Whilst debates concerning the ethics of humanitarian intervention have been the topic of significant

academic discussion over the past two decades, the 2011 intervention in Libya and non-intervention in
regard to Syria have arguably generated new intrigue into the morality of international decision-making
and the challenge of saving strangers. In response, this book provides a novel approach to addressing
the central ethical dilemmas surrounding humanitarian intervention by providing two separate and
contrasting views on the case for and against humanitarian intervention.

One of the key theoretical concepts that have played a role in the advancement of humanitarian
intervention is what is known as the ‘Equivalence Thesis’, by Tesón. The idea is based on the justification
that the just cause for humanitarian intervention is exactly the same as the just cause argued for
revolution, where both are subject to principles of proportionality. Hence, similar to revolutions,
humanitarian interventions require no higher permissibility, as the occurrence takes place to promote
and implement improvements, theoretically. At the same time, Van der Vossen points out ex-ante
theories, which follow that whether humanitarian intervention is legitimate cannot be judged on the
basis of the assumption of positive outcome derivable; the variable facts at time of the intervention
must also be considered