Peace Research Institute Frankfurt

Report Part Title: Recognition and Dispute: UN Debates on the R2P

Report Title: Stronger or more controversial than claimed?

Report Subtitle: Ten Years of Diplomatic Controversy About Responsibility to Protect Report Author (s): Gregor P.
Hofmann
Published by: Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (2014) Stable URL:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep14377.6

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Stronger or more controversial than claimed in the dispute? 7

4. Recognition and strife: UN debates on the R2P

In January 2006, Security Council resolution 1653 on Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo first referred to the primary responsibility of

governments in the region to protect their populations. It was more difficult to confirm all components of the R2P contained in the world summit

resolution. A corresponding British draft resolution was already discussed in an open meeting in December 2005 to protect civilians in armed conflicts.

Russia, China and Algeria, however, had refused to accept the concept of “collective responsibility” (Lederer 2006) and, together with Algeria, the

Philippines and Brazil, had argued that the World Summit Document only obliged to further discuss the R2P (Bellamy 2010: 145). After the expiry of

the non-permanent membership of Algeria and Brazil at the end of 2005, Great Britain and its supporters, persuaded China and Russia to convince the

R2P in April 2006 in Resolution 1674 to protect civilians in armed conflicts (Lederer 2006). In the years that followed, the Security Council referred to

the R2P only once in a specific conflict: Resolution 1706 (2006) on the situation in Darfur designated the responsibility of the Sudanese government to

protect its population. It was not until 2009 that the thematic resolution 1894 again referred to the R2P (see also section 5.3). to confirm the R2P in

April 2006 in resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts (Lederer 2006). In the years that followed, the Security Council referred to

the R2P only once in a specific conflict: Resolution 1706 (2006) on the situation in Darfur designated the responsibility of the Sudanese government to

protect its population. It was not until 2009 that the thematic resolution 1894 again referred to the R2P (see also section 5.3). to confirm the R2P in

April 2006 in resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts (Lederer 2006). In the years that followed, the Security Council referred to

the R2P only once in a specific conflict: Resolution 1706 (2006) on the situation in Darfur designated the responsibility of the Sudanese government to

protect its population. It was not until 2009 that the thematic resolution 1894 again referred to the R2P (see also section 5.3).

The years in between were characterized by disputes over the scope of the responsibility to protect and its
applicability to certain cases. The first case after Darfur to be discussed with reference to the R2P was the
conflict over the Kenyan election result of December 27, 2007. Unrest, looting, rape and violent clashes between
the various political camps and security forces quickly took on an ethnic background Dimension because the
government camp and the main opposition faction were carried by different ethnic groups (Jacobs 2011: 5-7).
Around 1,500 people died, hundreds of thousands fled. After several attempts at mediation by African states had
failed, An African Union mediation mission led by Kofi Annan attempted mediation. With international and
German help 7

succeeded in forming a government of national unity and ending the crisis (Jacobs 2011: 7). No direct connection
to R2P was established at the time, but the crisis was later classified by Kofi Annan and supporters of R2P as a
successful application (Annan 2009).

Two disputes that helped clarify the scope of the R2P were initiated by France and Russia in 2008. Despite
the devastation caused by Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, the Myanmar government initially refused to allow
international aid workers to access the affected areas. France demanded in the Security Council that the
international community, in terms of the R2P, be responsible for rushing to the aid of the needy in Myanmar, even
against the will of the

7 Kofi Annan asked the State Secretary at the Federal Foreign Office, Gernot Erler, in Kenya the German form of the
To explain the division of power in a large coalition as a possible solution to the crisis using a coalition agreement (Deutsche Welle
2008).

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8th Gregor P. Hofmann

ruling military junta. Ultimately, the regional organization ASEAN was able to convince the military junta to open
the borders for humanitarian aid. France's threat to intervene gave vigor to ASEAN's efforts, but most countries,
even strong proponents of the R2P, rejected the French interpretation of the scope. Such an expansion
threatened to question the 2005 compromise (Badescu / Weiss 2010: 9). In the summer of 2008, Russia tried to
justify the war against Georgia with the R2P: Following a Georgian offensive against secessionist rebels in South
Ossetia in early August 2008, Russia responded by sending troops to the region to stop the attacks by the
Georgian army . The Russian government argued that she had the right and was obliged by the constitution to
prevent genocide against the Russian-born South Ossetian secessionists and to "exercise responsibility for
protection" (MFA Russia 2008). This reference to the R2P was not received by other countries - especially since
Russia's primary justification was the exercise of the right to self-defense in the form of protecting Russian and
Russian citizens (Badescu / Weiss 2010: 11).

Kenya offered R2P supporters an example of a response to atrocities below the coercive threshold. In
Myanmar and South Ossetia, various interpretations of the scope of the R2P standards clashed, with the result
that the majority of those who spoke up agreed that these cases were not included. This dispute about its
applicability specified the scope of the R2P: it can only be applied to the four crime types genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing.

4.1 General Assembly debates on the R2P

Against this background, Ed Luck, UN Special Advisor for the R2P since 2007 (see Section 6.1), developed the
three pillar structure of the R2P from consultations with member states in the first report of the Secretary General
to the General Assembly on the implementation of the R2P: Responsibility of the State, International Support and
quick and decisive reaction from the international community (Ban Ki-Moon 2009). This breakdown into different
components should clarify Ban Ki-Moon's “close but deep” approach: all available instruments should be
applicable for prevention and response, while the scope should be kept narrow: With reference to the R2P, only
the four crimes cannot be responded to other serious crises, such as natural disasters (Bellamy 2012: 18).

The report was first discussed in an informal interactive dialogue with experts on July 23, 2009, before the
General Assembly officially discussed the topic in the following days. The President of the General Assembly,
Nicaraguan Miguel D'Escoto, tried to prevent a decision on the R2P. He presented a concept paper that
questioned the legitimacy of the summit decision and placed the R2P in the context of European colonialism
(President of the 63rd General Assembly 2009). He stated that the United Nations collective security system was
not an instrument for enforcing human rights, but for maintaining international security:

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Stronger or more controversial than claimed in the dispute? 9

"Colonialism and interventionism used responsibility to protect arguments. National Sovereignty in developing countries is
a necessary condition for stable access to political, social and economic rights and it took enormous sacrifices to recover
this sovereignty and ensure these rights for their populations. […] The concept of responsibility to protect is a sovereign's
obligation and, if it is exercised by an external agency, sovereignty passes from the people of the target country to it. The
people to be protected are transformed from bearers of rights to wards of this agency. "(President of the 63rd General
Assembly 2009)

Only Bolivia, Ecuador, Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea, Malaysia, Sudan and Venezuela openly agreed with this
view and expressed rejection of the decision of the World Summit. Others, such as the Non-Aligned Movement
and particularly Brazil, China, Iran and Pakistan, were skeptical and demanded further discussions about the
compromise reached in 2005.

In general, while the debate expressed approval of the Secretary-General's report, it also showed that support for the package of standards as

a whole was not particularly deep. The third pillar of the R2P - the international response to atrocities - continued to encounter great reservations in

the world of states: This could serve as a justification narrative for interventions without a UN mandate and the goal of forced regime change, and

the thresholds for the application of the R2P are unclear (see also in the following GCR2P 2009). Lack of consistency and double standards in the

Security Council's reactions were criticized. In its working methods and composition, some states saw the real causes of inability to act in the face

of atrocities. In addition, some states feared that the R2P would strengthen the Security Council in relation to the General Assembly as it would

have additional authority in overseeing the internal affairs of the Member States. The causes of the crimes addressed by the R2P in

underdevelopment and poverty should also be sought and the UN should concentrate its resources on combating these causes of conflict.

However, many states also followed Ban Ki-Moon's demand that the permanent members should not exercise their right of veto over mass crimes.

The causes of the crimes addressed by the R2P in underdevelopment and poverty should also be sought and the UN should concentrate its

resources on combating these causes of conflict. However, many states also followed Ban Ki-Moon's demand that the permanent members should

not exercise their right of veto over mass crimes. The causes of the crimes addressed by the R2P in underdevelopment and poverty should also be

sought and the UN should concentrate its resources on combating these causes of conflict. However, many states also followed Ban Ki-Moon's

demand that the permanent members should not exercise their right of veto over mass crimes.

After D'Escoto closed the debate without a decision, a group of states led by Guatemala began negotiations
on a resolution (Serrano 2011: 435). Western states initially feared that such a project could be hijacked by
skeptics to prevent the R2P from being implemented. Interestingly, Guatemala found an important ally in the
search for supporters in India, which had loudly criticized the R2P in 2005. According to a diplomat involved, the
group around Guatemala initially campaigned for a resolution among developing countries and only accepted
Western support when broad support was indicated to increase the credibility of the initiative. The draft resolution
ultimately submitted by 67 states did not contain any substantive statement on the R2P, but only the
acknowledgment of the Secretary General's report and the intention of the General Assembly to further deal with
the R2P. The General Assembly adopted it unanimously on September 14, 2009 as Resolution 63/308.

An informal interactive dialogue on the R2P has taken place annually in the General Assembly since 2009. In
this context, Member States discuss the Secretary General's annual implementation reports on protection
responsibility. These

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10th Gregor P. Hofmann

dealt with the topics of early warning (Ban Ki-Moon 2010), the role of regional organizations in implementing the
responsibility to protect (Ban Ki-Moon 2011), the third pillar (Ban Ki-Moon 2012b), the responsibility of the state
(Ban Ki-Moon 2013a ) and ways to support the state in assuming its responsibilities (Ban Ki-Moon 2014). The
number of countries that speak out in these informal dialogues is continuously increasing:

Figure 2: Number of countries in the UN 2009-2014 R2P debates

100

80
92
60
68 70
40 58

42 43
20

Officially 2009 Informal 2010 Informal 2011 Informal 2012 Informal 2013 Informal 2014

Source: Own illustration

The R2P is also taken up by around 20 states each year in the general debates of the general assembly at the
beginning of each session. It therefore has a growing presence in international discourse. Increased support was
also expressed in the R2P debates, particularly in relation to the first and second pillars of the R2P.

However, it should not be overlooked that only around a third of all states are involved in the informal debates
on the R2P. If one takes the critical mass of states described above, the criticism of which may cast doubt on the
validity of a standard as a guideline, it must be stated that, due to the limited participation in the dialogues, it has
so far not been possible to clearly determine how many states really are behind the entire set of standards.

The criticisms from 2005 and 2009 are still present in the discourse. Disputes broke out again in 2011 as a
result of NATO's intervention in Libya (see section 5.1). The third pillar of the R2P remains very controversial.
The criticism is often not formulated openly in state statements. Many countries, especially in Latin America and
Southeast Asia, are still critical of the R2P. Given the history of imperial interventions in these regions, every
potential back door for external interference is viewed with skepticism. While many countries supported the idea
of ​atrocity prevention, the R2P is still seen in the context of the debate on a right to humanitarian intervention in
the 1990s,

"It is an idea you cannot buy wholesale without qualification. […] This is an idea that is to be implemented
predominantly in the developing world but not in the US, Israel, or France. Almost unconsciously but manifestly people
are talking about the Protection of Civilians in weak and poor countries. From an historical point of view this is unfair.
[…] The most shocking crimes were committed by developed countries. In a way, the idea of ​R2P is used to
whitewash the guilt of the powerful states, without them acknowledging this guilt. "

The UN Secretariat and other countries are trying to counter such skeptical attitudes with concrete initiatives to
implement the R2P and thus to promote their interpretation of the R2P as a holistic framework with three related
pillars.

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Stronger or more controversial than claimed in the dispute? 11

In addition to the Secretary General's attempt to direct the debate towards prevention through his reports, there
are some government initiatives to implement and institutionalize the R2P at a national and regional level, which I
will deal with in Section 6. First of all, however, I direct my attention to the most active actors in the international
discussion about the R2P, since their initiatives and lobbying activities were decisive for the development of the
responsibility to protect.

4.2 Group of Friends of R2P and non-governmental organizations

Canada had started before the World Summit, well-intentioned states in an informal way Group of Friends of the
Responsibility to Protect to collect. This was initially led by Canada and Rwanda and now meets under the
chairmanship of the Netherlands and Rwanda. The 45 members include states from all continents and the
European Union. Representatives of civil society and the UN Secretariat also attend the group meetings. 8th It
meets as needed and coordinates its action in relevant debates and in the annual interactive dialogues on the
R2P.

In addition, it is primarily civil society actors who are trying to advance the debate on R2P in the UN context.
After the publication of the ICISS report and in the run-up to the World Summit, Canada sought to set up a
transnational network of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Banda 2007) and received support from the World
Federalist Movement Institute for Global Policy

(WFM-IGP) 9 just like Oxfam International. WFM-IGP had already organized consultations with other NGOs about
the R2P in cooperation with Canada after the publication of the ICISS report in 2002, ICRtoP employees told the
author. The result was that R2P Engaging Civil Society ( R2P-CS) project, which under the leadership of WFM-IGP
and Oxfam tried from 2003 to advance the R2P on the international agenda. R2P-CS also played an important
role after the World Summit, through the creation of a network of NGOs, the provision of information to the public
and through active lobbying with permanent representations in New York (Bellamy 2009: 71-73; ICRtoP 2009). In
the years after the World Summit, Oxfam also continued to use the R2P as a framework for campaigns to protect
civilians. But since the Libyan intervention in 2011 at the latest and in view of the failure of the UN in Syria, Oxfam
no longer saw the R2P as a useful argument when it came to calling for more intensive protection of civilians
(Cairns 2014).

The most influential in the R2P debate are currently two organizations globally: The
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect ( ICRtoP) 10th and the Global Center for

8 Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect
and Office of the Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect 9 The WFM-IGP,
founded in 1947, works on issues of peace and security policy, UN reform,
global democracy, environmental protection and protection of civilians. It is based in New York and is funded by foundation
and western government funds. See: WFM-IGP 2015. 10 The International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP)
is the successor organization of
R2P-CS and was founded in January 2009 by eight regional and international NGOs.

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12 Gregor P. Hofmann

the Responsibility to Protect ( GCR2P) 11, as well as at the regional level Asia-Pacific Center for the Responsibility to Protect ( AP-R2P) 12. Regular contacts

with diplomats in the permanent representations in New York and in the capitals can have a major impact on the debate. ICRtoP serves primarily as a

transmission belt between 82 NGOs, which are primarily active at local or national level, and the international discourse in New York (ICRtoP 2015).

According to various diplomats from the group of friends of R2P, GCR2P in particular offers itself as a comprehensive information service provider and

institutional memory: "I never had so many phone calls on any other dossier I have been working on, regarding what to say and what not to say ”Said a

diplomat from an EU member state. A comprehensive briefing is offered to diplomats who are taking on new responsibilities. In the run-up to all

relevant debates, GCR2P contacts the permanent representatives and tries to convince them at least to comment and take up their core messages. By

monitoring relevant crisis situations, the organization also exerts influence in debates about the use of the third pillar. The AP-R2P influences the

debate through academic work and regional attempts at persuasion, for example recently as a secretariat of a high-level group of experts who

developed recommendations for anchoring the R2P in the ASEAN community emerging in 2015 (see section 6.4). By monitoring relevant crisis

situations, the organization also exerts influence in debates about the use of the third pillar. The AP-R2P influences the debate through academic work

and regional attempts at persuasion, for example recently as a secretariat of a high-level group of experts who developed recommendations for

anchoring the R2P in the ASEAN community emerging in 2015 (see section 6.4). By monitoring relevant crisis situations, the organization also exerts

influence in debates about the use of the third pillar. The AP-R2P influences the debate through academic work and regional attempts at persuasion,

for example recently as a secretariat of a high-level group of experts who developed recommendations for anchoring the R2P in the ASEAN

community emerging in 2015 (see section 6.4).

The work of the NGOs ICRtoP, GCR2P and AP-R2P, which focus on international standards development, is
complemented by the activities of organizations in the field of atrocities and genocide prevention. For example,
the Stanley Foundation 13, which primarily focuses on organizing dialogue events with UN officials, government
officials, diplomats and NGOs, with the aim of strengthening and developing protective standards and achieving
practical implementation of them through the exchange of implementation examples (The Stanley Foundation
2015 ). It also cooperates with the GCR2P, for example in organizing workshops for the Focal-Point network
coordinated by GCR2P (The Stanley Foundation 2012) (see section 6.4).

That located in New York and Poland Auschwitz Institute for Peace and Reconciliation ( AIPR) is dedicated to
the practical implementation of atrocity prevention, without a direct connection to R2P. 14 On the one hand, AIPR
works directly with governments and

11 The Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P) was created in 2007 by Gareth Evans
and a group of NGOs (International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch, Oxfam International, WFM-IGP and Refugees
International) and quickly found support from the governments of Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway,
Rwanda and the UK, as well as the Open Society Institute (Evans 2007). GCR2P has an international advisory board led
by the ICISS co-chairs Gareth Evans and Mohammed Sahnoun.

12 The Asia-Pacific Center for the Responsibility to Protect (AP-R2P) is at the University of Queensland in
Australia is located and pursues the goal of promoting the recognition of R2P in Southeast Asia. 13 The Stanley
Foundation is a foundation founded in 1956 with peace and security policy
Orientation based in Muscatine, Iowa. She is a member of the ICRtoP network. 14 Founded in Auschwitz in 2005 and registered in the United

States since 2007, the AIPR has been offering services since 2008
Education and technical support in developing and strengthening global, national and regional policies and mechanisms
to prevent genocide and atrocities.

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Stronger or more controversial than claimed in the dispute? 13

regional organizations such as the AU together in the development and implementation of policies as well as in
the training of government officials, diplomats, soldiers and development workers in this area, such as within the
framework of the Latin American Network for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention ( AIPR 2015b) (see section
6.4). On the other hand, the institute cooperates with the UN Office for Genocide Prevention and R2P in its
training program for UN officials and interested diplomats.

A loose group of diplomats, researchers, practitioners and former politicians also shaped the debate.
Individuals such as Gareth Evans, Ed Luck, Ramesh Thakur, Alex Bellamy, Thomas Weiss or even the current
American UN Ambassador Samantha Power and others have given their intellectual contributions as well as
changing positions in state, civil society and international organizations as well as think tanks and
Media-influencing influence on the development of R2P (Karlsrud 2013).

The close cooperation between civil society, committed individuals, government officials and the UN
secretariat has enabled the relatively rapid development of the R2P from an idea to a bundle of standards that is
increasingly anchored in the UN, at least nominally, despite great skepticism in the international community. 15

But this is also viewed particularly critically by countries in the south: the GCR2P is funded by grants from mostly
western countries (Evans 2008: 238), the AP-R2P mainly by the Australian government (AP-R2P 2015). In media
work and at NGO events, but also in some academic publications, the level of recognition of R2P among states is
sometimes exaggerated (see critical Daase 2013). This can be seen, for example, in Southeast Asia, where a
closer look reveals that the R2P and its components are still highly controversial. Local initiatives are often
initiated by external actors who often shorten the R2P to the first two pillars in order not to provoke resistance
(Capie 2012).

Today, because of this marketing for R2P, the organizations and individuals mentioned play a central role in
keeping the topic on the UN agenda. The pressure of civil society on the member states and the resources made
available in the areas of information and training, crisis monitoring, lobbying and conference organization as well
as the state prevention initiatives supported by these organizations are essential factors for the large presence in
the international discourse. Exaggeration is one of the strategies used by these organizations to strengthen R2P.
This is particularly evident in the UN Security Council.

15 These can be called the so-called advocacy coalition (Keck / Sikkink 1998: 1-2): Die
Organizations are to be understood as a network of different actors with shared values ​and beliefs who pursue common
goals in the security policy field and exchange information with one another without appearing as a closed group.

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14 Gregor P. Hofmann

4.3 Controversy over sovereignty of interpretation: Debates on the R2P in the Security Council

Despite the widespread reservations in the international community, affirmative references to the R2P are
increasingly found in Security Council resolutions, since the Libyan intervention even four times more often than
in the previous five years 16.

Figure 3: References in Security Council resolutions to the three pillars of the R2P

10

2006 2009 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Regarding 1st pillar Regarding 2nd pillar Regarding all 3 pillars

Source: own illustration; Period: September 2005 to March 2015

But the growing number of references to the R2P is not yet evidence of a decrease in controversy, even if NGOs
often put it that way. This can be seen from a look at the type of references: two thirds of the 31 mentions of the
R2P refer to the undisputed first pillar - even in cases such as Libya or Ivory Coast, where measures under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter against the government were taken. Seven resolutions (23%) refer to the R2P as a
whole, two of which relate to specific country situations (Sudan 2006, South Sudan 2014). And only in the two of
the three resolutions relating to the pillar of support does the R2P appear operationally, as a concrete component
of the mandates of UN peacekeeping missions (South Sudan

2011, Mali 2012). But what is decisive is not just written references, but rather whether the R2P is recognized as
a normative reference framework for action in the discourse about a crisis situation.

NGOs such as the GCR2P or ICRtoP refer to diplomats' references and in Security Council resolutions to the
R2P, as proof that they and their three components exist as norms and that a practice of application is emerging.
With a certain exaggeration of the importance of such references, sovereignty over the conceptual statements of
Security Council resolutions is to be achieved and the R2P is nominally strengthened, according to an NGO
employee:

16 resolutions with literal reference to the R2P between 2005 and late February 2011: 1653 (2006)
Congo and Burundi, 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009) for the protection of civilians in armed conflict, 1706 (2006) in Sudan / Darfur,
1970 (2011) and 1973 (2011) in Libya. Literal resolutions on the R2P between March 2011 and February 2015: 1975 (2011) on
Ivory Coast, 1996 (2011), 2109 (2013), 2155 (2014), 2187 (2014) and 2206 (2015) on South Sudan, 2014 ( 2011) to Yemen, 2016
(2011), 2040 (2012) and 2095 (2013) to Libya, 2085 (2012), 2100 (2013) and 2164 (2014) to Mali, 2093 (2013) to Somalia, 2117
(2013) on small arms, 2121 (2013), 2127 (2013), 2134 (2014), 2149 (2014) and 2196 (2015) on Central Africa, 2139 (2014) and
2165 (2014) on Syria, 2150 (2014) on genocide prevention, 2171 (2014) on the prevention of armed conflict, 2185 (2014) on the
role of the police in peacekeeping missions.

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Stronger or more controversial than claimed in the dispute? 15

"By collecting 'R2P language' in Security Council Resolutions and Member states' statements, [R2P advocates] try to collect evidence for an

existing opinionio juris that R2P exists as a norm. This is important, since R2P is a young norm and there is always the danger that that what the

member states' governments say is just political theater […]. It is a tactic of R2P advocates to overstate the Security Council Resolution's language on

R2P, to show that R2P matters. ”This tactic of exaggerating the importance of R2P is used because it is easier in the UN context to adopt moral

norms such as R2P - Standards to evolve when recognized as part of the UN language and used in resolutions. After all, in contrast to contractual

norms, there are no explicit obligations of the states to comply with standards. The 2005 World Summit Document is only a non-binding resolution of

the General Assembly. It is therefore the aim of R2P standards companies, such as NGOs and the states in the group of friends of the R2P, that all

components of the R2P become part of common international law. However, this would require universal recognition of all its components in the

international community and among international lawyers, as well as consistent application by the Security Council. R2P standard entrepreneurs are

trying to build social pressure to comply with standards: States should protect their populations and the Security Council should intervene in extreme

situations. The more reference possibilities there are, the stronger this pressure becomes and the easier it is to refer to it again in similar cases. It is

therefore the aim of R2P standard entrepreneurs, such as NGOs and the states in the group of friends of the R2P, that all components of the R2P

become part of common international law. However, this would require universal recognition of all its components in the international community and

among international lawyers, as well as consistent application by the Security Council. R2P standard entrepreneurs are trying to build up social

pressure to comply with standards: States should protect their populations and the Security Council should intervene in extreme situations. The more

reference possibilities there are, the stronger this pressure becomes and the easier it is to refer to it again in similar cases. It is therefore the aim of

R2P standards companies, such as NGOs and the states in the group of friends of the R2P, that all components of the R2P become part of common

international law. However, this would require universal recognition of all its components in the international community and among international

lawyers, as well as consistent application by the Security Council. R2P standard entrepreneurs are trying to build social pressure to comply with standards: States should protect thei

5. The controversial use of the R2P by the Security Council

The references to the first pillar of the R2P and the references to the summit decision in thematic Security Council resolutions show that the

responsibility to protect is at least used as a normative reference frame in the Security Council. However, it is difficult to come to an agreement on a

specific application. The approval of the set of standards of the R2P has not yet been completed, but the controversy is limited to questions of

applicability and implementation and less to the validity of the sub-standards (see also: Deitelhoff 2013). The third pillar should only include the use of

violence as a last resort, and only in situations where there is sufficient prospect of success in protecting vulnerable populations. Diplomatic pressure,

observation missions, The imposition of sanctions or a referral of the case to the International Criminal Court are usually the preferred means of

reaction as long as they effectively lead to an improvement in the situation of the local people (Hofmann 2013: 10-11). The application of the third pillar

is particularly controversial if the Security Council uses coercive means to enforce the protection responsibility or if recourse is required to this. This

was shown in 2011 in the disputes about Libya and Syria, but also in the broader context of protecting civilians in armed conflicts through UN

peacekeeping missions and in resorting to the International Criminal Court to respond to atrocities. as long as they effectively lead to an improvement

in the situation of the local people (Hofmann 2013: 10-11). The application of the third pillar is particularly controversial if the Security Council uses

coercive means to enforce the protection responsibility or if recourse is required to this. This was evident in the disputes about Libya and Syria in 2011,

but also in the broader context of protecting civilians in armed conflicts through UN peacekeeping missions and in resorting to the International Criminal

Court to respond to atrocities. as long as they effectively lead to an improvement in the situation of the local people (Hofmann 2013: 10-11). The

application of the third pillar is particularly controversial if the Security Council uses coercive means to enforce the protection responsibility or if

recourse is required to this. This was evident in the disputes about Libya and Syria in 2011, but also in the broader context of protecting civilians in

armed conflicts through UN peacekeeping missions and in resorting to the International Criminal Court to respond to atrocities. if the Security Council

uses coercive means to enforce the protection responsibility or is required to resort to it. This was evident in the disputes about Libya and Syria in

2011, but also in the broader context of protecting civilians in armed conflicts through UN peacekeeping missions and in resorting to the International Criminal Court to respond to atro

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