AIDS TO INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

For the purpose of interpreting the meaning of a provision contained in a statute, judges
and lawyers depend on certain aids to interpretation which will facilitate to know the
intention of the legislature at the time of enacting a particular statute. Mainly there are two
types of aids to interpretation of statutes.

i) Internal Aids

ii) External Aids

Internal Aids

The aids which could be found within the statute in question are called internal aids. An
examination of a statute as a whole or at least the parts which deal with the subject matter
of the provision to be interpreted, would give an indication of the overall purpose of the
legislation.
Examples of internal aids to interpretation could be listed as follows;

i. Long Title

ii. Preamble

iii. Provisos and Exceptions

iv. Side notes/ marginal notes

v. Interpretation/ Defining clauses

vi. Illustrations and Explanations

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vii. Punctuation

viii. Headings

i. Long Title

The long title is set out at the head of the statute. It gives a general idea of the purpose,
objectives and scope of the statute. For an example, Fauna and Flora Protection
(Amendment) Act No.22 of 2009, by which the long title to the Fauna and Flora Protection
Ordinance (Chapter 469) was repealed and a new long title was substituted states as
follows;

“AN ORDINANCE TO PROVIDE FOR THE PROTECTION AND CONSERVATION

OF THE FAUNA AND FLORA IN SRI LANKA AND THEIR HABITATS; FOR THE
PREVENTION AND OTHER MISUSE OF SUCH FAUNA AND FLORA IN SRI
LANKA AND THEIR HABITATS, FOR THE CONSERVATION OF THE
BIODIVERSITY OF SRI LANKA; AND TO PROVIDE FOR MATTERS CONNECTED
THEREWITH OR INCIDENTAL THERETO”

The long title of a statute is considered as a part of the statute and it can be used for the
purpose of interpreting the statute as a whole. A long title of a statute may not control,
restrict or widen the extent of the statute if the provisions of the statute are clear and
unambiguous.

In R Vs Galvin1, Lord Lane CJ speaking of the Official Secrets Act 1911 said;
“One can have regard to the title of a statute to help resolve an ambiguity in the body of it,
but it is not, we consider, open to a court to use the title to restrict what is otherwise the
plain meaning of the words of the statute simply because they seem to be unduly wide…..”

1
(1987) 2 All ER 851

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If a provision of a statute appears to be ambiguous, it is accepted that the construction
should be accustomed with the object stated in the long title.

According to Maxwell, although there are observations in earlier English cases that the
title of a statute should not be considered as a part of the statute, “it is now settled law that
the title of a statute is an important part of the Act and may be referred to for the purpose
of ascertaining its general scope and of throwing light on its construction, although it
cannot override the clear meaning of the enactment.”2

ii). Preamble

The preamble of a statute is not an enactment but a mere recitation of the intention of the
legislature and the mischief to be remedied. It may give guidance to judges in identifying
what a statute intends to achieve and its scope.

The preamble can be taken as an aid in interpretation of a statute only if the statute is not
clear and ambiguous. When the body of the statute is clear and unambiguous, the preamble
of the statute cannot restrict or extend the enacting part or the body of the statute.

Per Lord Tenierden CJ in Halton Vs Cover,3 “Although the enacting words of a statute are
not necessarily to be limited or controlled by the words of the preamble but in many
instances go beyond it, yet, on a sound construction of every Act of parliament, the words
in the enacting part must be confined to that which is the plain object and general intention
of the legislature in passing the Act; and the preamble affords a good clue to discover what
that object was. “

In Nga Hoong Vs Queen4 it was held that “There can be no doubt that the court must
construe the preamble as a key to the construction of the statute though, it would not, of

2
Maxwell, 11th Ed.p44 and the cases cited therein
3
(1 B Ad. 538)
4
[(1857-59) 7MIA 72, 4 WR (PC) 104]

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course, control every provision because, very often subsequent provisions of a statute
extend beyond the limits of the preamble.”

Apparently, a similar view has been taken by the Sri Lankan Courts with regard to the
position of the preamble of a statute. Therefore, it is important to examine a few Sri Lankan
case decisions in which the position of the preamble of a statute has been discussed
extensively.

In Development Finance Corporation (DFCC Bank Ltd) Vs Somaweera5 it was held that
the preamble of an Act cannot be utilised to cut down or restrict a clear provision in the
Act.

The petitioner in this case has obtained a loan for his business of selling fast foods and
operating a restaurant. Security offered was land, and as the loan was not repaid, the Bank
sought to Parate Execute the property.

Then the petitioner sought and obtained an injunction preventing the Bank from "Parate
Executing" the property, on the ground that the D.F.C.C. is not entitled to resort to section
4 of the Recovery of Loans by Banks (Special Provisions) Act No. 4 of 1990 as the Act is
confined to recovery of loans given for economic development, and the business of selling
fast foods and running a restaurant is not an enterprise which is conducive to economic
development of Sri Lanka. The Court took the view that the D.F.C.C. had no power to grant
the loan as the plaintiff's business did not fall within the purposes of the D.F.C.C.

In the Court of Appeal judgement, Amaratunga J stated that;

“The learned District Judge has referred to the preamble of the Recovery of Loans by
Banks (Special Provisions) Act, No. 4 of 1990, which reads as follows "An Act to provide
for the recovery of loans granted by Banks for the economic development of Sri Lanka...."
Having earlier held that the running of a fast foods sales outlet and a restaurant are not acts
connected with or conducive to the economic development of Sri Lanka, the learned Judge
has come to the conclusion that the provisions of Act No. 4 of 1990 cannot be utilized to

5
(2003) 3 SLR 128 (CA),

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recover loans granted to the plaintiff. This view is erroneous for two reasons. Firstly, the
preamble of an Act cannot be utilized to cut down or restrict a clear provision in the Act.
If the enacting words admit only one construction that construction will be given effect to
even if it is inconsistent with the preamble”

Credit Information Bureau of Sri Lanka Vs Jafferjee and Jafferjee Pvt Ltd6.is an appeal
to the Supreme Court against the judgment of the Court of Appeal where the Court of
Appeal issued a writ of Mandamus directing the Respondent Appellant Jafferjee and
Jafferjee Pvt Ltd to disclose-to the Petitioner- Respondent Credit Information Bureau of
Sri Lanka, the credit information that it had provided to lending institutions.

under and in terms of Section 6 (b) of the Credit information Bureau of Sri Lanka Act,
No. 18 of 1990 as amended by Act, No. 8 of 1995, the Respondent- Appellant is bound to
provide the credit information to its shareholders and simultaneously forward such
information to borrowers and prospective borrowers to whom such information relates.
The Petitioner - Respondent's grievance was that the Respondent - Appellant had
wrongfully, unlawfully and / or illegally refused to forward such information to the
Respondent and thereby failed to perform its statutory duty and obligation.

When the application for Special Leave to Appeal was supported in the Supreme Court,
one of the eight questions raised by the counsel for the petitioner – Respondent was “Have
their Lordships erred in law in interpreting the word "simultaneously" found in Section 6
(b) and the preamble of the Act?”

According to J.A.N.de Silva J;

“The preamble is certainly a part of the Act. It is elementary to say that the intention of
the legislature must be gathered from the language of the Act itself. It is only where there
is ambiguity and when an expression used by the legislature is capable of more than one
meaning that it is permissible for the Court to look at the preamble. When there is a conflict
between the preamble and the provisions of an Act the latter shall prevail. It is a well settled

6
(2004) BLR 105 (SC) / (SC Appeal No.47A / 2003)

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rule of construction that the provisions of a statute should be so read as to harmonize with
one another and the provisions of one section cannot be used to defeat those of another
unless it is impossible to effect reconciliation between them.” In this judgement J.A.N.de
Silva J has referred to an Indian case of Sanjeevayya Vs Election Tribunal7

iii). Provisos and Exceptions

The main role of a proviso is to lay down an exception to the main provision.

In CIT Vs. Ajax Products Ltd8 a case decided by the Supreme Court of India, it was held
that;

“There may be cases in which the language of the statute may be so clear that a proviso
may be construed as a substantive clause. But whether a proviso is construed as restricting
the main provision or as a substantive clause, it cannot be divorced from the provision to
which it stands as a proviso. It must be construed harmoniously with the main enactment.”

In Ismalebbe Vs Jayawardene9 the statute in question was Agrarian Services Act, No. 58
of 1979.

Here it was argued whether application of a proviso of a section is restricted to the section
immediately preceding it.

In the Court of Appeal judgement it was held that,

“Even as a general rule of interpretation it is not permissible to restrict the operation of the
proviso to the subsection which immediately precedes it. A proviso should be construed in
relation to the entire section and where necessary in the context of even the other sections.”

Per Sarath .N. Silva J;

7
AIR (1967) SC 1211.
8
[(1964) 55 ITR 741 (SC)],
9
(1990) 2 SLR 199,

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“An examination of case law shows that a proviso is a fertile area from which arguments
of varied dimensions could be thrown up. It has been argued that the contents of a proviso
limit the ambit of operation of the main section and at times in the reverse, that the ambit
of the proviso is restricted by the main section……In my view the correct approach to the
construction of a proviso is to read it in the entire context in which it appears. As observed
by Holroyd, J. in the case of R v. Newark Inhabitants (38 & C 71) such a matter has to be
decided upon the words and their import and "not upon the division into sections that may
be made for the convenience of reference in the printed copies of the Statutex".

Sarath .N. Silva J has further stated that a proviso should be considered as a legislative
measure to remove a certain class of cases from the operation of the main section and where
necessary the other sections of the Act.

In the Indian case of Saradambal v. Seethalakshmi10 Pillai J. observed the function of a

proviso as follows;

"Unless there are special indications to show that a proviso to a section is limited to one
part of it, normally the proviso governs the entire section; secondly, it is not necessary for
the purpose of making a proviso applicable to the entire section to repeat it after each clause
of that section. The proviso is really in the nature of an exception which takes a class of
cases out of the operation of the main section."

See also: Karunadasa Vs Wijejinghe11

Exceptions and provisos to Section 294 of the Penal Code of Sri Lank

iv). Side notes/ Marginal notes

Marginal notes are often found at the side of the sections in a statute and the purpose of a
marginal note is to summarize the effect of the section. These notes may be used as an aid
for the purpose of interpreting a provision of a statute.

10
(AIR 1962 Madras 108)
11
(1986) 1 SLR 368,

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K.P. Varghese Vs ITO12 a case decided by the Supreme Court of India, it was held that
“The marginal note to a section cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the
section but it can certainly be relied upon as indicating the drift of the section or to show
what the section is dealing with. It cannot control the interpretation of the words of a
section, particularly when the language of the section is clear and unambiguous but, being
part of the statute, it prima facie furnishes some clue as to the meaning and purpose of the
section.”

v). Interpretation/ Defining clauses

Definitions of various terms and words which are frequently used throughout a statute
contained in the Interpretation/ defining clauses. When a certain definition has been given
to a word or a term in the interpretation clause, prima facie that definition governs
whenever that word is used in the body of the statute. However, if a different meaning is
given to a word in a particular context, only that particular meaning should be used for the
purpose of interpretation.

(See for interpretation clauses in various statutes.)

In the case of Development Finance Corporation (DFCC Bank Ltd) Vs Somaweera 13 the
definition of ‘Commercial enterprise’ given in the Recovery of Loans by Banks (Special
Provisions) Act No. 4 of 1990 was questioned. According to the Act, “Commercial
enterprise” includes an enterprise not falling within the description of an agricultural or
industrial enterprise which shall be conducive to the economic development of Sri Lanka",

Per Amarathunga J;

12
[(131 ITR 597 (SC)],
13
Ibid 5

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“The plaintiff’s argument has been formulated by overlooking the significance of the word
'includes' used in the above quoted definition. If the definition has used the word 'means'
instead of the word ‘includes' the plaintiff's argument is tenable. …” In this case, the word
is restricted to the scope indicated in the definition section. Sometimes, however, the word
"include" is used in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body
of the statute; and when it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as
comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but
also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. In other
words, the word in respect of which "includes" is used bears both its extended statutory
meaning and its ordinary, popular and natural sense whenever that would be properly
applicable."

vi). Illustrations and Explanations

Illustrations attached to sections are considered as a part of the statute. These descriptions
are useful for the purpose of interpretation of a provision or a statute as they explain and
provide examples for the content in the section in detail.

In some instances, an explanation is attached to a section to explain the meaning of words

contained in the section.

The importance of illustrations and explanations for the purpose of interpretation was
discussed in CIT Vs. Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works14 It was held that “The normal
principle in construing an Explanation is to understand it as explaining the meaning of the
provision to which it is added; the Explanation does not enlarge or limit the provision,
unless the Explanation purports to be a definition or a deeming clause; if the intention of
the Legislature is not fully conveyed earlier or there has been a misconception about the
scope of a provision, the Legislature steps in to explain the purport of the provision; such
an Explanation has to be given effect to, as pointing out the real meaning of the provision
all along.”

14
[193 ITR 77 (Kar)].

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See: illustrations and explanations in various statutes

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