by making soul and body not merely ontologically
inseparable but conceptually as well. Alongside the features common to
Stoics and Epicureans - the insistence that for a soul to be causally effec-
tive it has to be corporeal - differences in this area can be seen between
them perhaps most clearly in terms of sympatheia, a term which, with its
cognate verb, refers to the co-affectibility of body and soul.
For the Epicureans sympatheia is due to a fifth element in the soul,
and is especially involved in sensation. Sympatheia does not mean that
the soul undergoes something caused by the body, but rather that body
and soul are affected by the same things in similar ways, at the same time.
Nonetheless, the body can affect soul and vice versa, and the possibility
of the affection of only one of them is especially preserved by the distinc-
tion between mind and soul; the mind can be unwell while the body is
thriving and vice versa. This distinction is paralleled by the Stoic one be-
tween pneuma as a sustaining element mixed with the whole body which
it sustains and the commanding faculty, also working with pneuma but
situated in the heart, and governing the whole living thing from there, the
centre from which the other powers of the soul flow (the senses, speech
and reproduction). While interaction (sympaschein) of body and soul, in
sickness or through wounds, shows for them too that soul is a body, that
is pneuma, they are not affected at the same time in the same way by the
same thing. Rather, one thing is affected primarily, and then the other
secondarily: primarily the body is cut, and secondarily the soul is affected.
In this context, the interesting thing about emotions is the extent to which
they can be described physiologically. On the one hand, an emotion is a
fresh belief, which can be described as swellings and contractions of two
of the generic emotions (appetite and fear, pleasure and distress). In the
case of distress, the actual contraction is linked to the freshness of the
belief; the pain can subside, while the belief remains. On the other hand,
there seems to be no further physiological description beyond swelling and
contraction available in Stoic theory.
In the case of Aristotle we have the important programmatic question
at the start of De Anima whether all the affections of the soul are common
to body and soul; the star witnesses for an affirmative answer are the
emotions. These are not to be explained by a two-component theory, an
opinion and a physiological realisation, since the emotion just is a certain

Introduction 11
movement of the blood: because of its causation and purpose. In other

words they only occur in bodies with specific souls. Thus the full definition
given by the student of nature is concerned with the composite. Because
we are not dealing with two things we cannot be dealing with causal
interaction - a result which chimes well enough with Morel's result, in
that body and soul do not interact, rather the body serves an end, and
thus forms a unity with the soul. Emotions cannot be abstracted from
a certain kind of bodily process; this is the way Rapp understands the
famous conclusion to this passage, namely that affections of the soul are
enmattered logoi.
Whereas the Post-Cartesian account of emotions holds that there are
two components - a mental judgement and a bodily affection - for Aris-
totle the emotion is the kinesis of the blood, namely a kind of represen-
tation. Hence the question of interaction does not arise. There are thus
similarities between Aristotle and the materialist in that bodily states of
living things such as anger cannot be described without their intensional
objects. Thus classic modern problems with mind-body dualism do not
arise for him.
The limits of philosophical psychology are reached in Galen, in that
on the one hand he uses Platonic resources to direct his researches into the
location of vital function, and on the other he finds the substance of the
soul inaccessible to his methods. James Hankinson's contribution discusses
Galen's Platonism. This involves, perhaps surprisingly, the empirical side
of the question, as with Aristotle's Parva Naturalia, but offers in contrast
a proof of tripartition, not seen now as an arrangement for moral purposes
as in the Republic. Rather as a modern doctor might consider phenomena
to be psychosomatic without taking a position on whether the soul is
identical with (part of) the body, Galen pursues his empirical studies
without committing himself as to what the substance of the soul is -
whether it is mortal or immortal, corporeal or incorporeal.
Primarily, he sees the soul as the cause of sensation and voluntary mo-
tion - it always occurs with body of a certain kind. Here, I think Galen
is close to Aristotle, as he is in giving a functional account of soul: we as-
cribe soul to things on account of their powers; anatomical investigation
can reveal location and mediation of these powers. Galen's view combines
a certainty that atomist-style reduction fails with the adoption of a prov-
idential teleology. Bodies as such are not capable of perception or any of
the other functions which go with soul. There has to be more in perception
than just alteration since otherwise we cannot say why everything altered
does not thereby perceive. In his view, everyone agrees we have a soul
since we are aware of its effects. This conclusion is supported by the "nat-
ural axiom" , that there must be a cause for any effects. He draws a sharp

12 R.A.H. King
distinction between powers and substance. Talk of "powers" is in Galen's

view merely the first step in scientific investigation, before discovering the
causes, and this can be done in part without establishing the substance of
the soul. Bodily structures account for its distinctive powers. Because it is
responsible for action, it cannot be merely an epiphenomenon (cf. Phaedo
93a). Thus the soul's powers are consequent on bodily states, related to
the locations of the three parts of the soul. He also thinks that one can
prove with certainty that the various powers of the soul, in particular sen-
sation and movement, are subject to control from the brain by way of the
nervous system, transmitted by the psychic pneuma. This is the reason for
Galen adopting his position on psychological states and dispositions: they
are directly affected by physiological conditions, without inferences about
the substance of the soul being possible. Despite Galen's non-committal
stance, he is inclined to think that there is no independent existence of
the soul. His theory is thus a suitable end to the series of ancient theories
about what is common to body and soul, looking both back to Plato and
forward to modern neurophysiology and philosophy of mind.

Edward Hussey
Parmenides on Thinking
1. Parmenides fr. 16: some semantic questions
1.1. Parmenides fr. 16 Diels-Kranz, notoriously, presents a tangle of tex-

tual and syntactic problems. This paper starts by by-passing these prob-
lems (though it eventually returns to them). The aim is to explore the
possibility of a certain kind of reading of Parmenides' account of "mind"
and "thinking" (v6oc;, v6y)f,lcx, cppovte:LV) here.
In the rest of section 1, I consider the archaic (principally Home-
ric) usage of the words for "thinking" and "mind". Section 2 outlines the
proposed reading of Parmenides' theory in the light of these linguistic con-
siderations. Section 3 grapples with the greatest problem for that reading:
the apparently contradictory testimony of Aristotle. Here it is necessary
to use the rather different testimony of Theophrastus, and a general hy-
pothesis about Aristotle's reading of the "materialistic" psychology of his
predecessors.
Section 4 considers the earlier theories of "perception of like by like" ,
of which Parmenides' is one. I aim to show that these can be understood
as involving an "inner model". Finally, section 5 returns to Parmenides
fr. 16, and shows how it may be read as an example of an "inner model"
theory of mental activity.
1.2. The following text of the fragment, with brief apparatus, is given
for reference. The witnesses to the text are: Alexander of Aphrodisias
(in Metaph. 306.29-30 and 306.36-307.1 Hayduck); Aristotle (Metaph.
1009b22-25); Asdepius (in Metaph. 277.19-20 and 277.24-27 Hayduck);
Theophrastus (Bens. 3). On the choice of readings, all that need be said
here is that Aristotle's citation (on which Alexander and Asdepius de-
pend) is probably inaccurate, since: (1) 1tcxp(cnCX1"CXL is metrically anoma-
lous; (2) 1tOAUX<Xfl1t1"WV, unlike 1tOAU1tAcXYX1"WV, lacks any obvious Parmeni-
dean relevance and is not easily paralleled. The presumption is that Aris-
totle is citing from memory, and that Theophrastus should be followed
where his text differs.

14 Edward Hussey
WC: yap EXCXO"to-t' EXe:L XpCXOLV fle:Mwv 7tOAU7tAeXYX"tWV,

"tWC: VOOC: &v'I'}PW7tOLOL 7tcxpeo"tT)xe:v' "to yap CXU"tO
EO"tLv 07te:p cppovee:L fle:Mwv CPUOLC: &v'I'}PW7tOLOLV
xcxt 7tCXOLV xcxt 7tCXV"tL' "to yap 7tMov Eo"tL VOT)flCX.
1: EXCXO"tO"t(e:) Aristotle (some mss), Theophrastus EXCXO"tOC: Aristotle (some
mss), Alexander Exao"twL (or EXCXO"tOL) Aristotle (some mss.) EXCXO"tOV Ascle-
pius
XpCXOLV all witnesses XpCXOLC: cj. Stephanus
7tOAU7tAeXYX"tWV Theophrastus 7toAuXafl7t"twv Aristotle (also Alexander,
Asclepius)
2: 7tCXp(O"tCX"tCXL Aristotle (also Alexander, Asclepius) 7tcxpeo"tT)xe:v Theophras-
tus
1.3. The key words vooe;, VOT]flCX, CPPOVEELV are to be taken as signifying
something like "mind", "thought", "think". In order to see in more detail
how they should be understood, we have to begin from archaic Greek
usage. Parmenides' vocabulary is mostly archaic. That is not to say that
he uses only archaic words, or uses archaic words only in archaic senses.
In this very fragment, the key word xpcxme; is certainly being used in an
up-ta-date theoretical sense (see sec. 2 below). But in general, where there
is no immediate reason to suppose otherwise, our assumption should be
that his usage of words is closely and organically similar to that of the
Homeric poems, whose very phrasing he so often echoes.
1.4. The Homeric usage of vaoe; and its derivatives VOEELV and vOT]flcx is
not difficult to describe in outline. 1 One should not assume or seek to
find a single "fundamental" or "dominant" sense for any of these words;
rather, as usual in natural languages, there are likely to be (one or more)
principal focal areas of meaning, with intelligible genetic and semantic
connections between them.
Nooe; in Homer is (1) "mind", the mind being conceived of as an
organ of the body like any other. It is the organ by and in which a person
(mortal or divine) has their thoughts, intentions, plans and imaginings.
But the word (just like "mind" in English) often represents the mind's
state or activity in certain particularly important aspects. So it may be
equivalent to (2) "character" or "disposition": a long-term aspect of the
mind. Here the particular reference is usually to dispositions determining
one's attitudes and behaviour towards other people. Or it may indicate
(3) a short-term "state of mind" and especially an intention, or the having
An earlier survey and discussion of this linguistic field is found in von Fritz (1943)
and von Fritz (1945/46); the second paper is reprinted in Mourelatos (1993, pp. 23-
85).

Parmenides on Thinking 15
of a plan. It may also be a state of imagining. Here the emphasis is often

on the vooc; as something creative and resourcefully inventive.
It is a rather delicate matter to decide whether or not, in archaic
usage, there is a further distinct sense: (4) the content of the state, i.e.
the intention or the plan "in itself" , seen as something that is in principle
separable from the particular mind that happens to contain it. Naturally,
Homer is not usually much concerned to mark a difference between a
particular state of intending or planning, and the "contents", by which
it is identified; in most cases it is artificial to insist on the distinction.
Yet cases do occur, even in Homer, where the distinction is implicitly
recognised, and sense (4) is clearly present. 2
1.5 In the archaic usage of the verb VOlte:LV, there is an important dif-
ference between the present and the aorist forms (perfect forms do not
occur). In its aorist forms, it is primarily and almost always a "success-
verb", meaning "become aware of, notice", taking as a direct object, the
specification of the person(s) or thing(s) noticed. (It can also have the
specialised force of "noticing that something needs doing, and doing it".)
The present-tense forms, for the most part, correspond to the senses
of vooc;. They sometimes, but rarely, signify being aware (as a permanent
state); more usually, the having of dispositions or intentions, occasionally
imaginings or even opinions. The direct objects of the verb are the spec-
ifications of these. There seems also to be an "absolute" usage without
direct object: "be generally aware", "have sense". Thus the distinction of
tenses corresponds, as often, to a difference of linguistic aspect. While the
aorist forms signify a mental act or event, the present forms indicate some
mental state or disposition, and this state is not one of knowledge but of
"thinking" .3
1.6. It is not surprising to find that the derived noun v6T]f.l<X exhibits much
the same patterns of meaning as v6oc; and the direct objects of the verb
VOlte:LV. Corresponding to the senses of v6oc; distinguished above, v6T]f.l<X
often signifies either a disposition or state of mind (cf. senses (2) and (3)
above).
We might expect, then, that like v6oc;, it would sometimes take on
the sense of the content of the state of mind, which in Homer is usually a
plan but sometimes a wish or imagining (cf. sense (4) above). This point is
possibly of some importance for Parmenides. Unfortunately the evidence
is indecisive; there are several places in Homer where we might think that
2 The clearest instances are: Iliad 9.104, 15.509; Odyssey 5.23, 24.479; more on the
borderline are: Iliad 15.699, 23.149; Odyssey 14.490.
3 On this point see also Lesher (1994, p. 27 n. 54).

16 Edward Hussey
v6YJf.l1X signifies a "content" abstracted from any particular mind; but in

none of these places is the context such that this translation is enforced. 4
1.7. Finally, the use of the verb CPPOV€e:LV is, overall, similar to that
of VO€e:LV. But CPPOV€e:LV is more frequently used of settled dispositions of
character and outlook; and otherwise perhaps with more suggestion of the
deliberative and discriminatory aspects of mental activity.
One question deserving mention here is whether, for Homer or for
Parmenides, either v60c; and its derivatives, or CPPOV€e:LV, carry with them
the implication of cognitive success. As mentioned, the aorist uses of VO€e:LV
do carry that implication in archaic Greek; but they do not appear to be
transferred to the other forms. So, in particular, CPPOV€e:LV in Parmenides
should be taken as equivalent to "think", not to "know".
2. The notion of xpiimc; and the outline

of a general theory of mental states
2.1. If these observations of archaic usage may be taken as a guide,

Parmenides fr. 16 is stating a theory about the general nature of what
may loosely be called "mental states". And however one translates it,
the lines express some kind of explanation of differences between mental
states and dispositions, the explanation being in terms ofaxpcxOLC; of the
"limbs" .
The differences between the v60c; of different people, and those be-
tween the same person's v6oc; at different times, are already of interest to
Homer, particularly in the Odyssey. Hermann Frankel noted 5 the connec-
tion of this fragment with the moralising remark of Odysseus at Odyssey
18.136-7, and its echo in Archilochus (Archilochus 131 West; though it
may be significant that Archilochus speaks in terms of'l'}uf.l6C;, not v6oC;).
Evidently Parmenides is, at least, incidentally alluding to these earlier
statements. It does not follow, though, as Frankel seems to suppose, that
the wording and thought of Parmenides here must have been more or less
completely determined by those earlier passages.
2.2. Using a notion of XpCXOLC; ("mixture"), to give a systematic and ba-

sically quantitative explanation of differences of states, within a complex
organic unity, is decidedly a fifth-century phenomenon. In fact it is some-
thing that seems to originate around the mid-fifth century, and is found in
4 The occurrences in question are: Iliad 10.104, 18.328; Odyssey 2.121, 7.292.
5 Friinkel (1960, pp. 173-4).

fifth-century theorists with medical and biological interests: Empedocles

and some Hippocratic writers.6 Parmenides fr. 16 may well be the earliest
attested use of this theoretical device. (Parmenides in other fragments
shows medical and biological interests; so he fits the overall pattern of
the xpCiO'Lc;-theorists. The word temperiem in B 18, which is a close Latin
rendering of some lines of Parmenides, also attests his use of the word.)
Despite his archaic language of mental states, then, Parmenides is here
up-to-date with a "cutting-edge" theory about them. This contrast is, in
fact, a characteristic feature of the natural philosophy in the "Opinions
of Mortals" section of Parmenides' poem. The whole set of cosmological
and physiological doctrines there expounded seems to be contrived as
a mingling of "old" conceptualisations (for example the theogony and
theomachy in Hesiodic style) and "new" theoretical aspects. One of its
aims seems to be the reinterpretation of earlier "opinions" in "modern"
terms.
2.3. Can we say anything useful in general about the use ofaxpCiO'LC;-
model here, in advance of closer textual and linguistic examination of the
fragment?
First, it is already clear that the theory is of a reductive kind, an
example of what Aristotle saw as the early Presocratic habit of giving
all explanations solely in terms of the (Aristotelian) "material cause". In
that sense it could be called a "materialist" theory. The entire explanation
is in terms of a krasis of the "limbs" (flE:Ae:CX). It makes no difference to
this point whether we interpret "limbs" literally as the limbs of the body,
or, in a transferred sense, as the basic constituents, Fire and Night; both
senses may be intended.
"Materialist" is here a term that is convenient but not wholly satisfac-
tory, as the quotation marks are meant to suggest. There was no genuine
materialism in early Greek natural philosophy, until the time came when
a theorist expressly excluded anything mental or intentional from his list
of basic constituents. Leucippus and Democritus may well have been true
materialists; but there is no reason to take Parmenides in the "Opinions"
to be one. The essential point is that his fundamental constituents, Fire
and Night, were equipped from the outset with psychological properties.
Fire is "gentle" or "gentle-minded" (it is almost certain that either ~mov
or some compound such as ~m6cppov occurs at fro 8.55; unfortunately the
exact text is open to doubt). Night is "unknowing" (&ocx~: 8.59; admittedly
only a negative psychological property).
6 Empedocles: frs 21.14, 22.4, 22.7 Diels-Kranz; [Hippocratesj: A er. 12; VM 5
(twice), 16, 19; Nat.Hom. 3, 4; Vict. 32, 35. Some doxographic reports on the
later Presocratics, from Aristotle and Theophrastus onwards, also probably attest
authentically Presocratic uses of the word and the concept.

18 Edward Hussey
The fact is that Parmenides' theory (like others in the same pe-
riod) takes those aspects of things that we might distinguish as "physi-
cal" / "material" and as "mental", as both equally fundamental in ontology
and in explanation, and as found entwined together everywhere. Hence the
explanation of mental differences, between dispositions and states of mind,
can well have been sought in quantitative differences between mixtures of
ultimate constituents in the framework of the body. It remains to see how
this was worked out in detail.
2.4. It is reassuring that the tentative conclusions, drawn (in sec. 1 above)
from archaic word-usage, fit perfectly with these further tentative conclu-
sions from the general theoretical use of xpcxm<;. That is: we are here
dealing with a theory about differences, and these are differences between
states and/or dispositions of the body or of parts of the body. A partic-
ular xpcxm<; is a particular proportionate mixture; as the proportions in
the mixture are quantitatively different from case to case, or from time to
time in the same case, so are the resulting observable phenomena of the
complex unity. The notion of xpcxm<; is used thus to explain the unified
living body's variety of diseases, or the unified human mind's variety of
characters, or the varieties of human societies etc.
It is a beautiful theoretical idea to explain this sort of variety in this
way. Whether or not Parmenides invented this idea, he certainly seems
to enjoy its power. The highly emphatic phrase "for all and for each"
(XCXL 1tcxmv XCXL 1tcxV"rL), at the beginning of line 4, can be taken as showing
Parmenides underlining the key point: the notion of xpcxm<; enables him
to establish a unity of explanation underlying the surface variety.
2.5. This reading therefore suggests a primary reading of the clause 1:0
yap cxtJ1:6 ... cXV6pW1tOLmv: "it is the same thing that the limbs think, [the
same] for all human beings and everyone". In other words, the same
formula covers, and explains, all cases of thinking. Then 01tEP is the gram-
matical object of CPPOVe:EL. This in turn is naturally seen as picked up
again by v6T]!lcx, since that standardly stands for something that can be a
grammatical object of VOe:ELV. We have, therefore, the beginnings of an un-
derstanding of the particularly enigmatic final clause: "for the full/more
is (the) thought" (1:0 yap 1tAEOV e:a1:L v6T]!lcx).
As has been seen, the word v6T]!lcx in Homer does not certainly signify
something logically "detachable" from the mind in which it occurs. So
we may not translate it here as referring straightforwardly to the content
of the thought. It is, rather, the particular state or act of thinking in a
particular mind.

Nevertheless, this is not conclusive about the meaning of the final

clause. The point is that Eo"n here may quite naturally be read as a case
of "constitutive" e:LVCtL, which is quite common in Homer as in later Greek.
A vOY)f.LCI( in the sense explained is naturally identified and individuated in
terms of its contents; and these are therefore naturally seen as constituting
it. 7
2.6. So the suggested reading leads naturally to the view that 'to 1tAEOV
should describe or characterise the grammatical object of CPPOVe:e:L, which
is the vOY)f.LCI(; and this description can be taken, without linguistic odd-
ity, in either of two ways. Either E<J'tL makes an identity-statement: "the
full/more is [= is identical with) the thought"; or it makes a statement
of constitution: "the full/more is [= constitutes; i.e. is the content of) the
thought" .
This is still an embarrassing superfluity of possibilities, but it is not
the aim of this paper to decide definitively between them. The points I
wish to make here are two. (1) Part of the point of a krasis, in a typical
krasis-theory, is that it suppresses more or less entirely the existence and
characteristic properties of its lesser ingredients at the expense of the
principal one or ones, i.e. of "the more". Here then is a good reason to
take 'to 1tAEOV in that sense, regardless of how we read the E<J'tL. (2) It may
well be that Parmenides had both senses in mind. s
3. The testimony of Aristotle and Theophrastus

3.1. The foregoing discussion seems to justify a modest hope that the
meaning of fr. 16 can be grasped, at least in outline. According to the
reconstruction so far, fr. 16 expresses a theory of mental constitution, or
mental states, whether short or long term, and very likely both. It is not,
or not primarily, a theory of mental acts, reactions, or events.
At this point a serious problem has to be faced: the apparently totally
discrepant reading of fr. 16 given by Aristotle in Metaphysics IV.5, and,
partially and indirectly, in several places in De Anima.
To be sure, it is always possible to dismiss anyone piece of Aristotelian
testimony as the product of Aristotle's misunderstanding of what he has
7 There are implicit references to the content of the v6lJ!1ot as determining the ref-
erence at: Iliad 7.546, 18.295; Odyssey 2.121, 2.363, 7.292, 14.273, 15.326, 17.403,
23.30.
8 On the meaning of 'to ltAtov, see further below, sec. 5.2 and 5.4; and for the case in
favour of "the full", see Laks (1990, pp. 7-9). It seems to me that the reading of 'to
yilp otlh6 . .. ltotV't£ given above circumvents the stronger objections raised against
the translation "the more" .

20 Edward Hussey
read. Less charitably, it is sometimes claimed that he is deliberately twist-

ing texts to suit the thesis he is himself propounding. More charitably, and
usually more plausibly, one may suppose that he often uses or misuses his
predecessors by introducing them, more or less aptly, as participants in
his own dialectical discussions. In such cases, the historical truth about
their theories is not even the purported aim.
Whatever the outcome may be in any particular case, it is clear that
there is in general a duty of "provisional charity" towards Aristotle. One
is required to make out the best possible case for his remarks; and only if
that turns out to be weak is one justified in resorting to the hypotheses
of misunderstanding or deviousness. (Such hypotheses are in any case
alarming: if Aristotle is really guilty of stupidity and/or dishonesty to the
extent that some believe, one is left with very little reason to trust any
piece of his testimony.)
3.2. Aristotle cites fr. 16 in the context of a much wider claim about
earlier philosophers.
At the beginning of Metaphysics IV.5, he has explained that two mis-
taken opinions naturally entail one another: (a) that contradictories are
true together; and (b) that all opinions and appearances (dokounta kai
phainomena) are true. At 1009a22 he then embarks upon a reconstruc-
tion of the ways in which earlier theorists were led to hold one or other
of these opinions: 1009a22-38 explore the motivations for holding (a), and
1009a38-101Oa15 those for holding (b).
At 1009b12 he reaches what he considers the most general form of
explanation for the holding of (b) in regard to sense-perception. This
explanation is claimed to apply to "Empedocles and Democritus and more
or less everyone else", where the last phrase need only mean "almost
everyone else who held that view". According to Aristotle's explanation,
they reached the view (that sense-appearances were always true) because
they supposed (1) that sense-perception was (a kind of) phronesis; and
(2) that this (phronesis) was (a kind of) qualitative change (cpp6VYJOLV !lEV
-c~v CX'Cai)YJOLV, -ccxu-cYJv 0' e:lvcxL aAAO(WOLV, 1009b13).
Here the meaning of the first clause is not in doubt: the supposition
that sense-perception must be a kind of phronesis, i.e. some truth-grasping
state,9 has been already motivated at 1009b2-9, and recurs at b28-31. It is
this supposition that is at the logical centre of Aristotle's reconstruction.
It is the second clause that is problematic. While the reference of
-ccxu-cYJv is presumably CPp6VYJOLV, not CX'COf)YJOLV, what is unclear is the rel-
9 As pointed out in sec. 1.6. above, CPPOVtELV in archaic Greek, and therefore pre-
sumably in Parmenides, does not imply any cognitive success; whereas cpp6vTjal<;
in Aristotle does so. But there is no reason to suppose that this semantic shift, in
itself, caused any confusion to Aristotle or Theophrastus.

evance of the supposition (2), under either construal, to the holding of

opinion (b). It seems to be supposition (1), not (2), that is meant to re-
quire or support (b) (compare 1009b31-33). There is the further problem
that the citations that follow do not at all seem to support Aristotle's
claim that the theorists cited held (2). It is at these citations that we
must next look.
3.3. Apparently in support of his reconstruction, Aristotle cites (1009b17-

31) a string of texts: two fragments of Empedocles (frs 106 and 108 Diels-
Kranz); our fragment of Parmenides; an alleged apophthegm of Anaxago-
ras from an unnamed memoir; and an interpretation of the Homeric word
eXAAOcppOVE:WV as supposedly used of Hector.
This is a strangely unimpressive collection, if it is meant to constitute
Aristotle's total evidence that his general reading of the earlier thinkers
is correct. ID Indeed, once the question is raised, it is clear that these odds
and ends cannot possibly have been meant by Aristotle to be used as proofs
of the correctness of his far-reaching interpretation, or even as substantial
supports for it. Their function, as is quite often the case when Aristo-
tle cites earlier philosophers, is neither that of proof nor of substantial
support, but simply of illustration; they are given as amusing and illu-
minating asides that enliven and humanise the exposition. l l That is why
it evidently doesn't matter much to Aristotle here whether, for example,
the anecdote about Anaxagoras is well-attested; or whose was the remark
about Homer and whether or not it is textually accurate (in the Iliad as
we have it, it is Euryalos, not Hector, who is described as eXAAOCPPOVE:WV
at 23.698; though Hector too is indeed knocked out earlier)P
3.4. How then are these citations meant to serve as illustrations of

Aristotle's thesis? The last two (the anecdote about Anaxagoras, and the
explanation of Homer) are directed solely to point (1) above, that sense-
perception was held to be a kind of "thinking", a reality-grasping state
or process. But what the quotations from Empedocles and Parmenides
notably have in common is nothing to do with sense-perception, which
they do not mention, but the thought that, as Aristotle puts it, change
10 Mansfeld (1996, p. 164) aptly calls it a "centon de citations" .
11 Anecdotes and chronological data are sometimes used in the same way.
12 Hector when unconscious is described as xfjp clltlVUaaWv (Iliad 15.10), which might
be taken to imply the same alleged equation of perception and understanding.
From De Anima 1.2 404a27-31 and Theophrastus De Sensibus 58, it seems that the
"Homeric" citation is due to Democritus; possibly Aristotle took the whole string
of testimony from the same source. Theophrastus gives a clue as to the context
in Democritus. Mansfeld (1996, p. 168), denies that Aristotle took the "Homeric"
citation from Democritus, but does not mention the Theophrastus passage.

22 Edward H ussey
of internal bodily state is what accompanies, and presumably causes (and

perhaps even constitutes) "change of thinking" (flE-ccxf3&AAOYtCXC; -c~v E~LV
flE-Ccxf3cXAAELV cpT]ar. -c~v cpp6vT]aLV of Empedocles, lO09b17-18)P
So far as that thought goes, it is comfortably in line with the outline
theory that was attributed to Parmenides in section 2 above. Above all
this formulation, and the accompanying citations, agree with the outline
theory in seeing thinking as an internal state (hexin) , not a process.
3.5. The strange fact, then, is that none of these citations gives any
support at all to Aristotle's second thesis: (2) that sense-perception and
thinking were conceived of as processes or events (as "alteration" (al-
loiasis) 14) and not as states. The kind of change that Parmenides and
Empedocles speak of is change of thought-contents, which is seen as being
determined by change of bodily state. This is a different thesis from the
one, reported by Aristotle: that thinking itself is, or consists in, a change
or process. 15
Further, as already suggested, thesis (2) is not at all necessary for
Aristotle's purposes in Metaphysics IV.5. His main contention here is
that sense-perception was thought to be necessarily true, on the grounds
that there are great differences in the contents of aisthesis or phronesis,
whether between different observers, or for the same observer at different
times. It is in order not to give some indefensible privilege to some cases
of aisthesis or phronesis as against others, that these thinkers, according
to Aristotle, said that all sense-contents or thought-contents are "true". 16
3.6. Thus the little extra clause -ccxu-cT]v 0' e:LVCXL eXAAO(WaLV is strangely
hard to understand in the Metaphysics context. Yet Aristotle's interpre-
tative claim, so unsupported and out of place in Metaphysics IV, is not
an isolated one. It recurs in De Anima, where it appears as an essential
part of Aristotle's reading of earlier psychology, applied to a broad range
of earlier theorists.
13 The same pair of Empedocles citations appears also at de An. II1.3 (see section
3.7 below).
14 The word &AAO!Wcn~, as used here in reporting the alleged content of earlier opin-
ions, seems to have the broad non-technical sense of "being affected" (Le. as equi-
valent to lta:OXE1V 'tl in De Anima 1.5 41Oa25-26); cf. its use at 415b24 and 416b34-5,
also in reporting generally-held opinions.
15 This is so, whether or not Aristotle read the metrically impossible ltCXp!O't<X't<X1 in
Parmenides. Friinkel (1960, p.175), more probably supposes that this is scribal
error (possibly Aristotle's own) induced by It<Xp!o't<X'to in the following Empedocies
citation.
16 There is some affinity with the "doxography" offered by Socrates at Plato Theaete-
tus 152d2-153a5, though the relationship is not straightforward.

The thesis is stated in its fullest generality at De Anima 1.5 410a25-26:

"They suppose that sense-perception is a being-affected in some respect,
and is a being-changed (mxaxe:Lv "tL XCXL XLve:'Lcri)CXL); and likewise for think-
ing and having knowledge". This thesis is ascribed by Aristotle to all
who suppose that the mind is composed of the principles or elements:
certainly Empedocles and Plato in the Timaeus; possibly also Heraclitus
and Diogenes of Apollonia; presumably Parmenides too, though he is not
mentioned here. At 11.5 416b33-35 Aristotle claims more cautiously, in his
own person, that "sense-perception comes about in being changed and in
being acted upon" . This he apparently takes to be the correct and uncon-
troversial residue of the earlier theories and of "common sense", since he
adds: "for it is thought to be a kind of alloiosis" (echoing 415b24-25),17
3.7. A useful first step, for making sense of all this, is provided by yet
another passage of De Anima: 111.3 427a17-b6. Here we have, first (a19-
29), a nexus of theses attributed quite generally to "the ancients": (A)
thinking and perceiving are the same thing; (B) they are both corporeal;
(C) they are both of like by like. Cited in support of this reading are
the two Empedocles fragments used in Metaphysics IV, and the Homeric
passage that is in the background of Parmenides fr. 16, namely Odyssey
18.136-137. Then (a29-b6), in a parenthesis, Aristotle adds that the diffi-
culty of accounting for error on such a view drove "some" to suppose that
(D) all phenomena were true.
Thus, very much as in Metaphysics IV, the holding of (D) is accounted
for by the holding of (A) and some subsidiary theses. i8 In the Metaphysics,
the subsidiary thesis is the one at the centre of our problem: that thinking
and perceiving are a kind of change. Here in De Anima Ill, the subsidiary
theses are (B) and (C).
3.8. In combination, all the passages so far mentioned show that Aristo-
tle has a quite consistent line of interpretation. Yet they do not explain
its motivation; on the contrary, the only evidence Aristotle cites as sup-
port seems rather to undermine the interpretation. There is, therefore, a
fundamental problem affecting the understanding of Aristotle's evidence.
We cannot proceed without, at least, some provisional hypothesis. Here
17 Compare de An. 1.2 405a27-29, making a connection with the supposedly popular
doctrine of "flux"; and GC 1.8 324b25-29.
IB Mansfeld (1996, p.165) takes the De Anima (A)-claim ("the ancients say that
thinking and sense-perception are the same thing") to be significantly stronger
than the Metaphysics claim ("[they say that] sense-perception is a kind of think-
ing"). It seems easier and more plausible to suppose that these are merely two
different ways of expressing the same thought: namely, that according to the an-
cients sense-perception and thinking are generically the same, both being cognitive
states consisting in a certain kind of bodily state.

24 Edward Hussey
then is such an hypothesis; it cannot be fully argued for within the limits
of this paper.
3.9. The hypothesis is that Aristotle's interpretation of the earlier the-

orists is driven by a combination of two thoughts. First, that the earlier
theories of thinking and perception were cast in purely material terms (in
the Aristotelian sense). Secondly, that the only possible kind of purely
materialist theory of perception is an "impact" one: that is, one that sup-
poses that it must be the impact (instantaneous, or prolonged) of some
"external input" that constitutes perception and intelligent awareness of
the world outside the mind. A "state" theory (that perceiving or thinking
about something is constituted by being in a corresponding state) is, for
Aristotle, ruled out from the outset by one simple observation. A purely
material mind could perfectly well be in the appropriate state without
having, or having had, any interaction with the outside world at all. But
perceiving and thinking about the world outside must by definition in-
volve some kind of interaction with it. A "state" theory would therefore
not even qualify to be considered as a theory of perception at all.
On this view, Aristotle's interpretation of earlier theories of perception
(and of thinking, so far as it was assimilated to perception) is driven
by a combination of logic and interpretative charity.19 He takes it that,
whatever they may have said that may seem to indicate a "state" theory,
they must have meant to propound an "impact" theory. So, with some
slight support in some of the Presocratic texts he cites,20 Aristotle is doing
his best for the earlier theorists by attributing to them the view that
knowing and perceiving are events or processes consisting of impacts. 21
Even if we reject this interpretation, as we must, it still remains a problem
for the interpreter of the Presocratic theories of the mind to explain how
the "like by like" theories were meant to be understood.
3.10. As a footnote to all this, it should be remembered that by good

chance we also have Theophrastus' discussion of earlier psychology in De
Sensibus. 22 It is noteworthy that Theophrastus, without mentioning it,
discards the Aristotelian claim altogether. Certainly he initially makes
19 As so often in his discussions of earlier theories. Interpretative charity is, of course,
not exclusive of rigorous criticism of the doctrines so reconstructedj it is precisely
because of the rigour that Aristotle's charity is often not noticed or not understood.
20 Aristotle does not mention particular cases, but it seems at least that Empedocles
described hearing as consisting in a process (see below, sec. 3.10, on Theophrastus).
21 This also explains why Aristotle claims that, for "most of those phusiologoi who
talk about perception" , the objects of sense-perception must all be objects of touch
(Bens. 4 442a29-blj cf. GC 1.8 324b25-29).
22 On Theophrastus' criticism of Presocratic psychology generally, see Baltussen
(2000).

the less strong claim that, for some earlier theorists, "sense-perception
comes about in a process of alteration" (De Sensibus 1-2). Even this more
cautious formulation is here attributed only, but not exclusively, to a sub-
group of Presocratic theorists: to those who held that sense-perception was
"by opposites". Then, in the detailed reports on Empedocles and Plato's
Timaeus, hearing in particular seems to be constituted by a process of
resonance inside the head. Likewise, discussing Empedocles, Theophras-
tus implies that for him perception comes to be "in" a process of alloiosis,
and that therefore thinking must also do so. Again this is far from the fiat
equation of the one with the other that Aristotle attributes to Empedocles
and others.
There is a further quiet but total rejection of Aristotle's general line at
De Sensibus 58: where it is claimed that sense-perception was standardly
thought of as constituted by a "disposition" (diathesis). Nor is there any
contradiction with De Sensibus 72, where it is reported to be "a most
ancient opinion" that thinking is "according to qualitative change" (XOft(X
"C~v w..AO(WOW); this is evidently Theophrastus' summary of the Homer
and Archilochus passages, and he makes immediately clear that he does
not take this as leading to an equation of thinking with alloiosis, since he
adds: "they make the thinking dependent on the disposition" (xomx "C~v
oLcHle:mv CX1tOOL06cxm "Co CPPOVe:LV).
4. An "inner model" theory of mind
4.1. The negative but useful result of the last section, if its hypothesis is
accepted, is that, in elucidating Parmenides, we may set aside Aristotle's
claim (2b) in the Metaphysics IV.5 passage. Aristotle's interpretation, on
this view, arises from misplaced charity and is based on evidence that,
in fact, points to a different understanding. 23 So there is no remaining
good reason to suppose that Parmenides took either sense-perception or
thinking to be a change or a process.
That still leaves the other leading points from Metaphysics IV.5 and
De Anima: (a) that Parmenides' explanations were in "corporeal" terms,
in terms of the material make-up of the soul; (b) that sense-perception
was assimilated to "thinking" (phronein); (c) that perception and thought
was "of like by like"; and (d) that "all phenomena are true". These seem
at least to be not obviously inconsistent with the tentative outline of a
reconstruction given in 2.4 above. There is nothing in (a) that is surprising
23 For less favourable, or at least more sceptical, attitudes towards Aristotle's inter-
pretation, see Cherniss (1964, pp. 79-83), Laks (1999, pp. 255-262). On Aristotle's
treatment of his predecessors in the area of psychology, and Theophrastus' relation
to this treatment, see Mansfeld (1996).

26 Edward Hussey
or that calls for further comment here (see section 2 above). But (b), (c)
and (d) all demand further elucidation. The central idea, however it is
to be understood, is (c): the perception and/or knowing "of like by like".
This is attested by both Aristotle and Theophrastus De Sensibusj though
their testimony and their criticisms suggest strongly that they failed to
see how this thesis was intended to be understood. 24
For these reasons, a general hypothesis about the earlier "like by like"
theories is in order.
4.2. Here then is an outline of the sort of theory I take Parmenides and
Empedocles (there may well have been others) to have held. I shall call
this type of theory an "inner model theory" of the mind.
According to this theory, all mental states with some content, both
states of perception and e.g. of assessing, planning, imagining etc., are
essentially of the same kind and consist in having, inside the mind, a
scale model of the situations that are perceived or imagined or planned.
This is meant to hold of all mental states with content. And it is important
that these models are made out of the same kinds of material as the outer
world is: namely out of the same basic constituents. Hence these models
can represent the outer world with accuracy good enough for all practical
purposes at least.
Naturally, something extra will then need to be said about sense-
reception, as opposed to the inner state of perception. There is some
mechanism by which we get, via the sense-organs and by "efRuences"
or something else, indications from outside from which the inner model is
constructed. But the details are not here important.
There is, so far as I know, no direct evidence about any possible
motivation for such a theory. But if the postulation of this kind of theory
is not to seem quite gratuitous, something however minimal needs to be
said. Here is an illuminating passage from a modern philosopher's attack
on analogous theories advanced in more recent times:
Even in contemporary cognitive science, for example, it is the fashion to
hypothesize the existence of "representations" in the cerebral computer. If
one assumes that the mind is an organ, and one goes on to identify the
mind with the brain, it will then become irresistible to (1) think of some
of the "representations" as analogous to the classical theorist's "impres-
sions" ... and (2) to think that these representations are linked to objects
in the organism's environment only causally, and not cognitively . .. (Put-
nam, 1999, pp. 9-10).
24 Some of the difficulties of Theophrastus' treatment of this principle in relation to
EmpedocJes are explored in Sedley (1992) which outlines an ultra-sceptical solu-
tion (Theophrastus is the prisoner of a doxographical schematism inherited from
Aristotle, and EmpedocJes did not actually subscribe to any such principle).

4.3. This type of theory gives us the correct sense of the thesis that
perception is "by the similar" . It is not so much that e.g. something earthy
in us perceives something earthy outside. What is meant, rather, is that
in sense-perception something earthy outside stimulates us to form an
earthy inner model. And (obviously) if we happen not to have any earth
in our minds, we cannot form the model, and therefore cannot perceive
the earthy things outside.
There is then, at most, only an incidental connection here with the
superficially similar principle of "like to like" as used in explaining move-
ments of bodies. Of course it may be that for some theorists (e.g. Empe-
docles) "like to like" was part of the explanation of the mechanics of
"perception of like by like" .
4.4. The theory also satisfactorily explains Aristotle's and Theophrastus'

claim that, for these theorists, sense-perception was a kind of phronein.
All phronein consists of direct inner awareness of an inner model. But
in the case of sense-perception the inner model is formed as a result of
information coming in from outside.
Does this intelligibly justify Aristotle's further claim that these theo-
rists "say that what appears in sense-perception is necessarily true"? It is
clear that this sort of theory has to maintain that there can be no error
involved in the "inner awareness" . For it is the ultimate stage in the whole
process. Any error would be inexplicable. Phronein therefore is generically
without error; and sense-perception is just a particular case of phronein.
Of course, this still leaves open the possibility that the inner model, for
some reason, does not always correctly represent the outside realities.
Besides, it would seem that on any "inner model" theory, it is bound
to be impossible in principle to draw a line between the mind and its
contents. It is not that there is an observing mind on the one hand, and
some "contents" being observed on the other hand. All perception, then,
must be the mind's own self-awareness, its direct and infallible awareness
of its own state. The mind, like the rest of the body, is constituted by the
things in it, whether these are single simple constituents or several such
in krasis; these are its "contents".
5. Consequences of the "inner model" interpretation

for the understanding of fr. 16
5.1. Finally, here is a brief sketch of the interpretative gains offered, by

this hypothesis, for the understanding of fro 16. Within the limits of this

28 Edward Hussey
paper, there can be no attempt to consider even superficially the questions

that arise, and the discussions of them in the literature; hence there are
also no references to those discussions.
5.2. It is not difficult to see, if Parmenides' theory is indeed a theory

involving an inner model with krasis, why he speaks of "the more". It
is a standard feature of krasis-theories that the overall character of the
compound is determined by the quantitatively greater ingredients. Hence
this holds true of perceptible qualities of the compound, as formulated by
Anaxagoras: "That of which most is present, that is what each thing most
manifestly is and was." (lhcuv OE ltAe:10'"Ccx EVL, "CcxU"CCX EvoT)M"Ccx"Ccx EV E)(cxO'"C6v
€O'"CL )(CXI. ~v: Anaxagoras fr. 12 DK).
So human minds, whether in sense-perception or in any other case of
"inner perception" , are restricted by this "predominance principle" . Inner
perception is a direct self-awareness, and what we are aware of is that
which predominates in the krasis. So noein, in the world of the doxai, is
correct so far as it goes, but, necessarily, incomplete.
There is, of course, a further and wider question, which I have not
addressed at all: how, if at all, noein in the world of the doxai is meant
to be related to noein in the account of aletheie.
5.3. In the light of this reconstruction, we can also understand why

Theophrastus adds that for Parmenides "in general everything that is has
some gnosis" ()(CXI. OACUC; OE ltCiv "Co QV EXe:LV "CLVil yVWO'Lv: De Sensibus 4). It
seems that by gnosis Theophrastus does not mean "knowledge" in any rig-
orous sense, but rather something like "awareness, perception, sentience" .
Since the ultimate constituents, Fire and Night, have "mental" as well as
"physical" basic properties, as mentioned earlier, it is not surprising that
everything there is has at least a potential mental life. Such "pangnosis"
is only another aspect of the "materialism" of Parmenides' theory.
Hence, too, even a corpse (though presumably only one with its sense
organs and mind still in relatively good shape), even if unable to form most
inner models because of lack of the fiery ingredients, will be able to have
awareness at least of "darkness and silence" , as testified by Theophrastus
(De Sensibus 4).25
5.4. Finally, at last we can begin to see why, even apart from the inciden-
tal textual doubts, the syntax and the translation of fro 16 have proved
so controversial. The lines seem to be deliberately so constructed as to
express the ambiguities, the doublenesses of mental states. Because noein
25 As Laks puts it, "knowledge-sensation in Parmenides does not necessarily depend
as such upon any mixture of the two elements" (Laks, 1990, pp. 12-3).

is self-awareness, the "thinker" and the "thought" are one and the same.
Parmenides found in the spread of Homeric usage an implicit recognition
of this: in particular noos and noema could be either "mind" or "men-
tal content" or both. The syntactic ambiguity over 01te:p CPPOVEe:t (is 01te:p
subject or object?) is very likely also a deliberate ambiguity. Again it
expresses the identity, on this kind of theory, of mind and its contents.
Finally, we may once more consider the statement 1:0 yap 1tAEOV E(nt
v6y)IlCl. It has been disputed whether 1tAEOV is to be taken in the sense of
"more" , which is also the sense demanded by the general pattern of krasis-
theories; or as "full". Again there may be a great gain in understanding
by taking it as meant both ways. The point of saying that "the full is the
thought" would be that the mind simply consists of what it is full of, and
that that is also what it is mentally "full of": the thought.
As an example of Parmenides' use of language, these lines suggest that
he is much closer to Heraclitus than is usually thought, in his exploitation
of the archaic and the ambiguous for philosophical effect. 26
References
Baltussen, Han, 2000, Theophrastus against the Presocratics and Plato:

peripatetic dialectic in the De Sensibus, Leiden: Brill.
Cherniss, Harold, 1964, Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy,
New York: Octagon Books.
Diels, Hermann I Kranz, Walther (eds), 1952, Die Pragmente der Vorso-
kratiker, Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung.
Frankel, Hermann, 1960, Wege und Formen frUhgriechischen Denkens,
Munich: C.H. Beck.
von Fritz, Kurt, 1943, "Noos and Noein in the Homeric Poems", Classical
Philology, 38, pp. 79-93.
Hayduck, Michael (ed.), 1888, Asclepii in Aristotelis Metaphysicorum li-
bros A-Z commentaria, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, 6.2,
Berlin: Georg Reimer.
- (ed.), 1891, Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Metaphysica com-
mentaria, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, 1, Berlin: Georg
Reimer.
Laks, Andre, 1990, '''The More' and 'The Full': On the Reconstruction of
Parmenides' Theory of Sensation in Theophrastus de Sensibus 3-4" ,
26 I acknowledge with gratitude the helpful and constructive observations of the par-
ticipants in the Munich conference, and in particular of my respondent Roman
Dilcherj see his paper in this volume for his interestingly different approach to the
problems of Parmenides on thinking. At a later stage, David Charles most kindly
read and commented on this paper.

30 Edward Hussey
in: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 8, pp. 1-18.

-, 1999, "Soul, Sensation, Thought", in: A.A. Long (ed.), The Cam-
bridge Companion to Early Greek Philosophy, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Lesher, James H., 1994, "The emergence of philosophical interest in cog-
nition", in: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 12, pp. 1-34.
Mansfeld, Jaap, 1996, "Aristote et la Structure du De Sensibus de The-
ophraste", in: Phronesis, 41, pp. 158-188.
Mourelatos, Alexander P.D., 1993, The Presocratics: A Collection of Cri-
tical Essays, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Putnam, Hilary, 1999, The Threefold Cord: Mind, Body, and World, New
York: Columbia University Press.
Ross, William D., 1953, Aristotle's Metaphysics, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Sedley, David, 1992, "Empedocles' Theory and Theophrastus De Sensi-
bus", in: W.W. Fortenbaugh / D. Gutas (eds), Theophrastus: His
Psychological, Doxographical and Scientific Writings, Rutgers Uni-
versity Studies in Classical Humanities, vol. 5, New Brunswick, Lon-
don: Transaction Publishers, pp. 20-31.
Stratton, George M., 1917, Theophrastus and the Greek Physiological Psy-
chology Before Aristotle, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. and
New York: The Macmillan Company.
-, 1945/46, "Noos, Noein and their Derivatives in Presocratic Philoso-
phy", in: Classical Philology, 40, pp. 223-242 and 41, pp. 12-34.
West, Martin L., 1989, Iambi et Elegi Graeci, editio altera, Oxford: Clar-
endon Press.

Roman Dilcher
Parmenides on the Place of Mind
Parmenides seems to have no place in the history of the philosophical

problems that are indicated by the phrase "common to body and soul".
While in Heraclitus we do find for the very first time a concept of soul as
something distinct from the body that is responsible for thought, action
and feeling, there is a basic dichotomy in Parmenides' thought that also
has a bearing on the question of a possible relation of "body" and "soul":
on the one hand the account of Being which involves the exercise of mind;
on the other hand a theory of the physical world on the basis of the two
elements Light and Night. The coherence of these two parts of Parmenides'
poem has been much debated in terms of the possible relation of Being to
Doxa. Fr. 16, however, provides an account of mind in relation to the two
elements of the doxastic world, and so it might contribute in a different
way to a better understanding of how the two parts cohere. Given the
general outlines of Parmenides' thinking, what is to be expected is an
account of mind that in some way explains its capacity to apprehend
Being and so to reach out of the realm of Light and Night. In fr. 4, there
is in fact an appeal to using mind in this way: "Behold absent things being
in an equal way firmly present to the mind ()..EOcrcrE 0' 0!lWC; cXltE6v-rcx v6cp
ltcxpe:6v-rcx pe:pcx(WC;). For it will not cut off being from holding fast to being,
as either dispersing everywhere in regular order or as gathering." Here,
mind functions as a uniting capacity, or rather as a capacity directed at an
original unity. The phrase "not cutting off" implies that there is a unity or
continuity of Being prior to its appearance in a somehow separated state.
To this, voOC; is, or can be, directed by its capacity to relate to absent
things as if they were present. Everything can be equally present to the
voOc;. While it is not clear in what context this important remark was
made, the suggestion evidently is that of a transition: the dispersed state
of some things being present and others being absent is apparently the
situation in which we usually find ourselves, being located in space and
time. The appeal of the Goddess to behold beings by voOc; is an appeal
to a human being to proceed to that insight which the main part of the
poem speaks about.

32 Roman Dilcher
Now when turning to fr.l6, the expectation to learn more about this
transcending capacity of voGe;: is clearly disappointed, at least on the face
of it. It runs: l
wc: yap txcXO'to't' e:X£L XpCXaLV Il£Mwv 1tOAUXcX!!1t'twv
'twc: v6oc: clVt}PW1tOLaL 1t(XpEO'tT)X£V· 'to yap au't6
e:O'tLV iS1t£p CPPOVE£L Il£Mwv CPUaLC: clVt}PW1tOLaLV
xal. 1tCXaLV xal. 1tav't(· 'to yap 1tMov EO'tl. v6T)lla.
What this fragment presents is apparently an application of the idea
of mixing of the two elements by which the constitution of the cosmos
was accounted for. The first sentence refers to a mixture of or in the limbs
(xpexme;: fle:Mwv) which is - as is implied by €xcXo·wre:, "each time" - in a
state of constant fluctuation, and this mixture is in some way correlated
(we;: - ,we;:) to the appearance of voGe;:. The second sentence then explains
this correlation of bodily mixture and mind by way of stating some sort
of identity (,0 yap ClU,O x,A.). Now what it is that is said to be the
same is by no means clear. The construction of this sentence is hotly
disputed, and no less than nine different grammatical solutions have been
proposed,2 the main problem being how to construe ,0 Clu't6. In any case, it
seems clear that the relation between thinking and the bodily constitution
established in the first sentence is elaborated, such that thinking, at least
in some important respect, is made dependent on the varying states of
the mixture of the limbs.
Now, before considering the fragment in more detail, it may be worth-
while asking what this piece of theory is supposed to explain and what its
scope might be. On this, there seems to be an almost universal acceptance
of the interpretation given by Theophrastus in his De Sensibus, chs. 3-43 -
not in every detail, but at least as a guideline to understanding, especially
as he provides some further information. The topic of the De Sensibus is,
as indicated by the title (IIe:p1. Cltm')~Oe:wv), perception, and the discus-
sion of the various theories is structured by the two possible principles
on which to account for perception, that is "like by like" (,e;> 0flo(CP) or
"by opposites" (,e;> E:VClV,(cp).4 Parmenides is presented as the first thinker
As far as the wording is concerned, there seems to be general agreement now that
Theophrastus' version is to be preferred to Aristotle's. For the textual problems
see Coxon (Ji'ragm. of Parm., 1986, fr. 17 and commentary pp. 247ff.).
2
For a useful survey see Wiesner (Parmenides. Der Beginn der Aletheia,
1996, pp. 51f.). The problems are discussed by Holscher (Anfiingliches Ji'ragen,
1968, pp. 113ff.) and Heitsch (Parmenides, 1974, pp. 196ff.).
3 The full text still has to be read in the edition of Stratton (Theophrastus and
the Greek Physiological Psychology, 1919). The two chapters on Parmenides are
accessible in DK 28 A 46 and Coxon Test. 45. I shall refer to Theophrastus' account
by using the line numbering given in DK.
4 A comprehensive discussion of the De Sensibus (leaving out, though, the chapters
on Parmenides) was recently undertaken by Balthussen (Theophrastus against the

Parmenides on the Place of Mind 33
who conceived a theory of perception on the principle "like by like", and

it is on this basis that Theophrastus tries to make sense of Parmenides'
contribution. He apparently had the full text of the Parmenidean poem
before him, but as he quotes B 16 for illustration or substantiation it is
the fragment we have which serves as the main textual basis for his inter-
pretation. What he sets forth is a coherent theory of mixture according
to which all mental states are to be explained by whichever of the two
elements - which he here calls the hot and the cold (1. 8) - is prevail-
ing in this mixture. While it is clear how Theophrastus understood this
mechanism, what does not emerge is that it actually pertains to percep-
tion. Theophrastus' account in fact refers to cognition or mental states in
general: he speaks not only of IXLOi)y)O'LC;:, but also of YVWaLC;:, OLcXvOLIX, and
CPPOVELV, including, importantly, memory and oblivion (!lv~!ly) XIX!. A~Y),
1.11). The explicit mention of perception comes in what is apparently a
comment on B 16 itself: namely, that Parmenides took "perception" and
"thinking" as identical ("t<'> yap IXtai)cXvEai)IXL XIXI. "to CPPOVELV WC;: "tIXU"tO AtYEL,
1. lOf.).
Now, this claim is highly questionable. Persuasive as it may be to
bring Parmenides in line with this well-known idea, there is a flaw in this
interpretation. In B 16 we nowhere explicitly hear of a relation of - to use
very broad terms - cognition and that which is apprehended in cognition.
The essential link between knowledge, be it by voOc;: or by the physical
constitution, and the reality which gets known is not established, let alone
accounted for. 5 What is being explicitly discussed, is only the mixture of
the limbs and its relation to thought (voOC;: or cPpOVELV). Of course, there
have been several attempts to find in B 16 a reference to "outside" things
in the world that are supposed to get known in perception; but, I believe,
they all fail. The issue hangs on the construction of the disputed second
sentence.
The least convincing attempt to find a reference to the world is by
understanding the mixture or nature of the limbs itself to be designating
the two elements prevailing in the world. 6 This is hardly what someone
Presocratics and Plato, 2000).
5 This central problem of the traditional interpretation is apparent in Taran's ac-
count as he on the one hand believes that B 16 is "implying only the notion that
like is known by like" but then on the other hand states - inconsistently - that
"thought is the result of the particular CPUatC; ILE).tll>V at any given moment and
that to every constitution of the body the same thought would result. There is,
consequently, no mention of the object" (Taran, Parmenides, 1965, p.261).
6 So e.g. Schwabl (Sein und Doxa bei Parm., 1968, pp. 416ff.): "Wir miissen uns dabei
klarmachen, daB die Schwierigkeit, unter den IL~AEot das eine Mal die 'Elemente',
das andere Mal den menschlichen 'Leib' verstehen zu sollen, eine nur scheinbare
ist". Yet this is not so, as Schwabl's interpretation in fact requires the IL~AEot to
mean both at once in I. 1.

34 Roman Dilcher
can "have" in his mixture EXEL, with the supplement of 'nc;, 1. 1).
The second attempt favoured by many interpreters is based on the
following reading: "For it is the same what the nature of the limbs is
thinking in all men" .7 The phrase "the same" is here however not under-
stood, as would be natural, to be referring to some identical object which
all men think. It is taken to refer back to the cp6mc; [lEA€(')V, in the sense: "it
thinks the same as it - the physical constitution - is itself" . It is doubtful
whether this idea can be expressed by simple -co cxu-c6. What is in fact
understood is the Theophrastean idea that would have to be phrased in
Greek as something like O[lOLOV ECXU-Ct;> , or (with Theophrastus) -ct;> o[lo(cp.
And even if this were a possible construction, the main contention of the
theory - that like is known by like - would be left unexpressed. More-
over, the [lEA€(')V cp6mc; must refer to the mixed state of the body, not
separately to the elements that constitute it. So, if what is perceived or,
more generally, gets known really is the same in kind as the apprehending
mixture, this will imply that every perception or thought will be exactly
as is the proportion of the two elements in the mixture. Thus, this reading
would not even yield the desired result that each element in the mixture
is responsible for apprehending what is like itself in the world. On the
contrary, what is perceived would be entirely dependent on the varying
states of the physical constitution, and not on what is the case outside.
According to a third solution the reference to the object of perception
is found in the phrase om:p CPPOV€EL. According to this interpretation, we
are to read: "For what it thinks - i.e. what is the object of thought -
is the same as the nature of the limbs".8 Now this seems impossible on
grammatical grounds. What makes the construction of -co cxu-c6 so hard
to understand is precisely the fact that we do not have a statement of
the simple form: "A is the same as B" or "the same is A and B". An
example of this construction is Parmenides' fragment 3: -co yap cxu-co VOE'Lv
e:<J-CLV -CE )(CXL El:VCXL. In fr. 16, by contrast, there simply is no connective
)(cxL So it will be otiose to look for possible As and Bs if there is no
grammatically sound way they can be identified. 9 And even if we had
7 E.g. Taran (Parm., 1965, p.169): "For the same thing is what the nature of the
body thinks in each and all men". Wiesner (Parm., 1996, p.72): "Denn es ist
genau dasselbe, was die Konstitution der Glieder bei den Menschen alien und
jedem erfaBt". Hiilscher (Parmenides, 1969, p.45): "Denn die Beschalfenheit der
Kiirperteile ist dasselbe, was sie denkt" (altered in the second edition).
8 E.g. Verdenius (Parmenides, 1964, p.15): "For with all mortals the lPUat.; of the
IlE).€et is the same as what it lPPOVE€I". Vlastos ("Parmenides' Theory of Know-
ledge", 1995, p. 153): "For to all men and to each the nature of the frame is the
same as what it thinks". Frankel (Parmenidesstudien, 1986, p.175): "(der Art
nach) dasselbe wie das man denkt ist die Beschalfenheit der Glieder".
9
Also Frankel's suggestion to construe a statement of identity by the common phrase
'to etu'to Olt€P (loc. cit., also defended by Coxon (F'ragm. of Parm., 1986, pp. 249f.))

some statement of identity - e.g. "to <xu"t6 Ea"tW one:p CPPOV€e:L X<x1. fle:Mwv
cp6mc:;;, as it is tacitly understood - even so this would still not provide
what is needed, that is, a correlation between the physical constitution
on the one hand and that which is apprehended on the other. If one:p is
construed as the accusative object to CPPOV€e:L, it would still designate the
content of "thinking", as a so-called internal object, and not an object in
the world that is apprehended. In other words, the clause one:p CPPOV€e:L will
in any case stand for what is called v61)fl<X in the last line, and cannot be
equivalent - in Aristotelian language - to the vo1)"t6v or, for that matter,
<xta~1)"t6v. It is not incidental that there is no word like cppov1)"t6v in Greek,
but only cpp6v1)fl<X and cppov"t(c:;;.
The contrast to the principle "like is known by like" comes out very
clearly once we turn to Empedocles.lO Fr. 109 states the idea in its clear-
est fashion: "Through earth we see earth, through water water", and so
forth. Here, we find an explicit relation between the elements in the world
and in the physical constitution in us, so as to establish some contact be-
tween that by which we are perceiving and that what is being perceived.
The elements in us are here not presented as determining thought or per-
ception but rather as being the condition for apprehending: they enable
the reception of what is like them in the world. This was elaborated by
Empedocles in detail by a theory of efHuences from the things coming to
us and being received via certain pores in the sensual organs. So, Empe-
docles' theory is a full account of how perceptive contact with the world
takes place. The perceptive act itself is primarily determined not by the
constitution of the organs or the body but - as is to be expected from a
theory of perception - by its object. Preponderance of one element has no
place in this explanation; on the contrary, if Empedocles locates thought
in the blood around the heart (B 105), he does so presumably because he
believes that blood has the most even blending of the elements. 11 There-
fore it is best suited to have full apprehension of the world consisting of
manifold mixtures of those elements.
By contrast, what is considered in Parmenides' fr. 16 is solely the side
of man - the relation between vouc:;; and the constitution of the limbs.
No mention is made of anything in the perceptible world entering this
constellation or conversely being attended to. In fact, this is positively
excluded, at least on the standard understanding of the first sentence:
"As one has the blending of the limbs each time, so vouc:;; comes upon
men" . The phrase E:xcXa"to"te:, as has often been noted, makes it clear that
is not borne out by the parallels, as Hiilscher (AnI. Fragen, 1968, pp.1l4f.) has
shown; cp. also Heitsch (Parm., 1974, p.197).
10 For a general account see Long ("Thinking and Sense-perception in Empedocles" ,
1966, pp. 256-76).
11 So Theophrastus tells us, Bens. 10 (= DK 31 A 86).

36 Roman Dilcher
it is not only the individual blending that may differ from one person to
the next but that there is a constant change taking place in the limbs
which accounts for different thoughts. (This will also be the meaning of
ltOAUltAcXYX"tUlV "vagrant, much wandering": the limbs are not wandering
around in the body or outside, but it is their very nature to be in a
state of fluctuation.) So, if the ',100,= under consideration is understood as
being dependent on the ever varying blending then there is no place for
the object of perception to take part in this process. If the gist of the
fragment is to bind ',100,= to the physical constitution then there is nothing
more to it: the process in the limbs will suffice for what we believe to
be an awareness of the world around us. The picture will be of a mind
encapsulated in its body and shut off from all contact with the world.
Or rather, if mind is nothing but the physical constitution, there will
be a bodily mixture entertaining thoughts with no relation to reality. So
instead of a theory of perception, we in fact obtain an account that makes
perception virtually impossible.
So it appears that we fare much better, and what is more, Parmenides
fares much better, if the idea of a theory of perception is discarded alto-
gether. It rests on Theophrastus' assertion alone, and is not backed up by
the original text. On the contrary, CPPOV€LV is, unlike ClL0'6cXV€m')ClL (or, for
that matter, to a certain extent VO€LV), not a verb of apprehension that
goes with a direct object.12 Usually it just means "to have understanding,
to be prudent" . If CPPOV€LV does take an accusative object, it is almost al-
ways an adjective in neuter form that characterises the mind of the person
who is engaged in CPPOV€LV. So, if someone does cp(ACl CPPOV€LV, he does not
see or recognise a friend, but he has friendly feelings towards someone.
Likewise, fJ.€yCl CPPOV€LV means to be high-minded, or even presumptious,
but not to have a special awareness for big things. It is a characterisation
of the content or mode of thought, be it practical considerations or the
state of mind as a whole. It is in this way that also the Parmenidean
phrase "what one thinks" (Olt€P CPPOV€€L) should be understood. 13 If one
says in Greek, for instance, that someone CPPOV€€L dark and nightly things,
this does not mean that anything dark, or the night itself, is perceived.
The statement would rather amount to saying that the person has sinister
intentions, or that he is in a somber mood, or even in a state of depression.
This gives an indication of the way in which Parmenides' theory ought to
be interpreted.
So, when Theophrastus, after quoting B 16, comments that Parmenides
takes ClL0'6cXV€0'6ClL and CPPOVe:LV as the same (1. lOf.) , he has a very good rea-
12 For a convenient survey, see LiddeljScott/ Jones, s.v. For the semantic development
from Homer onwards, see esp. Snell ("IJIP&ve:C; - IJIp6v1loL<;", 1978, pp. 53ff.).
13 With 01te:p to be construed as an accusative object. The alternative rendering "what
is thinking" is ruled out by the construction (by lack of a connective xexl, cp. above).

son for making that comment. Apparently, he rightly felt that this sen-
tence would not pertain to perception at all according to normal Greek
usage. So his remark is to be understood to refer specifically to the usage
of the words: "he uses them indiscriminately". This assumption is not so
much the result but on the contrary the very premise of his interpretation.
Without this alleged equation of ()(Loo()cive;m')()(L and cppO\le;L\I the fragment has
no bearing whatsoever to the theory Theophrastus wants to find. 14 When
he claims that for Parmenides perceiving and thinking are the same, he
is apparently twisting the word so as to suit his own needs. This claim
should not be confounded with the parallel remarks by Aristotle, though
they may sound very similar. What Aristotle has in mind, in Metaphysics
IV as well as in De Anima,15 is a systematic point. What he means is that
the early philosophers did not properly distinguish mind from perception,
and so actually treated them on the same lines, with dubious philosophical
consequences. 16 To say they did not distinguish mind from the senses does
not imply that they were not aware of certain differences. The point is
that (with the notable exception of Anaxagoras) they failed to produce an
appropriate account of mind as something completely separate, as Aristo-
tle himself did. This view of the Presocratic attempts is certainly correct
in general; whether it is correct also in the case of Parmenides remains to
be seen.
Thus, it might after all be no coincidence that neither perception nor
the perceptible enter in any way Parmenides' reasoning where we would
expect. The basic dichotomy on which the lecture of the Goddess is built
is consistently presented as that between &A~o()e;L()( and mortal 06~()(L. It is
all too natural, in view of the predicates of Being - especially its being
unmoved and changeless - to reconstruct this dichotomy on the broadly
Platonic division of what is known by reason and what is known by the
senses. This is how already Aristotle and the later commentators rephrase
the Parmenidean dichotomy,17 and there is hardly a modern account that
does not refer to the "Doxa" as the sensible or phenomenal world. While
14 It should be noted that Theophrastus begins his exposition on Parmenides as
follows: IIcxp(J.t,,(o'l}e: (J.E:" y&p OAWe: OOOE:" &'CPWPIXt" &.AAa. (J.6"o" X'tA. (I. 6). This is
an indication that his "report" involves a good deal of liberal reconstruction. For
Theophrastus' similar interpretative procedure in the case of Heraclitus, see Dilcher
(Studies in Heraclitus, 1995, pp. 163ff.).
15 Metaph. IV.5 1009b12ff.j de An. 111.3 427a17ff.
16 The crucial point for Aristotle can best be seen in his criticism of Democritus
that "he made no use of mind as a faculty of truth" (00 o~ Xpij'tlll 'tiji "iji we:
OU"ll(J.tl 'tl"t lttpt 't~" &'A-qt}tlll", de An. 1.2 404b30f.). On Aristotle's concern with his
predecessors' account see Caston ("Why Aristotle Needs Imagination", 1996, esp.
pp. 25ff.).
17 Metaph. 1.5 986b27ff. (= T.26 Coxonj DK28 A24): ... &'''llyxIl1;;6(J.t,,0e: 0'
e"
&'xoAouiltr" 'tore: cpIlI"o(J.evOLe: Xllt 'to (J.E:" XIl'ta. 'to" Myo", ltAt!W OE: XIl'ta. 't~" ctioil'l}olV
I.l1toAIl(J.I3&."w" tT"IlI. Similarly De Caelo 111.1 298b14ff. (= T.20 Coxonj DK A 25).

38 Roman Dilcher
this need not be altogether wrong, it is nonetheless conspicuous that Par-

menides sees the point where the mortals go astray not in their clinging
to the delusions of sense perception, but in an act of naming. IS Fr. 7,
though, may appear to come close to the traditional distinction: the God-
dess tells us to restrain thought (v61)!lcx) from the erroneous path, adding:
"don't let habit force you upon this road, to ply an aimless eye (o!l!lcx) and
echoing hearing (&xou~v) and tongue (YAwaacxv); but judge by reasoning
(XpLVCXL OE: MYWL)". Still, we do here not only not have a general term for
the cognitive approach that is to be avoided, it is even doubtful whether
the peculiar combination of eye, hearing and tongue should be taken to
stand collectively for perception of the sensual world. As the mention of
the tongue certainly does not refer to tasting but to speaking, the point
seems to be more specific. It is a situation of someone not comprehending:
confronted with the choice between the two ways, the eyes turn aimless,
the words one has heard are resounding, and the tongue is paralyzed and
speechless. This is in fact a very adequate description of what a modern
reader may also experience on the first encounter with the doctrine of
Being. While the use of reasoning that is being appealed to here certainly
implies that our normal experience of the world (as implied by the phrase
e:'I')0c;; 1tOAUm:Lpov, B 7.3) can provide no criterion to judge upon the issue
that the Goddess presents, this is still far from denouncing the use of the
senses as being deceptive as such. 19
There is, in the end, only one piece of evidence that seems to speak
in favour of Theophrastus' view. At the end of his report he says that
according to Parmenides the dead also have some perception. Due to the
lack of warmth, that is, of the form of fire, the dead are restricted to per-
ceiving what belongs to the opposite side of night. Now, the question is
again whether Theophrastus gives an accurate interpretation of the text
which he draws upon. Certainly, the idea of the dead having perception is
so extraordinary and idiosyncratic that Theophrastus cannot have been
completely misled, and if the basic idea he reports is correct then, it ap-
pears, we here do have a piece of a theory "like is known by like". Yet it
all hinges on the question whether Theophrastus was right in attributing
perception to the dead, and here there is again room for doubt. What the
dead are specifically said to perceive is "the cold and silence" (~uXpoO XCXL
aLW1t~C;; cxta'l')ave:a'l')cxL, 1.15). While we have a clear notion of what it means
to perceive the cold, it is not clear what the perception of silence might
possibly amount to. Both cold and silence may be said, with Aristotle,
in a formal way to be the privation, of warmth and of voice respectively
18 B 8.38, B 8.53, B 9 and B 19.
19 For some cautioning remarks in respect of the terminology of perception, see
Langerbeck (Doxis Epirhysmie, 1935, pp. 441£.). The contrary view was held e.g.
by Tar/in (Parm., 1965, p.80): "a rejection of all sense-perception".

(Theophrastus mentions both of them, together with light, as that which

the dead do not perceive, 1.14). Still, this is not true phenomenologically,
and therefore not true in a way that is relevant to perception. The per-
ception of cold is not just perceiving the warm not being there, but it is
a specific experience in itself. The same is evidently not true of silence.
While hearing a voice implies perceiving various tones or noises, there are
no degrees or varieties of silence to be noticed. Perceiving silence means
that there is nothing to perceive. One could certainly make an effort to de-
scribe a certain mode of awareness that somehow corresponds to hearing
silence, showing that silence is not just "nothing" but a negative phe-
nomenon in its own right. Even so, what is decisive is that it is precisely
the term "perception" that in this case appears peculiarly inept.
Therefore, it seems more likely than not that Theophrastus, when
reading Parmenides' account of the dead, interpreted it on the same lines
as he did B 16, namely that he took as perception what originally was
phrased as CPPOV€LV or similar. A statement of this sort referring to a state
of mind may be less extraordinary, but it gives a much better sense. The
word v€xp6c;: which Theophrastus uses is often rendered as "corpse". But
a corpse will soon disintegrate, and is therefore not likely to be the repre-
sentative of that nightly side which essentially belongs to the fullness of
the Parmenidean world. Also the dead souls in Hades to whom Odysseus
pays a visit are called VEXU€C;: or g,\,)V€CX V€XPwV, "the people of the dead" .20
In the Nekyia in the Odyssey, this place is described as bereft of light and
life, almost as if it were an incarnation of Parmenides' negative principle:
it is completely covered by "deadly night", and Helios has never thrown
a glance there. 21 Its inhabitants, the <jJuxcx( of the dead, are like shadows,
without any power - and therefore, important to note, they need to drink
blood in order to regain memory and voice. This Homeric Underworld
provides the perfect background on which to reconstruct Parmenides' re-
marks on the dead. 22
So, considering the dead yields after all a rich picture. First of all, it
shows that what Parmenides was concerned with was a theory of "mind"
as a way of explaining not perceptual awareness of the world, but of
accounting for different modes of human life. What the varying mixture
of the two elements means on a human scale comes out most dearly in
the case of the dead in whom there is no fire any more. In whichever way
Parmenides may have formulated this "mental activity" of the dead, it is
20 Od. 10.526, 1l.34ff.
21 Od. 1l.13ff.
22 In addition, there is a report by SimpJicius stating that Parmenides' Daimon or-
dering the cosmos is also responsible for sending the souls from the visible to the
invisible and back: X(11 'tcX<; q,UXcX<; ltElLltEIV lto'tE: ILtv tx 'tOV tlL(jI(1VOV<; Et<; 'to OO:IOE<;,
lto't/; OE: &'VcXltCV.IV, Simp. in Ph. 39.18f. (= DK before B 13, T.207 Coxon).

40 Roman Dilcher
clear that their "thinking" the cold and silence describes their specific way
of being. It is, so to speak, a world of cold, darkness and silence they live in,
and silence is in a way what they perform as their most characteristic act
of being. Theophrastus reports that Parmenides explained also memory
and oblivion (Ilv~IlYJ XCXL A~i}YJ, 1. 11) by reference to the two elements, and
again A~i}YJ is what is above all connected with Hades and the dead. To
be in a state of A~YJ or rather to be overtaken by A~i}YJ means a state of
impercipience, such as we experience in sleep. So if the dead, by lack of the
warm and light element, experience A~i}YJ, this cannot amount to saying
that they have an awareness of a negative world which we as living beings
cannot experience. It must mean that they are deprived of awareness as
such.
Whatever the connection of the xp<imc; Ile:Mwv with voOC; in B 16, the
two elements are apparently in themselves related to mind and thought. As
constituents of the doxastic world they are explicitly said to be equipollent
(B 9). In view of their epistemic relevance, this equipollence does however
not hold, and it appears that knowledge must mainly if not entirely be
connected with the form of light. As Theophrastus reports, the OLcXVOLCX in
which the warm (i.e. the positive element) preponderates is the better and
purer (1. 8f.). Fortunately, we have on this point some textual evidence
that supports the epistemic priority of light. When night is introduced
as the form in all respects opposite to fire, the first of its attributes is
&ocx~ (B 8.59), it is unknowing and ignorant. It is not easy for us to do
justice to such a claim. It may seem plausible to call night the element
of ignorance as the dark takes away most of our awareness of the world
in that we cannot see any more and are reduced to our other senses. We
can also speak of the night of ignorance in respect to a person in what
we would call a metaphorical way of speaking. Conversely light is what
grants us the best access to the world in all its differences. And again, light
seems to be something like an absolute metaphor for characterising or even
explaining the function of mind, from Plato and Aristotle onwards down
to modern ideas like the lumen naturale, the light of reason and the talk
of illumination, enlightenment, and so forth.23 So, it seems plausible to
attach what we might call the positive mental functions to the working of
light in the human constitution. If Theophrastus was right in coordinating
memory and oblivion, then memory must stand for the way to knowledge
in a broad sense. After all, it is by memory that absent things can be
present, as was claimed in B 4 to be characteristic of voOc;. And what is
more, if A~i}YJ characterises best the general lack in an epistemic sense
23 For the concept of absolute metaphors in philosophy, see Blumenberg (Paradigmen
zu einer Metaphorologie, 1998); for the metaphor of light specifically, cp. Blumen-
berg ("Licht als Metapher der Wahrheit", 1957, pp. 435ff.).

connected with night, then it follows that its opposite -light - is directed
towards what is opposite to A~{)YJ. In Greek, this is called A-Ietheia.
This epistemic role of the elements now gives the interpretation of B 16
a peculiar turn. If voOC;; is correlated or even identified with the mixture of
the limbs, this may first sound like an Archaic precursor to a modern nat-
uralist or reductionist account of mind. A reductionist or identity theory
of body and mind however works within a certain conceptual framework
of the physical and the mental, which seems to follow, broadly speaking,
the principal lines of Cartesian dualism. If in Presocratic philosophy (and
beyond) there is no hesitation to attribute mental functions to what ap-
pears to us to be only physical elements, the meaning and the implications
of such ascriptions will be very different. In the case of Parmenides, this
makes it all the more difficult to see what precise point fr. 16 is trying to
make. On the one hand, it is still hard to understand why and in which
way voOC;; can be related to the elements of the doxastic world if its prime
task after all is to apprehend Being in a way unsplit into the two opposite
forms. On the other hand, if light is intrinsically endowed with under-
standing, at least of some sort or to some extent, there will be almost no
need for an explicit and almost emphatic correlation of voOc;; and physical
constitution, as presented by B 16.
The point of correlating voOc;; with the physical constitution of the
body might be read as being directed against the Homeric idea that the
gods in some way act on men's mind, by taking off their cppe:ve:c;; or putting
some idea into them. Thus, it would proceed on a similar line as Xeno-
phanes' saying "What men call Iris is in fact a cloud" (DK 21 B 32). Still,
the reinterpretation of Greek religion in terms of a natural theory does
not give a plausible explanation here. While Parmenides apparently did
account for many natural phenomena in terms of the two elements, this
doesn't seem directed against traditional religious beliefs, as it clearly
was in Xenophanes. After all, Parmenides did account for the gods in the
course of the cosmogony: The daimon "first of all the gods devised Eros"
(B 13). In addition, if the idea of the gods' acting on men were to be
criticized, one would expect a statement that stresses man's own respon-
sibility - in the way that Heraclitus' saying "Character is man's daemon"
(DK 22 B 119) has often been understood. Binding mind to the nature of
the limbs will not do that.
A different solution would be to let light do the job of mind. In fact,
there is good reason for attributing all as it were positive mental functions
to the working of light in the mixture of the limbs. Accordingly, one could
postulate on the basis of B 16, in view of attaining Aletheia, "a state from
which forgetfulness and error were absolutely excluded" as "the ratio of

42 Roman Dilcher
light to darkness should be as one to zero" .24 The consequence of this con-
struction would however be to identify light with Being and night with
nothing. For various reasons, this is implausible, and instead of bridging
the Parmenidean dichotomy it would in fact unbalance it. Also, it is not
clear what being in a state of pure light might mean. If we talk of some-
one becoming fully enlightened, this is understandable as a metaphorical
expression. It is not any more understandable if referred to the physical
mixture of the limbs. If we are to be purified completely of our dark and
heavy components, this would lead, at least from our earthly viewpoint,
to a physical dissolution into pure light. One might well imagine death
to be a mere separation of the mixture that constitutes the living being.
However, that the doctrine of Being is to describe the experience that
awaits the light constituents in us after death will hardly be convincing.
Now, bearing these considerations in mind, it appears that the link
established in B 16 between voOc;; and the physical constitution of the body
is not as straightforward as has often been thought. The first sentence just
indicates a correlation of some sort: "As is the mixture at each time, so
voOc;; comes by". It would be rash to conclude that the mixture's state
by itself gives rise to thought. IIcxp(o'tcxcri)cxL does not mean "to be gener-
ated, to come about, to rise", but literally "to stand by" . In later classical
Greek this can mean just "to happen to someone" , sometimes even in the
sense "to occur to one's mind". 25 So, the phrase here could mean that
thought in some way just occurs to men, rising out of the depth of their
bodies without their own doing. This idea would accord with what is said
of unknowing mortals in fro 6: " ... helplessness (~Y]XCXVLY]) directs in their
breasts their distracted minds (1tACXYX'tOV v60v)". Still, in Homeric lan-
guage - to which Parmenides is usually close 26 - 1tcxp()"tCXcri)CXL has a less
abstract meaning, it usually means "to stand by the side of someone" ,
often with the implication of helping someone out in battle. 27 There is,
interestingly, also a special usage in Homer: it is fate that can 1tCXP(O''tCXO'{}CXL
to someone, that is: come close or be imminent. So, Patroclus when being
slain by Hector calls out: "Death and mighty fate have also come close to
your side" (&AM 'tOL ~oY] exYXL 1tCXP€O''tY]xe:v {}cXvcx'toc;; XCXL flOLpCX XpCX'tCXLY], Il.
16.852f.), with the same expression 1tCXP€O''tY]xe:v as in fr. 16. 28 So, despite
their being in some way correlated, there is a certain disparity in the way
the physical constitution and the appearence of voOc; are presented. The
mixture of the limbs is something one has apparently in a different way
24 Vlastos ("Parmenides' Theory of Knowledge", 1995, p.159). Similarly Frankel
(Parm.stud., 1986, pp. 173ff.).
25 LSJ S.v. B IV.
26 See Coxon (Pragm. of Parm., 1986, pp.9ff.).
27 LSJ s.v. B I.1 and 2.
28 Coxon also sees this verse as the model (Pragm. of Parm., 1986, p.249).

at each time (~Xe:L here understood with the supplement of an indefinite

"nc;, "someone"). Contrasting to the present tense in the first clause, voOC;
appears here with a verb in the perfect tense. If we spell out the temporal
implications, ncxp€aTYlxe:v could be translated: "it has come near and now
stands close", in a similar way as the presence of death in the Homeric
line quoted. Thus, we rather have something like a permanent imminence,
but not a voOc; changing all the time as the mixture is. 29 This conspicuous
divergence of their mode of appearance is a clear indication that there is
no simple dependence. On the contrary, if voOc; has some permanent pres-
ence, as the perfect tense suggests, then we are to expect it as something
enduring against the bodily changes. It can even not be excluded that
voOc; is in fact the grammatical subject also of the first line. 3D Instead
of supplementing an indefinite 'nc; who in some peculiar way "has" his
own mixture, we would now have mind as holding together the mixture
of the limbs, such that just as it contains the fluctuations each time, so it
appears to men.
Given that the first sentence presents a correspondence between mind
and mixture rather than a dependence, the difficulties in construing ,0
cxu,o in the following sentence do not come any more as a surprise. The
question is whether we actually have a statement of identity here. If we
are not bound any longer by the Theophrastean premise, the most natural
way to understand the phrase ,0 cxu,o would be to see it as simply stating
that it is one and the same thing that ... for each and every man. 31 This
reading conflicts with the expectation that it is individual differences of
thought that are to be explained by one and the same mechanism. Still,
there is a special emphasis on the fact that what is said is valid not just for
men, but for all of them and each (XCXL niiaLV XCXL nw,(). This emphasis only
makes sense if what is stated here is meant to hold despite all individual
29 The varia lectio ltap(o'ta:t<X1 in the present tense that Aristotle's text offers is rightly
rejected by almost all editors on metrical grounds. It is presumably occasioned by
the preceding quotation of Empedocles' fr. 108: OOOOV dtA),OIOl 11E:'tECPUV, 't6oov &p'
0cp(OIV <xle:! x<Xt 'to CpPOVe:LV dtA),OI<X ltap(O't<X't<X1 (Metaph. IV.5 1009b20ff.j see Frankel
(Parm.stud., 1986, p. 175». And here again it shows that there is only a super-
ficial similarity between the two doctrines. While Empedocles in fact stresses the
correspondence between different constitution and different thought, Parmenides
turns out, by contrast, to be concerned with what is identical in all men.
30 This was already suggested by Diels (changed in DK), and accepted by Coxon
(F'ragm. of Parm., 1986, p.248).
31 This is how Heitsch understood the sentence: "Denn was die Beschaffenheit der
Korperteile begreift, ist bei den Menschen dasselbe und zwar bei allen und bei
jedem" (Parmenides, 1974, p. 198). - Holscher's solution is to take the phrase in
a merely demonstrative sense: "Denn dies eben ist es, was die Beschaffenheit der
Glieder denkt" (An/. F'ragen., 1968, p. 115). - In principle, it would also be possible
to construe 'to <xu't6 with dative case - and here this would have to be livilpwltolaLv.
Thus the sentence would read: "For, what the nature of the limbs thinks is the
same as men, all and each of them" .

44 Roman Dilcher
differences. Taken this way, the perspective turns out to be not that we
do have an explanation of how it is that our fluctuating limbs produce
different thoughts, but rather that there is something identical in all of
them.
In order to see what this might amount to we eventually have to turn
to the last sentence that says something about what thought itself is: "Co
yCip 7tAEOV EO"C!. V6T)f.lCl - it is what is 7tAEOV. This is usually understood
as referring to the XpiiC1L<; of the limbs, specifying in which way thought
depends on this mixture. The question to be discussed is whether 7tAEOV
means "what is more" (7tAe:CWV, as comparative to 7tOAU), or rather "the
full" (the neuter of 7tAEW<;). Theophrastus seems to interpret it on the
former construction: 32 It is from this verse that he apparently derived
the main contention concerning Parmenides' theory: "according to what
exceeds, cognition will come about" - XCl"CcX "Co U7te:pPw..AOV EO"C1.v ~ yvWC1L<;
(1. 7), which is then explained as either the warm or the cold prevailing
in the mixture. Now while this explanation is reasonable by itself, this is
not quite what Parmenides is saying. If thought is what is more, then it
is identified not with the mixture as a whole, but with the element that
is prevailing in it. "What is more", "Co 7tAEOV, singles out one component
against the other which is the lesser, the OALy6"Ce:pov. By way ofrephrasing
with the help of the preposition XCl"CcX Theophrastus in fact changes the
meaning so it can refer to the whole mixture in respect of the proportion of
its components, and again the majority of modern scholarship has followed
his lead. Yet, if thought is to be identified with the prevailing element,
this implies that the lesser component is not part of thinking. This would
not necessarily mean that there are just two thoughts to be entertained,
one for each form respectively; there could be intensity and degrees of the
prevailing element that account for varieties. It would imply, however, that
it is not the mixture in itself, as varying in proportion of its ingredients,
which is somehow correlated to thought. The result will be that we can
"think" only one form at a time, completely separate from its opposite.
The explanatory power of the theory of mixture to account for varieties
will thus be gone.
Thus, there is good reason to consider the other reading of "Co 7tAEOV
in the sense of "the full" .33 This reading also seems persuasive as it might
establish a meaningful link to the two other occurences of "Co 7tAEOV in the
poem, the one in B 8.24, stating that "all is full of being", and the other
in fr. 9.3: "all is equally full of light and of unintelligent night". On the
reading "the full is the thought" , the fullness is interpreted to refer to the
32 For this issue cp. Wiesner (Parm., 1996, pp.60ff.). A different account of
Theophrastus' reading was given by Laks ("Parmenide dans Theophraste", 1988,
pp. 262-80).
33 Advocated e.g. by Tanin (Parm., 1965, p.258).

"full" mixture. So, this alternative reading does in fact not provide an
explanation different to the standard one, but rather proposes a different
way to reach the desired result that the 'J6Tj(lcx is not correlated only to the
one element which is in excess, but again to the full blending of both forms.
It is again doubtful, though, whether this idea can be expressed by "the
full". For what is meant is that the whole of the blending is responsible
for thought, not just one part or ingredient. In Greek, this would require
something like "to OAOV (or maybe "to 1ta'J). Being full, by contrast, is not
opposed to parts in respect to which it is the full, but to emptiness. What
is excluded in the two Parmenidean instances involving the expression
"the full" is precisely the idea that there are empty parts, within being
and in between the two forms which cover the whole. However, because
there is no emptiness for Parmenides anyway, it would make no sense
to assert fullness here in respect to thought. Thus, there seems to be no
satisfactory explanation of what thought being the full might mean.
Neither translation of "to 1tAE:o'J accords with the standard explanation
in respect of the mixture, as neither will actually yield the sense which
Theophrastus has, with universal acceptance, drawn out of this phrase.
So, there seems to be only one way left: to understand "to 1tAE:o'J in the
sense "what is more" not in respect to the proportion within the mixture,
but in respect to the mixture as such: it is that which is more than the
mixture - 1tAE:o'J "t~e; xpaae:(Ue;. In this way, the point will be quite the
opposite to the traditional reading. Instead of identifying thought with the
mixture and its ingredients, Parmenides will on the contrary be drawing
a distinction. While admitting a certain connection of the various modes
and states of human mind with the physical constitution, mind as such is
separated from it. Human mental acts may variously be coloured by light
and darkness, but in all of them there is something which is more than the
two elements. So, out of the ruins of Theophrastus' ill-conceived attempt
to include Parmenides in a theory of perception there finally emerges
an account of mind that is both more consistent and more adequate to
Parmenides' historical role.
On this reading, Parmenides will not be engaged any longer with a
theory of mind that fundamentally clashes with the role of 'JoDe; in ap-
prehending Being. While it is difficult enough to gain an adequate under-
standing how the two parts of the poem, Aletheia and Mortal Doxai, are
to be related, the claim of B 16 as it is usually understood would effectively
undermine any such attempt. If human 'JoDe; is completely determined by
the physical constitution, then there is no way it could possibly make a
transition towards what transcends the realm of Doxa. As the claim of
B 16 is most explicitly said to be valid for every human being, it would
follow that the apprehension of Being presented as Aletheia could only be

46 Roman Dilcher
gained by a divine mind that has no contact whatsoever with the human
mind of B 16. On systematic grounds it would be excluded that we could
ever achieve more than merely listening to the Goddess's account - that
is, that we could comprehend it.
Once voO~ is liberated from its complete absorption into the wandering
limbs, these inconsistencies cease to exist. Fr. 16 can now be seen as an
attempt to show, on the one hand, that voO~ is present in man in having
some intrinsic contact with the limbs' mixture, while on the other hand
not being restricted to it. Mind being that which stands by man will not
be viewed as a somehow localised capacity in man. Whatever the claim
of its constant presence may amount to - to say "thought is what is
more than the bodily mixture" amounts to stating nothing less than the
transcendence of mind - and at the same time to stating nothing more
than just that it is transcendent. So, on this line of interpretation, fr. 16
will not give an account of mind - it rather is the attempt to give mind
a place in the changeable world by showing that it has no place.
To claim that in Parmenides we find the first vague formulation of the
transcendence of mind may run counter to many preconceptions about an-
cient philosophy, and yet, it is not out of place. Anaxagoras envisaged a
cosmogony that had voO~ as its guiding principle, and despite its involve-
ment with the many things it is itself as it were untouched and separate:
as he says, voO~ "is not mixed with any thing" (!l€!lELX'rcxL OUOEVL XP~!lCX't'L,
DK 59 B 12), and so it has absolute rule. The most systematic account of
voO~ we have from antiquity takes up precisely this idea. To show in what
way voO~ is to be understood as something "separate" (XWPL(H6v) is the
primary aim of Aristotle's treatment in De Anima III chs. 4-5. His solution
is to split voO~ into a passive and an active part. 34 While thinking is what
is produced, so to speak, by their cooperation, the passive and corruptible
part falls on the side of man while the active voO~ is unmixed, eternal and
in its essence actuality (just like the so-called unmoved mover in Meta-
physics XII). The way of its presence is shown by a simile: just as light
in a way produces colours, so the active voOC; enlightens the noetic realm.
This use of the metaphor of light may shed also some light on Parmenides.
On the one hand, it shows how the constant presence of voOC; can be un-
derstood as being something independent of human thought while still
being in a way the condition for thinking. This way, the claim implicit in
the phrase 1tCXP€O''t'TjXEV may gain some sense. On the other hand, it might
give a clue as to the role of light as a principle of knowledge. If this is
Parmenides' view, and if he still holds mind is what is more and beyond,
then he is in fact very close to saying that light is just a metaphor for
34 For a more detailed account, see Dilcher ("Zur aristotelischen Noetik", 1998,
pp. 309-38).

Parrnenides on the Place of Mind 47
thinking - in his words that would be: a name that humans have posited.
It is from this perspective that fr. 16 might provide fresh insights into the
discourse on Being.
References
Baltussen, Han, 2000, Theophrastus against the Presocratics and Plato.

Peripatetic Dialectic in the De sensibus, Leiden: Brill.
Blumenberg, Hans, 1957, "Licht als Metapher der Wahrheit", in: Studium
generale, 10, pp. 435ff.
-, 1998, Paradigm en zu einer Metaphorologie, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Caston, Victor, 1996, "Why Aristotle Needs Imagination", in: Phronesis,
41.
Coxon, Allan H., 1986, The Fragments of Parmenides, Assen: van Gor-
cum.
Dilcher, Roman, 1995, Studies in Heraclitus, Hildesheim: Olms.
-, 1998, "Zur aristotelischen Noetik (De Anima III 4-5)", in: Interna-
tionale Zeitschrift fur Philosophie, H. 2, pp. 309-38.
Frankel, Hermann, 1968, "Parmenidesstudien", in: H. Frankel, Wege und
Formen frUhgriechischen Denkens, 3rd edn., Miinchen: Beck.
Heitsch, Ernst (ed.), 1974, Parmenides. Die Anfange der Ontologie, Logik
und Naturwissenschaft, Miinchen: Heimeran.
Holscher, Uvo, 1968, Anfangliches Fragen. Studien zur frUhen griechischen
Philosophie, Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- (ed.), 1969, Parmenides. Vom Wesen des Seienden, Frankfurt: Suhr-
kamp.
Laks, Andre, 1988, "Parmenide dans Theophraste, De sensibus 3-4", in:
La Parola del Passato, 43, pp. 262-80.
Langerbeck, Hermann, 1935, Doxis Epirhysmie. Studien zu Demokrits
Ethik und Erkenntnislehre, Berlin: Weidmann.
Long, Anthony A., 1966, "Thinking and Sense-perception in Empedocles:
Mysticism or Materialism?", in: Class. Quart., 16, pp. 256-76.
Schwabl, Hans, 1968, "Sein und Doxa bei Parmenides", in: Hans-Georg
Gadamer (ed.), Um die Begriffswelt der Vorsokratiker, Darmstadt:
Wissenschaftliche B uchgesellschaft.
Snell, Bruno, 1978, "cPPEVe:c: - cpp6vT}or.c;", in: Bruno SneIl, Der Weg zum
Denken und zur Wahrheit, Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Stratton, George M. (ed.), 1919, Theophrastus and the Greek Physiologi-
cal Psychology before Aristotle, London, repr. 1964, Amsterdam:
Bonset.
Taran, Leonardo, 1965, Parmenides, Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.
Verdenius, Willem J., 1964, Parmenides, Amsterdam: A.M. Hakkert.

48 Roman Dilcher
Vlastos, Gregory, 1995, "Parmenides' Theory of Knowledge", in: D.W.

Graham (ed.), Studies in Greek Philosophy I, Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Wiesner, Jiirgen, 1996, Parmenides. Der Beginn der Aletheia, Berlin, New
York: WaIter de Gruyter.

Denis O'Brien
Life Beyond the Stars:

Aristotle, Plato and Empedocles
(De Caelo I.9 279all-22)*
Can there be a life which is not common to body and soul? More simply
still: can there be life without a body? Students of Aristotle will need
only to be reminded of the life led by the unmoved mover, as described
in the Metaphysics and no doubt implied elsewhere, before answering
that question, on Aristotle's behalf, in the affirmative. 1 But readers of
Aristotle's mature philosophy may not be prepared for a slightly different
question: does Aristotle believe that there can be life, without a body,
beyond the stars?
The framing of that question may seem to have no obvious place
in the philosophy familiar to us from Aristotle's extant writings. It is,
nonetheless, a question which, I shall argue, has to be faced in a passage
of the De Caelo, where the Aristotle who speaks to us is not the voice
familiar to us from the extant corpus, but an Aristotle whose thoughts are
still heavily indebted to Plato's Timaeus and, through Plato, to ways of
thinking that had been characteristic of philosophers in the fifth century.
Admittedly, a "presocratic" Aristotle does not usually find a place
in histories of Greek philosophy. It is therefore with due diffidence that
I shall put forward my explanation of a passage that has so far resisted
all attempts at a more conventional style of exegesis. If, as is likely, my
proposed "presocratic" reading of the text fails to convince on a first, and
even on a second hearing, I would ask the doubting Thomas at least to
* Acknowledgement. My most grateful thanks are due to those who at various times
have criticised and commented upon the written version of my contribution: Jean-
Claude Picot, Marwan Rashed, Suzanne Stern-Gillet.
At Metaph. XII.7 1072b26-30, Aristotle not only attributes to the unmoved mover
a "life" that is "the best" and "everlasting" (1072b28: ~(,)~ &plo1:11 XO!L &f5toc;) j
he also speaks of the unmoved mover as itself therefore "a living being" that is
"everlasting" and "the best" (b29: ~iiiov &t5tov &pt01:ov). In the Ethics, Aristotle
again writes of the "life" of the gods in a passage usually taken to refer to the
unmoved mover (EN X.8 1178b18-32).

50 Denis O'Brien
recognise the problem and if he dislikes my interpretation, as he may well

do, to provide another.
I. De Anima 1.4
Aristotle's criticism of Empedocles
I start from a curious criticism which Aristotle makes of Empedocles in

chapter 4 of book one of the De Anima, as part of his general critique of
the widespread and semi-popular belief that the soul is a harmony. 2
Love as "Harmony"
"Harmony" is one of the many names that Empedocles uses for his cosmic
principle of Love (fr. 96.4).3 From various comments made by Aristotle,
supported by quotations from Simplicius, we know that Love, including
2
Aristotle, De Anima 1.4 407b27-408a30. Soul as "harmony" also figures largely
in Plato's Phaedo, 85e3-95b4 (see n.19 below). In writing both of Plato and of
Aristotle, I have kept to the translation of &PI-l0v(cx as "harmony", despite Burnet's
objection (1911, p.85), in his commentary on the Phaedo (ad 85e3), that &PI-l0v(cx
does not mean what we call "harmony". Applied to a lyre, and to the soul when
compared to a lyre as in Plato's dialogue, the word, so Burnet tells us, means
"tuning" (cf. LSJ, s.v., IV 1: "in Music, stringing" (p.244», whereas "what we
call 'harmony' is in Greek aUI-lCjllllv(cx". The distinction noted by Burnet is regularly
repeated, in one form or another, by translators and commentators of the Phaedo
(Hackforth, 1955, p. 97, n.1; Gallop, 1975, p.147; Dixsaut, 1991, pp.358-359 (=
n.198); Rowe, 1993, p.203), and is as regularly disregarded by translators and
commentators of Aristotle's De Anima (Hicks, 1907, p. 29 and pp. 265 sqq.; Smith,
1931, ad loc.; Ross, 1961, p. 195; Thillet, 2005, p. 330). The word and the concept is
nonetheless in both places the same, and is not restricted to the action of "tuning"
(Burnet) or "stringing" (LSJ). So it is that Socrates speaks of his "harmony" as a
"combination" (cf. 92e4-93a1: &PI-lov(~ ~ lD.>..n ·nvI auV'6ta&L), dependent upon the
way in which the constituents are combined (93al-2), as a result of their being
"harmonised" (93al1-12). Similarly, Aristotle specifies his "harmony" as a >..6yot;
"tLt; [... J "tWV I-lLXittV"tIllV ~ auvit&aLt; (De Anima 1.4 407b32-33), a specification which
again applies not, or not only, to the activity which produces a "harmony", but
to the "proportion" (cf. >..6yot;) or "combination" (cf. auvit&aLt;) which thereafter
inheres in the constituents. Since, as we shall see, it is the status of what inheres
in the constituents (whether a "proportion" or "something other" than the pro-
portion) which gives meaning to Aristotle's criticism, I have kept the translation
"harmony", as more appropriate to a discussion that does not bear directly on
the act by which potentially discordant constituents are made to be "in tune"
(Burnet's "tuning", Hackforth's and Rowe's "attunement"), but looks rather to
determine the outcome of that action. "Tuning" and "attunement" cease, once
whatever constituents are in question have been "attuned". But precisely what is
it (so Aristotle will ask) that continues once the "tuning" has been completed?
3 For the multiplicity of names, see n.9 below sub finem.

Life Beyond the Stars 51
Love as Harmony, was especially responsible for making animal parts,
specifically bones, blood and flesh, at the beginning of a zoogony that
followed the total separation of the elements by Strife. 4 When therefore,
in the De Anima, Aristotle's criticism of the soul as harmony leads him
to object that, if by harmony we mean "the proportion of the mixture",
there would have to be a separate "soul" for each one of the animal parts,
such as flesh and bone, we are hardly surprised that those words serve as
a cue for Empedocles to be brought on stage. 5 But what we may not be
prepared for is the odd way in which Aristotle formulates his criticism of
Empedocles, at this point. 6
The proportion of the elements in bones, blood and flesh

The passage starts off simply enough. If the proportion of the mixture
were "soul and harmony" , says Aristotle, then one might want to question
Empedocles. For Empedocles, so Aristotle continues, says that "each of
them", i.e. "each one" of the animal parts, flesh as well as bone, is what
it is by reason of a certain "proportion". 7
We happen to know just what that means, since verses quoted later
by Aristotle and elsewhere by Simplicius give specific figures for the "pro-
portion" of the elements that made up blood, flesh and bone. Blood and
flesh were made up from all four elements, in a more or less equal pro-
portion ("more or less" , to account for the fluidity of blood as compared
to the relative density of flesh).8 Bone was made up from four parts out
of eight of fire, two parts of the "gleam of Nestis" (water, or water and
air) and two parts of earth, all of these "joined by Harmony's marvellous
glues" ('APIlOVLYl<: X6AAnaw <XpYlp6,cx ·ih:am:aLnmv).9
4 For evidence and argument, see O'Brien (1969, pp. 200-203).
5 Aristotle, De Anima 1.4 407b27-408aI8.
6 Aristotle, De Anima 1.4 408aI8-23.
7 Aristotle, De Anima 1.4 408aI7-20: ... b OE: 1:ljt; IJ.(~tc.Jt; Myot; CtpIJ.0v(ex xexi cjIuX~.
&.ltexl1:~oeat 0' &v 1:1t; 1:ou1:6 yt xexi ltotp' 'EIJ.lttoox/"€OUt;· ~xex01:0V yetP exlhwv Mylt> 1:IV(
ql'l)<7LV tlvexl. "... the proportion of the mixture is harmony and soul. That is just
the question (1:ou't6 yt) one might put to Empedocles too. For he says that each
of them (sc. each of the animal "parts", specifically flesh and bone, see 408aI4-15)
is (sc. what it is) in virtue of some proportion."
8 See fr. 98, quoted by Simplicius, in Ph. 32.6-10. The fragment concludes (v.5) EX
'twv extIJ.&. 'tt y€v'to xexi &/../..'I)t; t'ffitex oexpx6t;. The meaning is not, as it is thought to
be by Empedocles' most recent editor (Inwood, 1992, p.247), "blood" and "other
kinds of flesh", but "blood and flesh as well". See LSJ, s.v. &/../..Ot;, 11 8 (p.70).
9 See fr. 96, quoted by Aristotle, De Anima 1.5 41Oa4-6 (vv. 1-3), and by Simplicius,
in Ph. 300.21-24 (four verses). I adopt Sider's '6tOltto(TlolV (1984, p.17) for the
questionable form '6tOltto('I)'6tV, recorded in the manuscripts of Simplicius. In the
penultimate verse of the fragment, Empedocles writes: 'tet 0' oodex /..tUXet y€vov'to.
Lloyd (1966, p.274) translates "the white bones came into being". This is almost
certainly wrong: 'tet ot is here much more likely to be, not the definite article, but a

52 Denis Q'Brien
The "soul" and "Love": Aristotle's paired questions

Aristotle continues with an intricate series of paired questions. A first pair
of questions relates to "soul", De Anima 1.4 408a20-21:
1to-n:pov ouv 6 f..6yo~ EO·t1.v ~ ~UX~, ~ IlflAAOV Ete:p6v tL ouoex EYYIVe:texL tOLe;
Il€pe:mvj
Very well, so (ouv) is soul the proportion, or is soul rather something else,
that comes to be present in the parts?10
This is followed by two pairs of questions, obviously intended as in
some way an explicitation of the initial pair of questions relating to soul,
but where Aristotle writes, not of soul, but of Love, 408a21-23:
~tL OE: 1t6te:pov ~ q,LAlex tfie; tux06oT)~ ex!t(ex Il(~e:we; ~ tfi~ xexta tOV f..6yov, xexl.
exUtT) 1t6te:pov 6 f..6yoe; EOtl.v ~ 1texpa tOV f..6yov Ete:p6v tLj
What's more (hL ot), is Love the cause of chance mixture or of proportion-
ate mixture, and supposing she is the latter, is she (xexl. exUtT)) the proportion,
or something else (he:p6v tL), alongside and in addition to (1texpa) the pro-
portion? 11
demonstrative pronoun, as frequently in Homer (cf. LSJ, S.v. b, ~, "t6, A (p. 1194»,
with "bones" as the complement, not the subject of the verb. The meaning will be
that "these things" ("t& ot, i.e. the "parts" already named) "became bones". Lloyd
adds (1966, p. 274, n. 3): "The sentence may refer not to the creation of bones,
but to their arrangement in the body." This gives an impossible time sequence.
The perfect participle (cipllP6"tcx) cannot but refer to an action prior to that of
the leading verb (here y&vov"to). (See Goodwin (1897, p. 48, § 142).) The participle
cannot therefore refer to "the arrangement" of bones "in the body" (cf. cXPllP6"tcx)
subsequently to their formation (cf. ytvov"to). It is the "parts" (cf. "t& ot), not
the "bones", that are "joined by the glues of Harmony" prior to their becoming
bones. 'APIlOV(ll, here as in fr. 27.3, I take to be one more in the varied list of names
that Empedocles uses to describe the cosmic principle <PIA6"t1lc; (fr. 17 et alibi),
along with KU7tplC; (frs 73.1, 75.2, 95 and 98.3), 'Acppooi"tll (frs 71.4 and 87), I:"topy~
(fr. 109) and <PIA(ll (in the Strasbourg papyrus, d 3). Jean-Claude Picot will, I hope,
soon be writing on the reference of the expression I have translated as "the gleam
of Nestis" (v. 2: N~a"tlooc; cxtYAllC;)'
10 The disjunction in the Greek is marked more strongly than it can be in a straight-
forward English translation. Aristotle writes: 1t6upov ... ~ ... Literally: "whether
... or ... " The difficulty is that, in modern English, that form of disjunction is
possible only in an indirect question. To admit the same disjunction in a direct
question, one would have to resort to a heavy-handed paraphrase: "Very well then
(cf. oiJV) , which of two things is it going to be: is soul the proportion, or is soul
rather something else, that comes to be present in the parts?"
11 Again, the explicitly disjunctive form of question (1t6upov ... ~ ... ) is possible
in English only for an indirect question. Aristotle first asks whether (7t6upov ... )
Love is cause of chance mixture or whether (~ ... ) she is cause of proportionate
mixture, and secondly whether, if the latter (xcxl cxihll 1t6"te:pov ... ), she is the
proportion itself or whether (~ ... ) she is something else alongside and in addition
to the proportion. The repetition brings out the proximity, at this point, of the
two notions of Love as "cause of proportionate mixture" and as the "proportion"
itself, in so far as an affirmative answer to the second member of the first question
(Love as "cause of proportionate mixture") is presupposed by the first member of
the second question (Love as the "proportion" itself). Hence my translation of xcxl

The question whether Love is cause of a chance mixture is in this

context a mere side issue. Aristotle knows perfectly well that the elements
which made up bone or flesh had to be mixed in a certain proportion to
produce the required result. When several pages later he quotes the verses
which specify the ingredients that make up bone (fr. 96), he prefaces his
quotation with the obvious remark that the elements which produce bone
cannot be mixed "any old how" (omuooOv), but have to follow a specific
formula. 12
If therefore we leave aside what is clearly, at this point, a diversionary
tactic, then the paired questions that Aristotle asks of "soul" and the
second of the two pairs of questions that he asks of "Love" are to all
intents and purposes the same. In the first question of each pair, Aristotle
writes, first of the soul and then of Love, as the "proportion". In the
second question of each pair, he writes, first of the soul and then of Love,
as "something else", in addition to the proportion.
The first question in each pair
- Is soul the proportion (Tt61:e:pov [... ] 0 Myoe;; e:01:LV ~ tJiuX~)?
- Is Love the proportion (... XCXL cx\hT} [sc. ~ «PLA(CX] Tt61:e:pov 0 MyoC;;
e:01:(v)?
The second question in each pair
- Is soul "something else" (g1:e:p6v 1:L) that "comes to be present in the
parts" (e:YY(Ve:1:CXL 1'OLe;; IlEpe:mv)?
- Is Love "something else" (g1:e:p6v 1:L), "alongside and in addition to
the proportion" (Ttcxpa 1:QV Myov)?
The paired questions that Aristotle asks of Love are essentially no dif-
ferent from the paired questions he asks of soul. The repetition gives the
game away. Seen through Aristotle's eyes, Love and the soul, so the crit-
icism of the De Anima implies, are in Empedocles' philosophy the same.
Cl\;'"/) as "and supposing she is the latter, is she ... " See also the footnote but one
following this.
12 Aristotle, De Anima 1.5 41Oa1-3: ou yap 01tIilOOUV EXOV"tCl "tet O"tOLXt'LCl "tOU"tIilV ~XClO
"tOY, &AAet A6YIjl "tIVL XCl\ ouv6toea, xClil&'1ttp CjI"/)o\ XCl\ 'El1ltt50XAijC; "to Oo"touv. "The
elements that make up each of the animal parts are not arranged any old how.
No, they have to be arranged in some specific proportion and combination, which
is just what Empedocles for one does say of bone." The expression AOYIjl "tIV\ XCl\
ouviltotl (including the use of the indefinite pronoun, but with a different conjunc-
tion) is repeated from Aristotle's description of harmony at lA 407b32-33 (Myoc;
"tIC; [... ] ~ ouviltaLc;). The repetition brings out the point that Aristotle does not
take seriously the possibility that, in producing animal parts, Love was cause of
a chance mixture (cf. 408a22). The allusion to chance is here more of a sideways
glance at a much wider question, which Aristotle makes much of in the Physics
and elsewhere, namely the question whether there is a cause higher than Love and
Strife, a cause which determines their activity at any point in the cosmic cycle.
See Ph. 11.4 196a19-24; GC 11.6 333b33-334a9. For the background to Aristotle's
criticism on this count, see Q'Brien (1969, pp. 213-214).

54 Denis Q'Brien
The principle which determines the mixture of the elements in animal

bodies, and which Aristotle here casts as an (unsuccessful) candidate for
soul, is what Empedocles calls Love. 13
"Souls" and "daimones"

That association of ideas is less strange than it may seem if we suppose
that Aristotle has in mind Empedocles' conception of the daimones.
Empedocles' account of transmigration in the Purifications ends with
the poignant cry (fr. 115.13): "I too am now one of them, an exile from the
gods and a wanderer." The beings with whom Empedocles here associates
himself are so many daimones (cf. v. 5), tossed from sky to sea, from sea
to land and from land to "the rays of the shining sun" (vv. 9-11), as they
"tread in turn the bitter paths of life" (v. 8), "born in the course of time"
as all the different types of mortal creature that inhabit the different parts
of the cosmos (cf. v. 7).
Scholars have long puzzled over the identity of the transmigrating
daimones of the Purifications. The simplest explanation is that they are
isolated pieces of the cosmic principle of Love, the very principle portrayed
as responsible for the making of animal parts in the poem On Nature.
In both poems, Empedocles' world will have comprised the same four
elements (earth and water, air and fire) and the same two cosmic powers,
Love and Strife, with the daimones, who appear in both poems, not some
extraneous race of beings, but so many manifestations of Love when she
has been subjected to the divisive power of Strife. 14
13 Philosophically minded readers are liable to be distracted at this point by the
distinction between soul as "proportion" (cf. 408a20) and Love as "cause" of the
proportion (cf. 408a22). In the context of Aristotle's argument, that distinction is
subordinate to the difference between a principle which is the proportion (or cause
of the proportion) and an entity which has an existence independently of that of
which it is the proportion (or cause of the proportion). So much is clear from the
sequence of thought in the two pairs of questions concerning Love (see the footnote
but one preceding this). Aristotle first asks "whether Love is the cause of chance
mixture or of proportionate mixture" (408a21-22: lt6upov ~ tPL),(l 'tlie; 'tuxoua'l)e;
(ll't(l (J.(~&we; ~ 'tlie; X(l'tcl 'tOY )'6yov). He continues: "and is she the proportion,
or something else, alongside and in addition to the proportion?" (408a22-23: X(ll
(llh'l) lt6upov 6 Myoe; ta'tlv ~ It(lPcl 'tOY Myov ~up6v 'tLj) Whether Love is "the
proportion" (lt6upov 6 )'6yoe; ta't(v) summarises a supposedly affirmative answer
to the question whether Love is "cause of proportionate mixture" (lt6'te:pov [... J
(lh(l (J.(~e:we; [... J 'tlie; X(l'tcl 'tOY Myov), and exactly repeats the form of words used
of soul in the lines immediately preceding (408a20: lt6upov [... J 6 Myoe; ta'tlv ~
tIIuX~). Love as "proportion" is opposed, not to Love as "cause" of the proportion,
but to Love as "something else, alongside and in addition to the proportion", in
the same way that soul as "proportion" is opposed to soul as "something else, that
comes to be present in the parts" .
14 I do no more than re-state the interpretation of daimones as parts or pieces of
Love given in Q'Brien (1969, pp. 325-336, and 1995, pp. 442-443). Cf. Martin and

So it is that, in the passage quoted from the De Anima, Aristotle can

speak, in one and the same breath, of Love and the soul. The individual
daimones, inhabiting successively the bodies of plants and animals, Aris-
totle sees as so many transmigrating souls, a conflation of ideas which
will become common coin in later accounts of Empedocles' philosophy.15
Those same souls or daimones are none other than fragmented particles
of the cosmic god of Love.
Aristotle's impossible alternative

No less significant than the obvious parallelism between "Love" and "the
soul" (or daimon) is the answer to the question that Aristotle has asked.
Is soul/is Love the proportion or something other than the proportion,
something which exists "alongside the proportion" and which "comes to
be present in the parts"? Aristotle presents his question as an alterna-
tive: which is it, one or the other? Empedocles' answer would have been
"both" .16
The Love which is "Harmony" (cf. fr. 96.4), and which joins the ele-
ments to form bones, flesh and blood, is herself a being extended in space
and moving from place to place, including therefore, as we can infer from
Aristotle's passage, being "present in the parts" of mortal creatures. 17
She is at once the "proportion", or cause of the proportion, and herself
present in the elements that are proportioned in the way that she desires
them to be.
So it is that, when Empedocles first seeks to impress upon Pausanias
the existence and the importance of Love (fr. 17.20-26), he says both that
Love is "embedded in mortal limbs" (v. 22), and that it is because of the
presence of Love in their limbs that people "think kindly thoughts and
accomplish deeds that fit well together" (v. 23). Love's presence and Love's
influence would have seemed to Empedocles inseparable: Love produces
Primavesi (1999, pp. 90-95).
15 See especially Plutarch, De Exilio 17 607C-D, and Hippolytus, Refutatio Omnium
Haeresium, VII 29-31. For both texts, see O'Brien (2001).
16 As already noted, the edge to Aristotle's question is more obvious in Greek than
it is in English. In the sentences quoted above, the same explicitly disjunctive
form of question (lt6"ttpov ... ~ ... ) is used once for "soul" (408a20-21) and twice
for "Love" (408a21-23). The three successive uses of the same disjunction bring
out Aristotle's insistence that Empedocles has to choose. In the first and the last
question of the series, Aristotle hammers home the point: Is soul - is Love - the
proportion itself, or something other than the proportion? She has to be one or the
other. She cannot be both. By the very form of his question, Aristotle has excluded
what would have been Empedocles' own answer.
17 Love is "a being extended in space": see fr. 17.20, where Love is said to be "equal
in length and breadth". "Moving from place to place": see fr. 35, where, as her
power increases, Love follows close on the heels of Strife as he withdraws to "the
outermost boundaries of the circle" (v. 10).

56 Denis O'Brien
the effects she does because she is "embedded" in our limbs; because she
is "embedded" in our limbs, she produces the effects that we can see. So
it is in human behaviour (fr. 17.22-23); so it is also in the formation of
bones (fr. 96), flesh and blood (fr. 98).18
Empedocles' unconscious materialism

For Aristotle, that mutual entailment betrays, nonetheless, an impossible
conjunction of ideas. If Love is herself present as a ~"te:p6v "tL, "a something
other", "a something extra", in the limbs of man and beast, then she
cannot also be the ratio, the logos according to which the elements that
make up the limbs are ordered.
So far as Aristotle is concerned, Love is either the logos, the proportion
of elements that make up bones and flesh, or "something other" than
the proportion, a substance in her own right. She cannot be both. To
Aristotle's way of thinking, Love cannot, at one and the same time, be an
independent entity somehow present in the mixture and the "proportion"
of the mixture, both a "substance" and a "harmony".
But that is just what Empedocles did think she was, a divine power
extended in space and moving from place to place, at once Harmony (a
proper name) and cause of harmony. But Empedocles' world, a world of
unconscious materialism which we can still glimpse in the objections put
forward by Simmias in the Phaedo, has so disappeared from view by the
mid-fourth century that Aristotle can treat that whole cast of ideas with
18 Two qualifications are needed at this point. (1) In fr. 17, Empedocles is speaking to
Pausanias. When he tells him to "see with the mind" (cf. v. 21: 't~v av v6'1l 5tpxev)
the Love that is "embedded in mortal limbs" (v. 22), he is therefore speaking of
the present world. As noted above, Love's production of animal parts, specifically
including bone, was in all probability taken from the account given of Love's ac-
tivity in a world that follows the total separation of the elements and therefore in
a world other than our own (see again O'Brien (1969, pp. 200-203». I nonetheless
assume the modalities of Love's action (the way in which her influence is exercised)
to be the same in either world. (2) In admitting - indeed in emphasising - that, in
Aristotle's words, the soul which will prove to be none other than Love "comes to
be present in the parts" (De Anima 1.4 408a2I, as quoted above), I do not mean
that Love comes to be present as an additional ingredient in the mixture, as one
more in the list of elements that make up blood or bone. When Empedocles lists
the eight "parts" that make up bone (fr. 96), "Harmony", though essential to the
formation of bone (cf. v. 4), is not included as one of the numbered "parts". When
Aristotle writes, in a different context (Metaph. XII.IO I075a38-b6), that Love is
"a part of the mixture" (1075b4: 116pLov [... ) 'tou Il(Yllot'tOC:), he again plays upon
the ambiguity that underlies his questions in the De Anima. In so far as Love is
"a part of the mixture" she has to be counted, in Aristotle's eyes, as a material
cause. But in that case, so Aristotle asks complainingly, how can she be, at the
same time, a moving cause? The answer is, again, that Love may be, in Aristotle's
terms, a "part" of the mixture; she is not therefore an ingredient in the mixture,
even though she is indeed present in the mixture.

what we may be tempted to think is feigned incomprehension, but what

is perhaps more likely to be genuine lack of understanding. 19
n. De Caelo 1.9
Beings who live beyond the outermost circumference
of the heavens
With so inauspicious a beginning, one might well expect the influence

on Aristotle's writings of what he considers to be Empedocles' "soul" to
be nil. And so indeed it very nearly is, except for one curious passage
which has intrigued and puzzled commentators from Simplicius onwards.
In chapter 9 of book one of the De Caelo, after having assured us, at
length and in detail, that outside the heavens there is neither place, nor
void, nor time, Aristotle continues with a lyrical description of beings who
nonetheless have their home there, and who are all the better off for being
unencumbered with body, beyond the reach of both place and time.
"Outside the heavens"

The scene is set with a few deft moves (279all-18). "Outside the heavens
there is neither place, nor void, nor time.,,2o For place, void and time all
depend upon the presence of a body. Place is what can receive a body.21
Void, "or so they say", is where there is no body, but where there might
come to be one. 22 Time is the measure of movement, and without a phys-
19 "Unconscious materialism" is a deliberately elliptical expression. Readers who
would like to know more may care to glance at O'Brien (1989, 1990 and 1991); see
also O'Brien (1969, pp. 237-251 (the final chapter of Empedocles' cosmic cycle)).
Simmias' objection, in the Phaedo, that the soul is a "harmony" (85e3-86d4), re-
minds Echecrates of something that he had always believed or half-believed (cf.
88d3-6), words which may indicate that the belief in question was Pythagorean,
even if not exclusively so (see Ebert (2004, pp. 288-289)). The burden of Socrates'
long reply (91c6-95b4) is precisely that the soul as "harmony" could not exist
independently of whatever is "harmonised"; in the words of the De Anima, the
soul as "harmony" is a )'6yoc;, and cannot therefore also be a /:up6v "tL. Aristotle's
criticism of Empedocles in the De Anima, taken together with Socrates' reply to
Simmias, and by implication to Echecrates, in the Phaedo, points to an earlier way
of thinking which would have seen no need to keep the two arms of the disjunction
apart.
20 De Caelo 1.9 279all-12: ... ouM "t6ltoc; ou5e: XtVOV ou5e: Xp6voc; E:C1"tLV e:~(o) "tou
OUpCltVOU.
21 De Caelo 1.9 279aI2-13: E:V &ltCltV"tL yilp "t61t1jl 5uvCIt"tov UltlXp~CltL aWI1C1t. I turn to a
closer examination of these words later in my essay (§ III sub finem).
22 De Caelo 1.9 279aI3-14: XtVOV 5' tlvClt( cpCltaLV E:V iji 11~ tvUltlXpXtL aWI1C1t, 5uvCIt"tov 5'
ta"tL ytvtatlCltL. "Or so they say" (cpClta(v), because Aristotle does not himself believe
in the existence of a void (Ph. IV.6-9).

58 Denis O'Brien
ical body there can be no movement. 23 But "it has been shown that, out-
side the heavens, there neither is, nor can there come to be, a body". 24
"It is clear, therefore, that outside the heavens there is neither place, nor
void, nor time." Q. E. D.25
Enter the dramatis personae. Since, outside the heavens, there is nei-
ther place nor void nor time, those who have their home there, so Aristotle
tells us, are not in place, De Caelo 1.9 279a17-22:
. .. CPCXV~PDV apcx o"n o!h~ X~VDV o!h~ Xp6voc:: EO·t\V E~W'I')~V' OL61t~p o!h' EV
't61tCp 'tax~L 1tltcpux~v, oun Xp6voc:: CXll'tlX 1tOL~L YTlpaoX~Lv, ouo' Eo"-Lv OUO~VDC::
OUO~Il(CX 1l~'tcx[30)..~ 'tWV U1tE:P 't~v E~w'ta'tw 't~'tCXYlltvwv cpopav, &A),,' aVcxAAoLw'tCX
xcx1. a1tcx'l')Tj 't~v ap(o'tTlv EXOV'tCX ~w~v xcx1. 't~v cxu'tcxpx~o'ta'tTlv OLCX't~)..~L 'tDV
a1tcxv'tcx CXLWVCX.
It is obvious therefore that, outside (se. the heavens), there is neither place
nor void nor time; so it is that the beings there are not of such a nature as
to be in place, nor does time work upon them to age them, nor indeed is
there any change of any kind for those who are ranged above and beyond
(U1ttp) the outermost movement. Instead, dispensed from all alteration and
immune to change, they continue in possession of the best life and the most
self-sufficient for all eternity. 26
23 De Caelo 1.9 279a14-16: Xp6voc; 5~ &P1i}110C; XIV~Oe:WC;' x(vTiolC; 5' live:u CPUOIXOU
OWl1cx'tOC; OUX 1:0'tIV. Aristotle repeats (or anticipates) the definition of time as the
measure of movement given in Ph. IV.1O-14 (see esp. cap.ll 219b1-2).
24 De Caelo 1.9 279a16-17: !:~w 5~ 'tou oupcxvou 5t5e:lx'tcxl O'tl oth' e:0't1V olh' tv!itXe:'tCXI
ye:vtoi}cxl oWl1cx. The reference (5t5e:lx'tcxl) is to the passage immediately preceding
(278b21-279all).
25 De Caelo 1.9 279aI7-18: cpcxve:pov lipcx O'tl olhe: 't6ltoc; othe: xe:VO'll othe: Xp6voc; &O'tLV
€~wi}e:v. The closing sentence of the sequence repeats the opening sentence (279all-
12, quoted above, n.20). Hence my Q. E. D.
26 "Outside (se. the heavens)": !:~wi}e:v (279aI8). The reference of the adverb has been
clearly specified in the lines preceding (279aI2: e:~w 'tou oupcxvou, a16: €~W 51; 'tOU
oupcxvou). "The beings there are not of such a nature as to be in place": oth' &'11
't6lt'll 't&:Xe:llttCPUXe:v (279a18). Guthrie (1939, p.91) adopts the meaning "born":
"Wherefore neither are the things there born in place." The reference to "birth"
seems to me inappropriate for beings of whom we are told, at the end of the same
sentence, that they continue forever (cf. 5Icx'te:Ae:L 'tov IiltcxV'tcx cx[wvcx). The gods of
Homer, it is true, have all been born and yet will never die. But in Aristotle's
universe it is surely much more probable that a being which continues forever has
had no beginning. The implication of the verb in this context I therefore take to
be that the beings in question are not "of such a nature" as to be in place, a use
of the verb well attested in the classical period (see LSJ, S.u. cpuw, B, II (pp. 1966-
1967». Aristotle's point is not that "the beings there" were not "born in place"
(leaving open the possibility that they might have been "born", but not in place);
his point is that beings which are "outside the heavens" (be:L = e:~wi}e:v = e:~w 'tOU
oupcxvou) are not "of such a nature as to be in place" , since "outside the heavens"
there is no "place". The use of the verb is hardly different when Aristotle writes
of a body (the aether) that is "of such a nature as to move in a circle", De Caelo
1.2 269b4-6: lttcpuxe:v [... ] XUXA'Il cptpe:oi}CXI, emphasising that it does so "according
to nature": xcx'ta cpUOIV. Aristotle's point is simply that the movement of the aether
is "by nature" circular, not that the aether was ever "born" or ever came into

Discordant voices
Those few sentences have roused a babel of discordant voices from An-
tiquity to the present day. Jaeger claims the whole passage (from 279a17,
the sentence preceding the introduction of ,cix€'L, to 279b3) as a verbatim
extract from Aristotle's De Philosophia, which is indeed referred to, by
name, at one point in Simplicius' commentary on the piece. 27 Untersteiner
therefore included the passage in his edition of the fragments of the De
Philosophia, and added an extensive commentary.28 Others have been less
impressed by Jaeger's arguments. Cherniss protests that Simplicius' ref-
erence "has no evidentiary value" .29 Elders dismisses Jaeger's thesis as
"baseless" .30
Unfortunately, neither Jaeger nor Jaeger's adversaries have done much
to clarify the content of the passage. Jaeger tells us merely that "the beings
there" (279a18: ,cix€'L) are "the transcendental" , a remark which, unless we
know what "the transcendental" is in the De Philosophia, serves merely to
explain obscurum per obscurius. 31 Since Jaeger believes that the theory
of an unmoved mover found a place in the De Philosophia, the reader
is perhaps intended to identify "the transcendental" with the unmoved
mover (or perhaps, given the plural, with a plurality of unmoved movers).
But Jaeger does not himself make that claim in the pages given over to
his account of the passage from De Caelo 1.9.
Elders does at least put a name, or rather several names, on "the
beings there" (279a18: ,cix€'L). They are, he tells us, "forms, mathematical
entities or souls" .32 By casting his net so wide, Elders must have thought
to satisfy even the most pernickety critic. But in fact none of his potential
candidates fits the bill at all easily. (1) The beings that Aristotle speaks
of have "life" (279a21). To claim that Aristotle's "forms" are alive is to
have Aristotle anticipate the forms of Plotinus' intelligible world, each
of which is a living intellect - but does Elders really mean to claim so
being. We are specifically told that the movement of the aether will never end (cf.
De Gaelo 1.9 279b1-3), and there is no implication that it could ever have begun.
- My translation of 'tQV (1ltClV'tCl Cl!WVCl (279a22) as "for all eternity" is of course a
mere convenience. "Eternal" and "eternity" take their colour from the context (cf.
O'Brien (1985»; the "eternity" of Aristotle's Cl!WV is that of an endless duration
(cf. 279a22-28).
27 Jaeger (1923 (cf. 1955), pp. 316-320). Simplicius, in Gael. 289.1-2.
28 Untersteiner (1963, pp. 58-59, fr.29, text and translation; pp. 285-295, commen-
tary).
29 Cherniss (1944, p. 587).
30 Elders (1966, p. 149). Here and in the pages that follow, I am quoting only a fraction
of the vast literature that, in one way or another, has to do with this passage.
31 Jaeger (1923, p.317): "das Transzendente."
32 Elders (1966, p. 144).

60 Denis 0 'Brien
much?33 (2) The thesis that Aristotle's "mathematical entities" have life
is equally precarious. Xenocrates did indeed claim that soul was a number,
but "a moving number" , whereas Aristotle's supracelestial beings have no
body and are not in movement. Are we therefore to suppose that Aristotle
has taken over Xenocrates' "self-moving numbers", but deprived them of
movement?34 (3) Hardly more plausible is Elder's claim that the beings
outside the heavens are "souls". He presumably means disembodied souls.
But even disembodied souls either have had, or presumably one day will
have, a body. If, at some stage in their career, souls have been, or will be,
joined to a body, how can it be that, "for all eternity" , they are "dispensed
from all alteration and immune to change" (279a20-22, quoted above)?35
One can only smile when, with so many questions left unasked and
unanswered, Elders awards his reading of the passage an alpha double-
plUS: "The chapter is an admirable piece of work, well written, clear and
pleasant in its argumentation.,,36 But Elders is not alone. Even serious
scholars are led to deny the obvious meaning of the words before them.
"In the De Caelo we are enabled to see a stage of Aristotle's thought at
which the sphere of the fixed stars, the highest corporeal entity, is at the
same time the highest entity of all." 37 Whatever else we may be sure of, it
is that the beings living beyond space and time, and free from movement,
do not have a body, and yet are in no way inferior to beings that do have
one. If the De Caelo bears witness to a "corporealist" stage in Aristotle's
philosophy, it also bears witness to its opposite.
Guthrie earlier expresses the same conviction in terms not of body, but
of matter: "Aristotle must have gone through a stage of pure materialism
[... ], represented by at least the first book of the De Caelo.,,38 To justify
that interpretation, he claims that the sentences describing -coo<e:'L are no
33 For each of Plotinus' forms to be a living intellect is the natural reading of Enn.
V 9 [5) 8.1-7. Gerson (1994, p.55) disagrees.
34 Soul, for Xenocrates, was "a number moving itself", according to Plutarch, De
Animae Procreatione in Timaeo 1 1012D (Xenocrates, fr. 68 ed. Heinzej fr. 188 ed.
Isnardi Parente). Aristotle is scathing in his criticism of the theory (De Anima
1.4 408b32-409a30j cf. 1.2 404b27-30).
35 But does Elders perhaps refer to the "souls" of the stars and therefore to souls that
are forever in the same state (whether we count that as "embodied" or "disem-
bodied")? Possibly. But could it have been said of the souls of stars that they were
"ranged above and beyond (UnEp) the outermost movement" (279a20) and there-
fore that they were "ranged above and beyond" those very objects (se. the stars)
of which they were the soul? Hardly likely, one would have thought. Certainly, if
that is what Elders meant, he should have said so.
36 Elders (1966, p. 149).
37 Guthrie (1939, p. xxix). Guthrie is commenting on several texts, notably the
description of the aether in the continuation of the present passage, De Gaelo
1.9 279a30-b3.
38 Guthrie (1933, p. 169).

more than a "note", designed to show that "if there is anything there
(se. "beyond the outermost sphere"), then the Platonists must have been
right in assuming it to have been ageless and divine" .39 But why the "if"?
There is no breath of a conditional clause at this point in the text of the
De Caelo.
Alexander's interpretation
Guthrie observes, seemingly with some satisfaction, that his general in-
terpretation is close to that of Alexander. 40 The coincidence is hardly
something to be proud of. Alexander (as reported at length by Simpli-
cius) sought to read back the description of the circular movement of the
aether at the end of the argument (279bl-3) into the account given of the
supracelestial beings at the beginning of the passage (279a18-22).41 When
Aristotle writes of the beatific beings as "beyond the outermost move-
ment" (279a20: (ntEP ,~v E:~w,(hw [... J cpopav), his meaning, so Alexander
would have us believe, is not that they lie totally outside the heavens, but
merely that they lie beyond the rectilinear movement of the four sublu-
nary elements (cpopa as distinct from 1te:pLcpopa), and that the supposedly
supracelestial beings (279a18: ,00ce:l:) are therefore none other than the
rotating aether. 42
Simplicius gives short shrift to so specious an argument. 43 When Aris-
totle claims that, outside the heavens, there is neither place nor void nor
time, it is because he has already demonstrated that "outside the heavens
there neither is, nor can there come to be, a body" (279a16-17). Whatever
else the beatific beings may be, they are not bodily. And therefore they
are not the aether. As for Alexander's would-be distinction between cpopa
and 1te:pLcpopa, a passage later in the De Caelo shows it to be groundless. 44
For, in an obvious reference to the present passage, Aristotle switches to
1te:pLcpopa in the place of cpopa. 45
39 Guthrie (1933, p. 168).

40 Guthrie (1939, p. xxxi, note a).
41 Simplicius, in Gael. 287.19-290.4.
42 Simplicius, in Gael. 287.30-288.6.
43 Simplicius, in Gael. 290.4-21.
44 Alexander's distinction: ap. Simpi., in Gael. 287.30-288.6. Simplicius' rejection of
the same: in Gael. 290.14-18. Alexander's distinction is repeated by Philoponus,
in Ph. 556.29-557.1.
45 Aristotle writes, De Gaelo 11.4 287a12-13: otOt~x'tcx~ o· Ih~ 'tije: &crXa.'tl}e: lttp~cpopae:
o\ht xtv6v tcr't~v l~(,)'I'}tv ou'tt 't6ltoe:. "It has been demonstrated that, outside the ex-
treme rotation, there is neither void nor place." The "demonstration" (cf. otOt~x'tcx~)
is rightly taken, by Tricot (1949, p. 78, n. 2) and by Moraux (1965, p. 65, n. 1 (=
p.159)), as a reference to De Gaelo 1.9 279all-18. The expression 'tije: tcrXa.'tl}e:
lttp~cpopac: [... ] e:~(,)'I'}tV in book two therefore repeats ontp 't~v &~(,)'ta.'t(,) [... ] cpopa.v
from book one (quoted above).

62 Denis O'Brien
Pepin's aether
We may perhaps hope to avoid Simplicius' all too obvious refutation
of Alexander's interpretation of the passage by adopting the variant of
Alexander's thesis put forward by pepin. Aether, so Pepin claims, in be-
ing distinguished from the four traditional elements, was not counted as
a "body".46
But even an "incorporeal" aether cannot, as Pepin supposes, be iden-
tified with "the beings there" (279a18: "teXXe:i:).47 For, whether or not aether
is counted as incorporeal, it is undoubtedly in movement, whereas "the
beings there" are specifically said to be not in time because they are not
in movement. 48
Pepin's error is indeed so obvious as to be puzzling. Pepin observes,
correctly, that absence of change (cf. I.9 279a19-20: ouo' Eo"thl ouoe:vo~
ouoe:fl(O( fle:"tcx(30A~) need not in itself imply lack of movement, since else-
where in the De Caelo the heavens are specifically described as "unchang-
ing" (II.6 288bl: eXfle:"tapAT]"tov).49 But when Pepin writes, on the same
page, that "aucune mention n'apparait de l'immobilite de ce principe"
(namely 279a18: "teXxe:i:), he seems not to have noted that, in the lines im-
mediately preceding the appearance of "teXxe:i:, the denial of time is specif-
ically tied to a denial of movement (cf. 279all-18).
It is much to be feared that, in seeking to discover the identity of "the
beings there" (279a18: "tcXxe:i:), Pepin has restricted his attention to that
part of the text of the De Caelo that is excerpted by Untersteiner in his
edition of the fragments of the De Philosophia. Untersteiner's "fragment"
runs from the sentence preceding the introduction of "teXxe:i: (279a17 sqq.),
and therefore subsequently to the mention of movement (279a14-16).50
But the words supposedly taken from the De Philosophia are introduced
by a connective particle (279a17: cpotVe:pov exPO( ... ), which cannot but
imply that the opening lines of the supposed fragment, in the context in
which they have come down to us, are intended as a continuation and
a consequence of the lines immediately preceding (279all-17). Time and
movement have there been excluded, along with place and void. 51
46 Pepin (1964, pp. 485-488).
47 Pepin (1964, pp. 469-471).
48 See again De Caelo 1.9 279a14-17 (quoted above n. 23 and n.24).
49 Pep in (1964, p.470).
50 Untersteiner (1963, pp. 58-59 (fr. 29», following in the footsteps of Jaeger (1923
(cf. 1955), pp. 316-320).
51 When Pepin returns to his thesis some years later (1971, pp. 214-216) the reader's
perplexity only increases. This is not simply because Pepin himself now refers to
aether as a "body" (p. 216); still more perplexing is it that Pepin prefaces his new
analysis (p.214) with a summary of the lines which he had seemed to leave out of
account in his earlier study (De Caelo 1.9 279all-17), and yet still clings to the
identification of "the beings there" (279aI8: 't&:xE:i) with aether. But how can one

Unmoved movers?
Are we therefore to suppose that the incorporeal and supracelestial beings
in the De Caelo are none other than the unmoved mover, or the unmoved
movers, known to us from Physics VIII and from Metaphysics XII? For
all his criticism of Jaeger's thesis, that is the interpretation adopted, with
due circumspection, by Cherniss, and by numerous other commentators. 52
The obstacle to such an interpretation lies in the continuation of the
passage, where we are told that there is nothing "more powerful" that
"will set in movement" (279a33-34: OlrrE y&p &AAo xpElnov €(HLV 0 1"L
XLV~crEL), and almost immediately afterwards that a body, not named but
presumably the aether, is forever in movement (279b1: CX1tCxucr1"OV o~ X(Vy)crLV
XLVE't1"exL EuMywc;).53
On any straightforward reading of those two sentences, what is left
unspecified as the object of the verb in the first sentence is none other
than the subject of the verb in the sentence that follows. The body that
is forever in movement (279b1: XLVE't1"exL) is not subjected to any more
powerful agency that sets it in movement (cf. 279a34: XLV~crEL).
If that construal of the passage is correct, the eternal movement of
the aether cannot easily be made dependent upon a mover that is itself
unmoved. Whatever the incorporeal beings at the beginning of the passage
may be (279a18-22), they cannot readily be identified as so many unmoved
movers, cause of the endless movement of the aether.
possibly identify "un corps en mouvement incessant comme est l'ether" (p.216),
with beings who have been introduced as lacking body, time or movement, in the
very sentences which Pepin has summarised only two pages earlier (279al1-17; cf.
p.214)? Pepin's claim (p.215) that his identification of "the beings there" with
aether "rend raison d'a. peu pres tous les details du texte" merely adds to one's
bewilderment. "Body" and "movement", or their absence, one would hardly have
thought could be discounted as mere "details".
52 Cherniss (1944, pp. 587-588). (For Cherniss' criticism of Jaeger's thesis, see n.29
above.) Cherniss writes, p.588: "Aristotle did at this time believe in some kind
of causal relation between them (se. the "external entities", i.e. "tclXEI, 279a18)
and the heavens." He concludes that our passage (De Caelo 1.9 279a11-b3) is
"evidence rather for an unmoved mover than against it". Among the "numerous
other commentators" are Tricot (1949, p. 45, n. 3), Berti (1962, pp. 316-319) and
Hussey (1983, p. 99), to name only a few.
53 I am not unmindful of Hahm's strictures (1982) on using the word "aether" even
when, as here (279bl-3), Aristotle writes only of a body which moves continuously
in a circle. But scrupulosity can, I think, be taken too far. Aristotle himself sanc-
tions the use of the word, if only on grounds of etymology (De Caelo 1.3 270b20-24),
and, although claiming that the word had been misused (see, for example, the con-
tinuation of the passage quoted, 270b24-25), he does not offer any alternative name
to celebrate his (re)discovery of an element other than the traditional four. There
seems to me little harm therefore in using "aether" to denote the "first body" or
the body that moves always in a circle, provide that we do not ascribe repeated
use of the word to Aristotle himself.

64 Denis O'Brien
Cherniss' long parenthesis

To circumvent that reading of the piece, and to restore the presence of the
unmoved mover, or unmoved movers, at the beginning of the passage (De
Caelo 1.9 279all-18), Cherniss has to suppose that the circular movement
of the aether which is spoken of at the end of the passage (279bl-3) is
directly derived from the absence of place, void and time outside the
heavens, as described at the beginning of the passage (279a17-18). All
the intervening material (279a18-35), or so he claims, including the denial
of a cause that sets in movement (cf. 279a34: XL'.I~O'€L), is an extended
parenthesis, which cannot therefore be taken as denying the existence of
a cause of movement for the aether.
But few readers will agree that the connection of thought given by
this division of the text is as "plausible" as Cherniss claims it to be. 54
Circular movement, so Aristotle argues (279bl-3), is endless because the
place where it ends is no different from the place where it begins. No little
ingenuity would be needed to derive that conclusion from the lack of place
outside the heavens (cf. 279a17-18).55
Simplicius' interpretation: a difference of reading

Like Cherniss, Simplicius seeks to identify the incorporeal and supraceles-
tial beings who are to be found "outside the heavens" (279a18-22) with the
unmoved mover, or the unmoved movers, cause of the unending movement
of the aether. Unlike Cherniss, Simplicius has no doubt that, at the end
of the argument (279a33-bl), the two sentences, as quoted (with XL'.I~O'€L
and XLV€1"rcxL), exclude the presence of an unmoved mover. To restore the
unity of the passage, he therefore brings forward an alternative reading:
XLV€L in the place of XLV€L1:CXL. 56
With the active form of the verb, the sequence of thought is wholly
different. The clear implication of the passage, once we adopt Simplicius'
alternative reading, is that there is no higher power that can set in motion
(279a34: XLV~O'€L) - not the body that is in movement (XLV€L1:CXL), but - the
agent that is cause of unending movement (279bl: XLV€L).
If the cause of unending movement (cf. 279bl: XLV€L in the place of
XLV€L1:CXL) is not itself set in motion by any higher power (cf. 279a34: XLV~O'€L),
54 Cf. Cherniss (1944, p. 588).

55 Cherniss' unspoken supposition is possibly that, since the outermost body (the
aether) has no place outside the heavens whither it can direct its movement, there-
fore it has to turn back upon itself and pursue a circular movement. A pretty
enough idea, but not one which has left any obvious trace in the first two books of
the De Gaelo.
56 Simplicius, in Gael. 290.21-292.7 (restoring X(V'/lOlV <XLV~O'€L> at 291.16). For the
difference of reading (xLv€i in the place of XLV€i'tClL), see 291.24-32.

it can properly be counted a mover that is itself unmoved and can therefore
be included among the incorporeal and supracelestial beings that appear
at the beginning of the passage (279al8-22).
An impasse
All well and good, one might think. But how far can we trust the alter-
native reading (279bl: XLV€L in the place of XLV€L-rCXL) that Simplicius found
"in some manuscripts" ?57 The active verb (XLV€L) was not the reading that
Alexander had before him, it was clearly not the reading of the manuscript
or manuscripts that Simplicius relied on for the rest of his commentary,
and it is not the reading found in any of our medieval manuscripts. 58 D.J.
Allan affords it a fortasse recte in his apparatus. 59 But one can hardly do
more.
The modern reader is therefore faced with an impasse. If we adopt an
active instead of a middle voice of the verb (XLV€L in the place of XLV€L-rcxL),
we can indeed make some sense of the whole passage as an - admittedly
exceptional - account of the beatific life of the unmoved mover, or un-
moved movers, cause of the endless circular movement of the aether, and
themselves "dispensed from all alteration and immune to change" , leading
"the best life and the most self-sufficient for all eternity" (cf. 279al7-22).
But however comfortable that reading of the passage may be ideologically,
even Simplicius is no more than half-hearted in his espousal of the lectio
facilior (XLV€L in the place of XLV€'L"tCXL).
If, instead, we keep to the lectio difficilior (XLV€L1'CXL in the place of
XLV€L), and if we still hope to give a unitary meaning to the whole passage,
we have to recognise that the incorporeal beings at the beginning of the
passage are not unmoved movers, cause of movement of the aether, but
some otherwise unknown incorporeal entities which, whatever their rela-
tionship (if any) with the endlessly moving aether, cannot be said to be
the cause of its movement.
The puzzle of a "location" where there is neither place nor void

At this point, therefore, the reader may be tempted to shrug his shoulders,
to suppose that we have to do here, not with a single text (whether or
not taken in part from the De Philosophia), but with a patchwork, put
together from bits and pieces that Aristotle wrote at different times and
for different purposes, with the description of the circular movement of
the aether (279bl-3) perhaps simply tacked on to the end of the passage,
57 Simplicius, in Gael. 291.25 (lv "CLaLV ttipov &:v"CLyplicpm.;).
58 For Alexander's reading (XLVtL"CotL), see Simplicius, in Gael. 291.26.
59 Allan (1936, ad loc.).

66 Denis O'Brien
with no continuous line of argument linking it to the material that goes

before.
However, before adopting that counsel of despair and turning our
backs on any attempt at a more detailed understanding of the passage,
I suggest that we return to look more closely at how it is that beings,
whoever or whatever they may be, can be said to be "located" (cf. 279a18:
't&X€'L), despite the absence of both place and void.
Ill. Physics IV.1-5

Aristotle's definition of "place"
First let us ask: is the account which Aristotle gives here of "place"
(279a12-13: "in every place it is possible for there to be a body") the
same as, or at least compatible with, the definition given of place in the
course of his detailed discussion and definition of place in book four of the
Physics?
The answer to that question is not as simple as one might think it
would be, if only because the definition of place given in Physics IV has
itself been misunderstood by commentators, both ancient and modern.
Before comparing the two conceptions of place (in De Caelo I.9 and in
Physics IV.1-5), we have therefore to establish precisely how it is that
Aristotle defines place in the Physics. 60
The supplement to the definition

At the start of his analysis, Aristotle outlines the model of a recipient,
which he later conveniently specifies as an amphora, filled in turn with air
and with water. It is "obvious", so Aristotle claims, that "the place and
the space, into which and out of which there passed in turn the water and
the air, is something other than those two bodies" .61
60 I do no more than summarise my understanding of the analysis of place put forward
in Ph. IV.1-5 208a27-213a11. I plan to publish a more detailed study elsewhere. In
writing of Aristotle's "definition" , I refer only to the first definition (Ph. IVA 212a5-
6a, quoted below), not to the revised version of the definition given later in the
same chapter (212a20-21).
61 Ph. IV.1 208b6-8: ... wa,t 5ljAOV ooe; ~v b ,6ltoe; ,I XClI ~ XWPCl htpov ilv-CjI0LV [sc.
,ou eXtpoe; XClI ,ou ~5Cl,0e;J, de; ilv t~ ~e; IJ.nt13ClAov. The expression ~v ,I picks up the
existential use of ~a,lv at the beginning of the passage (IV.1 208b1: [hi IJ.&V oiJv
ta,lv b ,6ltoe; ... ). I therefore translate the past tense (~v) by a present, on the
supposition that this is a "philosophical" use of the imperfect (see LSJ, S.v. dlJ.(
[sum], F (p. 489». Were it not so, the past tense would have to be adapted to the
time sequence of the movement of air and water, into and out of the receptacle

So much is perhaps clear enough. What is not immediately clear is

the use that the model is put to in the pages following, not least when, at
the end of his preliminary analysis of the various candidates for "place",
Aristotle offers as his own definition, Ph. IV.4 212a5-6a: 1:0 1tE:PCXC;; 1:0U
1tE:PLE:XOV1:0C;; aWflcx1:0C;; <xcri)' 8 aUVcX1t1:EL 1:<;) 1tEPLEXOflE:V4l>.
The supplement, printed here between angular brackets, is not to be
found in any extant manuscript of the Physics. It has nonetheless left
its mark in the Latin version of a translation of the Physics into Ara-
bic, a translation roughly contemporary with the oldest of our surviving
manuscripts (ninth century).62 It is also quoted, or referred to, in all three
of the ancient commentaries that have survived, by Simplicius, Philoponus
and Themistius. 63
The supplement is firmly anchored in the text by the sentence that
follows, 212a6a-7: Myw OE 1:0 1tEPLEXOflEVOV aWflcx .... "By the body that
is contained I mean ... " , a form of words which clearly requires the pres-
(ILE"ttI3CXAOV). Each time that air and water moved in and out of the recipient (cf.
ILE"ttl3cxAOV), "the place and the space" provided by the recipient "was something
other than the air or the water". Possible perhaps, but awkward. For ILE"t0t{3a.AAc.l
used to describe alternating actions (208b8: ILE"ttI3CXAOV, "there passed in turn"),
see Bonitz (1870), S.U. ILE"t0t{3a.AAELV, 459al1-13; cf. LSJ, S.u. ILE"t0t{3&.AAc.l A, III 2
(p.1110). Hussey seems not to have taken account of this use of the verb. His
rendering (1983, p.20) of ILE"ttl3cxAov (208b8) as "they moved in moving about", is
so awkward in English as to be almost meaningless.
62 See the apparatus to Ross (1936, ad loc.) and the note in his commentary (p.575).
See also Mansion (1923, p. 24). For the Latin text, Mansion refers (cf. pp. 13-14) to
an edition of Aristotle's works, in Latin, published in Venice in 1560 (details at the
end of the Bibliography). See tomus iv, folio 114 recto C, linea 2 ab imo (textus 38,
not, as Mansion claims, textus 39). For the Greek text (presumably taken from the
commentators, see below), Mansion refers to a posthumous printing of Erasmus's
edition of Aristotle's works, published at Basel in 1550 (again, details at the end of
the Bibliography). See [tomus il, p. 161, linea 5. For the background to the Arabic
translation, see Peters (1968, pp. 57-67). For more recent information, see Pellegrin
(2003, pp. 265-271), and my forthcoming study (see n. 60 above).
63 See again the apparatus to Ross (1936, ad loc.). Lang (1998, pp. 91-92) is wrong in
claiming that the additional words "appear only in the Arabo-Latin translation"
and doubly wrong when she writes (ibid.) of the "complete absence" of the words
"from the Greek tradition". Since the additional words are to be found (quoted or
paraphrased) in the commentaries of Simplicius, Philoponus and Themistius, they
clearly form part of a "tradition" and a "tradition" that cannot but be "Greek"
(see Ross' Introduction, p.103). Lang has perhaps failed to grasp the significance
of the sigla used at this point in Ross' edition of the Physics. S = Simplicius, who
records the additional words at in Ph. 580.3, 582.30 and 584.20. T = Themistius,
who records the additional words (but with xcxi}o in the place of xcxi)' 11 and with the
addition of aWlLcx"tL at the end of the sentence) at in Ph. 118.8-9. P = Philoponus,
who, here as elsewhere, aims to provide no more than a paraphrase and therefore
writes xcxi}o ltEPLtXEL "to ltEPLEX6ILEVOV in the place of xcxi}o auva.lt"ttL "tiji lttPLExolLtVCjl.
See in Ph. 585.13-14, and no less than three places in the Corollarium de loco
(563.32-33,567.4-5 and 6-7).

68 Denis O'Brien
ence of an expression referring to "the body that is contained" (cf. "tCl>

1te:PLe:XO(.Ut'V4> [sc. O'w(lomD in the sentence preceding. 64
Ross' interpretation of the supplement

But what precisely is the meaning of the supplement? If we adopt the
translation-cum-paraphrase given in Ross' editio maior and to be found
frequently elsewhere, Aristotle defines "place" as "the limit of the con-
taining body at which it is in contact with the contained" .65
Ross has presumably taken "the limit" ("to 1tEPCXC;) as the antecedent
of the relative pronoun (xoo')' 0) and "body" (O'W(lcx) as the subject of the
verb that follows (O'U'VcX1t"te:L). With this construal of the sentence, "place" is
"the limit of the containing body at which (sc. limit) it (sc. the containing
body) is in contact with the contained".
That understanding of Aristotle's definition has been taken from Sim-
plicius' commentary on the passage. The point of the supplement, so Sim-
plicius believes, is to provide a specification of the limit that constitutes
"place". "Place" is the inner, concave limit of the surrounding body (the
amphora), as opposed to the outer, convex limit of that same body. Only
the inner, concave limit is in contact with the body that is contained
(air, wine or water); only the inner, concave limit serves therefore as the
"place" of the body that at anyone time fills the amphora. 66
A statement of the obvious

But surely to say so much (or so little) is to state the obvious. Can Aris-
totle really have thought to warn his reader, at this late stage of his
argument, that the "place" of the body that is contained is the inner,
concave surface of the containing body, as opposed to the outer, convex
surface of that same body?
Can any reader or student have been tempted to think, following Aris-
totle's repeated use of the model of the amphora, that the outer, convex
64 Lang (1998, p.91) claims that, in the sentence following the definition (212a6-7),
!it "is probably adversative". Wrong again. The expression My!.) !it .. , occurs
very frequently in Aristotle's writings. The Physics alone provides some twenty
examples (easily recoverable from the computerised Thesaurus Linguae Graecae).
None is adversative.
65 Ross (1936, p.375). There is essentially the same translation in Hardie and Gay
(1930, ad loc.): "the boundary of the containing body at which it is in contact with
the contained body"; and in Hussey (1983, p.28): "the limit of the surrounding
body, at which it is in contact with that which is surrounded."
66 To make his point, Simplicius, in Ph. 579.37-580.6, compares the two surfaces of
the sphere of the moon. An outer, convex surface faces the planet Mercury. An
inner, concave surface faces the body below the moon, and therefore constitutes
the "place" of the sublunary world.

surface of the amphora constituted the place of whatever body (water,
wine, air) finds itself, at anyone time, inside the amphora? Simplicius'
reading of the definition may not falsify Aristotle's intention. But it surely
gives emphasis where none is needed.
A new translation of the supplement

The meaning of the supplement I take to be quite other. Aristotle's defini-
tion of "place" I suggest should be translated: "The limit of the containing
body in as much as it (sc. the limit) is in contact with the body that is
contained." The subject of the verb in the subordinate clause (cruVcl1t"te;L)
is not "body" (cf. "tOU [... ] crwflcx"tOC;), but "limit" (cf. "to 1t€pcxc;). It is "the
limit" of the containing body that is "in contact with" (cruVcl1t"te;L) the
body that is contained and which therefore fulfils the role of "place" in
Aristotle's definition.
That translation of the supplement requires only that we give to xoo<}'
o the meaning "in as much as", so allowing "to 1t€PCXC; to be taken, not
as the antecedent of the relative pronoun, as in Ross' translation (xoo<)' 0
= xcx"t& "to 1t€pcxc;), but as the subject of the verb that follows (cruVcl1t"te;L).
This is not only a perfectly well attested use of the expressionj 67 it is none
other than the meaning that has to be given to the supplement if, in the
place of xcx1')' 0, we adopt the reading xcxi)6, as given in the editions of
Themistius and Philoponus. 68
The purpose of the supplement

Read in this way, the supplement serves to bring out the purpose of Aris-
totle's definition, in its context. Aristotle had laid down, as one of the
preliminary conditions for a successful definition, that place should be
neither larger nor smaller than the object whose place it is. 69 At the
67 Cat. 12 14a26-28 (an example chosen at random): Xlltl' 8 ltpEa~UUpov tUpov &-tepou
XIlL ltll).1l16"tEPOV MYE"tIlI. One thing is said to be "prior" to another primarily with
reference to time, "in as much as one thing is said to be older and more ancient
than another" .
68 Ross prints Xlltl' 11 from Diels' edition of SimpJicius (1882, in Ph. 580.3, 582.30 and
584.20). The editions of Themistius (ed. Schenkl, 1900, in Ph. 118.8) and Philo-
ponus (ed. Vitelli, 1888, in Ph. 585.13) have xIlM. KIlM (one word) as opposed
to xa.t}' 11 (two words) may be no more than a difference of spelling (see LSJ, s.v.
xlltl6, I (p. 855); cf. s.v. xll"ta, B, IV 2 (p. 883»; even so, use of the contracted form
(xlltl6) excludes the translation that Ross has adopted, since it excludes the ref-
erence to a specific antecedent for the relative pronoun (Xlltl' 11 = XIl"tcX "to lttPIlC;).
The contracted form of the expression, as recorded in the editions of Themistius
and Philoponus (xlltl6), cannot but have the meaning that I have given to it (xlltl6
= quatenus, prout).
69 "We require that primary place should be neither smaller nor larger (se. than the
body whose place it is)" (Ph. IV.4 210b34-211a2: &;IOUIlEV 6~ [... ) "tOY ltpw"tov [se.

70 Denis O'Brien
same time, place has to be separable from that of which it is the place. 70
Those two, seemingly almost contradictory requirements, are satisfied by
defining place as a two-dimensional surface, "the limit of the surrounding
body".
Since a surface has length and breadth, but no depth, two surfaces
that are in contact, along the whole of their length and breadth, are no
different in size. Provided that there is no void, as in Aristotle's system
there cannot be, the inner surface of the amphora is therefore necessarily
of the same dimension as the outer surface of the air or water that fills
the amphora.
Even so, "place" can be separated from that of which it is the place,
in so far as the inner surface of the amphora will continue to exist, even
when the air that it contains has been replaced by water, or vice versa.
Air and the "place" of air (or water and the "place" of water) are therefore
not the same. Nonetheless, "place", defined as the "limit" or surface of
the surrounding body, is neither smaller nor larger than that of which it
is the place.
Those two features of Aristotle's characterisation of place give point
to the wording of the supplement: place is "the limit of the containing
body in as much as it is in contact with the body that is contained".
"The limit", and not "the body", is the subject of the verb that follows
the conjunction (>cad)' 0 aUVcXlt'te;L ••• , "in as much as it (se. the limit)
is in contact ... "), precisely because it is the "limit" or surface of the
containing body which is in contact with the body that is contained.
Because it is "in contact" with the body which it contains, "the limit"
fulfils the condition that place should be neither larger nor smaller than
the object whose place it is, even while being separable from it, since "the
limit" of the definition is the limit of the containing body and not the
limit of the body that is contained.
The paradox of place

Aristotle's definition of place rests, nonetheless, on a paradox. How can
a two-dimensional surface be the "place" of a three-dimensional body?
It may seem obvious to the modern reader, as it did to Philoponus, that
't61tovjlJ.~'t' tA&:'t'tw 1J.~'tt IJ.t1~w). What will prove to be place "is neither a part of (se.
and therefore smaller than) the thing that is in it, nor larger than the dimension
(se. of the thing that is in it), but equal" (Ph. IV.4 211a32-33: ouu /;O'tL IJ.tpoc; 'tou
tv cxu'tiji ou'tt IJ.t1~ov 'tou 1iLCXO't~IJ.CX'toc; [se. 'tou tv cxu'tijij eXAA'ioov).
70 "Place" can be separated from that of which it is the place (Ph. IV.2 209b21-24).
It does not "belong to the thing" (cf. IV.4 211al: 1J.'l!ii:v 'tou 1tpcXylJ.cx'toc;). It is "left
behind" when the body that it contains departs, and is in that sense "separable"
from the body that it contains (cf. 211a2-3: eX1toAt!1ttoilcxL b(cXo'to1) XCXL XWPLO'tOV
tlvcxL).

"place" must be, not the two-dimensional surface of the surrounding body,
but the three-dimensional volume circumscribed by the two-dimensional
surface of the recipient.
But Aristotle is adamant that that is not so. It is true that, in his list
of initial aporiai, Aristotle states both that "place" has three dimensions
and that it is not a body.71 But the aporia lies precisely in the conflict
between those two statements. A "limit" that was both three-dimensional
and bodiless would be, for Aristotle, a contradiction in terms. A point
is the "limit" of a line. A one-dimensional line is the limit of a two-
dimensional surface. A two-dimensional surface is the limit of a three-
dimensional body. But there is (certainly in Aristotle's sublunary world)
no three-dimensional object that is "bodiless", nor any four-dimensional
object which we could suppose to be bounded by a three-dimensional
"limit" .72
The solution that Aristotle offers to his aporia is precisely that "place"
is a two-dimensional "limit" (a surface therefore) which circumscribes a
three-dimensional object. Aristotle does not therefore suppose that "place"
is itself three-dimensional. The only three-dimensional extension surround-
ed by the two-dimensional surface that is "place" is that of whatever body
it is that is surrounded by the surface of the recipient.
The three-dimensional extension of the body that is surrounded does
not itself constitute a "place" (as Simplicius will claim it does), nor is
place a three-dimensional void that persists whether or not it is occu-
pied by body (this will be Philoponus' conception of "place"). "Place",
for Aristotle, is constituted exclusively by the two-dimensional surface of
the surrounding body. The three-dimensional volume circumscribed by a
two-dimensional surface has no existence other than as the extension of
whatever body is contained by the inner surface of the recipient. 73
71 "Place has three dimensions, length, breadth and depth, by which every body is de-
fined" (Ph. IV.l 209a4-6: !iLaa't~lJ.a:ta IJ.E:V ouv €XE:I 'tp(a, lJ.ijxo.; xal ltACl'tO'; xal (3&:60';,
01.; op(I;e:'taL ltaV aWlJ.a) is followed immediately by: "But it is impossible for place
to be a body" (209a6: ci5Uva'tov OE: aWlJ.a e:1vaL 'tOY 't6ltov). The two sentences are
clearly flagged as constituting an aporia. See, in the lines immediately preceding,
ciltop(av (209a2-3), and at the end of the passage ciltope:iv (209a30).
72 The existence, and even the possibility, of a fourth dimension is explicitly dis-
counted in the opening chapter of the De Caelo (I.l 268a9-bl0).
73 Lang (1998, pp. 66-121 (see esp. pp. 71-72 and pp. 103-110» argues at length, and
forcefully, against the view that the "limit" in Aristotle's definition of "place" is
a two-dimensional surface. This is because she has taken the two terms of Aristo-
tle's aporia (IV.l 209a4-6) at their face value, and has therefore concluded that
the "limit" of Aristotle's definition (IV.4 212a5-6) is both three-dimensional and
bodiless. A three-dimensional, bodiless "limit" would have been, for Aristotle, a
meaningless, if not an impossible, conception.

72 Denis O'Brien
Aristotle's misleading example

It is true that Aristotle has been, in a way, his own worst enemy, in so far as
the detailed description of a recipient with which he launches his analysis
has almost inevitably led commentators to suppose that "place" is indeed
in some way three-dimensional, answering to the three-dimensional vol-
ume running from wall to wall of the amphora and occupied successively
by air and by water or wine. 74
But Aristotle is not unaware of the danger since, in the chapters fol-
lowing, he has done his best to correct the erroneous impression that the
initial statement of his example might seem to suggest. So it is that he
writes, Ph. IV.4 211bl4-17:
OLa "to fle:"tex~cXAAe:LV ltoAMx~ flEVOV"tOC; "tOU lte:PLEXOV"tOC; "to lte:PLe:XOfle:vov xex1.
OLnPTlflEVOV, OLoV t~ &yye:(ou uowp, "to fle:"tex~u e:lvex( "tL ooxe:! OLcXo"tTlflex, wc; 5v
"tL ltcxpa "to o{;)flex "to fle:-6LO"tcXfJ.e:vov.
Since the body that is surrounded and that is divided (sc. from the recep-
tacle) frequently changes position to make way for another, as water does
when it leaves the vessel (sc. that contained it), while the surrounding body
stays put, what is in between (Le. what is in between the limits of the con-
taining body) seems to be an extension of some sort, as being something in
addition to the body that changes position. 75
Those words spell out clearly the conception that Aristotle's analysis
is designed to correct. They are followed (211b18) by a resounding "to 0'
oux EO'"tLV. "But that is not so." Aristotle does not allow that there can
be, within the amphora, an extension other than that of the body that
fills the amphora at anyone time. A fortiori no such extension can be
called upon to fulfil the role of "place" .
Exactly the same point is made in lines immediately preceding the
definition. Place is neither form nor matter, "nor is it an ever-present
extension of some kind, different from and in addition to the extension
of the object that changes position" (Ph. IV.4 212a3-5: OL<XO'i:'f)fl<X "tL &e:t
(m<xpxov E"te:pOV 1tQ(pa "to "tOU 1tP<XYflQ("toC; "tOU fle:~LO'"tQ(flevou). 76
74 Ph. IV.1 208b1-8 (air and water). Cf. IV.3 21Oa30-31 (wine).
75 The description of the body that is contained as "divided" (21lb16: OLnp'll1tvov) is
no more than the converse of Aristotle's earlier point that "place" can be separated
from that of which it is the place (Ph. IV.2 209b21-24, see n.70 above). The
two bodies, container and contained, despite being in contact, remain distinct.
"Division" will allow them to be separated one from the other without change of
nature or identity.
76 "Different from and in addition to": he:pov ltcxpci (212a4). For this translation of
the expression, see, for example, Aristotle's account of his "rediscovery" of aether,
De Caelo 1.3 270b20-22: htpou "tIvac; 5v'tOC; 'tOU ltpw"tou aWl1cx'tOC; ltCXpdt yijv xcxl ltUP
xcxl dtpcx xcxl uowp. "There being a distinctive (cf. 'tLv6c;) primary body, different
from and in addition to earth and fire and air and water."

What "appears" to be so, is not so

That explicit denial explains the two sentences which follow Aristotle's
definition of place, Ph. IV.4 212a10-12 and 13-14:
tVOEXe:O{}CXL yap cpCX(Ve:"CCXL e;lvCXL OLcXO"Cy]IlCX 1le:"Ccx~u aAAO "CL "CWV XLVOUIlEVWV Ile:ye:-
{}WV.
It appears that in between there can be an extension other than the mag-
nitudes that are in movement.
CPCXLVe:"CCXL yap ou 1l6vov "Ca 7tEPCX"CCX "Cou ciyye;!ou e:tVCXL 0 "C67toc;, cXAAa xcx!. "Co
1le:"Ccx~u WC; xe:VOV <ov>.
Place appears to be not only the limits [i.e. the inner limits] of the vessel,
but also what is in between, as though it were a void.
Commentators have been misled by Aristotle's repeated use of CPCXLVe:,CXL
(212alO-ll and 13). Aristotle is not here acknowledging that his definition
of place as a "limit" is misleading or inadequate. He is not conceding that
"place" is in some way to be identified with the "extension" that "lies
between" the inner limits of the containing body. For Aristotle's point is
not that what "appears" to be so, is so. On the contrary, his point is that
what "appears to be so", is not so.
So much is clear once we remember his vigorous retort, 211b18: ,0 0'
oux EC1"rLV. "Place" may "seem" to be the extension that "lies between" the
inner walls of the amphora. "But that is not so." "Place", for Aristotle,
is not a three-dimensional volume circumscribed by a two-dimensional
surface, "the limit of the containing body" .77
There is, within the amphora, no three-dimensional extension other
than that of the body that occupies a place. The "place" that it occupies is
constituted exclusively by the two-dimensional "limit", the inner surface,
of the body by which it is surrounded. 78
77 "Seems" (211b17: ooxti) and "appears" (212alO-ll and 13: cpCX(Vt"tCXI) are therefore
both used of what is not in fact so. The two uses of cpcx(vtoilcxl (what appears to
be so, and is not so, what appears to be so, and is so) are clearly distinguished by
Bonitz (1870), s.u. cpa!vtlv, 808b37-41.
78 King (1950, pp.87-88) has failed to take the measure of the two sentences fol-
lowing Aristotle's definition. Referring to the second of the two sentences (Ph.
IVA 212a13-14), he writes that Aristotle "occasionally refers to Place as simply a
two-dimensional locus", only to add that "in the course of discussion he becomes
aware that he is assuming more than this". He continues: "You cannot speak of
the bound of a container without implying some contained, not a particular con-
tained body, but a Ol<lo"tlllLCX W~ xtv6v, receptive of all body. Of course, Place is
not a mere OIa.O"tllILCX, an extension over and above the extended bodies, as Aristo-
tle says; but "to ILt"tCX~U W~ xe:v6v cannot be divorced from the notion of Place as
the bound of a container." (The expression "to 1Le:"t~U W~ xe:v6v is to be found at
Ph. IVA 212a14. The expression OIa.O"tllILCX W~ xe:v6v is King's own invention.) The
conception which King claims "cannot be divorced from the notion of Place as the
bound of a container" is precisely the conception that Aristotle aims to eschew.

74 Denis O'Brien
Conflicting conceptions of ''place''

A clear understanding of that distinction is essential when we return to
the brief account given of place in De Caelo 1.9, to be told that "in every
place it is possible for there to be a body". 79
On a first reading, those words could indeed be seen as happily adapted
to Aristotle's initial use of the example of the receptacle in Physics IV.
The receptacle provides "the place and the space" into which and out of
which there pass in succession water and air. BO What more natural there-
fore, or so one might think, than to say that "place" is that in which "it
is possible for there to be a body"? An obvious enough description, we
may be tempted to conclude, of what happens when air and water occupy
successively "the place and the space" provided by the receptacle.
But that is not Aristotle's view of the matter. With the definition
that Aristotle will give of his own concept of place, in Physics IV, the
inner surface of the recipient does indeed exist independently of whatever
three-dimensional body (air, water, wine) it may contain at anyone time.
However, Aristotle does not therefore think that the three-dimensional ex-
tension, circumscribed by the two-dimensional boundary of the containing
body, can properly be thought of independently of whatever body fills the
recipient. The inner surface of the recipient does not, as it were, mark out
a three-dimensional place waiting to be filled, nor does it mark out a place
that, when the body which filled it has departed, somehow continues as a
ghostly outline of the place that it once was.
And yet that would appear to be the conception of "place" which
Aristotle appeals to in De Caelo 1.9: "In every place it is possible for there
to be a body." Those words are most simply taken as implying, indeed
as expressing, the very view which the discussion of the Physics sets to
one side. "Place", in the Physics, is not a three-dimensional place which
a body can leave behind it, nor is it a predetermined three-dimensional
place which it can come to occupy. But how else are we to understand
the words of the De Caelo "in every place it is possible for there to be a
body" (279a12-13)?
Aristotle's words would here seem to imply the very conception of
place which the analysis of the Physics is designed to correct. "In every
place it is possible for there to be a body" fairly clearly implies that a
three-dimensional place exists prior to, and independently of, the body
that may come to be present in it.
79 De Caelo 1.9 279a12-13 (quoted above n.21).

80 Ph. IV.1 208b6-8 (quoted above n. 61).

Aristotle's change of mind

Should we therefore conclude that the concept of place which Aristotle
by implication appeals to, in denying that there can be place outside the
heavens (De Caelo 1.9), is deliberately introduced as not his own?
I think not. It is true that, when Aristotle introduces the parallel de-
nial of void (De Caelo 1.9 279a13-14), he lets it be seen (by the addition of
a tiny cpcxaLv) that the void which he denies can exist outside the heavens
is not a void that he himself believes can exist even inside the cosmos. But
the same can hardly be true of "place". Aristotle does not deny the exis-
tence of "place" as such. He is concerned only to deny its existence outside
the heavens. There would be little point in his denial of a conception of
place that he himself did not believe in.
Admittedly, in the text of the De Caelo following the denial of place
(cf. 1.9 279a12-13), there is a denial of time (279a14-16), which is cast pre-
cisely in terms of the definition of time worked out in the Physics (IV.lD-
14, esp. cap. 11 219bl-2: time as the measure of movement). The "time"
which Aristotle denies can be found "outside the heavens" is "time" as
defined in Physics IV, "time" as Aristotle himself conceives of it.
Nonetheless it seems to me reasonably clear that when, in the De
Caelo, Aristotle denies that there can be place "outside the heavens",
the concept of place which he appeals to does not answer at all easily
to the definition of place which he will establish in the Physics. On the
contrary, the "place" that Aristotle alludes to in De Caelo 1.9 answers to
the concept of place which the discussion of the Physics is designed to
correct.
I conclude therefore, quite simply, that the "place" which Aristotle
denies can exist "outside the heavens" is "place" as he himself conceives
of it at the time of writing, but that the conception of place taken for
granted in De Caelo 1.9 has been abandoned by the time that Aristotle
came to work out the definition of place put forward in the Physics. s1
81 In deference to "the hermeneutical circle" I should perhaps acknowledge as a possi-
bility that, having worked out his own definition of place in the Physics, Aristotle
reverted, in the De Caelo, to the common or garden conception of place that he
had earlier abandoned. Possible, perhaps. Probable, no. - Remarkably, neither Al-
gra (1995) nor Lang (1998) make any mention of the concept of place adopted in
De Caelo I.9. (Lang's line reference (1998, p.1l6) does not match her quotation.}
The omission is the more remarkable in Algra's book, in that the author finds a
"loose" and "unorthodox" use of topos in De Caelo book two, but fails to recog-
nise that the passage he has quoted is a reference to De Caelo I.9. When Aristotle
writes that "it has been demonstrated that there is neither void nor place outside
the extreme circumference" (De Caelo HA 287aI2-13: Bt5tLX'tCXL 5' IhL 't1je; taxcl"ty)e;
lttplcpopCie; olht XtVOV ta'tlV t~(1)tV olht 't6ltoe;), he does not, as Algra supposes,
refer to a "fact" which is "here taken for granted" (Algra, 1995, p. 185). On the
contrary, far from taking the point "for granted", Aristotle claims that it has been

76 Denis O'Brien
IV. De Caelo 1.7

"Outside the heavens": an inconsistency
The distinction on which that conclusion is founded may perhaps seem

over-subtle. The statement that "in every place it is possible for there to
be a body" (De Caelo 1.9 279a12-13) may seem a mere far;on de parler,
which it is wrong to seek to pit against the intricacies of Aristotle's analysis
of place in Physics book four. Not at all so subtle is the contradiction
between what Aristotle writes of place in De Caelo 1.9 and what we read
only two chapters earlier in the same treatise.
Aristotle's "disconnected jotting"

Aristotle is here concluding a first series of arguments (De Caelo 1.5-7)
designed to disprove the existence of a body infinite in extent. Since Aris-
totle's cosmos is finite, such a body, were it to exist, could be found only
outside the heavens. Hence the form taken by the conclusion to the first
set of arguments: "Outside the heavens, there is therefore no body that
is infinite."82 That conclusion is followed by a short additional argument
which has bafRed commentators, and which Guthrie goes so far as to call
"a disconnected jotting" .83
Despite Guthrie's comment, the connection of thought with the pas-
sage preceding is as clear as could be when Aristotle picks up from his
initial conclusion by writing, 275b8-9: CtAAa fl~v ouoe: flE:XPL 'tLV6c;;. "Nor
yet is there any body which stretches for a certain distance (sc. beyond
the heavens)." The introductory pair of particles (&AAa fl~V) falls squarely
within the range of meaning noted by Denniston: "Progressive: proceed-
ing to a new item in a series, introducing a new argument, or marking
a new stage in the march of thought." 84 Aristotle is here starting off on
a separate, but connected train of argument. Having proved, to his own
satisfaction, that there cannot be an infinite body outside the heavens, he
now intends to show that, outside the heavens, there cannot be a body
which, though not infinite, stretches to a certain distance (cf. flE:XPL 'tLv6C;;).
Aristotle obviously does not want it to be thought that his denial of
an extra-cosmic body infinite in extent might have left open a loop-hole
"demonstrated" (287a12: 5t5€LX"tCXL), a transparent reference to 1.9 279all-18 (as
noted by Tricot and by Moraux, see n.45 above).
82 De Caelo 1.7 275b7-8: oox to"tLV &pcx OOOIlCX &lt€LPOV ~;w "tov oopcxvov oo'l'ltv. The
repeated negation (untranslatable in English) acquires additional force from the
placing of the two negations as the first and the last words of the sentence (oox
[... ] oMtv).
83 Guthrie (1939, p. 62, note c).
84 Denniston (1959, s.vv., (4) p.344).

for an extra-cosmic body that was finite in extent. Hence his statement in
the sentence immediately following, 275b9: ou'l'}h apcx OAWC; crw!1cx ~~w "wO
oupcxvoO. "Therefore there is simply no body at all outside the heavens."
Outside the heavens there cannot be a body that is infinite (275b7-8)j
there cannot be a body that is finite (cf. !1EXpL 'tw6c;, 275b8-9)j therefore
- the obvious conclusion - there is no body at all outside the heavens
(275b9), i.e. no body at all, either infinite or finite.
Darkness impenetrable
If I so labour Aristotle's introductory remarks (275b8-9), it is simply to
bring out how remarkable it is that Guthrie should write as he does of
the three lines that follow. When Aristotle has stated in advance (cf.
275b9) what will be the conclusion to his argument with such blazing
clarity, how can it be that the argument which he will advance to support
that conclusion should appear to an intelligent reader no more than "a
disconnected jotting"?
The answer to that question is to be found in the opening words
of Aristotle's argument. Aristotle writes, 275b9-1O: e:t !1€V yap vOl)1:6v,
~cr"'CCXL €:v "'C67tCp. Guthrie translates: "If it be intelligible, it will still be in
a place.,,85 With Guthrie's translation of Aristotle's words, the darkness
that falls upon the passage is indeed impenetrable. For, with Guthrie's
translation, the two parts of Aristotle's argument are impossibly out of
step.
Throughout the series of arguments where Aristotle aims to prove that
there cannot be an infinite body outside the heavens (De Caelo 1.5-7), it
is repeatedly stated that the body in question, were it to exist, would be
a body perceptible to the senses. So it is that, only two lines before our
present passage, Aristotle frames his argument as that "it is impossible
for an infinite body to be perceptible" .86
If Aristotle is now to argue (275b9-1O) that the body which might be
thought to stretch for a limited distance outside the heavens cannot be an
"intelligible" body (vo1]"'C6v [se. crw!1cxl, in Guthrie's translation), then he
cannot conclude that "there is simply no body at all outside the heavens"
(275b9), i.e. no body at all, whether infinite or finite. For "no body at all"
would have to rest on the joint exclusion of (1) a body that was infinite
but sensible (in the earlier arguments) and (2) a body that was finite but
intelligible (in the additional argument).
85 Guthrie (1939, p.63).
86 De Caelo I. 7 275b6: &:liuva:tov aiiil10t IiltE:lPOV ot!aihrcov e:lvotl. I translate ot!aihrt6v
(275b6) as "perceptible". But in my commentary I write of a "sensible body" or of
a "body perceptible to the senses", in order to being out the opposition between
"sensible" and "intelligible" (vo'l"t6v, in Guthrie's translation).

78 Denis O'Brien
An impossible conjunction of ideas

To grasp the anomaly of that impossible conjunction of ideas, we do not
even have to agree, with Guthrie, that "intelligible body" is "a contradic-
tion in terms" .B7 (The opposition of "intelligible" and "sensible" body is
in fact to be found in both the Physics and the Metaphysics. BB )
For whatever Aristotle may be thought to mean, in the De Caelo,
by that expression, it is certainly true that, in Guthrie's words, Aristo-
tle's argument would be "scarcely tenable for a moment" if it collapsed
the distinction between "sensible body" and "intelligible body" . From the
absence of an infinite sensible body and from the absence of a finite intelli-
gible body, Aristotle cannot conclude to the absence, outside the heavens,
of any body at all, finite or infinite.
Such a form of argument, far from allowing Aristotle to claim that
"outside the heavens, there is simply no body at all" (cf. 275b9), would
throw open his argument to the four winds, by inviting the objection: Can
there be, outside the heavens, a finite body that is sensible? or even: Can
there be an infinite body which is intelligible?
A change of syntax
But we have no need to follow the argument along those slippery paths,
for a simple change in the syntax of the sentence gives Aristotle's words
a wholly different meaning, and one that is entirely appropriate to the
context. When Aristotle writes e:l flEV yap v07r,6v, €01'CXL €V 1'61tCp (275b9-
10), there is no reference to an "intelligible body" (finite or infinite). The
adjective voT)1'6v, should be taken, unusually but not impossibly, as part of
an impersonal construction: "For if it is conceivable (sc. that there should
be a body outside the heavens), it will be in place."B9
So understood, the sentence introduces an argument that is immedi-
ately seen to be adapted to the context. For only two lines earlier Aristotle
had asserted that "whatever bodies are in place, are all perceptible" (De
Caelo I. 7 275b6-7: eXAACt fl~v XCXL OOCX yE: OWflCX1'CX €V 1'61tCp, 1tcXv1'CX CXLO'l'}T)1'cX).
87 Guthrie (1939, p.62, note c).
88 Ph. IlI.5 204b5-7: E! yap to'·t! O'oo(1O['to<; A6yo<; 'to &ltLJttS'Il WPLO'(1tVOV, oux &.v EL'Il O'iii(1O[
liltELPOV, oiJu VO'll'tov OiJ'tE 0[!0"6'1l't6v. "If 'what is bounded by surface' is a defini-
tion of body, then there could not be a body that is infinite, whether intelligible
or perceptible." "Intelligible body" is here the object of mathematics (including
geometry). See Ross (1936, ad lac. (pp. 548-549)). The sentence is repeated almost
word-for-word in Metaph. XI.10 1066b22-24.
89 "Unusually but not impossibly." See Parmenides, fr. 8.8-9: ou yap tpO['tov ouSE
vO'll't6v / EO''tLV 07t!ol<; oux EO''tL. "It cannot be said, nor thought, that 'is not'." I
repeat the translation given by O'Brien (1987, ad lac. (p.35)). The absence of a
subject for oux e;O''tL ("is not"), here and in Parmenides, fr. 2.5, is dealt with at
length in the commentary accompanying the translation.

That assertion allows Aristotle to conclude that the body which we may
think of as outside the heavens (cf. 275b9-1O: e::t flEV yap voy)'t6v), since
it is in place (cf. 275b10: EO'tCl\ EV 't61tCp), will necessarily be a body that
is perceived by the senses. Hence the conclusion, stated explicitly in the
lines that follow, 275bll: ... wo't' EO'tCl\ CltCTl'}y)'t6v. "Consequently it will
be perceptible."
With the corrected translation of voY)'t6v, the argument unfolds with
disarming ease. (1) A body that is in place (EV 't61tCp) is necessarily per-
ceptible (cf. 275b6-7). (2) If it is conceivable that there should be a body
outside the heavens, that body will be in place (275b9-1O: EV 't61tCp). (3)
Therefore the body which we may think of as being outside the heavens,
if there is such a body, will be perceptible (cf. 275bll: ... wo't' EO'tCl\
Clto~Y)'t6v ).
The final sentence of the argument

In the final sentence of his argument Aristotle writes, 275bll: CltO~Y)'tov 0'
OU~EV fl~ EV 't61tCp. "There is no perceptible body that is not in place." It
is true that, at this moment, the sequence of thought is not immediately
apparent. The assertion that "there is no perceptible body that is not
in place" (275bll) cannot be taken as leading to the conclusion that a
body which is in place is therefore perceptible (cf. 275bll: ... wo't' EO'tCl\
Cltcr~Y)'t6v ) .90
But Aristotle obviously thinks of his two main propositions as con-
vertible. (1) "Whatever bodies are in place, are all perceptible" (275b6-7).
(2) "There is no perceptible body that is not in place" (275bll).
Having concluded that the body which we may think of as outside the
cosmos will be perceptible (275bll: ... wo't' EO'tCl\ CltCTl'}Y)'t6v), he therefore
adds, inconsequentially but truly, 275bll: "There is no perceptible body
that is not in place."91
90 Cancelling out the double negation: from the fact that every body that is percep-
tible is in place (cf. "there is no perceptible body that is not in place"), it does
not follow (though it may be true) that every body that is in place is perceptible.
Returning to the double negation: from the fact that no-one who is a citizen of the
United Kingdom (cf. 275bll: cxlath)"tov 0' oUo/}tv) is not a subject of Her Majesty (cf.
275bll: IJ.Tj &V "t6ltltl), it does not follow that whoever is a subject of Her Majesty
(cf. 275blO: e:a"tcx~ &V "t6ltltl) is a citizen of the United Kingdom (cf. 275bll: ... wa"t'
e:a"tcx~ CXla1h)"t6v). He may be a citizen of Canada or Australia.
91 If it is true (1) that everyone who is a member of the college has a vote on the
college council (cf. 275b6-7: lSacx YE: aWlJ.cx"tcx &V "t6ltltl, mxv"tcx cxlaih)"ta.) and (2) that
no-one who has a vote on the college council is not a member of the college (cf.
275bll: cxl(1)l}"tov 0' oo1)1;v IJ.Tj &V "t6ltltl) , then someone who concludes, from (1), that,
since so-and-so is a member of the college (cf. 275blO: la"tcx~ &V "t6ltltl), therefore he
has a vote on the college council (cf. 275bll: ... wa"t' e:a"tcx~ cxl(1)l}"t6v), may add,
inconsequentially but truly, that (2) no-one who has a vote on the college council is

80 Denis Q'Brien
The implied conclusion

Aristotle cuts short his argument at this point. But that is only because
the final stage of his argument is sufficiently obvious to be left unstated.
"Sensible body", for Aristotle, cannot be other than the bodies we
do already perceive, fire and earth, air and water, with the frequent ad-
dition (in the first two books of the De Caelo) of aether. The "natural"
movements of those bodies, as Aristotle has demonstrated at length in
the preceding chapters of his treatise, are such that they can be found
only within a cosmos (fire and earth move to circumference and centre
respectively, air and water take up intermediate positions, while aether,
when included in the scheme, is the only one of the elements to have a
circular movement).
A "sensible body" cannot therefore be found outside the confines of
the heavens. The finite body which we may think to conceive of as outside
the heavens, since it is in place, cannot but be a sensibly perceptible body
(cf. 275b9-11). But if it is a sensibly perceptible body, then it must be one
or other of the bodies that lie within the cosmos. Therefore there cannot
be, outside the heavens, a sensibly perceptible body that is finite.
Given Aristotle's preceding arguments, that there cannot be, outside
the heavens, an infinite body that is sensibly perceptible, the conclusion
happily follows (cf. 275b9) that there cannot be, outside the heavens, a
sensibly perceptible body, infinite or finite. Q. E. D.
"The transcendent intelligible entities of Platonism"

Taken in this way, Aristotle's use of the word vorrt6v, far from introducing,
as Guthrie and others have supposed, an "intelligible" as opposed to a
"sensible" body, serves, in the context, precisely the opposite purpose.
Aristotle's proof that, outside the heavens, there cannot be a finite
body, turns on the point that the body which we might think of as existing
outside the heavens, since it would be in place, could not but be a sensible
body. Aristotle expects his reader to draw the conclusion (unexpressed in
the text, but sufficiently implied by Aristotle's previous arguments) that,
since the body in question would have to be a sensibly perceptible body,
it would have to exist within the cosmos. The body which we might think
of as existing outside the cosmos cannot in fact do so.
not a member of the college. - I am not trying to prove that the sequence of thought
at the end of the argument (275bll: wo't' to'ta.1 a.!oih)'t6v. a.!oi)"I)'tov /)' oui)tV IL~ !:v
't6ltCjl) is logical, if the second sentence is taken as a demonstration of the first, only
that the sequence of thought is natural enough, once the two propositions (275b7:
Boa. YE OWILa.'ta. tv 't6ltCjl, lt~v'ta. a.!oi)"I)'t~, and 275bll: a.!oi)"I)'tov /)' oui)e:v IL~ €v 't6ltCjl)
are taken to be convertible (both propositions are true, and either one is taken to
imply the other).

There is no reference here to an "intelligible body", still less any ref-

erence to "the transcendent intelligible entities of Platonism" .92
A missing link
So much, I would like to think, is clear enough. But I have not yet touched
upon the most curious feature of Aristotle's argument. With the transla-
tion proposed above, Aristotle asserts that "if it is conceivable (sc. that
there should be a body outside the heavens), then it will be in place"
(275b9-1O: EL fl€V yap vorrc6v, ~O-CCXL EV ,6mp). He will go on to argue that,
since it is in place, and since every body that is in place is sensibly percep-
tible (cf. 275b6-7), therefore the body in question cannot but be a body
that is sensibly perceptible (cf. 275bll: ... wo,'
~O,CXL cxLcrfiy),6v). But
there is still a missing link in Aristotle's argument. For why, in conceiving
of a body outside the heavens, do we have to suppose that it would be
"in place"?
As proof of that point, essential to the pursuance of his argument,
Aristotle writes, 275blO: ,0 yap ~~w )Ccxt. ~ow ,61tov 0Y)flCX(VEL. "For 'inside'
and 'outside' designate place." The additional step enables the argument
to continue. (1) If a body is "outside" the heavens, then it is necessarily in
place (275blO). (2) It has already been established (275b6-7) that "what-
ever bodies are in place, are all perceptible". (3) Therefore the body that
we may think of as being outside the heavens, since it is in place, cannot
but be perceptible (cf. 275bll: ... wo,'
~O,CXL cxLcrfiy),6v).
The whole passage runs, De Caelo 1.7 275b7-11:
oux ~(n\V tipcx oWflcx tilte:LPOV ~~w "tOU oupcxvou OOOEv. &AAa fl~V ouoe: llEXPL
·tLv6c;. oOOh tipcx 5Awc; oWflcx ~~w "COU oupcxvou. e:! lle:v yap vorrc6v, ~O"tCXL EV
"t6ltCj>· "to yap ~~W XCXL ~ow "t6ltov oT)llcx(vEL. wo"t' ~O"tCXL cx!o-6T)"t6v. cx!a-6T)"tov 0'
ou-6e:v ll~ €v "t6ltCj>.
Outside the heavens, there is therefore no body that is infinite. Nor yet
is there any body which stretches for a certain distance (sc. beyond the
heavens). Therefore there is simply no body at all outside the heavens. For
if it is conceivable (sc. that there should be a body outside the heavens), it
will be in place. For "inside" and "outside" designate place. Consequently
it will be perceptible. There is no perceptible body that is not in place. 93
92 Guthrie (1939, p.62, note c): "This parenthesis [Le. De Caelo 1.7 275b9-11] is no
more than a disconnected jotting. The objection which it meets is scarcely tenable
for a moment, since "intelligible body" is so obviously a contradiction in terms. But
A[ristotle] is constantly aware of the transcendent intelligible entities of Platonism,
and constantly in fear of being thought to have overlooked, rather than consciously
rejected them." There follows the inevitable reference to the \me:poup<XVLOC; "t6ltoc;
of the Phaedrus. As already noted (n.88 above) the expression "intelligible body"
(O'W\LOl vOl}"t6v) is not, as Guthrie supposes, a contradiction in terms.
93 I have kept to an impersonal construction for vol}"t6v, 275b9-1O: e:! \LE:V yap vOTj"t6v.
"If it is conceivable (sc. that there should be a body outside the heavens)." It

82 Denis O'Brien
A flagrant contradiction
The additional step to the argument (275blO: '''inside' and 'outside' des-
ignate place") would perhaps be unremarkable, were it not that it is in
flagrant contradiction with what Aristotle will state only two chapters
later, namely that there are beings who are "outside" the heavens and
who are not "in place" (De Caelo I.9 279a18: OL67tE:p OU"" E\I -c61tCp -CcXXEL
1t€fjlUXE\I) .
When he wrote those words, Aristotle cannot have remembered, or
cannot yet have written, the claim made in his demonstration against
the possibility of a finite, sensible body existing outside the heavens. If
'''outside' designates place" (cf. 275blO), then the beings who are said to
be "outside the heavens" cannot be said to be not in place.
A "metaphor"?
Desperate causes require desperate remedies. So it is when King asserts
that, in De Caelo I.9, Aristotle's language, and specifically his reference
to "the beings there" (279a18: -CcXxEL) , is merely "metaphorical" .94 One
has only to read Aristotle's expression in its context to see that that is
not so.
In the lines immediately preceding the reference to "the beings there"
(279all-18), Aristotle repeatedly uses the expression "outside the heav-
ens" (275a12 and 16: €~W -coO OUpCX\loO, see also 275a18: €~W{)E\I). When
he continues with the demonstrative adverb (279a18: -CcXXEL), the reference
cannot but be to the repeated use of €~W and €~W{)E\I in the lines preceding.
So it is also in the lines immediately following. Aristotle writes of
the beings who are "there" (279a18: -CcXxEL) as "ranged above and beyond
the outermost movement" (cf. 279a20: -CW\I Cm€p -C~\I E~w-cchw -CE-CCXYfJ.€\lW\I
fjlopa\l). "Above and beyond" (U1t€p) cannot but look back to the demon-
strative use of the adverb three lines earlier (279a18).
It is true that, at this point in the De Caelo (I.9 279a18-22), Aristotle's
words can hardly be made consistent with the detailed analysis of "place"
would be possible to arrive at essentially the same meaning by adopting a personal
construction and putting the adjective in the predicative position, 275b9-1O: t! IJ.&V
yap V01)1:6V, ~a'tal tv 't6ltCjl. "For if such a body [Le. a body 'outside the heavens']
is conceivable, it will be in place." In either case, I keep the "real" form for both
protasis and apodosis (ta'tal in the apodosis, ta'tl "understood" in the protasis).
Given the flexibility of conditional sentences in Greek, it would no doubt be possible
to cast the protasis in an "unreal" mode (t! IJ.tv yap vOY)'t6v [se. ~v]), despite the
presence of a trenchant future as the first word of the apodosis (~a'tal). "If it were
conceivable ... " (or if the personal construction is preferred: "If such a body were
conceivable ... ").
94 King (1950, p.81): '''Beyond' [cf. 279a18: 'tOOctl] is a metaphor for the supra-
natural" (King's own italics).

given in book four of the Physics. It is true also that they are in flagrant
contradiction with what Aristotle writes of "place" two chapters earlier
in the De Caelo. But the remedy is not therefore to dismiss his words as
"metaphorical" .95
A change of perspective
Instead, I would suggest, we need to look outside the corpus for an expla-
nation of what Aristotle may have in mind when, in De Caelo 1.9, beings,
presumably divine, are said to be "outside the heavens" .
That is not as chimerical a project as it may seem. When Aristo-
tle writes of the unity of the cosmos, finite and spherical, a text is ever
present to his mind, a text which he both loves and hates, a text which
he constantly seeks to criticise, but which in more ways than one acts as
a blue-print for his own cosmology - Plato's Timaeus.
V. Timaeus 34b4 and 36e3

Plato's criticism of Empedocles
The Timaeus, or so I shall suggest, provides part of the explanation of

what Aristotle has in mind in De Caelo 1.9. For the same puzzle, the
puzzle of a being or beings who live beyond the extreme outer boundary
of the heavens, recurs in a passage of the Timaeus. However, the parallel
is not one that it is easy to take the measure of. For Plato's words in
the Timaeus, no less than Aristotle's words in the De Caelo, have given
endless trouble to the more thoughtful of his commentators, in Antiquity
as in the modern world.
Plato's world-soul
In the Timaeus, Plato starts, just as Aristotle has done, by seeming to
lead his reader up the garden path. 96 Aristotle said that the whole body
95 The adverb can, of course, be used metaphorically. It is so used by Plotinus, who
regularly writes of the intelligible world as the world that is "there" or "yonder"
(~X~I). See Sleeman and Pollet (1980, s.u., d, col. 347.40-349.11). But to appeal to
Plotinus at this point would be a confession of failure. To attempt to read back
Plotinus' repeated use of ~X~I into an isolated passage of Aristotle's De Caelo would
be an anachronism so blatant that I hesitate even to suggest what I nonetheless
suspect to be true - that the language of the Enneads may have been at the back
of King's mind when he writes of Aristotle's use of &X~I as "metaphorical". (Since
King refers at some length (1950, pp. 92-93) to Simplicius and Damascius, I assume
that he is familiar with the technical and semi-technical language of Neoplatonism.)
96 For the analysis that follows, see O'Brien (2003).

84 Denis O'Brien
of the universe contained within the extreme outer circumference com-

prised all the "physical and sensible" body that there was, "because there
neither is nor can there come to be body outside the heavens" (€~W -wO
oupcxvOO).97 Aristotle, we now discover, is merely repeating, in different
words, what Plato had said in the Timaeus. In making the body of the
world, the demiurge uses up every scrap of material available to him,
"leaving no part nor power of anyone of the elements outside" .98 The
adverb (€~w'l')Ev, "outside") is then repeated no less than three times in
the pages that follow. There is nothing "outside" the world that might
crash in on the world and destroy it (33a4: €~W'l')EV). The living creature
that is the universe has no hands, feet or mouth, because there is nothing
"outside" itself to be seen or heard, nothing that the living creature could
possibly need or get hold of (33c2: €~w'l')EV). The world is therefore made
perfectly smooth all the way round "on the outside" (33cl: E~w'l')EV).
Just as in the De Caelo, the reader might well think that that was
an end to it. Outside the universe, there is nothing. But no: once again,
there follows a complete volte face. Just as, in the De Caelo, we discover
that, where there is neither body nor place nor void nor time, there are
nonetheless beings who lead a beatific life, so too, in the Timaeus, we
discover that beyond the outermost heavens, despite the total absence of
body, there is nonetheless soul. The demiurge, so we learn, placed soul in
the centre of the world, stretched it throughout the body of the cosmos,
and then wrapped it all round the outside of that body as well, Ti. 34b4:
€-cL €~W'l')EV "to OWflCX CXU"tn [sc. tjJuxnl ltEpLEXcXAUtjJEV [sc. 6 0Ylf.LLOUpy6C;l. Lit-
erally: "he encircled the body with soul, even on the outside." And just
in case you might think that that detail was a mere lapsus calami and of
no intrinsic significance, Plato goes out of his way to repeat the point, no
less emphatically, two pages later. Soul is stretched throughout the whole
body of the world all the way from the centre "to the outermost oura-
nos" (36e2: 7tpOC; "tov €Oxcx"tov oupcxv6v) and then goes on to wrap itself all
around the world "in a circle on the outside", Ti. 36e3: XUXACP "tE cxu"tov
[sc. "tov oupcxv6vl €~w'l')Ev 7tEpLXcxAUtjJCXOCX [sc. ~ tjJUX~l.99
Alcinoos and Comford

Commentators, ancient and modern, have done their best to whittle away
the clear and indisputable meaning of Plato's words. Alcinoos, in the first
97 Aristotle, De Caelo 1.9 278b21-279all, and the passage already quoted, 279a16-17
(see n. 24 above): ~~(,) 1i1: 'tOU OUpotVOU IitIiElx'totllhl ov't' ~a'tlv oV't' tVlitXE'totl YEV€ai)otl
aiiilLot.
98 Ti. 32c7-8: ILEPOC: oulii:v OUIiEVOC: oulii: !iUVotIL1V E~(,)i)EV tmOAIltWv.
99 For the syntactical difference between the two sentences, with "the demiurge"
subject of 1ttPIEXaAUtjltV (34b4) and "soul" the subject of 1ttplxotMtjlotaot (36e3), see
O'Brien (2003, pp. 135-143).

or second century of our era, took Plato's reference to the 'outside' of

the world to be a reference to the circle of the Same. lOO It is true that,
in describing the circle of the Same, Timaeus does twice use the adverb
g~W.lOl But Alcinoos' attempt to align Plato's two uses of g~W (when
writing of the circle of the Same) with his two uses of g~w1}e:v (when
writing of soul) fails when we appreciate that, in the description of the
circle of the Same, g~W takes its meaning from the contrast with E:V't6c;
in the description of the circle of the Other. The circle of the Same is
"outside" the circle of the Other which is therefore "inside". As Cornford
has seen, the circle of the Same is in fact none other than the sphere of the
fixed stars. 102 The soul which animates the sphere of the fixed stars does
not find itself, in doing so, "outside" the extreme circumference of the
heavens. It is (or it animates) the extreme circumference of the heavens.
Alcinoos' explanation fails. But Cornford does no better. For all that
Cornford does is assert the contrary of what is to be found written expli-
citly in Plato's text. Cornford writes:
The statement [... ] that the soul is wrapped round the body of the world
"on the outside" does not mean that the soul extends beyond the body, but
only that it reaches the extreme circumference. 103
What Cornford says that Plato does not say is exactly what Plato does
say. In the second passage I have quoted, Timaeus says that the soul
reached "the outermost ouranos" (36e2: "tov gaxcx"tov oupcxv6v) and then
wrapped itself all round on the outside as well, Ti. 36e3: XUXAcp "te: cxu"tov
[se. "tov oupcxv6v] g~w1}e:v lte:PLxcxAuljlcxacx [se. ~ ljIuX~].
Plato's world-soul, however odd it may seem, does stretch beyond the
body of the heavens in order to wrap itself all round the outside as well.
There is a soul therefore even where there is no body, just as, in the De
Caelo, there are divine beings "outside" - an "outside" where there is
neither body, nor place nor void nor time. The adverb in both places is
the same: g~w1}e:V.104 So too is the reference of the adverb. Plato's soul
is to be found even beyond the outermost heavens (36e2: "tov gaxcx"tov
oupcxv6v). Aristotle's divine beings are to be found "beyond the extreme
circumference" (279a20: lJ1t€:p "t~v E:~w"tChw [... ] Cjlopclv). Aristotle is clearly
following in the footsteps of Plato.
However, before looking to explore that convergence of ideas, a more
immediate question obtrudes itself. Let us allow that Aristotle picks up
from Plato. But why does Plato write as he does?
100 Alcinoos, Didaskalikos, cap. XIV (p.33.4-20 ed. Whittaker).
101 Ti. 36c3-5.
102 Cornford (1937, p. 58).
103 Cornford (1937, p.58).
104 Plato, Ti. 34b4 and 36e3 (t~w-6t:v). Aristotle, De Caelo 1.9 279a18 (&~w-6t:v).

86 Denis O'Brien
Plato's precosmic movement

To find the answer to that question, we need to look at a much later
passage in the Timaeus, which, because of the convoluted architecture of
Plato's exposition, nonetheless describes the time before the construction
of soul by the demiurge. In the pre-cosmic world, before the appearance of
soul, there were already "traces" of the elements, moving "without reason
and without measure" (53a8: &A6ywe;; xoil. &ttt"!pWC;). That description of
precosmic, disordered movement is, again, a well-worn crux in the inter-
pretation of the Timaeus. How can there be movement, when there is as
yet no soul? Does Plato no longer believe what he states, so explicitly and
so firmly, in both the Phaedrus and the Laws, namely that all movement
is caused by soul?105 And why should the movement that seemingly has
no cause be discordant and disordered movement?
Once again in order to answer those questions, Cornford is driven to
asserting exactly what Plato denies. Cornford writes:
If you abstract Reason and its works from the universe what is left will be
irrational Soul, a cause of wandering motions. 106
But that is not at all what Timaeus says. For Timaeus says that the
elements are in discordant movement "when god is absent" from the world
(cf. Ti. 53b3-4: ... wcrm:p e:txoe;; EXe:LV cxmxv o"!cxv Cbtfi "!LVOe;; «)e:6e;;). Cornford's
"irrational Soul" is no soul at all.
But Cornford's "irrational Soul" is not therefore a mere fiction. For
when Plutarch writes of our passage, in the De Facie, echoing Plato's
very words on the absence of god (... we;; EXe:L n(Xv ou «)e:oe;; cxne:cr"!L xcx"!a
IIAcX-rwvcx), he compares the disordered movement of Plato's precosmic el-
ements with the time when, in Empedocles' cycle, the elements have been
fully separated, and therefore no longer form a cosmos, and yet are in
movement. 107 The difference between the erratic movement of the ele-
ments in the precosmic world of the Timaeus and the movement of the
elements in the non-cosmic world of Empedocles is precisely that Empe-
docles' non-cosmic movement does have a cause - not quite Cornford's
"irrational Soul" , but something very close to it, a divine force of evil: the
god of Strife. 108
105 Leges X, 896bl: 11e:"tCLl3oAYi~"te: )(CLt )(lv~ae:l.Il~ &It&.a71~ CLI"t(CL IiltCLcrtV [se. cjllJx~l. Phaedrus
245e9: "tOL~ IiAAOI~ /SaCL )(IVe:L"tCLI "tou"to [se. cjllJx~l lt71Y~ )(CLt &Px~ )(1V~ae:I.Il~.
106 Cornford (1937, p. 203).
107 Plutarch, De Faeie Quae in Orbe Lunae Apparet cap.12 926E-927 A. For the
time of total separation in Empedocles' "cyclic" history of the world, see O'Brien
(1969, pp. 146-155 (chapter 7), and 1995, pp. 405-429).
108 For the association of Strife with evil (and of Love with goodness), see Aristotle,
Metaph. lA 985a4-7 ("If you follow up what Empedocles means to say and not
what he comes out with in baby talk, you will find that Love is cause of good
things and Strife of things that are evil").

Plato's tacit correction of Empedocles

Hence Plato's insistence that, at the time of his precosmic movement, god
is "absent" from the world. As in the myth of the Politicus, the cause
of evil - of discordant and disorderly motion - is not the presence of an
evil god, but the absence of a good god. The disorderly movement of
Plato's precosmic world is the disorderly movement of a world as it would
have been, or as it was, if left to its own devices, without, or before, the
advent of soul. The words that Plutarch has seized on ( ... 01"CXV CX1tfi 1"LVOC;
ile;6c;) are therefore significant, not because they affirm the presence of an
"irrational Soul", but for exactly the opposite reason. Plato's insistence
on the absence of god is his tacit correction of Empedocles' belief in the
presence of a god of evil. 109
The same criticism, or so I would suggest, is implicit in the description
of the world-soul wrapped around the body of the world "even on the
outside" (34b4; cf. 36e3). I have already remarked on how, in Empedocles'
universe, Love moves from place to place. The same is true of Strife. When
Love's power is increasing, she moves out from the centre of the universe
towards the circumference, before being driven back to the centre when
Strife's power increases. Conversely, when Strife's power is increasing, he
moves inwards from the circumference towards the centre, before being
driven back to the circumference when Love's power increases. 110 So it is
that, following the separation of the elements, Love drives Strife "to the
outermost boundaries of the circle" (fr. 35.10: En' EGXCX1"CX 1"EP!lCX1"CX XUXAOU).
When therefore Love rules supreme, we are to imagine Strife extruded
from the body of the elements, driven beyond the "outermost boundaries
of the circle" within which the elements have been made into one by the
power of Love.
Hence, again, Plato's correction of Empedocles. For Plato, there is,
and can be, no evil god, no "irrational Soul" . But, to ensure that that is so,
Plato has the world-soul occupy the place that, in Empedocles' world, had
been taken up by Strife. Plato's world-soul, as Empedocles' Love during
the time of her domination, occupies the whole of space from the centre to
the circumference, but with the crucial difference that Plato's world-soul
extends beyond the circumference, taking up the place therefore that had
been occupied by Strife, as proof that there is and can be no divine force
of evil. The place that Strife had occupied has been entirely taken up by
Love. 111
109 For exploration of this theme, see O'Brien (1997 and 1999).
110 For this account of the successive positions taken up by Love and Strife in the course
of the "cycle", see O'Brien (1969, pp. 104-126 (chapter 5), and 1995, pp. 416-421).
111 The critical reader may have noted that, in the preceding pages, I allow myself
various periphrases when writing of Strife: "a god of evil", "a divine power", "a
divine force of evil". My writing of Strife as a deity and as divine is not matched

88 Denis O'Brien
VI. Empedocles' hidden influence
In the light of that conclusion, I return to the coincidence of the beings who
find themselves beyond the outermost reaches of the cosmos, in Plato's
Timaeus as in Aristotle's De Caelo. 112
A repeated anomaly
Plato's insistence that the world-soul stretches beyond the outermost cir-
cumference of the heavens may be explained by his tacit criticism, and re-
jection, of Empedocles' god of Strife. Even so, there remains the anomaly,
in the Timaeus, that a part of the world-soul is to be found even beyond
"the outermost ouranos" (cf. 36e3), despite Timaeus' assurance (32c7-8)
that, "outside" the heavens, there is "no part nor power of anyone of the
elements". There is a (part of) the soul of the world even where there is
no "world" for it to be the soul of.
Plato, or so I would suggest, has been willing to tolerate (has indeed
deliberately introduced) that anomaly for the sake of its ideological over-
tones (a tacit repudiation of Empedocles' god of Strife). But why should
Aristotle have been willing to tolerate what would seem to be a not dissim-
ilar anomaly? Plato's world-soul extends beyond the body of the heavens,
where there is "no part nor power of anyone of the elements" (32c7-8)j
Aristotle has made a not dissimilar claim for the beings who find them-
selves "ranged above and beyond the outermost movement" (De Caelo
1.9 279a20), again despite the firm assurance that, outside the heavens,
there is neither body nor place nor void nor time (cf. 279a17-18). Why
does he do so?
in the fragments. If, in the present context, I allow myself these expressions it is
because, in Plato's eyes, both Love and Strife are "gods". So much at least may
be inferred from his writing, in the Politicus, of Mo 'tLV& 1'}E~ CPPOVOUV'tE €CXU'tOLC;
tvCXV't(cx (270al). The reference to "a pair of gods" with "opposite thoughts and
purposes" is almost certainly an allusion to Empedocles' Love and Strife. The
addition of an indefinite pronoun ('tLVt) may well indicate that Plato deliberately
declines to put a name on "the pair of gods" (cf. LSJ, S.V. 'tLC;, 'tL, A, II 3 (p.1796»,
by way of indicating his dismissal of the notion of two gods who might be thought
to be "opposed". In a not dissimilar spirit he writes, in the Sophist, OUX VELX6c; 'tL
(243al-2), where the use of the article (pace Bollack (1965-1969, t. i, p. 124, n. 1»
is plainly depreciative (cf. LSJ, s.v. 'tLC;, 'tL, A, II 6, a (p.1796».
112 Contrast Solmsen (1960, p. 169): "Outside the Cosmos, Plato and Aristotle agree,
there is nothing, simply nothing." Really? I hope that readers of the preceding
pages will find this as implausible as I do. For Solmsen's apparent volte face,
fifteen years later, see n.123 below. Nonetheless, Solmsen's earlier view persists.
See Morison (2002, p. 18 n. 31): "there is nothing outside the heavens" (referring
specifically to De Caelo I.9 279all-18, but seemingly taking no account of the lines
that follow).

A n uneasy question
The question is made no easier if we seek to take account of Aristotle's
assertion, at the beginning of the discussion of "place" in the Physics: "Ev-
eryone takes it for granted that things that exist are somewhere ('ltOU).,,113
Admittedly Aristotle does not have to include himself among the "ev-
eryone". Indeed he makes clear allowance for one exception in the final
chapter of his discussion of place: the universe itself ("the all"), since it
has nothing to surround it, is not "somewhere" .114 But no sooner has
Aristotle made that point than he hastens to add that "there is nothing
apart from the all and the whole, nothing outside the all" .115 And lest one
should think to quibble that "the beings there" of the De Caelo, in being
"outside the heavens", are perhaps not outside "the all", he continues:
"And that is why all things are within the heavens, for the heavens are, I
suppose, the all." 116
Why has Aristotle so clearly dissociated himself from such a view in
the De Caelo when he claims that the beings who lead "the best life and
the most self-sufficient for all eternity" (cf. 279a17-22) are "outside the
heavens" and are not "in place"? If they are not in place, does it follow
that they are not "somewhere" (rcou)? But if they are not "somewhere",
then how can it be said of them that they are "there" (e:XE1:)?
A first dismissal: Aristotle's unmoved movers

The answer, I would suggest, is a very simple one. If they are not "outside"
the heavens, then where else are Aristotle's gods to go? To readers of
Physics book VIII, the reaction to that question may well be a snort of
dismissal, if not derision. The very posing of the question, so it may be
objected, betrays a misunderstanding of the nature of Aristotle's "gods" , if
we choose so to name the unmoved mover, or the unmoved movers, whose
113 Ph. IV.1 208a29: "tcl y~ yap /Sv"tcx ltclV"t~C; \)ltOACXI1f3clVOUaLV ~rvcx( ltou.
114 Ph. IV.5 212b14: "to 51; ltiiv ou ltou.
115 Ph. IV.S 212b16-17: ltCXP,x 51; "to ltiiv XCXL ISAov ou5tv ta"tLv fc;w "tou ltCXv.oc;. I repeat
"nothing" simply for the sake of the translation, and to bring out the point that
the reference of the two expressions introduced by ltCXPcl and by ~c;w is, in effect,
the same.
116 Ph. IV.5 212b17-18: XCXL 5L,x "tou"to tv "tiji oupcxviji ltclV"tCX' /) yap oupcxvoc; "to ltiiv
lawc;. I translate "to ltiiv as "the all", despite paraphrasing the same expression as
"the universe" in my commentary (cf. LSJ, S.u. ltiiC;, D, III 1, b (p. 1345». The
paraphrase should not be taken for granted. The specification of "all there is" as
"to ltiiv is a philosophical innovation, whose origins we can trace in Empedocles'
borrowings from Parmenides, and which becomes a standard expression only in
Plato. See O'Brien (2005). Hence, in the lines quoted, Aristotle's writing initially
of "to ltiiv (212b14), but having recourse to the dual expression "to ltiiv XCXL ISAov
(212b16), "the all and the whole", when, as here, he needs to give emphasis to the
all-embraciveness of his conception of "to ltiiv.

90 Denis O'Brien
existence Aristotle has been at such pains to demonstrate in Physics VIII

as in Metaphysics XII.
The unmoved mover is "indivisible" (&OLCI((pe:'WV) and "without parts"
(&!le:p€<;),117 This is not because it is an exception to Aristotle's rule that
all body is divisible and therefore at least potentially has parts, but for
the more radical reason that the unmoved mover is quite simply not cor-
poreal. 118
Equally, the unmoved mover is neither finite nor infinite in extent.
Again, this is not because those two terms do not provide an exclusive
disjunction for anything and everything that has size, but for the more
radical reason that the unmoved mover has no size at all.119 With no body
and with no "size", the unmoved mover, so one might well think, has no
"place" at all, and is therefore not the kind of being of which we can ask
the question "where?".
The same, or so it may be claimed, is true of the divine beings of
De Caelo l,9, which are specifically said to have no "body", and whom
we may therefore perhaps assume to have no "size". Without body and
without size, these are not the kind of things, so it may be urged, of
which we can legitimately ask the question "where?", nor therefore things
of which we can give, in any literal sense, the answer "there".
The "place" of the unmoved mover

However, even when it is a question of the unmoved mover, that dis-
claimer does not wholly match the facts. For, although without body and
without size, the unmoved mover is not wholly without position, in so
far as its influence, so Aristotle tells us, is most apparent at the outer-
most circumference of the heavens, where movement is fastest (cf. Ph.
VIIl,lO 267b7-9), with the result, in Aristotle's own words, that the un-
117 This is the burden of Physics VII1.10. See especially &!Ltptc; at the beginning of the
chapter (266alO-ll), and in the final sentence of the treatise (267b25-26), where
the unmoved mover is also said to be cioLcx(pt'tov.
118 This is not stated explicitly in the final chapter of Physics VIII, but it seems to
me the clear implication of Aristotle's argument. The assertion that the unmoved
mover is "without parts" and "indivisible" is repeated in Metaph. XI1.7 1073a5-7,
where the unmoved mover is also said to be "a substance separate from things
perceptible" (1073a4-5: ouo(cx 'tLC; [... ] XtlCWPLolltV'l} 'toov cxloi}'I}'toov). By contrast,
body is "what is everywhere divisible" (De Caelo 1.1 268a7: 'to ltciv'tn OLCXLpt't6v).
Every magnitude (and therefore every body) and every period oftime is "endlessly
divisible" (cf. Ph. VI.6 237b20-21: cid oLcxpt'tci). In the De Caelo, a brief argument,
clearly referring to the unmoved mover (11.6 288a27-b7), states explicitly that the
mover, as distinct from the object moved, is "bodiless" (288b6: cioWllCX'toV).
119 This is stated explicitly at the beginning and at the end of the chapter, Ph.
VIII.10 266alO-ll: ll'l}Oe:V &lCtLV llEyti}oc;, and 267b26: ouoe:v &lCOV lltyti}oC;. For the
argument that the unmoved mover has no "size" because it is neither finite nor infi-
nite in extent, see 267bI7-24. The argument is repeated in Metaph. XII.71073a5-11.

moved mover may be said to be "there" (267b9-1O: ... 1"OLCXU1"Yj 0' ~ 1"00
XUXAOU XLVYjaLC;' €xe:i: apcx 1"0 XLVOOV).
Does it then follow that the unmoved mover can be in some way
located? An obvious reply is that, in Physics VIII, the adverb (267blO:
€xe:i:) does not mark the location of the unmoved mover itself, but only
the place where its influence is felt to the greatest effect. True enough,
perhaps. But what then are we to make of the adverb introduced in the
sentence immediately preceding: "The fastest movement is that of bodies
that are nearest to the mover" (267b7-8: 1"cXXLCJ1"CX XLVe:i:1"CXL 1"a €YYU1"CX1"CX 1"00
XL'IIoOV1"OC;)? How can the movement of the outermost sphere be said to be
"nearest" to the unmoved mover, if the unmoved mover is not itself in some
way spatially located? In this context, is the relationship of "nearness"
somehow not reciprocal?
A misleading parallel
Whatever the answer to that question (if there is one), we need to recog-
nise that the reference of the adverb (EXe:i:), in the two passages (De Caelo
I.9 and Physics VIII.10), is not the same. (1) In Physics VIII, the adverb
is employed simply with reference to the place where the influence of the
unmoved mover is most immediately manifest. The unmoved mover has
"position" or "location" (cf. EXe:i:) only to the extent that its influence
is especially marked in a specific region of the universe, the outermost
sphere of the revolving heavens, whatever further implications there may
be lurking in Aristotle's description of the outermost sphere as "nearest"
or "closest" (cf. EYYU1"CX1"cx) to the unmoved mover. (2) By contrast, in De
Caelo I.9, the reference of the adverb is no longer to the visible cosmos
and applies directly to the divine beings themselves, and not only to the
place where their influence (if any) is strongest.
The adverb therefore may be the same (EXe:i:), but the difference in its
application is too great for whatever account we may wish to give of the
unmoved mover to be transferred, without more ado, to the divine beings
of De Caelo I.9.
I return therefore to the question of how we are to understand the
adverb in the passage from the De Caelo. And to answer that question, I
again ask: if they are not "outside" the heavens, then where else are the
divine beings, in the De Caelo, to go?
A second dismissal: Plato's "dream"

Such a question may still arouse a mere gesture of dismissal, but for a
different reason from the one already adumbrated. There is no reason,
it may be said, for such beings to "go" or to "be" anywhere. Plato, in
the Timaeus, had clearly and emphatically put forward the idea that "to

92 Denis O'Brien
be" is not necessarily to be "somewhere". It is only "in a dream", says

Timaeus, that we assume that "what is" has to be "somewhere". So it
is when we direct our gaze towards what will be called "the nurse of
becoming", 52b3-5:
ltPOC; 0 5~ xcii. QVE:LPOltOAOUIlE:V ~MltoV"tE:c; xa( CPallE:V cXvayxaLov E:lvaL ltOU "Co
QV alt<XV ~V "CM "COltCP xat xa"CEXov xwpav "CLva, "Co 5& 1l~"C' tv yfi 1l~"CE: ltOU xa"C'
oupavov ou5&v dvaL. 120
... we are in a dream and we claim that everything that there is must needs
be somewhere, in a particular place and taking up a definite space, and that
what is neither on earth nor anywhere in the heavens is nothing.
In the light of that passage, so it may be urged, beings who lead a life
untrammelled by body, place or time, as in De Caelo 1.9, do not have to
be anywhere. To suppose that the divine beings have to be "somewhere"
(cf. 1tou) is to suppose that Aristotle has failed to take account of what
Plato says, so emphatically and so clearly, in the Timaeus.
Plato's "dream" and the myth of the "Phaedrus"

The parallel with the Timaeus may seem to be reinforced if we take ac-
count of what is said in the Phaedrus. 121 When Plato has Timaeus allude,
if only by implication, to what is not "in a particular place and taking up
a definite space", the reference, in the context of the Timaeus, is clearly
to the forms. In the myth of the Phaedrus, justice and prudence and other
such realities, also no doubt forms, are to be seen in their true splendour,
so we are told (247d5-e4), occupying a "place beyond the heavens" (247c3:
,QV oS: U1tEPOUPcXVLOV ,61tOV ... ), also called "the plain of truth" (248b6).
Why not suppose that the same is true of forms in the Timaeus? They
may not be "anywhere in the heavens" , but that is only because, as in the
Phaedrus, they occupy a "place beyond the heavens". The latter expres-
sion, it may be said, is all part of Plato's "myth", and no less "mythical"
therefore will be Aristotle's reference to his divine beings existing "outside
the heavens", "above and beyond the outermost movement" .122
Aristotle on the "place" of forms

Aristotle, it may even be said, recognises as much when he states that
Plato's forms are not "outside the heavens" and are "not anywhere", Ph.
120 Ti. 52b3: ltpo<; a o~ [... J 13Atltov-ce<;. The antecedent to the relative pronoun is the
"third kind" (52a8), what Timaeus will call, in the lines following, "the nurse of
becoming" (52d4-5).
121 The comparison of the Phaedrus and the Timaeus, in the paragraphs that follow,
is introduced argumenti causa, not because I believe it to be true.
122 The comparison of the myth of the Phaedrus with De Caelo 1.9 is a great favourite
with the commentators. Among writers already quoted, see Guthrie (1939, p.62,
note c (cf. n.92 above)}. For Solmsen's interpretation, see the footnote following.

I1I.4 203a8-9: IIAcl-rw'J OE: E~W 1lE:'J [sc. "toO oUpCX'JoO] OUOE:'J e:t'JCXL oWllcx, OUOE:
"tete;; LOECXe;;, OLet "to IlYlOE ltOU e:t'JCXL cxu"tae;;. In the myth of the Phaedrus, the
realities contemplated by the gods are specifically said to be "outside the
heavens" (cf. 247c2: "tet E~W "toO oUpcx'JoO). If, in the passage quoted, Aris-
totle remembered those words, he obviously did not take them literally.
Indeed the passage from the Physics sounds very much as though it
were intended to explain (or perhaps to correct) the myth of the Phaedrus
in the light of Plato's "dream" in the Timaeus. The forms of the Timaeus
are not to be found "somewhere" (cf. 52b4 and 5: ltou) for the simple
reason that they are not such as to be extended in space. The same is
true (so the words of the Physics would lead us to believe) of the forms
of the Phaedrus, which are not "outside the heavens" in any literal sense.
Why not suppose that the same is true of Aristotle's own divine beings
in the De Caelo? When Aristotle writes of divine beings "outside the
heavens", he does no more than echo the words of the Phaedrus, but with
the proviso made explicit in the Physics. The forms are not "somewhere"
and are not therefore, in any literal sense, "outside the heavens" .123
A crucial distinction
The comparison is possible, only if we are willing to set aside a crucial
distinction. Plato's forms are not alive; it can hardly be said of the forms
123 I am still writing argumenti causa. I have already remarked that I find little merit in
King's "metaphorical" interpretation of the language of the De Caelo (§ IV above
sub finem). As will be seen in what follows, I find a "mythical" interpretation (even
if the "myth" is corrected by the proviso made explicit in the Physics) no more
appealing. - The main exponent of a "mythical" (or semi-mythical) interpretation
of Aristotle's words in the De Caelo is Solmsen, but his treatment of the question
is so elliptical and allusive that I hesitate even to attempt a summary. (1) Solm-
sen originally stated, in no uncertain terms (1960, p.169 (cf. n. 112 above», that
"Outside the Cosmos, Plato and Aristotle agree, there is nothing, simply nothing" .
(2) When he returns to the subject, fifteen years later, he nonetheless locates the
divine beings of the De Caelo "in the area outside the heavens" (1976, p. 29), since
this was precisely the area no longer occupied by the forms of the Phaedrus (p.30):
"Since the entities previously associated with this realm (sc. the area outside the
heavens) were for him (i.e. Aristotle) non-existent, his own supreme realities might
as well succeed to the honor." (3) The transposition, Solmsen tells us (p. 31), has
been made "philosophically safe", because, although "outside the Heavens" (Solm-
sen's use of the capital varies), the divine beings of the De Caelo, unlike the forms
of the Phaedrus, are no longer "in place". (4) Even so (cf. p. 31), Aristotle's divine
beings are not the same as the forms described in the Physics, since, although
not "in place", they are "outside the heavens", whereas the forms alluded to in
the Physics are not "outside the heavens". - Despite these intricacies, Solmsen
nowhere alludes to what I see as the major difference between Aristotle's divine
beings and Plato's forms, set out below (a difference which makes any comparison
between Aristotle's gods and the forms, whether of the Phaedrus or the Timaeus,
tenuous in the extreme).

94 Denis O'Brien
that, "dispensed from all alteration and immune to change, they continue
in possession of the best life and the most self-sufficient for all eternity" .124
It is true that later philosophers (and notably Plotinus) will not shrink
from claiming that beings that are fully living exist in a world that is
exempt from both space and time. But does it follow that Aristotle, before
his discovery of the existence of an unmoved mover, took such a step?
If we adopt the perspective, not so much of the philosopher as of the
historian of philosophy, the answer to that question is far from being a
foregone conclusion. Plato, in the Timaeus, has established a clear distinc-
tion between "being" and "being somewhere" , but he has done so only for
beings (the forms) that are not endowed with life. It does not at all follow
that the same distinction will have been immediately applicable to beings
that do have life, nor therefore that the distinction implied by Plato's
"dream" can be applied to the beings of the De Caelo who "continue in
possession of the best life and the most self-sufficient for all eternity" .
Plato '8 forms and Aristotle's supracelestial beings

It does not at all follow therefore that, for an early reader of the Timaeus,
beings who "continue in possession of the best life and the most self-
sufficient for all eternity" can be said to exist, as do the forms for Plato,
"neither on earth nor anywhere in the heavens" , and that they can there-
fore be said to exist, as do Plato's forms, not "in a particular place" and
not "taking up a definite space" .
The question, "Where are such beings to go?", is not therefore, his-
torically, the foolish question that it may perhaps seem at first to be.
Plato's Timaeus does provide a model for beings that "are" but are not
"somewhere", but it is a model that, in the Timaeus, is applied to beings
which, however "real", are not said to be alive. Since the supracelestial
beings of Aristotle's De Caelo are specifically said to have "life", it does
not at all follow that the precedent of Plato's forms can be applied to such
beings, and that the question of their location therefore simply does not
arise. 125
124 De Caelo 1.9 279a17-22 (quoted § 1I above).
125 Bis repetita placent. The divine beings of De Caelo 1.9, as also the forms of the
Timae'Us, are not "in place" (De Caelo 1.9 279a18: olh' tv 't6ltCjl, cf. Ti. 52b4:
!v 'tLVL 't6ltCjl). In the Timae'Us, that denial is tied to a denial that the forms are
"anywhere in the heavens" (52b5: 1l~'tE: ltOU XCl't' oopClv6v), a denial which, if what
Aristotle writes in Physics III is true, includes the denial that they are "outside
the heavens" (IlIA 203a8-9: !~(o) Il€V [se. 'tou OOpClVOUJ), which is exactly what
is asserted of Aristotle's divine beings in the De Caelo (cf. 279a16: t~(O) 81; 'tOU
OOpClVOU). Plato's forms (not said to be alive) and Aristotle's gods ("in possession
of the best life and the most self-sufficient for all eternity") are not therefore, in
the same sense, "non spatial". - In claiming that Plato's forms are "not said to
be alive", I leave aside the tricky question of the conclusion to be drawn from the

The model of the world-soul "outside" the cosmos

However, the Timaeus provides another, and a different, model for beings
that are not part of the cosmos, namely the extension of world-soul beyond
the outermost limits of the visible world. It is that model, I venture to
suggest, that Aristotle has adopted, and adapted, when he writes of beings
who, "dispensed from all alteration and immune to change, continue in
possession of the best life and the most self-sufficient for all eternity" , and
who therefore find their home "outside" the heavens, "above and beyond
the outermost movement".
Admittedly, the model will have to have been not only adapted, but
heavily adapted, since, for all his indebtedness to Plato, Aristotle has no
world-soul. A remarkable omission when one reflects that it is the presence
of a world-soul, together with the activity of the demiurge, that gives point
and purpose to the whole of Plato's cosmology, in the Timaeus. At the
same time, the omission is inevitable, given Aristotle's theory of natural
movement and of the stratification of the elements as resulting, not from
soul, but from physis. Aristotle's definition of soul as the principle of a
physical and organic body (cf. De Anima ILl 412a27-b6) is incompatible
with - is virtually designed to exclude - Plato's belief in the existence of
a demiurge and a world-soul.
But Aristotle's throwing over the notion of a world-soul does not en-
tail his disbelief in the existence of divine beings, beings who lead a life
untrammelled by time or body or movement - but beings who, for all the
loose talk of "transcendence" by Jaeger and others, are not therefore nec-
essarily to be thought of, like Plato's forms, as not existing "somewhere".
It is, I would suggest therefore, in that (to us) strange, half-way world,
that the passage from De Caelo 1.9 finds its place. Aristotle's divine beings
are not subject to time or movement, they have no body and they have no
"place" , and they are therefore not to be found within the visible universe.
But that does not mean that, like Plato's forms, they have no location at
all, for Aristotle's divine beings are living, whereas Plato's forms are not.
They are therefore to be found "outside the heavens", "above and beyond
the outermost movement".
Aristotle's debt to Empedocles?

It is at that point, or so I would venture to suggest, that we see the paradox
of Empedocles' influence on Aristotle. As is clear from his criticism of
Empedocles in the De Anima, Aristotle has no time for what he sees
conjunction of movement, life and thought with "what is fully real" , envisaged at
one point in the Sophist (24Se6-249a3). The discussion, in the lines immediately
following (249a4-bl), bears on the soul, not on forms.

96 Denis O'Brien
as the ambiguity of Empedocles' conception of Love or the "soul" .126

Indeed, the very model that Aristotle has taken from the Timaeus, for the
"localisation" of his divine beings, is a model that in its original context,
in the Timaeus, had been intended as a criticism and a refutation of
Empedocles.
Despite the disagreement, the Empedoclean link is nonetheless not
entirely fortuitous. Empedocles' philosophy is innocent of any notion of a
being which is not extended in space. There are no "forms" in Empedo-
cles' world (no "forms" of the Platonic kind), nor do Empedocles' divine
powers, Love and Strife, have their being in a world free from the confines
of space and time. It is indeed because the good god of Love is extended
throughout the Sphere that in the Timaeus she reappears, transmuted,
as a world-soul, stretched throughout the cosmos from centre to circum-
ference (cf. Ti. 34b3-6, 36d7-e5) and ensuring, by her presence, that the
whole is "joined in friendship, sufficient unto itself" (34b7-8: <jlLAOV txcxvwc;
CXtJ""CQV CXl.rtCf»). And it is because Plato has deliberately cast Empedocles'
god of Love as a foreshadowing of his own world-soul that he is led to
correct the borrowing by ensuring that his own stand-in for the god of
Love has no direct rival to her power and is therefore extended beyond
the outermost boundary of the heavens, so occupying the terrain of her
(now non-existent) adversary.
Aristotle, in his criticism of Empedocles in the De Anima and else-
where, persistently opposes that whole world of unconscious materialism
to his own. Empedocles' world - and the world of the presocratic philoso-
phers in general - is not one that he will recognise as his own, even though
he will, on occasion, acknowledge the first tentative steps that were taken
by earlier thinkers towards the recognition of a moving cause, or even to-
wards the recognition of "form" as a principle determining the proportion
of elements in sensible particulars. 127
But, as so often, we are the victims of those we criticise. When he
writes of beings in the De Caelo who lead a life free from time and place
and movement, Aristotle has, no doubt all unconsciously, drawn on the
world of implicit materialism that Plato had put before him in his de-
scription of the world-soul as extending and existing beyond the cosmos.
126 Aristotle, De Anima 1.4 407b27-408a23. See § I above.
127 For Aristotle's acknowledgement of the steps taken by earlier thinkers towards the
recognition of a moving cause, see Metaph. 1.3 984a16-b18. (On the priority, chrono-
logical and philosophical, accorded here to Anaxagoras, see O'Brien (1968, pp. 97-
106).) For Aristotle's grudging recognition of Empedoc1es' approximation to a con-
cept of "form", see Metaph. 1.10 993a15-24, and the implicit denial, a few pages
earlier, 1.7 988a34-b5. There is a passing allusion in De Anima 1.5 41Oal-3 (see
n. 12 above).

The last ftickerings of Empedocles' daimonology

"Influence" is no doubt too simple a term to describe such a relationship.
Empedocles' conception of Love, as constituting at once a cosmic princi-
ple and individual souls or daimones, is easily and obviously comparable
to Plato's conception of soul, present at once as a world-soul and (in an
inferior form) as individual souls. 128 When Aristotle, in his criticism of
Empedocles in the De Anima, casts Love in the role of "soul", and when
he asks whether Love, whether the soul, is present in the "parts" of living
beings, his remarks are most simply read in the context of that compari-
son. 129 It is a context wholly alien to Aristotle's own way of thinking. A
world-soul, the world-soul of Plato's Timaeus and its precursor in Empe-
docles' god of Love, finds no parallel in Aristotle's distinction between the
physis of the elements and the souls of organic bodies.
But the contours of Aristotle's universe may not always have been so
clearly drawn. For how else are we to explain the tantalising glimpse of
divine beings in De Caelo 1.9? These are beings fully endowed with life -
they lead "the best life and the most self-sufficient for all eternity" - who
nonetheless have no place in the visible cosmos, but who continue to live
beyond the outermost boundary of the heavens, the very position that
Plato's world-soul had occupied when it was no longer coterminous with
the body of the world (and therefore no longer stricto sensu the soul of
the world), ensuring nonetheless by her presence, beyond the outermost
boundary of the heavens, Plato's total disavowal of a world subjected to
equal and opposite powers of good and evil - the world of Empedocles.
So it is that the source of Empedocles' daimonology, the cosmic god of
Love, does perhaps find, in the divine beings living beyond the outermost
circumference of the heavens in the De Caelo, the last flickerings of a
world-soul that has otherwise been ousted by a combination of physis, of
soul that is no longer a world-soul and of the unmoved mover, a cosmic
force, but no longer a soul.
Bibliography
Algra, Keimpe, 1995, Concepts of space in Greek thought, in the series

Philosophia antiqua 65, Leiden, New York, Koln: E. J. Brill.
128 The world-soul, Ti. 35al-36d7. Individual souls, Ti. 41d4-42e4. For Empedodes'
daimones as parts or pieces of Love, see § I above.
129 Aristotle, De Anima 1.4 408a18-23. My point here is simply that Empedocles'
conception of daimones as individuated particles of Love explains the transition,
in Aristotle's criticism of Empedocles in the De Anima, from questions asked of
"soul" to the parallel questions asked of "Love". See again § I above.

98 Denis O'Brien
Allan, Donald J. (ed.), 1936, Aristotelis 'De caelo' libri quattuor, recog-
novit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit D. J. A., in the series
Scriptorum classicorum bibliotheca oxoniensis, Oxonii, e typogra-
pheo Clarendoniano ('with corrections', 1965).
Berti, Enrico, 1962, La filosofia del "primo" Aristotele, in the series Pub-
blicazioni del Centro di Ricerche di Metafisca, Collana Temi meta-
fisici e problemi del pensiero antico, Studi e testi 59, Milano: Vita e
Pensiero.
Bollack, Jean, 1965-1969, Empedocle, 3 tomes, Paris: Les Editions de Mi-
nuit.
Bonitz, Hermannus, 1870, Index Aristotelicus, in Aristotelis opera edidit
Academia Regia Borussica, vol. v, Berolini: Typis et impensis Georgii
Reimeri.
Burnet, John (ed.), 1911, Plato's 'Phaedo', Edited with introduction and
notes, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Cherniss, Harold, 1944, Aristotle's criticism of Plato and the Academy,
Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press.
Cornford, Frands M., 1937, Plato's cosmology, The 'Timaeus' of Plato
translated with a running commentary, in the series International li-
brary of psychology, philosophy and scientific method, London: Kegan
Paul, Trench, Trubner; New York: Harcourt, Brace.
Denniston, John D., 1959, The Greek particles, 'second edition' 1954, 'with
corrections' 1959, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Diels, Hermannus (ed.), 1882, Simplicii in Aristotelis Physicorum libros
quattuor priores commentaria, in the series Commentaria in Aris-
totelem graeca, edita consilio et auctoritate Academiae Literarum
Regiae Borussicae, vol.ix, Berolini: Typis et impensis G. Reimeri.
Dixsaut, Monique, 1991, Platon 'Phedon', Traduction nouvelle, introduc-
tion et notes, in the series (Euvres de Platon, Paris: Garnier-
Flammarion.
Ebert, Theodor, 2004, Platon 'Phaidon', Ubersetzung und Kommentar,
in Ernst Heitsch and Carl W. Muller (eds), Platon Werke, Uberset-
zung und Kommentar, Im Auftrag der Akademie der Wissenschaften
und der Literatur zu Mainz, I 4 'Phaidon', G6ttingen: Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht.
Elders, Leo, 1966, Aristotle's cosmology, A commentary on the 'De caelo',
Assen: Van Gorcum.
Gallop, David, 1975, Plato 'Phaedo', translated with notes, in the Claren-
don Plato series, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gaye, Russell K., see Hardie, Robert P. / Gaye, Russell K., 1930.
Gerson, Lloyd P., 1994, Plotinus, in the series The arguments of the philo-
sophers, London, New York: Routledge.

Goodwin, William W., 1897, Syntax of the moods and tenses of the Greek
verb, 'rewritten and enlarged', London: MacMillan.
Guthrie, William KC., 1933, "The development of Aristotle's theology",
Part I, Classical quarterly 27, pp. 162-171 (followed by Part Il, Clas-
sical quarterly 28 [1934], pp. 90-98).
-, 1939, Aristotle 'On the heavens', with an English translation, in The
Loeb classicallibmry, London: William Heinemann; Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts: Harvard University Press.
Hackforth, Reginald, 1955, Plato's 'Phaedo', translated with introduction
and commentary, Cambridge: University Press.
Hahm, David E., 1982, "The fifth element in Aristotle's De philosophia:
a critical re-examination", Journal of hellenic studies 102, pp. 60-74.
Hardie, Robert P. / Gaye, Russell K, 1930, Translation ofthe Physics in
William D. Ross (ed.), The works of Aristotle translated into English
under the editorship of W. D. R., vol. ii, 'Physica' by R. P. H. and
R. K. Gaye ... , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Heinze, Richard, 1892, Xenokrates, Darstellung der Lehre und Sammlung
der Jilragmente, Leipzig: B. G. Teubner.
Hicks, Robert D., 1907, Aristotle 'De anima', with translation, introduc-
tion and notes, Cambridge: University Press.
Hussey, Edward, 1983, Aristotle's 'Physics', books iii and iv, Translated
with notes by E. H., in the Clarendon Aristotle series, Oxford: Claren-
don Press; New York: Oxford University Press.
Inwood, Brad, 1992, The poem of Empedocles, A text and translation with
an introduction, in the series Journal of the Classical Association of
Canada, supplementary volume 29, Toronto, Buffalo, London: Uni-
versity of Toronto Press.
Isnardi Parente, Margherita, 1981, Senocrate - Ermodoro, Jilrammenti,
Edizione, traduzione e commento a cum di M. I. P., in the series Isti-
tuto italiano per gli studi filosofici, La scuola di Platone, Collezione
di testi diretta da Marcello Gigante 3, Napoli: Bibliopolis.
Jaeger, Werner, 1923, Aristoteles, Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner
Entwicklung, Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung. (The pagina-
tion of the main body of the text is the same in the 'Zweite vedinderte
Auflage', 1955, by the same publisher.)
King, Hugh R., 1950, "Aristotle's theory of topos", Classical quarterly
44, pp. 76-96.
Lang, Helen S., 1998, The order of nature in Aristotles physics, Place and
the elements, Cambridge: University Press.
Liddell, Henry G. / Scott, Robert / Jones, Henry S. (eds) , 1940, A Greek-
English lexicon, 9th edn, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Abbreviated as
LSJ.)

100 Denis O'Brien
Lloyd, Geoffrey E. R., 1966, Polarity and analogy, Two types of argumen-
tation in early Greek thought, Cambridge: University Press.
Mansion, Augustinus, 1923, "Etude critique sur le texte de la Physique
d'Aristote (1, I-IV)", Revue de philologie, de litterature et d'histoire
anciennes, annee et tome 47, pp. 5-41.
Martin, Alain / Primavesi, Oliver, 1999, L'Empedocle de Strasbourg (P.
Strasb. gr. Inv. 1665-1666), Introduction, edition et commentaire,
with an English summary, Strasbourg: Bibliotheque Nationale et
Universitairej Berlin, New York: WaIter de Gruyter.
Moraux, Paul (ed.), 1965, Aristote 'Du ciel', Texte etabli et traduit par
P. M., dans la Collection des Universites de Prance publiee sous le
patronage de l'Association Guillaume Bude, Paris: Les Belles Let-
tres.
Morison, Benjamin, 2002, On location, Aristotle's concept of place, in the
series Oxford A ristotle studies, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
O'Brien, Denis, 1968, "The relation of Anaxagoras and Empedocles",
Journal of hellenic studies 88, pp. 93-113.
- , 1969, Empedocles' cosmic cycle, A reconstruction from the fragments
and secondary sources, in the series Cambridge classical studies,
Cambridge: University Press.
- , 1985, "Temps et eternite dans la philosophie grecque", in Mythes et
representations du temps, 'recueil prepare par Dorian Tiffeneau',
in the series Phenomenologie et hermeneutique, 'dirigee par Paul
Ricreur et Dorian Tiffeneau', Paris: Editions du Centre National de
la Recherche Scientifique, pp. 59-85.
- , 1987, Etudes sur Parmenide, 'sous la direction de Pierre Aubenque',
Tome i, Le poeme de Parmenide, Texte, traduction, essai critique,
in the series Bibliotheque d'histoire de la philosophie, Paris: Vrin.
- , 1989, "Heraclitus on the unity of opposites", in Konstantin J. Bou-
douris (ed.), Ionian philosophy, in the series Studies in Greek phi-
losophy, Athens: International Association for Greek Philosophy,
pp. 298-303.
- , 1990, "Heraclite et l'unite des opposes", Revue de metaphysique et de
morale 95, pp. 147-171.
-, 1991, "Comment ecrire l'histoire de la philosophie? Heraclite et Em-
pedocle sur l'un et le multiple", Rue Descartes [Cahiers du College
international de philosophie] 1-2, pp. 121-138.
- , 1995, "Empedocles revisited" , Ancient philosophy 15, pp. 403-470.
- , 1997, "L'Empedoc1e de Platon", Revue des etudes grecques 110,
pp. 381-398.
-, 1999, "Plato and Empedocles on evil", in John J. Cleary (ed.), Tra-
ditions of Platonism, Essays in honour of John Dillon, Aldershot:
Ashgate, pp. 3-27.

- , 2001, "Empedocles: the wandering daimon and the two poems", Ae-
vum antiquum n.s.l, pp. 79-179.
- , 2003, "Space and movement: two anomalies in the text of the Timaeus",
in Carlo Natali and Stefano Maso (eds), Plato physicus, Cosmologia
e antropologia nel 'Timeo', in the series Supplementi di Lexis 17,
Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, pp. 121-148.
- , 2005, "Le Parmenide historique et le Parmenide de Platon", in Ales
Havllcek and Filip Karfik (eds), Plato's 'Parmenides', Proceedings of
the Fourth Symposium Platonicum Pragense, Prague: OIKOUMENH,
pp. 234-256.
Pellegrin, Pierre, 2003, "Aristote de Stagire, La Physique", in Richard
Goulet (ed.), Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, Supplement,
Paris: CNRS editions, pp. 265-271.
Pepin, Jean, 1964, "L'interpretation du De philosophia d' Aristote d'apres
quelques travaux recents", Revue des etudes grecques 77, pp. 445-
488.
- , 1971, Idees grecques sur l'homme et sur Dieu, in the series Collec-
tion d'etudes anciennes, publiee sous le patronage de l'Association
Guillaume Bude, Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Peters, Francis E., 1968, Aristotle and the Arabs: The Aristotelian tradi-
tion in Islam, in the series New York University, Studies in Near
Eastern civilization 1, New York: New York University Press; Lon-
don: University of London Press.
Pollet, Gilbert, see Sleeman, John H. / Pollet, Gilbert, 1980.
Primavesi, Oliver, see Martin, Alain / Primavesi, Oliver, 1999.
Ross, William D. (ed.), 1936, 1\PL(H01"EAOUC; CPUOLX~ CtXPOCXOLC;, Aristotle's
'Physics', A revised text with introduction and commentary, Oxford:
Clarendon Press ('from corrected sheets of the first edition', 1955).
- (ed.), 1961, Aristotle 'De anima', Edited with introduction and com-
mentary, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Rowe, Christopher J., 1993, Plato 'Phaedo', in the series Cambridge Greek
and Latin classics, Cambridge: University Press.
Schenkl, Henricus (ed.), 1900, Themistii in Aristotelis Physica paraphra-
sis, in the series Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca, edita consilio
et auctoritate Academiae Literarum Regiae Borussicae, vol. v pars
2, Berolini: Typis et impensis G. Reimeri.
Sider, David, 1984, "Empedocles B 96 (462 Bollack) and the poetry of ad-
hesion", Mnemosyne, Bibliotheca classica Batava, series iv, vol. 37,
pp. 14-24.
Sleeman, John H. / Pollet, Gilbert, 1980, Lexicon plotinianum, in the se-
ries Ancient and medieval philosophy, De Wulf-Mansion Centre, se-
ries 1, nO 2, Leiden: E. J. Brill; Leuven: University Press.

102 Denis O'Brien
Smith, John A., 1931, Thanslation of the De anima in William D. Ross

(ed.), The works of Aristotle translated into English under the edi-
torship of w. D. R., vol. Hi, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Solmsen, Friedrich, 1960, Aristotle's system of the physical world, A com-
parison with his predecessors, in the series Comell studies in classi-
cal philology 33, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.
-, 1976, "'Beyond the heavens"', Museum helveticum 33, pp. 24-32.
Thillet, Pierre, 2005, Aristote 'De l'ame', traduit du grec par P. T., edition
etablie, presentee et annotee par P. T., in the series Collection, Folio
essais, [Paris]: Gallimard.
Thicot, Jules, 1949, Aristote, Traite 'Du ciel' suivi du traite pseudo-
Aristotelicien 'Du monde', Traduction et notes par J. T., in the se-
ries Bibliotheque des textes philosophiques, Paris: Vrin.
Untersteiner, Mario, 1963, Aristotele, 'Dellafilosofia', Introduzione, testo,
traduzione e commento esegetico di M. U., in the series Temi e testi
10, Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura.
Vitelli, Hieronymus (ed.), 1888, Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis Physico-
rum libros quinque posteriores commentaria, in the series Commen-
taria in Aristotelem graeca, edita consilio et auctoritate Academiae
Literarum Regiae Borussicae, vol. xvii, Berolini: Typis et impensis
G. ReimerL
Whittaker, John (ed.), 1990, Alcinoos, Enseignement des doctrines de Pla-
ton, Introduction, texte etabli et commente par J. W. et traduit par
Pierre Louis, in the series Collection des Universites de Prance,
publiee sous le patronage de l'Association Guillaume Bude, Paris:
Les Belles Lettres.
I have also quoted two early editions of Aristotle's works:
l\.pLO'"'CO"'C€AOU~ <X1tctv"'Cct,
Aristotelis summi semper philosophi [... ] opera
quaecumque hactenus extiterunt omnia [... ] per Des[iderium] Eras[mum]
Roterodamum [Le. Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam], Basileae, per Io[an-
nem] Beb[elium] [Le. Johann Bebel] et Mich[aelem] Ising[rinium] [Le. Mi-
chael Isengrin], 2 tomi, 1550. I have consulted the copies held in the Bib-
liotheque Nationale, Paris (class-mark R 632), and in the library of the
Sorbonne (class-mark L.G. cp 12).
Aristotelis [... ] omnia quae extant opera [... ], 11 tomL Tomus iv, Venetiis,
apud Cominum de Thidino [Le. Comin da Thino], Montis Ferrati, 1560. I
have consulted the copy held in the Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris (class-
mark R 1622).

Thomas Buchheim
Plato's phaulon skemma:

On the Multifariousness of the Human Soul*
There does not seem to be one definite idea of the soul in Plato's philoso-
phy. For an idea would have to be always one and the same, whereas the
soul appears to be a Proteus: It is sometimes the one, and sometimes the
other; sometimes many in quarrelsome conflict, and then again a harmo-
nious unity out of many. The soul changes its appearances and constitu-
tions. l That is why it is a "thorny investigation" (phaulon skemma) as
Plato says in the Republic (435c) to discover "whether the soul has the
same three ideas [as a polis] or not." This paper is devoted to this "thorny
investigation" , and follows Plato's arguments and explains them as far as
possible.
I have not been able to find the expression "the idea of the soul"
or "the eidos of the soul" in Plato's texts 2 used without any explicit
reservations. 3 Plato does, however, frequently distinguish several eid€ in
the soul, as I have just said, and he also asks if they are the same as the
eid€ in the state or complete community. There are also formulations of
Plato's, which unify all the different aspects or capacities of the soul "in
only one idea".4 But it is precisely such expressions that show that, for
Plato, it is not at all self-evident to see the soul in unity with itself; and
this is surely the least that one has to be able to claim about a genuine
idea.
* Many thanks to R.A.H. King for translating this paper, and for some comments
on an earlier draft.
Cf. Phdr. 246b: pasa psyche . .. allot' en allois eidesi gignomene.
2 What we do find is "the idea of life", (Phd. 106d). But this passage tells us that we
may not identify soul (psyche) with life (zoe), because life is only a certain quality
or disposition which is provided by having a soul (cf. ibid. 105d). On the question
whether or not the soul is a form in the Phaedo cf. Schiller (1967, pp. 50-58).
3 Such as in Phdr. 246a: instead of finally explaining "the idea of that thing [se.
Soul]" what it is really like, Socrates tells us just another myth as a "simile" of it
(cf. below fn.28). See the excellent interpretation of the whole passage, and esp.
the meaning of the term "idea of the soul" by Griswold (1986, pp. 88-89).
4 Ti. 35aj Tht. 184dj cf. sumphuton dunamis, Phdr. 246a.

104 Thomas Buchheim
Furthermore, it is not right to equate the question about the different

eide that a soul may have with the question about the different parts of
the soul, as the tradition of interpreting Plato usually does. For parts are
usually taken to be elements, of the same kind and the same quality, that
can exist independently of one another and out of which the whole in
question is constituted. But in the case of ideas, the conditions of having
a shared character and of being independent from one another are not
fulfilled, and hence there is no composition5 of a divisible whole out of
them, for example, the definition of a circle appears to include the ideas
of a central point and the circumference, which is equidistant from it,
without the circle being composed of these "parts". For the circumference
is not a circumference without the central point, and the central point
is not a central point without the circumference. But the circle cannot
exist without these various aspects, although Plato would certainly call
it monoeides, that is to say, a single idea, which can be analysed through
dialectic into several features or factors, and thus defined.
To return to the thorny investigation in the Republic, whether the
soul includes the same three ideas as the polis or not: Plato distinguishes
"a longer route" to answering this question from "a shorter one, that is
at present being pursued" (435c-d), which unfortunately cannot lead to a
precise (akribOs) result, as he goes on to say.
Obviously, we would prefer the longer route, in order to decide the
question clearly. 6 Fortunately, Plato appears to return to the problem,
and even to remind us expressly of the prospect of a longer route to this
insight, when, later in the Republic, he talks about his most important
doctrine, "the idea of the good":
We said that there is a longer way to gain the finest insight, so that it
becomes obvious to whoever takes it; however, it was [only] possible to add
on the demonstrations that followed what had been said before. (504bl-4)
The real "standard" (metron, 504c1,3) by which this question can be
decided, he continues, had not then come into view, and is connected with
the most important topic of Platonic philosophy, which is only now being
discussed:
So a Guardian should take the longer way. (504c9-dl)
Since the curious reader certainly wants to become acquainted with
this route - even if he is not meant to become a Guardian - he hopes that
the question about the human soul will be unambiguously decided and so
become clear to him. But Plato would not be Plato if he were to make
5 Cf. Phd. 78c-d: a uniform ousia is also non-composite (axuntheton).
6 Most of the more detailed discussions of the tripartition of the soul in the Republic
fail to take into account that the first route is only one of two routes to the same
"thorny" investigation of the soul; they only consider the first one (e.g. Graeser
(1992, pp. 151ff.)).

Plato's phaulon skemma 105
his most important doctrine accessible for someone who merely opens a
book to pick it up - without himself taking the longer route and so being
suited to be a Guardian. All we get are similes and vague curricula for
philosopher kings, which do not really communicate the doctrine; they
merely offer a distant view of it.
So it is fitting that at the end of the massive Republic, Plato, still full of
doubt, announces that the question about the soul - whether it is uniform
(monoeides) or multifarious (polyeides) - still remains unclear (611b-612a,
esp. a3-4).7 Here Plato himself compares the soul with a kind of Proteus,
more exactly with the sea deity Glaucus, who has become so encrusted
with shells, seaweed and stones through his life in the sea that one cannot
see what really belongs to him and what does not. Similarly, the soul
has plunged into the sea of corporality and has become so encrusted with
corporeal concerns, that one cannot recognise its "original nature" (611d2)
in this state.
But the attempt to cast a little more light onto the "longer route" does
not imply that we think we are actually taking the longer route, merely
that it seems possible to extract an implicit message which in some way
goes beyond what Plato appears to say explicitly.
First, we have to reconstruct briefly which method is employed on the
shorter route that Plato actually uses. Secondly, the general characteristics
of the longer route have to be contrasted with those of the shorter one,
and have to be applied to the special case of the soul's structure. Finally,
our conclusions will be supported by some references to other dialogues.
The "shorter" route

The shorter route, which the reader takes to begin with, consists in pro-
viding the apparently necessary conditions for a clearly marked cognitive
aim; in this way, the plausibility and coherence of the approach can be
appreciated. In the present case, the aim is the definition of justice, pru-
dence, wisdom and courage as possible qualities of the human soul, once
they have been presented and understood as possible qualities of a po lis .
In the case of the polis, these virtues are based on the existence of three
"natures" in it, and their relations to one another, namely the artisans,
auxiliaries and the philosophical leaders of the community, as it were the
reason of the state.
7 In the Phd. 78d-79d the soul is not said to be uniform, as is sometimes thought.
Rather, Plato explains that the soul is that one of the two components of humans
(body and soul) which is more or most similar to the uniform ousia of the ideas.
See Graeser (1992, p. 58).

106 Thomas Buchheim
So the question that Plato asks, is whether the soul itself also contains
a manifold of different "ideas" or "natures", if the virtues are in the soul
and not in the state. In a series of steps, he shows that it really does seem
to be the case.
Firstly, the abilities or capacities which are connected with these
virtues can only exist in the city if they are exercised by individuals, and
hence actually possessed by individual humans. Because humans desire
things, they have to earn their living; because humans spur themselves
and others on to activity and arm themselves with courage the polis can
be secured against internal and external disturbances; and because hu-
mans pursue the sciences, there is wisdom and rational guidance in the
state.
If, then, individuals exercise such capacities, then:
do we learn with the one thing in us, goad ourselves with another and desire
with a third [... ] or else do each of them with the whole soul, when we are
moved to act? This is difficult to decide with a decent argument. (436a9-b3)
Hence in the second step Plato works with an argument that he had
already used in a variety of ways both in the Republic and in other dia-
logues, namely an argument using a principle of contradiction: One thing
cannot, in the same respect and at the same time, undergo or perform
contraries. If, then, one could show that we act in a contrary fashion in
the psychic activities named here, then it is clear that the activities -
learning, spurring oneself on, desire - can only be exercised with different
things in us, and not with one and the same thing.
The third step in the argument guarantees that every psychic capacity
only can perform that towards which it is directed. Being thirsty is a
desire for drink, not for food or specially for a hot drink. An additional
modification of the thing desired requires an additional modification of the
desiring capacity; and a wholly different modification, a wholly different
desire. Hence it is clear that one and the same capacity can never be
contrary to itself, for example by simultaneously desiring and avoiding
one and the same thing. For avoiding something is not merely the desire
for something else, but the desire for a contrary.
If the individual capacities in themselves never lead to contraries, then,
when we find contrary tendencies with a view to one and the same thing,
there are several psychic elements or capacities involved. The fourth step
in the argument consists in pointing to such situations: For example, we
often find ourselves drawn to the object of desire but also restrained by the
thought of the consequences. s But the same capacity in the soul cannot
cause both; hence desire and rational foresight are two different capacities
and corresponding eid€ in the soul. Similarly, when we are angry about
8 See Plato's example, R. 439c.

our own irresistible desires and as it were fly into a rage about them: This
happens neither in unison with desire nor is it an expression of reason,
since when we give in to desire with great pleasure, we are still indignant
and annoyed about it. 9 Hence such a temperamental, blazing element
in us is identical neither with desire nor with reason in our soul: 10 it is
something else.
It is notoriously difficult to convey accurately the meaning of the Pla-
tonic expressions thymoeides or thymoumenon. It is best to be guided by
the examples that Plato himself gives to explain the phenomenon. The first
example (43ge) is of someone with necrophily, who gives in to his desire
and at the same time disassociates himself from it and is indignant about
it: so the thymoeides is a kind of vociferous partisanship, which openly
disagrees with one's own overwhelming inclinations; the second example
(440b), an alliance with rational obligation against some unnamed desires,
is also a form of goad in the interest of rationality against irrationality.ll
So it is a kind of spur or stimulus for reason, which makes us flare up,
when we do or suffer something wrong in our own judgement. In those
cases when we think we are acting rightly it provides the zeal and energy
to pursue the project to the end. 12 Depending on the context, the best
German translations seem to me to be Anspom (spur, stimulus, goad) or
Emporung (indignation): neither is used of something which we take to
be unreasonable or for anything that happens automatically, like pleasure
in following one's own inclinations. Rather they mean something exact-
ing, something we think reasonable, which requires that we disentangle
ourselves from our momentary state. 13
It is worthwhile emphasising that Plato's argument, in the four stages
we have described, does not merely depend on the fact that different
functions are performed by the soul, like desire and thought, and that it
therefore has to have different capacities. Instead, the soul displays con-
tradictory tendencies, on the basis of those capacities relating to the one
thing. Hence the soul becomes involved in a real conflict with itself.14 The
9 Again, Plato's own example 43ge.
10 Characterising the "thymos" as blazing and "indignant", as I do in the main text,
is parallel to a text in the Laws 863b: "the thymos, whether it is a state or part
of the soul's nature, grown into the soul like a quarrelsome possession that is hard
to master, and that causes much confusion with its irrational violence"; but it is
insufficient in the context of the Republic where Plato is concerned to emphasise
the covert connection between reason and thymoeides.
11 See R. 440c-d, and the summary of of the thymoeides as "that part which, in the
conflict of the soul, takes up arms for reason" (440e).
12 See R. 440d e diapraxetai e teleutese.
13 Classic uses of the term suggest an interpretation along these lines, e.g. Parmenides
DK B 1.1, Heraclitus DK B 85.
14 So too the text mentioned above from the Laws (863b-864b), where Plato says in
talking about thymos, hedone and agnoia: "Each of them forces everyone to their

108 Thomas Buchheim
premise for the argument was, however, that one and the same thing can
never in the same respect have simultaneously contradictory predicates.
So, in such a situation, it cannot be one factor in the soul that grounds
or has the different tendencies. It would not be a problem for one and the
same thing to have different capacities or fulfil contradictory functions -
e.g. a carpenter's hammer has the capacity to be used to hammer nails
into wood or to extract them. The difficulty lies in the fact that the con-
tradiction has to be real, in the one thing and caused by the one thing. So
it is only the tendencies derived from the functions, and not the functions
themselves, which make the three eide of the soul necessarily different.
This point has been missed in the literature. 15
To conclude this section, let us sum up the shorter route: it is clear
that in at least two places Plato pursues a hypothetical method: we try to
find the conditions necessary for a given description or characterisation,
and take the latter to be true on the basis of these conditions. The same
capacities and their relations to one another are relevant for the same
virtues of the soul, as they are for the virtues of the po lis . And the contrary
tendencies along with the corresponding activities assume the difference
of the grounds of each activity.
The "method pursued at present" , at least in this part of the Republic,
is that discovered by Socrates, and described in the Phaedo as typically
Socratic: drawing conclusions from hypotheses 16 that are assumed to be
true. Both the conditions that are discovered are the "hypotheses" i.e.
assumptions behind a claim we wish to make; but also the unexamined
starting points are hypotheses for further conclusions which can be drawn
from them. Looking back at the shorter route, when he is turning to the
longer one, Plato characterises the earlier method as one in which "it is
possible to attach conclusions on to what has already been said" (504b3-
4).
will, although everyone of us is at the same time drawn in the opposite direction"
(863e).
15 An exception is the very intricate and scrupulous discussion of the passage by
Woods (1987, pp. 23-48)j the problem with Woods' interpretation lies in his neg-
lecting the fact that according to Plato there are two different routes to answering
one and the same questionj and these routes have significantly different results.
16 "Instead, it seemed to me that I had to take refuge in the logoi and contemplate
the truth of things in them .... So I directed my steps thither, and by assuming
(hypothemenos) that logos which I judge to be strongest, I take that to be true
which agrees with the logos, whether with reference to the cause or to something
elsej whatever does not agree with it, I take to be not true" (9ge-100a). See also
Plato's Crito 46b.

The "longer" route

Now let us try to present at least some of the features of "the longer route",
which alone, according to Plato, gives us certain and precise insights into
the elements of the soul and their number. Before embarking on this step,
I want to emphasise that this route is incomplete in the text as we have
it, insofar as Plato nowhere says that and how the insight aimed at is
arrived at by this route.
Plato's train of thought begins from the consideration that for a
prospective Guardian a vague, that is, a not entirely clear and precise
(akribes), understanding of this question is entirely unacceptable. For if
he did not grasp the facts of the matter, then the Guardian of the polis
could not possess a standard for all the measures that he has to undertake
for the arrangement of the community (cf. R. 504b-d).
Naturally, the structure of the human soul is the standard meant
here, according to which the relations in a community are designed and
preserved by the Guardians.
So the prospective Guardian should take the longer route and he must try
no less hard at learning than at sport; otherwise he will never reach the
end of that field of study which is particularly appropriate for him. - Are
these things not just the most important ones but also more important than
justice and [the other virtues] we discussed? (504c9-d5)
Namely, as Socrates says a little later, the idea of the good (505a2),
and our knowledge of it. Two things are clear at the outset:
Firstly, the person who takes the longer route is only described in
terms of knowledge and learning, i.e. just one of the three kinds of human
activity, whose relations allow one to define justice and prudence in the
city and the individual. So if one wished to follow the oversimplified logic
of the shorter route, which is all too easy to misunderstand - that a
particular function requires a separate capacity of the soul - then only
one capacity and idea in the soul would exercise this activity.
Secondly, the formulation in the sentence quoted makes it quite cer-
tain that the other two functions of the soul - the epithumetikon and the
thumoeides - are involved in this cognitive activity - and have to be. For
the aim is at a distance, and is to begin with merely the object of a desire;
at the same time, one has to goad oneself into action unremittingly, to
track down the object of this desire. Following the route to the highest
kind of knowledge is all the way along an affair for all three psychic eide.u
17 Cf. also R. 580d-581d where Plato describes how the whole soul of a human sub-
ordinates itself to one of the three eide and fulfils all three functions; correspond-
ingly, different types of human can be classified according to the dominant eidos
as philosophoi, philonikoi and philokerdai.

110 Thomas Buchheim
Just as Plato thought he could conclude from the conflict within the
soul with respect to a single object that the soul has to include different
aspects, one could here conclude from their harmony with respect to a
single object that all different aspects arise from a single source in our
soul. In reality, however, both conclusions are much too weak, and have
no satisfactory basis. There can be many other causes for one person
having different attitudes to the one thing; and also many causes for the
concentration of one's powers towards one single object.
This quotation also makes clear that the effort to learn about the good
is meant to surpass and ground the knowledge of justice that has already
been acquired. It is not just a matter of questions like: when is a state
or a person just? Rather the question is: when is something or someone
good? And they are good not merely because they are just - e.g. if the just
person were ill, and if there were no medicine to make him healthy again;
or if he were just, but used his justice inappropriately on trivialities. In
both cases the just man would not be good in every respect. The good is
thus more comprehensive than the just, or anything else which promises
an advantage. For justice, like everything else, is only able to develop its
value within and in connection with a good organisation and balance with
many other factors. For this reason Plato defines the good provisionally
as follows:
You have often been told that the most important thing to learn is the idea
of the good, since through it the just and everything else which one needs
besides it becomes useful and advantageous. (505a2-4)
The good produces utility of the second order, in such a way that, to
any thing like the just, an organising framework has to be added, within
which, and relative to which, the thing becomes useful. Neither the good
in itself, taken on its own, is really useful for anyone nor any thing without
such an organising framework, in which it is embedded. It develops, in all
its advantageous variants, only through suitable composition and the co-
ordination of several things in a fruitful association. In the Gorgias we
have the terse formulation:
Being good can be attributed to any entity, if a certain proper order (kosmos
oikeios) is realised in it. (506e2-4)
This order orders the thing itself and arranges it at the same time
within an encompassing context - which for just this reason is called
cosmos, or a taxis 18 as Plato says in the same text. 19 Through this kind
of development and repetition of the same order in itself, the good exists
in the first place. 2o
18 E.g. Grg. 506d.
19 Grg. 508a.
20 According to Plato's thesis in his last work, the Laws, the whole cosmos is com-
pletely, and with reference to all its parts, organised in such a way that "the best
for each part is the best for the whole and for each part, through the coming to be

Plato's phau/on skemma 111
But the nature of the good is not our subject now. It only had to be
sketched here in order to make clear to what extent the use of everything
good is possible only through arrangement and a greater or lesser amount
of unification in a properly ordered system. If the good is to be actually
useful, then a context, a larger or smaller world, as it were, must be created
in which one thing is useful for another. The good itself never belongs to
such a context, but it assembles the world as its cause or principle.
This is confirmed by the similes of the good that Plato continues with:
Sight and every other sense organ develops its specific usefulness only in
relation to certain given objects, which the organ itself cannot produce.
In the case of sight, the connecting element, which organises the context
of seeing and being seen, light, can also be seen, so that in this special
case, the principle or first cause is recognisable in a way in the context
which it organises, although, as the cause, it really is outside the context.
The sun, because its light is experienced as the condition of using sight, is
seen as the cause of seeing on the part of the thing which is most similar
to it, namely on the part of the eye, the second cause of seeing. 21
Similar mediating contexts provide the line in the second image with
its orientation towards the good as the principle of the whole line. For
we see both pictures and the things they portray. So we see both the
difference and the relation between picture and thing. This fact enables us
to repeat the relation in a particular way and, as Plato says, "use" things
in the visible region "as pictures" (51Ob4-5) of the invisible region that
is only to be grasped by thought. Only through the manifold interactions
and relations between the several different capacities of the soul and their
objects is the good able to put us on its tracks. That is to say, we are
led to a path of cognition which can finally lead to the good itself as the
megiston mathema.
To sum up the decisive point of this complicated train of thought: it
is not a blind stroke of fortune or misfortune that we first have perception
and then knowledge; and first desire perceptible things before we want
clearer knowledge and strive for higher aims. Rather, it is only thus that
we can be directed and orientated, that is, placed within an order that
leads us to something which, in itself, without a context caused and or-
ganised by it, would not be knowable at all. The several capacities of our
soul and their dependence on a sensible, corporeal world are a necessary
arrangement, so that the longer route, which leads to knowledge of the
good, exists in the first place and can be followed. On the one hand, the
indispensable advantage of such a composition of our soul out of several
eide related to one another consists in the possibility that we can be inte-
shared by all" (903d).
21 See R. 508all-blO.

112 Thomas Buchheim
grated in the external organisation of things in relation to their principle

- the idea of the good; that way, we can be led to that principle. On the
other hand, the unavoidable disadvantage is that to begin with, weighed
down by perception and bodily desires "as though by lead weights", as
Plato expresses it once (R. 519a8-bl), we can all too easily be led in the
wrong direction. An atomic soul would be neutral towards the orientation
of the whole; only a composite soul can orientate itself, and hence also,
unfortunately, look the wrong way.
It is interesting and significant that after the three similes, which illus-
trate the idea of the good and its importance as the organising principle
for all things, Plato calls precisely this effect of conversion or turning
around (periagoge) of the whole human soul the significant event during
the intellectual education of the future guardians; that is to say, this is
the longer route towards an answer to our question:
The present argument implies that this capacity and organ for knowledge,
present in the soul of each individual, behaves as if the eye were not able to
turn towards brightness from the darkness except with the whole body: thus
this capacity must be turned around with the whole soul from becoming
until it becomes capable of standing and looking towards being and the
brightest aspect of being. We call this the good. (518c4-dl)
I do not think that one could say any more clearly that the shorter
route, which suggested that just one of the different elements of the soul
exercises knowledge, and not the whole soul (436a-b),22 did not hit on the
truth about the soul, but merely set up a very wobbly hypothesis.
Our capacity for knowledge is not an apparatus for cognitive activ-
ity besides other soul modules for desiderative and courageous activity:
Knowledge that deserves the name reforms the whole structure of the soul
and integrates its order properly in the order of the whole. We see things
differently, desire differently, and make an effort differently, when we have
gained genuine knowledge. In such knowledge the whole soul is a unity
and harmonious, even if it had been a split soul in its preliminary cogni-
tions, perceptions, various desires and impetus. The division of the soul
that we have discussed, not merely into different eide, but into different,
incompatible kinds of motivation, does not happen because of its different
functions, but because of the contrary tendencies, which imperfect use of
the soul entangles us in down here, that is, in the Cave. The good not
merely makes the different things and states of affairs, which constitute a
22 If the eye were not capable of looking at the light unless the whole body turns, in
Plato's simile, the whole body would of course not be able to see. So too the soul: if
it knows with the whole soul, after its "conversion", then that does not mean that
the faculty of desire has turned into a cognitive faculty. Rather, desire is exclusively
directed at that which the soul knows. I am grateful to Myles Burnyeat for insisting
that this point has to be made clear.

useful world, harmonious and, in a way, one - rather, in knowledge, the

good makes the individual soul one with itself, and a whole.
The longer route to "precise" understanding of the question, whether
the soul consists of three different natures or not, does not merely draw
conclusions from facts and hypotheses, it changes the knower in such a
way that he acquires his knowledge with his whole soul and not with a
supposedly isolated part of the soul. The longer route, if someone were
to take it in all seriousness, would change the object of knowledge, (the
soul of the subject of the knowledge), in this special but important case
for Plato. 23 That explains why the question whether the soul is uniform
or not, is hard for us to answer - since we are unchanged, and prefer the
first route.
But it is possible to point to a general difference between the provi-
sional method and knowledge attained by the longer route. Plato empha-
sises this difference himself in his account, although this consists of images
and abstract curricula. Whilst the provisional method always proceeds by
hypotheses, as we have seen, the method of the longer route is described
clearly by Plato as unhypothetical or better as bringing hypotheses to an
end. In the following well known text, at the high point of the simile of
the line, Plato hints what it means to know something with pure reason
or dialectic:
Logos itself grasps this through the capacity of dialectic, not by making
hypotheses into principles, but as real hypotheses, like steps and rungs, so
that it comes up to the unhypothetical and to the principle of everything;
and once it has grasped this, and holding on to the things that depend on
the principle, it descends to the end, making no use whatever of perception,
just of ideas themselves, getting at ideas through ideas; and finishing up
with ideas. (511b4-c2)
Through the connection with an unhypothetical principle - such as the
idea of the good has to be according to Plato - hypotheses are converted
into ideas and these fit together to make up the states of affairs that are
the object of a dialectical investigation. Something from the perceptible
world which was taken to be true, as being thus and so, for example, the
situation in which our soul contradicts itself, is converted into an ideal
form, which really does belong to the state of affairs. 24 This happens
when it is reconstructed starting from the unhypothetical principle using
pure ideas. The three similes of the good merely use as components, firstly,
the structure of the human soul, located between perception and thought,
23 This is the way Plato describes this state of affairs in the Phaedo 80e-82b: a soul
that is in love with the body cannot free itself from the body, and sinks again and
again back into bodily chaos, whilst the happy, philosophical and good soul finds
the way to peace with the divine.
24 See also 533c: Plato says that a dialectical investigation never leaves the hypotheses
unchanged, since without a change no justification can be given for them.

114 Thomas Buchheim
secondly, the orientation of these two capacities towards one another and,
thirdly, their common ascent to its true self from the imprisonment in the
perceptible world, towards the idea of the good through pure, dialectical
thinking.25 And so if someone were really to take this cognitive route,
and not merely read a book, then his soul would turn into a single idea,
unified with itself, since it would then be beyond all conflict with itself
in the perceptible world. All in all, the similes provide a picture of this
longer route to the knowledge of the structure of the soul, on which the
soul itself is directed towards itself, that is, to unity and harmony with
itself. 26
The human soul - one or many?

According to Plato's dialectical views, expressed clearly in many places
in his works, an idea may have several eide in itself, and still be uniform,
that is monoeides. 27 In contrast to that "ideal" compatibility of one and
many, we have seen that Plato leaves undecided at the end of the Republic
whether the soul is uniform or multifarious: This can give us an argument
for saying that the soul is not a form, but the activity of mediating be-
tween cognisable ideas and perceptible bodies,28 an activity that has to
be carried out again and again. As long as we ourselves are encrusted with
the shells and seaweed of becoming and pleasure, then we are unable to
see how we can liberate our torn soul from the divergent claims of the
perceptible world and lead it to unity with itself.
25 The same dialectical project is summed up at 533c-d.

26 Cf. Griswold (1986, p. 122): "The point of all this is that [a human soul's] self-
knowledge possesses a "practical" dimension; it is a matter of a person's acting
in a certain manner, of living his life in a certain way. As we shall see, the soul's
original character type (represented by a god) is really potentiality for being a
certain character; a soul does not become its character type until it lives out the
character and acts accordingly. [... ] Nor could an earthly soul in this life perfectly
follow a god, for the god is, after all, divine [... ]. That is, even character remains
a telos that is never quite fulfilled."
27 In footnotes 36-37 below I list further texts which show that for Plato there is no
absolute difference between unity and plurality, as long as one investigates ideas
as such using dialectic. Rather the logan techne must practice both "a synoptic
leading to one idea" as well as "the dissection according to natural members", in
order to discover what the nature of something is (Phdr. 265c-266c).
28 According to Plato's argument in the Phaedrus the soul's constitution before its
embodiment is like a sumphutos dunamis of two chariot horses and their driver.
Like Ostenfeld (1992, pp. 324-328) I take this description to follow on the account
of the soul given immediately before it, as a self-moving prime cause of motion.
The soul can only be such a self mover in combination with a body. Later in the
dialogue (271a) Plato repeats his question about the uniformity or multifariousness
of the soul, and associates the latter with behaviour kata somatos morphen.

From our discussion of the longer route it has become clear, however,
that a decision about this question, strictly speaking, depends on the
behaviour of the individual soul itself, and the life it leads - if Plato's
megiston mathema is true. For if all faculties of the soul are in harmony
with one another, and if a person recognises what he desires and what
he would goad himself into doing, then his soul is "friends" with itself, as
Plato puts it, and hence at one with itself.
According to the end of the Republic, the soul is immortal in both
cases - whether it is at peace in the highest state of eternal knowledge of
the good, or restless and torn through the evils of bodily existence. For
something like the soul which cannot be killed by its own particular evil
cannot perish through alien evils,29 with which it is burdened again and
again because of rebirth.
The particular evil of the soul is, according to Plato, injustice; the
adversities of the sensible world are alien to the soul, and in any case it
is exposed to them repeatedly. For if the soul lives correctly, and knows
the good, then it will enjoy the time of separation from the body as a
reward, and then make the right decision for a new way of life in sensual
existence. But if the soul is unjust and does not know what is good, then
it has to suffer from every injustice, and finally blindly chooses again
the wrong life. In this way, the soul remains torn or its situation becomes
even worse through an even more tyrannical life that it chooses, and hence
becomes even less of a friend to itself. None of those making the choice
notices, Plato says, "the order of the soul" ,30 because this order can only
be realised by a new corporeallife,31 which is the soul's chosen lot. 32 The
order of the soul is its vice or virtue33 - virtue or being good (arete), when
the soul manages to integrate itself through its own achievements in the
cosmos of things,34 that is not to be torn apart, to be at one with itself.35
29 R. 61Oe5-8.
30 R. 618b2-4.
31 So the soul continues to exist, once it has been created, in its three eid€, which
make it possible for the soul to perform the task of more or less successfully unifying
perceptible body with the intelligible realm of ideas, after each rebirth. Since the
continued existence of the soul includes the cycle of life and death, one cannot
say simply that the soul is immortal or eternal: it is merely imperishable (cf. Lg.
904a). In contrast, Plato makes it quite clear in the Timaeus that only nous, i.e.
the thinking eidos of the soul, is "immortal" or "divine" (Ti. 8ge-90c, 69c-d, cf.
also 41c-d). So I agree entirely with J.Y. Robinson (1990, pp. 103-110): Robinson
shows that such a view is in harmony with Plato's conception of the soul.
32 Both Republic Bk. X and Laws Bk. X describe the choices of the soul in similar
fashion (see Lg. 904c-905d).
33 Crg. 506d, quoted above.
34 Cf. Lg. 904b-d.
35 My account of the Glaucus passage and the soul's being one or many according to
its own virtues and vices is in full accordance with T.M. Robinson (1970, pp. 50-54).

116 Thomas Buchheim
There is no absolute difference between one and many. Something that

is monoeides does not, on that account, have to be one dimensional and
absolutely simple, without any inner differentiation. 36 At many places in
his works,37 Plato describes dialectical knowledge, by saying that it always
investigates one and the same eidos as one and as many, and analyses it
and unifies it again. Hence every entity is at once many and one, especially
in its ideal constitution.
However, the problem of the corporeal, sensible world, which souls
have to continually connect with the truly knowable world, consists in the
fact that the multiplicity of a perceptible thing involves "the Nature of
difference" (thaterou physin: Ti. 35a7f.) in such a way as to be in danger
of being torn apart by its own opposing tendencies. I understand that to
mean that a perceptible thing not only is constituted by different compo-
nents and characteristics, but that these very characteristics cause their
own tendencies or natures to be different from the thing they constitute
at the moment. In this way, a perceptible thing possesses not merely dif-
ferent factors, but divergent ones, which, unless they are overcome by a
dominant unity, tear the thing apart and so destroy it. Among Ideas, unity
and multiplicity are compatible, and remain dialectically unified; but in
the perceptible world, they diminish and hamper one another. For every
factor in a multiplicity pursues its own path of becoming and alteration
in the perceptible world, unless a more powerful unity holds it together.
Every corporeal thing decays into something different from itself. Among
ideas, that is not the case: the integrated manifold that forms the unity,
pursues just that unity which gives the thing as a whole its character. 3B
This is the reason, as Plato says in the Timaeus, that the soul, which in
itself connects both orders - that of sensation and that of true knowledge
- only in its best state, namely as world soul or (perhaps) as the soul of
36 The locus classicus describing ideas as uniform (monoeid€) is Symposium 211a-b.
1) Change 2) relation and 3) localisation are excluded from the idea of beautyj
only then is it described as "in itself and uniform with itself, eternally being" . The
three things excluded concern possible relations to things other than the idea itself,
and not its own essence or constitution. Other texts show that this constitution is
not simple, but rather constructed from several essential aspects, e.g. Prm. 143aj
144e et passimj Phlb. 64e-65a, 66a-b, together with 16c-d.
37 Some of the most important passages on the dialectic of unity and multiplicity are
Sph. 253dj Pit. 278b-cj Phlb. 16dj Phdr. 265c, 266bj Lg. 965c.
38 Bob Sharples has pointed out to me that Plotinus presents an identical conception
of the difference between the dialectical unity of things in nous and the divergence
of their characteristics within the perceptible world (see Ennead III 2 [47] 2, and III
3 [48]7). Both of these Enneads concern providence (pronoia), the "preconception"
of the world in the divine nous. Many allusions in Plotinus' presentation shew
that he thinks he is giving an interpretation of Plato's Timaeus. I agree entirely
with Plotinus's view, without being able to argue the point here. See Sharples
(1994, pp. 171-181).

the wise, forms "one idea of everything" - that is, of being (ousias eidos),
of the nature of Sameness and the nature of Difference. Each of these
three components consists in turn of a indivisible element as an idea, and
a divisible form of existence in a body. In the Timaeus, Plato sees the
essence of the soul in its capacity to unify everything, even as he empha-
sises, out of the "nature of Difference, hard as it was to mingle, which is
forced into union with Samenes" (35a6-8). This is the reason that it is
worthwhile for Plato to give the world a soul, for it connects that which
is definitively different into the unity of the world. What is definitively
different? As Plato repeatedly says, and as is emphasised right at the start
of the description of the world in the Timaeus, on the one hand, eternal
being, that is, the ideas, and on the other, that which is always in process
of becoming, the region of sensible bodies. Since the soul manages to make
"one idea out of everything", even if with great difficulty, it is the factor
that mediates between eternal being and becoming. Whilst ideas belong
to thinking, that is, all together they constitute nous, and becoming is
body, soul mediates the two, according to Plato: "no us is in the soul, and
the soul in body, so that the whole comes into being" (Ti. 30h4-5).
It is a consequence of this construction of Plato's, which can only be
sketched briefly here,39 that the soul quite clearly cannot be an idea, if it
is to fulfil its function; hence, there cannot be an idea of the soul according
to Plato, as I remarked at the start of my paper. For the soul always has
to integrate the difference of the world of becoming, which can only be
mixed with difficulty. If the soul did not do this, then there would be
no route from the world of bodies to any idea, including the idea of the
good. But if the soul in this way integrates the other that is in process
of becoming, then one can really have a long argument as to whether the
soul itself is uniform or not. For this is precisely the question whether this
other, which the soul again and again has to integrate into a unity with
itself and nous, in the final analysis is part of the soul or not, that is,
whether it remains something really different.
Nonetheless, the question could well be put why a soul has to take
on the tough business of unifying the perceptible world, which is divided
in itself, and the unassailable harmony of nous: wouldn't it be simpler to
renounce entirely the corporeal world? If one did, then no one would know
39 For a more comprehensive account cf. Johansen (2004, esp. ch. 7). Johansen dis-
tinguishes two successive stages of the partition of the soul. First, the integration
of the "Nature of Difference" and consequently of a "circle of difference" besides
the "circle of the same" of pure nous before the individual embodiment; second,
the confrontation and unification of the individual soul with the rectilinear move-
ments of body at the embodiment in an individual human. Only this confrontation
causes the potential division in rational and irrational parts to be actualised as a
tripartition (see esp. p.144f., 158f.), which in turn can be used by the individual
to actualise the good for him- or herself in the perceptible world.

118 Thomas Buchheim
the good, and no one would be able to follow a route to this knowledge, ex-
cept perhaps eternal nous itself, which, because it is eternal, never follows
a route anywhere. So the business of the soul, however arduous it may
be, is the multiplication of the chances of knowledge and the realisation
of the good in the world, if the soul achieves a good life, that is, if it is
able to repeat the order of the world in itself. At the end of the Timaeus,
Plato describes at some length this task, which individual humans with a
soul have to perform:
The therapy for each [element in the soul] is in each respect, just the one:
give each its proper nutriments and motions. The motions in us that are
related to the divine are the thoughts and revolutions of the whole; each of
us must follow these, and using learning, correct the harmonies and revolu-
tions, by destroying the revolutions in the head connected with becoming:
that which knows must be made like that which it knows, corresponding
to its original nature, so that once it has become the same it attains the
best life, as prescribed by the gods for men, as its end, both now and in the
future. (Ti. 90c6-d7)
In order to perform this task we need in any case three different eid€
in our souls, whether they plunge us into contradictions and we never get
our heads clear of the "revolutions connected with becoming" or whether
the three eid€ finally lead us to a realisation of the order of the whole in
ourselves and we can enjoy the harmony of the whole both in ourselves
and in the cosmos. For present purposes we can leave it open whether
that would really be worth the effort or not.
Summary of the main theses
1. The human soul always has the three eid€ of desire, indignation,
and reason. For "soul in general", from which human soul comes (see
Timaeus), has the task of connecting the sensible world of becoming
with the eternal intelligibles, and in this way to attain the good, and
knowledge of the good.
2. Hence the soul cannot have reached its aim right from the start;
rather it sets out towards its aim by way of desire and stimulus.
The better organised it is the more effective and the smoother is the
achievement of this end.
3. Insofar as the soul fundamentally mediates between the sensible
world of becoming and the ideal-intelligible, "the other that is re-
sistant to mixing" has been added to the soul "by force". For this
reason, soul cannot be an idea. For an idea has the formal charac-
teristic of being monoeides in a harmonious manner, as a dialectical

unity out of many aspects which define the idea and hence belong
together from the outset.
4. The human soul can fulfil the functions of its three eide either in a
confused and conflicting manner or in a clear and harmonious one.
In the first case, the soul tends towards a "polyeidetic" state, in the
second, to a "monoeidetic" one. A stable, monoeidetic constitution
of the human soul is only attainable via the successful passage from
the sensible world to the idea of the good. But even then Plato
thinks that the soul has to return to a new test, in a life the soul
chooses for itself, and which has to be returned to the harmony of
a good life from the divergent and divisive claims of our world.
5. If the soul is in a monoeidetic state, then it desires, goads itself
and knows "with the whole soul", without thereby removing the
differences between the three forms of the soul. In this state, the
human soul fits its inner order (psyches taxis) correctly in the order
of the cosmos. According to Plato that is what the soul's virtue
(arete) consists in, that is, its good.
6. Truly philosophical knowledge, i.e. knowledge gained on "the longer
route", does not merely aim at knowledge of objectively true states
of affairs, but also at a "turning round of the whole soul" from in-
ternal and external distraction to a harmonious orientation towards
the good.
References
Graeser, Andreas, 1969, Probleme der platonischen Seelenteilungslehre,

Munich: Beck.
Griswold, Charles L. (Jr.), 1986, Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus, New
Haven, London: Yale University Press.
Johansen, Thomas K., 2004, Plato's Natural Philosophy. A Study of the
Timeaus-Critias, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ostenfeld, Erik N., 1992, "Self-Motion, Tripartition and Embodiment",
in: L. Rosetti (ed.), Understanding the Phaedrus, Proceedings of
the 11. Symposium Platonicum, Sankt Augustin, pp. 324-328.
Robinson, Thomas M., 1970, Plato's Psychology, Toronto: Univ. Press.
Robinson, James V., 1990, "The tripartite soul in the Timaeus", in: Phro-
nesis, 35, pp. 103-110.
Schiller, Jerome, 1967, "Phaedo 104-105: Is Soul a Form?, in: Phronesis,
12, pp. 50-58.

120 Thomas Buchheim
Sharples, Robert W., 1994, "Plato, Plotinus and Evil", in: Bulletin of the
Institute of Classical Studies, 39, pp. 171-18l.
Steiner, Peter, 1992, Psyche bei Platon, Gi:ittingen: Vandenhoeck & Rup-
recht.
Woods, Michael, 1987, "Plato's Division of the Soul", in: Proceedings of
the British Academy, 73, pp. 23-48.

Pierre-Marie Morel
"Common to Soul and Body"

in the Parva Naturalia
(Aristotle, Bens. 1 436bl-12)
In both De anima (de An.) and Parva Naturalia (PN) Aristotle speaks
of states common to soul and body.1 But, given that the soul is a subject
for the natural philosopher, who is able to take account at once of matter
and form - in this case body and soul - this subject lies at the heart
of Aristotelian psychology. However, this expression is not very clear, for
two reasons. On the one hand, the genus of what is common to soul and
body is not clearly identified; on the other, the meaning of "common"
is not stated. Let us start with the first point. Aristotle gives a list of
the X which are common to soul and body (sensation, memory, impulse,
appetite, desire, pleasure and pain; waking and sleep, youth and old age,
breathing in and out, life and death).2 A few lines earlier3 he has spoken
of actions (praxeis) and indicated that some are proper to some species,
while others are common to some species. However, he uses the expression
about "the most important X", using a neuter plural (ta megista). One
could take this to refer to "functions" (erga), but youth and old age, life
and death are not functions, properly speaking. So we have to stick to very
general terms, using the wide semantic range provided by pathos, used
in one of the formulations of the expression: 4 "affections" or "accidental
properties", or, still more generally, "states".
See de An. I.l 403a3-4j m.1D 433b20j Bens. 1 436a7-8j Bomn. Vig. 1 453bll-13 (in
the form of a question). The qualification "common to soul and body" refers to the
subject of PN. It appears on the first page of Bens. in a passage fixing in a general
way the programme for all of the treatises. I would like to thank Myles Burnyeat,
for his useful comments after reading a previous version of this paper, and R. A. H.
King for his translation of my text.
2 Bens. 1 436a7-15.
3 436a4.
4 De An. 1.1 403a3-4: "there is a difficulty about the states of the soul (-ta. 7ta.il'll 'tijc:
Ij!uxijc:), that is, to know if they are all equally common to that which has a soul or
if there are some which are proper to the soul itself". The expression "that which
has a soul" (in italics) refers to the body.

122 Pierre-Marie Morel
The second source of unclarity is due to the fact that the term koinos
in Aristotle is not opposed to idios in a single way. The adjective "com-
mon" means to begin with a property which one can attribute by analogy
to two distinct entities. This is the way it is used at the beginning of
the text when Aristotle mentions the praxeis of different living things;
and often in the biology. 5 Hence swimming, flight, walking are common
to different animal species. Yet there is no causal relation between these
common things. However, koinos can also mean a state or a movement
which implies correlatively the two entities - or a number n of entities -
and may apply to an operation that they perform together. This is the
case for example with the interest or common good which citizens produce
by their effective and correlative participation in the life of the city.6 If, in
"common to the soul and body" , we understand "common" in the previ-
ous sense, we are already tending implicitly towards a kind of parallelism,
according to which soul and body, undergo affections each on their own,
which are associated, but discontinuous, and constitute two substantially
distinct entities. In fact, such a strict parallelism is not supported by the
texts. Furthermore, strictly speaking, the soul as such does not undergo
affections: it is not the soul that experiences pity or reflects, but the man
"by his soul" .7
So the second sense appears to be required, all the more so as the
soul and the body, like citizens of the same city, form a koinonia. 8 It is
hard to know what Aristotle means exactly by this term, but it is clear
that by using it he means that soul and body do not merely have some
features in common: they have a common existence. However, even if we
take koinos in the second sense we are still able to think that the two
entities are really, i.e. substantially distinct - each working in common
operations which are merely accidents of each. Thus D. Ross is of the
opinion that PN belong to a period of Aristotle's psychology which is
still dualist, and that they derive from "a two-substance view" which is
incompatible with the hylomorphism of book II of de An. 9 It is true that
nowadays this kind of interpretation is considered outmoded, and that
there is general support for the view that PN is compatible with the
thesis that soul and body form a matter-form composite, that is to say
a really unified whole. Since the 'sixties several commentators e.g. Block
5 See e.g. PA 1.5 645b22.
6 See e.g. the expression to koinon to tOn politOn, Pol. 1I1.13 1283b41.
7 De An. 1.4 408b15. Furthermore as we will see, "common" is not the only term
opposed to "proper" in the de An. For Aristotle makes clear right from the begin-
ning of the treatise that some path€ are proper to the soul, whereas others affect
animals - as wholes - "because of the soul" (Bt'i;x&!v'I)v, de An. 1.1 402a9-1O).
8 De An. 1.3 407b18; Long. 2 465a31.
9 Ross (1955, p. 16).

"Common to soul and body" in the Parva Natumlia 123
(1961), Siwek (1963), Kahn (1966), have supported the thesis convincingly
that PN could have been edited at a time when Aristotle's psychological
doctrine had been definitively fixed. Most researchers who currently are
working on PN share this view.lO
Nonetheless, it is useful to look more closely at something which causes
problems in the eyes of a commentator on Aristotle as well-informed as
Ross. What's more, "developmentalist" hypotheses have the advantage of
putting the emphasis on the peculiar nature of the subject of PN and of
drawing attention to the physiological considerations in Aristotle's con-
ception of life. Other passages in the PN, e.g. those where Aristotle says
the soul is "set alight" in the area round the heartll confirm this orienta-
tion.
In any case, to the extent that "common to soul and body" appears
in de An., the problem of the expression's meaning affects the whole doc-
trine of soul and body.12 But according to this doctrine, as is well known,
it is very artificial to draw a real distinction between body and soul, even
if this is to determine what they have in common, given that the living
body is by definition ensouled. It is not even helpful to ask if soul and
body are a single thing or two, since it is useless to ask this question about
matter and the actualised thing of which it is the matter, e.g. about wax
and its form. 13 However, is it enough to say that soul and body, under-
stood as form and matter, are in reality a single thing, considered either
from the point of view of act or from that of power?14 The expression
"common to soul and body" really assumes a distinction which is not
simply conceptual. 15 In other words, the use of the expression leads to a
form of duality,16 although its intention is clearly to insist in the unity of
body and soul. So the question is twofold: what kind of duality does the
expression imply? And, conversely, what kind of unity does it attempt to
define?
To answer this question, it is fitting to turn to PN, for three rea-
sons. Firstly, as we have already seen, these treatises have a more marked
10 Van der Eijk (1994), King (2001)j I refer the reader here to the arguments in the
introduction to my translation (Morel, 2000).
11 Juv. 4 469b13-17j Resp. 8474b13, 16 478a28-30.
12 I assume that Book 11 of de An., where hylomorphism is most explicit, is coherent
with Books I and Ill, where the expression under discussion appears.
13 De An. 11.1 412b6.
14 For this view see Metaph. VIII.6 1045bI7-20.
15 Everson (1997, p. 234) underlines this difficulty very clearly: "The problem now is
to see how there can be a common affection of two things, when these cannot in
fact be affected separately."
16 That is, a form of dualism, to take up a point made by Menn (2002, pp. 100-1).
He thinks that the expression is not designed to avoid dualism, but to preserve the
soul from the mutability which affects the body. It goes without saying, as Menn
shows, that the notion of dualism may not be used here without reservations.

physiological dimension than de An., so that they would appear to take

properly bodily aspects of what is "common to soul and body". The fol-
lowing discussion will, according to me, confirm that point. 17 Secondly,
de An. leaves us unequipped to deal with the question despite the rich-
ness of its theory. Furthermore, the preamble to P N, where the expression
appears, suggests that PN completes de An. on just this point. Thirdly,
PN introduce a new element in comparison to what we learn about the
expression in de An.: the functional pre-eminence of sensation among all
the functions and states of the composite. For the use of the expression in
PN is intended to designate a criterion of what is common to body and
soul. The criterion in question, at least as far as animals are concerned, is
sensation. 18 In our examination of it we will see not only that "common to
soul and body" does not imply the substantial distinction that some com-
mentators would like to see, but also that PN give to this question a more
precise meaning than mere unity of matter and form. They put emphasis
on the material, and thus corporeal, conditions of internal movements, of
which the soul is the principle, in the composite.
Let us begin by looking at the way PN justify the expression "common
to soul and body", and why sensation plays a crucial role here. Aristotle
say several times that sensation defines animals, and that it is their prin-
cipal activity.19 The great diversity of texts in which this doctrine appears
shows that it is neither marginal nor dependent merely on context. Indeed
this doctrine corresponds to one of the fundamental theses about the ty-
pology of living things, in that sensation is proper to animals as opposed
to plants. 2o It is logical that PN which treats living things in general but
as a matter of fact favours animals, starts from sensation to examine the
states common to soul and body. Aristotle makes the choice explicitly:
It is not unclear that all the (states) mentioned are common to body and
soul. For all of them occur either with or through sensation. Some are
actually affections of sensation, others are ways of being of sensation, others
guarantee its protection and preservation. That sensation arises in the soul
through the body is clear both from argumentation and without it. But we
have shown in the treatise on the soul, what sensation and sensing is, and
17 Contra, about De Sensu, see Johansen in this volume.
18 Sens. I 436bl-12.
19 Not only Sens. I 436blO-12, but also: Somn. Vig. I 454a8-10, b24j Juv. 3 469a18-
20j de An. II.2 413b2j PA 11.1 647a21, 111.4 666a34-35j GA 1.23 731a33, M-5. This
list is not exhaustive. See also Metaph. VII.IO 1035bI6-18: no part of the body
can be defined without mentioning its function (eryon) which in turn cannot exist
without sensation.
20 Thus, the definition of animals by sensation is clearer and more fundamental than
that by self-motion, in that some animals do not move although they possess
sensation. The difficulties Aristotle runs into when he tries to explain exactly what
he means by "self-motion" are familiar. This problem cannot be tackled in this
paper.

"Common to soul and body" in the Parva Naturalia 125
through what this affection occurs in animals. Sensation belongs necessarily

to animals insofar as each is an animal. For it is by this that we distinguish
between that which is an animal and that which is not. (Sens. 436bl-12)21
In the course of this text, two transitions are performed - that between
de An. and PN and between the introduction to De sensu and the specific
analysis of the different senses. An aim of de An., according to this text,
was defining sensation and giving its cause (ti esti kai dia ti), which does
not mean that the De sensu does not offer any causal explanation, but
that it examines the senses separately, whereas de An. emphasises rather
what they have in common. Nonetheless, our text adopts the generalising
perspective of de An., since it refers to sensation in general or as a faculty.
It establishes that sensation presents the common factor of the different
properties or functions tackled in PN. Sensation is even the criterion of
that which is common to soul and body, since it is as far as they participate
in sensation, in one way or another, that these states are common to soul
and body (436b1-3). The presence of sensation in the case of any living
individual testifies to the fact that we are dealing with an animal and not
a plant.
To justify the fact that all the states mentioned above belong to soul
and body, Aristotle distinguishes in 436b3-4 two general ways of being re-
lated to sensation: some occur "with" (meta), others "through" (dia) sen-
sation. This means at least that none of them is produced "apart (chOris)
from sensation", to take up Alexander of Aphrodisias' remark. 22 That
allows one to exclude the activities of intellect, if it is true that it is re-
ally separable. However, this phrase does not enable us to explain the
expression "common to soul and body" , of which it is merely the negative
formulation. Alexander (Wendland, 1901, 7.19-22) gives several examples
of states produced with sensation: the state of waking, pleasure and pain,
health and sickness. Waking is closely linked to sensation in the treaty On
sleep:
It is thought that he who has sensation is awake and that every waking
individual has sensation of a certain movement, internal or external. If,
then, being awake consists simply of having sensation, it is clear that it is
that by which one has sensation which makes waking individuals awake and
sleeping ones sleep. (Somn. Vig. 1 454a2-7)
Sensation here is to be seen as a realised activity and not only as
21 Ihl 51: naV'tat 'tIX AE:Xl'ltV'tat KOIVIX 'tjje; 'tE: ljIuxjje; tIn! Katl 'tOU aWlLat'toe;, OUK 1i5TjAOV.
nav'tat yilp 'tIX ILl:v 1LE:'t' at!al'l~aE:we; aUIL(3at(VE:I, 'tIX 51: 51' at!al'l~aE:we;, lVlat 5E: 'tIX ILE:V
nal'lTj 'tatv'tTje; Qv'tat 'tuYXavE:l, 'tIX 5' ~~E:le;, 'tIX 51: <pUAatKat! Kat! aw'tTjp(atl, 'tIX 5/; <pl'lopat! Katl
a'tE:p~aE:Ie;: ~ 5' aIaI'lTjale; (hI 51IX aWlLat'toe; Y(YVE:'tatl 'tfi ljIuxfi, 5jjAOV Kat! 51IX 'tOU Myou
Katl 'tOU Myou xwpk. &:AAIX nE:pI IL/;V at!al'l~aE:we; Kat! 'tou at!al'laVE:al'latl, 't( ta'tl Katl 51IX
't( aulLf3at(vE:1 'toie; C!j>ole; 'tou'to 'to nal'loe;, e:tpTj'tatl np6upov tv 'toie; nE:pI ljIuxjje;. 'toie; 5E:
n
C!j>OIe;, ILE:V Cijiov ~Kata'tov, &:vaYKTj onapXE:lv attal'lTjalv' 'tov't'l> yilp 'to Cijiov e:LVatl Kat!
IL~ Cijiov 510p(ColLE:V.
22 Alexandri in librum de sensu commentarium (Wendland, 1901, 7.16,18).

a determinate power or a natural disposition. It cannot then show itself

completely except when the animal actualises its faculties, that is to say,
in the state of waking. We know from the first lines of the Metaphysics,23
but also from De Anima, that pleasure and pain accompany sensation.
Sensation is accompanied by the perception of pleasure and pain, and is
hence directly tied to desire:
If there is sensation, there is also imagination (phantasia) and desire (orexis),
for if there is sensation, there is also pain and pleasure and therefore nec-
essarily appetite (epithumia). 24
True, the presence of phantasia in this list poses a problem, if the aim
were to enumerate the states which only occur "with" (meta) sensation,
in the narrow sense of simultaneity, to the exclusion of all other relations.
I will return to this point shortly.
The final example given by Alexander, health and sickness, is certainly
not the most convincing: if he is saying that the living body is necessarily
healthy or sick, there is no need to mention sensation, unless for the reason
that it is the specific activity of the animal body. Besides Aristotle contents
himself, a few lines before, by saying that neither health nor disease are
to found in entities deprived of life. 25
The class encompassed by the phrase di 'aistheseos is also very broad.
Alexander gives as an example youth and old age,26 which define a certain
state of the sensitive faculty, but one could just as well say that as the
living thing is necessarily young or old, these states are present "with"
sensation. Besides, if the relation dia is a relation denoting the agent, we
have to say that sensation is not itself the agent of youth or old age, but
that it is on the contrary the agent of other states. So the logical sug-
gestion has been made 27 that Aristotle is thinking of memory and, more
generally, phantasia. This latter can accompany actual sensation, but its
definition presents it basically as a process derived from sensation and
brought about by it - a relation which can be expressed by dia. For ima-
gination is a "movement which is produced under the influence of actual
sensation" .28 The sensation precedes and makes possible the phantasia,
not only because it is the first to grasp a form which the imagination will
be able to preserve and revive, but also because it is the first term of a
series of movements of which actual imagination - the internal represen-
tation of a phantasma - is the last in time. The alteration of the sense
23 I.1 980a21-26.
24 De an. II.2 413b23, see also 3 414b4-6.
25 436aI8-19.
26 7.22-23.
27 Notably by Ross (1906, p. 127), Siwek (1963, p.70).
28 De An. m.3 429al-2j Insomn. 1 459a17-18j see also de An. III.3 428bll-12.

organ during sensation 29 spontaneously produces a kinetic effect and a

trace, a sensible impression (aisthema). Apparently, aisthemata become
phantasmata under the influence of the common sense faculty and move in
the direction of the heart. In this way, the appearance of dreams, because
it is just a "rising" of the images,30 is the ultimate consequence of this
process of which actual sensation is the prime mover. Aristotle is merely
applying the Platonic conception of repercussion (antiperistasis), despite
his criticism of the idea, to explain how movement can be produced in the
absence of the mover.31 In the case of projectiles, the medium - air, water
or something else - receives the capacity to move from the mover after the
mover has exercised its movement. This model proves particularly fertile
in PN since it allows an explanation of the secondary effects of sensation:
memory, dreams,32 but also a certain number of dysfunctions, like those
which bring about melancholy. 33
The causal relation expressed by dia is clearly justified since the two
classes of phantasmata which constitute memory and dreaming are pro-
duced after the actual sensation of the object, of which they preserve the
trace - and on account of the fact of this sensation. Although one should
not be satisfied with a definition of phantasia as the simple degradation
of actual sensation, above all if one bears in mind the variety of functions
which Aristotle attributes to phantasia, nonetheless the latter remains,
both in its origin and dynamically, dependent on actual sensation. The
various passages in PN which deal with imagination are to be seen from
this perspective. So as not to get involved in the complicated debate on
the real status of phantasia - is it in itself a faculty with its own spe-
cific properties or a simple kind of movement originating in the faculty of
sensation - I will content myself with remarking that the context of PN
favours the holders of the second position. Phantasia, whether it produces
dreaming or memory, is really closely bound up with the common sense
29 I am not going to broach the much discussed question whether this alteration
should be taken literally as a physiological modification of the sense organ or
if sensation itself implies no physiological process. The reader may be referred
to the status quaestionis presented by M. Burnyeat (2002), an opponent of the
literalist reading. At any rate, it is clear that the formation of images by phantasia
presupposes the preservation of a sense trace which is not merely the (immaterial)
form ofthe object grasped by sensation: it is a physiological trace. This is the reason
that even if one does not reckon that sensation in itself implies a physiological
process, it seems to me certain that it is the cause of a number of such processes.
30 See lnsomn. Ch.3.
31 See Ph. VIII.lO 266b28-267a20, IV.8 2l5a15, where the term antiperistasis is
reserved for the theory expounded at Timaeus 59a, 7ge-80c. See also Cael.
III.2 301 b23-30.
32 For a description of the process, see especially lnsomn. 2 459a23-b7.
33 Mem. 2 453a14-3lj Somn. Vig. 3 457a27j lnsomn. 3 46la22j Div.Somn. 2 463b17,
464a32, and Pr. XXX.I.

faculty. Hence "dreaming originates in the faculty of sense, but insofar as

it is imaginative (phantastikon)" .34
In addition we can also say that desire (orexis) is produced di' aisthe-
seos. For it is given the double status of moving and of being moved in the
De Motu Animalium, for the animal moves under the influence of desire
and choice, having been altered by imagination or thought. 35 Moreover
Aristotle notes that "desire is produced through sensation or imagination
or thought" 36 and the preposition used here is again dia.
This first system of classifications is completed by new headings, be-
ginning at line 436b4. The dichotomy metal dia appears to be a real di-
chotomy, designed to include the other headings. This is suggested by
the symmetry ta men met' aistheseos . .. ta de di' aistheseos. When he
introduces the list given at 436b4-6 by enia de Aristotle analyses the di-
chotomy further by introducing new headings which are not on the same
level: pathos, hexis, protection, preservation, destruction and privation
are not abstract causal connections, but rather real modalities or states
of the living thing. As we shall see, in one way or another all may be sub-
sumed under the initial dichotomy. Alexander of Aphrodisias is therefore
not wrong to put a full stop at the end of the phrase "all in fact occur with
sensation or through sensation", and to make the dichotomy exhaustive
in this way.37
The first heading of the new list is affection (pathos): certain properties
are affections of sensation. The text does not allow us to decide between
the two senses of pathos - accident or change under the influence of an
agent. Alexander tends towards the second solution, when he takes sleep
as an example of an affection of sensation and when he describes the
internal process by which animals fall asleep and cease to exercise actual
sensation. 38 Aristotle shows at any rate very clearly that sleep and waking
constitute an affection (pathos) of the sensitive faculty as a whole. 39 Thus
sleep is a certain affection (pathos ti) of the sensitive part, like a bond and
an immobilisation (akinesia) such that of necessity every animal that sleeps
possesses the sensitive part. 40
34 Insomn. 1 459a21-22j for memory, see Mem. 1 449b15-30.

35 MA 6 701al-6.
36 7 701a35-6.
37 7.19.
38 7.25-8.2. The process in question is described in Bomn. Vig. 3: nutrition is trans-
formed into blood, producing a warming passed onto the heart, which is the starting
point of the blood towards the rest of the organism. Since heat naturally rises, it
flows back in a second cycle towards the heart. Furthermore, the heart is the centre
of the sensitive faculty. The heat weighs down on the heart, which is thereupon
prevented from performing its sensitive functions, until the other parts cool down
and lose some of their force.
39 Bomn. Vig. 2 455a26-b2.
40 Bomn. Vig. 1 454b9-12.

This example, which has the authority of Aristotle's text, is nonethe-

less equivocal, if one refers it back to he meta-dia dichotomy. For sleep
does not really occur (simultaneously) with actual sensation, but it does
not occur either through sensation as an intermediary, except in a very
indirect way, in the sense that the activity of waking - and consequently
sensation - produces tiredness. Nonetheless, the analysis of dreams shows
that the absence of sensitivity is not complete in sleep and that even if
the common sensitive faculty does not achieve its optimal functioning,
it is not totally inactive. In any case this example obliges us to extend
the relation meta beyond actual sensation, i.e. that in complete action to
intermediary forms of sensitive activity.
Other states of the animal are dispositions or ways of being (hexeis)
of sensation. Alexander (Wendland, 1901, 8.2) remarks that sensation
itself is a hexis. If we consider it here as a faculty, sensation is in fact a
determinate, natural disposition, and not a power (dynamis) of the first
order, i.e. a power of contraries. 41 However, hexis can refer here to a way
of being actual for the subject of which it is the property, and not merely a
disposition, and there is no doubt that it is for this reason that youth and
old age may be thought to fall under this category.42 In addition, memory
is a hexis or a pathos of sensation or judgement when time has passed, not
to be confused with one of these states. 43 However, this example is a bit
tricky for Aristotle's classification. On the one hand, we can note that the
boundary between pathos and hexis is pretty porous. On the other hand,
the relation to the generic dichotomy is none too clear. The relation "a is
a hexis of b" should in principle be subsumed under the general relation
"x exists with y". However, the relation between memory and sensation-
we have seen this already and Aristotle establishes the point very firmly44
- is not one of simultaneous accompaniment, but rather a relation of the
type "x exists through y" , memory is not sensation, but comes about after
it and by virtue of the fact that it occurred previously.
Alexander (Wendland, 1901,8.3-4) for his part prefers to classify mem-
ory and recollection among the states which protect and preserve sensa-
tion, while he sees in destruction and privation allusions to forgetting and
death, which creates an asymmetry in the passage, since he then has to
put life in the first of the two classes. In fact, sensation depends on every-
thing which combines to preserve the life of the animal, like respiration,
which is treated at length in PN, since it balances the heat in the heart
and so protects at the same time the thermal balance of the animal and
the preservation of the heart itself, that is of the organic principle of sen-
41 De An. II.5 417a31-bI6.
42 (1906, p. 128).
ROBS
43 Mem. 1 449b24-25.
44 449b24: "memory is therefore neither sensation nor judgement ... " .

sation. 45 These headings seem to find their place under the relation meta,
although the example given by Alexander is misleading, since memory
and recollection obviously do not occur at the same time as the sensation
from which they originate, unless one takes meta in a very broad sense. 46
In 436b7 Aristotle adds the second term necessary to the demonstra-
tion: in order to establish that the states examined are common to soul
and body, one has to assume that they are all dependent on sensation,
but also that sensation is an activity common to body and soul. However,
since it is a faculty of the soul which cannot be exercised without the body
being altered, in the sense organs, it is "produced in the soul, through the
body" .47 In fact the preceding lines have already prepared the ground for
the argument, since certain organic functions, like the functioning of the
heart or breathing are necessary conditions for sensation.
Aristotle alludes to two kinds of proof: "it is obvious both by argu-
mentation and without argumentation" - the proof dia logou is perhaps
a proof by deduction, based on a definition: sensation, by definition - or
at least according to a possible definition - consists in grasping sensi-
bles through the mediation of the sense organs. 48 The continuation of De
sensu, in ch. 2, will examine precisely the material properties of the sense
organs and the corresponding sensibles. In a more general way, we know
from de An. that the study of the soul and its faculties is the business of
the natural philosopher, that is, of someone who takes account of both
form and matter, and that sensations, like all the affections of the com-
posite are logoi enuloi, reasons involved in matter. 49 As for the proof tou
logou chiJris, it is probably due to the experience itself of sensation: this
shows of itself its own "affective" nature, and hence its own corporality. It
45 See Ross (1906, p. 128); Siwek (1963, p.70) adds health.
46 Alexander's commentary is probably influenced by the passage in the Philebus,
34a3-b8, which is perhaps the origin of our passage in Bens. Socrates claims there
not only that memory and recollection guarantee the safety (soteria) of sensation,
but also that sensation is the affection during which soul and body are moved
together. See King (2001, p. 36, n. 22) in favour of this connection.
47 As M. Burnyeat has pointed out to me, one could equally take the dative 'tfi ljIuxfi
as dative of means (by the soul), following the example of de An. 1.4 408b15: the
human pities by his soul. In fact it is true that the soul is the first principle and,
consequently, the real agent. The body acts merely as an intermediary for the action
of this principle. But this is not the point Aristotle is emphasising here, in that he
appears to want to say that the sensation arrives at the soul by the intermediary of
the body. There is a text in PN along these lines, namely Bomn. Vig. 1454a7-11:
"Since on the other hand the act of sensation is proper neither to the soul nor to
the body (for that of which it is the power, is that of which it is the activity; and
what one calls sensation, as activity, is a certain movement of the soul through the
body), it is clear that this affection does not belong to the soul and that neither a
body without a soul is capable of sensation."
48 Alexander's explanation (Wendland, 1901, 8.12-13).
49 Or logoi en hul€ according to other Mss: de An. 1.1 403a25.

is "in itself obvious" 50 that sensations come about through the mediation
of sense organs.
So Aristotle can rely51 on what he has said in de An. about sensation
in general as a foundation and conclude that animal is defined by sensation
not only because it is specified by it, but also because all its states and
internal movements are bound up with it in one way or another.
However, this result is fairly unsatisfactory, in that it has been reached
at the price of a number of approximations. Alexander's interpretative hy-
potheses only confirm this. As we have seen, they are due to this impreci-
sion and the extreme diversity of the categories considered as defining the
relation between sensation and the other faculties and states. The con-
nection with sensation does not positively explain in what way desire, life
death, youth, old age and respiration are states common to body and soul;
rather, this characterisation is passed on to these states from sensation by
various forms of transitivity, which are sometimes vague.
More generally, listing these categories only indirectly contributes to
the elucidation of the expression, namely via the psychosomatic character-
isation of sensation. Strictly speaking, one may admit that Aristotle has
succeeded in showing by transitivity that the states concerned are com-
mon to body and soul. At any rate, our passage does not tell us which
body-soul duality is presupposed by the expression "common to soul and
body". Our attention has been drawn to the fact, but the modalities of
this duality remain obscure. In this respect, our text is deceptive, at least
on the first reading, to the extent that it uses sensation as a simple cri-
terion to identify what is common to soul and body. Aristotle would no
doubt have done better to stick to the laconic formulation of Metaphysics
VII.10: no part of the body can be defined without its function, which in
turn would be nothing without sensation.
However, perhaps we should leave these approximations on one side,
and ask if the essential point is not to be found elsewhere - not in the exact
nature of the connection with sensation, but in the fact that there is this
connection; not in the positive explanation of the interactions between
sensation and other states, but in the principle of the interdependence
between the faculties or states of the composite, dominated by sensation.
Furthermore one should notice that sensation is being considered here
merely as a faculty in abstraction from its objects: It is because of the
organic side to sensation, not the intentional or cognitive side (cognition
of something) that it serves as a criterion to evaluate what is common to
soul and body. Aristotle makes quite clear that the definition of sensation
50 To translate Alexander's expression auto then enarges (Wendland, 1901, 8.10).
51 Bens. 1 436b8-1O.

and the reasons for its existence have been given in de An .. 52 So that is
not the issue in the preamble to the PN, just the simple fact that there is
an essential relation between sensation and the other faculties or states.
Our text provides a very important clue on this point, when it says
precisely that sensation "comes about in the soul through the body": in
this way it indicates that that which allows sensation to play the role of
criterion is the kind of causality which explains it. But this causality is
complex. As I have just remarked, Aristotle does not allow the causation
exercised by the sensible object as such on the faculty of sensation, that
is to say by the external agent of sensation, to play a role here. Instead,
he emphasises the internal causality and the fact that the body plays an
essential role. As the phrase "through the body" suggests, the body cannot
be the prime mover of sensation, not only because the latter depends on
the presence of an external agent, but also because the soul alone among
the internal principles of motion can be a prime mover. In fact, saying
that sensation arrives at the soul through the body does not mean that it
is passive in relation to its objects and in relation to the body. Sensation
can be either potential or actual, and it is at once passive since it has to be
realised by the presence of sensible objects, and active precisely because
it actualises itself as a faculty of the soul. 53
In turn, there is no sensation if the soul itself is not a mover in the
exercise of this faculty. Under these conditions, conforming to the propo-
sition on which Aristotle's argument hinges: sensation is produced in the
soul through the body - the body can only be the instrument of the prime
mover which constitutes the soul of the animal. 54 This comes down to say-
ing that sensation is a faculty which the soul exercises, when sensibles are
present, by acting both on the body and through the body. Hence the
idea of a community between body and soul gains a more precise mean-
ing: sensation is common to body and soul not merely because it requires
sense organs to be exercised, as Alexander says, but also because sensa-
tion presents a situation in which the relation between soul and body is
that between agent and patient. The de An. stipulates explicitly that the
community (koinania) between body and soul implies a dynamic relation
between agent and patient, and between mover and moved:
52 Sens. 1 436b8-1O.
53 De An. II.5 417aI3-14.
54 The question of the theoretical legitimacy of an instrumentalist interpretation of
the body-soul relation in Aristotle's psychology - the body as organon of the soul
(I.3 407b26; II.1 412bl, 12; II.4 415b19) - is complex and much debated. Menn
(2002) produces new arguments in favour of the compatibility of this conception
with hylomorphism. He thinks that the canonic definition of the soul as the primary
entelecheia of an organic body means that the soul uses the body as an organon
in the sense of an instrument or as a collection of organa. By taking this relation
as one between agent and patient within the one substance, I intend to free it of
any notion of substantial dualism.

for because of their community, the one acts and the other undergoes, the
one is moved and the other moves, and none of these mutual relations
obtains between chance terms. (de An. 1.3 407b17-19)
Thus the body can only "act" because action is delegated to it, in
that the states involving not only the soul but also the whole animal are
always acts depending on the primary causation exercised by the soul. 55
The heart, as De Motu Animalium shows, is the organic principle of this
delegated mobility. It is striking that the relation between mover and
moved which connects the soul to the body, and of which the heart is the
hinge or the pivot is just what makes Aristotle say that the movement
brought about by desire arises from "operations common to soul and
body" .56
So we reach our first conclusion: "common to soul and body" implies
the duality of agent and patient, of mover and moved. But this duality
is legitimate, not problematical for it does not go against the substantial
unity of the composite: the act of the agent and the act of the patient are
one and the same act. When agent and patient are two powers of a single
substance, the same substance acts on itself qua another,57 in contrast to
what happens in technical activity which requires a real duality between
agent and patient.
Now it remains for us to try to understand which unity it is that is
presupposed by the expression "common to soul and body". PN suggest a
decisive answer to this question. For the text shows that the agent-patient
relation is exercised thanks to the functional relation which unifies all the
operations and states involved. 58 Sensation is not simply a common fea-
ture. If that were the case, it would be difficult to understand why Aris-
totle uses it to define animal. As we have seen, the terse parenthesis from
Metaphysics VIl.lO sees in sensation not merely a common feature but the
necessary condition for the existence of the other operations or functions.
Furthermore, Aristotle justifies the definition of animal in On the Gener-
ation of Animals with the excellence of sensation. Sensation is not merely
one useful function among others - it is the best of the animals' functions.
Although sensation only possesses a negligible value in comparison with
the use of the rational faculty, "if one compares it with insensibility it
is the best thing,,59 when the animal only fulfils its function as a living
55 See De An. I.I 402a9-10: "among the states of the soul, some appear to be proper
to it, while the others involve, because of the soul, the whole animal."
56 Ill. ID 433bI9-28.
57 Metaph. IX.I 1046all-13.
58 Menn (2002) in his analysis of the expression "common to soul and body" uses the
agent-patient relation, which, according to him allows us to understand the kind
of dualism we are dealing with.
59 CA I.23 731a34-73Ib2.

thing, in mating "it becomes like a species of plant" .60 So in virtue of the
principle that the better and the end are identical, sensation should be
considered as the final activity of all the animal's internal activities, inso-
far as it characterises pre-eminently the animal soul. De Sensu 436bl-12 is
precisely remarkable for not distinguishing between the nutritive and sen-
sitive faculty: the relations of interdependence between faculties or states
defined there are indifferent as to the distinction between nutritive and
sensitive. Hence, it is very probable that the existence of faculties which
take part in the preservation and protection of sensation presupposes that
the latter is the final cause of the former, not merely its accompaniment.
If one considers that our text, taken on its own, says little on this
point, we may extend the analysis to its immediate context namely the
PN. These treatises are concerned indirectly but constantly with the ques-
tion of final causality, because they pay particular attention to the physio-
logical processes and the mechanical circuits which make the performance
of the functions of the soul possible. The relation to the final cause cor-
responds obviously to hypothetical or conditional necessity, as Aristotle
understands it. This causal category is called on to give an account of
sleep: this is justified by the need for rest,61 in the same way that an axe
has to be made of a hard metal so as to be able to cut. 62 Beyond the
particular case of rest, all of the strictly vital functions, from the point of
view of hypothetical necessity, combine to bring about the characteristic
mode of life of the animal. Given a) the repetition of the definition of
animal by the possession and exercise of sensation and b) the value of
sensation in comparison with the other faculties, this activity can only be
sensation or a life lead in virtue of sensation.
This does not prevent sensation from being in some cases a moving
cause. Thus in bringing about spontaneously a movement of the imagi-
nation, and independently of its representative content - as sensation of
something - it brings about a series of movements. Equally, it can play
the role of the instrument or means in the realisation of natural processes:
in particular it is a necessary condition of animal movement. Sensation
instructs desire of the good to be pursued or of the danger to be avoided,
and in this sense it is necessary to the animal's preservation. 63 Thus touch,
60 731b5-8.
61 Somn. Vig. 2 455b26.
62 See esp. PA 1.1 642a9-13; Ph. 11.9 200a30-32.
63 One could object that the case of sensation is a little more complicated, insofar as
Aristotle, while maintaining very firmly the idea of a fundamental unity of faculties,
distinguishes purely cognitive faculties (sensation, imagination, intellect) from the
desiderative faculty: there can be no movement without desire, so that from this
point of view sensation is not a mover in itself. However, it is a mover when it
comes to internal movements, as we have just seen.

a sense shared universally by all animals, "must of necessity belong,,64 to

the animal capable of locomotion, in order to be able to guarantee its
preservation. This situation conforms to the doctrine in de An., which as-
sociates the final and formal causality of the soul with its motive power. 65
At any rate it appears that the causal relation between sensation and the
other properties of the soul is a circular one: sensation is at once their end
and their pre-condition. So sensation appears in turn as a final and as a
moving cause. 66 In this sense, sensation is the best criterion possible for
something belonging to body and soul for those functions which depend
on it, that is, for all organic functions.
The beginning of De sensu provides a further valuable indication of
the subject of PN and indirectly, of the kind of pre-eminence belonging to
sensation: it is a matter of studying, in the case of living things in general,
which are the actions (praxeis) proper to them and which are the actions
common to them. 67 This theme is echoed in a passage in On Sleep:
After that we have to say through which kinds of movements and actions
(praxeis) internal to the body waking and sleep come about. 68
Moreover the study of internal actions, which PA is also devoted to,69
cannot merely list the actions, they must be integrated with one another:
internal actions cannot be explained separately, because they are both
continuous and coherent. They are continuous to the extent that the action
of one part works towards the achievement of the action of the part on
which it depends, right up to the realisation of the overall activity of the
animal. This makes up the unity of the multiple activities and internal
movements of the animal, by assigning to them their final end, as is shown
by a passage from PA:
Since on the one hand every instrument (organon) is for the sake of some-
thing (heneka tou), and every part of the body is for the sake of something;
and since on the other hand that which is for the sake of something is an
action (praxis tis), it is clear that the whole body is constituted for the
sake of a complete action. Indeed, (the action of) sawing is not performed
for the sake of sawing, but the saw is made for the sake of (the action of)
sawing for this is a kind of using (chresis). Consequently the body itself is
in some way for the sake of the soul, and the parts are equally for the sake
of functions which belong naturally to each of them. 70
64 anagnke huparchein, de An. 111.12 434b25-26, Bens. 1 436b15.
65 11.4 415b21-28.
66 As shown well by Carbone (1998).
67 Bens. 1 436a4.
68 Bomn. Vig. 2 455b28.
69 See esp. 1.5 645bI9-22. On this point see the arguments presented in my
(Morel, 2002).
70 1.5 645bI4-20. "Complete action": I accept the reading plerous, in the majority of
Mss, following Balme (1972, p.124). Louis (1956) prefers the reading polumerous
(complex) from the single Ms P. The action being discussed may be called "com-

This practical continuity implies also practical coherence, in the sense

that the different actions of the animal are not only in certain cases nar-
rowly united, but also related to one principle. On the one hand they are
related to the heart in various ways. On the other hand, the praxis of
a single anhomoiomerous part mobilises a plurality of properties which
"combine with one another" (sugkeimenas allelais). 71 Each homoiomer-
ous part has a determinate dynamis - softness, hardness, moisture etc.
- whereas the anhomoiomerous parts have several different properties,
which are however, functionally compatible: a hand can open or shut.
Sensation is the ultimate praxis of the animals organism and thus unifies
all the internal movements. Above and beyond strictly organic processes,
sensation is essential to the form of life belonging to an animal - its be-
havioural praxis - because it indicates what it should pursue and avoid.
One could object at this point, in view of the distinction established
elsewhere 72 by Aristotle between kinesis and praxis, that if sensation is a
praxis - and it is really a praxis in the sense in which it is an energeia,
i.e. a process which reaches its end immediately - then sensation is distin-
guished from movements in the strict sense, which are always incomplete
processes. However, I wish to make two remarks on this point. Firstly, the
distinction between praxis and kinesis is not always so rigorous, and gets
forgotten sometimes, especially in the biological works. 73 Secondly, it is
perfectly conceivable that a praxis, even a praxis in the narrow sense -
a deliberated action that is morally significant - includes a series of con-
nected movements, even if it is not identical with their sum. 74 Thus the
internal dispositions of the internal organs and even of the sense organs
can vary and affect sensation: I can wake up progressively - and this cor-
responds to a gradual modification of my internal thermal balance and to
a purification of my blood, once digestion is completed 75 and thus I can
gain sensory acuity. Nonetheless, it remains true that at every stage of
the sensory process, when there is sensation, there is effective sensation,
that is to say, actual sensation, which is not exactly a movement.
This does not mean that sensation exhausts all the activities common
to body and soul. In the first place, it is not necessary, if sensation is to
fulfil its unifying function, that it is present in every point of the organism.
Furthermore, organic unity, even if it is governed by sensation, is not a
plex", but one can just as well call it "complete", without having to choose the less
well supported reading, for it makes up the unity of the multiple internal activities
of the animal.
71 PA ILl 646b22.
72 See esp. Metaph. IX.6 1048b18-36.
73 Besides, even if not all movement is an action, all action is a movement, understood
in a broad sense.
74 See Natali (2002).
75 Somn. Vig. 3 458alO-25.

perfect unity: the animal depends on its environment, on the medium

(water or air) in which it lives, on the nutrition which it can find, and
its relations with other animals; it produces residues, some of which are
useless, falls ill and always ends by dying. Aristotle does not claim that
sensation is the activity of the animal in each of its parts, but that each
of its parts, mediated by the functions that animate them, are connected
to sensation. However, sensation is not at fault in this point, because it is
enough for it to be the principle activity of the animal. For the principle
does not have to be present immediately in all the parts of which it is the
principle in order to play its role. That is no doubt the main justification
for the relation between the heart and sensory activity. For the heart
is the triple principle of life, movement and sensation76 and as such it
constitutes only the starting point and the terminus of the various internal
movements of the animal: the arrival of nutrition or sensible impressions,
the departure of blood, images, internal breath and vital heat. This idea
is expressed very clearly in De Motu Animalium, using the image of a well
governed city, in which the governing factor - both the heart and the soul
- does not have to be present in every place. 77 The spontaneous sequence
between the internal movements is sufficient guarantee for the effectiveness
of their principle. In this sense, sensation is not a diffuse principle, present
in each part of the organism, but a central activity, to which the different
parts and functions are connected without being reduced to it. 78
The use of the expression "common to soul and body" in PN allows
one to draw decisive conclusions about the foundation of organic unity. It
would appear that in the first place it requires an internal duality, that
of the mover and the moved, without which Aristotle's position would
not be distinguishable from a radical monism, which he cannot subscribe
to, given the differences between the properties of body and soul. At the
same time, the actual unity of soul and body leads us to take the duality
in question as teleologically determined: Organic unity is never reducible
76 See e.g. PA 111.3 665all-13.
77 10 703a29-b2.
78 Perhaps it will be objected that the status of noetic activity and of its relation
to sensation present a crucial problem: how can one apply to the human being
the idea of unification through sensation as its pre-eminent faculty, to the extent
that sensation is not its pre-eminent faculty. However, we should note that it is
not Aristotle's aim to distinguish the species within the genus animal. He is rather
trying to give a definition valid of the genus as such. Furthermore, the aim is to
understand what makes up the unity of the faculties common to body and soul;
the question if intellect belongs among these faculties, which is tricky enough for
Aristotle himself, refers to a different issue. Finally, if one admits that the soul
does not think without images and that because of this fact, it depends necessarily
on the body, at least to begin with (see de An. 1.1 403a3-16), we could well think
that the intellectual faculty too comes about "by sensation" , in a way appropriate
to itself.

to simple material cohesion, to a kind of more or less tough stitching

together of tissues and organs. It is always a functional unity, that of
a system of activities, of which sensation constitutes the architectonic
principle in animals.
References
Balme, David M., 1972, Aristotle's De Partibus Animalium I and De Gen-

eratione Animalium I, Translated with notes, Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Block, Irving, 1961, "The Order of Aristotle's Psychological Writings",
in: American Journal of Philology, 82, pp. 50-77.
Burnyeat, Myles, 2002, "De anima II 5", in: Phronesis, 47, pp. 28-90.
Carbone, Andrea L., 1998, "La sensazione come tratto distintivo dell'
ani male nella zoologia aristotelica", in: Rivista di Estetica, 1998-2,
pp. 95-112.
van der Eijk, Philip, 1994, Aristoteles. Uber Triiume. Uber Weissagung
im Schlaf, iibersetzt und erlautert, in: E. Grumach / H. Flashar
(eds), Aristoteles Werke in dt. Ubersetzung, Band 14, Teil Ill, Berlin:
Akademie Verlag.
Everson, Stephen, 1997, Aristotle on Perception, Oxford: Oxford Univ.
Press.
Kahn, Charles, 1966, "Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle's Psy-
chology" , in: Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie, 48, pp. 43-81.
King, Richard A.H., 2001, Aristotle on Life and Death, London: Duck-
worth.
Louis, Pierre, 1956, Aristote. Les Parties des Animaux, texte etabli et
traduit, Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Menn, Stephen, 2002 "Aristotle's Definition of the Soul and the Program-
me of the De Anima", in: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 22,
pp. 83-139.
Morel, Pierre-Marie, 2000, Aristote. Petits traites d'histoire naturelle
(Parva naturalia), trad. fr., intr. et notes, Paris.
- , 2002, "Action humaine et action naturelle chez Aristote", in: Philoso-
phie, 73, pp. 36-57.
Natali, Carlo, 2002, "Actions et mouvements chez Aristote", in: Philoso-
phie, 73, pp. 12-35j reprinted in: L'Action efficace. Etudes sur la
philosophie de l'action d'Aristote, Louvain-la-Neuve, 2004.
Ross, George R.T., 1906, Aristotle. De Sensu and De Memoria, Text and
Translation with Introduction and Commentary, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.

Ross, William D., 1955 Aristotle. Parva naturalia, Text with Intr. and
Comm., Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Siwek, Paul, 1963, Parva naturalia Graece et Latine, edidit, versione auxit,
notis illustravit P. S., colI.: Philosophica Lateranensis, 5, Rome.
Wendland, Paulus (ed.), 1901, Alexandri in librum de sensu commentar-
ium, in: GAG, Ill, 1, Berlin: WaIter de Gruyter.

Thomas K. Johansen
What's New in the De Sensu?

The Place of the De Sensu In
Aristotle's Psychology
The opening of the De Sensu et Sensibilibus (Sens.) suggests a new be-

ginning in Aristotle's psychology:
Since definitions have been made concerning the soul with respect to itself
and about each of its faculties with respect to parts, the next stage is to
inquire about animals and all the living beings what their specific and what
their common activities (praxeis) are. Let's take what was said about the
soul as established, and let's speak about what remains and let's speak first
about the things come first. It is clear that the greatest [attributes],! both
those that are common and those that are specific to animals, are common
to soul and body, such as sense-perception, memory, anger, appetite and
generally desire, as well as pleasure and pain. For these belong to almost all
animals. But in addition to these some are common to all that participate in
life, whilst others belong only to some of the animals. The greatest of these
happen to form four pairs, namely waking and sleeping, youth and old age,
inhalation and exhalation, and life and death. We need to consider, concern-
ing these, what each of them is and by what causes they happen. It belongs
to the natural philosopher to know the first causes of health and disease.
For neither health nor disease can occur in those that are deprived of life.
That is why most of the natural philosophers complete their inquiry with
medical principles and those doctors who pursue their art more philosophi-
cally begin their studies with the principles of natural philosophy. It is clear
that all the [attributes] mentioned are common to the soul and the body.
For they all either occur with (meta) perception, or through (dia) percep-
tion, and some happen to be affections (pathe) of perception, others states
(hexeis), some are protections (phulakai) or preservations (soteriai) [of per-
ception], and yet others destructions (phthorai) and privations (stereseis)
I supply "attributes" as a complement for "greatest" and again at 436b2 with 7ta:v"Ccx
without implying any categorical restrictions (though clearly 7tpa:~ELC;
"COt AEX'l')tV"Ccx
should be taken as included). "Affections" is an alternative term which I will use
elsewhere, but I avoid using it here to prevent possible confusion with 7ta:'l')Yj at
436b4, which, in its contrast with l:~ELC;, seems to carry a more specific sense.

What's New in the De Bensu? 141
[of perception]. That perception happens to the soul through the body is
clear both with and without argument. But we spoke earlier in the de An.
about the sense and perceiving, what it is and why this affection happens
to animals. (436al-b 10)
It is possible to see this passage as introducing the topics not only of
the Bens. but also, if rather incompletely, the rest of the Parva Naturalia
(PN). So perception is discussed in the Bens. itself. The four pairs of
opposites coincide with the topics of three or four other works in P N:
sleep and waking, youth and old age, life and death and inhalation and
exhalation are dealt with respectively in the De Bomno, De Iuventute et
Benectute, De Vita et Morte and De Respiratione. 2 One might add the
De Memoria from 436a8's mention of memory, while dreaming (as well
as memory) is plausibly included in the attributes mentioned as in vari-
ous ways involving perception (De Insomniis, De Divinatione).3 Finally,
436a18-9 suggests an interest in the first causes of health and disease
(rather than the causes of particular diseases), a subject which may be
seen as addressed by the discussion of the causes of life and death in the
De Longitudine et Brevitate Vitae. 4
It is clear from the passage that Aristotle sees the inquiry into these
topics as following (ekhomenon) the inquiry in the De A nima (de An.). It
is less clear, however, how he sees the two inquiries as related, specifically
how he sees the inquiry introduced by the Bens. as differing from that of
the de An. This paper attempts to offer some clarification. In response to
what I take to be some mistaken attempts to offset the Bens. from the de
2 For the question of how many works we should count here, see R. King
(2001, pp. 38-40).
3 Alexander takes the reference to health and disease at 436a17-b1 to a planned work
which, if written, had been lost already at his time.
4 All or most of the PN seems then to be introduced by Bens. 1. But are other texts
introduced as well? The MA in many manuscripts follows immediately after the
Div.Bomn. Locomotion is not explicitly mentioned as one of the activities in the
introduction, though the MA has things to say about orexis, which is mentioned.
Moreover, the Introduction at 436b18-437a1 assumes animal locomotion in the
teleology of the distance senses. Alexander (4.1) goes one step further in taking
Bens. 1 to introduce also the PA and the HA: "For there is utility in the examination
and division concerning animals with reference to the activities which are peculiar
to each species of animal and to their parts". One good reason for connecting the
Bens. with the biological works is that, as Lloyd (1992, pp. 147-167) has shown,
the biological works rely on the psychological works in the priority assigned to
perception in the accounts of animal parts and behaviours. In this regard, the
introduction's claim that most of the activities of animals are through or with
perception might be thought to be programmatic also for the biological works.
The position of the work on perception and its objects as first in the PN could
plausibly be seen as reflecting the fundamental role that perception plays in the
psychology to come not just in the PN but also in subsequent biological works.
On the question of the continuity between Aristotle's psychology and biology, see
(in addition to Lloyd op.cit.) van der Eijk (1997, pp. 231-259), especially at 234.

142 Thomas K. Johansen
An., I start by stressing what I see as points of continuity between the two
works. I then proceed to offer what I think are the genuine innovations in
the Bens.
One possible answer to the question, "What is new in the Bens.?" , is to
say, "The focus on the material side of the activities of living beings" . This
change of focus seems to be suggested by Aristotle's focus on attributes
"common to body and soul" . So we might take Aristotle to say in the first
line that whilst he defined the soul in itself in the de An. he now wants
to account for the attributes that living beings have insofar as the soul
is embodied. However, there are two kinds of point one might take to be
involved here. One is to say that the de An. showed little interest in the
body when it defined the soul and its parts. However, this point does not
seem to do justice to the recommendation of de An. 1.1 that we account
for those affections that are "with the body" in the manner of the natural
philosopher, the physikos. As physikoi (unlike the mathematicians) we
define the affections as forms that occur in matter, as formulae in matter,
logoi enhuloi. Bens. 1 436a18-b2 suggests that the affections of the soul
to be treated in Bens. are the domain of the physikos. Indeed, Bens. 1
seems in its formulation of the sorts of affections to be studied (if not
the individual examples) to echo de An. 1.1. So at de An. 403a16-9 we
read: "And it seems that the affections (pathe)5 of the soul are with the
body, anger, gentleness, fear, hope, enthusiasm, and further joy and both
loving and hating, for at the same time as these the body is somehow
affected". Compare with this Bens. 436a6-10: "it seems that the greatest
[attributes], both those that are common and peculiar to animals, are
common to body and soul, such as perception, memory, anger, appetite,
and generally desire, and in addition to these pleasure and pain". We may
therefore take it as a point of continuity between the de An. and Bens.
that affections that are common to body and soul are to be approached
as such, in the manner of the physikos. 6
Another way of understanding the claim that the Bens. pays greater
attention to the material basis of psychological attributes is to say that
whilst the de A n. does bring in the body as a necessary element in the nat-
ural philosopher's account of living beings, it does not give much detail. I
assume that it is something like this point that Michael Wedin (1988, p. 3)
has in mind when he writes that: "Bens. 's distinctly physiological empha-
sis suggests that the difference between de An. and the PN consists in
the fact that the former shows little interest in physiological details" .
5 Aristotle's examples suggest that 1t&:61) here carries a quite general sense of "at-
tribute", cf. note 1 above.
6 For a similar emphasis on the continuity with de An. 1.1, cf. King (op.cit., pp. 34-5).

What's New in the De Sensu? 143
Such a view of the relationship between the de An. and the Bens.
would seem grist to the mill of those interpreters of Aristotle who argue
that perception for Aristotle requires material changes in the organs of
perception. They might say that the impression that there are no such
necessary changes is in part a function of the definitional, more abstract
approach of the de An., whereas the Bens., with the rest of the PN, will tell
us more about the material processes by which perception is realized. Yet
as far as proper perception and Bens. go, there seems to be little added in
the Bens. to what we are told in de An. about what happens in the sense-
organs in perception proper. 7 It is, for example, the de An. that tells us
that the sense-organ of taste (422b4-5) is made wet in tasting and therefore
should have the right degree of liquidity prior to perception, not Bens. It
is the de An. that describes the organ of hearing as a chamber containing
a bounded mass of air that resonates in hearing (420aI7-19)j it is the de
An. (421b28-422a6) which points to the presence of a "nose-lid" in the
organ of smell, lifted in smelling, (discussed also at Bens. 444b22-28 but
with little added information, see below). In other words, we don't have to
wait for the Bens. to tell us about what happens in the sense-organs when
we perceive: whether or not we take these literally to be material changes
is of course another matter. Certainly Aristotle discusses the material
basis of perception in sufficient detail to bear out his intention in de An.
1.1 to approach affections of the soul such as perception in the manner
of the physikos. In the Bens. focused discussion of the sense organs is
limited to Chapter 2. As far as any material changes in actual perception
is concerned, Aristotle critically engages in Bens. 2 with theories such as
Empedocles' and Democritus' which do involve material changes in the
medium and the eye. But Aristotle himself does not clearly identify any
material changes in the eyes over and above those one might or might not
have inferred from his discussion of sight in de An. There is a passage in
Bens. 6 446b6-9 (the transformation of the letters) that might be taken
to imply material changes in the mediation of hearing. 8 However, one can
hardly say that this passage suggests that Bens. as a whole emphasizes
the role of material changes in perception in a way de An. did not. It
7 The situation may differ when we turn to post-perceptual processes of the sort
discussed in the De Somno or the De Insomniis. Yet the anti-literalist is generally
happy to admit that there are material changes involved in non-standard perceptual
processes, such as dreams, since these are activities that are not part of the form
and proper function of the sense-faculties. The more accurate formulation of the
anti-literalist interpretation is that there are no changes in the sense organs that
stand as matter to form in the definition of sense-perception proper. That there
are material changes involved in post-perceptual processes falls outside the scope
of this claim.
8 Cf., however, Myles Burnyeat's (1992, p.430) argument against a literalist reading
of the passage.

is hard, then, to find evidence for a new "physiological" approach to the

perceptual changes in the Bens. in the relatively limited new information
we learn from the Bens., compared to the de An., about the material side
of perception.
The question whether the Bens. adds to our information of any nec-
essary material changes in actual perception is a somewhat different issue
from whether it adds to our knowledge of the sense organs. The overall
conclusion of the Bens. 2, that the five senses can be correlated with the
four simple bodies, adds little to what we already knew from de An. IlI.l,
where Aristotle also attempted a correlation of the organs with the el-
ements, though admittedly with slightly different outcomes. The eye is
the only sense organ that receives extended discussion in Bens. 2, which
establishes not only that the seeing part is made of water but also that
the surface of the eye is smooth, that its seeing part lies inside the eye,
that it has a black and white part, and is attached to passages (poroi).
However, the fact that there is no corresponding discussion of the other
sense organs and that the account of the sense organs as a whole occu-
pies such a relatively small part of the Bens., with the bulk devoted to the
sense objects, should make us suspicious of any claim that the exploration
of the material basis of perception provides the fundamental motivation
for this work.
My own view is that the talk in Bens. 1 of activities that are common
to the soul and the body is not in itself meant to indicate a shift towards
a greater focus on material explanation. Rather it is meant to mark off
the subject-matter so as both to exclude certain topics that were also
discussed in the de An. and to include certain topics, not touched on the
de An., which we may not know whether to include in the inquiries of a
physikos. What is excluded are the affections of the soul referred to in de
An. as "peculiar" (idia) to the soul, that is, by the antonym of "common"
(koina). The first use in the de An. of idia in this sense is at de An.
1.1 402a9-1O, where Aristotle observes that some of the affections appear
to be idia of the soul, "whilst others belong because of the soul also to
the animals". Again at 403a3-11 he asks whether all of the affections of
the soul are common also to the body, or whether there is some affection
that is peculiar to the soul. Aristotle answers by saying that intellectual
thought (noein) is most like something that is idion to the soul, which
is why it may be possible for the soul in respect of the intellect to be
separated from the body. 9 At 413b24-27 he further suggests that it is,
specifically, the theoretical intellect that is most likely to be separable
from the other capacities of the soul, and by implication from the body.
9 Cf. also PA 1.1 641a32-blO.

The phrase "common to body and soul" thus stands in contrast to

the phrase "peculiar to the soul", which in the de An. primarily applies to
the theoretical intellect. It seems reasonable therefore to take "common
to body and soul" also in the Bens. as meant to exclude the theoretical
intellect. lO This exclusion thus leaves us with all the affections of soul that
comply with the account of soul as the first actuality of a living body. In
other words, by concentrating on the affections common to body and soul
we seem to be left with all those affections of the soul that fall under
Aristotle's "most common" account of the soul. By indicating that he
will focus on affections common to body and soul, Aristotle seems, then,
to have said little more than that he will not talk about the theoretical
intellect.
However, alongside excluding the theoretical intellect, the phrase "com-
mon to body and soul" also serves in Bens. 1 to introduce a range of af-
fections which were not accounted for in the de An. The de An. focused
on the affections of the soul that defined the main parts of the soul such
as the nutritive, the perceptual, the intellectual and the locomotive. The
Bens. announces the study of affections such as sleeping and respiration,
which were not dealt with by the de An. Introducing these affections in
Bens. 1 as "common to the body and soul" suggests to the reader of the
de An. that Aristotle's approach to them will be that of the physikos, just
as the approach to nutrition and perception was in the de An. However,
Aristotle also means to indicate in Bens. 1 that the range of this kind of
affection is much wider than one might have suspected simply from read-
ing the de An. He thus introduces the affections that are common to the
body and the soul in Bens. 1 by first stressing their prevalence: "the great-
est (ta megista) [affections], both the common ones and the ones specific
to animals, seem to be common to body and soul" (436a6-7). "Greatest"
could mean "most important" but I think its primary sense here is that of
"having the widest extension". For having illustrated the greatest affec-
tions by perception, memory and so on, Aristotle adds "for these belong
to almost all animals". Meanwhile, other affections belong to all living
beings, and yet others only to some animals. He thus promotes the study
of affections common to body and soul by highlighting how widespread
they are amongst living beings and animals.
10 It is of course true that the biological works, which one may also see Sens. 1 as a first
introduction to (cf. note 3 above), discuss various kinds of intellect in connection
with animals. So a kind of phronesis, or perhaps phronesis of a kind, is ascribed to
animals at Parts of Animals II.2 648a2ff. where degrees of intelligence is explained
by reference to the thinness and coolness of blood. At History of Animals 588a27-
30 animals are given wisdom by analogy with human beings. How exactly to take
this attribution of phronesis to animals is debated (cf. van der Eijk, op.cit., with
Coles (1997». However, it seems unlikely that any of these discussions attribute
theoretical intellect to animals.

Now Aristotle uses perception as part of his strategy to show that

these affections are indeed common to the body and soul:
It is clear that all the affections mentioned are common to the soul and
the body. For they all either happen with (meta) perception, or through
(dia) perception, and some happen to be affections (patM) of perception,
others states (hexeis) , some are protections (phulakai) or preservations
(sateriai) [of perceptionJ, and yet others destructions (phthorai) and pri-
vations (stereseis) [of perceptionJ. That perception happens to the soul
through the body is clear both with and without argument. (436b2-8)
One consequence of using "involving perception" in this way as an index
of being common to body and soul would seem to be to put pressure on
Aristotle to show the way or ways in which perception involves both body
and soul. For if our assent to the claim that all the affections mentioned
are common to body and soul relies on our accepting that perception is
common to body and soul, it seems that Aristotle had better have a good
story to tell about how perception is common to body and soul. However,
it is noteworthy how Aristotle sidesteps this question in Bens. 1. All he
says is "that perception happens to the soul through the body is clear both
with and without account (logos)" (436b6-8). No doubt part of Aristotle's
confidence that we will accept the claim comes from the account he gave
in the de An. of the faculties of perception as the first actualities of their
sense organs, and perhaps this is the sort of account or logos referred to
here. The reader of the de An. will know the specific sort of hylomorphic
account that Aristotle would offer to show how perception is common to
body and soul. However, Aristotle is also clear that you do not have to
accept this account, or indeed any account, to accept that perception is
common to body and soul. Here it is important to note Aristotle's pe-
culiar wording at 436b6-8. He says "that perception happens to the soul
through the body". What is peculiar about the wording is its Platonic
ring. Socrates argued at Theaetetus 184c that the sense organs were that
through which, rather than that with which, we perceived, whereas the
soul itself was that with which we perceived. This preference for thinking
that the soul perceives through the body is reflected in other Platonic
works. So at Timaeus 43c4-5 Timaeus refers to perception as a motion
that arrives at the soul "through the body" (cf. also 45d2, 64b3-6). The
implication of this idiom for Plato seems to be that the body is a con-
duit for what the soul perceives rather than an integral part or aspect
of that which perceives. Now Aristotle's use of the idiom of perceiving
through the body at Bens. 436b6-7 need not be taken as inconsistent with
his own hylomorphism: Aristotle too would accept that there is a way
in which sense impressions are mediated through the sense organs to a

What's New in the De Bensu? 147
central sensorium. ll Nonetheless, we may say that the expression is sig-
nificantly chosen because it keeps a door open to a Platonic conception of
the relationship between soul and body in perception. Aristotle's point I
take to be this: even if you are a Plato and therefore the sort of person
who is most likely to think that the soul undergoes a considerable number
of important affections on its own apart from the body, you will accept
that perception is an affection common to body and soul. 12 For even Plato
speaks of perception happening together with the body. Indeed, it is he
who may be said not only to have introduced the notion of affections
"common to body and soul" in the Philebus 34a3-b8 but to have done so
in the particular context of perception. Aristotle's phrasing reminds us of
this Platonic background. It thereby underlines how Aristotle takes the
claim that perception is common to body and soul to be uncontentious:
you do not have to accept my hylomorphic account to accept the claim;
indeed be a Platonist, and you will still accept it. So, in this context, it is
not important for Aristotle what story you want to tell of the relationship
between the body and the soul in perception; what is important is that
you have some story according to which perception is common to body
and soul, be it a Platonist one or an Aristotelian one. I think that this con-
clusion underscores that Aristotle in Bens. 1 does not hang methodological
weight on the expression "common to body and soul" itself. "Common to
body and soul" marks off a subject-area, paradigmatically illustrated by
perception, whose existence we can agree on, even if we are Platonists;
whilst the expression to a reader of de An. suggests the explanatory frame-
work of natural philosophy, its Platonic background shows that it is not
itself the mark of any distinctively Aristotelian method of psychological
explanation.
Now I think it is because it is agreed on all sides that perception is
common to body and soul that whether an affection involves perception
is such a useful marker for deciding whether that affection is common
to body and soul. Aristotle wants to use the agreement with Plato that
11 Cf., for example, Aristotle's stipulation of passages (poroi) that extend from the
proper sense organs to the heart in GA II.6 743b35-744a5. The lack of vision
caused by severing some of the ophthalmic poroi behind the eye suggests that
these (if not all the poroi connected to the eye) have some mediating function
in vision, cf. Bens. 438b8-16. For a full discussion of the complex evidence see
Lloyd (1978, pp. 215-239), especially at p. 220, and Johansen (1998, pp. 67-95) with
Sharples (2005, pp. 349-357).
12 Note the similar phrasing at Bomn. Vig. 454a7-11: hEt o/: o(ht "tije: q,uxije: IOIOV
"to cx!oilcivtcn')cxl o(ht "tou OW(lcx"toe: (ov yelp Tj MVCX(lIe:, "tOlhou xcxt Tj tvtpytlcx' Tj o/:
AtYO(lEVT) cxfoilT}OIe: we: tvtpytlCX x(vT}ok "tIe: Olel "tOU OW(lcx"toe: "tije: q,uxije: to"tI) , CPCXVtpOV
we: olht "tije: q,uxije: "to ltciiloe: IOIOV, ou"t' ~q,uxov oiii(lcx ouvcx"tov cx!oilcivtoilcxl. As in
Bens. 1 so in this passage the dialectical appeal of Aristotle's claim that perception
is common to body and soul is widened by a phrasing acceptable to a Platonist.

perception is common to body and soul as a tool with which to establish

that a much wider range of affections than might be thought, particularly
by the Platonist, are common to the body and soul. It is in this way
that the two claims made in the introduction, that there is a very wide
group of affections - the greatest (ta megista) indeed - that are common
to body and soul, and that these involve perception, come together. We
can demonstrate, Aristotle is saying, that the affections common to body
and soul have a great extension because there are so many of them that,
in various ways, involve perception. This should of course not be taken
it to imply that Aristotle thinks that just because an affection does not
involve perception it is therefore not common to body and soul. Aristotle
would clearly take the nutritive processes as common to the body and the
soul. However, the nutritive processes seem so clearly to involve the body
that it is hard to imagine anybody disputing this case: nutrition, after
all, maintains or changes the body. Similarly, we might take it that there
are emotional affections that clearly engage the body, such as Aristotle's
star example in de An. I.1 403a26-7, anger. There are other cognitive
states, however, such as imagination, dreaming, memory, and forms of
thinking where the question of their embodiment is much less obvious.
It is particularly in these cases that it seems helpful to have a criterion
such as "if X is an affection of the soul involving perception, then X is
common to body and soul". In de An. I.1 403a8-10 we saw how this sort
of criterion might be used to make even thinking depend on the body:
Aristotle suggested that if thinking turned out not to happen without
phantasia, then thinking too would not be without the body. It would
seem then that even thinking by implication would be "common to the
body and soul" (cf. koina kai tou ekhontos, 403a4)P The Platonist should
clearly be unhappy with this conclusion. It seems that his acceptance
that perception is common to body and soul has been used as the thin
end of the wedge to force the conclusion that even thinking, the activity
characteristic of "the soul by itself", may be an activity shared by the
body. Whilst Bens. 1 does not mention thinking, the same tendency to
use perception as a lever to expand the domain of affections common to
body and soul is in play in the Bens. We can see therefore see Aristotle's
promotion in Bens. 1 of the activities common to body and soul not only as
an attempt to stake out the limits of psychological enquiry in the manner
13 It is likely that Aristotle here assumes a further dependency of phantasia on per-
ception (to be fully articulated in de An. 111.3 429al-2). Such a dependency would
explain why Aristotle can go from saying, in lines 403a5-7, that the majority of
affections do not happen without the body, "such as being angry, courageous, ap-
petitive and generally perceiving", to saying in the next lines, 403a8-10, that if
thinking doesn't happen without phantasia, then it doesn't happen without the
body either.

of the physikos, but also as the attempt to show vis-a-vis a Platonist how
many psychological phenomena he must accept will be amenable to this
sort of inquiry, given his agreement that perception is common to the body
and soul. This argument is worth making again in the Bens. given that
Aristotle will from now on be addressing a whole range of psychological
activities not dealt with in the de An. and of which one might reasonably
ask if they too are to be approached in the manner of the physikos.
So far my argument has been mainly negative, as directed against
the suggestion that the Bens. represents a turn to material explanation
of perception of a sort not anticipated or accommodated by the de An. I
have stressed the paucity of new information about the material side of
perception offered by the Bens. given what the de An. had already told
us, and I have emphasized the continuity between the de An. and the
Bens. on the claim that there is a class of affections common to the body
and soul that are to be studied as such. Moreover, I have pointed to the
endoxic nature of the idea that perception belongs to this class and I have
argued that this idea is used by Aristotle to establish how comprehensive
the class is. Compared to the de An., the novelty in Aristotle's approach
in the Bens. to the affections common to the body and soul lies, it seems,
not in a greater emphasis on the bodily side of these affections, but in a
greater emphasis on the extension of this class.
However, I want now to make a more substantive proposal about the
difference between the two works. Again my starting point is the opening
lines of Bens. 1. The first sentence suggests two kinds of contrast with
the de An. We are told that the de An. offered definitions concerning the
soul in itself and concerning each of its several faculties, whereas we will
now go on to consider concerning animals and living beings what their
proper and common activities are. The first contrast here is between the
faculties of the soul itself that have been defined (dioristai) in the de An.
and the activities (praxeis) of animals to be considered in what follows.
The phrase "the soul itself" underlines its status as an object of definition
in the de An. To say that the de An. was concerned with defining the soul
through its faculties is a fair reflection of key programmatic passages in
de An. such as 11.4 415a14-22. The first contrast which emerges between
the de An. and the Bens. is, then, that the de An. considered the fac-
ulties of the soul in the context of defining the soul, whereas the Bens.
assumes those definitions (cf. 436a5). The second contrast is that the de
An. defined the soul itself by its faculties or potentialities (dunameis),
whereas the Bens. promises to consider the praxeis of animals and other
living beings. The contrast with dunamis suggests that praxis here implies
"actuality" (energeia),14 Compare, for this use of praxis to contrast with
14 As read by Alexander of Aphrodisias (ad loc.) : "he [Aristotle] has used the word

dunamis, de An. II.4 415a18-20 where Aristotle says that "the actualities
and actions (energeiai kai praxeis) are prior in account (kata ton logon)
to the potentialities (dunameis)" .15
However, if the job of defining the faculties of the soul has been done
in the de An., as Aristotle suggests, then the point of bringing up the
activities (praxeis) in the Bens. is clearly not to use them to define those
faculties again. In the Bens. we no longer have the definitional constraint
which we had in the de An. whereby we are primarily interested in the
activities of the soul insofar as they help us define the characteristic po-
tentialities of the soul. The absence of the definitional constraint in the
Bens. has two implications. Firstly, we would expect that where the Bens.
and subsequent works discuss the activities of the soul, perception for ex-
ample, that may define a faculty of the soul, those activities will not be
discussed insofar as they serve to define the soul. Secondly, the absence
of the definitional outlook gives us reason to think that those activities
that the Bens., and works introduced by Bens. 1, will consider will not
exclusively be those activities that may serve to define the faculties of
the soul. Put differently, given that the Bens. is no longer concerned with
activities of living being insofar as they will help us define the faculties of
the soul we would expect a wider range of activities to be considered than
just those that enter into the definitions of the various kinds of faculty
constitutive of the major kinds of living being. These expectations are
borne out, I think, by two further points in Bens. 1. The first is that when
Aristotle talks about activities at 436a4 it is as activities of animals and
living beings, whereas in the previous lines he spoke of the potentialities
or faculties of the soul itself as having been defined in the de An. An-
imals clearly engage in a lot of activities that do not define their souls.
Secondly, the impression that the Bens. and subsequent works will tackle
non-definitional activities is confirmed by the examples Aristotle gives
which include sleeping and waking, youth and old age, inhalation and
exhalation. These are activities that whilst prevalent amongst living be-
ings do not define any of the main kinds of soul in the de An. (nutrition,
locomotion, perception, intellect). If we consider the subject-matters of
the theses forming the PN: memory and recollection, sleep, dreams (and
divination through dreams), longevity, youth and old age, life and death,
and respiration, none of these are activities that define faculties of the
'action', praxis, here, just as he is accustomed to elsewhere, as a more common
alternative to 'activity', energeia".
15 It is may also be worth keeping in mind the wider use of praxeis in PA 1.5 645b15ff.
and HA VII for characteristic activities of animals. (Praxis of course need not be
the same as the human rational agency discussed in NE 1.11094al, IV.2 1139a31ff.,
cf. Gael. II.12 292a22). This wider use is compatible with taking praxeis in the sense
of energeiai.

sort that will enter into the definitions of any of the major kinds of soul
or life forms in the de A n. That is of course not to say that they do not
relate importantly to these kinds of soul. So, both dreams and memory
are affections or activities of the perceptual faculty. However, they are
not activities that help define the perceptual faculty. And that is why the
consideration of these activities belongs to a new stage of Aristotle's psy-
chology, the stage initiated by the Bens. Nor should saying that the Bens.
introduces the study of affections that do not define the soul be taken to
mean that Aristotle will not offer definitions of these activities. On the
contrary, he clearly announces at 436a16-17 that we should consider what
the conjunctions (suzugiai) waking and sleeping, youth and old age, in-
spiration and expiration, life and death each are and why they happen.
However, these affections do not play a part in the definition of soul itself
or any of its main types. I take it that is why none of them were accounted
for in the de An.
What about perception itself though? Perception was the centerpiece
of Aristotle's account of the soul in the de An. But if the Bens. is required
to complete Aristotle's account of perception does that not show that the
de An.'s definitions of the perceptual faculties were somehow incomplete?
No. Again we should distinguish between what Aristotle wants to say
about perceptual activities in the context of defining the faculty and what
he wants to say about perceptual activities more widely. Attention to
Aristotle's directions to his audience in the Bens. confirms this distinction.
Consider, again, how perception is brought in at Bens. 436bl-l0:
It is clear that all the [attributes] mentioned are common to the soul and
the body. For they all either occur with (meta) perception, or through (dia)
perception, and some happen to be affections (pathe) of perception, others
states (hexeis), some are protections or preservations [of perception], and
yet others destruct ions and privations [of perception]. That perception hap-
pens to the soul through the body is clear both with and without argument.
But we spoke earlier in the de An. about the sense (aisthesis) and perceiv-
ing (aisthanesthai), what it is (ti estin) and why this affection happens to
animals.
Aristotle is in effect saying to his audience here: "Don't ask me now what
perception itself is. In the de An., I defined the faculty and the actuality of
perception. I also explained why perception belongs to animals (cf. de An.
111.12-13). What we shall now deal with are affections that the animals
have as a consequence of having perception. These are affections that
arise with or through perception, or are in some way states or affections
of perception. So in the context of accounting for these affections I will
be talking also about perception, but whatever I will be saying won't
alter the account I gave in the de An. of what perception is; rather that
account will be assumed and used as the basis for my accounts of the other

affections." Read in this way the passage confirms that Aristotle wishes
to distinguish the inquiry to be conducted in the Bens. and subsequent
works into activities involving perception from the inquiry that provided
the definition of the faculty and activity of perception in the de An.
As we have seen, Bens. 1 presents the next topic after the de An.
as the activities of living beings common to body and soul, as they are
common and specific to different kinds of living being. Yet the remainder
of the Bens. has as its explicit subject matter the sense organs and the
sense objects. Indeed, the conclusion of the Bens. at 449b1-3 says simply
"it has been said concerning the sense organs and the sense objects in
what way they are disposed generally or in relation to each sense organ."
It is hard to recognize the introduction to the Bens. in these lines. We
can see a motivation for tackling the two subjects of the sense organs and
the sense objects together after the de An.: for if the de An. talked about
the sense objects only insofar as they helped define the potentialities of
perception and if it talked about the sense organs only insofar as they
provided potentialities of perception, then we can understand why one
might be curious to know more both about the sense objects and about
the sense organs themselves, that is to say apart from their role in defining
the sense faculties. However, if we accept this as a plausible motivation
for tackling the sense organs and the sense objects together in the work
following the de An., then it becomes all the more curious why Aristotle
introduces this work in Bens. 1 as one concerned with the various activities
of living beings and with the distribution of these activities across living
beings. 16 What I want to do in the rest of this paper is therefore to consider
the discussions of the sense organs and sense objects in the Bens. with a
view to showing the relevance of these discussions to the inquiry into
the activities of living beings and their distribution. The answer I shall
suggest is that the accounts of the sense organs and the sense objects
provide Aristotle with the resources for accounting for the non-defining
activities of living beings and differences and similarities amongst these
activities.17
I have suggested that Bens. 1 sets up the inquiry into activities of
living beings that rely on but do not define the main faculties of the soul.
I have further suggested that the lifting in the Bens. of what I have called
"the definitional constraint" (activities are studied insofar as they allow us
to define the major faculties and parts of soul) allows Aristotle to explore
16 As noted above, Sens. 1 may be read as the introduction to all of the PN and we
may think that the introduction's emphasis on activities and their distribution is
quite appropriate to the rest of the PN. My point here is that we also have to
make sense of Sens. 1 as an introduction to the Sens. itself.
17 Cf. van der Eijk (op.dt., p. 233): "the material bodily embedding of psychic func-
tions accounts for the occurrence of variations (diaphora) both in the distribution
of these functions over various kinds of animals and in their exercise."

differences in the ways in which the same faculties are realized in different
living beings. The contrast with the definitional approach of the de An. is
highlighted by the introduction to each of the main themes of the Sens.,
the sense organs in Sens. 2 and the sense-objects in Sens. 3. Chapter 2
introduces the discussion of the sense organs as follows: "We have already
spoken about the faculty (dunamis) which each of the senses has. But as
to the parts of the body in which the sense organs naturally occur, some
seek to find them in accordance with the elemental bodies" (437aI8-20).
Again this seems to be a back-reference to the de An. as having defined
the sense faculties. The reference is meant to allow Aristotle to move on
to a new subject-matter, the composition of the sense organs. When Sens.
2 concludes by saying that the perceiving parts of the body have now been
defined, we can take Aristotle to imply that we have now defined not only
the perceptual faculty, in the de An., but also its bodily parts, in Sens. 2.
Sens. 3, in turn, begins as follows:
Concerning the sensibles that correspond to each sense organ, I mean for
example colour, sound, odour, flavour and the tangible, we have spoken
generally about these in the de An., what their function (ergon) is and
what the activity (to energein) is according to each of the sense-organs. But
we need to inquire what we should say that each of them is, for example
what colour is or what sound is or what odour is or flavour, and similarly
concerning touch but firstly we should inquire about colour. For each of
them is said in two ways, the one as actuality, the other as potentiality.
We said in the de An. how colour and sound are the same as or different
from the senses in actuality, such as seeing and hearing. But let's now say
what each of them is such that it will produce perception and its actuality.
(439a6-17)
The approach to the sense objects underlines the difference between the
de An. and the Sens. In the de An. the sense objects were discussed
insofar as their actuality allowed us to determine the actuality of the
senses. The thought in de An. 1104 415a16-21 was that since actuality
is prior in account (logos) to potentiality and the actuality of the sense
object is prior to the actuality of the sense faculty, we need to consider the
actuality of the sense object first when defining the sense faculties. That
was why the discussions of the five senses in de An. Book 11, Chapters
7-11 began with an account of the proper object of each sense faculty.
Aristotle's interest in the sense objects in the de An. was thus determined
by their role in defining the sense faculties, a role they had because they
were in actuality what the senses were in potentiality. Accordingly, in
the passage just quoted Aristotle suggests that the de An. said what
colour and sound were in actuality in their relation to the senses but
not what they were in potentiality. The reason, it now seems clear, why
he only said in de An. what the sense objects were in actuality was that
it was the actualities of the sense objects that he needed to identify in

order to define the sense faculties. Now we might think that if we know
the actuality of the sense object then we can also now easily state its
potentiality insofar as the potentiality of the sense object to be perceived
is explained by its actuality (just as the potentiality of the sense faculty is
explained by its actuality). However, Aristotle makes it clear in the next
sentence that by considering the sense objects in potentiality he means
considering what the sense object is such that it has the potentiality to
bring about perception: "let's now say what each of the sense objects is so
as to bring about perception in actuality" . In other words, what Aristotle
wants now is an account of the sense objects which explains why they are
capable of bringing about perceptions. 18 If this account is to be genuinely
explanatory, the sense objects' role in perception cannot itself feature in
the account. Rather what we are looking for is some understanding of
features of the sense object in which the capacity to cause perception is,
as we might say, grounded. There will, then, be two sides to accounting
for the sense objects in the Bens.: one is to show what the sense objects
are as such, the other to show the consequences of the sense objects' being
such for perception. Notice again the difference between this approach to
the sense objects and that of the de An.: the Bens. does not approach
the nature of the sense objects from the point of view of simply defining
the sense faculties; rather it enjoins us to describe, first, the nature of
sense objects independently of perception, and then the consequences for
perception and its actuality (ten aisthesin kai ten energeian, 439a17) of
the sense objects' having this nature.
A good example of how the Bens. differs in just this way from the
de An. is the discussion of colour. In the de An. 11.7 colour was said by
nature to have the power to change the actually transparent (418a31-b1,
419a9-11). This account of colour was clearly linked to the role of colour
in vision, insofar as vision happens when the sense of sight is affected by
the colour through the actually transparent medium. 19 Moreover, the ac-
count of colour in de An. 11. 7 was generic. Aristotle did on other occasions
in the de A n. mention species of colour as well as species of other sen-
sibles (422blO-16, 426b8-12). His reason for mentioning different species
of sensible on these occasions was to indicate the range of qualities that
the sense faculty in question had the potentiality to assume in percep-
tion (so 422blO-16). This information was particularly called for by Aris-
totle's conception of the sense-faculty as a potentiality to discriminate
(krinein), where "discriminating" means discriminating between species
18 In "CC B& /:xcxO"COV CX\J'tWV Bv ltOI~OE:L "Cf)V CXtal')'lOIV XCX\ "Cf)V EvtpYE:LCXV at 439a16-17 the
participle «'Iv is causal/explanatory.
19 This link is not enough to make Aristotle's definition of vision in terms of colour
circular: the medium of vision, like the sense organ of vision, is actually transparent,
but neither is part of the meaning of "the actually transparent" .

within a genus of sensible (421a26-b2, 426b8-16). However, the de An.

provided no account of colour independently of vision, nor of the different
species of colour. In contrast, Aristotle in Bens. 3 offers us the following
account of colour that allows us to explain the different species of colour
and thereby the different species of colour vision. So, we are told, colour
is "the boundary of the transparent in a bounded body" (439bll-12).
Given our understanding of light and darkness in unbounded bodies like
air and water in terms of the actuality or privation of transparency, we
can now understand white and black as analogous states of transparency
in bounded objects (439bI4-18). On that basis, Aristotle thinks we can
explain the other colours as mixtures of white and black according to cer-
tain ratios. Finally, we can explain the different kinds of colour perception
as the result of the agency of the different colours on the faculty of sight.
On this last point too the Bens. is of course fully consistent with the
de An.: it was after all in the de An. that we learnt that the faculty
of sight has the ability to be changed by colour as such and that the
faculty is in potentiality what the colour is in actuality. So to be told
that there are seven kinds of colour perception because there are seven
kinds of colour is fully in line with the de An.'s understanding of the
relationship between sense object and sense perception. Indeed, if the de
An. was right in ascribing causal priority to the sense objects over the
actuality of the senses, then Aristotle positively has to differentiate the
different kinds of colour if he wants to differentiate the different kinds of
vision. For, given the causal priority of colour over vision, it would only be
if there were different kinds of colour that we could explain why colour on
different occasions acts so as to bring about different kinds of colour vision.
However, it is only in the Bens., and not in the de An., that Aristotle
explains the different kinds of colour and thereby the different kinds of
colour vision, for the reason that these differences were not relevant to
the definition of sight as such in the de An. So the fact that are seven
species of colour was not relevant to the definition of sight, whereas it
is relevant to our understanding of the different kinds of perception that
animals engage in, given that they have the faculty of sight. 2o
The species of colour explain a further aspect of our perceptions,
namely, their pleasantness or painfulness. Now which perceptions are plea-
surable or painful is clearly an important factor in explaining animal be-
haviour. We are told in de An. 11.2 413b23-4 (cf. 414b4) that wherever
there is perception, there are pleasure and pain, and wherever there are
20 If Myles Burnyeat (2004, pp. 177-180) is right to say that the material on sound
originally included in the Sens. was moved to de An. 11.8, then one of the changes
made to the material seems to be a drastic reduction in the discussion of the
different kinds of sound. All we get on this subject in de An. 11.8 is a brief discourse
(420a26-b4) on the analogies between sharp and flat in sound and in touch.

pleasure and pain, there is also appetite. The connection between per-
ception and desire is further explored in the account of animal motion in
de An. III.9-11. It seems that animals come to desire and pursue objects
when they have perceived them as pleasurable and shun them when they
have perceived them as painful. However, with the possible exception of
taste,21 pleasantness and painfulness play no role in defining the various
kinds of perception in the de An. 22 The pleasantness and painfulness of
sense objects are features that do not play a role in the definition of the
sense faculties in Book 2 of the de An. That role is performed by the proper
objects of the senses. Pleasantness and painfulness are, however, features
of the sense objects that arise out of their nature and which significantly
affect our perceptions. In other words, features that are just the job for
the Bens. Aristotle accounts for the pleasantness of colours and flavours in
terms of the ratios in which their ingredients, white and black, are mixed.
So there are seven pleasant colours because there are seven colours mixed
from white and black according to definite ratios expressible by numbers
(440a1, 442a12-19). The colours that are mixed according to indefinite
ratios are less pleasant. Similarly, in the case of sounds, the pleasant ones
are concords (sumphOniai) of high and low in accordance with numerical
ratios (439b25-440a6). It is, then, by understanding how colours, sounds,
and flavours are mixed that we come to understand why some perceptions
are pleasant and others not. We have another example, I submit, of how
a fuller characterization of the sense objects than that provided by the
de An. allows Aristotle in the Bens. to explain aspects of perception not
included in the definition of the sense faculties.
I have given examples from the Bens. of how differences in the sense
objects explain aspects of perception other than those used to define the
senses in the de An. Is there any evidence in the Bens. of Aristotle's
using his account of the sense objects also to demonstrate likenesses and
differences between living beings? The discussion of smell in Bens. 5, I
think, presents a paradigm of how characteristics of the sense objects, as
well as the sense organs, allow Aristotle to establish significant differences
and similarities between the perceptual activities of different animals. It
may be correct, with W.D. Ross and Philip van der Eijk, to give a low
21 'to~ou and 'to )"UltY1P6" are mentioned as objects of taste at de An. nl.13 435b23,
whilst the proper object of taste, flavour (xuI16c:), is described at de An. n.3 414bl3
as a kind of seasoning (~liuO'l1ci 'tI). However, neither ~liuO'I1a. nor ~ou is mentioned
as a proper object of taste in the definition of taste in de An. n.10. 'to y)"uxu is
mentioned as one of the species of flavour at de An. III.2 426bll, but whether the
sweet flavour is also pleasant would seem to depend on one's attitude to food and
drink at a given time.
22 The pleasantness of odours was also mentioned in connection with the object of
smell (421all-13), but this showed our inadequate access as human beings to the
proper object of smell.

estimate of the amount of comparative psychology offered by the PN in

general and the Bens. in particular. 23 Nonetheless, the discussion of smell
in Bens. 5 provides a significant example of the sort of inquiry into the
differences and similarities between animal activities which will be pursued
on a much larger scale in the Parts of Animals, History of Animals and
Generation of Animals.
The difference in smell in humans and other animals is discussed at
some length in Chapter 5 (443b17-444b7). The account of this difference
is driven, as we would expect from the causal priority of the sense objects,
by an account of the differences within the sense object, odour. Aristotle
explains that there are two different kinds of odour, one that is pleasant in
itself, another that is pleasant only accidentally. Odours that are pleasant
accidentally are pleasant only if the perceiver has a desire to eat or drink
the odorous object, whereas odours that are pleasant in themselves are
pleasant irrespective of our desires to eat and drink. Only humans perceive
the odours that are pleasant in themselves, a form of perception that has
salutary effects only on humans. It is clear that such differences do not
imply that the animals and humans do not have the same sense of smell;
what we have rather is a differentiation of two species within the object
of smell (cf. 443b17) and thus a differentiation of two species of smelling,
one of which is available only to humans. The de An.'s definition of smell
as a faculty therefore remains generally true for both humans and other
animals.
Notice how in the discussion of the differences between human and
animal smell Aristotle returns to the distinction between what is special
and what is common, introduced in the opening lines of Bens. 1. So the
perceptions of odours that are accidentally pleasant are said to be "com-
mon to all animals" (443b24-26),24 whereas the smelling of odours that
23 David Ross (1955, p. 18) observes that "His [Aristotle's] psychology aims at being
comparative, and at being psycho-physical. Comparative psychology is not very
prominent in what follows, until we come to the Long. and the Juv.". Ross notes
the elements of comparative psychology in other treatises in the PN (e.g. in the
discussion of smell in Sens. 5), though these are slim pickings by comparison with
the PA and the HA. However, it may be more proper to say, not that comparative
psychology is not prominent in the PN, but that it is comparative psychology in
its capacity of establishing the common activities of animals that comes to the
fore in the PN, whereas comparative psychology in its capacity of showing the
differences is more in evidence in the works that in our editions follow the PN. So
van der Eijk (op.cit., p.235) "One might say that History of Animals VII-IX and
Generation of Animals V discuss the differences that manifest themselves among
different species of organisms with regard to, i.a., to their perceptual apparatus,
whereas in de An. and PN Aristotle focuses on what all living beings possessing
sense-perception have in common" (his italics).
24 WO'tE: CLli1:CLI [sc. CL! 60I1CL!J I1EV, XCL'Ila.7tEP Ei7tOI1EV, xortcX OUI1~E~l)XO'; ~XOUal "to ~5u XCLI
AU7tl)pOV, 510 XCLI 7ta.v"twv dot XOIVCLI "tWV ~cjlwv; cf. 444b5-6.

are pleasant in themselves is "special to the nature of man" (444a28-29).25

Smelling in general is of course an activity that is special to some animals
(those moving in space), whilst smelling of the per se pleasant odours is
special to a subgroup of these animals. The differentiation of two species
of odour in Bens. 5 is an innovation compared to the treatment of smell
in the de An. and one that allows Aristotle, as we have seen, to identify
one sort of olfaction that is special to one group of living beings, humans,
as well as another sort that is common to all animals. We have, then, a
clear example from the Bens. of how the inquiry into the sense objects
allows Aristotle to identify some perceptual activities as special to some
animals, and others as common to a larger group of animals. We have, in
other words, a clear example of the study into the sense objects deliver-
ing what Bens. 1 promised, an account of activities that are common and
special to animals.
It is in order to show that the smelling of the accidentally pleasant
odours is truly a common activity that Aristotle brings in the case of
non-breathing animals:
But that creatures which do not breathe have the olfactory sense is evident.
For fishes, and all insects as a class, have, thanks to the species of odour
correlated with nutrient, a keen olfactory sense of their proper food from a
distance, even when they are very far away from it; such is the case with
bees, and also with the class of small ants, which some denominate knipes.
Among marine animals, too, the murex and many other similar animals
have an acute perception of their food by odour. (444b7-15, revised Oxford
translation by J.1. Beare)
There is a parallel discussion in de An. n.9 421b9-422a7 of smell in non-
breathing animals. The de An. passage is much less specific than here in
identifying the various species of non-breathing animals, and that in itself
may be taken as evidence of the greater interest in comparative psychology
in the Bens. However, there is nonetheless sufficient similarity between the
two discussions to threaten my claim that the Bens. has a different ap-
proach from the de An. to the activities of perception. So let me briefly
highlight the difference between the ways in which the two works discuss
the case of non-breathing animals. Firstly, what is noticeable in the de An.
is that the smell of non-breathing animals was brought up as a problem:
given that smell happens in humans through inhalation but not so in the
non-breathing animals is what we call smell in fact two senses (421b20-
I)? No, answered Aristotle, for the non-breathing animals respond to the
same odours as we. Since they perceive the same "smellable" (osphran-
ton) as we, the sense by which they respond to it must be smell, for the
sense of smell just is the sense by which we perceive the smellable. In the
25 fl'iIOV 'tije; 'tou &:vI'}PW7tOU cpuoEIIle;j cf. 444a3.

Bens., meanwhile, the case of non-breathing animals is not used to raise a

definitional question about the sense of smell. It is simply stated as "evi-
dent" that the non-breathing animals perceive odours, and this is a point
made in order to show that they (despite their different mechanisms of
smelling) like other animals are attracted to odours on the basis of their
relationship to food and drink. In Bens. 5 the case is thus used to under-
line that the odours that are pleasant accidentally are so to all animals:
wherever there is smell, animals perceive odours as pleasant insofar as
they attracted to the odorous object as food or drink, even in the case of
non-breathing animals.
So far I have said a good deal about how differences within the sense
objects allow Aristotle to explain both different kinds of perceptual ac-
tivity and differences in those activities between different animals. What
about the sense organs? How, if at all, do they enter into the explana-
tion of perceptual activities in the Bens.? Do the sense organs too lend
themselves to comparative psychology? Let us return firstly to Bens. 2.
As already mentioned, this chapter revisits the assignment of the sense
organs to the four elements in de An. IlLl. In de An. IIl.1 Aristotle was
concerned to show that there was no other sense faculty than the five con-
sidered in Book Il. His argument was that since all of the four elements
were represented in our sense organs, and all the sensible properties were
properties of the four elements, we had by virtue having of those sense
organs the ability to perceive all the sensible properties. In Bens. 2 Aris-
totle again correlates the elements with the organs, though with minor
alterations: smell, for example, is assigned to fire in Bens. 2 but to air or
water in de An. IlLl. In the Bens. Aristotle's interest, however, is not in
the completeness of the senses as defined in de An. Book Ilj it is in the
composition of the sense organs themselves. In the case of the eye, it is
clear that the Bens. 438b2-5 assumes the lesson of de An. 11.7 that what
is to be changed by colour has to be transparent in order to be acted on
by colour. It was implied here that the sense organ of sight too had to be
transparent. However, in the context of defining sight de An. 11.7 did not
itself draw the implication that the eye had to be made of water or any
particular kind of transparent matter. That the organ of sight is made of
water is something we learn only later in de An. IlLl. This omission in
de An. 11.7 should not surprise us since the identification of the particular
transparent matter of the sense organ of sight is not called for by the def-
inition of the definition of sight as a faculty. The identification, however,
is a job for the Bens. 2, given its concern for the composition of the sense
organ in themselves. Aristotle establishes the watery composition of the
eye by reference to a range of phenomena or events. It is tempting to label
this section of Bens. 2 "things that do and do not befall the organ of sight

by virtue of its composition" .26 He thus starts with an affection (pathos)

of the eye which has led people to identify the matter of the eye with fire
by their ignorance of its true cause. 27 This is the affection of the flash that
appears when one's eyes are rubbed. The flash is not to be explained by
any fire in the eye, but rather by its smoothness. There are other aspects
of the organ of sight that the fiery composition thesis does not explain:
that sight does not see itself, that it does not see without light, and that
we see in wet conditions and in the cold. There is also the phenomenon
of reflections of objects in the eye, which to some suggests that the eye
sees those objects by means of the reflections, but which is in fact to be
explained again by the smoothness of the eye. More generally, Aristotle
calls for a proper understanding of optics, which will explain why the
eye as a smooth object behaves such as to give rise flashes or reflections.
Other aspects of the composition of the eye are brought in to support the
watery composition of the seeing part, such as the fact that the white of
the eye is fat and oily. This explains why the water in the eyes is resis-
tant to cold,28 and so, presumably why our sight is able to function even
in freezing conditions, a point that the fiery composition thesis failed to
explain (437b21-22). These are all accidents of the eye that are explained
by the fact that the eye is made of water, and which cannot be explained
on the alternative fiery composition thesis. We find in the watery com-
position of the eye, then, explanations of various aspects of sight, and it
is the fact that the watery composition thesis explains these aspects that
for Aristotle recommends it to us rather than the fiery composition thesis.
Where de An. I1.7 only brought us to the point of appreciating that the
organ of sight would have to be transparent, Bens. 2 has shown us an eye
that is not only transparent but watery, smooth, and in parts oily. These
are features that allow us better to understand a range of affections of the
eye, some relevant to vision, others not.
As far as comparative psychology goes, the discussion of the matter of
the sense organs does provide material for comparisons between different
animals. At 438a22-25 the fact that the white of the eyes of blooded ani-
mals is fat and oily explains why they do not freeze in the cold, whereas
the eyes of bloodless animals have hard skin to provide similar protection.
An explanation of why both blooded and bloodless animals can see in cold
conditions thus follows from a consideration of different, but functionally
26 Time and again Aristotle refers in the discussion to what does or does not happen
(s'Umbainei, 437a25, a29, 437b2, b5, b23, 438a7, a13, 438bl2, b17).
27 Bens. 437a22-23: ltOIOUOI 0& lta.V"te:<; "t~v 1Sq,1V ltUpo<; 01(( "to lta.i)ou<; "tIVO<; &'yvoe:iv "t~v
IXh!lXv.
28 Bens. 438a21-4: Olte:p 01(( "tou"t' to"t!, ltpo<; "to OIIXllEVe:IV "to uypov IiltTjx"tov, XIX\ 01((
"tOU"to "tOU OWILIX"tO<; a.pPly6"tIX"tOV 6 ocpi)cxAIL6<; ~O"tIV' olloe:k y&.p lte.> "to tv"to<; "tWV
(3Ae:cp&.pe.>V tpp!ye.>oe:v.

analogous, features of their eyes. The discussion in Sens. 5 provides fur-

ther examples. The peculiar human ability to perceive odours that are
pleasant in themselves is related to the peculiar coldness of man's brain.
Since these odours are hot they rise through inhalation to the brain and
prevent it from getting too cold. Alongside this peculiar feature of man's
physiology, which helps explain the peculiar way in which smell happens in
humans, our organ of smell also has features shared with all other blooded
animals. Blooded animals smell only through breathing, the reason being
that their organ of smell is covered by a lid, comparable to the eye-lid,
which is removed only through inhalation of air. The fact that blooded an-
imals breathe only through inhalation naturally leads Aristotle to wonder
what the organ of smell could be in non-breathing animals. This is a ques-
tion that has been on the cards since Sens. 2. Aristotle suggested in Sens.
2 438b25 that smell could be correlated with fire since odour was a smoke-
like exhalation. But in Sens. 5 443a30 he explicitly retracted this claim
because "a smoke-like exhalation cannot occur in water and water animals
too smell". Given this retraction the puzzle at 444b15, "it is not equally
certain what the organ is whereby they [non-breathing animals] perceive
(odours)", is entirely appropriate. Aristotle's solution is to explain the
difference between the organs of smell in breathing and non-breathing an-
imals by analogy with the difference in the eyes between soft-eyed animals
with eye-lids, like man, and hard-eyed animals with none. This difference
in the organs further shows why breathing animals only smell when they
breathe but the non-breathing ones are able to smell at all times, "on the
basis of what is possible for them from the start" (444b27-8).
It is true that there is a considerable overlap between the comparative
material on smell mentioned in Sens. 5 and in de An. 11.9. De An. 11.9, like
Sens. 5, points both to the inferiority of human smell and the superiority
of human touch. However, the reason why Aristotle in de An. 11.9 talked
about the difference between human and animal smell is that he wanted to
underline the difficulty for us as humans in identifying the proper object
of smell and therefore the difficulty we find when trying to define the sense
of smell by its proper object:
Smell and its object are much less easy to determine than what we have
hitherto discussed; the distinguishing characteristic of smell is less obvious
than those of sound and colour. The reason for this is that our power of
smell is less discriminating and in general inferior to that of many species
of animals. (421a7-1O)
All of this made good sense as an exploration of why we have peculiar
difficulties in defining smell compared to the other senses. Aristotle then
(421alO-b8) proceeded to explain why human smell is inaccurate (because
of its organ), how it is imprecise (we have only access to odours based on
the pleasant and painful and name them after flavours), and he naturally

drew comparisons with the relative accuracy of our other senses. He also
argued (421b9-422a7) that smell is a mediated sense and in this context he
brought in the difference between blooded animals which smell by breath-
ing in air and animals that smell in the medium of water. He explained
why smell happens by inhalation in blooded animals: we have a sort of
"nose-lid" comparable to the eye-lid that is lifted when we breathe in.
However, the key point for Aristotle in deploying the comparative ma-
terial in de An. 11.9 was to show that the sense of smell can defined as
the same irrespective of the mechanisms by which animals smell. Smell
is whatever sense we perceive odours by, whether by inhalation or not.
Moreover, smell is always a mediated sense whether we smell in water
or air; there is, therefore, no danger of smell collapsing into a form of
taste. 29 The comparative material is thus used in the de An. to show the
difficulty of defining smell and the universality of the definition of smell.
In contrast, the comparative material does not relate in Bens. 5 to the
definition of the faculty of smell; rather it was used highlight differences
as well as similarities between the sense objects and the sense organs, dif-
ferences which in turn we could use to explain the modalities of olfaction
in different animals.
What I hope to have shown here is that, whilst Bens. 5 revisits some
of the comparative material from de An. 11.9, it does so in a manner that
is consistent with the distinctive concerns of the Bens. with the nature of
the sense-objects (cf. the distinction between two species of odour) and
the composition of the sense-organs (cf. the difference between the organ
of smell in breathing and non-breathing animals).3o These concerns are
distinct from the question that marked Aristotle's discussion in de An.
11.9, namely, that of the implications of non-breathing olfaction for the
definition of the faculty of smell as a distinct and unitary faculty.
How, finally, do the aporiai in chapters 6 and 7 of the Bens. tie in with
this interpretation? The aporiai concern the sense objects. However, it is
clear that Aristotle wishes to draw the implications for actual perception
from these aporiai. So he asks whether the power of the sense-objects is
infinitely divisible, and says that if so, then our perception of the sense
objects too should also be infinitely divisible in the sense that there should
be a perception of every part of what is infinitely divisible. He resolves the
aporia by showing how, although the sense object is infinitely divisible,
29 On Aristotle's difficulties in defining smell in a manner that makes it distinct from
the contact senses, see Johansen (1996).
30 Indirectly, there is support here for my earlier claim that the Sens. provides rela-
tively little new information about the sense organs compared to the de An.: what
is striking, in cases such as the correlation of the senses with the elements and the
human "nose-lid", is how the Sens. recycles material on the sense organs from the
de An. to reflect its own distinctive concerns.

each part need only be actually perceptible as part of the whole to which it
belongs. We can divide one "ten-thousandth part in a grain of millet" and
this part will be actually perceptible as part of the millet grain, but not
on its own where it is only potentially visible (445b7-446a20). The aporia
is thus dealt with by drawing the appropriate distinction on the side of
the sense object between perceptible in potentiality and perceptible in
actuality. Another question explicitly raised as a question about the sense
perceptions (peri tas aistheseis, 447a12) is whether "it is possible or not
that one should perceive two objects simultaneously in the same indivisible
time" (447a12-14). This aporia is dealt with by understanding how the
same sense object can be qualified by different attributes at the same time
(449a13-20). Again, in these aporiai the explanation of the accidents of
perception proceeds from a fuller understanding of the modalities of the
sense objects.
In conclusion, I take it as a recommendation of my interpretation that
it makes sense of two pressing questions about the Bens. The first is the
relationship between the de An. and the Bens. The claim that the reference
in Bens. 1 to the study of affections common to the body and soul heralds a
turn to a more "physiological" style of inquiry does not reflect the contents
of either the Bens. or the de An. Already the de An. was concerned with
the affections common to body and soul and provided material about the
bodily aspect of these affections as and when it was relevant to defining
the faculties of the soul. Indeed, we have seen a significant amount of this
material recycled in the Bens. 2 and Bens. 5 in order to account for the
sense organs. My alternative interpretation said that the study of the sense
organs and the sense objects in the Bens. was motivated by Aristotle's wish
to explain these independently of their roles in defining the sense faculties,
the roles according to which they had been accounted for in the de An.
The other question concerns the relevance of the introduction of Bens. 1
to the main business of the Bens., the discussion of the sense organs and
the sense objects. The explanation I have given is that, on the principle
that the sense objects are causally prior to the acts of perception, we can
account for the variety of sensory activities by providing a fuller account
of the sense objects than that required to define the sense faculties as
such. Moreover, we can use our understanding of the nature of the sense
organs to explain a range of features of perception (such as how we can
see in the cold or how we smell by breathing) - which do not enter into
our definitions of the senses. Since attributes of perception that do not
define the senses were such that creatures with the same senses might
differ with respect to them, we could meaningfully pursue questions as
to which of these attributes where shared by which species and why. The
key suggestion, then, was to draw the contrast between the de An. and

Sens. in terms of the de An. being a work meant to define the faculties,
and thereby the main kinds of soul, and the Sens. a work that sets out
to account for the various activities of various living beings that do not
define those faculties but which they engage as a result of having those
faculties. In this way, the Sens. reads, as it should, as a stage in Aristotle's
psychology premised on, but also distinct from, that of the de An.
References
Burnyeat, Myles, 1992, "How much happens when Aristotle sees red or
hears middle C? Remarks on De Anima 2.7-8", in: M.C. Nussbaum
/ A.O. Rorty (eds) , Essays on Aristotle's De Anima, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
-, 2004, "Aristotelian Revisions: The Case of De Sensu", in: Apeiron,
37, pp. 177-180.
Coles, Andrew, 1997, "Animal and Childhood Cognition in Aristotle's
Biology and the Scala Naturae", in: W. Kullmann / S. Follinger
(eds), Aristotelische Biologie. Intentionen, Methoden, Ergebnisse,
Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, pp. 287-324.
van der Eijk, Philip J., 1997, "The Matter of Mind: Aristotle on the Bi-
ology of 'Psychic' Processes", in: W. Kullmann / S. Follinger (eds),
Aristotelische Biologie. Intentionen, Methoden, Ergebnisse, Stutt-
gart: Steiner Verlag, pp. 231-259.
Johansen, Thomas K., 1996, "Aristotle on the Sense of Smell", in: Phro-
nesis, 41, pp. 1-19.
-, 1998, Aristotle on the Sense-Organs, Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
King, Richard A.H., 2001, Aristotle on Life and Death, London: Duck-
worth.
Lloyd, Geoffrey E.R., 1978, "The Empirical Basis of the Physiology of
the Parva Naturalia", in: G.E.R. Lloyd / G.E.L. Owen (eds) , Aris-
totle on Mind and the Senses, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press,
pp. 215-239.
-, 1992, "Aspects of the Relationship Between Aristotle's Psychology
and his Zoology", in: M.C. Nussbaum / A.O. Rorty (eds), Essays
on Aristotle's De Anima, Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, pp. 147-167.
Sharples, Robert W., 2005, "Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Nature and
Location of Vision" ,in: R. Salles (ed.), Metaphysics, Soul, and Ethics
in Ancient Thought. Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji, Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press.
Wedin, Michael V., 1988, Mind and Imagination in Aristotle, Yale: New
Haven.

Robert W. Sharples
Common to Body and Soul:

Peripatetic Approaches After Aristotle*
An examination of how Aristotle's successors in the Peripatos dealt with

phenomena that are "common to body and soul" seems appropriate, be-
cause those who regarded themselves as in some sense in an Aristotelian
tradition were, to a varying extent, building upon aspects of what Aris-
totle said, and in some cases trying to arrive at an interpretation of what
he had meant - the same task, mutatis mutandis, on which we are now
engaged. I do not indeed want to claim that examination of the writings of
Aristotle's successors will necessarily add anything to our understanding
of Aristotle himself that we could not work out for ourselves by study-
ing Aristotle's writings alone. The interest of the texts I shall be looking
at is essentially historical, though I hope that does not prevent its being
philosophical as well. I should also say at the outset that I am not making
great claims for any of the texts or authors I shall be considering; none of
them is, arguably, in the first rank of importance. Even the most humble,
however, may provide some grist for the mill of discussion. I am thinking
here of the pseudo-Aristotle treatise On Breath, a text which Julia An-
nas, who is more open-minded than some scholars about the interest of
the more obscure texts of classical antiquity, l has described as a "dismal
little work".2 In terms of innovative thinking or systematic treatment of
the topic that is true, but the treatise, if we can call it that, is essentially
This is a version of the paper given at Munich on 9th September 2003, revised in
the light of discussion at the conference and other comments thereafter; I am grate-
ful to all who have contributed comments, and in particular to Andrew Barker,
Victor Caston, Jim Hankinson, Johannes Hiibner, Edward Hussey, Thomas Jo-
hansen, Christof Rapp and Robert Temple. Translations except where otherwise
acknowledged are my own.
For example in her statement (Annas, 1993, pp. 144-145), which I believe to be
correct though some have challenged it, that Alexander, Mantissa 156-9, "does a
much better job" than Aristotle in the Ethics of demonstrating the existence of a
single natural justice which is best everywhere. Cf. Sharples (2005).
2 Annas (1992, p. 27).

166 Robert W. Sharples
a series of aporetic discussions relating to the origin and various aspects

of the functioning of pneuma in animal bodies, and so may at least serve
to indicate, explicitly or implicitly or indeed by omission, some possible
perspectives on the issue with which we are concerned. 3
In relating the later discussions to Aristotle's own doctrine I take it
that the latter has the following implications:
(A) Any contrast between body and soul, or between their activities
or functions, must fall under one of the following three descriptions.
(AI) It is a contrast between two ways of looking at a single

phenomenon, for example at anger which is both the boiling of
blood around the heart (matter) and the desire to hurt another
in return (form).4
Or else
(A2) it is a contrast between those phenomena that involve both
body and soul, on the one hand, and, on the other, those which
involve only the body, behaving in a way that an inanimate body
could equally well behave - for example if, when I am pushed off
a cliff, my body falls and lands on top of someone, just as a rock
would. 5
Or else
(A3) it is a contrast between those phenomena that involve both
body and soul, on the one hand, and, on the other, activities of
soul that do not involve the body at all, if there are any - the
only candidate for Aristotle being the activity of intellect, though
even here there are well-known issues about whether intellect can
in fact function without phantasia. 6
3 Cf. Roselli (1992, pp. 8-9). It does not seem entirely inappropriate to compare the
manner adopted in this text to that of Theophrastus' so-called Metaphysics, for all
that the range of issues covered in De Spiritu is both much narrower and of much
less general philosophical import; one particular feature that the treatise shares
with Theophrastus is the view that causes or principles should only be inquired
into up to a certain point (485a4-5; cf. Theophrastus, Metaphysics 8 9bl-24, and
fr. 158-159 in (Theophrastus, 1992) [henceforth abbreviated as FHS&GJ).
4 Aristotle, de An. 1.1 403a29-b7.
5 Alexander may provide a better example of something involving only the body and
not the soul, later in this paper: see below, at p. 183.
6 And cf. Caston (1997, p. 334, n. 57): "Unless Aristotle believes that there could be
something exactly like a human in all other respects, but lacking this power [the
intellect) ... then he must allow the ability to think to supervene on the body as
a whole."

Peripatetic Approaches After Aristotle 167
(I suppose there is a fourth logical possibility, combining the second mem-

ber of A2 with the second of A3, but it is harder to think of contexts in
which this would naturally arise; engaging in theoretical contemplation
while falling off a cliff, perhaps.) What there ought not to be room for is
(X) a contrast, stated as one between body and soul, which is in fact a
contrast between one function and another of an ensouled living body
as such, the lower function being described as bodily and the higher
as due to soul.
(In this connection, it is striking how often translators feel impelled to
render psukhe by "mind" rather than by "soul"; I will be noting some
examples.)1
There is however room for
(B1) a contrast, and even a conflict, between body and soul which
is to be analysed in terms of an insufficiency in the material bodily
organ hindering the activity of a function of soul.
After all, that imperfections in the matter can hinder the realisation of
the form is good Aristotelian doctrine. Moreover,
(B2), any talk of body hindering the activity of soul should be at least
implicitly analysable in terms of bodily factors affecting the organ or
instrument of a particular soul-faculty in such a way that it cannot
perform its function so well,
as in Aristotle, On the Soul 1.4 408b18-25:
Tl. Intellect seems to become present as some substance, and not to be
destroyed. It would be destroyed above all by being dulled in old age, but
as it is what happens is as with the sense-organs; if an old man could
get an eye of a certain sort, he would see like a young one. So old age is
not due to something happening to the soul, but to that in which it is,
as in drunkenness and disease. Thinking and contemplation is dulled when
something else within is destroyed, but it is not affected itself.
- where we may note that in the case of sense-perception, as well as
in that of intelligence, Aristotle is prepared to speak of the soul itself
as unaffected. As (B2) suggests, an analysis of psychological processes,
and of the interactions between such processes, in materialistic terms is
not necessarily un-Aristotelian, provided it does not suggest that those
processes can be fully explained in such terms; and that is so even if a
text does not specifically refer to soul at all, though the absence of such
7 Cf. the translation of Plutarch, De 7'uenda Sanitate 27 137DE, by Babbitt in
(Plutarch, 1928, p. 293).

a reference may well suggest that the relation between soul and body is
not uppermost in the author's mind.
It might seem that the identification of the soul as the form of the
body should also exclude talk of
(Cl) the soul using the body, or a specific part of the body (Le. the
connate pneuma) as its instrument;
such language suggests that the soul is a separate thing, as a human agent
is separate from the tools he or she uses. But Aristotle is himself ready
to use such language. 8 An analogy may, or may not, be helpful here: if
houses built themselves, they would use bricks or stones to do it. 9 And
perhaps one can even press the house analogy, inadequate though it is,
to suggest that some of the parts of a house are more suitable for use
as instruments by a self-building house than others would be; the roofing
materials, for example, would not be very good candidates for this role,
if the roof is not the first part of a self-building house to develop. Where
there will be divergence from Aristotle is if
(C2) talk of the soul using an instrument is allowed to suggest a
conception of body and soul as two distinct things;
though in principle it is going to be difficult to distinguish between (Cl)
and (C2) in cases where the texts do not make the distinction clear. It
also goes without saying that there is a divergence from Aristotle in cases
where
(D) the soul is identified with pneuma and contrasted with the body
as one body with another.1°
II
Theophrastus' work On Creatures that Change Colour is known to us
only from a summary by Photius, which does not as it happens include
8 Body as instrument: de An. 1.3 407b25, 1I.4 415b19. Pneuma as instrument: MA
10 703a20j cf. de An. HI.10 433b18: Peck in Aristotle (1942, p.578). See Menn
(2002, especially pp. 138-139), where he argues that the emphasis laid on the soul
using the body as an instrument means that the relation between soul and body
is not to be reduced to that which applies between form and matter generally.
9 [Aristotle], Spir. 485b6-7 notes that while the crafts use fire as an instrument,
nature uses it both as instrument and as matter.
10 Menn (2002, p.84) indeed sees rejection of a dualism in which soul and (the rest
of the) body are contrasted as one body to another as Aristotle's main concern in
his de An., where as he points out discussion of harmonia theory plays a relatively
small part. The same is true of Alexander's de An., where opposition to the Stoic
theory is a major factorj see below, p.181.

the point that will particularly concern us here, and from the following
second-hand reports:
T2. Why does the octopus change its colour? Is it, as Theophrastus thought,
by nature a cowardly creature? So when it is alarmed, there is a change in
the pneuma in it, and its colour changes along with this - as with a human
being.
Plutarch, Aetia Physica 19 916B
(= Theophrastus, fr. 365C FHS&G)Y
T3. For the chamaeleon changes (colour) not by any design, nor concealing
itself, but does so from fear and to no purpose, being naturally frightened by
noise and cowardly. And in accordance with this, too, is the great amount
of pneuma (in it), as Theophrastus says; for almost the entire body of the
creature is filled by its lungs, and from this he infers that it is full of pneuma
and for this reason liable to change (colour). But the change (of colour) of
the octopus is something that it does, rather than something that happens
to it; for it changes (colour) deliberately, using this as a device both to hide
from (the creatures) it fears and to capture (those) on which it feeds.
Plutarch, De Sollertia Animalium 27 987E-F
(= Theophrastus, fr. 365D FHS&G)
T4. Theophrastus, in On (Creatures) that Change Colour, says that the
octopus takes on the colour chiefly, or only, of stony places, doing this
through fear and for the sake of self-protection.
Athenaeus, Deipnosophistae 17.104 317F
(= Theophrastus, fr. 365B FHS&G)
In an earlier discussion 12 I suggested that the explanation of the apparent
conflict over whether the octopus' reaction is deliberate (in T3 and T4) or
an automatic reaction due to fear (in T2 and T4) is that for Theophras-
tus, at the level of irrational animals, physical reactions and deliberate
behaviour are two descriptions of the same phenomenon. Plutarch will
then be imposing a distinction of his own that Theophrastus would not
recognise. That, however, is a point about whether the behaviour in ques-
tion is deliberate or an emotional reaction. What is significant for our
present purpose is that T2 recognises in the case of the octopus, and T3
in the case of the chamaeleon, that the same reaction can be described
both in psychological terms, as due to fear, and in physiological terms. So
too does Aristotle in describing the chamaeleon in PA IV.1l 629a20,l3
11 Translation (as in T3, T4 and T6) from (Theophrastus, 1992); I am grateful to

E.J. Brill and Co. for permission to reproduce it here.
12 Sharples (1995, pp. 40-41, pp. 93-96).
13 The description of the chamaeleon in HA 11.11, which has been argued by some
to be a later insertion there, discusses only the physiological aspect of the process,
but that may be explained by its being the report of a dissection. I am grateful to
Robert Temple for this point.

Apollonius, Historia Mirabilium 49.1-3, reports Theophrastus (fr. 726A

FHS&G) as saying that music can cure afflictions of the soul and the body,
the examples given being fainting, fright, mental disturbances, sciatica and
epilepsy. There is no explicit allocation of the examples between soul and
body, and if any contrast between soul and body is intended here it is not
emphasized;14 moreover, we are dealing with a second-hand report. More
questionable is Historia Plantarum 9.18.3, where Theophrastus says that
herbs can affect not only the body, in such things as health, disease, death
and fertility,15 but also the soul; 9.19.1 cites, among effects on the soul
- translated "mind" by Hort in Theophrastus (1926, p.311) - madness
and a mild and cheerful temper. A pedant might argue that Theophrastus
should have recognised that for Aristotle health, disease and death have
as much to do with the soul as madness does; but in the context it is
reasonable to suppose that he is simply using the contrast between body
and soul in a conventional way.
Theophrastus is cited by Plutarch, by pseudo-Plutarch On Desire and
Grief, and by Porphyry16 as saying that the soul "pays the body a high
rent"; the first two contrast this with Democritus' statement, which they
approve, that the body has more justification in complaining about the
soul's misuse of it. What is significant here is that pseudo-Plutarch de-
scribes the cost the body imposes on the soul in terms of emotions: grief,
fear, desire and envy. If this goes back to Theophrastus himself,17 the
point is clearly not that emotion has no psychic component - if it did
not, there would be no cost to the soul, or not a cost of the same type
- but that activities of the soul that have a bodily component are being
contrasted with those that do not. Albertus Magnus, De XV Problemati-
bus 9 41.11-14,42-50 Geyer, in the context of arguing that we are able to
resist our desires, compares those who deny this to Theophrastus,18 saying
that they liken passions of the soul to physical passions, or perhaps better
"affections"; the implication seems to be that even if physical affections
14 On the other hand, I am not sure that ltOAAa. "tii>v &ltL tjlux~v >CelL "to aii>l1el YLYVOI1€VWV
ltel'6ii>v is to be read as implying that all the phenomena mentioned involve both
body and soul, even if strict hylomorphism requires this (sciatica affecting the func-
tioning of the locomotive faculty, and perhaps of others too); it is unclear whether
the effect of music is supposed to be through a mechanism which is psychological in
our sense of that term. Cf., perhaps, p.183 below. I am grateful to Jim Hankinson
for raising these issues and to Andrew Barker for discussion of them.
15 The last item being in the part of the text omitted by Hort in Theophrastus (1926)
apparently for reasons of decorumj see Preus (1988, p. 88, p. 96, n. 14).
16 Plutarch, De Tuenda Sanitate 24 135DEj [Plutarchj, De Libidine et Aegritudine
2 52.10-53.4 Zieglerj Porphyry, De Abstinentia 4.20 265.22-266.4 Nauck: respec-
tively Theophrastus fr. 440B, 440A and 440C FHS&G.
17 For the relation between the passages, and the likelihood that the fuller account in
pseudo-Plutarch preserves Theophrastean material, cf. Fortenbaugh (1984, pp. 152-
154).
18 fr. 439 FHS&G.

cannot be resisted passions of the soul, and in particular desires, can be.
The basis of the reference to Theophrastus is unclear; but Albertus' cita-
tion of Nicomachean Ethics VII as showing the possibility of resisting the
passions prompts comparison with the fact that Aristotle's own discussion
of akrasia culminates in an appeal to physiology:
T5. As to how the ignorance is removed and the person who lacks self-
control comes to have understanding again, the same account applies also
to the one who is drunk or asleep, and it is not peculiar to this experience;
and we should go to the physiologists for it.
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics VII.3 1147b6-9
Simplicius, in Ph. 964.29-965.6 (= Theophrastus, fr.271 FHS&G),
provides evidence that Theophrastus recognised movements of the mind
which have no connection with the body at all:
T6. These views also find favour with the chief of Aristotle's colleagues,
Theophrastus, who says, in the first book of his On Motion, that "de-
sires and appetites and feelings of anger are bodily motions, and have their
starting-point in this [the body], but as for decisions and speculations, it
is not possible to refer these to something else, but in the soul itself is
their starting-point and activity and completion. But if indeed the intellect
is also something better and more divine," since it comes from outside and
is all-perfect * * *. And to these words he adds: "About these (decisions
and speculations), further, we must enquire whether it involves some sep-
aration which is relevant to the definition, since it is agreed that these too
are motions."
The context in Simplicius is a contrast between bodily and psychic move-
ments, in response to a point raised by Alexander of Aphrodisias about
how an incorporeal and unextended soul can move; there is much that
could be said about that debate,19 but fortunately it need not concern
us here. Nor need the question, also debated, about where the quota-
tion from Theophrastus ends, and about why the text apparently (unless
emended) breaks off ungrammatically. For the first part of the quotation
in any case shows that Theophrastus distinguished between movements
that begin in the body and those that do not involve it at all. The latter
are clearly those that take place in the intellect. The question whether
there are or are not movements in the intellect is one that will recur later
in this discussion. 2o
19 Simplicius says Alexander is (964.15) "dragging everything to serve his own thesis
that the soul is inseparable from the body", but M antissa 2 shows that Alexander
answers the problem where intellect is concerned by denying that intellect coming
from outside involves spatial motion. Cf. Rashed (1997).
20 "Movements" , indeed, can and I think should be understood here in a wide sensej
one might argue for the translation "changes", if that did not risk implying a radical
transformation from one state to another (cf. Aristotle, de An. 11.5 417b2-418a5).

These may seem meagre gleanings from Theophrastus. But that very
fact is I think significant. He discusses physiological processes and phe-
nomena - for example Sweat, Dizziness and Fatigue - but does so without
explicitly referring to the soul as such; and while we have numerous re-
ports of his views on the soul, they appear to accept the hylomorphic
analysis rather than to discuss it. To judge from the admittedly fragmen-
tary remains of Theophrastus' work, the point that some processes have
both a material and a psychological aspect did not particularly interest
him, except negatively in criticising Presocratic theories. This apparent
lack of interest in the hylomorphic analysis of the relation between the
soul and the body is not surprising, for Theophrastus seems in general
remarkably uninterested in the whole issue of the relation between form
and matter. But that is an issue I intend to discuss elsewhere.
III
Simplicius goes on from T6 to cite Strato for a similar contrast between
motions of the soul alone and those that are started by the body:
T7. And Strato of Lampsacus agrees that it is not only the irrational soul
that is moved but also the rational, saying that the activities of the soul
too are motions. So he says in On Motion ... and before this statement
he has written, "since most of the movements are the same,21 those with
which the soul moves by itself in thinking and those in which it was moved
by the senses 22 previously. This is clear; for it is not able to think of any of
those things which it has not seen previously."
Simplicius, in Ph. 965.7-16 (= Strato, fr. 74 Wehrli).
Konstan in the notes to his translation of Simplicius 23 argues that if the
motions of intellect originate and end in it then the intellect will be sepa-
rable from the body. That is indeed the conclusion that Simplicius himself
wants to draw, but I am not sure that it follows if the motions of the soul
that do not themselves involve the body are dependent on others that
do involve it, if for example speculation derives the concepts it uses from
imagination and ultimately on sensation. Or perhaps the body can be
dispensed with once the intellect has acquired the concepts?
Strato has often been castigated as a materialist. He is reported by
Tertullian, De Anima 14 (= Strato fr.108 Wehrli), as having compared
the soul with breath in a pipe, which could suggest a materialistic view
of the soul:
21 ott otu.ot£ Poppelreuter: ott'LotL vel ott.£otl vel ott"tlOV codd. Cf. Repici (1988, pp. 33-34).
22 otta-6~ae:CI)v Aid.: xlv~ae:CI)v codd. Repici, loco cit.
23 Simplicius (1989, p. 61 n. 46, 48)i Konstan cites Aristotle, de An. 1.1 403a3-b9 and
1.4 408bI5-19.

T8. But indeed from the many limbs a single body is fashioned, so that that
division is rather a combination. Think of the most prodigious contribution
of Archimedes, I mean the water-organ: so many parts. .. and all will make
up a single structure. Just so the breath, which gasps there from the pressure
of the water, will not be separated in the different parts just because it is
directed through the parts; it is united in its substance, though divided in
its activity. This example is not very different from Strato and Aenesidemus
and Heraclitus; for they too preserve the unity of the soul, which is spread
out through the whole body and itself everywhere springs forth in various
ways through the sense-organs, like the breath in a pipe through the cavities;
it is not so much divided up as distributed.
Annas argues 24 that this passage could be read either as identifying soul
and pneuma or as expressing hylomorphism, with pneuma as the imme-
diate vehicle of soul; but the idea of the form of an organic body having
a particular part of that body as its "vehicle" seems even more counter-
intuitive than its having a particular part of that body as its instrument,
and even if the latter is acceptable in Aristotelian terms I am not sure
the former is. Annas gives the citation of Heraclitus and Aenesidemus as
a reason for not pressing the implications of this passage; there is also, as
Repici has pointed out,25 a question how far an analogy should be pressed
in any case. That is, T8 may not necessarily tell us anything about the
relation between pneuma and soul in Strato's view. In Aetius 5.4.2-3 (=
Strato, fr. 94 Wehrli) Strato is contrasted with Aristotle as holding that
the power of the seed is corporeal; this could be cited as supporting the
view that he regarded soul in general as corporeal, but we should not per-
haps build too much on this isolated reference without a context. 26 Later
on, as is well known, Critolaus was to argue that the soul was made of the
same substance as the heavens, and Cicero attributes such a view to Aris-
totle; whether this reflected something in Aristotle's early works which we
do not now possess, or whether it originated in a misunderstanding, need
not concern us here. 27
24 Annas (1992, p.29). Solmsen (1961, p.568 and n.34) says that "there is every
reason for agreeing with Wehrli's remarks that the comparison receives its point
in the definition of soul as pneuma" (emphasis mine).
25 Repici (1988, pp. 29-30).
26 Wehrli in Strato (1969, p.70) speculates that Strato may be rejecting Aristotle's
doctrine that intellect has no bodily substrate, or that materialism may lead him
to abandon the view that male seed conveys form.
27 Critolaus, fr. 17-18 Wehrli. Cf. Moraux (1963, p.1206, pp. 1229-1230); Easterling
(1964).

IV
More problematic is the case of the pseudo-Aristotle treatise On Breath,
De Spiritu. It does not make many references to soul, and those that
it does, like much else in the treatise, are not exactly clear. At 482b29-
36 a contrast which resembles that familiar from Aristotle's own works,
between the explanation of some feature of a living creature in terms of
mechanical causation and that in terms of purpose,28 is expressed in a
way that does not make explicit reference to soul or indeed to purpose:
T9. The pulse is something individual besides these [se. respiration and nu-
trition as processes in the arteries], which in one way seems to be accidental,
if, when there is a great quantity of heat in a liquid, it is necessary for what
is vaporised, because it is trapped, to produce a pulsation. But it is at the
beginning and primary, because it is cognate with what is primarYi for it is
most of all and primarily in the heart, from which [it is present] also in the
rest, and perhaps it is necessary for this to follow (1tCxpaxoAou,'}e;iv) with a
view to (ltpoc:) the underlying substance of the living creature which results
from the actuality.
At 483a3-5, in the course of arguing that the pulse is not affected by the
rate of breathing, the author asserts that the pulse is uneven and inten-
sified "in certain affections of the body and in fears, hopes and anguish
of the soul"; but this is a commonplace antithesis, of a sort we have fre-
quently seen, and while the very fact that the pulse is affected indicates
an interaction between body and soul, it is difficult to infer from this pas-
sage any indication of the exact relation between them. 481a17, "Purer is
the (part of pneuma) which is akin to the soul" , is neutral as to whether
soul itself is thought of as corporeal or not. 483b8-15 apparently argues
that soul-pneuma is contained in the arteries rather than in the nerves or
sinews, as the former are finer in texture than the latter:
TlO. Or is it necessary for [the air which becomes breath] to be mixed in
some way, since it moves among moisture and bodily masses? So it is not
most rare, since it is mixed. And yet it is reasonable that the first recipient
of soul [should be most rare], unless indeed the soul too is like this [i.e.
mixed,?}, and not pure and unmixed. [So] the artery alone [will] be receptive
of breath, but not the sinew. They differ in that the sinew has a tautness,
while the artery is swiftly torn, like the vein. (The text goes on to adopt
Erasistratus' theory of "tplltAoxLai flesh is made up of arteries, veins and
nerves or sinews.)
If "the soul too is like this" is endorsed by the author, the soul is corporeal;
even if the soul is "pure and unmixed" after all, it could be argued, but
need not be, that this too is corporeal language - one is reminded of
the controversy over whether Anaxgoras' Mind, "the finest and purest
of all things" , was corporeal or not. 29 On the other hand, the account of
28 Cf. e.g. GA II.4 738a33ff.
29 Anaxagoras, fr. 12; cf. e.g. Guthrie (1965, pp.276-278). Roselli (1992, p.74) says

respiration in 482b21-25 need not imply that soul is regard as itself a body,
unless we interpret "other" as meaning that the soul too is a mixture of
bodies:
Tll. It is clear that respiration has its origin/principle from within, whether
this [the principle} should be called a power of soul, or soul, or some other
mixture of bodies, which cause an attraction like this through themselves.
The nutritive [faculty} would seem to [derive} from respiration; ....
That the nutritive faculty (of soul, presumably) arises from breathing need
not rule out hylomorphism either, for that doctrine does not deny that the
soul has a necessary material basis and that an account can be given of
how the soul-faculties develop - it simply insists that the material aspect
is not primary in explanation. In 483a23-b4 too it is far from clear that
the author wants to insist that the soul is simply air that has undergone
some sort of purely material change:
T12. There is also a puzzle concerning sense-perception. For if the artery
alone perceives, is it by the breath in it, or with its bulk, or with its body?
Or if air is the first thing after soul, [is sensation} by what is more sovereign
and prior? What then is the soul? They say that the cause of such a motion
is a power. Is it clear [then] that you will not be right to reproach those
[Platonists who speak of] the rational and spirited [parts of the soul]? For
they too speak [of these] as powers. But if the soul is in this air, [air] is
common. So it is reasonable that being affected and altered in some way ...
[the air] is carried towards what is akin to it and like is increased by like.
Or not? For [the soul as a whole} is not air, but the air is something which
contributes to this power. Or not . .. [but} what makes [the soul}, 30 and it
is what has made this that is the principle and starting point? In the case
of creatures that do not respire, [this is so that the air in them] should not
mix with that outside. Or [is this] not [the case,] but it mixes in some other
way? What then is the difference between the [air] in the artery and that
outside? It is reasonable, perhaps even necessary, that it should differ in
rarity.
Roselli (1992, p. 101) argues that the author is here rejecting identification
of soul and air and defining soul rather as a power. The reference to
"what makes [the soul]" does however suggest that the soul is regarded as
secondary and generated, what gives rise to it being the true principle. If
the latter were bodily elements in a certain state, we would have a position
like that of Andronicus and Alexander (below), with the crucial difference
that the bodily elements would be primary and the power secondary; in
other words, a type of harmonia-theory of the soul. However, the context 31
that T9 shows that soul is being thought of as corporeal.
30 Reading in a34 ~ ou * * * 'to 'tcxu'ty)v ltOIOUV with Roselli, who posits a lacuna. ~
O\J"tW 'tcxu'ty)v, "or [air] in this way makes [the soul]", Dobson, Hett, Tricot: ~ ou,
<elAACt> 'to 'tWJ'ty)v, "or not, <but rather> what makes [the soul]" Bussemaker,
Jaeger.
31 Unless we adopt Dobson's conjecture; see the previous note.

suggests rather that the "principle" is what turns air into soul, and it
seems more natural to interpret this as some sort of immaterial principle.
The general impression given, at any rate, is that the treatise is aporetic
on the whole issue of the status of soul.
v
Physiological issues are extensively discussed in the pseudo-Aristotle Prob-
lems; what then, if anything, is said there explicitly about the issue of
what is common to body and soul?
Well, the answer is: explicitly, very little. Soul is rarely mentioned in
the Problems, and where it is, it is in the context of the body affecting
the soul, and of the soul affecting, or failing to affect, the body. Forster
in the Oxford translation throughout translates psukhe by "mind" rather
than by "soul". The explanations in question could be analysed in terms
of physical effects on the bodily instrument of the affected soul-faculty,
thus satisfying (B2) above; but there seems nothing to compel such an
interpretation rather than one in more dualistic terms.
T13. Why does the tongue of those who are drunk stumble? ... Or is it
because in drunkenness the soul is affected in sympathy and stumbles? So
when the soul is affected in this way it is reasonable that the tongue be
affected in the same way as well; for it is from [the soul] that speech has
its origin. And for this reason even in the absence of drunkenness, when
the soul is affected in some way, the tongue too is affected in sympathy, for
example when people are frightened.
[Aristotle], Problems III.31 875b19-33
This Problem is concerned with the effect of drunkenness on speech. The
first three solutions involve physiological effects on the tongue directly, the
fourth - and preferred - solution, quoted here, is in terms of the effect of
drunkenness on the psukhe and hence on speech, supported by the parallel
case of the effect of fear on speech. What is missing is a reference to the
precise relationship between the psychological faculty affected and its own
material basis, if indeed it has one. 32
Problem V.15 882a33-39 explains the fact that muscles continue to
quiver after exercise by saying that psukhe can lose control of certain
parts of the body, e.g. the heart and the sexual organs, and the lower lip
when it trembles in anger, because heated breath is still present:
32 Similarly at Problems XI.38, where stammering and lisping due to melancholia

and drunkenness are explained by the claim that in these conditions the psukhe
responds to phantasia too quickly and speech cannot keep up with it.

T14. The soul often controls the body as a whole but not its parts, when they
are moved in a certain way, as with the heart and the genitals. The reason
is that much pneuma is burned up around the sinews, and is not cooled
down as soon as one stands still [after running]. This causes vibration, as if
drawing down [the remaining pneuma] by its movement, and drags it down,
and causes there to be least control of the most remote parts, such as the
heels, like the lower lip in those who are angry.
In effect, the answer given is that the bodily instrument of soul can take
on an impetus of its own. 33
At Problem X.lO the claim that human children differ from one an-
other more than do the young of other animals is explained by the fact that
in humans the condition of the soul (~uX~, translated by Forster as "men-
tal condition") varies more during intercourse, while other animals are
wholly absorbed in the act. This is clearly an appeal to the idea that the
embryo is affected by the mental state of the parents during intercourse;
but there is no indication as to what sort of mechanism is imagined as ex-
plaining the effect. The same idea is used at pseudo-Alexander, Problems
1.28 Ideler, as an explanation for wise people having foolish children and
vice versa: the wise ones, we are told, are thinking about other things dur-
ing intercourse, so not so much "soul power" (~UXL)(~ 06VCX/lLC;) gets into
the seed. The implication seems to be that thought about other things
affects the relation between the psukhe and the seed, but it is again not
clear what mechanism we are to suppose.
[Aristotle], Physiognomonica 1 805al-14, argues not only that body
can affect soul and vice versa, but even that each causes most of the
pathemata of the other:
T15. Thoughts accord with bodies, and are not isolated, unaffected by move-
ments in the body. This is altogether clear in drunkenness and ill-health;
for thoughts are clearly greatly altered by what happens to the body. And
conversely, that the body is affected in sympathy with the affections of the
soul becomes clear in love and fear and grief and pleasure. Moreover in the
things that come about by nature one could observe more [clearly] that
body and soul are united with each other by nature in such a way that they
are the causes of most of each other's affections. For no living creature has
ever come to be such as to have the form of one creature and the thought
of another, but body and soul are always those of the same creature [in
each case], so that it is necessary for a certain sort of thought to go with a
certain sort of body.
33 Flashar, in his comment on this passage in (Aristotle, 1991, pp. 475-476), cites the
reference to involuntary movements of the heart and sexual organs at MA 11 703b6
as evidence that for Aristotle too the soul is not in control of every part of the
body; but Aristotle himself there speaks only of movements contrary to reason.

This is compatible with a hylomorphic analysis of the relation between

body and soul, but the author's words suggest a more straightforward
body-soul dualism.
VI
Andronicus and Alexander regard the soul as the power which results
from or supervenes on the mixture of the bodily elements:
T16. <As for Andronicus the Peripatetic>,34 in general 1 praise him for
having the courage to declare that the being of the soul is as a tempering
or power of the body, [speaking] like a free man and not veiling the matter
in obscurities (for 1 find him to be like this in many other matters); but in
that he says that it is either a tempering or the power which follows on the
tempering, I criticise the addition of "the power. "
Galen, Quod Animi Mores 4, IV.782.15-783.3 Kiihn (= 44.12-20 Miiller)
T17. [The soul] has its origin (YEVe:aLC;) in a certain sort of mixture and
tempering of the primary bodies, as was shown.
Alexander, De Anima 24.3-4
T18. Soul is not a certain sort of tempering of bodies, as a harmonia was,
but the power that is created (ye:VVWIlEVTj) supervening on a certain sort of
tempering.
ibid. 24.21-3
This is not to be interpreted as making body primary and soul secondary;
for Aristotle too a certain type of soul requires a certain bodily composi-
tion, and for Aristotle too soul as a whole can be described as a power:
T19. Being awake is actuality like cutting or seeing, but the soul [is actuality]
like sight and the power of the organ.
Aristotle, de An. 11.1 412b27-413a1
What will make soul secondary is to read YEVE:CJLC;: in T17 and YE:WWflEV7)
in T18 as implying that this is the whole story, or the important story,
about the origin of soul. But to do so would be to take T17 and T18 out
of context; they need to be read (a) in the context of Alexander's whole
discussion of soul as form in the first part of his de An.,35 and (b) in their
specific context in the rejection of the theory of soul as harmonia. As
Donini and Caston have both pointed out, Alexander is best interpreted
as resisting an interpretation that would reduce the soul to being nothing
more than a description of the arrangement of the matter. 36 A human
34 The addition is confirmed by the Arabic version.
35 Cf. Sharples (1993, pp. 87-88); (1999, p.81).
36 Donini (1971); Caston (1997, pp. 347-354). As Jim Hankinson has pointed out (this
volume, p.249f.) Galen's point in T16 is that soul cannot be both a substance and
a power; but Aristotle would disagree, as T19 shows, given that for Aristotle (and

being or a giraffe needs a certain type of body to live the life of a human
being or a giraffe, and it has that type of body in order to live that sort
of life; but it is also true that having the type of body it has means that
there is only a certain type of life it can live, more or less well.
There are indeed questions to be asked about this reciprocal implica-
tion. Aristotle in Physics n.9 200a5-15 describes a certain form as necessi-
tating certain matter, but is not prepared to say that matter necessitates
form. That may however be because of the point, stressed by Balme,37
that natural processes can be interrupted, and more generally because an
efficient cause is required. Nevertheless, just because a particular config-
uration of matter needs to be explained by a form of a particular type,
the fact that a particular configuration has come to exist implies, though
it does not explain, the presence of the form - even in those cases where
generation is due to chance.
One might indeed ask how this applies in the case of anger. Does
boiling of the blood - or boiling of a particular type - never occur without
the presence of anger, so that the presence of anger could in principle
be inferred from the observation of a particular type of boiling?38 The
following two passages are relevant here:
T20. (discussing the effect of the body on the emotions): when nothing
frightening is occurring, [people] are affected [in the same way as] one who
is afraid (tv 'coic; ltIx-6EaL y(vO'IrtCXI "toic; "tOU cpo~oulltvOU).
Aristotle, de An. I.1 403a22-24
T21. So, when something frightening is announced, if it finds the temper-
ament rather cold, the result is cowardice; for it has prepared the way for
fear, and fear chills. Those who are very afraid show this; for they tremble.
But if [the temperament] is hotter, fear puts it in a moderate condition,
in control of itself and dispassionate. Similarly with regard to day-to-day
despondency; for we are often in a condition of distress (o()"twc; ~xollEV wa"tE
AU1tEia-6cxI), though we could not say over what; and at other times we are
cheerful, though it is not clear for what reason. Such affections and those
spoken of earlier happen to everyone to a small degree, for all have some
admixture of the power [of black bile]; but those to whom [it happens] in a
profound way, these belong to a certain character-type.
[Aristotle], Problems XXX.1 954b10-21
On the face of it, these texts seem to suggest that a completely groundless
emotion-like state falls short of being an instance of the actual emotion. 39
for Alexander: de An. 6.2-4) form is substance.
37 Balme (1939) and in (Aristotle, 1972, p.82-83).
38 Cf. Christof Rapp's paper in this volume, p.205. The way I have stated the ques-
tion presupposes indeed that the type of boiling can in principle be described
independently without reference being made to the presence of anger.
39 I take it that what is being described in these passages is a mood of anxiety in
the one case, and dejection in the other, which has no specific ground or object,

However, Caston argues (1997, p. 333, n. 55) that EV 'tOL<; 1tcXo()e:m ... 'tOL<;
'tOU cpoPOUIlE:VOU does not imply that only the bodily condition of fear is
present while the psychological aspect is absent, on the grounds that when
Aristotle wants to make such a point he refers explicitly to the patM of
the body.4o
Returning to the question of the direction of explanation, one passage
in Alexander stands out - at first sight anyway - as diverging at one
point from the general insistence that it is to form that we must look for
explanation. 41
T22. The soul, being actuality, [extends] throughout the whole body, for
every part of what has soul has soul. And soul is actuality not in the way
that shape is [the actuality] of things that have been shaped, nor as position
and arrangement [is the actuality] of things that have been put together,
nor as some disposition and being affected, nor as mixture or blending (for
pleasure and pain are being affected or disposition, but soul is none of these).
Certainly these come to be present in the body, for it is through these that
[there exist] the organs which soul uses; but [soul] itself is some capacity
and substance which supervenes on these. The body and its blending are
the cause of the soul's coming-to-be in the first place. This is clear from the
difference between living creatures in respect of their parts. For it is not
the souls that fashion their shapes, but rather the different souls follow on
the constitution of these being of a certain sort, and change with them. For
the actuality and that of which it is the actuality are related reciprocally.
And that difference in soul follows on a certain sort of blending in the body
is shown also by wild animals, which have an [even] more different sort of
soul deriving from the blending in their body being of a certain sort.
Alexander, Mantissa 104.21-3542
In general, to say that a certain type of body necessitates a certain type
of soul does not threaten the priority of soul; the necessity is reciprocal,
and for that very reason says nothing about priority in explanation. The
statement that "the body and its blending are the cause of the soul's
coming-to-be in the first place" thus does not seem objectionable in itself;
it can at a pinch be understood as describing a process in which soul and
body develop together, even if it omits the more important aspect of the
relationship as understood by Aristotle, namely that the nature of the
and that the parallel in the case of anger would not be irascibility which attaches
itself groundlessly to objects that do not merit it, but an unfocussed feeling of
anger with no specific object. Admittedly, the Problems formulation is in terms of
a subjective inability to state the cause, while the de An. leaves it open (but does
not require) that there is an imagined cause even when there is no actual one.
40 I am grateful to Victor Caston for drawing my attention to his discussion of this
issue and for further correspondence thereon.
41 Most of the Mantissa, and in particular the first section, from which this passage
comes, is apparently Alexander's own work. See Sharples (2004b).
42 Translation from (Alexander of Aphrodisias, 2004). I am grateful to Gerald Duck-
worth and Co. for permission to reproduce it here.

body is explained by that of the soul rather than vice versa. What does
seem exceptional is the categorical assertion that "it is not the souls that
fashion their shapes" .43 That seems flatly to contradict Aristotle's claim
that the soul is needed to explain why plants maintain their structure
rather than separating into their constituent elements, each following its
natural tendency:44
T23. For it seems on the contrary that it is rather soul that holds body
together; for when [soul] departs [body] is dispersed and rots.
Aristotle, de An. 1.5 41lb7-9
T24. In addition to these points, what is it [in the bodies of plants], that
holds together the fire and the earth which travel in opposite directions? For
they will be torn apart, if there is not something that prevents [this]. But
if there is, this is the soul, [that is] the cause of growth and nourishment.
ibid. 11.4 416a6-9
For the growth of a body and its maintenance are two aspects of the same
process. To say that the souls do not fashion their shapes seems to go
beyond claiming that given types of soul require given types of body as
well as vice versa.
A clue may however be given by the very strength of the term I
have rendered "fashion", OL<X1tA<XO'O'€LV, "mould" or "form". If we distinguish
three possible positions (among many):
(a) soul fashions body from matter which is in itself completely inert
and contributes nothing to the proceSSj
(b) the process of the growth of a body can be described both in
material and in formal terms (but explanation in terms of soul is
primary);
(c) the process can be described in material terms in a way that gives
a complete causal account; soul may be a convenient shorthand but
actually adds nothing further by way of explanationj45
then Alexander may intend the denial that souls "fashion" bodies only as
a denial of (a)j the danger is that those focussed on the issue of (b) versus
(c) will see it is a denial of the last clause of (b) as well. (a) could be seen
as adopting a Stoic view of the relation between the active and passive
principles, in which case it is not surprising to find Alexander opposing it.
Moreover, the term is used by Alexander in his attack on the Stoic god as
an immanent craftsman in his De Mixtione 11 226.24-30 (= SVF 2.1048):
T25. How is it not unworthy of our notion of divinity to say that God passes
through the whole of the matter that underlies all things, and remains in it,
43 Cf. Sharples (1994, p. 168, n. 20), challenged by Caston (1997, p. 348, n. 95). I am
grateful to Victor Caston for further discussion of this issue.
44 Rightly emphasised by Caston (1997, p.329).
45 In Caston's terms, (c) is epiphenomenalism at best, (b) is emergentism, (a) is
presumably a type of dualism.

whatever quality it has, and has as his primary task constantly producing
and fashioning (OICXltAeXO'O'EIV) the things that can come to be from it, and
to make God the craftsman of grubs and mosquitoes, absolutely like some
model-maker devoting his time to clay and making it into everything that
can come to be from it?
There is however a complication here. OLCXltAcXcrcre:LV is a regular term for
the shaping of the embryo in the womb,46 apparently with no particular
implication that it is fashioned from completely formless matter. 47 In
particular, Jim Hankinson has drawn my attention to the following text,
which bears a striking similarity to T25, even though "grubs" CcrxWA~)(e:c:)
are the only lowly form of life mentioned in both:
T26. When one of my Platonist teachers said that the soul that extends
throughout the whole world fashions the foetuses, I thought the skill and
power [involved] worthy of it, but I could not bear to think that scorpions
and spiders, flies and gnats, serpents and grubs are fashioned by it, thinking
that such a view came close to impiety.
Galen, De Foetuum Formatione IV.700.17-701.6 Kiihn
It is difficult to resist the suggestion that OLCXltAcXcrcre:LV is used in T22 simply
because it is the standard term for embryonic development; moreover, if
T25 has been influenced by T26 or similar texts, the use in connection with
the Stoics in T25 may itself reflect embryological discussions. Nevertheless,
it still seems possible to read T22 as a rejection of Ca) rather than of Cb).
Alexander follows Aristotle, as one might expect, in insisting that it
is the person, rather than the soul, who performs the activities made
possible by sou1. 48 Sensation is not to be reduced to material changes: 49
T28. For what is heated becomes hot itself and becomes matter for the
affection, and this does not apply either to sensation or to intellect. For
even if sensation comes about through certain bodily effects, sensing itself is
not being affected, but judging.
Alexander, de An. 84.3-6
And - contrary to what we saw in Theophrastus and Strato - the soul
itself is unmoved:
T29. For the living creature perceives and thinks and walks in virtue of its
soul, but without the soul being moved itself in order to cause movement.
For it is not necessary, just because the dancer moves in virtue of the art
of dancing, that the art of dancing too should be moved in itself. For the
46 Already in Aristotle, GA 11.4 740a36, citing Democritus.
47 Though Edward Hussey has suggested to me that 61(1(- may indicate the thorough-
ness of the process.
48 De An. 23.2-24.3 (note especially 23.24-26, "Nor is it true that these activities are
those of the soul using the body as an instrument"); Mantissa 104.35-105.2.
49 Cf. Sorabji (1991, pp. 228-230).

soul is not in us in the way the rower 50 is in the ship, but as a form and
perfection, as has been shown.
ibid. 79.15-21
Mantissa 117.9-22 emphasises the unity of soul and body - "nor is the
soul affected along with the body as something which is other and sep-
arate, ... but what is affected is the compound, for example the living
creature, composed of soul and body, which is cut in respect of its body,
but feels pain in respect of its soul" - and distinguishes between purely
bodily affections and those which are common to body and SOUlj51 this
passage says nothing about any affections that are confined to the soul,
even though Alexander elsewhere insists that the intellect has no bodily
organ, and indeed improves upon Aristotle's comparison of its initial con-
dition to a blank writing-tablet by comparing it rather to the blankness
of the tablet. 52
VII
The pseudo-Alexander Medical Problems, edited by Ideler (1841), are un-

likely to derive from Alexander or his immediate followers. There is much
that could be said about their origin and transmission, and about their
relation to the various parts of the two further books edited by Usener in
(Alexander of Aphrodisias, 1859), but that is an issue I intend to discuss
elsewhere. 53 In the present context I will simply note that the texts in the
collection differ in the interpretation of soul they adopt. Some show clear
Platonist influence: 54 thus 1.121 appeals to Plato's theory of recollection,
and the prologue to book 2 asserts the immortality and impassivity of soul.
2.63 says that the rational soul is in the head and is impassive. Others of
these Problems however interpret the soul in grossly materialistic terms:
thus in 1.26 small people are said to be more intelligent because their souls
50 Rather than the sailor of Aristotle, de An. 11.1 413a9. The change is rightly con-
nected by Accattino and Donini in (Alexander of Aphrodisias, 1996, p.266) with
de An. 15.9ff., where Alexander distinguishes between two readings of the image
of the helmsman in the ship, as standing for the art of navigation - in which case
the image would be acceptable - or as a distinct ensouled individual, and argues
that in the latter case the soul would be a separate thing within the body moving
it by force, which is how the rower in T28 moves the ship. In other words, the
substitution of the rower for the helmsman blocks any possibility of understanding
the image as metaphorical for the presence of form in body simply.
51 See above, at p. 166.
52 Alexander, de An. 84.24-27.
53 On one particular aspect relating to the problems edited by Usener see Sharples
(2004a). On the general issue see Kapetanaki and Sharples, forthcoming.
54 Cf. Rose (1863, p. 219).

are compressed into a smaller space - though we may note that [Aristotle],
Problems XXX.3, says that people with small heads have greater practical
wisdom, without giving this physical reason. At [Alexander] 2.22 the in-
wards and outwards movement of the soul is said to explain respectively
why the eyes are sunken in grief but bulge in anger. These arguments
could perhaps be reconciled with orthodox Aristotelianism by saying that
soul here really stands for pneuma as the instrument of soul; but there is
no attempt to make this point, though pneuma is so described elsewhere
in the collection. 55 In 1.21 groaning and sighing in emotional states are
explained by the soul being distracted from providing a motive force to
the chest-muscles, and the heart (and subsequently: nature) compelling
soul to make good the lack in such a way as to catch up, as it were. The
contrast between nature and the soul is striking, but the argument does
recognise soul as the source of movement in the body generally. Finally,
one may note a contrast between the activities of soul and body in 2.27,
where melancholy is said to affect the former but not the latter. Here we
are surely dealing with a contrast in the terms of ordinary speech.
VIII
Is there a general moral that can be drawn from this discussion? This at
least: Aristotle's notion of the relation between soul and body is a highly
sophisticated one which requires careful expression if it is not to be dis-
torted. It is hardly surprising that formulations by those who are in some
sense followers of Aristotle do not always adhere to it. The most sophis-
ticated and faithful treatment we have is that by Alexander. However, in
comparing Alexander on the one hand with Theophrastus and Strato on
the other we need to bear in mind the very fragmentary nature of our
evidence for the latter.
References
Alexander of Aphrodisias, 1859, Alexandri Aphrodisiensis quae feruntur

Problematorum libri 3 et 4, Hermann Usener (ed.), Berlin: Typis
Academiae regiae.
- , 1996, Alessandro di Afrodisia: L'anima, Paolo Accattino / Pierluigi
Donini (eds), Rome, Bari: Laterza.
55 2.64 explains dizziness in this way (cf. 1.131, but there without reference to pneuma
as instrument), and similar references to pneuma as the instrument of soul occur
in 2.67 and 3.10-11.

-, 2004, Supplement to On the Soul, Robert W. Sharples (tr.), London:

Duckworth.
Annas, Julia E., 1992, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press.
- , 1993, The Morality of Happiness, New York: Oxford University Press.
Aristotle, 1942, Generation of Animals, Arthur L. Peck (ed.), London,
Cambridge (Mass.): Heinemann and Harvard University Press.
-, 1972, De partibus animalium I and De generatione animalium I, D.M.
Balme (tr.), Oxford: Clarendon Press.
-, 1991, Problemata Physika (1st ed. 1962), Hellmut Flashar (tr.), Aris-
toteles Werke in Deutscher Ubersetzung, vol.19, Berlin: Akademie
Verlag.
- (pseudo-) , 1992, De spiritu, Amneris Roselli (ed.), Pisa: ETS.
Balme, David M., 1939, "Greek Science and Mechanism I: Aristotle on
Nature and Chance", in: Classical Quarterly, 33, pp. 129-138.
Caston, Victor, 1997, "Epiphenomenalisms, Ancient and Modern", in:
Philosophical Review, 106, pp. 309-363.
Donini, Pierluigi, 1971, "L'anima e gli elementi nel De Anima di Alessan-
dro di Afrodisia", in: Atti dell' Accademia delle Scienze di Torino,
classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche, 105, pp. 61-107.
Easterling, H. John, 1964, "Quinta natura", in: Museum Helveticum, 21,
pp. 73-85.
Fortenbaugh, William W., 1984, Quellen zur Ethik Theophrasts, Amster-
dam: Griiner.
Guthrie, William Keith Chambers, 1965, A History of Greek Philosophy,
vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ideler, J.L., 1841, Physici et medici graeci minores, vol.1, Berlin: Reimer.
Kapetanaki, Sophia / Sharples, Robert W., forthcoming, Aristotle: Sup-
plementary Problems, Berlin: De Gruyter.
Menn, Stephen, 2002, "Aristotle's Definition of Soul and the Programme
of the De anima", in: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 22,
pp. 82-139.
Moraux, Paul, 1963, "Quinta essentia", in: A.F. von Pauly / G. Wissowa
(eds), Realenkyklopiidie der Altertumswissenchaft, vol. 24.1, Stutt-
gart: Metzler, cols. 1171-1263.
Plutarch, 1928, Moralia, vol. 2, Frank C. Babbitt (ed.), London, New
York: Heinemann and G.P. Putnam's Sons.
Preus, Anthony, 1988, "Drugs and Psychic States in Theophrastus' His-
toria Plantarum 9.8-20", in: William W. Fortenbaugh / Robert W.
Sharples (eds) , Theophrastean Studies, New Brunswick: Transac-
tion, Rutgers Univ. Studies in Classical Humanities, 3, pp. 76-99.

Rashed, Marwan, 1997, "A 'new' text of Alexander on the soul's motion",
in: Richard Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle and After, London: Institute of
Classical Studies (Bulletin, suppl vol. 68), pp. 181-195.
Repici, Luciana, 1988, La natura e l'anima: saggi su Stratone di Lamp-
saco, Torino: Tirrenia.
Rose, Valentin, 1863, Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, Leipzig: Teubner.
Sharples, Robert W., 1993, Review ofH. Blumenthal / H. Robinson (eds) ,
Aristotle and the Later Tradition, Oxford Studies in Ancient Phi-
losophy, Suppl. Vol., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, in: Classical
Review, 43, pp. 87-89.
- , 1994, "On Body, Soul and Generation in Alexander of Aphrodisias",
in: Apeiron, 27, pp. 163-170.
- , 1995, Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought
and Influence, Commentary volume 5, Sources on Biology, Leiden:
Brill.
-, 1999, "On being a tode ti in Aristotle and Alexander", in: Methexis,
12, pp. 77-87.
-, 2004a, "Evidence for Theophrastus On Hair, On Secretion, On Wine
and Olive-Oil'?", in: Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies,
47, pp. 141-151.
-, 2004b, "Alexander of Aphrodisias: what is a mantissa?", in: Peter
Adamson et al. (eds), Philosophy, Science and Exegesis, London:
Institute of Class. Studies, Bulletin, Suppl. Vol. 83.1, pp. 51-69.
-, 2005, "An Aristotelian Commentator on the Naturalness of Justice",
in: Christopher Gill (ed.), Virtue, Norms and Objectivity: Issues in
Ancient and Modern Ethics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 279-293.
Simplicius, 1989, On Aristotle Physics 6, David Konstan (tr.), London:
Duckworth.
Solmsen, Friedrich, 1961, "Greek Philosophy and the discovery ofthe ner-
ves", in: Museum Helveticum, 18, pp. 169-197j reprinted in id., Kleine
Schriften, vol.1, Hildesheim: Olms, 1968, pp. 536-582.
Sorabji, Richard, 1991, "From Aristotle to Brentanoj the development
of the concept of intentionality", in: Henry Blumenthal / Howard
Robinson (eds) , Aristotle and the Later Tradition, Oxford Studies
in Ancient Philosophy, Suppl. Vol., pp. 227-259.
Strato, 1969, "Straton von Lampsakos", in: Fritz Wehrli (ed.), Die Schule
des Aristoteles: Texte und Kommentare, vol. 5, 2nd ed., Basel: Schwa-
be.
Theophrastus, 1926, Enquiry into Plants, vol. 2, Arthur Hort (ed.), Lon-
don, Cambridge (Mass.): Heinemann and Harvard University Press.
-, 1992, Theophrastus of Eresus. Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought
and Influence, William W. Fortenbaugh et al. (eds), Leiden: Brill.

Christ of Rapp
Interaction of Body and Soul:

What the Hellenistic Philosophers Saw
and Aristotle Avoided
Anti-dualistic philosophers of mind often refer to the problem of inter-

action between body and soul. If we understand body and soul as two
different substances and if, like Descartes for example, we combine these
two substances with different or even incompatible characteristics, such
as "being extended" and "having awareness", then, indeed, it seems dif-
ficult to explain how one of these two substances can causally act upon
the other. With some phenomena, however, it is hard to deny that some
kind of interaction takes place; for example in sensual perception some
information must be transmitted from the sense organs to the soul, and
in intentional action the decision of the soul must somehow be communi-
cated to the bodily limbs that have to carry out the intended action. Thus
the obvious interaction between body and soul raises serious difficulties.
In early modern philosophy, the most famous, though perhaps not the
most attractive, responses to these difficulties are occasionalism, various
kinds of parallelism, and monism of the Spinozist type.
It is remarkable that also ancient philosophers often refer to pheno-
mena that are, at least, "common to body and soul" , though, of course,
their context is quite different. Whereas the modern critics and successors
of Descartes are primarily interested in the possibility of causal inter-
action, the ancient concept of being common to body and soul is much
broader. In addition to causal affections, it comprises relations like mere
cooperation, simultaneous affections of body and soul, mere co-variation,
epiphenomenal reaction, etc. The examples of cooperation or interaction
between body and soul are taken mainly from three domains: perception
(in various senses), action, and emotion. In the long run, I think, it would
be worthwhile to collect and classify the various examples that have been
given of the interaction of body and soul together with the various conclu-

188 Christof Rapp
sions that the adherents of the various philosophical schools have drawn
from these examples.
Of course, there is no chance to compress such a project into a few
pages. So I have decided to treat only one of these three domains, the
domain of emotions. I have picked emotions for several reasons. The most
important is that the emotions are often used as the paradigmatic case of
the interaction or cooperation between body and soul. In many passages
discussing the question whether there are states or properties of the soul
that affect the body too, philosophers refer to the example of emotions.
Obviously, they want to remind their readers of the non-controversial
experience that things like anger and fear - though they are undoubtedly
affections of the soul - are combined with immediate reactions of the
body. When we are angry, the blood surges through our veins, when we are
frightened, we become pale and start shivering, etc. References to this kind
of examples can be found in Aristotle, Epicurus, Lucretius, and some Stoic
sources as well. Comparing the different uses the various philosophers
make of these examples I found that there is one point which is important
or even crucial for the Hellenistic philosophers, but is completely absent
from the relevant passages in Aristotle: While the former ones assume that
the psychosomatic character of emotions requires causal interaction and
that causal interaction cannot be explained within a non-monistic system,
Aristotle's account of more or less the same examples completely abstains
from the terminology of causal interaction. This seems to be remarkable in
itself; but if it were possible to extend the significance of this observation
beyond the example of emotions it would even have a major impact on
the interpretation of Aristotle's concept of the soul. The remainder of this
paper is centered around this observation; for strategic reasons I start with
the discussion of the Hellenistic philosophers to sketch the background of
their causal account of interaction between body and soul; in the later
parts of the paper I am going to introduce the Aristotelian approach and
to draw some more general conclusions.
Epicurus and Lucretius
The Epicurean philosophy of mind centers on the argumentative target

that the soul is mortal. Since his opponents who advocate the immor-
tality of the soul have made incorporeality the most important precondi-
tion of the immortality of the soul, Epicurus has to argue that the soul
is corporeal. According to his general atomistic physics, this corporeal-

Interaction of Body and Soul 189
ity implies that the soul is a fine-grained body that is diffused through
the whole aggregate that constitutes the living thing. Epicurus carefully
avoids bringing body and soul into plain opposition; instead of speaking
of body and soul, he prefers the formulation "the soul and the remaining
part of the aggregate".l This, however, does not mean that he regards
the concept of soul as redundant, nor that the function of the soul can be
equated with the rest of the body. On the contrary, it is the soul that is
responsible for some essential capacities, for example perceiving, thinking,
feeling, mobility, and "those features whose loss would mean our death,,2,
i.e., the vital functions. When the soul has been separated from the rest
of the aggregate, what remains cannot have one of these capacities. On
the other hand, the soul must be contained by the rest of the aggregate
in order to display these functions.
Epicurus' Letter to Herodotus, in which he outlines his essential as-
sumptions about the soul, is not very explicit about the material con-
stitution of the soul. He compares the relation of body and soul to the
blending of wind and heat and adds that there must be something beside
wind and heat that is even finer than they are; this additional finest ele-
ment is mere co-affectability (sumpatheia) with the rest of the aggregate,
which again is especially useful in sense perception. 3 What starts as a mere
comparison in the Letter to Herodotus is taken up by the later testimonies
and Epicureans in a literal way, identifying wind and heat as elements of
the soul. According to Aetius, the Epicurean soul is a blend consisting
of one fire-like, one air-like, one wind-like, and a fourth element, which
is unnamed. This fourth element is responsible for sensation because of
its unique fineness. 4 Therefore, the fourth element in the report of Aetius
reminds us of the third element that Epicurus himself mentions in the
Letter to Herodotus. Lucretius confirms the doctrine of the four elements
of the soul,5 but is also eager to show that these four components are
blended in a specific way such that no one element can be distinguished
and no capacity can be separated;6 together they make up a homogeneous
body with multiple capacities. It is by no means clear what this assertion
amounts to; on the one hand, it seems as if the four elements of the soul
are somehow melted together and blended to an entirely new stuff that is
no longer governed by the principles of elementary change. On the other
hand, in some contexts, Lucretius still makes use of the original powers
of fire, air, and wind, for example when he says that the element of fire
Letter to Herodotus 64 (= LS 14A 3). As usual, 'LS' refers to: Long/Sedley (1987).
2 Letter to Herodotus 63 (= LS 14A2).
3 Letter to Herodotus 63 (= LS 14A 1).
4 Aetius 4.3.11 (= LS 14C).
5 Lucretius 3.231-245.
6
Lucretius 3.262-273 (= LS 14D 1).

190 Christof Rapp
prevails in the minds of irritable persons, while cold wind prevails in the
minds of the cowards and the timorous people.
We have said that, for Epicurus, the soul is responsible for all ca-
pacities involving any sort of consciousness, such as perceiving, thinking,
feeling, but that, at the same time, the soul is responsible for all vital
functions, thus qualifying itself as a principle of life. In Lucretius, these
two aspects of the soul reappear in a technical distinction between animus
or mens, on the one hand, and anima, on the other. Lucretius concen-
trates the controlling faculties in the animusj the animus is like the head,
he says, and it dominates the entire aggregate. But while the anima, or
as he sometimes says, the rest of the anima (hereby using anima as the
broader term, which includes the more specific term animus) is distributed
throughout the body, Lucretius insists that the animus itself is firmly lo-
cated in the central place of the chest. 7 This information may strike us as
odd, for one could wonder why the animus needs a well-defined place at
all, and one could also wonder how Lucretius could find the location of the
animus. The answer to the first question is that, according to Lucretius,
it often happens that the body is sick while the mind is in a pleasant state
or that - conversely - someone has a poor state of mind, but flourishes in
his body. Lucretius' point is that if the animus were distributed through-
out the body, it could not remain unaffected by what the body undergoes,
hence it must have its own separate location. The answer to the second
question is that we can feel where the animus is located, since the animus
is the place where fear leaps up and where joys caress us. Because we can
feel that these affections arise in our chest, we know that this is the place
of the animus. 8
This is the background against which we must see the following ar-
guments. Since the animus is spatially relatively separated, it is possible
that the animus itself possesses its own understanding and its own joys,
without any affection of the rest of the aggregate. And this in turn means
that the rest of the anima and the body are not co-affected. But this is
only one half of the story. Like other philosophers before him, Lucretius
introduces the example of emotions to elucidate the connection between
the soul and the body. Obviously the pure joy that can be entertained
by the animus itself is not what we usually take to be a fully-fledged
emotion. An ordinary strong emotion is expected to have an impact on
the body, too. This is why Lucretius says that in the case of a powerful
fear, for example, we see the whole anima throughout the limbs share
its (the animus') sensation, with sweat and pallor arising over the whole
body, the tongue crippled and the voice choked, the eyes darkened, the
7 Lucretius 3.140.
8 Lucretius 3.141ff. (= LS 14B 1).

ears buzzing, the limbs buckling. Sometimes, he says, we even see men
collapse from the mind's (animus') terror. 9
According to the simple atomistic theory of the soul, one could easily
explain these phenomena by saying that the soul is distributed throughout
the body and hence has no problem to co-affect the different parts of the
soul. But since Lucretius insists that the animus must have a determinate
limited location within the body, one additional step in the argument is
needed. The first thing we can conclude from the observation of these
strong bodily reactions to an affection of the animus, is, according to
Lucretius, that the animus is closely linked with the anima or the rest
of the anima, which is spread all over the body. The anima is directly
impelled by the animus' power and it hastens to forward this impulse to
the surrounding parts of the body. Commenting on the processing of the
impulse between animus and anima, Lucretius even says that together
they constitute a single nature. This again could raise the question why
some affections of the animus are forwarded to the anima and some are
not. Anyway, he draws a second conclusion from the description of strong
emotions; he says:
This same reasoning proves the nature of the animus and the anima to be
corporeal. For when it is seen to hurl the limbs forward, to snatch the body
out of sleep, to alter the face, and to govern and steer the entire man - and
we see that none of these is possible without touch, nor touch without body
- you must surely admit that the animus and the anima are constituted
with a corporeal nature. 10
It is this kind of interaction between the anima and the body that
deserves our attention. Epicurus himself formulated one of the premises
of this argument. In his Letter to Herodotus, he writes that we cannot
think of the incorporeal per se except as void. The void cannot be acted
upon, but it is clear that the soul can be acted upon. Hence the soul must
be corporeal, because otherwise it could not be acted upon and could
not suffer anything at all. l l For Epicurus, the corporeality of the soul
is not only the condition for its interaction with the rest of the bodily
aggregate, but is also the precondition for its affect ability tout court. This
again presupposes that if there is an affection at all, it must be of the
kind that is typical of bodily affections. When he speaks of sumpatheia,
co-affectability, his point, then, is not that the soul undergoes something
caused by the body, but rather that body and soul are affected by the
same thing at the same time in a similar way. In Lucretius, the anima
takes on the properties of the animus at once, since, strictly speaking,
they share one and the same nature. The contact between anima and
body is made possible by touch. This again strongly suggests that, in
9 Lucretius 3.152-158 (= LS 14B 2).
10 Lucretius 3.161-167 (= LS 14B 3).
11 Letter to Herodot'Us 67 (= LS 14A 7).

192 Christof Rapp
the case of strong emotions, the body is causally affected by the animus.
Therefore, the term "sumpaschein" not only means that body and soul are
affected by the same thing in a similar way, but also that one of them is
affected by the other. This must be seen against the background that the
quoted passage 12 is immediately followed by a description of the inverse
situation, namely that the body is hurt, for example by a spear, and the
animus suffers together with the body.13 In this inverse case, Lucretius'
description points in another direction: the injury does not proceed from
a part of the body to the animus; rather he emphasizes that the animus is
affected together with the body in a similar way. Now, even if we assume
that in the case of strong emotions there is a causal interaction from
the animus to the soul, we can add one important qualification: Since
the animus and the bodily parts that are moved in the course of strong
emotions share the same bodily nature and since the preservation of the
original quality is guaranteed by the fact that parts of the body and the
soul are in touch, the body can be affected in the same way as the soul, and
vice versa. This specific kind of interaction is illustrated when Lucretius
says that, in the state of fear, the animus is filled with cold wind, which
stimulates the shuddering and shivering of the limbs. 14 Though, of course,
it is not clear how to extend this mechanism beyond the three elements
wind, air, and fire, it seems plausible, according to the Epicurean premises,
that the sort of alteration that an emotion causes in the body must have
the same quality as the alteration that took place in the soul. 15
The Stoics
According to Stoic physics, all things that are something (to ti) can
be divided into corporeal and non-corporeal beings. In the class of non-
corporeal beings, we can find the lekta, the void, place and time, while
the soul is listed among the corporeal beings. The material of the soul is
identified as breath (pneuma), which is composed of two elements, air and
fire. All elements, i.e., water, earth, air, and fire, are subject to reciprocal
change. The mutual transformation is performed either by condensation
or expansion. Since the stuff of the soul is a blending of ordinary elements,
at least some of the alterations that happen in the soul are governed by the
principles of elementary change. Though there is a report by Galen say-
ing that the Stoics distinguished three different kinds of breath, of which
12 Cf. footnote 10.
13 Lucretius 3.170-176.
14 Lucretius 3.290f.
15 For a full account of the Epicurean concept of soul see: Annas (1991).

the psychical breath is only one kind,16 it seems that at least Chrysippus
said that we live and breathe with one and the same natural breath.17
According to general physical laws, the elements of the soul - fire and air
- are the two sustaining elements, while everything else, especially water
and earth, must be sustained by something else. This, in turn, leads to
the opposition of the breath-substance that has the power to sustain and
the material substance that must be sustained by the breath-substance.
Ensouled things have the principle of their motion in themselves and are
moved by themselves. Just as the Epicureans distinguished between the
animus or mind, which is firmly located in the breast, and the anima,
which is distributed throughout the entire body, there is a certain am-
biguity in the Stoic concept of the soul, as well. Sextus Empiricus even
says that for the Stoics the word "soul" has two meanings: on the one
hand, that which sustains the entire compound; on the other hand, the
commanding faculty, which in the case of human beings is the deliberative
part of the soul. If we say that man is a compound of body and soul or
that death is the separation of body and soul, we particularly refer to the
commanding faculty and not to the broader sense of "soul". 18
The commanding faculty is located in the heart, where an immediate
contact between the soul and the blood system of the body is guaranteed.
Though Stoics and Epicureans differ slightly on the exact place of the cen-
tral part of the soul, the Stoics' reasons for assuming that the soul must
be in the heart are quite similar to what the Epicureans said. According
to Chrysippus, we came to think that the soul is in the heart through
our awareness "of the emotions that affect the mind happening to them
in the chest and especially in the region where the heart is placed. This
is so particularly in the case of distress, fear, anger, and, above all, ex-
citement." 19 Besides the commanding faculty, there are several parts of
the soul that "flow from their seat in the heart, as if from the source of a
spring, and spread through the whole body. They continually fill all the
limbs with vital breath and rule and control them with countless different
powers - nutrition, growth, locomotion, sensation, impulse to actions." 20
One source mentions seven such parts of the soul: "From the commanding
faculty, there are seven parts of the soul that grow out and stretch out
into the body like tentacles of an octopus." 21 Five of these parts are the
16 Galen, Introductio seu medicus XIV.726.7-11 (= LS 47N).
17 Calcidius 220 (= LS 53G 1-2).
18 Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors 7.234 (= LS 53F).
19 Galen, On Hippocrotes' and Plato's Doctrines 111.1.25 (= LS 65H). For Galen's
report of Chrysippus' theory of emotion see the admirable study by Teun Tieleman
(2003).
20 Calcidius 220 (= LS 53G6).
21 Aetius 4.21.1-4 (= LS 53H 2).

194 Christ of Rapp
senses sight, smell, hearing, taste, and touch. Sight can be described as
breath that extends from the commanding faculty to the eyes, hearing as
breath that extends from the commanding faculty to the ears, etc. The
number of seven parts can be reached only by counting seed and the use
of language as parts of the soul, too; in these cases the breath also ex-
tends to the genitals and the tongue. But obviously, even Chrysippus and
Cleanthes disagree whether these faculties must be regarded as parts of
the soul. 22 It also seems to be controversial whether there are different
kinds of breath leading from the central seat of the soul to the different
senses.
The assumption that there are no incorporeal beings beside the lekta
and the void is deeply rooted in Stoic physics. Nevertheless, there are
some explicit attempts to argue for the corporeality of the soul. And
these arguments are remarkably similar to what we already know from
the Epicureans.
The premise is again that it is impossible that something incorporeal
should be the agent of anything, and that only a body is capable of acting
or of being acted upon. 23 This premise is taken for granted in the following
report that Nemesius gives about Cleanthes:
He (Cleanthes) also says: no incorporeal interacts with a body, and no body
with an incorporeal, but one body interacts with another body. Now the
soul interacts (sumpaschei) with the body when it is sick and being cut,
and the body with the soul, thus when the soul feels shame and fear, the
body turns red and pale respectively. Therefore the soul is a body.24
In this argument, "sumpaschei" obviously does not mean that a and
b are simultaneously affected by the same thing. Rather, there is in both
cases one thing that is primarily affected and another thing whose being
affected follows the first primary affection. When someone is being cut,
then it is the body that is primarily affected, while the affection of the
soul occurs as a secondary affection. In the case of emotions, it is the soul
that is primarily affected, while the affection of the body is dependent on
the soul being affected. The visible bodily symptoms of an emotion like
shame or fear are used to demonstrate that the soul can act directly upon
the body, and this, in turn, implies that the soul must be corporeal, since
otherwise it could not act upon something else.
Now, on the one hand, the psychosomatic character of emotions is
being used to argue for the corporeality of the soul; but if we have come
to assume that the soul is a body, then, on the other hand, it seems
somehow odd to say that in the case of emotions the body is co-affected
22 Seneca, Letters 113.23 (= LS 53L).
23 Cicero, Academia 1.39 (= LS 45A), Sextus Ernpiricus, Against the Professors 8.263
(= LS 45B).
24 Nernesius, 78.7-79.2 (= LS 45C).

with the soul, if the soul is a body, too. Is it still practicable to distinguish
between the bodily and psychological aspects of an emotion? In what
sense is becoming red or pale more peculiar to the body than the belief
that something frightening is about to happen? And if we came to the
conclusion that the emotion is no more then one bodily act, then we no
longer need a causal impact of the soul on the body. But originally it was
exactly this kind of impact for whose sake the emotions were introduced.
Do the Stoics just keep the conventional vocabulary when they say that
some aspects of the emotions belong to the soul and some to the body?
Or is the difference just a matter of different degrees of complexity?25 To
shed some light on those questions, we have to say a little bit about the
Stoic theory of emotions:
There are several Stoic definitions of the emotions; we start with the
most famous one:
A passion is an impulse that is excessive and disobedient to the dictates of
the reason, or a movement of soul that is irrational and contrary to nature. 26
An excessive impulse is generated if we evaluate something as good or
bad when it is actually adiaphoron. Since the wise or sage would never
approve of an adiaphoron, he cannot have emotions. Since an opinion or
belief is the result of the approval (sunkatathesis) we give to an impres-
sion, and since the excessive impulse is generated by an active consent
to an adiaphoron, emotions are also said to be beliefs. Strictly speaking,
they are called "weak" or "fresh beliefs". 27 The term "weak" indicates
that the approval given to an impression is contrary to the approval a
wise man would give. The judgments of a wise man are always firm, in-
variable and about kataleptic phantasiai, so the approval of the unwise
person is always infirm, variable, and sometimes of non-kataleptic phan-
tasiai. But what is much more relevant in our context is the concept of
a "fresh belief" (prosphaton).28 That the belief a Stoic emotion consists
in is fresh means that "it is the stimulus of an irrational contraction or
swelling" .29 To understand this definition of "fresh", we have to keep in
mind that there are four generic emotions: appetite and fear, pleasure and
distress. 30 Appetite is directed toward what appears good in the future,
fear to what appears bad in the future, pleasure arises when we obtain
the objects of appetite and avoid the objects of fear, and distress arises
25 As Christopher Gill has suggested, cf. his contribution to this volume; see also his
The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought, Oxford, forthcoming.
26 Stobaeus, 2.88,8-90,6 (= LS 65A 1).
27 Stobaeus, 2.88,22-89,3 (= LS 65C).
28 I am indebted to Katja Maria Vogt for referring me to this context; a full and
thorough account of those issues can be found in her (2004, pp. 69-93).
29 LS 65C; cf. Galen, On Hippocrates' and Plato's Doctrines IV.2.1 (= LS 65C).
30 Cf. Stobaeus 2.90,19-91,9 (= LS 65E).

196 Christof Rapp
in the opposite case. Now, swelling or expansion and contraction or con-

densation are just these two types of process that happen between the
elements of the soul, so that swelling and contraction are the physiologi-
cal description of two of the generic emotions. I postpone for the moment
the question whether there also is an appropriate physiological description
of the remaining two generic emotions in order to outline two situations in
which the physiological aspect of an emotion becomes relevant. The first
situation is this: If I feel grief about the death of a friend, I have the fresh
opinion that the death of my friend is something bad. As long as this is
a fresh opinion there is a corresponding contraction. When after months
the feeling of distress or grief becomes weaker and finally disappears, it
is not because I altered my opinion on the point that the death of my
friend is something bad, but because the contraction has disappeared. 31
The inverse constellation is the case of inertia, which Stoic philosophers
also mention: people remain in states of emotion, even if they realize or
are taught to realize that one should not feel distress or fear, for example,
because they are "controlled by the tyranny of the emotions" .32 If we want
to explain this sort of tyranny, it is tempting to assume that the inertia of
the bodily contraction or swelling keeps us in the state of emotion - even
if we have already altered our opinion.
In these two situations, the bodily dimension of emotions clearly pro-
vides an explanatory advantage. However, the problem arises that, in the
first case, we hold opinions that, after the contraction has disappeared, no
longer have a corresponding bodily state. A similar problem occurs with
respect to the remaining generic emotions, appetite and fear. The very sec-
tion that told us that pleasure and distress are swelling and contraction
merely describes appetite and fear as stretching (orexis) and shrinking
( ekklisis). These two terms have no place in Stoic physics. Nevertheless,
it would be strange to assume that there is no bodily alteration that cor-
responds to appetite and fear. The problem, I think, is that, beyond the
level of swelling and contraction, Stoic physics does not provide an appro-
priate description that could cover the physiological aspect of these two
emotions.
What do we learn from all this about the distinction between bodily
and psychological aspects of an emotion? We haven't reached a clear an-
swer yet. But it seems to me that the bodily reactions of becoming red or
pale are regarded as belonging to the body because they are just secondary
affections of the respective emotions. If the processes of contraction and
swelling are attributed to the soul, it is partly because these are states
with direct intentional objects, namely what is apparently good and what
31 Cf. Galen, On Hippocmtes' and Plato's Doctrines IV.7.12-17 (= LS 650).
32 Stobaeus, 2.88,8-90,6 (= LS 65A8).

is apparently bad. Another reason why those processes are attributed to

the soul became obvious in the discussion about the location of the soul:
they belong to the soul partly because we can feel them and because it is
not one of the sense organs where we feel them.
Interim conclusion:
What the Hellenistic philosophers saw
There are, of course, many important differences between the Epicurean

and the Stoic philosophy of mind. Above all, the Epicurean account of
emotions is far from the elaborated theory of the various Stoic philoso-
phers. But regardless of these differences the Stoic and the Epicurean ac-
counts of emotions converge on one important point: They acknowledge
that emotions are common to body and soul and they assume that this
relation must be understood as causal interaction between both. Further,
they take for granted that causal interaction always takes place between
bodies so that the soul must be corporeal too. And this, again, is taken
as a proof in favor of anti-dualism. It is obvious, then, that the Hellenistic
anti-dualists envisage their opponents as assuming that body and soul are
related to each other as two separate entities, of which one is corporeal
and one is not, but even the non-corporeal one is separate in a similar way
as the corporeal is. But once we think of body and soul as two separately
existing entities it is challenging to assume, as the Hellenistic philosophers
actually did, that whatever is common to body and soul must be mutu-
ally exchanged or communicated by causal interaction. The only problem
for the dualists, then, is that one of the two involved agents is incorpo-
real, and, no matter what the precise meaning of that is, it is clear that
what is incorporeal cannot be causally acted upon and cannot causally act
upon something else. - This seems to be coherent as it stands, the only
problem is that the alternative between an Epicurean or Stoic material-
ism on the side and a naive dualism (as the dualism that the Hellenistic
schools ascribe to their opponents) on the other side does not exhaust the
theoretical options for describing to relation between body and soul.
Aristotle
In a well-known section at the beginning of De Anima that raises the
question whether all so-called affections of the soul are common to body
and soul or whether there are some affections that belong exclusively to

198 Christof Rapp
the soul, Aristotle places great emphasis on the role of emotions. 33 The
example of emotions helps him formulate some general points about how
to define psychological states within the frame of hylomorphism. The cel-
ebrated outcome of this section is that the student of nature and the
dialectician define different aspects of the same thing, since the former
describes a bodily state, for example the boiling of the blood around the
heart in the case of anger, while the latter adds the reasons why people
get angry as well as the target the angry person aims at. 34 This is an im-
portant point for hylomorphism, and it is striking that of all the affections
of the soul, he picks out emotions, especially since the emotions - unlike
nutrition, sense perception, or phantasia - will not play a major role in the
remaining parts of the book. The reason he chooses the emotions must be
that he thinks the emotions provide the most telling and most persuasive
example of the fact that some of the affections that are attributed to the
soul are combined with bodily movements.
Let us take a closer look at this very interesting passage. In 403a3,
Aristotle says that there is a difficulty concerning the pathe of the soul,
whether they are common to that which have it or whether some of them
are peculiar to the soul. This is an aporia, he says, that is not easy to
overcome. He continues that seemingly (phainetai) most of them are not
undergone without the body, and he adds as examples: being angry, being
confident, desiring, and perceiving generally.35 In this sentence, Aristotle
mentions emotions among those cases in which there is no doubt that
the body must be somehow involved; but they are not the only examples,
since he also mentions perceptions, which can be subsumed under ta pathe
tes psuches, but not under emotions. If there is something at all that is
peculiar to the soul, he continues, thinking would be the best candidate,
but even thinking, which is possibly peculiar to the soul, cannot be without
body, if it does not occur without phantasia. Next he tells us that the soul
cannot be separable if there is nothing that is peculiar to it 36 - leaving
open, in my view, the possibility that thinking is separable, though under
normal circumstances it is somehow dependent on the contribution of
phantasia, which in turn implies a bodily alteration.
A few lines later, in 403a16, he gets back to what he said before his
digression on thinking, now claiming that seemingly (eoike) all affections
of the soul (ta tes psuches pathe panta) are together with the body (einai
meta somatos), and his examples are now: anger, gentleness, fear, pity,
confidence, joy, and loving and hating. In all these cases, he says, the body
undergoes something simultaneously with them (hama toutois paschei ti
33 De An. 1.1 403a3-5.
34 De An. 1.1 403a27-403b2.
35 De An. 1.1 403a5-7.
36 De An. 1.1 403a8-12.

to soma).37 Before we proceed to his evidence in support of his assertion,

I would like to highlight some minor observations. First, how can he say
that "seemingly" or "obviously" all patM of the soul are together with
the body? Just a few lines ago he was at least sympathetic to the view
that thinking could be an exception, and he also told us that this question
leads to a serious aporia. The obvious solution is that now the formula
"pathe tes psuches" is more restricted and only refers to emotions, as
the given examples clearly indicate. This terminological confusion mirrors
the fact that Aristotle has no single word to select this subset of "patM
tes psuches" that we call 'emotion'. Therefore, every time he wants to
introduce the emotions he has to specify what he means by "patM" with
a list of typical emotions. So I am inclined to think that for Aristotle
"patM tes psucMs" is not a technical term. He uses this formula to talk
about phenomena that are usually ascribed to the soul. Hence the issue
at stake is not whether phenomena that primarily belong to the soul are
accompanied by bodily movements; rather, the point is that phenomena
that are usually called "affections of the soul" belong to the body, too. My
second minor observation is this: The wording "the body suffers something
simultaneously with them (hama toutois paschei ti to soma)" sounds a
bit strange, if we take it literally: then it seems to indicate that there
are some definite and identifiable entities, called "the patM of the soul" ,
that are immediately followed by distinct and also identifiable processes or
occurrences, called "what the body undergoes". However, we should keep
in mind that the passage is taken from a preliminary discussion in the
very first chapter of the book. This could explain why Aristotle chooses
such a rough and ready way of speaking.
In what follows, Aristotle gives us three pieces of evidence for his
assertion that the patM of the soul are combined with an affection of
the body. The common background of these pieces of evidence is the
observation that emotions are typically accompanied by bodily changes:
people become pale when they are in fear and they have foam at the
mouth when they are angry. But Aristotle's examples are more specific:
"This is shown by the fact," he says, "that sometimes when severe and
manifest patMmata occur we do not get angry and do not feel fear, while
at other times we are moved by small and feeble patMmata, when the
body is already in a state of tension and behaves as it does in anger.,,38
These are two different cases, though they must be read together. In
the first case we have clear and strong patMmata, but no corresponding
emotions. Though Aristotle sometimes uses the word "patMma" almost
synonymously with "pathos" to refer to emotions, here it is clearly distinct
from pathos in the sense of emotion, since it is the very point of the first
example that there can be manifest patMmata without patM. So I take
37 De An. I.1 403a16-19.
38 De An. I.1 403a19-22.

200 Christof Rapp
patMmata here to mean something like "appearance" or "impression of

the soul" in a non-technical sense - as it is used, for example, in the
first paragraph of De Interpretatione. According to this reading, Aristotle
wants to say that in the first case there is a clear impression either of
something that is frightening or of something that is apt to evoke anger,
for example an injustice or an insult done to me and my family or a
humiliating treatment by someone who is not entitled to inflict it. Now,
the text does not tell us explicitly why the patM fear and anger do not
occur in the first case; but, since the second case obviously is meant to
describe the inverse situation and since in this second case the body is
already in the state offear or anger, we can infer that there are no patM in
the first case, because the body is not in a state of fear or anger. Aristotle
does not explain how something like this can happen, but we can easily
adopt some elucidating examples from his Rhetoric. In the second book
of the Rhetoric, for example, he says:
People become calm whenever they have spent their anger on someone else,
which happened in the case of Ergophilusj for though the Athenians were
more angry at him than at Callisthenes, they let him go because they had
condemned Callisthenes to death on the previous day. 39
The underlying idea seems to be the following: It is possible to vent one's
anger on somebody, but then it takes time to recover the energy that
is needed for a new eruption of anger. Now imagine that what we just
called energy is something that affects the state of the body as well; then
it can happen that we have a clear impression of something that should,
under normal circumstances, cause our anger, but that we are nevertheless
not able to feel anger - either no anger at all or not enough anger -
because our body has already spent its aggressive energy on something
or someone else. Another, less intricate, example can be derived from the
statement that older people are cowardly and fearful, because they are
chilled or cooled. Here "being chilled" or "cooled" must not be taken
metaphorically; in addition to other factors, old people do not tend to
courageous and aggressive emotions because their bodies are cooled down
and for the most part do not produce the heat that is needed for such
emotions. Therefore it can happen that an old person is faced with a
situation that would have evoked her anger some years before, but now
no anger occurs because the body is not in the appropriate state, i.e., does
not provide enough of the specific heat. 4o
These remarks conclude my comments on the first case: if the absence
of certain bodily conditions can prevent someone from being angry or
feeling fear, even though the reasons for those emotions are given, then,
indeed, we have a proof of the assertion that the patM of the soul affect
39 Rh. 11.3 1380blO-13.
40 Rh. 11.13 1389b31-33.

the body, too. The second case, as I have already mentioned, describes
the inverse constellation: The pathemata are small and feeble, but they
are enough to arouse an emotion, because the body already behaves in
the way that is typical for the respective emotion. So if, for example,
a previous event has already made someone's blood surge through her
veins, an insignificant insult or the vague and obscure suspicion that such
an insult could have taken place can suffice for a new episode of anger.
In De Insomniis, Aristotle even says that the more someone is under
the influence of an emotion, the less similarity with the proper object
of this kind of emotion is required to give rise to such emotions. 41 If
this is an apposite reading, then this description is even closer to our
everyday experiences than the first case. That we usually regard emotional
behaviour as irrational is mostly due to the observation that emotional
reactions tend to be neither consistent nor appropriate, and this again
especially applies to situations in which persons overreact. But Aristotle's
example works only if he can expect that his readers are familiar with the
thought that these phenomena of emotional overreaction often occur as a
result of a bodily disposition.
Aristotle adds a third case that is said to be even more convincing:
Even when nothing happens that is frightening, people find themselves in
the pathe of someone who actually feels fear (en tois pathesi ginontai tois
tou phoboumenou). 42
It is clear that in this case no external cause or object of the respective
emotion is given. Everything else in this description is open to various
interpretations. That there is no external object or cause does not, strictly
speaking, exclude the possibility that there is an internal object of the fear;
for example, Aristotle tells us in De Motu Animalium, that we often start
to shudder and are frightened when we merely think of something. 43 Or
does Aristotle's wording "nothing frightening" also rule out a frightening
thought or phantasma of something that is absent? The next difficult
point is that Aristotle does not explicitly say that people actually suffer
the emotion of fear despite the absence of a proper object; he only says
that they are affected like someone who actually feels fear. This indirect
description avoids ascribing a fully-fledged emotion to the person; rather,
the state in question is merely compared with the condition of someone
who actually has the emotion. The reason for distinguishing the present
situation from the fully-fledged emotion could be that, for Aristotle, a
fully-fledged emotion requires the appropriate or allegedly appropriate
cause or object of this type of emotion, so that where no cause or object
41 Insomn. 2 460bl-15.
42 De An. 1.1 403a22-24.
43 MA 7 701b21-22.

202 Christof Rapp
is given at all, we cannot speak of an emotion in the strictest sense. I

am inclined to think that this would be a plausible point, since we are
used to thinking and talking about most of our emotions as being directed
towards a certain object or cause; this is why we hesitate to speak of a
regular emotion if we cannot identify a possible cause. In Thomas Mann's
Magic Mountain, there is a passage where the protagonist Hans Castorp
complains about the exaggerated activity of his heart until he discovers
that if he relates the beating of his heart to his thinking of Madame
Chauchat, the activity of his body receives a target and hence becomes a
Gemuetsbewegung or affection of the soul.
Anyway, the third case makes us think of a person whose body displays
all the symptoms of fear (she pales, goes weak in the knees, her teeth
chatter) without any visible cause or without any cause at all. So the
point of this third case seems to be that sometimes the body itself brings
about either an emotion or at least the state that is equivalent to a fully-
fledged emotion, and this in turn would support Aristotle's point that the
patM of the soul are affections of the body, too.
The celebrated conclusion he draws from these three cases is:
From all this it is obvious that the affections of the soul are enmattered
logoi. 44
Consequently their definitions are, for example, as follows:
Being angry is a particular movement of such and such a body or part or
faculty (of the body), as result of this or that cause and for the sake of this
or that end. 45
The two aspects of this definition correspond with the division of labour
between the student of nature and the dialectician - the former empha-
sizing the material aspect, the latter the form or logos. Therefore the
dialectician would define anger, for example, as the desire for retaliation
or something like that, but the student of nature would include into his
definition that anger is also the boiling of the blood and hot stuff sur-
rounding the heart.
This conclusion, again, is subject to widely differing interpretations.
Before outlining my own preferences, some comments on the definition
of emotions might be in order. Ample evidence of Aristotelian definitions
of emotions can be found in the second book of the Rhetoric. There, in
the Rhetoric, Aristotle does not attempt to describe the bodily changes
that occur during the episode of an emotion. That is one of the reasons
why some authors have felt encouraged to think that in the Rhetoric an
emotion is nothing but a judgment. But after all, the absence of bodily
processes in the Rhetoric is by no means surprising. First, the Rhetoric
44 De An. 1.1 403a25.
45 De An. 1.1 403a26-27.

stresses several times its affinity to dialectic, so that it also uses the defini-
tions of the dialectician, and not of the student of nature (not to mention
the point that a complete list of the bodily changes that constitute the
several emotions is one of the ultimate aims of psychology and cannot be
given off-hand). And second, it would be of no use for the orator to know
the bodily changes that are involved in each type of emotion; for him it
is important to know the causes and objects of the different emotions,
because he can make the audience think that the cause of a certain pathos
is given, but, of course, he has no means to modify the bodily conditions
of his audience directly.
The definitions given in the Rhetoric better fit what Aristotle has
called the formal aspect of such a definition. So the general scheme, ac-
cording to which an emotion occurs "as the affection of this or that cause
and for the sake of this or that end", can more or less be exemplified by
the definitions of the Rhetoric. Anger is the emotion that fits very well
in this scheme, since it is defined as desire (orexis), accompanied by pain,
for conspicuous retaliation because of a conspicuous insult that was di-
rected, without justification, against oneself or those near to one. 46 In this
definition we have a cause, the unjustified insult, and an end or purpose,
which is the revenge that the angry one desires to take on the person who
is responsible for the undeserved insult. The purpose of anger can easily
be identified, because anger is defined as desire with a certain direction.
But anger is the only emotion that is defined as desire, other emotions are
defined as pain or agitation or wanting. Hence they do not have any built-
in impulse for a certain course of action, and therefore it is more difficult
to say for the sake of what end they exist. Nevertheless, I am inclined to
think that the definitions given in the Rhetoric tell us the form or the
logos of the various emotions as required in De Anima, insofar as all def-
initions include the specific cause or object of a certain kind of emotion;
for example the object of fear is a future destructive or painful evil, the
object of pity is an undeserved misfortune, the object of shame is the evil
that seems to bring a person into disrepute, the object of gratitude is a
favor that releases us from or prevents a painful situation, etc. I am even
inclined to think that, on closer examination, those emotions that are not
defined by a certain impulse have a teleological dimension, too: Probably
there are purposes that are not explicit in the definition of an emotion
and of which the respective person is not aware. Most of them are directed
either toward the preservation of one's existence or are associated with
the task of maintaining one's self-esteem in a social context.
Finally a word on pleasure and pain. Most of the emotions the Rhetoric
deals with are defined as pain. But, unlike Plato's Philebus, Aristotle does
46 Rh. II.2 1378a30-32.

204 Christof Rapp
not try to use pleasure and pain as the genus of all emotions. This becomes
clear, for example, from the definition of anger, which is not said to be a
kind of pain, but only to be connected with pain. The definitions of some
emotions do not even mention "pain"; these are the definitions of loving
(philein) , hating, and gratitude (charin echein). Aristotle explicitly says
that hate is without pain. 47 Nevertheless, all of them are somehow - in a
vague sense - related to pleasure and pain: For example, if we have the
emotion of philia, then we feel pleasure and pain together with our friend
when something good or bad happens to him. Gratitude is also connected
with pleasure and pain, since the favor we are grateful for liberates us
from a painful situation, etc.
Pleasure and pain are interesting for our purpose, because they imply
an immediate bodily change, as Aristotle tells us, for example, in De Motu
Animalium:
the painful and the pleasant are nearly always accompanied by chilling and
heating. This is clear from the passions. For feelings of confidence, fears,
sexual excitement, and other bodily affections, painful and pleasant, are
accompanied by heating and chilling. 48
However, it is important to note that these bodily affections are not identi-
cal with the alterations mentioned in the material definition of an emotion,
because the painful and the pleasant have uniform bodily reactions, while
different emotions are thought to be the activity of different parts of the
body.
What Aristotle avoided
What can we infer from these examples and how do they illuminate the
expression "common to body and soul"? The initial question for the dis-
cussion of the patM of the soul in De Anima 1.1 was whether some of those
affections belong exclusively to soul. Perhaps we are inclined to think so
because we are used to call them "affections of the soul", but the dis-
cussion of the emotions clearly shows that this initial question must be
answered in the negative: they are not peculiar to the soul, but common
to body and soul. This result would still allow us to think of emotions
as combinations of two separately existing components, one psychic or
mental and one material. For a post-Cartesian philosopher, it is tempting
to think of Aristotelian emotions as consisting of two such components,
but this is not exactly what we find in the text of De Anima 1.1:
47 Rh. H.4 1382all-13.

48 MA 770lb37-702a4.

First of all, Aristotle refers to certain impressions or perceptions we

have, but he nowhere says that these impressions are the mental or psychic
component of the emotion and he nowhere contrasts them with a merely
physiological component. He does not attempt to describe in a termino-
logical vocabulary how these impressions are presented to us: whether we
have perceptions or phantasmata of, say, frightening things or whether
we judge that something frightening is about to happen. But if he were
interested in sketching a two-component-model it would have been cru-
cial for him to show that it is the representation of frightening objects
which play the role of the merely psychic component in his story (this,
again, would have been astonishing since it is clear that within Aristotle's
theory of the soul perceptions and phantasmata involve bodily changes
so that they cannot be taken as the paradigm for purely mental states).
This is also important for the claim that the full definition of an emotion
includes a formal and a material part, e.g., that anger is the boiling of
blood around the heart as the result of an insult for the sake of revenge:
If, as we said, the impression that some insult has happened is not meant
as representing the psychic component of an emotion which causes an ad-
equate reaction of the body, then it is not likely that the formal part of
that definition "as the result of an insult for the sake of revenge" is meant
to represent the respective impression, opinion, or judgment in the sense
of a purely psychic or mental process which acts upon a certain part of
the body.
Further, Aristotle does not say that the movement of the blood is
affected by something that belongs to the soul. He clearly maintains that
the emotion is a certain movement of the blood. And what makes this
movement a full-fledged emotion is the fact that it is a movement with
certain causes and purposes. True, it must be some kind of representation
of the insult that is likely to evoke the anger. But the passage's point is
not that a sort of opinion or judgment representing the presence of an
unjustified insult acts upon a purely material system, the body. This can
be seen from the fact that the emotion is not the movement of some blood,
but the movement of a certain portion of blood located in a certain place
of an ensouled body. Hence, what happens in the ensouled body when the
blood starts to boil is not due to the laws of elementary change, but rather
something that only happens in a specific body formed by a specific sort of
soul. 49 For that simple reason it would be inappropriate to say that in the
definition of anger as "boiling of blood around the heart as the result of
an insult for the sake of revenge" , the first part describes a purely physical
and second part a purely psychic or mental component of the full-fledged
49 This point has also been stressed by Alan Code; cf. Code/Moravcsik (1992, pp. 129-
146).

206 Christof Rapp
emotion, since the boiling of the blood is a change that can only happen
in an ensouled body; consequently, it would be odd to understand the
remaining part of the definition as a description of what kind of mental
process the soul undergoes while the blood in the bodily parts of the
same person is boiling. The formal part of such definitions specifies the
causes under which this particular emotion occurs; it does not determine
the psychic capacity by which we understand or imagine that the relevant
kind of insult has happened and, hence, it does not pick out a psychic
component of the emotion as opposed to a physical or physiological one.
It could be objected that the boiling of blood is something that is
separately identifiable and hence counts as a separate occurrence or entity
with or without the specific causes and purposes of anger. I think that
the wording of the third case provides a clear counterexample. If Aristotle
says that one is "in the state of someone" who actually feels anger or
fear, this seems to be a clear indicator that it is not possible to refer
to this specific bodily state without mentioning anger or the form and
purpose that define anger or fear. Hence, in this context, the emotions
are described as a specific bodily activity, informed by certain causes
and purposes, and not as a complex phenomenon which consists of two
separate components. This is confirmed by Aristotle's discussion of the
third case, that even when nothing happens that is frightening, people
find themselves in the pathe of someone who actually feels fear: If his
intention had been to argue that each emotion is composed of a bodily
and a psychic component he should have stressed that in the present case
the specific mental or psychic contribution is missing. But he makes no
further comment on whether something is missing in this case; he rather
confines himself to the point that even without visible causes the relevant
changes in the body can come about so that emotions cannot exclusively
belong to the soul.
Finally, the outcome of the comparison between the two types of def-
inition, the dialectical and the material one, is not that both types of
definitions are complete in relation to different purposes: With respect to
the dialectical definition, or logos, Aristotle says that it must be necessar-
ily in a certain kind of hule 50 so that the definition remains incomplete
if we do not add in which kind of hul€ it is. And with respect to the
student of nature (phusikos) Aristotle does not want say that he could be
content with the material definition alone. On the contrary, at the end of
the chapter51 it seems that, properly understood, the student of nature
is concerned with the composite, matter and form, and not with mere
physiological descriptions.
50 De An. 1.1 403b2-3.
51 De An. 1.1 403b7-16.

If this analysis is correct so far we have identified a remarkable differ-

ence to the discussion of the same phenomena in the Hellenistic schools:
Aristotle fully acknowledges, as they did, the psychosomatic character of
emotions, but the question of how a psychic part could act upon a merely
bodily part - i.e., the question of causal interaction - does not even arise
in the context of Aristotle's discussion. And the presumable reason why
this question does not arise is that he does not even attempt to distinguish
two relatively separate components. But as long as we do not have sep-
arate components or agents there is no need to relate these components
via causal interaction. The idea of such an interaction between body and
soul does not occur until we think of the soul as a more or less separate
entity which is like a second body - with the only difference that it is
incorporeal. Certainly, this is how the Hellenistic philosophers have en-
visaged their predecessors; but in the light of what we have said about
Aristotle and his discussion of emotions in De Anima L1, it seems that
at least Aristotle would not even have accepted the setting in which the
problem of causal interaction arises and the arguments of the Hellenistic
philosophers against the immaterial soul become applicable.
A question to end with could be the following: Did Aristotle deliber-
ately avoid the distinction between two more or less separate components
of the emotion or did he just fail to see the problems of psychosomatic
compounds which the Hellenistic philosophers clearly saw? A full and
reliable answer to this question would certainly require a detailed inter-
pretation of De Anima II and Ill. But a first hint can also be found in
our chapter De Anima L1: The discussion of emotions and the different
types of definitions is finally concluded by the following remark:
We have said that the pathe of the soul are inseparable from the physical
hule of living beings in the way in which anger and fear are inseparable and
not in the way in which line and plane are. 52
This conclusion is remarkable for several reasons: First, it becomes clear
that the emotions just served as a paradigm and that the results that we
derived from this discussion can be extended beyond the special case of
emotions. Second, it is important that Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of
inseparability:53 Lines and planes are inseparable in existence, since they
could not exist beside or over and above the enmattered exemplifications.
But they are still separable in thought, because they do not require a
specific type of matter and because their essence can be defined without
reference to such a specific type of matter. Now, the point of Aristotle's
conclusion is that anger and fear are inseparable in a different way, i.e.
they turned out to be even inseparable in thought. Applying the example
52 De An. I.1 403b17-19.
53 I owe this point to David Charles. He elaborates on this distinction in his unpub-
lished paper "Aristotle's Psychological Theory".

208 Christof Rapp
of lines and planes we must conclude that anger and fear can never be ab-
stracted from a specific type of matter or specific type of material process.
This confirms our dismissal of a two-component-reading: That emotions
are inseparable in thought implies, at least, that they are not composed
of two separately identifiable components but are psycho-physical units.
If this is the major outcome of Aristotle's discussion of emotions in De
Anima 1.1 he marks his own account off from two theoretical alternatives:
firstly, from the assertion that some states of the soul can exist without
the body and, secondly, from the assumption that the states of the soul
are inseparable from the body for their existence, but that they can be
separated in thought, i.e. that they are separable for their essence or iden-
tity. If someone accepts one of these two accounts he is bound to think
that, in principle, the two components involved could interact as other
separately existing substances would do. Since Aristotle carefully argues
against these theoretical alternatives and pleads, instead, for the model
of emotions as psycho-physical units it seems safe to conclude that he
deliberately avoids a setting which allows of causal interaction between
body and soul.
References
Annas, Julia, 1991, "Epicurus' philosophy of mind", in: S. Everson (ed.),

Companions to Ancient Thought 2: Psychology, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, pp. 84-1Ol.
Charles, David, unpublished, "'Aristotle's Psychological Theory"'.
Code, Alan / Moravcsik, Julius, 1992, "Explaining Various Forms of Liv-
ing", in: M.C. Nussbaum / A.O. Rorty (eds), Essays on Aristotle's
De Anima, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 129-146.
Gill, Christopher, forthcoming, The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Ro-
man Thought, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vogt, Katja Maria, 2004, "Die Stoische Theorie der Emotionen", in: Bar-
bara Guckes (ed.), Zur Ethik der iilteren Stoa, Gottingen: Vanden-
hoeck & Ruprecht , pp. 69-93.
Long, Anthony / Sedley, David (eds), 1887, The Hellenistic Philosophers,
2. vols., Cambridge: Cambridge Universtiy Press.
Tieleman, Teun, 2003, Chrysippus' On Affections: Reconstruction and In-
terpretation, Leiden: Brill.

Christopher Gill
Psychophysical Holism
in Stoicism and Epicureanism
1. Converging Types of Holism
Despite their radically divergent versions of the world and human beings,
Epicurus, many Stoics, and the more significant early Hellenistic physicians
share a constellation of convictions concerning soul and body .... [This]
includes, for example, that all psyche is soma but not all soma is psyche;
that only what is spatially extended, three-dimensional, and capable of
acting or being acted upon exists; that the soul meets these criteria of
existence; that this corporeal psyche, like the rest of the body, is mortal
and transient; that the psyche is generated with the body; that it neither
exists before the body nor exists eternally after its separation from the
body - that is, the soul does not exist independently of the body in which
it exists.
In this incisive survey, Heinrich von Staden (2000, p. 79) identifies a
series of reasons for thinking that the idea "common to body and soul"
is central for Hellenistic thought and that this idea is conceived there
in a particularly strong form. I agree, in substance, with his appraisal.
My aim in this chapter is to illustrate in Stoic and Epicurean thought
this shared belief in the fundamental unity of body and psyche. In the
first instance, I explore how they reach this shared view in spite of other
major differences, and how this idea fits within their larger philosophical
outlooks and objectives. 1
In approaching this topic, modern scholars, perhaps inevitably, com-
bine two kinds of method. One is that of characterising ancient ideas
about the body-psyche relationship in terms of modern categories such as
This chapter is an independently formulated version of ideas explored more fully
in various sections of Gill (2006), especially in ch. 1. I am grateful to Richard King
for organising the stimulating colloquium on which this volume is based.

210 Christopher Gill
materialism or physicalism (or variants such as substantial dualism or re-

ductive materialism).2 Another is that of trying to identify the distinctive
intellectual project that underlies the way that this relationship is under-
stood in a specific ancient theory or theories. It is important, I think, to
try to deploy both types of method in a co-ordinated way. The modern
categories provide a means of defining ancient ideas with some degree
of intellectual precision. But, as Myles Burnyeat has underlined, there is
also a danger of conceptual mismatch and anachronism. The "mind-body"
distinction, in particular, tends to have Cartesian and post-Cartesian con-
notations which are, arguably, irrelevant to the issues central to ancient -
and indeed, a good deal of contemporary - philosophy. 3 So it is important
to combine our use of modern concepts with an attempt to reconstruct
the larger project of the ancient theories involved.
Hence, I begin by outlining a set of ideas on which, in my view, Stoic
and Epicurean approaches converge. This outline bears on their concep-
tion of human nature and personality in general; but it also provides a
framework for analysing their thinking on what is common to body and
psyche. Both theories embrace, I think, a combination of types of holism
and naturalism with certain striking and paradoxical "Socratic" ethical
claims. In both cases, we find a unified or holistic conception of human
personality, understood as a psychophysical and psychological organism
or unit, rather than as a combination of (separate or independent) psyche
and body, or of mind/reason and emotions/desires. This holistic concep-
tion is combined with a naturalistic approach, which has at least three
strands. One is a focus on the natural (birth-to-death) life of human be-
ings as embodied rational animals. Another is a conception of natural
development as being open, in principle, to all human beings and includ-
ing the expression of (natural forms of) sociability. A third is what might
be called "rich naturalism" , in which the picture of nature offered depends
on the combination or synthesis of ethics, physics and logic and not on -
for instance - trying to reduce ethics to physics. These types of holism and
naturalism are coupled - in a way that may seem surprising - with certain
strong ethical claims, which seem to be based, directly or indirectly, on
Socratic thinking. One is that the achievement of complete happiness is
"up to us" , through the exercise of virtue and rational reflection, in a way
that is not constrained by our inborn nature or by contingent features
of our upbringing and social environment. A second is that happiness in-
volves an invulnerable, time-independent, perfection of character, marked
2 For a range of such categories, see Irwin (1991, p.57) (applied to Aristotle).
3 See Burnyeat (1992), and, for a related claim, (1982). See also Everson (1991), in-
troduction (pp. 1-12), Gill (1991). On the contrast between Cartesian-style thought
about mind (centred on II'-centred self-consciousness) and ancient psychology, see
also text to nn. 23-4 below.

Psychophysical Holism in Stoicism and Epicureanism 211
by freedom from distress or passion. A third is that only the fully rational
and virtuous (or "wise") person is completely integrated and coherent,
while non-wise people are psychologically and ethically incoherent and
lead incoherent lives. 4 My focus here, in fact, is only on the first of these
shared features, their psychophysical holism, which expresses a larger out-
look which I call "substantial holism". But it is useful, none the less, to
locate this feature within a nexus of (shared) ways of thinking about hu-
man personality, to give a fuller picture of the framework of ideas which
underlies their thinking about what is common to body and psyche.
Before defining further what is meant here by psychophysical and
substantial holism, it is worth confronting possible scepticism about the
assertion that these two Hellenistic philosophical schools, which are, in
many ways, intellectual opponents, share a single complex of ideas of the
sort outlined. My response, in broad terms, is that, despite their differ-
ent philosophical starting-points, these schools converge in adopting psy-
chophysical (and substantial) holism, even though they do not explicitly
agree with each other and co-operate as intellectual partners. The differ-
ences in their world-view are obvious and widely recognised. For instance,
Epicurus begins from the assumption that all phenomena, including psy-
chological ones, can be explained as the outcome of random conjunctions
of atoms moving in void. This position involves a reaction against the
Platonic teleological and providential world-view in the Timaeus, as well
as against traditional ideas about divine intervention in the natural and
human sphere. 5 The Stoics, by contrast, maintain that the universe is
a self-sustaining unified organism, pervaded by innate purposive reason.
Plato's Timaeus, perhaps in combination with Aristotle's causal frame-
work, may have played a key role in shaping the Stoic causal principles
as well as their teleogical world-view. 6 However, there are reasons for
thinking that the way the two theories responded to their main influ-
ences brought them closer to each other and led each one to adopt a
version of substantial holism. Specifically, Epicureanism can be seen as
a non-reductive version of Democritean atomism, while Stoicism can be
interpreted as a naturalised version of Platonism. Epicurus seems to have
rejected the "reductive" approach of Democritus, which treats all explana-
tion at the supra-atomic level as merely conventional. 7 He adopts a version
4 See further on this set of Stoic-Epicurean ideas, Gill (2006), especially chs.2-3.
Socrates was a direct and explicit influence on Stoicism, but seems also to have
influenced Epicureanism more indirectly.
5 See Long/Sedley (1987) (= LS), 13, especially F-G (LS references are to sections
and paragraphs unless otherwise stated). Texts cited from LS use their translation
except as indicated.
6 See LS 46, 54, also LS, vol. 1, p.319.
7 See especially Democritus DK, fr. B 9 (= Sextus Empiricus M. VII.135): "By con-
vention (nomos) sweet, by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention

of atomism that recognises the reality, intelligibility and coherence of the

macroscopic, supra-atomic world. 8 The Stoics, on the other hand, seem to
have recast the main features of Plato's Timaeus into a world-view that
is thoroughly naturalistic and ontologically unified. Plato's transcendent
craftsman-god reappears as an immanent principle of rationality, agency
and purpose, working within natural processes. Plato's Timaeus, perhaps
with other influences, helps to shape the Stoic two-fold set of principles,
active and passive or god and matter, both of which are conceived as phys-
ical or as "bodies" and as being only conceptually distinguishable from
each other within the material universe. 9 Hence, despite their different
starting-points and main influences, Epicureanism and Stoicism converge
in presenting the universe as an essentially unified, material entity which
is fully intelligible both as a whole and in its component perceptible man-
ifestations.
It is, thus, plausible to suggest that Epicureanism and Stoicism could
have converged in adopting a unified or holistic world-view, in a way that
informs their conception of what is common to body and psyche. What,
in broad terms, are the marks of this holistic world-view? Why should
one speak about substantial holism? The holistic character of the theories
derives, in part, from the fact that they offer an inclusive but integrated
account of the world or reality (or "substance") and of the entities within
the world. The contrast is most marked with the kind of (substantial)
dualism we find in Plato's Phaedo, in which there is an emphatic contrast
in level of being and value between Forms and particulars, body and psy-
che, mind and emotions or desires. There is a contrast of a different kind
with Democritean thought (notably, DK fr. B 9), in which the phenome-
nal world has become reduced to the atomic or eliminated altogether as a
serious candidate for being and truth.lO Although Epicureanism and Sto-
icism also treat as fundamental the polarity between atoms and void or
the active and passive principles, these are seen as co-ordinate features of
reality rather than as opposed dimensions within a framework of substan-
tial dualism. Instead of body and psyche, or mind and desire/emotion,
being placed on one or other side of a dichotomy of being and value, they
are seen as (more or less complex and structured) states of a single entity
or whole within a universe that is similarly conceived. 11 This is a suffi-
colour, but in truth (etos) atoms and void", trans. Warren (2002, p.7).
8 See further Sedley (1999, pp. 379-82), Hankinson (1999, pp. 498-503), Warren
(2002, pp. 67-71, pp. 193-5).
9 LS 44-5, also (vol. 1, pp. 277-8,319,331). See further Reydams-Schils (1999, chs. 1-
2), Sedley (2002), Dillon (2003, pp. 168-74).
10 See nn. 7-8 above.
11 For the contrasting (part-based or "core-centred") way of thinking about body and
psyche or psychic parts, see Gill (2006, 1.2), referring to, e.g., PI. R. 611d-612a,
PI. Alc. 129c-130c, 132c-133c, Arist. EN 1168a28-31, 1177b30-1178a4, 14-21. See

ciently systematic feature of Epicureanism and Stoicism for us to suppose

that it is a deliberate, even programmatic, dimension of their thought,
which expresses a partial reaction against earlier ideas, even though some
previous thought also contributed to their holistic outlook. 12
I now develop in more detail this way of understanding these two
theories. I explore leading features of Stoic and Epicurean theory that
seem to me to reflect their psychophysical holism. In connection with
Epicureanism, especially, I consider how their thinking should be analysed
in terms of modern categories, in particular, whether their holistic outlook
presupposes "physicalism" and in what sense.
2. Stoicism
In Stoicism, it is especially clear how a unified world-view provides a

basis for a holistic picture of relations between psyche and body. The uni-
verse as whole, and all determinate entities within it, are regarded as the
combination of an active, animating principle (identified with pneuma by
Chrysippus, the most important Stoic theorist) and matter (hul€). The
relationship between pneuma and hul€ is presented as that of "total blend-
ing", in which the two elements, while thoroughly interpenetrated, retain
their nature and can, in principle, be recovered. 13 The active element
has the role of "sustaining" or "holding together" (sunechein) matter in
a way that gives determinate objects their form and structure. It does
this by producing tonos, "tension" or "tensility", that is, the capacity of
objects to maintain stability, shape and distinctness. 14 Hence, "unified
bodies" (henomena), including "grown together" (sumphua) or organic
bodies, form a spectrum according to the degree of tension of the active,
sustaining principle.
This spectrum is presented by Philo in these terms (LS 47P):
Intelligence (nous) ... has many powers, the tenor kind, the physical, the
psychic, the rational, the calculative .... Tenor (hem) is also shared by
lifeless things, stones and logs, and our bones, which resemble stones, also
participate in it. Physique (phusis) also extends to plants, and in us there
also Plato's famous argument for separate psychic parts, R. 435d-441cj on later
ancient readings of this argument, see Gill (2006, 5.2). For "substantial dualism"
in the early Academy, centred on the contrast between One and Indefinite Dyad,
see Dillon (2003), index under "Dyad".
12 In addition to Plato's Timaeus, Aristotle's "hylomorphism" (on which see van
der Eijk (2000, pp. 63-9)), and Hellenistic medical thought (von Staden, 2000) are
possible salient influences.
13 LS 47-8, also LS, vol. 1, pp. 286-9, Long (1996, pp. 230-1), von Staden (2000, pp. 99-
100).
14 LS 47G, also LS, vol. 1, pp. 288-9.

are things like plants - nails and hair. Physique is tenor in actual motion.
Soul (psuche) is physique which has acquired impression and impulse. This
is also shared by irrational animals.
This passage shows how differing degrees of tension determine the
character of more or less complex types of entity and also how these causes
supervene on each other within a single entity. For instance, in human be-
ings and other animals, the structure of bones is the work of "tenor"
(hexis) , while growth and nutrition come from "physique" or "nature"
(phusis), and more complex functions such as impression and impulse de-
rive from psyche. The spectrum includes some of the typical associations
in Greek thought of body or psyche, for instance, physical shape (linked
with hexis), organic process (linked with phusis), and impression and im-
pulse (linked with psyche). But these are seen as aspects of a single scale of
types of tension, rather than being placed in a dichotomy of fundamentally
different types of entity. Thus, what I am calling "psychophysical holism"
forms part of a larger holism, applying to all determinate objects.
Since a given object, for instance a human being, embodies different
degrees of tension, the question arises how the cohesion or wholeness of
this object is produced. The answer to this question is particularly signi-
ficant, since it highlights a general difference between a holistic framework
and a more dualistic or part-based one. The cohesion of a complex entity is
secured by a combination of the addition of types of tension, the fact that
these types supervene on each other and are transformed by this process.
A third factor is that of systematic co-ordination. In a human being,
for instance, the types of tension illustrated in LS 47P, cited earlier, are
added together and form what one might call a "layered" or "nested" set
of functions. The higher functions build on the lower ones and also modify
their mode of operation, as indicated in this passage.
Nature (phusis) ... is no different in regard to plants and animals [when it
directs both] without impulse and sensation, and in us certain processes of
a vegetative kind take place. But ... animals have the additional faculty of
impulse, through the use of which they go in search of what is appropriate
to them .... And since reason, by way of a more perfect management,
has been bestowed on rational beings, to live correctly in accordance with
reason comes to be natural for them. For reason supervenes (epiginetai) as
the cmftsman of impulse. IS
This passage brings out how functions supervene on each other and
are transformed in the process. Animals share with plants phusis, which
shapes nutrition and growth. But the operation of these processes is, in an-
imals, further informed by capacities such as sensation and impulse, which
are shaped by psyche. Reason (logos) is a further dimension of "tension"
15 Diogenes Laertius 7.86 (trans. LS 57A4-5), with omissions and added italics.

- not a separate psychological "part" or essential "core" of human nature,

as it is in some other Greek theories. 16 Reason "supervenes" on the other
types of tension and transforms their operation, "by way of a more per-
fect management" and "as the craftsman of impulse". For instance, reason
does so by "rejecting some of these [impressions] and accepting others, in
order that the [rational] animal may be guided accordingly" (LS 53A5).
Another example of this idea is that the birth of an animal embryo is
presented (by Hierocles) as bringing about the change (metabole) of phu-
sis into psyche. This means that the embryo gains psyche in addition
to phusis, but also that the functions of phusis are transformed by this
addition. 17
The cohesiveness of determinate entities is also secured through assu-
ming the systematic co-ordination of functions. In animals, this is brought
about by a unitary "control-centre" (hegemonikon) , an idea thought to
be a Stoic innovation. 18 The control-centre has its own specific functions
(those of impression, assent, impulse and perception) as well as the role
of co-ordinating the other seven psychic functions (the five senses, ut-
terance and reproduction). The Stoics use various images to convey the
co-ordinating role of the control-centre: a tree-trunk and its branches,
an octopus and its tentacles, and a spider at the centre of a web (LS
53G 7, 53H). The control-centre is allocated a physical location, namely
the heart, and the linked system of communication, though seen as based
on pneuma, is taken to operate through the veins and arteries. The Stoic
choice of location was criticised extensively by Galen, a prime source
for the theory, especially for the failure to take account of the discov-
ery (through vivisection) of the function of the brain and nerves by the
Hellenistic doctors Herophilus and Erasistratus. 19 However, Chrysippus'
main aim, in adopting one of the two longstanding candidates for the
location of the ruling part, was, probably, to identify the most plausible
single location to explain the cohesiveness of the animal, considered as
a psychophysical organism. His picture, though based on an inaccurate
view of human anatomy, can be seen as expressing better than Galen's
three-location account the unified picture of animal psychology that he
aims to convey. 20
The cohesive character of the Stoic picture, and also the assumption
of psychophysical unity, comes out vividly in this passage by the second-
century AD Stoic, Hierocles:
16 See n. 11 above.
17 LS 53B 2-3; see also Long (1996, pp. 236-9), and, on Hierocles, see further below.
18 See Annas (1992, pp. 61-4), Long (1999, p.572).
19 This is a central theme in Galen, On the Doctrines of Hippocmtes and Plato
(PHP), Books 2-3; see Tieleman (1996).
20 See Mansfeld (1991), Annas (1992, pp. 69-70), Long (1999, pp. 567-70).

Since an animal is a composite (suntheton) of body and psyche, and both

of these are tangible and impressible and of course subject to resistance,
and also blended through and through, and one of them is a sensory faculty
(dunamis aisthetike) which undergoes movement ... it is evident that an
animal perceives itself continuously. For by stretching and relaxing, the
psyche makes an impression on all the body's parts, since it is blended with
them all, and in making an impression it receives an impression in response.
For the body, just like the psyche, reacts to pressure; and the outcome is
a state of their joint pressure upon, and resistance to, each other ... [this
outcome] travels ... to the control-centre, with the result that there is
an awareness (antilepsis) both of all the body's parts and of those of the
psyche. This is equivalent to the animal's perceiving itself. 21
The fact that "psyche" is distinguished from "body" here should not
be taken as implying that these are fundamentally different kinds of en-
tity. On the contrary, the emphasis, throughout the passage, is on the idea
that psychological processes are also, and inherently, physical ones. This
emphasis is combined with a stress on the throughly cohesive or unified
character of the workings of the animal as a psychophysical whole. This is
conveyed, in part, by the idea of animal self-perception, one which seems
to be, to some degree, an innovation of Hierocles. 22 This idea might seem
to anticipate Cartesian and post-Cartesian ideas about consciousness or
self-consciousness as a permanent accompaniment of human psychological
processes. But, in fact, the contrast with Cartesian self-consciousness is
stark. A.A. Long suggests that the Stoics, like modern neurologists, are
"interested in the principle that enables animals to function internally as
well-organised wholes, coordinating their movements and ensuring that
the deployment of their bodily parts is appropriate to their environment"
(1996, pp. 258-9). Hierocles' "self-perception" is comparable, rather, with
the modern idea of "proprioception", a partly unconscious process of
internal psychophysical cohesion, rather than with Cartesian-style self-
consciousness, which is linked with assumptions about mind-body du-
alism and 'I'-centred mental states and subjectivity.23 The capacity of
any animal to perceive itself from birth is a sign that it operates from
the start as a cohesive psychophysical organism. 24 In the passage cited
earlier, the combined ideas of psychophysical unity and of cohesive (psy-
chophysical) functioning are conveyed especially by the suggestion that, in
self-perception, "the psyche makes an impression on all the body's parts"
21 Hierocles 4.38-53 (= LS 53B5-9), translation slightly modified.
22 In other Stoic treatments, the idea stressed is self-awareness: e.g. Diog. Laert. 7.85,
Cic. Fin. 3.16j on Hierocles, see further Inwood (1984), Long (1996, ch. 11).
23 Long (1996, pp. 257-61), referring especially to the theory of C. Sherrington. On
the general contrast between ancient and Cartesian psychology, see n.3 above.
24 LS 47N, 48C9-lO, 53G-Hj also Long (1996, pp. 240-2).

and that "there is an awareness both of all the body's parts and of those
of the psyche."
Stoic thinking on what is common to psyche and body draws on a
complex background of earlier ideas. For instance, the attempt to corre-
late psychological functions with animal and human physiology and to
identify a control-centre and communication-system goes back to Plato's
Timaeus. 25 The use of a scala naturae, a spectrum of psychological ca-
pacities, against which to locate human and animal functions, recalls
Aristotle. 26 But the distinction between phusis and psyche is very un-
Aristotelian, and may reflect analogous contrasts between psychic and
natural capacities drawn by Herophilus and Erasistratus. 27 Despite these
possible influences, the Stoic theory emerges as a strikingly original anal-
ysis of psychophysical holism. As illustrated earlier, this is best seen as
one aspect of a larger holistic world-view. The key categories are sub-
divisions of a scale of types of sustaining cause and degrees of tension.
These distinctions, such as between psyche and "nature" (phusis), do not
correspond with those between living and non-living entities or between
different natural kinds. In their concern to chart a mode of analysis ap-
plying to all determinate objects, the Stoics, in effect, dispense with the
psyche-body distinction altogether, as traditionally conceived,28 although
this distinction can be redeployed in terms of their theory, as is clear in
the passage cited from Hierocles. "Holism", in a different sense, is evident
in their concern to define the cohesive character of human beings, and
other animals, as psychophysical and psychological wholes. Wholeness is
analysed, in part, in terms of the combination and "layering" of func-
tions, from hexis to logos, which are also seen as degrees of tension in
the shaping of matter by pneuma. Wholeness is also characterised by ref-
erence to the (psychophysical) co-ordination associated with the unitary
control-centre and by ideas such as "self-perception". A salient contrast
with much other ancient thinking is that different psychological functions,
including perception, motivation, emotion and reason, are all seen as func-
tions of a unified psychophysical organism, rather than being associated
with quasi-independent psychic "parts" or with (more or less) "core" or
"essential" aspects of our personality. 29
25 PI. Ti. 69c-71e, taken with Gill (1997).
26 See Inwood (1985, pp. 9-41).
27 Aristotle follows earlier Greek usage in seeing "psyche" as a product of all life-
fUnctions, including those of plants. See Everson (1991, introduction, pp. 3-4); on
the possible influence of medical ideas on the Stoic distinction between phusis and
psyche, see von Staden (2000, p. 98) (also 90, pp. 95-6).
28 In LS 47P, cited earlier, "body" as such is not a category: see further Long (1996,
pp. 227-34, especially pp. 231-2).
29 See n. 11 above.

3. Epicureanism
In the case of Epicureanism, I begin by considering certain points of simi-
larity with Stoicism and then (in Section 4) I take up the question of how
to analyse their conception of the psyche-body relationship in terms of
modern categories. The two points in Stoicism mainly stressed here are
that animals, including humans, are conceived as cohesive psychophysical
(as well as psychological) wholes and that psychophysical unity is seen
as part of a larger holistic world-view. Similar themes can be found in
Epicureanism, despite other important differences between the two philo-
sophical outlooks.
The corporeal nature of the psyche, and the integral link between
the (corporeal) psyche and (the rest of) the body are emphasised in the
relevant section of Epicurus' Letter to Herodotus (63-7). This closes with
this programmatic statement:
The "incorporeal", according to the prevailing usage of the word, is applied
to that which can be thought of in itself. But it is impossible to think of the
incorporeal in itself except as void. And void can neither act nor be acted
upon, but merely provides bodies with motion through itself. Consequently,
those who say that the psyche is incorporeal are talking nonsense. 30
Here, Epicurus abruptly dismisses any type of psyche-body dualism
of the kind found, for instance, in Plato's Phaedo. The only non-corporeal
determinate entity he recognises is void, and void is simply space through
which body moves. As in Stoicism, the ability to act and be acted on
is taken as the criterion of independent existence. 31 This general claim
underlies his characterisation of the body-psyche relationship, presented
here in von Staden's ultra-literal translation: 32
The psyche is a fine-textured body (soma), which is spread along the whole
of the aggregate (athroisma); [psyche is a body] most similar to breath
(pneuma) which has a certain blending (krasis) of warmth, and [psyche is
a body] in one way similar to the former [breath], in another way to the
latter [warmth]. But [psyche] is the part (meros) [of the whole aggregate]
which, by virtue of the fineness of its parts, has acquired a great difference,
even from these things themselves [breath and warmth]' yet it [the psyche]
is liable to co-affection (sumpathes), more so with the former [breath], but
also with the rest of the aggregate. The capacities of the psyche make all
this evident, and so do its affections, mobilities, acts of thinking, and the
30 LS 14A 7, translation modified (per se replaced by "in itself", twice).
31 See LS 5, also, on Stoic thinking on body, LS 45, especially C-E.
32 Epicur. Ep.Hdt. 63-4. See von Staden (2000, p. 81, p.85); I have modified his lay-
out, repunctuated, and made other minor changes and omissions but have used his
translation and some of his explanatory glosses in square brackets. For an alterna-
tive translation, see LS 14A 1-4.

things deprived of which we die. And we must hold on to (the fact) that
the psyche bears the greatest responsibility for sense perception (aisthesis):
psyche would not have acquired perception if it were not somehow covered
by the rest of the aggregate. The rest of the aggregate, having provided
the psyche with this responsibility [for perception], itself in turn acquired
from it [the psyche] a share in such an accidental property (sumptoma) -
though not a share of all the attributes which the psyche has obtained and
possesses. For this reason, when the psyche has been removed, it [the rest
of the aggregate] does not have perception.
Strongly stressed here is the idea that psyche is a form of "body"
(soma). Hence, the conventional "psyche-body" contrast needs to be aban-
doned; and it is replaced by the contrast between the psyche, viewed
as one "part" (meros) of the whole, and "the rest (to loipon) of the
aggregate (to athroisma)", the latter being Epicurus' new term for the
whole (psychophysical) body. Epicurus also stresses that psychic func-
tions such as perception, and indeed life itself, depend on the co-working
of the (corporeal) psyche and "the rest of the aggregate". This is ex-
pressed by the repeated use of "with-" or sun-compounds, such as "liable
to co-affection" (sumpathes, 63), "born together at the same time" (hama
sungegenemenon, 64), "contiguity and co-affection" (sumpatheia, 64). It
is also conveyed by the point that functions such as perception are not
essential properties of either psyche or the rest of the aggregate but are
accidental properties. More precisely, they are shared accidental proper-
ties, whose existence depends on the two aspects being engaged in the
various shared activities (indicated in the sun-compounds) that make up
psychophysical life. 33
The stress on the idea that animal psychological functions are also
physical ones is similar to that in Hierocles' description of self-perception,
cited earlier. We also find an analogue for the related Stoic idea that
an animal constitutes a cohesive psychophysical unit, with psychological
functions forming a system which is correlated with the body as a whole.
Both theories assume a pattern with a heart-based psychological centre
and a communication-system running through the body. Lucretius char-
acterises these two aspects as animus and anima ("mind" and "spirit").
He stresses that these two aspects are closely bonded with each other and
the rest of the body.
. .. the mind and spirit are firmly interlinked and constitute a single nature
(unam naturam), but the deliberative part which we call the mind is, as it
were, the chief, and holds sway throughout the body. It is firmly located
in the central part of the chest. For that is where fear and dread leap up,
and where joys caress us; therefore it is where the mind is. The remaining
33 See von Staden (2000, pp. 85-6). On "essential" and "accidental" properties, see
Epicur. Ep.Hdt. 68-73, Luer. 1.445-82, Sedley (1999, pp. 380-2).

part of the psyche [Le. the spirit], which is distributed throughout the body,
obeys the mind and moves at its beck and call. 34
Lucretius' main focus is on the interconnection of "mind and spirit" -
typically characterised as a linked pair - with body. For instance, when the
animus experiences intense fear, the anima "shares the feeling" (cons en-
tire), thus producing powerful psychophysical effects such as simultaneous
pallor and sweating. Actions initiated by the animus (which stimulate cog-
nate responses from the anima and body) and also physical states such
as being wounded (which have an impact on the animus) show the fun-
damental integration of the animus-anima complex with (what Epicurus
would call) the rest of the body.35
In Stoicism, I highlighted the way in which the body-psyche relation-
ship is located in a larger framework in which all determinate entities are
conceived in terms of degrees of "tension" of the operation of pneuma on
hul€, a framework which forms part of their unified or holistic world-view.
There is at least a partial analogue for this pattern in Epicureanism in
the idea that psyche is a relatively complex form of structured matter
(specifically, of atoms) and the related idea that the distinctive charac-
ters of animal species and human individuals are a product of the mix
of their constituent psyche-atoms. The analogy derives from the shared
(Stoic and Epicurean) assumption that a single explanatory system can
be applied in the case of a whole series of types of entity, in a way that
locates psyche and psychological characteristics (treated as also physical
ones) in a unified (holistic) world-view.
The atomic basis of the distinctive character of the psyche is presented
in one source (LS 14C) in this way:
Epicurus [said that the psyche is] a blend (krama) consisting of four things,
of which one is fire-like, one air-like, one wind-like, while the fourth is some-
thing which lacks a name .... The wind . .. produces movement in us, the
air produces rest, the hot one produces the evident heat of the body, and
the unnamed one produces sensation in us.
This passage implies two salient themes. One is that the distinctive
quality of psychological functions - more broadly, "life-functions", such as
movement, rest, and heat, are to be explained by reference to determinate
types of atom. The other is that the psyche consists in a "blend" (krama)
of these types of atom, and that this blend or synthesis enables complex
34 Luer. 3.136-44 (= LS 14B 1), translation slightly modified.
35 Luer. 3.145-76 (= LS 14B 2-3), especially cQnsentire (153), "the spirit is interlinked
(coniunctam) with the mind" (159), "the nature of the mind and spirit [is] corpo-
real" (161-2), "mind and spirit are constituted (constare) with a corporeal nature"
(166-7), "the mind is affected jointly with (consentire) the body, (169, also 175-
6). Cf. the con-compounds with the sun-compounds (body and psyche) in Epicur.
Ep.Hdt. 63-4.

psychophysical functions such as sensation. The second feature is clarified

by Lucretius: 36
The primary particles of the elements so interpenetrate each other in their
motions that no one element can be distinguished and no capacity spatially
separated, but they exist as multiple powers of a single body (unius cor-
poris) ... heat, air and the unseen force of wind when mixed form a single
nature (unam natumm), along with that mobile power [the unnamed fourth
element] which transmits the beginning of motion from itself to them, the
origin of sense-bearing motions through the flesh.
What this passage suggests is that the completeness of the blend of
these atomic types enables the relatively advanced capacity of sensation.
Producing this cohesive unity is the special role of the "fourth element" ,
whose nature and function is otherwise rather mysterious. Just as the
psyche as a whole pervades and animates the body, so the fourth element
pervades and unifies the mix of psyche-atoms and is in this sense "the
psyche of the psyche" (anima animae), though it is also corporeal and
has an effect on the body as a whole. 37 This conception of what is distinc-
tive about the atomic nature of psyche can also be related to the holistic
approach characteristic of Epicureanism and Stoicism. Epicurus stresses
that psychological functions depend on the integration or co-operation of
(corporeal) psyche and body (the rest of the aggregate). Analogously, the
distinctive role of psychic atoms is ascribed to their being specially inte-
grated (a "blend"), and the fourth element has a special role in effecting
this integration and so creating what Lucretius calls a "single nature"
(unam naturam). 38 The general form of explanation is to identify what
gives a complex unit (here, the psyche) its cohesion and wholeness, and
thus what enables advanced or sophisticated functions. There is a strong
contrast with the type of thinking sometimes found in Plato, Aristotle,
and elsewhere in ancient thought, in which advanced functions are at-
tributed to some part, core, or essence of the person, which is sometimes
also treated as virtually or actually separate from the human being or
animal as a whole. 39
One further idea, expressing the same line of approach, is that Epi-
curean thought sees natural species as having stable psychological char-
acteristics which reflect the predominant type of psychic atom, within
the overall "blend" in each species. 4o Relatedly, individual human beings,
36 Luer. 3.262-5,268-72 (= LS 1401), cf. 282-7 (= LS 1403).
37 Luer. 3.273-81 (= LS 1402), noting the repeated phrase "in the whole body",
corpore toto, 276, 281.
38 On the "fourth nature" and its consistency with Epicurean physicalism, see Annas
(1992, pp. 139-40).
39 See n. 11 above.
40 Luer. 3.282-306 (= LS 1403-4).

like animal species, are seen as differentiated by innate (atomically based)

inclinations, which reflect the predominance of heat or cold in their make-
up. Hence, "one man will ... plunge hastily into bitter anger, another may
be assailed too readily by fear, or the third type ... be over-indulgent in
tolerating certain things.,,41 This point can be taken as reflecting a more
general feature of Epicurean thought, of which Stephen Everson offers a
suggestive formulation. Epicurus' version of atomism does not mean that
explanation in atomic terms must be at the level of atomic constituents.
Epicurus also holds that "certain systems of atoms cannot be understood
other than as systems of atoms", and that "one cannot understand the
behaviour of certain systems of atoms - i.e. humans - without describing
it as the behaviour of a system - i.e. of the person - and so as having
psychological causes". 42 Several of the features noted here can be taken
as illustrating this idea. One is that the four types of psychic atom form
a unified nexus or "blend" (krama) which enables an animal to function
as a complex system which has advanced capacities such as sensation.
Another is that the animus-anima complex forms a psychological sys-
tem which is integrated with physiology and physical functioning. The
claim that animal species, and individual human beings, represent dis-
tinctive psychological configurations with an atomic basis can be taken
as a further instance of this line of thought. Everson's suggestion also
has potential implications for understanding Epicurean thinking on ani-
mal development and free will, a topic considered shortly. This aspect of
Epicureanism can be associated with the holistic approach, especially its
concern to define the characteristics of animals as cohesive psychophysi-
cal wholes rather than as combinations of separate and quasi-independent
parts.
4. Categories and Issues

So far in this discussion, the focus has been on trying to locate Epicurean
and Stoic thinking about what is common to body and psyche in a larger
framework, namely the holistic approach and world-view, on which they
converge, though from different intellectual starting-points. I now consider
how their thought, as understood here, relates to modern categories. In
particular, I examine a specific question in this area, which relates to a
well-marked scholarly debate about Epicurean thought, though one also
has implications for understanding Stoic ideas.
41 Lucr. 3.311-13 (= LS 14D4), with omissions. Presumably, the variations reflect
differing proportions of psychic atoms, e.g. fire-like or wind-like.
42 Everson (1999, p.549 and p. 557), his italics. For a similar suggestion, see O'Keefe
(2002, pp. 159-60).

The relevant question is this. Does the kind of psychophysical holism

that I attribute to these Hellenistic theories presuppose physicalism? This
question, however, needs to be specified further. The meaning of "physical-
ism" can be taken very broadly. Its typical ancient form, Annas suggests,
is holding that "everything that exists, including the psyche, falls under
phusik€, enquiry into the constituents and structure of the universe.,,43
But this conception of physicalism leaves things very open, particularly as
both Stoicism and Epicureanism also maintain, in different ways, that the
findings of physics are also compatible with those of ethics (and logic).44
The issue becomes more acute if physicalism is defined more narrowly.
Physicalism is often taken to imply materialism, that is, "that all indi-
vidual substances are composed of matter" (Everson, 1999, p. 546). It is
also often taken to involve explanation in terms of physical properties,
for instance, mass, motion and space, by contrast with mental proper-
ties. At least, even if both kinds of properties are considered, physicalism
"must give some sort of priority to the physical over the mental" (Ever-
son, 1999, p.547). Everson draws a further relevant distinction, between
"ontological" and "explanatory" physicalism:
... according to [ontological physicalismj, mental events are a species of
physical event and themselves satisfy physical descriptions. Explanatory
physicalism, in contrast, does not require that mental events should be
identical with physical events - merely that all events should be explicable
by reference to physical events. 45
This outline of possible senses of "physicalism" enables me to specify
more fully the question I have in view, namely whether or not psychophys-
ical holism, as understood here, also presupposes physicalism. The ques-
tion refers to "physicalism", in the narrower, modern sense, which assumes
materialism and gives priority to physical over mental explanation, with
the choice between "explanatory" or "ontological" physicalism being left
open at present. If we raise this question in connection with Stoicism and
Epicureanism, as so far characterised here, there are, I think, two possible
answers. One is that their psychophysical holism presupposes (at least)
explanatory physicalism. The Stoic-Epicurean view diverges from, for in-
stance, Platonic substantial dualism in analysing even complex and high-
level functions (psychological or mental ones) as the properties of material
objects. Even if these properties are not themselves material entities, they
are seen as amenable to explanation in physical terms. The other possi-
ble view is that psychophysical holism allows scope for mental alongside
43 Annas (1992, p.3), "soul" revised to "psyche"; see also her 2-9.
44 See Algra et al. (1999, xii-xvi); on the implications for interpreting Stoic and Epi-
curean psychology, see Gill (2006, 3.5).
45 Everson (1999, p.558, cf. pp. 546-50).

physical explanation, though as part of a unified (holistic) account. One

might argue, for instance, that both Stoicism and Epicureanism, while
maintaining that all independently existing (per se) entitities have body,
also allow the possibility of non-material properties. The Stoics explicitly
recognize a category of "incorporeals" (place, void, time, and lekta), that
is, "the content ofrational impressions" (Diog. Laert. 7.63), which are "an
ineliminable part of the world's structure" (Sedley, 1999, p. 402). Another
relevant idea is that the Stoic god "considered in abstraction from matter
... is an intelligent energizing power" (LS, vol.1, p.278).46 Analogously,
in Epicureanism, the only per se existents are (material) bodies and void,
while other entities are classed as qualities or properties of these material
entities. 47 But it has been argued that Epicurus believes that the (mate-
rial) psyche has non-material "emergent properties" (Sedley, 1983, 1988).
It could also be maintained that the non-material, mental properties in
each theory provide the basis for a non-physicalist mode of explanation.
On this view, then, psychophysical holism would constitute an inclusive
type of analysis, allowing the possibility of physicalist explanation for in-
dependently existing entities, and of non-physicalist explanations for (at
least) some mental and incorporeal properties. 48
I now consider this question in connection with the issue on which
scholarly debate in this area has especially focused. This is how to inter-
pret certain recently deciphered Epicurean texts on free will and animal
development. After citing the key relevant sources, I outline the main op-
posing interpretative positions. I then return to the question just posed,
whether psychophysical holism, as deployed in Epicureanism, presupposes
physicalism. 49
Here are two central passages for this issue.
From the very outset we always have seeds directing us towards these,
some towards those, some towards these and those, actions and thoughts
and characters, in greater and smaller numbers. Consequently, that which
we develop - characteristics of this or that kind - is at first absolutely up
to us; and the things which of necessity flow in through our passages from
that which surrounds us are at one stage up to us and dependent on beliefs
of our own making. 50
Many [developments] which have a nature which is capable of becoming
productive of both this and that through themselves do not become pro-
ductive, and it is not because of the same cause in the atoms and in them-
46 See further Sedley (1999, pp. 383-4, pp. 395-402).
47 Sedley (1999, pp. 366-71, pp. 379-82).
48 The second line of thought has been suggested to me by David Sedley, in response
to reading a draft of Gill (2006, ch. I).
49 For brief discussion of this issue in Stoicism, see the end of this section.
50 LS 20C 1, trans. LSj On Nature 34.26 Arrighetti (1973).

selves. These in particular we combat and rebuke ... in accordance with

their nature which is disturbed from the beginning, as is true of all ani-
mals. For in their case the nature of the atoms has contributed nothing to
some of their actions, and to the extent of their actions and dispositions,
but the developments themselves contain all or most of the cause of some
of these things. As a result of that nature some of the atoms' motions are
moved in a disturbed way, not in every way through the atoms, but through
what enters . .. from the environment into the natural ... combating and
advising many people together, which is opposed to the necessary cause of
the same kind. Thus when something develops which has some distinctness
among the atoms in a differential way, which is not like that from a differ-
ent distance, it acquires a cause from itself, then transmits it at once to the
primary natures and in some way makes all of it one. 51
The main themes of the discussion from which these extracts come
are relatively clear. Epicurus claims that human beings are properly held
responsible for their actions because of the way they develop, by contrast
with wild non-human animals. In the continuation of the first passage
cited, he argues against the idea that human action is necessitated in a
way that undermines responsibility (LS 20C 2-12). A well-marked feature
of these and related passages is the idea that "we ourselves" or "the devel-
opments" (ta apogegenemena) play a major role as causes. Another is the
contrast between "we" or "developments", on the one hand, and "atoms"
(or "the nature of the atoms") or "nature" (or "original constitution"). 52
Scholarly debate has centred on the question of the theoretical framework
implied by these contrasts and by the passages as a whole.
David Sedley, whose work has done much to bring out the importance
of these texts, has argued that the framework implied is that of "emergent
dualism". Given a certain level of material complexity, mental capacities
"emerge", which are distinct from, and causally independent of, the ma-
terial make-up of the entity concerned. The contrasts noted earlier are
seen by Sedley as suggesting that "self-determining animals (including
humans)" develop "selves which are not identical with their constituent
atoms". "The self becomes responsible as soon as the animal develops a
certain type of characteristic over and above his atomic make-up". "In
Epicurus' view matter in certain complex states can take on non-physical
qualities which in turn bring genuinely new behavioural laws into opera-
tion."53
51 LS 20B 1-6, On Nature 34.21-2 Arrighetti (1973). Translation as in Annas

(1993, pp. 56-7); for differences from the translation in LS, based partly on the
readings of Laursen (1988) (cf. Laursen (1998)), see Annas's footnotes.
52 See Annas (1993, pp. 57-8).
53 Quotations from Sedley (1983, pp. 38-409); see also Sedley (1988, pp. 321-2), and
LS, vo!. 1, p.no.

However, some other scholars have expressed scepticism about this

view, arguing, instead, that Epicurus' position reflects - what we should
call - "ontological physicalism" or "token identity physicalism" (accord-
ing to which each mental event is identical with a physical event).54 The
contrasts noted earlier are taken, from this standpoint, as identifying dif-
ferent stages in the development of the animal, understood as a mental-
cum-physical unit. The main contrast is thought to be between the de-
veloping or developed personality and the original or earlier nature or
state. The passages cited are seen as challenging the claim that human
beings are properly exempted from responsibility for the moral quality of
their actions and character because of the "necessity" imposed on them
by their inborn nature or social upbringing. In the first passage cited (L8
20C 1), the stress falls on the idea that the way we develop is "from us"
or "up to us" (par' hemas) and that we respond to environmental factors
because of our belief-set at anyone time. In the second passage, develop-
ment is presented as being the process by which the person chooses one
or other action or way of life out of those made possible by the congenital
or environmentally shaped background. The developing person "acquires
a cause from itself" which he or she transmits to the "primary natures"
(pre-existing natural traits) and makes all this into "one" or a cohesive
character. 55 In other words, what both passages present is understood as
the process by which we (as mental-cum-physical) units shape our pre-
existing characters by thought and conscious effort, rather than as an
exercise of purely mental causation on our physical make-up (as 8edley
argues).56
The issues involved turn partly on the interpretation of difficult and
fragmentary texts. For instance, in the last sentence of the second pas-
sage cited, there is debate about whether the phrase heteroteta ton atom on
means "distinctness from the atoms", as 8edley thinks, or "distinctness
among the atoms" , as is supposed by some other scholars. Also in this sen-
tence, 8edley takes protOn phuseon to mean primary natures in the sense
of "atoms", whereas others take it to mean the pre-existing (mental-cum-
physical) "original character" .57 Another salient factor is the interpreta-
tion of the rationale of Epicurus' argument. 8edley has argued that the
main, though implicit, target of the argument consists in certain post-
54 For these categories, see Everson (1999, p.547), cited earlier, and Annas (1993,
p.59, n.30, point (1)). Other discussions dissenting from Sedley's analysis include
Hankinson (1998, pp. 226-32), Bobzien (2000), O'Keefe (2002).
55 LS 20B 6, cited earlier in the translation of Annas (1993, pp. 56-7), final sentence.
56 See further Annas (1993, pp. 57-64), Bobzien (2000).
57 See Sedley (1983, p.37), also LS 20B 5. Contrast the view of Laursen
(1988, p.9, pp. 12-13), Annas (1993, pp. 56-7), Bobzien (2000, pp. 326-7), O'Keefe
(2002, pp. 173-9).

Democritean thinkers, who suppose that human actions are determined

by physical (atomic) causes in a way that negates responsibility. Epicurus'
use of (in modern terms) "emergent dualism" is seen as part of a response
designed to counteract Democritus' "reductionist" thesis, noted earlier,
that "in truth" (by contrast with "convention"), there are only atoms and
void. 58 Other scholars, while accepting Sedley's account of Epicurus' over-
all aim, dispute the idea that Epicurus' response to the Democritean (or
post-Democritean) view requires a breach in the physicalism which they
see as characteristic of his approach. Everson, for instance, argues that, on
several grounds, it is plausible to attribute to Epicurus the strong position
of "ontological" (as distinct from "explanatory") physicalism. But he ar-
gues that this does not mean that Epicurus offers a "reductionist" account
of human action or freedom. A crucial feature of Everson's interpretation,
noted earlier, is that Epicurus conceives humans, and other animals, not
just as atomic constituents, but also as "systems of atoms". Analysis of
what is sometimes seen as the "mental" dimension of human life can be
given effectively in physicalist terms, provided that we recognise the rel-
atively complex and structured character of certain "systems of atoms"
and draw out the implications of this fact for ascribing responsibility for
character and action. 59
Although both of these interpretations can credibly be maintained, the
second (physicalist) one seems to me more convincing. This is, mainly, be-
cause the physicalist interpretation of the rationale of Epicurus' position
seems to match better the full range of relevant evidence. For instance, the
passages cited earlier from Epicurus' Letter to Herodotus (63-7) appear to
express a strong, and indeed programmatic, form of physicalism. Relevant
also are the ideas that the psyche consists of a determinate type of atoms
and that animal species and human individuals have characters based on
their atomic make-up. These features reflect what Everson calls "ontolog-
ical", rather than "explanatory", physicalism. 6o Sedley's view would be
more persuasive if it were clear that Epicurus (like Kant, for instance) held
that moral agency and responsibility require us to postulate purely mental
58 DK fr. B 9 (n.7 above). See Sedley (1983, pp.29-36); also, on Epicurus' response
to Democritean "reductionism", Warren (2002, especially pp. 193-200), von Staden
(2000, p. 86, n. 11).
59 Everson (1999, p.549, p.557). See also O'Keefe (2002, pp. 158-60, p.167), who,
however, sees Epicurus' position as reductionist (by contrast with the "eliminative
materialism" of Democritus).
60 See discussion of these features in Section 3 above, and Everson (1999, pp. 550-
3), who also refers also to Lucretius' explanation in atomic terms of the role of
images in stimulating movement (4.877-91) and of the onset of emotion (3.288-93).
Other features in Epicurean thought lend themselves better to analysis in terms of
explanatory physicalism; see further Hankinson (1999, pp. 501-2).

(non-physical) capacities or properties. 61 But this would be a difficult the-

sis to maintain. The arguments on moral responsibility in On Nature 25
can be credibly interpreted on the assumption that we are both "systems
of atoms" and moral agents;62 and this reading seems more consistent
with Epicurean theory overall.
There are good grounds, then, for concluding that, if Epicurean thought
constitutes a form of psychophysical holism, as maintained here, this is
compatible with what is - in modern terms - physicalism, rather than
emergent dualism. Physicalism (again, in the modern sense) also seems
more in line with the holistic outlook, as I have presented this in Epi-
curean and Stoic thought. I have suggested that, in a holistic approach,
even complex or advanced functions are seen as belonging to the person
as a (psychophysical) whole, rather than as belonging to a psychic "part"
or "core". The latter line of thought is characteristic, rather, of a cer-
tain strand in Platonic or Aristotelian thought; and it is a strand against
which Epicureanism and Stoicism seem to react, in their convergence on
substantial holism. 63 Separate argument would be needed to show that
Stoic theory also assumes or advocates physicalism. However, I am not
persuaded that the features noted earlier (as regards "incorporeals" such
as lekta or god as an intelligent agent) imply that the Stoics take a non-
physicalist approach to the question of the psyche-body relationship.64
There is little to suggest that the Stoics conceive the psyche as being anal-
ogous to lekta, that is, as a non-physical property of a physical entity.65
Rather, as illustrated earlier, psyche, like the other modes of "tension",
including "nature" and "reason", seems to be conceived as a (physical)
instantiation of the combination of pneuma and hule. This explains Hiero-
cles' presentation of animal functions such as self-perception as those of a
unified entity, whose psychological properties are at the same time physi-
cal ones (Section 2 above). However, as noted earlier, there are grounds for
questioning whether the mind-body distinction in general can be mapped
effectively on to the ancient distinction between psyche and soma. So,
to the extent that modern categories such as physicalism and emergent
dualism presuppose the (modern) mind-body distinction, some questions
still remain about how far Stoic-Epicurean thought is best described as
"physicalist". It is partly for this reason that I have mainly focused in
61 For Kant's argument that moral autonomy requires freedom of the will, and that
this requires the postulate of a purely intelligible (non-sensual) standpoint, see
Groundwork, Prussian Academy Edition, vo!. 4, pp. 446-59.
62 See Everson (1999, pp. 549-50, p. 557).
63 See n. 11 above. Debate between these two strands of thought continues throughout
Hellenistic-Roman thought, e.g. in Plutarch's essay, On Ethical Virtue, and Galen
PHP Books 4-5; see further Gill (2006, ch. 4).
64 See text to n. 41 above.
65 On lekta ("sayables"), see LS 33.

this chapter on the idea of (psychophysical) holism which seems to me to

reflect the (converging) philosophical projects of the Stoics and Epicure-
ans, as conceived from their own standpoint. 66 However, in so far as the
(modern) notion of physicalism is applicable to their frameworks, it seems
to me clear that they hold a physicalist, rather than dualist, conception of
psyche, and that this follows from their overall outlook of (psychophysical)
holism.
References
Algra, Keimpe / Barnes, Jonathan / Mansfeld, Jaap / Schofield, Mal-

col m (eds), 1999, The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Annas, Julia, 1992, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, Berkeley: University
of California Press.
-, 1993, "Epicurus on Agency", in: J. Brunschwig / M.C. Nussbaum
(eds), Passions and Perceptions: Studies in Hellenistic Philosophy
of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 53-71.
Arrighetti, Graziano (ed.), 1973, 2nd edn., Epicuro: Opere, Biblioteca di
Cultura Filosofica 41, Turin: Giulio Einaudi.
Bobzien, Susanne, 2000, "Did Epicurus Discover the Free Will Problem?",
in: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 19, pp. 287-337.
Burnyeat, Myles, 1982, "Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes
Saw and Berkeley Missed", in: Philosophical Review, 91, pp. 3-40.
-, 1992, "Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? A Draft",
in: M.C. Nussbaum / A.O. Rorty (eds) , Essays on Aristotle's De
Anima, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 15-26.
Dillon, John, 2003, The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy (347-
274 BC), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
van der Eijk, Philip, 2000, "Aristotle's Psycho-physiological Account of
the Soul-Body Relationship", in: J.P. Wright / P. Potter (eds), Psy-
che and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-Body
Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment, Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, pp. 57-77.
Everson, Stephen (ed.), 1991, Psychology: Companions to Anc. Thought
2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
66 I see the contrast between a holistic and part-based or core-centred approach to
psychology as reflecting a deliberate philosophical programme, a thesis argued
more fully in Gill (2006, ch. 1). The clearest evidence of programmatic physicalism
(in the modern sense) discussed here seems to me to consist in the passages from
Epicur. Ep.Hdt. 63-7 cited in Section 3.

-, 1999, "Epicurean Psychology", in: K. Algra / J. Barnes / J. Mansfeld

/ M. Schofield (eds), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philo-
sophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 542-59.
Gill, Christopher, 1991, "Is There a Concept of Person in Greek Philo-
sophy?", in: S. Everson (ed.), Psychology: Companions to Ancient
Thought 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 166-93.
-, 1997, "Galen versus Chrysippus on the Tripartite Psyche in Timaeus
69-72", in: T. Calvo / L. Brisson (eds) , Interpreting the Timaeus-
Critias: Proceedings of the IV Symposium Platonicum, Sankt Au-
gustin: Academia Verlag, pp. 267-73.
-, 2006, The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Hankinson, James, 1998, Cause and Explanation in Anc. Greek Thought,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
-, 1999, "Explanation and Causation", in: K. Algra / J. Barnes / J.
Mansfeld / M. Schofield (eds), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic
Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 479-512.
Inwood, Brad, 1984, "Hierocles: Theory and Argument in the Second Cen-
tury AD", in: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 2, pp. 151-84.
-, 1985, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Irwin, Terence, 1991, "Aristotle's Philosophy of Mind", in: S. Everson
(ed.), Psychology: Companions to Ancient Thought 2, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 56-83.
Laursen, Simon, 1988, "Epicurus On Nature XXV (Long and Sedley 20,
B, C and J)", in: Cronache Ercolanesi, 18, pp. 7-18.
-, 1998, "The Later Parts of Epicurus, On Nature, 25th Book", in: Cro-
nache Ercolanesi, 27, pp. 5-82.
Long, Anthony, 1996, Stoic Studies, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
- , 1999, "Stoic Psychology", in: K. AIgra / J. Barnes / J. Mansfeld / M.
Schofield (eds) , The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 560-84.
Long, Anthony A. / Sedley, David N., 1987, The Hellenistic Philosophers,
2 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mansfeld, Jaap, 1991, "The Idea of the Will in Chrysippus, Posidonius,
and Galen", in: J.J. Cleary (ed.), Boston Area Colloquium in An-
cient Philosophy, vo!. 7, pp. 107-45.
O'Keefe, Timothy, 2002, "The Reductionist and Compatibilist Argument
of Epicurus' On Nature 25", in: Phronesis, 47, pp. 153-86.
Reydams-Schils, Gretchen, 1999, Demiurge and Providence: Stoic and Pla-
tonist Readings of Plato's Timaeus, Turnhout: Brepols.

Sedley, David, 1983, "Epicurus' Refutation of Determinism" , in: G.P. Ca-

ratelli (ed.), SUZETESIS: Studi sull'epicureismo greco et romano
ojJerti a Marcello Gigante, Naples: Bibliopolis, vol. 1, pp. 11-51.
-, 1988, "Epicurean Anti-reductionism", in: J. Barnes / M. Mignucci
(eds), Matter and Metaphysics, Fourth Symposium Hellenisticum,
Elenchos 14, Naples: Bibliopolis, pp. 295-327.
-, 1999, "Hellenistic Physics and Metaphysics", in: K. AIgra / J. Barnes
/ J. Mansfeld / M. Schofield (eds), The Cambridge History of Hel-
lenistic Philosophy, Cambridge: University Press, pp. 355-411.
-, 2002, "The Origins of Stoic God", in: M. Frede / A. Laks (eds), Tra-
ditions of Theology: Studies in Hellenistic Theology, its Background
and Aftermath, Leiden: Brill, pp. 41-83.
von Staden, Heinrich, 2000, "Body, Soul, and Nerves: Herophilus, Erasi-
sistratus, the Stoics, and Galen", in: J.P. Wright / P. Potter (eds),
Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-
Body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, pp. 79-116.
Tieleman, Teun, 1996, Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul: Argument and
Refutation in De Placitis Books II-III, Philosophia Antiqua, 68, Lei-
den: Brill.
Warren, James, 2002, Epicurus and Democritean Ethics: An Archaeology
of Ataraxia, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

R. J. Hankinson
Body and Soul in Galen
Galen acknowledged an immense philosophical debt to Plato,l just as he

avowed his medical allegiance to Hippocrates. 2 In both cases the acknowl-
edgements may have outweighed the actual debts; but however that may
be, he composed his massive De placitis Hippocratis et Platonis (PHP: De
Lacy (1978-84)) in order to demonstrate how, on all important matters
of method and doctrine, his two great masters spoke with one voice. And
central to Plato's doctrines are those regarding the soul, pre-eminently its
tripartition and its (at least partial) immortality. In PHP, Galen devotes
an immense amount of time to demonstrating (as he sees it) the truth of
tripartition, and the facts regarding the physical locations of the parts,
doctrines which he expressly attributes to Plato:
While I am not so foolish as to make rash assertions about these things [i.e.
the substantial nature and possible immortality of the soul], still I do claim
to have proofs that the forms of the soul are more than one, that they are
located in three different places, that one of them (the reasoning part) is
divine, while the other two are concerned with affections, such that we are
angry with one of them, and desire those pleasures that come through the
body with the other (which we share with plants) - and further that one of
these parts is situated in the brain, one in the heart, and one in the liver. 3
These facts can be demonstrated scientifically. (1: PHP V.793 Kiihn, (=
598.27-600.4 De Lacy))
See De Lacy (1973) for a brief account of his Platonism.
2 On Galen's Hippocratism, see Smith (1979); it is even more extreme than his
Platonism. Indeed he thinks that Plato owed much to his medical predecessor:
"he was a follower of Hippocrates, if anyone was, and took his most important
doctrines from him": De 'US'U parti'Um corporis h'Umani (UP) 111.16 Kiihn (= 11.21-
3 Helmreich (1907)); cf. De methodo medendi (MM) X.17 Kiihn. Texts of Galen
are cited mainly by way of Kiihn (1821-33); but where later and better texts exist
(notably in the Corp'Us Medicorum Graecorum [CMG], and the three volumes of
Galeni Scripta Minora [SM]), I generally refer to them as well.
3 But while Galen thus expressly places the appetitive soul in the liver, Plato more
vaguely situates it "between the diaphragm and the navel" (Ti. 70e, cf. 77b),
with the liver constructed as a special part of it designed to receive divinatory
information from the gods (Ti. 70a-71b).

Body and Soul in Galen 233
Thus he rails at the folly of those who refuse to accept that the soul
has separate spirited and appetitive parts in addition to the rational,
rehearsing and defending the classical Platonic arguments on the subject
drawn from the Republic and the Timaeus, reserving particular scorn for
the unitary psychology of the Stoics. 4
Moreover, that the rational soul is located in the brain and not in
the heart is, he holds, irrefutably demonstrable on the basis of anatomi-
cal investigation. Towards the beginning of PHP,5 discussing the various
different views about the origin of sensation and intellection in the hu-
man body, Galen attacks those (primarily Aristotle, the Stoics and the
doctor Praxagoras) who suppose that the heart is the seat of reason (the
attack is pressed home vigorously and at length in the succeeding books),
castigating their inability to realise that the nerves are the bearers of
sensation and voluntary motion and that they have their origin in the
brain. Chrysippus's error, Galen somewhat backhandedly says, is excus-
able, since he admitted he knew nothing of anatomy; but for Aristotle and
Praxagoras to say, in the face of the evidence available to them, that the
heart is the source of the arteries deserves censure {PHP V.187 Kiihn (=
80.21-6 De Lacy)).
Galen first deals with Praxagoras's views that nerves are the thinned-
out ends of arteries - and hence are to be associated with the heart -
at typical length {V.188-200 Kiihn (= 80.33-90.25 De Lacy)); and then
he turns to Aristotle, who "twice spoke confusedly and imprecisely about
the origin of the nerves" {V.200 Kiihn (= 90.28-9 De Lacy)); but he failed
to "point out how the nerves ramified from it [se. the heart] to every
part of the body, as we have just now done in the case of the arteries"
{ibid. (= 90.30-2 De Lacy)). Galen then quotes from Parts of Animals
IlI.4 666b14-16: "it is reasonable that the heart has a large number of
nerves, since movements originate from it, and are accomplished by their
tension and relaxation,,;6 and he points out the inadequacy of such an ar-
gument: mere numbers of a particular structure in a certain organ doesn't
establish that that organ is the source of the structures; but in any case
the heart is not particularly well-endowed with nerves {201-2 (= 92.2-21)).
Rather "it contains certain nerve-like outgrowths; but these are in no way
actually nerves" , a fact which, Galen says, can be demonstrated according
4
On the anti-Stoic arguments, see Hankinson (1991a, 1993); see also Tielemann
(1996).
5 At least of the surviving part - most of Book One of the treatise has been lost,
and the passage in question occurs towards the end of that book.
6 Quite how the nerves do manage to transmit their power to the muscles was a
vexed question in antiquity even among the anatomically lettered like Galen, who
wrote a treatise on the subject (De motu musculorum (Mot.Musc.) IV.367-464
Kiihn).

234 R. J. Hankinson
to Aristotle's own principles {ibid. {= 92.21-3)).7

This passage encapsulates Galen's methodological predilections with
regard to questions involving the soul: to the extent to which detailed
physiological investigation can enable us to push forward the inquiry into
the soul's nature, location, and modes of functioning, then such investiga-
tions are neglected at our peril; and any attempt to elaborate a theory of
the soul and its relations with the body that does not make use of (or at
least make itself consistent with) the results of the best such investigations
is scientifically unfounded and philosophically worthless.
Galen's own detailed explorations in dissection and vivisection, and his
experiments on live animals to demonstrate the effects of spinal sections
and the ligature of various nerves, need no rehearsal here. 8 The crucial
point is that he holds, and holds it to have been securely established, that
the nervous system (properly so-called, and not merely anything that
Aristotle and his predecessors, including Hippocrates, might have lumped
together under the general heading of neura: see n. 7 above) is the means
by which those powers characteristic of the soul, or more precisely of the
rational soul, are transmitted.
Indeed, or so Galen at least thinks, it can be shown, or at the very least
rendered highly plausible, that this transmission takes place by means of
psychic pneuma, a highly volatile fluid to which was attributed a wide va-
riety of different functions by different ancient doctors and philosophers. 9
7 Of course the word Aristotle uses, neuron, did not at his time have the precise
sense of "nerve" that it was later to acquire, as a result of the anatomical advances
of the Alexandriansj Galen was probably well aware of this, but his failure to point
this out here does not affect the substantial point of his argument.
8 See however Hankinson (1991a, 1994a)j and most recently Rocca (2003).
9 Pneuma is mentioned in various Hippocratic texts in a variety of contexts (cf. in
particular On Breathsj but see also, e.g., Sacred Disease 7, lO)j it plays an impor-
tant, if somewhat obscure, role in Aristotle's physiology and psychology, where it
appears, among other things, to be the vehicle of the soul's power (GA n.3 736b30-
37a8j cf. PA n.7 652b8-15j on the role of "connate (sumphuton) pneuma", see MA
10 703a4-27j GA n.6 741b37-42a15j see Peck (1942, pp. 576-93»j and it is central
to the Stoics' account of the structure and coherence of the material world (see LS
47C-J,L-Qj 53B,G-H,K-L). Post-Aristotelian doctors distinguish between "psy-
chic" and "vital" pneuma, substances of different constitutions responsible for dif-
ferent effects (Herophilus, Erasistratus, Diocles, Praxagoras)j and one later, Stoic-
influenced school, that of Athenaeus, was actually designated "Pneumatist". For
Galen's views regarding psychic pneuma, see De utilitate respimtionis (Ut.Resp.
IV.470-511 Kiihn)j De usu pulsuum (Us. PuIs. V.149-80 Kiihn). In Christian hands
pneuma even comes to represent the Holy Spirit. Evidently, the concept (or con-
cepts) is made to do a wide variety of work in different circumstances - and there
was much dispute even as to its physical constitution. Whether there was any phys-
ical evidence adduced for the existence of such stuff, and if so of what type it was
and how it was deployed, is a major, and vexed question, one which is obviously
related to the subject-matter of this paper but which I am unable to pursue further
here.

The Alexandrians, pre-eminently Herophilus, had distinguished the sen-

sory from the motor nervous system, and had established that the nerves
ramify from the brain.lO Moreover, Galen also follows a long tradition
(one which in this case too probably includes Herophilus)l1 in supposing
that these psychic powers and affects are mediated through the nervous
system by pneuma. Galen's own grounds for subscribing to such a theory,
and what precisely he took pneuma to be, are difficult to determine and
would require a separate study of their own. But it is at least clear that
he thinks that psychic pneuma, which is to be distinguished (following
the Stoics and others)12 from the coarser vital pneuma associated with
the heart and the arterial system out of which (he supposes - he describes
the account as eUlogon) it is distilled in the ventricles of the brain, is at
most the vehicle of transmission for the motor and sensory powers char-
acteristic of the rational soul. Thus, even if the term functions only as a
sort of place-holder, pneuma plays a significant role in his account of the
soul. But he explicitly refuses to go along with the Stoic claim that the
pneuma actually is the soul; and he has an empirical argument to back
up this claim:
On the basis of these phenomena 13 one might suppose, concerning the
pneuma in the ventricles of the brain, one of the two following possibili-
ties: if the soul is incorporeal, it [sc. the pneuma] is as one might say its
primary dwelling-place; but if it is a body, this very pneuma is the soul.
But when it occurs that, shortly after the ventricles have been closed up,
the animal perceives and moves again, one can maintain that neither of
these alternatives is true regarding the pneuma. It is thus better to sup-
pose that the soul dwells in the actual body of the brain, whatever it might
turn out to be as regards its essence (for our inquiry has not yet got to
that point)14 and that its [se. the soul's] primary instrument [organon] in
regard to all the animal's sensations, and its voluntary movements as well,
10 Although Galen castigates him and other Alexandrians for not determining pre-
cisely the neural pathways and their origins; on the Herophilean evidence, see von
Staden (1989, esp. pp. 155-61, pp. 247-59).
11 See von Staden (1989, pp. 251-7).
12 The distinction between psychic and vital pneuma may well be owed to the Alexan-
drian Erasistratus; at any rate according to Galen he rightly refused to allow that
the two pneumas were derived directly from the heart (as the Stoics apparently
held), but had the vital pneuma originate in the heart, a portion of which was
then further elaborated in the meninges into the more refined psychic pneuma: see
Galen, Ut.Resp. IV.502 Kiihn; An in arteriis sanguis contineatur IV.703 Kiihn;
PHP V.280-1 Kiihn (= 164.8-16 De Lacy). See also PHP V.602-11 (= 440.9-448.6
De Lacy); Ars medica 1.406 Kiihn (= 386.11-12 Boudon).
13 Sc. that an animal does not lose sensation or motion while undergoing brain surgery
until the ventricles themselves are damaged: PHP V.604-5 (= 442.19-35 De Lacy).
For Galen's hair-raising experiments in cerebral anatomy, see now Rocca (2003).
14 The Greek might be taken to imply that we will eventually get there; but it may
simply mean that no such progress has yet been made. The ordinary sense favours
the former; Galen's aporetic pronouncements elsewhere incline one towards the
latter interpretation.

236 R. J. Hankinson
is this pneuma, and for this reason when it is emptied out, and until it is
collected again, the animal does not lose its life, but is rendered incapable
of sensation and motion, whereas if it really were the substance of the soul,
the animal would die immediately it was emptied out. (2: PHP V.605-6 (=
442.36-444.11 De Lacy); cf. 280-4, 287-9, 609 Kiihn (= 164.8-166.23, 170.6-
27, 446.11-15 De Lacy); De simplicium medicamentorum temperamentis et
facultatibus (SMT XI.731 Kiihn; Ut. Resp. IV.501-2 Kiihn).
Thus, while a catastrophic loss of pneuma through a wound can result
in a failure of psychic abilities such as that of voluntary motion, these
abilities can be recovered once the pneuma has been given a chance to
regenerate; pneuma is thus a necessary medium of transmission (like the
fluid in a hydraulic system), and perhaps also a fuel for the movement, 15
but not the source of the motion itself: and so it is not the substance of
the soul.
Whatever its obscurities may be, then, Galen's pneuma-theory is none
the less both distinct from that of the Stoics and, clearly enough, at
least compatible with the doctrine of tripartition. And, as we have noted,
Galen thinks tripartition can be demonstrated by anatomical investigation
informed by a proper understanding of the nature of causal connections.
The same thing, however, does not apply in the case of Plato's other
signature doctrines regarding the soul, namely those of its immateriality
and immortality. And these are the issues with which I am most concerned
at present.
At the very end of his life, Galen wrote a summary of his views on
what he took to be the most important and difficult questions of medicine
and philosophy, De propriis placitis (Prop.Plac~, which has come down
to us by a more than usually tortuous process. 1 In an early chapter, he
writes:
As for the soul, I see that it exists, and I know regarding it that we have
a soul, just as everyone does; for I see that all men call the cause of volun-
tary motion and sensation the soul. But I do not claim to know the soul's
substance, and a fortiori I should not claim to know whether it is mortal.
15 This is suggested by Us. Puis. V.154-6 Kiihn, where Galen describes ligating the
carotid arteries of some animal, and then being surprised by its ability to continue
running around for some time before keeling over; he attributes this ability to its
being able to draw on a reserve of psychic pneuma stored in the "retiform plexus" of
the brain until this is finally exhausted (Wilkie, in Furley and Wilkie (1984, pp. 48-
50), refers to the animal as a dog; but this is nowhere made explicit in this text,
and seems to be a slip, deriving from the fact that Sir Astley Cooper's similar, but
more radical experiment of 1836, which Wilkie also refers to, was performed on a
dog).
16 For details of the composition and transmission (via Syriac, Arabic, Latin, and -
occasionally - Greek: a small fragment from the end survives under the name De
substantia jacultatum naturalium fragmentum (Subst.Nat.Fac.» of Prop.Plac., see
Nutton (1999, pp. 14-50).

I composed a book On the Doctrines of Hippocmtes and Plato .... But I

made no claim anywhere in it as to whether the soul was mortal or im-
mortal, corporeal or incorporeal. (3: Prop.Plac. 3.1-2, 58.22-60.11 Nutton;
trans. here and elsewhere after Nutton)
Indeed he did not - in fact he deliberately and consistently disavowed the
possibility of making such claims at any rate with the sort of scientific,
demonstrative certainty which he demands in medicine and physiology. At
PHP V.779-82 (= 586.34-600.11 De Lacy) Galen notes that knowing the
location of the parts of the soul is important to the doctor, but irrelevant
to the moral philosopher; while other sorts of inquiry are appropriate only
to "theoretical" philosophy (Le. speculative metaphysics), for example
"whether there is anything after this cosmos, and if so what it is like, and
whether this cosmos is self-contained, and whether there is more than
one of them, and indeed very many of them, and if it is generated or
ungenerated, and if generated whether by a god, or whether rather there
is no artisan-god which made it, but only some irrational and unskilled
cause ... " (780 (= 588.9-14 De Lacy); cf. Prop.Plac. 13.7, 14.5, 15.5,
108.11-110.3,114.19-116.1,120.4-12 Nutton (= Subst.Nat.Fac. IV.759-60,
761-2, 764 Kiihn). On the other hand, the question of whether or not the
universe is providentially organized, Galen holds, matters to both science
and natural philosophy. In fact, he thinks, it is demonstrable that it is
(783-91 (= 590.20-596.29 De Lacy)), although science cannot (and does
not need to) determine what form and number the divinities take (781 (=
588.22-5 De Lacy)),l7 But if questions regarding the divine substance are
philosophically and scientifically intractable, that regarding its existence
he thinks is not; it is evident on the basis of the senses properly interpreted
that the universe is under divine, providential control, and hence that
some god or gods exist. Exactly the same state of affairs obtains, he
thinks, with regard to the soul. That it exists is uncontroversial; what
it is, and how long it lasts, are altogether different and knottier problems.
And this, of course, creates a difficulty for Galen's Platonism, since
Plato seems to hold unequivocally that the soul is both immaterial and
immortal. Galen seizes on Plato's claims in the Timaeus 29c-d that his
account extends only as far as the "plausible and reasonable" (Galen's
characterization: PHP V.792 (= 598.9 De Lacy); cf. ibid. 791-3 (= 598.2-
27 De Lacy); cf. Prop.Plac. 13.4-7, 104.15-110.3 Nutton (= Subst.Nat.Fac.
IV.757-60 Kiihn)); and he notes that nowhere in his own discussion of the
soul and its location did he so much as discuss the issue of whether the
claim of the Timaeus 69c-e that the lower parts of the soul are mortal
17 Equally undecidable are questions involving the existence of an extramundane
void: PHP V.766 Kiihn (= 576.27-578.1 De Lacy); see also Prop.Plac. 2.1,56.12-
20 Nutton.

238 R. J. Hankinson
is to be taken literally or metaphorically (794 (= 600.7-10 De Lacy))j18

and this is the position he espouses in Prop.Plac. There is a scholarly is-
sue as to whether Galen's views on the soul remain completely consistent
throughout his oeuvre (elsewhere, as we shall see, he is more forthright
in rejecting the possibility of the lower parts of the soul being immortal:
text 15 below) and in particular as to how far in some places he seems
committed to an anti-substantialist, functionalist view of the soul as a
locus of powers attributable to particular bodily structuresj19 but at all
events it seems impossible to make him into any sort of orthodox Platon-
ist in spite of his own evident desire to minimize his differences with the
master (or at any rate to place the two of them in the same methodolog-
ical camp). In an aside in De symptomatum causis (Symp.Caus.) VII.191
Kiihn, he remarks: "perhaps in some other work I will dare to make some
pronouncement regarding the substance of the soul": but it seems that he
never did so.
A little later in Prop.Plac. he addresses those issues which he thinks
cannot be settled with scientific certainty:
I have refused all claims to knowledge (scientia) of whatever the substance
of the soul might be, and whether it is mortal or immortal, insofar as it
seems to me to be possible for the soul to inhabit the body even if it were
immortal and incorporeal; none the less, it seems probable to me that the
body, upon receiving it [se. the soul] should become perceptive, since it [the
body] is controlled by it [the soul] in its dispositions in which it [the body]
ought properly to be, and in virtue of which we say20 that an eye is seeing,
an ear hearing and a tongue speaking. I also say that the generation of the
body depends upon a certain mixture 21 which is the same as the mixtures
of the elements; and if the soul arrives at the same time as the body, then
its generation is also from the four elements. But it is impossible that the
soul should come from one thing and the perceptive body from another,
because the substance of the soul is not something which exists on its own
account (per se), but is found along with the species (by which I mean the
form) of the body. (4: Prop.Plae. 7.1-2, 76.25-78.10 Nutton)
18 This is of course a vexed issue in Platonic scholarship - at times it looks as though

only the rational soul ought to be immortal, and yet the mythological passages
seem strongly to suggest that the tripartite soul survives as a whole. Galen leans
towards the view that Plato only supposed the rational soul to survive bodily
death: see Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta sequantur (QAM) IV.772-9
Kiihn (= SM 2, 36.9-42.2) discussed further below.
19 See Donini, forthcoming.
20 Nutton (79,4) translates "just as we say"; but the point is surely that it is in virtue
of being ensouled that we say that an eye is capable of seeing, etc.
21 Or "temperament": krasis in the original Greek. A krasis is a blending of the
fundamental elements or properties that make something up, and it is what is
responsible for the thing's particular characteristics; see further below, p.250.

This passage is in many ways typical of Galen's remarks about the soul;
and it is not untypically difficult to determine its exact import. None
the less, the final sentence appears to assert relatively unequivocally that
the soul is always at least associated with a body, and with a body of a
particular type (this is what it is to be "found along with ... the form
of the body"). The talk of bodies "receiving" souls might seem to imply
their separate, substantial existence, but Galen can have meant there to
be no such implication, even if, as he says in the first sentence, he holds
such a state of affairs to be possible. All he means to do is to distinguish
conceptually between the idea of the soul and its properties, and that of
the body, conceived purely as such. Nothing whatever is supposed to follow
from this regarding the soul's ontological status; the soul is separable in
account, as Aristotle would have put it, but not necessarily in actuality.
Still, 4 does at least commit Galen to some sort of functional account
of the soul. We ascribe soul to things in virtue of the various capacities
they possess; and we can discover important facts about the location and
mediation of those capacities by way of anatomical investigation. But to
go any further than that is to enter the realm of speculation, and while
that need not necessarily be unfounded or irrational speculation, it still
forms no part of legitimate science. And it is in unpacking the last idea
that the subtlety and intrinsic interest of Galen's position becomes patent.
Let us, then, look at some of the claims of that last passage a little more
closely.
First of all, it is the soul that makes the body perceptive. Bodies as
such, we may infer, are not capable of perception, nor (presumably) of
any of the other functions traditionally attributable to the soul. Bodies
may possess soul, or not, as the case may be; but they are not by nature
ensouled. Galen thus rejects any form of panpsychism, and (consequently)
any of the sorts of reductionism that go along with it. One of his objections
to the views of the atomists and other materialist reductionists is that
they cannot account for the qualitative phenomenology of perception. Of
course perception involves physical alterations of a certain type; but it is
unreasonable to suppose that it is identical with those alterations:
He [se. Plato]22 says that the body of the universe was made from fire and
earth so that it might be visible and tangible; so for this reason in animals'
bodies too the tactile organ is earthy and the visual one fiery; but while they
could undergo alteration without perceiving it if they had no nerves, since
they do have them, they can perceive the alteration. For perception is not
identical to altemtion, as some say, but it is the discernment of altemtion
[emphasis added]. Nor is it enough for the generation of pleasure or pain that
a smooth or a rough motion should occur in the body;23 rather sensation
needs to be added to each of these motions. I do not care if you choose to
22 Timaeus 3ib.
23 This being the view of various materialists, notably the Cyrenaics: DL 2.86.

240 R. J. Hankinson
call the condition (diathesis) itself "pain" or "suffering" ;24 I only urge you
to remember that there is a difference between the condition which grips
bodies which have departed from their natural state, and the perception of
it. (5: PHP V.635-6 Kiihn (= 468.10-22 De Lacy))
Bodies as such may suffer alteration; but only those endowed with some
further set of soul-attributes may be supposed capable of being aware
of that fact. At De naturalibus facultatibus (Nat.Fac.) 11.26-30 Kiihn (=
119.25-122.16 Helmreich (1983)), Galen distinguishes between two types
of theorists: those who hold that "substance subject to generation and de-
struction is completely unified [Le. continuous] and capable of alteration
[Le. purely qualitative change]" and those who think that substance is
"unchangeable, unalterable, divided into fine bodies which are separated
from one other by intervening empty spaces" . The latter of course are the
atomists; and since for them all alteration is epiphenomenal only,25 "those
adhering to the second party think that there is no substance or power
peculiar to nature or the soul, but that these result from some sort of
concatenation of these primary, unaffectible bodies". Their opponents (of
whom Galen is one) make nature on the other hand a primary principle,
prior to and responsible for material arrangements, rather than simply
being emergent upon them. Nature is a skilful artisan who generates liv-
ing creatures and endows them with certain faculties by which they can
maintain themselves and their kind. By contrast, the pure materialists
refuse to accept any such account of a formative Nature, and deny the ex-
istence of any such faculties or innate ideas in the soul; they are hardline
empiricists, deriving all ideas and reason from sensation; indeed "some of
them have expressly claimed that there is no power in the soul by which
we reason, but that we are led like cattle by the affections of our senses,
and have no capacity of refusal or dissent" (this latter view, Galen thinks,
does away with the virtues of courage, practical reason, temperance and
self-control, and as such is both abhorrent and unacceptable).
Whether or not he is right to think that atomist-style reductionism
can give no satisfactory non-eliminative account of such properties is not
an issue 1 can explore here. But the battle lines are clearly drawn: and it
24 Galen regularly insists that naming itself is conventional, and that it doesn't matter
what you choose to name things as long as you do so consistently. On the other hand
he usually does not endorse such solecismsj much better to speak normal Greek
if you can (cf. PHP V.521-2 (= 374.9-21 De Lacy)j MM X.80-1 Kiihnj and see
Hankinson (1994b». Here, however, he is concerned to vindicate Hippocrates, who
appeared to allow for pains which were not felt by their "sufferers" (Aph. 2.6, IV 470
Littre)j cf. Galen, In Hippocratis aphorismos commentarius XVII.B.460 Kiihnj De
temperamentis (Temp.) 1.676-7 Kiihn (= 104.22-1055 Helmreich (1904».
25 Cf. Democritus, fr. DK 68 B 125: "by convention sweet, by convention bitter, by
convention hot, by convention cold, by convention colour: in reality atoms and the
void".

is evident that Galen thinks that in the case of the soul, just as elsewhere,
the atomists' explanatory resources are hopelessly poverty-stricken. So
something is needed over and above a pure material reductionism. But
what? Here Galen is particularly cagey, and his views are hard to pin
down, but not because of any dissimulation or lack of frankness on his
part. Rather he himself is genuinely puzzled about what to say about the
soul - and it is that puzzlement which I want to follow out here.
Galen's crucial claim is that italicized in text 5: there must be more
to perception (and consciousness) than simply the fact of alteration, oth-
erwise there will be no good reason not to suppose that every alteration
is accompanied by an associated perception of it on the part of the thing
altered - but that, Galen evidently supposes, is simply too much to swal-
low. And it is indeed hard to avoid such panpsychist conclusions if one
adheres to some sort of naive reductionism here,26 conclusions which are,
as we shall see, anathema to Galen. Moreover, one might also invoke here
on his behalf the sort of "open question" argument frequently deployed by
non-reductionists in these contexts: no matter how we describe in physical
terms the alterations which take place in some system (in modern con-
texts the standard examples of such alterations are computational, and
the systems computer hardware and software), it is still an open question
whether or not the systems are conscious of what they are doing, much
less that they understand it.
But it is one thing, however, to feel uncomfortable with eliminative
materialism, and to feel that the categories of the soul cannot be simply
reduced out of existence; it is another altogether to be able to say some-
thing positive about just what such distinctively psychic powers consist
in. Thus, in spite of his enormous admiration for Plato's philosophy, Galen
will endorse neither his immaterialism nor his view that part at any rate
of the soul is immortal.
What, then, can he say about the soul? First of all, in spite of his
castigation of Aristotle for his empirical shortcomings in regard to the
nature of the nerves and the cardiocentric doctrine, Galen owns himself
an adherent of the Stagirite's method,
Since it was he who taught us to look to the function (chreia) and the
activity (energeia) of each of the parts, and not merely to its structure,
whenever we are concerned with determining what it essentially is; thus if
we were asked what it is for something actually to be an eye, we would
answer "to be an organ capable of seeing" ... every part is distinguished
by its activity and function, and not by its physical shape ... For if it is
an organ capable of seeing, it is an eye, even if it is differently constructed
in humans and in crabs ... But if this is the case, dearest Aristotle, then
26 E.g. of the sort apparently espoused by Empedocles: see the report in Plato, Meno
76c-d.

242 R. J. Hankinson
you must distinguish nerves not by their physical form, as do the majority,
untrained as they are in logic, but by activity and function. (6: PHP V.202-3
Kiihn (= 92.23-94.10 De Lacy))
Nerves resemble other structures (tendons and ligaments), at least super-
ficially; but they do quite different things and perform totally distinct
roles in the overall economy of the animal (ibid. 203-6 (= 94.11-96.11
De Lacy); cf. Mot.Muse. IV.368-9, 374-6 Kiihn), and it is function which
is important, rather than superficial structure. 27 What matters is what
things do (their energaiai); and what they do them for (their ehreiai); and
it is equally important to get clear about the nature of powers (dunameis)
and their products (erga):
We will investigate ... how many and of what kind are the powers of nature,
and what product (ergon) each of them is such as to produce. By "product"
1 mean what has been generated and brought to completion by their [sc.
the powers'] activities. e.g. blood, flesh or nerve. And 1 call an "activity"
the active motion, and the cause of it a "power" . Thus in turning food into
blood, the passive motion is that of the food, while the active is the motion
of the vein;28 just as when the limbs change position, the muscle does the
moving while the bones are moved. Thus 1 call the motion of the muscles
an activity, while that of the foods and of the bones is an effect (sumptoma)
or an affection (pathema) - the former being altered, while the latter are
transported. So it is possible to refer to an activity as also being a product of
nature (e.g. digestion, uptake [anadosis] ,29 and haematopoiesis), 30 although
not every product is an activity: for flesh is a product of nature, albeit not
an activity. (7: Nat.Fac. 11.6-7 Kiihn (= BM 3, 105.10-106.1))
The picture is completed a couple of pages later:
Each separate power falls under the category of relations: for it is primarily
the cause of the activity [sc. of the particular organ] but incidentally31 of
its product. But given that the cause is relative to something, being the
cause of what results from it alone, and of nothing else, it is obvious that
the power also falls under the category of relation. And so long as we do
not know the essence of the activating cause we call it a power [emphasis
27 Galen's views on the relationship between structure and function in biology are
interesting and sophisticated: see Hankinson (1988); see also the essay by Wilkie
in Furley and Wilkie (1984, pp. 58-69).
28 Galen supposed that food was metabolized by the stomach and then the liver into
nutritive blood that was carried by the venous system: see Nat.Fac. 11.20-27, 89,
102-7, 154-7, 159-68 Kiihn (= BM 3, 115.10-120.6, 165.20-166.7, 175.24-178.21,
212.21-214.20, 216.17-222.18); etc.
29 The process of absorption of the elaborated gastric juices, or chyle, into the liver:
see n. 28 above.
30 Later on, Galen distinguishes "bone-producing", "nerve-producing" and "cartilage-
producing" powers: ibid. 13.
31 "Incidentally (kata sumbeb€kos)" is here equivalent to "derivatively" or "indi-
rectly" i it is a technical term in Galen's vocabulary of causal analysis: see De
symptomatum differentiis (Bymp.Diff.) VII.47-9 Kiihn; Hankinson (1994b; 2003).

added]: thus we say that there is in the veins a haematopoietic power, a

digestive power in the stomach, a pulse-creating power in the heart, and in
each of the other parts a specific power corresponding to its activity. So if
we are to investigate methodically how many and what sort of powers there
are, we need to start from the products - for each product comes from a
certain activity, and some cause precedes each of the latter. (8: Nat.Fac.
11.9-10 Kiihn (= SM 3, 107.11-22))
These passages from the methodological exordium to Nat.Fac. spell out
with clarity Galen's position vis-a.-vis the postulation of powerSj and the
italicized clause of 8 is crucial. Talk of powers is not intended to replace
or pre-empt the search for a proper causal explanation, but simply to be
the first stage of conceptual clarification which is required before such
an investigation can be seriously mounted. This methodology is in evi-
dence, along with an important further stipulation and clarification, in
the following passage of PHP which is directly relevant to our concerns:
Indeed the liver is the source of the same type of power that even plants
possess. For the moment, let us call it a "power", although since we will
later show that the liver is the source of many powers, it would be bet-
ter and more accurate to call what is contained within each of these three
organs a substance rather than a power of the soul: a rational one in the
brain, a spirited one in the heart, and a desiderative one in the liver, or,
as Aristotle and his followers call it, nutritive, vegetative or generative, the
name being derived in each case from one of its activities, from growth veg-
etative, from nourishing nutritive, from generating generative. Plato called
it "desiderative" on account of the multiplicity of its desires. The Stoics on
the other hand do not call what governs plants a soul at all, but rather
nature. (9: PHP V.521 Kiihn (= 374.9-19 De Lacy))
This distinction between powers and substance is crucial. It recalls the
concerns of 3-4 above, and leads us into another central text also writ-
ten towards the end of his life, Quod animi mores corporis temperamenta
sequantur, the probandum of which is adequately indicated by its title. 32
Even so, the word translated "follow" (hepesthai) is artfully indetermi-
nate: it might, but need not, indicate causal consequencej the connection
may be one of mere conjunction (in Galen's own technical terminology,
the soul's powers will be sumptomata of bodily states)j33 and he commits
himself only to the conclusion that it is the soul's powers (in the sense
outlined above and to be clarified below) that are so consequent. None the
less, Galen thinks, empirically determinable facts about the relationship
between physiological and mental states, plus some commonsensical views
32 This "title" is in fact the first line of the treatisej it is rendered in Singer (1997) as
"The Soul's Dependence on the Body" - but this may be too strong.
33 For this terminology, see MM X.63-7, 78, 81, 85-6 Kiihnj Hankinson (1991c,
pp. 150-3)j and see also the treatises Symp.DiJJ. (VII.42-84 Kiihn, esp.42-9) and
Symp.Caus. (VII.85-272 Kiihn).

244 R. J. Hankinson
regarding the nature of causal connection (never precisely spelled out, but
easily inferable from the contexts), will render it extremely plausible that
psychological states and dispositions are, at least some of the time, directly
affected by physiological conditions. And that fact in turn has important,
albeit not demonstrative, consequences for a proper understanding of the
nature of the soul.
"The starting point of the whole subsequent inquiry", Galen says, "is
knowledge of the differences between the evident actions and affections
of the soul in small children, on the basis of which its powers become
evident" (QAM IV.768 Kiihn, (= 32.14-17 Miiller)). Different children
display radically different traits of character from very early ages, and so
these differences cannot be due to differences in upbringing;34 rather
This shows that completely opposite powers of the three forms and parts of
the soul exist by nature in children, from which one may deduce that the
nature of the soul is not the same for everyone .... For if the substance of
their souls were not different, they would perform the same activities and
suffer the same affections as a result of the same causes [emphasis added].
So it is clear that children differ from one another as regards the substance
of their souls insofar as their activities and affections differ; and if this is
the case, their powers will differ too. (10: QAM IV.768-9 Kiihn (= BM 2,
33.5-16))
The italicized passage makes an important causal claim: if the initial con-
ditions and inputs are the same, then the outputs will be the same (this
contention is put to further use towards the end of QAM where Galen at-
tacks the Stoic conception of the innate goodness of all men: 816-21 Kiihn
(= SM 2, 74.20-78.23 Miiller)).35 Thus, even though as yet we know noth-
ing concrete about the soul's substance, we do know that it must differ
substantially among individuals on the basis of empirically available facts
about the natures of their several powers. Still, many philosophers have
misunderstood the idea of "powers" , taking them to be "things which in-
habit substances in the same way as we inhabit houses" (cf. 14 below); as
we have seen (1-9 above), powers are causal postulates, invoked relative
to specific, determinate effects. Thus there will be as many "powers" as
there are particular effects, and one substance can have several distinct
34 This is Galen's version of the "cradle argument" (on which see Brunschwig (1986»:
children have certain features by nature, and their characters are not entirely deter-
mined by environmental influences (Galen is attacking the Stoics here: for further
discussion, see Hankinson (1993); but Chrysippus too argued that the fact that
children resemble their parents in regard to both physical and character traits in-
dicates that the soul is generated, and generated after the body: SVF 2.806 (=
LS 53C».
35 One may compare contemporary studies of separated identical twins in the "na-
ture/nurture" debate.

powers: thus aloe may both cleanse and dry (ibid. 769-70 Kiihn (= BM 2,
33.19-34.8) ).
So, while powers are defined provisionally and in relational terms,
the substances which exemplify them are not; which is of course why
one and the same substance may be possessed of several distinct powers
(although it need not be): and this applies equally to the concept of the
soul. Thus to say of the rational soul that it can perceive through the sense
organs, and on the basis of those percepts remember, and through its own
resources analyze and determine the coherence and conflict in things 36
is to say no more than that it "has several powers: perception, memory
and understanding, along with all the others" (QAM IV.770-1 Kiihn (=
BM 2, 34.16-25)). But these powers themselves can be divided into their
various species; moreover, the other parts of the soul are similarly well
endowed with faculties,37 although all of them {and not merely the lowest
part: 771-2 (= 35.3-36.8)) may in a sense be said to be desiderative. 38
But, he continues, while "Plato at any rate is also clearly convinced
that of these types and parts of the whole soul, the rational part is im-
mortal; but I am unable determine either that it is or that is not" {772-3
(= 36.12-16)). Here again Galen re-iterates his agnosticism regarding the
possibility of the immortality even of the rational part of the soul. But if
Galen is, even in QAM, officially at least agnostic, here he clearly leans
towards a more dogmatic form of skepticism:
If it is immortal, as Plato wants, he would have done well to tell us why
it should be separated [se. from the body] when the brain is excessively
cooled, or overheated, dried, or moistened .... For death occurs, according
to Plato, when the soul is separated from the body. I would very much like
to learn from Plato himself, if only he were alive, why a massive loss of
blood, or a draught of hemlock, or a raging fever, should separate it. But
he is no longer with us, and none of my Platonist teachers ever gave me
any reason why the soul should be separated from the body as a result of
the things I have mentioned. (11: QAM IV.775 Kuhn (= 38.4-16 Muller))
The remark about Plato's no longer being around to explain his account
of immortality is no doubt ironically humorous (as is often the case with
Galen's comments on life and death). But behind the jocularity is a deeply
serious point. How can something supposedly incorporeal and simple be
36 Cf. PHP V.720-3 (= 540.4-542.20 De Lacy).
37 Galen makes similar points in regard to physical powers and their relations in
Nat.Fac.: 11.10-20 Kiihn (= SM 3, 107.24-115.9)i and see Hankinson, forthcoming.
38 In QAM at least Galen skates over an obvious difficulty: if one and the same
substance may have different powers, why suppose that the soul is a Platonic
aggregate of three separate substances? Galen's answer is to be found in PHP,
and it is fundamentally Platonic: the facts of phenomenology force us to accept
that the soul is subject to conflicting drives and desires at the same timei and one
and the same thing cannot simultaneously be affected in contradictory ways (PHP
V.795-B05 Kiihn (= 600.21-608.29 De Lacy)).

246 R. J. Hankinson
affected by physical alterations? Galen thus raises the conceptual prob-

lem of making sense of interaction between physical and non-physical sub-
stances which was to plague the Cartesian project. Much of the remainder
of QAM is devoted to pressing this case, and to emphasizing the fact that
Plato too allows for such psychophysical (or perhaps better in these cases
physicopsychic) interactions. It is a matter of self-evidence that the soul's
parts are affected by purely physical alterations; but more devastatingly
still, they may in fact be nothing more than functions of physical aggre-
gations of material. Galen is committed, as we have seen, to there being a
determinate spatial location for the various parts of the soul; and the or-
gans wherein it resides are physical structures. Thus, notwithstanding his
repeated professions of ignorance as to the essential nature of the soul, he
remarks that each of the organs in which it is located have their own sub-
stance, and all substances are composites of matter and form, and their
material components are reducible to the four basic qualities, hot, cold,
wet and dry {773 {= 36.19-37.2 Miiller)),39 from which are elaborated
such stuffs as bronze and gold, but also
Flesh, sinew, fat and gristle, and in general all those things called "first born"
by Plato,40 and "uniform,,41 by Aristotle. For this reason, since Aristotle
himself says that the soul is the form of the body,42 we should enquire of
him, or at any rate of his followers, whether by "form" he means the shape,43
as for instance in the case of the organic bodies, or whether rather he means
some other principle of natural bodies, one which produces that uniform and
simple bodily structure which has no sensible organic composition. And
they will surely reply that it is this other principle, if indeed the activities
belong primarily to these .... Now given that all such bodies are composed
of matter and form, and, as Aristotle himself thinks, when the four qualities
are generated in the matter of physical things, bodily mixture is generated
out of them, he must posit this latter as the form; and so the substance
of the soul must be some sort of mixture of the four: of wet and dry, cold
and hot if you want to call them qualities, or, if you prefer, of the wet, hot,
cold and dry bodies; and hence we will show that the powers of the soul
are consequent upon its substance, and so too are its activities. So if the
39 This is the basis of the physics Galen outlines in De elementis ex Hippocrate, 1.413-
508 Kiihn (= De Lacy (1996)), and Temp., 1.509-694 Kiihn (= Helmreich (1904));
it is one of the things Galen holds to be securely known in Prop.Plac. 15.1,116.5-24
Nutton, even though the precise details may remain uncertain.
40 Cf. Politic us 288e-9a.
41 homoiomere: cf. PA II.l 646aI3-b27, 11.2 647al0-648aI9.
42 Cf. de An. II.l 412a19-21.
43 Not of course just the shape: but the idea is that in organic bodies it is not just the
type of stuffs involved, but their arrangements, that make them the bodies they
are.

rational part is a form of the body,44 it will be mortal. (12: QAM IV. 773-4
Kiihn (= SM 2, 37.3-38.1))
This text finds Galen clearly leaning towards some version of Aristotle's
view that the soul is the form of the body; and if it is, in the manner
described, then it is hard to imagine its existing independently of any
body. At first sight, this may seem to sit badly with text 4 from Prop.Plac.
(7.1-2, 78.2-10 Nutton), above, where Galen's agnosticism seems more
pronounced: it is still possible, he thinks there, that the soul be incorporeal
and immortal. But this discrepancy is more real than apparent, since even
in the latter passage Galen writes that "the substance of the soul is not
something which exists on its own account, but is found along with the
species (by which I mean the form) of the body". That is, I think, best
interpreted as an empirical claim, to the effect that we have no good reason
for believing that souls ever exist independently of physical bodies (Galen
apparently does not believe in ghosts); as he goes on to say, "even if45 the
soul is immortal and incorporeal, yet we find it co-existing with the body
and it is possible that 46 it works through the medium of its [se. the body's]
natural activities" (Prop.Plac. 7.3, 78.13-15 Nutton). Thus, while there
is no reason to doubt the sincerity of Galen's acknowledgements of the
possibility of the soul's being incorporeal and immortal, he is none the less
convinced both by empirical evidence and by Aristotelian metaphysical
analysis that it must be very closely tied to physical organs, perhaps to
the extent of being identical with their form (although it is worth here
remembering Aristotle's remark, at the end of de An. 11.1 in which he
develops the idea that the soul is the form of the body, that for all that
has been established so far, the soul might yet be the form of the body
"as the sailor is of the ship": de An. ILl 413a3-9). How then could it
be immortal? Presumably only by way of transmigration; the soul, as an
incorporeal entity, would persist, but only by associating with successive
44 Reading "tou somatos" for "Us psuch€s". This emendation, although questioned
by some of my audience in Munich, still seems to me to be certain; for there
seems to be no obvious point here in expressing the tautologous supposition that
the rational part is a part (and this is what "eidos" would have to mean here,
rather than "form [sc. of underlying matter]" which has been its sense earlier in
the passage; of course it can on occasion have such a sense: cf. 10 above) of the
soul. On the other hand, what is at issue is precisely the conditions under which
the rational part will turn out to be mortal - and its being a form of the body is
here argued to be just such a condition.
45 Nutton here translates "although" - but this has the unfortunate effect of making
it appear that Galen is in fact committed to the Platonist position on immortality.
46 This is awkward, although Nutton's translation of the Latin version of Galen's
original text ("et possibile est quod ipsa operetur mediantibus operationibus nat-
uralibus") seems reasonable enough; the Latin may however hide an original that
read "it is capable of doing what it does through the medium, etc.".

248 R. J. Hankinson
physical bodies. 47 More strongly, as the last sentence of 12 shows, if the

rational soul really is to be identified with the form of physical body, then
it cannot be immortal. 48
So what exactly does Galen think? In Prop.Plac., he is scrupulously
careful to distinguish between what he thinks he knows securely, and what,
following Plato (he thinks - or at rate claims), must be relegated to the
realm of the merely plausible; and in this context once again he resorts to
the postulation of powers. Everyone agrees that we have a soul, since we
are all aware of its effects (Prop.Plac. 14.1, 110.4-10 Nutton); moreover,
We know on the basis of an axiom that commends itself naturally to all of us
that there is some cause for these actions: for we know that nothing occurs
without a cause. 49 But because of our ignorance as to exactly what the
cause of these things might be, we assign it a name on the basis of its being
able to do what it does, namely "a power of producing everything which
comes to be". (13: Prop.Plac. 14.1, 110.10-21 Nutton (= Subst.Nat.Fac.
IV.760 Kiihn))
But in a manner by now familiar, we cannot with security say more than
that about the actual nature of the soul. Galen gives examples of physical
powers: everyone agrees that scammony is a laxative, medlar the opposite
(ibid. 110.21-4 Nutton); but "those versed in so-called natural science"
disagree about how precisely they work:
Some have asserted (ia) that incorporeal powers inhabit sensible substances,
while others say (ib) that the [physical] substances act themselves according
to their own particular nature, which arises either from a mixture of the four
elements or from some conjunction of the primary bodies (which some say
to be atoms, others unlinked, indivisible or homogenous particles). Indeed
some think (iia) that our soul itself is some incorporeal substance, others
(iib) that it is pneuma, others (iic) that it has no independent existence of
its own, but is rather a particular property of the substance of the body,
which is said to possess the powers of doing what it is such as to be able
to do; and these latter do not themselves do not have the specific nature of
particular substances, but rather the [physical] substance, which acts in its
own right, is said to possess the powers for doing what it is such as to be
able to do in regard to those things which come to be through it and as a
result of it. (14: Prop.Plac. 14.2-3, 110.24-114.5 Nutton (= Subst. Nat. Fac.
IV.760-1 Kiihn))
47 Galen has little time for speculations about metempsychosis: Prop.Plac. 15.2,
118.5-10 Nutton.
48 This contention implies some substantive principles of continuant identity: if there
is nothing more to the soul than the form of a body, then even if some type-
identical physical condition is realized in some other matter, this cannot constitute
the re-appearance of the original form; this in turn raises interesting and difficult
metaphysical issues, but they cannot be followed out here.
49 For this and other causal "axioms", and the claim that they are self-certifying, see
MM X.33-7 Kiihn; see Hankinson (1991c, pp. 18-20, pp. 117-29).

In such matters, Galen says, "I adopt a middle course" , allowing that he
certainly knows some things, is totally ignorant of others, while in some
cases he can do no more than form a plausible opinion (14.4, 114.6-19
Nutton (= Bubst.Nat.Fac. IV.761 Kiihn)). Text 14 considers two questions
(which I label (i) and (ii)): what is the nature of a power? And what is the
nature of the soul? For all Galen's agnosticism, we can infer from what
we have seen elsewhere that he favours (ib) over (ia), and that he rejects
(iib); and while not entirely ruling out (iia), he clearly leans towards (iic)
in preference to it.
Let us briefly recapitulate what has been established so far. It is ob-
vious that we have souls, since that amounts to no more than the truism
that we are capable of performing certain distinctive activities (3, 10, 13);
equally clearly, there must be some cause for the existence of these activ-
ities, since everything has a cause (8, 10, 13). Moreover, the structural
form of each type of physical thing explains in some sense its distinctive
powers; and at the very least, certain determinable physical structures
are required in order for those activities constitutive of the existence of a
rational soul (or at any rate an important subset of them: perception and
memory) to be exemplified. Yet even so it is still an open question what
that soul is.
That the soul is in some sense "responsible" for making a living body
alive, and for its functions and activities qua living is clear (12); but Galen
explicitly refuses to draw Plato's conclusion from this that since anything
so responsible must be prior to any arrangement of physical elements, the
soul cannot simply be epiphenomenal upon them (cf. Phaedo 93a). Much
of the latter part of QAM seeks to support the view that all the "parts"
of the soul, whatever they may turn out actually to be, are clearly affected
(in their activities and capacities) by the states of the body - and this is
just as true of our reasoning abilities as it is of emotion and desire. Wine is
a physical substance producing physiological effects; but equally obviously
some of it effects are psychological in character, while even Plato allows
that regimen has an effect on the functioning of the soul (QAM IV.805-14
Kiihn (= BM 2, 64.19-73.2)).50 Galen goes further, indeed, in this text
than he does elsewhere in his remarks about the substance of the soul:
So since the rational part of the soul, which has a substance single in form,
undergoes change along with that of the mixture of the body, what should
we say befalls the mortal part of it? Is it not clear that it is in every way
subservient to the body? Indeed it is better to say not that it is subservient
to it, but rather this, the mixture of the body, actually is the mortal part of
50 Galen quotes selectively, and not always entirely fairly, from Timae'Us and the Laws
in the service of his syncretizing interpretation; on Galen's strategy and reliability,
see; Lloyd (1988); Singer (1991).

250 R. J. Hankinson
the soul (for it was demonstrated earlier 51 that the mortal soul is a mixture
of the body). Thus the mixture 52 of the heart is the irascible (thumoeides)
part of the soul, that of the liver what is called the desiderative by Plato
(epithumetikon), the nutritive or vegetative (threptikon de kai phutikon) by
Aristotle. And Andronicus the Peripatetic actually dared to state that it
was the substance of the soul, without any shilly-shallying, and I praise
and welcome this man's words .... But when he calls it "either mixture,
or a power consequent upon the mixture", I take issue with his addition
of "a power", since, while the soul has many powers it is a substance, as
Aristotle rightly said ... : for while "substance" can mean either matter,
form, or a composite of the two,53 he held that soul was substance in the
sense of form. 54 (15: QAM IV.782-3 Kiihn (= BM 2, 44.2-45.2»
This text sees Galen at his most forthright, at least in regard to the
two lower parts of the soul: he seems unequivocally to adopt an identity-
theory regarding them. These parts of the soul really must be the appro-
priate (physical) mixtures, with the powers that result from them being
attributes of the souls rather than the souls themselves. Souls, after all, are
supposed to be substances, things which exemplify certain powers rather
than being those powers themselves (3, 8, 10, 12). Scholars55 have won-
dered why Galen should be apparently more willing to commit himself
here than elsewhere on substantial questions: but however we might an-
swer that, his avowed reasons for so doing are interesting and important.
If soul is form (and he never actually explicitly asserts this, even though
he very strongly implies it), then it must be an elaboration of some basic
(not necessarily physical) elements: for that is what form is. 56 So the sub-
stance of the soul should not be identified with its activities, nor yet with
any powers which we attribute to it in virtue of which it is able to act in
this way: rather it should be the source for and basis of those powers.
But now one may well wonder why Oalen does not go all the way and
claim that at the very least it is plausible that the rational soul too is
51 The reference is presumably to QAM IV.773-4 Kiihn (= BM 2, 37.3-38.1): 12
above.
52 Or perhaps better here "temperament": see n.21 above.
53 See e.g. Aristotle Metaph. VII.3.
54 Galen proceeds to assimilate the Stoic doctrine to this general pattern too, holding
that their pneuma, which is for them the soul, is itself a krasis of the fundamental
elements of air and fire which make it up (QAM IV.783-4 Kiihn (= 45.4-46.7
Miiller)). For the Stoics' account of pneuma, see e.g. frs 46A, 47F-P Long and
Sedleyj for Galen's views, see PHP V.602-11 (= 440.9-448.6 De Lacy)j and see
n.21 above.
55 Most recently Donini, forthcoming.
56 This idea that the form of things is a matter of their exhibiting certain ratios of
elements goes back to Empedodes (e.g. frs DK 31 B 96, 98) and the Pythagoreansj
and compare Aristotle's account of the formal cause at Ph. II.3 194b26-9 where
the example given is of the ratio 2:1 being the form of the octave.

nothing more than material elements arranged in specific ways such that
the characteristic activities of the soul emerge. It is possible, of course,
that his residual Platonism, his acknowledgement of Plato as his master
in all matters philosophical, simply moves him to do so pietatis causa.
But Galen is never a simple sectarian - indeed he explicitly disavows
sectarianism as such, writing a text De optima secta 57 on the subject
(De ordine librorum suorum XIX.51-2 Kiihn (= BM 2, 81.13-82.3)) -
and in any case I think there are philosophically more interesting (and
respectable) reasons for his refusal to commit himself.
That psychological conditions are responsive to (and perhaps directly
affected by) physiological conditions (and not merely when the individual
is in a state of ill-health as some Platonists suppose: QAM IV.805 Kiihn
(= BM 2, 64.19-23)) is, as we have seen, something he thinks securely
establishable by observation and experiment. Moreover, physical affec-
tions can even cause the departure of the soul from the body, something
which as we saw Galen finds puzzling on the supposition that the soul
is, as Plato holds, something incorporeal (11). Indeed, certain physical
conditions must be satisfied in order for a body to be receptive of soul:
None the less it is clear to me that even if the soul merely takes up residence
in bodies, it is still subservient 58 to their natures, which arise, as I said, out
of some mixture of the four elements. .. for the body must be in a suitable
condition for receiving the soul, while if it undergoes some major alteration
in regard to its mixture (such as a severe chilling as a result of the evacuation
of blood, or through the ingestion of refrigerant drugs, or when the ambient
atmosphere is very cold, or when the body is excessively heated by fever
or by inhaling flame or through the ingestion of heating drugs) the soul
immediately departs. And it is not only when the mixture of the body is
altered in such a way that we see the soul depart from the body, but also
when it is totally deprived of breath, 59 since here too an alteration occurs
57 Not the treatise of that name surviving under his name: 1.106-223 Kiihn.
58 The metaphor of subservience (douleuein) is of course a causally powerful one; in
addition to text 15, see QAM IV.779,787 Kiihn (= BM 2, 41.15-18, 48.5-12).
59 Galen's views on the function of respiration, and on its necessity for life, are pe-
culiar (although not particularly for the time); he claims to have demonstrated by
experiment that humans can live without inspiring air into the windpipe for several
hours (Ut.Resp. IV.504-5 Kiihn (= 124 Furley/Wilkie»; respiration for him, as for
Aristotle, fulfils primarily a cooling function (ibid. 492-3, 506-11). Heat and life
are intimately linked for Galen; it is the gradual extinction of the animal's innate
heat which is ultimately responsible for its dying of old age (Temp. 1.582 Kiihn (=
46.15-47.2 Helmreich», although as this passage shows, other sorts of pathological
unbalancing can also prove fatal. At this point we may also note a text that might
seem to run counter to everything that has been established so far. At De tremore,
palpitatione, convulsione et rigore (Trem.Palp.) VII.616-7 Kiihn, Galen describes
this innate heat as the substance of the soul, ousia tiis psuchiis: but I think that
all he need mean by this is that it is its substance in a material sense (cf. Aristotle

252 R. J. Hankinson
in the body. (16: Prop.Plac. 15.2-3,116.26-118.29 (= Subst.Nat.Fac. IV.763

Kiihn))
This "subservience" (or rather enslavement) of the soul to the body is
also emphasized in QAM (see n. 58), where a little elbow room is still left
for the Platonic view (QAM IV.785 Kiihn (= BM 2, 46.9-47.2)): having
noted again that excessive coldness can destroy all psychic functions, he
writes:
This clearly establishes the probandum of this treatise, namely that the
actions and affections (erga kai pathe) of the soul follow upon the mixtures
of the body. For if the soul is the form of a uniform (homoiomeres) body, we
will have a most scientific demonstration on the basis of its very substance;
but if we suppose it to be incorporeal and to possess its own particular
nature, as Plato held, it must still be agreed that even on his account it
is mastered by and subservient to the body, on the grounds of the sense-
lessness of infants, and of those who rave in old age, and of those who are
driven to delirium, mania and seizure by administrations of drugs, or by
the accumulation within them of harmful humours. For since such things
follow upon these things to the point of unconsciousness, raving, paralysis
and insensibility, one would say that the soul has suffered impediment as a
result of them in regard to the exercise of its natural powers .... So this is
a powerful incentive for supposing, in regard to the whole substance of the
soul, that it is not incorporeal. For how could it be forced into the opposite
of its natural condition as a result of its association with the body, unless it
is either a quality, a form, an affection, or a power of the body? (17: QAM
IV.777-8 Kiihn (= SM 2, 47.22-48.25)}
The form of the claim regarding the possibility of having "a most scien-
tific demonstration on the basis of its very substance" is very important
- if it can be established that soul really is as the Aristotelians say it
is, then we could have a proper, scientific demonstration, starting from a
spelling out of the essence of the thing; but Galen will not commit himself
firmly to that point of view. The available evidence, although strongly
inclining in that direction, is not conclusive - it is not enough to estab-
lish the proposition that the soul is the form of the body (in this sense)
beyond any reasonable doubt. 6o Still, it does allow Galen to promote a
provisional hypothesis, to the effect that such an assumption will make
excellent sense of the phenomena (and here perhaps we see a glimpse of
a later, more familiar scientific method). Moreover, the soul is not only
subject to physical causal effects; it is itself a cause, and the best avail-
Metaph. VII.3 1029a2-27).
60 For the key aspects of Galen's epistemology here, in particular that science should
be founded on axioms which are "compelling on their own account" whether to
the intellect or the senses, see Hankinson (1991b, 1992b)i Frede (1981).

able models 61 for causal interaction make the causes of corporeal effects62
themselves corporeal, and causation something brought about by physical
contact.
But, in spite of the suggestiveness of this argument, Galen is still
not entirely convinced. We have already noted his distrust of extreme
reductionism in psychology; what is more, he distrusts it in physics too.
He is, as we also saw, a convinced teleologist and providentialist; and
throughout his works he hymns the artistic skill of a productive Nature,63
not least in regard to the thorny problem of precisely how living organisms
grow and reproduce. Moreover, his Nature is not the disembodied intrinsic
teleological tendency of the world; it is closely allied with (perhaps even
identical with) a designer God whom Galen, following Plato, calls the
"Demiurge" .64
His objections to the atomism of Epicurus and his followers go far
beyond mere dissatisfaction with their eliminativism; their refusal to ac-
cept the overwhelming (as he sees it) evidence in favour of the adoption
of some form of teleology also counts heavily against them. 65 Moreover,
their refusal to admit qualities into their explanatory ontology forces them
to appeal to purely mechanical principles to account for the basic bod-
ily processes of growth and metabolism. But in Galen's view (expounded
and defended at length in Nat.Fac.), any account that simply involves the
transportation and rearrangement of unchanging material corpuscles will
be explanatorily inadequate. Thus digestion cannot simply be a process of
grinding and attrition of the ingested food (Nat.Fac. II.152-5 Kiihn (= SM
2,211.11-213.20); cf. 160-8 (= 217.10-222.18», but must involve qualita-
61 The only ones, according to some, e.g. the Stoics: "every cause is a body which
becomes a cause to a body of something incorporeal: for instance, the scalpel is the
cause to the flesh of being cut" (Sextus, Against the Professors 9.211 (= SVF 2.341;
= LS 55B); "being cut" , the predicative designation being in their terminology an
"incomplete lekton", or sayable (cf. Diogenes Laertius, 7.63.1-4 (= LS 33F-G); cf.
Long and Sedley (1987, pp. 195-202)).
62 Not that for the Stoics, strictly speaking, effects themselves are corporeal (they are
rather incorporeal lekta: n.61 above): but they subsist in corporeal objects.
63 In particular in his major treatise on biological design and function De usu partium
corporis humani III.1-IV.366 Kiihn (= Helmreich (1907-9)); but such sentiments
are found in abundance elsewhere, not least in Nat.Fac., where Erasistratus and
Asclepiades in particular are berated for failing to see the clear evidence of an
artistic nature at work; see Hankinson (1988a, 1989).
64 Again, see Hankinson (1988a, 1989).
65 Equally culpable is the failure, as he sees it, of Erasistratus (his principal medical
opponent in Nat.Fac.) and his sectators to pay more than lip-service to its princi-
ples. Erasistratus, on Galen's account, adopts Aristotle's principle that nature does
nothing in vain in name only (Nat.Fac. II.91-2 Kiihn (= SM 2, 167.2-23); cf. 78,
81, 87, 88, lOO, 101-2, 106, etc.); in practice, he seeks to account for physiological
processes in terms of material principles of fluid dynamics, such as that of horror
vacui.

254 R. J. Hankinson
tive alteration (ibid. 20-6 (= 115.10-119.24); cf. 88-93, (= 165.7-169.5)).

Such postulates are necessary in non-physiological cases too. Galen spends
some time exposing the absurdity, as he (rightly) sees it, of the Epicurean
account of magnetism (ibid. 44-53 (= 133.11-139.21); cf. Lucretius VI.906-
1089): no story involving the streaming, rebounding, and intertwining of
small particles can explain the facts of an attractive force transmitted in-
stantaneously, through a succession of contiguous iron bodies, in a variety
of different directions (47-51 (= 135.11-138.18)). The Epicurean corpus-
cularian explanation cannot account (or so Galen thinks - no doubt there
are replies available to the Epicurean) for either the speed or the multi-
directionality of the effect. And if one detailed type of hypothesis won't
work, we need to substitute another one. Further, the point of the appeal
to magnetism in Nat.Fac. is precisely to make plausible the case for his
own preferred, as yet unanalyzed powers, of attraction, retention, assim-
ilation and expulsion, as being at least provisionally basic in physiology
- in just the same way that the materialists' account of magnetic attrac-
tion is hopelessly inadequate, so too is their attempt to account for the
internal processes of the body on the basis of primitive corpuscularian
mechanics and dynamics. In De locis aJJectis (Loc.AJJ.) VIII.421-2 Kiihn,
Galen makes a similar point about the mysteriousness of magnetic action,
and adds another example of apparent causal transmission without ma-
terial transfer, that of the torpedo fish, which can send a numbing shock
through the solid bronze of a fisherman's trident.
The point is that one can't argue with the reality of the effect (al-
though certain shameless "sophists" in Galen's view seek to do exactly
that) - and the upshot is (or at least ought to be) a preference for an
unprejudiced empiricism. If we come across examples of a phenomenon
that cannot be accounted for on the basis of our best available models,
then so much the worse for those models. And it is this, I think, which
underlies Galen's consistent (as I see it) agnosticism with regard to the
question of the substance of the soul. Soul is clearly very closely associ-
ated with the body;66 but that association need not of itself imply that
the soul is physical. Galen grapples, equally aporetically, with these issues
in his late treatise De foetuum formatione (Foet.Form. IV.652-702 Kiihn
(= CMC V3.3 (Nickel, 2001)): the complexity and organization of the
processes involved in the construction of physical parts, in particular in
66 It is worth noting in this context that, again on empirical grounds, Galen thinks
the association can go the other way too; At De praenotatione ad Posthumum
XIV.634 Kiihn (= 104.9-15 Nutton (1979)), he says that some diagnoses escape
doctors, even though they are empirically obvious, because they have no thorough
understanding (diagnosis) of how the mind affects the body. He also believes in
the possibility of altering our basic emotional make-up (and hence our physical
mixtures) by cognitive therapy, and he devotes a short treatise (De cognoscendis
curandisque animi morbis V.I-57 Kiihn (= Marquardt (1883, pp. 1-44), = de Boer
(1937)) to developing this view; see Hankinson (1993).

the embryo, strongly suggest that it is, at least at some remove, under
intelligent control, and for this reason the view of the Peripatetics that
something irrational like the nutritive soul, or of the Stoics that it is not
even soul at all, but simply blind nature, is responsible for its production
seems equally inadequate (Foet.Form. IV.700 (= 104.16-24 Nickel)). Yet,
on the other hand, Galen cannot bring himself to accept the view "of one
of my Platonist teachers" that the World Soul, permeating the entire uni-
verse, is directly responsible for moulding the foetus, for it seems to him
almost blasphemous to make such a divinity responsible for scorpions,
spiders, vipers and the like (700-1, (= 104.25-106.2 Nickel)). In fact,
As I have said, never having found a single opinion scientifically demon-
strated about it, I confess myself at a loss regarding the soul's substance,
and am unable to advance even to plausibility regarding it. So I confess my-
self at a loss regarding the moulding cause of the foetus. (18: Foet.Form.
IV.700 Kiihn (= 104.12-16 Nickel))
This certainly seems more aporetic than the position of QAM; but is
not ultimately incompatible with it. The failure of reductionism, and the
adoption of a providential teleology (as opposed to one of the immanen-
tist, Aristotelian type), carries along with it important implications, ones
which are also relevant to the case of the soul - but they do not point un-
equivocally in the direction of any of the non-reductionist alternatives on
offer. So it is precisely Galen's openness to the possibility of there being
different forms of causal interaction, ones which might not involve corpo-
reality, or at all events might not involve it in the gross, mechanist fashion
of the reductive materialists, that makes him ultimately unable to commit
himself on the side of a thoroughgoing materialism of mind, for all that
he sees the force of the arguments in its favour. It is this combination of
care, caution, and an avoidance of dogmatic commitment to idees refues
that makes Galen's approach to issues in philosophical psychology so ad-
mirable; and, as I suggested above, at least hints at something far more
like what we might recognize as a scientific method than that with which
he is usually credited - or perhaps rather, unfairly, debited - today.67
Bibliography
Barnes, Jonathan, 1979, The Presocratic Philosophers, 2 vols., London:

Routledge.
-, 1991, "Galen on logic and therapy", in: R. Durling I F. Kudlien (eds),
Galen on the Method of Healing, Leiden: E.J.Brill, pp. 50-102.
Berryman, Sylvia, 1997, "Horror vacui in the 3rd cent. BeE", in: R.
67 I should like to thank the participants at the Munich conference for their lively
interest in this paper, and for several acute and helpful remarks.

256 R. J. Hankinson
Sorabji (ed.), Aristotle and After, Bulletin of the Insitute of Classi-

cal Studies, Suppl. Vol. 2), pp. 147-57.
-, 2002, "Galen and the mechanical philosophy" , Apeiron, 35.3, pp. 235-
254.
Boudon, Veronique, 2000, Galien: Exhortation ala medecine; Art medical,
Paris: Les Belles Lettres.
Brunschwig, Jacques, 1986, "The cradle argument" , in: Malcolm Schofield
/ Gisela Striker (eds), 1986, The Norms of Nature, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, pp. 113-44.
De Lacy, Phillip H., 1972, "Galen's platonism" , American Journal of Phi-
lology, 93, pp. 27-39.
-, 1978-84, Galen: On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato, 3 vols.,
CMG V 4.1.2, Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
-,1992, Galen: On Semen (edn., trans., and comm.), CMG V 3.1, Berlin:
Akademie Verlag.
-, 1996, Galen: On the Elements according to Hippocrates, CMG V 1.2,
Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Donini, Pierluigi, (forthcoming), "Psychology", in: RJ. Hankinson (ed.),
The Cambridge Companion to Galen, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Fortuna, Stefania, 1997, Galeni de Constitutione Artis Medicae ad Pat-
rophilum, CMG V 1.3, Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Frede, Michael, 1982, "Galen's epistemology", in: Vivian Nutton (ed.),
Galen: Problems and Prospects, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Furley, David / Wilkie, James S., 1984, Galen on Respiration and the Ar-
teries, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Hankinson, R James, 1988, "Galen explains the elephant", in: Mohan
Matthen / Bernard Linsky (eds), Philosophy and Biology, Canadian
Journal of Philosophy, Suppl. Vol.14, 1988, pp. 135-57.
-, 1989, "Galen and the best of all possible worlds" , in: Classical Quar-
terly, n.s. 39, pp. 206-27.
-, 1991a, "Galen's anatomy of the soul", in: Phronesis, 36.3, pp. 197-233.
-, 1991b, "Galen on the foundations of science", in: Juan A. L6pez Ferez
(ed.), Galeno: obra pensamiento y influencia, Madrid: Universidad
Nacional de Educaci6n a Distancia, pp. 15-29.
-, 1991c, Galen: On the Therapeutic Method Books I and Il, Oxford:
-, 1991d, "Ancient medical models of the mind", in: S. Everson (ed.),
Psychology: Companions to Ancient Thought Il, Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, pp. 194-217.
-, 1992a, "Implications of immortality", in: Boston Area Colloquium in
Ancient Philosophy, 6, pp. 1-32.

-, 1992b, "A purely verbal dispute? Galen on Stoic and Academic episte-
mology", in: A.-J. Voelke (ed.), Le Stoicisme: Revue internationale
de philosophie, 45.3 (1992), pp. 267-300.
-, 1993, "Actions and passions: affection, emotion, and moral self-ma-
nagement in Galen's philosophical psychology", in: Jacques Brun-
schwig j Martha C. Nussbaum (eds), Passions f3 Perceptions: Stud-
ies in Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, pp. 184-222.
-, 1994a, "Galen's anatomical procedures", in: Aufstieg und Niedergang
der romischen Welt [ANRW] Il 37.2, Berlin: WaIter de Gruyter,
pp. 1834-55.
-,1994b, "Galen's theory of causation", in: ANRW Il 37.2, pp. 1757-74.
- , 1994c, "Usage and abusage: Galen on language", in: Steven Ever-
son (ed.), Language: Companions to Ancient Thought, Vol. 3, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 166-87.
-, 1997, "Natural criteria and the transparency of judgement: Philo, An-
tiochus and Galen on epistemological justification" , in: Brad Inwood
j Jaap Mansfeld (eds), Assent and Argument: Studies in Cicero's
Academic Books, Leiden: E.J. Brill, pp. 161-216.
-, 1998, Cause and Explanation in the Ancient Greek World, Oxford:
-, 2003, "Causation in Galen" , in: Jonathan Barnes j Jacques Jouanna
(eds), Galien et la Philosophie, Entretiens sur l'Antiquite Classique:
Fondation Hardt: Vandoevres-Geneva, pp. 31-72.
-, forthcoming, "Medicine and the science of the soul", in: Faith Wallis
(ed.), Essays in Honour of Don Bates, Montreal: McGilljQueens
University Press.
Helmreich, Georg, 1893, Galeni Minora, Vo!. 3, Leipzig: Teubner (= SM
3).
-, 1904, Galenus: de Temperamentis Libri Ill, Leipzig: Teubner.
-, 1907-9, Galenus: de Usu Partium (2 vols.), Leipzig: Teubner.
Hutchinson, Douglas S., 1988, "Doctrines of the mean and the debate
concerning skills in fourth-century medicine, ethics and rhetoric",
in: R.J. Hankinson (ed.), Medicine, Method and Metaphysics, Apei-
ron, Supp!. Vo!. 21, Edmonton, Alberta, pp. 17-52.
Jones, William H.S., 1923, Hippocrates Il, Loeb Classical Library, Har-
vard, London: Harvard University PressjWilliam Heinemann.
-, 1931, Hippocrates IV, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard, London: Har-
vard University PressjWilliam Heinemann.
Kiihn, Carl G., 1821-33, Galeni Opera Omnia, 20 vols., in: 22, Leipzig;
repr. 1965, Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung.
Larrain, Carlos J. (ed.), 1992, "Galens Kommentar zu Platons Timaios",
in: Beitriige zur Altertumskunde, 29, Stuttgart.

258 R. J. Hankinson
Lloyd, Geoffrey E.R., 1988, "Scholarship, authoritya. argument in Galen's

Quod animi mores" , in: Manuli / Vegetti, 1988, pp. 11-42.
Long, Anthony A. / Sedley, David N., 1987, The Hellenistic Philosophers
2 vols. (= LS), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Manetti, Daniela, 1985, "Tematica filosofica e scientifica nel papiro Fioren-
tino 115", in: W. Cavini et. al., Studi su papiri greci di logica e medi-
cina, Academia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere "La Columbaria", 74,
Firenze, pp. 175-206.
Manuli, Paola / Vegetti, Mario (eds), 1988, Le Opere Psicologiche di Ga-
leno, Naples: Bibliopolis.
Muller, Ivan, 1891, Galeni Pergameni Opera Minora, Vol. 2, Leipzig: Teub-
ner (= SM 2).
Nickel, Diethard, 2001, Galeni de Foetuum Formatione, CMG V 3.3, Ber-
lin: Akademie Verlag.
Nutton, Vivian, 1979, Galeni de Praecognitione, CMG V 8.1, Berlin: Aka-
demie Verlag.
-, 1999, Galeni de Propriis Placitis, CMG V 3.2, Berlin: Akademie Ver-
lag.
Peck, Arthur L., 1942, Aristotle: Generation of Animals, Loeb Classical
Library, Harvard, London: Harvard University Press/William Heine-
mann.
Quinton, Anthony, 1976, "The soul", in: Perry, 1975, pp. 53-72.
Rocca, Julius, 2003, Galen on the Brain: Anatomical Knowledge and Phy-
siological Speculation in the 2nd Century AD, Leiden: E.J.Brill.
Schroder, Herman 0., 1934, Galeni in Platonis Timaeum comm. Frag-
menta, CMG Supp. I, Berlin: Akademie Verlag.
Singer, P.N., 1991, "Aspects of Galen's Platonism", in: Juan A. Lopez
Ferez (ed.), Galeno: obra pensamiento y influencia, Madrid: Uni-
versidad Nacional de Education a Distancia, pp. 41-56.
-, 1997, Galen: Selected Works, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Smith, Wesley D., 1979, The Hippocratic Tradition, Ithaca: Cornell Uni-
versity Press.
-, 1994, Hippocrates VII, Loeb Classical Library, Harvard, London: Har-
yard University Press/William Heinemann.
Tielemann, Teun, 1996, Galen and Chrysippus on the Soul: Argument
and Refutation in the 'De Placitis' Books II-III, Leiden: E.J.Brill.
Todd, Robert B., 1976, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic Physics, Lei-
den: E.J. Brill.
Vallance, John T., 1990, The Lost Theory of Asclepiades of Bithynia, Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press.
Wenkebach, Ernst, 1956, Galeni in Hippoc. Epidemiarum Librum VI Com-
mentaria 1- VIII, CMG V 10.2.2, Berlin: Akademie Verlag.

Contributors
Thomas Buchheim, Professor of Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-

University, Munich
Roman Dilcher, Assistent at Philosophisches Seminar, Ruprecht-

Karls-University, Heidelberg
Christopher Gill, Professor of Ancient Thought, University of Exeter
R. J. Hankinson, Professor of Philosophy and Classics, University of Texas

at Austin
Edward Hussey, Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford
Thomas K. Johansen, Reader in Philosophy, University of Edinburgh
R. A. H. King, Privatdozent in Philosophy, Ludwig-Maximilians-

University, Munich
Pierre-Marie Morel, Maitre de conferences, Universite Paris 1,

Pantheon-Sorbonne
Denis O'Brien, Directeur de Recherche, Centre National de la Recherche

Scientifique, Paris
Christof Rapp, Professor of Philosophy, Humboldt University, Berlin
Robert W. Sharples, Professor of Classics, University College London

Index locorum
Abbreviations, where possible, follow Liddell/Scott/ Jones Greek-English

Lexicon.
Aenesidemus, 173 De Mixtione

216.14-218.16, 216
Aetius 226.24-30, 181
4.3.11, 189, 220 Problemata
4.21.1-4, 193, 215, 216 1.21, 184
5.4.2-3, 173 1.26, 183
1.28, 177
Albertus Magnus 1.121, 183
De XV Problematibus 2.22,184
9 41.11-14, 170 2.27,184
9 41.42-50, 170 2.63,183
2.64, 184
Alcinoos
2.67, 184
Didaskalikos
3.10-11, 184
cap. xiv, 85
In Aristotelis Metaphysica Com-
Alexander of Aphrodisias, 61,168, mentaria (in Metaph.)
171, 175, 178, 184 306.29-30, 13
De Anima (de An.) 306.36-307.1, 13
6.2-4,179 In Librum De Sensu Commen-
15.9££., 183 tarium (in Sens.)
23.2-24.3, 182 7.16-18, 125
24.3-4, 178 7.19,128
24.21-23, 178 7.19-22, 125
79.15-21, 183 7.25-8.2, 128
84.3-6, 182 8.2,129
84.24-27, 183 8.3-4, 129
Mantissa 8.10, 131
104.21-35, 180 8.12-13, 130
104.35-105.2, 182
117.9-22, 183
Anaxagoras, 21
156-159, 165 B 12, 28, 46, 174

262 Index locorum
Andronicus, 178, 250 I.4 407b27-408a30, 50

1.4 407b32-33, 53
Apollonius 1.4 408a17-20, 51
Historia Mirabilium I.4 408a18-23, 51, 97
49.1-3, 170 I.4 408a20, 54
1.4 408a20-21, 52
Archilochus I.4 408a21, 56
131, 16 I.4 408a21-23, 55
I.4 408a22-23, 54
Aristotle, 19, 22, 46, 168, 170, 182,
1.4 408b15, 122, 130
217,234,250,251,253
1.4 408b15-19, 172
De Anima (de An.)
I.4 408b18-25, 167
1.1 402a9-10, 122, 133, 144
I.4 408b32-409a30, 60
1.1 403a3-4, 121
I.5 41Oal-3, 53, 96
1.1 403a3-5, 198
I.5 41Oa4-6, 51
1.1 403a3-11, 144
I.5 41Oa25-26, 22
1.1 403a3-16, 137
I.5 411b7-9, 181
1.1 403a3-b9, 172
11.1 412a19-21, 246
1.1 403a4, 148
11.1 412a27-b6, 95
1.1 403a5-7, 148, 198
11.1 412bl-12, 132
1.1 403a8-1O, 148
11.1 412b6, 123
1.1 403a8-12, 198
11.1 412b27-413a1, 178
1.1 403a16, 198
11.1 413a3-9, 247
1.1 403a16-19, 142, 199
11.1 413a9, 183
1.1 403a19-22, 199
1I.2 413b2, 124
1.1 403a22-24, 179, 201
11.2 413b23, 126
1.1 403a25, 130, 202
11.2 413b23-24, 155
1.1 403a26-27, 148, 202
11.2 413b24-27, 144
1.1 403a27-403b2, 198
11.3 414b4, 155
1.1 403a29-b7, 166
11.3 414b4-6, 126
1.1 403b2-3, 206
11.3 414b13, 156
1.1 403b7-16, 206
1I.4 415a14-22, 149
1.1 403b17-19, 207
11.4 415a18-20, 150
I.2 404a27-31, 21
11.4 415a16-21, 153
I.2 404b27-30, 60
11.4 415b19, 132, 168
I.2 404b30f., 37
11.4 415b21-28, 135
I.2 405a27-29, 23
1I.4 415b24, 22
I.3 407b17-19, 133
11.4 415b24-25, 23
I.3 407b18, 122
11.4 416a6-9, 181
I.3 407b25, 168
11.5 416b33-35, 23
I.3 407b26, 132
11.5 416b34-35, 22
I.4 407b27-408a18, 51
1I.5 417a13-14, 132
I.4 407b27-408a23, 96
1I.5 417a31-b16, 129

Index locorum 263
II.5 417b2-418a5, 171 I.9 279aI2-13, 66, 74, 76

II.7 418a31-bl, 154 I.9 279aI3-14, 75
II.7 419a9-11, 154 I.9 279al4-16, 75
II.8 420aI7-19, 143 I.9 279al4-17, 62
II.8 420a26-b4, 155 I.9 279a16, 94
II.9 421a7-1O, 161 I.9 279aI6-17, 61
II.9 421alO-b8, 161 I.9 279aI7-20, 88
II.9 421all-13, 156 I.9 279aI7-22, 58, 65, 94
II.9 421a26-b2, 155 I.9 279aI7-b3, 59, 61
II.9 421b9-422a7, 158, 162 I.9 279a18, 82, 94
II.9 421b28-422a6, 143 I.9 279aI8-20, 85
II.9 422b4-5, 143 I.9 279aI8-22, 63, 82
II.10 422blO-16, 154 I.9 279aI8-bl, 64
III.2 426b8-12, 154 I.9 279aI9-20, 62
III.2 426b8-16, 155 I.9 279a20-22, 60
III.2 426bll, 156 I.9 279a30-b3, 60
III.3 427aI7ff., 37 I.9 279a33-34, 63
III.3 427aI7-b6, 23 I.9 279bl, 65
III.3 428bll-12, 126 I.9 279bl-3, 63
III.3 429al-2, 126, 148 II.4 287aI2-13, 61, 75
III.10 433b18, 168 II.6 288a27-b7, 90
III.lO 433bI9-28, 133 II.6 288bl, 62
III.10 433b20, 121 II.12 292a22, 150
III.12 434b25-26, 135 III.1 298bI4ff., 37
III.13 435b23, 156 III.2 301b23-30, 127
De Gaelo (Gael.) Gategoriae (Gat.)
I.1 268a9-blO, 71 12 14a26-28, 69
I.2 269b4-6, 58 De Divinatione per Somnia
I.3 270b20-22, 72 (Div.Somn.)
I.3 270b20-24, 63 2 463b17, 127
I. 7 275b6, 77 2 464a32, 127
I. 7 275b6-11, 78, 79, 81 Ethica Nicomachea (EN)
I.7 275b7-9, 76 I.1 1094al, 150
I.7 275b7-11, 81 IV.2 1139a31ff., 150
I.7 275b9-10, 77, 78 VII.3 11 47b6-9, 171
I.7 275bll, 79 IX.8 1168a28-31, 212
I.9 278b21-279all, 84 X.7 1177b30-1178a4, 212
I.9 278b21-279a22, 58 X.8 1178al4-21, 212
I.9 279all-18, 57, 61, 62, 76, X.8 1178bI8-32, 49
82, 88 De Ceneratione Animalum (CA)
I.9 279all-20, 62 I.23 731a33-b5, 124
I.9 279all-b3, 63, 64 I.23 731a34-731b2, 133

264 Index loco rum
1.23 731b5-8, 134 IV.5 1009b13, 20

11.3 736b30-37a8, 234 IV.5 1009b17-31, 21
1104 738a33ff., 174 IV.5 1009b17-18, 22
11.4 740a36, 182 IV.5 1009b20ff., 43
11.6 741b37-42a15, 234 IV.5 1009b22-25, 13
11.6 743b35-744a5, 147 IV.5 1009b28-31, 20
De Generatione et Corruptione IV.5 1009b31-33, 21
(GC) VII.3 1029a2-3, 250
1.8 324b25-29, 23, 24 VII.3 1029a2-27, 252
11.6 333b33-334a9, 53 VII.10 1035b16-18, 124
Historia Animalium (HA) VIII.6 1045b17-20, 123
VIII.1 588a27-30, 145 IX.1 1046al1-13, 133
De Insomniis (Insomn.) IX.6 1048b18-36, 136
1 459a17-18, 126 XLlO 1066b22-24, 78
1 459a21-22, 128 XII. 7 1072b26-30, 49
2 459a23-b7, 127 XII.7 1073a5-7, 90
2 460bl-15, 201 XII. 7 1073a5-11, 90
3 461a22, 127 XILlO 1075a38-b6, 56
De Interpretatione De Motu Animalium (MA)
1 16a3, 200 6 701al-6, 128
De Juventute (Juv.) 7 701a35-6, 128
3 469a18-20, 124 7 701b21-22, 201
4 469b13-17, 123 7 701 b37-702a4, 204
De Longaevitate (Long.) 10 703a4-27, 234
2 465a31, 122 10 703a20, 168
De Memoria (Mem.) 10 703a29-b2, 137
1 449b15-30, 128 11 703b6, 177
1 449b24-25, 129 De Partibus Animalium (PA)
2 453a14-31, 127 Ll 641a32-b10, 144
Metaphysica (Metaph.) Ll 642a9-13, 134
Ll 980a21-26, 126 1.5 645bl4-20, 135
1.3 984a16-b18, 96 1.5 645b15ff., 150
1.4 985a4-7, 86 1.5 645b19-22, 135
1.5 986b27ff., 37 1.5 645b22, 122
I. 7 988a34-b5, 96 ILl 646a13-b27, 246
LlO 993a15-24, 96 11.1 646b22, 136
IV.5 1009a22, 20 11.2 647a10-648a19, 246
IV.5 1009a22-38, 20 ILl 647a21, 124
IV.5 1009a38-101Oa15, 20 11.2 648a2ff., 145
IV.5 1009b2-9, 20 11.7 652b8-15, 234
IV.5 1009b12, 20 111.3 665al1-13, 137
IV.5 1009b12ff., 37 IlIA 666a34-35, 124

Index loco rum 265
I1I.4 666bI4-16, 233 Problemata

IV.ll 692a20, 169 I11.31 875bI9-33, 176
Physica (Ph.) V.15 882a33-39, 176
11.3 194b26-29, 250 X1.38, 176
II.4 196aI9-24, 53 XXX.l 954bl0-21, 179
I1.9 200a5-15, 179 XXX.3,184
I1.9 200a30-32, 134 De Respiratione (Resp.)
III.4 203a8-9, 93, 94 8 474b13, 123
III.5 204b5-7, 78 16 478a28-30, 123
IV.I-5 208a27-213all, 66 Rhetorica (Rh.)
IV.l 208a29, 89 I1.2 1378a30-32, 203
IV.l 208bl, 66 I1.3 1380bl0-13, 200
IV.l 208bl-8, 72 11.4 1382all-13, 204
IV.l 208b6-8, 66 11.13 1389b31-33, 200
IV.l 208b8, 67 De Sensu (Sens.)
IV.l 209a4-6, 71 1 436al-blO, 141
IV.2 209b21-24, 70, 72 1 436a4, 121, 135, 150
IV.3 21Oa30-31, 72 1 436a5, 149
IV.4 21Ob34-211a2, 69 1 436a6-7, 145
IV.4 211a2-3, 70 1 436a6-10, 142
IV.4 211a32-33, 70 1 436a7-8, 121
IV.4 211bI4-17, 72 1 436a7-15, 121
IV.4 211bI8, 72, 73 1 436aI6-17, 151
IV.4 212a3-5, 72 1 436aI7-bl, 141
IV.4 212a5-6a, 67 1 436aI8-19, 126
IV.4 212a6a-7, 67 1 436aI8-b2, 142
IV.4 212alO-14, 73 1 436bl-l0, 151
IV.4 212aI3-14, 73 1 436bl-12, 124, 125, 134
IV.5 212b14, 89 1 436b2-8, 146
IV.5 212bI6-17, 89 1 436b4-6, 128
IV.5 212bI7-18, 89 1 436b6-8, 146
IV.8 215a15, 127 1 436b7, 130
IV.ll 219bl-2, 58, 75 1 436b8-10, 131, 132
VII1.1O 266alO-ll, 90 1 436bl0-12, 124
VII1.1O 266b28-267a20, 127 1 436b15, 135
VII1.1O 267b7-1O, 91 1 436bI8-437al, 141
VII1.1O 267bI7-26, 90 2 437aI8-20, 153
VII1.1O 267b25-26, 90 2 437a22-23, 160
Physiognomonica 2 437a25-438bI7, 160
1 805al-14, 177 2 437b21-22, 160
Politica (Pol.) 2 438a21-4, 160
II1.13 1283b41, 122 2 438a22-25, 160

266 Index locorum
2 438b2-5, 159 8 485a4-5, 166

2 438b8-16, 147 9 485b6-7, 168
2 438b25, 161
3 439a6-17, 153 Asclepiades, 253
3 439aI6-17, 154
3 439bl1-12, 155 Asclepius
3 439bI4-18, 155 in Metaph.
3 439b25-440a6, 156 277.19-20, 13
3 440al, 156 277.24-27, 13
4 442aI2-19, 156
Athenaeus (Medicus), 234
4 442a29-bl, 24
5 443a30, 161 Athenaeus
5 443bI7-444b7, 157 Deipnosophistae
5 443b24-26, 157 17.104 317F, 169
5 444a28-29, 158
5 444b7-15, 158 Calcidius
5 444b15, 161 220, 193, 215, 216
5 444b22-28, 143
5 444b27-8, 161 Chrysippus, 193, 194, 233
6 445b7-446a20, 163 2.806,244
6 446b6-9, 143
7 447a12, 163 Cicero
7 447aI2-14, 163 Academia
7 449aI3-20, 163 1.39, 194
7 449bl-3, 152 De Finibus
De Somno et Vigilia (Somn. Vig.) 3.16, 216
1 453bl1-13, 121
1 454a2-7, 125 Cleanthes, 194
1 454a7-11, 130, 147
Critolaus
1 454a8-b24, 124
frs.17-18, 173
1 454b9-12, 128
2 455a26-b2, 128 Democritus, 21, 17, 20, 143, 170,
2 455b26, 134 182,
2 455b28, 135 B 9, 211, 212, 227
3 457a27, 127 B 125,240
3 458al0-25, 136
De Spiritu (Spir.) Diodes, 234
1 481a17, 174
4 482b21-25, 175 Diogenes Laertius
4 482b29-36, 174 7.63,224
4 483a3-5, 174 7.63.1-4, 253
4-5 483a23-b4, 175 7.83,214
5 483b8-15, 174 7.85,216

Index locorum 267
2.86,239 Erasistratus, 217, 234, 235, 253
Empedocles, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 97, Galen, 178

143,241 An in arteriis sanguis eontinea-
B 17,52,56 tur
B 17.20,55 IV.703,235
B 17.20-26, 55 Ars medica
B 17.22-23, 56 1.406, 235
B 21.14, 17 De eognoseendis eurandisque an-
B22.4, 17 imi morbis
B22.7,17 V.1-57,254
B27.3,52 De elementis ex Hippoerate
B35,55 1.413-508, 246
B35.1O,87 De foe tuum formatione
B 71.4,52 (Foet.Form.)
B73.1,52 IV.652-702, 254
B75.2, 52 IV.700-701, 255
B87,52 IV.700.17-701.6,182
B95,52 In Hippoeratis aphorismos eom-
B 96, 51, 53, 56, 250 mentarius
B 96.4, 50, 55 XVI1.B.460, 240
B 98, 51, 56, 250 Introduetio seu medieus
B98.3,52 XIV.726.7-11, 193, 216
B 105,35 De locis affeetis (Loe.Aff.)
B 106,21 VII1.421-2, 254
B 108,21,43 De methodo medendi (MM)
B 109,35,52 X.17,232
B 115.5-13, 54 X.33-37, 248
X.63-86, 243
Epicurus, 188, 190, 253 X.80-81, 240
Epistula ad Herodotum (Ep.Hdt.) De motu museulorum
63, 189 (Mot. Muse.)
63-64,220 IV.367-464, 233
63-67, 218, 227, 229 IV.368-376, 242
64, 189 De naturalibus faeultatibus
67, 191 (Nat.Fae.)
68-73, 219 11.6-7, 242
De Rerum Natura 11.9-10, 243
25, 228 II.10-20, 245
34.21-22, 225 11.20-26, 254
34.26, 224, 226 11.20-27, 242
34.26-30, 225 II.26-30, 240
II.44-53, 254

268 Index loco rum
11.47-51, 254 V.795-805,245

11.89, 242 De praenotatione ad posthumum
11.91-92, 253 XIV.634, 254
II.102-7, 242 De propriis placitis (Prop.Plac.)
II.152-155, 253 2.1,237
II.154-7, 242 3.1-2, 237
II.159-68, 242 7.1-2, 238, 247
De optima secta 7.3, 247
I.106-223, 251 13.4-7,237
De ordine librorum suorum 13.7-15.5, 237
XIX.51-52, 251 14.1,248
De placitis Hippocratis et Pla- 14.2-3,248
tonis (PHP) 14.4, 249
IlL 1.25, 193 15.1,246
IV.2.1, 195 15.2,248
IV.7.12-17,196 15.2-3, 252
V.187,233 Quod animi mores corporis tem-
V.188-200, 233 peramenta sequantur (QAM)
V.200,233 IV.768,244
V.201-202, 233 IV.768-769,244
V.202-203, 242 IV.769.770, 245
V.203-206, 242 IV. 770-771, 245
V.280-281, 235 IV.771-772,245
V.280-284, 236 IV.772-773, 245
V.287-289, 236 IV. 772-779, 238
V.521,243 IV.773,246
V.521-522, 240 IV. 773-774, 247, 250
V.602-611, 235 IV.775, 245
V.604-605, 235 IV.777-778,252
V.605-606, 236 IV.779, 251
V.609,236 IV.782-783,250
V.635-636, 240 IV.782.15-783.3,178
V.720-723,245 IV.783-784,250
V.766,237 IV.785,252
V.779-782,237 IV.787, 251
V.780,237 IV.805,251
V.781,237 IV.805-814, 249
V.783-791,237 IV.816-821, 244
V.791-793,237 De simplicium medicamentorum
V.792,237 temperamentis et faculta-
V.793,232 tibus (SMT)
V.794,238 X1.731,236

Index loco rum 269
De substantia facultatum natu- B 115,4

ralium fragmentum B 119,41
(Subst.Nat.Fac.)
IV.757-760,237 Herophilus, 217, 234, 235
IV.759-764, 237
Hierocles, 217, 228
IV.760-761, 248
1.5-33,215
IV.761, 249
4.38-53, 216
De symptomatum causis
(Symp. Caus.) Hippocrates, 234
VII.85-272, 243 De Aere Aquis Locis (A er.)
VII.191, 238 12, 17
De symptomatum dijJerentiis Aphorismi (Aph.)
(Symp.DijJ.) 2.6,240
VII.42-84, 243 De Morbo Sacro (Sacred Dis-
VII.47-9, 242 ease)
De temperamentis (Temp.) 7.10,234
1.509-694, 246 De Natura Hominis (Nat.Hom.)
1.582, 251 3,17
1.676-677, 240 4, 17
De tremore, palpitatione, con- De Victu (Vict.)
vulsione et rig ore 32, 17
(Trem.Palp.) 35, 17
VI1.616-617, 251 De Vetere Medicina (VM)
De usu partium corporis hum ani 5,17
(UP) 16, 17
III.1-IV.366, 253 19, 17
III.16, 232
De usu pulsuum Hippolytus
V.149-80, 234 Refutatio Omnium Haeresium
V.154-156, 236 VII 29-31, 55
De utilitate respirationis
( Ut. Resp.) Homer
IV.470-511,234 Ilias (Il.)
IV.492-511, 251 7.546, 19
IV.501-502, 236 9.104, 15
IV.502, 235 15.10, 21
15.509, 15
Heraclitus, 4, 29, 173 15.699, 15
B23,4 16.852f., 42
B45,4 18.295, 19
B67,4 23.149, 15
B85,107 23.698,21

270 Index locorum
Odysseia (Od.) Origen

2.121, 19 De Principiis
2.363, 19 3.1.2-3, 215
5.23, 15
7.292, 19 Parmenides
10.526,39 B 1.1,107
11.13ff., 39 B2.5,78
11.34ff.,39 B3,34
14.273, 19 B4,40
14.490, 15 B6,42
15.326,19 B7,38
17.403, 19 B7.3,38
18.136-137, 16, 23 B8.8-9,78
23.30, 19 B8.24,44
24.479, 15 B8.38,38
B8.53,38
Leucippus, 17 B8.55,17
B 8.59, 17, 40
Lucretius, 188 B9, 38, 40
3.136-144, 220 B9.3,44
3.140, 190 B 13,41
3.141ff., 190 B 16, 13-29, 31-47
3.145-176, 220 B 16.4,18
3.152-158, 191 B 17,44
3.161-167, 191 B 18,17
3.170-176, 192 B 19,38
3.231-245, 189
3.262-265, 221 Philo
3.262-273, 189 Legum Allegoriae
3.273-281, 221 2.22-23, 213
3.282-306, 221
3.288-293, 227 Philoponus
3.290f., 192 In Aristotelis Physica Commen-
3.311-313, 222 taria (in Ph.)
3.417-462, 211 556.29-557.1, 61
3.445-482, 219 563.32-33, 67
3.624-633, 211 567.4-7,67
4.877-891, 227 585.13,69
6.906-1089, 254 585.13-14, 67
Nemesius Plato, 25, 147, 183, 203, 249, 250

78.7-79.2, 194 A lcibiades (A lc. )
129c-e, 6

Index loco rum 271
129c-130c, 212 Philebus (Phlb.), 203

132c-133c, 212 16c-d, 116
Critias (Cri.) 16d, 116
46b, 108 34a3-b8, 5, 130, 147
Gorgias (Grg.) 64e-65a, 116
506d, 110, 115 66a-b, 116
508a, 110 Politicus (Plt.)
Leges (Lg.) 270a1, 88
863b-864b, 107 278b-c, 116
896b1, 86 288e-289a, 246
903d, 111 Republica (R.)
904a, 115 435c, 103, 104
904b-d, 115 435c-d, 104
904c-905d, 115 435d-441c, 213
965c, 116 436a-b,112
Meno (Men.) 436a9-b3, 106
76c-d,241 439c, 106
Parmenides (Prm.) 43ge, 107
143a, 116 440c-d, 107
144e, 116 440d,107
Phaedo (Phd.), 5, 212, 218 504b-d, 109
78c-d,104 504bl-4, 104
78d-79d, 105 504b3-4, 108
80e-82b, 113 504c9-d1, 104
85e3-86d4, 57 504c9-d5, 109
85e3-95b4, 50 505a2, 109
91c6-95b4, 57 505a2-4, 110
93a, 249 506e2-4, 110
9ge-100a, 108 508al1-b10, 111
106d, 103 51Ob4-5, 111
Phaedrus (Phdr.) 511b4-c2, 113
245c9,86 518c4-d1, 112
246a, 103, 103 519a8-b1, 112
246b, 103 533c, 113
247c2, 93 533c-d, 114
247c3,92 580d-581d, 109
247d5-e4, 92 610e5-8, 115
248b6, 92 611b-612a, 105
265c, 116 611d-612a, 212
265c-266c, 114 611d-612a5, 5
266b, 116 611d2, 105
271a, 114 618b2-4, 115

272 Index locorum
Sophistes (Sph.) 70e,232

243al-2,88 77b,232
248e6-249b3, 95 7ge-80c, 127
253d, 116 8ge-90c, 115
Symposium (Symp.) 90c6-d7, 118
211a-b, 116
Theaetetus (Tht.) Plotinus, 83
152d2-153a5, 22 Enneades
184c, 146 I 1 [53] 9.16-20, 5
184d,103 I 1 [53] 5-7,9-10,5
Timaeus (Ti.), 212 III 2 [47] 2, 116
29c-d,237 III 3 [48] 7, 116
30b4-5, 117 V 9 [5] 8.1-7,60
31b, 239
Plutarch
32c7-8, 84, 88
Aetia Physica
33a4, 84
19 916B, 169
33c1-2,84
De Animae Procreatione in Timaeo
34b3-36e5,96
1 1012D, 60
34b4, 85, 87
De Communibus Notitiis Con-
34b7-8,96
tra Stoicos
35a, 103
1085C-D, 213
35al-36d7, 97
De Virtute Morali, 228
35a6-8, 117
De Exilio
35a7f., 116
17 607C-D, 55
36c3-5, 85
De Facie Quae in Orbe Lunae
36e3, 84, 85
Apparet
4lc-d, 115
12 926E-927 A, 86
41d4-42e4, 97
De Libidine et Aegritudine
43c4-5,146
2 52.10-53.4, 170
45d2, 146
De Sollertia Animalium
52b3-5,92
27 987E-F, 169
52b4-5, 93, 94
De Tuenda Sanitate
52d4-5,92
24 135D-E, 170
53a8,86
27 137D-E, 167
53b3-4,86
59a, 127 Porphyry
64b3-6, 146 De Abstinentia
69c-d, 115 4.20 265.22-266.4, 170
69c-e,237
69c-71e, 217 Praxagoras, 233, 234
70a-71b, 232

Index locorum 273
Seneca Tertullian
Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales De Anima
113.23, 194 14, 172
Sextus Themistius
Adversus Mathematicos (M.) In Aristotelis Physica Paraphra-
7.135,211 sis (in Ph.)
7.234, 193 118.8,69
7.263, 194 118.8-9,67
9.211,253
Theophrastus, 19, 24, 32, 32, 36,
Simplicius, 51, 172 40, 184
In Aristotelis de Gaelo Gom- fr. 158-159, 166
mentaria (in Gael.) fro 271, 171
287.19-290.4, 61 fro 365B, 169
287.30-288.6, 61 fr. 365C, 169
289.1-2, 59 fr. 365D, 169
290.4-21, 61 fr. 439, 170
290.14-18, 61 fr. 440A-C, 170
290.21-292.7, 64 fr. 726A, 170
291.25-6, 65 Metaphysica (Metaph.)
In Aristotelis Physica Gommen- 8 9bl-24, 166
taria (in Ph.) Historia Plantarum
32.6-10, 51 IX.18.3, 170
39.18f.,39 IX.19.1, 170
300.21-24, 51 De Bensibus (Bens.)
579.37-580.6, 68 1-2, 25
580.3, 67, 69 3, 32
582.30, 67, 69 4, 28
584.20, 67, 69 8f.,40
964.15,171 10,35
964.29-965.6, 171 10-15, 38
965.7-16,172 11,40
58, 21, 25
Stobaeus 72, 25
2.88,8-90,6, 195, 196
2.88,22-89,3, 195 Xenocrates
2.90,19-91,9, 195 fr. 68, 60
fr.188, 60
Strato, 184
fr. 74, 172 Xenophanes
fr.108, 172 B32,41

General Index
For ancient authors see Index locorum. ")(" indicates a contrast of some
kind.
action, 121, 135-136, 140, 187, 227 infinite in extent, 76

) (undergoing, 133-134, 252 intelligible)(sensible, 78, 80
activity, 31, 123, 125, 133, 135, 136, receiving soul, 239, 251
149,150,152,158,159,164, body) (soul, 166-168
218, 241, 242, 244 as system, 222
actuality, 149, 174, 180 co-affection, 22, 170, 176, 177,
) (potentiality, 153 187,191,218-219,244,251
aether, 62, 63, 80 co-ordination, 125, 214, 217
affections, 121, 128, 142, 151, 177, co-variation, 187
179,180,199,202,218,242, common to b./s., 1, 3, 6, 31,
244 49, 121, 123-131, 133, 137,
akrasia, 171 142,145-148,151,176,183,
all, the, 89 187,197,204,209,211,217
anatomical investigation, 233, 239 composite, 1, 122, 133, 247
anger, 148, 166, 171, 177, 179, 188, conflict, 171
200, 203, 204, 208 cooperation, 187
animal correlation, 181, 213, 254
parts of, 51 criterion of c.b.s., 124, 131, 135
psycho-physical composite, 216 distinction, 1,31,217
rational, 210 dualism, 1, 41, 122, 123, 197,
antiperistasis, see repercussion 212, 214, 223, 227, 229
atomism, 240, 253 duality, 123, 133, 137, 187, 216
identity, 41
becoming, 118 interaction, 123, 187, 188, 194,
bcing, 37,44, 45,47,117 197, 207, 221, 246, 253
) (being somewhere, 92 unity, 123, 124, 137, 209, 210
blending, see mixture brain, 215, 233
blood, 51, 128, 193, 205, 206 breathing, see pneuma, 173-175, 192,
body, 57 218, 251
bodily movements, 198, 204
generation of, 238 capacity, power
inanimate, 28, 166 incorporeal, 248

276 General Index
of physical things, 249 dreams, 127, 129, 141, 151

powers of nature, 242, 243 dynamis, see capacity
)(substance, 243
transmission of, 234 effect, 242
category elements, 28, 40, 41, 53, 55, 86, 97,
relation, 242 144, 189, 192, 205, 250
causation, see cause ) (aether, 62
cause eliminativism, 253
activating, 242-243 embryo, 182, 215, 255
causal explanation, 2, 125, 181, emergence, 225, 227
188-197, 243 emotions, 31, 170, 179, 188, 190, 194,
causal interaction, 2, 187, 253 195,197-199,201,202,204,
efficient, 134, 179 217
final, 134, 135, 174 definition of, 203, 205
formal, 134, 135, 206 movement of blood, 205
mental, 226 teleology, 203
without material transfer, 254 two component model, 205-208
change energeia, see actuality, activity
material, 143, 171, 192 epiphenomenalism, 187, 240, 249
)(movement, 62
physis into psyche, 215 fear, 169, 179, 194, 200, 201, 208
character, 14, 41, 227 flesh, 51, 174, 221, 242
cognition, 33, 131 food, see nutrition
colour, 154-155, 169 form, 92-94, 122, 124, 166,205,213,
common, 121, 122, 144, 158 246, 249, 250
) (peculiar, 144, 145 function, 6, 121, 124, 127, 131, 133-
contradiction, principle of, 106 135,137,167,220,223,241,
cosmogony, 41, 46 246
courage, 240
generation, 243
cradle argument, 244
God, 87, 181, 211, 212, 224, 228,
daimones, 54, 97 237, 253
death, 40, 42, 137, 141, 170, 189, good, 6, 109-111, 118
219 growth, 193, 214, 253
soul's separation from body, 245
demiurge, 86 happiness, 210
Descartes, 4, 41, 187, 210, 216, 246 harmony, 50, 56
desire, 107, 128, 142, 156, 170, 171, health, disease, 126, 141, 170, 190
203, 243, 250 heart, 123, 128, 133, 137, 166, 184,
development, 225, 226 193,198,202,205,215,219,
dialectic, 113, 116, 202, 206 233
disposition, 15, 129, 201 heat, cold, 200, 204, 220, 251
dissection, 234 holism, 210, 211, 214, 228

General Index 277
hylomorphism, 122, 132, 146, 170, apprehending being, 31

175, 178, 198 as character, 14
as light, 41
identity, 35 as organ, 14
imagination, 126, 127, 134, 137, 148, content of, 15
166,198,201,205,214,224 model theory of, 25-27
impression, see imagination ) (spirit, 167, 219
impulse, 191, 193, 203, 214 state of, 15
innate ideas, 240 theory of mental states, 16-19
instrument, 132, 133, 135, 167, 168 transcendence of, 43, 45, 46
intellect, see thinking mixture, 16-19, 27, 28, 32, 35, 43-
46, 51, 53, 175, 178, 180,
judgement, 202 189,220,222,238,246,250-
252
Kant, 227, 228
modern categories, 209, 222
kinesis, see change
motivation, 217
) (praxis, 136
movement, see change, 86, 171, 172
knowledge
caused by the soul, 86
like by like, 35
disordered, 86
koinos, see common
krasis, see mixture naturalism, 210, 212
nature, 184, 213, 214, 217, 243, 253,
life, 39, 49, 141
255
beyond the stars, 49, 94
as artisan, 240
light, 40-42, 44-46, 111, 155
natural philosopher, 142-144, 147,
locomotion, 145, 193
149, 202, 206
logos
nerves, 215, 233-235, 242
enmattered, 202
nutrition, 137, 145, 174, 175, 193,
Love, 50-56
198, 214, 243, 250, 255
as cause, 54
as harmony, 55 organ, 14, 137, 151-162, 180, 183,
cosmic principle of, 54 187, 246
organism, 211, 213-215
materialism, 24, 210, 240
organon, see instrument
eliminative, 241
unconscious, 56, 95 panpsychism, 239, 241
matter, 122, 124, 144, 149, 166, 178, passages, 144, 147
205,206,212,213,223,250 passions, 195
memory, 39, 40, 126, 127, 129, 141, pathos, see affections
142, 148, 150, 151, 245 perception, 37, 111, 124, 125, 131,
metabolism, 253 133,137,141,142,145,147,
mind, 14, 27, 170, 176, 190 151,156,159,163,193,198,
and modes of life, 39 205,217,219,221,238-239

278 General Index
and alteration, 22, 25, 175, 182, comparative, 159-160

239-241 materialistic, 13
co-affection, 189
faculty of, 153, 163, 216, 245 reason, 107, 113, 177, 214, 217, 233
impact theory of, 24 recollection, 183
in soul through body, 132, 146 reduction, 210, 211
in the dead, 38-39 reductionism, 239, 253, 255
like by like, 32, 175 repercussion, 127
object of, 36,152-154,156,162, respiration, see breathing
163 responsibility, agency, 225, 227
sense organs, 130, 136, 143, 144,
146, 152, 153, 162, 173 self, 225
state theory of, 24 self-awareness, 28
phantasia, see imagination sensation, see perception
physical constitution, 34, 41, 42,180 sense-perception, see perception
physicalism, 3, 210, 223, 226-229 separability, 207, 210, 239
ontological vs. explanatory, 223, sight, 159-160
227 simple bodies, see elements
~eep, 128, 134, 135, 141, 150
physiology, 124, 127, 161, 163, 169,
171,172,176,196,217,234, smell, 161, 162
254 soul (psyche)
physis, see nature account of, 7
place, 57, 66-75 and change, 172
pleasure, pain, 126, 142, 156-157, and choice, 115
161, 180, 183, 203, 239 as body, 178
pneuma, see breathing, 137, 165, 166, as form, 5, 178, 246, 247, 250,
168,169,173,174,177,184, 252
192-193,213,215,218,228, as principle of life, 1, 5, 114,
234-236, 248 190
poroi, see passages as proportion, 52, 53
potential, see capacity as pneuma, 173, 174, 218, 228,
potentiality 235, 248
)(actuality, 153 capacities of, powers, faculties,
power, see capacity 106,107,109,115,123,145,
praxis, see action 146,149,150,171,177,189,
)(kinesis, 136 217,220,234,236,243-245,
product (ergon), see function 248, 250
properties commanding faculty, 182, 193,
emergent, 224 215
mental,227 composite, 106, 109, 111, 112,
non-material, 224 206
psychology, 169, 172, 176, 233, 255 construction by the demiurge,
86

General Index 279
corporeal, 174, 189, 191, 192, substance, 122, 174, 180, 187, 211,
218, 252 248, 250
definition of, 149, 150, 173, 214, as composite, 246, 250
218 )( capacity, 243
dependent existence, 248 dualism, 132
elements of, 189 sympatheia, see body) (soul / co-affection,
functional account of, 239 176, 189, 191, 194, 219
harmonia theory of, 50, 168, 175,
178 taste, 162
idea of, 103 teleology, see cause / final, 2, 211,
immateriality of, 236, 237 253, 255
immortality of, 183, 232, 236, thinking, 14, 31, 44, 137, 144, 145,
237,241,245,247,248 148,166,167,172,177,198,
incorporeal, 60,171,174,192, 213,218
197, 247, 248 act of, 18
location of, 190, 191, 193-194, and alteration, 25
232, 234, 237, 246 and constitution of limbs, 35
mens) (animus, 190 as internal state, 22
mortality of, 188, 237, 247 impact theory of, 24
parts of, 145, 150,233,237,246, state theory of, 24
250 transcendence of, 45
peculiar to, 144-145, 198 thymos, 250
rational/irrational, 172, 183, 198, time, 57
233, 234, 245, 248 touch, 161
striving for the good, 115, 117
substance of, 238, 244, 252 understanding, 245
. universe
tnpartite, 108, 109, 115, 232,
236 organization, 237
uniform/multifarious, 105, 114 unmoved mover, 49, 63-65, 89-91
unity of, 103, 114, 115, 117, 173 virtues, 106, 210
world s., 83-88, 116, 255 vivisection, 234
species, 221, 227, 247 void, 57, 191
state, 22, 121, 124, 125
with intensional objects, 196 youth, old age, 126, 141


Common To Body and Soul-Asin - LXBH3OE2K5QWEQIH2BMKUQRAYI5KCF7N PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Common To Body and Soul-Asin - LXBH3OE2K5QWEQIH2BMKUQRAYI5KCF7N PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Common to Body and Soul

Brought to you by | UNAM

Waiter de Gruyter . Berlin' New York

Brought to you by | UNAM

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Bibliographic itiformation published I!J Die Deulsche Bibliothek

Brought to you by | UNAM

This collection of essays owes its inception to a symposium held in Munich

R. A. H. King / Munich, September 2005

Brought to you by | UNAM

Introduction (R. A. H. King) .......................................... 1

Parmenides on Thinking (Edward Hussey) ........................... 13

Parmenides on the Place of Mind (Roman Dilcher) .................. 31

Life Beyond the Stars:

Plato's phaulon skemma:

"Common to Soul and Body"

What's New in the De Sensu? The Place of the De Sensu