HEIRS OF SANTIAGO NISPEROS v. NISPEROS-DUCUSIN such failure does not prevent the SC from addressing the issue.
vent the SC from addressing the issue. Especially when the
(TOLENTINO)
July 31, 2013 | Villarama, Jr., J. | Jurisdiction (Rule 1)
Flow of the case: MARO - DARAB Regional Adjudicator - DARAB - CA - SC
PETITIONER: Heirs of Santiago Nisperos, et al., represented by Teoderico
Nisperos
RESPONDENTS: Marissa Nisperos-Ducusin
SUMMARY: Heirs of Nisperos inherited a 58, 000 square meter agricultural land in
San Fernando, La Union from their predecessor Santiago Nisperos. The property was
being managed by two of the heirs: Maria and Cipriana. During this time, Maria took
in Marissa and raised the latter as her own child.
Maria and Cipriana executed a Deed of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLT) in favor of
Marissa as farmer-beneficiary. The VLT covered 15, 000 square meters of the
original 58, 000 square meter property and another 46, 000 property.
The Heirs filed a complaint with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO).
They allege that the VLT was procured by Marissa through fraud. The parties failed
to settle the dispute amicably, so the MARO issued a Certificate to File Action.
The Heirs filed with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) a complaint for the annulment of the VLT. The DARAB Regional
Adjudicator annulled the VLT because its issuance was not in accordance with
agrarian laws. She could not be considered a tenant because she was more of an heir
of one of the transferors.
Marissa contested this decision before the DARAB. The DARAB reversed the
Regional Adjudicator’s decision because it did not find any presence of fraud in the
acquisition of Marissa’s title.
The heirs then elevated the case to the CA. The CA upheld the DARAB’s decision. It
said that the Regional Adjudicator acted with grave abuse of discretion because
issues involving the qualification and disqualification of agrarian reform
beneficiaries are issues not cognizable by the Regional Adjudicator and the DARAB
but by the DAR Secretary.
The SC upheld the CA’s decision. It said that an agrarian dispute must exist for the
DARAB to have jurisdiction. Sec. 3 of the CARP defines an agrarian dispute is “any
controversy relating to tenurial agreements.” Hence, there must be a tenancy
relationship between the parties for the DARAB to have jurisdiction. In this case it is
apparent that there was no such relationship. The complaint of the heirs did not
mention that Marissa was a tenant. They call her a “ward” instead.
And despite the fact that the Heirs did not challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB,
DARAB’s lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint or petition.
Moreover, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not allow the SC to have
jurisdiction over a case initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process,
which has yet to run its regular course. The DAR must be given a chance to correct
its administrative and procedural lapses in the issuance of the CLOA.
DOCTRINE: Failure to challenge jurisdiction does not prevent the court from
addressing the issue. Especially when lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of
the complaint/ petition.
Also, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not allow the Court to have
jurisdiction over a case initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.
FACTS:
1. This case involves a 15, 837 square meter property (subject property) in
Pao Sur, San Fernando City, La Union. It was originally part of a 58, 350
square meter parcel of agricultural land owned by Santiago Nisperos, the
predecessor of the petitioners.
2. When Santiago and his wife Estefania died, they were survived by their 9
children (the petitioners): Tranquilino, Felix, Oling, Maria, Lenardo, Millan,
Fausto, Candido, and Cirpriana.
3. These children claim that they all occupied, controlled, and tilled the subject
property. They paid taxes for it and even hired farm workers under Maria
and Cipriana’s supervision.
4. During the time Maria and Cirpriana were overseeing the property, Maria
took in respondent Marissa Nisperos-Ducusin, a daughter of their cousin
Purita, as her ward and raised her like her own child.
5. On February 12, 1988, Maria and Cipriana, acting as representatives of their
other siblings, executed a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa in favor of
petitioners over the 58, 350 square meter property and another 46, 000
square meter property.
6. But on April 28, 1992, a Deed of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLT) over
the subject property was executed between Maria and Cipriana as
landowners and Marissa (who was only 17 years old at the time) as
farmer-beneficiary.
7. On June 24, 1992, a Certificate of Land Ownership (CLOA) was issued in
favor of Marissa. By virtue of that CLOA, an OCT was issued in her favor a
month later on July 24, 1992.
8. Heirs of Nisperos, after allegedly discovering fraud on the part of Marissa
only on August 2001, filed a complaint with the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Office (MARO) of San Fernando City, La Union. Since no
 amicable settlement was reached between the Heirs and Marissa, the
MARO issued a Certificate to File Action.
9. On January 23, 2002, the Heirs filed with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) a complaint for annulment of
documents and damages against Marissa. The Heirs allege that:
1. The transfer of ownership over the subject land to Marissa was
made without their consent.
2. Marissa took advantage of Maria’s senility to make it appear that
Maria and Cipriana gave her the property.
3. The document was falsified by Marissa because Maria could no
longer sign and could only affix her thumb print, as she did in the
1988 Deed of Donation. To support this, they attached a Joint
Affidavit of Denial by Anita and Lucia Gascon, the supposed
instrumental witnesses of the VLT.
4. Marissa committed fraud because she was not a bona fide
beneficiary. She was still a minor when the VLT was executed,
meaning: (a) she was not engaged in farming; and (b) she could not
validly enter into a contract with Maria and Cipriana.
10. The DARAB Regional Adjudicator rendered a Decision annulling the
VLT and OCT/CLOA in Marissa’s name. They said that the issuance of the
title in Marissa’s name was not in accordance with agrarian laws because
she cannot be considered a tenant but more of an heir of the transferors.
11. Marissa contested the Regional Adjudicators decision before the DARAB.
She alleged that the Regional Adjudicator committed grave abuse of
discretion. She contends that the complaint should not have been given
due course because other parties in interest such as Maria, the Register
of Deeds of La Union and duly authorized representatives of the DAR
were not impleaded and prescription had already set insofar as the
contestability of the CLOA is concerned.
12. DARAB reversed the Regional Adjudicator’s decision and upheld the
validity of the VLT and Marissa’s title. It dismissed the Heirs’s claim of
fraud because the VLT was executed in the presence of DAR-MARO
Susimo Asuncion, signed by 3 instrumental witnesses, and notarized. The
records were also bereft of any indication of fraud.
13. The Heirs elevated the case to the CA through a petition for review. They
raised the following issues:
1. Whether the subject property is covered by the CARP
2. Whether the VLT is valid having been issued through
misrepresentation and fraud
3. Whether the action for annulment had already prescribed
14. The CA dismissed the petition for review and upheld the DARAB decision.
It ruled that the Regional Adjudicator acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it held that the subject property was not covered by agrarian laws
because of the retention rights of the Heirs. Retention rights, exclusion of
a property from CARP coverage and the qualification and
disqualification of agrarian reform beneficiaries are issues not
cognizable by the Regional Adjudicator and the DARAB but by the
DAR Secretary.
15. Hence, this petition by the Heirs with the SC.
ISSUE/s:
1. WoN the DARAB has jurisdiction to tule that the subject land was no
longer covered by agrarian laws – NO.
RULING: SC sets aside the CA’s decision. The case is referred to the Office of the
DAR Secretary for appropriate action.
RATIO:
1. The complaint should have been lodged with the Office of the DAR
Secretary, NOT the DARAB.
2. According to Sec. 1, Rule II of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, the
DARAB has “primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and
appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the
implementation of the CARP… Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include
but not be limited to cases involving… the issuance, correction, and
cancellation of CLOAs and Emancipation patents (EPs) which are
registered with the Land Registration Authority.”
3. But it is not enough that the controversy involves the cancellation of a
CLOA for the DARAB to have jurisdiction. What is of primordial
consideration is the existence of an agrarian issue between the parties.
4. Sec. 3 of CARP defines an agrarian dispute as “any controversy relating to
tenurial arrangements.” In other words there must be a tenancy
relationship between the parties for the DARAB to have jurisdiction
over the case.
5. It is essential to establish all of the following indispensable elements: (1)
that the parties are landowner and the tenant of the agricultural lessee; (2)
that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that
there is consent between the parties to production; (4) that the purpose of
the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5) that there is
personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6)
that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.
6. The Heirs, as supposed owners of the subject property, did not allege in
their complaint that a tenancy relationship exists between them and
Marissa. In fact, the Heirs described Marissa as a “ward” of one of the co-
owners.
7. And despite the fact that the Heirs failed to challenge the jurisdiction of
the DARAB, such failure does not prevent the SC from addressing the
issue. Especially when the DARAB’s lack of jurisdiction is apparent on
the face of the complaint or petition.
8. Considering that the allegations in the complaint negate the existence of an
agrarian dispute among the parties, DARAB is bereft of jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the case.
9. What the DARAB should have done is refer the complaint to the proper
office, as mandated by Sec. 4 of DAR Administrative Order No. 6 Series of
2000.
10. The fact that DARAB has no jurisdiction over the case prevents the SC
from resolving the petition on its merits. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not allow the court to arrogate unto itself authority to
resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged
with an administrative body of special competence. To assume the
power is to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to
run its regular course. The DAR must be given a chance to correct its
administrative and procedural lapses in the issuance of the CLOA.