A.C. No. L-1117             March 20, 1944
THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,
vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.
Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for
complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.
OZAETA, J.:
The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice
for having published an advertisement in the Sunday Tribune of June
13, 1943, which reads as follows:
Marriage
license promptly secured thru our assistance & the
annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and
marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any
matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.
Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.
Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having
published the said advertisement; but subsequently, thru his attorney,
he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the
indulgence and mercy" of the Court, promising "not to repeat such
professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the strict
ethical rules of the law profession." In further mitigation he alleged that
the said advertisement was published only once in the Tribune and
that he never had any case at law by reason thereof.
Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant
violation by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a
brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127
expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an
attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his
wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades
himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public.
As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary
activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah.
"The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a
young lawyer, . . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but
must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of
Ethics.)
In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended
from the practice of law for the period of one month for advertising his
services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular letters.
That case, however, was more serious than this because there the
solicitations were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and
insistent.
Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the
misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so decided that the
respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-23815 June 28, 1974
ADELINO H. LEDESMA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, respondent.
Adelino H. Ledesma in his own behalf.
1
Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.
FERNANDO, J.:p
What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent
Judge denying a motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as
counsel de oficio.1 One of the grounds for such a motion was his
allegation that with his appointment as Election Registrar by the
Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time to
the defense of the two accused. The denial by respondent Judge of
such a plea, notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants, was due
"its principal effect [being] to delay this case."2 It was likewise noted
that the prosecution had already rested and that petitioner was
previously counsel de parte, his designation in the former category
being precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing
the accused. It cannot be plausibly asserted that such failure to allow
withdrawal of de oficio counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a
grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. There is, however,
the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that must
be taken seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, it should tilt
the balance. This is not one of them. What is easily discernible was the
obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities
incumbent on the counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the assumption
that he continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to be very
much less at present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him to
shirk an obligation a member of the bar, who expects to remain in good
standing, should fulfill. The petition is clearly without merit.
According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was
appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of
Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its
duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case
pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw
as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also
appointed him counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently,
on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to
withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the
Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the
volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from
handling adequately the defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged
order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for
reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted
this certiorari proceeding.3
As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.
1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion
of petitioner to withdraw as counsel de oficio speaks for itself. It began
with a reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on February 17,
1962, with the proceedings having started in the municipal court of
Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his order of
October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of the objection of the
prosecution to the motion for postponement of October 15, 1964
(alleging that counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing in this
case without the express authority of the Commission on Elections);
and since according to the prosecution there are two witnesses who
are ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the
motion for postponement is denied. When counsel for the accused
assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew
since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed today.
Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil service status of
counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for
the accused. The defense obtained postponements on May 17, 1963,
June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963,
February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964 July 26, 1964, and
September 7, 1964."4 Reference was then made to another order of
February 11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma,
alleging indisposition, the continuation of the trial of this case is hereby
transferred to March 9, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is
reminded that at its instance, this case has been postponed at least
eight (8) times, and that the government witnesses have to come all
the way from Manapala."5 After which, it was noted in such order that
there was no incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the
accused and to the court and the performance of his task as an
election registrar of the Commission on Elections and that the ends of
justice "would be served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to
continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has already rested
its case."6
2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than
duly mindful of his obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have
known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the neophytes
in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome
chore. For those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that
counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an opportunity. It
makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to
the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable then why
a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A
recent statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban:7 "There is
need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the
fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a
responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a
profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called
upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the
State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof,
especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be
required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are
rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his
zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other
pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his
practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of
relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to
neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as
counsel de oficio must be fulfilled."8
So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa,9 where
respondent was de oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice
Carson making clear: "This Court should exact from its officers and
subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official duties,
especially when negligence in the performance of those duties
necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of criminal
cases ...."10 Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia11 reiterated such a
view in these words: "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But
we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the
accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as
in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and
professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. He is to
render effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him
due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. For, indeed a
lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have a
bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest."12
The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.
3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only
due to the apprehension that considering the frame of mind of a
counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the
accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be
rendered nugatory. Its importance was rightfully stressed by Chief
Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases
there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of
little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even
the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science
of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and; without counsel, he
may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not
know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily
to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the
right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has
become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under rules
of procedure it is not enough for the Court to apprise an accused of his
right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he
desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should
assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him
a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his
own."13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts.14 The present
Constitution is even more emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that
the accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel,"15 there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence,
threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall
be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence."16
Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar
in the defense of an accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed
for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he
did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to
him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility as
an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be
availed now. There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future,
an exorbitant demand on his time. It may likewise be assumed,
considering what has been set forth above, that petitioner would exert
himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with
competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to
2
remain a member of the profession in good standing. The admonition
is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners that
there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to
client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against
petitioner.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
March 23, 1929
In re LUIS B. TAGORDA,
Duran & Lim for respondent.
Attorney-General Jaranilla and Provincial Fiscal Jose for the
Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
The respondent, Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member
of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that previous to the last
general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and
Ilocano, which, in translation, reads as follows:
LUIS B. TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public
CANDIDATE FOR THIRD MEMBER
Province of Isabela
(NOTE. — As notary public, he can execute for you a deed
of sale for the purchase of land as required by the cadastral
office; can renew lost documents of your animals; can make
your application and final requisites for your homestead; and
can execute any kind of affidavit. As a lawyer, he can help
you collect your loans although long overdue, as well as any
complaint for or against you. Come or write to him in his
town, Echague, Isabela. He offers free consultation, and is
willing to help and serve the poor.)
The respondent further admits that he is the author of a letter
addressed to a lieutenant of barrio in his home municipality written in
Ilocano, which letter, in translation, reads as follows:
ECHAGUE, ISABELA, September 18, 1928
MY DEAR LIEUTENANT: I would like to inform you of the
approaching date for our induction into office as member of
the Provincial Board, that is on the 16th of next month.
Before my induction into office I should be very glad to hear
your suggestions or recommendations for the good of the
province in general and for your barrio in particular. You can
come to my house at any time here in Echague, to submit to
me any kind of suggestion or recommendation as you may
desire.
I also inform you that despite my membership in the Board I
will have my residence here in Echague. I will attend the
session of the Board of Ilagan, but will come back home on
the following day here in Echague to live and serve with you
as a lawyer and notary public. Despite my election as
member of the Provincial Board, I will exercise my legal
profession as a lawyer and notary public. In case you cannot
see me at home on any week day, I assure you that you can
always find me there on every Sunday. I also inform you that
I will receive any work regarding preparations of documents
of contract of sales and affidavits to be sworn to before me
as notary public even on Sundays.
I would like you all to be informed of this matter for the
reason that some people are in the belief that my residence
as member of the Board will be in Ilagan and that I would
then be disqualified to exercise my profession as lawyer and
as notary public. Such is not the case and I would make it
clear that I am free to exercise my profession as formerly
and that I will have my residence here in Echague.
 I would request you kind favor to transmit this information to
your barrio people in any of your meetings or social
gatherings so that they may be informed of my desire to live
and to serve with you in my capacity as lawyer and notary
public. If the people in your locality have not as yet
contracted the services of other lawyers in connection with
the registration of their land titles, I would be willing to handle
the work in court and would charge only three pesos for
every registration.
Yours respectfully,
(Sgd.) LUIS TAGORDA
Attorney
Notary Public.
The facts being conceded, it is next in order to write down the
applicable legal provisions. Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure
as originally conceived related to disbarments of members of the bar.
In 1919 at the instigation of the Philippine Bar Association, said codal
section was amended by Act No. 2828 by adding at the end thereof the
following: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice."
The statute as amended conforms in principle to the Canons of
Professionals Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association in 1908
and by the Philippine Bar Association in 1917. Canons 27 and 28 of
the Code of Ethics provide:
27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. — The most
worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a
young lawyer, and especially with his brother lawyers, is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must
be the outcome of character and conduct. The publication or
circulation of ordinary simple business cards, being a matter
of personal taste or local custom, and sometimes of
convenience, is not per se improper. But solicitation of
business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal
communications or interview not warranted by personal
relations, is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to
procure business by indirection through touters of any kind,
whether allied real estate firms or trust companies
advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering
retainers in exchange for executorships or trusteeships to be
influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business
by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning
the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest
involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all
other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the
tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.
28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH
AGENTS. — It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer
advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of
blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring
up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is
indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up
defects in titles or other causes of action and inform thereof
in order to the employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by
seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those
having any other grounds of action in order to secure them
as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes,
or to pay or reward directly or indirectly, those who bring or
influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or to
remunerate policemen, court or prison officials, physicians,
hospital attaches or others who may succeed, under the
guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing
the criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others,
to seek his professional services. A duty to the public and to
the profession devolves upon every member of the bar
having knowledge of such practices upon the part of any
practitioner immediately to inform thereof to the end that the
offender may be disbarred.
Common barratry consisting of frequently stirring up suits and quarrels
between individuals was a crime at the common law, and one of the
penalties for this offense when committed by an attorney was
disbarment. Statutes intended to reach the same evil have been
provided in a number of jurisdictions usually at the instance of the bar
itself, and have been upheld as constitutional. The reason behind
statutes of this type is not difficult to discover. The law is a profession
and not a business. The lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by
3
himself or through others for to do so would be unprofessional.
(State vs. Rossman [1909], 53 Wash., 1; 17 Ann. Cas., 625;
People vs. Mac Cabe [1893], 19 L. R. A., 231; 2 R. C. L., 1097.)
It becomes our duty to condemn in no uncertain terms the ugly practice
of solicitation of cases by lawyers. It is destructive of the honor of a
great profession. It lowers the standards of that profession. It works
against the confidence of the community in the integrity of the
members of the bar. It results in needless litigation and in incenting to
strife otherwise peacefully inclined citizens.
The solicitation of employment by an attorney is a ground for
disbarment or suspension. That should be distinctly understood.
Giving application of the law and the Canons of Ethics to the admitted
facts, the respondent stands convicted of having solicited cases in
defiance of the law and those canons. Accordingly, the only remaining
duty of the court is to fix upon the action which should here be taken.
The provincial fiscal of Isabela, with whom joined the representative of
the Attorney-General in the oral presentation of the case, suggests that
the respondent be only reprimanded. We think that our action should
go further than this if only to reflect our attitude toward cases of this
character of which unfortunately the respondent's is only one. The
commission of offenses of this nature would amply justify permanent
elimination from the bar. But as mitigating, circumstances working in
favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was
unaware of the impropriety of his acts, second, his youth and
inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar
mistake in the future. A modest period of suspension would seem to fit
the case of the erring attorney. But it should be distinctly understood
that this result is reached in view of the considerations which have
influenced the court to the relatively lenient in this particular instance
and should, therefore, not be taken as indicating that future convictions
of practice of this kind will not be dealt with by disbarment.
In view of all the circumstances of this case, the judgment of the court
is that the respondent Luis B. Tagorda be and is hereby suspended
from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the period of one month
from April 1, 1929,
Street, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., reserves his vote.
G.R. No. L-31429 January 31, 1972
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROSCOE DABAN y GANZON, defendant-appellant, SIXTO P.
DEMAISIP, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:p
There is need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay stress on the
fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a
responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a
profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called
upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the
State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration thereof,
especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be
required to act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are
rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his
zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other
pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his
practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses a high degree of
relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly he cannot afford either to
neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as
counsel de oficio must be fulfilled. If for any reason, he fails to do so —
a matter which may be susceptible of explanation but not of justification
— he should know that he is to be held accountable. He is entitled to
be heard in his defense, it goes without saying. Where he is unable to
do so, because what is alleged by him to ward off disciplinary action is
bereft of support in law, he certainly cannot expect to be let off lightly.
That is the fate in store for respondent Sixto P. Demaisip, counsel de
oficio of appellant Roscoe Daban.
The facts are undisputed. Respondent, Attorney Sixto P. Demaisip,
started as counsel de parte of appellant. On October 24, 1970, he filed
a motion for extension of time of 30 days within which to file appellant's
brief. It was granted. So were subsequent motions for extension
respectively filed on November 11, 1970 for 25 days, December 12,
1970 for 20 days, January 4, 1971 for 18 days, January 14, 1971 for 15
days, January 28, 1971 for 15 days, February 12, 1971 for 12 days,
February 27, 1971 for 10 days, March 6, 1971 for 15 days, April 12,
1971 for 15 days, April 20, 1971 for 13 days, May 3, 1971 for 10 days,
and May 14, 1971 for 15 days. Then, on May 25, 1971, after having
obtained 13 extensions in all, he filed a motion asking that in view of
the father of appellant being unable to raise money for printing
expenses, he be allowed to retire as counsel de parte and be
appointed as counsel de oficio instead to enable him to file a
typewritten brief, a draft of which, according to him, he had by then
finished. This Court, in a resolution of June 2, 1971, granted his prayer
to be appointed counsel de oficio, but required him to file a
mimeographed rather than a typewritten brief. In the light of his own
representation, there was reason to expect that such a brief would be
duly forthcoming. It did not turn out to be the case at all, for respondent
Demaisip, this time as counsel de oficio, kept on filing motions for
postponement, four in number, likewise granted by this Tribunal in a
spirit of generosity. All in all, he had seventeen extensions. Still there
was no appellant's brief.
It was only then that on October 11, 1971 this Court issued a
resolution, reading as follows: "For failure to submit accused-appellant
Roscoe Daban y Ganzon's brief within the extended period which
expired on August 24, 1971, Atty. Sixto P. Demaisip is hereby required
to explain, within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why disciplinary
action should not be taken against him." What passed for an
explanation for appellant's persistent failure to file appellant's brief was
submitted on November 25, 1971, worded thus: "[Comes now] the
accused-appellant, by and thru the undersigned counsel de oficio, unto
this Honorable Supreme Court most respectfully manifests and
explains that, in the opinion of the undersigned lawyer, grounded on
settled jurisprudence, the escape of the prisoner automatically makes
the appeal useless and unnecessary because it is considered
abandoned." It is his prayer, therefore, that the above be considered a
satisfactory explanation.
Respondent Demaisip ought to have known better. His explanation
disregards the facts and betrays ignorance of the law. It is true there
was a notice on June 23, 1971 from the then Acting Director Vicente R.
Raval of the Bureau of Prisons that on June 15 of that year appellant
Roscoe Daban y Ganzon did escape. As far back as May 13, 1971,
however, respondent Demaisip, according to his motion of that date
filed on May 25, 1971, wherein he prayed that he be appointed
counsel de oficio and permitted to submit a mimeographed brief, had
assured this Court that he had already prepared a draft. If he were not
careless of the truth, then there was no excuse why prior to June 15,
1971 he was unable to submit such a brief to this Court. It is not to be
ignored either that as of that date he had already secured thirteen
extensions, ordinarily many more than any counsel is entitled to but
nonetheless granted him, because the sentence imposed was one of
death.
Now, as to the law. It would appear that respondent Demaisip is
unaware of Section 9 of Rule 122. Thus: "The records of all cases in
which the death penalty shall have been imposed by any Court of First
Instance, whether the defendant shall have appealed or not, shall be
forwarded to the Supreme Court for review and judgment as law and
justice shall dictate. The records of such cases shall be forwarded to
the clerk of the Supreme Court within twenty (20) days, but not earlier
than fifteen (15) days, after rendition or promulgation of the sentence in
the form prescribed by section 11 of Rule 41. The transcript shall also
be forwarded as provided in section 12 of Rule 41 within five (5) days
after the filing thereof by the stenographer." The penalty imposed on
appellant Daban y Ganzon in the judgment of November 21, 1969
being one of death, the case was properly elevated to this Court.
Moreover, until after this Court has spoken, no finality could be
attached to the lower court decision. As explained in former Chief
Justice Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court:1 "In this connection,
it must be emphasized that the judgment of conviction imposing the
death penalty entered in the trial court, is not final, and cannot be
executed and is wholly without force or effect until the case has been
passed upon by the Supreme Court en consulta; that although a
judgment of conviction is entered by the trial court, said decision has
none of the attributes of a final judgment and sentence; and that until it
has been reviewed by the Supreme Court which finally passes upon it,
the same is not final and conclusive; and this automatic review by the
Supreme Court is something which neither the court nor the accused
could waive or evade."2 The mere fact of escape of appellant,
therefore, could not be relied upon by respondent Demaisip as
sufficient cause for his failure to file appellant's brief.
4
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that respondent Demaisip, by
such gross neglect of duty, notwithstanding the many extensions
granted him, was recreant to the trust reposed in him as counsel de
oficio. The language of former, Justice Sanchez in a recent
decision3 fits the situation: "It is true that he is a court-appointed
counsel. But we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high
a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself.
Because, as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts
and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his care. His
is to render effective assistance. The accused defendant expects of
him due diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. We do not
accept the paradox that responsibility is less where the defended party
is poor. ... For, indeed, a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of
justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a
little less of self-interest. Because of this, a lawyer should remain ever
conscious of his duties to the indigent he defends." 4
Such a doctrine is of venerable vintage. As far back as 1905, this Court
did have occasion to admonish counsel de oficio for failure to take the
appropriate steps in defense of an indigent client. Thus: "An
examination of the record in the case of the United States vs. Julian
Tulagan, et al. shows that the appellants were sentenced in the trial
court to long terms of imprisonment for the crime of robo en cuadrilla,
from which sentence they appealed, and it appearing that they were
too poor to employ a lawyer, this court, in accordance with the law
provided in such cases, assigned the said Lahesa as counsel de oficio,
yet the said Lahesa has utterly failed to take any action whatever in
behalf of the defendants in said case, though more than a year has
elapsed since the date of said assignment. An examination of the
record in the case of the United States vs. Julio Liuag shows that the
defendant was sentenced to seventeen years and four months'
imprisonment for the crime of homicide, from which sentence he
appealed, and it appearing that he was too poor to employ a lawyer,
this court assigned the said Lahesa as counsel de oficio, yet the said
Lahesa has utterly failed to take any action whatever on behalf of the
defendant in that case, though more than six months have elapsed
since the date of his assignment."5
The liability incurred by respondent Demaisip is thus unavoidable. He
had failed to fulfill his responsibility as defense counsel. Whether as
counsel de parte or a counsel de oficio, he was indeed truly remiss in
the discharge of a responsibility which, as a member of the Bar, he
cannot evade. It is by such notorious conduct of neglect and
indifference on the part of counsel that a court's docket becomes
unnecessarily clogged. His transgression is indisputable; what remains
is the imposition of an appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, until further orders of this Court, respondent Sixto P.
Demaisip is hereby suspended from the practice of the law in all courts
of the Philippines, except for the sole purpose of filing the brief for
appellant Roscoe Daban y Ganzon with this Court within a period of
twenty days from receipt of this resolution. Let a copy of this resolution
be spread upon his record. The Court of Appeals is furnished a copy of
this resolution for its information. The Department of Justice is likewise
furnished a copy thereof for transmission to the courts of first instance
and the inferior courts for their information and guidance. This
resolution is immediately executory.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Castro, Teehankee,
Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.
THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]
SOPHIA ALAWI, Complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of
Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City, Respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or
coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real
estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi
City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free
purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units Postage PD 26."1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa &
Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds
Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
(NHMFC).

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya
reputation;"
addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the
termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of
my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between 4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of
me and your company, as represented by your Sales the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office
here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler,
vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic)
abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said
his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations
contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated
as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with
such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her
Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."
dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent.
She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic be appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "
language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit,
fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint.
unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa &
Conformably with established usage that notices of resolutions
Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform
emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice
you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the
of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan,
contract **. I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said
Assistant Division Clerk of Court.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I
was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the
controversial contract." Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"3 in which he
questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of
him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div.
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co.
Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to
at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it,
the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and
and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at
voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong
the right hand corner above the description of the addressee, the
link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred
words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.
that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for
being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and ex-officio Provincial
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal Family **."4
Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less
Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract
aggressive, even obsequious tones,5 Alauya requested the former to
with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in
give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment
connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the
thereon.6 He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good
rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:
faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales
agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions
cancel, rescind and voided, the 'manipulated contract' entered into of P4,333.10 from his salary.
between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented
by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996,
fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and
Alauya contended that it was he who had suffered "undue injury,
pursued the housing loan without my authority and against my will.
mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold
Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the
financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total
attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by
of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.7 He declared that
misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence;
there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa &
and that there was no meeting of the minds between me and the
Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse
swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."
of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation
fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were typewritten on the
he took to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi. envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by the
affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to
before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated
J);8 and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the
February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for
use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were
the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his
indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred
housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on
inadvertently and because of an honest
account thereof.a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon
mistake.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to
the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from
his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is
anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which
the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."b Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of
"attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor,"
"konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective
May 1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-
back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his) He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is
payments."c expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured."10 He claims he
was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and
friend.11 He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995,
that she would show the completed document to him later for
Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January
correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters
25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the
and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property -- subject of
5
his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is
situated;12 He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife,
and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so
until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his
contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such
pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance,
lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which
he ever saw.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice,
Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it
consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," and
complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her
complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and
demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant
Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996),
and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of
which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June
5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU
ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he
made "malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid
grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in
"undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established
reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized
acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had
fooled him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse
of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with
Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without ** (his) authority and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the
real facts **."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he
was merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what "is
expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered
"mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold
financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total
of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his
salary.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of
promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the
public service.16 Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials
and employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain
from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public
policy, public order, public safety and public interest."17 More than once
has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every
official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of
justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct
must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety
and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the
judiciary."18
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good
customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch
denunciations of acts believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful,
fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent
language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action
against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with
propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in
a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."19 Righteous
indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative
language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar
6
and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct
more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of
the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive,
scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.20 As a judicial
employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the
rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be
characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical
deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but
cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been
grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already
had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not
full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice
law before Shari'a courts.21 While one who has been admitted to the
Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may
both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel
or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The
title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the
necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is
they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or
"counsellor-at-law," because in his region, there are pejorative
connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to
local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His
disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of
the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking
privilege, the record contains no evidence adequately establishing the
accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby
REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting or
virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for
usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other
impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
January 9, 1973
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration1 submitted
its Report dated November 30, 1972, with the "earnest
recommendation" — on the basis of the said Report and the
proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 5262 of the Court, and
"consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the
Commission's] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming
nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" — that "this
Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as
possible through the adoption and promulgation of an appropriate
Court Rule."
The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order
the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving
recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and
other local Bar associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor
of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally expounded before
the Court. Written oppositions were admitted,3 and all parties were
thereafter granted leave to file written memoranda.4
Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant
developments relative to the matter of the integration of the Bar in this
jurisdiction.
In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a
strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar integration, the Court
created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of
ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.
In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled
"An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar, and
Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the
same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of
this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar
under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to
raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.
SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos
is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the
National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to
carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter, such
sums as may be necessary for the same purpose
shall be included in the annual appropriations for
the Supreme Court.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.
The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the
constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all necessary factual
data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar
integration. Also embodied therein are the views, opinions, sentiments,
comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine
lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed
integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission and presented to
them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient
basis as well as ample material upon which the Court may decide
whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this time.
The following are the pertinent issues:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the
Philippine Bar?
(2) Would the integration of the Bar be
constitutional?
(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the
Bar at this time?
A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the
meaning of Bar integration. It will suffice, for this purpose, to adopt the
concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of
its Report, thus:
Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official
unification of the entire lawyer population of the
Philippines. This
requires membership and financial support (in
reasonable amount) of every attorney as
conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and
the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of
the Supreme Court.
The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all
persons whose names appear in the Roll of
Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar)
perforce must include all lawyers.
Complete unification is not possible unless it is
decreed by an entity with power to do so: the
State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the
setting up by Government authority of a national
organization of the legal profession based on the
recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.
7
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an
instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law,
integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and
ensures, through their own organized action and
participation, the promotion of the objectives of the
legal profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with minimum
supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.
The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members
high ideals of integrity, learning, professional
competence, public service and conduct;
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its
members;
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of
cordiality and brotherhood;
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law,
jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice and
procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the
Bench and to the public, and publish information
relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal
research in substantive and adjective law, and
make reports and recommendations thereon; and
(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility effectively.
Integration of the Bar will, among other things,
make it possible for the legal profession to:
(1) Render more effective assistance in
maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse
of tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers;
(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility
in the disciplining and/or removal of incompetent
and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot
defend itself except within its own forum, from the
assaults that politics and self-interest may level at
it, and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality
and independence;
(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of
judges and prosecuting officers;
(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and
break up any monopoly of local practice
maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled
and deceased lawyers;
(8) Provide placement services, and establish
legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference
services throughout the country so that the poor
may not lack competent legal service;
(9) Distribute educational and informational
materials that are difficult to obtain in many of our
provinces;
 (10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing
legal education for practising attorneys in order to
elevate the standards of the profession throughout
the country;
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and
promulgate minimum fees schedules;
(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries
for legal research;
(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on
their legal rights and obligations, on the
importance of preventive legal advice, and on the
functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and
(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and
meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer
population in the solution of the multifarious
problems that afflict the nation.
Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the
Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of
the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law."
Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court's
constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme
Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine
Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the
Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the
integration of the Bar will promote public interest or, more specifically,
will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively."
Resolution of the second issue — whether the unification of the Bar
would be constitutional — hinges on the effects of Bar integration on
the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom
of speech, and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.
The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made
by the Commission on Bar Integration pages 44 to 49 of its Report:
Constitutionality of Bar Integration
Judicial Pronouncements.
In all cases where the validity of Bar integration
measures has been put in issue, the Courts have
upheld their constitutionality.
The judicial pronouncements support this
reasoning:
— Courts have inherent power to supervise and
regulate the practice of law.
— The practice of law is not a vested right but a
privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with public
interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to
his client, but also to his brethren in the profession,
to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in
one of the most important functions of the State,
the administration of justice, as an officer of the
court.
— Because the practice of law is privilege clothed
with public interest, it is far and just that the
exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure
compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
— These public responsibilities can best be
discharged through collective action; but there can
be no collective action without an organized body;
no organized body can operate effectively without
incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that
all attorneys be required to contribute to the
support of such organized body; and, given
existing Bar conditions, the most efficient means of
8
doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of
court that requires all lawyers to pay annual dues
to the Integrated Bar.
1. Freedom of Association.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of an
integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional
freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to
associate).
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of
any group of which he is not already a member.
He became a member of the Bar when he passed
the Bar examinations. All that integration actually
does is to provide an official national organization
for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already
a member.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter
or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The body compulsion to which he is
subjected is the payment of annual dues.
Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar
imposes only the duty to pay dues in reasonable
amount. The issue therefore, is a question of
compelled financial support of group activities, not
involuntary membership in any other aspect.
The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the
function of elevating the educational and ethical
standards of the Bar to the end of improving the
quality of the legal service available to the people.
The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared
by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory
program — the lawyers.
Assuming that Bar integration does compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police
power of the State. The legal profession has long
been regarded as a proper subject of legislative
regulation and control. Moreover, the inherent
power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar
includes the authority to integrate the Bar.
2. Regulatory Fee.
For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the
members does not mean that the Court levies a
tax.
A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an
exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a tax
is revenue. If the Court has inherent power to
regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to
regulation, it may impose a membership fee for
that purpose. It would not be possible to push
through an Integrated Bar program without means
to defray the concomitant expenses. The doctrine
of implied powers necessarily includes the power
to impose such an exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to
regulate the Bar is that the regulation does not
impose an unconstitutional burden. The public
interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far
outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a
member that might result from his required
payment of annual dues.
3. Freedom of Speech.
 A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice
his views on any subject in any manner he wishes,
even though such views be opposed to positions
taken by the Unified Bar.
For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to
promote measures to which said member is
opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his
freedom of speech.
Since a State may constitutionally condition the
right to practice law upon membership in the
Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it
should become unconstitutional for the Bar to use
the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for
which it was established.
The objection would make every Governmental
exaction the material of a "free speech" issue.
Even the income tax would be suspect. The
objection would carry us to lengths that have never
been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if
his liberties were to be thus extended, might
refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or
of any other end condemned by his conscience as
irreligious or immoral. The right of private
judgment has never yet been exalted above the
powers and the compulsion of the agencies of
Government.
4. Fair to All Lawyers.
Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already
practising because although the requirement to
pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the
members of the Bar a new system which they
hitherto have not had and through which, by
proper work, they will receive benefits they have
not heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public
responsibilities in a more effective manner than
they have been able to do in the past. Because the
requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of
regulatory power by the Court, because it will
apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the
time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is
a new regulation in exchange for new benefits, it is
not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair.
To resolve the third and final issue — whether the Court should ordain
the integration of the Bar at this time — requires a careful overview of
the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and
disadvantages of Bar integration.
In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United
States, Bar integration has yielded the following benefits: (1) improved
discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and
ascendancy of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of
the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated Bar; (4) greater
Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6)
avoidance of costly membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an
official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9) better
and more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and
responsibilities to its members, to the courts, and to the public. No less
than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected
from the unification of the Philippine Bar.
Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of
integration, Government authority will dominate the Bar; local Bar
associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result;
effective lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will become an
impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by
opponents of Bar integration have failed to materialize in over fifty
years of Bar integration experience in England, Canada and the United
States. In all the jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried,
none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other hand, it has
restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional
consciousness, energized the Bar's responsibilities to the public, and
vastly improved the administration of justice.
9
How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The
official statistics compiled by the Commission on Bar integration show
that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission in the
matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090
lawyers from all over the archipelago who have turned in their
individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar
integration, while only 378 (or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157
(or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80)
local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have
submitted resolutions and other expressions of unqualified
endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local
Bar association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed position
thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers who cast
their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court Rule drafted
by the Commission, 12,855 (or 93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof,
662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are
non-committal.5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide
demand for Bar integration at this time.
The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study
of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the
authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the
exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the
integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the
Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of
the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by
Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, hereby ordains the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the attached
COURT RULE, effective on January 16, 1973.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-28899 May 30, 1974
ALFREDO C. TAJAN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Judge, Court of First Instance of
Davao, respondent.
Jose P. Arro for petitioner.
Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr. in his own behalf.
ANTONIO, J.:p
In this original action of prohibition petitioner Alfredo C. Tajan
challenges the authority of respondent Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Davao to hear Administrative Case No. 59 of said court
involving a disciplinary action initiated against petitioner as a member
of the Philippine Bar.
In a letter dated December 5, 1967 addressed to petitioner Alfredo C.
Tajan, he was required by respondent Judge to explain within 72 hours
why he should not be removed or suspended from the practice of law
for preparing, or causing to be prepared, a petition in court containing
factual averments which petitioner knew were false, to wit:
The records and the transcript of stenographic
notes of Misc. Case No. 2968 of this Court show
that you prepared and/or caused to be prepared a
verified petition for issuance of a new owner's
duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-7312 in favor of Vicente Calongo, alleging
therein as grounds therefor, "That the aforesaid
Transfer Certificate was lost by the herein
petitioner in his house in Mati, Davao; That in spite
of the diligent search of the aforesaid title, the
same could not be found and is therefore now
presumed to be lost," and had the petition signed
by Atty. Justo Cinco, when you know very well that
the owner's duplicate copy has always been in the
custody of Municipal Judge Bernardo P. Saludares
of the Municipality of Kapalong to whom the same
was entrusted by Vicente Calongo, and that as a
 result of the petition, this Court, through the Hon.
Vicente P. Bullecer, Presiding Judge of Branch IV,
issued an Order on June 28, 1967, directing the
Register of Deeds of the City of Davao to issue a
new owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-7312.
In view thereof, you are hereby given seventy-two
(72) hours from the receipt hereof to explain why
you shall not be removed or suspended from the
practice of law.
Petitioner, in answer thereto, wrote a letter to respondent Judge on
December 7, 1967 denying the material averments of respondent
Judge's letter and explaining the circumstances under which he
prepared the aforementioned petition.
Apparently not satisfied with petitioner's answer, respondent Judge
had his letter filed and docketed as Adm. Case No. 59 against
petitioner, and, together with Adm. Case No. 58 against Atty. Justo
Cinco, gave due course thereto and set the same for hearing on
January 24 and 25, 1968. At the hearing on January 24, 1968,
petitioner questioned, among others, the propriety of the proceedings,
contending that since the case was one for disbarment, respondent
Judge had no jurisdiction over the person of petitioner as well as the
subject matter thereof. Petitioner orally moved that respondent Judge
inhibit himself from hearing the administrative case in view of the
latter's conflicting positions as prosecutor and judge at the same time.
The oral motion was denied.
On February 1, 1968, respondent Judge proceeded to hear the
evidence against petitioner. At the said hearing Municipal Judge
Saludares testified by more or less reiterating the testimony he
previously gave at the hearing of the petition for relief from the order in
Misc. Case No. 2968 allowing the issuance of an owner's duplicate of
title. The continuation of the hearing was set for April 26, 1968.
On April 15, 1968, petitioner filed the present petition, and on April 17,
1968, this Court gave due course thereto and ordered the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction upon petitioner's posting of a bond.
Petitioner's thesis is that respondent Judge has no authority on his own
motion to hear and determine proceedings for disbarment or
suspension of attorneys because jurisdiction thereon is vested
exclusively and originally in the Supreme Court and not in courts of first
instance. Petitioner also contends that assuming arguendo that courts
of first instance have such authority, the procedure outlined in Rule 139
of the Revised Rules of Court should govern the filing and investigation
of the complaint.
We find petitioner's contentions without merit.
1. The power to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the legal
profession stems from the inherent power of the Supreme Court to
regulate the practice of law and the admission of persons to engage in
that practice. It is a necessary incident to the proper administration of
justice. An attorney-at-law is an officer of the court in the administration
of justice and as such he is continually accountable to the Court for the
manner in which he exercises the privilege which has been granted to
him. His admission to the practice of law is upon the implied condition
that his continued enjoyment of the right conferred, is dependent upon
his remaining a fit and safe person to exercise it. When it appears by
acts of misconduct, that he has become unfit to continue with the trust
reposed upon him, his right to continue in the enjoyment of that trust
and for the enjoyment of the professional privilege accorded to him
may and ought to be forfeited. The law accords to the Court of Appeals
and the Court of First Instance the power to investigate and suspend
members of the bar.
The following provisions of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court are
applicable:
SEC. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of
Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court
of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may
suspend an attorney from practice for any of the
causes named in the last preceding section, and
after such suspension such attorney shall not
practice his profession until further action of the
Supreme Court in the premises.
10
SEC. 29. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or
Court of First Instance, further proceedings in
Supreme Court. Upon such suspension, the Court
of Appeals or the Court of First Instance forthwith
transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of
the order of suspension and a full statement of the
facts upon which the same was based. Upon the
receipt of such certified copy and statement, the
Supreme Court shall make full investigation of the
facts involved and make such order revoking or
extending the suspension, or removing the
attorney from his office as such, as the facts
warrant.
SEC. 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or
suspension.— No attorney shall be removed or
suspended from the practice of his profession,
until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable
notice to answer the charges against him, to
produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be
heard by himself or counsel. But if upon
reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer
the accusation, the court may proceed to
determine the matter ex parte.
These provisions were taken from Sections 22, 23 and 25,
respectively, of the Code of Civil Procedure, which read:
SEC. 22. Suspension of lawyers.— Courts of First
Instance may suspend a lawyer from the further
practice of his profession for any of the causes
named in the last preceding section, and after
such suspension such lawyer will not be privileged
to practice his profession in any of the courts of
the Islands until further action of the Supreme
Court in the premises.
SEC. 23. Proceedings upon suspension. — Upon
such suspension the judge of the Court of First
Instance ordering the suspension shall forthwith
transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of
the order of suspension and a full statement of the
facts upon which the same was based. Upon the
receipt of such certified copy and statement, the
Supreme Court shall make full investigation of the
facts involved and make such order revoking or
extending the suspension, or removing the lawyer
permanently from the roll as it shall find the facts
to warrant.
SEC. 25. Hearing of charges.— No lawyer shall be
removed from the roll or be suspended from the
performance of his profession until he has had full
opportunity to answer the charges against him,
and to produce witnesses in his own behalf and to
be heard by himself and counsel, if he so desires,
upon reasonable notice. But if upon reasonable
notice the accused fails to appear and answer the
accusation, the court may proceed to determine
the matter ex parte.
2. It should be observed that proceedings for the disbarment of
members of the bar are not in any sense a civil action where there is a
plaintiff and the respondent is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings
involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance.
They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They
are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the
official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is
called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court.
The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to
the attorney's alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may
have in the proper administration of justice. The court may therefore
act upon its own motion and thus be the initiator of the proceedings,
because, obviously the court may investigate into the conduct of its
own officers.1 Indeed it is not only the right but the duty of the Court to
institute upon its own motion, proper proceedings for the suspension or
the disbarment of an attorney, when from information submitted to it or
of its own knowledge it appears that any attorney has so conducted
himself in a case pending before said court as to show that he is
wanting in the proper measure of respect for the court of which he is an
officer, or is lacking in the good character essential to his continuance
as an attorney. This is for the protection of the general public and to
promote the purity of the administration of justice.
3. Procedural due process requires that no attorney may be "removed
or suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full
opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him,
to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or
counsel" (Sec. 30, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court).2
While the aforecited Sec. 30 of Rule 138 does not state what is a
reasonable notice, Sec. 9 of Rule 139, of the Revised Rules, provides
that as far as applicable, the procedure outlined by the preceding
actions of Rule 139 "shall govern the filing and investigation of
complaints against attorneys in the Court of Appeals or in Courts of
First Instance." Section 2 of Rule 139, provides that the respondent
lawyer in disciplinary proceedings is granted 10 days from service of a
copy of the complaint within which to file his answer. It is desirable,
therefore, that a similar period should be granted by the Court of First
Instance to attorneys charged before it, for the purpose of uniformity in
procedure. We find, however, that in the case at bar, petitioner not only
failed to question as unreasonable, the period granted to him by the
court within which to answer the complaint, but actually was not
substantially prejudiced thereby as he filed his answer to the complaint
within the period of 72 hours from receipt thereof.
Petitioner claims that pursuant to Section 9 of Rule 139, which
provides that as far as may be applicable, the procedure for the
investigation by the Solicitor General of complaints against lawyers
referred to said official by the Supreme Court shall govern the filing and
investigation of complaints against lawyers in the Court of Appeals and
in Courts of First Instance, the Solicitor General, and not respondent
Judge, should be the one to conduct the present investigation.
Sections 3 to 6 of Rule 139 are not applicable to the investigation of
complaints against attorneys in the Court of Appeals and in Courts of
First Instance. The investigation by the Solicitor General in Section 3 of
Rule 139 refers to complaints referred to said office by this Court and
not to investigations in suspension proceedings before the Court of
Appeals or Courts of First Instance, because Sections 28 to 30 of Rule
138 authorize said courts and confer upon them the power to conduct
the investigation themselves, subject to another and final investigation
by the Supreme Court in the event of suspension of the lawyer. On the
basis of the certified copy of the order of suspension and the statement
of the facts upon which the same is based, required by Section 29 of
Rule 138, the Supreme Court "shall make full investigation of the facts
involved and make such order revoking or extending the suspension or
removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant." In
other words, under such circumstances the intervention of the Solicitor
General would, therefore, be unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the present person is denied, and the writ of
preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court is ordered
dissolved, with costs against petitioner.
Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando, Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ.,
concur.
 
[SBC-585. February 29, 1984.]
EMILIA E. ANDRES, Complainant, v. STANLEY R.
CABRERA, Respondent.
[SBC-571. February 29, 1984.]
LOURDES C. PEREA, Complainant, v. STANLEY R.
CABRERA, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER TO ADMIT,
SUSPEND, DISBAR AND REINSTATE LAWYERS; NATURE. — The
authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law is vested in the
Supreme Court by the Constitution. (Art. X, Sec. 5(5). This power is
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. It is judicial in the
sense that discretion is used in its exercise. The function requires (1)
previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether
past or present, affecting determinate individuals, and (3) decision as
to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in
effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. (In re: Cunanan, Et Al.,
94 Phil. 534).
2. ID.; ID.; POWER TO ADMIT ATTORNEYS TO THE BAR;
11
REQUIRES EXERCISE OF SOUND JUDICIAL DISCRETION. — This
power to admit attorneys to the Bar is not, however, an arbitrary and
despotic one, to be exercised at the pleasure of the Court, or from
passion, prejudice or personal hostility, but it is the duty of the court to
exercise and regulate it by a sound and judicial discretion.
3. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; POWER TO PUNISH FOR
CONTEMPT, INHERENT IN ALL COURTS. — The power to punish
persons for contempt is inherent in all courts and essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of
their lawful orders and decisions (Montalban v. Canonoy, 38 SCRA 1).
A lawyer who uses intemperate, abusive, abrasive or threatening
language betrays disrespect to the court, disgraces the Bar and invites
the exercise by the court of its disciplinary power. (Surigao Mineral
Reservation Board v. Cloribel, L-27072, Jan. 9, 1970, 31 SCRA 1; In re
Almacen, 31 SCRA 562; Montecillo v. Gica, 6Q SCRA 234). Such
power, however, should be exercised on the preservative and not on
the vindictive principle and on the corrective and not on the retaliatory
idea of punishment. (Weigal v. Shuster, 11 Phil. 340; Villavicencio v.
Lucban, 39 Phil. 778; People v. Marcos, 70 Phil. 468, 480; Victorino v.
Espiritu, 5 SCRA 653; Reliance Procoma, Inc. v. Phil-Asia Tobacco
Corp., 57 SCRA 370, Fontelera v. Amores, 70 SCRA 37). Furthermore,
contempt power should not be utilized for mere satisfaction of natural
inclination to strike back at a party who has shown lesser respect to the
dignity of the court. (Royeca v. Animas, 71 SCRA 1).
4. ID.; PURPOSE THEREFOR; ACCOMPLISHED IN THE CASE AT
BAR. — The dignity and authority of the Court has been maintained
and preserved when the Court punished respondent for his
contumacious conduct and he willingly and promptly paid the penalty
therefor. The preservative and corrective purpose of the contempt
power of this Court has already been accomplished and achieved that
to continue denying his plea for forgiveness and mercy in his behalf
and his family is not only to prolong the agony of his misconduct which
he has suffered for seven long years since 1977 when he passed the
Bar examinations but also would appear to be despotic and arbitrary.
We hold that respondent has expiated enough for his misdeed and
may now be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath and thus become a more
useful member of society and of the law profession.
RESOLUTION
GUERRERO, J.:
In Our Resolution promulgated December 14, 1979 in the first above-
entitled case, respondent Stanley R. Cabrera, a successful Bar
examinee in 1977 against whom petition had been filed for denial of his
admission as member of the Bar for lack of good moral character and
for his proclivity to filing baseless, malicious, and unfounded cases,
was found guilty of contempt of this Court for" (b)y his improper
conduct in the use of highly disrespectful, insolent language,
respondent has tended to degrade the administration of justice; he has
disparaged the dignity and brought to disrepute the integrity and
authority of the Court" and was sentenced to pay within ten days from
notice a fine of P600.00 or imprisonment of 50 days. (See 94 SCRA
512.)chanrobles law library
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January 9, 1980
which We denied on March 6, 1980 and further required respondent to
pay within five (5) days from notice the aforesaid fine of P500.00.
The fine was thereafter paid on March 14, 1980 under SC Official
Receipt No. 5369050X. On July 16, 1980, respondent submitted an
Urgent Motion for Admission to the Bar "in view of the foregoing
(payment) and for mercy" which We denied on August 12, 1980 since
the investigation against the said respondent was still pending before
the Legal Investigator of the Court, Atty. Victor J. Sevilla.
Another Urgent Motion for Early Resolution dated August 29, 1980 was
again filed with the Court by respondent, calling attention to the fact
that the case has been pending since April, 1977. We noted said
motion on September 16, 1980.
Meanwhile, respondent manifested to the Court in still another Urgent
Motion for Admission to the Bar dated September 25, 1981 that
"respondent has amended his ways and has conformed to the use of
polite, courteous, and civil language as can be gleaned from (his)
urgent motion for admission to the Bar dated July 16, 1980 and (his)
urgent motion for early resolution dated August 29, 1980 filed with this
Honorable Court; and that undersigned respondent reiterates his
sincere apologies to this Honorable Court and its Legal Investigator for
all his actuations since this case was filed in 1977; . . . that
undersigned respondent was acquitted by Judge Priscilla Mijares of the
City Court of Manila for estafa wherein Lourdes C. Perea was the
complaining witness as hereto authenticated by Annexes A, A-1, A-2,
A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6 and made an integral part of this motion.
Respondent prayed that "for humanitarian considerations, considering
that undersigned respondent has seven children, a wife and a widowed
mother to support," he be allowed to take his oath of office as a lawyer
and be admitted to the Bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondent then wrote a letter dated August 25, 1982 to the Chief
Justice, reiterating his sincere apologies to the Court for all his actions
which culminated in his conviction for contempt and prayed for help to
enable him "to uplift the living conditions of (his) seven children
considering that up to this date (he is) a squatter beside the railroad
tracks living in abject poverty." The aforementioned letter was noted by
this Court on September 16, 1982.
In the meantime, the second case, "SBC-571 (Lourdes C. Perea v.
Stanley R. Cabrera)" was ordered archived in view of the resolutions in
the first case "SBC-586 (Emilia E. Andres v. Stanley R. Cabrera)"
denying, among others, respondent’s admission to the Bar, as per Our
Resolution dated September 13, 1979 in SBC-571.
On February 21, 1983, respondent wrote a second letter to the Chief
Justice, once more reiterating his sincere apologies to the Court and
begged for mercy "to the end that he be allowed to take his oath of
office as a lawyer and enable him to give his children a bright future."
In Our Resolution of June 14, 1983, We resolved to deny the aforesaid
letter/petition.
On July 5, 1983, there was received in this Court a letter from one
Nerida V. Cabrera with address at 732 Int. 4, Bagumbayan, Bacood,
Sta. Mesa, M.M., wife of the respondent herein, addressed to the Chief
Justice, appealing for kindness and humanitarian consideration to
allow her husband to take his oath as a lawyer so that he can provide
food and shelter for their eight children because he is unemployed.
She also apologized for her husband for his disrespectful language to
the Court and prayed that she be allowed to apologize personally to
the Chief Justice and to the Supreme Court for her
husband.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
We noted the said letter of Nerida V. Cabrera and required said
respondent to appear personally before this Court on Tuesday, August
23, 1983 at 11:00 o’clock a.m. The records further disclose that a
handwritten letter by Nerida Cabrera dated August 1, 1983 attaching a
picture of the family of respondent and their eight children and a similar
handwritten letter by Presentacion Vda. de Cabrera, mother of the
respondent, were sent to the Chief Justice. Notices of the hearing set
for August 23, 1983 were given to the parties.
At the said hearing, Atty. Rhodora Javier appeared and argued for the
complainant Emilia E. Andres in SBC-585 (Emilia E. Andres v. Stanley
R. Cabrera). Stanley Cabrera appeared in his own behalf and
answered the questions asked by the Court. Atty. Victor Sevilla, Legal
Investigator of this Court, who investigated SBC-585, also answered
the questions asked by the Court. The Court then resolved to require
respondent Cabrera to submit within five (5) days from date (1) letters
of apology to the Court, to Atty. Victor Sevilla, to complainant Emilia E.
Andres, and to Fiscal Leonardo Arguelles for the contumacious and
vile language contained in his pleadings, and (2) certifications of good
behavior and exemplary conduct from the Parish Priest and from the
Barangay Captain of the place where he resides. Thereafter, the
petition to take the lawyer’s oath shall be considered submitted for
resolution.
On August 25, 1983, respondent forwarded to the Chief Justice his
letter of apology and through him to all the Associate Justices of the
Court "for all (his) disrespectful acts and utterances thru (his) pleadings
against the Honorable Supreme Court" and promised never to commit
the same. He enclosed therewith the Letter of Apology to Atty. Victor
Sevilla, Legal Investigator of the Court, Letter of Apology to Atty. Emilia
E. Andres, Legal Division, MOLE, complainant in SBC-585, Letter of
Apology to Fiscal Leonardo Arguelles, Manila City Hall, Certification of
Good Moral Character from Rev. Fr. Eduardo A. Cruz, Parish Priest,
Our Lady of Fatima Parish, Fatima Village, Bacood, Lubiran St., Sta.
Mesa, Manila, and Certification of Good Moral Character from
Barangay Captain Emiliano C. Masilungan of Barangay 604, Zone 60,
Sta. Mesa, Manila.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
The authority and responsibility over the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law is vested in the
Supreme Court by the Constitution. (Art. X, Sec. 5(5). This power is
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. It is judicial in the
sense that discretion is used in its exercise. The function requires (1)
previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete facts, whether
past or present, affecting determinate individuals, and (3) decision as
to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in
effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. (In re: Cunanan, Et Al.,
94 Phil. 534).
12
This power to admit attorneys to the Bar is not, however, an arbitrary
and despotic one, to be exercised at the pleasure of the Court, or from
passion, prejudice or personal hostility, but it is the duty of the court to
exercise and regulate it by a sound and judicial discretion. (In re: Crum,
204 Pac. 948, 103 Ore. 297; 1 Thornton on Attorneys-at-Law, Sec. 2,
cited in Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 6, pp. 204, 205).
On the other hand, the power to punish persons for contempt is
inherent in all courts and essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of their lawful orders and
decisions (Montalban v. Canonoy, 38 SCRA 1). A lawyer who uses
intemperate, abusive, abrasive or threatening language betrays
disrespect to the court, disgraces the Bar and invites the exercise by
the court of its disciplinary power. (Surigao Mineral Reservation Board
v. Cloribel, L-27072, Jan. 9, 1970, 31 SCRA 1; In re Almacen, 31
SCRA 562; Montecillo v. Gica, 6Q SCRA 234). Such power, however,
should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle and on the corrective and not on the retaliatory idea of
punishment. (Weigal v. Shuster, 11 Phil. 340; Villavicencio v. Lucban,
39 Phil. 778; People v. Marcos, 70 Phil. 468, 480; Victorino v. Espiritu,
5 SCRA 653; Reliance Procoma, Inc. v. Phil-Asia Tobacco Corp., 57
SCRA 370, Fontelera v. Amores, 70 SCRA 37). Furthermore, contempt
power should not be utilized for mere satisfaction of natural inclination
to strike back at a party who has shown lesser respect to the dignity of
the court. (Royeca v. Animas, 71 SCRA 1).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In the case at bar, respondent having paid the fine imposed upon him
for direct contempt against the integrity and dignity of this Court, having
apologized in repeated motions filed before this Court for his
disrespectful language and personally reiterated at the hearing
conducted herein, and has furthermore complied with the Court’s
directives contained in Our Resolution dated August 23, 1983 by
submitting his letters of apology to the Chief Justice and to the
members of this Court, to Atty. Victor Sevilla, Legal Investigator of the
Court, to complainant Atty. Emilia E. Andres, to Fiscal Leonardo
Arguelles, and Certifications of Good Moral Character from his parish
priest, Rev. Fr. Eduardo A. Cruz, and his Barangay Captain, Emiliano
C. Masilungan of Barangay 604, Zone 60, Sta. Mesa, Manila where
respondent resides, We are convinced by these actions that he has
become respectful, sincere and honest, thereby evincing that good
moral character required of a person who may be admitted to the
practice of law.
The pleas of his mother and wife for the sake and the future of
respondent’s family with eight young children, altho self-serving, are
strong human factors in considering, judiciously and wisely the motion
of respondent which in effect would allow him to start on a professional
career as a lawyer that would certainly mean a bright future for himself
and his family, for otherwise the discretion with which the Court may
admit qualified persons to the practice of law may be clouded with
vindictiveness and retaliation which is not the basic purpose of the
Court’s inherent power to punish for contempt.
The dignity and authority of the Court has been maintained and
preserved when the Court punished respondent for his contumacious
conduct and he willingly and promptly paid the penalty therefor. The
preservative and corrective purpose of the contempt power of this
Court has already been accomplished and achieved that to continue
denying his plea for forgiveness and mercy in his behalf and his family
is not only to prolong the agony of his misconduct which he has
suffered for seven long years since 1977 when he passed the Bar
examinations but also would appear to be despotic and arbitrary. We
hold that respondent has expiated enough for his misdeed and may
now be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath and thus become a more
useful member of society and of the law profession.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
In SBC-571, since the charge against respondent for estafa which is
the basis of the petition for disqualification filed by complainant
Lourdes C. Perea, has been dismissed and respondent acquitted in
Criminal Case No. 015429-CV by the City Court of Manila, Branch VII,
the same is hereby dismissed.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING respondent
Stanley R. Cabrera is hereby allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad
Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin and Relova, JJ.,
concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., I entertain some reservations about the respondent’s
ability or willingness to maintain his changed disposition and conduct
but I concur in the decision to give him a chance to be a member of the
bar in good standing.
G.R. No. L-12426             February 16, 1959
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,
vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the
Philippines Patent Office, respondent.
Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico
P. de Castro for respondent.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for
prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as
Director of the Philippines Patent Office.
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing
that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the
purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent
attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to
cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before
said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar,
engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical
training are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that
heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar examinations.
It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that
one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the
Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good
standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent
Office, and that consequently, the cat of the respondent Director
requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and
pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition
precedent to their being allowed to practice before said office, such as
representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of
applications for patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation
of the law.
In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General,
maintains that the prosecution of patent cases "does not involve
entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of
scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a
matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be
handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons with
sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed
examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court
do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from
requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to
handle cases before the Patent Office which, as stated in the
preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and
technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . .
that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic
Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines,
which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with
which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar
examination as that prescribed by respondent. . . .
Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United
States of America authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to prescribe
examinations to determine as to who practice before the United States
Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our
Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would
appear to have been holding tests or examinations the passing of
which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before the
Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the
Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of the bar,
has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have
given it careful thought and consideration.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with
respect to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines1 and to
any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law
anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or
administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to
whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the
preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes
or is included in the practice of law.
13
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings
and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation
services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim
in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do
the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the
work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p.
262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).
Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small
part of work performed outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal
instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust
relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may
have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require
in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide
experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for
adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These
customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear
an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question
set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is
of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and
acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients
which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re
Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted
in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R.
I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the
Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other
persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their
oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases.
In the first place, although the transaction of business in the Patent
Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific
knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in
accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the
Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Patent Office in accordance
with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves
the interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as
well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance with the
law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent
Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to
public order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says
that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was
known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof
by the inventor named in any printed publication in the Philippines or
any foreign country more than one year before the application for a
patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the
Philippines for more than one year before the application for the patent
therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to patent belongs to the true
and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section
25 and 26 refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28
enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any
person may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor
General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent.
Section 30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation.
Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the petition for
cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case the said
cancellation is warranted. Under Section 34, at any time after the
expiration of three years from the day the patent was granted, any
person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is
not being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the
demand for the patented article in the Philippines on a commercial
scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not
being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason
of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms or by
reason of the condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use
of the patented article or working of the patented process or machine
of production, the establishment of a new trade or industry in the
Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or
medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety. All these
things involve the applications of laws, legal principles, practice and
procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for
which a member of the bar has been prepared.
In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the
act, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involve questions of
law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent
Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:
. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a
design, any party to a proceeding to cancel a patent or to
obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other
proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court
from any final order or decision of the director.
In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of
business in the Patent Office and the acts, orders and decisions of the
Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific
knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not
to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers
or technical men, which is not the case.
Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature
of the functions and acts of the Head of the Patent Office.
. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in
reissues, interferences, and extensions, exercises quasi-
judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the
duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated copies to any
person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537).
(Emphasis supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory
jurisdiction that exists up to the granting and delivering of a
patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new
and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his
action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function.
In passing on an application the commissioner should decide
not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as
whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the
article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).
The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial
functions, it is reasonable to hold that a member of the bar, because of
his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before
the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of
course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary,
may require that members of the bar practising before him enlist the
assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers
and documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an
invention or machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a
lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on
behalf of his clients, is required to submit a plan and technical
description of said land, prepared by a licensed surveyor.
But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the
law to require persons desiring to practice or to do business before him
to submit an examination, even if they are already members of the bar.
He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned
after the United States Patent Law; and of the United States Patent
Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that which
he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention
to the following provisions of said Rules of Practice:
Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of an
attorneys and a register agents are kept in the Patent Office
on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as
entitled to represent applicants before the Patent Office in
the preparation and prosecution of applicants for patent.
Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of
these rules shall only entitle the person registered to practice
before the Patent Office.
(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing
admitted to practice before any United States Court or the
highest court of any State or Territory of the United States
who fulfills the requirements and complied with the
provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before
the Patent Office and have his name entered on the register
of attorneys.
14
xxx     xxx     xxx
(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be
admitted to practice and register unless he shall apply to the
Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form
supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested
information and material; and shall establish to the
satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral
character and of good repute and possessed of the legal and
scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable
him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is
otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the
presentation and prosecution of their application before the
Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may determine
whether a person seeking to have his name placed upon
either of the registers has the qualifications specified,
satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and of
sufficient basic training in scientific and technical matters
must be submitted and an examination which is held from
time to time must be taken and passed. The taking of an
examination may be waived in the case of any person who
has served for three years in the examining corps of the
Patent Office.
Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the
United States Patent Office in Patent Cases is authorized by the United
States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:
The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules and regulations
governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other
persons representing applicants or other parties before his
office, and may require of such persons, agents,
or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives of
applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are of
good moral character and in good repute, are possessed of
the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to
applicants or other persons valuable service, and are
likewise to competent to advise and assist applicants or
other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their
applications or other business before the Office. The
Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity
for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any
particular case from further practice before his office any
person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or
disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who refuses to
comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with
intent to defraud in any matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten
any applicant or prospective applicant, or other person
having immediate or prospective applicant, or other person
having immediate or prospective business before the office,
by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for
any such suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded.
The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the
petition of the person so refused recognition or so
suspended by the district court of the United States for the
District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such
proceedings as the said court may by its rules determine.
(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No.
165 being similar to the provisions of law just reproduced, then he is
authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons
desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an
examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for
purposes of comparison:
SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to
the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law,
for the conduct of all business in the Patent Office.
The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different
from the provisions of the United States Patent Law as regards
authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those
allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law
authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show
that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to
render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent
cases, which showing may take the form of a test or examination to be
held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this
important point. Our attention has not been called to any express
provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to determine the
qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent Office.
Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief
of bureau to prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders
not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient
administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect
the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section
608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of
the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall,
subject to the approval of the Department Head, makes all rules and
regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section
338 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No.
466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon
recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate
all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the
provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have
been promulgated not only for the Bureau of Customs and Internal
Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the
transaction of business in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.
Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and
clear provision of law giving the necessary sanction, to require lawyers
to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they are
allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no
reason why other bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue
and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or less
complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance
sheets, etc., assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods,
imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards
the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising
before them or otherwise transacting business with them on behalf of
clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.
In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the
Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good
standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the
reason that much of the business in said office involves the
interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the
Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of
evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the
Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals
from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme
Court.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the
respondent Director is hereby prohibited from requiring members of the
Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same
before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office.
No costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 716             January 30, 1969
EDUARDO J. BERENGUER, complainant,
vs.
PEDRO B. CARRANZA, respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
  The law is an exacting taskmaster. Membership in the bar, as so
appropriately put, is a privilege burdened with conditions. 1 A lawyer is
called upon by virtue of his oath of office to "do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; ... [and to] conduct (himself) as a
lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity ... to the courts ..." 2 The question, one that has an element
of novelty, is whether respondent Pedro B. Carranza, duly admitted to
the practice of the law, did get entangled in the complexity of the
strands in the web of obligation such an oath imposes? More
specifically, did he manifest the utmost fealty to the trust reposed in
him as an officer of the Court by taking all necessary measures to
avoid the court being misled, even if such were the result not of design
but of inadvertence?
  A complaint against respondent Pedro B. Carranza was filed on July
15, 1966, for deception practiced on the Court of First Instance of
Sorsogon, in that aware of the falsity of an Affidavit of Adjudication and
Transfer executed by the mother of his client to the effect that her own
mother left no legitimate ascendants or descendants or any other heirs
except herself, when, as a matter of fact, the deceased was survived
by four other daughters and one son, father of the complainant, he
introduced the same in evidence. 3
15
  Respondent Carranza was required in our resolution of July 22, 1966,
to file an answer. Thereafter, on August 17, 1966, he did so, alleging
as the truth of the matter that the aforesaid Affidavit of Adjudication and
Transfer was introduced in evidence only to prove the fact of such
transfer of the property in question to his client, respondent having "no
hand in the making of said affidavit nor of the petition, both of which
were prepared in Pasay City." 4
  On September 1, 1966, the matter was referred by us to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. Such
investigation was had wherein both complainant and respondent were
duly heard. The issue in the opinion of the then Solicitor General, the
Honorable Antonio Barredo, now a member of this Court, as set forth in
his report of March 18, 1968, is whether respondent "consented in
violation of his oath, to the doing of any falsehood in court."
  It was admitted in said report: "If respondent had anything to do with
the preparation of the Petition or of the Affidavit of Adjudication, his
participation does not appear from the evidence presented in this case.
The Petition was subscribed and sworn to in Pasay City before one
Atty. A. Mendoza, while the Affidavit was subscribed under oath in
Pasay before Notary Public Ernesto V. Ventura. The foregoing
documents were posted from Pasay to the Clerk of Court,
Sorsogon...." 5
  It was likewise noted that respondent testified as to his being "not
"very meticulous about the petition" because there was neither private
nor government opposition thereto; that if he had intended to deceive
the court by virtue of the documents, he could have told his client to
answer his questions at the cadastral hearing to conform to the
controverted paragraph in the Affidavit of Adjudication concerning the
statement reproduced from the tax declaration that the decedent left no
legitimate ascendants or descendants or any other heirs except the
affiant...." 6
  There is this admission in the aforesaid report. Thus: "As the
evidence stands, there is no apparent causal link between the
falsehood and the fact that respondent is the lawyer handling the
cadastral case at the Sorsogon end." 7 Nonetheless, while recognizing
the absence of evidence that such falsehood in the Affidavit of
Adjudication could be traced to respondent, the report would hold him
liable for discretionary action as the circumstance that various estates
are involved "certainly warranted a greater exercise of diligence on
respondent's part." 8
  Moreover, as likewise stated therein, the fact "that he did not even
bother to read the entirety of the affidavit runs counter to respondent's
inescapable duty to clear up doubts and inconsistencies." 9 For he
could have been aware of the family litigations between his client and
complainant which are rooted in successional rights...." 10 If only for the
above fact then, as stated in the report, "he should precisely have
taken the bother to read the entirety of the Affidavit of Adjudication
when the cadastral case was heard on January 17, 1966...." 11
  From which, in the light of the above, it was the conclusion of the then
Solicitor General Antonio Barredo, assisted by Assistant Solicitor
General Frine Zaballero: "If he did not, he cannot be relieved from the
consequences of his acts as a lawyer, and disclaim responsibility
therefor. To allow respondent relief from his duty is to ignore what is
obvious from the nature of the litigations in which he entered his
appearance.... Actually, respondent's failure to read the affidavit proves
that he did not properly inform himself of the evidence he was going to
present in court, thereby exhibiting an indifference to proof inconsistent
with facts he definitely knows. Thus, respondent has contributed to
confusion and the prolongation of the cadastral suit, which pends as a
petition for Relief...." 12
  It was the recommendation that the corresponding complaint for the
violation of his oath against respondent be instituted. Such complaint
was filed by the two above officials on March 18, 1968. Respondent
was charged with "violation of his oath of office, [having] caused
confusion and prolongation of the cadastral suit for presenting
evidence therein containing a false statement inconsistent with facts he
definitely knows by reason of the family litigations between his client
and complainant herein, which are rooted in successional rights [and
that] respondent's failure to discharge his duties as a lawyer consistent
with his oath of office finds sanction in Rule 138, Section 27, Revised
Rules of Court." 13
  Respondent in his answer, dated May 16, 1968, raised no issue as to
the facts. He would allege in justification however "that while it is true
that the ... respondent was the counsel who appeared for the petitioner
in Cadastral Case No. 2, LRC Cadastral Record No. 869 of Sorsogon
Cadastre, yet he had nothing to do with the making of the petition and
the annexes thereto attached; for the same were made in Pasay City
and that when (he) accepted to represent the petitioner in the
Cadastral Case mentioned above, there was no opposition from
anybody ... not even from the Bureau of Lands nor from the Honorable
Solicitor General, making, therefore, the hearing therein a mere
formality. Such being the case, the [respondent] presented the
petitioner's case on January 17, 1966, without meticulously going over
the documents, and the alleged Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer
was presented to show the fact of transfer of the land described therein
from the affiant to her son. The stenographic notes in that proceeding
will bear this matter out. [Respondent's] failure to notice the existence
of an incorrect statement in the said affidavit was a mere oversight. It
was not [wilful], for he has not consented to the doing of the falsity
therein made, since the same was prepared by petitioner's lawyer in
Pasay City; nor did [respondent] willingly do falsehood in the hearing
mentioned above; ..." 14
  There is something unique in this proceeding then. With the finding of
the then Solicitor General Barredo that there was nothing wilful in the
conduct pursued by respondent in thus introducing in evidence the
Affidavit of Adjudication and Transfer which turned out to be false, in
the preparation of which, however, he had nothing to do, the charge of
deliberate deception obviously cannot be sustained.1awphil.ñêt
  Would that of itself entirely exculpate him from any responsibility? The
answer must be in the negative. As was correctly pointed out in the
complaint, his failure to exercise greater care did result in the
"confusion and prolongation of the cadastral suit." Under the
circumstances, it would be to err on, the side of undue leniency if he
would be held blameless. He had incurred liability. His fidelity to his
oath as attorney was less than entire.
  Every member of the bar must be on his guard, lest through oversight
or inadvertence, the way he conducts his case or the evidence he
presents could conceivably result in a failure of justice. Time and time
again, lawyers have been admonished to remember that they are
officers of the court, and that while they owe their clients the duty of
complete fidelity and the utmost diligence, they are likewise held to
strict accountability insofar as candor and honesty towards the court is
concerned.
  Even if there be no intent to deceive, therefore, a lawyer whose
conduct, as in this case, betrays inattention or carelessness should not
be allowed to free himself from a charge thereafter instituted against
him by the mere plea that his conduct was not wilful and that he has
not consented to the doing of the falsity.
  A lawyer's oath is one impressed with the utmost seriousness; it must
not be taken lightly. Every lawyer must do his best to live up to it. There
would be a failure of justice if courts cannot rely on the submission as
well as the representations made by lawyers, insofar as the
presentation of evidence, whether oral or documentary, is concerned.
If, as unfortunately happened in this case, even without any intent on
the part of a member of the bar to mislead the court, such deplorable
event did occur, he must not be allowed to escape the responsibility
that justly attaches to a conduct far from impeccable.
  WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro B. Carranza is reprimanded and
warned that a repetition of an offense of this character would be much
more severely dealt with. The Court of First Instance of Sorsogon,
through any of the district judges, is hereby directed to administer in
public the reprimand thus imposed on respondent Pedro B. Carranza.
The complainant, Eduardo J. Berenguer, must be duly informed of the
date when such reprimand is to be administered.
  Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez, Castro, Capistrano and Teehankee, JJ., concur.
Barredo,. J., took no part.
A.C. No. 838 January 21, 1974
IN RE: ATTY. FELIZARDO M. DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
RESOLUTION
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
16
This is an administrative case involving a member of the Bar,
Atty. Felizardo M. de Guzman.
In Civil Case No. 71648 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
entitled: "Lagrimas Lapatha, et al. versus Vicente Floro, et al.", the
Hon. Jesus de Veyra rendered on July 23, 1968, a decision the
dispositive portion of which reads:1
Judgment is, therefore, rendered setting aside the
judgment of the City Court in Civil Case No.
165187 entitled Floro v. Lapatha as well as the writ
of execution issued pursuant thereto, and
remanding this case to the City Court of Manila in
order to give Petitioner her day in Court.
Defendant Floro shall pay the costs. Let copy of
this decision be furnished the Supreme Court to
take whatever disciplinary action it may deem fit
against Atty. Felizardo de Guzman for his manner
of behavior in the proceedings before the City
Court of Manila. (Emphasis Ours)
Upon receipt of copy of the above-mentioned decision, this Court in its
Resolution of August 16, 1968, required Atty. Felizardo de Guzman to
answer,2 and the latter complied on August 30, 1968.3 On September
10, 1968 the matter was referred to the Solicitor General for investigate
report and recommendation.4 On November 20, 1973, We received the
Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General.5
At the hearing conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General during
which none of the parties, with the exception of respondent, Atty.
Felizardo de Guzman, appeared despite due notice, the following
incidents were brought out:
Sometime on October 12, 1967, a complaint for ejectment was filed
with the City Court of Manila by Vicente Floro against Lagrimas
Lapatha which was docketed as Civil Case No. 165187 of said
court.6 On November 2, 1967, a decision was rendered by the City
Court, Branch VIII, presided by Judge Roman Cansino, Jr., to this
effect:7
BY CONFESSION, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering the defendant and all persons claiming
under her to vacate premises described in the
complaint and surrender the possession thereof to
the plaintiff; to pay unto the plaintiff the unpaid
rentals in the sum of P795.00, with interest
thereon at the legal rate from October 12, 1967
until fully paid; the sum of P150.00 as attorney's
fees plus the costs of the suit.
On December 29, 1967, Lagrimas Lapatha filed with the Court of First
Instance of Manila a "Petition for Relief from Judgment, Orders & other
Proceedings in the Inferior Court with a Writ of Preliminary Injunction",
naming therein Vicente Floro and the Sheriff of Manila as party-
respondents.8 In the Petition it was alleged by petitioner Lagrimas
Lapatha that at the initial hearing of Civil Case No. 165187 in the City
Court of Manila held at 8:30 o'clock in the morning of November 2,
1967, she appeared without counsel; she approach Atty. Felizardo de
Guzman, the lawyer of Vicente Floro, and begged for a five-day
postponement of the trial to which Atty. de Guzman verbally agreed;
Atty. de Guzman then asked her to affix her signature on the court's
"expediente" which she did, and after signing she left the courtroom; on
November 16, 1967, she gave to Atty. Felizardo de Guzman a check
for P350.00 in partial payment of her arrears in the rentals; on
November 20, 1967, she was surprised to receive copy of a decision
from the City Court dated November 2, 1967, wherein it appeared that
she confessed judgment when in truth and in fact she asked for
postponement of that initial hearing with the conformity of Atty.
Felizardo de Guzman; upon verification of the "expediente" of the case,
she discovered that below the signature which she affixed at the
request of Atty. de Guzman, the latter had written "CONFESS
JUDGMENT", without her knowledge and consent; hence her petition
for relief from the judgment rendered by the City Court.
Vicente Floro filed his Answer to the above-mentioned Petition for relief
and he alleged that the decision of the City Court was based on an
admission made in open court by petitioner Lagrimas Lapatha on the
basis of which the words "Confession of judgment" were written on the
"expediente" of the case and underneath were affixed the signature of
said petitioner and that of Atty. Felizardo de Guzman; that the alleged
payments of Lagrimas Lapatha were made after the rendition of the
decision to forestall immediate execution of the judgment; that when
petitioner filed with the City Court a motion for reconsideration of the
decision alleging fraud, the true circumstances attending the hearing of
November 2, 1967, were brought out to the satisfaction of petitioner's
counsel, for which reason the City Court denied the motion for
reconsideration; that during the hearing on petitioner's motion for
reconsideration Atty. de Guzman agreed not to press for the execution
of the judgment on the assurance of petitioner that she vacate the
premises by January 15, 1968, however, petitioner did not comply with
her promise and instead filed the Petition for Relief.9
On July 23, 1968, His Honor, Judge Jesus de Veyra, rendered his
decision 10 in the above-mentioned Petition for Relief favorable to
petitioner Lapatha, the dispositive portion of which We quoted in page
two of this Resolution.
Judge de Veyra stated in his decision that due to the "machinations
unworthy of an attorney" committed by respondent herein, Lagrimas
Lapatha was deprived of her day in court, said lawyer having agreed to
a postponement of the hearing and even accepted partial payment so
the case would not proceed, but behind her back wrote the words
"confessed judgment" over her signature and prevailed upon the City
Court to render judgment. 11 Judge de Veyra based his findings on the
alleged testimonies of Lagrimas Lapatha and one Atty. Vargas given
during the trial of the Petition for Relief.
We are constrained, however, to agree with the Solicitor General that
the above-mentioned findings of Judge de Veyra were not only left
unsubstantiated at the investigation conducted by the Solicitor
General's Office for failure of said witnesses to appear notwithstanding
due notice that they were satisfactorily controverted by the evidence
submitted by respondent at said hearing.
Thus:
1. The records of Civil Case No. 71648 (Petition for Relief) show that
the clerk of the City Court of Manila testified that when the ejectment
case was called for hearing on November 2, 1967, both Lagrimas
Lapatha and Atty. de Guzman made their appearances, and when the
trial Judge asked Lapatha if she admitted the indebtedness alleged in
the complaint, she answered in the affirmative and forthwith the words
"confessed judgment" were written on the "expediente" of the case
after which Atty. de Guzman and Lapatha affixed their signatures. 12 As
aptly observed in the Report of the Solicitor General, the
aforementioned testimony of the clerk of court deserves credit because
the clerk was present at the hearing of November 2 and his testimony
is substantiated by the decision of the City Judge 13 who, We state, is
presumed, sans evidence to the contrary, to have regularly performed
his official duty 14 and passed upon the matters before him in the
manner stated in his decision. 15 On the other hand, Atty. Vargas on
whom Judge de Veyra relied, was not in Court on the date of the
hearing so that his testimony was simply based on the supposed
statement to him of his secretary that the latter asked Atty. de Guzman
for a postponement of the trial. 16.
2. The check for P350.00 was given by either Atty. Vargas or Lagrimas
Lapatha to Atty. de Guzman not for the purpose of securing a
postponement, for said check was paid on November 16 several days
after the hearing, but in partial payment of the arrears in the rentals to
which Lapatha "confessed judgment" and in order to forestall the
immediate execution of the City Court's decision. 17 As a matter of fact,
during the hearing of Lapatha's motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the City Court, Lapatha agreed to vacate the premises by
January 15, 1968, and Atty. de Guzman in turn waived the collection of
the rentals for the months of November, 1967, up to January 15,
1968. 18
3. The only objective of Lagrimas Lapatha in filing her Petition for
Relief before Judge de Veyra was to gain more time to stay in the
leased premises notwithstanding her commitment to vacate as of
January 15, 1968, and in fact, she accomplished her purpose as
shown by the "Compromise Agreement" entered into between her and
the lessor, Vicente Floro, before Judge de Veyra in Civil Case No. 71
which reads:
Plaintiff agrees to vacate the premises at 821 Second Floor, Isabel
Street, Manila, on or before October 31, 1968 and in the Defendant V.
Floro agrees to condone all rentals past up to October 31, 1968 plus
attorney's fees and costs.
Manila, Philippines, October 22, 1968
(Sgd.) LAGRIMAS LAPATHA
17
(Sgd.) VIC
(See Exh. "B" page 53 rollo)
We agree with the Solicitor General that in the instant case "the
evidence is wanting" to sustain a finding that respondent committed
any deceit or misconduct in Civil Case No. 165187 of the City Court of
Manila.
In Go vs. Candoy, 19 this Court said: "It is quite elementary that in
disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant. To be made the basis suspension or disbarment of a
lawyer, the charge against him must be established by convincing
proof. The record must disclose as free from doubt a case which
compels exercise by this Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious
character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof must be
clearly demonstrated."
An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved, and as an
officer of the court, that he has performed his duty in accordance with
his oath. Thus, the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension
should follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence
against a respondent attorney. (Moran, Revised Rules of Court, 1970
Ed., vol. 6, p. 243, citing In re Tionko, 43 Phil. 191)
WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint is dismissed and
respondent, Atty. Felizardo M. de Guzman, is exonerated of the
charge.
Makalintal, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ.,
concur.1äwphï1.ñët
Castro, J., concurs in the result.
G.R. No. L-23908            October 29, 1966
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
VENANCIO H. AQUINO, defendant-appellee,
THOMAS H. GONZALES, intervenor.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff and appellant.
Vicente J. Francisco for defendant and appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Stating that it involves questions purely of law, the Court of Appeals
certified this appeal to Us.
The prosecution at bar is for libel. An information, dated March 29,
1963, was filed in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan against
Venancio H. Aquino, alleging: .
That on or about July 27, 1960, in the Municipality of
Camalaniugan, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused Venancio H.
Aquino, being the counsel for Demetrio B. Encarnacion in
Civil Case No. [N-] 151, for "Damages for libel", in the Court
of First Instance of Cavite, 7th Judicial District, Branch III, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with
malicious intent of impeaching the personal worth, integrity,
honor and reputation of the complaining witness Thomas M.
Gonzales, circulate and publish and/or caused to be
circulated and published his "Reply and Answer to
Counterclaim" a copy of which was furnished and received
by the counsel of the complaining witness Thomas M.
Gonzales at Camalaniugan, Cagayan, on July 27, 1960,
which the accused wrote, prepared and mailed and/or
caused to be written, prepared and mailed, containing highly
libelous, derogatory and scurrilous words and expressions
among which are the following:
"To this, our applicable reply are the very words of
the Honorable Supreme Court to a party for
shamelessly making untrue, libelous statements,
to wit: "(This party) appears to belong to the class
of individuals who have no compunction to resort
to falsehood or falsehoods, . . . as part of their
systematic campaign of falsehoods, and slanders
 directed against us, is an imposture that only
ignorants, black hands and others mental
pachyderms (like him) can swallow."
. . . Defendant was the impertinent assaulter of
plaintiff's reputation, the malefactor who concocted
the preposterous and malicious insinuations
against the plaintiff, so that, defendant has no
feelings, if at all, to be wounded."
knowing fully well that the aforesaid words and phrases to be
inapplicable to and inappropriate for the pleading of which
they are made integral parts, and knowing likewise the same
to be immaterial, impertinent and irrelevant to the issues
involved in the aforementioned civil case, thus publicly and
maliciously exposing the complaining witness Thomas M.
Gonzales to public ridicule, derision, mockery, scorn and
contempt to the irrepable damage and prejudice of the said
complaining witness Thomas M. Gonzales whom the
aforequoted words and phrases were applied and referred
to.
Aquino filed a motion to quash or amend the information, upon the
ground that it was not sufficiently intelligible. Said motion was denied
by the court.
Subsequently, however, on September 28, 1963, Aquino filed a second
motion to quash, claiming that (1) the statements referred to are not
defamatory; and (2) the statements, even if defamatory, are absolutely
privileged. Annexed thereto were copies of the Complaint, Answer with
Counterclaim, and the Reply and Answer to the Counterclaim, in Civil
Case No. N-151 of the Court of First Instance of Cavite.
After the Assistant Fiscal filed an answer to the motion, the court a
quo, on October 15, 1963, dismissed the case, upon the second
ground of the motion to quash. Thus it ruled that statements of the
accused in the "Reply and Answer to the Counterclaim" filed in Civil
Case No. N-151 constituted absolutely privileged matters, having been
made in the course of judicial proceedings and being relevant to the
issues that arose in that aforestated case.
From the order of dismissal — there was yet no arraignment and plea
— the prosecution has appealed.
Appellant, through the Solicitor General, recognized the rule, as laid
down in several decisions of this Court, that statements made in the
course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged — that is,
privileged regardless of defamatory tenor and of the presence of
malice — if the same are relevant, pertinent or material to the cause in
hand or subject of the inquiry. And that, in view of this, the person who
makes them — such as a judge, lawyer or witness — does not thereby
incur the risk of being found liable thereon in a criminal prosecution or
an action for the recovery of damages.1 At issue here is the application
of said rule, or whether the statements of Aquino, quoted in the
information, fall within the scope of this privilege.
As shown in the records before Us, the suit known as Civil Case No. N-
151 was filed by Ex-Judge Demetrio Encarnacion against Thomas
Gonzales, to recover damages for allegedly false, malicious and
libelous statements contained in the defendant's letter to his
(defendant's) sister, dated September 3, 1958, shown and given to
plaintiff in July of 1959, imputing that plaintiff had been "separated from
the position of Judge of the Court of First Instance by reason of his
supposedly dirty and indecent ways of dispensing human justice and of
his (plaintiff's) having been leading an immoral life." (Plaintiff's
Complaint, par. 3, Annex A to Second Motion to Quash.)
To plaintiff's Complaint alleging the above matters, Thomas Gonzales
filed an Answer with Counterclaim, putting up the defense that the
letter referred to "was addressed to defendant's sister, Mrs. Magdalena
G. Manikan, mailed in a sealed envelope to her, and written with the
sincere desire to comply with an obligation, social and moral, and with
the honest belief in the truthfulness of the statements contained there";
and that "reference to the complainant, if any, was merely incidental,
devoid of any intent to libel". Thus, defendant further asked for
P25,00,0 in moral damages, alleging that "by the unwarranted filing by
the plaintiff, in bad faith, of the aforesaid malicious and unfounded
charges against the defendant, the latter suffered mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and moral shock". (Defendant's
Answer with Counterclaim, pp. 1-2, Annex B to Second Motion to
Quash.)
18
Then followed plaintiff's Reply and Answer to the Counterclaim, filed
through counsel Venancio H. Aquino, containing among others, the
allegations subject matter of the present criminal action. For
convenience, said allegations are hereunder again quoted:
To this, our applicable Reply are the very words of our
Honorable Supreme Court to a party for shamelessly making
untrue, libelous statements, to wit: "(This party) appears to
belong to the class of individuals who have no compunction
to resort to falsehood or falsehoods . . . as part of their
systematic campaign of falsehood, and slanders directed
against us, is an imposture that only ignorants, blackhands
and other mental pachyderms (like him) can swallow."
. . . defendant was the impertinent assaulter of plaintiff's
reputation, the malefactor who concocted the preposterous
and malicious insinuations against the plaintiff, so that,
defendant has no feelings, if at all, to be wounded;
From the pleadings thus filed in Civil Case No. N-151, the subject of
inquiry readily discernible is whether the defendant acted out of sheer
malice with intent to cast dishonor upon the plaintiff; or in good faith,
pursuing a sense of social or moral duty. Since the plaintiff asserted
the first proposition, the allegations in his Reply and Answer to
Counterclaim to the effect that defendant's posture of innocence was a
shameless pretense — strongly or offensively worded though it may be
— are pertinent and related to the subject of inquiry. Thus, in quoting
from the opinion of Justice Perfecto in the Sotto Case,2 said pleading
may indeed have thereby called the defendant "an imposture that only
ignorants, blackhands and other mental pachyderms (like him) can
swallow." Yet this was responsive to defendant's allegations to the
contrary, and pertained to the subject of inquiry. The same is true with
the assertion that defendant "was the impertinent assaulter of plaintiff's
reputation, the malefactor who concocted the preposterous and
malicious insinuations against the plaintiff, so that, defendant has no
feelings, if at all, to be wounded."
Appellant's brief would however dissect the quotation
and separately analyze such terms as "blackhands" and
"pachyderms". It is argued that these are words having no bearing to
the cause; that "black hand"' according to Webster's New International
Dictionary means "a lawless secret society practising terrorism,
extortion or other crimes" and "pachyderm" means "thick-skinned"; and
that appellant cannot conceive of any situation whereby during the trial
of the civil case the defendant might be proved to be a "pachyderm" or
a "blackhand" or even an "imposture" or "ignorant" as these terms are
used in the expressions in question.
First of all, in this regard it is the rule that what is relevant or pertinent
should be liberally considered to favor the writer, and the words are not
to be scrutinized with microscopic intensity.3 Secondly, there is no such
word as "blackhand"; Webter's New International
Dictionary gives "Black Hand" meaning, what the Solicitor General
gave to "blackhand," that is, a lawless secret society whose members
engage in extortion, terrorism, and other crimes. A person belonging to
or associated with said society is not called "blackhand" — as stated,
there is no such term — but "blackhander" (See, Webster, New
International Dictionary, 2nd. Ed., p. 280; Eric Partridge, A Dictionary
of the Underworld, [1950] p. 44.)
"Now, We discussed this here because there was an obvious clerical
error in the pleading in quoting from Justice Perfecto, who used not
"blackhand" but "blockhead" in the portion quoted. Since there is no
such word as "blackhand" (referring to an individual), and since
reference to the quotation from Justice Perfecto is made, the term used
must be deemed, for our purposes, "blockhead". And "blockhead"
means a person deficient in understanding" (Webster, Ibid., 290).
As to the word "pachyderm," the same was qualified by the word
"mental" so that it does not refer to thickness of the physical skin. As
appellee's brief points out, "mental pachyderm" refers to a "distorted
mind, a mind that is insensible, unfeeling, senseless, hardened,
callous (Thesaurus of Words and Phrases, par. 376, p. 121, copyright
1947)."4
It will thus be seen that whether or not the defendant is so deficient in
knowledge ("ignorant") and understanding ("blockhead") and
possessed of an insensible, unfeeling and hardened mind, as to
indulge in a pretense of the kind that he is alleged to have made in his
Answer with Counterclaim, is a question that reasonably pertains to the
subject of inquiry in the civil case, namely, whether his claim of good
faith in mentioning things defamatory to plaintiff is an imposture or a
truth.
As such, the allegations complained of herein cannot give rise to
criminal or civil liability against the advocate who made them. As this
Court observed in Sison v. David, L-11268, January 28, 1961:
. . . The privilege is not intended so much for the protection
of those engaged in the public service and in the enactment
and administration of law, as for the promotion of the public
welfare, the purpose being that members of the legislature,
judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak
their minds freely and exercise their respective functions
without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an
action for the recovery of damages. (33 Am. Jur. 123-124.)
Stated otherwise, the privilege is granted in aid and for the advantage
of the administration of justice. Since it appears from the information
that the allegations complained of herein are contained in an
appropriate pleading, and since they pass the test of relevancy, it was
no error for the court a quo to sustain the privilege and to quash the
information upon defendant's motion (People v. Andres L-14458, April
29, 1960).
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from quashing the information in
this case is hereby affirmed, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and
Castro, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., reserves his vote.
Barrera, J., is on leave.
G.R. No. 91391             January 24, 1991
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, in his capacity as Solicitor
General, petitioner
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, respondents.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano Reyes & Manalastas for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The petitioner challenges the resolutions dated June 8, 1989 and
November 2, 1989 of the Sandiganbayan issued in Civil Case No.
0033 which granted the motion of private respondent Juan Ponce
Enrile, one of the defendants in the civil case, to implead the petitioner
as additional party defendant in Enrile's counterclaim in the same civil
case and denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
On July 31, 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, through the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) with the
assistance of Solicitor General Francisco Chavez filed with the
respondent Sandiganbayan a complaint docketed as Civil Case No.
0033 against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Juan Ponce Enrile, among
others, for reconveyance, reversion and accounting, restitution and
damages.
After the denial of his motion to dismiss, respondent Enrile filed his
answer with compulsory counterclaim and cross-claim with damages.
The Republic filed its reply to the answer and motion to dismiss the
counterclaim. The motion was opposed by respondent Enrile.
On January 30, 1989, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a resolution,
to wit:
The resolution of the Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim
against the Plaintiff government is deferred until after trial,
the grounds relied upon not appearing to be indubitable.
On the matter of the additional parties (Solicitor General
Chavez, Ex-PCGG Chairman Diaz, former Commissioners
Doromal, Rodrigo, Romero and Bautista), the propriety of
impleading them either under Sec. 14, Rule 6 or even under
Sec. 12 as third-party defendant requires leave of Court to
determine the propriety thereof. No such leave has been
sought. Consideration thereof cannot be entertained at this
19
time nor may therefore, the Motion to Dismiss the same be
considered. (Rollo, p. 329; Annex "H", Petition)
Respondent Enrile then requested leave from the Sandiganbayan to
implead the petitioner and the PCGG officials as party defendants for
lodging this alleged "harassment suit" against him.
The motion was granted in a resolution dated June 8, 1989, to wit:
In respect to defendant Juan Ponce Enrile's Manifestation
and Motion dated February 23, 1989, praying for leave to
implead additional parties to his counterclaim, the Court,
finding reason in the aforesaid Manifestation and Motion,
grants leave to implead the defendants named in the
counterclaim and admits defendant Juan Ponce Enrile's
answer with counterclaim.
This is without prejudice to the defenses which said
defendants may put forth individually or in common, in their
personal capacities or otherwise. (Rollo, p. 27)
In a later resolution dated November 2, 1989, respondent
Sandiganbayan denied a motion to reconsider the June 8, 1989
resolution. The dispositive portion of the resolution states:
WHEREFORE, the Motions for Reconsideration of the
Solicitor General and former PCGG officials Ramon Diaz,
Quintin Doromal, Orlando Romero, Ramon Rodrigo and
Mary Concepcion Bautista are denied, but, considering these
motions as in the nature of motions to dismiss
counterclaim/answers, resolution of these motions is held in
abeyance pending trial on the merits. (Rollo, p. 31)
Thereafter, all the PCGG officials filed their answer to the
counterclaims invoking their immunity from suits as provided in Section
4 of Executive Order No. 1. Instead of filing an answer, the petitioner
comes to this Court assailing the resolutions as rendered with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The lone issue in this petition is the propriety of impleading the
petitioner as additional party defendant in the counterclaim filed by
respondent Enrile in Civil Case No. 0033.
It may be noted that the private respondent did not limit himself to
general averments of malice, recklessness, and bad faith but filed
specific charges that then PCGG Chairman Jovito Salonga had already
cleared the respondent and yet, knowing the allegations to be false,
the petitioner still filed the complaint. This can be gleaned from
excerpts found in respondent Enrile's Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim and Cross-Claim:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Defendant-in-counterclaim Francisco Chavez was the
Solicitor General who assisted the PCGG in filing and
maintaining the instant Complaint against Defendant. As the
incumbent Solicitor General, he continues to assist the
PCGG in prosecuting this case.
He is sued in his personal and official capacities.
On or about October 1986, the PCGG, speaking through the
then Chairman, now Senate President, Hon. Jovito R.
Salonga, found and declared that "not one of the documents
left by then President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos
including the 2,300-page evidence turned over to the PCGG
by the US State Department implicates Enrile." Chairman
Salonga stressed that in view of the PCGG's findings, he
refused to yield to the "pressure" exerted on him to
prosecute Defendant.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Notwithstanding the findings of the PCGG that there was
absolutely no evidence linking Defendant to the illegal
activities of former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos,
the PCGG, this time composed of Chairman Ramon Diaz,
the Commissioners Quintin Doromal, Ramon Rodrigo,
Orlando Romero and Mary Concepcion Bautista, filed the
 Complaint against Defendant, among others, on or about 22
July 1987.
Defendant has reasons to believe, and so alleges that
Chairman Diaz, and Commissioners Doromal, Rodrigo,
Romero and Bautista ordered, authorized, allowed or
tolerated the filing of the utterly baseless complaint against
Defendant.
Solicitor General Francisco Chavez assisted or cooperated
in, or induced or instigated, the filing of this harassment suit
against Defendant.
In so ordering, authorizing, allowing and tolerating the
institution of the action against Defendant, all the
aforenamed officers, with malice and in evident bad faith,
and with grave abuse of power and in excess of their duty
and authority, unjustly and unlawfully obstructed, defeated,
violated, impeded or impaired the constitutional rights and
liberties of Defendant . . . . (Rollo, pp. 260-262)
On the other hand, the petitioner submits that no counter-claim can be
filed against him in his capacity as Solicitor General since he is only
acting as counsel for the Republic. He cites the case of Borja v. Borja,
101 Phil. 911 [1957] wherein we ruled:
. . . The appearance of a lawyer as counsel for a party and
his participation in a case as such counsel does not make
him a party to the action. The fact that he represents the
interests of his client or that he acts in their behalf will not
hold him liable for or make him entitled to any award that the
Court may adjudicate to the parties, other than his
professional fees. The principle that a counterclaim cannot
be filed against persons who are acting in representation of
another — such as trustees — in their individual capacities
(Chambers v. Cameron, 2 Fed. Rules Service, p. 155; 29 F.
Supp. 742) could be applied with more force and effect in the
case of a counsel whose participation in the action is merely
confined to the preparation of the defense of his client.
Appellant, however, asserted that he filed the counterclaim
against said lawyer not in his individual capacity but as
counsel for the heirs of Quintin de Borja. But as we have
already stated that the existence of a lawyer-client
relationship does not make the former a party to the action,
even this allegation of appellant will not alter the result We
have arrived at (at pp. 924-925)
Thus, the petitioner argues that since he is simply the lawyer in the
case, exercising his duty under the law to assist the Government in the
filing and prosecution of all cases pursuant to Section 1, Executive
Order No. 14, he cannot be sued in a counterclaim in the same case.
Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena correctly observed that there is
no general immunity arising solely from occupying a public office.
The general rule is that public officials can be held personally
accountable for acts claimed to have been performed in connection
with official duties where they have acted ultra vires or where there is a
showing of bad faith. We ruled in one case:
A number of cases decided by the Court where the municipal
mayor alone was held liable for back salaries of, or damages
to dismissed municipal employees, to the exclusion of the
municipality, are not applicable in this instance. In Salcedo v.
Court of Appeals (81 SCRA 408 [1978]) for instance, the
municipal mayor was held liable for the back salaries of the
Chief of Police he had dismissed, not only because the
dismissal was arbitrary but also because the mayor refused
to reinstate him in defiance of an order of the Commissioner
of Civil Service to reinstate.
In Nemenzo v. Sabillano (25 SCRA 1 [1968]), the municipal
mayor was held personally liable for dismissing a police
corporal who possessed the necessary civil service eligibility,
the dismissal being done without justifiable cause and
without any administrative investigation.
In Rama v. Court of Appeals (G.R. Nos. L-44484, L-44842,
L-44591, L-44894, March 16 1987), the governor, vice-
governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
provincial auditor, provincial treasurer and provincial
engineer were ordered to pay jointly and severally in their
20
individual and personal capacity damages to some 200
employees of the province of Cebu who were eased out from
their positions because of their party affiliations. (Laganapan
v. Asedillo, 154 SCRA 377 [1987])
Moreover, the petitioner's argument that the immunity proviso under
Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 also extends to him is not well-
taken. A mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso
facto result in the charges being automatically dropped.
In the case of Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Peña (159 SCRA 556 [1988]) then Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee,
added a clarification of the immunity accorded PCGG officials under
Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 1 as follows:
With respect to the qualifications expressed by Mr. Justice
Feliciano in his separate opinion, I just wish to point out two
things: First, the main opinion does not claim absolute
immunity for the members of the Commission. The cited
section of Executive Order No. 1 provides the Commission's
members immunity from suit thus: "No civil action shall lie
against the Commission or any member thereof for anything
done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by
this order." No absolute immunity like that sought by Mr.
Marcos in his Constitution for himself and his subordinates is
herein involved. It is understood that the immunity granted
the members of the Commission by virtue of the
unimaginable magnitude of its task to recover the plundered
wealth and the State's exercise of police power was
immunity from liability for damages in the official discharge of
the task granted the members of the Commission much in
the same manner that judges are immune from suit in the
official discharge of the functions of their office . . . " (at pp.
581-582)
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano stated in the same case:
It may be further submitted, with equal respect, that Section
4 (a) of Executive Order No. 1 was intended merely to
restate the general principle of the law of public officers that
the PCGG or any member thereof may not be held civilly
liable for acts done in the performance of official
duty, provided that such member had acted in good faith and
within the scene of his lawful authority. It may also be
assumed that the Sandiganbayan would have jurisdiction to
determine whether the PCGG or any particular official
thereof may be held liable in damages to a private person
injured by acts of such manner. It would seem
constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff
member of the PCGG could not be required to testify before
the Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted
from complying with orders of this Court. (at pp. 586- 587)
Immunity from suit cannot institutionalize irresponsibility and non-
accountability nor grant a privileged status not claimed by any other
official of the Republic. (id., at page 586)
Where the petitioner exceeds his authority as Solicitor General acts in
bad faith, or, as contended by the private respondent, "maliciously
conspir(es) with the PCGG commissioners in persecuting respondent
Enrile by filing against him an evidently baseless suit in derogation of
the latter's constitutional rights and liberties" (Rollo, p. 417), there can
be no question that a complaint for damages may be filed against him.
High position in government does not confer a license to persecute or
recklessly injure another. The actions governed by Articles 19, 20, 21,
and 32 of the Civil Code on Human Relations may be taken against
public officers or private citizens alike. The issue is not the right of
respondent Enrile to file an action for damages. He has the right. The
issue is whether or not that action must be filed as a compulsory
counterclaim in the case filed against him.
Under the circumstances of this case, we rule that the charges pressed
by respondent Enrile for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
arising from the filing of an alleged harassment suit with malice and
evident bad faith do not constitute a compulsory counterclaim. To
vindicate his rights, Senator Enrile has to file a separate and distinct
civil action for damages against the Solicitor General.
In the case of Tiu Po v. Bautista, (103 SCRA 388 [1981]), we ruled that
damages claimed to have been suffered as a consequence of an
action filed against the petitioner must be pleaded in the same action
as a compulsory counterclaim. We were referring, however, to a case
filed by the private respondent against the petitioners or parties in the
litigation. In the present case, the counterclaim was filed against the
lawyer, not against the party plaintiff itself.
To allow a counterclaim against a lawyer who files a complaint for his
clients, who is merely their representative in court and not a plaintiff or
complainant in the case would lead to mischievous consequences.
A lawyer owes his client entire devotion to his genuine interest, warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of
his utmost learning and ability. (See Agpalo, Legal Ethics [1980] p.
147 citing Javier v. Cornejo, 63 Phil. 293 [1936]; In re Tionko, 43 Phil.
191 [1922]; In re: Atty. C. T. Oliva, 103 Phil. 312 [1958]; Lualhati v.
Albert, 57 Phil. 86 [1932]; Toguib v. Tomol, Jr., G.R. Adm. Case No.
554, Jan. 3, 1969; People v. Macellones, 49 SCRA 529 [1973]; Tan Kui
v. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA 199 [1973]). A lawyer cannot properly
attend to his duties towards his client if, in the same case, he is kept
busy defending himself.
The problem is particularly perplexing for the Solicitor
General.1âwphi1 As counsel of the Republic, the Solicitor General has
to appear in controversial and politically charged cases. It is not
unusual for high officials of the Government to unwittingly use
shortcuts in the zealous desire to expedite executive programs or
reforms. The Solicitor General cannot look at these cases with
indifferent neutrality. His perception of national interest and obedience
to instructions from above may compel him to take a stance which to a
respondent may appear too personal and biased. It is likewise
unreasonable to require Government Prosecutors to defend
themselves against counterclaims in the very same cases they are
prosecuting.
As earlier stated, we do not suggest that a lawyer enjoys a special
immunity from damage suits. However, when he acts in the name of a
client, he should not be sued on a counterclaim in the very same case
he has filed only as counsel and not as a party. Any claim for alleged
damages or other causes of action should be filed in an entirely
separate and distinct civil action.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The questioned
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan are SET ASIDE insofar as they allow
the counterclaim filed against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 1037 December 14, 1998
VICTORIANO P. RESURRECCION, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. CIRIACO C. SAYSON, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to
state the obvious, but such statement can never be overemphasized.
Considering that, "of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most
sacredly bound to uphold the law, 1 it is imperative that they live by the
law. Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful
conduct have no place in the legal profession.
In a Complaint-Affidavit, Victoriano P. Resurreccion charged
Respondent Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson with acts constituting "malpractice,
deceit and gross misconduct in his office and a violation of his duties
and oath as a lawyer." The Complaint arose from a homicide through
reckless imprudence case, in which Complaint Resurreccion was the
defendant and Respondent Sayson was the counsel for the offended
party, Mr. Armando Basto Sr. The complaint alleged that, pursuant to
the amicable settlement previously reached by the parties, he gave
P2,500 to the respondent who, however, never gave the money to his
client. Thus, the complainant was compelled to give another P2,500 to
Mr. Basto as settlement of the case. The complainant then demanded
the return of the money from respondent, to no avail. Thus, the
Complaint for Disbarment.
21
The records show that the Office of the Solicitor Genaral (OSG)
conducted several hearings on the matter, during which the
complainant was represented by Atty. Ronaldo Lopez. Although
respondent had been notified, he failed to attend a number of such
hearings. He eventually appeared through his new counsel, Atty.
Wenceslao Fajardo. Because respondent once again failed to attend
the next hearing, the OSG, in its September 4, 1973 Order,2 deemed
the investigation of the case terminated. But upon the motion of the
respondent, the OSG on October 31, 1973, set aside its earlier Order
and once again set the case for a hearing of the former's evidence.
Since, then, however, it appears that the OSG has not been able to
submit its report and recommendation on the case.
In 1990, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) took cognizance of
the case,3 and tasked Commissioner Jesulito A. Manalo with the
investigation, of which both the complainant and the respondent were
duly notified. Complainant Resurreccion manifested his assent to the
pursuit of the matter, but Respondent Sayson could not be found.4 In
his Report, Commissioner Manalo presented the following facts.
Respondent, a member of the Philippine Bar was
accused of having converted and appropriated
[for] his own personal benefit the amount
P2,500.00 representing the amount which was
delivered by the complainant to the respondent as
compensation or settlement money of a case for
homicide thru reckless imprudence.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Complainat alleged that on 13 May 1970, he was
involved in a vehicular accident which occured at
Epifanio delos Santos Avenue, Quezon City which
involved a boy [named] the name of Armando
Basto resulting [in] the death of the latter. By
reason of the said incident, complainant was
accused of homicide thru reckless imprudence
before the City Fiscal's Office at Quezon City. In
the preliminary investigation, the father of the
victim Mr. Armando Basto Sr., was represented by
Atty. Ramon Umali. The case for homicide thru
reckless imprudence was amicably settled on 8
August 1970 and respondent received from the
complainant the amount of P2,500.00.
Respondent allegedlly assured complainant that
the sum [would] be delivered to his client Mr.
Armando Basto, Sr. Respondent acknowledged in
writing having received the amount of P2,500.00.
Contrary however, to the assurances of the
respondent, he had not delivered the said amount
of P2,500.00 and the case was not dismissed for
which reason complainant was compelled to pay
anew the heirs of the victim the amount P2,500.00.
Demands were made for the respondent to return
the said amount of P2,500.00 but the latter failed.
By reason thereof, complaint filed a complaint for
estafa against the respondent before the City
Court of Quezon City which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. III-149358 entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Ciriaco C. Sayson".
In the hearing held on 22 May 1973, complainant
Victoriano P. Resurrection appeared assisted by
his counsel. There was however, no appearance
for the respondent Ciriaco C. Sayson. The
investigator declared his failure to appear as a
waiver of his presence and Mr. Armando Basto Sr.
was presented as witness. He testified that he
[was] the father of Armando Basto Jr. who was ran
over by a motor vehicle then driven by the
respondent. By reason of such death a case was
filed in court and he was represented by Atty.
Ciriaco Sayson, respondent in this case. A
settlement arrangement was arrived at and
complainant entrusted the amount of P2,500.00 to
the respondent for the latter to turn over the same
to his client. Atty. Ciriaco Sayson, however, failed
to turn over the said amount of P2,500.00 to his
client for which reason the case was not
immediately dismissed. To effect dismissal of the
case, complainant was forced to pay anew the
sum of P2,500.00
 Complainant was next presented as witness and
the testified that on 30 May 1970, he was involved
in a vehicular accident which resulted in the death
of one armando Basto, Jr. By reason thereof, he
was accused of homicide thru reckless
imprudence [,] and to effect settlement of that case
he agreed to pay the amount of P2,500.00.
stricken from the Roll of Attorneys for having been
found guilty of Estafa promulgated by the City
Court of Quezon City and [which] complainant was
able to establish by more convincing evidences
that misappropriation was in fact committed by the
respondent, all of which were not controverted by
the respondent.7

On 8 August 1970, complainant together with his The Court agrees with Commissioner Manalo's findings and
counsel conferred with [the] respondent in the conclusion, as approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
latter's office at may Building, Rizal Avenue, Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson must be disbarred.
Manila and in a conference, a settlement was
arrived at whereby complainant [would] pay the
Respondent Sayson was convicted of estafa by the Regional Trial
amount of P2,500.00. This was done and payment
Court of Quezon City on September 20, 1973.8 Such conviction was
was delivered to the respondent who
affirmed by the Court of Appeals9 and upheld by this Court. 10
acknowledged having received the said amount.

In In re Vinzon,11 the Court disbarred a lawyer who had been convicted

Subsequently, complaint learned that the said
of estafa and held that "moral turpitude includes everything which is
amount of P2,500,00 was not delivered by
done contrary to justice, honesty or good morals. In essence and in all
respondent to Mr. Armando Basto, Sr., the father
respects, estafa, no doubt, is a crime involving moral turpitude because
of the victim for which reason he was compelled to
the act is unquestionably against justice, honesty and good morals.
pay another amount of P2,500.00 to the heirs of
the victim.
In a more recent case,12 the Court upheld the recommendation of the
IBP Board of Governors to disbar a lawyer who had been convicted of
Thereafter, he demanded [the] return of the said
estafa through falsification of public documents, because the was
amount of P2,500.00 from the respondent. Despite
"totally unfit to be a member of the legal profession." In adopting, the
visiting the latter fifteen or sixteen times, Atty.
recommendation, we held that "good moral character is not only a
Ciriaco C. Sayson still failed to return the money.
condition precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must
Thus, complainant filed a complaint for estafa
also remain extant in order to maintain one's good standing in that
which was elevated in Court and docketed as
exclusive and honored fraternity.
Criminal Case No. 49358.

A Decision finding respondent guilty of [the] crime
of estafa was promulgated by the City Court of
Quezon City.5
Commissioner Manalo then rendered his evaluation and
recommendation in this wise:
Complainant was able to establish by more than
convincing that the misappropriation was in fact
committed by the respondent. This fact [is]
eloquently poroven by Exhibits "A" to "E", all of
which were not controverted by the respondent.
x x x           x x x          x x x
In view of the foregoing, undersigned
Commissioner respectfully recommends that the
above-entitled case be endorsed by the Honorable
Board Governors to the Supreme Court with the
recommendation that the complain[ant be]
disbarred and his name be stricken off . . . the roll
of attorneys.
x x x           x x x          x x x6
True, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of
the bar.13 Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser
penalty, such as temporary suspension, would accomplish the end
desired.14 However, in the present case, the Court notes that even if
respondent's culpability for estafa has been indubitably established,
there is no indication that he has served sentence, returned to
complainant what was due him or showed any remorse for what he did.
The 27-year delay in the resolution of this case was, to a large extent,
caused by his failure to appear before the Office of the Solicitor
General and to inform the IBP of his change of address, a failure that
also indicated his lack of regard for the very serious charges brought
against him. Respondent Sayson, by his conduct, has shown that he is
not worthy to remain a member of the bar.
Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed
only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically
and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law
and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves,
especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with
honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.
WHEREFORE, Respondent Ciriaco C. Sayson is hereby DISBARRED.
The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of
Attorneys.

On February 28, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors issued a SO ORDERED.

Resolution adopting and approving the report and recommendation of
Commissioner Manalo. The Resolution, signed by IBP National
Davide, Jr. C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Secretary Roland B. Inting and forwarded to this Court on March 28,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima and Pardo,
1998, is worded as follows:
JJ., concur.

RESOLUTION NO. XIII-97-202

Adm. Case No. 1037

Victoriano P. Resurreccion vs.

Atty. Ciriaco C. sayson

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is

hereby ADOPTED AND APPROVED, the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex
"A" and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, respondent Atty. Ciriaco
C. Sayson is DISBARRED and . . . his name . . .
22