A.M. No.
1162 August 29, 1975 passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of
Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar
Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL
TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members,
1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon
Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo
and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for disciplinary action — for their acts and
omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court
for re-correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations
question, Oscar Landicho — who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar
Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively — invited the
attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil
Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the
bar results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was
confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C.
Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated
"that there are strong reasons to believe that the grades in other examination
notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations — to raise the grades —
prior to the release of the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or
request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the examiners
concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why
they may not do so now when proper request answer motion therefor is made. It
would be contrary to due process postulates. Might not one say that some
candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades were not asked to be
reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient
reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to
ultimately decide the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol.
I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the
1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects — Political Law
and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial
Law — of a successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some
changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective
examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed that the bar candidate
with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who
flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade
of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in
the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by
virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for
the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar
Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit
their sworn statements on the matter, with which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having
brought the five examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang,
back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the
circumstances under which the same was done and his reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-
evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon
the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do
the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject
and/or was on the borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal
investigation, the Court required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar
Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his
name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34,
rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a
5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why his
name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99,
rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by the Court "to show cause
within ten (10) days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against
them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p.
70, rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed
theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and
35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another
sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on March 19,
1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified
answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was
required by the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973
(Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo
Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code
No. 954 in Political Law and Public International Law of examinee Ramon Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a number of
examination notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the
deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty.
Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No.
1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered
that another paper in Political Law and Public International Law also underwent re-
evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out
to be owned by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg.
Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-
checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of
the grade from 4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by
another successful candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty
dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify in the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of
the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer,
showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the
School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged
with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed
on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted with
this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.),
respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged with
the crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make
mention of this fact which he is required under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was
terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to
submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and Pardo submitted their
respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence
in Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not
summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as
evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral
testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits and answers earlier
submitted by them to the Court. The same became the basis for their cross-
examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct
testimony in the investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners
recounted the circumstances under which they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the
examination notebooks in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I
was correcting the examination notebooks, Atty.
Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the practice
and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo)
make a review of the grades obtained in all subjects and if he
finds that candidate obtained an extraordinary high grade in
one subject and a rather low one in another, he will bring
back the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation
and change of grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he
brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for
1
 re-evaluation, because according to him the owner of the
paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade
to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was
really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in
the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in
doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade
to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to
me for such re-evaluation and upon verifying my files I found
that the notebook is numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of
the answers were based on the same standard used in the
correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4
with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No.
5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to
10% (emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April
11, 1972 affidavit with following additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not
reconsidered as it is no longer to make the reconsideration of
these answers because of the same evaluation and standard;
hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at
10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination
booklet No. 951 I did not know the identity of its owner until I
received this resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor
the identities of the examiners in other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and
under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of the
misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the
following circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers
on or about October 16, 1971,
relationship between Atty. Lanuevo and
myself had developed to the point that
with respect to the correction of the
examination booklets of bar candidates
I have always followed him and
considered his instructions as reflecting
the rules and policy of the Honorable
Supreme Court with respect to the
same; that I have no alternative but to
take his words;
b) That considering this relationship
and considering his misrepresentation
to me as reflecting the real and policy
of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did
not bother any more to get the consent
and permission of the Chairman of the
Bar Committee. Besides, at that time, I
was isolating myself from all members
of the Supreme Court and specially the
chairman of the Bar Committee for fear
that I might be identified as a bar
examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me
in return for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to
consider and evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid
because I was not the one who made the original correction
of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in
Political Law and Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972
that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence
to obtain from me the last bag of two hundred notebooks
(bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400) which
according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he came to
my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel
of the Supreme Court, with at least two companions. The bar
confidant had with him an examinee's notebook bearing code
number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested me
if it was possible for me to review and re-examine the said
notebook because it appears that the examinee obtained a
grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said
examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the
highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-
examinee the notebook as I had submitted the same
beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so
because the same was still within my control and authority as
long as the particular examinee's name had not been
identified or that the code number decode and the examinee's
name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name
of the examinee in the case present bearing code number 661
had not been identified or revealed; and that it might have
been possible that I had given a particularly low grade to said
examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's
representations to me, and as it was humanly possible that I
might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I re-
examined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded it
in accordance with the same standards I had used throughout
the grading of the entire notebooks, with the result that the
examinee deserved an increased grade of 66. After again
clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the
grades, and as he had assured me that the code number of
the examinee in question had not been decoded and his name
known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the
notebook and the grade card attached thereto, and properly
initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized grades
(from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading
sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant
brought with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar
Confidant brought with him the other copy the grading sheet"
(Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation",
respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts
stated in his earlier sworn statement and in additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political
and international law, code numbered 661, I did know the
name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only
upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now
knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not know him
personally, and that I have never met him even up to the
present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was
authorized to make such review, and had repeatedly asked
the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to make such
revision and was so assured of my authority as the name of
the examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity
revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently
regular and so appeared to be in the regular course of express
prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an
examiner, and the Bar Confidant was my official liaison with
the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as much as
possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairman
lest I be identified as an examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about
7:30 o'clock in the evening at my residence, I felt it
inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It did
not appear to me that his representations were unauthorized
or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the
official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel,
accompanied by two companions, which was usual, and thus
looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was
about the same hour that he used to see me:
xxx xxx xxx
2
 7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the
same condition as when I submitted the same. In agreeing to
review the said notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to
see if I committed an error in the correction, not to make the
examinee pass the subject. I considered it entirely humanly
possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular
notebook on December 31, 1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee
had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of
which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course,
it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew
the grades of the examinee in the position to know and that
there was nothing irregular in that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade
obtained by the examinee with notebook code numbered 661
was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points, resulting
in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the
subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to make
the examinee pass, notwithstanding the representation that
he had passed the other subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar
Examiners' Committee consensus was that where an
examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the
examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody
objected to it as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first
meeting, we still did not know the names of the candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had
absolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant
or his malfeasance in office, and did not know the examinee
concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him before or
rather the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated
April 12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and
collect examination books to my residence at 951 Luna
Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed
correction of the books in Criminal Law and was helping in the
correction of some of the papers in another subject, the Bar
Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law
saying that that particular examinee had missed the passing
grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his paper in
Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75% then he
would make the general passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that
is, giving a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points,
initialled the revised mark and revised also the mark and
revised also the mark in the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the
examinee concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted
the word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to
the identity of the examinee in question who up to now remains a total stranger and
without expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164,
p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14,
1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of
February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the
Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion
Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's
notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and
submitted to him. He informed me that he and others (he
used the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He
requested me to review the said notebook and possibly
reconsider the grade that I had previously given. He explained
that the examine concerned had done well in other subjects,
but that because of the comparatively low grade that I had
given him in Remedial Law his general average was short of
passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the
paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving of
being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo
particularly called my attention to the fact in his answers the
examinee expressed himself clearly and in good enough
English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I
would reconsider the grades I had previously given and
submitted was entirely within my discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as
Bar Confidant to address such a request to me and that the
said request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo,
proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every item of
the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the
answers, I increased the grades in some items, made
deductions in other items, and maintained the same grades in
other items. However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I
had totalled the new grades that I had given after re-
evaluation, the total grade increased by a few points, but still
short of the passing mark of 75% in my subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the
contents of his sworn statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in
increasing the total grade of the examinee-concerned in
Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent
acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for
not having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of
Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by Mr.
Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in attenuation
of such omission, that —
a) Having been appointed an Examiner
for the first time, he was not aware, not
having been apprised otherwise, that it
was not within the authority of the Bar
Confidant of the Supreme Court to
request or suggest that the grade of a
particular examination notebook be
revised or reconsidered. He had every
right to presume, owing to the highly
fiduciary nature of the position of the
Bar Confidant, that the request was
legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade of the particular
examinee concerned, herein
respondent carefully evaluated each
and every answer written in the
notebook. Testing the answers by the
criteria laid down by the Court,
and giving the said examinee the
benefit of doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo's representation that it was
only in that particular subject that the
said examine failed, herein respondent
became convinced that the said
examinee deserved a higher grade than
that previously given to him, but that
he did not deserve, in herein
respondent's honest appraisal, to be
given the passing grade of 75%. It
should also be mentioned that, in
reappraising the answers, herein
respondent downgraded a previous
rating of an answer written by the
examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated
April 17, 1972:
3
 xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners'
Committee after the Bar Examinations were held, I was
informed that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects
except Mercantile Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be
willing to re-evaluate the paper of this particular Bar
candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar
candidate's notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the
answers of this particular Bar candidate I decided to increase
his final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed
the changes in the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72,
rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents
of his sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby
state that I re-evaluated the examination notebook of Bar
Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith
and in direct compliance with the agreement made during
one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that
where a candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner
concerned should make a re-evaluation of the answers of the
candidate concerned, which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I
made the aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No.
1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never met up
to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in
the grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings, I
was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first
notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks.
Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the basis of
the memorandum circularized to the examiners shortly
earlier to the effect that
... in the correction of the papers,
substantial weight should then be given
to clarify of language and soundness of
reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after
the release of the results of the examinations, we are usually
swarmed with requests of the examinees that they be shown
their notebooks. Many of them would copy their answers and
have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of
them would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or
re-evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of such motions
or requests which we are reading for submission to the
Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the
same they have to be denied because the result of the
examinations when released is final and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances
that motivated me to bring those notebooks back to the
respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162,
p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners
concerned in his hotest belief that the same merited re-
evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his intention to forsake
or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the
contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that
neither did he act in a presumptuous manner, because the
matter of whether or not re-evaluation was inorder was left
alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge,
he does not remember having made the alleged
misrepresentation but that he remembers having brought to
the attention of the Committee during the meeting a matter
concerning another examinee who obtained a passing general
average but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As
the Committee agreed to remove the disqualification by way
of raising the grade in said subject, respondent brought the
notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who
thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said examinee to
pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned is one
surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his
act would stir such serious charges as would tend to
undermine his integrity because he did it in all good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo
filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer,
stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners
concerned into believing that the examinee involved failed
only in their respective subjects, the fact of the matter being
that the notebooks in question were submitted to the
respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good
faith that they so merited on the basis of the Confidential
Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo,
particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which
was circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them
entirely the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in
order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into
the notebooks in question:
Sometime during the latter part of
January and the early part of February,
1972, on my way back to the office (Bar
Division) after lunch, I though of buying
a sweepstake ticket. I have always
made it a point that the moment I think
of so buying, I pick a number from any
object and the first number that comes
into my sight becomes the basis of the
ticket that I buy. At that moment, the
first number that I saw was "954"
boldly printed on an electrical
contribance (evidently belonging to the
MERALCO) attached to a post standing
along the right sidewalk of P. Faura
street towards the Supreme Court
building from San Marcelino street and
almost adjacent to the south-eastern
corner of the fence of the Araullo High
School(photograph of the number
'954', the contrivance on which it is
printed and a portion of the post to
which it is attached is identified and
marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the
number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I
proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for
a ticket that would contain such
number. Eventually, I found a ticket,
4
 which I then bought, whose last three
digits corresponded to "954". This
number became doubly impressive to
me because the sum of all the six digits
of the ticket number was "27", a
number that is so significant to me that
everything I do I try somewhat
instinctively to link or connect it with
said number whenever possible. Thus
even in assigning code numbers on the
Master List of examinees from 1968
when I first took charge of the
examinations as Bar Confidant up to
1971, I either started with the number
"27" (or "227") or end with said
number. (1968 Master List is identified
and marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the
figure "27" at the beginning of the list,
as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List
as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure "227"
at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-
Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-
Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the
beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-
Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as
Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at
the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number
(27) was born out of these incidents in
my life, to wit: (a) On November 27,
1941 while with the Philippine Army
stationed at Camp Manacnac,
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken
with pneumonia and was hospitalized
at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as
a result. As will be recalled, the last
Pacific War broke out on December 8,
1941. While I was still confined at the
hospital, our camp was bombed and
strafed by Japanese planes on
December 13, 1941 resulting in many
casualties. From then on, I regarded
November 27, 1941 as the beginning of
a new life for me having been saved
from the possibility of being among the
casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I
was able to get out of the army byway
of honorable discharge; and (c) on
February 27, 1947, I got married and
since then we begot children the
youngest of whom was born on
February 27, 1957.
Returning to the office that same
afternoon after buying the ticket, I
resumed my work which at the time
was on the checking of the notebooks.
While thus checking, I came upon the
notebooks bearing the office code
number "954". As the number was still
fresh in my mind, it aroused my
curiosity prompting me to pry into the
contents of the notebooks. Impressed
by the clarity of the writing and
language and the apparent soundness
of the answers and, thereby, believing
in all good faith on the basis of the
aforementioned Confidential
Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh.
1-a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-
evaluation, I set them aside and later
on took them back to the respective
examiners for possible review recalling
to them the said Confidential
Memorandum but leaving absolutely
the matter to their discretion and
judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could
have reference to either of the two cases which I brought to
the attention of the committee during the meeting and which
the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective
examines, namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a
passing general average but with a
grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile
Law(the notebooks of this examinee
bear the Office Code No. 110, identified
and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the
notebook in Mercantile Law bearing
the Examiner's Code No. 951 with the
original grade of 4% increased to 50%
after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-
Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a
borderline general average of 73.15%
with a grade below 60% (57%) in one
subject which, at the time, I could not
pinpoint having inadvertently left in the
office the data thereon. It turned out
that the subject was Political and
International Law under Asst. Solicitor
General Bernardo Pardo (The
notebooks of this examinee bear the
Office Code No. 1622 identified and
marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the
notebook in Political and International
Law bearing the Examiner's Code No.
661 with the original grade of 57%
increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as
Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in
Political and International Law is
precisely the same notebook
mentioned in the sworn statement of
Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo
Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next
preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook was
reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the
former; and only Political and International Law in the latter,
under the facts and circumstances I made known to the
Committee and pursuant to which the Committee authorized
the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners
concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even
volunteered to review or re-check some 19, or so, notebooks
in his subject but that I told the Committee that there was
very little time left and that the increase in grade after re-
evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may not alter the
outcome since the subject carries the weight of only 10%
(Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that
Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was
"led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang, because he "was
impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as he "was going
over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on
the record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the number
954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of
respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former
BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before
except once when, as required by the latter respondent
submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar
examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court
not to reconsider "failure" cases; after the official release
thereof; why should it now reconsider a "passing" case,
especially in a situation where the respondent and the bar
confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met only once
in the ordinary course of official business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation
clearly manifests a reasonable doubt to which respondent is
richly entitled?
5
 5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable
Court's resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge
whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's
actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. In
fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had
the herein respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar
Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant
Lanuevo as stated in the Resolution, which are evidently
purported to show as having redounded to the benefit of
herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-
evaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar
Examination Committee done only or especially for him and
not done generally as regards the paper of the other bar
candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the re-
evaluation of Respondent's grades was done among those of
others, then it must have been done as a matter of policy of
the Committee to increase the percentage of passing in that
year's examination and, therefore, the insinuation that only
respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of
Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far
fetched. Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's
actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an
evidence per se of Respondent's having caused actuations of
Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To
assume this could be disastrous in effect because that would
be presuming all the members of the Bar Examination
Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves
and the result of their work that year, as also unworthy of
anything. All of these inferences are deductible from the
narration of facts in the resolution, and which only goes to
show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or
consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973
would make this Respondent Account or answer for the
actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the
actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of
some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The
evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the Bar
Examiners were in the performance of their duties and that
they should be regarded as such in the consideration of this
case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I Public International Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo
systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-
evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of respondent Galang by deceiving
separately and individually the respondents-examiners to make the desired revision
without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had
been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply
the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971,
just before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner
Pamatian while the latter was in the process of correcting examination booklets,
and then and there made the representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a
review of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a
candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one
on another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-
evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56;
Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-
evaluation, representing that the examinee who owned the particular notebook is
on the borderline of passing and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to
75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian
took respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered
the examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook
belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office Code
Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent
Pamatian did not know the identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the
said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven
subjects including Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six
subjects and could not obtain the passing average of 75% for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972,
respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at
1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law,
which respondent Manalo and previously corrected and graded. Respondent
Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and
possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing that "they" has
reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in
other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given said
examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of said
examinee was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and
observation that he thought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent
Manalo might yet find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar.
Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo to
the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good
English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent
Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic,
knowledge of legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze and
solve legal problems rather than a test of memory; in the
correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to
clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the
matter of reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent
Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to
make such request and further believing that such request was in order, proceeded
to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an
increase of the examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from
63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes
made by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook
examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his
affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2-
Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make
the passing grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent
Lanuevo went to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a
new batch of examination papers in Political Law and Public International Law to be
corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law
bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66,
rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said
notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and
the mark be increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar
examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible — the
respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help
out examinees who are failing in just one subject — respondent Pablo acceded to
the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook.
Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency.
After the re-evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of
10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the grading
sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with Office Code
Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp.
43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was
still below the passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo
brought back to respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law,
with the former informing the latter, who was then helping in the correction of
papers in Political Law and Public International Law, as he had already finished
correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject — Criminal Law —
that the examinee who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing grade
by only a fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be raised
a few points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting
the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did
not want to be the one causing the failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz
raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and
also revised the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The
examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This
examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent
Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he
remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a candidate had almost made the
6
passing average but had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court,
leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He
recalls, however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but
this was long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the
same was received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average
to a passing grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including
Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law,
respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme — by
securing authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in
Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972,
respondent Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject
and passed the rest, the examiner concerned would review the notebook. Nobody
objected to it as irregular and the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-
Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo
was informed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects
except Mercantile Law. This information was made during the meeting within
hearing of the order members, who were all closely seated together. Respondent
Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next
day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's
notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent
Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers,
decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not however thereafter
officially brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-
Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the
particular examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not
have consented to make the re-evaluation of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33,
rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that there was only one instance he
remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he had to change
the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the
notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's
Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the
residence of respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks,
respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent Pardo riding in a
Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the Philippines with two companions.
According to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February,
1972, after the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee. respondent
Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's
Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested
respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said notebook because,
according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular notebook
obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial
Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the
grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine
concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has
number 1622 as office code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg
(Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.
A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E.
GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the
five examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of Galang's average
from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted
points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a
resolution of the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's examination
without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took
his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the
Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the
answers of Galang or of other examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent
Galang failed only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of
passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on the authority of the
aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-
Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4,
rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains
that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-
evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust
reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee
concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner because the
matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the
examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said
confidential memorandum was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in
the initial correction of the examination papers and never as a basis for him to even
suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the
examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not only
presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and
Pamatian — whose declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and
deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as well as
corroborate each other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners
(Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted
during the investigation and hearing of the cases show how respondent Lanuevo
adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that
respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in
him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well
as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with
the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were thus deceived
and induced into re-evaluating the answers of only respondent Galang
in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately
enabling him to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent
Lanuevo's well-studied and well-calculated moves in successively representing
separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that the examinee
failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To
repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the
five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general average was
only 66.25% — which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly
claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of
passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang was referred back to the
examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing mark and this
was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The
averages and individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized re-
evaluation are as follows:
BAI
1. Political Law Public
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
BAI
Labor Laws and Social
Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points
or 33 weighted points.
Taxation 74% 74% = no re-
evaluation made.
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points.
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or
22 weighted points.
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.
————————————
General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%
7
Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of
Galang in the five (5) subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's
original average of 66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted
points, to the great damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations
and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor only of
examinee Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter
who — Political Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law
for Ty dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in
the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make
the passing mark before or after their notebooks are submitted to it by the
Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners,
his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects
taken and thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare
a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and failing in relation to a
certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on the basis
of which the Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc.
The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and
cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners
concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than
the examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and
the same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A
Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby
compromises his position as well as the image of the Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any
intention of betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar
Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he
singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than
ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which
he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly
claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of
absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-
evaluation. For certainly, as against the original weighted average of 66.25% of
Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than
ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to
do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted
on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the said more than
ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise
the Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation
before or after the said re-evaluation and increase of grades, precludes, as the same
is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International
Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz
to give his actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that
the over ninety examinees who were far better situated than Galang would not give
him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of
Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in one subject.
Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively — as
hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to
Galang's notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his
suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.)
filed during the investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of
Galang deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately
clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by
respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more
than five 95) months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo,
Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-thought.
B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW
TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF
EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER
BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS
GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the
aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty
dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty
dela Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent
Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were officially brought to the Bar
Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the
latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with
respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty
dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that
the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was
presented at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51,
rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was made
by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date
of the two examinees and record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee
were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them
inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on leave after the
release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that the
inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the Confidential Room of
respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No.
1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only
one notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is
substantiated by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to
him, this notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned
by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original
grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in
the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with
the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo
presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number
951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No.
1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of
Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol.
VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any
objection to their admission in evidence.
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case
of an examinee presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all
subjects except in one and the Committee agreed to refer back to the Examiner
concerned the notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-
16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not Political Law
(Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an
examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in
one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number
1613 (belonging to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the
Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day following the
meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up,
respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it.
This particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile
Law that was taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case
brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no
case of an examinee that was referred to the Committee that involved Political Law.
He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the
representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of
the members of the Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject
and passed all the others, the Examiner in whose subject the examinee failed should
re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No.
9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57%
was referred back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in
three (3) subjects, as follows:
Labor Laws 3%
Taxation 69%
Mercantile Law 68%
Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his
grade in Political Law are as follows:
BA
Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27
weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
————————————————
8
 Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to
Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject,
had two (2) other failing grades. These are:
Political Law 70%
Taxation 72%
His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are
as follows:
BA
Political Law 70% 70% = No
reevaluation
Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no
reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
—————————————————
Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).
The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty
dela Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination
Committee in February, 1971, which violation was due to the misrepresentation of
respondent Lanuevo.
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to
Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar
Examination Committee because even at the time of said referral, which was after
the unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still
failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in
Remedial Law was considered 75% under the Confidential Memorandum and was
so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated
by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of having betrayed
the trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the
integrity of the Bar examinations and undermining public faith in the Supreme
Court. He should be disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or
their names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be
required to show cause and the corresponding investigation conducted.
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
respondent.
A before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise
be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-
authorized re-evaluation of his answers in five(5) major subjects — Civil Law,
Political and International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal
profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1)
previous established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or
present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these
facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers' Petition
for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a
bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion
(Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination
Committee, composed of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight
(8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects with one
subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and
the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on
the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court.
Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of
discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in
accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always be subject to
the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is
primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in connection with
the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court
and must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of
respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated
by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the Court, a serious breach of
the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant.
Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971
Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar
Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission
of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine whether or
not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the
Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee
benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is
whether the proceedings or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the
Bar were in accordance with the rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among
others, with the character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar,
provides that "every applicant for admission as a member of the Bar must be ... of
good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of
good moral character, and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude,
have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or
under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce before the
Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127).
Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his
involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the
Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to
what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence,
the necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's personal record —
whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is
still pending — becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar
examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965 require the
disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending
against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of which he has been
accused. It is of course true that the application form used by respondent Galang
when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require the
disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated,
implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is
his obligation to reveal to the Court all his involvement in any criminal case so that
the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his moral
character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court
will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could
not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether
pending or terminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a
bearing upon his character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964,
when respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third time, respectively,
the application form provided by the Court for use of applicants already required
the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for
or convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and
that there is no pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang
took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the
Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases
whether involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant
is required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any offense
convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is
there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent
Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal
case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City
Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in
his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of
fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case
for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966,
1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he
had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court that he
had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed
unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was
allowed to take his oath.
9
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations
of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a
ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well — settled (see 165 ALR
1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the
respondent, in withholding from the board of law examiners
and from the justice of this court, to whom he applied for
admission, information respecting so serious a matter as an
indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court
(cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or
the judge to whom he applied for admission, been apprised
of the true situation, neither the certificate of the board nor
of the judge would have been forthcoming (State ex rel.
Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W — 709 — 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to
surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken
from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in
the discretion of the Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the
discretion, the court should be informed truthfully and frankly
of matters tending to show the character of the applicant and
his standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The
finding of indictments against him, one of which was still
outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts which
should have been submitted to the court, with such
explanations as were available. Silence respecting them was
reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102,
104; emphasis supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case
despite his having been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances
of the criminal case including the very name of the victim in that case(he finally
admitted it when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify
thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that
criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of
honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a
member of the noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the
Court requiring him to explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973, apprised of his
omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any
explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner
in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender
of his attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of
Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted
every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended
or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards
of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which
merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal
law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one
whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court, to
clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to
permit him to hold himself as a duly authorized member of
the bar (citing American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this
present case is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several
occasions in the past nullified the admission of successful bar candidates to the
membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of,
or false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational
attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name
of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court
Investigators contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re:
Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta,
101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs.
Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and
People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and
Castro, the Court found that the grades of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and
they were convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now
CFI Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals,
now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel
Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation
and/or re-correction of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of
respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith; and that
they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the
identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the
same without any consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly
demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the
respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and
without any consideration whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of
members to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances,
should have exercised greater care and caution and should have been more
inquisitive before acceding to the request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo.
They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who would
have referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners
should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete
grades and/or the average of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to
have failed only in their respective and particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned was
really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and the stain on the Bar
examinations could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so
declared under oath that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or
merited the increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection with the
re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to
respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades of
Galang in their respective subject solely because of the misrepresentations of
Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought
to me one paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost passed,
however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot remember the exact
average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing average. I
agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V,
pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164,
p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this particular
examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject except this subject and that if I
can re-evaluate this examination notebook and increase the mark to at least 75, this
particular examinee will pass the bar examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is this
being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to help
out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request
and said 'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and
what i did was to go over the book and tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did
not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was to be more lenient
and if the answers was correct although it was not complete I raise the grade so I
had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading sheet
accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made
by respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their
declarations that the increases in grades they gave were deserved by the examinee
concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and
deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo —
Q And by reason of that information
you made the re-evaluation of the
paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the
paper of your own accord in the
absence of such information?
10
 A No, your Honor, because I have
submitted my report at that time" (Vol.
V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in
paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April
17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation
No. 2, Answer dated march 19, 1973,
Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).
Pamatian —
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he
brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil Law for
re-evaluation because according to him the owner of the
paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade
to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was
really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to do so
and in the further belief that I was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and
under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view of them
is representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-
Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo —
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee
concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each and
every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answer by
the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said
examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's
representation that it was only in that particular subject that
said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced
that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that
previously given him, but he did not deserve, in herein
respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade
of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Pardo —
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred,
because I corrected that particular notebook on December
31,1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar
Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades
in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial
Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164,
p. 62, rec.; emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo
to induce the herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one
among them can truly claim that the re-evaluation effected by them was impartial
or free from any improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and
competence notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades
given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm.
Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-
examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection
with the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five (5) subjects do not warrant
or deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations
satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-
examiners that their participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one
impressed with the highest consideration of public interest — absolute purity of the
proceedings — and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and
vigilance in the performance of their duties relative thereto.
V Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn.
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14,
1973, claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded
cause, or lending undue assistance or support thereto ... was motivated with
vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his
(examiner's) alleged friend — a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said
examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass
said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of
the late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and
therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did
not bring this out during the investigation which in his words is "essential to his
defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during the investigation
when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against
Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter
departed for Australia "until this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread
or misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this
case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because
he does not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-
evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar
examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did
see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in connection
with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the
Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned
in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him
(Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even
though such information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official
release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly expected of a
member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his actuations demanded by
resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine
the integrity of the bar examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme
Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of
respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was
committed for valuable consideration.
A
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after
the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be
out of proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the
Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired
from the BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374
square meters, more or less, for the amount of P84,114.00.
The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized
only on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however,
respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two (2)mortgages
covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in
the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage —
P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of instrument — April 5,
1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972: Second mortgage
— P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument — April 5,
1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol.
III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the
amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is
equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price of
P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of
the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining the
P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a
loan and received by him through a niece before Christmas of
1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3,
rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00
savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are not fully
reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement
of Assets and Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under
Assets a bank deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In his
1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets was in
the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the
P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under
The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets in
his 1971 statement was not realized because the transaction
therein involved did not push through (Statement of Assets
and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol.
VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).
11
 Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of
respondent from his married sister in Okinawa is extremely
doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00)
is not reflected in his 1971 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged
note which he allegedly received from his sister at the time he
received the $200 was not even presented by respondent
during the investigation. And according to Respondent
Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan, his sister did
not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of
payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during
the investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish
the Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said
promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the records.
Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who has a
family of her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has
saved a lot of money to give to him, the conclusion,
therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was
either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under
the foregoing circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife
mortgaged their BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for the
amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 —
date of instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of inscription).
On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF
Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by respondent and
was subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No.
30143. Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage
in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by
respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled on March 20,
1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage
in favor of GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's
house and lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly
amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but
that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In
his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in
connection with his resignation and retirement (filed October
13, 1972), the house and lot declared as part of his assets,
were valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his
liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS real estate loan
in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities is a 1956 VW car valued at P5,200.00. That he
acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and
November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such
car or any car was listed in his statement of assets and
liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It appears,
however, that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in
his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of
November, 1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding
the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW
car worth P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release of
the 1971 Bar examinations and the acquisition of the above-
mentioned properties, tends to link or tie up the said
acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by
respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's
examination papers or to show that the money used by
respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above
properties came from respondent Galang in consideration of
his passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed
respondent Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations
alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after Respondent
Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered
by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on
October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation
before he was required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed
of the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the
1971 Bar examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from
March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value thereof in lump sum
in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a
part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48,
rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3
(a & e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer
to perform an act constituting a violation of rules and
regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an
offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or
allowing himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to
commit such violation or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices
or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a
public officer once it is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act
1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned
Statements of Assets and Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the
investigation; but they were examined as they are part of the records of this Court.
B
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent
Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the
latter become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights
educational program of the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days
— 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational Institution
(now MLQ University) — 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D.
Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the
governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the
implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent
Lanuevo successively held the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims
Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator
(Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time, therefore,
respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the
Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved on March 16,
1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver — July 31, 1951, which is also the date of
filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time
attended to the availment of the said educational benefits and even when he was
already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to
1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958,
he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-
80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he was the
private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears,
however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine
Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer
of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution
effective the first semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and
furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-
12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of
the Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he
does not even know the location of the said office. He does not also know whether
beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the
Philippine Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.).
But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of
Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring
buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans
Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans
Board, he investigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like
educational benefits and disability benefits; that he does not remember, however,
whether in the course of his duties as veterans investigator, he came across the
application of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that he does not know
the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry
operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the
war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.
12
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working
with the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father
belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in
Samar only and he had no communications with other guerrilla organization in
other parts of the country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only
and does not remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he
was employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is not a member of the
Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army
stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with
pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result
and was still confined there when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese
planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated
August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla
Forces, otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and
inducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the rank of first
lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US
Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and
with the 38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up
operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31
December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22,
1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected
notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose
whatsoever without prior authority from the Court. Consequently, this Court
expresses herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in
Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D.
LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE
ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT
RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND
HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ.,
concur.
Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.
Antonio, J., is on official leave.
Concepcion and Martin, JJ., took no part.
G.R. No. 000 July 18, 1975
IN RE: PEDRO A. AMPARO (1974 Bar Candidate), petitioner,
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
Pedro A. Amparo of Guindulman, Bohol filed a petition to take the 1974 Bar
examinations. This petition was granted.
In the afternoon of December 1, 1974 he was at his assigned seat no. 17, room 401,
fourth floor, Manuel L. Quezon University Building on R. Hidalgo, Manila. The Bar
examination that afternoon was in Criminal Law.
While the examination was in progress, the headwatcher in room 401, Lilian
Mendigorin, reported that examinee Amparo was found reading, at approximately
3:15 o'clock, a piece of paper containing notes in Criminal Law. He at first refused to
surrender the paper, but later gave it to Mendigorin when she threatened to report
the matter to the authorities. A verbal report was relayed to the Bar Chairman who
forthwith gave instructions that no investigation be then made in order to forestall
any commotion that might disturb the other candidates. Amparo was permitted to
continue answering the questions. Headwatcher Mendigorin thereafter submitted a
special report on the incident.
On the following day, Clerk of Court Romeo Mendoza filed a formal report. Acting
thereon, the Court en banc, on December 3, 1974, unanimously resolved "to
disqualify Pedro Amparo from taking the Bar examinations still to be given, namely,
in the subjects of Remedial Law and Labor and Social Legislation, on Sunday,
December 8, 1974, without prejudice to allowing him to take the Bar examinations
after this year."
In a letter dated December 5, 1974, Amparo requested that "before final action is or
becomes effective" he "be given a chance to explain" his side. On December 5, 1974
the Court reconsidered its prior resolution and allowed Amparo to take the Bar
examinations on the coming Sunday, December 8, 1974, without prejudice to
further action by the Court after a formal and more detailed investigation of the
incident.
As ordered, the Clerk of Court conducted an investigation on December 9, 1974 at
which the respondent Amparo (a) appeared in his own behalf, (b) cross-examined
the witnesses against him.(c) presented himself as his own witness, and (d)
presented as his witnesses three Bar candidates who in the afternoon of December
1 were seated near him in the examination room.
At the investigation, headwatcher Mendigorin identified Amparo as the Bar
examinee whom she saw reading a piece of paper inside the examination room in
the course of the examination in Criminal Law. The piece of paper, later marked as
exhibit C, contains handwritten notes, on both sides, on the durations of penalties
and a formula of computing them, particularly reclusion temporal. Mendigorin
testified that she approached Amparo and asked for the piece of paper; that he
refused and put the paper in his pocket; that when she approached him a second
time, he fished the paper from his pocket and gave it to her; that when, at the end
of the examination period, Amparo submitted his examination notebook, he told
her that he really had intended to cheat. On cross-examination, she elaborated that
Amparo gave the piece of paper only when she told him that she would bring the
matter up to higher authority.
Vernon B. Vasquez, a watcher under headwatcher Mendigorin, corroborated the
latter's testimony. He declared that from a distance of five meters, he saw Amparo
reading a piece of paper on his lap; that he wanted to approach him but his
headwatcher was already ahead of him; and that Amparo thereupon placed the
paper in his pocket, but when Mendigorin threatened to report the matter, Amparo
yielded exhibit C with a smile.
In his testimony, Amparo admitted having in his possession, in the course of the
examination, the piece of paper, exhibit C, explaining that because he was
perspiring, he took his handkerchief from his pocket, and out also came the piece of
paper which fell to the floor; that the notes were not in his handwriting as they
were given by a friend, and that it was by accident that he picked up the paper to
find out what it was, as he had forgotten about it, but had no intention to use it;
that while he was reading it, the headwatcher saw him and demanded it from him,
but he refused because he thought that he might need it for "future reference," but
when the headwatcher insisted as otherwise she would report the matter to her
supervisor, Amparo surrendered the paper. On cross-examination, he declared that
exhibit C had been in his pocket a long time before December 1; that he had not
changed his pants for three weeks; that when the first bell rang for the examination
in Criminal Law, he was required to put "all his things" out of the room; that he
forgot about the paper inside his pocket; that when he took out his handkerchief to
wipe his perspiration, the paper fell to the floor, and he wondered what it was and
then recalled upon reading it that it had been given by a friend; and that as he was
reading it, "that diligent headwatcher came and asked for that paper." He further
admitted that he knew it is contrary to the rules to bring notes and books inside the
examination room.
Bar candidates Jovencio Fajilan, Norman M. Balagtas and Apolinario O. Calix, Sr.,
who were seated near Amparo in room 401, were presented by the respondent as
his witnesses, but all of them professed lack of knowledge about the incident as
they were engrossed in answering the examination questions.
It is clear that Amparo, in the course of the examination in Criminal Law, had
possession of the piece of paper containing notes on the durations of penalties and
that he knew that it is contrary to the rules to bring notes and books inside the
examination room. It thus results that he knowingly violated Section 10, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, which pertinently provides that "Persons taking the examination
shall not bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms."
Amparo's impression that the notes had no "material use" to him is correct, in the
sense that they bore no reference to any question asked in the examination in
Criminal Law; even so he committed an overt act indicative of an attempt to cheat
by reading the notes, His refusal to surrender the paper containing the notes when
first demanded; his eventual surrender of it only after he was informed that he
would be reported; and the facts that the notes pertained to Criminal Law and the
examination then in Criminal Law — all these override and rebut his explanation
that he merely read the notes to find out what they were as he had forgotten about
them.
13
We find the respondent Amparo guilty of (1) bringing notes into the examination
room and (2) attempted cheating. According to the official report of the Bar
Confidant, approved by the Court, Amparo did not pass the 1974 Bar examinations.
ACCORDINGLY, it is the sense of the Court that Pedro A. Amparo should be as he is
hereby disqualified from taking the Bar examinations for the year 1975.
Makalintal, C.J., Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma,
Aquino, Concepcion Jr., and Martin, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 31012           September 10, 1932
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA ROMUALDEZ and LUIS MABUNAY, defendants-appellants.
Courtney Whitney, Vicente Nepomuceno and Julio Llorente for appellant Romualdez.
Vicente J. Francisco and Claro M. Recto for appellant Mabunay.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal from the following decision of the Honorable E. P. Revilla, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of Manila:
Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay are charged with the crime of
falsification of public and official documents, committed, according to
the information, as follows:
That in or about the month of February, 1927, in the City of
Manila, Philippine Islands, the accused Estela Romualdez,
who, by appointment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands, was then taking part in the discharge of public
functions as secretary to the Honorable Norberto Romualdez,
one of the Justices of the Supreme Court, and by reason of
said duty had under her care the compositions and other
papers and documents having reference to the examinations
for the admission of candidates to the bar held in the months
of August and September, 1926, which were then kept in the
archives of the said court, confabulating with her coaccused,
Luis Mabunay, and acting in common accord with him, who
was then one of the candidates who took the said Bar
Examinations, willfully, illegally, and criminally extracted from
the said archives of the Supreme Court certain public and
official documents, to wit: the compositions, which were
written, prepared and submitted by the accused, Luis
Mabunay in that examination. Once in possession of the
same, the said accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay,
conspiring together and acting in common accord, willfully,
illegally, and criminally erased the grade of fifty-eight (58%)
given by the correctors Alfonso Felix and M. Guevara to the
composition in Remedial Law, which was written and
prepared by the accused Luis Mabunay, and in its place wrote
sixty-four (64%); and also erased the grade of sixty-three
(63%) given by correctors Jeronimo Samson and Amado del
Rosario to the composition in Civil Law written and prepared
by the said Luis Mabunay, and in its place wrote seventy-
three (73%), and by means of these alterations the said
accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay were able to
change the relative merits of those compositions, thereby
attributing to the said correctors, statements and declarations
contrary to what they really made, and the accused Estela
Romualdez and Luis Mabunay thus succeeded by means of
falsifications made by them in the aforesaid public and official
documents in making it appear that Luis Mabunay obtained
the general average required by the rules of the Supreme
Court, and in securing the latter's admission to the practice of
law, as in fact he was admitted, to the great prejudice of the
public.
Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty.
Both the prosecution and the defense produced an abundance of
evidence, oral and documentary, the presentation of which consumed
considerable of the court's time.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
There is no question whatsoever as to the following facts which are not
disputed either by the prosecution or by the defense:
The accused Estela Romualdez was appointed upon the
recommendation of Justice Norberto Romualdez of the Supreme Court
of the Philippine Islands as his secretary on November 1, 1921, and
continued as such until September 15, 1928.
The accused Luis Mabunay was one of the candidates duly admitted to
the bar examinations held in 1926.
The clerk of the Supreme Court, Mr. Vicente Albert, who was appointed
to that office on July 11, 1912, acts every year as the secretary ex
oficio of the examination committee for admission to the bar.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands designated Justice Norberto
Romualdez as chairman of the examination committee for admission to
the bar in the year 1926, and upon recommendation of Clerk Vicente
Albert, he appointed the following as members of the examination
committee, with their respective subjects: Attorney Francisco Ortigas,
Civil Law; Judge Vicente Nepomuceno, Mercantile Law; Attorney
Godofredo Reyes, Criminal Law; Judge Jose Abreu, Remedial Law;
Attorney C. A. DeWitt, International Law; Attorney-General Delfin
Jaranilla, Political Law; and Attorney Carlos Ledesma, Legal Ethics.
Upon recommendation also of clerk of court Mr. Vicente Albert, a
committee of correctors was appointed, composed of the following
attorneys: Amado del Rosario, Assistant Director of Civil Service, and
Jeronimo Samson, deputy clerk of the Supreme Court, as correctors in
Civil Law; Rafael Amparo, Secretary of Justice Johnson, and Fulgencio
Vega, Secretary of Justice Malcolm, as correctors in Mercantile Law;
Cecilio Apostol, Assistant City Fiscal, and Remo, of the Bureau of Audits,
as correctors in Penal Law; Marciano Guevara, of the Bureau of Audits
and Alfonso Felix, Assistant City Fiscal, as correctors in Remedial law;
Juan Lantin, of the Executive Bureau, and the accused Estela Romualdez,
as correctors in Political Law; Rufino Luna, of the Executive Bureau, and
Zoilo Castrillo, of the Bureau of Lands, as correctors in International Law;
and Anatalio Mañalac, of the Bureau of Lands, and Jeronimo Samson as
correctors in Legal Ethics. On account of illness, Mr. Remo was
substituted by Jeronimo Samson as corrector in Penal Law. All said
correctors were designated by clerk of court Albert with the approval of
the chairman of the examination committee.
The work of the members of the examination committee was limited to
the preparation of the questions in their respective subjects and of a
memorandum or note of the articles, legal provisions and jurisprudence
showing the sources from which the questions were taken. The work of
reviewing and grading the compositions was entrusted to the correctors
designated for each subject. Each corrector was furnished with this note
or memorandum, and a set of rules, patterned after those of the Civil
Service, was prepared by corrector Amado del Rosario to guide the
correctors in grading the examination papers.
The correctors worked separately in reviewing and grading the papers on
the subject assigned to them, noting the grades given to each answer,
not on the composition, but in a separate note book, which were later
checked with the grades given by the other corrector in the same
subject, for the purpose of determining the general average to be given
to the composition.
The report of the examination committee on the final result of the bar
examination for the year 1926 was submitted, under date of March 2,
1927, to the Supreme Court and was published on the fifth of said
month. In the list of successful candidates (Exhibit C-5) there appeared
the name of candidate Luis Mabunay with a general average of 75%. The
grades of Mabunay in each subject, according to the list Exhibit C-2,
which was prepared after the publication of the result of the
examination, are: 73 in Civil Law, 77 in Mercantile Law, 69 in Penal Law,
76 in Political Law, 86 in International Law, 64 in Remedial Law, 80 in
Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises. However, a later revision of the
composition of Luis Mabunay showed that the grades of seventy-three
(73 in Civil Law (Exhibit B-1), and sixty-four (64) in Remedial Law (Exhibit
B-2) had been written on the first page of said compositions after striking
out the grades of sixty-three (63) therefore given to the composition in
Civil Law, Exhibit B-1, and fifty-eight (58) theretofore given to the
composition in Remedial Law, Exhibit B-2. The investigation of this
irregularity by the City Fiscal of Manila led to the filing of the information
in this case.
Admission of the accused Estela Romualdez
Before the prosecuting attorney had finished presenting his evidence
tending to show the identity of the person who altered the grades
appearing on the first pages of the compositions Exhibits-B-1 and B-2,
the accused Estela Romualdez spontaneously and with the conformity of
her attorneys made of record an admission as follows (p. 395, s. n.):
14
 "In Exhibit B-1 the words seventy-three and the figures 73%
inclosed in parenthesis are in my regular handwriting, and in
Exhibit B-2 the words sixty-four and the figures 64% inclosed
in parenthesis appearing in said composition are also in my
regular handwriting."
Authority of the accused Estela Romualdez to alter or change the grades
In view of the admission made by the accused Estela Romualdez that she
was the person who wrote on the compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 the
words and figures alleged to have been falsified, it now appears that the
burden of establishing the authority under which said changes and
alterations were made is on the accused. On this point the evidence for
the defense tended to show that the accused Estela Romualdez, both in
her capacity as private secretary of the chairman of the examination
committee and as corrector and at the same time supervisor of the
correctors, was authorized by said chairman to revise the compositions
already reviewed by the other correctors and to change the grades given
by them.
Justice Romualdez, testifying as a witness for the defense, said that he
considered the accused Estela Romualdez and Deputy Clerk Samson as
supervisors of the correctors; and explaining the powers of the former
he said (page 721, s. n.):
"As such supervisor I think there was on occasion when I gave
her to understand that in order to do justice to the
compositions, she could review the compositions already
graded by the other correctors; provided, I want to add, that
the new revision was done in order to do justice to the
compositions and before the names of the candidates were
known."
Referring to the alterations made by the accused Estela Romualdez to
the grades given by the corresponding correctors to compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2, this same witness testified that said alterations
were made within the limits of the powers he had given to said accused
(pages 723, 726, s. n.).
For her part the accused Estela Romualdez, testifying as a witness in her
own behalf, said that the chairman of the examining committee, gave
her to understand that she "was authorized to correct any composition
in any subject" in the bar examinations of the year 1926 and that she
had never corrected any composition after the name of the
corresponding candidate was identified (pages 782, 783, s. n.). She
denied having known Luis Mabunay, and said that the first time she saw
him was on the first day of the trial of this case (page 783, s. n.).
Contention of the Prosecuting Attorney
The contention of the prosecuting attorney with respect to the accused
Estela Romualdez may be summarized in two following propositions: 1st
— that Justice Romualdez, as chairman of the examination committee,
did not have authority to delegate to his secretary, the accused Estela
Romualdez, the power to revise compositions in subjects in which she
was not a corrector and which had already been graded by the other
correctors, and much less the power to alter or change the grades given
to and written on said compositions; 2nd — that granting that the
chairman of the examination committee had such authority, the accused
Estela Romualdez did not exercise the same in the manner prescribed by
said chairman, namely, in order to do justice to the compositions and on
the condition that the revision and the changes of grades should be
made before the names of the candidates, to whom the compositions
belonged, were known.
In support of the first proposition, the prosecuting attorneys maintains
that Justice Romualdez was appointed by the Supreme Court as
chairman of the bar examination committee of the year 1926, so that he
would supervise the examinations in accordance with law and the rules,
and that precisely, in accordance with the rules the chairman can not by
himself exercise the individual powers of the committee, among which
were the powers to review, and to change or alter the grades given to
the compositions.
As to the second proposition, the prosecuting attorney maintains that
the evidence adduced by the prosecution, specially the testimony of the
Deputy Clerk Samson, shows that the accused Estela Romualdez made
the changes in the grades given by the correctors to compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2, in order to favor the accused Luis Mabunay, to
whom she knew said compositions belonged, thus violating the
conditions imposed upon her by the chairman of the examination
committee when she was given said authority.
As to the accused Luis Mabunay, the prosecuting attorney also maintains
that the evidence for the prosecution shows that he was in connivance
with the accused Estela Romualdez in the alteration by the latter of his
grades in Civil Law and Remedial Law for the purpose of raising to 75%
the general average of 72.8 which he had obtained.
Theory of the Defense
In reply to the contention of the prosecuting attorney, the defense
argues that the power of supervision given by Justice Romualdez to his
secretary, the accused Estela Romualdez, is not contrary to law, rules or
precedents. This assertion is based on the testimony of said Justice that
the appointment of a committee of attorneys in accordance with section
2 of the rules had not been followed by the Supreme Court for a number
of years prior to 1926, and that when said court designated Justice
Romualdez as chairman of the examination committee without
designating the examiners, it left that function to said chairman, and
conferred upon him ample powers to do what in his judgment was most
in line with justice and the law, and that no Court of First Instance has
jurisdiction to determine the propriety or illegality of the procedure
employed by the chairman of the examination committee, or of the
powers conferred by him upon his secretary, inasmuch as said chairman
was responsible only to the Supreme Court for his acts.
The defense also claims that the accused Estela Romualdez could not
have known to whom compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 belonged at the
time of making the alteration of the grades appearing on the first pages
thereof, because, according to the testimony of said accused,
corroborated by that of Catalina Pons, who was one of those who helped
in the preparation of the list of candidates Exhibit C-1, the envelopes
containing the names and the identification numbers of the candidates
were opened just one day before the publication of the result of the
examination, and that in order to finish this work and to place the names
of the candidates on said list, they had to work continuously from 8
o'clock in the morning until 8 o'clock in the evening on the day prior to
the publication of the result of the examinations.
Considerations on the evidence and contentions of both parties
Upon an examination of the testimony of Justice Romualdez, as a
witness for the defense, the court finds that the accused Estela
Romualdez, as secretary of the chairman of the examination committee,
and Jeronimo Samson, as deputy clerk of the Supreme Court were
considered by said chairman not only as correctors in the subjects
assigned to them but also as supervisors of the correctors (page 721, s.
n.), both of them with equal powers and authority so that neither could
consider himself superior to the other (page 727, s. n.). It appears,
however, that while the chairman of the committee gave his secretary,
the accused Estela Romualdez, to understand that she "was authorized
to revise the compositions already graded by the other correctors
provided the new revisions were made for the purpose of doing justice
to the compositions and that the same were mad before the names of
the candidates were known" (pages 721, 722, s. n.), he did not do the
same with respect to Deputy Clerk Jeronimo Samson, to whom he said
nothing about this matter (page 768, s. n.). It also appears that the
accused Estela Romualdez had never informed the chairman of the
committee about the corrections or alterations made by her in
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2; neither did the latter examine said
compositions to determine whether or not their merits justified the
changes so made, and he only knew of said changes upon the filing of
the information against his said secretary (page 728, s. n.). For her part,
she made no report to the chairman of the examination committee of
any error or injustice committed by any corrector, and she only told him
during the progress of the work of grading the papers that they were
being graded very strictly and that "she feared that some injustice might
be committed" (page 729, s. n.), and for that reason Justice Romualdez
told his secretary, Estela Romualdez, that "should a case of the kind
come to her knowledge, she should take special notice of the same in
order to do justice," that is to say, if any person should bring to her
attention any such case in which, in her opinion, some injustice had been
committed, she was authorized to put things in order (page 781, s. n.),
and the revision in such cases was left to the judgment of his secretary
(page 780, s. n.).
The powers conferred in the manner above stated, by Justice Romualdez
as chairman of the examination committee upon his secretary, Estela
Romualdez, gave her so ample a discretionary power of supervision that
in its exercise she should act independently, not only of the correctors
and of her cosupervisor Jeronimo Samson, but also of the examination
committee. Now, granting that Justice Romualdez, as a chairman of the
committee appointed by the Supreme Court to conduct the bar
examinations of 1926, was authorized to confer such power of
supervision upon his secretary Estela Romualdez, in what manner did
she exercise that power when she made the changes in the compositions
in question?
15
The accused Estela Romualdez who, according to her own admission,
made the alterations of the grades originally given by the correctors to
compositions of Exhibits B-1 and B-2, is the only person who could give
an account of and explain the circumstances under which said alterations
were made. But said accused, testifying as a witness in her own behalf,
was not able to explain how and under what circumstances she made
those alterations. When pressed by the fiscal during the cross-
examination to state the circumstances under which she came across
those compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 the accused Estela Romualdez
said: "If I were to make any statement with reference to the
circumstances under which I came across these compositions, you would
compel me to tell a lie, because I do not really remember" (page 823, s.
n.). Neither does the accused remember why she did not put her initials
under or at the side of those alterations she made on compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2, limiting herself to say, when she saw the other
compositions (Exhibits 3-1, X, X-1 and X-2) bearing her initials which
were exhibited to her by the fiscal, that she placed her initials on said
compositions because she graded them as corrector, and she did not put
her initials on compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 because she revised
them in her capacity as supervisor (pages 824- 832, s. n.). She also said,
that, as corrector, she had instructions to put her initials when writing
the original grade on any composition, but as supervisor "she was under
no obligation" to put her initials (page 830, s. n.) and that the chairman
of the examination committee "has not gone into such minor details"
(page 831, s. n.). Upon being questioned by the fiscal as to why she
wrote the altered grade on composition Exhibit B-2 on the same line and
immediately before the initials of the correctors she said: "Because on
that occasion it pleased me to do so" (page 836, s. n.). Neither does the
accused remember whether or not she exercised her supervisory
authority with respect to the other five compositions forming part of
those marked as Exhibits B-1 and B-2 (page 840, s. n.); and when asked
by the fiscal for an explanation as to why the increase given by her to the
grades originally given to said compositions had the effect of raising the
general average of the compositions of the same candidate to 75%, the
accused answered that "the fiscal ought to know that in this life there
are happy coincidences" (page 848, s. n.). With these answers and others
appearing in her testimony, the accused instead of giving a satisfactory
explanation of her conduct, has demonstrated that with the
encouragement given by Justice Romualdez to the effect that the new
revision of the compositions was left to her discretion (page 780, s. n.)
she assumed that the powers exercised by her in the bar examinations of
1926 were such that she could revise any composition in any subject
already graded and increase or decrease the grades given by the
correctors; in other words, that she could, at her pleasure, do or undo
the work done by the correctors without the necessity of accounting to
anybody for it (page 834, s. n.), or of keeping a note or memorandum of
the compositions so revised and the alteration of the grades.
The evidence, however, shows that Justice Romualdez himself in
reviewing, in his capacity as chairman of the examination committee, the
compositions of the candidates who filed motions for reconsideration of
the grades given them, after the publication of the result of the
examinations, performed his work with such diligence and zeal that he
noted in a memorandum book (Exhibit F) not only the grades given to
each answer of the candidate, but also the total grade obtained by the
candidate in the revision, together with such other data which would
explain the increase of the grades of this or that candidate.
The court is loath to believe that Justice Romualdez had given his
secretary to understand that she had such unlimited powers, or that the
Supreme Court in designating said Justice as chairman of the bar
examination committee of the year 1926, authorizing him to confer such
powers upon his secretary, because it is an undisputed fact that his
designation was made so that he should conduct the examinations in
accordance with law and the rules.
But, even granting that when the accused Estela Romualdez altered the
grades given by the correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 she
acted in the exercise of the powers conferred upon her by the chairman
of the examination committee, is there any ground in support of her
claim that she made those alterations only to do justice to the
compositions, and without knowing the name of the candidate to whom
they belonged?
Without giving any weight to the testimony of the witness for the
prosecution, Juan Villaflor, which, according to the defense is not worthy
of credit because of the contradictions and inconsistencies therein
noted, the record contains other evidence establishing certain facts from
which such knowledge can be inferred.
It has been proved that after the revision and grading of all the
compositions numbering over 8,000, a list, Exhibit C-1, was prepared in
pencil. This list was prepared with the intervention of the said Jeronimo
Samson and Josephine Stevens, assisted by Catalina Pons, Juan Villaflor
and the accused Estela Romualdez. However, before the preparation of
this list, sometime during the first day of February, 1927, the sealed
envelopes containing the identification numbers attached to each
composition were opened. Said numbers were written either on the
upper part of each envelope or on the first page of the composition, and
that work lasted several days (pages 162, 163, s. n.). In the list Exhibit C-1
the numbers of the candidates contained in the envelopes attached to
the compositions were first written (page 166, s. n.), and then the grades
in each subject, followed by the general average (pages 71, 184, s. n.),
leaving in the blank the space intended for the names (page 166, s. n.).
Deputy Clerk Samson wrote on an adding machine the grades in each
composition as they were read out by one of the helpers, and then the
corresponding general average as computed by him (page 71, s. n.), and,
at the same time, Josephine Stevens wrote said grades in the space
corresponding to each subject (page 188, s. n.). The roll of paper used by
Deputy Clerk Samson on the adding machine was presented as Exhibit C-
6.
After the list Exhibit C-1 containing the grades in each subject and the
general average of each candidate, who was theretofore known by his
identification number only, was prepared, the envelopes containing the
names corresponding to the identification numbers written on said list
were taken from the safe of the office of the clerk, and the names of the
candidates were inserted in said list by those who assisted in the
preparation thereof (pages 166, 167, s. n.) among whom was the
accused Estela Romualdez, who admitted, upon cross-examination,
having written many of the names appearing on several pages of said list
(pages 859-861, s. n.). After said list Exhibit C-1 was prepared the
examination committee submitted to the Supreme Court a report
recommending the admission to the bar and not only for those
candidates with a general average of 75% or more, but also of those who
had obtained a general average of 70 or more but below 75%, and said
automatic increase was ordered noted on said list Exhibit C-1. However,
this recommendation was not approved by the Supreme Court on the
ground that said automatic increase was arbitrary (pages 73, 74, s. n.),
and for that reason the clerk of court, Mr. Albert, instructed his deputy,
Mr. Samson, to prepare another list containing only the names of the
candidates who had originally obtained a general average of 75%
without having obtained less than 60% in any subject, and in pursuance
thereof the typewritten list Exhibit C-5 was prepared (page 77, s. n.),
which was approved by the Supreme Court and published on March 5,
1927. In this list Luis Mabunay is included with an average of 75%.
Eight or ten days after the publication of the result of the examinations
the list Exhibit C-2 was prepared in the same form as Exhibit C-1 taking
the grades directly from the compositions; while one of the helpers read
them, Deputy Clerk Samson listed them on the adding machine and
computed the general average of each candidate. The roll of paper used
by Deputy Samson on this occasion was also presented and marked as
Exhibit C-7.
Both rolls, Exhibits C-6 and C-7, as well as the lists Exhibits C-1 and C-2,
were kept in the office of Justice Romualdez and were only taken out
when the investigation of the irregularities in the examinations of 1926
was commenced (page 81, s. n.). And only in the course of that
investigation it was discovered that the grades of candidate Luis
Mabunay, identified with number 898 in roll Exhibit C-6 and in the list
Exhibit C-1, which had been prepared simultaneously, did not agree,
because, while roll Exhibit C-6 shows that the grade in Civil Law of
candidate No. 898 is 63, the list Exhibit C-1 shows that the grade of the
same candidate is 73; and while roll Exhibit C-6 shows that the grade of
candidate No. 898 was 58 (in Remedial Law), his grade in the list Exhibit
C-1 is 64 (in the same subject), a difference also being noted between
the general average of candidate No. 898 in Exhibit C-6, which is 72.8%,
and his general average on Exhibit C-1, which is 75% (pages 73, 74, s. n.).
This discovery led to the revision of the compositions of Luis Mabunay in
the examinations of 1926, which were united to his personal record
(Exhibit B), which showed that the grades given to, and written by the
respective correctors on the compositions of said candidate in Civil Law
Exhibit B-1 and Remedial Law Exhibit B-2 had been altered, and further,
that the grades that appeared on said compositions before the
alterations were identical with those that appeared on the roll, Exhibit C-
6. An ocular inspection of page 29 of said Exhibit C-1 shows at first glance
that the numbers 73, 64, and 75 in the columns corresponding to Civil
Law, Remedial Law and General Average, respectively, were written after
erasing with rubber what was there originally written. It may also be
noted, upon an examination of the alterations appearing on the first
pages of compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, that the grades originally
written by the correctors, authenticated by their initials, had been
stricken out in such a way that it is difficult to make out said original
grades, leaving, however, intact, the initials of the correctors.
From these facts it is inferred: First, that the person who erased and
altered the grades written by the correctors on the first pages of
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 wished to make it appear that said
alterations had been made by the correctors themselves; second, that
said alterations were made after the grades written by the correctors
16
had been noted on the adding machine in roll Exhibit C-6 and on the list
Exhibit C-1 which were prepared simultaneously; third, that after said
alterations had been made, and in order that the grades so altered
should agree with the grades already written on the list Exhibit C-1, the
grades in Civil Law and Remedial Law were erased with rubber, and in
place thereof were written the grades now appearing in said
compositions. The accused Estela Romualdez having admitted that she
was the author of such alterations, the only logical inference from her
admission and the facts above set out, is that she was also the person
who erased not only the grades originally written by the correctors on
the compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 but also those appearing in the
columns corresponding to Civil Law and Remedial Law on the list Exhibit
C-1, and the same person who wrote the grades now appearing in said
columns, and which agree with those written by her on compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2. Now, if the accused Estela Romualdez erased in the
manner stated the grades originally written, and substituted for them
the grades now appearing in said compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 as
well as in the columns corresponding to Civil Law and Remedial Law in
the list Exhibit C-1, it cannot be doubted that in making such erasures
and alterations she not only acted with the intent of concealing her
identity, but she also knew the number and the name of the candidate
to whom said composition belonged, because at that time the numbers
and the names of the candidates were already written on the list Exhibit
C-1, and that list was kept in the office of Justice Romualdez (page 83, s.
n.), were she had complete and absolute control as private secretary and
supervisor of the examinations.
Participation of the accused Luis Mabunay
Discarding the testimony of witness Juan Villaflor in which he says that
one Luis Mabunay called up the accused Estela Romualdez on the
telephone a few days before the publication of the results of the
examinations, there is, indeed, no direct proof in the record showing the
participation of the accused Luis Mabunay. However, there is other
evidence for the prosecution establishing certain facts which show
strong indications that he operated in the act before or at the time of its
execution by his coaccused. It has been proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that the accused Luis Mabunay was one of the candidates who
took the bar examinations in 1926; that the general average obtained by
him, according to the computation appearing on the roll Exhibit C-6 of
the adding machine and that originally written in the list Exhibit C-1 was
72.8%; that after the Supreme Court denied the recommendation of the
examination committee that all grades from and between 70% and 75%
be automatically raised to 75%, his name, nevertheless, appeared in the
list of successful candidates which was published on March 5, 1927
(Exhibit C-5), and that said inclusion was due to the increase of these
grades in Civil Law (Exhibit B-1) and Remedial Law (Exhibit B-2), which
was made by his coaccused by erasing and altering the grades
theretofore given by the correctors.
It is true that the accused Estela Romualdez, in her desire to show that
she had no motive whatsoever for favoring his coaccused Luis Mabunay,
testified that she did not know him and that the first time she saw him
was on the first day of the trial of this case. However, in view of her
inability to explain why precisely the compositions of said Luis Mabunay
had been benefited by the revision, and in view of the admission of
Justice Romualdez that the power to revise conferred upon Estela
Romualdez could be exercised by her in the compositions already graded
by the correctors in all cases of injustice which came to her knowledge,
or which might be brought to her attention (page 781, s. n.), her
testimony lacks foundation, because it is absurd to believe that her
revision of the compositions of her coaccused Luis Mabunay was due
only and solely to a happy coincidence.
Furthermore, the accused Mabunay made no effort to contradict the
evidence for the prosecution with reference to his withdrawal of the
amount of P600 from his savings account in the Philippine Trust
Company on the second day of March, 1927, or three days before the
publication of the result of the examinations (Exhibit I) which, when
correlated with the deposit of the sum of P400 made by the accused
Estela Romualdez in her current account (Exhibit H) with the Bank of the
Philippine Islands on the seventh day of said March, 1927, may, perhaps,
give an explanation of the motive of said accused for increasing the
grades of Mabunay with just the necessary points to reach the lowest
passing general average. It is also true that Estela Romualdez testified
that said amount had been sent to her by her cousin named Prisca
Magpayo Redona from the province for the purchase of merchandise for
sale at the latter's store (page 791, s. n.), but the testimony in that
respect was not corroborated either by her said cousin, or by any other
persons mentioned by her as the bearers of said amount, or by the
corresponding check or postal money order, as she had done when
referring other deposits in the bank.
Conclusion
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds that the
allegations of the information are sufficiently supported by the evidence
and that the accused, Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay are guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt; the former as principal and the latter as
accomplice, of the crime of falsification of official documents with which
they are charged and, therefore, a judgment is rendered sentencing
Estela Romualdez, who was a Government employee at the time of the
commission of the crime, to suffer, in accordance with article 300 of the
Penal Code, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 2712, six years and one
day of prision mayor with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a
fine of 1,000 pesetas, without subsidiary imprisonment in view of the
nature of the penalty, and also to suffer the penalty of perpetual
disqualification from public office; and her coaccused Luis Mabunay, who
was a private individual with respect to said examination, to suffer,
under the provisions of article 301 as amended by section 2 of Act No.
2712 and article 67 of the Penal Code, the penalty of four months and
one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to
pay a fine of 250 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and each to pay one-half part of the costs.
The appellant Estela Romualdez through her attorneys makes the following
assignments of error:
I. The trial court erred in finding the accused, Estela Romualdez, guilty of
the crime of "falsification of public and official documents" and in
sentencing her to suffer imprisonment without due process of law,
contrary to section 3, Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, entitled "An
Act to Declare the Purpose of the People of the United States as to the
future Political Status of the People of the Philippine Islands, and to
Provide a More Autonomous Government for those Islands".
II. The trial court erred in not finding, that the accused, Estela
Romualdez, was fully authorized to make the alterations she in fact
made on the composition papers of Luis Mabunay, Exhibits B-1 and B-2
of the Government, and in denying full credit to the uncontradicted
testimony of Mr. Justice Norberto Romualdez, chairman of the bar
examining committee for the year 1926, concerning the authority
granted her.
III. The trial court erred in failing to extend to the accused Estela
Romualdez a fair and impartial trial.
The attorneys for the appellant Luis Mabunay allege that the trial court committed
the following errors:
I. The trial court erred in not crediting the uncontradicted testimony of
Justice Romualdez with reference to his authority as chairman of the bar
examination committee of the year 1926, to confer upon the accused
Estela Romualdez, the powers he in fact conferred upon her, in
connection with said examination.
II. It also erred in not crediting the uncontradicted testimony of Justice
Romualdez as to the fact that he, as chairman of the bar examination
committee of 1926, really and truly conferred upon the accused Estela
Romualdez the powers which she exercised in that examination.
III. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez did not
exercise the powers conferred upon her by the chairman of the bar
examination committee of 1926, within the limits fixed by said chairman,
to wit: that the new revision and grading of the compositions be made in
order to do justice thereto, and before the names of the corresponding
candidates were known.
IV. It likewise erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez
changed the general average and the grades of candidate Luis Mabunay
in Civil Law and Remedial law on the list Exhibit C-1.
V. The lower court erred in not admitting the expert testimony of Wm. J.
Rhode, Felicisimo Feria, and Claro M. Recto, as well as Exhibits 26 and
27, containing the opinion of said lawyers as to the grades to which said
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 were justly entitled.
VI. It also erred in not concluding that Jeronimo Samson used the same
powers exercised by the accused in the bar examination of 1926.
VII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez knew that compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2 belonged to her coaccused Luis Mabunay when she
reviewed and regraded them, the court erred in concluding that said act
constitutes the offense charged in the information.
VIII. Granting that Justice Romualdez, as chairman of the bar
examination committee of 1926, was not authorized by the Supreme
17
 Court to confer upon Estela Romualdez the powers which she exercised
in that examination, the court erred in concluding that she altered the
grades of said compositions willfully and feloniously.
IX. The lower court also erred in concluding that Estela Romualdez
intended to conceal her identity when she revised and regraded
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2.
X. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez, in
exercising her powers as supervisor of the correctors in said bar
examinations, revised compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 only, in order to
regrade them.
XI. It also erred in suggesting that her motive, in revising and regrading
said compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, was the fact that she had
received from her coaccused Luis Mabunay the sum of P400.
XII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez committed the offense
of falsification with which she is charged, the lower court erred in
concluding that Luis Mabunay participated in its commission.
In addition to the usual brief for each of the accused, the attorneys for the
appellants filed a joint memorandum on July 10, 1929. The Attorney-General filed a
brief on behalf of the People of the Philippine Islands and a reply to the
memorandum for the defense.
The court at that time consisted of nine members, one of whom, Justice Romualdez,
was disqualified to sit in this case. Upon a consideration of the case on its merits,
four justices were in favor of affirming the decision of the trial court and the same
number were in favor of acquitting the defendants. The court being unable to reach
a decision in the usual course, an attempt was made on February 11, 1930 to break
the deadlock, as is evidenced by the following resolution:
The court having under consideration again the case of People vs.
Romualdez, et al., No. 31012, those participating being all the members
of the court, except Mr. Justice Romualdez, who was disqualified, it was
moved that following precedents elsewhere, particularly in the United
States Supreme Court, to the effect that when there is an equal division
in the court and there is no prospect of a change in the vote the
judgment appealed from stand affirmed, and in accordance with the
action taken in the case of Nacionalista Party vs. Municipal Board of
Manila, No. 21265 — the judgment in the case at bar be affirmed. Mr.
Chief Justice Avanceña and Messrs. Justices Malcolm, Ostrand, and Johns
voted in favor of the motion. Messrs. Justices Johnson, Street, Villamor,
and Villa-Real voted against the motion. Mr. Justice Johnson based his
dissent on the peculiar statutory provisions in force in the Philippine
Islands. For want of a majority, the motion was lost.
The court thereupon directed that the clerk retain the record in the case
until the further order of the court.
On January 12, 1931 Luis Mabunay filed a motion praying that the case against him
be considered separately and he be absolved from the complaint. This motion was
denied by the court. He renewed his motion on August 1, 1931. This motion was
also denied on the ground that no severance had been asked for in the lower court,
and for the further reason that there was a prospect that the membership of the
court would soon be increased.
The membership of the court was finally increased to eleven, and due to the death
or retirement of three justices only six of the former members remained. On June
23, 1932 Courtney Whitney as attorney for Estela Romualdez filed a petition praying
that this case be set for a rehearing before the court as newly constituted. This
motion was granted. On July 2, 1932 he filed a motion for the dismissal of the
information, alleging that because of the inability of the court to reach a
determination from the facts as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant-
appellant Estela Romualdez, she had been denied her right to a speedy trial. This
motion was denied.
After a reargument of the case, the attorney for Estela Romualdez filed an
additional memorandum, to which the Attorney-General filed a reply.
Under the first assignment of error, the attorneys for Estela Romualdez maintain
that even if the lower court's findings of fact be justified by the evidence of record,
"they fail to sustain that any criminal offense, recognized under the laws of the
Philippine Islands, has been committed." They contend that the appointment of the
committee of attorneys by Justice Romualdez to read and grade the examination
papers was not warranted by law, and that therefore the alteration by the
defendant Estela Romualdez, under the circumstances alleged in the information, of
the grades in question did not constitute a crime.
The testimony of Justice Romualdez, who was a witness for the defense, completely
refutes this contention. He testified that the bar examining committee was
composed of two groups of attorneys: Those that were appointed to prepare the
questions, and those that were appointed to grade the papers. He further testified
that the court was informed of the way in which the examination was conducted
and that it approved thereof. There were more than a thousand candidates and
some eight thousand papers. According to the contention of appellant's attorneys
only the seven attorneys appointed to prepare the questions or the court itself
could lawfully grade these papers. Such a contention is clearly untenable. The
attorneys that prepared the questions did not intervene in the grading of the
papers, but they prepared a key to the questions, which served the other group of
attorneys, the readers or "correctors", as a guide in grading the papers. The
intervention of the "correctors" was just as legal as that of the attorneys that
prepared the questions, and the intervention of the two groups of attorneys was
perfectly regular and valid.
It is also contended that the examination papers which the defendant Estela
Romualdez altered were not public or official documents. That contention is
likewise without merit. As stated by her attorneys, the examination of candidates
for admission to the bar is a judicial function. It cannot therefore be maintained
with any show of reason that the papers submitted by the candidates in the course
of the examination were not public and official documents, or that the alteration,
under the circumstances alleged in the information, of the grades given to such
papers by the "correctors" was not a crime. (In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil., 399, where
this court refers to the falsification of his examination papers as "falsification of
public documents"; People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil., 41, where the conviction of
Castro for the falsification of his examination papers was affirmed.)
In accordance with the established practice of the court to have one of its members
each year make all the necessary arrangements for the bar examination, the Chief
Justice in 1926 designated Justice Romualdez for that purpose, and in pursuance
thereof he appointed one group of attorneys to prepare the questions and another
group to grade the papers. If any of these attorneys were designated by the clerk of
the court, it was with the advice and consent and on the authority of Justice
Romualdez.
The phrase "falsification of a document" is not used in articles 300 and 301 of the
Penal code in the ordinary acceptation of the words. It has a technical meaning, and
according to article 300 may be committed in the following eight ways:
1. By counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric.
2. By causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.
3. By attributing to persons who have participated in an act or
proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them.
4. By making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
5. By altering true dates.
6. By making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which
changes its meaning.
7. By issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy
of an original document when no such original exists, or by including in
such a copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the
genuine original.
8. By intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance
thereof in a protocol, registry or official book.
The acts of the accused are covered by paragraphs 2, 3, and 6. She made the
alterations in the grades in such a way as to make it appear that the "correctors"
had participated therein, because she blotted out the grades of the "correctors" and
wrote new and increased grades opposite their initials, without indicating by her
own initials that she had made the alterations. She in that way attributed to the
"correctors" statements other than those in fact made by them. Her only
explanation of why she altered the grades in that way was that it pleased her to do
so.
A decision in point has just come to hand. It is reported in 180 N. E., 725, and is
referred to in the American Bar Association Journal for August, 1932, p. 497. A bill
was presented in the Massachusetts Senate prohibiting the marking of the
examination papers of applicants for admission to the bar by any person not a
member of the board of bar examiners. The Senate wished to know whether such a
bill, if enacted, would be an unconstitutional interference with the functions of the
Judicial Department, and asked the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court for an
advisory opinion. They replied that such a law would be unconstitutional. In the
course of the opinion they said: "If the judicial department decides that the marking
of the written examinations may be performed by competent persons not members
of the board but acting under the direction of such members, that pertains directly
to the ascertainment of the qualifications of applicants. It is a definite attribute of
18
the judicial department and not an immaterial incident." It was also stated that the
plan of employing assistants to aid the bar examiners in marking the papers had
been approved by the Supreme Judicial Court.
In the second assignment of error, the attorney for Estela Romualdez maintains that
the trial court erred in not finding that she was fully authorized to make the
alterations she in fact made on the examination papers of Luis Mabunay, Exhibits B-
1 and B-2, and in denying full credit to the uncontradicted testimony of Justice
Norberto Romualdez, chairman of the bar examining committee for the year 1926,
concerning the authority granted her.
In the first place, we find it difficult to believe that Justice Romualdez ever gave the
accused the authority which she claims to have received; and in the second place,
even if it be assumed that he gave her the alleged authority, she did not exercise it
in accordance with the terms thereof.
The defense would have us believe that Justice Romualdez regarded his secretary,
Estela Romualdez, and the deputy clerk, Jeronimo Samson, who were themselves
"correctors" as supervisors of the other "correctors", and that he authorized Estela
Romualdez to revise any grade to correct an injustice, without consulting or
notifying the other supervisor, Samson, or the "correctors' who had graded the
paper, without requiring her to initial the alteration, or to make any record thereof
or any report to him or to anybody else.
Justice Romualdez was designated by the Chief Justice to conduct the examination
in accordance with the law and the Rules of Court. He himself had no such authority
as he is alleged to have given his secretary. He is presumed to have discharged his
duties in accordance with the law, and it is inconceivable that he would without any
warrant of law give or attempt to give his secretary the unlimited authority which
she claims to have received, thereby enabling her to alter at will any grade or any
paper, without making any record thereof or any report to anybody. The mere
statement of such a claim shows that it is preposterous.
No such authority was given to Samson, who according to Justice Romualdez was
regarded by him as a supervisor of equal rank with Estela Romualdez. Samson was
never notified that he was regarded as a supervisor, and he never acted in that
capacity.
Let us notice how this unlimited authority is alleged to have been granted to the
accused Estela Romualdez.
It was not in writing or evidenced by any memorandum. It was not even a positive
statement. Justice Romualdez testified that he believed that on a certain occasion
he gave his secretary to understand that if a case should be brought to her attention
she might revise any grade to prevent an injustice, so long as she did not know the
name of the candidate to whom the paper belonged. When asked where she was
when the pretended authority was given to her, the accused could not remember.
There was according to the theory of the defense nothing to prevent Samson from
revising the revision of Estela Romualdez, because she did not initial the changes
made by her, and he was supposed to be a supervisor of equal rank.
If it be admitted for the sake of argument that the accused Estela Romualdez was
given the authority which she claims to have received, nevertheless she was not
authorized to change the grades now in question, because when she made the
changes she already knew that the papers belonged to her coaccused Luis
Mabunay. The evidence fully sustaining that conclusion is carefully set forth by the
trial court, and it is unnecessary for us to review it. The testimony of Justice
Romualdez to the effect that the accused acted within the authority granted her in
changing the grades in question was a mere expression of opinion. It was clearly
inadmissible and not binding on the court. The accused Estela Romualdez did not
even attempt to explain under what circumstances she raised the grades of her
coaccused so as to enable him to obtain the necessary general average of 75 per
cent. She did not confer with the "correctors" who had graded the papers in
question. She di not attempt to explain how she arrived at the increased grades, or
how she came to revise the grades in question, how she happened to pick these
two papers out of eight thousand. She could not point to any other grades that had
been altered by her.
Under the second assignment of error the attorney for Estela Romualdez also
alleges that she freely and voluntarily admitted from the start of the trial of her case
that the alterations had been made by her, and concludes therefrom that she acted
in good faith. We cannot agree either with the statement of fact or the conclusion.
The accused Estela Romualdez did not admit that the alterations were made by her
until after the prosecuting attorney had presented three hundred and fifty pages of
testimony and announced his readiness to prove by three handwriting experts that
the alterations were in the handwriting of the accused. The evidence shows that
before the trial defendant's attorney from the fiscal's office a photograph that had
been made for the purpose of comparing a specimen of defendant's handwriting
and that of the altered grades. The fact that the defendant Estela Romualdez made
the alterations under the circumstances which we have mentioned, when she
already knew that the papers belonged to Mabunay, disproves any contention that
she acted in good faith.
In the case of the United States vs. Ballesteros (25 Phil., 634), this court said:
When the unlawful acts charged against an accused are established by
competent evidence, criminal intent may be and will be presumed,
unless such intent is rebutted by the introduction of evidence sufficient
to overcome this presumption, and satisfactorily disclosing the absence
of such criminal intent.
The third assignment of error made by the appellant Estela Romualdez is that the
trial court erred in failing to extend to her a fair and impartial trial. We shall not
waste much time on this assignment of error, which is utterly without merit. The
record itself completely refutes any such contention. If the learned trial judge erred,
it was in permitting the attorneys for the defendants too great latitude in arguing
their objections. Arguments four and five pages long were incorporated into the
stenographic record of the evidence. The record shows a most unjustifiable attack
on the good faith of the fiscal and a persistent effort to embarrass him in presenting
his evidence against the accused.
The appellant Luis Mabunay makes twelve assignments of error. They are for the
most part embraced in the assignments of error of his coaccused which we have
already considered. These remain only his fifth, eleventh, and twelfth assignments
of error. In his fifth assignment of error it is alleged that the lower court erred in not
admitting the expert testimony of attorneys Wm. J. Rhode, Felicisimo Feria, and
Claro M. Recto, and in rejecting Exhibits 26 and 27, which contain the opinion of
said attorneys as to the correct grades which the examination papers Exhibits B-1
and B-2 deserved.
The lower court sustained the objection to the admission of the testimony of these
three attorneys on the ground that it was not the best evidence, and suggested that
the defense might call the members of the examining committee that prepared the
questions in Remedial Law and Civil Law and the key thereto. The attorneys for the
defense did not see fit to adopt the suggestion of the court. It is not true therefore
that the lower court deprived the accused of an opportunity of showing that the
examination papers in question deserved the increased grades which the defendant
Estela Romualdez gave them. The attorneys that prepared the questions and the
key to the answers were certainly the persons best qualified to decide whether or
not the questions were correctly answered. The opinion of other attorneys, who
had nothing to do with the examination, would only lead to confusion. We find no
merit in this assignment of error.
The eleventh assignment of error is that the trial court erred in insinuating that the
motive of the accused Estela Romualdez in reviewing and regrading the
examination papers Exhibits B-1 and B-2 was the fact that she had received four
hundred pesos from her co-accused Luis Mabunay.
The twelfth assignment of error is that if it be assumed that the accused Estela
Romualdez committed the crime of falsification imputed to her in the information,
the court erred in concluding that the accused Luis Mabunay participated in its
commission.
For the sake of convenience we shall consider these two assignments of error
together.
In the first place we should like to say that there is no evidence to show that Estela
Romualdez ever reviewed the examination papers of her coaccused. So far as the
evidence shows, she merely raised his grades in two subjects, thus giving him by "a
happy coincidence", to use her own words, a passing mark. She could not or would
not enlighten the court as to why she raised the grades of Luis Mabunay so as to
enable him to be admitted to the bar. As already stated, the record does not show
that she raised the grades of any other candidate.
The evidence shows that Luis Mabunay had failed in two previous examinations,
and that he failed in the examination in question, receiving a general average of
only 72.8%. The bar examining committee recommended that not only those having
the required general average of 75 per cent be admitted, but also that those who
had received between 70 and 75 per cent. This is referred to in the record as "an
automatic increase". It was not automatic but arbitrary, and was disapproved by the
Supreme Court, and the committee was directed to prepare a new list and to
include therein only those who had obtained a general average of 75 per cent. The
name of Luis Mabunay was included in the new list submitted three days later,
notwithstanding the fact that he had obtained a general average of only 72.8 per
cent, precisely because Estela Romualdez had in the meantime raised the grades
now in question so that he appeared to have obtained the general average required
for admission to the bar.
The evidence shows that on March 2, 1927 Luis Mabunay withdrew P600 from the
Philippine Trust Co., and that on March 7, 1927 Estela Romualdez deposited P510 in
the Bank of the Philippine Islands. Luis Mabunay did not testify, and he did not
present any evidence to show for what purpose he withdrew P600 from the bank
immediately after the first list was disapproved.
In the case of United States vs. Tria (17 Phil., 303, 307), Justice Moreland speaking
for the court said:
19
 An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State.
If he does not perform that duty he may not always expect the State to
perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to
himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy indeed
if he demand and expect the same full and wide consideration which the
State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help
themselves. This is particularly so when he not only declines to help
himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it
may assist him.
In the famous case of the Commonwealth vs. Webster (5 Cushing, 295, 316), Chief
Justice Shaw laid down the following rule:
When pretty stringent proof of circumstances is produced, tending to
support the charge, and it is apparent that the accused is so situated that
he could offer evidence of all the facts and circumstances as they
existed, and show, if such was the truth, that the suspicious
circumstances can be accounted for consistency with his innocence, and
he fails to offer such proof, the natural conclusion is, that the proof, if
produced, instead of rebutting, would tend to sustain the charge. But
this is to be cautiously applied, and only in cases where it is manifest that
proofs are in the power of the accused, not accessible to the
prosecution.
Estela Romualdez showed that of the sum of P510 P100 was paid to her by her
mother and only P10 by her brother, but she could not satisfactorily prove where
the remaining P400 came from. She said it was sent to her by her cousin, Prisca
Magpayo Redona, for the purchase of goods, but she could not name the person
that brought the money to her, or explain why she deposited it in the bank. She did
not attempt to show that she had paid it out by means of checks for the purchase of
goods for her cousin. She did not call her cousin as a witness.
An accused person runs the risk of an inference against him because of
failure to produce evidence. The inference, unless the failure to produce
evidence is explained away, is that the tenor of the specific unproduced
evidence would not support the party's case. (U. S. vs. Sarikala, 37 Phil.,
486.)
In the case just cited the court quoted with approval the following rules as stated by
Dean Wigmore in his work on Evidence, Vol. IV, p. 3148:
The failure to produce evidence, in general, other than his own
testimony, is open to inference against a party accused, with the same
limitations applicable to civil parties. Here the effect of the burden of
proof has sometimes tended to confuse. It is true that the burden is on
the prosecution, and that the accused is not required by any rule of law
to produce evidence; but nevertheless he runs the risk of an inference
from nonproduction. This seeming paradox, which has been already
sufficiently noticed in treating of the general principle, has misled a few
courts to deny that any inference may be drawn.
The alterations in the grades made by Estela Romualdez were made for the sole use
and benefit of her coaccused Luis Mabunay. They were made willfully and illegally,
and after the Supreme Court had rejected those candidates that had received less
than 75 per cent. The alterations were therefore made after Mabunay had failed,
and he withdrew the money after he had time to learn from his coaccused that he
had failed. It was under those circumstances incumbent upon the accused Mabunay
to present evidence to show for what purpose he withdrew the six hundred pesos
from the bank. As this court said in the case of Worcester vs. Ocampo (22 Phil., 42):
When the circumstances in proof tend to fix the liability on a party who
has it in his power to offer evidence of all the facts as they existed and
rebut the inferences which the circumstances in proof tend to establish,
and he fails to offer such proof, the natural conclusion is that the proof,
if produced, instead of rebutting would support the inferences against
him, and the court is justified in acting upon that conclusion.
The case of In re Del Rosario (52 Phil., 399), is directly on point. Felipe del Rosario
failed for the third time in the bar examination of 1926. He then filed a motion for
the revision of his grades, based on an alleged mistake in computation. This motion
was granted, and he was admitted to the bar. It was subsequently found that
alterations had been made in his examination papers, and he and Juan Villaflor
were prosecuted for the falsification of a public document. Villaflor assumed full
responsibility for the commission of the crime, and testified that Del Rosario did not
know anything about the making of the alterations. The trial court acquitted Del
Rosario, but upon a view of the case for the purpose of taking disciplinary actin
against him Justice Malcolm, speaking for the court in banc, said:
It is asking a great deal of the members of the court to have them
believe that Felipe del Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal
machinations culminating in the falsification of public documents, of
which he was the sole beneficiary.
The attorney's certificate of Felipe del Rosario was cancelled.
In the case of People vs. Bella Bautista (53 Phil., 158), the accused was charged with
the falsification of a public document. The evidence showed that in the Register of
Attorneys the name of an attorney had been erased, and that the accused had
written his own name in that space, although he had not admitted to the bar. The
accused contended that he wrote his name in the register under the direction of an
employee of the court, and that he acted in good faith. He was convicted, and on
appeal the decision was affirmed. This court in its decision said: "The trial court
suggests in the opinion that the offense committed required the participation of
some unfaithful employee of the court. But this fact, as the court found, did not
lessen the criminal responsibility of the appellant."
It is alleged in the information that the accused conspired together and acted in
common accord in the commission of the crime. As the Attorney-General says, a
conspiracy can seldom be proved except by circumstantial evidence, but once it is
proved, the acts of one of the conspirators are the acts of all. (U. S. vs. Ipil., 27 Phil.,
530.)
The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy
may be, and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by
the jury from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
apparently indicate that they are merely parts of some complete whole.
If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that
their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no
actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. Evidence of
actual participation, rather than of passive acquiescence, is desirable.
But proof of acquiescence in, or consent to, the actions of others is
relevant to show the criminal intention of the passive party, and
generally the smallest degree of consent or collusion among parties lets
in the act or words of one against the others. (Underhill on Criminal
Evidence, pp. 795, 796.)
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the conclusions of the trial court are fully
justified by the evidence.
As the accused Estela Romualdez took advantage of her official position in
committing the crime, the trial court found her guilty of a violation of article 300 of
the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2712, and sentenced her to suffer six years
and one day of prision mayor, and the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a
fine of 1,000 pesetas, and to suffer perpetual disqualification to hold any public
office.
The penalty provided by the Penal Code is prision mayor in full extent, or from six
years and one day to twelve years, and the penalty under the Revised Penal Code
being the same, and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present
in the commission of the crime, the penalty should be imposed in the medium
degree, which is from eight years and one day to ten years. The penalty imposed on
the appellant Estela Romualdez is therefore increased to eight years and one day
of prision mayor.
The trial court found the defendant Luis Mabunay guilty as an accomplice under
article 301 of the Penal Code, the crime not being connected with the performance
of his duties as an employee of the Government, and sentenced him to suffer four
months and one day of arresto mayor, and the accessory penalties provided by law,
and to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. The defendants were each sentenced to pay one-half of the costs.
We find that the lower court erred in holding that Luis Mabunay was merely an
accomplice. He was a conspirator and coprincipal of Estela Romualdez. The penalty
provided by article 301 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2712, is prision
correccional in the maximum degree, but that has been changed by the Revised
Penal Code to prision correccional in the medium and maximum degrees, and the
medium degree of that penalty is from three years, six months, and twenty-one
days to four years, nine months and ten days. The prison sentence of Luis Mabunay
is therefore increased to three years, six months, and twenty- one days of prision
correccional.
The decision of the trial court is modified as hereinabove stated. In all other
respects it is affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.
Ostrand, Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-51813-14 November 29, 1983
20
ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V.
LUCILA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Parañaque,
Metro Manila, and FISCAL LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN, respondents.
Froilan M. Bacungan and Alfredo F. Tadiar for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
RELOVA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent Judge Nicanor J. Cruz,
Jr., of the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, disallowing the
appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as private
prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550, both for less serious physical
injuries, filed against Pat. Danilo San Antonio and Pat. Rodolfo Diaz, respectively, as
well as the Order, dated September 4, 1979, denying the motion for reconsideration
holding, among others, that "the fiscal's claim that appearances of friends of party-
litigants should be allowed only in places where there is a scarcity of legal
practitioner, to be well founded. For, if we are to allow non-members of the bar to
appear in court and prosecute cases or defend litigants in the guise of being friends
of the litigants, then the requirement of membership in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the additional requirement of paying professional taxes for a lawyer
to appear in court, would be put to naught. " (p. 25, Rollo)
Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate
criminal complaints against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less
serious physical injuries, respectively, and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
58549 and 58550 in the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila.
Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students
of the U.P.assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus, in
August 1979, petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their separate appearances, as
friends of complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan. Herein respondent Fiscal
Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the appearances of said petitioners, and
respondent judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979, sustained the respondent
fiscal and disallowed the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private
prosecutors in said criminal cases. Likewise, on September 4, 1979, respondent
Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayers, among
others, that the Orders of respondent judge, dated August 16, 1979 and September
4, 1979, be set aside as they are in plain violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court and/or were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. Upon motion, the Court, on November 8, 1979, issued a temporary
restraining order "enjoining respondent judge and all persons acting for and in his
behalf from conducting any proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 (People of the
Philippines vs. Danilo San Antonio) and 58559 (People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo
Diaz) of the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila on November 15, 1979 as
scheduled or on any such dates as may be fixed by said respondent judge.
Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states: têñ.
£îhqwâ£
SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a
justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him
for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid
of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar — a party to an action is authorized to
appear in court and conduct his own case; and, in the inferior courts, the litigant
may be aided by a friend or agent or by an attorney. However, in the Courts of First
Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, he can be aided only by an attorney.
On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to Sections
4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered to
determine who shall be the private prosecutor as was done by respondent fiscal
when he objected to the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila. Sections 4
and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provide: têñ.£îhqwâ£
SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal
actions either commenced by complaint or by information
shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
fiscal.
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.
— Unless the offended party has waived the civil action or
expressly reserved the right to institute it separately from the
criminal action, and subject to the provisions of section 4
hereof, he may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the
prosecution of the offense.
And, they contend that the exercise by the offended party to intervene is subject to
the direction and control of the fiscal and that his appearance, no less than his
active conduct of the case later on, requires the prior approval of the fiscal.
We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly
provides that in the municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in person
with the aid of an agent appointed by him for the purpose. Thus, in the case
of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law student was allowed to represent the
accused in a case pending before the then Municipal Court, the City Court of
Manila, who was charged for damages to property through reckless imprudence. "It
is accordingly our view that error was committed in the municipal court in not
allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of Catalino Salas to aid the
latter in conducting his defense." The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for
one to enter his appearance as private prosecutor. In the first place, the law does
not impose this condition. What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case
personally is to disallow the private prosecutor's participation, whether he be a
lawyer or not, in the trial of the case. On the other hand, if the fiscal desires the
active participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court that
the private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case
under his supervision and control. Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer can
appear as defense counsel or as friend of the accused in a case before the municipal
trial court, with more reason should he be allowed to appear as private prosecutor
under the supervision and control of the trial fiscal.
In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Parañaque, petitioner
Cantimbuhan, as the offended party, did not expressly waive the civil action nor
reserve his right to institute it separately and, therefore, the civil action is deemed
impliedly instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said complainant Romulo
Cantimbuhan has personal interest in the success of the civil action and, in the
prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of his right to be assisted by a
friend who is not a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by respondent judge dated August 16, 1979 and
September 4, 1979 which disallowed the appearances of petitioners Nelson B.
Malana and Robert V. Lucila as friends of party-litigant petitioner Romulo
Cantimbuhan. are hereby SET ASIDE and respondent judge is hereby ordered to
ALLOW the appearance and intervention of petitioners Malana and Lucila as friends
of Romulo Cantimbuhan. Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on
November 8, 1979 is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët
[B.M. No. 44. November 29, 1983.]
EUFROSINA YAP TAN, Complainant, v. NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, Respondent.
[B.M. No. 59. November 29, 1983.]
BENJAMIN CABIGON, Complainant, v. NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, Respondent.
[B.M. No. 624. November 29, 1983.]
CORNELIO AGNIS and DIOMEDES D. AGNIS, Complainants, v. NICOLAS EL.
SABANDAL, Respondent.
Nelbert T. Poculan for respondent Sabandal in BM 59.
Alberto Concha for oppositors in BM 44.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW; PETITION FOR
ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND TO BE ALLOWED TO SIGN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS;
DENIAL OF PETITION; CASE AT BAR. — The evidence supports the charge of
unauthorized practice of law. He called himself "attorney" knowing fully well that he
was not yet admitted to the Bar. Oppositors’ evidence sufficiently shows that
respondent had held himself out as an "attorney" in the agrarian, civil and criminal
cases mentioned by said oppositors. Even if respondent appeared merely in
collaboration with Atty. Senen Angeles in the several cases, that collaboration could
only have been ostensibly as a lawyer. It may be that in the Court of a municipality,
even non-lawyers may appear (Sec. 34, Rule 138, Rules of Court). If respondent had
so manifested, no one could have challenged him. What he did, however, was to
21
hold himself out as a lawyer, and even to write the Station Commander of Roxas,
complaining of harassment to "our clients," when he could not but have known that
he could not yet engage in the practice of law. His argument that the term "client" is
a "dependent or person under the protection of another and not a person who
engages in the profession" is puerile.
2. ID.; ID., ID.; DEFENSE THAT THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS DOES NOT APPLY
TO PETITIONER; EVIDENCE OF UNFITNESS TO BE ADMITTED TO THE PROFESSION. —
Respondent’s additional defense that the code of professional ethics does not apply
to him as he is not yet a member of the Bar proves him unfit to be admitted to the
profession that exacts the highest ethical conduct of all its members, and good
moral character even for applicants for admission to the Bar. He could at least have
shown his fitness for admission by showing adherence to and observance of the
standards of conduct required by all who aspire to profess the law. Accordingly, the
petition of Nicolas El. Sabandal to be allowed to take the oath as member of the
Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys in accordance with Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court is hereby denied.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
At issue in the above-entitled consolidated cases is the petition of respondent
Nicolas El. Sabandal, a successful Bar examinee in 1978, to be admitted to the
Philippine Bar and to be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
Complainants-oppositors, namely, Eufrosina Y. Tan (Bar Matter No. 44, Eufrosina Y.
Tan v. Nicolas E. Sabandal); Benjamin Cabigon (Bar Matter No. 591, Benjamin
Cabigon v. Nicolas E. Sabandal); and Cornelio Agnis, Et. Al. (SBC-624, Cornelio Agnis,
Et. Al. v. Nicolas E. Sabandal), have opposed the petition. They have charged
respondent with: illegal practice of law for accepting clients and for his appearances
as a lawyer even if he has not yet been admitted to the Bar; dishonesty, for filling up
daily time records as an Investigator of the Bureau of Lands during those days that
he appeared as counsel; falsification of public documents; gross dishonesty in public
service; and violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The above-entitled cases, upon respondent’s Motion, were ordered consolidated in
the Resolution of the Court dated November 12, 1982, and were referred to the
Office of the Chief Attorney for investigation, report and recommendation.
At the hearings conducted on March 23, 24 and 25, 1983, only complainants-
oppositors Eufrosina Y. Tan and Benjamin Cabigon, complainants in Bar Matters 44
and 59, respectively, appeared with their respective counsel and presented their
evidence, oral and documentary. The other complainants-oppositors, namely,
Diomedes D. Agnis, Dr. Gabriel Catane, Hedy Catane, Antonio Agnis and Fe E. Agnis,
complainants in SBC-624, failed to appear at the hearings despite several notices
sent to them by registered mail at their addresses of record. Cornelio Agnis had died
in the meantime.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal waived his right to attend the investigations for
reasons of financial constraints and his belief that the evidence he had already
submitted together with his pleadings are sufficient to prove his case so that he felt
it unnecessary to submit additional evidence.
In support of her charge of deception by appearing as counsel and accepting clients,
Eufrosina Yap Tan, in Bar Matter No. 44, testified on and submitted the following
documentary evidence: (1) photostatic copies of transcripts of stenographic notes
of (a) the hearing in CAR Case No. 347 entitled Eufrosina Y. Tan v. Spouses Daniel
Iman and Rosa Carreon, et als., before the Court of Agrarian Relations, XVI Regional
District, Branch III, on June 23, 1981, wherein respondent manifested "Atty. Nicolas
Sabandal, appearing for the defendants, Your Honor" and alleged that Atty. Senen
Angeles, counsel of record, was sick (Exhibits "A" and "A-1"); (b) the hearings in Civil
Case No. 98 entitled Benjamin Cabigon, Et. Al. v. Florentina Buntoran, Et Al., for
Forcible Entry and Damages, before the Municipal Court of Roxas, Zamboanga del
Norte, on September 23, 1980, wherein one of the appearances recorded was that
of "Atty. Nicolas Sabandal: For the defendants", and where respondent manifested
"Your Honor please, appearing for the defendants in collaboration with Atty.
Angeles" (Exhibits "H", "H-1" and "H-3"), and on December 16, 1980 when
respondent made a manifestation for the defendants (Exhibits "I" and "I-2"); (2)
xerox copy of a letter dated June 21, 1981 written by respondent to the Station
Commander of Rizal, Zamboanga del Norte, Obdulio Villanueva, in which
respondent wrote in part: "we are informed that your office is being used by Mrs.
Tan to harass our clients . . ." (Exhibits "B and "B-1"); and (3) copy of the Order of
Judge Nicanor M. Ilicito, Jr., in CAR Case No. 326, entitled Sps. Daniel and Rosk Iman
v. Eufrosina Yap Tan, stating in part that "plaintiffs, through Atty. Nicolas Sabandal,
informed the Court that plaintiff’s counsel on record, Atty. Cyril Ruiz, is in bed and
could not come in today’s hearing" (Exhibits "G" and "G-1").
On the same issue, in Bar Matter No. 59, complainant Benjamin Cabigon testified on
and presented the following exhibits: (1) the appearance of respondent in Civil Case
No. 98, the Forcible Entry case entitled Cabigon v. Bonturan before the Municipal
Court of Roxas (Exhibit "B"), already mentioned by Eufrosina Tan in Bar Matter No.
44; (2) a Certification by the Court Clerk, Interpreter I, of the Municipal Court of
Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte, that respondent had appeared before said Court on
October 1, 1981 in Criminal Cases Nos. 606, 607, and 622; on October 16, 1981 and
August 12, 1981 in Criminal Case No. 622; and on July 29, 1981 in Criminal Case No.
667 (Exhibit "A"); (3) the preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 667 (People
v. Florentina Bonturan, et als.) for Qualified Theft of Forest Products wherein Felipe
Inggo testified that respondent was the lawyer of the Bonturans (Exhibit "D-3"),
while accused Bernardo Gatina declared that respondent was his lawyer (Exhibits
"D-6" and "D-7"); so also with the accused, Antonio Ganuran, who gave the same
declaration and added that he used to pay respondent and Atty. Angeles for
handling his cases (Exhibits "D-8" and "D-9").
To prove her other charges as to the unfitness of respondent to be a member of the
Bar, Eufrosina Tan exhibited a Warrant of Arrest against respondent in Criminal
Case No. 667 entitled People v. Florentina Buntoran, Et. Al. for the crime of
Qualified Theft of Forest Products for having allegedly ordered the felling and
sawing of a dao tree (Exhibit "E"), and the Amended Complaint in the same case
including respondent among the accused (Exhibits "F" and "F-1"); and the
administrative charge against respondent in the Bureau of Lands and before the
Tanod-bayan for falsification of public documents.
For his part, Benjamin Cabigon (in Bar Matter No. 59) also presented a transcript of
proceedings during the preliminary investigation on July 6, 1981 in the same
Criminal Case No. 667 (People v. Florentina Buntoran, Et. Al.) before the Municipal
Court for Qualified Theft of Forest Products wherein the defense of three of the
accused was that it was respondent who had ordered the cutting of the dao tree
(Exhibits "D-2", "D-4" and "D-5").chanrobles law library : red
In his defense, respondent maintained that the charges against him were "baseless
and mere products of oppositor’s bedevilled mind, for the truth being that
petitioner’s admission to the Philippine Bar is a sharp thorn in the throat of
oppositor Eufrosina Tan, who had been waging a campaign of ejectment against her
tenant-farmers some of whom are relatives and friends of petitioners" ; and a
scheme by Cabigon "to stifle anybody who extends assistance to his opponents and
to press the Subano settlers of Gusa, Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte, to give up their
ancestral lands to Cabigon" ; that he was merely assisting his parents-in-law, Daniel
Iman and Rosa Carreon, in CAR cases Nos. 347 and 326 as allowed under Sec. 14(k)
of PD 946, and that it was the stenographer who had inadvertently entered his
name as "Atty. Sabandal" in those cases; that being an employee of the Bureau of
Lands does not bar him from attending to personal cases applying by analogy
section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, nor does he need any authority to appear
from said Bureau since the cases are not work connected; that insofar as Criminal
Cases Nos. 606, 607 and 622 of the Municipal Court of Roxas are concerned, it was
Atty. Senen O. Angeles who was the counsel of record as shown by the Notice of
Hearing (Annex "3", Amended Comment); that on the dates that those cases were
set on hearing, he was on leave as shown by a Certification of the District Land
Officer (Annex "9", Amended Comment); that in appearing in those cases he was
merely helping distressed friends and relatives; that if he had absented himself from
office it was to attend to his personal needs and procure materials for the nipa
house that he was building and not to attend to the case of Lito Dandoy, one of the
accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 606 and 607; that the term "client" should be
construed as a "dependent or person under the protection of another and not a
person who engages in the profession" ; and that the Code of Ethics does not apply
to him but only to members of the Bar.
As his documentary evidence, respondent submitted: (1) a photostatic copy of a
subpoena for the first day of trial in Criminal Cases Nos. 606, 607 and 622 issued by
the Municipal Court of Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte, addressed to Atty. Senen O.
Angeles, Dipolog City and Atty. Benedicto O. Cainta, Dipolog City, dated September
3, 1980, to show that they, not respondent, were the counsel of record (Annex "3",
Amended Comment); (2) Certification from the Clerk of Court of the Municipal
Court of Roxas that the dates of respondent’s appearance in Criminal Cases Nos.
606, 607 and 622 was October 1, 1980 and not 1981; and in Criminal Case No. 622,
the date was October 16, 1980 and not October 16, 1981 (Annex "1", Comment); (3)
a certification by the District Lands Officer, Benjamin Cabading, of the District Land
Office No. IX-8, Bureau of Lands, Dipolog City, Zamboanga del Norte on the leaves of
absences of respondent on October 1, 1980, October 16, 1980 July 29, 1981 and
August 12, 1981 (Annex "3", Comment), together with Civil Service Form No. 48
(Annexes "6", "7", and "8", Amended Comment) wherein he recorded his leaves of
absences to prove that he applied for leave whenever he appeared either for a
friend or his parents-in-law, and to disprove dishonesty (Annex "3", Comment); (4)
duplicate copies of the reinvestigation report (Annex "A") and the Amended
Information (Annex "B") filed by Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal Rodolfo T. Mata,
in the Court of First Instance, 16th Judicial District, Dipolog City in Criminal Case No.
2734 for Qualified Theft of Forest Products wherefrom respondent’s name was
dropped as one of the accused on the ground that his inclusion was based on
hearsay evidence (Annex "A", Motion to Submit Additional Counter Evidence); as
well as the Order of the Court dropping him from the Information (Annex "C", ibid.);
(5) the dismissal of the charge against him by the Director of Lands in Dagpin v.
Sabandal, Et. Al. (Annex "1", petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss); (6) the dismissal of the
charge against him for falsification of public document by the Tanodbayan (Annex
"1", petitioner’s Manifestation dated February 9, 1981; Annex "2", Reply); (7)
Affidavit of Atty. Nelbert T. Poculan, who had helped respondent prepare his
original Comment, denying the truth of the statement in the Comment that
"respondent absented himself from his work and appeared to protect the rights of
Dandoy" alleging that respondent’s purpose in absenting himself was "to procure
materials for his nipa residence" (Annex "1", Amended Comment); (8) Affidavit of
Atty. Senen O. Angeles wherein Atty. Angeles declared that he was the counsel of
22
record in Criminal Cases Nos. 606, 607 and 622, not the respondent who merely
accompanied accused Lito Dandoy in Criminal Case 622 to the Court (Annex "4",
Amended Comment); (9) an Affidavit of Lito Dandoy, one of the accused in Criminal
Cases Nos. 606 and 607 for Qualified Theft of Coconuts, and the accused in Criminal
Case No. 622 for Slight Physical Injuries, to the effect that respondent was his
intimate friend to whom he turned for help when a Warrant of Arrest was issued
against him; that it was upon his insistence that respondent accompanied him to
the Municipal Court of Roxas and that he gave no compensation, in cash or kind, to
respondent for the latter’s help (Annex "5", Amended
Comment).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
From the array of evidence presented by the parties, it is evident that the charges of
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, gross dishonesty in public
service and falsification of public documents, have not been substantiated.
However, the evidence supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. While
respondent’s infraction may be mitigated in that he appeared for his in-laws in CAR
Cases Nos. 347 and 326 where they were parties, it is clear from the proceedings in
CAR Case No. 347 that he clarified his position only after the opposing counsel had
objected to his appearance. Besides, he specifically manifested "Atty. Nicolas
Sabandal, appearing for the defendants, Your Honor" (Exhibit "A-1"). He called
himself "attorney" knowing full well that he was not yet admitted to the Bar.
Oppositors’ evidence sufficiently shows that respondent had held himself out as an
"attorney" in the agrarian, civil and criminal cases mentioned by said oppositors.
Respondent cannot shift the blame on the stenographer, for he could have easily
asked for rectification. Even if respondent appeared merely in collaboration with
Atty. Senen Angeles in the several cases, that collaboration could only have been
ostensibly as a lawyer. Oppositors had also presented evidence of proceedings
wherein witnesses testified as to respondent’s being their lawyer and their
compensating him for his services (Exhibits "D-8" and "D-9"). It may be that in the
Court of a municipality, even non-lawyers may appear (Sec. 34, Rule 138, Rules of
Court). If respondent had so manifested, no one could have challenged him. What
he did, however, was to hold himself out as a lawyer, and even to write the Station
Commander of Roxas, complaining of harassment to "our clients", when he could
not but have known that he could not yet engage in the practice of law. His
argument that the term "client" is a "dependent or person under the protection of
another and not a person who engages in the profession" is puerile.
Respondent’s additional defense that the code of professional ethics does not apply
to him as he is not yet a member of the Bar proves him unfit to be admitted to the
profession that exacts the highest ethical conduct of all its members, and good
moral character even for applicants for admission to the Bar. He could at least have
shown his fitness for admission by showing adherence to and observance of the
standards of conduct required by all who aspire to profess the law.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition of Nicolas El. Sabandal to be allowed to take the oath as
member of the Philippine Bar and to sign the Roll of Attorneys in accordance with
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby denied.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law
library
For failure of complainants-oppositors, namely, Diomedes D. Agnis, Dr. Gabriel
Catane, Hedy Catane, Antonio Agnis and Fe E. Agnis in SBC-624 to appear before the
Investigator of this Court, their oppositions to the petition of Nicolas El. Sabandal to
be admitted to the Philippine Bar and to be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys are
hereby dismissed, with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Makasiar, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Plana, Escolin, Relova and
Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J. and Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., I reserve my vote.
A.M. No. 545-SBC December 26, 1974
PURISIMA BARBA, complainant,
vs.
HECTOR S. PEDRO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:p
Hector S. Pedro, a successful bar candidate in the 1956 examinations, having
obtained an average of 81.16%, but thus far unsuccessful in his efforts to be allowed
to take the lawyer's oath, which had to be deferred because of a complaint for
immorality filed against him by Purisima Barba, reiterates his plea for admission to
the bar. It is unquestioned that he had amorous relations with the complainant
resulting in the birth of a child. He failed, however, to marry her, having thereafter
chosen another woman for his bride. After the lapse of eighteen years, and
considering that his conduct in the meanwhile has not on the whole shown to be
blameworthy, this Court feels that he has sufficiently atoned for that youthful
indiscretion, having in mind likewise, that people of prominence in the municipality
where he resides, did intercede on his behalf. Accordingly the long-sought privilege
of membership in the bar will not be denied him any longer, but with this caveat.
He must comply with his moral and legal obligation to his child born out of wedlock
with complainant Purisima Barba.
He has in his favor a resolution of this Court that dates back to January 15, 1969: "In
the matter of the petition of Hector S. Pedro to take the oath as member of the
Philippine Bar, alleging that while he passed the bar examinations given by this
Court in 1956 with an average of 81.16%, he was not permitted to take his oath as a
member of the Philippine Bar by reason of an administrative complaint against him
filed with this Court be a Miss Purisima Barba of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, the
complaint alleging immorality in that petitioner, sometime in July, 1953, came to
her house and with lewd designs succeeded in gratifying his carnal desires, an act
repeated thereafter on three different occasions accompanied by pledges to marry,
as a result of which a child was born on April 23, 1954, a matter which when
investigated resulted in a report that the complaint was well-grounded, petitioner
being prevented thus from taking his oath; the present petition alleging further that
petitioner is now married to Mrs. Estela U. Pedro, a public school teacher of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and that from January 4, 1960 up to the present, he has been
employed as community development worker with the Presidential Arm on
Community Development (PACD) that he has since then conducted himself well in
his relations with the community as well as in the performance of his duties as such
official, attaching to his petition certifications of his good behavior from the
Municipal Mayor of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, the Provincial Development Officer of
the PACD, the President of the San Nicolas Bar Association, and the Grand Knight of
the Knights of Columbus of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, and a resolution of the Ilocos
Norte Bar Association and likewise enclosing an affidavit of complainant Miss
Purisima Barba attesting to petitioner's good conduct and behavior and expressing
that she no longer has any opposition to his taking his oath as a lawyer this Court
resolved to defer action on such petition until petitioner has given satisfactory proof
to this Court as to the action subsequently pursued by him with reference to the
child who was born out of his relations with complainant Miss Purisima
Barba."1 Thereafter came this resolution of February 26, 1969: "Hector S. Pedro
having offered proof as to the action subsequently pursued by him with reference
to the child who was born out of his relations with complainant Purisima Barba, in
compliance with the resolution of January 15, 1969, [the Court resolved] to allow
respondent Hector S. Pedro to take the lawyer's oath." 2 Unfortunately, before he
could do so in accordance with the above resolution, there was a letter from the
aforesaid complainant Purisima Barba objecting to his taking his oath as a lawyer,
premised on the fact that the affidavit submitted by him as to her withdrawal of her
opposition to his membership in the bar did not represent her true feelings.
Thereafter, on March 6, 1969, this Court suspended the effectivity of its previous
resolution of February 26, 1969, which would have allowed him to take the lawyer's
oath. Moreover, he was required to comment. This he did in a pleading submitted
on March 28, 1969. He denied the allegation of falsity concerning the affidavit of
complainant. This Court then, in another resolution of April 8, 1969, referred the
matter to its Legal Officer, Ricardo Paras Jr., for investigation and report. A report
was submitted on August 26, 1969. It stated that after a careful evaluation of the
testimony given by the complainant and the respondent, the conclusion is
warranted that complainant "had all along thought that the document Exhibit "A"
was an affidavit of recognition of their daughter, Imelda, and definitely not an
affidavit of withdrawal of her opposition to Mr. Pedro's admission to the Philippine
Bar."3 The parties were heard on the matter on January 19, 1970, with the
complainant standing fast on her firm resolve to prevent respondent from taking
the lawyer's oath. That attitude she has maintained all this while. It remains her
deep conviction that respondent lacks good moral character, as proven by his
failure to marry her "after having carnal knowledge of her." As she pointed out in
her last pleading dated July 5, 1972: "The respondent was twenty seven years old
when he committed the acts complained of and he was very much qualified to
marry the complainant herein, but he did not comply with his promise to march her
to the altar. Instead he married another
woman."4
It cannot be denied that respondent's conduct left much to be desired. He had
committed a transgression, if not against the law, against the high moral standard
requisite for membership in the bar. He had proven false to his word. What is
worse, he did sully her honor. This on the one side. On the other hand, eighteen
years had gone by from the time of the 1956 examinations. He was a successful bar
candidate but because of this lapse from moral propriety, he has not been allowed
to take the lawyer's oath. It likewise appears, from the testimonials submitted, that
he has behaved rather well. At least, no other misdeed has been attributed to him.
There is no affront to reason then in ruling that the punishment, while deserved,
has lasted long enough. He has sufficiently rehabilitated himself. Retribution has
been exacted, He has expiated for his offense. It is understandable that the
bitterness in the heart of complainant cannot easily be erased, but that should not
prove decisive. Even the most heinous of crimes prescribe after a certain
period.5 Moreover, as the transgression resulted from the frailty of flesh, the
sociologist MacIver referring to it as "so powerful an appetite," an imperative of life
closely associated with the "recklessness and the caprice of desire,"6 this Court feels
that all the years he has been denied the privilege of being a lawyer would satisfy
the requirement that failure to live up to the requisite moral standard is not to be
taken lightly. It could also be said that in offenses of this character, the blame hardly
belongs to the man alone.7
23
It must be impressed on respondent Hector S. Pedro, however, that while his plea
to take the lawyer's oath is to be granted, it is indispensable, if he expects to be a
member of the bar in good standing, that he complies with the moral and legal
obligation incumbent upon him as the father of the child born out of wedlock as a
result of his relationship with complainant Purisima Barba.
WHEREFORE, the resolution of March 6, 1969, suspending a previous resolution of
February 26, 1969, is set aside and in accordance therewith, respondent Hector S.
Pedro is allowed to take the lawyer's oath as was provided in the February 26, 1969
resolution.
Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
 
A.M. No. 510 September 30, 1971
EVANGELINE ARGAÑOZA, complainant,
vs.
BENITO P. TUBACES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:p
Complainant Evangeline Argañoza sent a telegram to this Court on April 7, 1970
requesting that "the oath-taking of Atty. Benito P. Tubaces be held in abeyance." It
was therein further stated that the reason relied upon was immorality and that a
letter would follow. Subsequently, four days later, a letter duly subscribed and
sworn by the complainant was receivedby this Court. It was therein alleged: "In
1966, I agreed to live with Benito who was then a sophomore student in Cebu and
we had a child. Per his request, I left with our kid in July 1967 so he can muster the
usual financial support from his parents. As agreed I sacrificed almost two years of
painful seclusionalthough, I received constant communication from him as he
likewise did from me. We saw each other again in 1968 when he came to Manila for
his review and participation in the bar examinations. In November of the same year,
however, he returned to his home province, leaving me and the kid behind giving
flimsy excuse the uncertainty of his passing in the exam."1 The next paragraph of
such letter was worded thus: "He did flunk in the first exam and having decidedto
take the next, he further requested me to stop communicating with him untilthe
examination was over. I wrote him several letters immediately after especially when
I delivered our second baby but I constantly faced a blank wall. This never put me
off, though. Instead, my eagerness to hear from him kept on mounting until that
eventful day came — the release of the results ofthe bar examinations. He made
the grade this time and I was no more glad than my folks. We sent him two
congratulatory messages and again we were disappointed to hear no word from
him."2 This Court was likewise informed therein that they met accidentally, on
which occasion she tried to convince him that they should live together but instead
of agreeing, his proposal was just to get the two children to live with him and for
them to separate for good.3 She would plead then that "he be barred from
membership in the Philippine Bar."
This Court, on April 16, 1970, resolved: "... (a) to note the contents of the telegram
of Evangeline Argañoza requesting that the oath-taking of Benito P. Tubaces be
withheld on the ground of immorality; (b) to require that a copyof the letter of
Evangeline Argañoza be sent to Benito P. Tubaces and (c) require respondent
Tubaces to answer said letter-complaint, within 10 daysfrom notice
hereof."4 Instead of answering, respondent Benito P. Tubaces waited until August
26, 1970 when he filed a petition alleging that complainantwas retracting or
withdrawing her complaint and that therefore he should be allowed to take the
lawyer's oath. Enclosed in such petition is a letter signedby Evangeline Argañoza
where, after referring to the complaint filed by her against respondent, there was
this declaration of retraction or withdrawal. Thus: "Without pressure nor influence
exerted upon me, I voluntarily, irrevocably, and unconditionally retract or withdraw
the said complaint on theground that we have applied and was granted a marriage
license having agreed to get married on December of this year. The marriage license
was issued on the 21st day of August, 1970 by the Quezon City Civil Registrar."5
Then came the resolution of this Court of August 31, 1970 to the following effect:
"Complainant is required to comment, within 10 days from notice hereof,on the
petition of the respondent with the latter's affidavit attached thereto,praying that
he be allowed to take the lawyer's oath in view of the complainants withdrawal of
her complaint."6 The reply of complainant was received on September 21, 1970. It
was stated therein: "In reply thereto, I amhereby informing your good office that I
am objecting to said lawyer's oathtaking of Mr. Benito P. Tubaces on grounds of
immorality on one hand and deceit on the either. Accordingly, I thereby request
that my letter dated August 26, 1970 to your Office be withdrawn and considered
without force and effect. Evidently, I am reviving my complaint against Mr. Benito P.
Tubaces on grounds of immorality because of his refusal, upon my request, to put in
writing the fulfillment of his promise to marry me not later than December 21,
1971."7 This Court, however, on September 28, 1970, considering the petition of
respondent Tubaces praying that he be allowed to take the lawyer's oath in view of
the withdrawal of the complaint filed against him and the comment therein, denied
the petition, respondent being further required tofile an answer on the charges
lodged against him ten days from notice. There was a motion for the
reconsideration of the above action taken by this Court filed by respondent on
October 21, 1970, wherein he justified his failure to file an answer thus: "The
petitioner, in view of the retraction or withdrawal of complainant, felt it needless to
file his answer to her complaint as required by the resolution of this Court as there
is no more to answer for the complaint was withdrawn and instead file this motion
for reconsideration which filing is delayed because of the honest and innocent belief
that the letter of withdrawal or retraction is already sufficient and will serve as
petition of the undersigned to take the oath of attorney."8 The prayer in such
motion for reconsideration was a reiteration of his plea that he be allowed to take
the oath of an attorney. The above motion for reconsideration was referred to
complainant for comment in a resolution of October 26, 1970. The comment came
on November 16, 1970, complainant "retracting or withdrawing [her] complaint
against Mr. Tubaces on the reasons stated in [her] letter of withdrawal and
[interposing] no objection to his oath-taking in the earliest time possible, as prayed
for in his motion."9
Both complainant and respondent were required by resolution of this Court of
November 18, 1970 it on appear personally before it on December 16, 1970. Both
complainant and respondent duly appeared and informed the Court thatthey had
settled their differences and were intending to get married. Five dayslater, on
December 21, 1970, in a pleading filed with this Court by respondent,there was an
allegation of such marriage having taken place on December 18, 1970 with City
Judge Oscar A. Inocentes of Quezon City having performed the ceremony, a
photostat copy of the marriage contract accompanying such manifestation. To
satisfy itself, this Court resolved, on January, 5, 1971, torequire that both
complainant and respondent appear before it on Monday, February 22, 1971. At
such a date, the parties appeared before this Court withthe additional information
that they intended to get married in a religious ceremony, such a marriage to take
place on March 1, 1971 in the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church with Rev. Fr.
Emilio Castro officiating. A photostat copy of the marriage contract was submitted
by complainant and respondent in an urgent joint motion praying that the
respondent be allowed to take the oath of attorney, filed with this Court on March
3, 1971. Included in such motion is a photostat copy of the marriage contract
resulting from the religious ceremony.
This Court takes due cognizance that respondent Benito P. Tubaces appears to have
mended his ways and that a satisfactorily long period had elapsed from the time the
results of the 1969 bar examinations were announced on March 5, 1970. Under the
circumstances, it is of the opinion that his plea to be allowed to take the lawyer's
oath may be favorably acted on. Respondent is admonished to be duly mindful of
the standard of rectitude to which a memberof the bar is expected to live up to. The
delay in his being duly admitted to the practice of his profession, a matter traceable
solely to his far-from-exemplary conduct, ought to admonish him to observe with
fidelity itscanons of behavior. He must by this time be fully cognizant that a failure
to do so would be sufficient cause for the appropriate disciplinary action.
WHEREFORE, the urgent joint motion of March 3, 1971, praying that respondent
Tubaces be allowed to take the lawyer's oath, is granted.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee,
Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH
RESOLUTION
 
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The
Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of
a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner
and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges.
The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all
pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February
1993 imposing on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2)
years four (4) months :and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for
probation.
24
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April
1994 submitted by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from
probation.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take
the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the
Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of
good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen
(15) certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial
court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted
evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul
Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the
eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul,
to comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the
death of his son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was
not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's
helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength
and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused
and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas
day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging
for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the
accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the
incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his
son. However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would
succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the
stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission
to the bar. He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict
intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the
effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not
only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of
the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's
oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years
has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required weighing and reweighing of the
reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The
senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of
that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally
irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
. . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical
behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding that the
participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good
moral character. 1
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to
consider de novo the question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the
obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty.
Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic
experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases
where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the
reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between
grief and anger directed at the cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court- manifesting his having forgiven the
accused is no less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a
parent, given the circumstances in this case, to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if
petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al
Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice
the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr.
Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various
certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic
duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the
death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt,
taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and
uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or
formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions
according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all
lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be
faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has
been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to
render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take
the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and,
thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
[A.C. No. 559-SBC. January 31, 1984.]
CARMEN E. BACARRO, Complainant, v. RUBEN M. PINATACAN, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; ADMISSION TO THE BAR; GOOD MORAL CHARACTER,
A PRE-REQUISITE. — One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the
Philippine Bar is that the applicant must be of good moral character. This
requirement aims to maintain and uphold the high moral standards and the dignity
of the legal profession, and one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the
practice of this noble profession only those persons who are known to be honest
and to possess good moral character. "As a man of law, (a lawyer) is necessarily a
leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen." He sets an example to
his fellow citizens not only for his respect for the law, but also for his clean living.
Thus, becoming a lawyer is more than just going through a law course and passing
the Bar examinations. One who has the lofty aspiration of becoming a member of
the Philippine Bar must satisfy this Court, which has the power, jurisdiction and duty
to pass upon the qualifications, ability and moral character of candidates for
admission to the Bar, that he has measured up to that rigid and ideal standard of
moral fitness required by his chosen vocation.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; HIGH MORAL STANDARD REQUIREMENT NOT COMPLIED WITH IN
THE CASE AT BAR. — In the two consolidated cases of Bitangcor v. Tan and Peredo
v. Tan against successful 1971 Bar examinee Rodolfo M. Tan, it was held that
therein respondent "had fallen short of the requisite morality for admission to the
Bar" for violating the honor of two women. Tan had sexual relations with both
complainants without marriage and had sired a daughter by complainant Bitangcor.
As in the Tan cases, We hold that herein respondent Pinatacan had failed to live up
to the high moral standard demanded for membership in the Bar. He had seduced
complainant into physically submitting herself to him by promises of marriage. He
even eloped with her and brought her to another place. He got her pregnant and
then told her to have an abortion. When complainant refused, he deserted her.
Complainant had to track him down to ask him to help support their child born out
of wedlock, and during the few times that she was able to see him, respondent
merely made promises which he apparently did not intend to keep. On top of all
these, respondent had the audacity and impudence to deny before this Court in a
sworn Affidavit the paternity of his child by complainant.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DENIAL OF THE PRIVILEGE OF BEING A LAWYER FOR EIGHT YEARS
IS SUFFICIENT RETRIBUTION IN VIEW OF RESPONDENT’S REALIZATION OF PAST
WRONGFUL CONDUCT. — The acts taken together certainly do not speak well of
respondent’s character and are indicative of his moral delinquency. All the years
that he has been denied the privilege of being a lawyer were truly well-deserved.
25
Nevertheless, eight (8) years could be punishment and retribution enough.
Moreover, considering that respondent has legally recognized and acknowledged
complainant’s child Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan as his own, and has undertaken
to give financial support to the said child, We hold that he has realized the
wrongfulness of his past conduct and is now prepared to turn over a new leaf.
Likewise, We reiterate what had been stated in Barba v. Pedro that "in offenses of
this character, the blame hardly belongs to the man alone." In allowing respondent
to take the lawyer’s oath, he must be admonished that his admission to and
continued membership in the Bar are dependent, among others, on his compliance
with his moral and legal obligations as the father of Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan.
DECISION
GUERRERO, J.:
This is an administrative case filed on September 2, 1975 by Carmen E. Bacarro
charging Ruben M. Pinatacan, a 1975 successful Bar candidate, with moral turpitude
and depravity, and lack of proper character required of a member of the
Bar.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In her Affidavit, complainant Bacarro averred that she and respondent fell in love
and became engaged while they were studying at the Liceo de Cagayan in Cagayan
de Oro City; that when she became pregnant as a result of their relationship,
respondent abandoned her and never fulfilled his promise to marry her; that on
December 4, 1971, she gave birth to a baby girl; that because of respondent’s
betrayal, complainant, her daughter and her family suffered shame, disrepute,
moral distress and anxiety; and, that these acts of respondent render him unfit to
become a member of the Bar. 1
Respondent Pinatacan in his Answer by way of a sworn Affidavit admitted that
complainant had been his sweetheart for several years prior to 1971 but denied
that he was the father of complainant’s child. He claimed that his relationship with
complainant started to cool down in January of 1971 when, over her vigorous
objection and opposition, he applied for a direct commission with the Philippine
Constabulary. He went to Manila and stayed there for the greater part of March,
1971, for his physical examination. He returned to Cagayan de Oro City, but in June
of 1971, he left for his hometown, Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, and never again
returned to Cagayan de Oro City. On the other hand, as far as he knew, complainant
was working from 1970-1971 in Cagayan de Oro City. Respondent likewise denied
that he ever promised marriage to complainant and that he ever cohabited with
her. 2
On June 10, 1976, this Court referred this case to the Judicial Investigator for
investigation, report and recommendation. 3 Subsequently, however, upon
complainant’s request prompted by financial difficulties on her part, she was
allowed on July 27, 1976 to present her evidence before the City Fiscal of Cagayan
de Oro City. 4 Respondent failed to attend the hearings conducted by the City Fiscal
on August 30 and September 27, 1976 during which complainant presented her
evidence, both oral and documentary. 5
In a nutshell, the evidence for the complainant tends to establish the following
facts: After about a year of courtship, she and respondent became sweethearts on
March 17, 1967 while they were students at the Liceo de Cagayan in Cagayan de
Oro City. They had their first sexual intercourse on March 21, 1971, after
respondent made promises of marriage, and they eloped to Cebu City where they
stayed for about a week. They returned to Cagayan de Oro and respondent left
complainant allegedly to see his parents in his hometown and make the necessary
arrangements for their intended marriage. Respondent came back in May, 1971,
but only to inform complainant that they could not get married because of his
parents’ objections. When complainant told respondent that she was pregnant, he
told her to have an abortion. Complainant refused and they had a quarrel.
Thereafter, she did not see or hear from respondent until after the birth of their
baby girl named Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan on December 4, 1971.
Complainant had no other boyfriend or sweetheart during the time that she had a
relationship with Respondent. In July, 1973, she brought the child with her to see
respondent in Cavite City and the latter promised to support the child. However,
respondent did not make good his promise of support so complainant went to see
him again, and once more respondent made several promises, all of which were
never fulfilled, until he finished his law course and married a singer by the name of
Annie Sarabillo. 6
Forming part of the records, aside from complainant’s testimony, are the birth
certificate of her child, numerous letters written by respondent covering the period
from March 6, 1967 to March 25, 1971 professing his everlasting love for
complainant with assurances of his sincerity and loyalty, a letter dated January 13,
1975 from a certain Margie whom complainant identified as the sister of
respondent, and pictures of the child Maria Rochie with said Margie Pinatacan. 7
In a Motion to Dismiss dated February 16, 1977, 8 respondent argued that based on
the evidence adduced by complainant and even assuming her averments to be true,
no case had been made out to bar him from taking the lawyer’s oath. The Court’s
Investigator, Atty. Victor Sevilla, agreed with respondent in a Report dated February
24, 1977, stating that "the intimacy between the parties in this case is neither so
corrupt or so immoral as to warrant the respondent’s permanent exclusion from
the Philippine Bar." Atty. Sevilla recommended that respondent be allowed to take
the lawyer’s oath. 9
On December 12, 1977, respondent submitted a Manifestation stating among
others that he is willing to recognize and give support or financial assistance to
complainant’s child Maria Rochie although he cannot make assurance that he could
give such support or financial assistance immediately since he is without a source of
income. 10
Upon being required to comment on the foregoing Manifestation, complainant
submitted a sworn statement expressing her adamant stand that respondent "is
unreliable, untrustworthy, and without a word of honor, not only for what he has
done to me, but on several occasions in the past he had made the same promise to
support our child . . ., he did not even give something to the child to buy a candy
during our several meetings . . . when I tried to see him every now and then for the
fulfillment of his promise." Moreover, according to complainant, respondent’s
insistence that the child be aborted proves his "utter disregard of moral values and
(C)hristian doctrines," making him unfit or unsuitable for the legal profession.
Complainant stressed that she was not motivated by revenge, for she was aware
that whatever fortunes respondent may have in life would also benefit their child as
an heir, but that after a serious and profound consideration of the matter, she was
of the opinion that "respondent would be more of a liability than an asset to the
legal profession." 11
By Resolution of October 11, 1979, this Court required respondent, "as proof of his
sincerity and good faith, to acknowledge and recognize in a public document duly
notarized and registered in the local civil registrar’s office his paternity over the
child Maria Rochie and send the original thereof to the complainant and a duplicate
copy to this Court within ten (10) days after notice hereof. 12 On October 19, 1979,
respondent submitted proof of his compliance with the above Resolution. 13
From the foregoing narration of the background of this case, there clearly appears
on question that the complainant and respondent had been sweethearts for several
years, that during the said period they have been sexually intimate with each other,
and that the child Maria Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan is the result of such pre-marital
relations. Respondent, however, maintains that even admitting the truth of
complainant’s allegations, the circumstances of their relationship with each other
do not justify his disqualification from the practice of law.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
One of the indispensable requisites for admission to the Philippine Bar is that the
applicant must be of good moral character. 14 This requirement aims to maintain
and uphold the high moral standards and the dignity of the legal profession, and
one of the ways of achieving this end is to admit to the practice of this noble
profession only those persons who are known to be honest and to possess good
moral character. 15 "As a man of law, (a lawyer) is necessarily a leader of the
community, looked up to as a model citizen." 16 He sets an example to his fellow
citizens not only for his respect for the law, but also for his clean living. 17 Thus,
becoming a lawyer is more than just going through a law course and passing the Bar
examinations. One who has the lofty aspiration of becoming a member of the
Philippine Bar must satisfy this Court, which has the power, jurisdiction and duty to
pass upon the qualifications, ability and moral character of candidates for admission
to the Bar, that he has measured up to that rigid and ideal standard of moral fitness
required by his chosen vocation.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
In the two consolidated cases of Bitangcor v. Tan and Peredo v. Tan 18 against
successful 1971 Bar examinee Rodolfo M. Tan, it was held that therein respondent
"had fallen short of the requisite morality for admission to the Bar" for violating the
honor of two women. Tan had sexual relations with both complainants without
marriage and had sired a daughter by complainant Bitangcor.
As in the Tan cases, We hold that herein respondent Pinatacan had failed to live up
to the high moral standard demanded for membership in the Bar. He had seduced
complainant into physically submitting herself to him by promises of marriage. He
even eloped with her and brought her to another place. He got her pregnant and
then told her to have an abortion. When complainant refused, he deserted her.
Complainant had to track him down to ask him to help support their child born out
of wedlock, and during the few times that she was able to see him, respondent
merely made promises which he apparently did not intend to keep. On top of all
these, respondent had the audacity and impudence to deny before this Court in a
sworn Affidavit the paternity of his child by complainant.
These acts taken together certainly do not speak well of respondent’s character and
are indicative of his moral delinquency. All the years that he has been denied the
privilege of being a lawyer were truly well-deserved. Nevertheless, eight (8) years
could be punishment and retribution enough. Moreover, considering that
respondent has legally recognized and acknowledged complainant’s child Maria
Rochie Bacarro Pinatacan as his own, and has undertaken to give financial support
to the said child, 19 We hold that he has realized the wrongfulness of his past
conduct and is now prepared to turn over a new leaf. Likewise, We reiterate what
had been stated in Barba v. Pedro 20 that "in offenses of this character, the blame
hardly belongs to the man alone." chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
In allowing respondent to take the lawyer’s oath, he must be admonished that his
admission to and continued membership in the Bar are dependent, among others,
on his compliance with his moral and legal obligations as the father of Maria Rochie
Bacarro Pinatacan.
26
WHEREFORE, respondent Ruben M. Pinatacan is hereby allowed to take the
lawyer’s oath.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.
VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate
of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is
"a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts
this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to
our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and
commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he
continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has
become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same
breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of
this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue
the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the
silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs
and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition
with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the
certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law
IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and
in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may
retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest
profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned
petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements
attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he
did it to expose the tribunal's "unconstitutional and
obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals
without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen
deplored, his client was condemned to pay P120,000, without
knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in
this petition, "where our Supreme Court is composed of men
who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without
reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by
which he earns his living, the present members of the
Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought
to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of
those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or
"denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are
calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila
Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that
Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court
must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for
impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y.
Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the
defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client.
On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later,
or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse
counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of
hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for
execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both
motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion
for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for
reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second
motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on
August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is,
on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff
interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety
& Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed
the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed
by plaintiff-appellee praying that the appeal be dismissed,
and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant;
the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the
appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration
dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal)
does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof
and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-
16636, June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of
the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was
perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest
decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration,"
citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by
this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals
denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9,
1967 and the supplement thereto of the same date filed by
defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the
resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important
distinctions between this case and that of Manila Surety and
Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-
16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its
resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in the
latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966,
decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised
by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine
laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that
of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying
the motion to dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to
those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which
was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the
decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965.
Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was
interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without
prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the
main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme
Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because
of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of November
26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and
Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no
authority on the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the
case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his
motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion
for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on
27
September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after
the Said date was ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing
his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a
pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent
contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore
reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is
as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action
on his petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we
waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was
reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to
surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he
manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-
27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's
September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or
negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the
negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for
contumely and gross misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to
require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken
against him." Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he
asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should
be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on
December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof,
his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and
incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this
Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to
answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court
could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written
explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give him
the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation
and thereafter was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no
apology. Far from being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad
of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo.
Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible,
Chapter 7, St. Matthew: —
"Do not judge, that you may not be
judged. For with what judgment you
judge, you shall be judged, and with
what measure you measure, it shall be
measured to you. But why dost thou
see the speck in thy brother's eye, and
yet dost not consider the beam in thy
own eye? Or how can thou say to thy
brother, "Let me cast out the speck
from thy eye"; and behold, there is a
beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite,
first cast out the beam from thy own
eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to
cast out the speck from thy brother's
eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do
to you, even to do you also to them: for
this is the Law and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the
statements mentioned in his petition. On the contrary, he
refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his
lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that
the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are
insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory
to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to
bring the entire Court, without justification, into disrepute;
and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the
noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by
TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND
AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest
interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the
members have shown callousness to our various pleas for
JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility,
appeals for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding,
sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, —
what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with
all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of
the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is
plain callousness towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members
of the Court that notwithstanding the violation of the
Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the
reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict
punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and
supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and
FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn
denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your
respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates
the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the
way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own
President, said: — "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to
its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the
Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war.
There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that
justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the
Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS,
not the ACTOR. We attack the decision of this Court, not the
members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force
of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of
the decision. We waited until this Court has performed its
duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance
of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the
Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our
client and sensing that you have not performed your duties
with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence and wisdom",
your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to speak the
truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and
the further violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly
shared by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to
us. Recalling Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O
Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE,
what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE,
what injustices are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of
any abuses, but who would correct such abuses considering
that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion
must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can
be found in all courts and government offices. We have added
only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in
the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our
cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding
sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of
28
 our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons
why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken
or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the
above statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of
things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in
the members of this Court and for which reason we offered to
surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because
what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the
offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we
alone may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If
we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith
and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard
our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be
condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice,
we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not
intended as a studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his
grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite
aware of the criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions
by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts
and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion
very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously
collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments,
only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell,
however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never
to have been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail
to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving
due course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every
petition we reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed
upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief
Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those
cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance
beyond the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as
to the same petition different reasons may read different
justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed,
even confusing reasons for denying petitions for certiorari, it
has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate
its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In
order that the Court may be enabled to discharge its
indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control of the
Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion.
During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217,
224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three
terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189
petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do
its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however
brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be
required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already
indicated different reasons not infrequently move different
members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a
particular time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963
(60 O.G. 8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated
its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack
of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief
Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same
question has been raised before; and we held that these
"resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above
constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the
petition for review should not be entertained in view of the
provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary
lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be
remembered that a petition to review the decision of the
Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's
denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already
mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended —
helped the Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was
patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court,
wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered
"dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions
for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review.
Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to
be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction
vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing
party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review
is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and
will be granted only when there are special and important
reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor
fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character
of reasons which will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme
Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with
law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far
sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for
the exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing
examination of the pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and
correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable
decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a
number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its
supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty.
Almacen knew — or ought to have known — that for a motion for reconsideration
to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy
of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse
party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was
unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co.,
supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for
motions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule
26), which provides that such notice shall state the time, and
place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties
concerned at least three days in advance. And according to
Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by
the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been
held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless
piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638,
Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman
Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866;
and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is
obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of
hearing the Court would have no way to determine whether
that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he
objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules
themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his
reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's
judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of
the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away
from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy."
But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to
surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and
inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that
there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect
consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction
each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why
lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not
only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations
of public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed
29
at a judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially
recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, 6 because then the
court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all
our official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska, 8 "are public property, and
the press and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize
and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must
answer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's
integrity, competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of
justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those
who assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where
those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the
aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails
their actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that
weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the
court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it
his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation
of their performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the
judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic
appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court
and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate
channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important
place accorded to him in the administration of justice, his
right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair
and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as
well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the
courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of
the bar. In the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In
written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements
of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the
doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice
Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in
the expansion or publication of opinions as to the capacity,
impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar.
They have the best opportunities for observing and forming a
correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the
courts. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this
subject under liability to be called to account and to be
deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or
judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and
expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to
exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may
abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official
conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a
citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat
Opportunity to become conversant with the character and
efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the
privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the
preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of
Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to
seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it
their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is
concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits
there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair
criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof,
on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are
not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his
shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of
respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with
all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to
observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial
officers." 15 The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the
courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the
judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do
not by express declaration take upon themselves, when they
are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the
Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect
due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is
not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous
demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court
from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward
judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20
Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the
orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their clients' rights,
lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their
tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more
learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience
and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as
incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to
the orderly administration of justice as they are to the
effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be
obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and
the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering
respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual
endowment That is his privilege. And he may suffer
frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his
misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not
be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's
decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored
aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice
Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June
26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be
an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an
attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a
political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and
disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary
action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel
precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to
public criticism of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v.
Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer
which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands
condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that
a judge or a court is beyond bona fide comments and
criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and
truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public
confidence in the judicial system as such. However, when the
likely impairment of the administration of justice the direct
product of false and scandalous accusations then the rule is
otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and
circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal
judge of having committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his
clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city
officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it
took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did
not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a
lawyer, had a right to do.
30
 The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the
accused to belittle and besmirch the court and to bring it into
disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the
two-year suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who
at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which
referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge
"used his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place
no limit to the criticism members of the bar may make
regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts,
even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the
attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations
against the intelligence and integrity of the highest courts.
See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585,
15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40
Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for
instance:
"It may be (although we do not so
decide) that a libelous publication by an
attorney, directed against a judicial
officer, could be so vile and of such a
nature as to justify the disbarment of
its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were
of graver character than those made by the respondent here.
But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of
those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing
law the strictest observance at all times of the principles of
truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the
courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due
administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and
usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac.
220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney,
representing a woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set
aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave
the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter
began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so
that my name is protected from the libel, lies, and perjury
committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to
resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case
warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly
work to go unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and
not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's
disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever
there is proper ground for serious complaint against a judge,
it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to
the proper authorities, but the public interest and the
administration of the law demand that the courts should have
the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust criticism,
insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges
personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which
tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to
destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be
permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an
attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of
judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit,
together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was
intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute with
the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being
influenced by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court
were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the
opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional
conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to
weaken the authority of the court against whose members it
was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its
influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and
interfere with the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not,
under the guise of disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of
any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a
citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in
cases that have reached final determination, are not exempt
from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when
an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that
he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of
speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well
as independent court, is always a vigilant defender of civil
rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for
submitting to an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of
the court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes
unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he
fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was the
result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing
habit in the profession of criticising the motives and integrity
of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby
reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the
impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or
improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as
every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit
charges to the authorities in whom is vested the power to
remove judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial
officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would
justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has
improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and
such charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable
inferences, will be encouraged, and the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an
attorney in a case decided against him, or the right of the
Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the
reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the
motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official
duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers whose
acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence
of the community in the courts of justice and in the
administration of justice; and when such charges are made by
officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to protect
the administration of justice, the attorney making such
charges is guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience,
barring possible temporary observations more or less
vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were
foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for
a decision in their favor against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the
bounds of propriety and privileged criticism, but are an
unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo,
upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out
a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a
lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is under
oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as
well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a
newspaper an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its
members to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister
purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the
respondent for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is
one most subversive of the public good, if the conduct of such
members does not measure up to the requirements of the
law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial
determination is of prime importance under our system and
31
 ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede
for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well
as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity
or otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free
speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its
corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act
honestly and honorably both with their client and with the
courts where justice is administered, if administered at all,
could ever properly serve their client or the public good by
designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law.
Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such
discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none
the less impaired by a polluted water supply than is the
health of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by
the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the
bar of the confidence the public, through its duly established
courts, has reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the
private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his
strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such
conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law itself
demands retribution — not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by
an attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms
criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and
confident insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt
deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of
the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of
attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed
that greater latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally
adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the
integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain
appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were
published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no
better right to it than the burglar to his plunder. It seems like
robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a
fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no
undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the
decisions discoverable, short of assigning to the court
emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and
faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a
committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the
University Law School, aided by the researches of its
hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the
court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a
correct motive for the decision, which shall not require
fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made,
it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six
months, delivered its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of
professional misconduct in sending to the Chief Justice the
letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for
the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this
court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice
personally because of acts done by him and his associates in
their official capacity. Such a communication, so made, could
never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case
would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and
humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and could not
ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or
integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any
constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable
attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any
occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due
regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise
than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral
or written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed
secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any
action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous
communication or libelous matter to the person defamed
does not constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng.
Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the sending by
the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly
different from his other acts charged in the accusation, and,
as we have said, wholly different principles are applicable
thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable;
but so far as he exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed
by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of
public policy, to which reference has been made, he was
immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be
enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were
paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an
officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus
assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no right
which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully
violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts
and judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by
merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open
court, but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting
language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally
for their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20
L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as regards
the principle involved, between the indignity of an assault by
an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a
personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words
addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home or
elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different
from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others.
The distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well
sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex
parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has been
shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings
of the court in actions which are ended, it held that one might
be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that
case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a cause
wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the
court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official
acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge
leaves the building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his
own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame
submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the
evil example of punishing the insult by taking the law in his
own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would hold
judicial office under such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge
personally, constitutes professional delinquency for which a
professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly
decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a case,
wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his
conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty
of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of
Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is
held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3
N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney
had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of
New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision:
"It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have
been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such
conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter
should be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court,
which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the
court, "counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings
leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with
ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as
principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general
public may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances
in like manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but
a happy one, and the administration of justice will fall into
bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was
in this respect much the same as the case at bar. The accused,
an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit
judge, which the latter received by due course of mail, at his
home, while not holding court, and which referred in insulting
terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the
accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held
that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully
failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial
officer, and thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As
recognizing the same principle, and in support of its
application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex
parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State,
22 Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas.
408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am.
Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's
Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have
been so far sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a
32
 penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable
warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for
18 months for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of
being under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable
attack against the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral
turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but
his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his
decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the
trial of cases, criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of
this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring
the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was
disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a
case, prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to
make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though
he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of
judicial pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications,
made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether
amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair
comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or
to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of
justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with
disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court
in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of
the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of
unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited
jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally been disposed of under
the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on different
bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal
abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his
motion for reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to
the rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will
expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the
cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the fervor
and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will
be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to
intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect
which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is
that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their
institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be
resting on a very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made
disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and
an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is
thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter
disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the
untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and
mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press
Freedom Law, reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo,
who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his
paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his
regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is
once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the
majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and
injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put
an end to go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which
tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry
from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano
Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the
honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one of
the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress
would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court.
Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the
guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused
to be published in the press, the respondent does not merely
criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case,
which was then and still is pending consideration by this
Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to
intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of
a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members,
reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of
Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this
Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his
statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to
influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus
embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the
respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this
Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this
Court into disrepute and degrading the administration. of
justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last
years committing deliberately so many blunders and
injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of
Que party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of
the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the
decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last
years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of
the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of
this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the
administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of
the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to
which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their
grievances or protection of their rights when these are
trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the
honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and
believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might
be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder
and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the
bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any
other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he
has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees
the stability of other institutions, which without such
guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special
obligation to be respectful in his conduct and communication
to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from
the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17
L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce
Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly
fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous"
pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial
Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating
the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted)
employed in the motion for reconsideration, implications
there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one
pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever
the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into
question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on
its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on
jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of
this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as
making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute
governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain
import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in
determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has
committed error and continuously repeated that error to the
point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which
refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional
boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the
pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the
industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements
33
 detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court.
They bring into question the capability of the members — and
some former members of this Court to render justice. The
second paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which
counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of
jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the
interest of brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them
involved contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So
that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may
ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while
a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty.
Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied
emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made
only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost
much of its vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction.
The first stir for a modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs.
Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the
majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted
to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re
Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was
adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar
Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity
of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was
an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent
in Alarcon to the effect that them may still be contempt by publication even after a
case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:
functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration
that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is
not subject to restraint. Such a view is without support in any
respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court
having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this
state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right,
in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them
from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to
all that he is worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that —
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney
is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public
and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty,
of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him
the privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the
privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held that both the
admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and
that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as
an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege
conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a just
and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being
a mere inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by
the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to
make an assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty.
Almacen here in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.

The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or
on Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands
influence the courts in administering justice in a pending suit
in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and
or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is
coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious
'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to
tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile
degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them
insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and
or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute,
its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he
constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally
categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind
punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of
"but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court
contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper
and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of
comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to
"silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its
administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the
members as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to
second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is
argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," he caused the publication in
extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct
the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the
calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public
public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to
confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where
make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with
there is no action pending, as there is no decision which
characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and,
might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication.
alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members
In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending
as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose
case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and
disciplinary sanctions upon him.
its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence
in them is destroyed.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral
argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his
innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate
statements and actuations now under consideration were made only after the
criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate
judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for
attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this
contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said
Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the
appeal.
detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and
texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of
for contempt for such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the
By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for
situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is
identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the unavoidable.
exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to
safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like
intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this
any other Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not
inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no
be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and
consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the
discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than
legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has
this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and
proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities
requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through
belonging to the office of an attorney.
constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality
of judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional
mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the
admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding
premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are
authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved
the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance.
themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus —
This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of
the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the
court, is an inherent and incidental power in courts of record,
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present
and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial
are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and
34
does not involve — a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the
Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it
is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is
its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar
to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture,
there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties.
Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so
against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual
personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate
court, the individual members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly
constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their
office. 30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar,
it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof — as well as the
people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be
placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the
retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of
membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary
incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept,
this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as
much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So
that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the
aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the
exercise of that power because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court,
exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such
a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the
personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be
visited upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of
Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal or
disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the imposable
sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court
which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or
prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and
independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect
due to the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot
be overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should
never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and
believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some
future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do
disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample
room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under
the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither
manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of
determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled
to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not
alone because jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because,
even without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have
authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no
reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be
regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice
is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for
himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the
suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to
resume the practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as
he is hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the
suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor
General and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.
Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee,
Barredo and Villamor JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.
A.C. No. 620 March 21, 1974
JOSE ALCALA and AVELINA IMPERIAL, petitioners,
vs.
HONESTO DE VERA, respondent.
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:p
On May 19, 1964, Jose Alcala (now deceased) and his wife, Avelina Imperial, filed
this present petition for disbarment against respondent Honesto de Vera, a
practicing attorney of Locsin, Albay, who was retained by them as their counsel in
civil case 2478 of the Court of First Instance of Albay, entitled: "Ray Semenchuk vs.
Jose Alcala".
Complainants charge Atty. Honesto de Vera with gross negligence and malpractice:
1) for having maliciously and deliberately omitted to notify them of the decision in
civil case 2478 resulting in the deprivation of their right to appeal from the adverse
judgment rendered against them; and 2) for respondent's indifference, disloyalty
and lack of interest in petitioners' cause resulting to their damage and prejudice.
Respondent attorney, in his answer to these charges, asserted that he notified his
clients of the decision in question and that he defended complainants' case to the
best of his ability as demanded by the circumstances and that he never showed
indifference, lack of interest or disloyalty to their cause.
The Solicitor General, to whom this Court referred this case for investigation, report
and recommendation, substantially found the following:
Civil case 2478 was an action for annulment of a sale of two parcels of land (lots
Nos. 1880 and 1883 covered by TCT Nos. T-12392 and 12393 respectively) filed by
the vendee, Ray Semenchuk, against the vendors, spouses Alcala, on the ground
that lot 1880 "could not be located or did not exist", and for the recovery of
damages and attorney's fees.
Respondent attorney, whose legal services were engaged by complainants, filed an
answer denying the material allegations of the above-mentioned complaint and
setting up a counterclaim for the balance of the purchase price of the lots sold, the
expenses of notarials, internal revenue, registration, etc. plus damages and
attorney's fees.
On April 17, 1963, the trial court rendered judgment rescinding the contract of sale,
on the ground that the vendee Semenchuk was not able to take material possession
of lot 1880 it being in the possession of a certain Ruperto Ludovice and his brothers
who have been occupying the land for a number of years. The dispositive portion of
the judgment reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Declaring the deed of sale (Exhibit A) rescinded;
(b) Directing the plaintiff to deliver to the defendants the
possession of lot No. 1883.
(c) Ordering the defendants to return to the plaintiff the sum
of P1,000.00 after deducting the amount of P250.00 which is
the consideration in the deed of sale of Lot No. 185; and
(d) Without pronouncement as to costs. (p. 11, rollo)
On April 19, 1963, respondent Atty. de Vera received a copy of the decision but he
failed to inform his clients of the judgment against them. On July 17, 1963, a sheriff
came to complainants' house to serve a writ of execution issued in said case. Totally
caught by surprise, Jose Alcala immediately wrote to the trial court and inquired for
the status of case 2478. The deputy Clerk of Court, in his reply dated July 22, 1963,
informed Alcala that the case was decided on April 17, 1963, that a copy of the
decision was received by respondent attorney on April 19, 1963, and that since no
appeal was taken, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court on motion of the
plaintiff Semenchuk.
On September 12, 1963, spouses Alcala instituted civil case 2723 for damages
against Atty. Honesto de Vera for having failed to inform them of the decision in
case 2478 as a result of which they lost their right to appeal from said decision. The
trial court that heard case 2723 found for a fact that respondent did not inform his
clients of the decision rendered in case 2478; however, it denied damages for lack
of proof that the spouses Alcala suffered any damage as a result of respondent's
failure to notify them of the aforesaid decision. The judgment in case 2723 was
appealed to the Court of Appeals1 by respondent herein but the same was affirmed
by said appellate court.
35
Not content with having filed case 2723, complainants instituted this complaint for In this connection, it is indeed true that although both the
disbarment against their former counsel. Court of First Instance of Albay, in Civil Case No. 2723 for
damages filed by petitioners against respondent Atty. De Vera
(pp. 30-34, Exh. "D", id.), and the Court of Appeals, in C.A.-
1. "Indifference, loyalty, and lack of interest" of respondent in the handling of
G.R. No. 35267-R (the appeal taken by respondent from the
complainants' defense in civil case 2478.
decision of the trial court in C.C. No. 2723), found that
respondent actually did not inform petitioners of the decision
The basis of this particular charge is the alleged failure of Atty. de Vera to present at in Civil Case No. 2478, still both courts also held that
the trial of case 2478 certain documents which according to the complainants could petitioners did not sustain any damages as a result of said
have proven that lot 1880 actually existed, to wit: a sketch of lot 1880 prepared by decision, for which reason the trial court dismissed
the vendee, Semenchuk, himself (Exh. L-Adm. Case); technical description of lot petitioners' action for damages against respondent, which
1880 taken from complainants' certificate of title (Exh. M-Adm. Case); sketch plan of dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. We quote the
lot 1880 in relation to the adjoining lots prepared by surveyor Miguel N. Romero finding of the Court of First Instance of Albay in its decision in
(Exh. N-Adm Case); a receipt for P10.00 issued by surveyor Romero for the Civil Case No. 2723 in this regard:
preparation of the sketch, Exh. N (Exh. O-Adm. Case) — all of which documents
were turned over by Jose Alcala to respondent before the trial of case 2478.
The second issue that has to be passed
upon by the Court is neither the
We agree with the Solicitor General that there is no merit to this particular charge. plaintiffs are entitled to damages. On
this issue, the Court finds that the
The records of case 2478 show that upon agreement of the parties and their plaintiffs cannot recover damages from
attorneys, the trial court appointed a commissioner to relocate lot 1880 and after defendant Atty. Honesto de Vera. No
conducting such relocation, the commissioner reported to the Court that the lot evidence has been presented that they
existed, but that the same was in the possession of other persons. Inasmuch as the sustained damages of the decision.
existence of lot 1880 had already been verified by the commissioner, it was Neither it has been shown that the
therefore unnecessary for respondent attorney to introduce in evidence Exhibits decision is not supported by the facts
"L", "M", "N", and "O", the purpose of which was merely to prove the existence of and the law applicable to the case.
said lot. If the complaint for rescission prospered it was because of complainant Consequently, the plaintiffs are not
Alcala's failure to comply with his obligation of transferring the material or physical entitled to damages because of the
possession of lot 1880 to the vendee and for no other reason; hence, complainants failure of Atty. Honesto de Vera to
had nobody to blame but themselves. The fact that the plaintiff, Semenchuk, was inform them of the decision.
not awarded any damages, attorney's fees, and costs shows that respondent
attorney exerted his utmost to resist plaintiff's complaint. "An attorney is
not bound to
2. Gross negligence and malpractice committed by respondent for failure to inform exercise
his clients of the decision in case 2478: — extraordinary
diligence, but
only a reasonable
The matter in dispute with respect to this specific charge is whether or not degree of care
respondent notified his clients, the complainants herein, about the decision in case and skill, having
2478. Respondent claims that he did inform his clients of the decision; complainants reference to the
insist the contrary. character of the
business he
We agree with the Solicitor General that there is sufficient evidence on hand to undertakes to do.
prove that respondent neglected to acquaint his clients of the decision in case 2478. Fallible like any
other human
being, he is
As stated in the Solicitor General's report, the reaction of complainant Jose Alcala answerable to
when the writ of execution in said civil case was served upon him and his wife by a every error or
sheriff was such that it betrayed a total unawareness of the adverse decision. The mistake, and will
evidence shows that when he was told about the sheriff's visit, Jose Alcala be protected as
immediately inquired from the trial Court the reason for the writ of execution and it long as he acts
was only then that he was informed that a decision had been rendered, that his honestly and in
lawyer received a copy thereof since April 19, 1963, and because no appeal was good faith to the
taken the judgment became final and executory. Alcala then sought the help of his best of his skill
brother, Atty. Ernesto Alcala, in Manila and the latter wrote to respondent inquiring and knowledge.
as to what steps were taken, if any, to prosecute an appeal from the decision in Moreover, a
question but respondent chose not to answer the letter. Thereafter, Alcala party seeking
instituted an action for damages and filed the instant complaint for disbarment. damages
resulting from a
As aptly observed by the Solicitor General: judgment
adverse to him
which became
Again, we do not think petitioner Alcala would have felt so
final by reason of
aggrieved and embittered by the loss of his right to appeal the
the alleged fault
decision in Civil Case No. 2478 so as to take all these legal
or negligence of
steps against respondent, with all the attendant trouble and
his lawyer must
expense in doing so, if it is not true, as he alleged, that the
prove his loss due
latter indeed did not notify him of said decision. We believe
to the injustice of
and so submit, therefore, that respondent really failed to
the decision. He
inform petitioners of the decision in Civil Case No. 2478, and
cannot base his
this was also the finding made by the Court of First Instance
action on the
of Albay in its decision in Civil Case No. 2723 for damages filed
unsubstantiated
by petitioners against respondent, and by the Court of
and arbitrary
Appeals in the appeal taken by respondent from said
supposition of
decision. (pp. 38-39, rollo)
the injustice of
the decision.
Is respondent's failure to notify his clients of the decision sufficient cause for his (Tuzon vs.
disbarment? Complainants answer the question in the affirmative, while on the Donato, 58 O.G.
other hand, respondent prays that he be exonerated because, according to him, 6480)."
granting arguendo that he failed to inform the complainants about the decision, the
truth is that said decision was fair and just and no damage was caused to
(Exh. "D", id.; pp.
complainants by reason thereof.
33-34)

On this point, We agree with the following appraisal of the evidence by the Solicitor
Significantly, petitioners did not appeal from the above
General:
decision, which is an implied acceptance by them of the
correctness of the findings therein. Instead, it was respondent

36
 Atty. De Vera who appealed said decision to the Court of
Appeals (C.A.-G.R. No. 35267-R), and the latter Court,
although agreeing with the finding of the trial court that
respondent really did not inform petitioners of the decision in
Civil Case No. 2478 (Exh. "T"), affirmed, however, the lower
court's finding that petitioners were not entitled to the
damages claimed by them by reason of respondent's failure
to notify them of the decision in Civil Case No. 2478. ... While
the rule of res judicata in civil or criminal cases is not, strictly
speaking, applicable in disbarment proceedings, which is
neither a civil or a criminal proceeding intended to punish a
lawyer or afford redress to private grievances but is a
proceeding sui generis intended to safeguard the
administration of justice by removing from the legal
profession a person who has proved himself unfit to exercise
such trust (p. 207, Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics; Re
Keenan, 86 ALR 679; De Jesus-Paras vs. Vailoces, Adm. Case
No. 439, April 12, 1961; In re Montague & Dominguez, 3 Phil.
577, 588), still we consider the findings of the trial court as
well as of the Court of Appeals in the damage, suit filed by
petitioners against respondent Atty. De Vera based on the
same grounds now invoked in this disbarment case relevant
and highly persuasive in this case, especially as petitioners
themselves have, as already observed, accepted and admitted
the correctness of said findings. And we may add that we
ourselves agree with respondent that petitioners had not
been prejudiced or damaged in any way by the decision in
Civil Case No. 2478, but that said decision appears in fact to
be more favorable to them than could have been the case if
the trial court had applied the law strictly against them in said
case, ... (pp. 17-19, Report. pp. 39-41, rollo; emphasis
supplied).
The Solicitor General's Report continues and says:
True it is that petitioners do not appear to have suffered any
material or pecuniary damage by the failure of respondent
Atty. De Vera to notify them of the decision in Civil Case No.
2478. It is no less true, however, that in failing to inform his
clients, the petitioners, of the decision in said civil case,
respondent failed to exercise "such skill, care, and diligence as
men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in
such matters of professional employment" (7 C.J.S. 979). The
relationship of lawyer-client being one of confidence, there is
ever present the need for the client's being adequately and
fully informed and should not be left in the dark as to the
mode and manner in which his interests are being defended.
It is only thus that their faith in counsel may remain
unimpaired (Oparel, Sr. vs. Aberia Adm. Case No. 595, July 30,
1971). As it happened in this case, because of respondent's
failure to notify petitioners of the decision in Civil Case No.
2478, the latter were entirely caught by surprise, resulting in
shock and mental and emotional disturbance to them, when
the sheriff suddenly showed up in their home with a writ of
execution of a judgment that they never knew had been
rendered in the case, since their lawyer, the respondent, had
totally failed to inform them about the same. ... (pp. 23-24,
Report, pp. 45-46, rollo; emphasis supplied).
We concur with the above-quoted observations and add that the correctness of the
decision in case 2478 is no ground for exonerating respondent of the charge but at
most will serve only to mitigate his liability. While there is no finding of malice,
deceit, or deliberate intent to cause damage to his clients, there is, nonetheless,
proof of negligence, inattention, and carelessness on the part of respondent in his
failure to give timely notice of the decision in question. Fortunately for respondent,
his negligence did not result in any material or pecuniary damage to the herein
complainants and for this reason We are not disposed to impose upon him what
may be considered in a lawyer's career as the extreme penalty of disbarment. As
stated in the very early case of In Re Macdougall:
The disbarment of an attorney is not intended as a
punishment, but is rather intended to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise
this important function shall be competent, honorable, and
reliable; men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence. This purpose should be borne in mind in the
exercise of disbarment, and the power should be exercised
with that caution which the serious consequences of the
action involves.
The profession of an attorney is acquired after long and
laborious study. It is a lifetime profession. By years of
patience, zeal, and ability, the attorney may have acquired a
fixed means of support for himself and family of great
pecuniary value, and the deprivation of which would result in
irreparable injury. (3 Phil. 70, 77-78)
In the words of former Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Court:
On one hand, the profession of an attorney is of great
importance to an individual and the prosperity of his whole
life may depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought
not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him. On the other,
it is extremely that the respectability of the bar should be
maintained and that its harmony with the bench should be
preserved. For these objects, some controlling power, some
discretion, ought to reside in the Court. This discretion, ought
to be exercised with great moderation and judgment; but it
must be exercised. (Ex parte Burr. 9 Wheat 529; Martin, Legal
& Judicial Ethics 1972 Ed. p. 213.)
Although respondent's negligence does not warrant disbarment or suspension
under the circumstances of the case, nonetheless it cannot escape a rebuke from Us
as we hereby rebuke and censure him, considering that his failure to notify his
clients of the decision in question manifests a lack of total dedication or devotion to
their interest expected of him under his lawyer's oath and the Canons of
Professional Ethics. Respondent's inaction merits a severe censure from the Court.
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence, the report and recommendation of the
Solicitor General, and the fact that this appears to be the first misconduct of
respondent in the exercise of his legal profession, We hereby hold said respondent
GUILTY only of simple negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer of
complainants, and We hereby SEVERELY CENSURE him. Let this decision be noted in
respondent's record — as a member of the Bar — in this Court.
SO ORDERED.
A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000
SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R.
LLAMAS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues
filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M.
Santos, Jr., himself a member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate
sanction the matter of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now,
has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and data (date & place of
issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has
been using this for at least three years already, as shown by the following attached
sample pleadings in various courts in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available)
Annex A .......- "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submissi
25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC
Annex B .......- "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motio
RTC Br. 259 (not 257), Paraaque, MM
Annex C .......- "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for ex
Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies
that only a duly admitted member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing,
is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A, Section 10 which provides that
"default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of
membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall
be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the
bar standing of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the
IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty. Llamas purports to be a member.
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does
not indicate any PTR for payment of professional tax.
37
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an
attorney may be done not only by the Supreme Court but also by the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing some of these
courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown
by:
1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-
CJ En Banc Decision on October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA )
but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him to pay such
dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary.
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution 6 adopting
and approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
which found respondent guilty, and recommended his suspension from the practice
of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a
reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a
resolution,7 dated April 22, 1999. Hence, pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules
of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP ordering
respondents suspension for three months.

2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati, MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14,
1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the conviction which is purportedly
on appeal in the Court of Appeals). On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication of the
proper IBP O.R. and PTR numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the
letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP Rizal 259060 for at least three
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995,
years."
November 13, 1996, and January 17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at
the end thereof, what appears to be respondents signature above his name,
address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060." 1 Also attached was a copy of The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter
the order,2 dated February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the President Ida R. Makahinud Javier that respondents last payment of his IBP dues
Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati, denying respondents motion for was in 1991."
reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of Art.
316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by
respondent, he has invoked and cited that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification3 dated March 18, 1997, by the legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which took effect in 1992 in
then president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."
that respondents "last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991. Since then he has not
paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."
....

On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact,
days from receipt of notice, after which the case was referred to the IBP for
respondent admitted that he is still in the practice of law when he alleged that the
investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-memorandum,4 dated
"undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income tax Return up to
June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:5cräläwvirtualibräry
the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondents
Memorandum).
3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996
and 1997 the same O.R. No. 259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated
longer a member in good standing.
Bar of the Philippines.

Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the
bar who is in good standing is entitled to practice law.
The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good
standing, were as above cited, the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of
dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation of Article 316 RPC,
concealment of encumbrances.
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and
reversed and respondent was even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to
Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was
appealed to the Court of Appeals and is still pending.
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court
about his standing in the IBP by using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of
at least six years and therefore liable for his actions. Respondent in his
memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice
without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the
pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060"
in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus
misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for
the years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only
engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt
from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior
citizen since 1992.

Rule 139-A provides:

Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as
a Judge was never set aside and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction
for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Undersigned himself Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
would surrender his right or privilege to practice law. annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collections from
each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in
Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
his dues.

Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of

Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to
this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
the present, that he had only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for
Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he is. His 30 hectares orchard
one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.
from the Roll of Attorneys.

Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law
1992, is legally exempt under Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992,
only by paying his dues, and it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it
in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example. Being thus exempt, he
is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment of
honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a
individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not
limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is
exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development
covered by such exemption. In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member
Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption does not include payment of
to vote and be voted upon.
membership or association dues.

Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby
only to show that he never in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and
misrepresenting to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the
refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time to fulfill and pay all past
Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to
Responsibility which provides:
tender such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again
irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated for vindictive purposes by the complainant,
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Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings
he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of
respondents advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a
more temperate application of the law,8 we believe the penalty of one year
suspension from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is
later, is appropriate.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice

of law for ONE (1) YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a
copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Llamas personal record in the Office of the
Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and to all courts in the land.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

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