Intelligence failure

'Intelligence failure is political and psychological more often than organisational'.

Discuss in relation to at least two examples of intelligence failure.

In this essay I will illustrate, through specific examples, the human condition and the
psychological roots of surprise, the actions of policy-makers and an examination of
organisational defects of agencies, and how they contribute to intelligence failures.
However in order to understand what constitutes 'intelligence failure, some
contextual definition must be provided.

The phrase 'intelligence failure' often has highly negative connotations in terms of
national security. Although it is also been used to describe situations such as the
1998 Indian nuclear weapons tests whereby U.S and Western policy-makers were
surprised by the international incident that took place, even when that surprise
caused minimal impact to their national security. Using the word 'failure' to describe
situations where negative consequences for national security are minimal may seem
unusual however it highlights the imprecise meaning of the word. The amassing of,
interpretation and eventual distribution of information to those in power is an
ongoing process that can occasionally fail to depict events on the international
scene accurately or adequately in-depth to provide them with either infallible
information or total certainty.[1] As a result, when surprises like Pearl Harbour and
the 9/11 attacks occur, intelligence agencies bear the brunt of the scrutiny[2]. It is
interesting to note that in a study conducted by Dr. Robert Johnston within the U.S.
Intelligence Community in 2005 he interviewed several CIA officials and requested a
definition of the term 'intelligence failure' from several of the interviewees. Some of
the responses disavowed the existence of 'intelligence failure' while others placed
the terms in the broader context of policy and decision making[3].

It is apparent that one of the most difficult elements in intelligence analysis rests in
measuring up enemy intention and removing the element of surprise. Surprise is
essentially a psychological phenomenon that has its roots in human nature[4].This
process is not made any easier if the intelligence gathered is unreliable, incomplete
or just plain absent. Furthermore, knowledge about capability does not supply a
perfect clue to intention[5] as will be demonstrated below. A common failing is to
create an interpretation of the enemy's intentions yet base it on the ideology or
belief of the analyst and his home nation. Hindsight reveals that the element of
surprise in the majority of large-scale wars fought since 1939 was unwarranted and a
considerable amount of evidence of an imminent assault was available to the victims
before the fact[6].

In 1941 a number of high ranking administration officials expressed the belief that as
long as the U.S maintained overall military advantage over Japan, war was unlikely
to break out. All the evidence... indicates that they are more afraid of war with the
U.S. than anything else[7]. U.S policy-makers remained firm in their belief that Japan
would base its decision to wage war on military considerations. It has been argued
that, as Japanese/U.S. relations were on a steady decline and with a large number of
reports being received regarding possible Japanese aggression and aggressive
intentions, U.S. officials had almost certain knowledge that war was at hand[8].
Roberta Wohlstetter attributes the failure to anticipate the attack on Pearl Harbour
on the massive number of irrelevant material being accumulated regarding Japanese
intentions, euphemistically termed 'noise'. In addition, not all intercepts were
decoded and the intercepts that were, did not all travel along the same
communication routes and so ended up not rising the chain of command; no single
person or agency ever had at any given moment all the signals existing in this vast
information network[9]. Wohlstetter also believes that intelligence officers could
perhaps have foreseen the attack years before, if the U.S. had concealed spies
within Japanese military circles and expanded its code-breaking capabilities[10]. Of
course, it can be further argued that success in warning can be indistinguishable
from failure[11]. If, for example, the defender acknowledges a warning and responds
in time with defensive preparations then the attacker may cancel the operation.
Thus the original prediction would be rendered invalid. The Japanese task force en
route to Pearl Harbour had orders to abort if the element of surprise was lost[12].

During the week preceding the Yom Kippur war, Israeli intelligence officers
accumulated a substantial amount of credible information indicating unusual
Egyptian activities along the Suez Canal[13]. A memorandum was circulated to
Intelligence Command which concluded that there was a high probability that
Egyptian manoeuvres were only cover for an impending attack[14]. The intelligence
indicated a readiness for an offensive however on the eve of war; the intelligence
material did not affect the strategic thinking of Israeli's decision makers. They
attributed their own line of reasoning to the adversary[15]. Overlooking the
possibility that the enemy might not follow the same line of thought the Israeli
leaders displayed a fatal lack of imagination that separated them from their
opponent and in this case, aided by hindsight, it is clear that when tactical facts
differ from that of strategic possibilities, the former should be given increased
weight in the decision making process[16].

As established above, the cause of intelligence failure can be a result of an analysts

own psychological condition influencing data, reports or opinions of others, likewise
policymakers can be guilty of the same. In this next example I will demonstrate how
not only the psychological condition can result in an intelligence failure.

Since the 9/11 disaster public discussion has been focused strongly on the human
causes of the tragedy and asking the question 'What went wrong?' And one of the
failures of the intelligence community that had been overlooked in the beginning was
the organisational structure of both the FBI and CIA. On closer examination, it is
evident that the Bureau and CIA suffered from a litany of organisational weaknesses
that can be attributed to being a major component of the 9/11 disaster.

The structural problems the FBI faced were exacerbated by the fact the bureau was
part of an Intelligence Community that had been be in opposition to information
sharing, the CIA and FBI having a long history of poor communication[17] added to
divided responsibility geographically which invariably led to vast gaps in coverage of
territory. Whilst the CIA was among the agencies charged with tracking terrorists
abroad, the FBI had responsibility for monitoring terrorist suspects within U.S
borders. There was however no clear distinction of responsibility for monitoring
movement of terrorist suspects between the U.S and foreign countries. The bureau
was considered so peripheral that previous to 9/11 the CIA neglected to put the
Attorney General on its distribution list for the President's Daily Brief, the most
important Community-wide current intelligence report[18]. Consequently, terrorists
could operate freely across borders but the U.S Intelligence Community could not.

What's more, J. Edgar Hoover had created a specific picture of FBI agents in a large
publicity campaign that soon agents themselves began believing; they were glorified
agents, in everything from movies to play cards[19] - with the ultimate goal for a
striving ambitious agent was to work criminal cases and not sit behind a desk, and
so this had an unfortunate side effect - an aversion to technology and analysis. As
one agents describes the 'old-school' mentality after the 9/11 attacks, 'real men don't
type. The only thing a real agent needs is a notebook, a pen and a gun, and with
those three things you can conquer the world'[20]. With that perspective in mind,
greater emphasis was placed on the more tangible criminal conviction, as opposed
to a very absent terrorist attack. To further the argument, organisational incentives
supplemented this way of thinking with opportunities for analysts' promotion to
senior positions highly restricted if permitted at all[21]. Moreover, in terms of
technology, the FBI computer system was so outmoded that it took up to 12
commands to store a single document, this coupled with an almost pathological
distain for counterintelligence operations meant that billions of records were simply
kept in paper files in shoe boxes and if reports did come in, they were not assigned a
high priority level[22].

The CIA also suffered from similar failings in its internal structure. When the
organisation was created, it was charged with conducting missions to collect covert
intelligence, engage in covert action and it also publishes National Intelligence
Estimates (NIE). Thus in similar fashion to the FBI 'bi-polarity' of having duel
missions - law enforcement and intelligence- these tasks cannot be suitably carried
out and the intelligence analysis can end up politicised. The CIA had not been
particularly strong on terrorism since the late 1980's. William Casey and Robert
Gates - Director and deputy director respectively - falsely believed that the Soviet
Union was responsible for every act of international terrorism and formed the
Counter-terrorism Centre (CTC)[23]. Even after the failed plot to bomb Los Angeles
International Airport in December 1999, the agencies did not heighten concerns over
the ability of Al-Qaeda to strike inside the U.S[24].

Everyone has someone they want to hold responsible for 9/11 and although different
people have found different culprits, their point is the same: that individual leaders
are to blame for the World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks. It is however,
dangerous to place the entire burden of responsibility on single individuals, though it
may be understandable, as it is a natural human response after a great tragedy. It
does however suggest the wrong causes of failure and thus the wrong remedies in
tackling them. For instance, well-meaning 'intelligence reform' advocates including
members of Congress and families, of 9/11 victims mistakenly fixed their sights on
measure recommended by the 9/11 Commission, most notably the creation of the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI)[25]. It would be ridiculous to say that
individual leadership is irrelevant; it would merely be more prudent to examine the
less noticeable aspects of organisational life. If it was the case that leadership
determined counterterrorism success and failure, then resolution to the problems
encountered by the intelligence agencies would be easy[26].

To conclude, it seems that the enduring defects in the FBI and CIA organisational
structure, culture, and incentive systems proved to be a major debilitating factor
once the Cold War was over and the terrorist threat emerged. These weaknesses
ultimately prevented the agencies from exploiting 12 separate opportunities that
might have disrupted the 9/11 plot[27]. These agencies may be charged with
preventing surprise but not all surprises can be prevented, such as the abrupt end of
the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union[28].

Furthermore it seems the danger of defining 'intelligence failure' by example

resembling those above is that each case is contextually unique and can be argued
with no end in sight. The important recurring element through the examples
illustrated is the significance of surprise, regardless of if it is intelligence surprise,
military surprise in the case of Pearl Harbour and the Yom Kippur war, or political
surprise. Even if the intelligence community itself was not surprised by them, it was
unable to convince the military and political consumers of intelligence, these events
might occur; in which case it suggests the failure is one of organisational and
specifically of communication and persuasion.