The Luftwaffe[N 2] (German pronunciation: [ˈlʊftvafə] (About this soundlisten)) was the aerial warfare

branch of the Wehrmacht during World War II. Germany's military air arms during World War I, the
Luftstreitkräfte of the Imperial Army and the Marine-Fliegerabteilung of the Imperial Navy, had been
disbanded in May 1920 as a result of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles which stated that Germany
was forbidden to have any air force.

During the interwar period, German pilots were trained secretly in violation of the treaty at Lipetsk Air
Base in the Soviet Union. With the rise of the Nazi Party and the repudiation of the Versailles Treaty, the
Luftwaffe's existence was publicly acknowledged on 26 February 1935, just over two weeks before open
defiance of the Versailles Treaty through German re-armament and conscription would be announced
on 16 March.[9] The Condor Legion, a Luftwaffe detachment sent to aid Nationalist forces in the Spanish
Civil War, provided the force with a valuable testing ground for new tactics and aircraft. Partially as a
result of this combat experience, the Luftwaffe had become one of the most sophisticated,
technologically advanced, and battle-experienced air forces in the world when World War II broke out in
1939.[10] By the summer of 1939, the Luftwaffe had twenty-eight Geschwader (wings). The Luftwaffe
also operated Fallschirmjäger paratrooper units.

The Luftwaffe proved instrumental in the German victories across Poland and Western Europe in 1939
and 1940. During the Battle of Britain, however, despite inflicting severe damage to the RAF's
infrastructure and, during the subsequent Blitz, devastating many British cities, the German air force
failed to batter the beleaguered British into submission. From 1942, Allied bombing campaigns gradually
destroyed the Luftwaffe's fighter arm. From late 1942, the Luftwaffe used its surplus ground support and
other personnel to raise Luftwaffe Field Divisions. In addition to its service in the West, the Luftwaffe
operated over the Soviet Union, North Africa and Southern Europe. Despite its belated use of advanced
turbojet and rocket propelled aircraft for the destruction of Allied bombers, the Luftwaffe was
overwhelmed by the Allies' superior numbers and improved tactics, and a lack of trained pilots and
aviation fuel. In January 1945, during the closing stages of the Battle of the Bulge, the Luftwaffe made a
last-ditch effort to win air superiority, and met with failure. With rapidly dwindling supplies of
petroleum, oil, and lubricants after this campaign, and as part of the entire combined Wehrmacht
military forces as a whole, the Luftwaffe ceased to be an effective fighting force.

After the defeat of Germany, the Luftwaffe was disbanded in 1946. During World War II, German pilots
claimed roughly 70,000 aerial victories, while over 75,000 Luftwaffe aircraft were destroyed or
significantly damaged. Of these, nearly 40,000 were lost entirely. The Luftwaffe had only two
commanders-in-chief throughout its history: Hermann Göring and later Generalfeldmarschall Robert
Ritter von Greim for the last two weeks of the war.

The Luftwaffe was deeply involved in Nazi war crimes. By the end of the war, a significant percentage of
aircraft production originated in concentration camps, an industry employing tens of thousands of
prisoners.[N 3] The Luftwaffe's demand for labor was one of the factors that led to the deportation and
murder of hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews in 1944. The Oberkommando der Luftwaffe
organized Nazi human experimentation, and Luftwaffe ground troops committed massacres in Italy,
Greece, and Poland.

Contents

1 History

1.1 Origins

1.2 Preparing for war: 1933–39

1.2.1 Wever years, 1933–36

1.2.2 Change of direction, 1936–37

1.2.3 Dive-bombing

1.2.4 Mobilization, 1938–41

1.3 Luftwaffe organization

1.3.1 Luftwaffe commanders

1.4 Organization and chain of command

1.5 Personnel

1.6 Spanish Civil War

1.7 World War II

2 Omissions and failures

2.1 Lack of aerial defence

2.2 Development and equipment

2.2.1 Challenges in directly addressing combat pilots' issues

2.3 Production failures

2.4 Engine development

2.5 Personnel and leadership

3 Luftwaffe ground forces

4 War crimes and bombing of non-military targets

4.1 Forced labor

4.2 Massacres

4.3 Human experimentation

4.4 Aerial bombing of non-military targets

4.5 Trials

5 See also

6 References

6.1 Notes

6.2 Citations

6.3 Bibliography

7 External links

History

Origins

Main articles: Luftstreitkräfte and Aviation in World War I

Manfred von Richthofen with other members of Jasta 11, 1917 as part of the Luftstreitkräfte

The Imperial German Army Air Service was founded in 1910 with the name Die Fliegertruppen des
deutschen Kaiserreiches, most often shortened to Fliegertruppe. It was renamed the Luftstreitkräfte on
8 October 1916.[11] The air war on the Western Front received the most attention in the annals of the
earliest accounts of military aviation, since it produced aces such as Manfred von Richthofen and Ernst
Udet, Oswald Boelcke, and Max Immelmann. After the defeat of Germany, the service was dissolved on
8 May 1920 under the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles, which also mandated the destruction of all
German military aircraft.

Since the Treaty of Versailles forbade Germany to have an air force, German pilots trained in secret.
Initially, civil aviation schools within Germany were used, yet only light trainers could be used in order to
maintain the façade that the trainees were going to fly with civil airlines such as Deutsche Luft Hansa. To
train its pilots on the latest combat aircraft, Germany solicited the help of the Soviet Union, which was
also isolated in Europe. A secret training airfield was established at Lipetsk in 1924 and operated for
approximately nine years using mostly Dutch and Soviet, but also some German, training aircraft before
being closed in 1933. This base was officially known as 4th squadron of the 40th wing of the Red Army.
Hundreds of Luftwaffe pilots and technical personnel visited, studied and were trained at Soviet air force
schools in several locations in Central Russia.[12] Roessing, Blume, Fosse, Teetsemann, Heini, Makratzki,
Blumendaat, and many other future Luftwaffe aces were trained in Russia in joint Russian-German
schools that were set up under the patronage of Ernst August Köstring.
The first steps towards the Luftwaffe's formation were undertaken just months after Adolf Hitler came
to power. Hermann Göring, a World War I ace, became National Kommissar for aviation with former Luft
Hansa director Erhard Milch as his deputy. In April 1933 the Reich Aviation Ministry
(Reichsluftfahrtministerium or RLM) was established. The RLM was in charge of development and
production of aircraft. Göring's control over all aspects of aviation became absolute. On 25 March 1933
the German Air Sports Association absorbed all private and national organizations, while retaining its
'sports' title. On 15 May 1933, all military aviation organizations in the RLM were merged, forming the
Luftwaffe; its official 'birthday'.[13] The National Socialist Flyers Corps (Nationalsozialistisches
Fliegerkorps or NSFK) was formed in 1937 to give pre-military flying training to male youths, and to
engage adult sport aviators in the Nazi movement. Military-age members of the NSFK were drafted into
the Luftwaffe. As all such prior NSFK members were also Nazi Party members, this gave the new
Luftwaffe a strong Nazi ideological base in contrast to the other branches of the Wehrmacht (the Heer
(Army) and the Kriegsmarine (Navy)). Göring played a leading role in the buildup of the Luftwaffe in
1933–36, but had little further involvement in the development of the force after 1936, and Milch
became the "de facto" minister until 1937.[14]

The absence of Göring in planning and production matters was fortunate. Göring had little knowledge of
current aviation, had last flown in 1922, and had not kept himself informed of latest events. Göring also
displayed a lack of understanding of doctrine and technical issues in aerial warfare which he left to
others more competent. The Commander-in-Chief left the organisation and building of the Luftwaffe,
after 1936, to Erhard Milch. However Göring, as a part of Hitler's inner circle, provided access to
financial resources and materiel for rearming and equipping the Luftwaffe.[15]

Another prominent figure in German air power construction this time was Helmuth Wilberg. Wilberg
later played a large role in the development of German air doctrine. Having headed the Reichswehr air
staff for eight years in the 1920s, Wilberg had considerable experience and was ideal for a senior staff
position.[16] Göring considered making Wilberg Chief of Staff (CS). However, it was revealed Wilberg
had a Jewish mother. For that reason Göring could not have him as CS. Not wishing his talent to go to
waste, Göring ensured the racial laws of the Third Reich did not apply to him. Wilberg remained in the
air staff, and under Walther Wever helped draw up the Luftwaffe's principle doctrinal texts, "The
Conduct of the Aerial War" and "Regulation 16".[17][18]

Preparing for war: 1933–39

Wever years, 1933–36

Walther Wever, Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, 1933–1936

The German officer Corps was keen to develop strategic bombing capabilities against its enemies.
However, economic and geopolitical considerations had to take priority. The German air power theorists
continued to develop strategic theories, but emphasis was given to army support, as Germany was a
continental power and expected to face ground operations following any declaration of hostilities.[19]

For these reasons, between 1933 and 1934, the Luftwaffe's leadership was primarily concerned with
tactical and operational methods. In aerial terms, the army concept of Truppenführung was an
operational concept, as well as a tactical doctrine. In World War I, the Fliegertruppe's initial, 1914–15
era Feldflieger Abteilung observation/reconnaissance air units, each with six two-seater aircraft apiece,
had been attached to specific army formations and acted as support. Dive bomber units were
considered essential to Truppenführung, attacking enemy headquarters and lines of communications.
[20] Luftwaffe "Regulation 10: The Bomber" (Dienstvorschrift 10: Das Kampfflugzeug), published in 1934,
advocated air superiority and approaches to ground attack tactics without dealing with operational
matters. Until 1935, the 1926 manual "Directives for the Conduct of the Operational Air War" continued
to act as the main guide for German air operations. The manual directed OKL to focus on limited
operations (not strategic operations): the protection of specific areas and support of the army in
combat.[20]

With an effective tactical-operational concept,[21] the German air power theorists needed a strategic
doctrine and organisation. Robert Knauss, a serviceman (not pilot) in the Luftstreitkräfte during World
War I, and later an experienced pilot with Lufthansa,[22] was a prominent theorist of air power. Knauss
promoted the Giulio Douhet theory that air power could win wars alone by destroying enemy industry
and breaking enemy morale by "terrorizing the population" of major cities. This advocated attacks on
civilians.[23] The General Staff blocked the entry of Douhet's theory into doctrine, fearing revenge
strikes against German civilians and cities.[24]

In December 1934, Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff Walther Wever sought to mould the Luftwaffe's
battle doctrine into a strategic plan. At this time, Wever conducted war games (simulated against
France) in a bid to establish his theory of a strategic bombing force that would, he thought, prove
decisive by winning the war through the destruction of enemy industry, even though these exercises
also included tactical strikes against enemy ground forces and communications. In 1935, "Luftwaffe
Regulation 16: The Conduct of the Air War" was drawn up. In the proposal, it concluded, "The mission of
the Luftwaffe is to serve these goals."[25][26]

Corum states that under this doctrine, the Luftwaffe leadership rejected the practice of "terror
bombing" (see Luftwaffe strategic bombing doctrine).[27] According to Corum terror bombing was
deemed to be "counter-productive", increasing rather than destroying the enemy's will to resist.[28]
Such bombing campaigns were regarded as diversion from the Luftwaffe's main operations; destruction
of the enemy armed forces.[29]
Nevertheless, Wever recognised the importance of strategic bombing. In newly introduced doctrine, The
Conduct of the Aerial Air War in 1935, Wever rejected the theory of Douhet[30] and outlined five key
points to air strategy:[31]

To destroy the enemy air force by bombing its bases and aircraft factories, and defeating enemy air
forces attacking German targets.

To prevent the movement of large enemy ground forces to the decisive areas by destroying railways and
roads, particularly bridges and tunnels, which are indispensable for the movement and supply of forces

To support the operations of the army formations, independent of railways, i.e, armoured forces and
motorised forces, by impeding the enemy advance and participating directly in ground operations.

To support naval operations by attacking naval bases, protecting Germany's naval bases and
participating directly in naval battles

To paralyse the enemy armed forces by stopping production in the armaments factories.

Wever began planning for a strategic bomber force and sought to incorporate strategic bombing into a
war strategy. He believed that tactical aircraft should only be used as a step to developing a strategic air
force. In May 1934, Wever initiated a seven-year project to develop the so-called "Ural bomber", which
could strike as far as into the heart of the Soviet Union. In 1935, this design competition led to the
Dornier Do 19 and Junkers Ju 89 prototypes, although both were underpowered. In April 1936, Wever
issue requirements for the 'Bomber A' design competition: a range of 6,700 km (4,163 mi) with a 900 kg
(1,984 lb) bomb load. However Wever's vision of a "Ural" bomber was never realised,[32] and his
emphasis on strategic aerial operations was lost.[33] The only design submittal for Wever's 'Bomber A'
that reached production was Heinkel's Projekt 1041, which culminated in the production and frontline
service as Germany's only operational heavy bomber, the Heinkel He 177, on 5 November 1937, the
date on which it received its RLM airframe number.[34]

In 1935, the military functions of the RLM were grouped into Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL; "Air
Force High Command").

Following the untimely death of Walther Wever in early June 1936 in an aviation-related accident, by
the late 1930s the Luftwaffe had no clear purpose. The air force was not subordinated to the army
support role, and it was not given any particular strategic mission. German doctrine fell between the
two concepts. The Luftwaffe was to be an organization capable of carrying out broad and general
support tasks rather than any specific mission. Mainly, this path was chosen to encourage a more
flexible use of air power and offer the ground forces the right conditions for a decisive victory. In fact, on
the outbreak of war, only 15% of the Luftwaffe's aircraft were devoted to ground support operations,
counter to the long-held myth that the Luftwaffe was designed for only tactical and operational
missions.[35]
Change of direction, 1936–37

Wever's participation in the construction of the Luftwaffe came to an abrupt end on 3 June 1936 when
he was killed along with his engineer in a Heinkel He 70 Blitz, ironically on the very day that his "Bomber
A" heavy bomber design competition was announced. After Wever's death Göring began taking more of
an interest in the appointment of Luftwaffe staff officers. Göring appointed his successor Albert
Kesselring as Chief of Staff and Ernst Udet to head the Reich's Air Ministry Technical Office (Technisches
Amt), although he was not a technical expert. Despite this Udet helped change the Luftwaffe's tactical
direction towards fast medium bombers to destroy enemy air power in the battle zone rather than
through industrial bombing of its aviation production.[25]

Kesselring and Udet did not get on. During Kesselring's time as CS, 1936–1937, a power struggle
developed between the two as Udet attempted to extend his own power within the Luftwaffe.
Kesselring also had to contend with Göring appointing "yes men" to positions of importance.[36] Udet
realised his limitations, and his failures in the production and development of German aircraft would
have serious long term consequences.[37]

Ernst Udet. Along with Albert Kesselring, Udet was responsible for establishing the design trend of
German aircraft. Udet's focus was on tactical army support air forces

The failure of the Luftwaffe to progress further towards attaining a strategic bombing force was
attributable to several reasons. Many in the Luftwaffe command believed medium bombers to be
sufficient power to launch strategic bombing operations against Germany's most likely enemies; France,
Czechoslovakia, and Poland.[38] The United Kingdom presented greater problems. General der Flieger
Hellmuth Felmy, commander of Luftflotte 2 in 1939, was charged with devising a plan for an air war over
the British Isles. Felmy was convinced that Britain could be defeated through morale bombing. Felmy
noted the alleged panic that had broken out in London during the Munich crisis, evidence he believed of
British weakness. A second reason was technical. German designers had never solved the issues of the
Heinkel He 177A's design difficulties, brought on by the requirement from its inception on 5 November
1937 to have moderate dive bombing capabilities in a 30-meter wingspan aircraft. Moreover, Germany
did not possess the economic resources to match the later British and American effort of 1943–1944,
particularly in large-scale mass production of high power output aircraft engines (with output of over
least 1,500 kW (2,000 hp). In addition, OKL had not foreseen the industrial and military effort strategic
bombing would require. By 1939 the Luftwaffe was not much better prepared than its enemies to
conduct a strategic bombing campaign,[39] with fatal results during the Battle of Britain.[40]

The German rearmament program faced difficulties acquiring raw materials. Germany imported most of
its essential materials for rebuilding the Luftwaffe, in particular rubber and aluminium. Petroleum
imports were particularly vulnerable to blockade. Germany pushed for synthetic fuel plants, but still
failed to meet demands. In 1937 Germany imported more fuel than it had at the start of the decade. By
the summer 1938 only 25% of requirements could be covered. In steel materials, industry was operating
at barely 83% of capacity, and by November 1938 Göring reported the economic situation was serious.
[41] The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW), the overall command for all German military forces,
ordered reductions in raw materials and steel used for armament production. The figures for reduction
were substantial: 30% steel, 20% copper, 47% aluminium, and 14% rubber.[42] Under such
circumstances, it was not possible for Milch, Udet, or Kesselring to produce a formidable strategic
bombing force even had they wanted to do so.[39]

The development of aircraft was now confined to the production of twin-engined medium bombers that
required much less material, manpower and aviation production capacity than Wever's "Ural Bomber".
German industry could build two medium bombers for one heavy bomber and the RLM would not
gamble on developing a heavy bomber which would also take time. Göring remarked, "the Führer will
not ask how big the bombers there are, but only how many there are."[43] The premature death of
Wever, one of the Luftwaffe's finest officers, left the Luftwaffe without a strategic air force during World
War II, which eventually proved fatal to the German war effort.[25][44][45]

The lack of strategic capability should have been apparent much earlier. The Sudeten Crisis highlighted
German unpreparedness to conduct a strategic air war (although the British and French were in a much
weaker position), and Hitler ordered the Luftwaffe be expanded to five times its earlier size.[46] OKL
badly neglected the need for transport aircraft; even in 1943, transport units were described as
Kampfgeschwadern zur besonderen Verwendung (Bomber Units on Special Duties, KGzbV).[47] and only
grouping them together into dedicated cargo and personnel transport wings (Transportgeschwader)
during that year. In March 1938, as the Anschluss was taking place, Göring ordered Felmy to investigate
the prospect of air raids against Britain. Felmy concluded it was not possible until bases in Belgium and
the Netherlands were obtained and the Luftwaffe had heavy bombers. It mattered little, as war was
avoided by the Munich Agreement, and the need for long-range aircraft did not arise.[48]

These failures were not exposed until wartime. In the meantime German designs of mid-1930s origin
such as the Messerschmitt Bf 109, Heinkel He 111, Junkers Ju 87 Stuka, and Dornier Do 17, performed
very well. All first saw active service in the Condor Legion against Soviet-supplied aircraft. The Luftwaffe
also quickly realized the days of the biplane fighter were finished, the Heinkel He 51 being switched to
service as a trainer. Particularly impressive were the Heinkel and Dornier, which fulfilled the Luftwaffe's
requirements for bombers that were faster than 1930s-era fighters, many of which were biplanes or
strut-braced monoplanes.

Despite the participation of these aircraft (mainly from 1938 onward), it was the venerable Junkers Ju 52
(which soon became the backbone of the Transportgruppen) that made the main contribution. During
the Spanish Civil War Hitler remarked, "Franco ought to erect a monument to the glory of the Junkers Ju
52. It is the aircraft which the Spanish revolution has to thank for its victory."[49]
Dive-bombing

Junkers Ju 87 Ds over the Eastern Front, winter 1943–44

Poor accuracy from level bombers in 1937 led the Luftwaffe to grasp the benefits of dive-bombing. The
latter could achieve far better accuracy against tactical ground targets than heavier conventional
bombers. Range was not a key criterion for this mission. It was not always feasible for the army to move
heavy artillery over recently captured territory to bombard fortifications or support ground forces, and
dive bombers could do the job faster. Dive bombers, often single-engine two-man machines, could
achieve better results than larger six or seven-man aircraft, at a tenth of the cost and four times the
accuracy. This led to Udet championing the dive bomber, particularly the Junkers Ju 87.[50]

Udet's "love affair" with dive bombing seriously affected the long-term development of the Luftwaffe,
especially after General Wever's death. The tactical strike aircraft programs were meant to serve as
interim solutions until the next generation of aircraft arrived. In 1936 the Junkers Ju 52 was the
backbone of the German bomber fleet. This led to a rush on the part of the RLM to produce the Junkers
Ju 86, Heinkel He 111, and Dornier Do 17 before a proper evaluation was made. The Ju 86 was poor
while the He 111 showed most promise. The Spanish Civil War convinced Udet (along with limited
output from the German munitions industry) that wastage was not acceptable in munition terms. Udet
sought to build dive bombing into the Junkers Ju 88 and conveyed the same idea, initiated specifically by
OKL for the Heinkel He 177, approved in early November 1937. In the case of the Ju 88, 50,000
modifications had to be made. The weight was increased from seven to twelve tons. This resulted in a
speed loss of 200 km/h. Udet merely conveyed OKL's own dive bombing capability request to Ernst
Heinkel concerning the He 177, who vehemently opposed such an idea, which ruined its development as
a heavy bomber.[51] Göring was not able to rescind the dive bombing requirement for the He 177A until
September 1942.[52]

Mobilization, 1938–41

By the summer of 1939, the Luftwaffe had ready for combat nine Jagdgeschwader (fighter wings) mostly
equipped with the Messerschmitt Bf 109E, four 'Zerstörergeschwader (destroyer wings) equipped with
the Messerschmitt Bf 110 heavy fighter, 11 Kampfgeschwader (bomber wings) equipped mainly with the
Heinkel He 111 and the Dornier Do 17Z, and four Sturzkampfgeschwader (dive bomber wing") primarily
armed with the iconic Junkers Ju 87B Stuka.[53] The Luftwaffe was just starting to accept the Junkers Ju
88A for service, as it had encountered design difficulties, with only a dozen aircraft of the type
considered combat-ready. The Luftwaffe's strength at this time stood at 373,000 personnel (208,000
flying troops, 107,000 in the Flak Corps and 58,000 in the Signals Corps). Aircraft strength was 4,201
operational aircraft: 1,191 bombers, 361 dive bombers, 788 fighters, 431 heavy fighters, and 488
transports. Despite deficiencies it was an impressive force.[54]
Polish girl lying dead after being strafed by German dive bombers, September 1939

However, even by the spring of 1940, the Luftwaffe still had not mobilized fully. Despite the shortage of
raw-materials, Generalluftzeugmeister Ernst Udet had increased production through introducing a 10-
hour working day for aviation industries and rationalizing production. During this period 30
Kampfstaffeln and 16 Jagdstaffeln were raised and equipped. A further five Zerstörergruppen
("Destroyer groups") were created (JGr 101, 102,126,152 and 176), all equipped with the Bf 110.[55]

The Luftwaffe also greatly expanded its aircrew training programs by 42%, to 63 flying schools. These
facilities were moved to eastern Germany, away from possible Allied threats. The number of aircrew
reached 4,727, an increase of 31%. However, the rush to complete this rapid expansion scheme resulted
in the deaths of 997 personnel and another 700 wounded. 946 aircraft were also destroyed in these
accidents. The number of aircrew completing their training was up to 3,941, The Luftwaffe's entire
strength was now 2.2 million personnel.[56]

In April and May 1941, Udet headed the Luftwaffe delegation inspecting Soviet aviation industry in
compliance with the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. Udet informed Göring "that Soviet air forces are very
strong and technically advanced." Göring decided not to report the facts to Hitler, hoping that a surprise
attack would quickly destroy the USSR.[57] Udet realized that the upcoming war on Russia might cripple
Germany. Udet, torn between truth and loyalty, suffered a psychological breakdown and even tried to
tell Hitler the truth, but Göring told Hitler that Udet was lying, then took Udet under control by giving
him drugs at drinking parties and hunting trips. Udet's drinking and psychological condition became a
problem, but Göring used Udet's dependency to manipulate him.[58]

Luftwaffe organization

Main article: Organization of the Luftwaffe (1933–45)

Luftwaffe commanders

Defendants in the dock during the Nuremberg trials. The main target of the prosecution was Hermann
Göring (at the left edge on the first row of benches), considered to be the most important surviving
official in the Third Reich after Hitler's death.

Throughout the history of Nazi Germany, the Luftwaffe had only two commanders-in-chief. The first was
Hermann Göring, with the second and last being Generalfeldmarschall Robert Ritter von Greim. His
appointment as commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe was concomitant with his promotion to
Generalfeldmarschall, the last German officer in World War II to be promoted to the highest rank. Other
officers promoted to the second highest military rank in Germany were Albert Kesselring, Hugo Sperrle,
Erhard Milch, and Wolfram von Richthofen.
At the end of the war, with Berlin surrounded by the Red Army, Göring suggested to Hitler that he take
over leadership of the Reich.[59] Hitler ordered his arrest and execution, but Göring's SS guards did not
carry out the order, and Göring survived to be tried at Nuremberg.[60]

Sperrle was prosecuted at the OKW Trial, one of the last twelve of the Nuremberg Trials after the war.
He was acquitted on all four counts. He died in Munich in 1953.

Organization and chain of command

Main article: Organization of the Luftwaffe (1933–45)

At the start of the war the Luftwaffe had four Luftflotten (air fleets), each responsible for roughly a
quarter of Germany. As the war progressed more air fleets were created as the areas under German rule
expanded. As one example, Luftflotte 5 was created in 1940 to direct operations in Norway and
Denmark, and other Luftflotten were created as necessary. Each Luftflotte would contain several
Fliegerkorps (Air Corps), Fliegerdivision (Air Division), Jagdkorps (Fighter Corps),Jagddivision (Air
Division) or Jagdfliegerführer (Fighter Air Command). Each formations would have attached to it a
number of units, usually several Geschwader, but also independent Staffeln and Kampfgruppen.[61]
Luftflotten were also responsible for the training aircraft and schools in their operational areas.[62]

A Geschwader was commanded by a Geschwaderkommodore, with the rank of either major,

Oberstleutnant (lieutenant colonel) or Oberst (colonel). Other "staff" officers within the unit with
administrative duties included the adjutant, technical officer, and operations officer, who were usually
(though not always) experienced aircrew or pilots still flying on operations. Other specialist staff were
navigation, signals, and intelligence personnel. A Stabschwarm (headquarters flight) was attached to
each Geschwader.[61]

A Jagdgeschwader (hunting wing) (JG) was a single-seat day fighter Geschwader, typically equipped with
Bf 109 or Fw 190 aircraft flying in the fighter or fighter-bomber roles. Late in the war, by 1944–45, JG 7
and JG 400 (and the jet specialist JV 44) flew much more advanced aircraft, with JG 1 working up with
jets at war's end. A Geschwader consisted of groups (Gruppen), which in turn consisted of Jagdstaffel
(fighter squadrons). Hence, Fighter Wing 1 was JG 1, its first Gruppe (group) was I./JG 1, using a Roman
numeral for the Gruppe number only, and its first Staffel (squadron) was 1./JG 1. Geschwader strength
was usually 120 – 125 aircraft.[61]

Each Gruppe was commanded by a Kommandeur, and a Staffel by a Staffelkapitän. However, these were
"appointments", not ranks, within the Luftwaffe. Usually, the Kommodore would hold the rank of
Oberstleutnant (lieutenant colonel) or, exceptionally, an Oberst (colonel). Even a Leutnant (second
lieutenant) could find himself commanding a Staffel.

Similarly, a bomber wing was a Kampfgeschwader (KG), a night fighter wing was a Nachtjagdgeschwader
(NJG), a dive bomber wing was a Stukageschwader (StG), and units equivalent to those in RAF Coastal
Command, with specific responsibilities for coastal patrols and search and rescue duties, were
Küstenfliegergruppen (Kü.Fl. Gr.). Specialist bomber groups were known as Kampfgruppen (KGr). The
strength of a bomber Geschwader was about 80–90 aircraft.[61]

Personnel

See also: Luftwaffe personnel structure and Ranks and insignia of the Luftwaffe (1935–1945)

Luftwaffe strength during the fall of 1941

Forces Personnel strength

Flying units 500,000

Anti-aircraft units 500,000

Air signal units 250,000

Construction units 150,000

Landsturm (militia) units 36,000

Source:[63]

The peacetime strength of the Luftwaffe in the spring of 1939 was 370,000 men. After the mobilization
in 1939 almost 900,000 men served, and just before Operation Barbarossa in 1941 the personnel
strength had reached 1.5 million men.[63] The Luftwaffe reached its largest personnel strength during
the period November 1943 to June 1944, with almost three million men and women in uniform; 1.7
million of these were male soldiers, 1 million male Wehrmachtsbeamte and civilian employees, and
almost 300,000 female and male auxiliaries (Luftwaffenhelfer).[64] In October 1944, the anti-aircraft
units had 600,000 soldiers and 530,000 auxiliaries, including 60,000 male members of the
Reichsarbeitsdienst, 50,000 Luftwaffenhelfer (males age 15–17), 80,000 Flakwehrmänner (males above
military age) and Flak-V-soldaten (males unfit for military service), and 160,000 female
Flakwaffenhelferinnen and RAD-Maiden, as well as 160,000 foreign personnel (Hiwis).[65][66]

Spanish Civil War

Main article: Operational history of the Luftwaffe (1939–45)

Ruins of Guernica, 1937

The Luftwaffe's Condor Legion experimented with new doctrine and aircraft during the Spanish Civil
War. It helped the Falange under Francisco Franco to defeat the Republican forces. Over 20,000 German
airmen gained combat experience that would give the Luftwaffe an important advantage going into the
Second World War. One infamous operation was the bombing of Guernica in the Basque country. It is
commonly assumed this attack was the result of a "terror doctrine" in Luftwaffe doctrine. The raids on
Guernica and Madrid caused many civilian casualties and a wave of protests in the democracies. It has
been suggested that the bombing of Guernica was carried out for military tactical reasons, in support of
ground operations, but the town was not directly involved in any fighting at that point in time. It was not
until 1942 that the Germans started to develop bombing policy in which civilians were the primary
target, although The Blitz on London and many other British cities involved indiscriminate bombing of
civilian areas,[27] 'nuisance raids' which could even involve the machine-gunning of civilians and
livestock.[67]

World War II

When World War II began, the Luftwaffe was one of the most technologically advanced air forces in the
world. During the Polish Campaign that triggered the war, it quickly established air superiority, and then
air supremacy. It supported the German Army operations which ended the campaign in five weeks. The
Luftwaffe's performance was as OKL had hoped. The Luftwaffe rendered invaluable support to the army,
[68] mopping up pockets of resistance. Göring was delighted with the performance.[69] Command and
control problems were experienced, but owing to the flexibility and improvisation of both the army and
Luftwaffe, these problems were solved. The Luftwaffe was to have in place a ground-to-air
communication system, which played a vital role in the success of Fall Gelb.[70]

In the spring of 1940, the Luftwaffe assisted the Kriegsmarine and Heer in the invasion of Norway. Flying
in reinforcements and winning air superiority, the Luftwaffe contributed decisively to the German
conquest.[71]

In the spring of 1940, the Luftwaffe contributed to the unexpected success in the Battle of France. It
destroyed three Allied Air Forces and helped secure the defeat of France in just over six weeks.[72]
However, it could not destroy the British Expeditionary Force at Dunkirk despite intense bombing. The
BEF escaped to continue the war.[73]

Gun camera film showing tracer ammunition from a Supermarine Spitfire Mark I of No. 609 Squadron
RAF, flown by Flight Lieutenant J. H. G. McArthur, hitting a Heinkel He 111 on its starboard quarter

During the Battle of Britain in summer 1940, the Luftwaffe inflicted severe damage to the Royal Air
Force, but did not achieve the air superiority that Hitler demanded for the proposed invasion of Britain,
which was postponed and then cancelled in December 1940.[74] The Luftwaffe ravaged British cities
during The Blitz, but failed to break British morale. Hitler had already ordered preparations to be made
for Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union.

In spring 1941, the Luftwaffe helped its Axis partner, Italy, secure victory in the Balkans Campaign and
continued to support Italy in the Mediterranean, Middle East and African theatres until May 1945.

In June 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union. The Luftwaffe destroyed thousands of Soviet aircraft,
yet it failed to destroy the Red Air Force altogether. Lacking strategic bombers (the very "Ural bombers"
that General Wever had asked for six years before) the Luftwaffe could not strike at Soviet production
centers regularly or with the needed force.[75] As the war dragged on, the Luftwaffe was eroded in
strength. The defeats at the Battle of Stalingrad and Battle of Kursk ensured the gradual decline of the
Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front.

British historian Frederick Taylor asserts that "all sides bombed each other's cities during the war. Half a
million Soviet citizens, for example, died from German bombing during the invasion and occupation of
Russia. That's roughly equivalent to the number of German citizens who died from Allied raids."[76]

Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe continued to defend German-occupied Europe against the growing offensive
power of RAF Bomber Command and, starting in the summer of 1942, the steadily building strength of
the United States Army Air Forces. The mounting demands of the Defence of the Reich campaign
gradually destroyed the Luftwaffe's fighter arm. Despite its belated use of advanced turbojet and rocket
propelled aircraft for bomber destroyer duties, it was overwhelmed by Allied numbers and a lack of
trained pilots and fuel. A last-ditch attempt, known as Operation Bodenplatte, to win air superiority on 1
January 1945 failed. After the Bodenplatte effort, the Luftwaffe ceased to be an effective fighting force.

German day and night fighter pilots claimed more than 70,000 aerial victories during World War II.[77]
Of these, about 745 victories are estimated to be achieved by jet fighters.[78] Flak shot down 25,000–
30,000 Allied planes. Broken down on the different Allies, about 25,000 were American planes,[79]
about 20,000 British, 46,100 Soviet,[80] 1,274 French,[81] 375 Polish,[82] and 81 Dutch as well as
aircraft from other Allied nationalities.

The highest scoring day fighter pilot was Erich Hartmann with 352 confirmed kills, all of them at the
Eastern front against the Soviets. The leading aces in the west were Hans-Joachim Marseille with 158
kills against planes from the British Empire (RAF, RAAF, and SAAF) and Georg-Peter Eder with 56 kills of
aircraft from the USAAF (of a total of 78). The most successful night fighter pilot was Heinz-Wolfgang
Schnaufer, who is credited with 121 kills. 103 German fighter pilots shot down more than 100 enemy
aircraft for a total of roughly 15,400 aerial victories. Roughly a further 360 pilots claimed between 40
and 100 aerial victories for round about 21,000 victories. Another 500 fighter pilots claimed between 20
and 40 victories for a total of 15,000 victories. It is relatively certain that 2,500 German fighter pilots
attained ace status, having achieved at least five aerial victories.[83][84] These achievements were
honored with 453 German single and twin-engine (Messerschmitt Bf 110) day fighter pilots having
received the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. 85 night fighter pilots, including 14 crew members, were
awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross.[85] Some Bomber pilots were also highly successful. The
Stuka and Schlachtflieger pilot Hans-Ulrich Rudel flew 2,530 ground-attack missions and claimed the
destruction of more than 519 tanks and a battleship, among others. He was the most highly decorated
German serviceman of the Second World War. The Bomber pilot Hansgeorg Bätcher flew more than 658
combat missions destroying numerous ships and other targets.

Losses on the other hand were high as well. The estimated total number of destroyed and damaged for
the war totaled 76,875 aircraft. Of these, about 43,000 were lost in combat, the rest in operational
accidents and during training.[86] By type, losses totaled 21,452 fighters, 12,037 bombers, 15,428
trainers, 10,221 twin-engine fighters, 5,548 ground attack, 6,733 reconnaissance, and 6,141 transports.
[87]

According to the General Staff of the Wehrmacht the losses of the flight personnel until February 1945
amounted to:[88]

KIA: 6,527 officers and 43,517 enlisted men

WIA: 4,194 officers and 27,811 enlisted men

MIA: 4,361 officers and 27,240 enlisted men

total: 15,082 officers and 98,568 enlisted men

According to official statistics, total Luftwaffe casualties, including ground personnel, amounted to
138,596 killed and 156,132 missing through 31 January 1945.[89]

Omissions and failures

Lack of aerial defence

The failure of the Luftwaffe in the Defence of the Reich campaign was a result of a number of factors.
The Luftwaffe lacked an effective air defence system early in the war. Adolf Hitler's foreign policy had
pushed Germany into war before these defences could be fully developed. The Luftwaffe was forced to
improvise and construct its defences during the war.

The daylight actions over German controlled territory were sparse in 1939–1940. The responsibility of
the defence of German air space fell to the Luftgaukommandos (air district commands). The defence
systems relied mostly on the "flak" arm. The defences were not coordinated and communication was
poor. This lack of understanding between the flak and flying branches of the defence would plague the
Luftwaffe throughout the war.[90] Hitler in particular wanted the defence to rest on anti-aircraft artillery
as it gave the civilian population a "psychological crutch" no matter how ineffective the weapons.[91]

Most of the battles fought by the Luftwaffe on the Western Front were against the RAF's "Circus" raids
and the occasional daylight raid into German air space. This was a fortunate position since the
Luftwaffe's strategy of focusing its striking power on one front started to unravel with the failure of the
invasion of the Soviet Union. The "peripheral" strategy of the Luftwaffe between 1939 and 1940 had
been to deploy its fighter defences at the edges of Axis occupied territory, with little protecting the inner
depths.[92] Moreover, the front line units in the West were complaining about the poor numbers and
performance of aircraft. Units complained of lack of Zerstörer aircraft with all-weather capabilities and
the "lack of climbing power of the Bf 109".[92] The Luftwaffe's technical edge was slipping as the only
formidable new aircraft in the German arsenal was the Focke-Wulf Fw 190. Generalfeldmarschall Erhard
Milch was to assist Ernst Udet with aircraft production increases and introduction of more modern types
of fighter aircraft. However, they explained at a meeting of the Reich Industrial Council on 18 September
1941 that the new next generation aircraft had failed to materialize, and production of obsolete types
had to continue to meet the growing need for replacements.[92]

The buildup of the Jagdwaffe ("Fighter Force") was too rapid and its quality suffered. It was not put
under a unified command until 1943, which also affected performance of the nine Jagdgeschwader
fighter wings in existence in 1939. No further units were formed until 1942, and the years of 1940–1941
were wasted. OKL failed to construct a strategy; instead its command style was reactionary, and its
measures not as effective without thorough planning. This was particularly apparent with the Sturmböck
squadrons, formed to replace the increasingly ineffective twin-engined Zerstörer twin-engined heavy
fighter wings as the primary defense against USAAF daylight raids. The Sturmböcke flew Fw 190A
fighters armed with heavy 20 mm and 30 mm cannon to destroy heavy bombers, but this increased the
weight and affected the performance of the Fw 190 at a time when the aircraft were meeting large
numbers of equal if not superior Allied types.[93]

Daytime aerial defense against the USAAF's strongly defended heavy bomber forces, particularly the
Eighth Air Force and the Fifteenth Air Force, had its successes through the calendar year of 1943. But at
the start of 1944, Eighth AF commander Jimmy Doolittle made a major change in offensive fighter
tactics, which defeated the Luftwaffe's day fighter force from that time onwards. Steadily increasing
numbers of the superlative North American P-51 Mustang single-engine fighter, leading the USAAF's
bombers into German airspace defeated first the Bf 110 Zerstörer wings, then the Fw 190A Sturmböcke.

Development and equipment

The most troublesome of all German designs during WW II – both in development and in service – was
the He 177A Greif heavy bomber.

In terms of technological development, the failure to develop a long-range bomber and capable long-
range fighters during this period left the Luftwaffe unable to conduct a meaningful strategic bombing
campaign throughout the war.[94] However, Germany at that time suffered from limitations in raw
materials such as oil and aluminium, which meant that there were insufficient resources for much
beyond a tactical air force: given these circumstances, the Luftwaffe's reliance on tactical mid-range,
twin engined medium bombers and short range dive-bombers was a pragmatic choice of strategy.[95]
[96] It might also be argued that the Luftwaffe's Kampfgeschwader medium and heavy bomber wings
were perfectly capable of attacking strategic targets, but the lack of capable long range escort fighters
left the bombers unable to carry out their missions effectively against determined and well organised
fighter opposition.[97]

The greatest failure for the Kampfgeschwader, however, was being saddled with an aircraft intended as
a capable four-engined heavy bomber: the perpetually troubled Heinkel He 177, whose engines were
prone to catch fire in flight. Of the three parallel proposals from the Heinkel engineering departments
for a four engined version of the A-series He 177 by February 1943, only one, the He 177B, emerged in
the concluding months of 1943. Only three airworthy prototypes of the B-series He 177 design were
produced by early 1944, some three years after the first prototype flights of the Avro Lancaster, the
most successful RAF heavy bomber.

Arguably, one of the greatest tactical failures was the neglect of naval aviation in the western theatre,
1939–1941. (pictured is a Focke-Wulf Fw 200 C Condor)

Another failure of procurement and equipment was the lack of a dedicated naval air arm. General Felmy
had already expressed a desire to build a naval air arm to support Kriegsmarine operations in the
Atlantic and British waters. Britain was dependent on food and raw materials from its Empire and North
America. Felmy pressed this case firmly throughout 1938 and 1939, and, on 31 October 1939,
Großadmiral Erich Raeder sent a strongly worded letter to Göring in support of such proposals. The
early-war twin-engined Heinkel He 115 floatplane and Dornier Do 18 flying boat were too slow and
short-ranged. The then-contemporary Blohm & Voss BV 138 Seedrache (seadragon) trimotor flying boat
became the Luftwaffe's primary seaborne maritime patrol platform, with nearly 300 examples built; its
trio of Junkers Jumo 205 diesel engines gave it a 4,300 km (2,670 mi) maximum range. Another Blohm
und Voss design of 1940, the enormous, 46-meter wingspan six-engined Blohm und Voss BV 222 Wiking
maritime patrol flying boat, would see it capable of a 6,800 km (4,200-mile) range at maximum
endurance when using higher-output versions of the same Jumo 205 powerplants as used by the BV
138, in later years. The Dornier Do 217 would have been ideal as a land-based choice, but suffered
production problems. Raeder also complained about the poor standard of aerial torpedoes, although
their design was the responsibility of the Wehrmacht combined military's naval arm (the Kriegsmarine),
even considering production of the Japanese Type 91 torpedo used at Pearl Harbor as the Lufttorpedo
LT 850 by August 1942. (See both:Yanagi missions and Heinkel He 111 torpedo bomber operations)[98]
[99]

Without specialised naval or land-based, purpose-designed maritime patrol aircraft, the Luftwaffe was
forced to improvise. The Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor airliner's airframe – engineered for civilian airliner
use – lacked the structural strength for combat maneuvering at lower altitudes, making it unsuitable for
use as a bomber in maritime patrol duties. The Condor lacked speed, armour and bomb load capacity.
Sometimes the fuselage literally "broke its back" or a wing panel dropped loose from the wing root after
a hard landing. Nevertheless, this civilian transport was adapted for the long-range reconnaissance and
anti-shipping roles and, between August 1940 and February 1941, Fw 200s sank 85 vessels for a claimed
total of 363,000 Grt. Had the Luftwaffe focused on naval aviation – particularly maritime patrol aircraft
with long range, like the aforementioned diesel-powered multi-engine Blohm & Voss flying boats –
Germany might well have been in a position to win the Battle of the Atlantic. However, Raeder and the
Kriegsmarine failed to press for naval air power until the war began, mitigating the Luftwaffe's
responsibility. In addition, Göring regarded any other branch of the German military developing its own
aviation as an encroachment on his authority and continually frustrated the Navy's attempts to build its
own airpower.[97]

The absence of a strategic bomber force for the Luftwaffe, following General Wever's accidental death in
the early summer of 1936 and the end of the Ural bomber program he fostered before the invasion of
Poland, would not be addressed again until the authorization of the "Bomber B" design competition in
July 1939, which sought to replace the medium bomber force with which the Luftwaffe was to begin the
war, and the partly achieved Schnellbomber high-speed medium bomber concept with more advanced,
twin-engined high speed bomber aircraft fitted with pairs of relatively "high-power" engines of 1,500 kW
(2,000 hp) output levels and upwards each as a follow-on to the earlier Schnellbomber project, that
would also be able to function as shorter range heavy bombers.

Oberst Edgar Petersen, the head of the Luftwaffe's Erprobungsstellen network of test facilities late in the
war

The spring 1942 Amerika Bomber program also sought to produce useful strategic bomber designs for
the Luftwaffe, with their prime design priority being an advanced trans-oceanic range capability as the
main aim of the project to directly attack the United States from Europe or the Azores. Inevitably, both
the Bomber B and Amerika Bomber programs were victims of the continued emphasis of the
Wehrmacht combined military's insistence for its Luftwaffe air arm to support the Heer as its primary
mission, and the damage to the German aviation industry from Allied bomber attacks.

Challenges in directly addressing combat pilots' issues

The RLM's apparent lack of a dedicated "technical-tactical" department, that would have directly been
in contact with combat pilots to assess their needs for weaponry upgrades and tactical advice, had never
been seriously envisioned as a critically ongoing necessity in the planning of the original German air arm.
[100] The RLM did have its own Technisches Amt (T-Amt) department to handle aviation technology
issues, but this was tasked with handling all aviation technology issues in the Third Reich, both military
and civilian in nature, and also not known to have ever had any clear and actively administrative and
consultative links with the front-line forces established for such purposes. On the front-line combat side
of the issue, and for direct contact with the German aviation firms making the Luftwaffe's warplanes, the
Luftwaffe did have its own reasonably effective system of four military aviation test facilities, or
Erprobungstellen located at three coastal sites – Peenemünde-West (also incorporating a separate
facility in nearby Karlshagen), Tarnewitz and Travemünde – and the central inland site of Rechlin, itself
first established as a military airfield in late August 1918 by the German Empire, with the four-facility
system commanded later in World War II by Oberst (Colonel) Edgar Petersen. However, due to lack of
co-ordination between the RLM and OKL, all fighter and bomber development was oriented toward
short range aircraft, as they could be produced in greater numbers, rather than quality long range
aircraft, something that put the Luftwaffe at a disadvantage as early as the Battle of Britain.[100] The
"ramp-up" to production levels required to fulfill the Luftwaffe's front-line needs was also slow, not
reaching maximum output until 1944.[100] Production of fighters was not given priority until 1944;
Adolf Galland commented that this should have occurred at least a year earlier.[100] Galland also
pointed to the mistakes and challenges made in the development of the Messerschmitt Me 262 jet –
which included the protracted development time required for its Junkers Jumo 004 jet engines to
achieve reliability. German combat aircraft types that were first designed and flown in the mid-1930s
had become obsolete, yet were kept in production, in particular the Ju 87 Stuka, and the Bf 109, because
there were no well-developed replacement designs.[100]

Production failures

The failure of German production was evident from the start of the Battle of Britain. By the end of 1940
the Luftwaffe had suffered heavy losses and needed to regroup. Deliveries of new aircraft were
insufficient to meet the drain on resources; the Luftwaffe, unlike the RAF, was failing to expand its pilot
and aircraft numbers.[101] This was partly owing to production planning failures before the war and the
demands of the army. Nevertheless, the German aircraft industry was being outproduced in 1940. In
terms of fighter aircraft production, the British exceeded their production plans by 43%, while the
Germans remained 40% "behind" target by the summer 1940. In fact German production in fighters fell
from 227 to 177 per month between July and September 1940.[101] One of the many reasons for the
failure of the Luftwaffe in 1940 was that it did not have the operational and material means to destroy
the British aircraft industry,[102] something that the much-anticipated Bomber B design competition
was intended to address.

The so-called "Göring program", had largely been predicated on the defeat of the Soviet Union in 1941.
After the Wehrmacht's failure in front of Moscow, industrial priorities for a possibility in increasing
aircraft production were largely abandoned in favor to support the army's increased attrition rates and
heavy equipment losses.[103] Erhard Milch's reforms expanded production rates. In 1941 an average of
981 aircraft (including 311 fighters) were produced each month.[103] In 1942 this rose to 1,296 aircraft
of which 434 were fighters.[103] Milch's planned production increases were initially opposed. But in
June, he was granted materials for 900 fighters per month as the average output. By the Summer of
1942, Luftwaffe's operational fighter force had recovered from a low of 39% (44% for fighters and 31%
for bombers) in Winter of 1941–1942, to 69% by late June (75% for fighters and 66% for bombers) in
1942. However, after increased commitments in the east, overall operational ready rates fluctuated
between 59% and 65% for the remaining year.[104] Throughout 1942 the Luftwaffe was out produced in
fighter aircraft by 250% and in twin-engine aircraft by 196%.[105]

The appointment of Albert Speer as Minister of Armaments increased production of existing designs,
and the few new designs that had originated from earlier in the war. However the intensification of
Allied bombing caused the dispersion of production and prevented an efficient acceleration of
expansion. German aviation production reached about 36,000 combat aircraft for 1944. However, by the
time this was achieved the Luftwaffe lacked the fuel and trained pilots to make this achievement worth
while.[106]

The failure to maximize production immediately after the failures in the Soviet Union and North Africa
ensured the Luftwaffe's effective defeat in the period of September 1943 – February 1944. Despite the
tactical victories won, they failed to achieve a decisive victory. By the time production reached
acceptable levels, as so many other factors had for the Luftwaffe – and for the entire Wehrmacht's
weapons and ordnance technology as a whole – late in the war, it was "too little, too late".[106]

Engine development

By the late 1930s, airframe construction methods had progressed to the point where airframes could be
built to any required size, founded on the all-metal airframe design technologies pioneered by Hugo
Junkers in 1915 and constantly improved upon for over two decades to follow – especially in Germany
with aircraft like the Dornier Do X flying boat and the Junkers G 38 airliner. However, powering such
designs was a major challenge. Mid-1930s aero engines were limited to about 600 hp and the first 1000
hp engines were just entering the prototype stage – for the then-new Third Reich's Luftwaffe air arm,
this meant liquid-cooled inverted V12 designs like the Daimler-Benz DB 601.

The United States had already gotten its start towards this goal by 1937 with two large displacement,
twin-row 18-cylinder air-cooled radial engine designs of at least 46 litres (2,800 in3) displacement each:
the Pratt & Whitney Double Wasp and the Wright Duplex-Cyclone.[107]

Nazi Germany's initial need for substantially more powerful aviation engines originated with the private
venture Heinkel He 119 high-speed reconnaissance design, and the ostensibly twin-"engined"
Messerschmitt Me 261 for maritime reconnaissance duties – to power each of these designs, Daimler-
Benz literally "doubled-up" their new, fuel-injected DB 601 engines. This "doubling-up" involved placing
two DB 601s side-by-side on either side of a common vertical-plane space frame with their crankcases'
outer sides each having a mount similar to what would be used in a single-engine installation, creating a
"mirror-image" centrifugal supercharger for the starboard-side component DB 601, inclining the top
ends of their crankcases inwards by roughly 30º to mate with the space-frame central mount, and
placing a common propeller gear reduction housing across the front ends of the two engines. Such a
twin-crankcased "power system" aviation engine crafted from a pair of DB 601s resulted in the 2,700 PS
(1,986 kW) maximum output DB 606 "coupled" engine design for these two aircraft in February 1937,
but with each of the DB 606 "coupled" engines weighing in at around 1.5 tonnes apiece.[108]

The early development of the DB 606 "coupled" engines, was paralleled during the late 1930s with
Daimler-Benz's simultaneous development of a 1,500 kW class engine design using a single crankcase.
The result was the twenty-four cylinder Daimler-Benz DB 604 X-configuration engine, with four banks of
six cylinders each. Possessing essentially the same displacement of 46.5 litres (2830 in3) as the initial
version of the liquid-cooled Junkers Jumo 222 multibank engine, itself a "converse" choice in
configuration to the DB 604 in possessing six banks of four inline cylinders apiece instead; coincidentally,
both the original Jumo 222 design and the DB 604 each weighed about a third less (at some 1,080
kg/2,379 lb of dry weight) than the DB 606, but the DB 604's protracted development was diverting
valuable German aviation powerplant research resources, and with more development of the "twinned-
DB 605" based DB 610 coupled engine (itself initiated in June 1940 with top output level of 2950 PS
(2,909 hp),[108] and brought together in the same way – with the same all-up weight of 1.5 tonnes – as
the DB 606 had been) giving improved results at the time, the Reich Air Ministry stopped all work on the
DB 604 in September 1942.[109] Such "coupled powerplants" were the exclusive choice of power for the
Heinkel He 177A Greif heavy bomber, mistasked from its beginnings in being intended to do moderate-
angle "dive bombing" for a 30-meter wingspan class, heavy bomber design – the twin nacelles for a pair
of DB 606s or 610s did reduce drag for such a combat "requirement", but the poor design of the He
177A's engine accommodations for these twin-crankcase "power systems" caused repeated outbreaks
of engine fires, causing the "dive bombing" requirement for the He 177A to be cancelled by mid-
September 1942.[110]

A restored DB 610 "power system" engine, comprising a pair of DB 605 inverted V12s – the top of its
central space-frame motor-mount structure can be seen.

BMW worked on what was essentially an enlarged version of its highly successful BMW 801 design from
the Focke-Wulf Fw 190A. This led to the 53.7-litre displacement BMW 802 in 1943, an eighteen-cylinder
air-cooled radial, which nearly matched the American Duplex-Cyclone's 54.9-litre figure, but with a
weight of some 1,530 kg (3,370 lb) matching that of the 24-cylinder liquid-cooled inline DB 606; and the
even larger, 83.5-litre displacement BMW 803 28-cylinder liquid-cooled radial, which from post-war
statements from BMW development personnel were each considered to be "secondary priority"
development programs at best. This situation with the 802 and 803 designs led to the company's
engineering personnel being redirected to place all efforts on improving the 801 to develop it to its full
potential.[111] The BMW 801F radial development, through its use of features coming from the 801E
subtype, was able to substantially exceed the over-1,500 kW output level.[112] The two closest Allied
equivalents to the 801 in configuration and displacement – the American Wright Twin Cyclone, and the
Soviet Shvetsov ASh-82 radials – never had any need to be developed beyond a 1,500 kW output level,
as larger-displacement, 18-cylinder radial aviation engines in both nations (the aforementioned
American Double Wasp and Duplex-Cyclone) and the eventual 1945 premiere of the Soviet Shvetsov
ASh-73 design, all three of which started their development before 1940, handled needs for even
greater power from large radial aviation engines.

The twinned-up Daimler-Benz DB 601-based, 1,750 kW output DB 606, and its more powerful
descendant, the 2,130 kW output DB 605-based DB 610, weighing some 1.5 tonnes apiece, were the
only 1,500 kW-plus output level aircraft powerplants to ever be produced by Germany for Luftwaffe
combat aircraft, mostly for the aforementioned Heinkel He 177A heavy bomber. Even the largest-
displacement inverted V12 aircraft powerplant built in Germany, the 44.52-litre (2,717 cu. in.) Daimler-
Benz DB 603, which saw widespread use in twin-engined designs, could not exceed the 1,500 kW output
level without more development. By March 1940, even the DB 603 was being "twinned-up"[108] as the
601/606 and 605/610 had been, to become their replacement "power system": this was the strictly
experimental, approximately 1.8-tonne weight apiece, twin-crankcase DB 613; capable of over 2,570 kW
(3,495 PS) output, but which never left its test phase.

The proposed over-1,500 kW output subtypes of German aviation industry's existing piston aviation
engine designs—which adhered to using just a single crankcase that were able to substantially exceed
the aforementioned over-1,500 kW output level—were the DB 603 LM (1,800 kW at take-off, in
production), the DB 603 N (2,205 kW at take-off, planned for 1946) and the BMW 801F (1,765 kW (2,400
PS) engines. The pioneering nature of jet engine technology in the 1940s resulted in numerous
development problems for both of Germany's major jet engine designs to see mass production, the
Jumo 004 and BMW 003 (both of pioneering axial flow design), with the more powerful Heinkel HeS 011
never leaving the test phase, as only 19 examples of the HeS 011 would ever be built for development.
[113] Even with such dismal degrees of success for such advanced aviation powerplant designs, more
and more design proposals for new German combat aircraft in the 1943–45 period centered either
around the failed Jumo 222 or HeS 011 aviation powerplants for their propulsion.

Personnel and leadership

The bomber arm was given preference and received the "better" pilots. Later, fighter pilot leaders were
few in numbers as a result of this. As with the late shift to fighter production, the Luftwaffe pilot schools
did not give the fighter pilot schools preference soon enough. The Luftwaffe, OKW argued, was still an
offensive weapon, and its primary focus was on producing bomber pilots. This attitude prevailed until
the second half of 1943.[100] During the Defence of the Reich campaign in 1943 and 1944, there were
not enough commissioned fighter pilots and leaders to meet attrition rates;[100] as the need arose to
replace aircrew (as attrition rates increased), the quality of pilot training deteriorated rapidly. Later this
was made worse by fuel shortages for pilot training. Overall this meant reduced training on operational
types, formation flying, gunnery training, and combat training, and a total lack of instrument training.
[100]

At the beginning of the war commanders were replaced with younger commanders too quickly. These
younger commanders had to learn "in the field" rather than entering a post fully qualified. Training of
formation leaders was not systematic until 1943, which was far too late, with the Luftwaffe already
stretched. The Luftwaffe thus lacked a cadre of staff officers to set up, man, and pass on experience.
[100]

Moreover, Luftwaffe leadership from the start poached the training command, which undermined its
ability to replace losses,[62] while also planning for "short sharp campaigns",[114] which did not pertain.
Moreover, no plans were laid for night fighters.[114] In fact, when protests were raised, Hans
Jeschonnek, Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe, said, "First we've got to beat Russia, then we can
start training!"[115]

Luftwaffe ground forces

One of the unique characteristics of the Luftwaffe (as opposed to other independent air forces) was the
possession of an organic paratrooper force called Fallschirmjäger. Established in 1938, they saw action in
their proper role during 1940–1941, most notably in the capture of the Belgian Army fortress at the
Battle of Fort Eben-Emael and the Battle for The Hague in May 1940, and during the Battle of Crete in
May 1941. However, more than 4,000 Fallschirmjäger were killed during the Crete operation.[116]
Afterwards, although continuing to be trained in parachute delivery, paratroopers were only used in a
parachute role for smaller-scale operations, such as the rescue of Benito Mussolini in 1943.
Fallschirmjäger formations were mainly used as crack foot infantry in all theatres of the war. Their losses
were 22,041 KIA, 57,594 WIA and 44,785 MIA (until February 1945).[88]

During 1942 surplus Luftwaffe personnel (see above) was used to form the Luftwaffe Field Divisions,
standard infantry divisions that were used chiefly as rear echelon units to free up front line troops. From
1943, the Luftwaffe also had an armoured paratroop division called Fallschirm-Panzer Division 1
Hermann Göring, which was expanded to a Panzerkorps in 1944.

Ground support and combat units from the Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD) and the National Socialist Motor
Corps (NSKK) were also put at the Luftwaffe's disposal during the war. In 1942 56 RAD companies served
with the Luftwaffe in the West as airfield construction troops. In 1943 420 RAD companies were trained
as anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) and posted to existing Luftwaffe AAA battalions in the homeland. At the
end of the war, these units were also fighting allied tanks. Beginning in 1939 with a transport regiment,
the NSKK had in 1942 a complete division sized transportation unit serving the Luftwaffe, the NSKK
Transportgruppe Luftwaffe serving in France and at the Eastern front. The overwhelming number of its
12,000 members were Belgian, Dutch and French citizens.[117]

War crimes and bombing of non-military targets

Forced labor

See also: Jägerstab, Luftwaffe guards at concentration camps, and Companies involved in the Holocaust

Aircraft factory at Flossenbürg concentration camp

In 1943 and 1944, aircraft production was moved to concentration camps in order to alleviate labor
shortages and to protect production from Allied air raids. The two largest aircraft factories in Germany
were located at Mauthausen-Gusen and Mittelbau-Dora concentration camps.[118] Aircraft parts were
also manufactured at Flossenbürg, Buchenwald, Dachau, Ravensbrück, Gross-Rosen, Natzweiler,
Herzogenbusch, and Neuengamme.[119][120] In 1944 and 1945, as many as 90,000 concentration
prisoners worked in the aviation industry, and were about one tenth of the concentration camp
population over the winter of 1944–45.[121][N 3] Partly in response to the Luftwaffe's demand for more
forced laborers to increase fighter production, the concentration camp more than doubled between
mid-1943 (224,000) and mid-1944 (524,000).[130] Part of this increase was due to the deportation of
the Hungarian Jews; the Jägerstab program was used to justify the deportations to the Hungarian
government. Of the 437,000 Hungarian Jews deported between May and July 1944, about 320,000 were
gassed on arrival at Auschwitz and the remainder forced to work. Only 50,000 survived.[131][132]

Almost 1,000 fuselages of the jet fighter Messerschmitt Me 262 were produced at Gusen, a subcamp of
Mauthausen and brutal Nazi labor camp,[133][134] where the average life expectancy was six months.
[135] By 1944, one-third of production at the crucial Regensburg plant that produced the Bf 109, the
backbone of the Luftwaffe fighter arm, originated in Gusen and Flossenbürg alone.[133] Synthetic oil
was produced from shale oil deposits by prisoners of Mittlebau-Dora as part of Operation Desert
directed by Edmund Geilenberg in order to make up for the decrease in oil production due to Allied
bombing. For oil production, three subcamps were constructed and 15,000 prisoners forced to work in
the plant. More than 3,500 people died.[136] Vaivara concentration camp in Estonia was also
established for shale oil extraction;[137] about 20,000 prisoners worked there and more than 1,500 died
at Vaivara.[138]

Manufacture of V-1 and V-2 rockets in the Mittelwerk tunnels, resulting in the deaths of more than
12,000 people

Luftwaffe airfields were frequently maintained using forced labor. Thousands of inmates from five
subcamps of Stutthof worked on the airfields.[139] Airfields and bases near several other concentration
camps[N 4] and ghettos[N 5] were constructed or maintained by prisoners. On the orders of the
Luftwaffe, prisoners from Buchenwald and Herzogenbusch were forced to defuse bombs that had fallen
around Düsseldorf[149] and Leeuwarden respectively.[150]

Thousands of Luftwaffe personnel worked as concentration camp guards. Auschwitz included a

munitions factory guarded by Luftwaffe soldiers;[151] 2,700 Luftwaffe personnel worked as guards at
Buchenwald.[152] Dozens of camps and subcamps were staffed primarily by Luftwaffe soldiers.[N 6]
According to the Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos, it was typical for camps devoted to armaments
production to be run by the branch of the Wehrmacht that used the products.[126] In 1944, many
Luftwaffe soldiers were transferred to concentration camps to alleviate personnel shortages.[153]

Massacres

Further information: Bandenbekämpfung and List of Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS divisions that
committed war crimes in Italy

Civilians murdered by Luftwaffe paratroopers in Kondomari, Crete

Luftwaffe paratroopers committed many war crimes in Crete following the Battle of Crete, including the
Alikianos executions,[154] Massacre of Kondomari,[155] and the Razing of Kandanos.[156] Several
Luftwaffe divisions, including the 1st Parachute Division,[157] 2nd Parachute Division,[158] 4th
Parachute Division,[159] 19th Luftwaffe Field Division,[160] 20th Luftwaffe Field Division[161] and the
1st Fallschirm-Panzer Division,[162] committed war crimes in Italy, murdering hundreds of civilians.

Luftwaffe troops participated in the murder of Jews imprisoned in ghettos in Eastern Europe, for
example assisting in the murder of 2,680 Jews at the Nemirov ghetto,[163] participating in a series of
massacres at the Opoczno ghetto,[164] and helping to liquidate the Dęblin–Irena Ghetto by deporting
thousands of Jews to the Treblinka extermination camp.[165] Between 1942 and 1944, two Luftwaffe
security battalions were stationed in the Białowieża Forest for Bandenbekämpfung[N 7] operations.[166]
Encouraged by Göring, they murdered thousands of Jews and other civilians.[167] Luftwaffe soldiers
frequently executed Polish civilians at random with baseless accuastions of being "Bolshevik agents", in
order to keep the population in line,[168] or as reprisal for partisan activities.[169] The performance of
the troops was measured by the body count of people murdered.[170] Ten thousand Luftwaffe troops
were stationed on the Eastern Front for such "anti-partisan" operations.[171]

Human experimentation

See also: Nazi human experimentation

Professor Ernst Holzlöhner (left) and Luftwaffe doctor Sigmund Rascher (right) perform a cold water
immersion experiment at Dachau. The subject is wearing an experimental Luftwaffe garment.

Throughout the war, concentration camp prisoners were forced to serve as human guinea pigs in testing
Luftwaffe equipment. Some were carried out by Luftwaffe personnel and others were performed by the
SS on the orders of the OKL.

In 1941, experiments with the intent of discovering means to prevent and treat hypothermia were
carried out for the Luftwaffe, which had lost aircrew to immersion hypothermia after ditchings.[172] The
experiments were conducted at Dachau and Auschwitz. Sigmund Rascher, a Luftwaffe[172] doctor based
at Dachau, published the results at the 1942 medical conference entitled "Medical Problems Arising
from Sea and Winter".[173] Of about 400 prisoners forced to participate in cold-water experiments, 80
to 90 were killed.[172]

In early 1942, prisoners at Dachau were used by Rascher in experiments to perfect ejection seats at high
altitudes. A low-pressure chamber containing these prisoners was used to simulate conditions at
altitudes of up to 20,000 metres (66,000 ft). It was rumoured that Rascher performed vivisections on the
brains of victims who survived the initial experiment.[174] Of the 200 subjects, 80 died from the
experimentation,[172] and the others were executed.[173] Eugen Hagen, head doctor of the Luftwaffe,
infected inmates of Natzweiler concentration camp with typhus in order to test the efficacy of proposed
vaccines.[175]

Aerial bombing of non-military targets

See also: Bombing of Wieluń and Operation Retribution (1941)

Bomb-damaged buildings in Belgrade in April 1941

No positive or specific customary international humanitarian law with respect to aerial warfare existed
prior to or during World War II.[176] This is also why no Luftwaffe officers were prosecuted at the post-
World War II Allied war crime trials for the aerial raids.[177]

The bombing of Wieluń was an air raid on the Polish town of Wieluń by the Luftwaffe on 1 September
1939. The Luftwaffe started bombing Wieluń at 04:40, five minutes before the shelling of Westerplatte,
which has traditionally been considered the beginning of World War II in Europe. The air raid on the
town was one of the first aerial bombings of the war.[178] About 1,300 civilians were killed, hundreds
injured, and 90 percent of the town centre was destroyed. The casualty rate was more than twice as
high as Guernica.[178] A 1989 Sender Freies Berlin documentary stated that there were no military or
industrial targets in the area,[179][180] except for a small sugar factory in the outskirts of the town.
Furthermore, Trenkner stated that German bombers first destroyed the town's hospital.[180] Two
attempts, in 1978 and 1983, to prosecute individuals for the bombing of the Wieluń hospital were
dismissed by West German judges when prosecutors stated that the pilots had been unable to make out
the nature of the structure due to fog.[181][182]

Operation Retribution was the April 1941 German bombing of Belgrade, the capital of the Kingdom of
Yugoslavia. The bombing deliberately targeted the killing of civilians as punishment, and resulted in
17,000 civilian deaths.[183] It occurred in the first days of the World War II German-led Axis invasion of
Yugoslavia. The operation commenced on 6 April and concluded on 7 or 8 April, resulting in the paralysis
of Yugoslav civilian and military command and control, widespread destruction in the centre of the city
and many civilian casualties. Following the Yugoslav capitulation, Luftwaffe engineers conducted a bomb
damage assessment in Belgrade. The report stated that 218.5 metric tons (215.0 long tons; 240.9 short
tons) of bombs were dropped, with 10 to 14 percent being incendiaries. It listed all the targets of the
bombing, which included: the royal palace, the war ministry, military headquarters, the central post
office, the telegraph office, passenger and goods railway stations, power stations and barracks. It also
mentioned that seven aerial mines were dropped, and that areas in the centre and northwest of the city
had been destroyed, comprising 20 to 25 percent of its total area. Some aspects of the bombing remain
unexplained, particularly the use of the aerial mines.[184] In contrast, Pavlowitch states that almost 50
percent of housing in Belgrade was destroyed.[185] After the invasion, the Germans forced between
3,500 and 4,000 Jews to collect rubble that was caused by the bombing.[186]

Trials

Main article: List of Luftwaffe personnel convicted of war crimes

Several prominent Luftwaffe commanders were convicted of war crimes, including General Alexander
Löhr[187] and Field Marshal Albert Kesselring.[188]

See also

Bombing of Guernica

Der Adler, Luftwaffe's propaganda magazine

Luftwaffe Signal Intelligence Organisation

Organization of the Luftwaffe (1933–45)

Military Ranks of the Luftwaffe (1935–45)

List of flags of Luftwaffe (1933–45)

Uniforms of the Luftwaffe (1935–45)

German Air Fleets in World War II

List of World War II military aircraft of Germany

Schnellbomber

Bomber B

Amerika Bomber

Emergency Fighter Program

Luftwaffe serviceable aircraft strengths (1940–45)

Trial of Erhardt Milch

High Command Trial

List of World War II aces from Germany

List of German aircraft projects, 1939-45

List of German World War II jet aces

List of German World War II night fighter aces

List of weapons of military aircraft of Germany during World War II

List of Luftwaffe personnel convicted of war crimes

Nazi human experimentation

War crimes of the Wehrmacht

References

Notes

Official dissolution of the Wehrmacht, including the Luftwaffe, began with Proclamation No. 2 of the
Allied Control Council on 20 September 1945 and was not complete until Order No. 34 of 20 August
1946.[1]

Luftwaffe is also the generic term in German-speaking countries for any national military aviation
service, and the names of air forces in other countries are usually translated into German as "Luftwaffe"
(e.g. Royal Air Force is often translated as "britische Luftwaffe").[7] However, Luftstreitkräfte, or "air
armed force", is also sometimes used as a translation of "air force" for post-World War I air arms, as it
was used as the first word of the official German name of the former East German Air Force. Since "Luft"
translates into English as "air", and "Waffe" may be translated into English as either "weapon" or "arm",
"Air Arm" may be considered the most literal English translation of Luftwaffe (cf. Fleet Air Arm).[8]

In January 1944, Messerschmitt and contractors were using 7564 concentration camp prisoners, Heinkel
and subsidiaries employed a further 9724, and Junkers used 1571.[119] Heinkel used forced labor at
Mielec[122] and the Mauthausen subcamps Wien-Florisdorf,[123] Hinterbrühl,[124] and Schwechat.
[125] Junkers had factories at Wiener Neudorf (also a subcamp of Mauthausen);[126] and operated
factories at Buchenwald subcamps Mühlhausen,[127] Stempeda[128] and Harzungen.[129]
Buchenwald,[140] Dachau,[141] Flossenbürg,[142] Gross-Rosen,[143] Herzogenbusch,[144] and
Hinzert[145]

Krewo ghetto,[146] Baranowicze ghetto,[147] and Stołpce ghetto[148]

See Luftwaffe guards at concentration camps for a full list.

Literally "bandit fighting", the word referred to ethnic cleansing and genocide under the guise of anti-
partisan warfare.

Citations

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Hooton 2007a, p. 34

Hooton 2010, p. 28

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Griehl & Dressel1998, p. 9.

Buckley 1998, pp. 85–86

Corum 1997, p. 225

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Ketley & Rolfe 1996, p. 7.

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Murray 1983, p. 14

Griehl & Dressel 1998, p. 53.

Hooton 2007a, p. 79

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Hooton 2007a, p. 24

"Боевые операции люфтваффе", Москва 2008 г., изд. Яуза-пресс, по "Rise and fall of the German Air
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Who is who in the Third Reich (Кто был кто в Третьем рейхе. Биографический энциклопедический
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Ketley & Rolfe 1996, p. 4

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Die Deutsche Luftwaffe in der Ostmark Archived 26 April 2017 at the Wayback Machine Retrieved 15
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Neitzel & Weltzer 2012, pp. 57–58

Hooton 2007b, p. 93

Hooton 2007b, p. 91

Buckley 1998, p. 127

Corum 1997, pp. 274–275

Corum 1997, pp. 275–277

Killen 2003, pp. 114–116

Killen 2003, p. 149

Killen 2003, pp. 171–184

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