1 2
Laurel v. Abrogar BICERRA VS. TENEZA
G.R. No. 155076, January 13, 2009
Facts:
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) filed a
complaint for theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code
against Baynet Co., Ltd. (Baynet) for stealing its business. PLDT
alleged that Baynet offered phone cards to people in Japan to call
their friends and relatives in the Philippines using PLDT's facilities
and equipment.
Issue:
Whether or not the PLDT's business of providing
telecommunication services is a personal property under Article
308 of the Revised Penal Code.
Held:
No, PLDT's business of providing telecommunication services is
not a personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code.
Term “personal property” as used in Art. 308 of RPC should be
interpreted in the context of the Civil Code's definition of real and
personal property. Consequently, any personal property, tangible
or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation
may be the subject of theft so long as the same is not included in
the enumeration of Real Properties under the Civil Code. The
only requirement for personal property to capable of theft, is that
it be subject to appropriation.
PLDT's business is intangible and cannot be taken by another
and not the proper subjects of theft because they are without form
or substance.
FACTS:
The Bicerras were the owners of the house, worth P200.00, built
on and owned by them and situated in the said municipality
Lagangilang. In January 1957, the Tenezas forcibly demolished
the house, claiming to be the owners thereof. The materials of the
house, after it was dismantled, were placed in the custody of the
barrio lieutenant of the place.The Bicerras filed a complaint
claiming actual damages of P200, moral and consequential
damages amounting to P600, and the costs. The CFI Abra
dismissed the complaint claiming that the action was within the
exclusive (original) jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court
of Lagangilang, Abra.
ISSUE: W/N The action involves title to real property, as
appellants contend, and therefore is cognizable by the Court of
First Instance.
HELD: Yes, the action involves a real property.
A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its
adherence to the soil on which it is built (Art. 415, par. 1, Civil
Code). This classification holds true regardless of the fact that the
house may be situated on land belonging to a different owner. But
once the house is demolished, as in this case, it ceases to exist
as such and hence its character as an immovable likewise
ceases. It should be noted that the complaint here is for recovery
of damages. This is the only positive relief prayed for by
appellants. To be sure, they also asked that they be declared
owners of the dismantled house and/or of the materials. However,
such declaration in no wise constitutes the relief itself which if

granted by final judgment could be enforceable by execution, but
is only incidental to the real cause of action to recover damages.

The order appealed from is affirmed. The appeal having been

admitted in forma pauperis, no costs are adjudged.

3. PUNZALAN VS. VDA. DE LACSAMANA, 121 SCRA 331 (1983)

Facts:
PNB filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that venue was
improperly laid considering that the building was real property
under article 415 (1) of the New Civil Code and therefore section
2(a) of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court should apply. Petitioner
Punzalan contended that the action for annulment of deed of sale
with damages is in the nature of a personal action, which seeks to
recover not the title nor possession of the property but to compel
payment of damages, which is not an action affecting title to real
property.

Issue: W/N the building or warehouse is a real property?

Ruling:
The warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is an
immovable or real property as provided in article 415(l) of the Civil
Code. Buildings are always immovable under the Code. A
building treated separately from the land on which it stood is
immovable property and the mere fact that the parties to a
contract seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the
land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as
immovable property.


4 5

G.R. No. L-50466 May 31, 1982

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES) INC., petitioner,

vs.
CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS and CITY
ASSESSOR OF PASAY, respondents.

FACTS:
This case is about the realty tax on machinery and equipment
installed by Caltex (Philippines) Inc. in its gas stations located on
leased land.
The said machines and equipment are loaned by Caltex to gas
station operators under an appropriate lease agreement or
receipt. Under the lease contract, the operators are bound to
return the equipment in good condition upon demand and that
Caltex retains ownership thereof during the term of the lease.
The Central Board of Assessment Appeals held that the
machines and equipment are real property tax within the meaning
of sections 3(k) & (m) and 38 of the Real Property Tax Code and
that the definitions of real property and personal property in
articles 415 and 416 of the Civil Code are not applicable to this
case.
Caltex filed a petition for certiorari praying to set aside the
Board’s decision and for a declaration that the said machines and
equipment are personal property not subject to realty tax.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the machines and equipment are real property
subject to realty tax.
HELD:


Yes, the machines and equipment are real property subject
to realty tax. Said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances
to the gas station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it
is subject to realty tax) and which fixtures are necessary to the
operation of the gas station, for without them the gas station
would be useless, and which have been attached or affixed
permanently to the gas station site or embedded therein, are
taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning of the
Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.
Improvements on land are commonly taxed as realty even though
for some purposes they might be considered personalty.
Petition for certiorari is dismissed.
CASE No. 06
MERALCO vs. CBAA, G.R. No. L-46245, May 31, 1982
Facts:
Meralco Securities installed from Batangas to Manila, a pipeline
system consisting of cylindrical steel pipes joined together and
buried not less than one meter below the surface along the
shoulder of the public highway. The pipes are embedded in the
soil while the valves are welded to the pipes so as to make the
pipeline system one single piece of property from end to end.
Pursuant to the Assessment Law, Commonwealth Act No. 470,
the provincial assessor of Laguna treated the pipeline as real
property and issued Tax Declarations.
Issue:
Whether or not the Meralco Securities Pipeline System in Laguna
is a subject to a realty tax.
Held: Meralco Securities Pipeline System in Laguna is subject to
a realty tax. CBAA reasoned out that the pipes are machinery or
improvements and regarded as realty because they are
constructions adhered to the soil. It is attached to the land in such
a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without dismantling
the steel pipes which are welded to the pipeline. In so far as the
pipeline uses valves, pumps and control devices to maintain the
flow of the oil, it is in a sense a machinery within the meaning of
the Real Property Tax Code.
Thus, the Court dismiss the petition and the questioned decision
and resolution of the lower court is affirmed.

7 1. Yes. Petition for annulment of judgment was the proper
METROPOLITAN BANK, & TRUST COMPANY vs. Hon.
FLORO T. ALEJO, Presiding Judge of Branch 172 RTC
Valenzuela;
FACTS: As security for the payment of the loans obtained from
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company by the spouses Raul and
Cristina Acampado, a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of
Nullity of land was executed by same spouses. Subsequently a
Complaint for Declaration of the TCT of the spouses was filed by
Sy Tan Se in the RTC of Valenzuela. The bank was not made a
party to the said civil case(complaint for declaration of nullity of
TCT.) They weren’t notified as well. The spouses defaulted in the
payment of their loan and extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings
were initiated. The bank submitted the highest and winning bid. A
certificate of sale was issued in their favor.
When they were about to get their TCT from the Register of
Deeds, petitioner was informed of the existence of the decision in
the aforementioned civil case (complaint for declaration of nullity
of TCT) declaring the Spouses Acampados’s TCT null and void.
The bank filed with the CA a petition for the annulment of the
RTC Decision. The CA dismissed their petition and ruled that the
bank should have filed a petition for relief from judgment or an
action for quieting of title.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a petition for annulment of judgment is the
proper remedy available to the bank.
2. Whether or not the judgment of the trial court (declaring
the Spouses Acampados TCT null and void) should be
declared null and void
HELD :
remedy available to the bank. Such bank was deprived of its
duly registered property right without due process of the law
by not including the petitioner as defendant to the civil case by
Sy Tan Se even if he was an indispensable party.
2. Yes. The judgment of the trial court should also be declared
null and void because the bank, which is an indispensable
party, was not impleaded in the civil case. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actuations of the
court null and void, for want of authority to act, not only as to
the absent parties but even as to those present.
Case Number 8:
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority
415 SCRA 403 (2003)
FACTS:
The Register of Deeds of Paranaque issued TCT’s in the name of
PEA, as successor of CDCP, covering the 3 reclaimed islands
known as the “Freedom Islands” located in the southern portion of
the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. On April 25, 1995 , PEA entered
into a Joint Venture Agreement with AMARI, a private
corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands and to reclaim an
additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding the
islands. With this, PEA obliged itself to transfer to AMARI 70% of
PEA’s proportionate share in the reclaimed areas
ISSUE:
Is the Joint Venture Agreement, which will transfer the reclaimed
lands, valid?
RULING:
No. Under Sec.2, Article XII of the Constitution, the foreshore and
submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of lands of the public

domain, and consequently owned by the State. As such, these
areas shall not be alienated, unless they are classified as
agricultural lands of the public domain.
The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert
these into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.
There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially or
classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and
open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed
lands cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law
has reserved them for some public or quasi-public use. Absent
these two official acts – classification as alienable and a
declaration that these lands are not needed for public service,
lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of public
domain that cannot be transferred even by Joint Venture
Agreement. Hence, The Joint Venture Agreement is
unconstitutional.
9) Republic v. Santos
FACTS:
The respondents purchased three (3) parcels of unregistered
land. After the said purchase, the respondents caused the survey
and consolidation of the parcels of land into a single lot—“Lot 3”.
They then filed an Application for Original Registration of Lot 3.
They alleged that their predecessors-in-interest i.e., the previous
owners of the parcels of land making up Lot 3, have been in
“continuous, uninterrupted, open, public and adverse” possession
of the said parcels “since time immemorial.”
The government, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed
the lone opposition to the respondents’ application. It insists that
Lot 3 still forms part of the public domain and, hence, not subject
to private acquisition and registration. The government, however,
presented no further evidence to controvert the claim of the
respondents.
The RTC rendered a ruling granting the respondents’ Application
for Original Registration of Lot 3. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the RTC’s decision on appeal.
ISSUE:
WON the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC ruling
granting original registration of Lot 3 in favor of the respondents.
RULING:
We grant the petition.
Regalia simply means that the State is the original proprietor of all
lands and, as such, is the general source of all private titles.
Thus, pursuant to this principle, all claims of private title to land,
save those acquired from native title, must be traced from some
grant, whether express or implied, from the State. Absent a clear
showing that land had been let into private ownership through the
State’s imprimatur, such land is presumed to belong to the State.
Being an unregistered land, Lot 3 is therefore presumed as land
belonging to the State. It is basic that those who seek the entry of
such land into the Torrens system of registration must first
establish that it has acquired valid title thereto as against the
State, in accordance with law.
10. VILLARICO VS SARMIENTO, 442 SCRA 110
Facts:
Villarico is an owner of a lot that is separated from the
Ninoy Aquino Avenue highway by government land. Sarmiento
had a building constructed on a portion of the government land. In
1993, Villarico acquired a portion of the same area owned by the
government. He then filed an accion publiciana alleging that
respondents on the government land closed his right of way to
the NAA and encroached on a portion of his lot.

Issue: Whether or not VIllarico has a right of way to the NAA.
Held:
No. It is not disputed in this case that the alleged right of way to
the lot belongs to the state or property of public dominion.
Public use” means “use which is not confined to privileged
individuals,
but is open to the indefinite public. Public dominion property is
outside the commerce of man. Hence, It cannot be burdened by a
voluntary easement of right of way in favor of the petitioner and
petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself and he cannot claim
any right of possession over it.
11. Menchavez vs. Teves
Facts:
On February 28, 1986 a Contract of Lease of a Fishpond was
executed between the plaintiffs, as lessor and the respondent as
lessee. On June 2, 1988 the fishpond dikes constructed by
respondent was demolished as ordered by Cebu RTC. As a
result, he filed a Complaint for damages alleging that petitioners
violated their contract of lease specially the peaceful and
adequate enjoyment of property for the entire duration of the
contract. The RTC declared the Contract as void and declared
both parties in pari delicto. The CA however reversed the
decision. Thus the present appeal.
Issue:
Are the parties of the Contract of Lease in Pari delicto?
Ruling:
Under the 1987 Constitution specifically declares that all lands of
the public domain, waters, fisheries and other natural resources
belong to the State.18Included here are fishponds, which may not
be alienated but only leased, thus making the Contract of Lease
void. We apply the maxim NEMO DAT QUOD NON HABET’ -
meaning ONE CANNOT GIVE WHAT HE DOES NOT HAVE.
Petitioners are applicants of the fishponds. Even if the State
grants them the lease, the law also prohibits sublease of the
fishponds.
The parties are in pari delicto or in equal fault and the law deny
them aid for any claims against the other and courts leave them
as they are. However Article 1412 of the Civil Code provides the
exception.
"Art. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause
consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules
shall be observed:
"(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties,
neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract,
or demand the performance of the other’s undertaking;
"(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot
recover what he has given by reason of the contract, or ask for
the fulfillment of what has been promised him. The other, who is
not at fault, may demand the return of what he has given without
any obligation to comply with his promise."
The petition is GRANTED.
12. DACANAY V ASISTIO, JR
[G.R. No. 93654 May 6, 1992]

are null and void for being contrary to law. Thus, City Mayor may
Facts: not infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets
for the purpose they were intended to serve, i. e. as areteries of
A municipal ordinance was passed designating certain city and travel for vehicles and pedestrians.
municipal streets, roads and open spaces as sites for flea
markets, one of which is Heroes del ’96 where herein petitioner Petition granted.
resides. A change in the administration of the City of Caloocan
caused the demolition of the market stalls. Stall owners filed
before the RTC an action for prohibition against city officials. The
court issued the writ prayed for, but subsequently dismissed the
petition and lifted the writ of preliminary injunction which it had
earlier issued after it was found that subject streets are of public
dominion, hence, outside the commerce of man. However, shortly
after the decision came out, the city administration in Caloocan
City changed hands and the policy of clearing and cleaning up
the city streets did not push through. As the stall holders
continued to occupy the land through the tolerance of the public
respondents, and in clear violation of the court decision
previously issued, Dacanay filed the present petition
for mandamus praying that the public respondents be ordered to
enforce the final decision which upheld the city mayor's authority
to order the demolition of market stalls and other pertinent laws.

Issue:
May public streets or thoroughfares be leased or licensed to
market stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance or resolution?
Held:

No. A public street is property for public use, hence, outside the
commerce of man and may not be the subject of lease or of any
other contract. The right of the public to use the city streets may
not be bargained away thru a contract. As the stallholders pay
fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the
public street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been
leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or licenses


13
MANILA LODGE 761
VS
COURT OF APPEALS
73 SCRA 162
FACTS:
The Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1306 which
authorized the City of Manila to reclaim a portion of Manila Bay.
The reclaimed area was to form part of the Luneta extension. The
act provided that the reclaimed area shall be the property of the
City of Manila, and the city is authorized to set aside a tract of the
reclaimed land for a hotel site and to lease or to sell the same.
Later, the City of Manila conveyed a portion of the reclaimed area
to Petitioner. Then Petitioner sold the land, together with all the
improvements, to the Tarlac Development Corporation (TDC).
ISSUE:
W/the subject property was patrimonial property of the City of
Manila.
HELD:
No, the petitions were denied for lack of merit. The court
found it necessary to analyze all the provisions of Act No. 1360,
as amended, in order to unravel the legislative intent. The grant
made by Act No. 1360 of the reclaimed land to the City of Manila
is a grant of a “public” nature. Such grants have always been
strictly construed against the grantee because it is a gratuitous
donation of public money or resources, which resulted in an unfair
advantage to the grantee. In the case at bar, the area reclaimed
would be filled at the expense of the Insular Government and
without cost to the City of Manila. Hence, the letter of the statute
should be narrowed to exclude matters which, if included, would
defeat the policy of legislation.
14
Republic VS. CA
132 SCRA 514
Alluvium must be the exclusive work of nature. It has 3
requirements: 1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; 2)
through the current of the river; and 3) the land where the
accretion takes place is adjacent to the river bank. Deposits made
by human intervention are excluded.
FACTS:
The respondents (Tancinco’s) were registered owners of a parcel
of land in Bulacan, bordering on the Maycauayan and Bocaue
Rivers. They filed an application for the registration of three lots
adjacent to their fishpond, but because of the recommendation of
the Commissioner, they only pushed for the registration of two.
The RTC and CA granted the petition despite the opposition of
the Bureau of Lands.
The respondents based their claim on accretions to their
fishponds. They presented a lone witness (their overseer). The

Bureau of Lands argue that the lands in dispute are not
accretions. They assert that what actually happened was that the
respondents simply transferred their dikes simply further down
the river bed of the Meycauayan River. Thus, if there was any
accretion to speak of, it was man-made.
Respondents counter that the their evidence shows that accretion
happened without human intervention and that the transfer of the
dikes occurred only after.
ISSUE:
Whether accretion took place
RULING:
No. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. There is not
evidence that the addition to said property was made gradually
thro
15
MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY VS CA
GR No. 155650, July 20, 2006, 495 SCRA 591
Facts:
MIAA failed to settle the entire amount of real estate tax due.
Paranaque City levied and auctioned the land and buildings of
MIAA. MIAA sought for a TRO from the CA but failed to do so
within the 60 days reglementary period, so the petition was
dismissed. MIAA then sought for the TRO with the SC a day
before the public auction, TRO was granted but was received by
the Paranaque City 3 hours after the public auction. MIAA
contends that it is an instrumentality of the government and as
such exempted from real estate tax. That the land and buildings
of MIAA are of public dominion therefore cannot be subjected to
levy and auction sale.
Issues: Whether or not the land and buildings of MIAA are part of
the public dominion and thus cannot be the subject of levy and
auction sale.
Ruling: The land and buildings of MIAA are part of the public
dominion. Since the airport is devoted for public use, for the
domestic and international travel and transportation. As part of
the public dominion the land and buildings of MIAA are outside
the commerce of man. To subject them to levy and public auction
is contrary to public policy. Being for public use, its ownership is
with the Republic of the Philippines
16
Tufexis vs Olaguera
32 Phil 654
Facts: During the Spanish regime, Ricardo Pardo y Cabañas was
allowed by the Spanish government to have the usufruct of a
public market for 40 years. Ricardo died, and the usufruct was
inherited by Ricardo Pardo y Pujol, his son. When Pujol became
indebted, his properties were sold at an auction sale, and the
usufruct was bought by Tufexis. Then a fire destroyed the market.
The Council granted Pujol the right to reconstruct the building and
continue the usufruct. Tufexis complained on the ground that he
had bought at the auction sale Pujol’s usufruct.
Issue: Whether Tufexis can be given the usufruct and
administration of the market

Held: Tufexis cannot be given the right because the right is of
public character and could not be bought at an auction sale. For
Tufexis to take Pujol’s place would be contrary to law, for this
would be allowing a stranger who had not been selected by the
government, to take over a public function. On the other hand, in
terms of the concession given to Cabañas, were personal and
transferable only by inheritance. Tufexis, not being an heir of
Cabañas, cannot therefore exercise the right.
17.
Roman R. Santos v Hon. Florencio Moreno
21 SCRA 1141
December 4, 1967
Facts:
The Zobel famiy owned the Hacienda San Esteban. It was
devoted to the planting and cultivation of nipa palms. Accessibility
through the nipa palms deep into the hacienda posed as a
problem so its administrator dug canals. By the gradual process
of erosion, these canals acquired the characteristics and
dimensions of rivers.
Later, they converted the forest of nipa groves into a web of
fishponds for bangus culture. They constructed dikes and closed
the canals criss-crossing the hacienda.
Sometime in 1925 or 1926, a portion of the hacienda was sold to
Roman Santos who also transformed the swamp land into a
fishpond. Santos closed and built dikes across Sapang Malauling
Maragul, Quiñorang Silab, Pepangebunan, Bulacus, Nigui and
Nasi.
Residents complained that the closing of the canals caused
floods during the rainy season and it deprived them of their
means of transportation and fishing grounds. They demanded the
re-opening of the canals. Subsequently, the mayor, accompanied
by the residents, went to the hacienda and opened the closed
dikes.
Santos filed Civil Case No 448 in the CFI of Pampanga which
preliminarily enjoined the mayor and others from demolishing the
dikes across the canals. The municipal officials of Macabebe
countered by filing a complaint in the same court. The CFI
rendered judgment in both cases against Santos who
immediately elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Do the streams involved in this case belong to the public domain
or to the owner of Hacienda Esteban?
Held:
Pursuant to Art 71 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3,
1866 and Art 408 (5) of the Spanish Civil Code, channels of
creeks and brooks belong to the owners of the estates over which
they flow. The channels, therefore, of the streams in question,
which may be classified as creeks, belong to the owners of
Hacienda San Esteban. The streams, considered as canals, of
which they originally were, are of private ownership in
contemplation of Art 339 (1) of the Spanish Civil Code. Under Art
339, canals constructed by the State and devoted to public use
are of public ownership. Conversely, canals constructed by
private persons within private lands and devoted exclusively for
private use must be of private ownership.
There being a showing that the canals were constructed for the
use and benefit of its owner to the exclusion of the public, the
canals in question are adjudged to be of private ownership.

18. ALMAGRO VS KWAN GR 175806
Facts:
Respondents are the legitimate children of Kwan Chin and
Zosima Sarana, who both died intestate. Respondents filed with
the MTC an action for recovery of possession and damages for
their parents’ lot. The MTC dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the remaining dry portion of the subject lot has
become foreshore land and should be returned to the public
domain and that plaintiff cannot use the doctrine of indefeasibility
of their Torrens title, as property in question is clearly foreshore
land.
Issue: W/N the disputed portion of the subject lot is still private
land or has become foreshore land which forms part of the public
domain.
Held:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the
Resolution of the CA that the disputed land is not foreshore land.
To qualify as foreshore land, it must be shown that the land lies
between the high and low water marks and is alternately wet and
dry according to the flow of the tide. The land's proximity to the
waters alone does not automatically make it a foreshore land.
19
G.R. NO. 92161, MARCH 18, 1991
(ACCRETION; RIVER: PROPERTY OF PUBLIC DOMINION)
19. BINALAY VS MANALO
Facts:
Judge Taccad owned Lot 307 which is bordered by the Cagayan
River on its west. The western portion would occasionally be
submerged in waters and reappear during the dry season. When
a survey of the land was conducted on a rainy month, a portion of
the land that Manalo bought was then underwater and was thus
left unsurveyed and excluded from said Lot 307. The unsurveyed
portion, on the other hand, is the bed of the eastern branch of the
river.
Issue: Is Manalo Entitled to the unsurvey portion of the Land by
accretion?
Ruling:
The buyer did not acquire private ownership of the bed of the
eastern branch of the Cagayan River even if it was included in the
deeds of absolute sale executed by the sellers since the sellers
“could not have validly sold land that constituted property of
public dominion.” The disputed property is not an accretion. It is
the action of the heavy rains that cause the highest ordinary level
of waters of the Cagayan River during the rainy season. The
depressed portion is a river bed and is thus considered property
of public domain.
20
Hilario vs. The City of Manila
G.R. No. L-19570, April 27, 1967
Facts:
Dr. Jose Hilario was the registered owner of a large tract of land
which was inherited by Jose Hilario Jr., plaintiff. During the
lifetime of plaintiff's father, the Hilario estate was bounded on the
western side by the San Mateo River. To prevent its entry into the
land, a bamboo and lumber post dike or ditch was constructed on
the northwestern side. This was further fortified by a stonewall
built on the northern side. However, in 1937, a great and
extraordinary flood occurred which inundated the entire place.
The river destroyed the dike on the northwest, left its original bed
and meandered into the Hilario estate, segregating from the rest
thereof a lenticular place of land. In 1945 the U.S. Army opened a
sand and gravel plant within the premises and started scraping,
excavating and extracting soil, gravel and sand from the nearby
areas the River. The operations eventually extended northward
into this strip of land. In 1947, the plant was turned over to
defendants who took over its operations.
Issue:
Whether the new riverbanks lining the said course would be of
public ownership when a river, leaving its old bed, changes its
original course and opens a new one through private property
Defendants were extracting from the public domain under proper
authorization and did not extract materials from plaintiff's
property.
21.REPUBLIC VS. PARAÑAQUE,
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, on pure questions of law, assailing
the January 8, 2010 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
195, Paranaque City (RTC), which ruled that petitioner Philippine
Reclamation Authority (PRA) is a government owned and
controlled corporation (GOCC), a taxable entity, and, therefore,
not exempt from payment of real property taxes.

Ruling: ISSUE: W/N Reclaimed Lands are exempt from Real Estate Tax?
All riverbanks are of public ownership including those formed
when a river leaves its old bed and opens a new course through a
private estate. RULING: The Court agrees with PRA that the subject reclaimed
lands are still part of the public domain, owned by the State and,
Art. 339 of the old Civil Code provides: therefore, exempt from payment of real estate taxes. Here, the
Property of public ownership is —
1. That devoted to public use, such as …rivers…; Since subject lands are reclaimed lands, specifically portions of the
undeniably all beds of rivers are of public ownership, it foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. As such, these lands
follows that the banks, which form part of them, are also of
remain public lands and form part of the public domain.
public ownership.
Art. 372 of the old Civil Code which provides that:
Whenever a navigable or floatable river changes its course
from natural causes and opens a new bed through a
private estate, the new bed shall be of public ownership…


22. Yu Chang v. Republic, G.R. No. 171726, Feb. 23, 2011
Facts: Petitioners inherited some parcel of lots from their
deceased father and built on it buildings for commercial and
residential use. They then proceeded to have the land registered
under the Property Registration Decree. The state opposed the
registration as it claimed that said lots being forestland are part of
the inalienable property of the public domain. Petitioners
contended that it should no longer be considered and forest land
as they have already built buildings for residential or commercial
use on the lots.
Issue: Whether or not said parcels of lots are inalienable property
of the public domain.
Held: The classification of land is descriptive of its legal nature or
status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. The fact that the area within which the subject
parcels of land are located is being used for residential and
commercial purposes does not serve to convert the subject
parcels of land into agricultural land. It is fundamental that before
any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted
into alienable or disposable land for agricultural purposes, there
must be a positive act from the government. Here, petitioners
failed to present well-nigh incontrovertible evidence necessary to
prove their compliance of the requirements under Section 48(b) of
C.A. No. 141.
23. Laurel vs Garcia
187 SCRA 797
Facts:
The Roppongi property acquired from the Japanese government
became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was
transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi building needed
major repairs. President Aquino created a committee to study the
disposition of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and
Kobe, Japan. The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino
citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and
services in the event of sale, lease or disposition.
Issues: Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and
agents, have the authority and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi
property.
Ruling: It is not for the President to convey valuable real property
of the government on his or her own sole will. Any such
conveyance of real property falling under patrimonial property of
the state must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by
the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.

24
DepEd V. MARIANO TULIAO
G.R. No. 205664 June 9, 2014

FACTS: Tuliao filed an action for recovery of possession and

removal of structure with damages against the DepEd alleging
that he was the registered owner of the subject parcel of land and
that a portion of the said property was allowed by his
predecessors-in-interest to be used by the Atulayan Elementary
School (AES). Upon discovering that a structure was being
constructed on the land, he demanded that the DepED cease and
desist and vacate the property. In its defense, the DepEd denied
the material allegations and averred that it did not state a cause
of action. Even if there was, the same was already barred by
prescription and/or laches.
ISSUES: WON the action is barred by laches?
RULING/DOCTRINE:
When a landowner filed an action for recovery of
possession, and the plaintiff showed as evidence tax declarations
and a certificate of title over the property, the lone testimonial
evidence the DepEd presented is not sufficient to controvert the
landowner’s case. In addition, the landowner’s claim is not barred
by laches when the school’s possession of the property is not
adverse, and when the landowner brought suit two years after he
learned that the school is constructing a gymnasium over the
property.


In the case at bench, the heirs of Yabao merely alleged
that they are the heirs of Paciano Yabao without presenting any
25
proof why they are the latter’s heirs and in what degree or
Heirs of Yabao v. Paz Lentejas Van Der Kolk capacity.
GR No. 207266, June 25, 2014
The basis of the heirs’ claim of ownership was a mere tax
declaration that was supposedly in the name of their putative
Facts: The heirs of Yabao alleged in their complaint that they are ancestor Paciano Yabao. However, a tax declaration is not a
the sole surviving heirs of the late spouses Yabao, and that they proof of ownership; it is not a conclusive evidence of
are the absolute co-owners of the parcel of land declared in the ownership of real property. In the absence of actual, public,
name of the late Paciano Yabao. The Heirs of Yabao prayed that and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax
they be declared the co-owners and possessors of the subject purposes does not prove ownership. It can only be a strong
property occupied and possessed by Paz Lentejas Van Der Kolk indication of ownership if coupled with possession.
(Van Der Kolk), who also asserted claim of ownership over the
same.
Van Der Kolk started possessing the land in 1996 and refused to In the case at bench, it was Paz Lentejas who was in
vacate the same despite demands from the said heirs. Also, she possession of the property and not the heirs of Yabao.
filed a petition for original patent regarding such land. This was Consequently, the tax declaration, standing alone, is not an
timely oppsed by the heirs, according to them. acceptable proof of ownership.
Aside from these material averments in the complaint, nothing
else was presented to prove the heirs' right over the subject
property.
Issue: Whether or not the Heirs of Yabao are the rightful owners
of the subject property.
SC: No.
Ownership by the heirs cannot be established by mere lip
service and bare allegations in the complaint. As in all matters, a
party must establish his/her averments in the complaint by
sufficient evidence necessary to prove such claim.


26
Midway Maritime and Technological Foundation, petitioner v.
Marissa Castro
GR. No. 189061 August 6,2014
Facts: In a mortgage over a parcel of land a contract of a 15
year lease was entered in favor of Castro who later built a
residential building. The mortgage was later foreclosed and the
parcel of land was then sold in a public auction. After the lapsed
of the redemption period, the bank then sold it to Cloma. Cloma
leased the property with herein petitioner which also leased the
residential building owned by the Castro with payment of monthly
rentals. Cloma then sold the property to her daughter which is the
wife of the President of herein petitioner. Petitioner now files an
action for ownership and recovery of possession.
Issue: Whether or not there was a lease agreement as regards to
the residential building?
Held: Yes, it is settled that once a contract of lease is shown to
exist between the parties, the lessee cannot by any proof,
however strong, overturn the conclusive presumption that the
lessor has a better right of possession to the subject premises.
The payment of rentals confirms the existence of the lease
agreement.
27. Subic Bay Legend Resorts and Casinos, Inc. vs Bernard
Fernandez
September 29, 2014
G.R. No. 193426
Facts:
On July 1, 1994, Bernard Fernandez, brother of Ludwig and
Deoven, filed a complaint for the recovery of sum of money and
damages against Subic Bay Legend Resorts and Casinos, Inc
(SBL). According to him, he went to the casino on June 13, 1997
and handed to his brothers $6,000.00 worth of chips belonging to
him, for use at the casino. Thereat, the company personnel
accosted his brothers and confiscated his casino chips worth
$5,900.00. The company refused to return the same despite their
demand. Ludwig and Deoven were accused of stealing casino
chips from SBL. They were made to confess that the chips were
supplied by a casino employee, Michael Cabrera.
Issue: Whether or not Bernard is the lawful possessor of the
casino chips, entitling him to collect from the casino and award
damages.
Ruling:
No. There is no basis to suppose that the casino chips found in
Ludwig’s and Deoven’s possession were stolen. Unless the
independent fact that Cabrera stole the chips can be proved, it
cannot be said that the chips must be confiscated when found to
be in the brothers’ possession.
Though casino chips do not constitute legal tender, there is no
law which prohibits their use or trade outside of the casino which
issues them. Since casino chips are considered to have been

exchanged with their corresponding representative value, it is
with more reason that the Court should require SBL to prove that
the chips confiscated were indeed stolen from them. If SBL
cannot prove its loss, then Art. 559 cannot apply, and the
presumption that the chips were exchanged for value remains.
Case 28: G.R. No. 199448, 12 November 2014
ROLANDO S. ABADILLA, JR., Petitioner, v. SPOUSES
BONIFACIO P. OBRERO AND BERNABELA N.
OBRERO, Respondents.
FACTS: Respondent Spouses claimed that they are the
registered owners of the land in question by virtue of the TCT
issued under their name. They claimed that they were in
possession thereof based on improvements erected therein
utilized for residential and business purposes prior to the alleged
acts of petitioner who forcibly fenced the perimeter of the land
with barbed wire. Petitioner, on the other hand, claimed that the
land was sold by the spouses to his late father as evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale. Being one of the heirs, he is one of the
owners thereof. Despite the sale, respondents supposedly
attempted to remove the fence and even built concrete structures
on the land using it for dwelling purposes.
ISSUE/s: 1.) Whether or not an ejectment proceeding is proper in
the case at bar.
2.) Whether or not respondents are entitled to land’s
possession.
HELD: 1.) Yes. Ejectment proceedings are summary
proceedings. Issues as to ownership are not involved in the
action; evidence thereon is not admissible, except only for the
purpose of determining the issue of possession. Thus, where the
parties to an ejectment case raise the issue of ownership, the
courts may pass upon that issue but only to determine who
between the parties has the better right to possess the property.
2.) As between the petitioner's Deed of Absolute Sale and
the respondents' TCT, the latter must prevail. A title issued under
the Torrens system is entitled to all the attributes of property
ownership, which necessarily includes possession. Hence, as
holders of the Torrens title over the subject land, the respondents
are entitled to its possession.
29
HEIRS OF EUGENIO LOPEZ VS QUERUBIN
Facts:
In the Deed of Absolute Sale, the vendors-applicants obligated
themselves to file in the land registration case the necessary
motion or manifestation in order that the certificates of title will be
issued in the name of Eugenio Lopez or his successors-in-
interest. This was not complied with, the Lopez heirs prayed that
the decrees of registration and original certificate of titles be
declared null and void, and the subject properties be issued in
their names.
Issues: W/N Contention of Lopez Heirs is correct
Ruling:
Nowhere can it be inferred in Section 22 of PD No. 1529 that the
buyer of the property automatically becomes a party to the land
registration case after complying with the requirements of the
aforesaid provision of law. To rectify their situation, the Lopez
heirs could have resorted to Section 108 of PD No. 1529 in order
to correct the palpable mistakes in the certificates of title in this

case. Thus, this case is remanded to the land registration court
for further proceedings, subject to the Lopez heirs' compliance
with the requisites of Section 108 of Presidential Decree No.
1529.
30
GR No. 152141 August 8, 2011
DEL FIERRO vs SEGUIRAN
Facts:
Petitioners contend that they are the owners of Lot Nos. 1625 and
1626 as the Municipal Court declared them to be the ones in
possession of the property in an ejectment case against
respondents, which decision was affirmed on appeal. However,
as stated by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the property
involved in the ejectment case was Lot No. 1197. It was never
mentioned in the respective decisions of the Municipal Court and
the CFI of that the portion intruded upon was Lot Nos. 1625 and
1626.
Issue: whether petitioners are entitled to reconveyance of Lot
Nos. 1625 and 1626,
Ruling:
No. Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that to successfully
maintain an action to recover the ownership of a real property, the
person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2) things:
first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto.
In this case, petitioners failed to prove the identity of the parcels
of land sought to be recovered and their title thereto as they failed
to prove that Lot Nos. 1625 and 1626 were part of or used to be
part of Lot No. 1197.
31
Del Rosario v. Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc. G.R. No. 170575.
June 8, 2011. First Division; Del Castillo, J.
Facts: del Rosario appears to be the registered owner of a lot
covered by a TCT located in Roxas CIty. Gerry Roxas
Foundation, Inc., (GRFI) took possession and occupancy of said
land, in the character of a lessee, by virtue of a MOA it entered
with Roxas City. Later, Spouses del Rosario served notices upon
the GRFI to vacate the premises of said land. GRFI, however, did
not heed such notices because it still has the legal right to
continue its possession and occupancy of said land.
Issue: Whether or not there is a cause of action for forcible entry
and not an unlawful detainer?
Held: Yes. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical
possession of any land or building by means of force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. Where the defendant’s

possession of the property is illegal ab initio, the summary action
for forcible entry (detentacion) is the remedy to recover
possession. In their Complaint, the spouses maintained that the
GRFI took possession and control of the subject property without
any contractual or legal basis. Thus, it is one of forcible entry, or
the forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a person who
has entered without right, and not unlawful detainer.
32. Jose vs. Alfuerto, G.R. No. 169380
FACTS: Chua Sing leased a property to petitioner. Respondents
already occupied the property even before the lease contract was
executed. When Chua Sing and petitioner signed the lease
contract, the petitioner demanded in writing that the respondents
vacate the property within 30 days.
ISSUE: Whether or not this is a case for unlawful detainer and not
for recovery of possession.
RULING: No. Unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy.
Respondent’s occupancy was unlawful from the start and was
bereft of contractual or legal basis. If the possession was unlawful
from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would not be the
proper remedy and should be dismissed.
33
Bienvenido Barrientos, petitioner
-versus-
Mario Rapal, respondent
G.R. No. 169594 20 July 2011
FACTS:
Rapal acquired a parcel of land from Nataviovia a notarized Deed
of Transfer of Possessory Right and thereafter built a semi-
concrete house. Respondent allowed Barrientos and his family to
stay on the subject land as caretakers on the condition that the
latter shall vacate the premises when the former needs the
property. However, when respondent eventually demanded on
several occasions that the petitioner leave the property, the latter
refused. Rapal was prompted to file a case for Unlawful Detainer
against Barrientos.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has the better right over the
subject property.
HELD:
No. The respondent clearly makes out a case for unlawful
detainer, since petitioner's occupation of the subject property was
by mere tolerance. A person who occupies the land of another at
the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate the same upon demand, failing which a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.

34 raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless
of the actual condition of title to the property, the party in a
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC. V COURT OF
peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong
APPEALS
hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior
177 SCRA 495 (1989)
possession can recover such possession even against the owner
himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession,
FACTS:
if he has in favor priority in time, he has security that entitles him
Spouses Jose issued a power of attorney in favor of petitio to remain on the property until he has been lawfully ejected by a
ner for the development of their parcel of land into a person having a better right by accion publiciana or accion
subdivision. Private respondents reivindicatoria.
were occupying the land and petitioner advised them to vac
ate but they refused. Thereafter, petitioner continued their
development and 36
construction. Respondents then filed a case for forcible entry.
NPC v. Ibrahim
The trial court dismissed the complaint and this was reversed by
the CA. FACTS: NPC constructed underground tunnels on the property of
the respondent without their knowledge, consent, and any
ISSUE: expropriation proceeding. NPC contented that it constructed an
easement on the property.
Whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a forcible
entry case against petitioner?
ISSUE: Whether or not the owners of the property are entitled to
HELD:
just compensation.
Notwithstanding petitioner’s claim that it was duly authorized
by the
owners to develop the subject property, private respondents RULING: Yes. Despite the fact that NPC only occupied the sub-
as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entry case terrain portion, it is liable to pay not only an easement fee but
against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible rather the full compensation for the land because the nature of
entry is merely a quieting process, and never determines the the easement practically deprived the owners of its normal
actual title to an estate. Title is not involved. beneficial use.

Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership b 37

ased on the muniment of title it presented, such evidence PALERO-TAN vs. URDANETA
doesn’t responsively address the issue of prior actual possession


FACTS: Urdaneta found jewelry inside the RTC office. Tan is the
owner of the jewelry. Urdaneta did not return the jewelry instead
he threw it away when his wife suspected that we bought the
jewelry for a mistress. However, it was found out that he knew
that Tan had lost the jewelry and that he did not bother to inform
her.
ISSUE: WON Urdaneta can be faulted for throwing away the
jewelry he found.
HELD: Yes, Urdaneta can be faulted for throwing away the
jewelry he found. When a person who finds a thing that has been
lost or mislaid by the owner takes the thing into his hands, he
acquires physical custody only and does not become vested with
legal possession. In assuming such custody, the finder is charged
with the obligation of restoring the thing to its owner. It is thus
respondent’s duty to report to his superior or his officemates that
he found something.
38
G.R. No. 190106
January 15, 2014
MAGDALENA T. VILLASI v. FILOMENO GARCIA substituted by
his heirs, namely, ERMELINDA H. GARCIA, LIZA GARCIA-
GONZALEZ, THERESA GARCIA-TIANGSON, MARIVIC H.
GARCIA, MARLENE GARCIA-MOMIN, GERARDO H. GARCIA,
GIDEON H. GARCIA and GENEROSO H. GARCIA, and
ERMELINDA H. GARCIA
Facts:
Villasi engaged the services of respondent Fil-Garcia
Construction, Inc. (FGCI) to construct a seven-storey
condominium building located Cubao, Quezon City. For failure of
Villasi to fully pay the contract price despite several demands,
FGCI initiated a suit for collection of sum of money. Villasi filed an
answer specifically denying the material allegations of the
complaint. Contending that FGCI has no cause of action against
her, Villasi averred that she delivered the total amount of P
7,490,325.10 to FGCI but the latter accomplished only 28% of the
project. To enforce her right as prevailing party, Villasi filed a
Motion for Execution. To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied
on a building located Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City. (While the
building) which was declared for taxation purposes in the name of
FGCI while the lots in which it was erected were registered in the
names of the Spouses Garcia. The Spouses Garcia argued that
the building covered by the levy was mistakenly assessed by the
City Assessor in the name of FGCI and that it could not be levied
upon not being owned by the judgment debtor.
The spouses Garcia filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim and a
Motion to Set Aside Notice of Sale on Execution, claiming that
they are the lawful owners of the property.
The RTC hereby orders Deputy Sheriff Angel Doroni to suspend
or hold in abeyance the conduct of the sale on execution of the
buildings levied upon by him, until further orders from the Court.
Villasi timely filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA. The
petition was dismissed.
Villasi filed a petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court, assailing the decision rendered by
the CA.
Issue:
WON the general rule on accession can be applied in the
case at bar.
Held:

No. While it is a horn-book doctrine that the accessory follows the
principal, that is, the ownership of the property gives the right by
accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is
incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially,
such rule is not without exception. In cases where there is a clear
and convincing evidence to prove that the principal and the
accessory are not owned by one and the same person or entity,
the presumption shall not be applied and the actual ownership
shall be upheld.

When there are factual and evidentiary proof that the building and
the lot on which it stands are owned by different persons, they
shall be treated separately. As such, the building or the lot, as the
case may be, can be made liable to answer for the obligation of
its respective owner.

The SC granted the petition. The assailed Decision and

Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Deputy Sheriff is hereby directed to proceed
with the conduct of the sale on execution of the levied building.


39 HLURB, the City Building Official and the RD in Quezon City, of
the illegal constructions being made thereon. The HLURB issued
BPI vs Sanchez
a Cease and Decease Order enjoining Garcia / TSEI from further
Case Digest GR 179518 Nov 19 2014
developing and selling the townhouses. Such orders were left
unheeded. In fact, Garcia were already able to sell many of the
Facts:
units to different individuals and entities, and even mortgaged the
The Sanchezes entered into an agreement with Garcia (doing
property. Consequently, the Sanchezes filed before the RTC a
business in the name of TSEI) to sell for P 1.850 million their
complaint for rescission, restitution and damages with TRO.
parcel of land, with an earnest money of 50k. They agreed that
Garcia shall pay the purchase price in cash once the property is
The purchasers and mortgagee who are the intervenors in this
vacated. The Sanchezes entrusted to Garcia the owner’s copy of
case were found by the court to be in bad faith. On the other
TCT because it was agreed that he shall take care of all the
hand, the Sanchezes were held to be in good faith and not
documentations necessary for the transaction.
negligent.
Immediately after the property was vacated, Garcia took
Issue 1: W/N rescission of the contract was barred by the
possession and began constructing townhouses thereon without
subsequent transfer of the property
the Sanchezes’ knowledge and consent. While these
No. Under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, rescission is available to
developments were ongoing, Garcia failed to pay the purchase
a party in a reciprocal obligation where one party fails to comply
price. Subsequently, the Sanchezes were given six checks
with it. As an exception to this rule, Article 1385 provides that
representing the amount of the purchase price. Four of these
rescission shall not take place if the subject matter of the prior
checks were postdated, thus further delaying their overdue
agreement is already in the hands of a third party who did not act
payment. To properly document the check payments, they made
in bad faith.
an agreement stipulating that if one of the checks were
Here, the failure of Garcia/TSEI to pay the consideration for the
dishonored, the Sanchezes may rescind the contract.
sale of the property entitled the Sanchezes to rescind the
Agreement. And in view of the finding that the intervenors acted
The last two checks were dishonored, so the Sanchezes
in bad faith in purchasing the property from Garcia, the
rescinded the contract and demanded from Garcia the return of
subsequent transfer in their favor did not and cannot bar
the TCT. However, Garcia refused to return the documents and
rescission.
vacate the property.

Issue 2: W/N Article 449 – 450 of the Civil Code is applicable in

Meanwhile, the Sanchezes found out that Garcia/TSEI were
the case at bar.
selling townhouses situated in the property. So they informed the


Yes. Bad faith on the part of the purchasers leads to the
application of Art 449-450.
Consequently, the Sanchezes have the following options: (1)
acquire the property with the townhouses and other buildings and
improvements that may be thereon without indemnifying TSEI or
the intervenors; (2) demand from TSEI or the intervenors to
demolish what has been built on the property at the expense of
TSEI or the intervenors; or (3) ask the intervenors to pay the price
of the land.
As such, the Sanchezes must choose from among these options
within 30 days from finality of the decision. Should the Sanchezes
opt to ask from the intervenors the value of the land, the case
shall be remanded to the RTC for the sole purpose of
determining the fair market value of the lot at the time the same
were taken from the Sanchezes. If the Sanchezes decide to
appropriate the townhouses, other structures and improvements
as their own pursuant to Art 449, then the intervenors-purchasers
shall be ordered to vacate said premises within a reasonable time
from notice of the finality of the decision by the Sanchezes. They
have a right to recover their investment in the townhouses from
Garcia and TSEI. If the Sanchezes do not want to make use of
the townhouses and improvements on the subject lot, then the
purchasers can be ordered to demolish said townhouses or if
they don’t demolish the same within a reasonable time, then it
can be demolished at their expense. On the 3rd option, if the
Sanchezes do not want to appropriate the townhouses or
have the same demolished, then they can ask that the townhouse
purchasers pay to them the fair market value of the respective
areas allotted to their respective townhouses subject of their
deeds of sale.
40. FLOREZA VS. EVANGELISTA, 96 SCRA 130, February 21,
1980
Facts:
The Evangelistas were the owner of a residential lot in
Rizal with an area of 204.08 sq.m. assessed at P410. They
borrowed P100 from Floreza. Floreza occupied the residential lot
and built a house of light material (barong-barong) with the
consent of the Evangelistas. Additional loans were made by the
Evangelistas.
Floreza demolished the house of light material and
constructed a house of strong material. Floreza has not been
paying any rentals since the beginning of their transactions.
Eventually, Evangelistas sold, with a right to repurchase within 6
years, their land to Floreza. 7 months before the expiry of the
repurchase period, the evangelistas were able to pay in full.
Floreza refused to vacate the lot unless he was first reimbursed
for the value of the house he built.
Issue:
1. W/N Floreza was entitled to reimbursement of the cost
of his house.
2. W/N his heirs who replaced Floreza should pay rental
of the land.
HELD:
1. No. Issue of reimbursement is not moot because if Floreza
has no right of retention, then he must pay damages in the
form of rentals. Art. 448 is inapplicable because it applies only
when the builder is in good faith where he believed that he
had a right to build. Art. 453 is also not applicable because it
requires both of the parties to be in bad faith. Neither Art.
1616 applicable because Floreza is not a vendee a retro. The
house was already constructed in 1945 in light materials, even
before the pacto de retro was entered into in 1949. Floreza

cannot be classified as a builder in good faith nor a vendee a
retro, who made useful imporvements during the pacto de
retro, he has no right to reimbursement of the value of the
house, much less to the retention of the premisers until he is
paid. He may, however, remove such improvements shoul it
be possible to do so without damage to the property.
2. Yes. From the time the redemption price was paid in January
3, 1955, Floreza’s right to use the residential lot without rent
ceased. He should be held liable for damages in the form of
rentals for the continued use of the lot for P10 monthly from
January 3, 1995 until the house was removed and the
property vacated by Floreza or his heir.
# 41
Mercado v. CA
G.R. No. L-44001. June 10, 1988.
TOPIC: Builder in Good Faith
FACTS:
The private respondents Bulaong Group, had for many
years been individual lessees of stalls in the public market of
Baliuag, Bulacan; from 1956 to 1972. The market was destroyed
by fire on February 17, 1956; the members of the Bulaong Group
constructed new stalls therein at their expense; and they
thereafter paid rentals thereon to the Municipality of Baliuag.
In 1972, the members of the group sub-leased their
individual stalls to other persons, referred to as the Mercado
Group. After the Mercado Group had been in possession of the
market stalls for some months, as sub-lessees of the Bulaong
Group, the municipal officials of Baliuag cancelled the long
standing leases of the Bulaong Group and declared the persons
comprising the Mercado Group as the rightful lessees of the stalls
in question, in substitution of the former.
The members of the Bulaong Group sued. They filed
several individual complaints with the Court of First Instance
seeking recovery of their stalls from the Mercado Group as well
as damages. Their theory was anchored on their claimed
ownership of the stalls constructed by them at their own expense,
and their resulting right, as such owners, to sub-lease the stalls,
and necessarily, to recover them from any person withholding
possession thereof from them.
On October 24,1975, respondent Judge rendered a
summary judgment in all the cases. It rejected the claim of the
Municipality of Baliuag that it had automatically acquired
ownership of the new stalls constructed after the old stalls had
been razed by fire, declaring the members of the Bulaong Group
to be builders in good faith, entitled to retain possession of the
stalls respectively put up by them until and unless indemnified for
the value thereof. The decision also declared that the Bulaong
and Mercado Groups had executed the subleasing agreements
with full awareness that they were thereby violating Ordinance
No. 14; they were thus in pari delicto, and hence had no cause of
action one against the other and no right to recover whatever had
been given or demand performance of anything undertaken. The
judgment therefore decreed (1) the annulment of the leases
between the Municipality and the individuals comprising the
Mercado Group (the defendants who had taken over the original
leases of the Bulaong Group); and (2) the payment to the
individual members of the Bulaong Group (the plaintiffs) of the
stated, adjudicated value of the stalls, with interest.
The members of the Mercado Group are now before this
Court on an appeal by certiorari, this time timely taken, assailing
the above rulings of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: WON the Bulaong group is a builder in good faith.
HELD:

NO. It is not a builder in good faith. It was held that “to be
deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person assert
title to the land on which he builds; i.e., that he be a possessor in
concept of owner, and that he be unaware ‘that there exists in his
title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.’
Lessees cannot be considered builders in good faith
(taken from Haystacks, by Berne Guerrero)
The members of the Bulaong group were admittedly
lessees of space in the public market; they therefore could not,
and in truth never did make the claim, that they were owners of
any part of the land occupied by the market so that in respect of
any new structure put up by them thereon, they could be deemed
builders in good faith (in accordance with Article 526 of the Civil
Code). To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a
person assert title to the land on which he builds; i.e., that he be a
possessor in concept of owner, and that he be unaware “that
there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it. It is such a builder in good faith who is given the
right to retain the thing, even as against the real owner, until he
has been reimbursed in full not only for the necessary expenses
but also for useful expenses. On the other hand, unlike the
builder in good faith, a lessee who “makes in good faith useful
improvements which are suitable to the use for which the lease is
intended, without altering the form or substance of the property
leased,” can only claim payment of “one-half of the value of the
improvements” or, “should the lessor refuse to reimburse said
amount, remove the improvements, even though the principal
thing may suffer damage thereby.”
042 Balucanag v Fransisco [GR L-33422]
FACTS:
Mrs. Charvet leased to Richard Stohner a 177.50 square meter
lot, wherein improvements consisting of fillings on the land and
construction of a house were made on said lot by the latter. The
lot was then sold to petitioner Rosendo Balucanag, who, through
counsel, demanded Stohner to vacate the premises due to failure
to pay rent. Stohner, also through counsel, claimed that he was a
builder in good faith of the residential house constructed on the
lot.
The City Court of Manila rendered judgment on the ejectment suit
in favor of petitioner. However, Judge Fransisco, who presided
over the Court of First Instance of Manila where the appeal was
made, set the judgment aside saying that Stohner was indeed a
builder in good faith, invoking Art. 448 and 546. Thus, Stohner
cannot be ejected from the lot without being reimbursed for the
value of the improvements.
ISSUE:
W/N Stohner is a builder in good faith
HELD:
No. The Court stated that Art. 448, relied upon by respondent
judge, applies only to a case where one builds on land in the
belief that he is the owner thereof and it does not apply where
one’s only interest in the land is that of a lessee under a rental
contract.
Also, as was decided by the Court in Lopez, Inc. v Phil. And
Eastern Trading Co., Inc., a lessee cannot be considered a
possessor in good faith since he knows beforehand that he is not
the owner of the land, and cannot deny the ownership or title of
his lessor.
NOTE:
#You can choose not to include the statements that follow.

The Court also stated that the law applicable to the case at bar
would be Art. 1687.
– #44: Javier vs Concepcion 94 scra 212
(petition for review by certiorari) ARTICLE 546 of Civil Code
FACTS
Respondents allege that Lot 12 is part of Lot 6 covered by a TCT
under their name. In their Answer, petitioners denied such claim
and pointed out that Lot 6 could not include Lot 12 because there
exists a big river more than 50 meters wide and more than 20
meters deep between the two lots. Respondents filed an action
for reconveyance. CA held that respondents are the owners of
Lot 6 and Javier did not act in bad faith in occupying the land.
ISSUES
w/n respondents should pay for the improvements introduced by
petitioners?
Held
As possessors in good faith, petitioners are entitled to the fruits
received before their possession was legally interrupted upon
receipt of judicial summons in connection with the filing of the
complaint for reconveyance. Petitioners should also be refunded
the necessary and useful expenses, with the right to retain the
land until reimbursed of the same, pursuant to Article 546 of the
Civil Code. Under the said provision, respondents have the option
to refund the amount of useful expenses or to pay the increase in
value which the land may have acquired by reason thereof.
CASE DIGEST 43
[G.R. No. 149295. September 23, 2003]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. GENEROSO DE
JESUS
FACTS:
Through verification survey of the property, Respondent
discovered that the northern portion of the lot was being
encroached upon by a building of petitioner to the extent of 124
square meters. Despite two letters of demand sent by
respondent, petitioner failed and refused to vacate the area.
Petitioner asserted that when it acquired the lot and the building
from Mayor Ignacio, the then owner, encroachment already was
in existence and Ignacio offered to sell the area in question to
petitioner. The sale, however, did not materialize when, without
the knowledge and consent of petitioner, Mayor Ignacio later
mortgaged the lot to the DBP.
ISSUE: W/N PETITIONER IS A BUILDER IN GOOD FAITH
HELD:
Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not
aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw
which invalidates it. Evidently, petitioner was quite aware, and
indeed advised, prior to its acquisition of the land and building
from Ignacio that a part of the building sold to it stood on the land
not covered by the land conveyed to it. Equally significant is the
fact that the building, constructed on the land by Ignacio, has in
actuality been part of the property transferred to petitioner. Under
Art 448, where the true owner himself is the builder of works on
his own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely
irrelevant.
MADRONO – 45
Nuguid v. CA G.R. 151815
FACTS: Pedro P. Pecson owned a commercial lot on which he
built a four-door two-storey apartment building. For failure to pay
realty taxes, the lot was sold at public auction by the City
Treasurer of Quezon City to Mamerto Nepomuceno, who in turn
sold it to the spouses Juan and Erlinda Nuguid. However, the
RTC ruled that the four-door two-storey apartment building was
not included in the auction sale. Petitioners contend that their
failure to pay the full price for the improvements will, at most,
entitle respondent to be restored to possession, but not to collect
any rentals.
ISSUE: WON THE PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE TO PAY RENT
OVER AND ABOVE THE CURRENT MARKET VALUE OF THE
IMPROVEMENT.
HELD: YES. Since petitioners opted to appropriate the
improvement for themselves when they applied for a writ of
execution despite knowledge that the auction sale did not include
the apartment building, they could not benefit from the lot’s
improvement, until they reimbursed the improver in full, based on
the current market value of the property. Accordingly, a builder in
good faith (Pecson) cannot be compelled to pay rentals during

the period of retention nor be disturbed in his possession by
ordering him to vacate.
47
HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND HEIRS OF
SINFOROSO PASCUAL [G.R. No. 68166. February 12, 1997]
FACTS: The applicant owns the property immediately adjoining
the land sought to be registered. Between the Talisay River and
the Bulacan River is the property of applicants with both rivers
acting as the boundary to said land. The subject land was formed
at the tip or apex of appellants' land adjacent to the north in front
of Manila Bay adding thereto the land now sought to be
registered.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subject land deemed an accretion
formed by the action of the two rivers that naturally accrues in
favor of the riparian owner.
RULING: Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from
owners, the latter being owners of lands bordering the shore of
the sea or lakes or other tidal waters.
46. Ballatan vs CA
FACTS:
When Ballatan constructed her house in her lot, she noticed that
the concrete fence and side pathway of the adjoining house of
respondent Winston Go encroached on the entire length of the
eastern side of her property. Ballatan made written demands to
the respondent to dismantle and move their improvements.
ISSUE: What are the remedies available to petitioner Ballatan,
the landowner?
HELD:
Pursuant to Art. 448, Ballatan has two options. Firstly, the land
owner may buy the improvements and the 2nd option is to oblige
the builders to buy the land given that the value of the land is not
considerably more than the buildings or tree; otherwise
respondents may be compelled to pay rent.
In the event the landowner elects to sell the land to the builder in
good faith, the price must be fixed at the prevailing market value
at the time of payment. In the event of the failure of the builder to
pay the land, after the owner thereof has chosen this alternative,
the builder’s right of retention provided in Article 546 is also lost.
48. VDA DE NAZARENO V CA
Facts : Mr. Salasan and Mr. Rabaya leased lots owned by
Petitioner Nazareno. Such lots were formed due to accretion.
Salasan allegedly stopped paying rentals hence Petitioners filed a
case for ejectment. Before the death of Nazareno he caused the
approval by the Bureau of Lands of the survey plan with a view of
perfecting his title over the accretion being which Salasan and
Rabuya were ejected from. It was protested by Salasan. Upon
investigation, it was recommended that the survey plan be
cancelled and Nazareno was ordered to vacate the portion of
land adjudicated to him and private respondent Salasan be
placed in possession thereof.
ISSUE: WON the subject land is public land.
RULING: Since the subject land was the direct result of the
dumping of sawdust by the Sun Valley Lumber Co., the accretion
was man-made, hence, Art. 457 does not apply. Ergo, the subject
land is part of the public domain.
49. G.R. NO. L-3788 DECEMBER 21, 1907 PEDRO P. ROXAS,
PETITIONER -APPELLEE , VS . JULIA TUASON, THE

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN PEDRO MACATI, AND ALEJANDRO
AND CONSOLACION AGUIRRE, RESPONDENTS-APPELLANTS .
FACTS: Roxas applied for the registration of the estate, the
Hacienda de San Pedro Macati. The owners of the adjoining
properties, one of them, Julia Tuason, set forth her opposition for
the reason that two old monuments which had separated their
properties had been pulled down and new ones erected without
her consent, and in her opinion the latter included a considerable
portion of the land owned by her. The petitioner affirms that the
real boundary of the hacienda on the side that adjoins the land of
Tuason was and still is a creek separating both properties, and
that in former years said creek was wider that at the present time.
ISSUE: WON the accretion is included in the boundary line of the
parties' contiguous premises.
RULING: The right of the owners of the bank adjacent to rivers to
the accretion which they receive by virtue of the action of the
waters of the river is ipso jure and there is no need of an action of
the owner of the bank to possess the new addition since it
belongs to him by the very fact of the addition.
50
Cureg vs IAC 177 SCRA 313 (1989)
Facts:
Respondents, except Apostol, are the heirs of Domingo Gerardo,
the owner of the subject land. Domingo’s father, Francisco, and
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land,
adverse to all other claimants. Such land was declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Francisco Gerardo. The
respondents then sold the land to Apostol and executed an extra-
judicial partition. During the time such was executed, there were
already signs of accretion of 3 hectares. The accretion and the
land was declared by Domingo for taxation purposes under his
name. On the other hand, petitioners contend that their
predecessor, Carniyan, was the owner of the accretion of the
subject land. Carniyan acquired the land from his father-in-law, as
evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale. Antonio declared the
land for taxation purposes and even had an OCT pursuant to
Free Patent, which includes the accretion portion and the land
ISSUE: WONApostol and the Gerardo’s have better title over the
accretion than Cureg
Held: NO. The tax declarations presented are not sufficient
evidence to prove ownership. Onthe other hand, petitioners have
an OCT under the name of Antonio Carniyan to show.
Taxdeclarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership and
should not prevail over a decree ofregistration. A decree of
registration bars all claims and rights which arose or may have
existedprior the decree. The issuance of the decree quiets the
land.
51
Agne v. Director of Lands
181 SCRA 793, 805 (1990)
Facts: Private respondents filed in for recovery of possesion of
land stating that they are the real owners of a land in possession
of the petitioners. The latter answered that the said land was
formerly part of a river owned by them by reason of accretion due

to a big flood in 1920; and since then, they had occupied it openly
and adversely as riparian owners.
Issue: WON the petitioners owned the abandoned river bed.
Held: Yes. The petitioer own the abandoned riverbed. There need
be no act on their part to subject the old river bed to their
ownership, as it is subject thereto ipso jure from the moment the
mode of acquisition becomes evident, without need of any formal
act of acquisition. Such abandoned riverbed had fallen to the
private ownership of the owner of the land through which the new
river bed passes even without any formal act of his will and any
unauthorized occupant thereof will be considered as a trespasser.
– 52
HEIRS OF PACIFICO POCDO vs AVILA G.R. No.199146
MARCH 19,2014
FACTS: Pacifico Pocdo, who was later substituted by his heirs
upon his death, filed a complaint to quiet title over a 1,728–
square meter property (disputed property) located in Camp 7,
Baguio City. The heirs filed their ancestral land claims with the
DENR thus Certificates of Ancestral Lands Claims (CALS) were
issued. However, the DENR had already declared the disputed
property as public land. Thus, the claim of petitioners to quiet title
is not proper since they do not have title over the disputed
property. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners, in raising
the issue of quieting of title, failed to allege any legal or equitable
title to quiet.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners have title to the property that would
support an action for quieting of title.
RULING: No. The Office of the President held that such lands
belong to the public domain and are no longer registrable under
the Land Registration Act. In an action for quieting of title the two
indispensable requisites in an action to quiet title are: (1) that the
plaintiff has a legal or equitable title to or interest in the real
property subject of the action; and (2) that there is a cloud on his
title by reason of any instrument, record, deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding, which must be shown to be in fact
invalid or inoperative.
– 53
CAMPIT v GRIPA, et. al.
GR No. 195443
September 17, 2014
FACTS: Respondents Gripa, et. al. occupied a 2.7 hectare
agricultural land situated in Umangan, Mangatarem, Pangasinan
covered by TCT No. 122237 issued in the petitioner’s name. The
petitioner claimed to have purchased the property from his father
Jose Campit in the year 1977. On the other hand, respondents
claimed to be the rightful owners of the subject property, as
earlier adjudged by the court in Civil Case No. 11858 decided on
June 12, 1961, and in Civil Case No. 15357 decided on August 8,
1978. The Court, in these cases, cancelled the titles of the
petitioner and his father Jose because they were obtained
through the misrepresentation of the petitioner’s grandfather,

Isidro Campit. The respondents have long intended to divide the of respondent’s failure to secure a final deed of sale and/or
properties among themselves but despite formal demands, the conveyance 13 years after registration of the Sheriff’s Certificate
petitioner refused to surrender the said land. The respondents of Title.
filed a new case for annulment and cancellation of title with the
ISSUE:
RTC on Aug. 15, 2003 and ruled in favor of respondents. The CA
affirmed the RTC’s decision. WON the complaint for quiet title will prosper
HELD:
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is the rightful owner of the No. All rights, title, interest, and claim of the spouses De Guzman
subject property? to the subject property was already acquired by respondent upon
the expiration of the one-year redemption period without
redemption being made. The execution of the final deed of sale
HELD: No. Petitioner is not the true owner of the subject and/or conveyance to respondent is a mere formality and
agricultural land. The issue on the validity of the petitioner’s title confirmation of the title already vested in respondent. The
to the subject property has long been settled in Civil Case No. right acquired by the purchaser at an execution sale is inchoate
15357, where the court, in its decision dated August 8, 1978, and does not become absolute until after the expiration of the
which became final and executory on July 19, 1979, had found redemption period without the right of redemption having been
and declared the petitioner’s title null and void by reason of fraud exercised. Since the spouses failed to redeem the subject
and misrepresentation. The Torrens system of registration cannot property within the period allowed by law, they have been
be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can it be divested of their rights over the property.
used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or to permit one to
enrich oneself at the expense of others.
54
DE GUZMAN VS. TABANGAO REALTY INC. (2015)
FACTS: Herminio De Guzman and his siblings filed a complaint
for quiet title against respondent Filipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation (FSPC) over the parcel of land they inherited from
their parents. The subject property had long been levied upon
and sold to respondent at an execution sale. The only remaining
right of petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest over the property was
the right to redeem. Petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest failed to
redeem the property. Petitioners claimed that the acquisition of
the subject property at the execution sale was not valid because


55
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 160728
CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
PHIL-VILLE DEVELOPMENT AND HOUSING CORPORATION,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (through the OFFICE OF
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL), and the REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF METRO MANILA DISTRICT III, CALOOCAN
CITY, Respondents.
FACTS: This case started with a Complaint for Quieting of Title,
Damages and Injunction filed by respondent Phil-Ville against
petitioner and the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila District III.
Respondent claims that it is the registered owner and actual
possessor of sixteen (16) parcels of land in Baesa, Caloocan City
which were derived from and were part of Lot 26, Maysilo Estate
originally covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994.
They alleged that based on official records of the office of
respondent Register of Deeds and the Land Registration
Authority, petitioner was issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. T-177013, covering a parcel of land situated in Caloocan
City.
ISSUE: WON petitioner’s TCT imposes a cloud on respondent
Phil-Ville’s titles to the 16 parcels of land subject matter of this
case, as provided in Article 476 of the Civil Code.
RULING: The Court ruled in favor of respondent Phil-Ville.
Moreover, the acquisition by Atty. Dimson of the interests of the
late Maria De La Concepcion Vidal in Lot 26 and other lots of the
Maysilo Estate was subject to the condition, that something
remained of said lot in the intestate estate of said deceased that
have not been disposed of. Therefore, the subsequent
conveyances to E. Hipolito and then to the peititoner were still
subject to such condition.
56. Chung vs. Mondragon, GR 179754, Nov. 21, 2012
Facts: Respondent, Jack Mondragon, sold a portion of the land in
dispute to his co-respondent. Petitioner filed a case to annul the
sale arguing that respondent had no right to sell a portion of the
land and the sale to Regis Schmitz created a cloud upon their
title, and for quieting of title. RTC dismissed the case ruling that
since respondent was a co-owner of the land, he has the right to
dispose his undivided share. CA affirmed RTC.
ISSUE: WON respondent can dispose a portion of the said land.
RULING: Yes. In issues for quieting of title, the plaintiff need to
prove only two things: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal
or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the
action; (2) that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in
fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.
#57 Baha’is v Pascual (GR 169272)
Facts:
On December 11, 2000, Bahais filed a complaint with RTC for
quieting of title and other claims against Silverio Songcuan, his
heirs and the DENR. Bahais alleged that he is the lawful and
absolute owner of two parcels of land and that he had been in
possession for 30 years.

Bureau of Lands rejected the sales applications of Bahais’s
predecessors-in-interest for the lots and ordered all those in
privity to vacate the lots and to remove their improvements.
DENR secretary affirmed with this decision. Recourse to the
office of the President had been unavailing, so DENR issued writs
of execution.
Pascual moved to dismiss saying that petitioner had no legal right
to file the complaint since the decision of the Bureau of Lands has
become final and executory.
RTC denied the motion to dismiss; it was not yet final since
President's ruling on the appeal was unavailable. Respondent
elevated this case to the CA, questioning the propriety of the
RTC's denial. CA set aside the RTC’s ruling.
Issue: Whether CA committed a reversible error in when it set
aside RTC’s ruling
Held:
CA committed no reversible error.
We find it clear that the petitioner no longer had any legal or
equitable title to or interest in the lots. The petitioner’s status as
possessor and owner of the lots had been settled in the final and
executory December 4, 1985 decision of the Bureau of Lands that
the DENR Secretary and the OP affirmed on appeal. Thus, the
petitioner is not entitled to the possession and ownership of the
lots. They no longer have a cause of action.
Jurisprudence teaches us that the decisions and orders of
administrative agencies, such as the Bureau of Lands, rendered
pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, upon finality, have the
force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of
the doctrine of res judicata. Accordingly, the petitioner is now
barred from challenging the validity of the final and executory
Bureau of Lands’ December 4, 1985 decision.
58
VDA. DE AVILES v. CA
An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for
the purpose of settling a boundary dispute.
FACTS: The parties inherited their lands from their parents and
have agreed to subdivide the same amongst themselves. The
Petitioners claim that they are the owners of the fish pond which
they claim is within their area. Defendant Camilo Aviles asserted
a color of title by constructing a bamboo fence and moving the
earthen dikes, thereby molesting and disturbing the peaceful
possession of the plaintiffs over said portion. Petitioners brought
an action to quiet title but were denied thus this case.
ISSUE: WON Petitioners filed the right action
RULING: An action for quieting of title may not be brought for the
purpose of settling a boundary dispute.
59
Fernandez vs Villegas, GR No. 200191, Aug. 20, 2014
FACTS: Petitioner Fernandez and Cecilia, her sister, averred that
they are the registered owners of the subject property on which

both petitioner and respondents previously lived under one roof.
When their house was destroyed by a typhoon, petitioner
transferred to a nipa hut on the same lot, while Villegas, Cecilia’s
daughter-in-law, and her family were advised to relocate but, in
the meantime, allowed to use a portion thereof. Respondents
erected a house thereon despite plaintiffs’ objections and, despite
demands, refused to vacate and surrender possession of the
subject property.
ISSUE: WON Fernandez’ alone can institute the ejectment suit?
RULING: YES. Article 487 of the Civil Code explicitly provides
that any of the co-owners may bring an action for ejectment,
because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.
Both Lourdes and Cecilia are co-plaintiffs in the ejectment suit.
Thus, they share a commonality of interest and cause of action as
against respondents. Hence, the lone signature of Lourdes on the
verification attached to the CA petition constituted substantial
compliance with the rules.
60 EXTRAORDINARY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (EDC),
vs. HERMINIA F. SAMSON-BICO AND ELY B. FLESTADOS
G.R. No. 191090, 13 October 2014
Facts:
Apolonio owned a parcel of land. When Apolonio and Maria died,
the property was inherited by Juan and Irenea. When the latter
died, the heirs of Juan and Irenea became co- owners of the
property. The heirs of Juan, without the consent of respondents,
and the heirs of Irenea executed in favor of EDC a Deed of
Absolute Sale covering the subject property. The deed was
registered and transfers the tax declaration in its name.
Respondents filed the Complaint for Annulment. In its Answer,
EDC alleged that it is a buyer in good faith and for value because
of the honest belief that the heirs of Juan are the only heirs of the
late Apolonio.
Issue: Whether the sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of
an undivided property be valid.
Held:
Yes. As a general rule, a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a
particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition among
all the co-owners. However, this should not signify that the
vendee does not acquire anything at all in case a physically
segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since
the co-owner/vendor’s undivided interest could properly be the
object of the contract of sale, what the vendee obtains are the
same rights as the vendor had as co-owner. Thus, the vendee
steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and acquires a
proportionate abstract share in the property held in common.
61
TORRES vs. LAPINID G.R. No. 187987
November 26, 2014
Facts: Petitioners and Jesus are co-owners of the disputed lot. An
action for partition of the parcels of land against the petitioners
and other co-owners were filed. A judgment was rendered based
on a compromise agreement where they agreed that Jesus,
Mariano and Vicente were jointly authorized to sell the said
properties and receive the proceeds thereof and distribute them
to all the co-owners. The agreement was later amended to
exclude Jesus as an authorized seller. The petitioners inspected
the property and discovered that Lapinid was occupying a specific
portion of the lot by virtue of a deed of sale executed by Jesus.

Issue: WON Jesus, as a co-owner, can validly sell a portion of the
property he co-owns in favor of another person.
Held: A co-owner has an absolute ownership of his undivided and
pro indiviso share in the co-owned property. He has the right to
alienate, assign and mortgage it, even to the extent of substituting
a third person in its enjoyment provided that no personal rights
will be affected. This is evident from Art. 493 of the Civil Code.
62 ALEJANDRINO v CA
G.R. No. 114151. September 17, 1998
Facts:
Late spouses Alejandrino left their six children a 219-square-
meter Lot. The property should have been divided among their
children with each child having a share of 36.50 square meters.
However, the estate of the Alejandrino spouses was not settled in
accordance with the procedure outlined in the Rules of Court.
Petitioner Mauricia (one of the children) acquired a total of 97.43
square meters after allegedly purchasing some of her siblings’
share.It turned out, however, that a third party, the private
respondent, also purchased portions of the siblings’ property,
totaling to 121.67 square meters from Mauricia’s sister,
Laurencia.
Issue:
Whether as an heir of the Alejandrino property, Laurencia may
validly sell specific portions thereof to a third party
Ruling:
No. In the instant case, Laurencia was within her hereditary
rights in selling her pro indiviso share in Lot No. 2798. However,
because the property had not yet been partitioned in accordance
with the Rules of Court, no particular portion of the property could
be identified as yet and delineated as the object of the sale. Thus,
under Article 493 of the Civil Code, an alienation of a co-owned
property shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
(the seller) in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
63. G.R. NO. 179205 JULY 30, 2014 HEIRS OR REYNALDO
DELA ROSA, NAMELY: TEOFISTA DELA ROSA, JOSEPHINE
SANTIAGO AND JOSEPH DELA ROSA, PETITIONERS, VS.
MARIO A. BA TONGBACAL, IRENEO BATONGBACAL,
JOCELYN BA TONGBACAL, NESTOR BATONGBACAL AND
LOURDES BA TONGBACAL, RESPONDENTS.
The Facts: The subject property consists of a 3, 750 square
meter and registered under a TCT under the names of Reynaldo
Dela Rosa and his siblings. Reynaldo offered to sell the subject
property to Guillermo and Mario Batongbacal for P187,500.00.
Pursuant to the agreement, Reynaldo received an advance
payment of P31,500.00 leaving a balance of P156,000.00. The
parties agreed that the amount of P20,000.00 as part of the
advance payment shall be paid upon the delivery of the SPA,
which would authorize Reynaldo to alienate the subject property
on behalf of his co-owners and siblings.
ISSUE: WON the contract entered into by parties was valid.
Ruling: As a co-owner of the subject property, Reynaldo's right to
sell, assign or mortgage his ideal share in the property held in
common is sanctioned by law. The applicable law is Article 493 of
the New Civil Code.

64)
RAUL ARAMBULO & TERESITA DELA CRUZ VS GENERO
NOLASCO & JEREMY NOLASCO
GR No. 189420, March 26, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a petition for relief alleging that all co-
owners of a 233 square meter land in Tondo, except Nolasco,
have authorized to sell their respective shares to the properties,
saying that if one or more co-owners shall withhold their consent
to the alterations in the thing owned in common, the courts may
afford adequate relief.
Nolasco responded that they did not know about the
intention to sell, because they were not called to participate in the
negotiations regarding the sale of the property.

ISSUE: Whether the respondents are withholding their consent

and whether this withholding is prejudicial to the petitioners.

HELD:
Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a
sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of
the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights
of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a
co-owner of the property.

65)
DE GUIA V. CA
FACTS:


Abejo instituted an action for recovery of possession with
damages against De Guia. Abejo alleged that he is the owner of
half of the undivided portion of the property used as a fishpond
and that De Guia continues to possess and use such without any
contract and without paying rent to Abejo’s damage and
prejudice. De Guia also claims ownership over an undivided
portion of the fishpond and claims that partition and not recovery
of possession was the proper remedy under the circumstances.
ISSUE: Whether a co-owner can file an ejectment case against a
co-owner?
RULING:
Yes. Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487
against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and
asserts exclusive ownership of the entire property. However, the
only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-
ownership.
66)
BAILON-CASILAO vs CA
GR No. L-78178 April 14, 1988
FACTS:
Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon sold a portion of a parcel of
land to Delgado. They sold the remainder to Lanuza. Lanuza
acquired from Delgado his part of the land. Lanuza’s husband
sold the whole of the land to Afable but the land was
unregistered. Heirs of Bailon filed a case of recovery of property
with damages against Afable asserting that the subject land were
co-owned by them.
ISSUE: WON the appropriate remedy in the instant case is the
recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the
third person
HELD:
No it is not. The appropriate recourse of co-owners in
cases where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire
property and in a mere sale of undivided shares of some of the
co-owners is an action for partition under Rule 69 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
67)
GAPACAN V. OMIPET
387 SCRA 383
FACTS:
Antonio and Maria Gapacan are siblings who inherited
unregistered land from their father, Paicat. Maria Gapacan-
Omipet eventually took over the possession of the land. Subject
land was then transferred to Antonio via an Affidavit and his
family has been occupying it ever since. In 1992, Omipet filed an
action to quiet title in RTC and that she be declared the lawful
owner. RTC ruled in Gapacan’s favor. On appeal, the CA
declared that the land is common property of both Omipet and
Gapacans and ordered its partition but both parties appealed.
ISSUE: W/N there is a state of co-ownership
HELD:
Yes. A state of co-ownership exists only because there is
unity of the object or property and plurality of subjects.

68)
QUINTOS V. NICOLAS
GR No. 210252, June 16, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title against
respondents wherein they averred that they have been in
adverse, open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the
property for over four (4) decades and are, thus, entitled to
equitable title thereto. Respondents countered that petitioners’
cause of action was already barred by estoppel.
RTC dismissed the case holding that it did not find merit in
petitioners’ claim that they have acquired title over the property
through acquisitive prescription. CA affirmed RTC ruling.
ISSUE:
W/N the Petitioners’ Complaint for Quieting of Title in their
land was duly complied with
HELD:
No it was not. Petitioners were unable to comply with first
indispensable requisite to make an action for Quieting of Title
prosper which is proving that (1) they had legal or equitable title
to or interest in the real property.
69
ADILLE vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 157 SCRA 455, January 29,
1988
FACTS: The property in dispute was originally owned by Felisa
Alzul who got married twice. Her child in the first marriage
was petitioner Rustico Adile and her children in the second
marriage were respondents Emetria Asejo et al.
During her lifetime, Felisa Alzul sold the property in pacto de retro
with a three-year repurchase period. Felisa died before she
could repurchase the property. During the redemption period,
Rustico Adille repurchased the property by himself alone at
his own expense, and after that, he executed a deed of extra-
judicial partition representing himself to be the only heir and
child of his mother Felisa. Consequently, he was able to secure
title in his name alone. His half-siblings, herein respondents, filed
a case for partition and accounting claiming that Rustico
was only a trustee on an implied trust when he redeemed the
property, and thus, he cannot claim exclusive ownership of
the entire property.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not a co-owner may acquire exclusive
ownership over the property held in common.
2) Whether or nor Rustico had constituted himself a
negotiorum gestor
HELD:
1) No. The right to repurchase may be exercised by a co-
owner with respect to his share alone. Although Rustico
Adille redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the
expenses did not make him the owner of all of it.
2) Yes. The petitioner, in taking over the property, did so on
behalf of his co-heirs, in which event, he had constituted
himself a negotiorum gestor under Art 2144 of the Civil
Code, or for his exclusive benefit, in which case, he is
guilty of fraud, and must act as trustee, the respondents
being the beneficiaries, pursuant to Art 1456.


70
Sanchez v CA

Facts: Lilia Sanchez constructed a house on a 76-square meter

lot. The lot was registered with six co-owners, including petitioner.
Later, the lot was registered to Teria, respondent, by virtue of a
Deed of Absolute Sale supposed to have been executed by all six
(6) co-owners in her favor. Petitioner claimed that she did not affix
her signature on the document and subsequently refused to
vacate the lot. MeTC declared the sale was valid only to the
extent of 5/6 of the lot and the other 1/6 remaining as the property
of petitioner, on account of her signature in the Deed of Absolute
Sale having been established as a forgery. A writ of execution
was issued and a Notice to Vacate was served by the sheriff
upon petitioner who however refused to heed the Notice.

Issue: WON the sale is valid as to petitioner’s share?

Ruling: No. Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the

property, the metes and bounds of petitioners lot has not been
designated. As she was not a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale
voluntarily entered into by the other co-owners, her right to 1/6 of
the property must be respected. Partition needs to be effected to
protect her right to her definite share and determine the
boundaries of her property. Such partition must be done without
prejudice to the rights of private respondent Virginia Teria as
buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.


71
Pangan v CA
G.R. No. L-39299
October 18, 1988
FACT:
The petitioner filed an application for the registration of the land in
their names by virtue of their continuous and exclusive
possession by them which application was approved. The private
respondent then filed a petition to set aside the said decision on
the ground that she as an heir too, is entitled to the share of the
property. However the petition was dissmissed on the ground that
the private respondent right over the property had been forfeited
by extinctive prescription. On appeal, the decision was reversed.
ISSUE: Whether the private respondent is entitled to the share of
the property.
HELD:
Yes. Private respondent as an heir is a co-owner of the property.
For title to prescribe in favor of the co-owner, however, there
must be a clear showing that he has repudiated the claims of the
other co-owners and that they have been categorically advised of
the exclusive claim he is making to the property in question.
There was no adequate notice by the petitioners to the private
respondent of the rejection of her claim to her share in the subject
property.
72. Heirs of Restar –vs-Heirs of Cichon ~Diana
72)
Heirs of Restar –vs-Heirs of Cichon
FACTS:
Flores took over the land that he and his siblings inherited
from their father but he died intestate. Flores’ siblings/co-owners
filed a Complaint for partition of the land against Flores’ heirs.
The latter claimed that they had been in possession of the lot as
owners for more than thirty (30) years. The RTC of Aklan ruled in
favor of Flores’ heirs holding that there was repudiation of co-
ownership and that the lot was acquired by prescription. The CA
reversed the RTC decision on appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N the Heirs’ of Flores acquired ownership through
prescription despite co-ownership
HELD:
Yes, there has been acquisition through prescription.
While the action to demand partition of a co-owned
property does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire co-
ownership thereof by prescription where there exists a clear
repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised
of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.

TORAYNO – 73
EPITACIO DELIMA, PACIANO DELIMA, FIDEL DELIMA, ET AL.
VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. L-46296 201 SCRA 641 SEPTEMBER 24, 1991
PONENTE: MEDIALDEA, J.
Doctrine: No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against
his co-owners or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly
recognizes the co-ownership. The exception however is that the
from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the
absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the
others any share therein, the question is no longer one of partition
but of ownership.
Facts: Lino Delima acquired a lot by sale on installments from the
government. After his demise in 1921 he had his three brothers
and a sister listed as his heirs, Eulalio, Juanita, Galileo, and
Vicente. A new TCT was issued. Galileo executed an affidavit of
Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs adjudicating to himself the
subject property excluding the other heirs. He declared the lot to
be of his own and paid for its taxes. Eulalio and Juanita filed an
action for reconveyance and partition of property and for the
annulment of the certificate of title issued.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners’ action for partition is already
barred by the statutory period provided by law?
Held: Yes. Being that Galileo was holding the property in
representation of the co-owners; he was therefore acting as an
administrator who took care of the property yet still having the
ultimate obligation to deliver the property to his co-owners.
However this rule shall no longer apply when one of the co-
owners begin to claim the absolute and exclusive ownership and
denies the others any share therein. Since Galileo, having
executed a deed of partition and obtained subsequent to that the
cancellation of the old title and the creation of a new one wherein
he appears as the new owner of the property, he thereby in effect
denied and repudiated the ownership of the other co-owners over
their shares. From this act, the statute of limitations started to run.
74
Mariategui v. C.A.
205 SCRA 337
FACTS:
Mariategui died without a will. During his lifetime, he contracted
three (3) marriages. Lupo's descendants by his first and second
marriages executed a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they
adjudicated unto themselves lots in the Muntinglupa Estate.
Thereafter, an Original Certiicate of Title (OCT) was issued in
their name. Subsequently, separate transfer certificates of title

were issued after subdivision. Lupo's children by his third
marriage filed an amended complaint. They pray for partition of
the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the deed of
extrajudicial partition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not prescription barred private respondents' right to
demand the partition of the estate of Mariategui.
HELD:
No. Prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when
the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co-owner. No valid
repudiation was made by petitioners to the prejudice of private
respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration of the subject lot
was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had
not yet set in when private respondents filed the present action
for partition. Petitioners' registration of the properties in their
names did not operate as a valid repudiation of the co-ownership.
75. Lacbayan vs. Samoy, G.R. No. 165427, March 21, 2011
75)
LACBAYAN VS. SAMOY
G.R. No. 165427, March 21, 2011
FACTS:
Respondent, although married, had an affair with
petitioner. Five parcels of land were acquired and registered
under the petitioner’s and respondent’s name as husband and
wife for a business venture. Eventually they decided to part ways
and agreed to divide said properties and terminate their business
partnership. The respondent and petitioner disagreed on the
terms of the partition of subject parcels.
Petitioner filed a complaint for judicial partitioning of the
said properties. The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit and was then elevated to the CA.
ISSUE:
W/N a partition of the subject property appropriate in the
instant case
HELD:
The petition was denied.
The first phase of partition is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership exists, and a
partition is proper and may be made by voluntary agreement of all
the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with a
declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either
because co-ownership does not exist, or that partition is legally
prohibited.
76)
CRUZ V. CATAPANG
GR No. 164110, February 12, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioners are co-owners of a land in Taal, Batangas. One
of the petitioners gave respondent permission to construct her
(respondent’s) house adjacent to the co-owned property. The
house encroached on the subject property. Petitioners filed an
action for forcible entry against respondent in the MTC which
ruled in their favor. RTC affirmed MTC’s ruling on appeal. The CA
reversed RTC ruling in favor of respondent.
ISSUE: p
WON the consent given by a co-owner of a parcel of land
to a person to construct a house on the co-owned property
warrants the dismissal of a forcible entry case
HELD:
No. A co-owner cannot give valid consent to another to
build a house on the co-owned property, which is an act
tantamount to devoting the property to his/her exclusive use, to

the prejudice of the co-ownership. The construction of a house on
the co-owned property is an act of dominion. Therefore, it is an
alteration falling under Article 491 of the Civil Code. There being
no consent from all co-owners, respondent had no right to
construct her house on the co-owned property.
#77 SANTOS v. LUSTRE G.R. No. 151016
FACTS:
In Civil Case No. 1330, both heirs of Dominga Lustre, filed with
the RTC, a complaint for Declaration of the Inexistence of
Contract, Annulment of Title, Conveyance and Damages against
Froilan Santos, son of the appellant spouses. In another Civil
case, filed by Lustre’s other heirs against the parties of this case,
they averred that the sale of the property to Natividad Santos was
simulated, spurious or fake, and that they discovered that the
spouses Santos transferred the property to Froilan Santos when
an ejectment suit was filed against them.
ISSUE:
Whether the action for reconveyance on the ground that the
certificate of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed of
sale is virtually an action for the declaration of its nullity
RULING:
Yes. When an action for reconveyance is filed, it would be in the
nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is
imprescriptible. It follows then that the respondents’ present
action is not barred by laches.
78
G.R. No. 179914 June 16, 2014
SPOUSES REYNALDO AND HILLY G.
SOMBILON, Petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. REY FERDINAND GARAY AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK, Respondents.
FACTS
Spouses Sombilon were the previous owners of a property, which
was foreclosed and sold at public auction. PNB was the winning
bidder. The spouses failed to redeem the property. In 2005, they
sought the help of Atty. Garay. Both partieswere informed by PNB
that the property could be purchased at P2,938,000.00. The
following day, Atty. Garay bought the property for himself by
making a down payment of P587,600.00. Upon learning, spouses
Sombilon offered to buy back the property from
PNB. Subsequently, when a Final Deed of Conveyance was
issued in favor of PNB, the latter decided to approve the
purchase offer of Atty. Garay since spouses Sombilon failed to
make the required down payment. PNB filed an Ex-Parte Petition
for Issuance of a Writ of Possession, which Judge Venadas, Sr.
held in abeyance.
ISSUES
(1) Whether or not Judge Venadas, Sr. committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ
of Possession;
HELD
Yes, he committed grave abuse of discretion because PNB, as
the registered owner, is entitled to the possession of the subject
property as a matter of right.The redemption period had long
lapsed when PNB applied for the issuance of the Writ of

Possession.In fact, the title over the subject property had already
been consolidated in PNB’s name. The claim that the sale
between PNB and Atty. Garay was invalid as it was done in
violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code iswrong.
First, it was not a ground to defer the issuance of the Writ of
Possession. Second, it does not affect PNB’s right to possess the
subject property.
VISTAL – 79
Javate v. Sps. Tiotuico
G.R. No. 187606
March 9, 2015
Peralta, J..
Facts of the case;
Petitioner’s land was foreclosed by the bank for failure to pay his
obligation. He failed to redeem it within the given period, thus
ownership was consolidated with the bank. Respondent then
bought the subject property from the bank and petition the court
for a writ of possession, which was granted. Petitioner contend
that only the bank has the right to issuance of writ of possession,
respondents as a subsequent buyer must resort to appropriate
judicial remedy, which is ejectment or accionreinvindicatoria in
order to gain possession.
Issue:
W/N respondent are entitled to issuance of writ or possession
Ruling:
Yes. If the purchaser is the mortgagee or third party during
redemption period, writ may issue ex-parte. The remedy is
available to subsequent purchaser but only after hearing and after
determining that subject property is still in the possession of the
mortgagor. If the property is in the possession of the mortgagor, a
writ of possession could be issued. There is no dispute that
petitioner is in possession of the property thus, issuance of the
writ is proper. To require subsequent purchaser to file a separate
case of ejectment will only prolong and unduly deny possession
of property which already bought.
80)
DELA CRUZ V. SPS HERMANO
GR No. 160914, March 25, 2015
FACTS:
Respondent spouses, the registered owner of subject
house and lot, filed an ejectment suit against petitioner.
Respondent claims that said property is used as a rest/vacation
house. In his defense, petitioner alleged that the property was
already sold by respondent to a certain Benitez who sold the
same to herein petitioner. Also, the case at bar is not one of an
unlawful detainer or forcible entry to which an ejectment suit is
based.
ISSUE:
Whether the ejectment suit will prosper?
HELD:

No, it will not. The Supreme Court agrees that this was an
action for ejectment in the nature of accion reivindicatoria, the
case was actually for forcible entry and sufficient in form.
However, the respondents failed to provide sufficient evidence in
their allegation of prior physical possession thereof, which is an
element in forcible entry.
– 81
PNB V. DE JESUS
411 SCRA 557
FACTS:
On 10 June 1995, respondent filed a complaint against
petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Occidental Mindoro
for recovery of ownership and possession, with damages, over
the questioned property. In his complaint, respondent stated that
he had acquired a parcel of land situated in Mamburao,
Occidental Mindoro, with an area of 1,144 square meters covered
by TCT No. T-17197, and that on 26 March 1993, he had caused
a verification survey of the property and discovered that the
northern portion of the lot was being encroached upon by a
building of petitioner to the extent of 124 square meters. Despite
two letters of demand sent by respondent, petitioner failed and
refused to vacate the area.
Petitioner, in its answer, asserted that when it acquired the
lot and the building sometime in 1981 from then Mayor
Bienvenido Ignacio, the encroachment already was in existence
and to remedy the situation, Mayor Ignacio offered to sell the area
in question (which then also belonged to Ignacio) to petitioner at
P100.00 per square meter which offer the latter claimed to have
accepted. The sale, however, did not materialize when, without
the knowledge and consent of petitioner, Mayor Ignacio later
mortgaged the lot to the Development Bank of the Philippines.
He also contends that he is a builder in good faith.
ISSUE:
Whether or not being a builder in good faith matters under article
448.
HELD:
NO. Article 448, of the Civil Code refers to a piece of land
whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom
has built some works (or sown or planted something) and not to a
case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planter
who then later loses ownership of the land by sale or otherwise
for, elsewise stated, “where the true owner himself is the builder
of works on his own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is
entirely irrelevant.”
82
PARILLA v. PILAR
G.R. No. 167680, November 30, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners, as dealers of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation
(Pilipinas Shell), have been in possession of a parcel of land
which was leased to them by the respondent. When the lease
contract expired, and despite demands to vacate, petitioners
remained in possession of the property on which they built
improvements. Hence, respondent filed a complaint for ejectment
before the MTC which ordered the petitioners to vacate and to
pay respondent a reasonable compensation for the use of the
property. It also ordered respondent to reimburse the petitioners
the amount Two Million Pesos representing the value of the
improvements introduced on the property.

RTC affirmed the MTC‘s Decision. However, the CA set aside the
lower court’s decision.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to reimbursement for
the improvements being builders in good faith under Art. 453 of
the Civil Code.
HELD:
Article 448 covers only cases in which the builders, sowers or
planters believe themselves to be owners of the land or, at least,
have a claim of title thereto, but not when the interest is merely
that of a holder, such as a mere tenant, agent or usufructuary. A
tenant cannot be said to be a builder in good faith as he has no
pretension to be owner.
It is Article 1678 of the New Civil Code which applies to the
present case. However, the petitioners’ claim for reimbursement
of the alleged entire value of the improvements still does not thus
lie under Article 1678 there being no substantial evidence, e.g.,
receipts or other documentary evidence detailing costs of
construction. Besides, of the structures they originally built, only
the bodega-like, sari-sari store, and the parking lot now exist.
At all events, under Article 1678, it is the lessor who is given the
option, upon termination of the lease contract, either to
appropriate the useful improvements by paying one-half of their
value at that time, or to allow the lessee to remove the
improvements. This option solely belongs to the lessor as the law
is explicit that ―[s]hould the lessor refuse to reimburse said
amount, the lessee may remove the improvements, even though
the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. It appears that the
lessor has opted not to reimburse.
– 83
ABALOS VS. HEIRS OF TORIO
FACTS:
On July 24, 1996, herein respondents filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Possession and Damages with the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Binmaley, Pangasinan against Jaime Abalos
(Jaime) and the spouses Felix and Consuelo Salazar.
Respondents contended that they are the children and heirs of
one Vicente Torio (Vicente) who died intestate, leaving behind a
parcel of land measuring 2,950 square meters, more or less,
which is located at San Isidro Norte, Pangasinan. During the
lifetime of Vicente and through his tolerance petitioners. were
allowed to stay and build their respective houses on the subject
parcel of land. Even after the death of Vicente, herein
respondents allowed The petitioners to remain on the disputed
lot. However, in 1985, respondents asked Jaime and the Spouses
Salazar to vacate the subject lot, but they refused to heed the
demand of respondents forcing respondents to file the complaint.
Jaime and the Spouses Salazar filed their Answer with
Counterclaim, denying the material allegations in the Complaint
and asserting in their Special and Affirmative Defenses that
respondents' cause of action is barred by acquisitive prescription.
Petitioners claim the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of
the action and the persons of the defendant. They also alleged
that they are in actual, continuous and peaceful possession of the
subject lot as owners since time immemorial. They also said that
they have been paying real property taxes and have been
introducing improvements on the said land.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners and their predecessors-in-
interest possessed the disputed lot in the concept of an owner.

(2) Whether or not the possession of the petitioners is by mere
tolerance of respondents and their predecessors-in-interest.
(3) Whether or not the petitioners qualify to own the land through
acquisitive prescription.
HELD:
(1) No.
In the instant case, it is clear that during their possession of the
property in question, petitioners acknowledged ownership thereof
by the immediate predecessor-in-interest of respondents. This is
clearly shown by the Tax Declaration in the name of Jaime for the
year 1984 wherein it contains a statement admitting that Jaime's
house was built on the land of Vicente, respondents' immediate
predecessor-in-interest.21 Petitioners never disputed such an
acknowledgment. Thus, having knowledge that they nor their
predecessors-in-interest are not the owners of the disputed lot,
petitioners' possession could not be deemed as possession in
good faith as to enable them to acquire the subject land by
ordinary prescription.
(2) Yes.
In this respect, the Court agrees with the CA that petitioners'
possession of the lot in question was by mere tolerance of
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest. Acts of
possessory character executed due to license or by mere
tolerance of the owner are inadequate for purposes of acquisitive
prescription.Possession, to constitute the foundation of a
prescriptive right, must be en concepto de dueo, or, to use the
common law equivalent of the term, that possession should be
adverse, if not, such possessory acts, no matter how long, do not
start the running of the period of prescription.
(3) No.
In the case at bar, the CA correctly held that even if the character
of petitioners' possession of the subject property had become
adverse, as evidenced by their declaration of the same for tax
purposes under the names of their predecessors-in-interest, their
possession still falls short of the required period of thirty (30)
years in cases of extraordinary acquisitive prescription. Records
show that the earliest Tax Declaration in the name of petitioners
was in 1974. Reckoned from such date, the thirty-year period was
completed in 2004. However, herein respondents' complaint was
filed in 1996, effectively interrupting petitioners' possession upon
service of summons on them.24 Thus, petitioners possession
also did not ripen into ownership, because they failed to meet the
required statutory period of extraordinary prescription.
84
MANGASER V. UGAY
GR No. 204926, December 3, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioner Anacleto Mangaser filed an Action of Forcible
Entry against Respondent Ugay. However, the latter contended
that Petitioner was unable to prove prior physical possession over
subject property.
ISSUE:
W/N the Action for Forcible Entry would prosper
HELD:
Yes. Physical possession is not an indispensible
requirement. Possession can also be acquired by juridical acts.
These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of
possession. Examples of these are donations, succession,
execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of

possessory information titles and the like. It is sufficient that – 85
petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his will.
Suarez vs. Emboy, G.R. No. 187944, March 12, 2014

Facts:

A parcel of land was partitioned into 5 among the heirs of the

Carlos and Asuncion. Lot No. 1907-A-2 was occupied by Felix
and Marilou Emboy, who were claiming that they inherited it from
their mother Claudia Emboy, who inherited it from her parents.
Felix and Marilou were asked by their cousins to vacate the lot
and transfer to Lot No. 1907-A-5 but they refused to comply and
insisted that Claudia's inheritance pertained to Lot No. 1907-A-2.
In 2004, Felix and Marilou received a demand letter from
Carmencita requiring them to vacate the lot andinformed them
that they have purchased the same. Felix and Marilou argued that
the complaint for unlawful detainer was fundamentally inadequate
since there was no specific allegation as to when and how
possession by tolerance of them began.

Issue: Whether or not the complaint for unlawful detainer was

inadequate.

Held:

In a complaint for unlawful detainer, there are requisites that are

needed to be alleged. One of such requirements include, “initially,
possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or
by tolerance of the plaintiff”. In this case, the first requisite was
absent. Carmencita failed to clearly allege and prove how Emboy
entered the lot and constructed a house upon it. Hence, the
complaint should not have been for unlawful detainer and the CA
did not commit an error in dismissing Carmencita's complaint


86
G.R. No. 176055 March 17, 2014
SPOUSES EDMUNDO DELA CRUZ and AMELIA CONCIO-
DELA CRUZ, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES RUFINO R. CAPCO AND MARTY1 C.
CAPCO, Respondents.
FACTS:
Spouses Dela Cruz filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer
against the spouses Capco before the MeTC of Pateros. They
alleged that Teodora T. Concio, mother of petitioner Amelia
Concio-Dela Cruz, acquired ownership over a piece of land by
virtue of a decision of RTC of Pasig. Petitioners said that Teodora
tolerated the spouses Capco’s occupation thereof and conveyed
it to them due to their close ties as neighbors and relatives.
Intending to construct a house thereon and use it for business,
peititioners asked them to vacate the land but the respondents
refused. In their answer, respondents pointed out that the
complaint is defective for failing to allege the exact metes and
bounds of the property and that there was no title thereto to show
such ownership.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses Dela Cruz have the better right to
possess the property.
HELD:
The spouses Dela Cruz are able to establish by preponderance of
evidence that they are the rightful possessors of the property. The
spouses Dela Cruz were able to prove by preponderance of
evidence that they are the owners of the lot. Their allegation is
supported by a copy of the decision in Land Registration Case
No. 9511, title of land issued to Teodora and extra-judicial
settlement of the estate of Teodora conveying the said property to
Amelia. Petitioners are better entitled to the material possession
of the subject property. As its present owners, they have a right to
the possession of the property which is one of the attributes of
ownership.
CASE No. 87
PIEDAD vs. GURIEZA, G.R. No. 207525, June 18, 2014
Facts:
Piedad alleged that he is the absolute owner of the 1/3 portion of
land which he acquired from his late father, through a Deed of
Confirmation. Before migrating to Hawaii, he built a bungalow on
the lot and assigned Spouses Gurieza as the last caretakers.
However, Sps. Gurieza allegedly had the lot declared under their
name for tax purposes. He sent his daughter to the country to
demand the spouses to vacate and initiate a complaint. Sps.
Gurieza maintained they acquired the lot through acquisitive
prescription. CA ruled that Gurieza, whom Bonifacio recognized
as one of the heirs of the subject lot, continues to be a co-owner
thereof, because the lot was never partitioned since Gurieza
never signed the Deed of Confirmation.
Issue:
Whether or not the ejectment suit would prosper?
Held: Yes. An ejectment case, based on the allegation of
possession by tolerance, falls under the category of unlawful
detainer. Where the plaintiff allows the defendant to use his

property by tolerance without any contract, the defendant is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate on
demand, failing which, an action for unlawful detainer will lie.
88, FEU. QUIJANO vs ATTY. DARYLL A. AMANTE
FACTS:
The petitioner and her siblings, namely: Eliseo, Jose and
Gloria, inherited from their father a parcel of land. Prior to any
partition among the heirs, Eliseo sold a portion of his share to
respondent.
Fe, Eliseo, Jose and Gloria executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition to divide their father's estate among
themselves. The partition resulted in the portions earlier sold by
Eliseo to the respondent being adjudicated to the petitioner
instead of to Eliseo. The respondent's occupation had become
illegal following his refusal to vacate despite repeated demands.
Hence, this action for unlawful detainer.
The MTCC rendered its decision in favor of the petitioner.
The parcel of land left by their father had not yet been partitioned,
rendering Eliseo a mere co-owner of the undivided estate who
had no right to dispose of a definite portion thereof.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed the
judgment of the MTCC, and dismissed the complaint holding that
the summary proceeding for ejectment was not proper. Serious
question of ownership of the disputed property was involved and
which cannot be determined in a summary proceeding for
ejectment.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC on the ground
that the respondent was either a co-owner or an assignee holding
the right of possession over the disputed property; that the
respondent became a co-owner along with Eliseo and his co-
heirs, giving him the right to participate in the partition of the
estate owned in common by them; that because the respondent
was not given any notice of the project of partition or of the
intention to effect the partition, the partition made by the petitioner
and her co-heirs did not bind him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not review on certiorari is correctly sought by
the petitioner.
RULING:
The petition for review on certiorari lacks merit. To show
that the possession was initially lawful, the basis of such lawful
possession must then be established. The acts of tolerance must
be proved, for bare allegation of tolerance did not suffice. At least,
the petitioner should show the overt acts indicative of her co-
heirs' permission for him to occupy the disputed property. But she
did not adduce such evidence. Instead, she appeared to be
herself not clear and definite as to the respondent’s possession of
the disputed property being merely tolerated by Eliseo.
In contrast, the respondent consistently stood firm on his
assertion that his possession of the disputed property was in the
concept of an owner, not by the mere tolerance of Eliseo and

actually presented the deeds of sale transferring ownership of the
property to him. Unlawful detainer action is dismissed for being
an improper remedy.
Case Number 89:
De Leon v. Dela Llana
GR No. 212277
February 11, 2015
FACTS:
The case stemmed from an unlawful detainer complaint filed by
Gilbert dela Llana against Robert de Leon. The said complaint
averred that sometime in 1999, dela Llana through an undated
contract of lease, leased a portion of a 541 square-meter
property, registered in his name, to De Leon which the latter
intended use as a lottery. Upon failure to pay rental, Dela Llana
filed an ejectment suit to De Leon, but the latter posited that lease
contract was fraudulent and not binding. The lower court ruled in
favor of Del Leon where such decision was final and executory.
De Llana filed a second complaint for unlawful detainer. De Leon
raised the defense of res judicata, particularly averring that the
second ejectment complaint should be dismissed given that it
was already barred by prior judgment.
ISSUE:
Whether the principle of res judicata applies – that is, whether the
second ejectment complaint was barred by prior judgment.
RULING:
The principle of res judicata applies. There is a bar by prior
judgment where there is identity of parties, subject matter, and
causes of action between the first case where the judgment was
rendered and the second case that is sought to be barred. There
is conclusiveness of judgment, on the other hand, where there is
identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of
causes of action. With the identity of the parties, subject matter,
and cause of action between the first and second ejectment suit,
it cannot thus be seriously doubted that the final and executory
judgment in the first case had already barred the resolution of the
second. Hence, the second ejectment complaint of dela Llana is
dimissed.
90) Bunyi v. Factor
FACTS:
Respondent Fe S. Factor and Gloria Factor-Labao are co-owners
of an 18-hectare piece of land. Gloria Factor-Labao who was
married to Ruben Labao died thus the administration and
management of the Factor compound including the subject rest
house, passed on to respondent Fe S. Factor as co-owner of the
property. Factor, considering that Labao was sickly and had no
means of income, respondent allowed him to stay at the rest
house for brief, transient and intermittent visits as a guest of the
Factor family. Labao was married to Bunyi. Eventually, he died.
Petitioners stole the personal properties of said houses and
occupied the premises. Hence, respondent Fe S. Factor filed a
complaint for forcible entry against herein petitioners Precy Bunyi
and Mila Bunyi.
ISSUE:
WON the petioner has a better right of physical and material
possesion of the subject property.
RULING:
For one to be considered in possession, one need not have
actual or physical occupation of every square inch of the property
at all times. Possession can be acquired not only by material
occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the
action of one’s will or by the proper acts and legal formalities

established for acquiring such right. Possession can be acquired
by juridical acts.
91
PEOPLE vs. PENAFLORIDA
GR NO. 175604
April 10, 2008
Facts:
SPO3 Vicente Competente of PNP Station Camarines Sur
received a tip from an asset that a bundle of marijuana was
being transported by appellant. A team of police officers was
organized for the operation. The team boarded the police mobile
car and proceeded to Sitio Nasulan in Barangay Huyon-huyon.
They overtook appellant who was on a bicycle. The police officers
flagged appellant down and found marijuana wrapped in a
cellophane and newspaper together with other grocery items. The
amount of P1550.00 was also found in appellant’s possession.
The police officers confiscated the items. The appellant alleged
that he was arbitrarily arrested by the officers. TC ruled that there
was violation of Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Appellant asserts that there was doubt as to his possession of the
marijuana and that he was arbitrarily arrested.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of the appellant is tenable?
Ruling:
No. The warrantless arrest is justified. There was a clear violation
of Article II, Section 4 of RA No. 6425, as amended by RA No
7659, which specifically covers the sale, administration, delivery,
distribution and transportation of prohibited drugs. In the instant
case, appellant was riding his bicycle when he was caught by the
police. He admitted that he was about to convey the package to
a certain Gonzales. Appellant denied that the package in his
possession contained marijuana, but the Trial Court rejected his
contention. Taking one step further, the appellate court went on to
declare that being mala prohibita, one commits the crime under
RA No. 6425 by mere possession of a prohibited drug without
legal authority. Intent, motive or knowledge thereof is not
necessary.
92
MARK SOLEDAD y CRISTOBAL,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
The facts of the case, as narrated by the CA, are as follows:
Sometime in June 2004, private complainant Henry C. Yu
received a call on his mobile phone from a certain Tess or Juliet
Villar ( Rochelle Bagaporo), a credit card agent, who offered a
Citifinancing loan assistance at a low interest rate. Yu was invited
by Bagaporo to his office, where he was introduced to her boss.
In compliance of the requriements for the loan, complainant
submitted various documents, such as his Globe handyphone
original platinum gold card, identification cards and statements of
accounts. Subsequently, private complainant followed up his loan
status but he failed to get in touch with either [petitioner] or
Ronald Gobenchiong. Petitioner was thus charged with Violation
of Section 9(e), R.A. No. 8484 for possessing a counterfeit
access device or access device fraudulently applied for.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was legally in possession of the
credit card subject of the case.

No merit
The trial court convicted petitioner of possession of the credit card
fraudulently applied for, penalized by R.A. No. 8484. The law,
however, does not define the word possession. Thus, we use the
term as defined in Article 523 of the Civil Code, that is,
possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right.
The acquisition of possession involves two elements: the corpus
or the material holding of the thing, and the animus possidendi or
the intent to possess it.
93 - CHUA-BURCE vs. CA
[G.R. No. 109595. April 27, 2000]
Facts:
Judge Lauro V. Francisco of RTC Cebu City issued a search
warrant directing the immediate search of the premises of R.R.
Construction and the seizure of an Isuzu dump truck. Canoy
seized the vehicle and took custody, where later on a writ of
replevin was filed to recovery it. Chua alleged that he had a lawful
ownership and possession of the vehicle; that he had not sold the
vehicle to anyone; that he had not stolen nor carnapped it, and
that he had never been charged of the crime of carnapping or any
other crime for that matter. Meanwhile, a case for carnapping
against Chua pending preliminary investigation before the City
Fiscal’s Office of Cebu City. The CA reversed the RTC decision
and ordered the dismissal of the Replevin action, and directed
that possession of the subject vehicle be restored to Canoy.
Issue:
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners have a better right of possession over the subject
parcels of land.
HELD:
Crisologo has a better right of possession over the subject
parcels of land. The AccionPubliciana is an ordinary civil proceeding
to determine the better right of possession of realty independently
of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of
one & year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. The objective of the
plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not
ownership.
95
Subic Bay Legend Resorts and Casinos Inc. vs. Fernandez
September 29, 2014 G.R. No. 193426=
FACTS:
On July 1, 1997, Bernard Fernandez, a brother of Ludwig and
Deoven, filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money and
damages against the company. According to him, he went to the
casino on June 13, 1997; he handed to his brothers $6,000.00
worth of chips belonging to him, for use at the casino. Thereat,
the company personnel accosted his brothers and confiscated his
casino chips worth $5,900.00, and failed to return the same to
him despite demand. Brothers Deoven and Ludwig Fernandez
was accused of stealing casino chips from Subic Bay Legend
Resorts and Casinos Inc. They were made to confess that the
chips were supplied by a casino employee, Michael Cabrera.
Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred when it ordered the
transfer of possession seized to Chua when the latter filed an
action for replevin.
Held:
Yes. The Regional Trial Court of Cebu Branch VIII erred when it
ordered the transfer of possession of the property seized to Chua
when the latter filed the action for replevin. It should have
dismissed the case since by virtue of the "provisional dismissal",
of the carnapping case there is still a probability that a criminal
case would be filed, hence a conflict in jurisdiction could still
arise. The basic principle that a judge who presides in one court
cannot annul or modify the orders issued by another branch of
the same court because they are co-equal and independent
bodies acting coordinately, must always be adhered to.
94
GABRIEL
VS
CRISOLOGO
G.R. NO. 204626, JUNE 9, 2014
____________________________________________________
_________________________________
FACTS:
Crisologo alleged that she was the registered owner of two
parcels of land. She discovered that petitioners unlawfully entered
and occupied her properties by stealth, force and without her prior
consent and knowledge and constructed houses on the said lots.
Upon the discovery, Atty Carmelita Crisologo, the daughter,
demanded that petitioners vacate the premises and remove their
structures thereon. Petitioners refused to vacate the said
properties despite repeated demands.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Bernard is the lawful possessor of the casino
chips entitling him to collect from the casino and award of
damages.
RULING:
There is no basis to suppose that the casino chips found in
Ludwin and Deoven’s possession were stolen; petitioner acted
arbitrarily in confiscating the same without basis. If it cannot be
proved, in the first place, that Cabrera stole the chips, then there
is no more reason to suppose that Ludwin and Deoven were
dealing in or possessed stolen goods; unless the independent
fact that Cabrera stole the chips can be proved, it cannot be said
that they must be confiscated when found to be in Ludwin and
Deoven’s possession. If Subic Bay Legend cannot prove its loss,
then Article 599 cannot apply; that the presumptions that the
chips were exchanged for value remains.
96
Penta Pacific Realty Corp. vs Ley Construction and
Development Corp
Nov. 24, 2014, GR No. 161589
Facts: Penta Pacific leased its properties to Ley Construction.
Both parties then entered into a contract to sell. Ley Construction
failed to pay its amortizations prompting Penta Pacific to file an
action for ejectment. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC that
the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case.
Issue: Whether the complaint was for unlawful detainer, or accion
publiciana, or accion reivindicatoria.

Ruling: The SC ruled that a defendant’s claim of possession de
jure or his averment of ownership does not render the ejectment
suit either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The suit
remains accion interdictal, a summary proceeding that can
proceed independently of any claim of ownership. Even when the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership is to be resolved only
to determine the issue of possession.
97
Javier vs Lomuntad
G.R 203760
Facts:
In his forcible entry complaint, petitioner Homer C. Javier,
represented by his mother and natural guardian Susan G.
Canencia, alleged that he is one of the sons of the late Vicente T.
Javier ,who was the owner of a 360-square meter (sq. m.) parcel
of land in Taytay Rizal. Petitioner’s family contented that since
Javier was born, he has lived in the residential house erected
thereon. Upon Vicente’s death, petitioner, together with his
mother, continued their possession over the same. On March 26,
2007, despite the petitioner’s vigorous objections, respondent
Susan Lumontad gained entry into the subject land and started to
build a two (2)-storey building (subject building) on a 150 sq. m.
portion thereof. No amicable settlement was reached, thus the
case of forcible entry was filed by petitioner against respondent.
Issue: W/N petitioner’s filing of forcible entry against respondent
is with merits.
Held:
Petitioner’s forcible entry complaint cannot be granted on its
merits, considering that he had failed to justify his right to the de
facto possession of the disputed premises. As pointed out by the
CA, the supposed document from which petitioner hinges his right
to the de facto possession of the subject land, only covers his
house and not the entire land itself. Nothing appears on record to
show that he has the right to the de facto possession of the
172.80 sq. m. portion which, on the contrary, appears to be
consistent with the claim of ownership of respondent in view of
TD No. OOTY-002-13031 covering the same property as

registered in her name. Thus, with no evidence in support of
petitioner's stance, and the counter-evidence showing
respondent's right to the de facto possession of the 172.80 sq. m.
portion as its ostensible owner, the forcible complaint must
necessarily fail.
98. EDCA Publishing and Distributing Corp. v The Spouses
Leonor and Gerardo Santos
GR No. 80298
April 26, 1990
FACTS:
An individual who identified himself as Professor Jose Cruz
placed an order through telephone with Edca Publishing. He
ordered 400+ books and issued a personal check as payment.
Then he sold some of the books to Santos who, after verifying the
seller’s ownership from the invoice shown, paid Cruz. Meanwhile,
Edca being suspicious over the second order placed by Cruz
verified with De La Salle College where he had claimed to be
dean and was informed that no such person was under its
employ. There was also no account with the bank against which
he had drawn his check. It was later found out that his real name
was Tomas de la Pena. Edca reported this to the police and
through an entrapment, de la Pena was captured. They forced
their way inside Santos’ store and seized the books without any
warrant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the owner was unlawfully deprived of the
property?
HELD: No.
Santos was a good faith buyer after taking steps to verify the
identity of the seller. When she was showed the invoice, she
reasonably believed that he was a legitimate seller. With regard
to unlawful deprivation, EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the
property by mere failure of consideration. There was already a
perfected contract of sale. Proof was even substantiated when
EDCA gave the invoice as proof of payment upon delivery of the
books. This did not amount to unlawful taking, because by the
delivery of EDCA to Cruz, ownership of the books already
transferred to him.
99
BPI Family Bank v Franco
G.R. No. 123498, November 23, 2007
Facts:
Franco opened 3 accounts with BPI with the total amount of 2M,
where such was traceable to a check issued by Tevesteco. The
funding for the 2M check was part of the P80M debited by BPI
from FMIC’s account (w/ deposit of P100M) and credited to
Tevesteco’s account pursuant to an Authority to Debit which was
allegedly forged as claimed by FMIC. Tevesteco effected several
withdrawals already from its account amounting to
P37,455,410.54 including the P2M paid to Franco. Franco issued
two checks which were dishonored upon presentment for
payment due to garnishment of his account filed by BPI.
BPI claimed that it had a better right to the amounts which
consisted of part of the money allegedly withdrawn from it by
Tevesteco and ending up in Franco’s account. BPI urges us that
the legal consequence of FMIC’s forgery claim is that the money
transferred by BPI to Tevesteco is its own, and considering that it
was able to recover possession of the same when the money was
redeposited by Franco, it had the right to set up its ownership
thereon and freeze Franco’s accounts.
Issue: WON the bank has a better right to the deposits in
Franco’s account.
Held:
No. Significantly, while Article 559 permits an owner who has lost
or has been unlawfully deprived of a movable to recover the exact
same thing from the current possessor, BPI simply claims
ownership of the equivalent amount of money, i.e., the value
thereof, which it had mistakenly debitedfrom FMIC’s account and
credited to Tevesteco’s, and subsequently traced to Franco’s
account.
Money bears no earmarks of peculiar ownership, and this
characteristic is all the more manifest in the instant case which
involves money in a banking transaction gone awry. Its primary
function is to pass from hand to hand as a medium of exchange,
without other evidence of its title. Money, which had been passed
through various transactions in the general course of banking
business, even if of traceable origin, is no exception.
petitioners' property, has a potential direct access to Marcos
highway. Petitoners filed a complaint for an Easement Right of
Way and argue that it is unfair to require them to pay the value of
the affected road lots since the same is tantamount to buying the
property without them being issued titles and not having the right
to exercise dominion over it.
Issue: WON payment of indemnity in a right of way results to
alienation of subject lots.
Held: No. Payment of the value of the land for permanent use of
the easement does not mean an alienation of the land occupied.
Unlike in purchase of a property, should the right of way no longer
be necessary and the servient estate demands that the easement
be extinguished, the value of the property received by the
servient estate by way of indemnity shall be returned in full to the
dominant estate. This only reinforces the concept that the
payment of indemnity is merely for the use of the right of way and
not for its alienation.

-100
DEMETRIA DE GUZMAN v. FILINVEST DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 191710, 2015

Facts: Petitioners were co-owners of a parcel of land which is

enclosed and surrounded by other real properties belonging to
various owners. One of its adjoining properties is owned and
developed by respondent Filinvest(respondent) which, from


101
Reyes vs. Spouses Ramos
February 11, 2015 G.R. No. 194488
FACTS:
Reyes filed a Complaint for easement of right of way against
Spouses Ramos alleging that she was the registered owner of a
parcel of land Bulacan, and that the property used to be a portion
of Lot No. 3-B8 and was surrounded by estates belonging to
other persons.Petitioner also alleged that respondents' 1,500-
square-meter property surrounded her property, and that it was
the only adequate outlet from her property to the highway. A 113-
square-meter portion of respondents' property was also the "point
least prejudicial to the respondents. The easement sought was
the vacant portion near the boundary of respondents' other lot.
Petitioner insisted that her property was not isolated because of
her own acts.
ISSUE:whether petitioner has the compulsory easement of right
of way over respondents' property
DECISION:
NO. ART. 650 provides that: The easement of right of way shall
be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate,
and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from
the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.
Based on the Ocular Inspection Report, petitioner's property had
another outlet to the highway. Furthermore, the convenience of
the dominant estate's owner is not the basis for granting an
easement of right of way, especially if the owner's needs may be
satisfied without imposing the easement.
102. FAJARDO VS FREEDOM TO BUILD
Facts: Freedom To Build, Inc., an owner-developer and seller of
low-cost housing sold to petitioner-spouses a house and lot and
in the contract to sell, there contained a Restrictive Covenant
providing for some prohibitions regarding the expansion to the
house which the owners would like to do with their house. The
controversy arose when the petitioner-spouses extended the roof
of their house to a point directly above the original front wall
wherein respondent filed an action to demolish the unauthorized
structures.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the Restrictive Covenant is valid
(2) Whether or not the structures built by the petitionerspouses
are legal and valid.
RULING:
1. Yes. In a low cost socialized housing, owners developers are
constrained to build as many number of houses on a limited land
area to accommodate marginalized lot buyers, providing as much
as possible the safety, aesthetic and decent living condition by
controlling overcrowding. There appears to be no cogent reasons
for not upholding restrictive covenants aimed to promote
aesthetics, health, and privacy or to prevent overcrowding.
2. Since extension constructed exceeds the floor area limits of the
Restrictive Covenant, petitioner-spouses can be required to
demolish the structure to the extent that it exceeds the prescribed
floor area limits for as Article 1168 of the New Civil Code provides
that “when the obligation consists in not doing and the obligor
does what has been forbidden him, it shall be undone at his
expense”.
103. Abellana v. CA, G.R. No. 97039, Apr. 24, 1992
Facts: The petitioners sued to establish an easement of right of
way over a subdivision road which used to be a mere footpath
they and their ancestors had been using since time immemorial,
and that, hence, they had acquired, through prescription, an

easement of right of way therein. The construction of a wall by the
respondents around the subdivision deprived the petitioners of
the use of the subdivision road, which gives the subdivision
residents access to the public highway. They asked that the high
concrete walls enclosing the subdivision and cutting off their
access to the subdivision road be removed and that the road be
opened to them.
Issue: Whether or not the use of a footpath is a continuous
easement.
Held: The use of a footpath or road may be apparent but it is not
a continuous easement because its use is at intervals and
depends upon the acts of man. It can be exercised only if man
passes or puts his feet over somebody else’s land.
104. Bicol Agro-Ind vs Obias G.R. No. 172077 Oct. 09, 2009
Facts:
Bicol Sugar Development Corporation (BISUDECO) constructed
a “disputed” road and the road was used by BISUDECO in
hauling and transporting sugarcane to and from its mill site.
Respondents barricaded the disputed road and thus preventing
the petitioner’s vehicles from passing through. Petitioner alleged
that BISUDECO constructed the road pursuant to an agreement
with the owners of the ricefields that the road traversed. Petitioner
contends that BISUDECO acquired a right of way over the
properties of the landowners, which right of way in turn was
acquired by the petitioner when it bought BISUDECO’s assets.
Held:
In order for the petitioner to acquire the disputed road as an
easement of right-of-way, it is incumbent upon them to show its
right by title or by an agreement with the owners of the land that
said land traversed.
105. QUINTANILLA V. ABANGAN G.R. No. 160613
February 12, 2008
FACTS:
A complaint for Easement of Right of Way was filed by
petitioner. This was dismissed by the trial court for failing to
establish that the imposition of the right of way was the least
prejudicial to the servient estate. The RTC noted that there is
already a concrete fence around the area. Thus, substantial
damage and substantial reduction in area would be caused the
servient estate.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner has the right of way against
respondents
RULING:
NO. Petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving the
existence and concurrence of all the requisites in order to validly
claim a compulsory right of way against respondents.
To a legal easement of right of way, the following
requisites must be satisfied: (1) the dominant estate is
surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway; (2) proper indemnity has been paid; (3) the
isolation was not due to acts of the proprietor of the dominant
estate; and (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate. The fourth requisite is absent.
The Court is in full accord with the ruling of the CA.
106. QUIMEN V. CA- Easement
FACTS:
A portion of the lots behind Anastacia’s were sold by her (as her
brother’s administrator) brother to Yolanda who constructed a
house thereon despite having no access to the public road.

Yolanda was assured that Anastacia would give her a right of way
on her adjoining property for p200 per square meter.
Anastacia barred her from passing through her property.
Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of
way through Anastacia’s property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the valid grant of an easement and the right of
way proposed by Yolanda is the least onerous/least prejudicial to
the parties
HELD: YES
The conditions for a valid grant of an easement of right of way
were clearly present. The evidence clearly shows that the
property of private respondent is hemmed in by the estates of
other persons including that of petitioner; that she offered to pay
P200.00 per square meter for her right of way as agreed between
her and petitioner; that she did not cause the isolation of her
property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to the
servient estate.
107. Unisource Commercial and Development Corporation v.
Chung et,al.
GR. No. 173252 July 17, 2009
Facts:
A memorandum of encumbrance of a voluntary easement
entered in favor of Hidalgo was annotated at the back of the OCT
of Sandico. Sandico sold his land to herein petitioner carrying
over the encumbrance on the Transfer Certificate Title. Hidalgo
also sold his land to herein respondents Chung. The petitioner
then filed a petition to cancel the Encumbrance contending that
the easement is not necessary on the ground that the dominant
estate now has an adequate access to a public road.
Issue: Whether or not the Memorandum of Encumbrance can be
cancelled?
Held: No, the opening of an adequate access to a public road
extinguishes only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary
easements. This easement of right of way, like any other contract,
could be extinguished only by mutual agreement or by
renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate. (Art. 631, NCC)
108. Linda Rana vs Teresita Lee Wong, Sps. Ong, and Sps.
Uy June 30, 2014 G.R. No. 192861
Facts:
Wong, et al availed of the remedy of judicial abatement of
damages against Sps. Rana, claiming that the elevated and
cemented subject portion of the latter’s property affected their
usual manner of ingress and egress, and that the subject
backfilling may cause sudden collapse of land, and thus should
be declared “nuisances” which curtailed their use and enjoyment
of their properties.
Issues:
WON the cemented subject portion and subject backfilling
constituted a nuisance per se and thus should be abated
Ruling:
No, the subject portions are not nuisances per se. It is not
injurious to the health or comfort of the community, as defined
under Art. 694 of the Civil Code. It was primarily built to facilitate
the ingress and egress of Sps. Rana. But for introducing a
nuisance per accidens that particularly transgressed the aforesaid
rights, Sps. Rana should be liable for nominal damages.
109. AQUINO v MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY, AKLAN

FACTS: The Municipal Mayor of Aklan issued EO 10 to close and
demolish the Boracay West Cove Hotel for the reason that the
construction violates the “no-build zone” of the Municipal
Ordinance which prohibits constructions 25 meters from the edge
of the mean high water mark.
ISSUE: WON the property is a nuisance per se
HELD: No. The Court ruled that the property involved cannot be
classified as a nuisance per se which can therefore be summarily
abated. It is merely the hotel’s particular incident- its location-
because it was constructed in a no build zone and not its inherent
qualities that rendered it a nuisance. However, the hotel is still a
nuisance per accidens. Hence, the LGU may nevertheless
properly order the hotel’s demolition in the exercise of its
police power and the general welfare clause.
110. BUSTAMANTE VS TELMO
Facts:
A complaint was filed by Bustamante against Telmo, whose land
encroached upon former’s lot. Subsequently, Bustamante put up
concrete poles on his lot. However, Telmos and their men
allegedly destroyed the concrete poles.
ISSUE: WON the concrete poles were nuisance per se
Held:
NO. A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety
of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity. Evidently, the concrete posts
summarily removed by Telmo did not at all pose a hazard to the
safety of persons and properties, which would have necessitated
immediate and summary abatement.
Telmo is found administratively guilty of discourtesy in the course
of official duties.
111. EMILIO GANCAYCO VS CITY GOVERNMENT OF
QUEZON CITY AND MMDA
FACTS:
Justice Gancayco sought to be exempted from the ordinance
requiring that the arcade is to be created by constructing the wall
of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from
the property line. Decades later, MMDA conducted operations to
clear obstructions along EDSA, in consequence, they sent a
notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of
his building violated the National Building Code.
ISSUE: WON MMDA can legally demolish the property of Justice
Gancayco.
HELD:
NO. MMDA has illegally demolished the property of Justice
Gancayco.
The authority to order the demolition of any structure lies with the
Building Official. The penalty prescribed by the Ordinance itself
does not include the demolition of illegally constructed buildings
in case of violations. Instead, it merely prescribes a punishment.
The ordinance itself also clearly states that it is the regular courts
that will determine whether there was a violation of the ordinance.
112. PEREZ V. MADRONA G.R. No. 184478 March 21, 2012
FACTS: Respondent-spouses built a house which encroached on
the sidewalk and that is in violation of PD 1096 of the National
Building Code and RA 917 on Illegally occupied/constructed
improvements within the road right-of-way. Petitioner sent a letter,

giving respondents ten days from receipt thereof to remove the
structure allegedly protruding to the sidewalk and showing that
the respondents’ fence is a nuisance per se.
ISSUE: W/N respondents structure is a nuisance per se
HELD: No. The structure is not a nuisance per se that presents
immediate danger to the communitys welfare. If petitioner
believes that respondents fence indeed encroaches on the
sidewalk, it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that
purpose. Not being a nuisance per se, but at most a nuisance per
accidens, its summary abatement without judicial intervention is
unwarranted.
113. CHARLES BUMAGAT, et al. v. REGALADO ARRIBAY
G.R. No. 194818, 9 June 2014
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry against
Arribay alleging that with the aid of armed goons and through the
use of intimidation and threats of physical harm, the latter entered
the former’s parcels of land and ousted them from their lawful
possession. Arribay sought for the dismissal of the complaint,
claiming that the subject properties are agricultural lands – which
renders the dispute an agrarian matter and subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB).
ISSUE: Is the dispute within the jurisdiction of DARAB?
RULING: No. The CA failed to realize the fact that as between the
parties, there is no tenurial arrangement, not even an implied
one. For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there
must exist a tenancy relation between the parties.
114
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Secretary of
Agriculture
-versus-
Federico Daclan, et al.
G.R. No. 197115 23 March 2015
Republic of the Philippines-versus- Federico Daclan, et al.
G.R. No. 197115, 23 March 2015
(Donation with conditions)
FACTS:
In 1972, the respondents donated land in La Union to the
government to establish the Agoo Breeding Station. Subject to
the a condition that in case of non-use, abandonment or
cessation of the activities of the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI),
possession or ownership shall automatically revert to the donor,
including all permanent improvements. After the donation, the La
Union Medical Center was constructed on 1.5-hectare portion of
the donated property. In 2003, the respondents demanded the
return of their donated lands on the ground that the breeding
station has ceased operations and the land has been abandoned.
ISSUE: Whether the property can be reverted to the
respondents-donors.
HELD:
No. The preponderance of evidence points that the
breeding station remained operational even after its transfer from
the Republic to the Province. The court cannot validly order the
return the donated 1.5-hectare portion where the LUMC is
situated to the respondent because they admitted that the 1.5-
hectare portion where the LUMC is constructed does not form

part of the lands they donated to the government, but mandatory according to Article 748 and non compliance results in
belonged other donors who are not parties to the instant case. a void donation.

116. REPUBLIC VS GUZMAN GR No. 132964, Feb. 18, 2000

– 115
Esperanza C. Carinan vs Spouses Gavino Cueto and FACTS: David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is
Carmelita Cueto the son of the spouses Simeon Guzman (naturalized American)
GR No. 198636 and Helen Meyers Guzman (American citizen). In 1968, Simeon
October 8, 2014 died leaving to his heirs, Helen and David, an estate consisting of
Facts: several parcels of land in Bulacan.
Respondent Spouses Cueto alleged that In 1970, Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
the petitioner and her husband acquired the rights to a parcel of Settlement of the Estate, dividing and adjudicating to themselves
land under the name of the GSIS and were to assume payment of all of the property, and registered it to the Register of Deeds a
the monthly amortizations. Respondent paid the total obligation to year after.
GSIS along with the payment for transfer and renovation of the
residential house since Petitioner, who was widowed by then, In 1981, Helen executed a Deed of Quitclaim, assigning,
could not pay the amortizations. The petitioner and Jazer, the transferring and conveying her ½ share of the properties to David.
petitioner’s son, executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with the But since it was not registered, she executed another Deed of
condition to buy the land back within three years. The petitioner Quitclaim to confirm the first.
surrendered the TCT to the respondents. In 1994, Atty. Batongbacal wrote the Office of the Solicitor
Respondents demanded from the petitioner to fulfill the transfer General and furnished it with documents showing that David’s
of the property but they did not comply. Petitioner countered ownership of ½ of the estate was defective. He argued that Art.
saying that it was donation and there was no written or oral XII of the Constitution only allows Filipinos to acquire private
agreement for transfer or repayment. lands in the country. The only instances when a foreigner may
Issue: acquire private property are by hereditary succession and if he
was formerly a natural-born citizen who lost his Filipino
Whether or not the agreement was a contract of loan or donation. citizenship. Moreover, it contends that the Deeds of Quitclaim
Ruling: executed by Helen were really donations inter vivos.

The SC ruled that the purely gratuitous act was not supported by Republic filed with RTC a Petition for Escheat praying that ½ of
records citing the Civil Code that any donation over Php500 shall David’s interest be forfeited in its favor. RTC dismissed. CA
be in writing otherwise it is void. The formal requirements are affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a donation inter vivos.


Mine: whether or not there was repudiation in the case at bar.
HELD: No. Not all the elements of a donation are present. The
transfer of the properties by virtue of a Deed of Quitclaim resulted
in the (1) reduction of Helen’s patrimony as donor and the (2)
consequent increase in the patrimony of David as donee.
However, Helen’s (3) intention to perform an act of liberality in
favor of David was not sufficiently established. The 2 Quitclaims
reveal that Helen intended to convey to her son certain parcels of
land and to re-affirm it, she executed a waiver and renunciation of
her rights over these properties. It is clear that Helen merely
contemplated a waiver of her rights, title, interest over the lands in
favor of David, not a donation. She was also aware that donation
was not possible.
Moreover, the essential element of acceptance in the proper form
and registration to make the donation valid is lacking. The SPA
executed by David in favor of Atty. Abela was not his acceptance,
but an acknowledgment that David owns the property referred to
and that he authorizes Atty. Abela to sell the same in his name.
Further, there was nothing in the SPA to show that he indeed
accept the donation.
There is NO valid repudiation of inheritance as Helen had already
accepted her share of the inheritance when she, together with
David, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate,
dividing and adjudicating between them all the properties. By
virtue of that settlement, the properties were registered in their
names and for 11 years, they possessed the land in the concept
of owner. Thus, the 2 Quitclaims have no legal force and effect.
Helen still owns ½ of the property.
117
Villanueva vs Branoco
FACTS: Branoco claimed ownership over a property through
purchase from Rodriguez, who had acquired the said property
from Rodrigo by way of donation. Rodrigo subsequently sold the
same property to Vere.
ISSUE: WON the contract of donation of Rodriguez and Rodrigo
was effectively cancelled when Rodrigo sold the property to Vere.
HELD: No. When the donor used the words that the gift "does not
pass title during my lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true
owner of the two aforementioned parcels"] the donor meant
nothing else than that she reserved of herself the possession and
usufruct of said two parcels of land until her death, at which time
the donee would be able to dispose of them freely.
118
Central Philippines University vs C.A.
Facts:
• In 1939, late Don Ramon Lopez. Sr. executed a deed of
donations in favor of Central Philippines University (CPU)
of a parcel of land with the following conditions:
• The land shall be exclusively use for the establishment of
and use of a medical college.
• CPU shall not sell, transfer or convey to any third party or
any way the land.
• The said land shall be called “Ramon Lopez Campus”
• However in 1989, the respondents who are heirs of Don
Ramon filed an action for annulment of donation, re-
conveyance and damages against CPU alleging that since
1939 has not complied with the conditions of the donation

and that the University negotiate with National House
Authority (NHA) to exchange the donated land with
another land.
ISSUE:
Whether or not all the rights of the done are deemed lost
and extinguished because of the non-fulfillment of the conditions?
SUPREME COURT RULING:
• Supreme Court finds that since the records are clear and
facts are undisputed that since the execution of the deed
of donation until filing of instant action, petitioner has failed
to comply with its obligation as done. CPU has slept its
obligation for unreasonable length of time so it is only just
and equitable to declare the donation ineffective.
• Supreme Court declared that the conditions set forth in the
donation were resolutory conditions which mean the
fulfillment of the conditions extinguishes the obligation.
Ø Under Art. 1181 of the Civil Code, in conditional
obligations, the acquisition of rights, as well as
extiguishment or loss of those already acquired shall
depend upon happening of the event which
constitutes the condition. Thus, when a person donated
a land to another on the condition that the order would
build on the land a school. The condition imposed was
not a condition precedent or suspensive condition but
a resolutory condition.
Ø When obligations does not fix a period from its nature and
circumstances it can be inferred that the period was
intended, the general rule provided in Art. 1197 of the Civil
Code applies, which provides that the court may fix the
durations thereof because the fulfillment of the
obligations itself cannot be demanded until the court
has fixed the period for compliance therewith and
such period has arrived.
Ø However, this general rule cannot be applied in this case.
More than a reasonable period of 50 years has been
allowed for petitioner to avail of the opportunity to comply
with the obligations
Ø Art. 1191 of Civil Code, when one of the obligators
cannot comply with what is incumbent upon him, the
oblige may seek rescission and the court shall decree
the same unless there is just cause authorizing the
fixing of the period
– 119
THE INSULAR LIFE v. EBRADO and PASCUALA VDA. DE
EBRADO
G.R. No. L-44059, October 28, 1977
(insurance proceeds; common law wife)
Facts:
Cristor Ebrado was issued by The Life Assurance Co., Ltd., a
policy with a rider for Accidental Death. He designated Carponia
T. Ebrado as the revocable beneficiary in his policy. He referred
to her as his wife. Cristor was killed by a failing branch of a tree.
Insular Life was made liable to pay the coverage. Carponia T.
Ebrado, who was found to be a common law wife, filed with the
insurer a claim for the proceeds. Pascuala Vda. de Ebrado also
filed her claim as the widow of the deceased insured and asserts
that she is the one entitled to the proceeds. The lower court
declared Carponia as disqualified.
Issue:
WON a common-law wife named as beneficiary in the life
insurance policy of a legally married man can claim the proceeds.
Held:
No. When not provided for by the Insurance Law, the contract of
life insurance is governed by the general rules of the civil law
regulating contracts. Article 2012 of the same Code, any person
who is forbidden from receiving any donation under Article 739
cannot be named beneficiary of a life insurance policy by the
person who cannot make a donation to him. Common-law
spouses are barred from receiving donations from each other
– 120
WON automatic reversion of the land to the donor is a valid
condition in a deed of donation
HELD:
YES. Such stipulation, not being contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy, is valid and binding on the
parties to the donation. When a deed of donation, expressly
provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the property
donated, the rules on contract should apply, and not Article 764 of
the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes the
parties to a contract to establish such stipulations, . . . not
contrary to law, . . . public order or public policy, we are of the
opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties
providing for automatic revocation of the deed of donation,
without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid.

ZAMBOANGA V PLAGATA
G.R. No. 148433
September 30, 2008
FACTS:
ZBTKBI entered into a Deed of Donation whereby it donated to
the Republic a parcel of land with a condition that in the event
barter trading shall be phased out, prohibited, or suspended for
more than one (1) year in Zamboanga City, Philippines, the
parcel of land shall revert back to the DONOR without need of
any further formality or documentation.
On 17 June 1988, the Office of the President issued
Memorandum Circular No. 1 which totally phased out the
Zamboanga City barter trade area.
ISSUE:


121. QUIJADA VS. CA,
G.R. NO. 126444, DEC. 4, 1998
(donation with a condition; sale of donated property)
Facts: Trinidad Quijada, together with her siblings executed a
Conditional Deed of Donation in favor of the municipality of
Talacagon, the condition is being that the land shall be used
exclusively for the construction of a provincial high school.
Trinidad remained in possession of the Land. Thenafter, Trinidad
sold the land to Mondejar. The heirs to Trinidad (herein
Petitioners) filed a complaint for forcible entry against the
respondents. The proposed campus did not materialized and the
Sangguniang Bayan enacted a resolution donating back the land
to the donor. In the meantime, Mondejar conveyed portions of the
land to complaint for quieting of the title recovery of possession
and ownership of the land.
Issue: W/N the sale between Trinidad and Mondejar is valid.
Held: No. The Donor may have an inchoate interest in the
donated property during the time that ownership of the land has
not reverted to her. Such inchoate interest maybe the subject of
contracts including a contract of sale. In this case, what the donor
sold was the land itself which she no longer owns. It would have
been different if the donor-seller sold her interest over the
property under the deed of donation which is subject to the
possibility of reversion of ownership arising from the non-
fulfillment of the resolutory condition.
CASE #122
Metropolitan Fabrics Inc. and Enrique Ang vs. Prosperity
Credit Resources Inc., Domingo Ang and Caleb Ang
G.R. 154390. 17 March 2014
TOPIC: Action to Assail Mortgage
FACTS: 'In July 1984, MFI obtained a loan from PCRI in the
amount of P3.5M, represented by herein respondents Domingo
and Caleb Ang. The blank loan forms had no entries specifying
the rate of interest and schedules of amortization. Petitioner
Enrique and Vicky Ang, entrusted to the respondents their seven
(7) titles to secure the P3.5M loan. In September 1984, It was
then that the petitioners learned that PCRI had filled up the said
checks with dates and amounts reflected at 35% interest rate per
annum, instead of just 24%, and a two-year repayment period,
instead of 10 years.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action to assail the mortgage already
prescribed.
HELD:
YES. Here, it is important to first determine if the
mortgage was void or merely voidable. Where consent was
given through fraud alone, the contract was voidable, not void ab
initio. Article 1390, in relation to Article 1391 of the Civil Code,
provides that if the consent of the parties was obtained
through fraud, the contract is considered voidable and may
be annulled within four (4) years from the time of the
discovery thereof. Thus, because the mortgage involving the
seven lots was registered on September 5, 1984, they had until

September 5, 1988. But their complaint was instituted in the RTC
on October 10, 1991. Hence, the action had already prescribed.
123
Rural Bank of Cabadbaran v Melecio-Yap [GR 178451]
FACTS:
Erna Melecio-Yap and her 5 siblings inherited a lot from their
parents. Said lot had been a subject of a real estate mortgage
following a loan procured from petitioner RBCI, as authorized by
a notarized SPA purportedly executed by Erna’s parents. Upon
default in payment, the lot was sold to RBCI as the highest bidder
in the public auction sale. Respondents claimed that they were
not aware of the loan obtained by Erna and did not authorize the
mortgage transaction, and that the SPA bore their falsified
signatures. RBCI claims to be a mortgagee in good faith.
ISSUE:
W/N the subject property was validly mortgaged and foreclosed
W/N RBCI was a mortgagee in good faith
HELD: No on both issues. The forged SPA is sufficient grounds to
render the mortgage null and void, insofar as the shares of the
other co-owners, whose consent thereto were not actually
obtained, are concerned. Thus, RBCI may validly own, by virtue
of the foreclosure proceedings, only that portion of the property
belonging to Erna.
The RBCI cannot be considered a mortgagee in good faith since
(1) such doctrine applies only to lands registered under the
Torrens system and not to unregistered lands, such as the
property in the suit; and (2) the principle is inapplicable to banking
institutions who are called upon to exercise greater care and
prudence before entering into a contract of mortgage.
124
SPOUSES FRANCISCO SIERRA vs.
PAIC SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, INC
G.R. No. 197857 September 10, 2014
FACTS:
Goldstar Conglomerates, Inc. (GCI), obtained a loan from Summa
Bank, now respondent Paic Savings and Mortgage Bank, Inc.
(PSMB). As security therefor, GCI executed in favor of PSMB six
(6) promissory notes and a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. As
additional security, petitioners Sierra mortgaged four (4) parcels
of land in Antipolo. GCI defaulted in the payment of its loan to
PSMB. The properties were foreclosed and new TCT were issued
to PSMB since petitioners failed to redeem the subject properties
within the redemption period.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ARE MERE
ACCOMODATION MORTGAGORS
HELD: Yes. An accommodation mortgagor is a third person who
is not a debtor to a principal obligation but merely secures it by
mortgaging his or her own property. Petitioners’ claim of lack of
"proper instruction on the intricacies in securing [the] loan from
the bank" is belied by the fact that petitioners Francisco and
Rosario Sierra had previously mortgaged two (2) of the subject
properties twice to the Rural Bank of Antipolo. Moreover,
petitioners did not: (a) demand for any loan document containing
the details of the transaction, and (b) offer to pay the purported
partial loan proceeds they received at any time.

125
Shang Proper,es v. St. Francis Development Corpora,on GR
No. 190706; July 21, 2014
FACTS: Respondent, a domestic corporation, engaged in real
estate business, used the mark “ST. FRANCIS” to identify its
numerous property development projects, such as a shopping
mall called the “St. Francis Square,” and a mixed-use realty
project plan that includes the St. Francis Towers. The respondent
claimed that petioners could not have the mark “THE ST.
FRANCIS TOWERS” registered in their names, and that
petioners’ use of the marks “THE ST. FRANCIS TOWERS” and
“THE ST. FRANCIS SHANGRI-LA PLACE” in their own real
estate development projects constitutes unfair competion as well
as false or fraudulent declaration.
ISSUE:
WON petioners are guilty of unfair competition in using the marks
“THE ST. FRANCIS TOWERS” and “THE ST. FRANCIS
SHANGRI-LA PLACE.”
RULING:
NO. The unfair competion concept refers to a "Passing off" where
the defendant gives his goods the general appearance of the
goods of his competitor with the intention of deceiving the public
that the goods are those of his competitor.” The The test is
whether the acts of the defendant have the intent of deceiving" .
The Court finds the element of fraud to be wanting; hence, there
can be no unfair competion.
126
WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION VS. JESICHRIS
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
(G.R. No. 195549, September 3, 2014)
Facts:
Jesichris Manufacturing Company filed this present complaint for
damages for unfair competition to enjoin Willaware Products
Corporation the petitioner from manufacturing and distributing
plastic-made automotive parts similar to Jesichris Manufacturing
Company. The respondent alleged that it is a duly registered
partnership engaged in the manufacture and distribution of plastic
and metal products. Since its registration in 1992, respondent
company has been manufacturing in its Caloocan plant and
distributing throughout the Philippines plastic-made automotive
parts while petitioner corporation which is engaged in the
manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic
and metal has its office near that of the Respondent company.
Respondent further alleged that due to the physical proximity of
petitioner’s office to respondent’s office, and in view of the fact
that some of the respondent’s employees had transferred to
petitioner, petitioner had developed familiarity with respondent’s
products, especially its plastic-made automotive parts.
Issue:
1. W/N there is unfair competition under human relations when
the parties are not competitors and there is actually no damage
on the part of Jesichris?

Held:
(1)Yes, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Art, 28 of
the CC. From the foregoing, it is clear that what is being sought to
be prevented is not competition per se but the use of unjust,
oppressive or high handed methods which may deprive others of
a fair chance to engage in business or to earn a living.
Plainly,what the law prohibits is unfair competition and not
competition where the means use dare fair and legitimate.
To add, the instant case falls under Article 28 of the Civil Code on
human relations and not unfair competition under Republic Act
No. 8293, as the present suit is a damage suit and the products
are not covered by patent registration. If the products are covered
under said patent registration, such patent may be considered as
an intellectual property right. A fortiori, the existence of patent
registration is immaterial in the present case.
127 G.R. No. 195956, 1 March 2015
FACTS
A criminal complaint was filed by ABS-CBN against GMA for
violating Sections 177 and 211 of the Intellectual Property Code,
as amended by RA 8293. This was because respondent GMA
aired footage of the arrival and homecoming of Angelo Dela Cruz
from Iraq at NAIA without the consent of the petitioner. The
petitioner claimed that there was an agreement between them
and Reuters in exchange of the latter’s news and video material.
Additionally, Reuters ensured the petitioner the latter’s materials
cannot be aired in the country. GMA was a subscriber of Reuter’s
and CNN live feeds. After having received the live feed of Angelo
Dela Cruz’s arrival and homecoming, it immediately aired the
video from that news feed. However, the respondent not only
alleged its news staff was not aware of the agreement between
ABS-CBN and Reuters but also its staff had no knowledge that it
aired petitioner’s footage. On the 3rd of December 2004, the
Assistant City Prosecutor found probable cause to indict the staff
of GMA namely, Dela Pena and Manalastas. Consequently, the
respondents appealed the Prosecutor’s resolution before the
DOJ, and the latter ruled in favor of the respondents and held that
good faith may be raised as a defense in the case. Meanwhile,
DOJ Acting Secretary Alberto C. Agra issued a resolution which
reversed Sec. Gonzales’s resolution and found probable cause to
charge Dela Pena, Manalastas, as well to indict Gozon, Duavit
Jr., Flores, and Soho. Subsequently, Court of Appeals granted
the Petition for Certiorari to reverse and set aside the resolution
of the Acting DOJ and granted the issuance of temporary
restraining order and/or Writ Preliminary Injuction.
ISSUE
Whether or not there is probable cause to find respondents to be
held liable criminally for the case of copyright infringement under
the Intellectual Property Law (RA 8293, as amended)?
HELD
The petition of ABS-CBN was partially granted by the Supreme
Court. An order was directed to the Q.C. Branch 93 to continue
the proceedings against the staff of GMA, Dela Pena and
Manalastas due to copyright infringement. The other
respondents, Gozon, Duavit Jr., Flores, and Soho were held not
liable for the criminally; act of copyright infringement. It was held
that their membership in GMA’S Board of Directors doesn’t mean
that they have knowledge, approval, or participation in the
criminal act, as there is a need for the direct or active participation
in such act. Also, there was lack of proof they actively participated
or exercised moral ascendancy over Dela Pena and Manalastas.

The Court held that the respondent’s mere act of rebroadcast of
petitioner’s news footage without the latter’s authority creates
probable cause to find the former’s personnel criminally liable for
violating the provisions of Intellectual Property Code, particularly
Section 216-217 of RA 8293, as amended, since both have not
exercised diligence in their function to prevent that the footage
from being aired on television. They were aware there would be
consequences in carrying ABS-CBN footage in their broadcast.
-128
Taiwan Kolin vs Kolin Electronics
GR 209843 March 25, 2015
Facts:
Taiwan Kolin Corp. sought to register the trademark “KOLIN” in
Class 9 goods. Kolin Electronics opposed the application on the
ground that the trademark “KOLIN” is identical, if not confusingly
similar, with its registered trademark “KOLIN”. The latter argeud
that the products are not only closely-related because they fall
under the same classification, but also because they are
inherently similar for being electronic products and are plugged
into electronic sockets and perform a useful function.
Issue:
W/N the products are closely related
Held:
No. To confer exclusive use of a trademark, emphasis should be
on the similarity or relatedness of the goods and/or services
involved and not on the arbitrary classification or general
description of their properties or characteristics.
Products classified under Class 9 can be further classified into 5
categories. Accordingly, the goods covered by the competing
marks between Taiwan Kolin and Kolin Electronics fall under
different categories. Taiwan Kolin’s goods are categorized as
audio visual equipments, while Kolin Electronics’ goods fall under
devices for controlling the distribution and use of electricity. Thus,
it is erroneous to assume that all electronic products are closely

related and that the coverage of one electronic product
necessarily precludes the registration of a similar mark over
another.