Week 1

Script:

How are European Union-Russia relations set-up? (Political and institutional framework)
Relations between the European Union and Russia have had their ups and downs over the course of the
last few decades. In order to have a better grasp of these dynamics, we have to look back and
understand the nature of bilateral interactions and the setup of the institutional framework established
between the two entities. When discussing institutional developments between the EU and Russia, one
must always keep in mind that the engagement framework for both of the actors has been shaped not
only by the legacy and traditions of interaction between the then-European Community and the Soviet
Union, but also by the broader and constantly evolving post-Cold War order at both the global and EU
levels. In some ways, the overall relationship (at least in the early stages of the EU and Russia’s
interactions) might be characterised as the European Union’s attempts to place Russia into highly
institutionalized, post-sovereign arrangements that fit into the unipolar Europe built upon the EU’s
liberal norms and values, and Russia’s constant and progressing responses to that project.
In order to start looking at the evolution of the relations between the two actors, some scholars suggest
dividing the stages of EU-Russia relations into separate categories. We are going to rely on the Forsberg
and Haukkala taxonomy, which proposes to look at EU-Russia interactions through six phases in time
that roughly coincide with the presidential terms in Russia: the “optimism” phase (shaped by the
aftermath of the Cold War environment, lasting from 1992-1994), the “time of troubles” phase
(characterized by much more strained relations, lasting from 1994-2000), the “Putin promise” phase (a
time of a potential reset in EU-Russia relations caused by the election of new president in Russia, lasting
from 2000-2004), the “mutual disappointment” phase (characterised by unrealised possibilities and
misunderstanding, lasting from 2004-2008), the “partnership for modernisations” phase (influenced by
Medvedev’s agenda for innovation and modernisation inside Russia) and the final phase “rupture of
relations” (starting with Putin’s 2012 presidential term). Overall, it is worth mentioning that Russia has
always been uneasy in dealing with the EU as a supranational entity and has traditionally preferred to
relate to the member states bilaterally, as part of a broader strategy “divide and rule”.
In the next videos we are going to look at these phrases in more detail and try to point out the main
characteristics and implications of each era.
The “optimism” phase (1992-1994)
The changed geopolitical and societal situation after the collapse of the Soviet Union and (re) emergence
of the Russian Federation and other independent post-Soviet republics required both the European
Community/Union and Russia to re-asses and update their bilateral and institution-based interactions
established in the late 1980s. The previously signed Trade and Cooperation Agreement of 1989 proved
to be limited already in 1990, when the European Council advised the Commission to explore wider
possibilities and ways to engage with the Soviet Union that would include closer economic relations,
political dialogue and cultural cooperation. By the time of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, the agreed TCA
framework was already outdated and hadn’t lived up to the new challenges of the new post-Cold War
settings and needs of both actors. For the European Community/Union, the main puzzle was to identify
a new political and economic rapprochement agenda with Russia that would ensure a smooth and
orderly transition into a post-Soviet era. For Russia, the main challenge was to find and consolidate a
new place in the new European institutional architecture of the post-Cold War period. Accordingly, in
1991 the European Community established the TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of
Independent States) programme to support the ongoing process of economic reform, recovery and
development as well as the speedy integration into the world economy of Russia and the other eleven
CIS states. In parallel to the changing political environment, the security situation in Europe and the
wider post-Soviet space witnessed an attempt to create a new post-Cold War order based on
cooperation, rather than confrontation, which would be at the basis of a new continental security
structure involving Western European, North American and former Soviet states. In accordance with the
spirit of “the Charter of Paris for a New Europe”, agreed upon by the member countries of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
The initial balance of power between the two entities was quite asymmetrical. While the European
Community shifted to consolidate more coherent integration framework among its member states,
Russia faced both the harsh economic reality of transitioning to a market economy and, to some extent,
political instability and power struggles inside its key institutions.
The initial expectation was to conclude the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with a fairly short
negotiation process. However, initial plans were not fulfilled and, instead, the negotiation process lasted
for 19 months, including several rounds of official talks. The main factors slowing down the process stem
from Russia’s push for more trade concessions and more generous long-term perspectives in economic
engagement with the EC (in the form of a free-trade area), which were not originally part of the
Commission's mandate, as well as the EC’s inability to address and meet Russia’s needs and demands,
with separate member states being particularly slow in responding to the requests. All in all, it created
an environment where the EC was constantly fearful of “losing Russia” and thus threatened to push back
certain economic and political reforms in the country. To some extent, it led the EC to constantly need
to lock Russia into an institutional arrangement that would make such changes in the country
irreversible.
As a result, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, or PCA, was signed on the 24th of January
1994 and represented a break from the previous forms of agreements that were concluded with other
countries in the former Soviet space. While the emphasis of the agreement was still primarily focused on
economic and trade engagements, in contrast to the TCA, it included also broader areas of cooperation
stretching to political dialogue as well as partnership in social, cultural, educational, science and
technology spheres with a vision to provide a “framework for the gradual integration between Russia
and a wider area of cooperation in Europe” (PCA, Article 1).
The PCA also put a strong emphasis on the role of norms and values, which stipulated the post-sovereign
core of the EU-Russia relations and outlined a concrete “rules of the game” framework. This feature was
extended not only to the PCA but was and still is included in all of the EU‘s external agreements.
Perhaps one of the most rigorous innovations in the PCA came from the political dialogue section, which
enabled both parties to establish a list of configurations facilitating further engagement and
communication between the EC and Russia in the form of: 1.bi-annual ​EU-Russia Summits​ between the
EU troika (the Council president, the EU high representative and the Commission president) and the
president of Russia, 2. the annual​ Cooperation Councils​ meeting at the ministerial levels, 3.​ Cooperation
Committees​ (at the senior officials’ level) meeting as often as necessary and ​Sub-Committees​ (at the
working level) below them to deal with more technicalities and, lastly, 4. A ​Joint Parliamentary
Committee,​ where members of the European Parliament and the Russian Duma meet on a regular basis
to discuss current issues. (PCA Articles, 6-9, 90-7).
The “time of troubles” phase (1994-2000)
Despite the quite ambitious agenda set out in the PCA and signed between the two parties, the
ratification and implementation process slumped into a series of crises. The causes of delay can be
traced back to the Russian political situation both in domestic and foreign policy realms. At the domestic
level, the situation was slowed by the internal tensions between the reformers led by Yeltsin and the
more conservative Russian parliament, which resulted in an armed showdown and constitutional crisis
between the two in October of 1993, as well as start of the First Chechen War in December of 1994. At
the foreign affairs level, the pro-Western policies of Andrey Kozyrev were replaced with a more
multi-vector agenda under the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yevgeny Primakov. The policy would
come to be known as the “Primakov Doctrine”, which would emphasize Russia’s independent role in
operating in a multipolar world and establishing alliances with multiple centres of power, including
emerging powers such as China and India. All of these developments led Russia to start doubting the
very premises upon which the agreement had been negotiated right as the PCA took effect in December
of 1997. Despite this backdrop of negativity and suspicion, the cooperation with the EU was still
perceived as highly desirable.
However, the succession of events to follow exacerbated the relations and made cooperation between
the two entities more challenging. One such blowback came from the financial crisis that hit the Russian
economy in August 1998, pushing the Russian government to default on its debts and allowing the
rouble to devalue uncontrolled. The following developments led the EU to seriously question the
feasibility of any form of economic partnership with Russia. The second major blowback stemmed from
the Kosovo War in 1999. Although it was a NATO-led operation, with the United States bearing the main
responsibility of the military campaign against Serbia, Russia drew several conclusions from the
operation’s execution. First, the US, together with some EU member states, used military intervention to
affect regime change in a case where it saw fit, and, second, the unilateral military intervention took
place without an explicit mandate from the United Nations Security Council and against the voiced
objection of the Russian Federation in particular. The final event that affected EU-Russia relations, was
the Second Chechen War, which started almost immediately after the Kosovo crisis. Although the EU
condemned Russia’s actions and imposed limited sanctions, Putin was hardly bothered by the criticism
and insisted on pursuing the chosen course of action on his terms although the situation in Chechnya
remained unsolved. With these actions, Putin managed to showcase the inconsistency behind the EU’s
loud statements, and some of the key EU member states’ willingness to conduct interest-based
interactions with Russia regardless of the malaise in relations. This led the Kremlin to further the
strategy of establishing direct links and seeking agreements with influential members states, presuming
that the EU and its institutions will follow suit.
This bumpy start of expected closer cooperation between the EU and Russia within the framework of
the PCA, led the European Union to revitalize its approach towards Russia and resulted in a string of
internal strategies, such as the Northern Dimension launched during the Finish presidency of the EU in
1999 and the intergovernmental negotiation of a Common Strategy on Russia in 1999, the first CFSP
instrument of its kind following the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997.
The “Putin promise” phase (2000-2004)
At the beginning of his presidency, Vladimir Putin, hailing from the most European of Russian cities, St.
Petersburg, and who held a KGB officer position in East Germany, was seen as a supporter of
Europeanization. These intentions were supported both by the 2000 Foreign Policy concept and
medium-term EU strategy (2000-10), which were seen as a response to the EU's Common Strategy on
Russia. Although the documents were received with optimism, further reading of Russian strategies
reveals that, from the start quite different visions for future relations existed between the two entities.
Further consolidation of relations came from the EU-Russia Summits in 2000-02, which were held in a
constructive spirit, building on a Northern Dimension initiative and promoting a large range of diverse
areas aimed at strengthening stability, intensifying economic cooperation and promoting sustainable
development in the region. Moreover, in the same period of time, the EU granted Russia the status of a
full market economy.
The 2004 EU enlargement to the East also created a new reality for EU-Russia relations. Anticipating the
enlargement, the EU began drafting a New European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which was also
offered to Russia at the initial stage. Since Russia did not want to be treated like just another neighbour
in a group of smaller countries, the Kremlin pushed for a separate “Strategic Partnership” with the EU,
which sought to give more credit to the status of Russia as a great power, and more privileges as a
result.
Considering these, the EU and Russia developed the concept of the Four Common Spaces, which
became one of the main flagship programmes for both entities throughout the 2000s and were
incorporated into the framework of the PCA. The common spaces were based on the premises of
common values and shared interests, and centred around the following areas: 1. The Common Economic
Space (including economic issues and environment), 2. The Common Space of Freedom, Security, and
Justice, 3. The Common Space of External Security (including crisis management and non-proliferation)
and 4. The Common Space of Research and Education (including cultural aspects).
The launch of common spaces created another wave of optimism and was perceived by Brussels as a
victory of the normative power of Europe (since the common spaces implied Russia’s partial
Europeanization in terms of norms and rules). However, more and more experts both in Brussels and
Moscow began coming to a realisation of a diverse set of handicaps related to domestic politics and
competing foreign policy priorities between the two entities. At the time, however, the EU still put an
emphasis on pragmatic cooperation with Russia and both parties seemed to share more overlapping
interests that increased the potential for a fruitful partnership.
“Mutual disappointment” phase (2004-2008)
With the consolidation of power during his second presidential term, Putin shifted away from the
Europeanization agenda that had been taking shape in early 2000s. This can be partially explained by the
internal power shift among the political elite inside key institutions in Russia, when high ranking
positions were filled by siloviki - representatives of security organs - and liberal groups were
marginalised in the Russian Parliament. The second reason tracks back to the Kremlin’s (and particularly
Putin’s) disappointment with dealing with the EU, namely the perception that the EU did not properly
treat and acknowledge Russia as an equal partner. Despite positive developments in establishing
common spaces and identifying mutual interests, according to the Kremlin, it did not stop the EU from
lecturing Moscow on the way the situation in Chechnya should be handled, as well as about
anti-terrorist operations related to the hostage crisis at the Beslan School and the Nord-Ost Theatre in
Moscow. Instead of showing support for the Kremlin's fight against terrorism, the EU
expressed suspicion towards the level of transparency and the approach taken by their Russian
counterparts in resolving these situations. The following developments also overlapped with Putin’s shift
in foreign policy priorities, emphasizing a more statist approach in handling international affairs. The rise
of oil prices and improvements in the Russian economy gave Putin more space to manoeuvre to execute
these actions and pursue slightly more nationalistic policy, fuelled largely by patriotism.
The EU-Summits in 2004 and 2005 were rather disappointing for both sides, showing quite vividly that
no major progress had been achieved despite the launch of the new framework for the Four Common
Spaces. Moreover, the extension of the PCA Treaty, scheduled to expire in December 2007, had not
progressed either.
The “final push for partnership” phase (2008-2012)
After several months of Medvedev’s inauguration to the Russian Presidency, relations between the West
and Russia came under test yet again, but this time, as a result of Russia’s war in Georgia, which evolved
as a result of a tense relationship between Moscow and Tbilisi, and NATO’s open-ended invitation for
Georgia and Ukraine to eventually join the alliance. The conflict was solved in large part through
successful EU mediation, and sanctions were lifted as a result of the new “reset” policy proposed by the
Obama administration in the US, aimed at fostering limited and pragmatic cooperation between the
parties in the field of international security.
Medvedev’s presidential term and his advocacy for modernisation also gave a green light to a more
constructive mood and a breath of fresh air in EU-Russia relations. During the EU-Russia Summit in
Rostov-on-Don in the summer of 2010, a new platform initiative was launched - labelled the Partnership
for Modernisation (P4M), focusing on economic and legal cooperation, while pushing aside the wider
debate on the normative values. In additional to the EU-level initiative on modernisation, practically
every EU member state concluded bilateral modernization partnerships with Russia with detailed
agendas. At the same time, many pundits and experts in the West, including the EU, believed and hoped
that Medvedev would run for the second term, which could strengthen and consolidate Medvedev’s
modernisation agenda both within Russia and with the EU. However, during the United Russia Party
Congress in September 2011, it was announced that Putin would run for president in the upcoming
elections in March 201​2. The ensuing situation created much outrage not only within Russia, with
multiple protest following, but also caused profound doubts from the EU with regards to transparency
of such moves by the Kremlin.
The “rupture of relations” phase (2012 - present)
Despite massive protest throughout the winter of 2011 and spring of 2012, Vladimir Putin managed to
ensure his return to office, although the situation was not the same and the public approval ratings were
not as high as during his previous presidential terms. Putin’s road to his third term as president was
affected not only by the domestic protests but also collided with the Colour Revolutions in the
post-Soviet space as well as Arab Spring, which seriously reshaped the old dictatorships and
authoritarian regimes in those countries that had been in place for several decades. Terrified of the
outcome of these uprisings abroad and convinced that the domestic protests were part of fabricated
attempts to overthrow his regime with the support of foreign funds and agents (USAID, Soros, etc.),
Putin turned to more punitive measures to suppress any attempt of major protests in the streets of
Moscow or elsewhere in Russia. At the same time, the Kremlin learned the lesson of losing the grip of
influence and power over its near abroad region and pushed forward initiatives for its own integration
projects such as the Eurasian Customs Union (which would later evolve into the Eurasian Economic
Union, with the intention of being a counterweight to the European Union).
The shift that ensued only deepened the divide in EU-Russia relations and their vision for future
cooperation. This was particularly evident in the EU-Russia Summit in Yekaterinburg in 2013, which
revealed the rift between the two on issues ranging from the Russian anti-gay propaganda law to the
conflict in Syria and beyond.
The worst part in EU-Russia relations was yet to come and would happen during the run-up to the
Vilnius Eastern Partnership Summit in November of 2013. It was expected that the EU would sign a
series of Association Agreements (AAs) with a perspective to include a deep and comprehensive free
trade area (DCFTA) with four partner countries (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). Earlier on,
even before the negotiations took place, Russian expressed an interest in being granted an observer
status in the Eastern Partnership. This request, however, was turned down by the EU in order to prevent
any pressure or intimidation tactics from Russia (especially in the post-Georgian war situation) on
participating countries. The EU, in this respect, regarded the AA negotiations as a bilateral deal between
itself and the neighbouring countries.
The final outcome of the summit was quite disappointing, leading to only two AA deals signed with
Georgia and Moldova. Armenia, being pressed by Moscow during Putin’s visit to Yerevan in September
2013 as well as the broader security situation and the presence of a Russian military base on its territory,
opted to join the Eurasian Customs Union. The situation with Ukraine developed even more rapidly: the
Ukrainian President’s (Viktor Yanukovych’s) last minute decision to not sign the AA with the EU led to
long standing protests and resistance in Kiev (known as Euromaidan Revolution), which eventually led
to the collapse of the Yanukovych regime, but also steadily escalated into the conflict between Ukraine
and Russia, which was backing Yanukovych's regime and saw a potential threat to its security and
geopolitical interests in Ukraine, and Sevastopol in particular (the city has been a home to the Russian
Black Sea Fleet) as a result of Ukraine’s closer ties with the West, including the EU and NATO. Further
developments only worsened the situation: first the annexation of Crimean Peninsula and later
escalation of war in Eastern Ukraine between the separatists (backed by the Kremlin) and the Ukrainian
army, as well as shooting down of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 in the area of Donetsk, resulted in a
dramatic disruption not only of EU-Russia relations but in the broader post-Cold War security order as
well. The EU responded by supporting the new Ukrainian government and imposing broader sanctions
on key sectors of the Russian economy and individually targeted sanctions on Russian political figures
close to Putin or/and responsible for misdeeds.
While sanctions did make an impact on the Russian economy and made it harder for Putin’s circle to
conduct their financial operations abroad, the course of EU-Russia relations did not shift towards a
series of more positive developments. Putin’s return to the presidency for his fourth term and
continuation of confrontational rhetoric toward the West and the EU might indicate that no constructive
or fundamental changes in the EU-Russia relations agenda will take place in a mid-term perspective: the
Kremlin continues to apply assertive foreign policy towards the West and the EU not only in its willing
use of force on Syrian soil, but also in an attempt to influence the internal politics of some EU member
states by providing financial or media support for anti-establishment or perceived pro-Russian political
forces such as the National Front in France and Jobbik in Hungary, among others.