MERCANTILE LAW

TAGS: REHABILITATION PROCEEDINGS

ADVENT CAPITAL AND

FINANCE CORPORATION,

vs

NICASIO I. ALCANTARA and

EDITHA I. ALCANTARA

G.R. No. 183050, January 25, 2012

This case is about the validity of a rehabilitation court’s order that compelled a third party, in possession
of money allegedly belonging to the debtor of a company under rehabilitation, to deliver such money to
its

court-appointed receiver over the debtor’s objection.

the Issue Presented

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the cash dividends held by Belson and claimed by both the
Alcantaras and Advent Capital constitute corporate assets of the latter that the rehabilitation court may,
upon motion, require to be conveyed to the rehabilitation receiver for his disposition.

Advent Capital must file a separate action for collection to recover the trust fees that it allegedly earned
and, with the trial court’s authorization if warranted, put the money in escrow for payment to whoever
it rightly belongs. Having failed to collect the trust fees at the end of each calendar quarter as stated in
the contract, all it had against the Alcantaras was a claim for payment which is a proper subject for an
ordinary action for collection. It cannot enforce its money claim by simply filing a motion in the
rehabilitation case for delivery of money belonging to the Alcantaras but in the possession of a third
party.

Rehabilitation proceedings are summary and non-adversarial in nature, and do not contemplate
adjudication of claims that must be threshed out in ordinary court proceedings. Adversarial proceedings
similar to that in ordinary courts are inconsistent with the commercial nature of a rehabilitation case.
The latter must be resolved quickly and expeditiously for the sake of the corporate debtor, its creditors
and other interested parties. Thus, the Interim Rules “incorporate the concept of prohibited pleadings,
affidavit evidence in lieu of oral testimony, clarificatory hearings instead of the traditional approach of
receiving evidence, and the grant of authority to the court to decide the case, or any incident, on the
basis of affidavits and documentary evidence.”

REMEDIAL LAW

TAGS: FINAL VS INTERLOCUTORY ORDER

PRISCILLA ALMA JOSE,

Petitioner

RAMON C. JAVELLANA,

ET AL.,

G.R. No. 158239.

January 25, 2012

The denial of a motion for reconsideration of an order granting the defending party’s motion to dismiss
is not an interlocutory but a final order because it puts an end to the particular matter involved, or
settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, as to leave nothing for the trial court to do other than
to execute the order. Accordingly, the claiming party has a fresh period of 15 days from notice of the
denial within which to appeal the denial.

First of all, the denial of Javellana’s motion for reconsideration left nothing more to be done by the RTC
because it confirmed the dismissal of Civil Case No. 79-M-97. It was clearly a final order, not an
interlocutory one. The Court has distinguished between final and interlocutory orders in Pahila-Garrido
v. Tortogo, thuswise:

The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the
subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be
done except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely
dispose of the case but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with
preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test
to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is

interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with
respect to the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

And, secondly, whether an order is final or interlocutory determines whether appeal is the correct
remedy or not. A final order is appealable, to accord with the final judgment rule enunciated in Section
1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the effect that “appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order
that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to
be appealable;”[23] but the remedy from an interlocutory one is not an appeal but a special civil action
for certiorari. The explanation for the differentiation of remedies given in Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo is
apt:

xxx The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in
a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during
the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily delay the trial on the merits of
the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur unnecessary
expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised
by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory
order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground
for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action
under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.

Doc ID 1132811.1)

CRISANTA ALCARAZ MIGUEL

Petitioner,

versus -

JERRY D. MONTANEZ,

Respondent.

G.R. No. 191336

January 25, 2012

Facts

On February 1, 2001, respondent Jerry Montanez (Montanez) secured a loan of One Hundred Forty-
Three Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-Four Pesos (P143,864.00), payable in one (1) year, or until February
1, 2002, from the petitioner. The respondent gave as collateral therefor his house and lot located at
Block 39 Lot 39 Phase 3, Palmera Spring, Bagumbong, Caloocan City.

Due to the respondent’s failure to pay the loan, the petitioner filed a complaint against the respondent
before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay San Jose, Rodriguez, Rizal. The parties entered into a
Kasunduang Pag-aayos wherein the respondent agreed to pay his loan in installments in the amount of
Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) per month, and in the event the house and lot given as collateral is
sold, the respondent would settle the balance of the loan in full. However, the respondent still failed to
pay, and on December 13, 2004, the Lupong Tagapamayapa issued a certification to file action in court
in favor of the petitioner.

On April 7, 2005, the petitioner filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch
66, a complaint for Collection of Sum of Money. In his Answer with Counterclaim,[3] the respondent
raised the defense of improper venue considering that the petitioner was a resident of Bagumbong,
Caloocan City while he lived in San Mateo, Rizal.

Issues

(1) Whether or not a complaint for sum of money is the proper remedy for the petitioner,
notwithstanding the Kasunduang Pag-aayos;[13] and

(2) Whether or not the CA should have decided the case on the merits

rather than remand the case for the enforcement of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos.[14]

Our Ruling

Because the respondent failed to comply with the terms of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, said agreement
is deemed rescinded pursuant to Article 2041 of the New Civil Code and the petitioner can insist on his
original demand. Perforce, the complaint for collection of sum of money is the proper remedy.

As so well stated in the case of Chavez v. Court of Appeals,[23] a party's non-compliance with the
amicable settlement paved the way for the application of Article 2041 under which the other party may
either enforce the compromise, following the procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, or consider it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. To quote:
In the case at bar, the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides for a two-tiered mode of
enforcement of an amicable settlement, to wit: (a) by execution by the Punong Barangay which is quasi-
judicial and summary in nature on mere motion of the party entitled thereto; and (b) an action in regular
form, which remedy is judicial. However, the mode of enforcement does not rule out the right of
rescission under Art. 2041 of the Civil Code. The availability of the right of rescission is apparent from
the wording of Sec. 417 itself which provides that the amicable settlement "may" be enforced by
execution by the lupon within six (6) months from its date or by action in the appropriate city or
municipal court, if beyond that period. The use of the word "may" clearly makes the procedure provided
in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law directory or merely optional in nature.

Thus, although the "Kasunduan" executed by petitioner and respondent before the Office of the
Barangay Captain had the force and effect of a final judgment of a court, petitioner's non-compliance
paved the way for the application of Art. 2041 under which respondent may either enforce the
compromise, following the procedure laid out in the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or regard
it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand. Respondent chose the latter option when he
instituted Civil Case No. 5139-V-97 for recovery of unrealized profits and reimbursement of advance
rentals, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. Respondent was not limited to claiming
P150,000.00 because although he agreed to the amount in the "Kasunduan," it is axiomatic that a
compromise settlement is not an admission of liability but merely a recognition that there is a dispute
and an impending litigation which the parties hope to prevent by making reciprocal concessions,
adjusting their respective positions in the hope of gaining balanced by the danger of losing. Under the
"Kasunduan," respondent was only required to execute a waiver of all possible claims arising from the
lease contract if petitioner fully complies with his obligations thereunder. It is undisputed that herein
petitioner did not.[24] (emphasis supplied and citations omitted)