On the Burden of Proof JAMES CARGILE ‘The phrase ‘burden of proof or ‘onus probandi’ originally referred to something determined by a judge in a legal proceeding. Some claims would be accepted as true by the court, and other rel- evant claims would require proving. The burden of doing this proving could be assigned to one or another party by the judge. Success or failure to meet this burden could be determined by the judge or the jury, as could consequences of success or failure ‘Proving’ a claim originally meant probing or testing it, an activ- ity which would be just as natural t0 one opposing the claim as to one advancing it. To be well proven would be to be well-tested. “Conclusively tested’ would be ‘tested sufficiently to warrant & conclusion’, without the presumption of ‘conclusively proven’ that the verdict is affirmative. Anyway, ‘the burden of proof” cannot always be understood as the burden of conclusively proving, One may carry the burden merely by defending against argument to the contrary. It can happen in the course of an argument that a elaim P is challenged, and another claim Q is put forward in defence of it. It may be agreed that Q establishes P, but not accepted that Q this could lead to a further claim in support of Q. ‘The defender of P may not have succeeded in proving P, but he may nonetheless be credited with arguing in good faith and reason- ably. Allowing for recesses for rest and other practical necessi- ties, such arguments can go on for years, as may be seen in debates among philosophers. Someone may carry a burden of proof in the style of a government carrying its debts, Perhaps law courts cannot proceed in this way, though when appeal to higher courts is considered, even their dealings can be consid- erably protracted. Since proving varies, the nature of the burden of doing so varies. ‘The consequences of failure to do so also vary. It might be that not-p can be assumed in the case against you. If this were the policy, then it could not be allowed that one side could be assigned the burden of proof that p and the other side the burden of proof that not-p, unless it were further a rule that it could not be found that both sides failed to meet their burden. For if that were allowed, we could have a situation in which one side was allowed to assume that p and the other, that not-p Philosophy 721997 59James Cargile ‘There would be no such inconsistency in a judge assigning the burden of proof that p to two opposing sides. And one side might meet this burden and the other fail to do so, But it would be absurd to penalize this latter side by allowing not-p to be assumed against it. The side that failed must have gone first in the attempt; otherwise it need only have cited the success of the preceding side. If both sides fail, then they could both be penalized by having not-p be assumed against them. It would seem that this could not be a decisive penalty for both, if there is no third party to the dispute. But the case might be dis- missed, for example, to the disappointment of both sides, ‘The consequence of having not-p assumed against you is only one possible penalty for failure to meet the burden of proof. Another is the much milder consequence of not being able to assume p in your argument. Here again, it would be absurd to enforce this consequence simply because some party had failed to meet the burden of proof, if some other party in the proceeding succeeds in meeting the burden. However, with this consequence, one side could be assigned the burden of proof that p and the other side, that not-p, and both be found to fail to meet the burden. Both could then be denied the right to assume p and denied the right to assume not-p. However, neither of these consequences would be dependent on failure to meet a burden of proof, Having p assumed against you or your not being allowed to assume thet p, can happen to you without your ever having had any burden of proof. ‘The idea of burden of proof has come to be applied outside the context of legal proceedings, with some unclarity as a result. How, for example, is it that one acquires a burden of proof? In court, this is assigned by the judge or by established rules. The consequences of failure to meet the burden are also to be established by the judge. ‘The practice may be complex, but there is some hope of observing it to form a general under- standing of the notion. This is a matter of accurately describing, the practice. Even though the courts may have prescriptive rules governing the assignment of burden of proof, the task of describing how these rules are actually interpreted is different from that of deciding whether they are right rules or are being, applied as they should be. We can start from the idea of having the obligation to prove that p. But in or out of court, there can. be a puzzling contrast between the formal appearance of this obligation and the real thing. And even a genuine obligation to prove applies in many cases which we do not in fact tend to describe in terms of having the burden of proof. 60On the Burden of Proof ‘Thus a schoolboy struggling to prove that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are congruent has an obligation to prove this, but if he is merely working at home on his assign- ment, we do not describe him as having the burden of proof, in spite of the fact that he may find his task a heavy burden. Again, consider a mathematician who is the father of 12 and hard pressed for funds to support his family. At a local fair, a substantial prize is offered for anyone who can step up and prove a certain theorem, and this proof is well within this man’s powers. We may say it is his duty to get up and prove this theorem. But we would not call his having that obligation his having the burden of proof. He may even subscribe to some eccentric philosophy of mathematics and not believe the theo- rem is true, though still knowing how to present an argument that will convince the judges. When he is before the judges, they may debate among themselves whether to assign him the burden of proof for some lemma, or to just let him assume it. Here again, judges make the usage simpler. Whether these hesitations on our part to apply the phrase ‘burden of proof” in these cases has any firm basis may be doubted, but one common principle for assigning the burden could be applied. It is said that ‘the burden of proof always lies with the affirmative’. Neither the schoolboy nor the mathe- matician have affirmed the propositions they have obligations to prove, They will no doubt have to ‘affirm’ them in the course of giving their required performance; but the obligation preceded that. These cases make the common principle look good mative’ here must surely be taken to mean that the bur- den lies with one who positively asserts, that is affirms, Tt can- not be that one avoids the burden of proof by saying that Sam. is not married but incurs it by saying he is a bachelor, just because the former is grammatically negative while the latter is affirmative. Perhaps this is not as sure as it should be. There is the unfortunate slogan ‘You can’t prove a negative’. This could be combined with the thought that people should not be assigned obligations to do impossible things, to yield the com- mon principle as a result. This derivation would conveniently relieve defenders of the unfortunate slogan of the burden of proof, since it is a negative. ‘They would only have to be careful to avoid slipping into such formulations as “All negatives are beyond proving’. This may make them seem hard to criticize, but fortunately, it is quite easy t0 prove a negative and return by this route to insisting 61James Cargile that the common principle not be interpreted merely in terms of assigning the burden of proof to claims expressed in a gram- matically affirmative style. One response would be to move from the idea of being gram- matically affirmative to that of being logically or really affirma- tive when expressed in a logically perfect language. The dis tinction between logical and grammatical form is a valuable idea to study, and some will hold that it offers a hope of deter- mining whether a given proposition is or is not truly negative. Nonetheless, it does not support the view that no negative provable. It was also common to say that unrestricted universal affirmatives (All A’s are B's) could not be proven (if they were not analytic). ‘The best interpretation of the common principle is in terms of affirming as asserting positively, whether what is asserted is ‘affirmative’ or not. The final version of the common principle is that when someone positively asserts that p, he acquires the obligation to defend his cl: Such a burden may be met by responding honestly in a way that quolifies as arguing the point, and this needs to be under- stood relative to defending an affirmation in the course of a dialectical discussion, where there is some presumption of an obligation to participate. That is a vague requirement, but it is, possible to cite clear cases which fail to meet it. For example, suppose someone calls Smith's house asking for Smith. Smith replies, “This is Smith’, The caller then demands proof, The mere fact that Smith has positively affirmed that it is Smith speaking does not entail that he has the burden of proof on this matter, ‘This need not be obvious merely from the given description of the case. In some cases, the caller might be perfectly entitled to insist that considerable pains be taken to assure him that it is indeed Smith speaking. He might be calling as a kindness to Smith’s son, who is negotiating a crucial bank loan and has to have his father’s backing. It is enough that in some cases of the above sort, it is perfectly appropriate to dismiss requests for argumentative support for something you have affirmed, with- out responding with any argument at all. In such a case, your having affirmed that p does not carry any burden of proof. ‘The common principle thus depends on some restrictions to a situation in which participants in a discussion are rightly expected to take seriously the claims made by parties to the di cussion. In such a situation, when a claim is made, it may be unreasonable to refuse to support it if challenged. However, 02On the Burden of Proof even in this sort of context, the common principle is not true without qualification. It is possible that a point will be reached where someone makes a claim which is not accepted, and refu: ¢s to support it. In opening a discussion, such a claim might be identified as one that one side takes for granted. If the other side is not willing to work around that, leaving the claim to the side and discussing other points, then the discussion need not be undertaken. But sometimes such a claim arises after there has been some discussion and there is some general interest in keeping it going. For example, suppose that the topic is street gangs, one side suggesting that they are not all bad, the other side sceptical Jones is arguing that gangs bring young men together and teach them to cooperate with others, ete. Smith argues that they do too much damage. The conversation is somewhat di ficult, but Smith hopes to win support for stronger police action against gangs. He discovers that a new fad is catching on among the gangs—dousing derelicts with gasoline and burning them to death. He brings this fact into the discussion as proof that the gangs are intolerable. He is stunned to hear Jones reply that ‘torching "bos’ is an innocent activity that benefits the community while entertaining gang members. Jones ‘replies like @ reasonable person’ arguing his case gently, with lots of examples, waiting patiently for Smith to reply. He is disappointed and somewhat offended when he finds Smith to be speechles Smith is dizzy with shock. He manages to observe that the lads are guilty of torturing helpless people to death and that this is evil. Bur when politely challenged with the consideration that the derelicts are merely a drain on the resources of the community, he cannot think of any reply but to sputter about the sanctity of life. Jones points out that such derelicts might have been used in ancient Rome to entertain the public and that that was the good old days. Why can’t we shed our absurd inhi- bitions and recapture that spirit? Smith replies that torturing people to death for recreational purposes is evil and that one who is unable to see this is morally blind. Jones replies at length about the importance of considering the happiness of the whole community, ete. Smith says that he has had more than enough and leaves. Jones complains that Smith made a contro- versial claim and then refused to shoulder the burden of proof. It may well be that a study of voice inflection and conversation- al manner would show that Jones was engaged and responsive in the discussion while Smith was uncooperative and finally 63James Cargile unwilling to argue his position further. Smith has clearly affirmed a position. Does he have the burden of proof? Here is a basis for answering no: ‘If in some situation there is a proper presumption that something is true, anyone seeking to prove its opposite is said to bear the burden of proof’.' Jones then, is the one who bears an unanswerable burden of proof, since there is a proper presumption of the opposite of his posi- tion. There is a proper presumption that recreational torture is evil, no matter how widespread its denial may be. Smith does not have an obligation to produce arguments in support of his claim, It is reasonable to assume it true without argument. This is in some respects a very satisfactory ruling. It seems right about Smith. But it is not so clear about Jones. Jones is trying to prove the opposite of something which is properly presumed to be true, so by the foregoing criterion, he has the burden of proving his position. But this does not tell us what that means. He certainly does not have an obligation to prove or support his evil claim. In fact, the truth is that Jones has an obigation to cease making that claim and to go round humbly testifying to its wickedness by way of atoning for his error. How could it be someone’s duty to defend a wicked falsehood? Nonetheless, we have a notion of obligations to a discussion that do not clearly follow this line about the decency of the claims at issue. Tt is possible to have the situation such that it is, bad of Smith to drop out and not argue further. There might be some chance of breaking through and bringing enlighten- ment to Jones (in some version of the case). Furthermore, there is some sense in holding that Jones may come under some requirement to defend his claim. It can be said that, though he is evil for believing the claim, he is acting rightly in doing his best to produce what he honestly considers good reasons for it and waiting in good faith to hear what can be said against it. It is possible for a situation to arise in which it is good to continue to enquire about a matter on which the answer should be obvi- ‘ous to everyone. When, unfortunately, some parties are in a wicked state on the question, then it may be good to pursue the question according to standards of good debate. This is not at all to endorse the view that this is always good. To refuse to pursue a discussion with a moral monster may be absolutely right, but not universally. Tt depends on the standards appro- priate to the context. But what standards are appropriate is not determined by the opinions of the people in the context. ‘The Simon Blackburn The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford, 1994), 51 oFOn the Burden of Proof standards appropriate to a context are as absolute as moral standards always are. Absoluteness and universality should not be confused, Here it might be suggested that there is a distinction between moral duty and ‘logical’ or ‘dialectical’ duty. Suppose that Brown enters the conversation, saying to Smith “Wait a minute—I agree completely with your attitude towards Jones. He is a moral monster. To sympathize with recreational torture is horrifying. I strongly favour the most vigorous action to put 4 stop to the activities of these gangs and to do something to educate young people so they will not be attracted by these ghastly attitudes. But Jones is arguing logically for his position. ‘This should be encouraged. We should be concerned to try to be clear about the rational basis for our attitude. And now that 1 begin to think carefully about it, it occurs to me that there is none. Of course I can’t prove that, it being a negative. I can only say that I can’t think of any rational basis for our attitude of finding recreational torture horrible and something to be combatted with all possible energy. I just haye that attitude Announcing an attitude invites no burden of proof. But you talk as if your attitude is based on a knowledge claim. This places you under a logical or dialectical obligation to support your claim by argument. T agree that your being shocked by Jones is characteristic of a good person. But your response to him is not a good performance in arguing.’ Brown's position is that merely expressing an attitude is not a diuleetical move and does not carry a burden of proof, while representing an attitude expressing sentence as one expressing an objectively true claim does involve taking on an obligation 10. defend it when confronted with opposing attitudes. He sees Smith as claiming a rational basis for what has none, and hay- ing an obligation (perhaps ‘dialectically’ rather than ‘morally’) to produce rational arguments on pain of having to acknowl- ‘edge a mere faith in the existence of something he cannot show to doubters What, then, can Brown do with Jones? He cannot offer to prove that recreational torture is evil, since he does not hold. this saying is true but only expressive of an attitude he endorses. he can try to get Jones to adopt his attitude, showing the histo- ry of attitudes to torture and suggesting that countries where it has been suppressed are happier, ete. But if Jones prefers the pro-torture societies, Brown can only end up thankful that the voting majority is on his side for now. If Jones responds that he favours rebellion against this system, this may worry Brown, 65James Cargile especially since his liberalism commits him to allowing Jones to recruit as many converts as he can to his side and the police may not be adequate to prevent them from practicing what they preach. But he can say in his own behalf that he has done at least as well as in the debate with Jones as the indignant Smith. Smith meanwhile, may have joined the police or gone over to vigilantism, Brown's position that the claim that recreational torture is evil is neither true nor false, being a mere expression of atti- tude, is mistaken, But the notion of a dialectical or rhetorical, as opposed to moral, duty of arguing does not depend on that position. Brown’s position merely makes him likely to regard the question detachedly. For Smith focuses on the fact that Jones is defending evil, while Brown sees it as a difference in attitude. To sincerely regard your attitude as non-cognitive, merely an attitude, is to see its origin as passive rather than active, To be active an attitude must be a judgment and thus cognitive. The more one sees an attitude of his as non-cogni- tive, the more he sees it as having causes external to his reason. Spinoza holds that the more one understands such causes of a passion, the more he will become ‘free’ of the passion. (See Spinoza, Ethics V, prop. ITT) But all that Brown understands himself to have on the question of torture is his passion. If theory that his attitude towards torture is noncognitive were correct then the more he reflects on the origin of this attitude, the more he will tend to lose it. Ironically, on Spinoza’s theory, both Brown and Smith should end up dispassionate if they fol- low their positions through, But Brown will tend to apathy and Smith to activity Of course, the truth is that if Brown really did succeed in determining the causes of his passion, he would learn that it is due at least in part to his (somewhat dim) perception of the intrinsic evil of recreational torture. That is, in learning the true cause he would be rescued from his noncognitivist misrep- resentation of his sentiment. The fact remains, though, that Brown’s position about his attitude has the feature that if it were right, then on a plausible further theory about the effect of knowledge on emotions, gaining further understanding should cause him to tend to lose the attitude. ‘At any rate, the notion of a distinction between dialectical and moral duty is not required to make the distinetion which is, useful here. We need only the distinction between the idea of exercising 1 skill and acting rightly. Whether it is good or bad to argue in favour of torture, we can tell when it is being done 66On the Burden of Proof skillfully and when not. When Jones makes a clever dialectical move on behalf of torture, then Smith has a burden of replying, if he is to continue to show argumentative skill. ‘This is not the same as having an obligation simpliciter. ‘This distinction does not license an analogy with games. In chess, when one’s king is put in check, one has an obligation, within the game, to respond, but no absolute obligation to con- tinue with the game, Or rather, no absolute obligation arising merely from being in the game. One might have a moral obliga- tion to be playing the game for some extraneous reason, In argument, it is different, because argument is not merely a game, but may also be concerned at the same time with the absolute truth, Whatever level of skill Smith may exhibit, he is, absolutely right. And yet there is no (human) judge to mark this fact. Some observers will find it easier to evaluate Smith’s rhetorical performance than it is to know the absolute truth. It may even be absolutely true that in general debate, at least in philosophy, it is better pragmatically, to attend to what is best argued than to what is absolutely true. Tt will not do to say that one who attempts to prove what is properly supposed to be false has the burden of proof. It is pos- itive affirming, much more than attempted proving, that leads to the demand that you support your claim, One who insists that it is possible to construct a square equal in area to a given circle by ruler and compass alone is more appropriately asked to back this up with argument than is one who comes around thinking he can prove it possible and endeavouring to do so. One who struggles to prove circle-squaring possible does not thereby incur the obligation to keep at it. It is possible to attempt to prove a claim without thereby asserting it. It is not necessary to begin a proof by stating what is to be proved. The conclusion can be equally proven without this prefatory asser- tion. The prover may have an excellent standard of proof and recognize that he is not succeeding, with no obligation to con- tinue. If he is fortunate and does reach the conclusion, he then does assert it; but if he has been successful he will have dis- charged the burden of proof at the same time as he would have acquired it. That is, he would never have had it It is sometimes said that one who makes a claim contrary to received opinion has the burden of proot. ‘This may be encour- aged by the fact that one who accepts received opinion is not thereby making a claim, but rather, is just going along with one, So he does not qualify for the burden of proof by the com- mon principle, while the defier of popular opinion does. But it is, 6James Cargile not being opposed to popular opinion that should bring the bur- den, but rather, being committed to a position. If Brown holds that there are ghosts, and Black holds there are no ghosts, it is not correct to rule that in general, the burden of proof must fall on Brown and not on Black. If Black is very positive about there being no ghosts, then it may be his obligation to know a good deal of the basis for the general opinion in favour of his position. Pethaps he will merely appeal to (good) authorities. But that it is easier to defend his position does not mean that he has less of an obligation to defend ‘The notion of the weight of the burden of proof, like that of the weight of an obligation in general, is ambiguous. If Bill promises to deliver 100Ibs of beans to Boyd by noon, and also promises to deliver 20ibs to Bob by noon, he has, in a sense, a lighter obliga- tion to Bob. (Of course, Bob might live on the fifth floor with no elevator while Boyd has a drive-in larder and conveyor belt. We can assume such factors neutralized.) But if he promised Bob he would deliver the beans come Hell or high water, then he may have to wade through flood water with Bob’s beans, while Boyd has to recognize that circumstances have voided Bill’s obligation to him. The strength or degree of the obligation should not be con- fused with the difficulty of fulfilling it. The position just cited, that a burden of proof should fail on one who is advocating a pos tion contrary to received opinion, is related to the position that at least a heavier burden should fall on such a one. This involves the foregoing ambiguity. ‘The burden may in fact be heavier, in the sense that the position may be harder to sell. But there is no reason, why the obligation should be stronger merely for that reason. When people are regarded as justified in assuming that p, then ‘one motive for making the burden of proof for not-p ‘heavy’ is the feeling that success at carrying it would mean that the common presumption to the contrary is no longer justified. ‘This feeling may be due in part to confusing skill in argument with justification. Consider, for example, the justified assumption of a crowd that they are watching a football game. A skilful philosophical sceptic may claim that for all they know, they are just having boredom- induced mass hallucination while watching a public lecture on homeotopy theory. Representatives of this crowd may take up this challenge and do terribly, being soundly trounced even by their own admission. They may leave saying ‘Well, we still don’t believe it, but that guy sure is hard to catch’, (This could all be staged, for example, as the half-time entertainment at the Super Bowl.) 08On the Burden of Proof Tt may seem, then, that the way to protect the hard-working man in the street against the sharp-witted sophist is to apply to the sophist’s theses the more severe standards of argument, while allowing for the inroads of hard labour on the man in the street's, level of articulation, and giving him every advantage in standards of proof. This would be a mistake. When the sophist pulls one fast one after another on the struggling serf, we may lament the inequity of the contest without having to lose our ability to recog- nize superior verbal facility when we see it displayed. Indignation at the pool shark should not dull our appreciation of billiards. It may seem, though, that even if we distinguish skilful sophistry from genuine justification, the difference is not so clear when we come to real proof. Real proof, it may be said, is a guaran- tee of justification. The idea of a contrast between proving as satis fying the standards of the audience, and some more context inde- pendent notion of proof, may be quite valuable, Here it is enough to note that even real died in the wool proof, though it may be suf ficient for justification, is not necessary. The man in the street is justified in his judgment that he should not park in the middle of a busy thoroughfare, no matter how flummoxed he may become when challenged to prove that there even are any vehicles or thor- oughfares. In this connection, it is interesting to consider a standard for burden of proof which has been suggested especially for philos- ophical discussions. Keith Lehrer says that ‘generally arguments about where the burden of proof lies are unproductive’, but for philosophy he suggests an alternative to the previously discussed common principle. ‘The principle appropriate for philosophy (PH) is ‘that no hypothesis should be rejected as unjustified without argument against it. Putting forward a hypothesis contrary to the popular assumption does not put a burden of proof on either side “but neither may one side to the dispute be judged unjustified in believing his hypothesis unless an argument is produced to show that this is so” While both sides may be spared being found unjustified, there is, still a catch, for ‘if a belief is completely justified, then those with which it conflicts are unjustified’. So the fact that the sept hypothesis is not unjustified means that the popular assumption with which it conflicts cannot be completely justified (and thus is, * “Why Not Skepticism? The Philosophical Forum, 2.3 (1971) pp. 283-298, Reprinted in Essays on Knowledge and Justification, George S. Pappas and Marshall Swain (eds), (Cornell, 1978), pp. 346-363. References are to the latter. p, 358. 0James Cargile not known). Since PH is being advanced as part of a defence of scepticism, it is to be expected that it would lead to stinginess about complete justification and knowledge. But PH is peculiarly generous about not lacking justification, enough so to raise the question as to just what this ‘justification’ might be. Scepticism often arises from an extremely critical attitude and then evolves, into an extremely uncritical one. At any rate, itis important that PH is restrieted to ‘philosophy’ We are not required to tolerate the joker who shouts ina crowded theatre as making a justified claim pending the produc- tion of an argument against it. A madman who sincerely believes it his duty t0 bomb public buildings is not entitled to expect an argument against his position. If a citizen happens on such a bomber as the fuse is about to be lit, and tries to persuade him to cancel his plan, it is possible that a professional debate coach may also happen by, and be able to referee the argument, The coach may reluctantly rule that the bomber has argued better for his position than the citizen for his. But not being philosophy, he needn't endorse the bombing, ‘The coach may even jump into the argument himself, and surely he can defeat the lunatic. Surely the best available arguments are on the side of truth and right? Alas—the greatest truth may only show itself forth, shining like a jewel to those with eyes to see, but buried in the mud when cast before swinish arguers. Perhaps this is too pessimistic. But to assume the contrary—that the best argu- ment will prove that contradictions are always false and torture evil, etc. may be to overvalue argument. Real proof is of enor- mous value. But ignoring its limits may lead to eventually unde; valuing it. ‘This is not to endorse Aristotle's doctrine that ‘itis impossible that there should be demonstration of absolutely everything? (Metaphysics iv, 3) and his suggestion that the law of noneontra- diction is an example of a truth that cannot be proved. Aristotle himself goes on to suggest that while the law cannot be proven by ‘demonstration proper’, one who denies it can be answered by ‘negative demonstration’. This is a rather elusive distinction. Perhaps it is true that a proof by Aristotle's synthetic method would be impossible, because the law of noncontradiction in that approach would be a ‘first principle’ and thus assumed, at least implicitly, in every ‘proper’ proo' By contrast, in the dialectical method, there is a burden associat= ed with making an assertion which is akin to the burden of proof— the burden of explaining your utterance, of making its meaning, if any, clear. In Plato's dialogues, the discussion frequently focuses, 0On the Burden of Proof ‘on the question whether some participant, in uttering some words, has been saying anything at all, and if so, what it is that he has said, Often, just becoming clear what has been said is enough to bring out that ir is implausible. ‘This can happen in discussing a controversial issue. Just making clear what someone has said can be a devastating ‘reply’. In a criticism of Lehrer, Dan Turner held it to be ‘uncontrover- sially false” that no one is justified in believing H false, where H is “Every premise of every argument is false’.’ He then argues that any argument against-is question-begging, so there is no good argument against it: ‘to offer an argument against H is to assume the truth of some premises, which is to suppose the falsity of H, the view one is trying to impugn ... since it is precisely the truth value of H that is in question, the conflict between a supposition that some premise is true and H cannot be taken to adjudicate against H’ (368-9). ‘This is reminiscent of Aristotle and a foundationalist view that some principles are so basic as to be beyond proof. Perhaps Aristotle would allow ‘negative proof’ for H. At any rate, dialecti- cal argument against H need not beg the question, because part of the question is what someone uttering H is saying, and explaining the meaning is not always clearly distinguishable from supporting. with argument, Some philosophers of mathematics have gone 50 far as to hold that proot gives the meaning of what is proved. This is @ vague question, but the vagueness undermines the flat ruling that some things are simply beyond proving. Someone asserting H might explain that the only things that can be premises of arguments are sentences, and every sentence is both true and false. He can cite the sentence ‘It is raining’ as one that is, both true and false. We may then object that he surely does not ‘mean that this could be true and false at the same time in the same place. He may reply that it could—thar the sentence could be printed out beneath a T'V showing rain and also above a TV show- ing a drought. We might reply that this can’t happen with reference to the same time and place. ‘The reply needn't concern us here. Tt is not that these arguments back and forth have merit in abstrac- tion from the particular discussion but that they may, in the dis- cussion, be reasonable moves, either defending H or opposing: it To be arguing that @ certain proponent of H does not have grounds is to be arguing for H. (I am unable to determine whether this is like what Aristotle calls ‘negative demonstration’.) Tt is unlikely that Lehrer intended PH to be interpreted so as to count any such arguing as satisfying the requirement of PH. Surely there * Dan Turner ‘Why Scepticism? op. cit., pp. 364-3695 p. 368.On the Burden of Proof ‘on the question whether some participant, in uttering some words, has been saying anything at all, and if so, what it is that he has said, Often, just becoming clear what has been said is enough to bring out that ir is implausible. ‘This can happen in discussing a controversial issue. Just making clear what someone has said can be a devastating ‘reply’. In a criticism of Lehrer, Dan Turner held it to be ‘uncontrover- sially false” that no one is justified in believing H false, where H is “Every premise of every argument is false’.’ He then argues that any argument against-is question-begging, so there is no good argument against it: ‘to offer an argument against H is to assume the truth of some premises, which is to suppose the falsity of H, the view one is trying to impugn ... since it is precisely the truth value of H that is in question, the conflict between a supposition that some premise is true and H cannot be taken to adjudicate against H’ (368-9). ‘This is reminiscent of Aristotle and a foundationalist view that some principles are so basic as to be beyond proof. Perhaps Aristotle would allow ‘negative proof’ for H. At any rate, dialecti- cal argument against H need not beg the question, because part of the question is what someone uttering H is saying, and explaining the meaning is not always clearly distinguishable from supporting. with argument, Some philosophers of mathematics have gone 50 far as to hold that proot gives the meaning of what is proved. This is @ vague question, but the vagueness undermines the flat ruling that some things are simply beyond proving. Someone asserting H might explain that the only things that can be premises of arguments are sentences, and every sentence is both true and false. He can cite the sentence ‘It is raining’ as one that is, both true and false. We may then object that he surely does not ‘mean that this could be true and false at the same time in the same place. He may reply that it could—thar the sentence could be printed out beneath a T'V showing rain and also above a TV show- ing a drought. We might reply that this can’t happen with reference to the same time and place. ‘The reply needn't concern us here. Tt is not that these arguments back and forth have merit in abstrac- tion from the particular discussion but that they may, in the dis- cussion, be reasonable moves, either defending H or opposing: it To be arguing that @ certain proponent of H does not have grounds is to be arguing for H. (I am unable to determine whether this is like what Aristotle calls ‘negative demonstration’.) Tt is unlikely that Lehrer intended PH to be interpreted so as to count any such arguing as satisfying the requirement of PH. Surely there * Dan Turner ‘Why Scepticism? op. cit., pp. 364-3695 p. 368.On the Burden of Proof Descartes’s Evil Genius hypothesis claimed to cover. Consider, for example, my belief that my ear is parked across the street, in plain view. Descartes’ ‘hypothesis’ entails that this is false and there are no cars. Lehrer’s hypothesis only entails, if that, that my belief is more likely false than true, This is not inconsistent with my belief, In reply I may say ‘Well perhaps it is unlikely, but this may be my lucky day—anyway, I believe it is’. So PH does not require argu- ment against the Googol hypothesis as a condition of my belief in the car being completely justified. It would seem to apply, though, to my belief that am highly likely to be right about the car being there, though this does involve questions about probability and the application of general statistics to unique cases Ignoring the details of the Googol hypothesis as compared with the Cartesian Demon hypothesis, another problem for the applica- tion of PH is that both the gogool and the demon hypotheses are bogus, in the sense that their proponents are not sincerely advoca ing them, however they may protest to the contrary. Sincerity would require having many beliefs while supposing them to be false or unlikely. It would be maintaining, for many propositions p, ‘I believe that p but it is either false or unlikely that p’. And this would not be the sort of general reference as in the famous preface “Lam sure that many of my claims in the following text ate mistak- en’, where you do not attempt to specify which ones those are. You would be saying ‘I am sure my car is right across the street, but it is cither false or unlikely that my car is right across the street’, And this is to make a claim which is either insincere or probably false.* By contrast, the claim “I believe that p and p is true but it is log- ically possible that p is false’ can easily be true and sincerely asserted. One can assert that it is logically possible that we are ail mistaken in most of our beliefs while maintaining that most of our beliefs are true, The logical possibility can be investigated as to its logical or other consequences, and this may be prefaced by calling ita hypothesis. But it is not being advocated, advanced, endorsed In reply, it may be asked, ‘So what?”. It is no matter to mathe= maticians investigating the Continuum ‘Hypothesis’ whether any- one believes it. ‘To charge a defender with insincerity would be absurd, One is only interested in what arguments he can produce. Here the distinction between assuming for the sake of argument and genuine assuring is unimportant. Nonetheless, the mathematician who advocates the Continuum, Hypothesis may be putting his name to the suggestion that it is a I have discussed this form in ‘On Rei 1967, pp. 177=183. 1 You Believe’ Analysis 3James Cargile matter worth serious consideration, something that should be looked into. By contrast, consider the hypothesis that T am con- vinced that my car is right across the street in plain view but in reality Googols or a demon, etc. are deceiving me and there is no car there. One can assume this “for the sake of discussion’. The consequences are not particularly interesting. I am deceived, there is no car, there are Googols, etc. Why should this be important? On the other hand, if this were really happening, that would indeed be something! But T have not the slightest inclination to take that seriously. Neither does Lehrer or any other philosophical sceptic. Even insanity will not make it easy to take that hypothes seriously, because it requires regarding yourself as. mistakenly believing something while focusing on what it is you are believ- ing—believing that p and that you are mistaken in believing that p. Tris of course not at all a guarantee of scepticism to believe that your car is not across the street in plain view. You may not even. ‘own a car, And when someone does not believe that his ear is in plain view across the street and he is in a position in which he should believe this, we do not qualify such a person as a sceptic: Psychiatrists may well know and deal with people who get in @ condition like this, and philosophical argument may have occurred to them as a possible therapy. But I believe it has not been found effective. Similarly, there have been people, or so [see in the liter ature of popular neurology, who believe themselves to have no body or any senses, etc. And they also are not styled sceptics In my opinion, it is perfectly possible for a person to be in the position partially described by Descartes, in which he has no body and no location in space among objects. Such a person might also know this to be his condition and pray earnestly for relief from it. Kantians and others will argue that it is impossible to think in such a condition. T will not argue this point; but one in this posi- tion is not a sceptic, Descartes adds to this position the further qualification that its occupant falsely believes himself to have all the usual advantages of the normal perceiver. ‘This addition makes the position one which one cannot suppose himself to be in with- out logical troubles, ‘The would-be sceptic may concede that Descartes misdescribed his position and try instead the pretence of ‘suspending judgment’. ‘This changes the difficulty somewhat but does not avoid it. One may suspend judgment on the question whether his car is there in the parking lot. This is sometimes the right position to take. The sceptic wants (0 somehow take this position when it is perfectly obvious that the car is there, though of course he cannot acknowl- edge this latter feature. Tts seeming perfectly obvious won't do. 4On the Burden of Proof ‘That can happen to the neurological case. I believe, though I will not argue against the Kantians on this point, that someone might even be in the unfortunate position of its being appropriate for him to suspend judgment on the question whether he has a body, perhaps on waking after going under anaesthetic for a life threat- ening surgery. This again is not scepticism. This is not at all to say that various ‘sceptical hypotheses’ cannot be put forward, It is the possibility of taking them seriously that is, in question, And it only takes a clarification of PH to set this aside ‘That is, it may be understood that PH is simply not concerned, with the sincerity of the advocate of « hypothesis. In philosophy, just advocating a hypothesis cannot be ignored without argument. Iti ironical how far this suggestion is from the actual practice ‘To have the burden of proof requires at the very least, an oppo- nent; and it helps very much to also have an audience or judge or both, In speaking of the ‘burden of proof’, we may tend to assume it is something to avoid. But burdens ean be of enormous value Think of the people who long to have the ‘burden’ of caring for their very own child, or otherwise having ‘dependents’ who rely on them and respond with love to their supportive care. There is many a lonely philosopher who would love to be burdened with proving something, perhaps to a huge und critical audience, hang- ing on each step in his argument, Many would gladly drop their present position and espouse its opposite, if only this would arouse a chorus of ‘Prove it! Prove it’, ‘Very well’ they would calmly say, stepping with dignity to the podium. ‘The burden of proof is incurred in a dialogue; and in a dialogue there is a limit on how many voices can be heard and how long they can be heard. The standards of proof are closely connected with the capacities of the audience, and its responses may largely constitute the consequence of success or failure with the burden. Nonetheless, it behooves us, as philosophers, to abstract away from these facts, drawing on the memories of actual dialogue to enliven the imaginary ones that occupy so many of us so much of the time. We can pretend that we have the burden of proving something. But this does create a danger of losing all track of how such a burden might actually be incurred or what its consequences would be ‘Many philosophers have tried to find a general refutation of Googol or demon style hypotheses. This is an honourable impulse. ‘The hypothesis that we are all involved in a grand scale dream is a reasonable target of suspicion and a challenge to phenomenalists and other large scale theorizers, But the bogusness of these hypotheses does not derive from the dubiousness of their claims to 78James Cargile even bare logical possibility. Hypotheses which are clearly logieal- ly coherent show the same bogusness, For example, there is Dretske’s famous case in which you are at the 200 and asked to identify a somewhat distant animal, which vou easily recognize as a zebra. You are then told that there is a rumour that the zoo painted mules to look like zebras as part of an economy programme. How do you know this isn’t so? In many a case like this, the answer is that you don’t, And in many such cases, the doubt may be completely bogus, just made up to cause puzzlement. Cases of this sort can be manufactured endlessly ‘They involve imagining alternatives which are perfectly possible logically, which are incompatible with what you believe, and whieh you are in no position to rule out, Insofar as these alterna- tives represent a genuine concern, you are not qualified to address these concerns and thus do not know ‘You may, of course, inquire vigorously into the ‘zebra’ question and find out whether they are fake. But this could be & lot of trou- ble. If doubts of this sort were counted in general, we would indeed know very little. If a colleague asks me whether one of his advises, Roberts, has been attending my class regularly, consult- ing my roll sheet would not begin to do. I would have to look into the possibility that Roberts has an identical twin who has been sit- ting in for him, and so on and on, It would be easier just to give up on claiming to know, rather than to accept this overwhelming bur- den of proof. Here it is sometimes suggested that this is the right answer. We give up claiming to know and manage in practical life with prob: bility. We might even keep the loose popular use of ‘know’, just meaning ‘sufficiently probable for practical purposes’. This rests, I believe, on confusing ignoring a ‘hypothesis’ as irrelevant with assigning it a low probability. Most of our practical claims to knowledge are incompatible with countless coherent stories that could be dreamed up with a little effort of imagination, and which we have no basis for even assigning probabilities. A subjective theory of probability may look better here, because our practical indifference to these irrelevant stories can be treated in a subjec- tive theory as a low probability assignment. This is no virtue in the subjective theory. [t merely undercuts the objective evaluation of the merits of probability claims, which the subjective theory must attempt to restore with restrictions to ‘ideally rational’ subjects. ‘The fact remains that if we do require, for “philosophy” that a contrary hypothesis must be answered in order to qualify as co pletely justified, whether or not anyone is serious about it, there is, a real threat that philosophy-class knowledge will be extremely %6On the Burden of Proof rare, However much we may agree that this burden of proof is unrealistic in practical life, the boundary can be vague and worth exploring. Some one charged with murder may elaim that he heard rumours that he has an identical twin brother who was kid- napped at birth and is back trying to frame him for a murder. The defendant's parents are dead, the birth records were lost in a fire and there is no one to challenge his story. Reliable witnesses swear they saw him do it, but his twin story is reply. Does the prosecu- tion have the burden of proving there is no twin? There can be interesting questions along this line. ‘Philosophy’ is clearly well across this line, however. But nonetheless, philosophers may feel like rising to the challenge. The question raised earlier about quality arises again, Even granting that in philosophy we are somehow required to answer any scepti- cal story anyone can dream up, what is to count as an answer? PHL merely orders us not to reject these hypotheses ‘without argu- ment’. professional arguer may be glad to oblige with argu ment—100 words?, 1,000? Should there be some requirements about quality? In this connection it is instructive to consider one notable example of a philosopher willing to shoulder the burden of proof as assigned by PH, G. E. Moore, Moore famously offered to prove ‘the existence of things outside of us’. This was Kent's. description of 2 project he regarded himself to be the first to accomplish. Moore’s purpose was, in part, to belittle Kant’s claim as pretentious and silly. In so doing he proceeds in such a way as to suggest that PH need not be restricted to philosophy, thar its requirement could be met in practical life without difficulty Moore says ‘I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist ... How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, a8 T make a certain gesture with the right hand, ‘Here is one hand’, and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, ‘and here is another”, Thus we have (1) Here is one human hand (2) here is another; therefore (3) there are at least two human hands. From (3) we can go on to prove that there are objects in space. (Let us drop the matter of being ‘external to the mind’ as an unnecessary complication.) Moore’s conclusion would not directly answer Descartes’ ‘I shall consider myself as having no hands ... yet falsely believing myself to possess ... these things’. For that is something that can happen. A victim of a tragic accident may wake up in the hospital in just that state, He won’t be able to hold up two hands, as Moore did, but he can hold up a bandage-swathed arm and say ‘Here is ‘one hand, etc.’. Moore neecin’t prove Descartes was not in such an unfortunate condition. He is just concerned with his own case. 7James Cargile About his case he says ‘the proof I gave was a perfectly rigorous one ... it is perhaps impossible to give a better or more rigorous proof of anything whatever’. Moore also seems willing to shoulder the further burden of proving that this is so, He cites three conditions which a proof must satisfy: (1) the premises must be different from the conclu- sion (2) the premises must he known to be true, (3) the conclusion must really follow from the premises. Tt seems obvious that the sceptic would reject Moore’s claim to have satisfied requirement (2). More importantly, however, requirement (2) is not correct. A mathematician may not believe that Peano’s axioms for number theory are true, and thus will not qualify as knowing them. This will not count in the least against his proving some new discovery in number theory. If he proves, says, Goldbach’s Conjecture, he will be a hero, and pointing out his scruples about this or that axiom will be dismissed as irrelevant harping on a harmless eccen- tricity This shows that Moore's conditions for proof are not really ne‘ essary. Furthermore, in spite of the fact that he presents the cond tions as necessary, he argues as if they were sufficient. And th also false. It seers that many people do know the axioms of num- ber theory are true, and they are different from Fermat's ‘Theorem. Fermat's Theorem, it appears, does indeed follow from the axioms, But those three conditions would not qualify anyone as proving Fermat's Theorem. Simply offering the axioms as premises which you know and claiming that Fermat's Theorem is 4 distinet proposition which follows from them does not qualify you as proving that theorem even if all those claims of yours are true, You would also have to show the conclusion follows by steps that are acceptable proof steps, and that it is not so easy. However, Moore's proof does seem to proceed by acceptable steps. Rather than arguing whether his claim to know his premises is true, we can consider the notion of satisfying the burden of proof for an audience. This does not require knowing the premis- es, but merely using premises accepted by the audience, While there is widespread agreement among experts as to what the acceptable proof steps are in mathematics, there are significant disagreements too. ‘These disagreements may be more common in other subjects. Satisfying the burden ot proof (for an audience— whether there is an audience-neutral absolute proving is not in question here) will in general, vary with different audience stan- dards. Moore's audience did in fact believe that Moore was hold- ing up, first one hand and then another. To deny believing this would have been dishonest. So Moore will qualify as having pre 8On the Burden of Proof sented accepted premises and inferring from them by accepted inference procedures, the distinct conclusion that there are hands. Is this not proving the point to his audience? 1 will focus on this more modest relative of Moore's argument because it seems clearly within the spirit of his original and more easily defensible. Moore’s view as to the status of his premises is interesting. He says that he could not prove them, because in order to prove them, he would need to prove that he was not dreaming, and this is something he cannot do. He says that in spite of the fact that he has ‘conclusive evidence that I am awake’ he cannot prove this. And the reason he gives is that ‘I could not tell y evidence is; and I should require to do this at least, you a proof’, From this it seems to follow that, in proving there are hands, Moore must have then told us what all his evidence is. But is this true? His premises are just about Moore's hands, while his conclu- sion would be made equally true by anyone else’s hands. Moore ‘was speaking to people when he held up his hands, and those peo- ple most likely also had hands and those hands would have been equally good evidence for the conclusion. Furthermore, Moore oes on to prove that not only are there now external objects, but, there were external objects in the past. That is based on holding that it is just as obvious that he did hold up two hands a while ago as that he is now doing so. But then it is equally obvious that lots, of other people have held up two hands besides Moore. In reply, it may be said that all the evidence Moore requires for his conclusion is his premises, even if there is other evidence. But then, to defend his claim about being awake, we would have to interpret Moore as claiming, not that he cannot present all his evi= dence, but that he cannot present all the evidence he requires. And this in spite of the fact that he Aas ‘conclusive evidence’. He has sufficient evidence that he is awake but it cannot be presented, presumably, not even to himself; otherwise he could prove it to himself. It would seem that if he has sufficient evidence, it must be in some sense presented to him, It is of course possible to make sense of having something which is nonetheless not available, as in having a friend who can’t be reached at the time of need. But it is not clear how this would work in the present case. ‘This is puzzling, but will be set aside in favour of a clearer prob- lem: even if Moore cannot prove that he is not dreaming, he can surely prove, as well as he proved anything else, that he is not merely dreaming. Perhaps he is dreaming that there are hands and that he is holding up two hands. But there also ave hands and he ts holding up two hands. From this it follows trivially that it is not ot)James Cargile merely a dream that there are hands. It follows that, whatever pranks a Cartesian demon or googols may be up to, they are not successful in arranging that in reality there ure no hands. In this way it may be argued, if not by Moore, then on behalf of the spirit of his argument, that PH’'s severe requirement for meet- ing the burden of proof can be met. Argument ean be provided for rejecting the sceptic’s hypothesis and allowing some of us to quali- fy as knowing there are hands. ‘The argument given does not make knowledge claims as premises or as conclusion. It does, though, conclude that it is false that any deceiver has managed to arrange that it is false that there are hands. So it does manage to produ what PH requires must be produced if it js to be all right to reject the sceptie’s hypothesis on this matter as unjustified. ‘This is problematic because there is such a strong tendency on. the part of philosophers to fee! that this has to be too easy. That is, that scepticism should be easily refuted would seem, even to many philosophers who are not sceptics, to be quite paradoxical. It is worth trying to explain this. One objection is that proving something to an audience requires more than starting from premises they accept and proceeding by steps they accept to a conclusion. For if they also accepted the con- clusion as perfectly obvious in the first place, such an ‘argument’ may merely produce bewilderment, rather than convietion. It may be suid that a successful prover must convince his audience; and this is impossible if they are convinced already. This connects well with the feeling that Moore's proof is too easy In Moore's case, the audience is just as sure there are hands they are that Moore is holding up his hands. His performance does nothing to advance anyone's confidence in anything. In fact, try- ing to prove the obvious may make people wonder if it is so obvi- ‘ous after all, Still, if anyone wondered whether there were hands, while retaining his normal faculties, Moore’s procedure would set tle the matter for him. Suppose you are at a rich golf cou exclaiming on the extravagance, and say ‘I wonder if there really are any solid gold golf tees?” Someone overhears you, reaches into his pocket and comes up saying ‘Here’s one solid gold tee, and here's another—oh wait! this one’s just plate!—but this one is solid gold’, This performance is @ proof, provided you do accept the claim that that tee is solid gold. It would do just as well as Moore's for the further purpose of establishing ‘the existence of objects in space outside us’, as Moore would surely have agreed. It may be doubted that anyone could get in the peculiar condition of being reminded by your holding up two hands that there are indeed hands. But for other ‘external objects’ this is easy. It ean be said in 80On the Burden of Proof reply to this objection, then, that while no one does wonder if there are hands, if they did and were otherwise normal, Moore's procedure would suffice. Another objection to crediting Moore with success is that the burden of proof may in many eases not be dischargeable merely by drawing a conclusion from accepted premises by accepted inferen- tial steps. In a legal trial, for example, the judge, the prosecution and the defence may all be perfectly sure Smith is guilty and yet continue to play through the court game as he beats the rap. Smith was arrested two hours after the murder with blood on his hands. which matched the victim’s very rare blood type. However, in response to un ad run over the radio by the defense, Hiram Potts comes forward to testify that he lives within 57 miles of the crime, has that same rare blood type, and cut his hand while slicing a bagel around the time of the murder. Smith is willing to confess to unlawful entry of Potts's apartment and wiping up his blood with his hands while Potts was preoccupied with bandaging his wound Smith was doing this extraordinarily odd thing as part of an effort to keep his mind off the victim, whom he is known to have repeat- edly sworn to kill. The judge may have to struggle to keep from. laughing as he listens to Smith’s story, and still place on the prose- cution the burden of proving it is false. For the prosecution to burst out with ‘Your Honour, let's get serious! None of us believe this ridiculous story!’ could be a losing move in the legal game. Similarly, many philosophers tend naturally to forget about things they regard a8 obvious in their daily affairs and to regard appeal to such things as inappropriate in a philosophical diseus- sion, ‘Then it is not just PH that distinguishes philosophy from practical life, but x different standard for what counts as legitimate argument. The different standard is not in itself a mistake, but merely gives rise to a different climate of discussion from that of practical life. Mistakes can be made in failing to notice the differ- ence. And it can be blurred and hard to make out. Tt does happen that possibilities no one in the affected group could take seriously do come to be realized. Reflection on such cases may enlarge the range of possibilities people can take seriously, but this range will still be limited. ‘Practical Life’ is marked off from the ‘theoretical’ by such limits, by being the sphere of matters that are taken more seriously by more people. That scepticism is ‘impractical’ does not make it wrong, But it does invoke a standard of proof which would not work for practical life Returning to Dretske’s zebra example, it may well seem absurd, in some real life situation, to demand proof that those animals are not painted mules. They may yet turn out to be painted mules, 81James Cargile and this would give anyone accused of absurdity for demanding. proof a powerful defense, We may still plead that it was impract cal to checks and that our performance was up to ordinary stan- dards of care. But the facts are powerful support for the impor- tuner. Suppose the family is given a last minute invitation to a delightful picnic and we are happily preparing to hurry there. One family member demurs, pointing out that we hold a ticket in the state lottery. The winning number is announced over the radio and if the holder does not call in within 10 minutes, another num- ber is drawn. The drawing conflicts with the time of the picnic, which is being held 30 minutes away from the nearest telephone. We mustn't throw away our chance for 3 million dotlars, etc We may assure the objector that there isn’t a chance we will win, He replies that there is a clear chance of better than one in four million. We reply that this is utterly negligible and that it is per- fectly absurd of him to go on like this, Ihe somehow prevails, and we bitterly stay home and do yard work, his case and standing will be considerably enhanced if the radio blares out our number as the winner, If we go to the picnic and don’t win the lottery, then we will chide him for his foolishness. Which was the better argument, his or ours? It may seem that we should be able to determine this without appeal to how it actually turns out. PH tells us that the hypothesis that we have the winning lottery ticket should not be rejected as unjustified without argument against it, at least as far as philosophy goes. But what does this # We may chose to ignore the hypothesis on the grounds that is too unlikely to be worth taking seriously. Tf we say that, nonetheless, we are not regarding it as philosophically unjustified, what does it cost us to say this? Does it mean anything more than that there is a nonzero probability it is true? Similarly with other cases in which even nonzero probability does not make sense but we have some sense of ‘logical possibility’. In practical life, the remark that a hypothesis is not unjustified may suggest something about how we could proceed. This is vague, but details are forth- coming, which would show that something is meant beyond saying that the hypothesis is not logically inconsistent. What does the ‘philosophical’ saying that a hypothesis is not unjustified mean beyond its being consistent or of nonzero probability? What makes it appropriate to speak of justification? When another family mem- ber says ‘You know, he’s not without justification here’, this mi signify a turning point in the debate. The picnic prospects may begin to waver. Such turns don’t oceur in philosophical debate about sceptical hypotheses because there is nothing to turn. Perhaps it is unfair to philosophy to make this generalization 82On the Burden of Proof without exceptions. Suppose that you are talking to a dying man, who values your opinion as a philosopher. He advances the hypothesis that this life is like a dream and death an awakening which will allow him to learn new things about God’s plan for him. To say that this hope is not unjustified may be important, and perhaps it is not the same as saying that this hypothesis is a bare logical possibility. It may be to say that his taking thi thought seriously is not going to keep this man away from any pic- nies, But whether his position is a philosophical one is not clear to me, Perhaps dying is not @ practical matter any more than philos ophy is. Is there one, ultimately correct standard of proof? I don’t think so; but ina given case, it may be true that an appropriate standard of proof has been satisfied. It can be truly observed that a different standard has not been satisfied. Confusion can arise as to the sig- nificance of this fact. University of Virginia